UC Berkeley

Why do states choose different military technology procurement strategies when attempting to develop their security capacity? In this dissertation I examine under what conditions middle-power states choose to develop capabilities indigenously, purchase from allies, or pursue “middle ground” strategies like production under license. How states choose to acquire capabilities, as well as what they choose to develop indigenously, sends important signals about the structure of domestic politics as well as decisionmaker perceptions of the alliance. I address these questions through a close case study of Japanese procurement strategies for key defense technologies acquired since the end of the Second War. Japanese military acquisition is constrained in ways no other middle powers face. Despite this, there is significant variation in how Japanese policymakers seek to procure defense technologies. Drawing on archival research, direct observation, and interviews, I discuss the process of negotiating acquisitions trajectories in cases including Japanese information-gathering satellites, the Patriot missile program, maritime patrol aircraft, and radar. I compare my findings in these cases to patterns in South Korea and Taiwan.

Two key takeaways emerge from this analysis. First, I argue that defense technology acquisition patterns reflect domestic political balancing between state and business actors. When government and business interests align, acquisition patterns are consistent over time. Second, I argue that in cases where Japanese business and government interests diverge, policymakers tend to opt for production under license as a procurement strategy. I claim that this is because a divergence in business and state interest in domestic production tends to be based on what I term the “justifiability” of capabilities.

Decisionmakers are concerned about their image, especially in democracies. Government actors want to be perceived as both effective and legitimate. When indigenous development of a capability is seen as “difficult to justify” because it is seen as ineffective or illegitimate, government actors are unlikely to support domestic development in the short term. However, “justifiability” is based on public understanding of the legitimacy of technology and is therefore mutable. For this reason, where Japanese business and government interests diverge due to concerns regarding whether indigenization of the capability can be justified, production under license is a likely procurement strategy. This approach offers a middle ground for businesses and government in which businesses are granted some, but not all, benefits of domestic production. This allows an implicit promise to businesses that when capabilities become “justifiable” domestic production will be sought. In cases where public understanding of capabilities changes over time, the shift is made to indigenize. When justifiability stays constant, so too does licensed production.