UC San Diego

How do political institutions affect violent conflict in divided societies? I argue that where identity-group divisions are highly politically salient, the extent to which marginalized groups are included in key government institutions affects individuals' motives for turning to violence. Integrating government from the "bottom-up," i.e. via the rank-and-file of institutions responsible for implementing policies and enforcing laws, addresses incentives for fighting.

I test this theory of bottom-up integration in the context of one critical policy-implementing institution, the police, and in two divided societies, Iraq and Israel. Using a combination original survey data, new data on police officer demographics, interviews, and a priming experiment, I show that individuals who perceive the police as integrated are less willing to consider using violence against the government. I demonstrate that police integration reduces grievances over current conditions, including biases in police service provision and exclusion from desirable employment, as well of fears of future mistreatment by the police and government.

One of the key arguments is that institutional inclusiveness comes in many forms, and different configurations of inclusiveness predict different outcomes. For example, I demonstrate that integration, in which police officers from all groups work side by side to serve citizens from all groups, dramatically reduces fears of future repression among vulnerable minorities. On the other hand, local-level autonomy, in which citizens are policed by members of their own group, has no such effect. I suggest that the difference lies in the mechanisms integration provides to marginalized groups to impose costs on the state or the dominant group in the future. More generally, institutional inclusiveness matters not as an end unto itself but as a means for balancing power and affecting governance.

This dissertation speaks to the importance of institutions tasked with interpreting, implementing, and enforcing government policies. Institutional solutions to conflict cannot be limited to institutions which select leaders or make laws; they must also consider institutions that enforce the laws. By addressing a critical link in the chain of governance, bottom-up integration confronts the root causes that motivate fighting along sectarian lines.