UC Irvine

This dissertation examines the history of US-China relations from 1784 to 1870 with attention to the intersection of commercial interests and diplomacy. Merchants constituted the largest and most significant group of Americans traveling to China in the nineteenth century, and the government’s interest in China remained commercially oriented throughout this period. As a result, the US federal government depended heavily on American commercial traders for intelligence about China as well as broader diplomatic issues. Traders had limited experiences and imperfect knowledge about China, but nevertheless, they informed political and diplomatic decisions made by the new nation halfway around the world. With the slow pace of transportation and communication between the United States and China, Americans in Guangzhou—and later, other Chinese ports opened to trade—were on their own. This compelled American merchants and consuls to cooperate with their commercial rivals and former colonial masters, the British, who had much greater experience in China. As a new nation, the United States had few resources to devote to promoting trade in China. US warships infrequently visited the China coast, and Congress allocated minimal funds to consulates and legations. Unlike Great Britain, the United States had little power to force China to negotiate a commercial treaty. Since the United States remained mostly neutral during the Opium Wars, Americans depended on British military power for commercial and diplomatic privileges in China. This was an uncomfortable but obvious truth for American merchants, diplomats, and naval officers.

By closely examining the specific experiences of US traders, their attitudes regarding China and the Chinese both in public and private writings, and the efforts of consuls and diplomats, this dissertation traces the genealogy of a commercially-oriented, local, and port-based knowledge about China. Although the US government took traders’ “expertise” into consideration and provided general instructions, ultimately, individual merchants and diplomats in China forged America’s China policy. Rooted in English language sources but also making use of some Chinese language documents, this study demonstrates how the restrictiveness of Qing regulations created a commercial focus in America’s China policy that lasted decades after the end of the Canton system.