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Essays on the Economics of Health Insurance Markets

Abstract

This dissertation includes three chapters on the health insurance markets established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), known as exchanges. Chapter 1 estimates the demand for each plan in the California exchange using a discrete choice model. The model incorporates heterogeneity in consumer preferences and in product characteristics, including hospital and primary care physician (PCP) networks. Endogeneity of prices is addressed using networking hospital costs as instruments, and prices for any given plan can vary across consumers within a market. Consumers are highly sensitive to prices, with market shares declining by 3%-5% for just a $1 increase in the premium. Demand also responds to hospital and PCP networks, but to a relatively small degree. Along the take-up margin, a $1 increase in premium subsidy increases take-up by 1.4%.

Chapter 2 uses a structural model of demand and supply to examine how two insurance market regulations--community rating and risk adjustment--affect prices and enrollment in the ACA exchange in California. Without risk adjustment, community rating in the ACA would lead to a significant reduction in enrollment in desirable plans and in take-up overall. Risk adjustment under the ACA roughly restores relative shares across plans to what they would be without community rating; however, the reduction in take-up is not restored. An alternative risk adjustment method can increase enrollment by 3.0% and would have little impact on government spending.

Chapter 3, written jointly with Isaac Menashe and Wesley Yin, examines the impact of information on insurance take-up in the ACA. We exploit experimental variation in the information mailed to 87,000 households in California's exchange to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. We find that a basic reminder of the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.4 pp (or 16 percent). Compared to the reminder alone, also reporting personalized subsidy benefits increases take-up among low-income individuals, but decreases take-up among higher-income individuals. This is despite reminder-only recipients eventually observing their subsidies before purchase. Finally, the letter interventions induced healthier individuals into the market, lowering aggregate spending risk by 5.9 percent, suggesting these interventions can improve both enrollment and average market risk.

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