UC Berkeley

This dissertation proposes a new framework for examining the problem of “trust” (xin) in China’s early empires, from the third century BCE to the third century CE. Much of the current scholarship on trust in early China focuses either on trust as one of the virtues or the problem of personal trust as an organizing principle of imperial institutions. My dissertation brings the ethical and the institutional discussions together. I show that the ethical problem of trust is much more complex than its meaning as a virtue and the institutional problem of trust goes beyond problems of personal trust and favoritism. The dissertation proposes two paradigms to understand debates about trust in early China: (1) the paradigm of the invisible seer; and (2) the paradigm of the visibly blind. In the first paradigm, rulers, courtiers, and thinkers argue that reliable, trustworthy institutions come about by positing the possibility of a view from nowhere, inhabited by the ruler, that surveils and measures all. In that position one is invisible, but nevertheless sees everything. In the second paradigm, it is incumbent upon the ruler or gentleman to be exposed and visible. He assumes that other people are looking at him as a guide for action, so he tries to make himself appear more legible and reliable. At the same time, he works to be blind to the faults and possible deceptions of others. He is visible to all, yet blind to others. These two paradigms concern the distribution of visibility in imperial life. The dissertation further argues that regardless of paradigm, “trust” was set against “luck” and “favor” (xing). Reliable institutions required the elimination of luck. Through an examination of debates about social status and social hierarchy, on the one hand, and amnesty and law, on the other, I show how this struggle against luck—the empire over luck—marked out the limits of both of the paradigms of trust examined in the dissertation.