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Violent Crime and Immigrant Revitalization and Influx in the South: Contending with a

Southern Culture of Violence and Exclusion

THESIS

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in Social Ecology

by

James Bernard Pratt, Jr.

Thesis Committee:

Associate Professor Geoff Ward, Chair

Professor Charis Kubrin

Professor Mona Lynch

2016

DEDICATION

To

my parents, Sheila, James, Theresa, and Eric, friends, and my little brothers, Joshua, Erick, and Jordan, who inspire me daily

and, to Kharee, Eric, and Autumn, you were here through it all

finally, to my committee, especially Geoff, whose patience has been invaluable

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Violent Crime and Immigrant Revitalization and Influx in the South: Contending with a
Southern Culture of Violence and Exclusion

By

James Bernard Pratt, Jr.

Master of Arts in Social Ecology

University of California, Irvine, 2016

Associate Professor Ward Irvine, Chair

Immigrant revitalization has been used to understand the crime reducing benefits of immigrant

concentration. Recently, the South, a region described as a one with a distinct appetite for

violence and the most violent region in America, has seen dramatic increases in the

concentration of immigrants. The Southern Culture of Violence (SCV) Thesis has been used as

an explanation for this distinctness. Using negative binomial regression with 1990 and 2000 data

from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) supplemented with Census data, I

examine the impact of immigrant concentration, the change in these concentration levels, and the

lagged impact of the former on violent crime rates in the South compared to regions outside of

the South. I also examine the effects of immigrant concentration in areas that have had low,

average, and high levels of immigration in 1990. I find that immigration has negative effects on

violent crime that vary in degree based on the region. I also find some evidence for a lagged

effect and stronger effects when focusing on communities with higher levels of immigrant

concentration, especially in the South. I discuss how the effect of revitalization may be weakened

due to the SCV and the level of receptiveness of immigrants along with other mediating factors. I

conclude by suggesting that future studies that more directly examine immigrant feelings of

reception, opportunity, and ultimately the cultural conditions in specific regions along with

additional studies that more deeply investigates the intersecting roles of immigration, race, crime, and inclusion.

Introduction

Despite public discourse suggesting that immigration contributes to increasing levels of violence, researchers find that immigrant concentration decreases violent crime rates (Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez, 2000; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010). The immigration effect is discussed as being a product of immigrant revitalization—when immigrants move to often disadvantaged areas and contribute to rebuilding, reinforcing, and recreating institutions (e.g., churches and community centers) while bringing energy, traditional morality, and entrepreneurship to an area, which assist in increasing informal social controls (Lyons, Vélez, & Santoro, 2014; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ramey, 2013; Vannotti & Bodenmann, 2003). Some analyses have attempted to explore the immigrant-crime relationship by examining the impact of immigrant concentration on specific destination cities including Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Lee & Martinez, 2002). These studies have emphasized place-related differences and provide support for immigrant revitalization. Others still have demonstrated that "the ability of immigration to reduce violence partly depends on the political climate of immigrant reception" helping to further understand the immigrant-crime relationship (Lyons, Velez, & Santoro, 2013, p. 21).

Within the body of immigration research more generally, studies have increasingly examined the movement of immigrants to the Southern United States, specifically southern cities that are becoming "new destinations" like Charlotte, NC, and Nashville, TN (Ramey, 2013). This examination is timely given the most recent census report:

> "Since 1990, the South has experienced the greatest numeric growth in its total foreign-born population, growing by at least 4 million between 1990 and 2000 and again between 2000 and 2010. The South was the only region that exhibited a continuous increase in its

proportion of foreign born, tripling from about 10 percent in 1960 to 32 percent in 2010

(Grieco, 2012, p. 9)."

As the locations to which immigrants are beginning to increasingly move change, considering

place-related historical, social, and cultural contexts of these new destinations may become more

beneficial for understanding the immigrant-crime relationship.

The American South, specifically the southeastern region considered the "Old South",

may be an important context to consider the effect of immigration. This region has historically

been characterized as having a distinct appetite for violence, which has helped it to become the

most violent region in America (Cash, 1941; Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2014;

Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Ousey & Lee, 2010; Wyatt-Brown, 1982, 1986). One of the enduring,

though contested, theories used to explain this distinctness is the Southern Culture of Violence

(SCV). The SCV theory advances that, due to a deeply embedded culture of honor combined

with other historical and social factors (e.g., a history of interracial violence, police distrust,

relative isolation of the Southern region, the use and support for duels, and a strong support for

Evangelical Protestantism), a subculture has developed where violence is seen as a crucial tool in

a southern "reactionary toolkit" for resolving disputes (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Lee & Bankston,

2007; Nisbett, 1993; Ousey & Lee, 2010). Though the earliest version of this theory focused on

crime between white males in the southern U.S. (Gastil, 1971; Hackney, 1969), continuing

research has used components of this thesis to explain other subcultures and contexts of violence,

such as the "code of the street" and the violent western frontier (Anderson, 2000; Messner, 1983;

Slotkin, 1973). Also, linked to the SCV and contributing to the South's distinctness is its history

of racial violence. Work on lynching, the civil rights movement, racial violence, and the

migration of blacks from the South all contribute to a body of work that provides insight on the

intensification and dissipation of violent cultural norms in the South over time (DeFina & Hannon, 2011; Forces, 2013; Messner, 2005; Tolnay & Beck, 1992). In addition, work further considers how the historical relative isolation of the South has contributed to the development of this proposed distinct culture (Lee & Shihadeh, 2009).

There continues to be a growing interest in understanding the relationship between immigration and crime (Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Lyons, Velez, & Santoro, 2013; Wadsworth, 2010), the changes in immigration patterns (Bankston, 2007; Odem & Lacy, 2009; Odem, 2005), regional subcultures (Lee & Bankston, 2007; Ousey & Lee, 2010, Pridemore & Freilich, 2006), and legacies racial oppression, violence, and exclusion (Messner, 2005, Peterson & Ward, 2015; Porter, 2011). It is important to understand how these various interests intersect. In order to contribute to these discourses, this study attempts to examine a small part of what is a considerably large social phenomenon by considering if there are regional differences in the effect of immigrant concentration on violent crime between select southern cities and select cities in the rest of the United States.

This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide a brief discussion of immigrant revitalization. I continue by discussing past and present immigration patterns to the South. I follow by providing some evidence for the distinctness of the South. Here, I also describe SCV thesis and legacy of racial violence literature and their implications for the influence of immigrant concentration in the "Old South." In the next section, I detail my data sources, analytical strategy, and findings. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of research findings, limitations, and implications.

Theoretical Framework and Background

Immigrant Revitalization

Immigrant revitalization suggests that immigrant groups move into socially disorganized neighborhoods and cities and contribute significantly to their reinvigoration as their concentration increases (Desmond & Kubrin, 2009). In areas of higher immigrant concentration, there is the creation of "adaptive social structures," including strong familial and neighborhood institutions that can create more job opportunities for these immigrants and potentially for existing community residents as well (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez 2006, p. 10). In addition, "immigrants bring new energy, skills, and entrepreneurial spirit into their communities," (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009, p. 452).

Along with the economic boost provided by the concentration of immigrants, immigrants also provide "a booster shot of traditional morality injected into the body politic" and show a high level of support for traditional familial structures (e.g., two parent households) and the legitimacy of parental authority (Brooks, 2006). These factors contribute to increased levels of informal social control within families and ultimately reduce the likelihood of crime (Martinez, Lee, & Nielsen, 2004; Fukuyama 1993). By extension, there is the development of what is described as "fictive kin" networks that further provide support and informal social control (Ebaugh & Curry, 2000; Vélez, 2009). Churches, schools, community centers, and immigrant-focused agencies are often responsible for aiding in the development of these kin and the overall community development process (Chinchilla, Hamilton, & Loucky 1993; Ley 2008; Theodore & Martin 2007).

To summarize, immigrant concentration has been promising in reducing crime. This effect is in part due to a reinforcement of ideals and social ties that strengthen social control while also revitalizing the neighborhood economy and its social institutions (Lee and Martínez 2006; Vélez 2009). The increasing support for immigrant revitalization has brought about an

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agreement among some scholars to suggest that "cities of concentrated immigration are some of the safest places around" (Sampson, 2008, p. 31). And yet, Ramey notes that the trends of immigration in the United States have begun to shift and new types of destinations are emerging, which may have implications for revitalization;

> "…established destinations are home to large immigrant populations, encouraging the growth of strong co-ethnic community ties that extend across neighborhood boundaries. These communities may be positioned to provide the economic and social context for immigrant revitalization. Social and governmental institutions in established destinations are organized in such a manner as to encourage immigrant incorporation and social cohesion, rather than conflict and mistrust. By contrast, such arrangements are less likely to prevail in new destinations, rendering some neighborhoods less able to integrate new arrivals into the local community, potentially decreasing social cohesion, and putting the neighborhood at risk for higher violent crime rates compared to similar neighborhoods in established destination cities." (Ramey, 2013, p. 602)

The contrast between old destinations and new destination cities, particularly those in the Southeast, brings to fore a continued need to consider the levels of reception in these locations (Lyons et al., 2013), as well as other social and cultural factors that may inhibit revitalization.

Immigration to the South

As shown in Table 1, prior to the 1980s, immigration to the South has been limited. And yet, as noted, there have recently been stark changes in the levels of immigrant concentration in the South. Historically, movement to and from the South has been shown to impact the social milieu: namely, the great migrations of blacks from the South, early settlement of the Irish and Scottish in Appalachia, and other smaller exoduses from the South may have been influenced by

and have influenced changes associated with violent cultural norms and crime (Nisbett, 1993).

Given this, are the crime-reducing effects found to be associated with increased immigrant

concentration through immigrant revitalization impacted by the southern context? What is the

relationship of the recent increase in immigration to the South and violent crime in the South? In

beginning to grapple with these questions, I first provide an overview of immigration to

the South.

Changing Landscape: Immigration to the South Then and Now

In 1850, foreign-born individuals comprised only 2.7% of the population of the South

compared to 12% in the Midwest, 15.1% in the West, and 15.4% in the Northeast (Gibson, &

Lennon, 1999). Yet, during this period, immediately after the abusive practice of slavery, there

was some promotion of immigration to southern states because of the fear of labor shortages. As

a result of these sentiments, Mississippi saw an influx of Chinese in 1870 (Loewen, 1988). And

yet, as shown in Table 1, while the rest of the nation saw some waves of immigrants between the

late 1800s and the mid-1980s the South saw few changes to the size of its immigrant population.

Table 1. Percentage of Total Population Foreign Born by Region from 1880-2010

	Percent of Population by Region													
Year	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
South	2.7%	2.7%	2.3%	2.5%	2.6%	2.3%	1.5%	1.6%	1.8%	2.1%	3.8%	5.4%	8.6%	10.8%
Northeast	19.4%	22.3%	22.6%	25.8%	23.1%	20.9%	17.0%	13.4%	10.2%	8.4%	9.2%	9.2%	13.5%	15.2%
Midwest	16.8%	18.2%	15.8%	15.7%	13.5%	11.3%	8.4%	6.1%	4.4%	3.3%	3.6%	3.6%	5.5%	6.5%
West	28.3%	25.5%	20.7%	20.6%	18.0%	15.3%	10.8%	8.1%	6.9%	6.6%	10.6%	14.8%	18.6%	19.7%
National	13.3%	14.8%	13.6%	14.7%	13.2%	11.6%	8.8%	6.9%	5.4%	4.7%	6.2%	7.9%	11.1%	13.5%

Note. Immigration Data from the U.S. Census

Table 2. *Key Immigration Laws and Trends Nationally and in the South*

	Key Immigration Periods		
	1860-1920 The Great Wave and Asiatic Exclusion	1921-1964 The Great Pause and Quotas	1965-2010 The Second Great Wave and Immigrant Labor
Key Laws	– Contract Labor Law (1864): Allowed recruitment of foreign labor – Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) renewed 1902: Restricted entry for Chinese – Contract Labor Law (1885): Unlawful to import overseas workers – Immigration Act (1917): Literacy test for those over 16 and barred all immigrants from Asia	– Quota Act (1921): limited immigrants to 3% of each nationality present in the US in 1910. – Displaced Persons Act (1948): Increased allowances for refugee entry – Immigration and Nationality Act (1952): Eliminated race as bar to immigration or citizenship and set larger quotas. – Temporary restrictive quotas in 1924. Made permanent in 1929	– Hart-Celler Act (1965): abolished national origins quotas, quotas by eastern and eastern hemispheres – Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986): amnesty for many illegal aliens and sanctions for employers hiring illegals. – Immigration Act of 1990: limited unskilled workers to 10,000/year – USA Patriot Act (2001): expanded deportable offenses and groups
National Immigration Trends and Notes	– Great Wave: during which immigration averaged 600,000 annually due to industrialization and use of European labor. – Early increase of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe to the North and Midwest – Some Scottish and Irish immigration South – Creation Bureau of immigration	– Great Pause: restrictive immigration policies annual average of 200,000 – Cut in number of southern and eastern European immigrants to less than 1/4 of those in the US before WWI – 1943-1948 policies promote the reunification of families influencing increase of women and children – Repealing Chinese exclusions – Bracero Program: Increased hiring of Mexican workers. About 5 million participate	– Second Great Wave: Continues today. Between 1965 and 1990, immigration averaged one million people annually — five times the average in the previous four decades – Period skilled labor requirements and immediate family reunification major goals. – The US continued to promote nuclear family model.
Southern Trends and Notes	– The Great Migration of Blacks from the South 1916-mid 1930s – 1916-1919 1 Million Blacks moved to the North – Most immigrants during this period come for agricultural industry – Period of interest in foreign labor after slavery but xenophobia and job security fear	– 1959 and 1962 Increase in number of Cubans in the far South due to problems at home – 1950s and 1960s, northeast textile and carpet manufacturing businesses had begun to relocate to the South as early as the 1920s – Continued xenophobic attitudes and spread anti-immigrant sentiments	– The increase in manufacturing jobs and service jobs emerge as a leading source of income and employment. – 1970 and 1980 saw increased presences of meat packing industry – Unemployment rates lower in new South between 1990 and 2000

In Table 2, I note immigration policies along with national trends and identify the corresponding push and pull factors associated with immigration in the South. Both Tables 1 and 2 reinforce the image of the South as isolated and distinct from the rest of the nation. A trend in the South that does correspond with one for the rest of the nation is the national drop in immigration levels in during the period immediately following the 1930s. Though the South experienced some changes, unlike the urban North and West with conventional destination cities, there continued to be an absence of large ethnic communities built by immigrants and children of immigrants (Massey, 2008; Ramey, 2013).

Prior to the 1970s, a lack of jobs was a factor stifling immigration to the Southeast, but as urbanization and globalization increased in places like Atlanta, Ga., there was the increase in the presence of immigrants (Odem, 2005). Starting in the 1980s, immigrants have begun to come to the South for job prospects and continue to see the South as a new frontier to garner social and economic capital (Butcher & Card, 1991; Griffith, 1990). The South was promising:

"The Southeast was one of the fastest-growing regions in the country during the 1990s, and economic progress was spread across a variety of industries. Some counties bucked the national trend and added manufacturing jobs; others shed manufacturing jobs but saw other sectors such as services emerge as a leading source of income and employment. A third group of counties, many of them part of, or centered near, large metropolitan areas, enjoyed a diverse economic base that held up well during the decade." (Kochhar, Suro, & Tafoya, 2005).

While these new settlers have sought new ways of life, they have often been met with hostility. LA Times writer Lee May cites several examples all across cities in the South, both

large and small. She writes about a Chinese immigrant, "In Raleigh, N.C., Ming Hai Loo was killed in a pool hall in July, hit on the back of the head with a pistol and slammed to the ground, where his face struck a beer bottle," and continues by quoting two white brothers that state before the above incident, "'Because of you people, our brothers and friends went to Vietnam and never came back. We are going to finish you tonight.'" In Gainesville, Ga in the late 1980s, the Ku Klux Klan marched in protest of "immigrants who often work at low-skill, low-pay jobs in the agriculture and poultry businesses." A Klan flyer pledged, "to protest the thousands of filthy, illegal wetbacks that have ruined this fine north Georgia town.'" (May, 1989). These instances reinforce an environment of social exclusion and fear that is eerily similar to some of the retaliation blacks received for entering social spaces dominated by whites (Olsson, 2015). Though there may be southern cities where new immigrant settlers have been positively received, it seems that this dominant narrative remains—residents who resided in and moved to the South prior to and during the recent influx of immigrant settlers have been and continue to be overwhelmingly unreceptive though they have received some economic benefits from labor and productivity increases (Gray, 2011; Odem & Lacy, 2009; Olsson, 2015; Piven, 2012).

The South as a new destination seems promising economically, yet socially, the story is different. Part of the level of non-reception may be due to the South's socio-cultural history marked by racial aggression and exclusion and high levels of violence and its isolation (Lee & Shihadeh, 2009, Mcgloin, Schreck, Stewart, & Ousey, 2011; Reed, 1971; Vandello & Cohen, 2004). What is the social landscape for immigrants entering in the South? The SCV provides one perspective on this landscape.

The Southern Culture of Violence

Although constituting about one-quarter of the nation's population, the South accounted for 42.2% of all reported violent crimes in 2013 (FBI, 2014). This trend is not a new one. For example, in the 1870s, H.V. Redfield was perhaps first to characterize the South as the most violent and culturally distinct region in the United States (see Redfield, 1880). Sheldon Hackney (1969) and Raymond Gastil (1971) continued by attempting to attribute these high rates of violence to a distinct culture existing in the South, arguing that Scottish and Irish settlement during the early 1800s contributed to the rise of a "Culture of Honor." More recently, the violent crime rate in the South has dropped continually over the past three recent reporting years, 2012, 2013, and 2014, with only the Midwest's rate dropping faster (FBI, 2014; FBI, 2013; FBI, 2012; Clarke, 1998; Cohen, 1998). This raises the possibility of a decline in the historical culture of violence in this region along with more general causes of the drop in crime. Understanding the South's historical context, specifically one described by the SCV, may further help to understand changes in the rates of violent crime in the South. In addition to this, given the SCV, immigration to the South may differently influence violence when compared to the rest of the United States. Below, I describe the development of the SCV, expand on how it has been empirically tested, and some of the limitations of this explanation in order to shed light on a potential factor that may specifically inhibit immigrant revitalization in the southern United States.

Background of the SCV: Culture of Honor and Violence

Early Scottish and Irish settlers in the South, predominately white males, relied heavily on violence as a rational response to threats in order to maintain honor in their war-torn and feudal based homeland (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Upon settling in the South, an area with a primarily agricultural based economic structure, the utility of violence remained and a culture developed and was observed through the tendency of residents to support the need for a high

level of interpersonal respect in the maintenance of power and dominance (Hackney, 1969; Gastil, 1971). Because of the real (e.g., bandits) or perceived (e.g., racial threat) dangers that were ever present in the early South, it was valuable to maintain a reputation that demonstrated an ability to defend one's property (e.g., farmland and slaves who would later become participants in this violent culture) (Grosjean, 2010; Messner, 2005). Respect was clearly very important to southern residents as it was tied to their overall livelihood and because of this, the role of violence was maintained (Hackney, 1969; Gastil, 1971).

The SCV is theorized as a product of the combination of several factors that intersect in the South. These factors include the Culture of Honor, high levels of Evangelical Protestantism, and the common practices of lynching and dueling, racialized discriminatory conditions, as well as environmental conditions, particularly higher temperatures throughout the region (Anderson & Anderson, 1996; Messner, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Petersen & Ward, 2015). W. E. B. Dubois made early observations on the development of the social milieu (i.e., the physical setting where people live and operate) of the South with an emphasis on crime, police, and courts. He noted how the change in the social status of blacks in the South during integration increased motives of "revolt and revenge which stir up all the latent savagery of both races… (Dubois, 1901, p. 134)." In addition, he described how courts and police continued in the criminalization of blacks. These conditions helped to increase levels of violence and crime more generally in the South and norms that inform the SCV (see Haskell, 2002 for a longer discussion).

Aiding in the creation, development, and the spread of the SCV are institutions. For example, in courts, jurors have been cited endorsing violence as an acceptable means of retaliation. An often cited example: during a criminal case in which a man committed murder as retaliation for a group of men taunting him at a filling station, one juror stated, "He ain't guilty.

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He wouldn't of been much of a man if he hadn't shot them fellows" (Lee and Ousey, 2010; p. 22)." The pervasiveness of this culture can also be seen through more support in the South for laws concerning spousal abuse, corporal punishment, capital punishment, and foreign policy that privilege the use of violence as self-defense (Cohen, 1996). A key example of policy impacted by the cultural norms in the South may be "Stand Your Ground" laws used heavily in the southern states in addition to, support for gun laws (Barnes, 2015; Dixon & Lizotte, 2013; Drake, 2007; McClellan & Tekin, 2012). These institutional endorsements of violence help to demonstrate the ability for the norms associated with the SCV to continue to exist outside of interpersonal relationships. These norms become a part of the structure of the region and continue to perpetuate the idea that violence is a viable means for resolving disputes with broad and lingering negative effects.

Because white males, specifically those of Scottish and Irish ancestry, dominated the southern social and cultural landscape, their means of resolving conflicts permeated southern society more broadly (Pridemore & Freilich, 2006). One study has shown that a higher concentration of these white southern males has been related to higher rates of violence (Lee & Shihadeh 2009). These "legitimate" cultural norms associated with violence include access to "dueling" as means of dispute resolution and recognition of property rights and the right to violently defend them (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Messner (2005) has examined how these norms and lynching have influenced interracial homicide using data from 1850-1995 and, along with other scholars, discusses how violence in the region, and racial violence, in particular, permeated southern cultural notions of what are legitimate uses of violence (Jeffries, 2009; Petersen & Ward, 2015; Pridemore & Freilich, 2006).

A Legacy of Racial Violence and the South

Work on the history of honor and racial violence has been used to understand what has been considered a distinct culture in the South (Messner, 2005). The relationship between violence and race provides a further understanding of the way the SCV has likely influenced rates of violence generally. A key example, chiefly for blacks in the South, is how violence born of the SCV engendered a "self-help" response in the form of more violence. This is due to the perception, and in many cases, the reality of a need to fight, rebel, and dismantle oppressive white-dominated institutions and structures used to maintain racial order and associated norms (Jeffries, 2009; Markowitz, 2003; Messner, 2005; Pridemore & Freilich, 2006).

The body of work that seeks to understand the legacy of racial violence often focuses on lynching, anti-civil rights violence, and violence used by hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan in the South and shows, like the SCV, the distinctness of the South as it relates to high levels of interpersonal violence (Cunningham, & Phillips, 2007; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009; Peterson & Ward, 2015). It is important to highlight the legacy of racial violence in relation to the SCV as it provides an additional context for understanding how violence in the South has been often used to oppress and control racial minorities (Porter, 2011).The types of violence studied by the legacy of racial violence scholars can be understood as influenced by and an influence of SCV as the purpose of the violence was seen to maintain control and respect (Jeffries, 2009; Markowitz, 2003). As shown earlier in this paper, racial and ethnically motivated violence has been used to prevent the settlement of some immigrant groups in the South (May, 1989). Through this work, we get a better picture of how historical and cultural factors may contribute to a southern culture that has nurtured a violent environment and how racial experiences shape the purpose of said violence. Overall, the SCV as a potential inhibitor to the effect of immigrant revitalization is further bolstered by a long history of racial violence.

An Empirical Legend: The State of the SCV and Testing its Effect

The continued theorization of the SCV has suggested that the norms that promote violence and aggression have remained even in the absence of traditional historical threats (Nisbett, 1994). These threats, as mentioned earlier, include bandits that due to the lack of police and other formal mechanisms of control and order, called for violence in order to maintain security (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The norms and practices (i.e., seeming threatening and worthy of a great deal of respect) associated with the SCV continue to maintain power and remain components of southern culture (Pridemore & Freilich, 2006). The stability of these norms is also partially due to an incubation effect. This effect is caused by spatially bound interactions of southern residents that reinforce this culture. These continued interactions allow for cultural norms to perpetuate through generations and they remain instrumental in maintaining power and respect between individuals and within institutions (Reed, 1971; Vandello & Cohen, 2004; Mcgloin, Schreck, Stewart, & Ousey, 2011).

Lee and Ousey (2011) have shown the continued reach of SCV through their interview data, and further show how many groups endorse and recognize the existence of the cultural norms consistent with the SCV. Through their qualitative study using interviews and vignette response data, they find that blacks and whites, whether young or old, ascribe to a general philosophy: when their honor is threatened and in situations where there is perceived to be an "imminent or potentially recurring threat to their family or themselves" (Lee & Ousey, 2011, p. 899-900), most often, they will view violence as an appropriate "tool" to use. Additionally, men in the South, compared to the North, perceive others as more aggressive. In addition, these southern men also encourage others to be more aggressive when responding to threats (Vandello et al., 2008). This suggests a persistence of violent norms in the region.

Further demonstrating the impact of the SCV on crime, experimental ethnographies—using participant observations, vignettes, as well as the manipulation of the field of observation—show differences in physiological factors (e.g., heart rate and perspiration) during responses to actual physical threats and vignettes by southerners (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). Daly and Wilson (1988) show the perceived risk of imminent threat is so deeply embedded that, even in the absence of any real threat over generations, reliance on retaliation, specifically through violence, remains. So "sticky" and intergenerational, these norms are reflected in schools in southern states where students are significantly more violent than those in other regions (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009).

Limitations, Conflicts, and Structure

It has been argued that structural factors (e.g., lower levels of education, employment, and health) in the South should be the primary predictors of violent crime and this position has found some support by statistical models that include these factors (Huff-Corzine, Corzine, & Moore, 1986; Huff-Corzine, Corzine, & Moore, 1991; Loftin & Hill, 1974). Arguments against the SCV have been bolstered by studies that use southern location dummy as a proxy for culture (Loftin & Hill, 1974). It has been argued that the use of this method is flawed as it assumes that all structural variables are accounted for while the unmeasured error captured in the dummy variable may be due to unconsidered structural variables (Hayes, 2006). Yet, in keeping with convention and due to limits of my data, I use the southern dummy variable to illuminate the regional variations in the effect of immigration while attempting to capture the normally understood correlates of crime. This approach, while flawed for directly measuring culture, helps to understand the *potential* for cultural influences on crime. As shown earlier, studies have attempted to contend with this problem by various quantitative and qualitative measures and

methods which some feel provides a compelling body of support for the potential existence of the SCV (Grosjean, 2010; Lee & Shihadeh, 2009; Ousey & Lee, 2010; Vandello & Cohen, 2004).

The Effect of Immigration on Violence in a Sample of Southern Cities

Through my literature review, I have shown that immigration has the potential to change the landscape of an area through revitalizing, which decrease the potential for violence. In addition, the South historical context, specifically SCV, can be a potential barrier for this effect. There is an intersection immigration and the SCV on the aspect of institutional trust. In areas where many immigrants have moved, there is the potential increase in trust in institutions, including courts and police, to solve disputes, chiefly in areas where political opportunities (e.g., the ability to run for office, vote, etc.) exist (Lyons et al., 2013). Within the SCV, violence was rationalized on the grounds that police and courts could not be relied upon to resolve disputes, legitimizing inter-personal violence in retaliation to an affront (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007). The finding that many Latino immigrants have a greater trust of and are more likely to use the police than other groups, specifically Southerners, adds to the notion that some immigrant groups could help to shape the cultural norms, though, this trust has been negatively influenced by immigration enforcement measures especially for those immigrants who are undocumented (Davies & Fagan, 2012; Miller & Davis, 2008; Ong & Jenks, 2004; Skogan, 2006). Other immigrant groups, like the Chinese, have also been found to have overall higher levels of respect and trust for police, and along with Korean immigration, have a higher levels of social capital and educational achievement (Wu, Sun, & Smith, 2011; Zhou & Kim, 2006). Other social institutions may be a venue through which immigration may influence the SCV. Social institutions provide insight on alternative means for solving community problems, including

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crime (Browning, 2002; Kahan, 2002). This suggests that, over time, the immigrant revitalization component broadly impacts the social landscape and involves institutional (e.g., policies, new community centers, churches) shifts that influence cultural norms (Lyons et al., 2013; Menjívar & Bejarano, 2004). Overall, for immigrant groups there exist feelings of being more vulnerable to and appreciative of the law, which are attitudes opposite to those associated with the SCV and, when opportunities exist for immigrants to influence institutions, there may be shifts in the cultural norms (Lyons et al., 2013; Odem & Lacy, 2009).

Considering the increase in immigrants to the South and the southern context, I propose the following:

Hypothesis 1: *Higher levels of immigrant concentration in census tracts in select southern cities will have a negative effect on the violent crime. When comparing the effect of immigration to select cities in the regions outside of the South, the effect of immigrant concertation in the South will be comparatively smaller in degree.*

As shown through my review, the South has experienced a high level of recent immigration compared to a more consistent and long-term flow of immigration into "destination cities." Because of this history, the South likely trails in the creation of immigrant enclaves related to revitalization effects, compared to areas that have had high levels of immigration. I, therefore, propose the following:

 Hypothesis 2: A*s measured by census tracts, neighborhoods that have experienced the largest increases in immigration in the South should see a smaller negative effects on crime compared to areas that have seen the largest increases in immigration in the non-South.*

Hypothesis 3: A*reas that have a higher immigrant concentration in 1990 will see stronger effects from immigrant concentration on the violent crime than those with low or medium rates in both southern and non-southern cities.*

I examine the change in immigrant concentration and the level of concentration in 1990 and their independent effects on violent crime. I will further demonstrate threshold effects by using models that parse out effects in areas by low, average, and high 1990 levels of immigrant concentration. Through this, I can begin to demonstrate how some of the effects of early immigration, and lack thereof for the South, may impact the development of immigrant communities and provide a foundation for or inhibit immigrant revitalization.

Data and Analytic Method

To understand the regional variations of immigrant concentration I estimate models using standard negative binomial regression analysis at the level of the census tract. Along with models showing the correctional effect of immigration, I use residual change models that allow me to understand change while controlling for independent effects of the base year used. I also include clustered estimates that attempt to decrease the standard errors and provide more rigorous predictions. Consistent with previous research, I use census tracts as proxies for neighborhoods (Charis E. Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; C. J. Lyons et al., 2013; D. M. Ramey, 2013).

Data

The data come from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) (ICPSR #27501) collected by Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo. These data contain multi-level information on several facets of neighborhoods at the tract, city, and metro levels with a total of 9,593 tracts from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing Summary File (SF3). This data set is particularly useful because it contains measures of social disorganization, an often used theory

for understanding neighborhood crime. After cleaning and supplementing measures for immigration for 1990, the final sample contains census tracts (*N*=1439) for select cities in (*N*=8) southern states including Washington, DC, (Virginia, Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Florida, Washington, DC) and states (*N*=18) outside of this region (*N*=4849).

To construct change measures, I merge additional data from National Historic Geographic Information System (NHGIS) for the years 1990 and 2000. Due to the change in tract identifiers, I use tracts with the both 1990 and 2000 identifiers. The final sample includes 6288 census tracts within a sample of US cities within the NNCS dataset. The tracts in this sample have data for three years (1999-2001) that allow for the construction of a three-year average tract rate for aggregated assault and murder combined[i].

Dependent Measure

The outcome variable of interest is violent crime as measured by three-year averaged murder and aggravated assault rates (1999-2001), which follows conventional practices. Rape and robbery were excluded from this measure. This exclusion is due to the scope of explanation of the SCV; whereas, the SCV has been used to explain specific types of violent crime, specifically assault and murder, as retaliation for dishonor (Ousey & Lee, 2010). This is not to ignore that there are cases of rape and robbery used for retaliation, but it is to emphasize what research has demonstrated the type of crime "southerness" best predicts.

Independent Measures: Region and Immigration

The specific measures of interest were southern location and immigrant concentration within the census tract. Following the model of Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) and Ousey and Kubrin (2009), I construct a foreign born index of percent foreign born and percent

Hispanic/Latino by adding the standardized scores from both measures followed by a re-standardization of the summed measures. Given their high correlation, the unique effects of each measure would be hard to estimate. Factor analysis with varimax rotation for each region during both time periods was used to create an index with the combined measures. Factor loadings for both measures in the South were a high (.96 for 2000 and .93 for 1990) with foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino having 92% and 93% of the variance accounted for in the first component with eigenvalues of 1.83 (α= .91) and 1.74 (α=.85) respectively.

The results were similar for the Non-South; factor loadings for both measures were high (.93 for 2000 and .92 for 1990) with foreign-born and Hispanic/Latino having 87% and 85% of the variance accounted for in the first component with eigenvalues of 1.74 (α= .85) and 1.70 (α=.82) respectively. This approach to measuring immigrant concentration has been used effectively in several studies (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Sampson & Morenoff, 2004; Stowell & Messner, 2009). An immigration change measure was constructed by subtracting the index for 2000 from the 1990 index. The final measures were then re-standardized.

Finally, I use a dummy variable for southern location (1=South, 0=non-South) to create separate models to estimate regional differences.

Additional Controls

Additional variables were constructed from the 2000 Census to incorporate what Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012), among others, describe as generally accepted correlates in studies of neighborhood crime. These measures were highly correlated resulting in high VIF scores. These diagnostics and guided by other research (Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005), and similar to the process with the foreign born indices, exploratory factor analysis with varimax

rotation were used to construct two indices for each region, Neighborhood Disadvantage and Residential Instability.

Composing Neighborhood Disadvantage (South: α=.87 and Non-South: α=.86) are: the percentage jobless (percentage of civilian labor force age 16 to 64 who are unemployed or not in the labor force), percentage female-headed households (percentage of households that are female-headed with no husband), percentage of residents who aren't high school graduates (percentage of adults age 25 and over who are not high school graduates), percentage in poverty (percentage of the population for whom poverty status is determined whose income in 1999 was below the poverty level), percentage black (percentage of the total population that is non-Hispanic).

Residential Instability is composed of (South: α= .75and Non-South: α=.67): percent renters, percent movers, percent young males (percentage of the total population who are males between the ages of 15 and 24).

Analytic Method

As expected with crime data, the violent crime rates were skewed showing a high frequency of small counts and zeros. In order to analyze data with rare events within small units, I run negative binomial regression analysis, a Poisson-based model that accounts for the overdispersed nature of the data. Following the suggestion of Osgood (2000, 33) and the analytic method of Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012), tract population is used as an exposure variable that accounts for the population at risk. This method constrains the population coefficient to 1 and is comparable to analyzing rates.

I provide descriptive statistics for both regions and for tracts with low, average, and high levels of immigration as determined by the standard deviations of the foreign born index (low: $\leq$ -.5; average: $> -.5$ & $< .5$; high: $\geq .5$.

I continue by running several negative binomial regression models. In the first set of models, I use the year 2000 rates of immigration. In the first model of this set, I use only the immigrant concentration variable of interest. I follow this by adding neighborhood controls in order to determine if there remains an effect with these controls. Next, in my second set of models, in order to examine the impact of the change in immigration, I use a residual change model using the change in immigration from 1990 and the rate of immigration index in 1990. In these sets of models, I follow the same procedure as with the base 2000 model set. In addition, I run both sets of models by low, average, and high levels of immigration in 1990.

Results

Comparing violent crime rates in select cities in both regions, the rate in the South is higher at 7.97 per 100,000 while in the non-South the rate is 7.47 per 100,000 and not significant after a two-tailed t-test. The South has a larger spread and variation compared to the non-South as shown by a higher standard deviation of 10.83 (Table 3). On the measure of immigration, as expected, the percentage of the population that is both foreign born and from Hispanic/Latino descent is higher in the non-South. The change from 1990 to 2000 on the measure of percent Hispanic/Latino is 5 percentage points in the South while the change is 4 points in the non-South. With percentage foreign born, the change is about 4 percentage points while in the non-South the change is a little more than 3. These descriptives don't fully reflect trends in immigration more broadly. This may be a limitation to the data as the cities in the sample include those in the South that have been destination cities including locations in Texas and Florida.

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Though this is a limitation, findings that may show variations in the effect of immigration are still useful in understanding regional differences and will give cause for further exploration.

Table 3. *Descriptives by Region and Totals*

	Total				South				Not South			
	M	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*	*M*	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*	*M*	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*
Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000)	7.59	9.13	0	149	7.97	10.83	0	140	7.47	8.56	0	149
Immigration Measures												
Percent Hispanic 2000	17	23	0	100	14	21	0	100	18	23	0	100
Percent Hispanic 1990	13	19	0	100	9	16	0	100	14	20	0	100
Percent Foreign Born 2000	14.41	14.81	0	79	11.25	12.08	0	73	15.35	15.41	0	79
Percent Foreign Born 1990	10.78	13.03	0	82	6.64	8.13	0	56	12.00	13.93	0	82
Total Population 2000 (in 1000s)	3.91	2.10	0	34	4.12	1.99	0	14	3.85	2.13	0	34
Neighborhood Disadvantage												
Percent Black	30	35	0	100	33	34	0	100	29	35	0	100
Percent Below Poverty Line	19	14	0	1	18	14	0	100	19	14	0	100
Percent Unemployed	4	3	0	47	3	3	0	47	4	3	0	47
Percent Single Mother Households	18	12	0	100	17	12	0	100	19	12	0	100
Percent without High School Diploma	18	11	0	100	18	11	0	100	18	11	0	100
Residential Instability												
Percent Male 15-24	7	3	0	43	7	4	1	42	7	3	0	43
Percent Renters	50	0.24	0	100	48	24	0	100	51	24	0	100
Percent Movers	49.91	13.63	10	100	52.36	14.09	17	97	49.18	13.41	10	100
N	6288				1439				4849			

Note. Percentages rounded to whole numbers

Table 4. Descriptives for the South by Low, Average, and High Rates of Immigration in 1990 South

	Low				Average				High			
	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max
Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000)	11.20	11.99	0.0	81.6	5.51	8.89	0.0	131.5	6.89	10.64	0.0	140.5
Immigration Measures												
Percent Hispanic 2000	0.02	0.02	0.0	0.1	0.10	0.08	0.0	0.4	0.47	0.25	0.0	1.0
Percent Hispanic 1990	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.1	0.05	0.05	0.0	0.4	0.33	0.23	0.0	1.0
Percent Foreign Born 2000	2.74	2.26	0.0	12.2	10.14	5.81	0.0	38.8	30.76	12.05	6.2	73.4
Percent Foreign Born 1990	1.31	1.12	0.0	4.3	5.91	2.95	0.0	17.1	18.95	10.59	2.2	56.4
Total Population 2000 (in 1000s)	3.48	1.66	0.4	9.0	4.36	2.07	0.3	14.2	4.88	2.05	0.6	11.1
Neighborhood Disadvantage												
Percent Black	0.52	0.40	0.0	1.0	0.24	0.25	0.0	0.9	0.17	0.18	0.0	0.7
Percent Below Poverty Line	0.22	0.16	0.0	0.8	0.12	0.11	0.0	0.8	0.20	0.10	0.0	0.6
Percent Unemployed	0.04	0.03	0.0	0.3	0.03	0.03	0.0	0.4	0.03	0.02	0.0	0.2
Percent Single Mother Households	0.23	0.14	0.0	0.7	0.14	0.09	0.0	0.6	0.15	0.07	0.0	0.4
Percent without High School Diploma	0.19	0.10	0.0	0.6	0.13	0.09	0.0	0.4	0.27	0.13	0.0	0.6
Residential Instability												
Percent Male 15-24	0.07	0.03	0.0	0.4	0.07	0.04	0.0	0.4	0.10	0.04	0.0	0.3
Percent Renters	0.46	0.23	0.0	1.0	0.45	0.24	0.0	1.0	0.58	0.22	0.1	1.0
Percent Movers	46.37	11.23	17.5	84.5	55.35	14.50	25.4	97.0	57.84	14.09	26.5	91.6
N	556				606				277			

Note. Low is a z-score of < -.5, average is between -.5 and .5 and high is greater than .5

Table 5. *Descriptives for the Non-South by Low, Average, and High Rates of Immigration in 1990*

	Low				Average				High			
	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max
Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000)	8.71	10.32	0.0	149.2	5.41	6.49	0.0	70.5	8.06	6.74	0.0	85.8
Immigration Measures												
Percent Hispanic 2000	0.03	0.02	0.0	0.2	0.15	0.10	0.0	0.5	0.52	0.23	0.0	1.0
Percent Hispanic 1990	0.02	0.02	0.0	0.4	0.10	0.08	0.0	0.6	0.42	0.24	0.0	1.0
Percent Foreign Born 2000	3.78	4.00	0.0	73.6	15.47	8.26	0.0	45.0	37.18	12.98	4.5	79.1
Percent Foreign Born 1990	2.46	2.15	0.0	9.4	11.37	6.38	0.0	34.0	31.07	15.35	0.4	81.8
Total Population 2000 (in 1000s)	3.26	2.01	0.0	34.1	4.01	1.87	0.3	17.8	4.73	2.36	0.3	23.5
Neighborhood Disadvantage												
Percent Black	0.48	0.42	0.0	1.0	0.15	0.22	0.0	1.0	0.12	0.14	0.0	0.9
Percent Below Poverty Line	0.20	0.16	0.0	1.1	0.15	0.11	0.0	0.6	0.23	0.11	0.0	0.7
Percent Unemployed	0.05	0.03	0.0	0.5	0.03	0.02	0.0	0.3	0.04	0.02	0.0	0.4
Percent Single Mother Households	0.17	0.09	0.0	0.7	0.13	0.09	0.0	0.5	0.28	0.10	0.0	0.5
Percent without High School Diploma	0.19	0.10	0.0	0.6	0.13	0.09	0.0	0.4	0.27	0.13	0.0	0.6
Residential Instability												
Percent Male 15-24	0.07	0.03	0.0	0.4	0.07	0.04	0.0	0.4	0.08	0.02	0.0	0.4
Percent Renters	0.47	0.24	0.0	1.0	0.49	0.24	0.0	1.0	0.60	0.21	0.0	1.0
Percent Movers	45.77	13.56	9.6	100.0	52.43	13.95	15.5	98.1	51.02	10.51	14.2	91.8
N	2131				1598				1120			

Note. Low is a z-score of < -.5, average is between -.5 and .5 and high is greater than .5

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The sample of cities in the South has a larger percentage of the population that is black in addition to lower poverty rates, unemployment and number of female-headed households. With regards to residential instability, the South has more movers yet fewer renters when compared to the sample of cities in the non-South.

The descriptives by low, average, and high levels of immigration in 1990 show a more nuanced story on the relationship between immigration and violent crime regions (Tables 4 & 5). For the South, as immigration increases, the rate of violent crime decreases. The trend is supported in the South by a correlation between the immigration index and the rate of violent crime (r= -.06) and (r= -.07), significant at a .05 level. In the non-South, the direction of the trend is the same, yet it is smaller in degree (r= -.01) and (r= -.02) with both correlations being non-significant at a .05 level. This provides some basis for the examination of the effects of immigration at the various levels of immigration in 1990. By far, the most disadvantaged sample of cities in the South is those with levels of low immigration in 1990, similar to the trend in the non-South. In the non-South, there is more instability in areas with the highest levels of immigration.

Hypothesis 1

Table 6 shows the results from the negative binomial regression models for the two regions. First, drawing attention to the base level comparison of the two regions with only the immigration measure for 2000 included, the effect of immigration on the violent crime rate in the both regions is negative but not significant.

After adding controls for neighborhood disadvantage and residential instability, there are no significant changes in the impact of immigration. Consistent with previous research, though,

the measure for neighborhood disadvantage has a significant and positive relationship with the

violent crime rate for both regions while only in the non-South does residential instability have a

significant effect, though in the South the direction of the relationship is as predicted. None of

the effects of immigration are significant. This suggests that neighborhoods with higher

immigration levels have no effect on crime one way or the other.

Table 6. *Negative Binomial Regression Models of Census Tracts with Immigration, Percent Blacks, and Controls by Region on Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000) in 2000 with Clustered Estimates by County*

	South		Non-South	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 4	Model 5
Foreign Born Index 2000	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04	0.05
	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.11)	(0.05)
Neighborhood Disadvantage		0.85***		0.79***
		(0.08)		(0.05)
Residential Inequality		0.12		0.17***
		0.85***		(0.03)
Constant	-3.76***	-4.09***	-3.78***	-4.11***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.07)
N	1439	1439	4849	4849
Pseudo-R^2	0.001	0.066	0.000	0.077

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Hypothesis 2

A larger focus of this paper is the way the change in immigration in the South compared to the non-South impacts violent crime as well as how the early rate, before the influx of immigration, impacts violent crime. I use a residual change modeling technique where I include both the change and base year indices for immigration with 2000 controls and crime rates to examine the impact. In each model, there are no effects of immigration (Table 7).

Table 7. *Residual Change Negative Binomial Regression Models (1990–2000) of Census Tracts with Immigration, Percent Blacks, and Controls by Region on Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000) in 2000 with Clustered Estimates by County*

	South		Non-South		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 4	Model 5
Foreign Born Index 1990	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Change in Foreign Born Index (1990-2000)	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Neighborhood Disadvantage		0.85***		0.79***
		(0.08)		(0.05)
Residential Inequality		0.13*		0.17***
		(0.06)		(0.03)
Constant	-3.76***	-4.09***	-3.79***	-4.11***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.07)
N	1439	1439	4849	4849
Pseudo-R²	0.001	0.067	0.000	0.077

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Hypothesis 3

In the models with high, low, and average rates of immigration in 1990, as expected, there are more significant effects. In the 2000 models, for the South, in areas that had low immigration in 1990, there was a strong positive effect of immigration on violent crime (Model 1; Table 8). The exponentiated coefficient on the immigration index measure demonstrates that a unit increase in the immigration index would lead to an increase in the expected number of violent crimes by 203.44 percent by (percentage change $= [\exp(1.11) – 1] \times 100$), holding all other variables constant. Comparatively in the non-South, the effect is found in the area with a high level of immigration in 1990. This effect is significant yet small with a 7.69 negative effect.

In the residual change models, there was an effect found in the South on the measure of change in immigration. A unit increase in the change shows a 13.06 percent decrease in areas with high 1990s levels of immigration only. In the non-South again, only in areas with high levels in 1990 is there an effect. In the non-South on the 1990 year measure of immigration, a unit increase shows a 9.32 percent decrease in violent crime and on the change 1990-2000 measure, a unit increase in the change associated with a 4.88 percent decrease in the violent crime rate.

Table 8. *Negative Binomial Regression Models of Southern and Non-Southern Census Tracts with Immigration, Percent Blacks, and Controls on Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000) in 2000 with Clustered Estimates by County with Immigration at Low, Average, and High Levels*

| | South | | | Non-South | | |
| | Low | Average | High | Low | Average | High |
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Foreign Born Index 2000	1.11***	0.20	-0.09	0.17	0.15	-0.08*
	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.03)
Neighborhood Disadvantage	0.79***	0.94***	1.05***	0.91***	0.73***	0.72***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Residential Inequality	0.13	0.13	0.04	0.12*	0.20***	0.14***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-3.27***	-4.03***	-4.02***	-4.17***	-4.00***	-3.91***
	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.08)	(0.09)
N (percent of total tracts in region)	556	606	277	2128	1598	1119
Pseudo-R^2	0.064	0.063	0.052	0.097	0.056	0.049

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Table 9. Residual Change Negative Binomial Regression Models (1990-2000) of Southern Census Tracts with Immigration, Percent Blacks, and Controls on Combined Three Year Murder and Assault Rates (per 100,000) in 2000 with Clustered Estimates by County with Immigration at Low, Average, and High Levels

| | South | | | Non-South | | |
	Low	Average	High	Low	Average	High
	Model 1	Model 3	Model 5	Model 1	Model 3	Model 5
Foreign Born Index 1990	-0.27	0.36	-0.06	-0.04	0.34	-0.07*
	(0.74)	(0.25)	(0.05)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.04)
Change in Foreign Born Index (1990-2000)	-0.07	0.01	-0.14***	-0.14	-0.03	-0.05**
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Neighborhood Disadvantage	0.77***	0.95***	1.09***	0.86***	0.74***	0.72***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Residential Inequality	0.20*	0.13	0.05	0.17**	0.20***	0.13***
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	-4.25***	-4.00***	-4.14***	-4.31***	-3.97***	-3.91***
	(0.42)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.40)	(0.08)	(0.10)
N	594	606	277	2157	1598	1119
Pseudo-R^2	0.070	0.064	0.067	0.094	0.057	0.050

Note. Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Discussion

Divergent Regional Effects

Generally, destination cities have been used to explore the immigration crime relationship (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Lee & Martinez, 2002). In this paper, I used a large sample of cities within two larger regions to provide another perspective of this relationship. Contrary to some of the existing literature on immigration, using baseline models in 2000, there is no effect on immigration. This finding may be due to the approach of using a large sample of cities rather than comparing a small number of cities that serve as the extreme cases where immigration may have reached a critical mass. Yet, the inclusion of new destinations and areas that have yet to see large immigrant populations provides an expanded understanding of the immigrant-crime relationship.

Models that addressed the idea that immigration operates differently in areas where the base level of immigration was low, average, and high showed promising findings. In the South, the positive impact of immigration on crime (more immigration increases crime) was observed in areas where there was a low percentage of immigration in 1990. This finding provides some support for the distinctness of the South. The low relative base level of immigration may reinforce the argument that:

> "Smaller and more recent immigrant communities outside established destinations may have had less time to develop to a sufficient degree the economic and social ties necessary to contribute to immigrant revitalization. As a result, in new destination cities, levels of violent crime are unaffected by differences in immigrant composition or immigrant growth outside majority Latino neighborhoods" (Ramey, 2013, p. 599)

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In addition, the perceptions associated with immigrants pervasive in the South (e.g., distrust, criminogenic nature of immigrants, immigrants "take jobs") mostly seem to remain stable, isolated, and remain unchallenged due to the historic lack of immigrants to the region (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Johnson, Johnson-Webb, & Farrell, 1999; Neal & Bohon, 2003; Williams and Smith, 2006), though, due to the creation of services that show appreciation for the diverse cultural backgrounds of new immigrant groups, there seems to be some promise in cities like Nashville, TN (Ray & Morse, 2004) and in some areas across the state of North Carolina (Maitland, 2006, Marrow, 2005). These attitudes enhance conflict and combined with legacies of racial violence, the culture of the South may increase conflict and may relate to an acceptance of cultural norms associated with violence by immigrants. In the non-South models, areas that have high base levels of immigration using 1990 rates, show that immigration has a negative effect, which may be due to the ability for immigrant groups to build enclaves and develop their new locations, which provides some support for revitalization. This, coupled with the potential influence of the SCV in the South and its comparatively stronger history of exclusion, may explain the comparatively stronger crime diminishing role of immigration for the select cities outside of the South.

Focusing on the role of change in immigration, in the South, the change seems to have the greatest effect. This may be explained by the creation of a critical mass of immigrants where a push for both enclave development and political and social inclusion and participation diminish crime. The larger immigrant population may also increase alternative cultural norms. In addition, immigration to the South aids in de-isolation. This de-isolation may aid change in the norms, especially those related to the SCV. In the non-South models, the effect again is seen in areas

with high 1990 levels of immigrant concentration. Overall, these findings give some support for the argument of immigrant revitalization.

A Changing Landscape

The notion of immigrant revitalization paired with the SCV helps to better understand how changing the structural environment may initiate and change in the cultural one. More work can better evaluate what goes on in the "black box" of society that helps deconstruct the connection between culture and structure and how they influence behaviors.

Expanding on the theory that immigrants can change the culture, one potential explanation is diffusion of benefits from children of immigrants. Second generation immigrants or "1.5ers," may develop friendships and relationship with "native born" children in school, neighborhoods, and other communal spaces. Through these interactions, there may be the acceptance and development of norms which reflect those of both groups. Depending on the more dominant norms and the relative isolation of those in the area, there may be adaptations toward the SCV or away from it. Though there may not be a full-scale shift in the use of the cultural "tool" of violence, violence may become a less salient tool within the reactionary cultural toolkit. There is also the potential for a "leveling off" of the effect of immigration due to the acculturation of immigrant groups often seen by later generations of immigrations, "1.5ers." (Henry, 2013; Lyons et al., 2013; Kim, Brenner, Liang, & Asay, 2003).

Mediating Factors

There is the potential for immigrants to change or assimilate into the culture of the South and endorse and use the SCV norms and increase violence. There are also other factors in the South and related to the SCV and immigration that may mediate the relationship between

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increased immigration and immigrant revitalization and crime. These factors may prevent revitalization altogether.

Increased Formal and "Native" Informal Control

While formal control can deter crime, an increase in these controls may deter immigrants from settling in an area due to some immigrant groups having distrust for formal control agents (Correia, 2010). Relatedly, the increase in formal control may not quell the fears of southerners due to the history of distrust of formal social control agents and institutions. As seen in an instance of the KKK marching noted earlier (May, 1989) there may be the increase in informal control methods by formally and informally established hate and anti-immigrant groups. These factors reinforce the history of exclusion faced by blacks and other racial minorities and those of foreign birth and ultimately, may likely increase violence.

Political Opportunities

Lyons and his co-authors (2013) conclude that in order for communities to receive the benefits of immigrant revitalization, there must be receptive contexts. These receptive contexts can lead to increased political participation and increased public social control that can ultimately beget increased responsiveness of political agents and structures. They continue by suggesting that when the needs of these immigrant groups are met, there is the creation of stronger immigrant communities with high levels of trust. Creating more spaces for immigrant groups where they feel as they can trust established institutions and influence them can lead to a communal interest in attaining common goals, specifically those associated with decreasing crime (Lyons et al., 2013).

Minority Communities, Receptiveness, and Conflict

Due to high levels of immigration specifically to minority communities, another factor is feelings between immigrants and minority residents. Some research suggests that "minority respondents, especially Asians and African Americans, desire higher levels of immigration than non-Hispanic whites" (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996). With immigrants co-locating in these areas, the impact of immigration may the strongest effect in these neighborhoods (Diamond, 1998). And yet,

> "Both Chinese immigrants to the South during the late-nineteenth century and Cuban immigrants during the mid-twentieth century pursued a strategy of racial distancing, seeing themselves as being in economic and social competition with black Americans rather than as natural allies in the fight for social and political equality." (McClain et al., 2006, p. 573).

In addition, "the Mississippi Chinese began to see themselves as having more in common with whites than with blacks and acted on that perceived commonality," (McClain et al., 2006, p. 573). In the South, where there are higher levels of blacks, there may be the overall diminishing of cohesion and levels of informal social control as these negative attitudes directed at blacks are strongest when immigrants and blacks reside in the same neighborhoods (McClain et al., 2006).

A potential buffering factor comes when Latinos feel they are closely linked to their heritage and other Latino families. In this case, these individuals feel closer and hold less negative attitudes toward blacks in the South (McClain et al., 2006). Further, in non-urban locations, where there is linguistic isolation and in locations where there are shortages in employment opportunities, there is the potential for increases in violence against immigrants and violence within other minority populations, specifically blacks, thus decreasing the ability for immigration to have a crime dampening effect (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010). All these findings

suggest a need to explore the role of immigration within more non-urban areas like the Southern

Black Belt, a region with high crime, high rates of poverty, high percentage of blacks, fewer

jobs, and high levels of agriculture (Falk & Rankin, 1992; Gibbs, 2003; Glaser, 1994; Jeffries,

2009). As McClain et al. (2006) note,

> "The South still contains the largest population of black Americans in the United States
>
> and is considered their 'regional homeland.' Moreover, the South has suffered through
>
> some of the most politicized battles over race relations in recent history," and "how these
>
> new Latino immigrants situate themselves vis-à-vis black Americans has profound
>
> implications for the social and political fabric of the South" (McClain et al., 2006, p.
>
> 582).

Some research has suggested that immigration actually increases violent crimes through the

increased unemployment of blacks due to the acceptance of lower wages by some immigrants

(Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a). This increased unemployment leads to an increase in social

disorganization (Butcher & Card, 1991). Continuing research across disciplines must continue to

work to understand the complex and intersecting relationship of immigrant concentration, race,

inclusion, and crime in America through better grappling with the causes of negative attitudes

held by residents and immigrants alike (Sampson & Bean, 2006).

Limitations

There are also several significant limitations to the present research. Because my sample

does not include rural areas, the implications for the SCV may be limited. Along with this,

several tracts were removed due to the lack of Geographic Information System (GIS) data and

matching. Future work should be sure to use additional methods including GIS and other

software to better match historical census tracts and numbers with new ones. In addition, I don't

account for measures of political reception. Lastly, a point that should be evaluated further is the disaggregation of the "non-South" location measure that includes areas in the West where there has historically been a great deal of immigration. Because of the lack of exploration of these outliers, my results may be biased.

Summary and Conclusion

The crime depending effect of immigration has been considered deeply (Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez, 2000; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010). This and other research Sampson and Bean (2006) specifically called for continued evaluations of immigrant group experiences, noting that:

> "Mexican immigrants, despite their economic disadvantage, experience disproportionately lower rates of violence compared to second and third generation Americans. Concentrated immigrant enclaves also appear to be comparatively safe. Increasing diversity and immigration have thus not meant increasing crime as many imagine—if anything the opposite is true (p. 2)"

This observation suggests the need to explain more in depth the cause of this seeming paradox. I make the steps to highlight and continue the discussion of this conundrum. As shown by my analysis, there are some differences in the effect of immigrant concentration between the select cities in the South and those in regions outside of the South. In the case of immigration, "context matters" (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012, p. 166).

Future researchers should be careful to acknowledge that some immigrants may contribute to the SCV by bringing their own cultural norms associated with honor and thereby increase the violence. Furthermore, additional longitudinal studies may show a potential wearing off of the effect of immigration where the saturation of immigrant groups tied with the rate of assimilation

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may create null effects as seen here (Hagan, Levi, & Dinovitzer, 2008; Hagan & Palloni, 1999). In addition, the future studies should study the South's level of receptiveness as,

> "The ability of immigrants to revitalize their communities may depend on how attached immigrants feel toward receiving communities. By marginalizing newcomers, creating political cynicism, and instilling mistrust of the police and local authority, hostile regimes may set in motion the very processes they fear" (C. Lyons et al., 2013, p. 21).

In order to test many of these claims, more work on the interactive meso-level is needed (Sampson & Bean 2006). For example, more qualitative work, specifically interviews and ethnographic studies, should examine how immigrants have felt entering and living in new destination and what they feel can enhance feelings of belonging. In addition, more studies that examine how police training can help officers to garner trust in communities. Related to this, more studies that investigate the most effective methods of community oriented policing can be done to ensure general feelings of trust for all communities thereby potentially influencing the SCV and increasing the potential for immigrant revitalization.

Overall, as shown in my discussion, the hypotheses have found mixed support, but lead to this general conclusion: the neighborhood and larger regional contexts where immigrants move is important. In addition, immigrant concentration has mixed regional effects. More specifically, the South may be a difficult place where immigrant revitalization can take hold and there may be an increase in violence in places where there has not been early immigration. But, as also shown in my findings, there is promise in areas where the concentration of immigrants was high in 1990.

Immigration to the South continues at a high rate and it is important to consider what this new context means for immigration and specifically, immigrant revitalization and crime. It is

beneficial for work in the field of criminology and other social sciences to consider a broad range of historical, cultural, and social contexts. By studying the increase in immigration within a specific region that has had a historically distinct culture, we can better understand revitalization and its potential benefits. The lessons we can gain from understanding immigration can help us to better grapple with the ongoing issues of racial exclusion and violence. These lessons can ultimately lead to an increased understanding of how to prevent interpersonal violence and a reckoning with the reinforced legacy of violent and oppressive norms that breed more violence in the South and the rest of America.

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[i]The number tracts with missing data *N*=1326. Additionally, due to differences in census tracts from years 1990 to 2000, there were 1979 additional tracts with missing variables. I conducted t-test to compare the violent crime rate in areas with non-missing and missing data. There was a statistical difference in means between tracts with data missing (*M*=5.28, *SD*=5.75) and tracts with non-missing data (*M*=7.59, *SD*=9.13); t(8265)= -10.6, *p*=.00001. This finding diminishes the generalizability of the data as is a limitation of longitudinal studies using tract data.