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Imperial States and Civil Legacies:
Associational Life in the Former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and
Interwar Poland, ca. 1795-1939

By

Malgorzata Kurjanska

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

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Summer 2015

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Abstract

Imperial States and Civil Legacies: Associational Life in the Former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Interwar Poland, ca. 1795-1939

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Dylan J. Riley, co-Chair

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This dissertation examines how states shape civil society.¹ The past two decades have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in associational life. Some researchers place liberal civil society at the heart of democratic transformation and consolidation. Others question such claims, citing examples of authoritarian states supported by dense but illiberal associational landscapes. Yet there is a lack of research on the development of associational life. Responding to this gap in the literature, I ask what forces shape civil society and in particular its liberal or illiberal character?² Despite the paucity of scholarship focused on factors that mold civil society and its character, significant amounts of research have engaged questions of how the economy and political institutions shape liberal and illiberal political outcomes. Drawing on the implicit, and in a few instances explicit, claims found in disparate debates about the relationship of the state and market to civil society, I construct various state-centered and market-driven explanatory approaches of the development of liberal and illiberal civil societies. On the one hand, economic interest or market-driven approaches claim that capitalist development drives the emergence of classes, the self-organization of which promotes the development of liberal civil societies and the consolidation of democratic states. On the other hand, institutionalism and state-centered approaches argue that states, not markets, shape the character of civil society.

I examine these competing explanations of civil society and its character through an analysis of how economic development and state policies of cultural tolerance and political inclusion shaped civil society and its regional variation in pre-WWI regions of the former Lithuanian-Commonwealth (1795-1914) and of interwar Poland (1918-1939). Through a historical-comparative and narrative, mechanism-oriented, analysis, I propose a state-centered explanation of civil society that focuses on elites' conflicts, interests and the strategies that elites can apply in pursuit of those interests. I agree with economic interest

¹ I define civil society as a sphere of social organization or social capital that exists between the state, on the one hand, and the family and economy, on the other. While liberal civil society is one that promotes liberal ideals and political (democratic and inclusive) outcomes, illiberal civil society promotes illiberal ideals and political (authoritarian and exclusionary) outcomes.

² Building on existing literature, civil society character in pre-WWI and interwar Poland is conceptualized through (a) the degree of cross-ethnic integration, cooperation or fragmentation and (b) degree to which civil society is autonomous from or dominated by elites, particularly by one or a few groups.

approaches that economic development, particularly the growth of capitalist markets, promotes conditions favorable to the emergence and growth of associational life. However, I argue that the state, specifically the degree of political inclusion or exclusion of local elites and of the ethno-cultural autonomy or repression of the masses, plays a central role in shaping the liberal or illiberal character of civil society.

The end of the 18th century marked the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Russia, Prussia (the German Empire after 1871) and the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary after 1867). A historical-narrative analysis of the pre-WWI Warszawa Governorate in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, the independent and subsequently Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków in western Galicia and of the Austrian-ruled province of Lviv in eastern Galicia illuminates how state policies of cultural repression and political exclusion rather than economic development shaped the character of each region's civil society. While the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland saw the political exclusion of local ethnic majority elites and cultural repression of the masses accompanied by an industrial revolution, Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia's political exclusion of local majority elites and ethno-cultural repression and discrimination of the local Ukrainian masses was accompanied by economic underdevelopment. In comparison, the Duchy of Kraków not only experienced a long period of local autonomy, and thus the rule of local ethnic majority Polish elites, but when placed under Austrian rule, it saw the continuation of political inclusion of local elites and cultural autonomy of the local Polish masses. Political liberalism in western Galicia, however, was accompanied by the absence of an industrial revolution and general economic underdevelopment similar to that found in eastern Galicia.

Significant variation in economic development, political inclusion of local elites, and ethno-cultural discrimination aimed at the masses across the partitioned regions of the former Commonwealth facilitate a fruitful analysis of how state-backed cultural repression and political exclusion interacted with distinct paths of economic development and local ethno-cultural dynamics to shape the character of each region's late 19th and early 20th century civil society. Significant political and economic transformations within each case further enable the examination of how political and economic changes affected the developmental trajectory of each associational landscape. Thus, such cross-regional and cross-time comparisons allow for both an assessment of implied existing theoretical approaches to understanding and predicting the development of civil society and its character, and the development of an alternative approach focused on the relationship between the state and non-state elites.

Building on state-centered, postcolonial and nationalism theories, I support claims that variation in state-backed ethnic discrimination deepens ethnic cleavage. However, I diverge from such theories in assessing the implications of political exclusion of elites for civil society. Instead of arguing that exclusion of elites necessarily undermines their power, I show that increasing political exclusion of local ethnic majority elites contributes to elite domination of associational life. For instance, the political exclusion and marginalization of local ethnic majority elites in Warszawa and Lviv contributed to elite domination of social life as elites sought to augment their social backing within and through civil society as a means of countering state power. At the same time, imperial and local, respectively, state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination invaded practices of daily life, turning culture into a tool of political repression and, thus, of political resistance. As such, cultural repression allowed local, excluded elites to politicize and dominate the public sphere by forging a common identity and interests with the ethno-culturally repressed masses. Through cultural, cross-class alliances, elites mounted support for their political struggles with exclusionary ruling elites. Conversely, after the Austro-Hungarian compromise, local majority Polish elites in Kraków received local relative political and cultural autonomy. As elites focused on

negotiating power within political institutions associations developed more autonomously. Moreover, lacking cultural repression, Kraków developed a longer history of cross-ethnic cooperation.

Drawing on narrative and comparative analyses of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth, I suggest that elites³ in states with inclusive politics should protect their positions and power through participation within formal state institutions. Thus, by focusing on negotiation and cooperation with other elites within political society, these elites should allow civil society to develop more autonomously from both state and non-state elite control. However, when excluded from formal political institutions, elites should seek to counter state power through social mobilization within and through civil society. The degree to which their mobilization is successful, however, depends on the excluded and marginalized elites' ability and potential to muster significant alliances and support in civil society. In other words, the degree to which elites are successful in dominating associational life is rooted in their ability to draw on common identities or interests with broader masses. Economic and social transformations can significantly alter the identities and interests of elites, thus altering the strategies that they may be willing to enact. Yet the strategies that elites can successfully implement to forge broad-based alliances are largely shaped by the state. In particular, through policies of ethno-racial discrimination, states can provide excluded elites with the necessary mutual identities and interests to successfully dominate and mobilize large sectors of associational life, thus promoting the development of an illiberal—elite-dominated and ethno-racially fragmented—civil society.

In 1918, Poland re-emerged as an autonomous state. Its first years were marked by increased political marginalization and then temporary inclusion of minorities after Piłsudski's 1926 military coup. In 1930, Piłsudski's regime overtly increased its marginalization of left-wing and right-wing political actors. Once more, excluded elites fostered close, top-down ties to civil society as a means to challenge the state. The Second Polish Republic's significant political transformations allow for an auxiliary examination of competing explanatory approaches of the development of civil society's liberal or illiberal character, including the elite-centered argument proposed by this dissertation and developed through a historical-comparative analysis of the pre-WWI regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of civil society in two regions of interwar Poland illuminates the extent to which legacies of a century of imperial policies persevered, and the political and economic pressures under which they began to wane. Civil society that emerged in Kraków under pre-WWI policies of political inclusion and cultural toleration was more resistant to interwar political domination and ethnic fragmentation than that which emerged in Vilnius under pre-WWI policies of political exclusion and cultural repression. On the one hand, the analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of institutional stickiness in the face of external pressures. Moreover, it demonstrates specific internal mechanism of institutional reproduction, ones rooted in the ideals, habits and goals of members and others in associations' rules, which allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period. On the other hand, though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was waning. Thus, I show that though historical legacies embedded in civil society are persistent even in the face of significant external transformations, they are not impervious to externally-driven change.

³ Elites refers both to elite-groups and to elite-individuals with substantial control over a relevant form of capital—economic, cultural, social or symbolic—which they use to appropriate more or other forms of capital. Elite-individuals specifically refers to leaders, most often “cultural elites,” of non-elite groups who control significant social capital through their ability to mobilize the group or groups of which they are members.

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⁴ Listed in the order of mention in text.

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Chapter I: An Introduction.

Introduction

This dissertation examines how states shape civil society. The past two decades have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in associational life. Some researchers place *civil* society at the heart of democratic consolidation (Ekiert and Kubik 2001; Putnam 1994). Others question such claims, citing examples of authoritarian states supported by dense yet *illiberal* associational life (Berman 1997; Riley 2010). Missing from these debates are analyses of why civil society develops and why it promotes democratic regimes in some instances and authoritarian states in others. Thus, this dissertation asks: Why do associations arise and what leads them to develop a liberal or illiberal⁵ character? Some scholars suggest that economic development leads to the self-organization of classes and the emergence of liberal civil societies (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Others claim that states, not markets, shape the liberal or illiberal character of associational life. Using a historical-comparative and narrative analyses, I examine how variation in economic development and state policies shaped civil society and its regional variation in three regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth [1795-1914] and in interwar [1918-1939] Poland. I argue that the state, specifically the degree of political inclusion or exclusion of local elites⁶ and the degree of the ethno-cultural autonomy or repression of the masses, plays a central role in shaping the liberal or illiberal character of civil society.

The end of the 18th century marked the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Russia, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. Prior to their partitioning, lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, including the cities and surrounding areas of Warszawa, Kraków and Lviv, experienced at least two and a half and at most four centuries of common rule under one dominant culture and state. Following the partitioning of the Commonwealth, each distinct region was marked by a unique path of economic modernization and imperial state policies until the First World War. Narrative and comparative analyses of the pre-WWI Warszawa Governorate in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, the independent and subsequently Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków in western Galicia, and of the Austrian-ruled Lviv Province in eastern Galicia illuminate how state policies of cultural repression and political exclusion rather than the level of economic development molded the liberal or illiberal character of civil society in each distinct case.

⁵ A liberal civil society is defined as promoting democratic, thus inherently more inclusionary, political outcomes. An illiberal civil society is defined as promoting autocratic, thus inherently more exclusionary, political outcomes. These, of course, are ideal types. Actual states can be more difficult to place in one category or the other. For instance, though formally democratic and thus including some parts of society in the democratic process, some democracies can also be very exclusionary. Early democracies, for instance, allowed very few privileged members of society to take part in the democratic process and to wield actual political power. Similarly, while autocratic regimes are comparatively ruled by a few, those few can be very diverse with respect to some identities, such as ethnic or religious ones. However, in general, democratic states are conceived of as, if not including more types of individuals, then as including a greater number individuals in political power than autocratic states. Moreover, though not democratic, states can be democratizing, and thus moving toward including broader sectors of society. Conversely, authoritarian regimes usually grant some sort of political power to few individuals, if not fewer types of individuals. Furthermore, when moving further toward dictatorship they are viewed as limiting, rather than expanding, access to political power.

⁶ Defined in the next section.

Variation in the economic, political and social trajectories across regions of the formerly united state allows for a fruitful analysis of how distinct state policies shaped each region's 19th and 20th century civil society. Moreover, significant political and economic transformations *within* each case further facilitate an examination of how political and economic changes promoted the development of more liberal or more illiberal associational landscapes. In summation, such cross-regional and cross-time variation across these cases allows for a robust assessment of competing theoretical approaches to understanding and predicting the development of civil society and of its character.

Despite significant industrial development, political exclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural discrimination in Russian-ruled lands of Congress Poland promoted the formation of an illiberal associational landscape by the turn of the 20th century. The latter was characterized by high levels of politicization and elite domination of civil society, as well as by ethnically-exclusionary⁷, cross-class and culturally-based cooperation between Polish⁸—ethnic majority—elites and Polish masses. Local Polish elites utilized such alliances, which they forged through civil society, to mobilize broad social support for their political struggles with the imperial state and economic struggles with urban minorities. Conversely, after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian compromise, Polish elites received relative autonomy in Austrian-ruled Galicia. The political inclusion of Polish elites, who were still largely traditional and landed, focused the pursuit of their goals on negotiation within formal political institutions. Thus, with Polish elites looking towards dominating political society, associational life was able to develop with relative autonomy from their domination and control. Furthermore, lower levels of ethno-cultural repression and discrimination, particularly of the local ethnic majority (Polish), enabled Kraków and its surrounding areas in western Galicia to develop a longer history of cross-ethnic cooperation.

Galicia's regional autonomy meant the general inclusion of local ethnic majority elites in *western* Galicia (Kraków), where the majority of both elites and masses was Polish. Yet the same relative autonomy of Polish rule in Austrian Galicia promoted a different kind of state-society relations in *eastern* Galicia (Lviv), where the majority of the masses was ethnically Ukrainian. The latter was characterized by the political exclusion of local ethnic majority elites (Ukrainian, mostly cultural elites) and significantly higher levels of ethno-cultural discrimination and repression. In addition to the perpetuation of political exclusion of local ethnic majority (Ukrainian) elites by local ethnic minority (Polish) elites, eastern Galicia saw the continuation of a historical ethno-racial division of labor. This historical division of labor was characterized by mostly Ukrainian peasant masses ruled by mostly Polish and Polish-assimilated landed elites. Hence, though Austrian rule led to the political inclusion of Polish elites in both Lviv and Kraków, state-society dynamics of the former resembled those of Russian-ruled Congress Poland more so than those of the latter. Thus, it is not surprising that Lviv's 19th and early 20th century civil society was, in comparison to that of Kraków, marked by high levels of ethnic fragmentation, increasing politicization and domination of rural associational life by nationalistic organizations led by marginalized Ukrainian cultural elites. As such, eastern Galicia's associational landscape resembled that of Russian-ruled Congress Poland more so than of its western Galician counterpart.

⁷ Ethnically-exclusionary ideas, organizations or alliances are forged on shared ethnic (or cultural, see the following footnote) grounds, and which often reinforce intra-ethnic (and intra-cultural) belonging by overtly excluding individuals of other ethnic backgrounds.

⁸ Throughout this dissertation, I use qualifiers such as Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, German, Austrian, etc. to denote ethnic, rather than national, belonging. Though ethnicity and culture are not strict synonyms, in the cases that I analyze ethnicity was heavily, though not exclusively, defined by culture and language. In addition to culture, ethnicity overlapped with religion in many, though not all, instances.

Building on comparative and narrative analyses of pre-WWI cities and surrounding areas of Warszawa, Kraków and Lviv, and drawing on modernization, postcolonial and elite conflict theories, I argue that states, rather than markets shape the liberal or illiberal character of associational life. A comparative analysis of these regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suggests that economic development contributes to the growth of certain sectors of civil society, such as market-oriented associations. Nevertheless, through a cross-time and narrative analysis of each individual case, as well as a comparative examination of all three regions, I suggest that the state plays a fundamental part in shaping the liberal or illiberal character of civil society. Specifically, I argue that political exclusion leads marginalized elites to seek to dominate associational life as a means of countering state power. Such strategies, however, are only successful when excluded elites are able to call upon identities or interests that they share with broader masses. Along with states, economic transformations can provide elites with mutual economic interests or identities through which they can seek to forge alliances with broader social groups. Yet it is the state that strengthens or undermines social cleavages through repressive or discriminatory policies targeted at, for example, ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious groups. Thus, it is the state that allows or hinders excluded elites from successfully drawing upon shared identities and interests to mobilize significant support through civil society.

In 1918, Poland re-emerged as an autonomous state, once more reuniting Warszawa, Kraków and eventually Lviv under a single regime. The interwar state, which began as an ethnically-exclusionary democracy, became an ethnically-inclusionary though an increasingly ideologically-exclusionary dictatorship after Piłsudski's 1926 coup d'état. In 1930, Piłsudski's regime began to repress its left-wing and right-wing opposition more overtly and more violently. In 1935, the autocratic state augmented its ideologically repressive policies with a return to ethnically-exclusionary ones, thus further moving toward fascism. Interwar Poland's significant political transformations enable productive cross-time comparisons. Such intra-case, cross-time comparisons allow for an auxiliary examination of both existing theoretical approaches and of the proposed alternative explanation that I develop through the comparative analysis of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth. A narrative analysis of interwar Polish civil society and of its reactions to the political and economic turmoil of the interbellum state demonstrates that, like their pre-WWI counterparts, politically excluded or marginalized elites sought to foster close, top-down ties to civil society as a means to challenge the exclusionary and repressive state.

Second, an analysis of civil society in interwar Poland illuminates the extent to which civil legacies of over a century of distinct foreign rule persisted across its regions, and the political and economic pressures under which they began to wane. The redrawing of political boundaries after WWI allows for a fruitful examination of the extent to which pre-WWI legacies of different state-society relations had become embedded within the distinct civil societies of each region. The analysis of interwar Poland suggests that civil societies that emerged under policies of political inclusion and cultural toleration were more resistant to interwar domination by elites and ethnic fragmentation than associational landscapes that developed in an atmosphere of political exclusion and ethno-cultural repression prior to the First World War. Thus, a cross-regional analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of some institutional resilience in the face of external pressures. Moreover, it demonstrates certain internal mechanisms of institutional reproduction which allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period. Such legacies, and the internal institutional mechanisms that reproduced them, however, were not impervious to change. Over the course of the interbellum period, and under the weight of significant external

political and economic pressures, civil society began to converge in character across disparate regions of interwar Poland.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on civil society and to Eastern European historiography by illustrating and examining the development of 19th and early 20th associational life in regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and of interwar Poland, both of which have largely been overlooked in existing research. In addition to its empirical contributions, this research bears on contemporary debates on civil society by both proposing specific theoretical contributions on how states shape civil society and by calling for a reconceptualization of civil society itself. Some scholars have critiqued normative claims that equate civil society with liberal democratic outcomes. Nonetheless, much of the contemporary political and sociological literature continues to conflate structural claims about civil society, such as organizational density, with normative claims that define civil society through its ability to support democratic consolidation.

I argue that to understand the relationship between civil society and the state, future research must first clarify the relationship between civil society and political outcomes. I propose to do so by defining civil society in strictly structural terms and by introducing the concept of civil society character. The latter, while defined in normative terms, is mostly conceptualized in structural ones. Furthermore, I suggest that future research ought to analyze both (a) the normative implications of specific structural aspects of associational life and (b) the developmental mechanisms of these structural characteristics of civil society. Following these suggestions, the analyses and findings presented in this dissertation focus on how states, and to some extent economic and social factors, shape two specific structural characteristics of civil society that existing research has already persuasively linked to liberal or illiberal political outcomes. These are: (a) the ties or linkages of civil society to elites, conceived of as the degree of domination by or autonomy from elites, particularly a single elite; and (b) the ability of associations to reinforce or cut across significant social cleavages, thereby promoting or undermining radicalism, conceived of as the degree of cross-ethnic cooperation and integration or fragmentation within civil society. Civil society, civil society character and the two structural aspects of that character on which I focus in my analyses are further discussed in the following section.

I. Key Concepts

Elites

Building on Bourdieu's (1989) concept of capital and Lachmann's (1990) notion of elites, this dissertation defines elites as individuals or groups with substantial control over a relevant form of capital— e.g. economic, cultural, social, symbolic or political—which they use to appropriate more or other forms of capital. The concept of elite-groups refers to groups, such as landowners or the large bourgeoisie, whose members hold considerable control over a form of capital both as individuals and as a group. The notion of elite-individuals refers to the leaders of non-elite groups who can mobilize and control the latter, thereby endowing such individuals with significant social capital. An elite can remain as such despite transformations in its political, social or economic position, so long as its members retain control of at least one relevant form of capital. For instance, before the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1795), Polish nobles controlled symbolic, economic, cultural and political capital. Under Russian rule, traditional Polish elites progressively lost their political, social and often economic power and privileges. Yet, by largely retaining control over cultural capital many continued to be members of a relevant, though now mostly of a cultural, elite.

Civil Society

This dissertation rejects normative definitions that equate civil society with liberal democracy. Rather, I define civil society as a sphere of legal or illegal social organization, institutionalized networks and public discourse that exists in the public sphere between the state (Tenfelde 2000:91; White 2004:10), family and economy (Burawoy 2003:198–9; Cohen 1992:143). Civil society includes institutions of public discourse, institutionalized social networks and voluntary associations⁹ regardless of their ideological or political implications (Foley and Edwards 1996; White 2004:9-10). Thus, civil society excludes family structures, purely market driven organizations and state-controlled organizations, such as state-run schools. It includes all social, cultural and broad interest associations with voluntary participation regardless of their liberal or illiberal implications. Moreover, it includes economically-oriented and informational organizations that are based on voluntary participation and are not purely market-oriented, such as labor unions and worker cooperatives. Some definitions of civil society exclude illegal organizations; these organizations, however, are included as part of civil society in this study. Furthermore, I conceive of civil society as including typically state-run organizations that are at least in part independent from the state, such as paramilitary organizations or community-organized schools.

While I define the *character* of civil society in normative terms, I conceptualize it largely in structural ones. The character of civil society refers to characteristics or aspects of civil society that are likely to promote liberal (democratic, inclusionary) or illiberal (authoritarian, exclusionary) ideals and political outcomes. Some scholars suggest that a civil society is liberal when dominated by liberal ideals, such as tolerance (Lipset 1959:84; Putnam 1995:66). I do not dispute that civil societies dominated by liberal ideals are more likely to promote liberal—democratic (more inclusionary) states, and that those dominated by illiberal ideals promote illiberal—autocratic (more exclusionary) regimes. Clearly, if a civil society is dominated by liberal ideals, then it will most likely support the domination of liberal ideals in political society by promoting (a) their spread through its organizations and (b) the political success of actors who subscribe to them. Furthermore, defining the character of civil society in part through its promotion of illiberal or liberal ideals is useful, as doing so abets in understanding the ties between civil society and political outcomes. It does this by providing a conceptual distance between civil society and political outcomes. Creating a conceptual distance between political and civil society reduces the likelihood of replicating a common mistake which defines civil society and political systems in mutually inclusive terms (Edwards and Foley 1998). Moreover, it allows us to conceive of liberal civil societies as potentially existing under authoritarian regimes and of illiberal civil societies as potentially existing under democratic states.

While defining civil society through its domination by or promotion of specific ideologies is useful, conceptualizing it solely through such terms would not push the understanding of civil society's relationship to political outcomes far enough. Defining civil society through its likelihood to promote liberal or illiberal ideals, alongside its likelihood of

⁹ I consider religiously affiliated associations, such as religious philanthropic associations, as part of civil society of the pre-WWI and interwar cases included in this dissertation. Participation in such organizations did not necessarily overlap with religious identification, thus was, to some extent, voluntary. In such cases religious institutions provided resources that promoted the construction of civil society. However, I exclude religious institutions themselves. The extent to which participation in religious institutions is voluntary is case specific and it would be erroneous to view religious affiliation in either pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth or in interwar Poland as not having been socially coerced.

promoting liberal or illiberal political outcomes, reformulates the original question from “what leads some civil societies to promote liberal states?” into “what makes some civil societies more likely to promote, or be dominated by, liberal or illiberal ideals?” This re-orientation of the original question is useful as it shifts the focus away from civil society as the agent of political change and onto civil society as the object of change. This shift is beneficial precisely because it begs the questions of “what characteristics of associational life make it more or less likely to promote liberal or illiberal ideals?” and “what external forces drive the development of these characteristics?” Therefore, this re-orientation of the original question suggests that civil society character should be conceptualized through specific structural characteristics of associational life that make it more likely to be dominated by liberal or illiberal ideologies, and thus to promote liberal or illiberal political outcomes.

Hence, while I use the prevalence of liberal or illiberal ideals within civil society as *one* indicator of its liberal or illiberal character, I mainly conceptualize the character of civil society through two structural characteristics of associational life that existing research has persuasively tied to promoting, and not just reflecting, liberal or illiberal ideologies and political outcomes. Though these structural characteristics can be, and to some extent certainly are themselves driven by ideology, existing studies, which I discuss below, have persuasively argued that these characteristics also drive the spread of liberal or illiberal ideals amongst organizations’ members and civil society in general. The two specific structural characteristics through which I conceptualize and analyze the character of civil society are: (1) the degree of politicization and domination of civil society by elites, particularly by one or a few elite groups, and (2) the degree to which civil society cuts across or reinforces significant social cleavages.¹⁰ Once more, I focus on these two characteristics as there is a significant body of scholarly research that persuasively backs their ability to not merely reflect, but to also perpetuate liberal or illiberal ideals. However, I do not suggest that these are the only structural characteristics of civil society that make it more or less likely to promote liberal or illiberal ideals and political outcomes. Future research should certainly explore other characteristics of liberal and illiberal civil societies and how these are influenced by states, social tensions and economic growth.

(1) Relative autonomy

Some scholars suggest that civil society’s autonomy from elites, specifically from domination by a single elite, makes it more likely to promote liberal (democratic, inclusive) outcomes (Berman 1997; Diamond 1994; Ertman 1998; Hechter 2000; Huber et al. 1993:85; Paxton 2002). Scholars argue that the lack of state or elite-group domination of civil society allows for the *self*-organization of subordinate groups (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992:8-9). As leaders organize subordinate groups in pursuit of their mutual interests, they gain the organizational power necessary to negotiate for political inclusion. Luebbert (1987) extends this argument, suggesting that the self-organization of subordinate groups not only allows them to gain political inclusion, but that the successful political incorporation of previously excluded groups liberalizes existing political institutions (452-3). In other words, it paves the way for other excluded groups that wish to gain political rights. I further expand on this argument by suggesting that political inclusion of subordinate groups liberalizes states by both increasing the number of groups included in political decision-making and by creating a framework and a precedent for successful, rather than de-stabilizing, political incorporation.

¹⁰ Significant cleavages themselves are case-specific, therefore they necessitate case-specific answers. In the pre-WWI lands of the former Commonwealth and in interwar Poland, the predominant and most significant non-economic social cleavages were ethnic. As such, I focus on ethno-cultural cleavages in my research.

Conversely, the domination of associational life by elites, particularly by a single or a few elites, can lead to illiberal political outcomes (Berman 1997). First, domination or repression of associational life by state or non-state elites can prevent the self-organization of subordinate groups (Rueschemeyer et. al 1992:8-9). The inability of subordinate groups to self-organize hinders their ability to gain the organizational strength needed to bargain for political inclusion (Huber et. al 1993:74). Without organizational power, subordinate groups are unlikely to achieving political inclusion. Furthermore, without the precedent of successful political incorporation of previously subordinate and excluded groups—such as of the relatively small bourgeoisie—political institutions are not fundamentally liberalized through the creation of a precedent for the successful and stable political incorporation of other excluded, and especially larger, groups—such as the working class. Second, elite domination of associations and public discourse, particularly by one or a few elite-groups, provides elites with an organizational apparatus with which they can gain support from wide sectors of society, and which they can utilize to replicate social or political cleavages and pursue exclusionary and extremist outcomes (Berman 1997; Lipset 1981:75). In other words, if one or a few elites dominate civil society, they may utilize their relatively undisputed social power to promote either liberal or illiberal ideologies, and repress or marginalize opposing views, depending on their particular incentives and interests.¹¹ Hence, a liberal civil society—one more likely to promote democratic (more inclusive) outcomes—is characterized by a relative autonomy from domination by elites, particularly by a single elite. The domination of associational life by a few elites marks an illiberal civil society—one more likely to promote illiberal (more exclusionary) political outcomes.

(2) *Undermining or replicating social cleavages*

Other scholars suggested that the degree to which civil society cuts across or reinforces “significant” social cleavages not only reflects liberal or illiberal attitudes, but also makes civil society more or less likely to promote liberal ideals and political outcomes. Proponents of this view argue that cross-cutting associations promote the interaction of individuals from different backgrounds; by allowing members to learn about other groups they encourage understanding and “generalized trust,” which extends past the specific individuals with whom they interact to broader social groups (Marschall and Stolle 2004; Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000:23). Furthermore, cross-cutting associations can promote liberal values, such as tolerance, by allowing individuals to construct multi-group, cross-cutting, rather than single-group, difference-reinforcing, identities (Cosser 1956:153-154; Kornhauser 1959:78; Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000:23, 269-71; Tocqueville 1969:192-195). Thus, cross-cutting groups, interactions and alliances are less likely to support illiberal, exclusionary ideals and institutions, because their members are (1) less likely to fall under the sway of one institution or group (Lipset 1981:75-7), and (2) more likely to develop generalized tolerance and trust. Conversely, associations that reinforce significant social cleavages can promote illiberal, exclusionary ideals and institutions by reinforcing individuals’ stereotypes and mistrust of members of other groups (Bobo 1988).

It is important to note that in not specifying what is a “significant” social cleavage such arguments both allow for and necessitate case-specific answers. Though distinctions of

¹¹ This particular phenomenon is discussed in Chapter II’s analysis of the Warszawa governorate, where domination of civil society by a relatively few elites at first meant the promoting of *liberal* ideals. Yet as interests of elites who had dominated large sectors of civil society changed, they increasingly sought to utilize their control over civil society associations and networks to support *illiberal* ideals. Therefore, their initial role in creating the associational landscape, and continual domination of it, facilitated their ability to subsequently utilize social associations and networks to promote illiberal and exclusionary ideals.

estate or class should not be diminished, in the cases of the pre-WWI regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and of interwar Eastern Europe, including Poland, the most significant cleavages were ethnic (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010:1091; Mann 1999:33-35). Thus, in assessing the degree to which civil society in the pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth and in interwar Poland replicated and reinforced or cut-across and diminished the importance of “significant” social cleavages, I focus on ethno-cultural cleavages. In most instances, though not all (e.g. Poles and Austrians were both generally Roman Catholic), ethnic identification also overlapped with religion.

II. Methodology: case selection and data

Comparative Analysis and Case Selection

This dissertation focuses on two specific questions: What factors shape the liberal or illiberal character of civil society? Once formed, once in place, to what extent do legacies embedded in the associational landscape continue to shape civil society—thereby influencing future political development—and to what extent do they respond to new, external pressures for change? To answer the first question, I examine how different levels of economic growth and policies of cultural repression and political exclusion influenced civil society development in three regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: Russian-ruled Warszawa Governorate in the Kingdom of Poland, Austrian-ruled lands of the Free City of Kraków (known as the Duchy of Kraków), and Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia, with a focus on the province of Lviv. I selected these cases because a cross-regional comparison between them and cross-time comparisons within each case provide variation in key causal variables of interest: (1) economic development, (2) political inclusion, marginalization or exclusion of local elites, (3) state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination, and (4) the degree to which ethno-cultural cleavages align with, or cut across, class or estate distinctions.

Chapter II employs a historical narrative analysis of the Warszawa Governorate to show how increasing political exclusion of local, ethnic majority elites and ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of the masses interacted with market and state driven economic transformations to foster the emergence of an illiberal civil society. The latter was marked by (1) the domination, politicization and militarization of public discourse and associational life by elites and (2) increasing ethnic-fragmentation in favor of cross-class cooperation. Whereas Chapter II focuses solely on the analysis of the Russian-ruled Warszawa Governorate, Chapter III introduces two sub-regional comparative cases: that of eastern Galicia, as represented by Lviv and that of western Galicia, as represented by Kraków. In comparison to the case of the Russian-ruled Warszawa, an analysis of Austrian-ruled Kraków examines how the (1) political inclusion and relative political autonomy of local majority—Polish—elites, and (2) a relative lack of ethno-cultural discrimination of the masses, fostered the development of a civil society that was (a) more autonomous from elite domination, particularly by a single elite, and (b) marked by a higher degree of cross-ethnic cooperation. Lviv, like Kraków, was under pre-WWI Austrian rule, and thus was subject to similar policies. However, while Kraków’s politically included Polish elites belonged to the ethnic majority, Lviv’s politically included Polish elites belonged to the local ethnic minority. Thus, whereas Galician regional autonomy under Austrian rule meant the (1) political incorporation of local, traditional, economic and cultural, all mainly ethnic majority elites and (2) the relative absence of ethno-cultural discrimination or repression of the masses in *western* Galicia (Kraków), it meant the (1) political marginalization of ethnic majority, mostly

cultural, elites and (2) higher levels of ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of the masses in *eastern* Galicia (Lviv). As such, despite being ruled by the same imperial state, Kraków developed a relatively more liberal civil society while Lviv, like Warszawa, developed a comparatively more illiberal, particularly with respect to ethnic fragmentation, associational landscape.

Table 1, below, highlights the cross-regional variation in the key variables of interests that existed between the cities and surrounding areas of Warszawa, Kraków and Lviv prior to the First World War. Table 2, which follows, summarizes the pre-WWI variation in key state policies and the corresponding civil society outcome, with respect to the relative domination of associational life by elite-groups and the level of ethnic fragmentation.

	Imperial State	Economic Development	Poles as a Percent of the Population ^a	Political Exclusion of Ethnic Majority Elites	Forced Assimilation	Ethno-Racial Division of Labor
Warszawa	Russia	Industry, Medium-High	89.8	High	High	No
Kraków	Austria	Agriculture, Commerce, Low-Medium	93.0	Low	Low	No
Lviv	Austria	Agriculture, Commerce, Low-Medium	46.5 ^b	High (Mixed)	Medium	Yes

Table 1. Pre-WWI Case Comparisons

Notes: ^a Percentage of the population identified as Roman Catholic. Data from the 1921 census, published in *Annuaire Statistique*, GUS 1924, p. 12-16.

^b Percentage of the population identified as Roman Catholic. Author's own calculations based on data from the 1921 census, published in the *Pierwszy Powszechny Spis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 30 Września 1921 roku, Województwo Lwowskie*, GUS 1927, Table VI, p. 30.

	Key pre-WWI Policies		Pre-WWI Civil Society Character	
	Political Exclusion or Marginalization of Local Elites	Ethno-cultural Discrimination and Repression	Relative Autonomy from "Elite" Domination	Cross-ethnic Cooperation or Integration
Warszawa	High	High	Low	Low
Kraków	Low	Low	High	High
Lviv	High (Mixed)	Medium	Medium	Low

Table 2. Pre-WWI Case Outcomes

A comparative analysis of the development of a more liberal civil society in pre-WWI Kraków and of a more illiberal associational life in Lviv and Warszawa seeks to answer the question of what leads civil society, and particularly associational life, to become liberal or illiberal in character. Interwar Poland's significant political transformations allow for an additional examination of existing theoretical approaches and of the proposed alternative explanation, which I develop out of a comparative analysis of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth. To assess how significant political transformations influenced political, and subsequently, civil society, the narrative and cross-time comparative analysis presented in Chapter IV focuses on three significant turning points of the interwar Polish state: 1926, 1930 and 1935. Though interwar Poland began as a formal democracy, it pursued political marginalization of ethnic minorities, ethnic discrimination and policies akin to forced assimilation. Piłsudski's 1926 coup d'état brought Polish democracy to an end, temporarily transforming Poland into a more ethnically tolerant, but autocratic, state. Though Piłsudski's rule was marked by a higher level of ethnic inclusion, it was also characterized by increasing repression of oppositional political parties. Moreover, in the late 1920s and early 1930s,

Piłsudski's democracy moved from more covert¹² marginalization of oppositional political groups, to a more pronounced repression of the regime's opponents. In 1935, after Piłsudski's death, the interwar state returned to policies of increasing political marginalization and ethno-cultural discrimination against the nation's ethnic minorities. The combination of ethno-culturally exclusionary and discriminatory policies with the perpetuation of the autocratic regime's repression of its opponents moved the interwar state closer, and close to, fascism.

As in pre-WWI Congress Poland, the exclusion of Polish political elites shifted political competition from formal state institutions and into the public sphere, leading to the politicization and political domination of associational life through all regions of the interbellum state. Poland's temporary transition away from ethnic discrimination and toward ethno-cultural toleration in 1926 fostered cooperation between the state and ethnic minority elites. However, the rise in popularity of ethnically-exclusionary notions of nation, and the state's post 1935 return to policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination contributed to growing tensions and ethnic fragmentation in interwar Poland. Ethnic fragmentation was reflected and perpetuated by civil society as some associations placed ethnic restrictions on their memberships and others saw the exodus of minority members to separate organizations.

The first part of Chapter IV assesses the extent to which political and civil society of the Second Polish Republic reacted to the 1926, 1930 and 1935 transformations in interwar politics in ways similar to their pre-WWI counterparts. While doing so, the narrative-historical analysis of interwar Polish civil society also highlights significant ways in which legacies of pre-WWI rule that had become embedded in each region's civil society began to wane under the political and economic pressures of the interbellum era. The second part of Chapter IV further leverages the redrawing of political boundaries after the First World War, which, after over a century of distinct political and developmental trajectories, reunited regions of the former Commonwealth under common, Polish rule. It is this redrawing of political boundaries after WWI that enables a fruitful examination of the extent to which pre-WWI imperial policies that were embedded within civil society waned or persevered in the face of external interwar political and economic pressures. Thus, the second part of Chapter IV employs a historical comparative analysis to compare two regions of interwar Poland, which, prior to WWI, had experienced divergent policies of political inclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination.

Specifically, in the second part of Chapter IV, I compare the degree of political domination and ethnic fragmentation of interwar Vilnius, which prior to WWI had been under politically exclusionary and culturally repressive rule and of interbellum Kraków, which prior to WWI experienced significant periods of political inclusion and cultural autonomy of local elites. The case of Vilnius replaces that of Warszawa for this interwar comparison because interwar data for the latter was destroyed during World War II. However, individual-level data on the political affiliation of associations' members that was collected by the interwar state throughout its territories is still available for Vilnius and Kraków. Table 3, below, summarizes the variation in (1) pre-WWI policies of political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination, and in (2) interwar demographic and economic variation of the Vilnius and Kraków voivodeships.¹³ Table 4, which follows, presents and summarizes the relationship between (1) distinct pre-WWI policies of political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination, as characterized by the Vilnius and Kraków regions, and (2) interwar civil society outcomes, with respect to ethnic fragmentation and associational domination by a single political party. During the interwar period, both Kraków and Vilnius had fairly low

¹² The one exception was the visible and significant repression of the radical, communist left, which was a constant factor of Poland's policies throughout the interwar period.

¹³ A voivodeship (*województwo*), is an administrative division similar to a province.

levels of economic development and Poles were the ethnic majority in both. Yet they experienced significantly different policies of political exclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural discrimination of the masses (or forced assimilation) prior to WWI.

	<i>Interwar Characteristic</i>			<i>Pre-WWI Imperial Legacies</i>		
	Pre-WWI Imperial State	Economic Development ^a	Poles as a Percent of the Population ^b	Political Exclusion of Ethnic Majority Elites	Forced Assimilation	Ethno-Racial Division of Labor
Vilnius	Russia [<i>Kresy</i>]	Low [10.2%]	62.5	High	High	High
Kraków	Austria	Medium-Low [18.6]	89.0	Low	Low	Low

Table 3. Interwar Poland, Comparative Cases

Notes: ^a Percentage of the economically active local population employed in industry. Data from the 1931 census, published in *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny*, GUS 1938, 32-34.

^b Percentage of the population according to religion, with Roman Catholics counted as Poles. Data from the 1931 census, published in *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny*, GUS 1938, 25.

<i>Relative Interwar Civil Society Character</i>		
Region [Key Pre-WWI State Policies]	Relative Autonomy from “elite” domination	Cross-ethnic cooperation or integration
Vilnius [political exclusion of local elites, higher ethnic fragmentation]	Lower	Lower
Kraków [political inclusion of local elites, higher ethnic integration]	Higher	Higher

Table 4. Imperial Civil Legacies, Pre-WWI and Interwar Civil Society Character

The narrative analysis of interwar Poland suggests that, under new political and economic pressures, civil and political society began to converge in character across all regions of the interbellum state. However, the large-N comparative analysis presented in the second part of Chapter IV demonstrates that, despite a progressive national convergence in associational character, civil society in Kraków was more resistant to political domination and ethnic fragmentation than its counterpart in Vilnius. In other words more liberal associations that emerged under pre-WWI policies of greater political inclusion and cultural toleration were able, to some degree, to resist external pressures that promoted the development of more illiberal civil society organizations during the interwar period. Yet though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was visibly waning. As such, I suggest that though internal mechanism of institutional reproduction can be persistent in the face of significant political and economic pressures for transformation, they are not immutable. With time, despite internal—regulation and habit driven—processes of organizational reproduction, civil society associations, particularly ones truly based on an open and voluntary membership, succumb to external, and particularly to state-driven, change.

Historical Narrative Analysis

The comparison of three pre-WWI cases of the former Commonwealth and of two cases of interwar Poland enables a robust analysis of how variation in political inclusion and exclusion of elites, ethno-cultural discrimination of broader groups, and economic development influence the character of civil society. Additionally, each case relies on a

qualitative, narrative historical analysis that connects macro-historical processes to micro-level claims of groups', particularly of their elites', interests through an examination of specific causal mechanism (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2010; Griffin 1993:1125-6). Chapters II, III, and the first part of Chapter IV trace how specific causal mechanism—(1) political exclusion or inclusion of local elites (2) state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of the masses, and (3) state or market induced economic competition—impact the relative positions and thus interests of relevant groups, such as elite-groups, classes or ethnic groups, by highlighting points of historical transformation or intensification of each factor. Thus, the narrative analysis of each case focuses on how states, and specifically (1) intensifications or transformations of particular state policies, influenced (2a) the interests of elites¹⁴ and (2b) the strategies or social alliances that elites could successfully pursue to reach their goals, and how subsequently elites' interests, and in particular their transformations, shaped (3) the character of civil society. Once more, civil society character is conceptualized as the degree of autonomy from or domination by elites, particularly one or a few elites, and the level of ethnic integration or fragmentation.

Points of significant transformation of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland include: (1) the second partition of the Polish Commonwealth and the Polish elites' reaction as seen through the Four Year Sejm and Kościuszko's rebellion; (2) the annexation of the Duchy of Warszawa by the Russian empire, progressive exclusion of Polish elites and their response as seen through the 1830 November Uprising; (3) increasing marginalization and repression of Polish elites and the 1863 January uprising; (4) and increasing political exclusion of local elites and cultural repression of the masses after 1863. Points of significant transformation of Austrian-ruled Galicia, with a focus on the Duchy of Kraków include: (1) the political inclusion of Polish elites in the independent Republic of Kraków (1815-1846) on the one hand, the political exclusion and cultural repression of Polish elites under early Habsburg rule (1772-1848) on the other hand, and the social and civil society implications of each as seen through the 1846 Kraków uprising; (2) the transformation of the Habsburg monarchy from the harshest to the most liberal of the Commonwealth's partitioning powers (1860s), as characterized by the political inclusion of local Polish elites and Polish cultural autonomy in Galicia; (3) the introduction of universal and equal suffrage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1907. Points of significant political transformation of the interbellum Polish state, in addition to the formation (1918) and dissolution (1939) of the Second Polish Republic, include: (1) the 1926 military coup that transformed an ethnically discriminatory interwar Polish democracy into a more ethnically tolerant, though autocratic state; (2) a significant turn away from political inclusion toward the political exclusion and repression of the regime's political opposition (ca. 1929-1930), and (3) Piłsudski's death, increasing political exclusion of the state's opposition and a return to ethnically discriminatory policies (1935).

Sources and Data

The analysis and findings presented in this dissertation are rooted in research conducted over twenty-three months in four branches of the Polish National Archives (AP: Warszawa, Kraków, Katowice and Poznań), the Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN) and the Central Archives of Historical Records (AGAD) in Warszawa, as well as in the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine (TsDIAL) in Lviv and the Lithuanian State Central Archives (LCVA) in Vilnius. Documents collected across these archives include registries of organizations, government reports on social and political organizations,

¹⁴ Elites' interests are to retain, and if possible to increase, the capital that they already control and to utilize that capital to increase their hold on other types of capital.

individual registration forms for periods and regions where such documents survived both world wars, information kept by individual associations such as meeting notes, statutes, membership lists, bulletins and reports. Furthermore, this project draws on numerous published primary sources, such as statistics, memoirs, and collections of primary documents, as well as secondary sources. This sections provides a brief overview of the key primary sources that are introduced and utilized in each case-oriented Chapter of this dissertation.

Chapter II

The key primary source utilized in the analysis of the Warszawa Governorate in Russian-ruled Congress Poland is the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate, which spans the years since the 1906 legalization of associations under Russian rule until the beginning of WWI (1915).¹⁵ The associational registry provides important insights into the types and proportions of associations found in the region's *legal* associational landscape. Other archival primary sources included membership lists and meeting notes of specific individual associations, such as the Polish Artists' Association and Warszawa's Philanthropic Association. The dearth of archival sources for the Warszawa Governorate, particularly in comparison to those found in the archives in Lviv, can be attributed to considerable archival losses during WWI and WWII. At least part of the destruction of documents that did take place, mostly due to fires, can be assumed to have been random, particularly with respect to data collected by administrators of the Russian imperial state. The targeted destruction of data that likely occurred, such as the burning of documents that might have implicated particular individuals in potentially politically reprehensible activities, is assumed to be mostly orthogonal to the questions posed in this study. The potential biases presented in documents and data available on the pre-WWI Warsaw Governorate are further discussed in Chapter II, along with their bearing on the proposed findings. Key printed primary sources include: a collection of documents that were printed as part of the discourse surrounding the Four Year Sejm, which discussed questions of peasants and Jewish rights; the printed diaries of Jan Janowski, one of the organizers and leaders of the November 1863 Uprising; a collection of secret press articles published before and during the January Uprising; and statistical data compiled and printed by the Russian state, and by pre-WWI, pre-WII and contemporary scholars.

Chapter III

The key primary sources utilized in the analysis of the Duchy of Kraków and the Lviv province in Austrian-ruled Galicia include a registry of Galicia's associations kept by the office of the Governor of Galicia since 1866. Like Warszawa's associational registry, Galicia's registry provides important insights into the types of associations that existed throughout Galicia's various provinces. However, unlike that found in Warszawa, Galicia's registry has survived in its entirety. Moreover, the region's more liberal associational laws meant that, unlike in Warszawa, the registry contained numerous political and contentious organizations, including labor unions and political parties, which were illegal under Russian rule. Thus, it can be assumed to provide a fuller view of Galicia's pre-WWI associational landscape. In addition to the Galician Associational Registry, Chapter III draws on membership lists and registries of individual associations, such as various guilds in Kraków, as well as meeting and conference reports, such as those of the Folk School Association. Printed primary sources include a collection of short autobiographical accounts of Galicia's

¹⁵ AP Warszawa, WGUSS (C. 1155): Syg. 1212. The registry was kept in two volumes. Only the second volume, which begins with the organization numbered 63 and lists 616 local organizations, is located in the Polish National Archive in Warszawa. The first volume was either lost or destroyed.

rural activists and diaries of members of Kraków's intelligentsia. Moreover, the analysis draws on statistical data compiled and printed by the Austrian state, by Galicia's regional statistical bureau, as well as by pre-WWI and contemporary scholars.

Chapter IV

The key primary sources utilized in the analysis of the cross-regional convergence in associational character of interwar Poland include informational documents and situational reports compiled by the local and regional offices of the Ministry of Public Security. The latter monitored the life of Poland's political, social and economic organizations. Not all reports survived WWI, and not in equal measures across the former voivodeships. Existing reports shed light on Poland's social and political life, as well as the changing attitudes of the individuals and agencies that compiled the reports. On the one hand, the extensive surveillance of associational life by the interwar state provides copious details on interwar Polish civil and political societies. On the other hand, the reports are biased towards larger associations, particularly those seen as posing a significant political threat. Nonetheless, surviving state reports provide a fruitful view into the civil and political associational landscape of interwar Poland, how the two intersected, and how they developed in response to fluctuations in interwar politics.

The primary sources utilized in the analysis of the extent to which civil legacies of pre-WWI imperial rule continued to shape regional variation in associational character in interbellum Poland is a database of local level interwar associations. The latter was compiled from disparate archival documents, including associational registries and registration sheets of individual organizations found in the Polish State Archives of Warszawa and Kraków, the State Archives of Vilnius in Lithuanian, and the Archives of New Records in Warszawa. The relatively systematic nature of this data facilitates the comparison of regional variation in political domination and ethnic fragmentation of interwar Poland's associational life. Though no records on the political affiliations of local associations' members from the Warszawa voivodeship survived, considerable amounts of detailed registration sheets remain for both the Vilnius and Kraków voivodeships. Vilnius experienced political exclusion and cultural repression under pre-WWI Russian rule. If anything, political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination were harsher in Vilnius in comparison to Warszawa. Due to data availability, Vilnius, rather than Warszawa, is the focus of the systematic comparison of how legacies of pre-WWI political exclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural repression under Russian rule and of pre-WWI political inclusion and cultural autonomy under Austrian rule in Kraków continued to shape variation in the character of civil society during the interwar period.

III. Existing Economic and State-Centered Theories of Civil Society Development

Existing scholarship rarely grapples with the question of what mechanisms steer the emergence of civil society and its development of a liberal or illiberal character. Though studies of associational life seldom present explicit explanations for the development of civil society, disparate literatures provide theoretical frameworks which can be extended to explain the emergence of the public sphere and of associational life, or whose assumptions or arguments rely on implicit claims about the development of civil society. Such explanatory approaches can be classified into two main categories, which view either economic development or the state as driving the development of civil society and as shaping its character. This section discusses the predictions of each approach for civil society development. Moreover, I briefly assess the explanatory or predictive capabilities of each

theoretical lens with respect to the case studies presented in this dissertation. Chapter V, the conclusion, contains a more in-depth analysis of each approach in light of the cases analyzed in Chapters II-IV. Lastly, in the following section, I introduce an alternative explanation, which draws on some insights of these economic development and state-centered theoretical lenses.

Economic development explanatory approaches

Polanyi and a (re)-active society

Economic development explanatory approaches view capitalism, particularly industrialization, as the cause of civil society's emergence, growth and development. One such approach, rooted in Polanyi's notion of an active society, proposes that associationalism emerges as social groups organize based on diverse shared identities, and thus interests, for protection against a market uprooted from social control (Burawoy 2003:198; Polanyi 2001:159-77).

"Once we are rid of the obsession that only sectional, never general, interests can become effective ... the breadth and comprehensiveness of the protectionist movement lose their mystery. While monetary interests are necessarily voiced solely by the persons to whom they pertain, other interests have a wide constituency. They affect individuals in innumerable ways as neighbors, professional persons, consumers, pedestrians, commuters, sportsmen, hikers, gardeners, patients, mothers, or lovers—and are accordingly capable of representation by almost any type of territorial or functional association such as churches, townships, fraternal lodges, clubs, trade unions, or, most commonly, political parties based on broad principles of adherence." (Polanyi 2001:161-2)

Such a Polanyian approach would predict that unregulated capitalism leads to the emergence and growth in diverse types of associationalism. Thus, it can speak to the number and scope of associations that develop. Moreover, by implying that groups organize themselves, a Polanyian claim suggests that the emergent associationalism should be autonomous from domination by elite-groups, or in the least, from a single elite and its interests; as Polanyi notes: "not single groups or classes were the source of the so-called collectivist movement, though the outcome was decisively influenced by the character of the class interests involved" (Polanyi 2001:169, 174-81). By virtue of reacting to a disembedded market, a Polanyian perspective may be seen as proposing that groups organize based on mutual interests that are either threatened or made visible by the socially unfettered market. As such, one might be tempted to assume that a Polanyian argument proposes the self-organization of *classes* in response to a disembedded market. On the one hand, Polanyi does assert that economic interests are important, and even more so, "decisive," in the social self-organization that arises in response to the capitalist market. On the other hand, Polanyi disparages as "limited" views that see markets as leading groups to *only* mobilize based on economic interests. He notes that viewing the market as incentivizing people to organize purely on their economic interests makes for an "all too narrow conception of interest" that "must in effect lead to a warped vision of social and political history" (Polanyi 2001:162). A Polanyian explanatory approach is certainly a market-driven claim, as it sees shared economic identities as important in driving social self-association. However, it does not limit the identities on which individuals mobilize in response to the market to only economic ones.

By failing to specify exact types of identities, other than economic, on which society will organize in response to the socially unfettered market, a Polanyian approach gains explanatory power. Yet at the same time, by allowing society's self-organization in response to the market to be based on any identity, a Polanyian view cannot predict whether emergent civil societies will replicate or undermine "significant" social cleavages. This limits a Polanyian approach in its predictive power. Furthermore, in addition to failing to predict

whether economic development in the pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth should lead civil society to organize on ethno-racial or class-based interests, a Polanyian approach cannot account for the development of an elite-dominated associational life in pre-WWI Warsaw. Significant economic development in pre-WWI Warsaw corresponded to elite-domination of associational life. Similarly, such a Polanyian approach fails to correctly predict the case of pre-WWI Kraków. Low economic development, and particularly the lack of industrial growth, corresponded to the emergence of a civil society in Kraków that was relatively more autonomous from domination by elite-groups than the associational life that developed in the more industrially developed Warsaw.

Classes and mutual economic interests

A second economic explanatory approach is an interest-based argument rooted in the development of classes. While a Polanyian argument is more explicit in its connection to civil society, interest-based claims often implicitly link economic development to the growth of civil society by viewing capitalist expansion as leading to the development of middle and working classes on the one hand, and the foundations of class-interest based organizations on the other hand (Lipset 1963:50-3; Lipset 1959). Such arguments often posit class-based coalitions and organizations, such as labor unions and professional associations, as the foundation for social conflict and cooperation that, *under the right circumstances*, promote democratic outcomes (Lipset 1981:45, 79; Marshall 1950; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Sugar 1994:172-3). In other words, whether additional qualifiers—or “condition”—are added to such explanations, economic explanatory approaches view economic development as a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the emergence of not only civil societies, but of liberal civil societies and democratic political outcomes.

For instance, Rueschemeyer et al. (1993) explicitly tie capitalist growth to the development of civil society and to democratic outcomes. They argue that capitalist growth, particularly industrial development (thereby the emergence of a robust working class), leads to an “unprecedented capacity for self-organizing” of the emergent working and middle classes. The *self-organization* of subordinate classes “shifts the balance of class power.” By self-organizing in civil society, subordinate classes gain social capital, or organizational power, and thus are able to effectively bargain for political inclusion, thus leading to democratic—progressively inclusive—states. (Rueschemeyer 1993:73–5, 84) In its simplest, unqualified form, an economic interest-based approach suggests that capitalist development leads to a *liberal* civil society marked by the self-organization of subordinate classes and class-based coalitions. It is rare, however, that scholars present such a basic version of the economic development argument. More often, supporters of the thesis that economic development drives the development of not only civil society, but of a liberal civil society, suggest qualifiers or conditions which can derail civil society from developing a liberal character despite its emergence being rooted in ample economic and industrial development.

A more nuanced, qualified version of the interest-based capitalist development approach asserts that economic development will *not* lead to a liberal, class-based civil society if there is an ethno-racial division of labor¹⁶ (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000:71; Hechter

¹⁶ An ethno-racial division of labor can be conceived of in a strict sense, when (1) *class* divisions overlap with ethnic or racial divisions; in a more broad sense, when (2) an ethnic or racial group is concentrated in a specific profession, or in the broadest sense, when (3) a specific professions is largely dominated by a single ethnic or racial group. Scholars argue that it is the first or second conception of an ethno-racial division of labor that is most likely to lead to ethnic, often violent, conflict (Mann 2005:31). Thus, I use the concept of an ethno-racial division of labor to refer to the existence of a significant overlap between an ethno-racial group and either a single class or a single category of professions. The domination of specific professions by one ethno-racial

and Levi 1994:185-6; Mann 2005:5-6, 31). An ethno-racial division of labor is seen as increasing ethno-racial fragmentation in both society and civil society. The presence of an ethno-racial division of labor ultimately means that race or ethnicity *restricts upward mobility*, thereby leading to the merger of class and ethno-racial group identity. As such, the self-organization of classes becomes the self-organization of ethnic or racial groups, thereby further perpetuating ethno-racial fragmentation, exclusion, and illiberal politics (Gellner 1983:27-34, 121).

Neither the main economic development argument nor its qualified version account for development of a more liberal civil society in pre-WWI Kraków in western Galicia and the emergence of a more illiberal civil society in pre-WWI Warszawa in the Kingdom of Poland. The Kingdom of Poland witnessed capitalist growth and industrialization accompanied by an increasingly *illiberal* civil society. Moreover, to the extent that the Kingdom of Poland saw a state-backed ethno-racial division of labor, it did so *before* economic modernization in the mid-nineteenth century. The breakdown of former ethno-racial divisions of labor was accompanied by a decrease in cross-ethnic, class (or estate) based coalitions in favor of cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary alliances in public life. The comparison of pre-WWI Kraków in western Galicia and Lviv in eastern Galicia further complicates an economic approach to understanding the development of civil society. Compared to the Warszawa Governorate in the Kingdom of Poland, both Kraków, Lviv and their surrounding areas had a lower level of economic development, and certainly a much lower level of industrial development. However, both regions saw the emergence of vibrant civil societies, though with different levels of autonomy from elite-domination. Moreover, Kraków had a noticeably higher degree of ethnic inclusion and integration than either Warszawa or Lviv, suggesting that significant levels of economic development, and particularly industrial development, is not a *necessary* condition for the emergence of a liberal civil society. At the same time, the comparison of Lviv and Kraków does suggest that the presence of an ethno-racial division of labor is an important qualifier in the emergence of a liberal, with respect to ethnic integration, civil society. Out of all the pre-WWI cases examined in the dissertation, Lviv had the most significant and perpetual ethno-racial division of labor. The latter was characterized by eastern Galicia's local ethnic majority being overwhelmingly concentrated in the local peasantry and the local Polish minority dominating the middle and upper—mostly landowning—classes. Lviv in eastern Galicia, like Warszawa in Congress Poland, developed a civil society that was more illiberal than that of Kraków in western Galicia, particularly with respect to ethnic fragmentation.

In qualifying the relationship between interest-based claims and liberal democratic outcomes, scholars often highlight state-society relations. They suggest that institutional factors, such as state responsiveness and state autonomy, play a crucial part in determining political outcomes. The contributions of such qualifiers are discussed in the next section, which focuses on state-centered explanations of the emergence of civil society and development of its liberal or illiberal character.

State-centered explanatory approaches

Across disparate literatures considerable attention has been given to how political institutions influence the development of civil society. State-centered scholarship contends that states shape the fundamental contours of civil societies as political institutions provide

group, which can hinder members of other groups in pursuing such professions, is classified under the broader category of ethno-racial discrimination.

the framework in which, and against which, associations organize (e.g. Foley and Edwards 1996). The most basic arguments point out that states allow for or prohibit the growth of new organizational forms through the legal recognition of civil rights or structures (Banti 2000:44-5). Others argue that in addition to allowing the emergence of public associational life, states influence the structure of civil society by either providing associations with an organizational model that they *can* emulate (Skocpol 1999:56-7), or more actively, by coercing organizations to adopt specific structures and to conform to certain behaviors through legal regulations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). If the state fails to provide active support or guidance, it must at least allow a degree of associational toleration if civil society is to emerge (Bermeo 2000:243). In addition to providing a framework within which associations emerge, the state can also provide the framework against which civil society develops. For instance, societal actors' struggles with the state can lead the former to create associations as a means of counterbalancing state power (Banti 2000:45; Cohen and Arato 1992:31). On the one hand, such broad state-centered approaches persuasively argue that the state plays a fundamental part in allowing civil society to develop, in shaping its structural and legal contours, and in some instances, even providing social actors with an incentive to organize, particularly against the state. On the other hand, such broad state-centered approaches are too all encompassing and thus have little predictive power. Therefore, it is more informative to analyze state-level influence on the development of civil society through specific policies or institutional dynamics.

Institutional Development Order: Civil Society before Political Society

For instance, some state-centered approaches suggest that the developmental order of institutions determines the character of civil society. Ertman (1998) writes that civil society must emerge before political society to allow the former to develop relatively autonomously from domination by elites, particularly by political elites. In a similar vein, Bunce (2000:211) suggests that the development of political society before civil society can lead political society to "lack societal grounding," resulting in an unresponsive state. The strength of such arguments rests on the conception of political society. If political society refers to political organizations in civil society, whether openly political organizations or seemingly non-political associations that in fact are controlled by political elites, then it simply reiterates the question of why civil society can develop a politicized character, dominated by political elites, without furnishing an explanation. If political society includes institutions such as parties and parliaments (e.g.: Cohen and Arato 1994:ix-x), then the argument has predictive power. It suggests that in order to develop a liberal character, civil society must emerge before mass participatory politics. Such claims rest on the assumption that if civil society develops before participatory political institutions, it can organize autonomously from political elites and represent grass-roots interests. Once mass politics develop, political elites have to make concessions to grass-roots interests to win their political support.

Such an institutional development order thesis cannot account for the developmental trajectory of a more illiberal civil society in Congress Poland (Warszawa Governorate) and of a more liberal associational life in western Galicia before WWI. Congress Poland saw the dissolution of participatory institutions, rather than their creation, under Russian rule, and the emergence of an increasingly illiberal civil society *before* the introduction of mass participatory institutions at the turn of the 20th century. Austrian-ruled western Galicia, and its relatively more liberal civil society, makes for a more complicated case. On the one hand, civil society in Galicia was already well developed by the time that mass politics—embodied by universal and equal suffrage—were introduced under Austrian rule. On the other hand, the development of western Galicia's rural civil society, which was notably more autonomous

from elite domination than rural civil society in Congress Poland, was largely driven by the political participation of peasants in local state institutions. The emergence of a more liberal associational life in western Galicia, which was largely fomented by local participatory political institutions, disputes the claim that, in order to be liberal in character, civil society must precede the development of political society.

Responsive Political Institutions foster a Liberal Civil Society

Another version of the institutional development order thesis presents an argument diametrically opposed to the first. It suggests that to develop a liberal character autonomous yet responsive or efficacious political institutions must emerge before civil society (Berman 1997; Kumar 1993:391) and more broadly before mass mobilization and universal suffrage (Huntington 2006; Lipset 1981:64–80; Luebbert 1987). Berman's (1997) study on how associational life supported the rise of the Nazi party in interwar Germany argues that the lack of a strong and responsive state can lead to a contentious civil society that is susceptible to domination by groups antagonistic to the state. Though his focus is more on class and party coalitions, Luebbert (1987) similarly suggests that pre-WWII democracies arose only in instances of a state that responded—effectively and favorably—to the working class' desire for political incorporation. Such state-responsiveness institutional approaches correctly *predict* that (1) the civil society that emerged under repressive institutions in Congress Poland was antagonistic to the state and dominated by excluded elites, and (2) the civil society that emerged under more responsive institutions in western Galicia sought to cooperate with the state and was characterized by relative autonomy from elites, both traditional (landed) and new (bourgeois, cultural). However, they don't adequately *explain* the variation in civil society character in Galicia and Congress Poland, the divergence in the character of associational life in Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia (Lviv) and western Galicia (Kraków), and the rise in popularity of ethnically-exclusionary nationalist ideology in interwar Poland.

One of Berman's (1997) major contributions to the literature on civil society is that she clearly demonstrates why and how associational life matters for political outcomes. She argues that the pre-existence of a robust—dense and active—civil society facilitated the Nazi party's rapid ascent to power. By swiftly infiltrating and co-opting Germany's dense civil society, the Nazi party gained a vast network of organizations that it used to promote its ideology and to secure its political success. As such, her analysis of interwar Germany effectively demonstrates that civil society can be an important tool of political transformation. Further, the aim of Berman (1997)'s research was to demonstrate that civil society *is not necessarily* a predictor of democracy (401–2). Therefore, the inability of her analysis to answer why some civil societies support illiberal regimes and why others support liberal outcomes is simply a limit to which her findings can be applied or appropriated to answer the questions posed in this dissertation.

To the extent that Berman's (1997) analysis does suggest reasons why civil society in Germany was susceptible to co-optation by a single, fascist party, she points to two qualities of interwar German associational life: its replication of ethnic cleavages (411, 425), and its lack of strong linkages to political parties (411). Though she does not explore the mechanisms that created a politically disembedded civil society, and which led German's associational life to replicate rather than undermine significant social cleavages, Berman (1997) suggests that the blame for both rests with the state (411). Lastly, though she states that these two qualities of Germany's associational life made it susceptible to domination by the Nazi party, she does not explore why the latter succeeded where others failed. Hence, though correctly predicting the development of a more liberal civil society in pre-WWI Kraków and a more illiberal associational life in pre-WWI Warsaw, Berman's (1997) account can neither

provide a satisfactory explanation for the divergence in pre-WWI associational character in eastern and western Galicia, nor for the interwar Polish state's post-1935 adoption of fascist strategies and ideals. In 1935, the Polish interwar state radically shifted to the right in response to mounting right-wing popularity in civil society. One could argue that the state's post-1935 choice to take up the mantle of right-wing ideals and strategies was fueled by its previous lack of ties to civil society. Yet the interwar Polish state had worked to foster strong linkages to society through political and non-political associations since the late 1920s. Therefore, a more apt interpretation is one that focuses on the "effectiveness" rather than the "responsiveness" of the state (Lipset 1981:64, 70). It was neither the state's lack of linkages to society nor its inability to perceive or consider social demands, but rather its unwillingness or inability to effectively address the social and economic crises that fueled both (a) mass support for the opposition and (b) the state's subsequent attempt to maintain its power by mimicking slogans and strategies of its most popular competitor.

While Berman's (1997) analysis underscores the importance of state responsiveness, Luebbert's (1987) analysis highlights the importance of legitimacy for democratic consolidation. He argues that liberal democracies arose only when political incorporation of the working class was slow, piecemeal, controlled by an already politically incorporated bourgeoisie and completed prior to WWI (Luebbert 1987:453). Luebbert (1987) attributes the success of such slow and unthreatening political incorporation of the working class to the latter's slow development and belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. While stable liberal democracies could not arise during the interwar period, stable social democracies could. The latter came about when urban workers sought political incorporation through an alliance with the rural bourgeoisie (small land owners) (Luebbert 1987:456, 459, 460–3). With respect to the questions posed in this dissertation, Luebbert's (1987) main contribution is the demonstration that "the [interwar political] outcomes were determined by politics rather than by rural class structure" (p 463). Furthermore, his explanation of the successful consolidation of liberal or social democracy highlights an important dynamic, that in order to pave the way for a liberal democracy, the incorporation of the working class must occur piecemeal¹⁷ and under the guidance or control of the bourgeoisie so as to largely preserve existing class dynamics. The limitations of Luebbert's (1987) analysis to the questions posed to this study are twofold. First, though he focuses on the mobilization and organization of classes, he does not directly engage the concept of civil society. As such, any contributions of his study to question of civil society are the extensions of his arguments and of his assumptions. Second, the applicability of his model is limited by its nearly exclusive focus on class dynamics and brisk dismissal of the importance of ethno-racial social conflicts for interwar political outcomes (Luebbert 1987:468).

Luebbert's (1987) analysis furnishes valuable contributions to the question of what leads to the development of liberal or illiberal civil societies when his focus on class conflict and class coalitions is re-conceptualized as a dynamic between old elite-groups, new elite-groups and individual elites—leaders of subordinate, but organized, groups. Thus, a responsive and legitimate state, which is more likely to promote the emergence of a liberal democracy, should not be viewed as a state where all or a part of the bourgeoisie cooperates with parts of the working class to ensure the latter's stable and non-threatening political incorporation. Rather it ought to be viewed as a case of a political elite willing to incorporate new elites—leaders of organized sectors of the working class—into political institutions because they view doing so as their best strategy to retain significant control over political and economic capital. In the case of pre-WWI Galicia, for instance, despite the political

¹⁷ According to Luebbert (1987) the consolidation of liberal and social democracies both require working class fragmentation—or lack of full consolidation—to succeed.

inclusion of the (relatively small) bourgeoisie in local and national political institutions, it was the Austrian state and Polish traditional elites that facilitated the slow and piecemeal political incorporation of the peasantry and of the emerging working class.

Elite exclusion and ethno-racial discrimination

Theories of state-society relations that emerge from postcolonial and nationalism studies provide additional and valuable, though sometimes contradictory, insights on how the political inclusion or exclusion of local elites (Hechter 1975; Lange 2009; Mamdani 1996) and ethno-racial discrimination (Hechter 2000) can influence social organization. On the one hand, postcolonial research suggests that the exclusion of local elites from power, usually by a regime imposed by an imperial state and a distinct ethno-racial minority, should: (1) promote associational development by preventing local elites from suppressing the self-organization of lower classes (Bernhard 2004:246-7); and (2) promote *cross-cutting* alliances between discriminated groups, so long as discriminatory policies apply equally to all discriminated groups (Lange 2009). On the other hand, nationalism theories argue that the exclusion of local elites from political institutions can lead to ethnically-exclusionary alliances under regimes that enforce an ethno-racial division of labor between colonists and the colonized (Hechter 2000:71). Such approaches provide valuable contributions to research on the character of civil society by underscoring the central role that elites play in promoting or hindering associational development. First, they analyze and propose the ways that elite conflicts, especially when fueled by imperial states or socio-economic transformations, endanger elites control over political and economic capital (Slater 2010). Second, they highlight the importance of non-economic social and cultural codes (e.g. Brass 1994: 87), which local elites can utilize to mobilize support from disparate sectors of society.

Yet despite their important contributions to understanding how states can shape civil society through the political inclusion or exclusion of local elites, by themselves, such approaches cannot neither predict nor fully explain the emergence of an elite-dominated, ethnically-fragmented civil society in Congress Poland and the development of a relatively autonomous and more ethnically integrated associational life in western Galicia's Duchy of Kraków. According to postcolonial literature, the preservation of the political power of local elites through their inclusion in semi-autonomous political institutions should hinder the emergence of liberal civil societies as elites retain domination over society and thus are able to prevent the self-organization of subjugated groups. Yet in Congress Poland, it was the political *exclusion* of local elites and the Tsarist state's move towards increasingly direct rule, rather than preservation of the power of local elites that led to elite-domination and ethnic fragmentation of civil society. Moreover, this rise of ethnically-exclusionary nationalism in Congress Poland was accompanied by a decrease in state-backed ethnic division of labor over the course of the 19th century and an increase in discrimination of all non-Russian groups. As such, neither the presence of an ethno-racial division of labor, nor the presence of unequal discrimination of subjugated groups can account for this outcome.

Conversely, it was the political inclusion of Polish elites in Austrian-ruled western Galicia that facilitated the emergence of a civil society that was both autonomous from elite domination and better than its counterpart in Congress Poland at bridging ethnic cleavages. Lastly, though ethno-racial division of labor cannot explain the rise in ethnically-exclusionary nationalism in Congress Poland, it can account for the rise of ethnic fragmentation and conflict in Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia. The latter, despite a liberal and inclusive Austrian state saw the perseverance of a historical ethno-racial division of labor and the political marginalization and discrimination of the region's Ukrainian masses. Economic, political and cultural discrimination of eastern Galicia's Ukrainian minority was perpetuated

by the local autonomy and political inclusion granted to the local Polish—ethnic minority—elites.

IV. The Argument

This dissertation builds on state-centered theories. It utilizes (a) the degree of elite inclusion in political institutions and (b) the degree of cultural repression and ethnic discrimination to categorize key policies pursued by states. It follows claims of postcolonial theorists in arguing that ethnic discrimination prevents the formation of alliances between differently favored groups. However, it diverges from postcolonial theories regarding the implications of elite political inclusion or exclusion in associational life. Instead of arguing that excluding local elites from political power breaks down their control, I suggest that the exclusion of elites—whether elite-groups or elite-individuals¹⁸—leads these excluded elites to politicize and to attempt to dominate public sphere organizations as part of their struggle with the exclusionary state. Whether such elites pursue more liberal or illiberal ideals depends on the specific social alliances that are best positioned to secure their interests. Nonetheless, despite the particular ideology to which a dominant elite subscribes at a particular time, the mere domination of civil society by a single or a few elites makes associational life more likely to promote illiberal political outcomes. A single elite-group may find it prudent to pursue a more liberal or inclusive ideology. However, if such an elite controls civil society by itself, then it can more easily utilize the associational landscape to promote illiberal or exclusionary ideologies—when such a turn becomes the prudent strategy for pursuing its interests—then if that associational life were either dominated by many elites, or simply autonomous from elite domination. For this reason, though a civil society that is dominated by one elite can promote liberal ideals and outcomes—and thus be considered as, at least partly, liberal—its domination by one group makes it fundamentally more prone to domination by illiberal ideals than a civil society that is more autonomous from elite domination, and especially from domination by a single elite.

This dissertation proposes a two-sided, state-centered explanation of civil society development that embeds an elite-focused analysis of group conflicts, interests and agency, in a structure-oriented analysis of state policies and economic development. First, state policies and economic, social or political crises or transformations can alter the interests of and conflicts between elites. Second, political transformations and social, political or economic crises also shape the strategies that elites can successfully implement in pursuit of their interests by transforming the needs, beliefs, or relative positions of non-elite and elite groups. The strategies that elites opt to implement in pursuit of their interests subsequently shape, or re-shape, the character of civil society. In addition to this broad argument, I suggest four concrete propositions about how states, and specifically (1) the political inclusion of elites and (2) ethno-racial discrimination or repression of the masses, shape (a) elite preferences, (b) the ability and likelihood of elites successfully aligning with and mobilizing non-elite groups, and (c) the character of civil society. Following the explication of these claims are brief accounts of how the cases analyzed in Chapters II to IV support each proposition. Lastly, Figure 1, provides a summary of the proposed argument.

¹⁸ As defined earlier, leaders of social groups whose ability to mobilize the group or groups of which they are members provides them with, at minimum, significant social capital even if the groups to which they belong have no considerable control over any type of capital.

Broad Ethnic, Cultural or Racial Discrimination




Figure 1. Argument Summary

(1) *The political inclusion or exclusion of elites drives the degree to which civil society is politicized and dominated by excluded elites or the degree to which it is relatively autonomous from elite domination.* A greater degree of elite political inclusion facilitates the development of more autonomous associations. So long as the inclusion of local elites in political institutions is not merely symbolic, and thus elites can viably secure some interests through alliances, negotiation and compromise within formal institutions, then their attention, time and resources should be focused on increasing their power and standing in formal state institutions. As such, the inclusion of local elites in formal participatory institutions should shift their attention away from the public sphere, allowing for more unimpeded and internally-led creation of civil society associations by newly emergent and non-elite groups.

A greater degree of political exclusion of elites promotes the development of a politicized and elite-dominated associational life. The exclusion of elites from participation in state institutions leads them to view social mobilization as a viable means of countering state power. In other words, the exclusion of elites from formal political institutions shifts political competition, conflict and negotiation into the public sphere. In their attempts to mobilize social support against the state, excluded elites seek both to form new associations and networks, and to infiltrate, dominate or co-opt existing organizations and networks. The mobilization of civil society by excluded actors can either lead to their eventual inclusion in political institutions or the protraction of their conflict with the state as a political, and potentially even military, struggle waged outside of formal institutions. The inclusion of previously excluded elites can arise as a result of a military success, in which case former state elites are disposed from political positions, thereby losing their grip on political power. It can also arise as a result of the decision of ruling political elites that sharing their political power with representatives of new organized groups, particularly of new elite-groups, is in their own interests to retain control of some, if not most of, their political capital.¹⁹ The latter can come about after various degrees of successful elite mobilization of their constituent groups through and within civil society. Once incorporated into formal political institutions in a capacity that is not merely symbolic, included elites ought to abandon their previous focus on associational life. As such, the shift of elite competition, negotiation and compromise into formal political institutions should allow civil society to further develop with a higher degree of autonomy from the now included political elites.

Case Support

Following the 1815 Congress of Vienna, local, primarily Polish, elites of the Warszawa region in Congress Poland found themselves under Russian rule. At first, Russian-rule of Congress Poland was characterized by the potential for political inclusion of local elites. However, soon after the region's annexation by the Russian state, Polish elites were increasingly excluded from both participatory institutions and from bureaucratic positions of power. Following the uprising of 1863, Russia removed political and cultural freedoms that had previously remained in its western-most Polish lands (Congress Poland). While Russian-ruled Congress Poland saw increasing political exclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural repression of the masses in the second half of the 19th century, lands of the former

¹⁹ Slater's (2010) analysis of the rise of authoritarian regimes explores how significant social threats, as posed by strong contentious movements that call for radical redistribution, successfully *prevent* an outcome where new elites are brought into to share political power with already existing elites. He argues that such successful authoritarian outcomes come about when, faced with contentious movements, disparate and normally competing elites cooperate in protection of their mutual interests (11-4). In other words, when faced with a serious threat of losing their power, elites can work with other "existing" elites, with which they are already and always in competition, in order to retain as much of their privileges and political capital as possible.

Commonwealth under Habsburg (Austrian) rule saw a transition toward more inclusive and tolerant practices during the same period. The latter included increasing tolerance toward Poles and increasing inclusion of Polish elites into political institutions. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Polish Galicia received de facto autonomy within the confines of the Austrian state. In return for further aid and concessions, Polish elites supported the Austrian crown. The end of the First World War saw the reconstitution of an independent Poland, a return of Polish elites into power within Poland's borders, and the creation of a democratic state. Polish democracy ended with a military coup in 1926, the institution of a semi-inclusionary autocratic regime, and an increase in the dissolution of democratic institutions after 1930.

Chapter II will demonstrate how the political exclusion of Polish elites under Russian rule contributed to the development of an elite-dominated and ethnically-fragmented associational life. Subsequently, Chapter III will show that prior to WWI political inclusion of Polish elites in Austrian-ruled Galicia promoted the development of an associational landscape that was relatively autonomous from elite domination and characterized by higher levels of ethnic cooperation and integration. Whereas Polish elites in Galicia could pursue their interests through participation within political institutions, Polish elites in Congress Poland fostered close, top-down ties to civil society as a means to challenge the exclusionary Russian state. Lastly, Chapter IV will highlight how, during the interbellum period, politically marginalized and excluded elites adopted similar strategies—by attempting to infiltrate, co-opt and dominate civic associations—in their efforts to challenge the interwar state's adoption of increasingly politically exclusionary measures, and its progressive dismantling of democratic institutions.

The degree of political inclusion or exclusion of elites shapes the level of politicization and elite domination of civil society by incentivizing elites to carry out their political conflicts within or outside of formal state institutions. (2) *However, the degree to which excluded elites are successful in their endeavors to mobilize, politicize and dominate associational life relies on their ability to successfully forge alliances with other social groups based on appeals to mutual identities or interests.* In other words, the exclusion of elites from political power incentivizes them to turn to the public sphere in search of means to either reclaim their lost political position or to gain a share of political capital to which they feel entitled. Such campaigns, however, will not be successful in cases where excluded elite-groups cannot forge alliances with other social groups, or in cases where elite-individuals cannot convince at least one or more of the groups of which they are members that their inclusion in political institutions bears on the interests of these groups represent.

(3) *The state plays a significant role in shaping the strategies that elites can pursue to form cross-group coalitions.* States mold the strategies that excluded elites can follow by shaping the interests or positions that elites share with other groups. Excluded elites can utilize such points of mutual interests or identities to mobilize greater social support in their competition with the state or other elites. One way in which states shape such points of mutual interests, identities or positions is through marginalization or discrimination based on specific characteristics of individuals or groups, including culture, religion, race, ethnicity or geography. By utilizing such characteristics to determine to whom privileges are granted and from whom they are withheld, states can heighten pre-existing or create new significant social cleavages.²⁰ In addition to political privileges, such as citizenship or voting rights,

²⁰ This formulation could be expanded to claim that all social cleavages in society are ultimately controlled by the state by either permitting their existence or by perpetuating it to various degrees. Class distinctions, for instance, could be blamed not on whether one does or does not hold property, but on a political system that

states can discriminately provide or prohibit other privileges that are in its immediate sphere of influence. Such discrimination can include economic discrimination—wherein, for instance, states can discriminate who can be employed in state agencies—and cultural discrimination—as, for example, when states decide which languages and customs are prioritized in state institutions. Through such state-enforced or state-permitted discrimination, states provide elites with potential points of mutual interest through which the latter can forge coalitions with one or more groups to further their competition with the state and other elites. Lastly, though the state is a significant player in shaping the potential cross-group coalitions that can form, it is not the only one. Other significant institutions, including religious or economic institutions, can promote the significance of social distinctions, thereby perpetuating old or creating new significant social cleavages.

States play an important role in shaping the strategies that are available to elites.

(4) *However, it is elites' interests that dictate which strategies or cross-group alliances they will pursue.* At any point, a multitude of strategies are available to elites in their conflicts with other state or non-state elites. However, in addition to not pursuing all available strategies, elites often do not implement strategies that would be the most likely to provide them with a favorable outcome. They can forgo doing so when implementing a winning strategy in one conflict would jeopardize their position in another, presumably a more important or preferred conflict. For instance, elites engaged in political conflicts are rarely willing to instigate strategies or coalitions that would undermine their economic capital, particularly if they believe that by doing nothing they will not jeopardize their economic power and will also preserve some of their political power. At the same time, other elites—with an altered economic position—may be more than willing to pursue previously shunned alliances if doing so would not diminish but perhaps even augment their economic capital.

Political, economic or social transformations or crises can indicate changes in elites' social, political or economic positions, and thus they can signal changes in elites' interests. Hence, such significant transformations provide useful opportunities to analyze how elites' interests shape the strategies, and thus the cross-group coalitions, that they are willing to pursue. In other words, political and economic transformations or crises furnish an opportunity to examine *externally-driven* transformations of elites' interests, hence ones that are independent of their actions. This study, however, does not provide a way of measuring or indicating elites' hierarchy of capital-type preferences that is independent of their actions as represented by the strategies or cross-group alliances which they choose to pursue. In other words, the choice of strategy pursued is treated as an indicator of elites' hierarchy of capital-type preferences.

Case Support

Ethno-cultural discrimination existed in all regions of the partitioned Commonwealth under Russian and Austrian rule. Yet after the uprisings of 1863, discrimination against Poles, along with other non-Russians, intensified in Russian-ruled lands of the former Commonwealth and waned in Austrian-ruled Galicia. Following the January Uprising of 1863, the Russian state implemented discriminatory policies that targeted the region's non-Russian inhabitants. These included pressuring churches to conduct sermons in Russian, russifying local education, confiscating the land of rebellious elites and implementing economic reforms such as tax-increases. At the same time, in addition to granting Polish elites relative autonomy over Galicia, the previously repressive Austrian state adopted

grants specific privileges—property ownership—to those who make appropriate claims on property but not to others. Such a formulation could be extended over many, if not most, aspects of social differentiation.

policies of regional cultural autonomy. From 1859 to 1867 the Austrian state introduced Polish into schools, municipal bureaucracies, judicial matters and Galicia's administration. While exclusionary and discriminatory policies were coupled with industrial development in Russian-ruled Congress Poland, more liberal rule in Galicia coincided with relative economic, and particularly industrial, underdevelopment.

Chapter II will show that the Russian state's expansion of state-backed ethno-racial discrimination to target not only elites but also the masses provided the former with the mutual interests on which to forge cross-class coalitions with broader sectors of society. However, Polish elites only sought such cross-class alliances when doing so would not endanger their own economic standing. In other words, elites in Congress Poland only pursued cross-class coalitions when such a strategy would either reinforce or augment their economic interests. Following the 1830 and 1863 uprisings, Russian-ruled Congress Poland saw the transformation of many Polish elites from landowning to landless, mostly urban and *déclassé* gentry. Thus, in addition to political exclusion, Polish elites felt themselves targeted by state-backed economic discrimination and experienced a shift in their economic position. Furthermore, after 1863, the Russian state expanded the scope of its discriminatory policies from merely targeting elites to affecting the daily practices of the region's mostly Polish masses. Prior to 1863, Polish elites, many of whom continued to be landed, were concerned with conserving the economic status quo. Afraid to alienate Polish traditional, still landed gentry, organizers of the 1863 uprising made only half-hearted attempts at cooperation with Polish peasants by appealing to a mutual dislike of the Russian state and shared cultural codes rather than peasants' economic interests. Not yet feeling the effects of cultural repression, which still mostly affected only elites, Polish peasants did not mobilize in support of Polish landed and cultural elites. Yet once state-backed cultural and religious repression reached the daily life of the peasant masses, Polish elites were successful in fostering associations and alliances with Polish peasants based on their now shared ethno-cultural interests. Thus, the case of pre-WWI Congress Poland showcases both how elites' economic position and interests shaped their willingness to pursue cross-class alliances and the role the state played in making such alliances possible by promoting the successful reception of elites' overtures.

Despite political inclusion of local elites and relative cultural autonomy, eastern Galicia saw a similar outcome—the strengthening of ethnically-based alliances. Whereas Polish elites in Congress Poland were the leaders of the state-discriminated ethnic majority under Russian rule, Polish elites in *eastern* Galicia were the local representatives of the state. Moreover, their relative autonomy granted them the means to pursue state-backed cultural and economic discrimination against the Ukrainian masses despite the absence of support for such actions from the Austrian state. The conflation of political, economic and cultural discrimination provided leaders of the discriminated ethnic majority—who themselves were often members of the cultural elite—multiple points of shared interest with Ukrainian masses, fostering cross-class (some middle class, and many peasant), ethnically-based alliances against Polish elites. At the same time, a history of an ethno-racial division of labor similarly required that Polish landed elites protect their economic and political interests through ethnically-based alliances with members of the Polish urban middle classes.

A different outcome—one where Polish elites pursued cross-ethnic, class-based alliances—was observed in the case of pre-1863 Congress Poland, which was discussed earlier, and in the case of the post-1860 Duchy of Kraków in *western* Galicia. The onset of universal and equal suffrage at the turn of the 20th century confronted Kraków's elites with the choice of pursuing a strategy of class-based or ethnic-alliances. Western Galicia's elites had, historically, allied themselves with eastern Galician landed elites. Yet the absence of

ethno-cultural discrimination aimed at Poles, and thus the lack of strong, shared interests with the region's peasants and working class, positioned cross-ethnic, class-based alliances as the better strategy through which traditional and new Polish elites could retain some and acquire more political power while protecting their economic standing.

V. Case Chapter Summaries

Chapter II, Political Repression and Forced Assimilation: the development of an illiberal civil society in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, ca. 1815-1914.

Chapter II analyzes how, despite significant industrial development and modernization, the political exclusion of Polish elites and ethno-cultural discrimination against the non-Russian masses contributed to the development of an illiberal civil society in the Russian-ruled Warszawa Governorate in the Kingdom of Poland (also known as Congress Poland). Specifically, it focuses on how policies of political exclusion and ethno-cultural repression and discrimination fostered the development of two illiberal characteristics of the Kingdom's civil society: (1) the domination, politicization and militarization of public discourse and associational life by traditional and new ethnic-majority elites, and (2) increasing ethnic fragmentation in favor of cross-class cooperation in civil and political society. It argues that the progressively growing exclusion of local majority ethnic elites from participation and power in formal political institutions incentivized increasingly excluded elites to foster the development of a politicized and elite-dominated civil society as a means to mount an organizational and symbolic challenge to the state. Despite numerous military campaigns, local elites failed to muster enough social support in their struggles against the exclusionary imperial state. After the failed rebellion of 1863, the imperial state expanded its policies of ethno-cultural repression, formerly targeted at local elites, and sought to russify the region's masses. State discrimination and repression of non-Russian cultures and religion invaded the daily practices of the masses, turning culture into a political tool. Hence, despite the absence of an ethnic division of labor, excluded Polish elites could politicize and dominate civil society by forging alliances based on mutual cultural grounds.

Furthermore, economic modernization in 19th century Poland did not lead to the self-organization of subordinate groups and the emergence of a liberal civil society. Rather, under politically exclusionary, ethnically discriminatory and culturally repressive policies in Congress Poland, economic development supported the creation of an illiberal, elite-dominated and increasingly ethnically-exclusionary associational life. Policies of political exclusion and cultural repression interacted with the region's economic modernization to further shift elite preferences from cross-ethnic cooperation to cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary alliances. The exclusion of Polish elites from political institutions and the implementation of policies aimed at undermining their economic and social standing resulted in these elites' migration into the middle class. Increased immigration from rural areas and from abroad, along with an economic slowdown by the 1890s, led to increased economic competition and tensions between Christian and Jewish urban dwellers. Eager to expand into economic sectors, the Polish (Christian) bourgeoisie happily intensified the politicization of culture. Faced with political competition from the state on the one hand, and economic competition with urban minorities on the other, the Polish *déclassé* gentry favored cross-class, ethnically based cooperation as a means to gaining support in both their economic *and* political struggles. The politicization of culture and elite domination of associational life, fuelled by state policies of cultural repression and political exclusion, respectively, fomented

ethnic fragmentation. By creating a real, shared interest between the excluded elites and repressed masses, they allowed for and fostered cross-class, culturally-based cooperation.

Chapter III, Political Inclusion and Cultural Autonomy: the development of a more liberal civil society in the Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków, ca. 1772-1918.

Chapter III analyzes how the political inclusion of ethnic majority elites and cultural autonomy of the masses fostered the development of a more liberal civil society in the Habsburg ruled Duchy of Kraków. Kraków's relatively liberal associational life was characterized by relatively higher ethnic inclusion and autonomy from elite domination than in *either* Russian ruled Congress Poland or Habsburg ruled eastern Galicia. The comparison of Austrian-ruled Galicia to Russian-ruled Congress Poland examines how political inclusion or exclusion of local elites, respectively, fostered an elite-dominated civil society in Congress Poland and an associational landscape relatively autonomous from elite domination in Galicia. The comparison of Kraków in *western* Galicia with Lviv in *eastern* Galicia and with Warszawa in Congress Poland analyzes how cultural autonomy or ethno-cultural discrimination and repression, respectively, fostered higher levels of cross-ethnic, class-based cooperation and integration in Kraków and the growth of cross-class, ethnically-fragmented civil and political societies in Lviv and Warszawa.

In the first half of the 19th century, Habsburg rule in its lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was harsher than that of either Russia or Prussia. The 1860s witnessed significant transformations in the Habsburg Empire. In Galicia, the Empire's transformation led to significant growth in national and regional political inclusion of traditional elites, local political inclusion of other social actors, and relative cultural (Polish) and political autonomy. Relative regional autonomy allowed for the re-polonization of Galicia, including its educational and bureaucratic institutions. As the region's traditional elites retained their economic privileges and regained their political ones, they utilized their political power to preserve the status quo by limiting the participation of subjugated, mostly peasant groups in regional and national institutions. Polish elites applied a similar strategy to civil society, focusing on controlling regional-level leadership positions. State support of local-level peasant political participation and the freedom and self-determination that peasants experienced in local political and civic institutions allowed them to develop a culture of local participation, leadership skills and local networks free from elite domination. Relative autonomy in rural civil society and the absence of cross-class mutual interests that could be provided by a politicized culture and ethno-racial discrimination—as was the case in Congress Poland—meant that western Galician's Polish peasants did not mobilize in support of Polish cultural, traditional or new economic elites. Rather, following their entrance into the political landscape, they supported peasant, class-based interests and representatives.

While Galicia's relative autonomy also fostered cross-ethnic cooperation in political and civic life in western Galicia, it fueled ethnic fragmentation in eastern Galicia. As in Congress Poland, the late 19th century brought growth in anti-Semitism and nationalism to Galicia. Yet the anti-Semitic society that arose in Kraków was small, weak and did not have much influence. Whereas Zionism replaced assimilationism as the dominant ideology in Congress Poland prior to WWI, in western Galicia it lagged behind the continual popularity of assimilationism. Kraków's relative success in fostering Jewish assimilationism was firstly rooted in its regional Polish political and cultural autonomy, which incentivized Jewish elites to adopt Polish language and culture for social and economic advancement. The assimilation of Kraków's Jewish intelligentsia promoted cross-ethnic Polish-Jewish interaction amongst Kraków's intellectuals. Secondly, a relatively more receptive Polish society in Kraków

further fostered Jewish assimilation. Regional autonomy and lower levels of rural displacement of Polish gentry meant that, unlike in Congress Poland, Galicia's impoverished gentry and the urban middle classes did not encounter fierce economic competition for decreasing intelligentsia positions. With better paths of employment open to them, Galicia's lower gentry and parts of the middle class did not seek employment in historically "less desirable" sectors like commerce and artisan work, historically filled by the Jewish minority. Lacking the impetus of economic or culturally-based political competition, western Galicia's traditional and intellectual elites continued to champion class-based, cross-ethnic politics.

In Congress Poland, Polish-Jewish relations fueled ethnically-exclusionary ideology. In eastern Galicia, where Poles were the ruling minority and Ukrainians were the historically exploited ethnic majority, Polish-Ukrainian tensions fragmented society. The similarities between eastern Galicia and Congress Poland are not surprising. Both Congress Poland and eastern Galicia were characterized by the rule of an ethnic minority—Russian and Polish, respectively—which pursued policies of political exclusion or marginalization and cultural repression of the local majority—Polish and Ukrainian, respectively. The political inclusion of local Polish elites and the cultural autonomy of the local Polish masses in western Galicia allowed for the development of a comparatively more ethnically integrated civil society in western Galicia. Conversely, the political inclusion of Polish elites, the marginalization of Ukrainian leaders, and ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of Ukrainian masses in eastern Galicia led to a more ethnically-fragmented civil society. Political exclusion of Ukrainian leaders, cultural repression of Ukrainian masses, and the historical ethno-cultural division of labor between Polish elites and Ukrainian peasants allowed Ukrainian cultural (intelligentsia) and traditional (clergy) elites to mobilize Ukrainian masses not only on common cultural, but also common class, interests. Thus, it is not surprising that Lviv's rural countryside was dominated by cultural and sports associations with Ukrainian nationalist leanings that aimed to politicize culture and mobilize the masses against eastern Galicia's politically, culturally and economically repressive Polish elites.

Eastern and western Galicia's distinct ethnic dynamics and levels of ethnic fragmentation were also reflected in the regions' political landscapes. The political, economic and social privileges of traditional, conservative elites in western Galicia, unlike those of their eastern counterparts, did not depend on an ethnic, but rather on a class, privilege. Thus they could be best preserved through cross-ethnic, class-based coalitions. Despite their willingness to pursue cross-ethnic political coalitions with Galicia's ethnic minorities, western Galicia's conservatives tended to prioritize their class alliance with eastern Galicia's traditional elites. This, however, changed with the onset of mass politics and universal and equal suffrage in the early 20th century. This 1907 transformation of the political landscape required Polish elites to choose class or ethnic allegiances. Eastern Galicia's traditional Polish elites, who required both a class and ethnic privilege to retain their political and economic privileges, forwent cross-ethnic cooperation with the Ukrainian majority. Instead they sought to protect their class interests through ethnically-oriented alliances. Elites in western Galicia, whose privileges rested mostly on class interests, sought cross-ethnic, coalitions meant to preserve class, rather than ethnic, privileges.

Chapter IV, National convergence in associational character and the perseverance of civil legacies in the associational life of interwar Poland, ca. 1918-1939.

Chapter IV examines the extent to which legacies of pre-WWI political inclusion or exclusion of elites and cultural repression or autonomy of the masses shaped the character of interwar Poland's civil society. It argues that despite a national convergence in associational

character under new political and economic pressures during the interbellum period, pre-WWI imperial legacies were visible in the persistent variation of civil society character in regions under formerly Austrian and Russian rule. As such, Chapter IV highlights the tension between the degree to which state policies and transformations become embedded in civil institutions, thus rendering them resistant to change, and the degree to which state transformations and policies shape the immediate incentives and strategies of elites, thereby transforming political, and subsequently civil, life.

The first part of Chapter IV utilizes significant political transformations of the interwar Polish state to examine how (1) policies of political exclusion, either of Polish or minority political actors, led to the increasing politicization of civil society, and how (2) policies of ethnic discrimination and cultural repression fostered nationalist movements among the state's minorities and promoted ethnic fragmentation in associational life. As such, part I analyzes how political actors' responses to interwar policies of political inclusion and exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination mirrored those of their pre-WWI counterparts. Though interwar Poland began as a formal democracy, the democratic state pursued political marginalization of ethnic minorities, ethnic discrimination and policies akin to forced assimilation. Piłsudski's 1926 coup brought Polish democracy to an end, leading to Poland's transformation into an increasingly *politically* exclusionary yet, until 1935, a relatively *ethnically* tolerant, autocratic state. As in pre-WWI Congress Poland, the progressive exclusion of Polish political elites shifted political competition from formal state institutions and into the public sphere, leading to the politicization and growing political domination of associational life throughout interbellum Poland. Poland's temporary transition away from ethnic discrimination and towards ethno-cultural toleration in 1926 fostered increasing cooperation between the state and ethnic minorities. However, growing popularity of ethnically-exclusionary notions of nation and the state's post-1935 return to policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination fueled ethnic fragmentation. Ethnic fragmentation was reflected and perpetuated by civil society across all regions of interwar Poland as some associations placed ethnic restrictions on their memberships and others saw the exodus of minority members to separate organizations.

The second part of Chapter IV utilizes the 1918 redrawing of political boundaries to examine the extent to which, despite a convergence in political actors' interests and strategies across interwar Polish regions, legacies of distinct pre-WWI persevered in two regions of interwar Poland. In its last years, interwar Poland saw a rapid growth in the nationwide politicization, political domination and ethnic fragmentation of the associational landscape. Yet despite the growing convergence in the character of civil society across its regions, civil legacies were visible in the continual variation in civil society character across two regions of interbellum Poland. In the face of mounting political competition for control over civil society, and in comparison to that of Vilnius, Kraków's associational landscape proved more capable of withstanding the domination of associations by single political groups. Moreover, in addition to proving more resilient to political domination, associational life in the Kraków voivodeship was relatively more impervious to ethnic fragmentation. Hence, on the one hand, the analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of internally driven institutional reproduction in the face of external pressures for change. Furthermore, it showcases specific internal mechanisms which allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period. On the other hand, the analysis indicates that, though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was waning. Thus Chapter IV shows that though historical civil legacies can persist in the face of external pressures, they are not immutable to externally, especially state-driven, change.

Chapter II. Political Repression and Forced Assimilation: the development of an illiberal civil society in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, ca. 1815-1914

Introduction

This chapter employs a historical narrative analysis of the Warszawa Governorate²¹ as part of the larger Kingdom of Poland to explore the causal mechanisms that led to the intensification of “illiberal” trends in the region’s civil society. It analyzes how specific causal mechanism affected the interests of societal actors,²² by highlighting points of historical transformation or intensification of each causal factor. The causal mechanisms on which this chapter focuses are (1) policies and strategies of political exclusion of local (majority) elites pursued by the imperial, Russian state; (2) state-backed cultural repression and forced russification of the masses; and (3) in the case of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, market and state driven socio-economic transformations, particularly their effects on shifting the economic position, and with it economic and political preferences and strategies, of Polish elites. Lastly, it focuses on how these mechanisms influenced the development of two characteristics of illiberal civil society: (1) the domination, politicization and militarization of public discourse and associational life by elites²³; and (2) increasing ethnic-fragmentation in favor of cross-class cooperation in civil and political society.

The historical-narrative analysis presented in this chapter traces the struggle between Polish elites, the former leaders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the region’s new, Imperial, state. This historical narrative is divided into four sections. Each section focuses on moments of tension that marked the struggle between the region’s local elites and the imperial Russian state. Section I begins with the first partition of Poland-Lithuania, the Polish noble’s response in the form of intensified public discourse and the Four Year Sejm (1788-92). It highlights the failure of the latter to establish legal equality between ethnicities,

²¹ Warszawa refers to both the city and the region around it. The latter is demarcated by the interwar Warszawa voivodeship (*województwo*) and in the last years before WWI by the Warszawa Governorate (*Gubernia Warszawska*). A voivodeship is an administrative division, similar to a “province.”

²² By societal actors, I mean relevant solidarity groups forged based on, among others, mutual economic, cultural or religious, political or regional interests. The societal actors on which this chapter focuses are: (1) traditional elites, particularly on the landed nobility—small and large, and to some extent religious leaders; (2) new elites, specifically members of the burgeoning bourgeoisie and cultural elites, namely members of the intelligentsia; (3) ethno-religious groups, specifically the religiously and culturally distinct Jewish minority and Polish, Roman Catholic majority; (4) the old and newly emergent economically-based classes, specifically the peasantry and the developing working and middle classes.

²³ I define elites as groups of actors that control a substantial amount of a relevant form of capital, which they use to appropriate more or other forms of capital. Within this definition, elites can deploy various types of apparatuses—institutional or ideological, such as political, cultural, or economic, to garner economic, social, cultural or symbolic capital. Furthermore, this definition allows an elite to remain as such despite potential transformations in its political, social or economic position, so long as its members retain control over *at least one* relevant form of capital. Prior to the 19th century, the term elites refers to politically active Polish nobles (*szlachta*), which accounted for about 8-10% of the Polish population (Wandycz 1974:5). After the mid-19th century, it refers to the still landed and titled nobles (traditional, formerly political, economic and cultural elites), the déclassé gentry that had largely filled the ranks of the new intelligentsia (new cultural elites), clergy (traditional, old cultural elites) and the bourgeoisie (economic elites).

a move that could have altered the development of Polish society to privileging class over ethno-cultural cleavages during the region's 19th century industrial awakening. Section II analyzes how Russia's rule over the region, which increasingly marginalized Polish elites, fomented the development of at first a circumscribed, mostly upper class and not yet contentious, civil society. It traces how the state's implementation of policies aimed at undermining the social, economic and political standing of the region's local elites led to the radicalization and militarization of the region's elite-dominated associations and networks, and the 1830 November uprising.

Section III focuses on how, following the failed rebellion, the Russian state continued its strategy to undermine the economic and social standing of the region's Polish intelligentsia and nobility. Increasingly repressive policies of the Russian state on the one hand, and a rising awareness among Polish elites of their need for cross-ethnic and peasant support on the other hand, fostered clandestine association and cross-class and cross-ethnic cooperation that culminated in the 1863 January Uprising. Section IV analyzes how post-1863 policies of political exclusion of local elites, the state's strategic attacks on the political and economic status of the Polish gentry and forced assimilation—which after the January uprising targeted not only elites but the region's masses—contributed to politicizations of culture and to the development of an elite-dominated associational landscape. Lastly, it examines how policies of political exclusion and cultural repression interacted with the region's economic modernization to further shift elite preferences from cross-ethnic cooperation to cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary alliances.

I. The Last Years of the Commonwealth: when elites privileged estate divisions over ethnic (religious) ones

A Brief Background on Feudal Society in the Commonwealth and its social, political economic and ideological alignments

The Landed Elite

Society of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was feudalistic and fragmented along estate and religious lines.²⁴ Rights, privileges and obligations were based on one's membership in a particular estate and religion. The bulk of political and economic power was foremost in the hands of the aristocracy, as well as the king and the Catholic church. Nobles (*szlachta*) made up around eight to ten percent of the Commonwealth (Wandycz 1974, 5). Membership in the nobility crossed ethnic lines, as the *szlachta* included Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Poles and converted Jews. While the elite could, and often held, dual nationality, Polish was considered the nationality of the “nation state” and culture of the elite (Wandycz 1974, 5).²⁵ Moreover, the nobility shared equal civil, legal and political rights and privileges regardless of their wealth (Unger and Basista, 197-98).

²⁴ In earlier centuries, Poland prized itself on being one of the most religiously progressive nations in Europe. Yet as religious tolerance began to rise in the west, it began to decline in Poland's territories, along with the expanding power of the Catholic Church. Following the Counter Reformation, Protestants disappeared from the most powerful nobility. In 1733, Protestants, though still holding important positions in the military, local offices and receiving estates from the Crown, were barred from direct political power, in other words, from participating in Sejm (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:91).

²⁵ Mixed citizenship of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility was abolished in 1797 by the partitioning powers (Wandycz 1974, 20).

Though any Polish noble could sit on the Sejm or potentially be elected to hold the office of the king,²⁶ by the 18th century, economic and political power was largely concentrated in the hands of the large landowning magnates (Polonsky 2010:173-4; Wandycz 1974, 4-5). This increasing concentration of power was partly a result of 16th and 17th century warfare. War and economic devastation displaced some nobles from their land, contributing to the increasing concentration of land in the hands of the magnates and the shifting of some petty gentry into administrative positions, such as those of general managers, administrators or assistant administrators, on manors of wealthier lords (Rosman 1990:143). However, this wave of displaced gentry (unlike that of the late 19th century) generally did not compete with other groups for these positions. Though peasants and Jews were often employed on aristocratic estates, the former filled ranks of lower administrative positions as well as household and garden staff, while the latter were found in positions of control and supervision, such as stockyard supervisors, clerks or stewards (Rosman 1990:145). Thus, for the most part, neither peasants nor Jews were in direct competition with the petty nobility.

The Catholic Church

In addition to the aristocratic elite, the Catholic Church was a powerful political and economic player in the Commonwealth. While 67% of serfs lived and worked on land owned by nobles, 19% lived on Crown lands and 17% on land owned by the Church (Wandycz 1974, 4). Moreover, the Church wielded significant organizational, ideological and political power. The “brutal” Swedish-Lutheran, and Russian-Orthodox invasion in 1654, known as the “deluge” (*potop*) of invasions (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:75-6), which was viewed as a religious war (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:80), led to a decline in religious toleration, deepening of the Counter-Reformation and to an increase in ideological power of the Catholic church through its increasing identification of the Polish culture and nation with Catholicism (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:80; Polonsky 2010:172). The hold of the Catholic Church over the region’s Polish population, the increasing identification of Catholicism with Poland, and the exclusionary and chauvinistic ideologies that such an identification promoted would become an important characteristic of the region’s civil and political pre-WWI societies.

The 1772 First partition of the Commonwealth awoke Poland-Lithuania’s elites to the nation’s impending international threat and the woefully weak organizational structure of the Polish state. Faced with the threat of further partitioning by its strong, absolutist neighbors, some elites, particularly reformers in the Sejm, attempted to strengthen the power of the state and curb that of its disparate decentralized political actors—the church, the clergy and the Commonwealth’s magnates (Polonsky 2010:191-195). For instance, until the partitions, there was a lack of national educational institutions. The schools that existed prior to 1772 were mostly tied to religious institutions (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:87). It was not until a year after the first partition that the National Education Commission was created, lasting until 1794. During its twenty-year existence, the Commission organized two universities, 74 secondary schools, and 1600 parish schools. It aimed to create a coherent state-run system of schooling that would replace the older model of religious schools, and thus would promote secular, as well as national, ideals. (Davies 1981:228) The Commission’s success, no matter how limited, was largely grounded in the organizational progress made earlier by the Church. The pope’s abolition of the Jesuits in 1773 effectively allowed its schools and properties to be

²⁶ The elective monarchy was rejected in favor of a dynastic state, an attempt at bringing the Commonwealth’s political institution to match those of its powerful neighbors, in the Sejm’s “last” efforts to reinvent the country following its first partition, through the passing of the May 3, 1791 Constitution. The latter also abolished the ill-fated *liberum veto*. (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:100)

used as the infrastructural basis of new, national and secular schools (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:96). In other words, at the end of the 18th century, state institutions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were weak compare to the widespread and well-established reach of religious institutions, particularly of the Catholic Church. Thus, it is neither surprising that the Catholic church would continue to play an important role in shaping the public life of the region under partitions and in the reconstituted interwar Polish state.

The Burghers

In addition to the king, who was a relatively weak figure in the Commonwealth (Polonsky 2010:166, 172), the aristocratic elite viewed the burgeoning burgher class as their political rivals. As such, to stifle the growth of their rivals, landed elites hindered the development of independent towns. For instance, burghers were excluded from political representation in the Sejm until the May 3, 1791 constitution. In addition to re-establishing the autonomy of royal towns, the 1791 Constitution granted Christian burghers some diet representation. Inclusion of burghers in political institutions was part of a wave of reformation that aimed to slowly replace feudal notions of political rights based on social status (namely membership in the nobility) with political rights based on economic status, namely property ownership. In a similar vain, the Constitution extended to town dwellers, regardless of their religion or ethnicity, political rights equivalent to habeas corpus. (Wandycz 1974:8) Town inhabitants accounted for about 17% of the population of the Commonwealth. Christian burghers, whose ethnic backgrounds included Poles, Germans, Czechs, among others, made up around 7% of the total population. The remaining 10% was mostly Jewish. (Wandycz 1974:5-6) In other words, though change was slow, reformist elites placed the late 18th century Commonwealth on a path similar to that taken by western European states—of slowly replacing nobility privileges with privileges based on private property, and thus, expanding rights of political participation to some new, class-determined groups.

Peasants

While wealthy, landed elites—known as magnates—were the most powerful group in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonweal, Peasants and Jews were the least privilege estates. Yet as the Commonwealth lacked a cohesive and strong central state, the privileges and duties of peasants were not consistent across Poland-Lithuania, varying with the owners of the land they worked. Those that worked and lived on land owned by the crown (19%) had the most privileges, often with smaller labor requirements or paid rent, and often with the ability to appeal to the royal court; those living on church lands (17%) and on nobles' estates (67%) most often had compulsory labor and no rights to the land (Wandycz 1974, 4-5). The circumstances of the Commonwealth's peasants decreased during the 18th century, prior to the first partition and the desperate reforms that it spurred, as the landed aristocracy garnered more power vis-à-vis the king. Lords had the right of "life and death" over peasants until 1768, taxes on peasants had increased and their labor requirement was three days of unpaid labor. This led to increasing revolts, particularly in the Ukrainian lands, where peasants were separated from lords by not only class, but also by religion, culture and language. (Polonsky 2010: 173-4)

The Jewish Minority

In the 19th century, Jewish inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had a mutually-dependent and mutually-beneficial relationship with Polish nobles, largely based on

an economic and political interdependence. Whereas Polish lords provided their Jews with rights, privileges and protections, as they did with their other subjects, Jews were an integral part of the economic functioning and development of noble estates, particularly of commerce on manors and in towns (Rosman 1990:42, 79, 207, 210). At the same time, Christian townsmen, the church and petty nobility held the most antagonistic stance towards the Jewish populations (Rosman 1990:206). In addition to ideological (religious) and cultural prejudice, the animosity between Christian and Jewish town dwellers was rooted in economic competition. Christian town dwellers sometimes accused their Jewish competitors of receiving preferential treatment or of circumventing laws (Rosman 1990:72). Support given to Jews by nobles, who often invited them to their towns, meant that Jewish inhabitants of noble towns received more legal rights and protections, and less contestation of their rights, than in royal towns, where Christian inhabitants often lobbied the Sejm and the King to retract rights granted to Jews (Rosman 1990:71).²⁷ In other words, while peasants tended to receive more rights and better treatment on Church and Crown lands, the Commonwealth's Jewish inhabitants received better treatment and more rights on elite-owned land.

Ethnic and Class Fragmentation and Alignments in the Commonwealth

Prior to the partitioning of the Commonwealth, growing importance of religion as part of the cultural and national identity following the Counter-Reformation, the “deluge of invasions” and growing organizational and ideological power of the church dictated a realignment of the Commonwealth's society along ethnically-religious, and cross-estate lines. However, economic incentives suggested more complex, cross-ethnic and cross-estate alignments. The landed nobility had more incentive to align itself with Jewish and Christian burghers, viewing town dwellers as important to the country's—and thus to their—economic development. Christian burghers and petty, landless nobles in need of administrative positions viewed Poland's Jews as economic rivals. The latter, due to centuries of legal limitations had positioned themselves successfully in the professions that were open to them, namely in commerce, some administrative and artisan professions. Thus, from early on, Christian burghers sought to forge ethno-religious alliances with the Catholic clergy. Prior to the 18th century the Catholic Church had already reaped the political benefits of having subdued one former significant spiritual and institutional rival—Protestant Christianity. Prior to the late 19th century, the remaining significant social group—the peasantry—looked to the King and later to the imperial powers, rather than to Polish nobles, in hopes that its lot might be improved. Moreover, due to the organizational presence of the Church in rural areas, and the important role of the church in state-like functions of philanthropy and education,²⁸ the Church had a significant presence and influence over the Commonwealth's peasantry and countryside. The potential for cross-class and cross-ethnic alliances in the last years of the Commonwealth thus can best be described as the landed elite's preference for class-based, cross-ethnic alliances that would preserve their political and economic privilege, and cross-class, ethnically-based alliances favored by the Christian burghers and the Catholic church that would enhance their social, political and economic standing.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion on the relationship between the leading elite—the Polish magnates—and Jewish inhabitants of magnates' estates, which included whole towns, villages, manors, forests, etc.—see M.J. Rosman's (1990) exposition on this topic.

²⁸ The role of the church in the region's education prior to 1772 has already been discussed. It was also the church, not the state, which was first active in philanthropic endeavors. For instance, the Commonwealth's oldest known, and likely the first, philanthropic association (*Arcybractwo Miłosierdzia* and *Bank Pobożny*), which was founded in 1562, was founded and run by the Catholic Church (Estreicherówna 1968:28–9).

The Four Year Sejm

Heeding the first partition of 1772, and later the second partition of 1793 as wake-up calls, Polish nobles sought to reform the Commonwealth's institutions, including its social ones (Kieniewicz 1969b:30). Discourse that arose around the Four Year Sejm (1788-1792) and Kosciuszko's revolt (1794) highlights the relative willingness of Polish elites, who at the time were still mostly landed, to improve ethnic rather than estate (class) relations. Transformation of the former was less threatening to their economic position and political power. This preference would change over the course of the 19th century under the stewardship of imperial policies, the industrial awakening and the aristocracy's loss of political and economic privileges.

And the Jewish Question

The Four Year Sejm aimed to modernize Polish society in response to the annexation of Polish lands by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772 and in hopes to prevent a further weakening of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. One of the key issues addressed in the Sejm and in the public discourse that developed around its proceedings was the issue of Jewish rights, particularly of freedom of profession and settlement. Among the opinions considered by the Sejm was a radical proposition to fully integrate Jews into the system of estates (Polonsky 2010:210). Under the proposition Jewish town dwellers would have been granted the same rights as Christian inhabitants; Jewish craftsmen would have joined guilds and received the same rights and restrictions as Christian members, etc. (Polonsky 2010:210). Such a radical proposal would have bridged the institutional and legal religious cleavages in Polish society.

While the reconfiguration of Polish-Lithuanian society more along class lines had significant support in the Sejm and among Polish nobles, it did not have the full backing of either Polish or Jewish elites. Of the nobles and Jewish assimilationists who supported the goal of integration, many proposed to achieve this goal through slow cultural and economic acculturation of the Jewish population. One proposition for how to achieve such as slow-paced acculturation was to place Jewish education under the control of the Commission of National Education (1774-94)²⁹, and to encourage Polish, secular education among Jews. Another was to simply dismantle restrictions on Jewish participation in most economic activities (Polonsky 2010:204-6), and allow for economic integration to pave the way to a slow-paced acculturation. Jewish assimilationists generally supported such "economic integration" which came closer to an incentivized—if not somewhat coercive—but not a forced, assimilation. In other words, they supported assimilationist efforts that would not dismantle the relative autonomy of Jewish cultural institutions (Polonsky 2010:204-6). They argued that Jewish communities would promote linguistic and cultural acculturation through Jewish institutions in exchange for increased rights of settlement and economic participation (Polonsky 2010:204-6). The various voices and propositions ranged from radical to limited change. What is clear is that there was real discussion of and elite support for bridging the ethno-religious or ethno-cultural cleavage in Polish society.

In opposition to the supporters of a further class-based, cross-ethnic or cross-cultural transformation of Polish society were three main camps that resisted Jewish integration: conservative nobles, conservative Jews and Christian burghers. Conservative, reactionary Polish nobles supported the old constitution, a monopoly of the nobility on political power,

²⁹ The commission aimed to place education under the rule of the state, where it would be secularized and nationalized (Davies 1981: 228). It aimed to curtail the monopoly on Christian education held by the church that had existed and pushed society into intolerance and under church power since the counter-reformation (Hillar 1992:190-1).

not extending rights to cities, and the primacy of the Catholic Church (Polonsky 2010:204). They feared *any* change to the social fabric as a potential threat to their power. Conservative Jews similarly opposed integration, fearing that liberal ideals would undermine Judaism (Polonsky 2010:208). Lastly, Christian town dwellers viewed Poland's Jews as competition (Polonsky 2010:214). It was the Christian burghers, along with Jewish assimilationists, who were largely responsible for bringing the discourse on Jewish rights into the wider public sphere. In 1789, the burghers of Warszawa organized and demanded that Sejm reject a Jewish request to receive rights of settlement and work in exchange for a lump sum fee and an additional yearly tax (Polonsky 2010:205- 214). To muster social support they printed pamphlets, organized protests, etc. (Polonsky 2010:205- 214). Their efforts were matched by similar appeals to the public sphere by the Jewish community in support of integration (Polonsky 2010:205- 214). The burghers were successful in their protest, during which they asserted that "foreign" interests infiltrated Polish towns, crafts and trade, to the "detriment" of the economy (Polonsky 2010:211-2).³⁰ In the end, even a weak bill which had come to the Senate floor, and which would grant neither citizenship nor rights to settle in towns where Jews were not already permitted, failed to gain Sejm support (Polonsky 2010:219-220). No resolution was reached and there was no real social transformation, as further attempts and discussion were curtailed by the second partition and Kosciuszko's rebellion.

Had the Four Year Sejm taken steps towards legal and institutional integration of Poland's Jews, Polish society may have developed along a markedly different trajectory. Nonetheless, the discourse that arose was important for two reasons. First, though in the end no real or radical reforms were enacted, the mere breadth of opinions and support for the radical incorporation of Jewish minorities into other estates demonstrated relative willingness of many nobles to bridge religious lines, and moreover a relative lack of perceived threat to their power from doing so. This is particularly important in comparison to the lack of radical ideas surrounding the question of peasants. Second, the opposition of Christian burghers to integration and emancipation of Jews on grounds of economic competition foreshadowed the strong opposition that such assimilationist efforts would face in Polish lands after the industrial awakening and the migration of gentry into the middle classes.

And the Peasant Question

Though the Four Year Sejm and debate surrounding its consideration of the Jewish question failed to enact reforms, it demonstrated the presence of real supporters of Jewish integration amongst the Polish elite. The same cannot be said about support for peasant emancipation. The question on peasant rights received relatively little debate and backing in Sejm discussions as well as in the printed discourse that emerged around the Sejm (Woliński, Michalski and Rostworowski 1955:VI). When discussion of peasants did come up, it was usually in reference to other issues, such as state funds, the military or tensions in eastern Galicia. Focusing on these issues rather than on peasant rights allowed for questions of feudal privileges and land rights of the nobility to be circumvented (Woliński, Michalski and Rostworowski 1955:VI). In other words, unlike the heated debate on Jewish rights and integration, peasant emancipation generally had little support from either the Polish elite or the burghers and discussion around it was limited.

The arguments that did exist and which aimed to gain elite support for peasant emancipation focused on how ending serfdom would not undermine the economic position of the Polish elite. These argued that replacing compulsory labor with rents would actually

³⁰ The same slogans, similarly driven by economic competition between Christians and Jews, would mark the foundation of nationalist propaganda in the last decade before WWI and during the interwar period.

strengthen the economic standing of landlords. Proponents of such a view claimed that, by emancipating peasants, lords would free themselves from responsibilities to ensure that peasants had shelter and sustenance. Yet even these arguments called for granting peasants some social and political rights, without addressing their key concern of land distribution. They suggested that by providing peasants with the freedom to enrich themselves (i.e. changing their status from one of servitude to one of rents), yet *without actually granting them any land*, nobles could turn peasants into “owners.” This change in title would increase peasants’ stake in and willingness to fight for the nation state, but once more, as it would entail no change in land ownership, it would do so without really changing the status quo.³¹ Even the most progressive supporters of social transformation proposed limited reforms with respect to peasants. For example, both Kołłataj and Staszic, were key representatives of more progressive minority rights. Ideally, they may have supported greater reforms with respect to peasants. However, during the Four Year Sejm, they took a more “practical” approach (Kieniewicz 1969b:20-21). Hence, they supported such a symbolic transformation of the peasantry—from serfs burdened with compulsory labor to a free peasantry gifted not with the ability to work on land through a system of rents. The more limited debate on the peasant question, in comparison to that on the Jewish question, could further be seen in arguments presented by representatives of the peasants. Even the did not ask for land, but rather sought reduction in compulsory labor and some basic rights, such as the ability to bring cases to courts.³²

The discourse on peasants could be split into two main camps. Conservatives argued for the perseverance of the feudal system as one whereby peasants were provided for by the lord and where poverty stemmed from the peasants’ naiveté and those who would exploit it.³³ The second, though more progressive, did not argue for a radical social transformation. Rather, its supporters were careful to frame their argument in a way that would assuage fears of the Polish, overwhelmingly landowning, elite, that their position would not be threatened. They claimed that “emancipation” of peasants would bring mutual benefit to workers and to lords, allowing the former to feel some ownership over their work and product while granting land, rents and the alleviation of feudal patronage to the latter. Just as with the Jewish question, no transformation of peasant rights occurred. Yet unlike with the Jewish question, no significant transformation was even discussed.

³¹ For an example of such an argument, see Anonymous. 1788. “O Poddanych Polskich roku 1788,” (Kraków Grebl), published in *Materiały do Dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego, v. I.* (ed. Wolinski, Michalski and Rostworowski 1955). p 3-68; 66-67.

³² As suggests the anonymous author of “Głos poddaństwa do stanów sejmujących [Voice of the subjects to the Sejm]” (*PMDSC*, 6-73) in a letter from peasants to the Sejm, the main demands of peasants include personal rights, the ability to bring cases of mistreatment to courts, some ownership rights, and the protection of agriculture through legal establishment of rents rooted in the size of plots on which farmers work (*PMDSC* 72-3). In other words, peasants themselves were not demanding that land be transferred to them, but rather that labor requirements be reduced and standardized by law, and that legal rights and protection of courts be extended to them.

³³ Jezierski, Jacek. 1790. “Wszystcy błędzą. Rozmowa pana z rolnikiem. Obaj z błędu wychodzą.” in Wolinski, Michalski and Rostworowski. 1955. *PMDSC*. 284-302. Another example of the discourse on peasant rights, in which the author attempts to convince peasants of the justice of the feudal system, whereby the lord is rightfully due labor from peasants for his investment in buying land, building houses, providing capital. In its attempt to persuade peasants that it is not the lord who is responsible for the poverty of peasants, the author points to the “deceitful Jew” who takes all that the peasant has, so much that nothing is even left for the lord. Thus he urges authors who argue for peasant emancipation to write against Jews and for the development of the domestic economy to really “free” peasants (292-4). This is an example of how ethnic cleavage was being leveraged already in the 18th century to overcome tensions in “class” discontentment without actual transformation of the class/estate system.

Kościuszko's rebellion, the question of Jews and peasants

In 1793 the Commonwealth once more underwent partitioning of some of its territory by Russia and Prussia. Kościuszko's rebellion was a response to this second partition (Wandycz 1974:10-11). The rebellion revived the question of religion and peasant rights in the Commonwealth. Kościuszko was aware of the importance of including peasants and minorities in the revolt. Thus, he proclaimed that all were equal in the Commonwealth's struggle for independence (Kieniewicz 1969b:24-6).

Kościuszko was particularly open about supporting the Jewish cause for emancipation and equality (Finkelstein 1997:73). In response, his rebellion received the "most Jewish support" out of all the Polish uprisings that would come during the period of partitions (Polonsky 2010:220). Warszawa's Jews provided financial support for the rebellion and volunteered to join military organizations, where they fought *alongside* Poles in the Uprising. This cross-ethnic camaraderie and support was reported in the newspapers of the time (Rudnicki 2008:13-5).³⁴ One of the most famous Jewish supporters of the rebellion, Berek Joselewicz, was a Jewish merchant who organized a Jewish light cavalry regiment that he led as Colonel in Kościuszko's army (Polonsky 2010:219-20).³⁵ Moreover, the city's Jewish inhabitants played an important part in the defense of Praga, the eastern bank of Warszawa. The fear of Russian rule, Jewish attachment to Poland and Kościuszko's liberal program led the Commonwealth's Jews to join the uprising (Finkelstein 1997:73). Though the revolt failed and the Commonwealth's Jews saw no real concessions, Kościuszko did not only foment discourse on Jewish emancipation and equality but included these in his aims.

While Kościuszko was vocal about supporting Jewish equality, concessions offered to peasants during the rebellion were, just as during the Four Year Sejm, limited. The *szlachta* would not support the overturning of the social structure by freeing the peasantry (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:104; Kieniewicz 1969b:29). Even Kościuszko, a staunch supporter of democracy, realized that any concessions offered to peasants could not be ones that would undermine the gentry's position. Such a move would simultaneously wipe out gentry support for the rebellion. Hence, Kościuszko proposed to grant freedom to serfs, reduce compulsory labor by a day, and to end compulsory labor for those who fought in the insurrection and for their families. Yet he did not address peasant land ownership and asked that peasants remain on manors and work for wages (Kieniewicz 1969b:24-5). Despite the more limited promises, some peasants joined Kościuszko's army, where they often fought with scythes and pikes alongside members of the regular army. Kościuszko's appeal to peasants to join in the defense of the nation began a political discourse that would continue during the partitions (Kieniewicz 1969b:27), particularly surfacing in the wake of each uprising against the Commonwealth's new imperial ruling states. Yet like the Four Year Sejm, it brought neither real change nor even discussion of real concessions to peasants, as such concessions would have throughout much of the 19th century, undermined the economic position of Polish

³⁴ In addition to highlighting the military efforts undertaken by Warszawa's Jewish inhabitants during the rebellion, Rudnicki (2008) discusses the efforts of some late 19th century Polish historians who actively left out Jewish efforts during the rebellion. The latter tried to reframe Jewish participation in Polish uprisings as a lack of patriotic participation and support, as part of their efforts to write national history as an ethnic one. The latter would thus highlight parts of Jewish society that did not participate in patriotic uprisings, actively overlooking the fact that it was only parts of both Polish and Jewish society that ever took part in any of the uprisings in the late 18th and 19th centuries (13-15)..

³⁵ Joselewicz's participation and organization of Jewish society to fight alongside Poles in the struggle for independence became a symbol of Jewish assimilationism that survived into the interwar period. For instance, the assimilationist Jewish Scouts, who repeatedly attempted to join the Polish Scouts within one organization rather than remaining a separate entity, named their troop after Joselewicz [AAN, ZHP (C.76): Syg. 63, p. 180].

landed elites and thus their patriotic support. This, however, would change along with the significant economic, social and political transformations of Polish society, and particularly of its formerly landed elites, throughout the 19th century.

Summation

At the end of the 18th century, some Polish elites sought to overcome the region's ethnic and religious cleavage. During the Four Year Sejm and Kościuszko's insurrection there was more aristocratic support for, and real discussion of, extending rights to Jewish minorities than to peasants (Polonsky 2010:210). I suggest that the reasons for this preference of the Polish elite to consider bridging religious cleavages over transforming class relations stemmed from two key causes. First, in the 18th century the bulk of the Polish elite was *still* landowning. As such, the incorporation of Poland-Lithuania's Jews into the existing estates posed no real threat to most Polish elites and rather carried the potential of increasing their power by boosting the Commonwealth's economy through urban and market development. It was the still relatively weak, though nonetheless important, Christian burghers who viewed the Jewish minority as their economic competitors. Thus, Christian burghers mobilized to protest the granting of urban and professional freedoms to the Jewish minority. Second, before the Russian partition, culture had not yet achieved the status of political oppression that it would reach under Russian policies of forced assimilation. The Commonwealth itself was built on the primacy of civic citizenship of the *szlachta* over ethnic and cultural belonging (Friedrich 2009:14-5; Wandycz 1974:5). These notions would continue in post-partition Polish society, most notably in Piłsudski's interwar political project. However, under the Russian partition's policies of forced russification,³⁶ culture would increasingly become a tool of state oppression and resistance. The ideology of cultural citizenship and statehood would gain ground, eventually dominating the social landscape.

II. The Onset of the Russian Partition: oppression, marginalization and revolt

A year following Kosciuszko's rebellion, Poland was partitioned for the third time (see Map 1, Appendix I). In 1796, Warszawa became part of Prussia, and remained as such until 1807 when Napoleon founded the Duchy of Warszawa. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, most of the Duchy of Warszawa was granted to Russia, creating the Kingdom of Poland, also known as Congress Poland (see Map 3, Appendix I). Its western regions were given to Prussia and became the Duchy of Poznan (Wandycz 1974:74) while Kraków became a free Republic under the "protection" of the three partitioning states (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:121). The century long Russian rule of the former Commonwealth was marked by progressive political exclusion of the Polish elite from political power on the one hand, and cultural repression aimed at elites and masses of non-Russian ethnic backgrounds, on the other. Russia's policies would lead to the politicization of culture, the domination of social organization by the Polish elite, and increased ethnic fragmentation.

³⁶ Forced assimilation was also pursued under the Habsburg (Austrian) and Prussian (German) partitions of the Commonwealth. However, while russification and forced assimilation intensified in the Russian partition after the mid 19th century, it radically declined in the Austrian partition in the second half of the 19th century. In the Prussian partition, like in the Russian one, forced assimilation (germanization and attacks on the Catholic Church which had been, since the 17th century, intimately entwined with Polish culture) increased in the second half of the 19th century. The Prussian partition, however, is not discussed in detail in this dissertation. It will, however, be added as an additional comparative case of the book that will develop from it.

Society in the first years of the partition.

In the first years of foreign rule, the Polish elite remained largely landed. Though leaders of the Kościuszko uprising, including Kościuszko himself, went into exile, much of the elite remained in the lands of the former Commonwealth (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:110). To protect their wealth and status, many at first pledged their loyalty to their new ruling states (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:110). The partitioning states, including Russia, were happy to win over support of Polish nobles (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:110). The Tsarist state lacked the resources necessary to spread its bureaucratic apparatus through its newly acquired Polish lands. As such, it was happy to leave local rule in the hands of Polish nobles. Thus, early Russian rule in the Kingdom of Poland³⁷ left the gentry with more freedom, privileges and vestiges of local autonomy in comparison to their counterparts on formerly Polish lands now under Prussian and Austrian rule (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:110-1, 124). The gentry retained their legal privileges, they were allowed to form cultural organizations and education remained largely under Polish control. For instance, Adam Czartoryski was appointed as the head of the Vilnius educational district in 1803, thus heading the network of Polish language schools throughout Congress Poland and the eastern borderlands (*Kresy*) (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:111, 114).

At the same time, the Tsar made no concessions to improve the livelihood of peasants (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:111) or that of Jewish minorities, even when Polish elites supported such changes (Wandycz 1974:90). The lot of the former worsened with annexation of Polish lands by Russia, where peasants were treated like slaves. The selling off of family members, torture, and flogging, amongst other abuses of the peasantry by lords, became more common (Kieniewicz 1969b:32-3). A twenty-five year compulsory draft was instituted and the “soul tax” tax was introduced. The latter meant that labor which peasants owned to their lords was no longer to be calculated based on the size of land as it had been in the Commonwealth, but by the number of male peasants (Kieniewicz 1969b:32-3). Jewish inhabitants of the region faced increasing discrimination in the countryside, such as exclusions from inn keeping. Thus, many migrated to growing urban settlements. Increased migration led to the imposition of new limits on where Jews could settle, resulting in further separation of Jews from their Christian counterparts (Wandycz 1974:91). In 1827, Tsar Nicholas I sought to pursue policies of russification aimed at Jews. As part of this project, he extended military service to the region’s Jewish minority and attempted to convert Jews to Eastern Orthodoxy (Wandycz 1974:91).

The first decades of Russian rule brought new burdens for peasants and the Jewish minority. At the same time, there was little change to the economic, legal and social position of Polish nobles. The protection of their remaining economic, legal and social privileges motivated the Polish gentry to adopt a loyalist stance towards Russia while fostering the idea of Poland-Lithuania through cultural and linguistic organizations, such as the Warszawa Society of the Friends of Learning, founded in 1800 (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:113). Adam Czartoryski’s close friendship with Alexander I, who came to power in 1801, and the latter’s liberal notions of supporting the development of a semi-autonomous Poland within

³⁷ This was not the case for the more eastern borderlands of the former Commonwealth, known as the *Kresy*. There, the Russian empire pursued policies of forced assimilation since their first incorporation into the Tsarist state. In addition to bordering Russian land, the social make-up of the *Kresy* was distinct from that of the Kingdom of Poland, making it an easier target for quicker incorporation into the empire. They had smaller percentages of Polish populations, and ethno-cultural distinction between many nobles and city dwellers, many of whom were Polish, and peasants, many of whom belonged to other Baltic (Lithuanian) and Slavic (Belorussian, Ukrainian) ethnic groups.

the Russian empire further supported the gentry's loyalism (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:114). However, increasing political marginalization of Polish elites following the Congress of Vienna fostered the re-emergence of antagonistic, military strategies for the re-birth of Poland. It set the stage for increasing political exclusion, cultural repression, and the subsequent development of an increasingly illiberal civil society over the course of the 19th century.

Political Disenchantment

Following the Congress of Vienna, Tsar Alexander I played a crucial part in the creation of the Kingdom of Poland as a semi-autonomous body within the Russian empire, where the alternative could have been another simple partitioning of the Duchy of Warszawa (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:124). His liberal leanings, the creation of the Kingdom and important retention of privileges by Polish nobles fanned Polish hopes (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:124). In 1818, the first Sejm of the Kingdom met in this spirit of hope (Kieniewicz 1969:71). However, in addition to limitations of the Kingdom that were written into the constitution, such as the Sejm's lack of control over the budget or army (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:125), Alexander I began to introduce additional limitations on the Kingdom's autonomy. In 1819, he abolished freedom of the press and introduced censorship (Kieniewicz 1969:71). The second Sejm met in 1820 and unlike the first, questioned the authenticity of the Russian Tsar to respect Polish autonomy and criticized the imposition of censorship (Wandycz 1974:84). Alexander I took this critique as an attack on the empire. He thus retaliated by granting his brother Constantine, who was already appointed as the Tsar's ruler in the Kingdom, the power to disregard the constitution (Wandycz 1974:84).

Following the Tsar's disregard for the previously agreed upon constitution, the political participation of the Polish elite turned from a hopeful exercise in constitutional monarchy to a realization that their political inclusion was at the whims of the Tsar (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:125). The disenchantment of the gentry further grew after Alexander's death and the ascension of his brother, Nicholas I. While there was general discontentment with Alexander's increasingly illiberal leanings, Nicholas I made it clear that he would not honor the liberal promises made by his brother (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:126). For instance, he made it clear that he would not honor Alexander's promise to return the eastern regions (Kresy) to the Kingdom's fold (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:126; Wandycz 1974:88). Despite their numerous differences and views, Polish elites all agreed that Russia failed to uphold the civic rights agreed upon in the new constitution (Wandycz 1974:89). The disregarding of the constitution—the civic rights and political privileges that it bestowed on the Kingdom—led the Kingdom's disparate political groups to band together in support of the November Uprising.

And an Emergent Civil Society: Political, Secret Organizations

Coinciding with the elite's growing disillusionment of political institutions was its increasing interest in politically oriented civil society associations. In 1815 there were 32 freely operating Freemason lodges in the Kingdom, whose members were largely traditional, not revolutionary, nobles (Davies 1981:312). In 1819, following the state's movement towards increasing marginalization of Polish elites, Major Łukasiński founded the National Freemasonry, whose members largely came from the army. Soon after its inception the organization gained a following in the provinces, Sejm and increasing support from members of the Polish army (Davies 1981:312; Wandycz 1974:85). Though more political than the Freemasons, the National Freemasonry was not meant to foment a revolutionary spirit (Wandycz 1974:85). Rather, its purpose was to support the idea of the Polish nation and to

work as a “pressure group influencing public opinion and the government” (Wandycz 1974:85-6). In addition to the Freemasons, there were other politically oriented, secret societies that saw education and the cultivation of a national spirit as a means to foster, and eventually to achieve, Polish independence (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:126). While the National Freemasonry largely drew its supporters from military ranks, these clandestine societies were mostly composed of the members from the growing, new middle classes: university students, young officers. Many members of this new intelligentsia, or cultural elite, came from an old traditional, yet impoverished, gentry background (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:126; Wandycz 1974:85, 89). Thus, it is no surprise that, seeing their prospects of participating in the region’s political institutions, in which Poles had lost significant power along with the region’s autonomy, they sought a return to Polish national independence.

The associations that arose in the early years of Russian imperial rule were secret and liberal. Moreover, to some extent, they were created as a means to nurture Polish culture and hope for a future, autonomous Polish state. However, they were not *yet* revolutionary (Wandycz 1974:85). This began to change with increased cultural repression and political exclusion.

Increased Cultural and Political Repression and a Military Response: The November Uprising of 1830

In 1821, Alexander I banned secret societies, including the Freemasons, which once he had supported (Davies 1981:312). Following the dissolution of the more moderate Freemasons, the illegal, National Patriotic Society absorbed many of the former organizations’ more active members (Davies 1981:312; Wandycz 1974:85). In 1822 Alexander I trialed and jailed Łukasiński for his conspiratorial work in the National Patriotic Society (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:126). Moreover, he sought to prosecute other members of the Patriotic Society (Wandycz 1974:85). He attacked and disbanded secret societies as well as institutions of Polish culture, particularly in Vilnius, the cultural Polish stronghold in the eastern borderlands (Wandycz 1974: 86). Yet the Tsar’s offensive against Polish culture and associations backfired. Rather than suppressing Polish patriotism and fervor, it worked to “enhance their importance and produced martyrs for the Polish national cause” (Wandycz 1974:86). After Alexander I’s death, his successor, Nicholas I, continued to restrict previous liberties awarded to the Kingdom. Thus, by 1829, Russia was seen as completely violating the constitution on which the union of the Kingdom of Poland and Russia was established; in turn, opposition to the regime spread through the Kingdom (Wandycz 1974:89).

Political injustice and Russia’s infringement on civic rights, including censorship, dissolution of Sejm sessions, annulment of elections, interference with courts, and secret police activity, among others, fanned the development of increasing secret societies among civilian groups such as students, writers and journalists (Wandycz 1974:89). The period before the 1830 rebellion foreshadowed the elite’s increasing use of voluntary, social organizations as not only a space of political discussion, but a space, and tool, for political resistance. However, organizers of the 1830 November Uprising did little to include the wider society in either conspiratorial organizations or in the political aims of the rebellion. The uprising failed, at least in part, due to its inability to gain widespread social support.

The Peasant Question

One failure with which the revolution was charged was the lack of a coherent leadership and movement. The inability of the rebellion’s leadership to agree upon a coherent

plan was tied to the peasant question, and specifically the leadership's failure to tie the goal of Polish independence to broader aims of social reformation. Through such a merger of national and social aims, the Polish elites could have won long-term, peasant support (Wandycz 1974:112, 114). However, in the early 19th century, the Polish landed elite still opposed total peasant emancipation and land reform. For instance, the Constitution of 1815 reaffirmed peasant freedom but did not address their lack of rights to land (Kieniewicz 1969b:74). In 1822 the Sejm revisited the issue, particularly under the guidance of Staszic, who had been a supporter of peasant rights during the Four Year Sejm (Kieniewicz 1969b:74). However, discussion did not amount to anything.

Any concessions made to peasants were made by individual lords (Kieniewicz 1969b:74), as had been the case in the Commonwealth before its partitions. Of particular, and at the time unusual, note were the reforms introduced by Staszic. After purchasing land in Hrubieszów he divided it between his peasants and granted them ownership rights. Furthermore, in 1800 Staszic organized the "Peasant Society," the first agricultural cooperative to be recoded on lands of the former Commonwealth (Kieniewicz 1969b:74). Yet despite efforts of individual lords and support of liberals (Wandycz 1974:112), the majority of the landed elite held onto their conservative stance on peasant rights (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:127). By 1830, only about a third of the peasants in the Kingdom of Poland lived under a more modern system of paid rents (Wandycz 1974:90-1). Moreover, as evictions had increased following the regions partitioning, by 1827 there were 800,000 landless peasants in the Kingdom (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:127). The harsh realities of the region's peasants, the unwillingness of elites to support improvement of peasant conditions, and the inability of revolutionaries to adequately address the peasant question resulted in the lack of peasant support for the 1830 November Uprising (Wandycz 1974:117).

The Jewish Question

In addition to failing to incorporate peasants' interests into the uprising, the revolutionaries at first failed to make any substantive concessions to win support of the Jewish minority. They made no changes to the status of Jews, save for the promise of civic rights for those who received military honors or completed ten years of military service (Polonsky 2010:299). Moreover, the Polish leadership of the uprising did not have a unified stance on just what role Warszawa's Jewish inhabitants should play in the uprising. Assimilated members of the Jewish minority—particularly Jewish youth that had attended Polish schools—as well as some members of the wealthy Jewish economic (as opposed to religious) elite, supported the revolution and wished to take an active part in its military endeavors (Rudnicki 2008:16). Yet the leadership of the uprising, which was more conservative than that of the rebellions that came before and would come after, refused to admit Jewish members into the National Guard. Jews protested their categorical ban from the "exclusive" National Guard, and in response, the National Committee allowed Jews to join its ranks. While some Poles wanted all Jews to join the uprising's military organization, others protested that only properly acculturated Jews be allowed to join the National Guard. In the end, the National Committee only allowed Jewish inhabitants who owned 60,000 in property or capital, who spoke Polish, French or German and who shaved their beards to join (Rudnicki 2008:16–7). About 358 Jewish inhabitants of Warszawa did so; thus they joined the National Guard where they served *alongside*, and in a few instances, in charge of Christians (Duker 1979:226–7; Lewandowski 1830:126).³⁸ Another 1400 that were unwilling

³⁸ The breakdown of Jewish participants in the individual regiments of the National Guard, printed in Lewandowski (1830), shows that its Jews members were not part of a Jewish sub-set of the National Guard, but

to compromise their cultural and religious beliefs, yet who were still determined to join the patriotic endeavor, formed a Civil Guard (Polonsky 2010:298).

The stance of the revolutionaries towards the Jewish minority echoed an assimilationist approach of forced polonization, which asserted that Jews could only fully receive civic rights and membership in Polish society after adopting its culture. This view, which stated that Jew's should only be granted full rights of equality upon their full acculturation to Polish and Christian culture, dominated the opinion of Warszawa's elites in the decade prior to the November Uprising.³⁹ In the face of Polish rejection and unwillingness to grant serious concessions to the Jewish minority, it is not surprising that Jewish support for the November Uprising was divided. Jewish religious leaders and the bulk of the minorities' religious and impoverished masses were concerned with equal rights and autonomy, rather than with national politics. What is more surprising is the level to which some Jewish economic elites and members of the intelligentsia, and particularly Jewish youth that had assimilated into Polish culture by attending secular, Polish schools, went to in order to take part in the patriotic rebellion. In the end, about 1,600 to 1,800 (estimates vary) of Warszawa's 30,600 Jewish inhabitants, and thus a not insignificant number, fought in the National and Civil Guards. Moreover, those who fought in each guard protested for their right to do so, and did so before the National Committee signed a declaration that the region's Jewish inhabitants would finally receive citizenship rights upon the Kingdom's independence (Rudnicki 2008:19).

Summation

From the creation of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland to the 1830 November Uprising, Congress Poland saw the slow emergence of a civil society. The latter was no longer marked only by public debate, but now also consisted of a burgeoning associational landscape. Newly emergent associations were, however, limited in aim and membership. The Polish elite, which once had ruled the Commonwealth, was increasingly disenchanted with their ability to continue to rule under the stewardship of the Russian state. Increasing state disapproval and disregard for the region's previously agreed upon relative autonomy fomented political discontentment. Yet, rather than fostering debate within political institutions, political marginalization moved that debate to organizations and networks outside of the state. As repression of the public sphere increased, so did the clandestine nature of the associations that occupied it. In other words, the marginalization of Polish elites in formal state institutions led them to foster the development of a seemingly diverse, yet in reality largely politically-oriented, civil society.

In addition to its overly political beginnings, the burgeoning civil society was still limited in scope. Its members overwhelmingly came from Polish traditional, often still landed, and new, cultural elites. Both the largely circumscribed nature of the emergent associational life and the relative willingness of the "gate-keeping" Polish elite to break civil society's social boundaries for across-ethnic rather than across-class boundaries can be seen in the military—yet voluntary—organizations that arose for and during the November Uprising. Despite the relatively few concessions that the uprising's elites were willing to grant to the Jewish minority prior to its outbreak, and despite the Polish elite's limited

participated alongside its Christian members in the individual regiments (126). Five of the 358 Jewish members of the National Guard also held positions as non-commissioned officers (*podoficer*) in the Guard.

³⁹ For a detailed account of the debates and opinions surrounding the question of Jewish rights, and the egotistic stance taken by the Polish elite of the need of absolute acculturation and conversion of Jews as a necessity of their social integration from 1815-1830 see Polonsky (2010:288-299).

support for incorporating Jewish members into exclusive Polish organizations like the National Guard, some Jews protested their exclusion. Eventually they too could join the prestigious organization. However, it is important not to overlook or minimize the fact that the inclusion of Jewish members into regiments where they would fight alongside Christians was based in part on Jewish acquiescence to a degree of forced acculturation, as symbolized by the requirement of shaving one's beard. However, the admittance of Jews into the ranks of the National Guard, whose membership requirements rested on political privileges—legal residency in Warszawa and economic status—property ownership or a well-paying bureaucratic post (Lewandowski 1830:114), echoed the continual preference amongst elites for privileging class, or estate, social boundaries. In other words, religion and cultural certainly mattered. Yet for Polish elites class was still more important.

III. Russian Rule 1830-1863: Increased political exclusion, cultural repression and policies aimed at undermining the standing of the Polish gentry

Rather than ushering in Polish independence, the November Uprising led to a further diminishing of the Kingdom's political, civic and cultural freedoms. Furthermore, following the rebellion, the Russian state pursued policies meant to undermine the economic and social standing of members of the Polish intelligentsia and nobility who led and supported the uprising. In addition to stirring economic and political retaliation aimed at its leaders, the failure of the November Uprising transformed the attitudes of the Polish gentry. Specifically, it revived patriotic arguments earlier proclaimed by Kościuszko: that Polish independence would necessitate cross-ethnic and cross-class cooperation. Hence, increasingly repressive attitude of the Russian state on the one hand, and a rising awareness of Polish elites of their need for cross-ethnic and peasant support on the other, fomented clandestine association and increasing cross-class and cross-ethnic cooperation that culminated in the January Uprising of 1863. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the uprising was an impressive feat of social networking, associations and cross-ethnic and cross-class cooperation.

Political Exclusion, Cultural Repression and Attempts to Undermine the Polish Elite

Following the uprising of 1830, Congress Poland's official autonomy was limited and political activity was effectively repressed (Wandycz 1974:124). The Sejm and an independent army were abolished; Polish aristocrats were excluded from both participatory politics and from positions of power in the state administrative apparatus (Wandycz 1974:122; Kieniewicz 1967:148). For the next twenty-five years a Russian viceroy, Ivan Paskevich, ruled the Kingdom (Polonsky 2010:277). While some lower bureaucratic posts remained in Polish hands, the upper levels of government were effectively ruled by Paskevich (Polonsky 2010:277). All civil rights were suspended (Wandycz 1974:122). Though Polish remained the language of administration in the Kingdom, in 1847 the Russian language and criminal code were introduced into Polish courts (Wandycz 1974:122).

The suspension of political Polish institutions was accompanied by the dissolution of Polish cultural ones. By 1839 all Polish institutions of higher learning were abolished, control of schooling was taken over by Russia, art and museum collections were taken to Russia, and the children of nobles, seen as a potential threat, were discriminated in school admissions (Davies 1981:332; Wandycz 1974:122). In effect, the Russian state worked to hinder any organization, legal or clandestine, that could promote or be utilized for political aims (Wandycz 1974:124). The only social organization that could, and did, manifest in the years

following the November Uprising were early movements of the spirit of the “organic works” that aimed to encourage the economic and social improvement of the country, such as the clergy-led and peasant-focused temperance movement of the 1840s or meetings aimed at discussing agricultural modernization (Wandycz 1974:125).

In addition to stifling independent political and cultural association, the Russian state worked to hinder the Kingdom’s economic development. A tariff was imposed between the Kingdom and Russia, leading wool industries to move to Białystok, which was situated across the border in the firmly Russian-ruled Kresy (Wandycz 1974:123). The state refused to fund mining works that the previous regime tried to develop (Wandycz 1974:123). Agriculture was modernizing very slowly. In 1848, over 1.3 million peasants continued to work as forced laborers (*corvée*), only half a million were tenants, 141,200 colonists and nearly one million (848,200) belonged to the landless peasantry (Wandycz 1974:124).

Furthermore, beginning with the eastern lands of the former Commonwealth (*Kresy*) the Russian state worked to undermine the social and economic standing of the Polish gentry. In 1836 it passed a new regulation that required proof of nobility. Such registries were meant as a means of rescinding traditional rights of the lower nobles by demoting those without papers into the same status as peasants. Between 1832 and 1849, 54,000 of such *déclassé* gentry was deported from the *Kresy* beyond the river Volga, the Caucasus and even Siberia (Wandycz 1974:126). The registration of nobility and elimination of those lacking proof of their status occurred in 1856 in the Kingdom of Poland (Davies 1981:182).

The Peasant Question

To prevent peasant uprisings, as those that arose in Polish lands under Prussia and Austria, and to paint himself rather than the Polish gentry as the one who could and would better the lot of peasants,⁴⁰ in 1846 Russia’s Tsar granted concessions to the Kingdom’s peasantry. Though they only applied to peasants on large holdings of four acres or more, the concessions did address some immediate concerns of the gentry, such as displacement and continuation of *corvée* labor. They included the prohibition of evictions, a procedure for transforming compulsory labor into rents, and the right of peasants to appeal to courts and officials (Kieniewicz 1969b: 141). On the one hand, these policies were limited, as the Tsar could not introduce policies that would undermine the feudal system that continued to support Russia empire (Kieniewicz 1969b: 141). On the other hand, they were significant enough to foment hope among peasants that the Tsar would further improve their situation. This attitude could be seen, for instance, in the refusal of some peasants to negotiate new contracts with landlords in anticipation that the Tsar would bestow upon them additional rights (Kieniewicz 1969b: 143).

The Jewish Question

Critique of the failed November Uprising pointed to the lack of effort by instigators to win the support of oppressed groups, in particular peasants and Jews (Polonsky 2010:299). Such debate sparked new supporters for Jewish rights among the Polish elite who saw the region’s Jewish minority as an important ally in the future struggle with Russia (Polonsky 2010:300). At the same time, the Russian empire worked to undermine such potential cross-ethnic cooperation by increasing social cleavages between Jews and Poles. One way in which the Russian state sought to undermine Polish and Jewish cooperation was by russifying its

⁴⁰ In an 1846 address to a group of peasants in the Kingdom, Nicholas I said, “I am your only benefactor; you may rely on me—but I shan’t support any disorder.” His statement can be seen as serving the dual purpose of painting himself and not the Polish gentry as the true benefactor of Polish peasants, all the while warning against peasant uprisings. Quoted in Kieniewicz (1969b:140).

Jewish population (Polonsky 2010:301). While its efforts were somewhat successful in the eastern borderlands, they were much mostly unsuccessful in the Kingdom (Polonsky 2010:301). The state also hindered the efforts of Polish and Jewish assimilationists by repressing public debate, including discussion about Jewish equality in the Kingdom (Polonsky 2010:300-1).

With open, political debate hindered by the state, the Kingdom's Polish and Jewish supporters of Jewish acculturation turned to civil society to further their cause. Associations designed with cross-ethnic cooperation in mind included the Warszawa Rabbinic School, where instruction was purely in Polish, an integrationist Association of Tradespeople and the integrationist paper "Izraelita" (Polonsky 2010:301-4). The assimilationist movement was not an utter failure, as it facilitated the assimilation into Polish culture of a small group of the Jewish elite. However, those who assimilated were a distinct, and small, minority when compared to the still culturally, and to a large extent socially separate Jewish masses. (Polonsky 2010:306-7).⁴¹ As mentioned above, Russia's effort to russify the Kingdom's Jewish population was unsuccessful. However, its repression of political discourse and the dissolution of Polish cultural institutions did hinder the polonization of the Jewish minority. As such, it successfully enfeebled potential growth in Polish-Jewish cooperation, as in the eyes of many Polish elites the latter was largely, and increasingly, predicated on Jewish integration into Polish culture.

The Re-emergence of a Politicized and Militant Civil Society prior to and as part of the 1863 January Uprising

Nicholas I died in 1855 and was succeeded by Alexander II. Upon his ascension to the throne, the latter sensed the rise of social discontentment. To stave off a revolt, Alexander loosened restrictions on social organizations. For instance, he reopened the Polish Medical Academy (Davies 1981:348-9). Hopeful that change was possible, Polish elites organized new institutions. Yet while masquerading as apolitical, many such organizations mimicked political institutions, thus allowing Polish elites to engage in functions denied to them in formal political institutions. For instance, in 1858 the Agricultural Society was founded, and quickly grew to include 4000 members in 77 branches in Poland and Lithuania (Davies 1981:348-9). The Agricultural Society was officially formed as a means to promote agricultural modernization. Yet in reality it provided Polish elites with an institution in and through which they could engage in political discourse (Davies 1981:348-9). Furthermore, a City Guard, which could easily take on police functions, was organized (Davies 1981:348-9). In 1861, the assimilated Polish-Jewish industrialist Kronenberg founded the City Delegation in Warszawa. Its official aim was to transmit opinions of leading citizens to the viceroy. Yet, like the Agricultural Society, it was really a political organization. (Davies 1981:348-9) Alexander's reforms created a space for civil society to grow. Yet his continual exclusion of Polish nobles from real political power combined with their perseverance of cultural entitlement and a paternalistic-patriotic relationship to the notion of Poland fostered a

⁴¹ Assimilation was most prevalent among the economically successful elites, whose assimilation often accompanied intermarriage into the Polish aristocracy (Davies 1981:195; Wandycz 1974:207). There are two obvious potential explanations for this. First, while some Polish aristocrats might have required economic support to retain their lifestyles, the economically successful Jewish elite did not pose the same economic threat to Polish aristocrats as they did to Christian middle classes. First, the social status of the former resided in landownership, which in the Kingdom of Poland was closed off to most Jews, and a birthright whose cultural status had never been defined by economic wealth. Second, wealthy and educated Jews had the most incentive to assimilate. Doing so granted them access to the broader Polish society and potential for more economic and social power. Uneducated and poor minorities had no economic or political incentive for assimilation.

politicized civil society, where seemingly civic organizations were created with the aim of reclaiming Polish independence.

In addition to fomenting the growth of an elite-dominated and politicizing civil society, Russia's policies fostered the development of clandestine, hierarchical and militaristic networks and associations, setting the stage for the next, January 1863, Uprising. The January Uprising grew out of the collaboration between two factions in this Polish conspiratorial society. On the one hand was the "Red," more working class and revolutionary, faction that supported and started the military uprising. On the other hand were the "Whites," whose support stemmed from the landed and petty nobles. As the former were concerned with losing their land and the latter with losing their bureaucratic and administrative posts, the "Whites" were more hesitant in pursuing a military campaign. (Wandycz 1974:167–170)

The Central National Committee (*Komitet Centralny Narodowy*, KCN) was the clandestine, secret organization of the Reds. According to estimations of one of its leaders, it included 20,000 members in the Kingdom, of which 8,000 were from the Warszawa region alone (Janowski 1923:11). In his memoirs, Józef Kajetan Janowski, one of the leaders of the KCN, recounts that the conspiratorial work of the revolutionary Reds created a social network that crossed both urban and rural divisions, and, according to him, involved members of "all" social classes. According to the list of types of members that he provides, middle and upper-level members of the organization were drawn from the intelligentsia—such as those with administrative and bureaucratic posts, students and some older administrators, as well as from skilled workers—such as craftsmen (*rzemieślnicy*) or railway workers. Moreover, he notes that even members of the owning classes (*włościanie*) and of the landowning gentry (*ziemiańskie*) could be found among the higher echelons of the organization's rural and urban leadership, respectively. Lower positions were mostly filled by skilled working class/craftsmen (*rzemieślnicy*), youth and women, who often participated as couriers and were crucial in supporting efforts, such as in hospitals, during the armed uprising (Janowski 1925:64-5).

On the one hand, the social organization that developed in opposition to the Tsarist state and in anticipation of the January Uprising promoted liberal, or inclusive, ideals and behaviors as it fostered relations that crossed rural and urban, and class and estate divides. On the other hand, conspiratorial associations, by virtue of their illegal and clandestine nature, fostered the development of undemocratic—militant and hierarchical—structures and relations. First, in addition to its political-administrative branches, the KCN had a militarized branch that functioned as a police force. However, the hierarchical mindset that is fostered through and within military organizations was not limited to this sole branch of the secret organization. Rather, it was sown into the interactions and networks through which the clandestine movement existed. In his memoirs, Janowski clearly states that each member of the KCN had to swear loyalty utter trust and loyalty to the organization and to carry out all and any orders without question and hesitation—"everyone joining the organization, particularly its police branch, was obliged to swear an oath of absolute secrecy and obedience to carry out any orders and instructions provided by their superiors" (1923:11).

And the Jewish Question

As part of his reforms, Alexander II appointed a Polish magnate, Count Wielopolski, as the viceroy of the Kingdom in 1862, and charged him with reforming it. Preferring reform to revolts, Wielopolski proposed to slowly modernize the Kingdom. His plan included equality for the Jewish minority (Wandycz 1975:168). Like the supporters of Jewish integration at the Four Year Sejm, Wielopolski saw the Kingdom's Jews as crucial for its

industrial development and wanted to integrate them into the Polish bourgeoisie (Polonsky 2010:278). The fear of Polish-Jewish cooperation nudged the Russian state to support Wielopolski's reforms and to grant rights to its Jewish population in 1862 (Polonsky 2010:279). Yet despite Alexander II's and Wielopolski's efforts, the years leading up to the 1863 January Uprising saw growing cooperation between the Kingdom's Polish and Jewish societies (Rudnicki 2008:21–2).

Wielopolski's reforms could not undue in one year a camaraderie that had burgeoned during the region's years of shared discrimination and repression. In his diaries, Janowski highlights such sentiments of mutual understanding that grew out of mutual repression when discussing how prior to the January Uprising Jews, Poles and other "foreigners" were singled out for economic discrimination, through measures such as housing taxes, in the Kresy (Janowski 1925:109). Polonsky further argues that Russian attacks on Polish culture and activists, such as the censorship of a Polish aristocrat who defended acculturated Jews in the Kingdom, caused patriotic Poles to see the latter in a more favorable light (Polonsky 2010:308). In other words, the very public suppression of civic discourse, which was meant to prevent the bridging of cross-ethnic boundaries, worked to improve Polish-Jewish understanding, at least for those who viewed themselves as partaking in that discourse (Polonsky 2010:308). Lastly, Jewish populations were skeptical of the veracity of the state's promises that it would increase Jewish rights. Historically, the Russian state had proven itself to hinder rather than support Jewish integration. For instance, the state's rejection of a petition of the Warszawa Jewish Congregational Board that addressed the status of Jews in the Kingdom worked to fuel suspicion that the Jewish situation could not really improve under Russian rule (Polonsky 2010:308). Thus, though Wielopolski's made some reforms and made more promise to improve Jewish rights under Russian rule, his efforts were too little and too late to prevent Polish-Jewish cooperation that was showcased so clearly during the January Uprising.

By 1863, the Polish elite had finally come to understand that which Kosciuszko had argued in 1794—that the question of Jewish and peasant emancipation was tied to Polish independence (Polonsky 2010:309). In an effort to win Jewish support for Poland's independence, the underground government affirmed Jewish emancipation (Polonsky 2010:310-1), being the first "Polish state" to unequivocally proclaim absolute Jewish equality (Rudnicki 2008:22-3). The National Committee build its program for the January uprising on general goals of civic rights and tolerance, including religious tolerance for "Poles of all religions" (Janowski 1925:198-9). In addition to the official goals of the uprising, various secret publications that circulated before the uprising called for and supported Polish-Jewish cooperation. Such cooperation was framed as both build upon and necessary for a better, future Polish, state where all inhabitants of Poland would be equal (e.g. *Strażnicy*, nr 14, Warszawa 29.11.1861). Simultaneously, blame for a lack of previous Jewish equality and for the failure of Jewish assimilation was placed at the feet of the Russian state. Thus, a patriotic, pro-Polish awakening of the region's Jewish minority and support for the uprising was portrayed as effectively addressing both—lack of equality and of assimilation—and thus paving the way for a mutually beneficial Polish society (e.g. *Strażnik*, nr. 9, Warszawa 10.10.1861, p 15-17).

The elite's understanding that Jewish support was crucial for a successful uprising, and mutual feelings of repression and exclusion of Jewish and Polish societies by the Russian state fomented growing cross-ethnic cooperation. This cooperation was apparent in both the uprising itself, in the celebrations and support that followed its short-lived victories, and in manifestations and processions that proceeded and followed the uprising (Janowski 1923:85-8, 133; Rudnicki 2008:22). In his memoirs, when recalling a trip to the industrial city of Łódź

in January 1863, Janowski notes that three quarters of the city's population was Jewish and German. Moreover, he notes that both groups were important participants of the local secret organizations. While the city's German inhabitants were mostly assimilated into Polish culture, even sending their kids to Polish schools, its Jewish inhabitants remained generally unassimilated. Janowski highlights that the Jewish inhabitants generally unassimilated status led to their frequent harassment by representatives of the Russian state. These included events such as the police forcing the city's Jewish inhabitants' to cut their hair and to change out of their traditional clothing. When further describing the city's inter-ethnic relations, Janowski writes that Jews were generally "friendly" and positively disposed to Poles. He recounts that many participated in conspiratorial organizations, while others presented themselves during the uprising, noting that they were overlooked in the organizational efforts but wanted to join in the patriotic endeavor. Lastly, in addition to the support that the local Jewish populations lent to the uprising's efforts, Janowski notes that there were few Jews who supported the Russian state during this time. He adds that, after the uprising's end, many of the city's Jews were exiled to Siberia for the active part that they had played in the doomed rebellion (Janowski 1923:86).

Another famous depiction of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious cooperation that characterized the political demonstrations that preceded the January Uprising and the military campaigns which embodied it is Aleksander Lesser's painting "The funeral of five victims of the 1861 Warszawa demonstrations" (*Pogrzeb pięciu ofiar manifestacji w Warszawie w roku 1861*) The event known by the same name was a funeral of five demonstrators killed in 1861, during one of the various political protest that took place in Congress Poland prior to the outbreak of the 1863 January Uprising. In the painting, the central figure of a Roman Catholic priest is surrounded by Evangelical (left of the central figure) and Jewish (right of the central figure) religious leaders. Such demonstrations of cross-ethnic and cross-religious solidarity against the repression of Russian rule were not uncommon in the demonstration that preceded and followed the January Uprising (Rudnicki 2008:21-5).



Aleksander Lesser, *Pogrzeb pięciu ofiar manifestacji w Warszawie w roku 1861* (*The funeral of five victims of the 1861 Warszawa demonstrations*)

Source:http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masakry_w_Warszawie_1861#/media/File:Burial_of_victims_of_Polish_patriotic_manifestations_in_Warszawa_1861.PNG

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Janowski's diaries and Lesser's painting are just a few of the primary sources that support scholarly claims that the period surrounding the January Uprising saw considerable inter-ethnic and inter-religious patriotic cooperation in Congress Poland motivated by a mutual discontentment with the Russian state. However, these moments of cross-ethnic cooperation must not be overstated. For while significant parts of Polish and Jewish society did cooperate in their struggles against the Russian state and work towards increasing cross-ethnic cooperation and integration, they continued to be a small part of the region's society. In general, not only did Polish and Jewish masses continued to be separated by culture, religion and prejudice. On the one hand, Jewish society remained divided, with some, including some wealth Jewish economic elites, supporting the Russian state in hopes of winning greater concessions from the Tsar (Rudnicki 2008:23). On the other hand, Poles continued to reinforce segregation between the two groups. For instance, some Polish independence fighters did not use the uprising as an opportunity to forge alliances with local Jews but rather as one to rob them, thus further reinforcing inter-ethnic mistrust. In another example, a town (Pińsk) was known to have seen cross-ethnic camaraderie. Yet in the same time, when a local female gymnasium was faced with a vote whether to admit Jewish girls into the school, it voted not to do so, hence reinforcing segregation rather than integration. (Rudnicki 2008:23-4) Moreover, obstacles to integration did not only come from "lower" strata of society. For instance, Janowski's writings made it clear that he strongly supported and was glad for the region's inter-ethnic cooperation. Yet while describing a "Jewish-

patriot,” who was a key member of the uprising and his friend, he feels the need to comment how his friend’s character and behavior “distinguished him from typical members of his religion” (Janowski 1925:165-6). Thus, even progressive Polish leaders harbored prejudices and stereotypes that hindered the integration of Polish and Jewish societies.

And the Peasant Question

Like the Jewish question, the question of peasant loyalty was of serious concern to the Russian state and Polish elites. In addition to granting equal rights to Jews in the Kingdom, Wielopolski’s plan included the freeing of peasants and abolishment of labor duties, establishment of a university, and land reform (Wandycz 1975:168). Despite Wielopolski’s aims, the Russian state did not aim to implement radical peasant reform, and only did so when forced by the onset of the 1863 uprising. In 1864, in response to the uprising, and as a means to prevent peasants from supporting its military efforts, the Russian state abolished labor duties and granted freeholds to peasants under favorable conditions (Wandycz 1974:178). Polish elites also sought to win peasant allegiance for their cause. To do so, the National Central Committee’s (KCN) manifesto (prior to 1863) discussed peasant land ownership (Davies 1981:358). The National Committee’s goals were based on general notions of rights and progress that would bridge class and rural-urban divides (Janowski 1925: 198-9). Yet what such progress meant, besides being freed from Russian control, was ambiguous. Similarly, articles from the secret press that aimed to garner peasant support for the uprising did so by appealing to mutual discontentment under Russian rule rather than to actual promises of how a Polish state would improve the peasants’ lot. For instance, an article from *Męczennicy* notes that neither Germans nor Russians were ever friends of peasant, as a “friend does not forbid one to pray at the altar, never shoots to unarmed children, women, never imprisons priests, who pray with them [peasants, women, children] for a better lot for Poland” (*Męczennicy*, nr. 1, 1.5.1862, Warszawa, p.188-91). Social and cultural repression, rather than economic relations and the promise of an improvement in the economic standing of peasants was a safer strategy of attempting to bridge cross-class cleavages without actually addressing conflicting urban-rural and class interests. This strategy of focusing on cultural, including religious, repression and thus on culturally drawn allegiances would continue past the uprising and increase in prominence in the decades before WWI.

Both the revolutionaries and the Russian state made overtures to peasants during the Uprising. The actual extent to which peasants supported passively or contributed actively to the uprising is somewhat unclear. Some scholars argue that many peasants came to support one of the two revolutionary factions: the “radical reds” (Zyzniewski 1965:409, 412). While at first their support was cautious, peasants came to back the uprising once the CKN made a firm commitment to granting peasants land rights and freeholds, and once they saw such policies enacted in areas under the CKN’s brief control (Kieniewicz 1967:140-141). In addition to passive support, some claim that peasants joined the ranks of the conspiratorial organization and engaged in guerrilla warfare (Kieniewicz 1967:141). Other scholars, particularly ones that have more recently published on the topic, suggest that peasant support for the revolution was “limited” from the start, and in general halted after the March 2 1864 proclamation of peasant enfranchisement by the Russian state (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:117). A similar view of limited peasants support for the January Uprising can be seen in Janowski’s diaries—a singular yet primary account of the rebellion. While not denying peasant participation, Janowski suggests that conspiratorial activity was mostly, but not entirely, in the hands of urban dwellers. He acknowledged that large-scale peasant military support in the uprising was seen in one voivodeship (*województwo*) in the Kingdom

(Podlaskie). However, he asserts that the Podlaskie województwo was the only region that saw significant peasant participation during the uprising, and that in general rural inhabitants did not actively participate in the revolution (Janowski 1923:185-6). According to him, the revolution was much more successful in securing cross-ethnic urban cooperation rather than bridging the urban-rural divide (Janowski 1923:186, 317).

Summation

Like the Russian state, Polish elites came to support minority rights as a necessary tool in their struggle with Russia. In the increasingly restrictive atmosphere of the post-1830 Kingdom of Poland elites were still more willing to pursue cross-ethnic cooperation by granting concessions to ethnic minorities than to pursue cross-class cooperation by granting concessions to peasants. The voices of support for Jewish emancipation and integration, albeit conditional on their full acculturation to Polish culture, came from conservative, landed (formerly) Polish émigrés in Paris (Polonsky 2010:301) and the burgeoning intelligentsia, much of which still came from the Polish gentry, in Congress Poland. At this point both the conservative nobles and the liberal intelligentsia saw the integration of Jews into Polish society as beneficial, so long as it occurred alongside their integration into Polish culture as “Poles of the Mosaic faith” (Polonsky 2010:315). Prior to 1863, the Kingdom’s Jews posed little to no threat to landed elites and the Polish intelligentsia did not yet feel the pressures of economic competition with the Jewish minority. Employment in the free professions and administrative and bureaucratic posts still flourished before the January Uprising.⁴² Yet as the intelligentsia and middle classes would grow and come into economic competition with the Jewish minority, the former would move away from integrationist efforts.

Prior to and during the January Uprising, Polish elites also made overtures to win peasant support. However, at the time, support for more radical concessions to Polish peasants was still limited as many Polish elites continued to be landed, and thus held opposing economic interests to those of the peasants who worked their lands. To circumvent the issue of land so as to win support from peasants and to not lose the support of landed gentry, the Central National Committee’s Manifesto was purposely ambiguous, guaranteeing both land to peasants and compensation to landlords while avoiding details of how land reform could be carried out (Kieniewicz 1969b:161-2). Moreover, it was the radical Reds, whose ranks were sparsely filled with landed elites, who supported greater land concessions to peasants (Kieniewicz 1969b:162-5). Once the more conservative whites joined the revolution, promises to peasants were further subdued (Kieniewicz 1969b:165). In other words, in 1863 the prominence, number and importance of their landed elites continued to steer Polish elites towards preferring class-based, cross-ethnic concessions than cross-class cooperation which would require real economic concessions to Polish peasants. This dynamic would change after the 1863 January Uprising.

The Uprising of 1863 marked both the pinnacle of Polish-Jewish cooperation and the end of the Polish elite’s privileging of class over ethnic fragmentation. Russia’s land reform and increasing industrialization would lead to the weakening of landed Polish interests and to the flooding of impoverished Polish gentry into cities and middle and working classes. Mounting economic pressure and an increasing cultural struggles—a result of russification policies that followed the failed uprising—would contribute to growing support for

⁴² Economic competition resulting from the overproduction of the intelligentsia did not take serious shape until the 1870s and 1880s in the Kingdom (Micińska 2008:22-23).

nationalist ideals and propositions aimed at crossing class-cleavages at the expense of deepening ethnic fragmentation.

IV. Political Exclusion, Russification and Industrialization: the growth in illiberal—exclusionary, politicized and elite-dominated—associations, movements and ideals

The Russian state reacted to the January Uprising as it had to previous instances of Polish insubordination: with political exclusion, cultural repression and economic policies aimed at punishing defiant gentry by undermining their economic status. State-led land expropriation pushed Polish gentry from landed estates in the countryside into the working and middle classes in cities and towns. This wave of political and economic retribution coincided with Congress Poland's industrial awakening. Economic modernization undermined economically inefficient landed estates, further propelling the migration of the formerly landed gentry and landless peasants into towns. In addition to significant, state and market-induced economic transformations, the post-1863 Kingdom of Poland underwent important political and social changes. In addition to displacing landed gentry, the Russian state the Polish gentry's economic status by russifying its bureaucracies, thus limiting options for the now landless gentry's economic development. Furthermore, in hopes of preventing future uprisings, the state extended its policies of cultural repression.

While prior to 1863 Polish elites had experienced cultural repression and discrimination, after the January Uprising the state implemented policies aimed at russifying the broader Polish society. Yet forced assimilation had the opposite effect—rather than aligning Polish populations with the Russian state, it turned culture into a symbol and sphere of repression and thus resistance. In unifying Polish elites and masses under similar policies of cultural repression, the Russian state aided rather than undermined elite's patriotic efforts. The continual exclusion of old and new elites contributed to the growth of a politicized, elite-dominated and state-antagonistic civil society. The political repression that accompanied political exclusion, and which coincided with increased economic competition, further fueled the illiberal character of the civil and political societies that emerged. Thus, by the turn of the century Congress Poland saw the growth of substantial, at first secret and then legal, civil and political societies characterized by elite domination, politicization and increasing ethnic fragmentation.

Economic Transformation

An Industrial Revolution

The second half of the 19th century was a period of industrial awakening in the Kingdom of Poland.⁴³ The industrialization of Congress Poland began with textile manufacturing in 1815 (Łukasiewicz 1963:6,13). The industrial revolution, marked by the introduction of heavy machinery, began in the early 1850s and lasted until the mid 1880s (Jezierski and Leszczyńska 1999: 173; Łukasiewicz 1963:7). Emancipation of peasants in 1864 and protectionist policies instituted in 1877 boosted the growth of the domestic market, and imports began to exceed domestic production. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Kingdom experienced a technical revolution and mining of coal and iron flourished. The lack of industrial development in the majority of the Russian empire and its vast market further

⁴³ The Kingdom of Poland (informally known as Congress Poland) was officially renamed as Vistula Land after the end of the January Uprising. However, for simplicity, I refer to the region as Kingdom of Poland or Congress Poland throughout this chapter.

stimulated Polish industry (Wandycz 1974:201-6). The spread of industrial manufacturing into sectors that hitherto had retained pre-industrial manufacturing methods marked the third stage, lasting from 1886 to 1900 (Łukasiewicz 1963:7-8, 307).⁴⁴

While industrial production in the Kingdom amounted to only 30 million rubbles in 1864, by 1892 it accounted for 228 million (Wandycz 1974:202). Industrial workers increased from 80,000 (>1.3% of its total population) in 1864 to 150,000 (>1.6% of its total population) in the 1880s in Congress Poland. At the same time, Prussian Poland (*Grand Duchy of Poznań*) employed only about 28,000 industrial workers while Austrian Poland (*Galicia*) employed approximately 25,000 (<.42% of its total population) (Wandycz 1974:202). By 1912, only 60,000 (<.74% of the total population) workers were employed in industry in Galicia, accounting for a much smaller proportion of its population than had already been employed in industry in Congress Poland in 1864.⁴⁵ Hence, by 1890 the former Kingdom was not only the most economically advanced region of the Russian empire (Wandycz 1974:206), but it was also the most industrially developed partition of the former Polish-Lithuanian. Crucial to the Kingdom's industrial growth were long overdue social transformations that created the social conditions for its development. These included a large proletariat, urbanization and increased migration of *déclassé* gentry and newly emancipated Jews into cities and working and middle class professions.

Displacement from Land

After each rebellion, Russia pursued policies meant to undermine the economic stability of Polish landowners. After the Uprising, Russia enacted land reforms designed to undermine the economic stability of Polish landowners. In 1836, Nicholas I instituted a requirement that nobles prove their gentry status. Many could not furnish proof of their nobility and lost their gentry status. (Gella 1971:11) By 1856, nobility fell to 1.1% of the population (52,000) whereas in 1827 nobles still accounted for 7.5% of Congress Poland (Jedlicki 1968:422). After each rebellion, the land of participating gentry was confiscated and granted to Russian officials while its owners were often imprisoned or exiled to Siberia (Gella 1971:11). Any individual suspected of rebellious involvement was forced to sell his or her property to Russians, even when there was a lack of evidence of such assertions (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:151).

Land reforms that followed the January Uprising similarly aimed to undermine the economic position of Polish elites. The reforms granted peasants in the Kingdom the lands on which they lived and worked (Wereszycki 1979:58). Yet whereas in the rest of Russia nobles received an above market value for their land, in the Kingdom their compensation

⁴⁴ Though by 1890, Congress Poland was the most economically advanced region of the Russian empire (Wandycz 1974:206) critics may suggest that it was not industrial enough. In 1897, 58% of the population of the Kingdom was employed in agriculture and forestry, 16.5 % in industry and artisan work, 8.9% in trade and 16.6% in other professions. Yet such a critique is less apt in the case of the Warszawa Governorate. By 1897, the Warszawa Governorate achieved a significant level of economic development with 35.9% of its population employed in agriculture, 21% in industry, 13.1% in trade and 30% in other endeavors (Jeziński and Wyczański 2003:196).

⁴⁵ Percentages of the industrial workforce calculated using cited estimates of workers employed in industry in both Congress Poland for 1864 and the 1880s and Galicia for the 1880s and 1912, and cited population statistics for Congress Poland for 1870 and 1897 and for Galicia for 1880 and 1911. Thus, the percentages of the industrial workforce are underestimates, hence denoted as > for Congress Poland and slight overestimates, hence denoted as < for Galicia. Congress Poland's population amounted to 6.1 million in 1870 and 9.4 million in 1897 (Первая Всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи (The first general census of the Imperial Russian Empire) 1897 г. Table XIII. Population Statistics According to Native Language.) Galicia had a population of 5.96 million in 1880 and 8.08 million in 1911 (GALICIA et al. 1887:1; Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915:5-7).

undervalued their lost property (Wereszycki 1979:58). Moreover, to raise the funds with which nobles were to be compensated, the state taxed large landowners at a rate meant to recuperate all land-compensation losses within 42 years (Wereszycki 1979:58). Many nobles lost their land due to confiscation and some others did so do to their inability to adjust to the demands of an emerging capitalist market (Wereszycki 1979:60). By 1864, at least 80% of Polish nobles had lost their titles and social status to the market and to targeted laws, reform and expropriation pursued by the Russian state since the early 19th century (Wandycz 1974:199).

A second aim of the land reforms was to redistribute land to Polish peasants, thereby winning their support for the Russian state. As a response to the January Uprising, about 1,600 estates were confiscated in the Kingdom of Poland and about 1,800 more in the eastern Polish lands from the rebellion's participants and supporters (Wandycz 1974:195). However, the majority of these lands were not distributed to peasants. Only 27% of the confiscated land passed into the hands of peasants; in comparison 60% was given to Russian dignitaries (Wereszycki 1979:59). From 1870 to 1891 landless peasants quadrupled while the percentage of land in peasant holdings barely increased from 40% to 43% (Wandycz 1974:199). Landless peasants migrated to cities in search of jobs (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:160). In the end, land reform was much more successful in undermining the economic standing of the Polish landed gentry than it was in distributing land to peasants and securing their backing for the Russian Tsar.

Urbanization

By the late 19th century, the Russian state had successfully undermined the economic and political position of a large part of the Polish nobility. Though all nobles were targeted by Russia's land reforms and all were susceptible to capitalist pressures, the petty *szlachta* suffered the most. Some, having lost their titles and land sank "without a trace" into the peasantry (Wandycz 1974:199). Many others moved into towns and cities where they joined the working and middle classes (Davies 1981:182-3, 196; Wereszycki 1979:60; Wandycz 1974:196-199). In addition to land expropriation and displacement, urbanization was fueled by the removal of previous settlement restrictions that had limited the mobilization of the region's Jewish minority. On June 4, 1862, the Tsarist state emancipated the Kingdom's Jews, allowing the Jewish minority to join Christian peasants and gentry in urban migration (Polonsky 2010:309-310; Blejwas 1984:21). Hence, the second half of the 19th century saw rapid urbanization. The number of inhabitants living in cities of 10,000 or more rose from 5.1% of the population in 1858 to 11.4% in 1890 and 18.3% by 1909 (Jeziński and Wyczański 2003:177-8). The population of Warszawa doubled from 1864 to 1890, reaching nearly half a million, and grew to over 760,000 by 1910. Łódź, another industrial center, saw an impressive demographic increase as its population grew from a mere 28,000 in 1860 to 410,000 in 1910 (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:162).

The emergence of the intelligentsia and intensified economic competition

In addition to growth of cities, the second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of significant multiethnic working and middle classes in Congress Poland. In 1897, inhabitants of cities in Congress Poland were, on average, 47.5% Catholic and 37.4% Jewish. Outside of cities, the population was 82.8% Catholic, 3.9% Jewish, and 7.2% other. (Jeziński and Wyczański 2003:188) Industrialization allowed for some social mobility across ethnic groups, particularly of historically marginalized inhabitants. For instance, much of the big bourgeoisie that emerged in the Kingdom of Poland was of German or Jewish descent (Wandycz 1974:207). Near the turn of the century around 64% of the Polish textile industry

was Jewish owned (Wandycz 1974:281). While peasants could, and some did, rise in social status, the majority of the Kingdom's middle classes, and particularly of its intelligentsia came from the previously privileged gentry and burghers. Though some displaced and *déclassé* gentry fell into the landless peasantry and the working classes, many entered urban middle professions in trade and industry, culture, and when possible, government (Davies 1981:182-3, 196; Wereszycki 1979:60; Wandycz 1974:196-199). The displaced gentry was particularly attracted into intelligentsia professions.⁴⁶ It is no surprise that the intelligentsia, whose members could distinguish themselves through education and a higher social status, mostly came from aristocratic—patriotic and full of lost national entitlements—backgrounds (Weeks 2006:53; Szczepański 1962:408). However, the Polish gentry was not alone in seeking middle class, particularly intelligentsia, positions. The emerging middle class, like the former burgher estate, was also composed of Jews, Germans, Russians, and even Hungarians and Czechs (Davies 1981:194).

As Christian peasants, gentry and Jews flocked to cities, to business and to the free professions, ethnic competition and ethnic cleavage grew (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:170; Blejwas 1984:21). Economic competition between urban Christians and Jews, which reached back into the years of the Commonwealth, was on the rise. However, it was not until the later years of the 19th century that economically-oriented, ethnic conflict became a very prominent characteristic of the region's public and later political life. Employment in the free professions still flourished in the 1860s. It was not until the 1870s and 1880s that overproduction of the intelligentsia, and subsequent competition, took serious shape (Micińska 2008:22-3). In the 1890s, the overproduction of the intelligentsia and increased competition was exacerbated by an economic downturn. This economic slowdown was, in part, due to Russia's slow development of its own industry and protectionist policies (Wandycz 1974:202). Such protectionist policies included tariffs on raw materials coming from the Russian empire into the Congress, which hurt the Kingdom's industry. Similarly, the imposition of higher taxes on the Kingdom and the shift of foreign finance away from Congress Poland and into greater Russia slowed economic development (Wandycz 1974:279-280).

Land expropriation, land reform and economic modernization reshaped the social landscape of Congress Poland, transforming the former landed Polish elite into a mostly landless, urban, *déclassé* gentry. Now largely landless, Polish elites moved from economic opposition with peasants and into economic competition with urban minorities, particularly Jews. The oversaturation of middle class, especially intelligentsia, professions and an economic downturn exacerbated economic competition. In an atmosphere of extreme politicization of culture, economic competition formed along cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary tones, both utilizing and fueling the region's increasingly illiberal civil and political life.

The Politicization of Culture

Political Exclusion and Russification of the Kingdom of Poland

After the January Uprising, Russia removed all vestiges of the Kingdom's autonomy and placed it under more direct and discriminatory rule, as had been the case in the Polish borderlands. Between 1863 and 1868 all of Wielopolski's reforms were rescinded, alongside

⁴⁶ Members of the intelligentsia could often be placed through their profession in the middle class. However, the separation of the intelligentsia as a distinct group is meant to highlight the cultural capital of individuals that belonged to this group and which members often possessed due to a noble (*szlachta*) background. Hence, members of the intelligentsia could also by profession be classified into the working class.

all concessions hitherto made to Polish language and culture (Davies 1981:364). In 1864, the Kingdom of Poland became Vistula Land and the names of towns were russified. Autonomous administrative institutions were either destroyed or russified, staffed by Russians and placed under the rule of relevant Russian ministries. The state placed Poles under discriminatory legal policies, and russified the educational system (Davies 1981:99; Wandycz 1974:195-6). In 1868-9, Russian became the official language of all state institutions in the Kingdom (Chwalba 1999:56). By 1871, the only institutional distinction that remained between the former Kingdom and the rest of the Russian empire was the continual use of the Napoleonic Code in courts (Davies 1981:364-5). Congress Poland was finally completely subordinated under the Russian state.

Moreover, the state began a process of removing Poles from bureaucratic positions. In 1863, Poles accounted for over 95% of positions in state administration, courts and the police. Following the January Uprising, 575 people, 20% of bureaucrats or 6.7% of all white-collar workers in Warszawa lost their jobs. In December 1866, when the state decided to fully integrate Congress Poland into the Russian Empire, it outlined policies of removing Poles from bureaucratic positions in the Kingdom. Save for a brief interlude from 1905 to 1907, Poles in the Kingdom were generally accepted only into low paying positions undesirable to Russians. (Chwalba 1999:33-37, 40, 236) Though the removal of Poles from the bureaucracy began right after the 1863 uprising, it was a slow moving process. In 1869 the percentage of Russian state functionaries—administrators, teachers, policemen—amounted still to a mere 12% (Chwalba 1999:40). However, the effects of the russification of the bureaucracy became apparent by the turn of the century. In 1906, employment in state administration, courts and the police in the Kingdom was clearly altered, being 57.1% Polish, 36.9% Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian, 2.7% German, 1% Jewish and 2.3% other. Thus, by the start of the 20th century, state employment underrepresented Poles and Jews. The former made up around 75% of the population of Congress Poland and historically had dominated state positions; the latter made up about 14% of the Kingdom's population and had historically been excluded from the bureaucracy. Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians were significantly overrepresented as they accounted for only about 4% of the Kingdom's population. (Chwalba 1999:236)

As in previous instances of political exclusion, the Polish elite turned to social mobilization to mount its offensive against the state. Political exclusion had been increasing since the early 19th century. Yet the policies implemented after 1863 represented a symbolic nail in the coffin of the gentry's hope of reclaiming political power from the Tsarist state. The state's continual efforts to undermine Polish elites' historical economic and social privileges led the latter to focus on fostering social power as a means of reclaiming them. This shift is represented by the mounting popularity of the "organic works." It posited the potential for a future Polish independence in the social and economic development of the Polish people (Kieniewicz 1967:148). The "organic works" ideology and movement especially gained supporters amongst the group whose historically state-supported social and economic privileges were most threatened by the contemporary state: the *déclassé*, often landless, Polish gentry (Weeks 2006:57). With no access to political power, and in large part having lost its economic and social privilege (nobility status), the Polish elite turned its efforts towards modernizing the Polish economy and building an organizational infrastructure that would cultivate Polish culture outside of the reach of the state. Such institutions were to be the "means of national survival and revival" (Blejwas 1982:54). In other words, by attacking the political and economic privileges of the former *szlachta*, the state provided the latter with strong incentive to turn towards mobilization of the masses. At the same time, by implementing policies of cultural repression, discrimination and russification, the Russian

state provided the masses with an incentive to join newly emergent, often elite-led or elite-founded, organizations.

The russification of cultural and religious institutions... and the politicization of culture and emergence of politicized, cultural associations and movements

As part of its project to russify Congress Poland, the Tsarist state implemented policies that were increasingly repressive of non-Russian cultures⁴⁷ (Davies 1981:364). The latter included any religion other than Russian Orthodox Christianity. Identifying Roman Catholicism as distinctly Polish, the Tsarist regime confiscated properties of the Catholic Church. In total about 150 monasteries were dissolved. In 1867, the Church hierarchy was placed under the power of the Roman Catholic College in St. Petersburg. (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:150) State policies also targeted the religious institutions at a level that affected the masses. The state required that Catholic priests to sermon in Russian (Wandycz 1974:195-6), and it forbade the use of Polish in Jewish synagogues (Weeks 2006:54).⁴⁸ After the January Uprising, the Tsarist regime was only beginning its efforts to undermine Roman Catholic practices and leadership in Congress Poland. While this was the first time that the Russian state targeted the majority religion in Congress Poland, such strategies were not new in the region. For instance, in the 1870s, the Russian state was already concluding a four-decade long campaign, which utilized both police and military violence, to liquidate the Greco-Catholic Church in Russian-ruled lands of the former Commonwealth (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:150).

State policies aimed at dismantling and russifying religious institutions reached into the daily practices of the Kingdom's masses. Such policies heightened pre-January Uprising social discontentment that spread throughout the Kingdom, and even more so, the Kresy, that religion outside of Russia's Catholic Orthodox Church was neither respected nor safe under Russian rule (Janowski 1925:96,110). Yet Russia's attack on religion, particularly on its local practices, had unintended and undesired consequences. Unable to teach in schools, priests turned to the sphere of public association and organized religious education outside of classrooms (Miąso 1990:50). Hence, rather than distancing the masses from their religious leaders and institutions, religious repression intensified contact between religious leaders and their followers, thereby strengthening rather than decreasing religious influence over the masses. At the end of the century even the Tsarist state realized its mistake, proclaiming that, "a priest outside of school is more dangerous than one within it" (Miąso 1990:50).

Just as religious repression led to increased contact between religious figures and the masses, so cultural repression increased contact and cooperation between Polish masses and Polish elites. Education had been an important target for russification throughout the century of Russia's rule of the Kingdom (Davies 1981:99; Wandycz 1974:195-6). Polish higher learning institutions, including the Main School (*Szkoła Główna*) established in Warszawa by Wielopolski, were abolished. The Main School was replaced by a Russian University (Davies 1981:364-5; Wandycz 1974:196). Along with replacing the educational content, the policies replaced its instructors. In the 1880s, 25.8% of the professors at the Imperial University of Warszawa were Polish. By 1900, partly due to discrimination in acceptance to higher

⁴⁷ Through its efforts at russifying its Polish lands through a repression of Polish culture, the Russian state participated in the 19th century construction of what Polish culture would come to mean. Its policies, aimed at repressing the use of Polish in public (and religious) institutions, as well as attacks at religious institutions (against all non-orthodox religions) and more specifically, by equating Roman Catholicism in the region with a Polish identity, the Russian state reinforced linguistic and religious notions of culture and ethnicity.

⁴⁸ The use of Polish was also forbidden in synagogues as part of the state's effort to prevent the polonization of Jews. These were more successful in the eastern borderlands than in the Kingdom (Weeks 2006:54).

institutions and hiring and partly due to the refusal of patriotic Polish intellectuals to work for Russian institutions, that already small percentage had dropped to 10% (Blejwas 1984b:119, Jezierski and Wyczański 2003:242). Similarly, due to both discrimination on the part of the state and protest on the part of the Polish elite, Catholic students at higher institutions in the Kingdom dropped to 12.3% by 1910. The percentage of Catholic (i.e. Polish) students at Warszawa University had been 71% in 1880, 66.3% in 1905, and dropped to 13.2% in 1914 (Jezierski and Wyczański 2003:242). Thus, in response to the russification of higher education, Polish intellectuals moved away from formal educational institutions, replacing them by informal and secret ones. In 1882, the Flying University, which operated in secret by changing its location, was founded (Davies 1981:235). When legalization became possible in 1906, it became the “Society for Scientific Courses” and in 1919 the “Free Polish University” (Davies 1981:235).

Policies aimed at tertiary educational institutions mostly affected the region’s traditional and cultural elites. Policies targeted at primary educational institutions and practices reached into the daily practices of the Kingdom’s masses, increasing their interest in and support of cultural and educational associations. By 1885, Russian spread as the language of use from higher educational and administrative institutions into elementary schools and local government (Chwalba 1999:56). Polish could only be taught in schools in Russian, and as a “foreign language” (Davies 1981:99). Unwilling to pay for schools where children would learn in Russian rather than in their native tongue, Polish peasants sent their children to secret schools (Blobaum 2000:411-2). Not so coincidentally, the 1880s and 1890s saw the rise of secret schools, libraries and teaching associations (Miąso 1990:52-3, 61; Davies 1981:236). Between 1864 and 1893 the number of legal schools rose from 592 to 2,569, while between 1881 and 1891 their attendance declined by 8% (Blejwas 1984b:116-7). Hence, just as happened with religious repression, state attacks at cultural practices of the masses, like policies aimed at local religious practices and institutions, did not promote the region’s russification. Rather, they promoted cooperation between Polish cultural leaders and associations and the Polish masses. By pursuing policies of forced assimilation, the Tsarist state turned culture into a realm of political struggle and, hence, of political resistance. As Davis (1981) aptly writes, the “typical Polish ‘patriot’ of the turn of the century was not the revolutionary with a revolver in his pocket, but the young lady of good family with a textbook under her shawl” (231).

The Russian state played a significant role in politicizing culture. In turn, Polish cultural elites capitalized on this development and used cultural associations to further their political anti-state agenda. Some non-political organizations were co-opted by political actors. Other seemingly non-political, particularly cultural or youth organizations were from their inception crafted for political aims. It is important to remember, that prior to 1906, most associations, except for a few economic and philanthropic ones, were illegal. Thus, there was no legal benefit in creating cultural rather than purely political associations. There was, however a strategic benefit to doing so. Cultural associations allowed Polish cultural elites to capitalize on a mutual interest, provide a locally desirable service, and establish networks and associations that could also be used for their ultimately political aims. For instance, the Union of Polish Youth (*ZET*, 1887) was a patriotic organization that whose ultimate goal was the reconstitution of an independent Polish state. To achieve this goal, *ZET* utilized both culture and cultural associations. It promoted Polish culture, and through it a Polish-national agenda, by forming reading rooms, libraries, and secret educational circles. Similarly, like *ZET*, the Polish League, which was established in Congress Poland in the 1880s by former activists of the January Uprising, aimed to organize the Polish nationalist movement. Like *ZET*, the League created cultural and educational organizations to pursue this goal. In 1893 the Polish

League became the National League. The latter organization founded the cultural-educational National Education Association (*TON*). By 1907, *TON* had already approximately 6,000 member and 12,000 sympathizers and played a key part in establishing the Polish Educational Society (*Polska Macierz Szkolna, PMS*). The Polish Education Society was, in turn, responsible for bringing Polish culture and nationalist ideology to the Kingdom's countryside through the establishment of secret Polish schools.

Secret schools and cultural associations were popular, numerous and successful because they tapped into a real social need and discontentment with the russification of formal educational institutions. The clandestine, and illegal, nature of the majority of associations in Congress Poland precludes us from knowing the exact number of associations that emerged in the region during the 19th century. However, in 1906 the Russian state passed a law that legalized the formation of non-political associations (Olejnik 1996:38). The relaxation in associational regulation was temporary, as the state quickly reverted to more constrictive policies more akin to ones passed in 1898 (Olejnik 1996:38). The brief relaxation of laws allowed not only for the emergence of previously clandestine association, not only for the creation of numerous new organizations, but also for the registration of such “visible” associations. Not all associations chose to register and become legal. This was, for instance, the case for labor unions, which had pursued political activity alongside their economic goals since their inception in the last decades of the 19th century. The latter did not want to legalize as doing so would legal prevent them and practically hinder them from pursuing political activity (Orzechowski 1964:107-9). Nonetheless, despite not all associations choosing to legalize and register, the new law on association and subsequent registration of legal associations provides a significant glimpse into the Kingdom's turn of the century associational landscape. A volume of such a registry of associations, created in 1906 and kept until 1915, for the Warszawa Governorate survived the fires that swallowed many Polish archives during the first and second world war. The contents of the registry, categorized by type of association and municipality are listed in Table 1.

Organization Type ^a	Urban Municipality	Rural Municipality	No Municipality Match ^b	Total	Total in Percentages
Agricultural	12	34	6	52	8.50
Bureaucratic	3	4	-	7	1.10
Community	1	4	4	9	1.50
Credit	7	1	1	9	1.50
Cultural	30	21	8	59	9.70
Educational	8	1	10	19	3.10
Health	1	-	12	13	2.10
Interest	11	1	17	29	4.70
Mutual-aid	15	1	13	29	4.70
Philanthropy	78	15	65	158	25.90
Political	3	-	2	5	0.80
Professional	24	3	20	47	7.70
Recreational	41	6	29	76	12.40
School	19	74	6	99	16.20
Total	253	165	193	611	100.00

Table 1. Associations in the Warszawa Governorate by Type and Municipality, 1906-1915.

Notes: Data compiled from the *Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate*, Volume II, AP Warszawa (C: 1155): Syg. 1212.

^a Of 616 organizations listed in Volume II of the Warszawa Governorate Registry of Associations, 611 had enough information to infer an organizational type. For details on each organizational type, see Appendix II, Table 3.

^b Of the 616 associations listed, only 423 organizations listed a location. Of these, 408 were successfully matched with a municipality type using Zinberg (1877).

The 1906-1915 Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate⁴⁹ provides a good view into the types and proportions of associations found in the region's legal associational landscape. It also supports the claim that cultural and educational and cultural associations were an important part of the pre-WWI associational landscape in Congress Poland. Of the 616 organizations listed in the Warszawa Governorate's Associational Registry, there were 99 schools. Of these, 98 (16% of all associations registered) belonged to nationalistically-oriented and overtly politicized Polish Educational Society (PMS).⁵⁰ An additional 9.7% of registered organizations are self-identified cultural associations. Most of these are local branches of the Polish Culture Association (*Towarzystwo Kultury Polskiej, TKP*). Like the PMS schools, the TKP local circles had ties to a cultural-political movement. According to its official aim, the organization sought to develop Polish culture in the region, without any ties to political ideals (Konieczna 2014:81). Yet its founder, Aleksander Świętochowski, who steered the association throughout its nine years of existence, was one of the founders and supporters of the Kingdom's positivism. The Warszawa positivists viewed the development of Polish culture as a basis for future national independence (Konieczna 2014:81; Rudzki 1968; Miąso 1959:228-9). Combined, associational schools and cultural organizations accounted 25.9% of all registered associations.

In addition to composing over a quarter of Warszawa governorate's registered associations, cultural organizations and associational schools made up the majority of the region's rural legal associational life. Associational schools accounted for 44.8% of organizations registered in villages and rural municipalities (*gminy wiejskie*). Of these, 37 were found in areas that in the 1880s had fewer than 1000 inhabitants.⁵¹ Cultural associations accounted for an additional 12.7% of rural associations. Together, cultural associations and schools made up two thirds (67.5%) of organizations registered in Warszawa Governorate's countryside. The prevalence of cultural and educational associations in the governorate's villages provides additional support for the claim that cultural repression pursued by the state contributed to the strengthening of associational ties between cultural elites⁵² and the masses. As discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, the region's peasants had historically, and as late as the 1863 Uprising, been unwilling to support the region's traditional and cultural elites' political struggles. The concentration of PMS schools in villages allowed Polish cultural elites to establish ties with peasants and to foster the idea of an independent Poland. The wide scope of organizations like TON, which crossed urban-rural and class divisions aided cultural elites in their efforts to mobilize diverse populations for their political aims. The National League used TON's local branches to organize working class youth into the political National Workers Union (*NZR*) and farmers into the National Organization (*ON*) (Wasilewski 2005:108-16, 121, 194-8, 475-6; Miąso 1990:60). A police report sent to St. Petersburg in 1900 demonstrates just how effective cultural and educational associations were in politicizing the wider populace. The report notes how youth that attended secret

⁴⁹ AP Warszawa, WGUSS (C. 1155): Syg. 1212. The registry was written in two volumes. Only the second volume, which begins with organization nr. 63 and lists 616 local organizations, is located in the Polish National Archive in Warszawa. The first was lost or destroyed.

⁵⁰ Organizations categorized as educational were mostly composed of parent associations and "friends of" specific educational institutions, and thus cannot be easily categorized as either having political aims or being tied to specific political or ideological movements.

⁵¹ Population statistics from 1877-90, matched to towns using the *Słownik Geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego I Innych Krajów Słowińskich*. (Ed. Sulimierski, F, B. Chelbowski, and W. Walewski). 1880-1902. Vol. 1 -15. Drukarnia "Wiek.".

⁵² It is important to note that the déclassé gentry were at the forefront in these movements. Nobles who had retained their land and status were often more concerned with trying to prevent loss of their former feudal privileges. (Blejwas 1984:116)

schools and utilized reading rooms provided by associations “came to factories politically prepared” (Miąso 1990:52). Thus, the report reflects both the political goals of cultural and educational associations and such associations’ ability to attain these goals.

By the turn of the century, the cultural-educational movement in Congress Poland was dominated by two political groups: the nationalists, who controlled TON and PMS, the largest Associations of secret schools, and the Polish Folk Union (*Polski Związek Ludowy*), which had a more liberal, socialist and national-democratic orientation (Miąso 1990:50, 60). Prior to the January Uprising, cultural repression and discrimination had been aimed at elites. Yet the post-1863 widespread russification policies affected the daily cultural and religious routines of the masses. Forced assimilation reinvigorated the importance of Polish culture and religion among the masses, bringing them closer to Polish cultural, political and religious elites. The latter took it upon itself to lead the cultural, organizational and ideological struggle against the Tsarist state (Blejwas 1982:54). Education and cultural associations allowed elites to politicize the masses, allowing former gentry to establish a relationship with peasants and working class youth.⁵³ Hence, rather than leading to the russification of the masses, cultural and religious oppression turned Congress Poland’s masses, minorities and Polish peasants, against the Tsarist state.

The Peasant Question

State Concessions

Following the January Uprising, Russia enacted land reform aimed at trying to win peasant support. By 1914, nearly 2.5 million acres of land had passed from landlords to small farmers and the average size of peasant holdings increased from 14.7 acres in 1904 to 16.7 acres in 1913 (Blobaum 2000, 423-4). Yet, as discussed earlier, 60% of the land redistributed due to confiscation and reform passed into the hands of dignitaries rather than into peasant hands (Wereszycki 1979:59). Land confiscation and reform was thus, as discussed earlier, more successful in displacing and undermining the economic position of Polish elites rather than improving the economic standing of the region’s peasants. In addition to land reform, peasants were granted equal rights at the local municipal level (*gmina*), a move that simultaneously curbed the influence of nobles (Blobaum 2000, 407-8). While the post 1863 economic gains of peasants were limited, their political gains were not only small but also temporary. Unhappy with the officials that peasants elected, the state slowly retracted the freedoms that it had granted. Previously elected local offices were turned into state-appointed positions (Blobaum 2000, 410). Furthermore, peasants in the Kingdom, the majority of which spoke Polish, felt more politically excluded rather than included when the Russian state passed laws that made Russian the language of local administration (Blobaum 2000, 410). Thus, though the state made some attempts to win peasant support through land and political concessions after the outbreak of the January uprising, in reality it failed to enact lasting social transformations. Moreover, not only did the post-1863 Russian state fail to secure peasants support, but, due to its policies of cultural repression, as discussed earlier, it led to increasing discontentment among the region’s masses.

⁵³ Cultural and educational associations were not the only types of civil society organizations that became known for their political agendas. In addition to cultural and educational associations, politically-oriented movements and organization targeted many youth associations as a means to politicize the masses and establish networks of support. For instance, the National League organized recreational organizations, such as the sports organization “Sokół,” as a means to reach Polish youth and indoctrinate them with its political agenda (Małolepszy 2001:43;).

The Development of Agricultural Cooperatives

While the state hoped, but failed, to win peasant backing through land reform and fleeting political inclusion, Polish elites planned to gain rural loyalty through cultural and economic organizations. Rural organizations were aimed at instilling in peasants patriotic ties to Polish culture and resisting rural russification (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:166). As discussed in the previous section, rural demand for Polish cultural and educational associations attests to the success of this campaign, or at least to its relative success vis-à-vis the failure of russification. In addition to nurturing Polish culture among peasants and resisting russification, the Polish elite played a key part in promoting the development of agricultural cooperatives. Though agricultural cooperatives could be legally formed prior to the 1906 law of associations, they did not begin to appear en masse until after the law loosened previous regulations. In 1904, there were 14 local branches of the Central Agricultural Society in the former Kingdom of Poland. By 1913, seven years after associations were legalized, there were 1,052. In 1903, Blobaum (2000) estimates that there were 95 cooperatives with 63,336 members, while in 1912 there were 707 agricultural cooperatives, encompassing 477,773 members in the Kingdom (416). Looking at the data from the Warszawa Governorate registry, agricultural cooperatives were the second most common rural type of association registered, accounting for 23.9% of rural associations as demarcated by administrative divisions (*wieś* or *gmina wiejska*).⁵⁴

Peasants joined cooperatives in search of agricultural knowledge and innovation. At the same time, the organizers of the largest and most influential agricultural association in Congress Poland—the Central Agricultural Society (*Centralne Towarzystwo Rolnicze, CTR*) saw cooperatives as tools to garner political support (Blobaum 2010: 415; Dzieciolowski 1981:207). CTR cooperatives of in pre-WWI Congress Poland had a treble purpose. First, they worked to modernize and reform agriculture as a means of strengthening the economic position of Poles (Dzieciolowski 1981:201). Second, just like cultural associations, cooperatives afforded the elite with a means of creating close ties to peasants aimed at gaining their political support (Dzieciolowski 1981:47-8). Third, they were used to prevent the rise of autonomous peasant organizations (Dzieciolowski 1981:67-8). Yet not all cooperatives embodied the Polish elites' attempts at dominating rural associational life. The CTR's main competitor, Staszic's Association of Agricultural Coops (*Towarzystwo Kółek Rolniczych im. Staszica, TKRS*) represented an autonomous rural movement largely started by peasants for the pursuit of peasants' interests. As part of its goal of promoting the self-organization of peasants, the TKRS actively worked to free peasants from the influence of landed elites and representatives of the church, whose own work in rural associations was "intimately" tied to ideals and ideology of the nationalist National Democrats (Bartyś 1974:61, 111, 136).

Agricultural cooperatives that were part of the CTR and TKRS associations did not only represent opposing ideals, but they also embodied them. The CTR epitomized elite-domination of associational life in the Kingdom's countryside. According to organizational reports for the CTR, peasants were the presidents of only 18.2% local CTR agricultural circles in 1911 and 18.9% in 1913. At the same time, landed elites controlled not only higher levels of CTR leadership, but also its local echelons. Landed elites and their manor administrators were presidents of 51.2% *local* CTR circles in 1911 and of 44% in 1913, while

⁵⁴ When locations are separated by population, cooperatives account for 12.9% of registered organizations in dwellings with 1000 or fewer inhabitants (out of 314 identified locations and matched with local population statistics), and 12.3% in towns or groups of villages of 1000 to 10,000 inhabitants.

priests were the presidents of 17.6% local CTR circles in 1911 and of 22.3% in 1913.⁵⁵ A category of “others, without a given profession”, accounts for 12.9% of local CTR leadership in 1911 and for 14.7% in 1913. (Bartyś 1974:85) Bartyś argues that the creation of this category, as well as the joining of landlords with manor administrators under one heading, were some of the ways in which the CTR tried to hide the blatant domination of even local CTR circles by rural elites (Bartyś 1974:83–4). At the same time, the TKRS, true to its ideology, included peasant populists, alongside urban and rural intellectuals, in its regional and local leadership structure (Bartyś 1974:128–9).

The opposing views and aims of the CTR and TKRS organizations suggest that elite-domination of associational life in Congress Poland was not absolute. However, the relative prevalence and strength of each organization suggests that over-all, civil society in rural Congress Poland was generally characterized by elite-domination rather than the self-organization of marginalized groups. While there were approximately 1,052 CTR agricultural circles with 53,144 members in 1913 in Congress Poland, there were only approximately 140 TKRS agricultural circles in 1914 in the Kingdom (Bartyś 1974:62, 66). In other words, the TKRS accounted for a mere 2.6% of the agricultural cooperative landscape. This relative weakness of self-organization of the region’s largest historically marginalized and exploited group is not surprising. Associations that aimed to liberate marginalized groups from elite influence, such as the TKRS, had to not only contend with the lack of resources, but also had to struggle against elite-led associations, such as the CTR, which actively worked to repress them (Bartyś 1974:60–61).

The Jewish Question

State Concessions

In addition to peasants, Polish supporters of positivism and the Russian state viewed the Jewish minority as crucial in their political struggle. Wielopolski wanted to integrate Jews into the Polish bourgeoisie, believing the latter to be crucial to Poland’s industrial development (Polonsky 2010:278). However, it was the state’s suspicions of growing Polish-Jewish cooperation in the Kingdom and a desire to employ Jews as a “counterweight” to the Poles, that caused the Russian regime to support Wielopolski’s proposal and on June 4, 1862 grant emancipations to the Kingdom’s Jews (Polonsky 2010:309-310). Jews were finally granted equal citizenship, including the right to own farmland and urban property. Special taxes and former limits on where they could settle were abolished. In 1866 Jews were allowed to become lawyers and in 1876 to hold state posts. However, some restrictions, such as the right to make and sell alcohol in rural areas, remained (Polonsky 2010:311). Yet despite its concessions, and the relative success of russification efforts with Jews in the borderlands (*Kresy*), the Kingdom’s Jews who assimilated did so into Polish rather than Russian culture (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:168-9). Nonetheless, though the Russian state failed to sway the Kingdom’s Jews to support its reign, its policies worked to undermine Polish-Jewish cooperation in the region.

⁵⁵ The low percentage of local CTR agricultural circles with peasant leaders and high percentage of non-peasant, rural elites leading these local circles is even more striking when compared to the percentages of local circles run by peasants in Galicia. In 1914, Galicia’s largest agricultural cooperative association—the Association of Agricultural Circles (*Towarzystwo Kółek Rolniczych, TKR*)—had 2081 local circles with over 80,000 members. According to yearly reports, in 1912 peasants held president positions in 58% of the TKR’s local circles. Clerics were presidents of 21% of local TKR agricultural circles, teachers of 8% and landowners of only 4%. (Gurnicz 1967:106–7) The stark difference in the level of peasant self-organization in pre-WWI Galicia, particularly in comparison to elite-domination of rural associational life in Congress Poland, is further discussed in Chapter 2.

The failure of the assimilationist movement in Congress Poland

Competing with the state for Jewish support was the Polish positivist elite. At least in part likely due to the increasingly, and equally, repressive policies of the Russian state, the region's Jewish minority preferred polonization over russification. In the 1881 census, most of the Kingdom Jewish population identified as Polish rather than Russian (Polonsky 2010b:89). Moreover, Jewish and Polish integrationists continued to cooperate to promote Jewish assimilation and Polish culture in general. For instance, responding to increased russification, Jewish assimilationists played a key part in supporting secret Polish schools. While boys were often sent to religious schools (Hedars), in the 1880s some assimilationist Jews sent their daughters to secret, Polish schools. Moreover, they played an important part in trying to bring secular and Polish education to Jewish communities (Corrsin 1990:76-7). Yet despite continual efforts of the region's assimilationists, successes of the integrationist movement continued to be small. For instance, though Jewish assimilationists sent their children to secular Polish schools, the percentage of Jewish children that attended Polish, or Russian, schools was small in comparison to the number that attended private Hedars (Corrsin 1990:77).

The failure of the assimilationist movement in Congress Poland was, at least in part, likely a by-product of Russian restrictions that prohibited Poles from organizing legal, independent Polish institutions and which thus hindered the development of the positivist ideal of a tolerant and secular society (Polonsky 2010b:90). Another reason can be found in the underlying beliefs of the region's Polish assimilationists. Polonsky (2010) notes that Polish positivists, who, at least still in the 19th century supporters of assimilationism, were divided in how they viewed the role of the Jewish minority in Polish society. Some saw Jewish culture as possessing positive qualities of industry that needed to spread to the broader Polish society; others harbored 18th century ideas that Jews should work on the land, presumably to develop a deeper attachment to the nation (316-7). While some blamed Jewish culture for its continual separateness, others believed that it was a result of Polish hostility (Polonsky 2010:316-7). What the different camps of Polish, and some Jewish, assimilationists shared was an underestimation of the pace at which Jewish masses could feasibly acculturate, and an overestimation, grounded either in an underlying intolerance or notions of Polish cultural superiority, of why they should want to do so (Polonsky 2010:319).

Hence, after the January Uprising, Jewish society was faced with increasing repression from the state on the one hand, and an elite that tried to convince it that it should acculturate to Polish culture on the other hand. In the end, in the face of mounting chauvinistic nationalism and continual state repression neither could sway Congress Poland's Jewish masses. By the turn of the century, Jews, like Poles, would increasingly come to support ethnically-based nationalism.

Economic Competition as a Contributing Factor, But Not the Cause of Deepening of Ethnic Fragmentation

Prior to 1863, Jews and Germans held considerable power among the big bourgeoisie (Wandycz 1974:207). Yet, in addition to easily assimilating, wealthy ethnic minority capitalists tended *not* to be in direct competition with landed Polish elites (Weeks 2006:56; Jezierski and Leszczyńska 2001:118). Following the emancipation of 1862, Jewish masses entered previously prohibited ventures, some of which, like the ownership of taverns, had previously been dominated by Polish nobles (Blejwas 1984:26). Similarly, Polish masses set their sights on professions previously dominated by Jews, particularly commerce (Blejwas 1984b:101). As Christian peasants, gentry and Jews flocked to cities, to business and to the free professions, ethnic competition and ethnic cleavages grew (Łukowski and Zawadzki

2001:170; Blejwas 1984:21). Professions into which the new Christian middle class was trying to break-in became targeted with anti-Semitic slogans. As such, it is unsurprising that stereotypes that dominated anti-Semitic discourse revolved around Jewish economic activity, specifically trade and artisanal work. When nationalists emerged in the Kingdom, they pointed to the “missing [*Polish*] middle class,” accusing Jews of “usurping” it. Publications aimed at peasants, such as Jan Jeleński’s “Rola,” similarly urged peasants to form coops to eliminate the “Jewish middle-man,” to promote Jewish emigration and to support Polish commerce (Weeks 2006:59, 89-92, 102).

Some would argue that ethnically-based economic competition in Congress Poland developed because of an ethno-racial division of labor in the region. However, since the mid-19th century and the dissolution of feudal relations, there was no state-enforced ethnic division of labor in Congress Poland. There were, however, certain professions in which ethnic groups were either underrepresented or overrepresented. For example, in 1863, Poles were overrepresented in state administration, filling 95% of positions in administration, courts and police. By 1906, this changed. In 1897, Poles (Roman Catholics) accounted for 55.7% of the population of the city of Warszawa (Corrsin 1898:145) and 73.4% (Polish as the mother-tongue speakers) or 73.3% (Roman Catholics) of the Warszawa Governorate (Jeziński and Wyczański 2003:187). At the same time, Poles held approximately 57.1% of state administrative positions in 1906 (Chwalba 199:236). Hence, they were only slightly overrepresented (as opposed to earlier being grossly overrepresented) according to their population proportion in the city of Warszawa and underrepresented according to their population proportion of the Warszawa Governorate. Jews continued to be grossly underrepresented in state administration with respect to both their population proportions in the city of Warszawa and the Warszawa governorate. In 1896 Jews made up 33.7% of the population in city of Warszawa (Corrsin 1898:145) and accounted for around 20.2% of the population of the Warszawa Governorate (Jeziński and Wyczański 2003:187). Yet they held only about 1% of state administrative posts (Chwalba 199:236).

The Jewish minority was underrepresentation in numerous professions in Congress Poland, particularly in those that were at the time considered to be the most prestigious at the time—bureaucratic posts. Nonetheless, this underrepresentation was not only left out from the discourse of the time, but continues to be overlooked in many contemporary accounts of the period. The professions that were *always* referenced in Congress Poland, and which continue to be referenced in historical accounts, are those in which Jewish residents of the Kingdom were overrepresented. According to the 1897 Russian Imperial census, the *only general* employment category in which Yiddish speakers significantly outnumbered Polish speakers was trade (see Appendix II, Table 4). Though Jews were overrepresented in trade in general, their participation varied based on specific categories of trade. Additionally, the region’s Jewish minority was overrepresented in some sub-professional categories. For instance, though they were not overrepresented in the manufacturing sector in general, the region’s Jewish inhabitants were overrepresented in the more specific sub-category of the manufacture of tobacco goods.

Yet once more, it would be erroneous to conclude that an overrepresentation in trade and in some other professional sub-categories amounted to an ethnic division of labor. First, the overrepresentation of the Jewish minority in some professions was a relic of their centuries long exclusion from land-ownership and other professions. These state-enforced exclusions were wiped away with the dissolution of feudal restrictions over the course of the second-half of the 19th century. Moreover, as Jews and peasants moved into professions that were previously closed to them, the percentage of Jews employed in trade, the category that was increasingly targeted with ethnically-exclusionary, nationalist slogans *decreased* from

79.3% in 1882 to 62.2% in 1897 in Warszawa. At the same time, the percentage of Catholics employed in trade in the city of Warszawa significantly increased, rising from 17.3% in 1882 to 33.5% in 1897. The population of Jews in Warszawa remained relatively constant, being 33.4% in 1882 and 33.7% in 1897, while that of Catholics slightly decreased, from 58.1% to 55.7% in the same years. (Corrsin 1989:145, 153, 157) Second, in most upper and middle class broad employment categories, including industry, property owners, government professions, Jews were historically *underrepresented* and continued to be so at the turn of the century. Hence, despite Jewish overrepresentation in some working and middle class professions, it is fallacious to suggest that the Jewish minority was in anyway a “class-onto-itself” (Gellner 1981).

Despite some professions demonstrating over and underrepresentation, Jewish and Polish employment cut-across classes, and Jews certainly did not form the majority of a particular class. As such, there was no ethno-racial division of labor in turn of the 20th century Congress Poland. Nonetheless, disproportionate ethnic membership in certain professions became a significant characteristic of pre-WWI society in Congress Poland. It became a *tool* of some of the former gentry in its struggle to regain social, political and economic power after loss of its former privileges. It is not surprising that out of all the disproportions in ethnic representation in professions that existed by the end of the nineteenth century, only those into which Christian middle classes wanted to expand were made significant. Finding themselves in an economic downturn, and hence faced with increased economic competition, and in an environment where forced russification led to an extreme politicization of culture, Poles and Jews moved away from integrationist efforts and towards deepening ethnic fragmentation (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:160). In the face of strong, Jewish competition in business and the free professions, the Christian middle class became an active supporter of the emergent nationalism (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:173). The politicization of culture provided Polish elites with the tools through which they could gain social support for both their political and economic struggles. It allowed them to fend off economic competition from urban minorities while mounting a symbolic and political challenge to the Tsarist state.

Deepening of Ethnic Cleavage in Civil and Political Society

In addition to elites’ attempts to incorporate larger parts of society into their associational networks, the Kingdom’s pre-WWI civil society was increasingly ethnically-fragmented. In the mid-19th century, and particularly during the 1863 Uprising, Jewish-Polish cooperation was stronger in Congress Poland than in any other region of the former Commonwealth (Polonsky 1997:16-20; Mendelsohn 1981:142-3). Yet by the turn of the century, civil society in Congress Poland was marked by ethnic and religious cleavage.

Following the failure of the 1863 January Uprising, the positivist ideology of “organic works” rose in popularity (Kieniewicz 1967:148). Warszawa’s intelligentsia, particularly *déclassé* gentry enrolled at the Warszawa Main School, viewed positivism as means of promoting Polish independence (Blejwas 1982:49, 54). Though notions of Christian superiority and nationalism colored the movement from the start, its early supporters sought cross-ethnic and religious cooperation through assimilation (Polonsky 2010:316-9). When assimilation began to take precedence over cooperation, even the most magnanimous supporters of positivism began to echo nationalist, self-defensive ideas reminiscent of those later promoted by the nationalist National Democrats (Polonsky 2010:106). As Blejwas (1984) aptly noted, though the positivists supported secular education, science, and rationalism, under the partitions, the enlightenment ideals embedded in their ideology gave way to narrow conceptions of the nation (Blejwas 1984:33). Anti-Semitic publications began

to appear in Congress Poland in the 1870s and by 1910 anti-Jewish rhetoric was common in the Warszawa press (Weeks 2006:145,152-3; Wróbel 1997:39), mirroring the decline of assimilationist ideology and the rise of nationalism (Polonsky 2010b:105). This ideological shift was also reflected in associational life.

It would be erroneous to suggest that the Kingdom lacked any cross-ethnic associations in the later 19th century. The Circle of Popular Education (*KOL*, 1882) had an ethnically diverse membership (Miąso 1990:53, 61). Furthermore, Polish and Jewish cooperation played a key part in supporting secret Polish schools, as in the 1880s some assimilationist Jews sent their daughters to secret Polish schools. Yet instances of continual cross-ethnic cooperation were relatively minor. The small but cross-ethnic base of *KOL* must be contrasted with the large but nationalist educational organizations like *TON* and *PMS* (Wasilewski 2005:475). Though, as noted earlier, some Jewish children attended Polish or Russian schools, their numbers were trivial in comparison to the number that attended *Hedars*. (Corrsin 1990:76-7) Moreover, though some schools and professional associations had a multi-ethnic membership and promoted cross-ethnic cooperation, others reinforced ethnic fragmentation. Jewish children could not enroll in many private schools and many artisanal professional associations were religiously segregated (Kieniewicz 1976:257). Similarly, most philanthropic organizations, due to their ties to religious institutions, replicated ethnic fragmentation (Kieniewicz 1976:253). An analysis of the Warszawa Governorate's associational registry, and its comparison to the associational registry from Austrian-ruled Kraków, similarly suggests that cross-ethnic cooperation in the Kingdom's associational landscape was small.

Organization Type	All ^a	Catholic	Jewish	KTBC ^b	None	Other ^c	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Russian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	-	51
Bureaucratic	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
Cultural	-	-	1	-	7	3	48	-	-	59
Economic	-	-	8	-	5	-	-	-	-	13
Educational	-	-	5	-	61	-	1	-	3	70
Interest	-	2	1	2	20	-	2	1	-	28
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	9
Interest/ Nationalist	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	3
Interest/ Political	-	-	3	-	1	-	4	-	-	8
Mutual Aid	-	1	4	-	9	3	-	-	2	19
Philanthropy	1	13	52	-	49	2	-	-	1	118
Professional	-	1	1	-	41	-	7	-	4	54
Recreational	-	1	1	-	63	1	2	-	2	70
School	-	-	-	-	1	-	98	-	-	99
Total	1	18	77	2	325	9	163	1	13	609

Table 2a. Type of Organization by Religion or Ethnicity, as noted in the organization's name or description.

Data from the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate, Volume II. Notes:

^a Includes a Christian association (St. Joseph's Society) that explicitly specified its ethnic and religious inclusivity.

^b Known To Be Cross Ethnic: Includes the Polish Esperanto Society, which was, despite its name and Registry notes, known to be inclusive of all ethnicities and aimed to promote cross-cultural cooperation, and the Polish Aristocratic Society (PTA) discussed in text.

^c Includes German, Ukrainian, Muslim and Evangelical organizations.

Organization Type	All ^a	Catholic	Jewish	KTBC ^b	None	Other ^c	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Russian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	8.4	-	-	-	-	8.4
Bureaucratic	-	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	-	-	1.3
Cultural	-	-	0.2	-	1.1	0.5	7.9	-	-	9.7
Economic	-	-	1.3	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	2.1
Educational	-	-	0.8	-	10.0	-	0.2	-	0.5	11.5
Interest	-	0.3	0.2	0.3	3.3	-	0.3	0.2	-	4.6
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	1.5
Interest/ Nationalist	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.2	0.5
Interest/ Political	-	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	0.7	-	-	1.3
Mutual Aid	-	0.2	0.7	-	1.5	0.5	-	-	0.3	3.1
Philanthropy	0.2	2.1	8.5	-	8.0	0.3	-	-	0.2	19.4
Professional	-	0.2	0.2	-	6.7	-	1.1	-	0.7	8.9
Recreational	-	0.2	0.2	-	10.3	0.2	0.3	-	0.3	11.5
School	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	16.1	-	-	16.3
Total	0.2	3.0	12.6	0.3	53.4	1.5	26.8	0.2	2.1	100

Table 2b. Percentage of Associations by Religion or Ethnicity, as noted in the organization's name or description.

Data from the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate, Volume II. Notes:

^a Includes a Christian association (St. Joseph's Society) that explicitly specified its ethnic and religious inclusivity.

^b Known To Be Cross Ethnic: Includes the Polish Esperanto Society, which was, despite its name and Registry notes, known to be inclusive of all ethnicities and aimed to promote cross-cultural cooperation, and the Polish Aristocratic Society (PTA) discussed in text.

^c Includes one German, one Ukrainian, one Muslim and one Evangelical organization.

Out of the 611 identifiable organizations, 280 (46.0%) mention religion or ethnicity in the name or purpose of the organization, suggesting an ethnic affiliation and separation. Though 325 (53.4%) entries lack any information on their ethnic or religious affiliation, state officials only marked two health organizations (0.3%, classified as philanthropy) as multiethnic. Among the entries with no reference to ethnicity there are at least some multiethnic organizations. The same is true of some organizations marked as Polish, such as the Polish Esperanto Society or the Polish Artistic Society (*PTA*). The founder of the former was Polish-Jewish, its membership was known to be cross-ethnic, and the association promoted liberal-democratic ideals. A membership list of the latter (*PTA*, dated between 1903-1922) lists two members with Jewish first names (*Abraham* and *Mojżesz*). Thus the *PTA* is an example of an association with a real and not just permitted cross-ethnic membership. Yet even in this case diversity appears to have been small. The above-mentioned were the *only two* names out of 157 listed that can be assumed to come from an ethnic minority background.⁵⁶ Moreover, despite these real instances of cross-ethnic membership in associations, it is telling that out of all organizations registered state officials marked only two (0.3%) as explicitly permitting a cross-ethnic membership.

A direct comparison between associations registered in the Warszawa Governorate and those registered in the region of Kraków further supports the claim that cross-ethnic cooperation in civil society was relatively small in Congress Poland. There was more cross-ethnic cooperation in Kraków's associational landscape as compared to that of Warszawa. Of the associations registered in the Warszawa Governorate 53.4% had no ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name and 54% had no implied affiliation or can be assumed to

⁵⁶ Other members had German or Jewish "sounding" last names, but Polish first names; thus the more likely scenario—that they were ethno-culturally Polish—should be assumed (AP Warszawa, C. 112:Syg. 1).

have been multi-ethnic.⁵⁷ In comparison, of the associations registered between 1906 and WWI in the Austrian-ruled region of the former Republic of Kraków 59.2% have no ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name and 65% have no implied affiliation or can be assumed to be multi-ethnic.⁵⁸

At the turn of the century, multiethnic associations were not only an already small aspect of social life in the Kingdom, but they were also disappearing in favor of nationalist, cross-class and ethnically-exclusionary organizations. We can see this shift towards ethnic fragmentation in the movement of previously multiethnic associations away from cross-ethnic cooperation. The changing membership of the Warszawa Philanthropy Association (*WTD*) showcases this transformation. Established in 1814, its founders came mostly from the aristocracy. As industrialization (1850-80s) saw the rise in the fortunes of Warszawa's bourgeoisie, as the industrial awakening saw the rise in the fortune, importance and contribution to philanthropy of the Warszawa big bourgeoisie, both Christian and Jews could, and did, join the WTD so long as they paid their dues (Mazur 1999:20-22, 138-42). However, over the course of the 19th century, Jewish membership in the organization declined (Mazur 1999:146, 154). A booklet of the WTD's members lists last names of potentially Jewish origin, including those of known members of the Jewish bourgeoisie.⁵⁹ All members' first names are Polish, supporting Mazur's claim that the Jewish members of the WTD included members of the wealthy bourgeoisie who had already assimilated into Polish culture. Some names, including those of WTD's Jewish members, are crossed out. This supports Mazur's (1999) claim that they left the WTD, and hence that its membership reflected the growth in ethnic cleavage of Warszawa's civil society.

The wealthy elite, including Polish nobles and assimilated Jewish bourgeoisie, represented one, and relatively small, group that in the 19th century had made overtures to ethnic cooperation. Another was composed of the leaders of the working class—assimilated Jewish and *déclassé* Polish intelligentsia. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was founded by Poles largely from the impoverished gentry (like the future dictator of interwar Poland, Józef Piłsudski) and by assimilated Jews (Zimmerman 2004:19,26). Though the PPS was led by Poles and assimilated Jews, it aimed to incorporate all members of the working class into its ranks (Zimmerman 2004: p22-23). The leaders of the PPS viewed Jews as a religious or ethnic, rather than a national, group and thus as one that could be assimilated into the Polish

⁵⁷ This statistic includes the category None—which refers to associations with no ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name All—which refers to associations marked in the registry as being explicitly inclusive of all religions and ethnicities, and KTBCE—associations that are definitively Know To Be Cross Ethnic. There were no associations that utilized the category “Russian” to denote a local branch of a national level association of the Russian Empire (as was the case with the use of “Austria” or “Austrian” in the name of some organizations in Kraków; see the following footnote). The associations that did utilize Russian in the name evoked an ethnic and national use of the name. These included associations such as the Russian Society of Warszawa, Russian Pedagogical Assembly in Warszawa, Association of Russian Homeowners in Warszawa, etc.

⁵⁸ These include the categories of None, All, KTBCE (with only the Esperanto Association being placed into this category, to parallel the same treatment of this association in the Warszawa Governorate registry), and Austrian. The reason for counting “Austrian” associations as ones lacking an ethnic identification is that the use of Austrian and Austrian was often (and in these samples for the most part) in reference to either the political or geographic boundaries of the Austrian empire. The associations that included the term Austrian or Viennese, and which were categorized as “Austrian,” were for the most part local branches of “national” Austrian associations, mostly national labor unions. This, along with more discussion of the comparison of the associational registries for the Warszawa Governorate and Kraków province can be found in Chapter II.

⁵⁹ An undated, handwritten booklet of the WTD membership lists contains last names of potential Jewish origin, as well as those of known members of the assimilated Jewish bourgeoisie (ex: Kronenberg). All first names of members with potentially German or Jewish last names are Polish, suggesting their Polish or assimilated background. Some of these were crossed out. (AP Warszawa, WTD (C. 110): Syg. 426).

culture and nation (Zimmerman 2004:24). Assimilated Jews in Poland supported such a vision. Yet many Jews living outside the Kingdom in the lands of the former Lithuania, where russification rather than polonization had made more inroads in Jewish circles, were resistant to agree with a PPS vision that tied class liberation to the national liberation of Poland (Zimmerman 2004:27). As previously discussed, by the turn of the century, culture in the former Kingdom had become politicized. As such, in the eyes of the Polish and assimilated Jewish leaders of the PPS, the refusal of Vilnius's Jews to support the goal of an independent Poland necessarily marked the latter as "agents of Russification" (Zimmerman 2004:27). For many Polish leaders there was no middle ground. The lack of enthusiastic support for the goal of independent Polish nation was tantamount to staunch support of the continuation of imperial Russian rule in the Kingdom. Responding to pressures of forced russification on the one hand, and what increasingly approached forced polonization on the other hand, the leaders of the Jewish working class in Russian Lithuania chose a third option. By establishing a separate Jewish socialist party (Bund), they chose Jewish nationalism (Zimmerman 2004:37-8). The creation of a separate, Jewish socialist party represented a broader trend in the Kingdom of Poland, specifically the rise of ethnic separatism and ethnic nationalism. Due to the growth of Polish nationalism, and the emergence of Jewish nationalism, by the 1909, assimilationist ideology in the Kingdom was struggling and losing ground to separatism and Zionism (Polonsky 2010b:105).

The progression of Polish organizations and movements that sought the reconstitution of an independent Polish state in the second half of the 19th century similarly highlights the shift away from cross-ethnic cooperation in favor of cross-class alliances. The origins of the National Democrats, for instance, can be traced to the Polish Youth Union (*ZET*). *ZET* was patriotic rather than nationalistic, and thus tolerant of non-Polish nationalities so long as they supported the goal of an independent Poland. Soon after its inception, *ZET* joined the Polish League. Though the latter sought to bring back a Polish nation, the Polish League also wanted to recreate a pre-partition, federal and multi-ethnic Polish state. In 1893 the Polish League transformed into the National League, and eventually into the National Democrats. (Wasilewski 2005:108-10, 116, 194, 198) The latter no longer sought to reconstitute a federal and multiethnic Poland in the image of the old Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. Rather, they aimed to create an ethnically homogenous nation state. Thus, whereas its nationalist predecessors sought ethnic cooperation for patriotic goals, the nationalistic National Democrats propagated anti-ethnic (Jewish, Ukrainian) ideals to foster cross-class, Polish alliances. (Brock 1969:342-4)

In a way, the failure of the Four Year Sejm paved the path towards the eventual privileging of ethnic over class cleavage in Congress Poland and the domination of ethnically-exclusionary notions of and hopes for a future Polish state. After the January Uprising, the social, political and economic transformation pursued by the Russian state as a means of weakening the Polish gentry politicized culture and fueled economic competition. The politicization of culture undermined the romantic ideals of political and legal citizenship of the Commonwealth, and promoted the hegemony of nationalistic, cultural based notions of statehood and citizenship. Intensified economic competition further fueled ethnic conflict, leading to the deepening of ethnic cleavage.

Conclusion

At the end of the 18th century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was divided by three states. In 1815, Congress Poland came under Russian rule. At first Polish nobles were

hopeful that they could continue to rule the Kingdom of Poland as a semi-autonomous state within the Russian Empire. However, the gradual dismantling of Polish institutions and political marginalization of the Polish elite quickly doused the latter's hopes. In 1830, and then in 1863, Polish elites responded to their increasing political marginalization with military campaigns. After the January Uprising the Russian state sought to fragment and assimilate the society and lands of Congress Poland through, among other measures, a long overdue dismantling of feudal institutions. Social transformations brought about by the 1863 January Uprising, including Jewish (1862) and peasant (1864) emancipation, on the one hand, and the Russian state's efforts to undermine the economic and social standing of Polish elites on the other hand, fueled the Kingdom's economic development (1850s-1890s). Migration of peasants, gentry and Jews into towns promoted urbanization and industrialization. Yet, under politically exclusionary and culturally repressive policies in Congress Poland, rather than leading to the self-organization of subordinate groups and the emergence of a liberal civil society, economic modernization supported the development of an illiberal—elite-dominated and increasingly ethnically-exclusionary—civil society.

Coupled with economic modernization was increasing political and cultural repression. The exclusion of Polish elites from political institutions and power fostered support for the positivist ideology of organic works and the development of a largely elite created and elite led associational landscape. In other words, political exclusion led Polish elites to dominate and foster the development of civil society as a means to mount an organizational and symbolic challenge to the state. Alongside the political marginalization of local elites, the Russian state pursued policies of cultural repression. After the 1863 January Uprising these no longer only targeted Polish elites. Rather, they sought to russify the region's masses. Yet policies of cultural repression and forced russification did not drive a wedge between Polish peasants and elites. Elite-led cultural and economic, at first secret, and after 1906 legal, associations spread through rural Russian Poland. State discrimination and repression of non-Russian cultures and religion invaded the daily practices of the masses, turning culture into a political tool. As such, despite the absence of an ethnic-division of labor, excluded Polish elites could politicize and dominate civil society by forging alliances based on mutual, cultural grounds. Thus, the politicization of culture and elite-domination of associational life, fuelled by state-policies of cultural repression and political exclusion, respectively, fueled ethnic fragmentation. By creating a real, shared interest between the excluded elites and repressed masses, they allowed for and fostered cross-class, culturally-based cooperation.

The failed January Uprising of 1863 was a turning point for Polish-Jewish relations. Though cross-ethnic cooperation continued to develop in some movements and organizations, intensified russification amplified the insistence of Polish elites for a polonization of the region's Jewish inhabitants. Mounting pressure for assimilation on the one hand and increasing Polish nationalism on the other, both of which came to see a rejection of *any* Polish values as a rejection of Poland, fostered the growth of a third option—Jewish nationalism. At the same time, the transformation of Polish elites' social and economic position, largely a result of their continual struggle with the state, shifted elites' preferences from cross-ethnic to cross-class alliances. The exclusion of Polish elites from political institutions and policies aimed at undermining its economic and social standing resulted in the latter's migration into the middle class. Increased emigration from rural areas and from abroad, along with an economic slowdown by the 1890s led to increased economic competition and tensions between Christian and Jewish urban dwellers. Eager to expand into economic sectors, the Polish (Christian) bourgeoisie happily intensified the politicization of culture. Faced with political competition from the state on the one hand, and economic

competition with urban minorities on the other, the Polish *déclassé* gentry favored cross-class, ethnically based cooperation as a means to gaining support in both their economic *and* political struggles.

Civil society both reflected and perpetuated elites' changing preferences for forging social alliances. In the mid-nineteenth century, a significant portion of Polish elites, including the *déclassé* gentry, aspired to form a liberal political state. The revolutionary call of 1863 proclaimed total equality for all ethnicities and cultures, particularly the historically marginalized Jewish population. Thus, the domination of mid-nineteenth century civil society by Polish elites could have promoted liberal, inclusive ideals. Yet, as the revolution failed and former nobles found themselves in economic competition with urban minorities, liberal ideals turned into illiberal, nationalist rhetoric. The real potential of domination and politicization of associational life by a single or few elites was revealed—the former gentry increasingly utilized associational networks and public discourse to promote illiberal, exclusionary ideals. The politicization and domination of civil society grew as competing groups fought for control over organizations. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, illiberal, nationalistic, ethnically-exclusionary rhetoric came to dominate public discourse. Previously ethnically inclusive associations moved towards ethnic exclusion, and nationalistic, ethnically-exclusionary associations gained a significant foothold in the associational landscape.

Chapter III. Political Inclusion and Cultural Autonomy: the development of a more liberal civil society in the Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków, ca. 1772-1918.

Introduction

This chapter explores the development of a more liberal—ethnically inclusionary and autonomous from elite domination—civil society in the Habsburg (Austrian)-ruled Duchy of Kraków.⁶⁰ It argues that political inclusion of Polish elites and cultural autonomy of the masses in western Galicia, specifically the Duchy of Kraków, led to the development of a relatively more liberal associational life in Austrian-ruled Kraków than in either Russian-ruled Congress Poland or Habsburg-ruled eastern Galicia. The analysis of the emergence of a relatively liberal associational landscape in pre-WWI Kraków employs a comparative approach that highlights the correlation between specific policies of political inclusion, ethno-cultural discrimination and elite interests on the one hand, and liberal and illiberal associational life on the other hand. This comparative approach is paired with a historical narrative analysis that explores *how* different state policies and elite interests contributed to regional variation in the character of civil society. The comparative analysis is grounded in two comparisons of three regions under two distinct imperial states. As in the previous chapter, significant points of social or economic transformation are utilized to highlight shifts in elites' positions and interests. The comparison of elites' preferences of strategies or types of cross-group alliances that they sought to forge before and after such transformations underscores how elites' interests shaped the cross-group and within-group alliances that characterized the region's political and civil societies.

The first comparison analyzes the development of civil society in western Galicia, specifically the Duchy of Kraków, with respect to the emergence of associational life in the Warszawa Governorate in Russian-ruled Congress Poland. Chapter II argued that the *political exclusion* of Polish elites and the *cultural repression* of the Polish masses in Congress Poland led to the rise of an illiberal civil society and the triumph of nationalist, ethnically-exclusionary politics. This chapter demonstrates how the *political inclusion* of Polish elites and *cultural autonomy* led to the development of a more liberal civil society and more liberal—ethnically inclusionary and class-based—politics in the Duchy of Kraków. The second comparison examines pre-WWI civil and political societies in *western* Galicia with respect to their *eastern* Galician counterparts. The districts of Kraków and Chrzanów are represent the former, while the city and district of Lviv represents the latter. Whereas eastern Galicia consisted of Polish traditional elites ruling over Ukrainian peasant masses, western Galicia had both Polish traditional elites and a Polish peasant majority. Thus, whereas Galician autonomy under Austrian rule meant the political incorporation of local ethnic and cultural elites and cultural autonomy of the masses in western Galicia, it meant the political inclusion of the ethnic minority elites, the political marginalization of ethnic majority representatives, and the cultural repression of the masses in eastern Galicia. As such, despite

⁶⁰ The sub-regional analysis of the Duchy of Kraków focuses on two of the three counties of the Duchy: the county of Kraków and Chrzanów, which overlapped with the area of the pre-1846 independent Republic of Kraków.

being ruled by the same imperial state, western Galicia developed a relatively more liberal civil and liberal political society while eastern Galicia, like Congress Poland, developed a comparatively more illiberal—ethnically-exclusionary and elite-dominated—associational landscape.

This chapter is divided into four parts. Each part emphasizes a specific time period, its significant political, economic or social transformations and how these affected the social, political and economic fabric of the region. Though each part focuses on Kraków, it parallels Kraków's development with that of eastern Galicia. Specific attention is given to the main ethnic, religious and economic actors—conceived as significant groups and their representatives. In western Galicia these included Polish traditional and new (cultural) elites, as well as the Jewish minority. In eastern Galicia they included Polish traditional elites and the Ukrainian, largely peasant, majority. Part I presents a historical background of Galicia, and traces its development under harsh and repressive Habsburg policies from 1772 to 1848. Part II lays out the distinct political, social and economic development of the independent Republic of Kraków from 1815 to 1846. Part III details the annexation of the Republic of Kraków by Austria, a short period of the liberalization of the Habsburg Empire following the 1848 Spring of Nations, and its return to absolutist—politically exclusionary and culturally repressive—rule until the early 1860s. Parts II and III highlight the construction of Kraków's early, mainly class-based associations by its traditional and emerging, cultural and economic, elites. Part IV details Galicia's transformation under an increasingly liberalizing Habsburg—later Austro-Hungarian—state. It showcases the decline of germanization policies, the rise of political and cultural autonomy under the stewardship of local, Polish, elites and the radical transformation of the political landscape with the onset of universal and equal suffrage. On the one hand, political inclusion of Polish elites, political marginalization of new Ukrainian elites and cultural repression of Ukrainian masses fostered the emergence of a politicized, ethnically-fragmented civil society and ethnically-exclusionary, nationalist politics in *eastern* Galicia. On the other hand, political inclusion of traditional and new elites and cultural autonomy of the Polish masses in Kraków fostered the development of more liberal—relatively autonomous from elite domination, ethnically inclusionary and class-oriented—civil and political societies that persevered until WWI despite the rising wave of ethnically chauvinistic nationalism that amounted throughout Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

I. Historical Background: Galicia under repressive and exclusionary Habsburg rule, 1772-1848

Historical Background: Kraków and Galicia, 1772-1815

During the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 the Habsburg Empire annexed a sizeable southeastern portion of the Commonwealth, including the southern part of the Kraków voivodeship. Following its transition into Austrian hands, this region became officially known as the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomera, or simply Galicia. It remained under Habsburg control until WWI. The city of Kraków, however, remained within the significantly reduced borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1793, Russia and Prussia undertook a second partitioning of the Commonwealth. On March 24, 1794, speaking in Kraków's town square, Kościuszko proclaimed an uprising against this second wave of annexations (Kieniewicz 1969b:25). Despite his willingness to

bridge ethnic, and to an extent, estate, cleavages, Kościuszko's rebellion ended in defeat.⁶¹ In 1795, the Commonwealth disappeared after its third and final partition (see Map 1, Appendix I). After the third partition, the remaining lands of the former Kraków voivodeship, including the city of Kraków, passed into Habsburg hands. While the bulk of Galicia remained under constant Habsburg rule until WWI, Kraków's history was more turbulent, separating from the Habsburg Empire in 1809 and returning under Austrian rule in 1846.

In 1809, Kraków was incorporated into the Duchy of Warszawa where it temporarily joined Warszawa and Poznań under a common state (Map 2, Appendix I). As part of the Duchy of Warszawa, Kraków adopted Napoleon's constitution, which provided all groups equality under the law, thus extending legal rights to historically subjugated groups, particularly the peasantry and the Jewish minority. Yet the new constitution brought limited practical change. Though peasants were freed from feudal bonds, they were given no claims to land. Faced with the choice of leaving rural areas empty-handed or remaining on known nobles' lands, most peasants chose the latter. Similarly, though the constitution guaranteed the freedom of religion, the Duchy of Warszawa made little progress in terms of Jewish rights. In 1808, a year before Kraków joined the Duchy, a royal decree temporarily suspended the rights of "unassimilated Jews" for the period of a decade. As the Duchy was dissolved before a decade passed, most of the Duchy's Jewish inhabitants saw no real change in their position or prospects. Only converts to Christianity and Jewish burghers could enjoy constitutional rights. (Wandycz 1974:46–47) The year 1815 saw the dissolution of the Duchy of Warszawa and the establishment of Kraków as the Free, Independent and Strictly Neutral City of Kraków with Its Territory at the Congress of Vienna (Pęksa 2008:197). Thus, in 1815, Kraków and Warszawa were placed on distinct political and economic trajectories on which they continued until the 1918 re-emergence of a Polish state.

Galicia's Economic, Political and Social Transformations under early Habsburg rule

Unsure of how long Galicia would stay under its rule, the Habsburg Monarchy implemented policies that exploited the region rather than ones that would foster its long-term economic development. As such, Galicia's development was hindered, among others, by steep competition from more developed regions of the Habsburg Empire, the lack of state investment, and the lack of credit. (Bałaban 2013:598–9) Hence, while Congress Poland saw economic development and industrialization under Russian rule, Galicia's development stagnated earning it the distinction of being the most economically undeveloped region of both the Habsburg Empire and lands of the partitioned Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Wandycz 1974:72–4). During the late 18th and early 19th century, Galicia's economic stagnation was accompanied by the Habsburg Empire's attempts to assimilate, or germanize, its political, social and cultural institutions.

An unusually large portion of the Commonwealth's population, approximately eight to ten percent, belonged to the nobility (*szlachta*) (Wandycz 1974:5). By one estimate, there were 32,072 (adult male) nobles in 1797 in Galicia, accounting for 3.25% of its total population (Ślusarek 1994:9, 41). Within the Commonwealth, all members of the *szlachta* had political and social privileges, such as the right of political participation (Wandycz 1974:5). Despite the political rights that distinguished the gentry from the rural masses, each noble's wealth and status varied considerably, ranging from landed magnates and wealthy bureaucrats to petty gentry. Save for their social distinction, the latter often resembled uneducated but free landowning or land-renting peasants (Ślusarek 1994:127). Before

⁶¹ Chapter II discussed Kościuszko's rebellion in greater detail.

Habsburg reforms, approximately 75% of Galicia's aristocracy belonged to such petty gentry (*drobna szlachta*) (Ślusarek 1994:9, 41). Suspicious of Galician nobility, which allowed for such variation within its ranks, the Habsburg state implemented policies to transform the structure of Galician aristocracy to resemble that of the greater Habsburg Empire. As a result, considerable parts of Polish nobles, particularly the petty and poor gentry, slowly lost its privileges, with its poorest members becoming part of the free peasantry (Ślusarek 1994:129–30, 141–3). By 1827, the percentage of adult male nobles decreased by about a fifth, falling from accounting for 3.25% to accounting for 2.64% of Galicia's population (Ślusarek 1994:41, 127). Upon its reconfiguration, Galicia's social hierarchy was composed of three "new estates" whose members could participated in the regions "relatively disempowered" political institutions (Wandycz 1974:12). These estates included the clergy, magnate and gentry. Upon losing its status, Galicia's *déclassé* gentry mostly remained in rural areas, falling into and filling the ranks of the free, land owning and land renting peasantry.

... and the rise of clandestine organizations

After the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Kraków's and Galicia's elites reacted to the loss of their social status and political power by fostering conspiratorial activities in hopes of regaining Polish independence and autonomous—i.e. *their*—rule. Thus, the region's late 18th and early 19th century, just like Congress Poland, was marked by political conspiracies and social upheavals in the name of Polish independence. (Robertson 1960:206–258; Wereszycki 1967:290) Galicia provided armed support to both the Kościuszko Uprising and later to the Duchy of Warszawa. The later Uprising of 1831, though fought in Congress Poland had an auxiliary base in Galicia (Wandycz 1967:267–8). Furthermore, the 1830s in Galicia saw the formation of clandestine associations, such as Democratic circles, within its own borders (Kieniewicz 1969b:117). Like in Congress Poland, it was the lower ranks of the gentry—many of whom had lost their aristocratic privileges and employment on large estates and had to seek new opportunities in rural or urban areas, and thus those whose status now was mostly one of cultural and social distinction—who "spread a revolutionary spirit" throughout Galicia (Wereszycki 1967:297). Yet little came of conspiratorial activity under Habsburg rule. Most circles were uncovered by the state and their members were arrested (Kieniewicz 1969b:117). In addition to clandestine, conspiratorial associations, Habsburg-ruled Galicia saw the politicization of seemingly non-political associations. For instance, Lviv's Philanthropic Association, which was founded in 1816, was placed under the surveillance of the Empire's "highest police authorities" out of suspicion of its political leanings and due to its "open support" of Polish patriots (Hoffmann 2006:39). Hence, prior to the 1860s, like in Congress Poland, Galicia's Polish elites sought to mobilize and politicized associations in response to their loss of political autonomy and power.

... and germanization and the politicization of culture

Chapter I discussed how policies of forced russification in Congress Poland contributed to the *successful* politicization of culture and formation of culturally-oriented associational networks in Russian-ruled lands. Pre-1850s germanization policies in Galicia had similar effects, providing Polish elites and the Polish masses with a shared point of repression and thus interests. Thus, the Habsburg monarchy's efforts at forced cultural—mainly linguistic—assimilation, like those of Tsarist Russia, led to the romanticization, politicization and proliferation of Polish literature and culture in regions under Habsburg rule. The literary effort at romanticizing the Polish struggle was so successful that not only did it

prevent the *germanization* of Polish youth, but it also backfired, aiding in the *polonization* of the region's German populations (Wereszycki 1967:294–5, 297).

A poignant example of how the Habsburg's policies of forced germanization politicized language and culture, and pushed Galicia's inhabitants, particularly the intelligentsia, to become vehement proponents of polonization can be found in the diaries of Fryderyk Hechel. Hechel had a cosmopolitan, and originally nationally indifferent, background. Though he was born in Vilnius to an artisanal, politically and nationally indifferent urban family, his father was ethnically of German-Baltic descent. Hechel studied medicine at Vilnius University. After completing his studies, he temporarily settled in Berlin. In 1834 he received a teaching position in the Department of Medicine at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, where he became embedded in social circles dominated by Polish aristocrats. Hechel settled in Kraków, married a German woman and nearly exclusively spoke German at home. Yet according to his diary and that of his daughter, he came to hold increasingly Polish patriotic and nationalist views. (Barycz in Hechel 1950:v–x) Hechel's diary underscores the role that cultural repression and policies of forced germanization played in fomenting cultural grounds for opposition to the Habsburg state. Its pages are filled with concern over Poland's independence, a question and problem that he himself framed as one of “us” (Poles) versus “them” (Germans/Austrians) (Hechel 1950:3). Hechel's discussion of Austria's germanizing policies highlight his identification with Polish culture, despite his and his wife's Germanic roots. For instance, when lamenting the 1846 incorporation of Kraków into the Habsburg Empire, he refers to the German language as that of the “enemies” (Hechel 1950:7). Hence, like in Congress Poland, policies of forced assimilation failed to germanize the population. Moreover, in the social spheres that they affected—mostly urban, they often led to the polonization of the region's German inhabitants.

There were, however, two crucial differences between Galicia and Congress Poland that hindered cultural politicization in the former. First, in the mid 19th century, the Habsburg state radically altered its approach, moving from policies of forced germanization to granting Poles but cultural autonomy. While peasants rarely pursued formal education in the first half of the 19th century, an increased in the peasants attendance in elementary schools in the second half of the 19th century corresponded with decreasing germanization and the use of Polish and Ukrainian in local school (Stauter-Halsted 2001:143). In other words, by the time that state educational institutions came to impact the daily-life of peasants, they were no longer institutions of ethno-cultural discrimination targeted at Poles that could have fostered a closer, culturally-based alliance between Polish peasants and Polish elites.⁶² Second, the Austrian state, unlike its Russian counterpart, had a much more positive relation to Galicia's peasants, making the latter less eager to side with their historical oppressors—Polish landed elites, against the “benevolent” state. For instance, to gain favor with Polish peasants, the personal subjection of peasants was replaced with a milder form of serfdom, peasants were granted the right to own land, and they were placed under state taxes (Wandycz 1974:13). Though the state took legally more power over peasants, it was the landed gentry that had to execute state decrees, thus further increasing elite-peasant tensions (Wandycz 1974:13).

The Jewish Question

Under late 18th century and early 19th century Habsburg Rule

⁶² The rise of Polish cultural autonomy did, however, lead to the elites' attempts at the polonization of the Ukrainian masses, which led to the politicization of culture in eastern Galicia. The implications of this difference between eastern and western Galicia are discussed later on.

Austria's annexation of parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth forced the Habsburg Monarchy to contend with a growth in the importance of the Jewish question (Wróbel 1994:1). Prior to its annexation of Galicia, the Austrian state had a relatively small Jewish population. In 1785, approximately 150,000 Jews lived in the lands of the Habsburg Empire, excluding its newly acquired Polish lands (McCagg 1989:12). Austria's first annexation of Polish lands in 1772 more than doubled the empire's Jewish population by adding 171,851 Jewish inhabitants (Wróbel 1994:2).

By 1785, Galicia was recorded as having 215,447 Jewish inhabitants, accounting for 9% of its population (Wróbel 1994:2), the majority of which lived in cities and towns. For instance, according to the 1773 census, 4,138 or 19% of Kraków's inhabitants were Jewish, the majority of which, 3,392 or 82%, lived in the Jewish part of Kazimierz (Bałaban 2013:575). Kraków joined the rest of Galicia under Habsburg rule in 1795, remaining under Austrian control until 1809. Though its first tenure under Habsburg rule was relatively short, the turn of the 19th century saw significant changes implemented by Austria. On the one hand, Austria's Francis II implemented restrictive policies that reinforced, and even increased, discrimination against Jewish minorities. Jews were required to only live in Jewish neighborhoods, Jews living in villages were forced to move to already overcrowded cities, and the state implemented taxes targeted at the Jewish population, such as the kosher and candle taxes. The state tried to restrict Jewish population growth by creating obstacles to marriage, such as a marriage tax, requiring the future husband to finish a secular education, etc. In 1776, under Polish rule, Kraków saw the removal of Jewish businesses from the city streets and from the center of Kraków that did not have a permit to carry out their business outside of designated Jewish areas. In 1799, the Austrian state repeated this discriminatory practice, thus failing to distinguish itself amongst the Jewish minority as a more progressive option to the region's former Polish rule. Moreover, the region's new Habsburg rulers rescinded some rights that Jews possessed in the Commonwealth. For instance, since the 18th century, Jews could buy and own land in Poland-Lithuania. In 1795 the Austrian state implemented a law that rescinded this right. (Śliż 2006:57–8)

On the other hand, the Austrian state under Francis II implemented measures meant to integrate Jews into Austrian society. By the time that Kraków joined eastern Galicia under Austrian rule in 1795, such policies had been to some extent successful in the latter. For instance, the Austrian state removed Galicia's Jews from a legal system under rabbinic rule. By removing the Galicia's Jews social and political otherness as a separate, independent estate, it meant to bring Jews into the broader Habsburg society. For similar reasons, rabbis were required to receive a secular education, Galicia's, and then Kraków's Jewish inhabitants were required to join military service and to adopt last, mostly German, names. Furthermore, in their efforts to germanize Galicia's Jewish inhabitants, the state required that administrative and economic institutions keep their records in German (Jakimyszyn 2008:31). Measures, which crossed the line from promoting Jewish integration into forcing Jewish assimilation were resented by Galicia's Jewish inhabitants. However, other measures, which promoted incorporation by dissolving discriminatory laws, were better received. An example of such a measure was the state's permission to bring down the wall between the Jewish and Christian parts of Kazimierz—a town near Kraków that would eventually be incorporated into the city. (Bałaban 2013:564–573, 577–9, 584–5)

Under the Duchy of Warszawa, Kraków and its territories

In 1809 Kraków's trajectory, and that of its surrounding territory, diverged from that of Galicia under Habsburg rule. The former joined the Duchy of Warszawa, thus placing the Jewish population under a different set of discriminatory, now Polish rather than Habsburg,

rules. In theory, and according to the Duchy's constitution, Jews had full and equal rights. Yet, by the time that Kraków joined the Duchy the former had passed a ten-year waiver of Jewish equal rights "in hopes" that by then the region's Jewish inhabitants would be "assimilated" (Bałaban 2013:586–7). Furthermore, while part of the Duchy, Stanisław Wodzicki, a staunch anti-Semite, was appointed as the local administrator in charge of the department of Kraków. The latter imposed restrictive measures on the city, forbidding Jews to settle outside of Jewish neighborhoods, an action which had been supported and allowed by Kraków's chief of police. (Bałaban 2013:586–7) On the one hand, Kraków's Jewish inhabitants, particularly Jewish leaders, welcomed the return of Jewish autonomy in the city, the dissolution of the candle tax and the transference of revenues from the kosher tax to the Jewish municipal authorities. (Bałaban 2013:590) On the other, policies under the Duchy of Warszawa continued to be discriminatory, targeting Jews with restrictions like higher taxes, police fees, taxes on professions, etc., supporting Jewish separation rather than integration into Polish society (Bałaban 2013:592).

Polish-Jewish relations

The Four Year Sejm (1788-92) and Kościuszko's rebellion (1794)

Galicia's Jewish inhabitants closely watched the proceedings of the Four Year Sejm,⁶³ knowing that it had the potential to improve their situation in the remaining Polish lands, particularly as it corresponded to Joseph II's attempts to modernize and assimilate Jews into Austrian society (Bałaban 2013:540). While Jews hoped for change, Kraków's Christian inhabitants feared it. They opposed Jewish equality in hopes of avoid increased economic competition, particularly in trade and industry. Thus they lobbied against it, utilizing anti-Semitic letters and propaganda. (Bałaban 2013:549–50) The response of Kraków's Christian burghers to debates on Jewish equality during the Four Year Sejm mirrored that of Warszawa's burghers. Fearing an increase in economic competition that Jewish equality would bring, it was the still relatively weak and small, "middle class" urban dwellers that vehemently protested against it.

Kościuszko's rebellion received the most enthusiastic response of Warszawa's Jewish population of any Polish uprising. At the same time, despite being sparked in Kraków's town square, Kościuszko's revolt received a much more subdued response from Kraków's Jewish inhabitants. Kościuszko urged local Christians and Jews to support the rebellion by providing funds and volunteers. Warszawa's Jewish populations famously provided both. The Jewish Kahal in Kraków provided the former, but not the latter. Whether any Jewish volunteers from Kraków took up arms during the uprising is unknown, as there are no records that can confirm or deny such participation. Yet what is clear is that whatever the response, it did not match the enthusiastic and significant support that Warszawa's Jews gave to the rebellion. The latter was noted upon by Kościuszko and praised by Polish periodicals of the time. (Bałaban 2013:555–6, 558)

Though late 18th century and early 19th century Polish-Jewish cooperation in Kraków did not match the levels of Polish-Jewish patriotic cooperation in Warszawa, one should not assume that there was no Polish-Jewish cooperation or even that Jewish population in Galicia sided with the Habsburg state. Both low levels of cross-ethnic cooperation and a preference for cooperation with Poles rather than Austrians could, for instance, be seen in Kraków during Austria's brief 1809 war against the Duchy of Warszawa and Napoleon's forces. At first, Austria demanded cooperation of Kraków's Poles and Jews to shelter the Austrian army. Yet once the Polish army reached the city, its inhabitants were called upon to support

⁶³ Discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.

the Polish rather than Austrian efforts. Poles and Jews worked together to aid the Polish army. For instance, both Polish and Jewish tailors went “hand in hand” to make uniforms for Polish soldiers, thus ignoring former guild separations and showing an allied, patriotic front (Bałaban 2013:584–5). While the Polish desire for Jewish patriotic support is self-explanatory, the support that the Jewish minority provided to the Polish endeavor against the Habsburg monarchy deserves further analysis. The best explanation, perhaps, lies with the interests of Jewish elites. As previously discussed, while many of Austria’s integrationist efforts were, from a modern perspective, progressive, they were disliked by Jewish elites. For the latter, the incorporation of formerly independent Jewish institutions and municipalities into the Austrian bureaucracy meant a loss of local autonomy and political power. Moreover, while some of Austria’s policies aimed to incorporate Galicia’s Jews into the greater fabric of Habsburg society, many were, as previously noted not only discriminatory but economically detrimental to Jewish communities.

Kościuszko’s rebellion showcased Warszawa’s Polish elites’ willingness to compromise and cooperate with the Jewish minority (see Chapter II). The comparatively more subdued Jewish response in Kraków suggests that Polish-Jewish relations were, at the time, *stronger* in Warszawa. This changed over the course of the 19th century. By the turn of the 20th century, Kraków’s political and civil societies were marked by more cross-ethnic (particularly Polish-Jewish) alliances than those in Warszawa. This divergence in their trajectories, with Kraków and western Galicia characterized by comparatively more Polish-Jewish cooperation and alliances before WWI and Warszawa and Congress Poland characterized by comparatively weakening Polish-Jewish cooperation and alliances prior to the First World War is further discussed in Part II and III.

Summary

Kingdom of Lodomera and Galicia came under Habsburg rule after the first partition of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772. Beginning with the 1860s, Galicia would experience increasing inclusion of local, Polish landed elites and cultural autonomy of Polish culture that would increasingly distinguish it from Russian-ruled Congress Poland. However, prior to the mid-19th century, Galicia developed under repressive Habsburg policies. The political exclusion of local, mostly traditional, Polish elites led to the creation of clandestine associations aimed at mobilizing support *against* the repressive partitioning powers. Alongside the political exclusion of its elites, the early Habsburg monarchy implemented policies of forced assimilation in Galicia. However, rather than leading to the germanization of the Polish masses, forced assimilation allowed for and promoted the politicization and romanticization of Polish culture. This cultural counter-offensive was so successful that it fostered the polonization of urban, mostly but not exclusively Christian, non-Poles, including Germans, rather than the germanization of Poles. In other words, like in Congress Poland, political exclusion of local elites and cultural repression of relatively privileged groups in pre-1860s Galicia (1) led Polish elites to turn to social mobilization as a means of mounting social support against the exclusionary state, and (2) turned culture into a tool and sphere of political repression and resistance, though within a fairly circumscribed sphere of more privileged “masses.”

II. Historical Background of the Republic of Kraków: Polish Political and Cultural Autonomy, ca. 1815-1846.

Background

After the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the city of Kraków and its surrounding area became the “the Free, Independent and Strictly Neutral City of Kraków and its Territory,” also known as the Republic of Kraków. The Free City of Kraków encompassed an area of approximately 1164 square kilometers with 96,438 inhabitants in 1816, increasing to 120,000 by 1827 (Bałaban 2013:597–9; Wandycz 1974:72–4). While about 27% of the Republic’s population resided in the city of Kraków and its surrounding suburbs (Jakimyszyn 2008:40), the majority of the Republic’s inhabitants lived in rural areas. In addition to the city of Kraków, the Republic included three towns (Chrzanów, Trzebinia and Nowa Góra) and 224 villages (Bałaban 2013:597–9; Wandycz 1974:72–4). Lastly, most of the Republic’s inhabitants were Polish. Between 1820 and 1840, approximately 85% to 90% of the Republic’s population was Catholic, while about 1.5% to 2.5% was Evangelical, mostly Austrian (Jakimyszyn 2008:41). Jewish inhabitants accounted for approximately 8.5% to 13.1% of the Republic’s population (Jakimyszyn 2008:42).

Though the region saw considerable transition from *corvée* labor to rents, Kraków and its surrounding areas did not experience significant advances in agricultural techniques, manufacturing or industrial growth (Jakimyszyn 2008:45–6). However, thanks to the Free City’s unique political and geographic position, the Republic of Kraków experienced growth of the region’s commerce. Due to its proximity to Austrian, Prussian, and Russian ruled lands of the former Commonwealth, and to trade agreements with Congress Poland and the Habsburg Monarchy, forged in 1817 and 1845 respectively, the Free City became “one of the largest points of transport and smuggling in Central-Eastern Europe” (Jakimyszyn 2008:43). As much of the Republic’s success in trade depended on tariff agreements, the sector’s profitability waxed and waned with the disappearance and appearance of Congress Poland’s protectionist measures or tax privileges. (Bałaban 2013:624–5) The instability in the Republic’s commerce impacted its Jewish population, a large portion of which participated in trade.⁶⁴

Political Inclusion of Polish Elites and Polish Cultural Autonomy

For this study, the relevant points of comparison between the Republic of Kraków on the one hand and Habsburg-ruled Galicia and Russian-ruled Congress Poland on the other are the degree of political exclusion of elites and of ethno-cultural discrimination found in each region. Leaders of the Republic of Kraków mostly belonged to the Polish local landed gentry. Additionally, some urban inhabitants exercised influence in the Republic. Prior to Kraków’s annexation by Austria, these mostly included ethnically Polish and assimilated members of the cultural and economic elites: members of the intelligentsia, such as those employed at the university and higher levels of the bureaucracy, and of the growing bourgeoisie. The Republic’s constitution, drafted in 1818, created a Senate whose members were elected by an Assembly of Representatives. At the same time, nearly half of the Assembly’s posts were appointed by the Senate—providing a useful tool for the self-replication of the political elite—and by University and Catholic church leaders; the other half were elected by

⁶⁴ One source from 1815 lists 45% of Kraków’s Jewish population as being employed in trade, while another source from 1811 claims that 75% of the Free City’s Jewish population participated in trade (Jakimyszyn 2008:58–9).

communal assemblies. (Bałaban 2013:598–9; Wandycz 1974:72–4) Kraków’s reign as a Free and Independent City was characterized by political inclusion of local elites and cultural autonomy.

... and the emergence of an un-politicized associational life of tradition and new elites

As discussed earlier, in the 1830s, Habsburg-ruled Galicia saw the development of conspiratorial organizations aimed at challenging the power of the politically exclusionary state. Kraków, on the other hand, had a burgeoning civil society that developed out of social rather than political need of the politically included, and socio-economically privileged groups. Without the impetus to organize against an exclusionary state, Polish civil society in the Republic of Kraków largely revolved around the economic and social interests of its cultural and economic elites. Hence, in contrast to Russian-ruled Congress Poland and Habsburg-ruled Galicia, the political inclusion of Polish and assimilated, including Jewish (Jakimyszyn 2008:74–5), elites on the one hand, and the relative autonomy of political institutions of the region’s ethnic majority and of its largest, here Jewish, minority (Bałaban 2013:598–601; Śliż 2006:20–1), made clandestine and political organizations unnecessary.

Surviving documentation from Kraków’s reign as a free city does not appear to contain a full listing of associations that existed in the Republic of Kraków. Nonetheless, glimpses of the Republic’s associational landscape can be gathered from primary accounts of its participants, state documentation—created by administrative bodies of the Republic and the later regionally autonomous Galicia, and from documents left behind by individual organizations. The Registry of Associations,⁶⁵ which was kept by the *Namiestnictwo Lwowskie*—the central administrative body for Galicia established in 1867—lists only two organizations as having been registered in the city of Kraków prior to 1846. One is a philanthropic association concerned with the protection of small children (*Komitet Ochronki Dla Małych Dzieci*), officially registered in 1846. The other is a professional organization, the Association of Stenographers (*Towarzystwo Stenografów*), registered in Kraków in 1775. While the registry in theory recorded all associations that applied for registration in Galicia after 1867, it makes for a poor measure of the region’s actual associational presence prior to 1867. For instance, Kraków’s Philanthropic Association (*Krakowskie Towarzystwo Dobroczyńności*, KTD), despite being written down in the Registry as “Kraków’s Philanthropic Association from 1816,” is noted as having *registered* in 1874. According to its own historical sources the KTD, as its “name” in the Registry would suggest, was not only founded in 1816, two years after the foundation of Warszawa’s Philanthropic Association, (Bąk 1975:99; Urbanek 2003:111), but according to individual accounts, was also very much so active prior to its official registration in 1874 (Zathey 1962:25). The KTD was a religious-philanthropic association (Bąk 1975:102).

The Galician Registry of Associations lists only thirteen organizations as having been registered prior to 1860 in Kraków. These include professional, philanthropic and recreational associations. Though the registry likely largely underestimates the actual associational presence in pre 1860 Kraków, it does suggest that professional, philanthropic and recreational associations were likely an important part of the Republic’s associational landscape. All of the associations listed in the registry as having been registered in the Kraków province prior to 1860 are located in the city of Kraków. This suggests that the earliest and largest associational development occurred there. This pattern of associational concentration in the largest cities of a province is supported by the associational distribution found in Galicia in the second half of the 19th century. While the associational registry

⁶⁵ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg. 18258, 18259.

suggests that the Republic's early civil society blossomed in urban centers, other historical further suggest that the ranks of these early and mid-19th century organizations were filled by members of Kraków's aristocratic, bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia elites. One such text that provides a picture of the associational life and of its membership in the Free City of Kraków is the collection of diaries of the Louise family.

The patriarch of the Louise family, Michał Louise, was born in the mid 1770s into a French family. At some point, he immigrated to Poland, where he married the daughter of a Polish merchant. By 1813, the couple settled in Kraków, where Michał worked as a lottery clerk. Eventually he became the director of Kraków's lottery and remained in this position for over 20 years. (Zathey 1962:11) Two of Michał's sons joined the armed 1830 uprising in Congress Poland, and after its failure they settled in France. A third son, Józef, remained in Kraków. Józef, was born in 1803 and received a Polish education in Kraków. The latter immersed him in Polish traditions and fostered within him a Polish identity. Thanks to support from his father, the small fortune of his wife, and patronage from a wealthy member of Kraków's burgher elite, Józef became an established member of Kraków's merchant bourgeoisie. (Zathey 1962:12–6) He took part in numerous city commissions, and from 1845-6 and 1849-51 he was the Justice of the Peace in Kraków's first district. In addition to being an active and important member of Kraków's political society, he was an active member of the city's civil society. He was the president of the Economics Department of the Committee to Feed the Poor with Rumford's Soup (*Komitet Żywienia Biednych Zupą Rumfordzką*), and an important member of the Riflemen's Association (*Towarzystwo Strzeleckie*). In 1844 became the leader of Kraków's Merchant Association (*Kongregacja Kupiecka*). (Zathey 1962:18, 21, 25–6)

One entry in Józef's diary portrays early and mid-19th century Kraków's civil society as a public sphere occupied by members of the city's old and new elites. In the entry, Józef described the Riflemen's Association. He notes that the latter arose when a group of the city's wealthier inhabitants decided to purchase archery equipment. When interest in their recreational activities grew, the founding members decided to re-animate the *Bractwo Kurkowe*— an old aristocratic hunting association which was outlawed in Kraków as a result of Kościuszko's uprising (1794). Thus emerged Kraków's *Towarzystwo Strzeleckie*. The association organized its first competitive hunt in 1834. Józef's former patron introduced him into the association in 1835. Despite Józef's lack of interest in shooting, he joined the Riflemen's Association due to the prestige of the organization, that of its members, and thus the social status that membership would bestow upon him. Józef's descriptions of the organization's lavish celebrations further paint a portrait of a 19th century association whose members came from a mixed ethnic (frequently German) but generally from a homogenous, upper class—mostly wealthy bourgeoisie—background. (Zathey 1962:47–9, 55)

Józef's diaries provide a glimpse into Kraków's pre-1846 civil society. His active political and social lifestyle hints at a potentially significant overlap between members of various civil and political society organizations of the time. His description of associational life suggests that, at the time, it was largely limited to Kraków's traditional, cultural and economic elites. Moreover, it supports the claim that the Republic's elites did not seek social association and mobilization as a means of opposing the local state. Rather they saw the associational landscape as a space in which to create organizations that would fill non-political, whether recreational, social, religious, or economic, needs. One could argue that as Józef was part of Kraków's developing bourgeoisie, it is not surprising that his diary only gives a look at organizations that were joined by members of the city's upper classes. However, when diaries such as those of the Louise family are paired with other primary and

secondary sources, the claim that Kraków's and Galicia's early and mid-19th century civil society emerged among the upper classes becomes more likely.⁶⁶

Though with its own limitations, Galicia's Associational Registry paints a similar story. The three associations that are listed as having been officially registered in Kraków prior to 1850 include two philanthropic organizations and one professional association of stenographers. Members of such philanthropic associations, regardless of their ties to religious institutions, came from wealthier classes, as membership did not entail receiving aid from such associations, but rather it consisted of fundraising, coordinating or deciding on charitable causes, or simply providing generous dues and donations to support a charity's efforts.⁶⁷ Stenography, by virtue of requiring higher education, was a profession pursued by cultural elites, particularly in the 18th century, when the association was registered (1775). Three additional associations, despite having been officially registered in 1874 and 1877, were marked (in their name) as having arisen well before their official registration date. One, already mentioned, was Kraków's Philanthropic Association (*Towarzystwo Dobroczynności*, TDK), which despite its 1874 registration was founded in 1816. The TDK provided aid to the poor, including running a shelter for the poor and schools for orphans (Bąk 1975:99). A second, also mentioned above, was the Riflemen's Association, which was officially registered in 1877, yet according to the Registry was founded for the first time in 1562. The last was another philanthropic association, the Archconfraternity of Mercy and the Religious Bank (*Arcybractwo Miłosierdzia* and *Bank Pobożny*), which was founded in 1584. The latter aided the poor through provisions such as a store where the poor could sell and buy used and cheap products (Estreicherówna 1968:28–9).

Peasants in the Free City of Kraków

The peasant question in Kraków, despite its autonomy and distinct policies prior to 1846 must be understood in relation to the peasant question in Austrian-ruled western Galicia. The Republic of Kraków retained the Napoleonic code and some relatively progressive rules with respect to peasants from its few years as part of the Duchy of Warszawa. Wealthier peasants had the right to vote. Theoretically serfdom was abolished by the 1807 Napoleonic Code, which proclaimed that all were free and equal under the law (STANLEY 1989:129). A peasant commission was established to carry out agrarian reforms. It transformed former feudal labor obligations into a more modern system of rents. This transformation of peasants into tenant farmers first took place in Crown and church lands, which accounted for about seventy five percent of the Republic's estates. (Bałaban 2013:598–9; Wandycz 1974:72–4) Hence, while Habsburg-ruled Galicia not only saw the lack of agrarian development but an economic downturn, Kraków saw relative agricultural modernization. As such, relations between landed elites and peasants were more modern and more amicable in the Free City of Kraków than in the rest of Galicia. Polish gentry and peasants living in the latter continued to have a strained relationship. While Polish elites in Habsburg-ruled Galicia entertained notions of dissolving feudal relations and granting freedom to their peasants to win their favor, they were forbidden to do so by the Austrian state. The latter, fearing a Polish gentry-peasant alliance, encouraged peasant discontentment with the gentry as a means of preventing revolutions. (Wandycz 1974:72–3, 129; Wereszycki 1967:298). The small-size of the Republic of Kraków, its proximity to Habsburg-ruled

⁶⁶ Historians similarly suggest that membership of these mid-19th century associations was mostly composed of landed, cultural and bourgeois elites (Estreicherówna 1968).

⁶⁷ AP Kraków, Division #3, ul. Sienna. C. 547 (*Towarzystwo Dobroczynności w Krakowie*): Syg. 1, 320, 343, 359.

Galicia, and the stark contrast in peasant-elite relations in each region played a significant part in the 1846 Kraków Uprising and its swift termination by Galicia's peasants.

Kraków's Jewish Minority

Once Kraków was granted its independence, a commission was created to decide the political fate of Kraków's Jewish inhabitants. On the one hand, some members of the commission saw harm in Jewish separation from society, thus they wanted to dissolve independent Jewish political institutions. On the other hand, anti-Semitism prevented actual progress towards integration. Wodzicki—the president of Kraków's Senate from 1816 until 1831, for instance, wanted to dissolve Jewish political autonomy (in the form of *Kahały*). However, he could not “bring himself” to dissolve separate Jewish neighborhoods. Rather, he wanted to force the Republic's Jewish minority to assimilate, while throwing Jewish inhabitants out of villages and limiting their economic activity. (Bałaban 2013:597–9) In the end, the Commission agreed to grant the Republic's Jewish inhabitants increasing rights with the promise that these would lead to full equality within 12 years. Yet in reality, the Republic never saw full Jewish emancipation and equality. The majority of its Jewish inhabitants did not have representatives in the Republic's main administrative and political institutions. The conditions for acquiring such political rights were so demanding⁶⁸ that from 1815 until 1843 only 193 Jewish inhabitants of Kraków did so (Jakimyszyn 2008:74–5). The only transformation that occurred immediately following the establishment of the free city was the dissolution of the Jewish political bodies—kahals (*kahały*), and their replacement by provincial-level committees (*obwody*) under the rule of an Orthodox Committee (*Komitet Starozakonnych*). The power of the latter was limited in comparison to the power held by former kahals. Any rules, laws or statutes that the Orthodox Committee wanted to pass had to be approved by the city's Senate. During the same period, Jews in Habsburg-rule Galicia had retained more autonomy, as though the older and more autonomous bodies—kahals and Jewish communes (*gminy Żydowskie*) were weakened, they remained intact. (Bałaban 2013:598–601; Śliż 2006:20–1) Commenting on the hypocrisy of Kraków's leadership, which viewed itself as implementing liberal and progressive changes with respect to Kraków's Jewish inhabitants, Bałaban (2013 [1936]) noted that Kraków's elites were, in fact, really just enacting old, middle age rules (607).

Much of Kraków's Jewish population was involved in trade. The Republic's trade was largely dependent on international tax agreements, and thus fluctuated with the Republic's neighbors' policies. In addition to such instabilities, Kraków's Jewish traders faced discriminatory policies, such as restrictions on what they could sell and where. Although already slim, Jewish merchants' economic rights were protested by Kraków's Merchant Congregation (*Krakowska Kongregacja Kupiecka*). The latter wanted a full, state-backed monopoly on Kraków's trade. While insisting on the survival of guild-like protections of its organization, the Congregation refused to allow Jewish merchants into its ranks and to accept Jewish boys as apprentices of Christian merchants, even though such prohibitions broke local laws. In addition to refusing to admit Jewish merchants into the Christian Congregation, the Congregation opposed the formation of a separate Jewish guild. (Bałaban 2013:626–9) Like Jewish merchants, Jewish crafts and artisan workers faced similar

⁶⁸ To acquire rights of political citizenship, Jewish inhabitants had to already have the right to live in Kraków city proper outside of the Jewish quarter; had to be employed in art, free professions, intelligentsia professions, trade or artisan works; had to adopt “modern” clothing, had to speak and write either in Polish or English, send their children to public school, live among Christians for at least six years and provide proof of their “public usefulness” (Jakimyszyn 2008:74–5).

restrictions. Jewish artisan workers were not allowed to form their own guild until 1833. Once the formation of a Jewish artisanal organization was permitted, the latter was burdened with numerous restrictions, such as being placed under the control of the Christian guild and the city commissioner. Moreover, Jewish craftsmen also faced prohibition on where they could work and continued to be banned from the center of Kraków and Christian parts of Kazimierz. (Bałaban 2013:626–9)

During Kraków's years as an independent Republic, the state vacillated between support for Jewish integration and measures that promoted separation. Discriminatory measures, such as restrictions on Jewish settlement in Christian parts of Kazimierz were enacted and rescinded through the Republic's years. Multiple other discriminatory measures were discussed above. Assimilatory efforts, such as the promotion of secular education of Jewish children, would disappear and reappear throughout the 19th century. Secular schools for Jewish boys, set up by Joseph II, were closed in 1806. They remained closed until 1830, when Kraków's Senate created a secular Jewish school for boys. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the formation of the school was opposed by Jewish Orthodox leaders, who opposed the secularization of Kraków's Jews. Another secular school for Jewish boys was created in 1835. A third school with separate classes for Jewish boys and girls was founded in 1837. These secular schools were relatively popular, with 162 Jewish children enrolled in 1837, 237 in 1840, 428 in 1848 and 362 in 1851. (Bałaban 2013:652–4) Jewish participation in tertiary education had a similarly rocky history. Jewish students were allowed to enter Austrian universities, including those in Habsburg-ruled Galicia, for the first time in 1781. When Lviv's university re-appeared in 1817 (after having been dissolved in 1784), its Jewish population was so large that classes were off on Saturdays, rather than the traditional Thursdays. Similar laws allowing Jews to enter universities appeared in Kraków in the 1790s. Like in other universities, Jewish students first appeared in Kraków in the faculty of medicine, and subsequently in the faculty of law. The first Jewish student who can be verified to have been enrolled in Kraków's university appeared in 1802; the first Jewish student graduated, according to existing sources, in 1843. (Śliż 2006:52–3)

The expansion of secular educational opportunities for Jewish children both allowed and promoted Jewish assimilation into the culture of the ruling ethno-cultural group—Polish in Kraków and German in Austrian-ruled Galicia. Yet in addition to such attempts at assimilation, which promoted assimilation by dissolving discriminatory policies, both the Republic of Kraków and the Habsburg Empire enacted policies that aimed to “promote” assimilation through discrimination. Such measures are thus better described as ones of forced, rather than allowed or promoted, assimilation. For instance, Jewish couples wishing to marry had to provide proof of schooling, abandon traditional Jewish attire for modern clothing, men had to register with proper guilds based on their profession, etc. (Bałaban 2013:656–7). Such discriminatory measures were justified by the free city's Polish leadership as a means of incentivizing Jewish inhabitants to leave their “traditional way of life” and exchange it for “modern traditions.” (Bałaban 2013:656–7) Yet, unsurprisingly, measures of forced assimilation did not lead to cultural integration. Requirements for marriage, for instance, did not encourage Jewish couples to assimilate. Rather, they led to the continual separation of Jewish religious marriages from legal ones. (Bałaban 2013:656–7) The continuation of discriminatory measures and policies of forced assimilation aimed at the Kraków's Jewish inhabitants would come to a head during the 1846 uprising. Responding to the discontentment of Jewish leaders and intellectuals, leaders of the uprising would finally begin acknowledge and address their complaints (Bałaban 2013:668).

The 1846 Uprising: elite desire for, yet failure at, forging cross-ethnic and cross-class coalitions

In February of 1846, the Kraków Uprising—a military campaign organized in the Republic of Kraków but aimed at liberating Galicia from Habsburg rule—took place in the free city, its territories and surrounding regions of Habsburg-ruled western Galicia. The uprising lasted nine days. While its leaders resided in Kraków, the revolution aspired for a free and autonomous Poland. Thus, the uprising focused its sights on liberating Galicia from the Habsburg monarchy. Revolutionaries, comprised mostly of Polish nobles, hoped to win support from the region’s vast peasant population. Thus, the revolution’s manifesto promised radical land reforms to be carried out by a Polish state and freedom to all—including Galicia’s peasants and Jews. Yet much to its leaders’ surprise, the revolution was a disaster and a disastrous blow to aspirations of an independent, Polish-ruled Galicia. The revolution ended with the emergence of a violent (Polish) peasant counter-revolution (the “Galician Slaughter”), with Austria’s troops entering the free city, and with the Republic’s loss of autonomy and incorporation in the Habsburg state. (Kieniewicz 1969b:118; Wandycz 1974:134–5) The failure of the 1846 Uprising underscores the role played by the state in creating the potential strategies or cross-group alliances that elites can *successfully* pursue. For despite an elite’s willingness and desire to forge cross-class or cross-ethnic coalitions, such alliances can only be successful when forged based on actual, and *acknowledged*, shared interests.

... and The Peasant Question

On February 22, 1846, the uprising’s “national government” issued a proclamation erasing all class distinctions. The uprising’s leaders thus pronounced their goal to abolish all feudal institutions, including the peasant-despised labor obligations (*pańszczyzna*), declared that all peasant holdings would pass into full peasant ownership and that any peasant who enlisted in the new national army would receive a parcel of land from the new Polish government. (Kieniewicz 1969b:120–1) Unlike leader’s of uprisings in Congress Poland, Kraków’s revolutionary government did not attempt to win over the support of Galicia’s peasants simply by appealing to shared cultural and religious traditions. Rather, it hoped to do so by proposing real and radical changes that would provide peasants with real political and economic privileges. The reaction of Kraków’s peasants was, as one would expect, favorable. Peasants backed the uprising and “cheerfully enlisted in the insurrection army” (Kieniewicz 1969b:121). However, in the rest of Galicia, peasants reacted to the uprising by turning on the insurrection and the nobility, thus leading to the peasant counter-revolt—the Galician slaughter. (Kieniewicz 1969b:121)

The starkly different reactions of peasants in the Republic of Kraków and of those in Habsburg-ruled Galicia resulted from each region’s significantly different development from 1809 to 1846. Though Kraków and western Galicia both came under Habsburg control in 1795, Kraków left Habsburg rule in 1809, when it joined the autonomous Duchy of Warszawa. In that same year, serfdom was abolished in the Duchy (Kieniewicz 1969b:120–1). The situation of most peasants in the Duchy of Warszawa regressed when the majority of the Duchy’s lands came under Russian rule in 1815. However, the condition of peasants living in the Free City of Kraków further improved. For one, the Republic of Kraków, as a free city, was not allowed to keep a standing army save for a small militia. The lack of an army meant that the gentry could not use military force to keep their peasants “in check;” hence they needed to do so through concessions and compromise (Kieniewicz 1969b:120–1). It also meant that there was no army into the service of which the gentry could force its peasants. Furthermore, while labor obligations (*pańszczyzna*) continued to characterize land

lord and peasant relations in Galicia, by 1846, Kraków's peasants "had not performed labor duties for almost a generation" (Kieniewicz 1969b:120–1). Thus, when the gentry made further promises of emancipation and landownership to peasants, Kraków's peasants, having seen their situation improve and to do so under the leadership of their formerly oppressive Polish landlords, believed them and supported the uprising.

Unlike in the free city of Kraków, serfdom continued in the rest of Galicia. There peasants' status was even lower than that of their Russian-ruled counterparts (Kieniewicz 1969b:113). In Galicia, unlike in Kraków, the ruling state had a vested interest in fueling antagonism between Polish landowners and Polish and Ukrainian peasants. Hence, while the Habsburg state *forbade* Polish nobles from dissolving feudal labor obligations, it was willing to make such concessions itself, so as to win their support and further foster local elite-peasants tensions. (Wandycz 1967:274; Wereszycki 1967:298) Hence, whereas Kraków's peasants believed the gentry's promises, Galicia's peasants, *if* they heard them, did not believe them. While the foundation for that mistrust was built by Polish landowning elites over centuries of feudalism, it was carefully and purposely kept up by the imperial Habsburg state for the express purpose of making a coalition between Polish elites and peasants unlikely. Some historians suggest that the Austrian state played an even more active role in the events that transpired in 1846. Wandycz (1967) suggests that the Austrian state knew of the uprising, but purposely did not make any arrests to stop it from taking place, preferring that it end in violence (269–70). Others extend this argument even further. Davies (2005), for example, suggests that the state went as far as to instigate or incentivize the peasant counter-revolt (147–8).⁶⁹

The extent to which the Austrian state suspected or promoted the peasant-counter revolt does not change the puzzle that was the failure of the 1846 revolt. Despite championing truly progressive peasant rights—radical land reforms, the dissolution of feudal arrangements such as the *corvée*,⁷⁰ universal suffrage, and equality for all across religions and estates—few Galician peasants joined the short-lived revolutionary efforts. The best existing historical explanations pair the region's history with a high level of mistrust that it fostered and inadequacy of the rebellion's leaders to spread their proposal and create links with Galicia's peasants before its outbreak. Prior to the rebellion, rumors circulated in Galicia that the gentry was not arming against the Habsburg Empire, but against peasants. Whether it was rumors or the active intervention of the Austrian state, a counter-rebellion would likely not have been so quick to break out without an already deeply rooted mistrust and resentment of Polish landed elites among Galicia's peasants. Thus, strained relations between Galicia's peasants and repressive Polish elites, the prevalence of the "myth of the good [Habsburg] monarch," and the limited mobilization for the rebellion led peasants to nearly singlehandedly stop the uprising (Kieniewicz 1969b:121, 125). During the counter-revolt, peasants attacked and destroyed between four and five hundred manors, killing nobles and their families. In total, about 1,100 people died during the revolution, while about three times as many people were arrested. (Kieniewicz 1969a:168; Polonsky 2010b:262–3) Once peasants subdued the uprising, Austrian troops put down the peasant counter-revolt.

Hence, despite the revolutionaries' willingness to make real and significant concessions to Galicia's peasants, a history of repression and the nurturing of class (estate) cleavages by the Habsburg state meant that such an alliance was not likely to succeed outside of Kraków's borders. On the one hand, the revolutionaries' inability to effectively reach

⁶⁹ Simons (1971) provides a good overview of the historical debate about the degree to which the peasant counter-revolt was spontaneous, or provoked and organized by the Austrian state.

⁷⁰ Unpaid labor obligations.

Galicia's peasants and the peasant counter-revolt left a culture of mistrust that, as Kieniewicz (1969b) notes, tainted Galicia's peasant-elite relations for generations (125).⁷¹ On the other hand, the fear of future revolts shaped Galician and Habsburg politics. The fear of peasant uprisings hastened the Habsburg's willingness to improve the situation of its peasants, particularly at the outset of the Spring of Nations.⁷² Moreover, the Galician slaughter was a reminder to Polish elites that Polish peasants could be used against them, and thus curbed their future political aspirations and strategies. (Kieniewicz 1969b:125; Wandycz 1967:270; Wereszycki 1967:299).

...*And The Jewish Question*

The 1830 November Uprising in Congress Poland, the 1846 Kraków uprising and the 1848 Spring of Nations saw a progression of increasing Jewish-Polish cooperation for Polish independence in Kraków. Like the children of other ethnic minorities or of multi-ethnic marriages, the children of Jewish families that attended Polish schools increasingly and quickly adopted a patriotic mindset and a Polish identity. Some assimilated Jewish youths joined Kraków's other youths—ethnically Polish and assimilated from other ethnic backgrounds—and traveled to Congress Poland, where they took part in the 1830 November Uprising. (Bałaban 2013:658) In addition to the youth who participated in the uprising's military campaign, cooperation was also seen among Christian and Jewish inhabitants of Kraków who stayed behind. Kraków's Jews and Christians joined forces to create a City Guard that would protect the city in case of foreign intrusion. Though the joint cooperation of Kraków's Jews and Christians was visible and significant, in 1830 it still lagged behind the Polish-Jewish cooperation that took place in Russian-ruled Congress Poland. For instance, Jewish members of Kraków's City Guard formed a *separate* division (Bałaban 2013:659). Thus, though the City Guard was a symbol of cross-ethnic cooperation, it was fundamentally formed on the continuation of separateness of the two groups. Similarly, 1,268 Jewish inhabitants of Warszawa who sought to take an active part in the 1830 uprising but who were deemed to be not assimilated enough as they refused to shave off their bears, served in the *separate* Warszawa City Guard and Emergency Guard. However, 409 Jewish inhabitants of Warszawa who were deemed as "assimilated" and who willingly shaved off their bears, served *alongside* Warszawa's Christian inhabitants in the National Guard (Duker 1979:226–7; Lewandowski 1830:126; Polonsky 2010a:298).

Despite aligning with Poles in patriotic endeavors in 1830 and 1846, Kraków's Jews were not willing to accept the status quo of Polish leadership in Kraków, namely the continual treatment of Kraków's Jewish inhabitants as second-class citizens. During the last Sejm of the Free City of Kraków in 1844, Jewish intellectuals voiced their frustration with the continuation of medieval type regulations that sought to force Jews to assimilate into Polish culture and society while reinforcing their separation and otherness through discriminatory policies. The revolutionary government of 1846 took notice of the discontentment among the leaders of Kraków's Jewish community. On February 21, 1846, it published a Manifesto of the National Government of the Republic of Poland, which addressed these complaints and proclaimed full equality for Jews in exchange for their support in the uprising. Thus, as in the earlier uprisings that took place in Congress Poland, specifically Kosciuszko's and the November uprisings, leaders of the Kraków uprising proposed real concessions to the city's Jewish community—an exchange or incentive for

⁷¹ "Peasant children, in the course of three generations, were taught at school that Szela [the leader of the 1846 peasant rebellion] was a bandit and a traitor, but in utmost secrecy, the Galician countryside worshiped his memory. Two wars and two revolutions were necessary to overcome this prejudice." (Kieniewicz 1969b:125)

⁷² The Spring of Nations was a wave of liberal uprisings that passed through Europe in 1848.

backing their political efforts. Unlike Galicia's peasants, Kraków's Jews joined the revolution. Though estimates vary, ranging from claims that 30 Jewish intelligentsia youth (Bałaban 2013:668) to 500 Jews (Polonsky 2010a:262–3) took part in the uprising, scholars agree that, in response to the Polish Manifesto and its promises equality, Kraków's Jewish inhabitants supported—some in spirit, some in action—the uprising. Yet as the uprising resulted in the annexation of the Republic of Kraków by Austria, nothing came of the manifesto and its promises of equality. (Bałaban 2013:668; Polonsky 2010:262–3; Wandycz 1974:134–5)

Summary

While Habsburg-ruled Galicia was experiencing a period of harsh and repressive rule prior to the 1860s, the Republic of Kraków, prior to 1846, flourished as an independent state. Though the Republic did not undergo an industrial revolution, it did experience relatively more economic growth and modernization than the rest of Galicia—a result of the permanent dissolution of feudal agrarian relations and the Free City's privileged political and geographic positions that fostered trade. While Polish elites in Galicia and Congress Poland were excluded from real political power, Polish traditional and new—cultural and economic—elites ruled the Republic of Kraków. Assimilated minorities could share in that power, with class rather than ethnicity taking precedence in the rule of the Free City. Though Jewish traditional elites did not take part in the running of the Free City, they continued to exercise considerable control over the Jewish minority through relatively autonomous political and cultural institutions.

Like their counterparts in early 19th century Congress Poland, Polish and assimilated elites in the Free City of Kraków participated in the latter's emerging civil society. Yet, unlike their counterparts in the cities of Congress Poland, Polish elites were included in political power and institutions. Thus, they did not seek social organization as a means of opposing an exclusionary state.⁷³ Rather, Kraków's Polish civil society emerged out of and revolved around the economic and social interests of its Polish, and assimilated Christian, elites. In addition to a developing associational landscape, the Republic of Kraków also witnessed some military mobilization. However, Kraków's Polish elites did not organize against their own, but against the former Commonwealth's colonizing states. In 1830, they mobilized support for the November Uprising against the Russian state, and in 1846 they mounted a military offensive against Galicia's repressive Habsburg rulers.

Like the Polish revolutions in Congress Poland that preceded it (1796, 1830) and the one that followed (1863), Kraków's 1846 revolution aimed to bridge both ethnic and class divides. To do so, the revolution's manifesto promised radical land reforms and freedom and equality to all—specifically targeting Galicia's peasants and the Jewish minority—to be carried out by a future Polish state. Prior to the revolution, the Republic of Kraków had faltered in keeping its promise of Jewish emancipation. Yet by 1846, it had already effectively emancipated its peasants. Nonetheless, both Kraków's peasants and the Jewish minority, particularly Jewish youth educated in the Republic's Polish schools, believed the revolutionaries' promises, and both groups joined the uprising. Yet despite such strong local cross-class and cross-ethnic support, the revolution failed in a mere nine days. Furthermore, and more importantly, it was not the Austrian state that took up arms against the revolutionaries but Galicia's Polish peasants. Whether unaware of the promises of the revolutionaries or unwilling to believe them—due to a history of exploitation by local Polish

⁷³ New, cultural and economic, Jewish elites, however, did seek to utilize associations and the public sphere for political aims—mainly to critique continual discrimination and marginalization of the Republic's Jewish minority. In other words, they reacted just as would be expected of discriminated and excluded elites.

landlords and a belief in the benevolent, Habsburg monarch—Galicia’s peasants took up arms against the liberal revolutionaries. The revolution marked a disastrous blow to aspirations of an independent Polish state and brought the end of the autonomous Republic of Kraków.

The success of the 1846 revolution in mobilizing Kraków’s Jewish and peasant inhabitants, and its failure to mobilize Galicia’s Polish peasants, underscored the crucial role played by states in shaping the strategies available to elites and the likelihood of their success. On the one hand, a history of increasing rights within the Republic fostered local peasants’ willingness to forge a politically and economically motivated alliance with Polish elites. On the other hand, a history of exploitation by Polish elites, benevolence of the Austrian state, and a lack of shared interests and established networks, such as state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination *could have* furnished, fostered mistrust and undermined a politically and economically motivated alliance between Galicia’s peasant masses and Polish elites.

III. Two decades of Austrian “direct rule” and germanization

Background

The Annexation of Kraków

After the 1846 uprising, the partitioning powers of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth agreed that the autonomy heretofore afforded to Kraków could not continue. Thus Kraków was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. Among others, the state disbanded its local militia, introduced new censorship laws, appropriated the city’s tax revenues for itself, dissolved some of the Republic’s political and bureaucratic institutions and incorporated others into Austrian institutions (Demel 1958:521–2; Estreicherówna 1968:6–8; Wandycz 1974:129). In addition to the loss of Kraków’s autonomy, the annexation of the formerly Free City and its territories brought an economic downturn. Upon its incorporation into the Habsburg Empire, the city lost its former tax privileges. The imposition of new import and export duties dealt a significant blow to the region’s trade-based economy (Demel 1958:551). The slow economic development of the region, and the lack of its industrialization could be further seen in the absence of an industrial proletariat. Galicia’s working classes were not employed in factories. Rather they were found in low paying and lower skill professions, mostly craftsmen, house workers, low lever functionaries, security guards, cleaners, etc. (Demel 1958:551).

Political Transformations of the Habsburg Monarchy

In response to the 1848 Spring of Nations, the Habsburg Monarchy underwent radical, but short-lived, liberalization of the state. Along with constitutional monarchy, the Spring of Nations brought increased civic and political rights, such as equality of former estates, religious freedom, and freedom of the press and education to the Habsburg Empire (Grzybowski 1959:5, 12). Furthermore, during the 1848 Spring of Nations, the Emperor agreed to create a two-house National Assembly, based on universal suffrage, whereby all male citizens of Austria who were over 24 years old, and who did not work for daily or weekly wages or support themselves from public charity could vote (Grzybowski 1959:41; Robertson 1960:223). However, such radical political liberalization was short-lived. The National Assembly was dissolved in 1849 and by 1851 the Habsburg Monarchy returned to absolute rule (Grzybowski 1959:45–8; Robertson 1960:256–7; Śliz 2006:26). Thus, it was not until the early 1860s that the Habsburg Empire truly turned towards political and social

liberalization. The 1840s and 1850s in Galicia continued to be marked by cultural repression as Austria pursued the germanization of Galicia. Though local Polish, landed, elites were included in national political institutions, they did not receive the regional autonomy that they craved. Moreover, non-elite social groups, particularly peasants and working classes, remained disenfranchised and marginalized in national and regional institutions.

Germanization Policies

After its political incorporation into the Habsburg Empire, the Austrian state sought to culturally incorporate the former Republic of Kraków, as it had been attempting to do in Galicia since its annexation. Thus, from 1846 until the early 1860s, it implemented policies aimed to germanize the region (Wandycz 1974:129). For instance, between 1852, German was introduced as the language of state bureaucracy. Beginning in 1853, despite protests from Kraków's Polish society, the majority of lectures at Kraków's University were required to be conducted in German and the state replaced four known Polish academics with German supporters. Furthermore, the state attempted a slow germanization of secondary schools, a move which was critiqued as turning them into nothing more but tools of germanization (Demel 1958:521–2; Estreicherówna 1968:6, 17)

Like attempts to russify Congress Poland, attempts to germanize Galicia, now including Kraków, had at best mixed results with the unintended consequence of fueling patriotic fervor among the region's populations. During earlier years of Habsburg rule, germanization policies in Galicia were increasingly countered by the romanticization of Polish culture and of the Polish cultural struggle. Thus, rather than promoting Galicia's germanization, policies of forced assimilation led to a cultural revival that prevented the germanization of Polish youth and promoted the polonization of Galicia's Germans. (Wereszycki 1867:295) Like in Galicia, efforts to germanize Kraków's Polish population also failed. For instance, university teachers who only spoke and taught in German lost students. Others found ways to get around the policy, such as teaching the same lesson first in German and subsequently in Polish (Hechel 10.20.1847 in Hechel 1950:60–1). German was the official language of education for nearly a decade in Kraków. Yet during that time, the state failed to stimulate local desire to assimilate into German culture. When in 1860 schools were allowed to once more teach in Polish, the Austrian state attempted to keep just one German high school open in Kraków. However, even this proved impossible. The state had to close the school due to a lack of students. (Estreicherówna 1968:6) Hence, once again policies of forced cultural assimilation had the opposite of the intended consequence.

Polish Elites

Habsburg rule of Galicia from the time of the first partitions (1772) until the Spring of Nations (1848) divided the region's nobility into those who retained their status and privileges under the new state and those who lost them. Wealthier nobles who owned land, peasants and whole villages retained their privileges and status. Lower ranked nobles who owned land but not peasants kept their status but lost some privileges. For instance, they often lost the right to own serfs, but retained the privilege of freedom from army service. Still others, those who had noble status but no land, often lost their status and privileges, becoming indistinguishable from peasants. However, despite the loss of their economic and political privileges, *déclassé* gentry often retained aristocratic traditions. Even fallen gentry continued to distinguish itself from peasants—thus asserting their social superiority—by addressing peasants in the informal you (*ty*). (Ślusarek 1994:132–7, 141–3)

Displaced gentry in Congress Poland often lost their land due to state expropriation, frequently as a punishment for political disloyalty. Those who lost their holdings in Galicia mostly did so because of economic mismanagement (Demel 1958:530–9). Unlike their

counterparts in Congress Poland, they could not blame their misfortune on discriminatory policies implemented by the state. Gentry who lost their land had to move to cities and became part of the working and middle classes, or to seek employment on the estates of other nobles. The intelligentsia was a relatively small group in the Free City of Kraków. However, it saw a considerable increase in its ranks in the 1850s. Though some of the increase can be attributed to urban inhabitants, its main cause was the rapid growth of impoverished gentry. Heads of households employed in intelligentsia professions as a proportion of the total population increased from 2% in 1850 to 2.8% in 1869; the percentage of heads of households employed in intelligentsia professions as a proportion of all those employed increased from 7% in 1850 to 11.5% in 1857 (Demel 1958:541–2). The majority of this early intelligentsia was employed in low bureaucratic positions, free professions, elementary schools, and then a smaller number in higher bureaucratic positions, high schools and universities (Demel 1958:541–2).

Unable to garner large enough profits from land, some landed elites turned to other opportunities to increase their incomes. They invested in economic cooperatives, bought stock or sought employment in public or private administration (Demel 1958:530–9). In addition to seeking new economic endeavors, some nobles formed beneficial alliances with well-off industrialists as a means to protecting their economic standing. They did so by both forging ties of marriage with the latter and by joining businesses as presidents and members of their administrative boards. While aristocrats sought alliances with members of the bourgeoisie to secure their economic standing, wealthy members of the bourgeoisie—bankers, merchants, professionals, factory owners, etc.—sought to marry into nobility, buy land, procure titles or, in the least, to move into intelligentsia professions as a means of improving their social standing (Demel 1958:535–41). Lastly, to nurture their political and cultural influence, Galicia's traditional elites continued to foster relations with leaders of religious, bureaucratic and cultural institutions. As such, despite the hardships faced by much of the region's gentry, Polish landed elites continued to yield the greatest economic, political and cultural power in Galicia throughout the 19th and early 20th century. (Demel 1958:530–9)

... and Habsburg loyalism

Military losses in the early and mid-19th century altered the political strategies of Polish elites in all regions of the former Commonwealth. In addition to the failure of multiple uprisings, the political strategies pursued by Polish elites in each region were molded by the responses of their respective ruling imperial states. Unlike in Congress Poland, the Austrian state did not react to the 1846 uprising with state-backed attempts at economic displacement of the elite, either through land expropriation or by blocking key paths of employment—namely, the bureaucracy. Furthermore, increasing inclusion of Polish elites in state institutions—as decision makers and administrators—led to increasing loyalism towards the Habsburgs. Thus Polish elites in Galicia and Congress Poland adopted distinct strategies moving forward from the string of failed uprisings. After the 1846 and 1863 uprisings, conservative elites in Galicia, similarly to positivists in Congress Poland, sought the economic and cultural development of “Polish lands.” Yet unlike Congress Poland's proponents of the “organic works,” Galicia's western conservatives aimed to do so while *cooperating* with, and *supporting*, the Austrian state. (Pajakowski 1989:54–5; Wandycz 1974:150)

Despite the general attitude of loyalty to the imperial—Habsburg—state that distinguished Galicia's elites from those of Warszawa and their approach to the imperial—Russian—state, there was some divergence of opinion among the former regarding Austria's liberalization. Galicia's aristocracy, which was still largely landed, wanted to prevent and

minimize the formation of centralized political institutions and to secure greater regional autonomy for Galicia. In other words, though they expected to participate in Austria's central political institutions, they sought a less inclusive and more decentralized state, thus one where they retained all regional power. Like the aristocracy, Galicia's small but important bourgeoisie wanted to prevent the federalization and democratization of the Austrian state. Yet unlike the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie did not want a more decentralized, but rather a more centralized state, with more central organs and centrally backed rights and freedoms. Despite their divergence in opinion on the level of decentralization within the Habsburg state, Galicia's main Polish elites generally supported Galicia's regional autonomy. As the 19th century progressed, Polish traditional and economic elites' unwavering loyalism was opposed by nationalists, while their support for archaic local and central institutions was opposed by democrats. The latter wanted to replace the absolutist central state with a federal, more democratic model where all nationalities would have equal rights. (Grzybowski 1959:45–6; Pajakowski 1995:23)

Peasants

Despite its patriotic failure, the 1846 uprising set the groundwork for reform in Galicia. Prior to the Spring of Nations, Galicia's democrats gathered 12,000 signatures to petition the Austrian state for more liberal rights including the end of serfdom, legal equality, and Galician autonomy. While the state refused the democrats' demands, their mobilization did lead the Habsburg monarchy to emancipate Galicia's peasants before emancipating peasants in other parts of its empire. The haste with which the Austrian state approached peasant emancipation in Galicia was meant to ensure that it was the monarchy and not local elites who would continue to garner peasants' gratitude and support. (Grzybowski 1959:5, 12; Wandycz 1974:142–4)

As discussed with respect to the failure of the 1846 uprising to gain state backing in greater Galicia, distinct development trajectories shaped significantly different relationships between peasants and Polish elites in most of Galicia and in Kraków (Kieniewicz 1969b:203–4). Thus, even after Kraków's annexation, relations between peasants and elites in Kraków continued to be more conciliatory and less tense than those in greater Galicia. Thus, just as Kraków's peasants volunteered and fought with the Polish elites and liberals during the 1846 revolution, so Kraków's peasants joined the city's leaders and liberals in demonstrations during the 1848 Spring of Nations. While describing events that took place in Kraków during the Spring of Nations, one in April and one in March of 1848, both Hechel and Józef Louise noted in their dairies that peasants and artisans (the proletariat of the time) participated alongside Jews and Polish nobles in liberal demonstrations (Hechel 1950:119–121) and celebrations (Zathey 1962:153–4).

Though Polish elites in Galicia and Congress Poland diverged in their political approach in the second half of the 19th century, they did share some common strategies. Like their counterparts in Congress Poland, Galicia's Polish elites did try to gain the support of peasants. Moreover, just like elites in Congress Poland, they tried to do so by politicizing culture as a means of creating a common political aim with peasants (Stauter-Halsted 2001:7). However, unlike their counterparts in Congress Poland, Galicia's elites were neither as successful at politicizing culture, nor, particularly in the second half of the 19th century, as motivated to do so. Once more, this variation in elites' interests and the strategies that were available to them to pursue those interests, as well as each strategy's likely success, were shaped by the distinct policies pursued by each region's ruling regime. Galician peasants, unlike peasants in Congress Poland, for the most part saw themselves as receiving little pressure and many benefits from the Austrian state, such as the previously discussed rights

that were bestowed upon them. Moreover, though the Austrian state did, like Russia, pursue policies of forced assimilation in its “Polish” lands, it did so only until the end of the 1850s. As previously argued, before the 1850s such policies tended to affect elites and middle, urban classes more so than peasants. Peasants’ children rarely attended school before the 1860s (Stauter-Halsted 2001:143). Thus, in the absence of ethno-cultural discrimination and repression targeted at the Polish masses, Polish elites’ efforts to mobilize peasants to support Polish leaders by drawing on cultural notions and aims in Galicia lacked any real grounding.

After their emancipation, peasants were included in local and (temporarily) national political institutions and began to organize in pursuit of their political interests. Not only did the imperial state bestow on peasants economic and political privileges, but peasants viewed local Polish elites, who continued to exploit them and who were charged with carrying out state decrees locally, as the source of their economic sorrows. Thus when they voted, peasants tended to vote for peasants rather than aristocrats. (Grzybowski 1959:41; Stauter-Halsted 2001:3, 62) Moreover, following their emancipation, Galicia’s peasants began to form coalitions and organizations to further their mutual economic interests, such as to resist exploitive labor on manors or to seek to increase their share of agricultural profits (Stauter-Halsted 2001:3, 62). Such agricultural cooperatives, which championed peasants’ rather than landlords’ interests, also existed in Congress Poland. However in Congress Poland, these cooperatives, which belonged to the Staszic’s Association, were the exception rather than the rule. Though traditional, but not necessarily landed, elites also played an important part in the development of rural civil society in Galicia, Galician peasant organizations increasingly and quickly came to be led and nurtured by peasant-born leaders. I discuss this development of Galicia’s distinctly peasant-led rural public sphere, and the role played by elites and the Austrian state in fostering its emergence, in Part IV, which focuses on Kraków and Galicia after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise.

Ethnic relations

To prevent future uprisings after 1846, the Austrian state, as its Russian and Prussian counterparts, instituted policies to further divide the ethnically diverse populations in its “Polish” lands. The policies pursued by each state and their implications varied both across borders and between regions controlled by the same imperial state. For instance, the same policies had different implications for western Galicia, which was overwhelmingly Polish and eastern Galicia, where Poles were a minority compared to the region’s Ukrainian population. Furthermore, the Austrian state implemented, and after 1867 allowed,⁷⁴ different policies in eastern and western Galicia, supported by the Austrian state as a means of stoking ethnic and class tensions in Galicia and thus undermining the power of local, landed Polish elites (Wandycz 1967:264, 265-6). For instance, laws in western Galicia were written in German and Russia in order to promote Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nationalism (Wandycz 1974:144–5).

Ukrainian Minority

While the Habsburg monarchy certainly stood to benefit from increased ethnic tensions in Galicia, it was not the only actor whose interests fueled the region’s ethnic conflicts. Interests of Polish elites, particularly those of the landed aristocracy, led its representatives to implement and support policies that perpetuated Galicia’s Polish-Ukrainian

⁷⁴ The implementation of specific laws meant to safeguard Polish political and economic supremacy in eastern Galicia by Polish elites was particularly common and significant after the region received relative autonomy in 1867. Thus, it is further discussed in Part IV of this chapter.

conflict. In 1849, Count Gołuchowski, a Polish aristocrat, became Galicia's Governor. Though a staunch Habsburg loyalist, Gołuchowski had no qualms reconciling his pro-Austrian stance with pro-Polish policies that privileged the latter at the cost of Galicia's other ethnicities. For instance, he removed police powers from landlords and placed them in the hands of the state, a move that while indicative of state centralization, also shifted tensions and dislike of police enforcement away from local landlords and onto the Habsburg state. He strongly opposed the separation of Galicia into two—Polish and Ukrainian—parts, and promoted the use of the Latin alphabet throughout all of Galicia, thereby ignoring the linguistic desires of its Ruthenian (Ukrainian) inhabitants. To strengthen the political power of Poles within the Habsburg Empire, he encouraged and helped Poles to enter bureaucratic posts. Under his leadership, the political power of the region's Ukrainian (Ruthenian) populations declined. (Rudnytsky 1967:402–3; Wandycz 1974:151–2) Despite growing Polish-Ukrainian tensions, Galicia's Ukrainians (then still mostly identified as Ruthenians and mostly composed of peasants) were not significant players prior to the 1860s and, more so, prior to the development and mobilization of mass social movements that only began to take off in the last quarter of the 19th century.

Jewish Minority

When the Austrian army took the Republic of Kraków, it instituted a series of changes that hit the Jewish community particularly hard. The imposition of export and import taxes was tragic for Kraków's merchants, many of whom were Jewish. Moreover, the state took measures to undermine the autonomy of Jewish communes. For instance, though it retained special taxes that were placed on the Jewish community, such as the kosher tax (*koszerne*), it appropriated the revenue of such taxes for the Austrian state. The Habsburg state further restricted Jewish settlements, and, until 1848 and the Spring of Nations it ignored petitions from Kraków's Jewish groups to grant them the same rights that Jews already had in the rest of the Habsburg empire. (Bałaban 2013:669–71)

On the one hand, the Spring of Nations brought religious freedom and allowed Jews to participate in political institutions. Franz Joseph I confirmed equality before the law and extended it to the Jewish minority. Large cities, such as Lviv and Kraków had city councils (*radę miejskie*) in which members of the Jewish intelligentsia were included. In 1848, Kraków's city council had 12 Jewish members. On the other hand, the Austrian state retained all legal restrictions that were imposed on Kraków's Jewish inhabitants during its reign as a Free City and added new limitations. Thus, statutes from 1817, such as those that limited Jewish movement and practices, continued to shape Jewish life in Kraków in the 1850s and 1860s. Jews had to apply for permits to engage in artisanal work in Kraków, as, without a permit, they were not allowed to do so outside of Jewish Kazimierz (Demel 1958:17–18). Moreover, the 1817 statute only allowed assimilated—those who adopted “modern” clothing and could speak either Polish or German—members of the Jewish intelligentsia, merchants or industrialists to live in Christian quarters and to take part in political institutions. Save for “assimilated” Jews and for a few who received exceptions, the “unassimilated” masses were restricted to Jewish areas and were denied political rights. (Demel 1958:488–9)

In 1848 Galicia's Jewish inhabitants received increased freedom of association. In response, a Jewish civil society, oriented at *cooperating with* the relatively inclusionary state, began to form. For instance, members of the Jewish intelligentsia organized a local Jewish political club whose purpose was to negotiate and cooperate with the state to further dissolve policies that restricted Jewish life. Kraków's Jews organized to lobby the Austrian state and local Jewish municipality authorities for equal rights, the creation of a Jewish general—as

opposed to vocational, trade—secondary school that would prepare students to pursue a university education, and the removal of some restrictions, such as the kosher tax, which they proposed to replace with a poultry tax target at wealthy rather than all Jews. The Jewish lobby was successful in securing the removal of the kosher tax. (Demel 1958:490) However, even this small victory was short-lived. Following Austria’s return to absolutism in 1851, came a reversal of Jewish rights (Śliż 2006:26). In 1853, the state reinstated the kosher tax and did so under less beneficial terms for the Jewish community. Whereas previously the kosher tax was collected and utilized wholly by the local Jewish municipality, it was now utilized by the Austrian state (Bałaban 2013:669–71). An imperial patent reconfirmed previous limitations on Kraków’s Jewish inhabitants. The movement and settlement of Jews was increasingly restricted. All those who did not hold special exemptions were relegated to Kazimierz. Jews were not allowed to access public administration outside of the Jewish municipality and were forbidden to enter Christian neighborhoods on Sundays and other holidays. (Demel 1958:503–5) Moreover, some rights that Jews had in the free city, such as land ownership, which made strides in 1848–9, and being allowed to employ Christians as servants, were rescinded. (Polonsky 2010a:267; Śliż 2006:26, 57–8)

Following the Spring of Nations, Kraków’s and Galicia’s Jewish population saw their increased inclusion in political participation. Yet following the Habsburg monarchy’s return to absolutist rule in 1851, the Jewish community was once more targeted with regressive and discriminatory policies. This regression, however, would be, as many previous ones, temporary. The 1860s would bring a liberalization of the Habsburg state and lessening of discriminatory restrictions placed on the region’s Jewish inhabitants. Jews would once more be allowed to hire Christians as servants, would no longer need a permit—and the proof of cultural assimilation that it required—to be married, would once more be able to buy real-estate, testify in court cases where members of other ethnicities were involved, and restrictions on Jewish settlement rights would be removed. (Demel 1958:516; Śliż 2006:27)

... and the continuation of Jewish-Polish cooperation in Kraków

The Spring of Nations saw the continuation, if not the growth, of patriotic Polish-Jewish cooperation in Kraków and in Lviv (Feldman 1907:268). The city’s Jewish inhabitants took part in all patriotic manifestations in 1848. The cooperation between Poles and Jews was noted and praised by Polish newspapers⁷⁵ (Bałaban 2013:682; Polonsky 2010a:260). Cross-ethnic and cross-class cooperation that took place during the 1848 demonstrations in Kraków was recorded by individuals who witnessed them. In his diaries, Hechel notes how the participants of a manifestation on April 5th, 1848, of whom there were a few thousand, included Jews, peasants and artisans (Hechel 1950:119–121). Similarly, in his diary, Józef Louis recounts an “interesting” scene from March 1848, when members of the city’s various ethnic and class groups rejoiced together following the return of state prisoners to Kraków—youth danced to national (traditional) music, peasants and Jews danced with the city’s ladies, and those who “recently boasted of their coats of arms” danced with peasant girls. (Zathey 1962:153–4)

What is surprising is that the Spring of Nations, as noted by Feldman (1907) sparked a movement of Jewish support for the Polish patriotic cause and for Polish assimilation in

⁷⁵ In addition to noting that Polish-Jewish cooperation took place, the praise that Polish newspapers bestowed on Jewish support of Poles betrays: (1) the inherent patronizing attitude that Polish public held towards the Jewish minority; and (2) the expectation that Jews should first demonstrate their unwavering loyalty to Polish interests and desire to assimilate into Polish society—despite their own second class status—and only then, once satisfied with their “true” loyalty, should Poles dissolve the very discriminatory measures that promoted Jewish separation and mistrust in the first place.

eastern Galicia, including Lviv. Not only had eastern Galicia been under consistent Habsburg rule and policies of germanization since the late 18th century, in addition to lacking control of its political and cultural institutions, Poles were not even its demographic majority. Thus, throughout the 19th century, until Galicia received relative autonomy and its political and cultural institutions were once again placed under the rule of Polish elites, Lviv and eastern Galicia's Jewish populations tended to support germanization and assimilation into German, rather than Polish culture. Moreover, even once eastern Galicia was placed under Polish rule many eastern Galician Jews resented their political exclusion by Polish elites and supported full political and cultural integration into the Austrian empire (Polonsky 2010b:120). Thus, once more, it is surprising that the Spring of Nations, even prior to Galicia's receiving regional autonomy, saw the emergence of a Jewish movement, no matter how small, for Polish-Jewish cooperation and Jewish assimilation into Polish culture (Feldman 1907:269). One, and perhaps the most likely, explanation for the emergence of a Jewish movement for Polish rather than German assimilation and cooperation, lies in the region's germanization policies, and as previously discussed, its unintended consequences of a revival of Polish culture—led by Polish cultural elites—that led to the polonization of Galicia's ethnic minorities.

While the birth of a Polish assimilationism movement in eastern Galicia was surprising, the continuation of Jewish support for patriotic Polish endeavors in 1848 in Kraków was expected. First, Kraków's Jewish minority had historically supported Polish patriotic endeavors during the period of partitions. Second, Jewish inhabitants in all three regions of the former Commonwealth tended to follow policies of cooperation with existing institutions and, when possible, with social actors. As a demographic minority, Jews could not hope to inflict serious change through mass mobilization or military efforts. Thus, they tended to follow policies of *cooperation*—either with the state or with social actors organizing in opposition to the state, when prudent or necessary changing their alliances rather than their strategy. Prior to the mid to late 19th century, Jewish communities continued to be relatively outside of mainstream institutions and society. As such, they remained under the power of Jewish elites. The latter, as elites tend to do, preferred this. Jewish nationalism (as Part IV of this Chapter will show and Chapter I has shown) did not arise as a movement of traditional Jewish communities and elites against exclusionary states. Rather, it arose as a movement of new—intelligentsia—Jewish elites, who first pursued a strategy of assimilation. Only once assimilation failed, and Jewish minorities felt continual marginalization despite their support for patriotic and cultural assimilation, did they begin to organize a nationalist movement in a response to exclusionary states. The relatively more inclusive society and politics in western Galicia, thus, unsurprisingly, meant that assimilationism rather than nationalism was the dominant ideology in Kraków.

...and the continuation of Jewish discrimination fueled by Christian fears of economic competition

Despite the manifestations of cross-ethnic and cross-class camaraderie that the Spring of Nations elicited, ethnic relations in Kraków and Galicia continued to be marred by prejudice, segregation and discrimination. The city's Christian and Jewish inhabitants continued to live in their respective neighborhoods, a separation maintained by regulations that circumscribed Jewish business and settlement to specific areas. In addition to the state-backed discrimination that the Jewish minority faced in Kraków (and Galicia), it faced prejudice from the city's Christian inhabitants. A March 17th, 1848 diary entry of Aniela Louis demonstrates such prejudice and tensions that underlined Polish-Jewish relations. Describing the events of the day, Aniela related her observations from the release of a local

prisoner. When a man known to the prisoner offered to vouch for him, the latter, “seeing a Jew standing next to him, replied: ‘I would prefer to have this Jew vouch for me rather than to have you do so.’ Thus, they let him go without anyone vouching for him.” Aniela’s entry highlights the disdain with which Poles viewed Jews, as in her story a Jewish man was used as a reference to demonstrate the depth of contempt that the prisoner held for the man who offered to vouch for him. Furthermore, her diary entry highlights the lower class position to which Jews were assigned. Her retelling of the story makes it seem as if it was perfectly acceptable to point to a Jewish man and to, in front of him and others, use him as a symbol of the depths of one’s contempt for another. (Zathey 1962:168)

In addition to facing prejudice based on cultural and religious grounds, Kraków’s Jewish inhabitants faced discrimination driven by economic competition. Like in Warszawa, Kraków’s Christian merchants and artisans saw Jewish merchants and artisans as garnering profits that were “rightfully” theirs. Just as in Congress Poland, the historic exclusion of Jews from land and real estate ownership as well as from other professions fostered strong urban and merchant traditions among the region’s Jewish population. Subsequently, the latter’s strong footing in commerce and craftsmanship was viewed as an economic threat by Kraków’s Christian merchants and artisans, who had a hard time competing with their Jewish counterparts (Demel 1958:540). The 1849 March constitution allowed Jewish merchants to expand the areas in which they worked. Kraków’s Christian merchants and the Merchant Association (*Kongregacja Kupiecka*) protested these moves, as they had “grown accustomed to easy wealth” (Demel 1958:495). Upon Kraków’s incorporation into the Habsburg Empire, its merchants were faced with new important duties. The dissolution of statutes that constricted Jewish merchants meant further economic hardship, in the form of increased competition, that Christian merchants had to face. Kraków’s Christian merchants viewed this not as the dissolution of discriminatory measures, but as an imposition or attack on their “exclusive rights.” (Demel 1958:495; Zathey 1962:221, 226)

Józef Wawel-Louis (the son) was a member of Kraków’s Merchant Association. An entry from his diary, written in 1849, showcases the resentment that Kraków’s Christian merchants felt about the dissolution of discriminatory regulations targeted at Kraków’s Jewish merchants. In his diary, Józef comments on the “unfortunate consequences” of the Spring of Nations’ motto of “Wolność, Równość I Braterstwo” (Liberty, Equality and Fraternity). He writes that not only did the Spring of Nations fail to return Poland into the hands of its aristocracy, create “millions of enemies in peasants,” and fail to benefit the Polish nobility, but that, as a result inhabitants of cities also had to suffer (“fall into ruin”). The “ruin” of city dwellers which Józef references was brought upon by local activists, who, according to Józef, in search of support, “proclaimed calls of freedom and fraternity to Jews.” With disdain he claims that the promises of equality lie at the root of Christian merchants’ economic “hardships,” for they led Kraków’s Jewish populations to “to raise their heads” and drawing on the calls and notion of equality, “want to suddenly [in a violent manner] take away the benefits of our trade” (Zathey 1962:209–10). Louis goes on to lament that, despite an order from Vienna, which prohibited the opening of stores in the city center by Jewish merchants, Kraków’s Jewish merchants, thanks to their “cunning” found enough government support to open stores close to the city center. He notes that the Merchant’s Association, “seeing in this its own ruin” protested it. Yet they were unable to sway the local government and thus to stop the movement of Jewish merchants. (Zathey 1962:209–10)

Józef’s diary entry provides clear representations of, and interesting insights into, the economically-driven tensions that marked and steered relations between Kraków’s Christian and Jewish merchants and artisans. It poignantly showcases the economic basis—the fear of economic competition and Christian merchants’ certitude of their inability to economically

succeed without government protection— of Christian merchants’ continual attempts to support and petition for ethnically discriminatory economic measures. At the same time, it hints that some of Kraków’s elites, particularly those that supported the events of 1846 and 1848, harbored a preference for supporting class-based rather than ethnic interests despite the displeasure of a subset of the urban Christian middle class. While lamenting the lack of local support that the city’s Christian merchants’ received from its political leaders, Józef writes that, “the radical party is not supportive of Catholic Merchants and calls all merchants and owners of real-estate ‘black-yellow,’ thus one must fear that in its blindness it will support Jews over Christians.” Józef’s critique of the political stance of “radicals” once more draws on his economic and political fears. The first, grounded in economic motives, is that unhampered Jewish competition will lead to the ruin of Christian merchants and artisans. The second draws on a common stereotype of the time that Jews were “nationally unfaithful.” Echoing the latter notion of “unfaithful Jews” Józef writes that by supporting the economic development of Jews over that of Christians, the region will seal its political fate, as “there exists the danger similar to that which occurred in Poznań in 1848, where Jews declared themselves Germans, the result of which was that the Polish province of Poznań was incorporated into the German Republic.” For these reasons Józef laments that, after all the sacrifices of blood and property that “we [Poles] had to bear, all of the benefits are going solely to peasants and Jews, who are our biggest enemies.” (Zathey 1962:209–10)

Józef’s assertion that both peasants and Jews are “our biggest enemies” shows that, despite the strong economic competition, and the obvious and unapologetic attempts of Christian merchants to legally cripple their Jewish competitors, one should not assume that they would have preferred to forge an alliance with Polish peasants. Louis the son names *both* peasants and Jews as “our” biggest enemies. In drawing a line between “us” on the one hand, and them—peasants and Jews—on the other, Józef, who came from an assimilated Polish (of Polish-French descent) upper class family, viewed Christian, upper class city dweller descendants of former burghers, on par with “real Poles”—the Polish nobility. In other words, in spite of his vitriolic tirade against the dissolution of ethnically based discriminatory measures, Józef was not prepared to eschew class-based alliances and interests for ethnic ones. Rather, as other Polish elites of the time, he was firstly concerned with his economic interests, and only secondly with national or ethnic ones. Moreover, he evoked the latter, just like later Polish nationalists, the National Democrats would do—in service of the first, economic, interests.

Unlike his son, Józef Louis (the father), was not a merchant but an administrator. As such, unlike his son, he did not feel the personal and imminent economic threat that Jewish merchants supposedly posed to his own “material survival.” Thus, diary pages filled by Józef the father lacked long anti-Semitic tirades as those provided by his son. However, in one entry, Józef (the father) did provide an additional glimpse into both the widespread nature of anti-Semitism in the Habsburg Empire and, despite the prevalence of such attitudes, the continual primacy of economic, class-based interests. In such an entry, Józef recounts an event that occurred while he was at a sanatorium in 1850. Józef Louis noted that the public bathhouse in Cieplice where the event took place was frequented by an Austrian Captain. The latter, according to Józef, was vocal about his hatred of Jews. In fact, the Captain had arranged that no Jewish person could bathe before 9am so that he would not chance upon a Jewish person during his own visits. However, on May 27th, it so happened that when the Captain came to the bathhouse, a Jewish man was bathing there. The former violently chased the latter out of the bathhouse. While characterizing the Captain’s reaction as “unsurprising,” Józef goes on to critique it, writing that its “arbitrary nature offends, as the bathhouse is public and thus anyone who can pay can attend it freely.” Further, he goes on to say that

though he himself “does not like Jews and would be happy not to see one in his life,” he “cannot declare himself superior to anyone” so long as they “live under the law.” Lastly, Józef adds that “this Jew, who fell victim to the Captain’s convulsive temperament,” was a “civilized, very decent man, who had two townhouses in Opawa.” (Zathey 1962:283–4)

Józef’s reaction, his insistence of asserting his own dislike of Jews as a group and his offense at the Jewish man’s mistreatment appears perplexing. However, I suggest that it shows a deeper concern with the preservation of class over cultural or ethnic privilege. Józef’s reaction to the event suggests that Józef harbored what appears to have been a common if not dominant attitude of Kraków’s, if not Galicia’s, Christian city dwellers: contempt for the Jewish minority, rooted in religion, culture and a feeling of Christian superiority. At the same time, his critique of the Captain’s mistreatment of the Jewish man suggests that, in the end, class rather than ethnicity, at least in his mind, should have been the first category guiding the Captain’s actions. Józef evokes the Jewish man’s economic and social status—the extent of his wealth and degree of assimilation into “contemporary” culture, as denote by his reference to the man being decent and “civilized”—to rebuke the Captain’s actions. Thus, Józef’s diary suggests that at least he and perhaps others in his social and *economic* position, had a stronger preference for a class-based rather than ethnic-based understanding of privileges and rights.

A slowly growing civil society

Historical sources, including letters, journals and documents kept by organizations suggest that civil society associations began to emergence in Kraków prior to the Kraków uprising (1846). Following the Spring of Nations, Galicia’s associational landscape continued to grow. Some professional associations had their roots in guilds, and thus were already well established by the 1840s. Such was the case of the *Krakowska Kongregacja Kupiecka* (Kraków Merchant Association), which traces its history back to the city’s Merchant Guild. The earliest preserved historical references to the latter are from the early 15th century.⁷⁶ Other professional and economic organizations began to form during the mid 19th century (Hoffmann 2006:51). For instance, the Scientific Association (*Towarzystwo Naukowe*) developed during this period (Estreicherówna 1968:20–1). In addition to professional organizations, Galicia saw the development of supra-professional, class-based organizations that united members of various professions; such class-based organizations which brought together different groups of intelligentsia in Kraków included the Scientific Association of Kraków, the Fine Arts Academy and the Association of Western Galician Conservationists (Homola 1984:383). Rural economic organizations, namely cooperatives, began to appear in Galicia in the mid to late 1840s. The first agricultural association in Galicia, the Galician Farm Association, was founded in Lviv in 1845 (Gurnicz 1967:43). The Agricultural Association came into existence a few years later, and was officially registered in 1859.

The mid-19th century also saw the emergence of academic associations that accompanied the growth in higher education. These were formed to cater to students’ mixed social, economic or professional interests. For instance, the Association of Brotherly Aid (*Towarzystwo Bratniej Pomocy*), an association focused on providing material aid to students, and the culturally and professionally focused Academic Reading Room (*Czytelnia Akademicka*), were founded during and survived this period (Estreicherówna 1968:17). Thus, the liberalization of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1848, coincided with increasing growth in

⁷⁶ “Sześć wieków historii KKK,” <http://www.kongregacja-kupiecka.com.pl/podstrony.php?strona=2>
Wygonik-Barzyk, E. (2009). *Krakowska Kongregacja Kupiecka: 600 lat istnienia*. Urząd Miasta Krakowa.

the types of associations founded in Kraków and Galicia. However, not all types of association were allowed. Organizations viewed as potentially politically (or military dangerous), remained illegal. For instance, volunteer firefighting associations were only legalized in 1864 (Pilawski 1998:19). After their legalization the region saw the development of voluntary firefighting associations, beginning with one in Kraków and Tarnów in 1865, and other cities thereafter (Pilawski 1998: 19).

Galicia's Associational Registry similarly showcases the increased variety in the types of associations that began to appear in Galicia in the mid-19th century. In addition to the professional (Stenographer's Association), and two Philanthropic Associations, which were officially registered in 1775, 1846 and 1848, respectively, the registry lists seven additional associations as having registered before 1861. These included two professional organizations for merchant youth; three recreational associations: an Old Noblemen's Club (*Resurs Dawny Szlachecki*, 1853), the Society for the Friends of Fine Arts (*Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Sztuk Pięknych*, 1854) and a Common Casino (*Kasyno Powszechne*, 1854); a religious organization, the Association of Prayer and Support for Israeli Friends of Progress (*Towarzystwo Modlitwy i Wspierania Izrael. Przyjaciół Postępu*, 1861); and an agricultural organization, The Economic Agricultural Association with a Forestry Section (*Tow. Gospodarczo Rolnicze z Sekcją Leśniczą*, 1859). In the city of Lviv, nine associations were listed in the registry with a date prior to 1861. In addition to a Greek-Orthodox philanthropic association registered in 1821, there were two philanthropic associations registered in 1854 and 1856, both with Catholic ties: the Association of Female Protectors of Small Christian Children in Lviv (*Towarzystwo Ochronek Chrześcijańskich Małych Dzieci we Lwowie*) and Saint Vincent de Paulo's Association of the Ladies of Mercy (*Towarzystwo Dam Miłosierdzia Św. Wincentego a Paulo*); a professional organization, the Association of Catholic Servants "Cliff" (*Tow. Czeladzi Katolickiej Skala*, 1856); an economic organization, the Karol Rischke Loan Association (*Tow. Zaliczkowe Karola Rischke*, 1852); one recreational organization—the National Casino Association (*Towarzystwo Kasyna Narodowego*, 1859); one Ukrainian educational organization— The Galician-Ruthenian Educational (Matrix) Association (*Towarzystwo Hałycko-Ruska Matyca*, 1861), a Catholic religious-social organization—the Saint Vincent a Paulo's Men's Association (*Towarzystwo Męskie Św. Wincentego a Paulo*, 1856) and an unknown Jewish Association⁷⁷ (1861). The registry provides a much more accurate picture of the region's associational landscape for the years 1867, thus after the loosening of associational laws and the founding of the Lviv *Namiestnictwo* (Viceroyship). Nonetheless, despite its lacks, the registry can buttress or question characterizations of early and mid-19th century Galician associations that the few historians who have written on the topic have made: while the associational landscape continued to be largely dominated by associations founded and frequented by the upper classes—the szlachta, wealthy bourgeoisie and cultural elites, the scope—in both type and membership—of associations was beginning to grow.

...and its distinct class and ethnic cleavages

Civil society in early 19th century Kraków was fragmented along both class and ethnic lines. Yet despite its multifaceted fragmentation, membership in this still largely upper class dominated sphere was policed along class lines⁷⁸ (Estreicherówna 1968:51–2). In other words, most public life and organization was replicated both class and ethnic (or religious)

⁷⁷ Unfortunately, due to the wear and tear of the archival materials, parts of pages are missing, scratched out or so worn that some information, as the name of this association, is missing or unreadable.

⁷⁸ With the caveat that membership in the upper classes already required a high level of cultural assimilation, particularly in the case of Jewish minorities.

lines. Nonetheless, in the early and mid-19th century, cross-ethnic and cross-religious mixing in organizations was more acceptable and common—though limited to only some circles—than was cross-class association. In this respect, early and mid-19th century Kraków was not different from Warszawa.

Recreational associations, such as the Riflemen's Association (*Towarzystwo Strzeleckie*), reflected urban notions of exclusivity and were accused of refusing membership to those of lower class professions, such as artisans (Estreicherówna 1968:24–5). Similarly, membership in the Old Kraków Recreational Association was limited to the landowning and magnate gentry, with only the wealthiest members of other classes permitted to join (Estreicherówna 1968:26). After Kraków's annexation by Austria, a similar German association was founded. At first was composed of German middle classes and some upper strata members, such as officers. Yet with time, the German or Universal Recreational Association also attracted a Polish middle class membership. The German association had a reputation as a “less than gentlemanly place,” in contrast to its Polish counterpart, which was limited to wealthy traditional elites. Nonetheless, even more respected members of the Polish middle classes, especially those employed in the (at the time Austrian) bureaucracy, joined the association due to professional pressures (Estreicherówna 1968:27). While at first only Austrians attended musical and dancing evenings organized by the German or Universal Recreational Association, with time members of the Polish and Jewish intelligentsia also began to attend them (Estreicherówna 1968:105).

On the one hand, the developmental history of the membership of Kraków's German or Universal Recreational Association shows the importance of class distinctions over ethnic or religious ones. On the other hand, it also demonstrates how local politics colored the emergent civil society. Before Galicia received regional autonomy, ethnic tensions between Poles and Germans reflected the formers' resentment towards members of the “occupying” Austrian power. Not only were Poles and Austrians disinterested in fostering relations with each other (Estreicherówna 1968:54, 58), but Germans who supported the state's germanization agenda were “boycotted socially” by the city's Poles (Demel 1958:522–3). Thus, the continuation of germanization policies in the 1850s contributed not only to the politicization of culture and growth in cultural, Polish patriotism, but also to ethnic tensions within civil society, particularly between middle and upper class Poles and Austrians. Hence, despite cross-ethnic mixing in society and civil society, ethnic tensions were a visible and important part of mid-19th century associational life. Nonetheless, ethnic cleavages were less significant than class cleavages. While there were some cross-ethnic associations, particularly among the upper and middle classes, especially the intelligentsia, cross-class associations, particularly recreational and social organizations, were not an acceptable feature of social and public life.

Summary

In 1846 the Republic of Kraków rejoined Galicia under Habsburg rule. While the Habsburg monarchy flirted with liberalization of its state after the 1848 Spring of Nations, it quickly relapsed into an absolute monarchy in 1851. Nonetheless, faced with the bloody disaster that was the 1846 revolution, the inevitable failure of future revolutions, and the continuation of some political and most economic privileges, Polish elites pursued a strategy of cooperation with, rather than mobilization against, the Habsburg state (Grzybowski 1959:62–3). With respect to ethnic relations, western and eastern Galicia continued to develop on divergent paths. Western Galicia, particularly the Duchy of Kraków, saw growing Jewish-Polish patriotic cooperation. Yet whereas Jewish intelligentsia and middle classes had

begun to assimilate into Polish culture during the reign of the Republic of Kraków, their counterparts in Lviv and eastern Galicia had been assimilating into German culture. The preference for German-assimilation and cooperation in Lviv and for Polish assimilation and cooperation in Kraków amongst each region's Jewish minority would continue until the late 19th century. Furthermore, in addition to more Polish-Jewish integration in Kraków as compared to Lviv, Lviv and eastern Galicia saw significant growth in ethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians. Though the latter was purposely stoked by the Habsburg state, Ukrainian-Polish tensions would continue to grow with Galician autonomy and Polish rule. Lastly, Kraków's civil society continued to develop as it had in the Republic of Kraków. The associational landscape was still largely, but not exclusively, limited to organizations forged by and for traditional and new—cultural and economic—elites, particularly as the region saw the emergence of agricultural cooperatives. Within the urban associational landscape, class rather than ethnicity continued to be the most important dividing factor.

IV. Progressive liberalization of the Habsburg State: 1860s to 1914

Continual Economic Underdevelopment under Austrian rule

In Russian-ruled Congress Poland experienced an industrial revolution in the second half of the 19th century. In comparison, Galicia was significantly industrially underdeveloped (Jeziński 1999:165–71, 188; Wandycz 1974:277). Galicia employed only about 25,000 (<.42% of its total population)⁷⁹ industrial workers in the 1880s. By 1912, only 60,000 (19% of the workforce, and <.74% of the total population) of Galicia's active workforce was employed in industry (Wandycz 1974:202, 277). In comparison, Congress Poland had 80,000 (>1.3% of its total population) industrial workers in 1864 and 150,000 (>1.6% of its total population) industrial workers in the 1880s (Wandycz 1974:202). Congress Poland's population amounted to 6.1 million in 1870 and 9.4 million in 1897.⁸⁰ Galicia had a population of 5.96 million in 1880 and 8.08 million in 1911 (Rutowski 1887:1; Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915:5–7).

Galicia lagged behind Congress Poland in industrial development and behind the Prussian-ruled Duchy of Poznań in agricultural development. The reasons for Galicia's relative agricultural underdevelopment, however, are not as simple as late peasant emancipation or the small size of most peasant holdings. Peasants on church and crown lands in the Republic of Kraków were emancipated from feudal servitude in 1809 (Bałaban 2013:598–9; Stanley 1989:129), while peasants in the rest of Galicia were emancipated in 1848. In comparison, peasant reform in the Prussian-ruled lands of the Commonwealth took place began in 1807, but lasted until 1860. Reforms were introduced in the Duchy of Poznań in 1823, and significant progress prior to and during the 1848 Spring of Nations. Congress

⁷⁹ Percentages of the industrial workforce calculated using cited estimates of workers employed in industry in both Congress Poland for 1864 and the 1880s and Galicia for the 1880s and 1912, and cited population statistics for Congress Poland from 1870 and 1897 and for Galicia from 1880 and 1911. Thus, the percentages of the industrial workforce are underestimates, hence denoted as > for Congress Poland and slight overestimates, hence denoted as < for Galicia.

⁸⁰ Первая Всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Под ред. Н.А.Тройницкого. т. II. Общий свод по Империи результатов разработки данных Первой Всеобщей переписи населения, произведенной 28 January 1897, Saint Petersburg, 1905. Table XIII, "Population Statistics According to Native Language."

Poland was the last to emancipate its peasants, not doing so until 1864. (Kieniewicz 1969b:58–71, 172, 203)

In addition to their relatively early emancipation, more peasants in Galicia owned land and their holdings were larger than those of Poznań's poorest peasants. Peasant landownership increased in all three regions during the second half of the 19th century, rising from 1870 to 1910 from 38% to 49% in Congress Poland, 30% to 43% in Prussian-Polish lands, and from 58% to 66% in Galicia (Jeziński 1999:165). The percentage of arable land under peasant ownership amounted to 69% in Congress Poland, 80% in Galicia and 51% in the Duchy of Poznań (Jeziński 1999:165). Thus, peasant landownership was higher in Galicia than it was in either Poznań or Congress Poland. Furthermore, the average size of the smallest landholdings (which accounted for 16% of Galicia's land and 44% of its owners) was, at 1.5 hectares, larger in Galicia than in the other regions. The average size of the smallest plots (which accounted for 6% of land and 67% of landowners) in the Duchy of Poznań was even smaller at 0.5 hectares and only 1.1 hectares in Congress Poland (accounting for 5% of land and 25% of landowners). (Jeziński 1999:166) Lastly, despite the significant concentration of land in the hands of the very few—approximately 160—wealthiest land elites (Wandycz 1974:223), Galicia had relatively more equitable distribution of land ownership than either Congress Poland or Poznań. Galicia had the highest percentage (16%, as opposed to 6% in Poznań and 5% in Congress Poland) of land in very small landholdings (under two hectares), and the smallest percentage (40%, versus 47% in Poznań and 56% in Congress Poland) in large (15–20 hectares) and very large (over 20 hectares) landholdings (11% versus 40% in Poznań and 13% in Congress Poland).

The relatively high peasant landownership and larger size of plots owned by the poorest farmers neither translate to the material wellbeing of the Galicia's peasants nor to its economic development. Despite its relatively less equitable land distribution in comparison to Galicia, Congress Poland had a relatively similar or higher productivity of its main agricultural products in both the 1880s and in the years prior to WWI (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:170). Prussian-ruled lands of the former Commonwealth had much less equitable land distribution in comparison to Galicia, yet much higher agricultural productivity for all but one of their main agricultural products in the 1880s (save for potato production) and significantly higher productivity for all main agricultural products in the years preceding World War I (Jeziński and Leszczyńska 1999:170). This suggests that it was neither the prevalence of very small and inefficient parcels of land in Galicia (e.g. Kieniewicz 1969b:204), nor land concentration in the hands of very few wealthy elites (e.g. Wandycz 1974:223) which caused Galicia's relatively low agricultural productivity. Rather, it was the lack of technological advancements, the frequent denial of loans to peasants (Wandycz 1974:23–4), and high taxes, among other institutional obstacles, that contributed to Galicia's slow agricultural development and modernization.⁸¹

Russian-ruled Congress Poland was the most industrially developed region of the former Commonwealth, and prior to WWI the most industrially developed region of the Russian Empire (Wandycz 1974:206). However, Congress Poland did not have a more modernized agricultural sector than Galicia. Moreover, peasant emancipation in Congress Poland lagged behind peasant reforms in Galicia. Thus, one might suggest that the development of relatively more liberal civil and political societies in pre-WWI Galicia was

⁸¹ As is common in the scholarship on this topic, both Kieniewicz (1969b) and Wandycz (1974) conflate institutional variables that contributed to the agricultural underdevelopment of Galicia with the state of land distribution in Galicia. A comparison of land ownership distribution and parcel size in the three regions of the former Commonwealth under pre-WWI Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule, which can be found in Jeziński and Leszczyńska (1999), cautions against conflating these factors.

not a result of the degree of political inclusion of elites and ethno-racial discrimination in each region, but rather was rooted in the development of each region's peasantry. The pointed comparison between the agricultural development in 19th century Galicia and Prussian-ruled Duchy of Poznań is meant to dissuade such critiques. While 19th century Galicia saw similar, if not better agricultural modernization in comparison to Congress Poland, its agricultural development and modernization certainly lagged behind that of the Duchy of Poznań. Despite its higher level of agricultural, but not industrial, economic development the Duchy of Poznań, like Congress Poland, experienced an increase in political exclusion of local (Polish) elites and increase in cultural repression (and germanization) of its Polish (majority) populations under Prussian rule. And like Congress Poland, political exclusion of local, Polish elites and ethno-cultural discrimination targeted at Polish, ethnic majority, masses contributed to rise of illiberal ideals and relations within Poznań's civil and political societies in the second half of the 19th century (e.g. Hagen 1972; Makowski 1999).

Significant Political Transformations: transition to Galicia's political and cultural autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian State

The political atmosphere in Russian-ruled Congress Poland and Austrian-ruled Galicia significantly diverged in the 1860s. Whereas Congress Poland experienced periods of higher political inclusion and cultural toleration prior to 1863, Habsburg-ruled Galicia saw an increase in the inclusion of local elites in national and regional political institution, the political inclusion of other social actors in local political institutions, and cultural (Polish) autonomy beginning in the 1860s. After decades of absolutism, the Habsburg state revisited its promises of liberalism that the empire had shortly entertained in response to the 1848 Spring of Nations. The October Diploma—a constitution adopted in 1860—decentralized power in the Habsburg Empire and spread it between the emperor, a newly established state council (*Reichsrat*) and provincial diets (Wandycz 1974:214). The 1861 February Patent replaced the original one-house state council with a bicameral Reichsrat consisting of an upper house of hereditary members, imperial nominees and church dignitaries and a lower house of deputies elected by local provincial diets, and after 1873, by regional curiae.⁸² Each of the empire's regions received a predetermined number of delegates based on its population and financial contribution. Thus, due to its economic underdevelopment, Galicia's population was underrepresented in the Reichsrat. (Polonsky 2010b:117; Wandycz 1967:285, 1974:215) Following the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Galicia received relative regional autonomy within the Habsburg Empire.

Increasing regional autonomy allowed for the re-polonization of Galicia. Polish became the language of the region's education, judiciary and administration. Poles began to "retake" Galicia's top bureaucratic offices and a Pole was appointed as a minister in charge of Galicia's affairs. (Grzybowski 1959:65, 75; Wandycz 1974:214–5, 220) From 1869 all of Galicia's governors were Polish and almost all were members of the Polish aristocracy (Rudnytsky 1967:404). In 1871, a Polish State Minister (*Landesminister*) for Galicia was established in every Austrian cabinet (Shedel 1984:24). Once in charge of a regional school board, Poles could, and did, end Austria's germanization of education, which the Habsburg state had pursued since its annexation of Galicia. As part of the de-germanization of Galicia's education, Lviv's and Kraków's universities were re-polonized in the 1870s (Wandycz 1967:278). Though it had given Galicia's elites increasing autonomy, the Austrian state

⁸² The curiae system was similar to a class system, whereby citizens with the right to vote were grouped according to their socio-economic status. The curiae were not equal. The curiae of landed elites received the largest proportion of mandates relative to their overall population percentage. (Polonsky 2010b:117)

made multiple attempts to curb the power and political legitimacy of Polish elites as the two competed for local legitimacy, power and support (Wandycz 1967:282).

Local elites' competition with the Habsburg state over political and organizational power was one driving force behind Galicia's mid and late 19th century political transformations. A second driving force was the emergence of mass movements and organizations in the last decades of the 19th century (Grzybowski 1959:83). For instance, in response to growing discontentment, a universal fifth curiae, in which all males of age were allowed to vote, was introduced into the Reichsrat in 1895 (Wandycz 1974:322). Yet the creation of a universal curiae was not enough to stop growing pressure and mobilization for universal *and equal* suffrage, hence universal suffrage that would also entail the dissolution of the curiae and equalization of the value and power of each vote. Mounting pressure and the outbreak of the Russian revolution led to the introduction of universal and equal suffrage in Austria in 1907 (Wandycz 1974:322). The introduction of universal suffrage changed Austria's political landscape. The rise of mass movements and parties placed Polish landed elites and economic (bourgeois) and cultural (intelligentsia) elites in competition with leaders of non-elite groups: peasants, workers and marginalized minorities (Shedel 1984:39). Privileges heretofore held by Polish elites, such as the appointment of Polish elites to ministries, became more precarious, and came into question along with Polish landed elites' hold over Polish representation in the Reichsrat (Shedel 1984:40). Thus, universal and equal suffrage to the Reichsrat set the stage for the significant re-organization of political alliances in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The early 20th century changes of Austria's political landscape and the transformation of Polish elites' strategies and alliances that it necessitated is further discussed in the last section.

Political and Social Actors: positions, interests, organization and alliances

Elites

Aristocracy

Elites in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were a largely homogenous group that encompassed landed, mostly Polish and Catholic, aristocrats and to some extent the clergy and wealthy burghers. By the second half of the 19th century, Galicia's elite-groups, which had significant control over at least one type of capital, became more diverse. Despite increasing heterogeneity among Polish elites, landed aristocrats continued to wield the most political, economic and cultural power in the region until the turn of the 20th century (Demel 1958:545). Galicia's transition towards relative regional autonomy primarily served the interests of landed Polish elites (Pajakowski 1989:5, 29–31). After the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Galicia's highest ranking official—*Namiestnik Galicyjski* (Galicia's Viceroy)—always was a Pole. Of these, all but one, the Kraków Conservative and historian Michał Bobrzyński, were either members of the aristocracy or wealthy landowners. Similarly, most top province, county or municipal administrative positions (e.g. *Starosta*)—were held by landowners or individuals with ideological or ancestral ties to the landowning classes. (Grzybowski 1959:75) There was a special minister of Galician affairs in Vienna who protected Polish interests, and the electoral system for the Galician Sejm was biased not only in support of Poles, but wealthy and specifically landed Poles (Rudnytsky 1967:404; Wandycz 1967:279)

Haute Bourgeoisie

In addition to the aristocracy, which was, by all accounts, the dominant elite in Galicia—wielding political, economic and cultural capital—other groups had significant influence over economic and cultural capital (Demel 1958:545). As cultural and economic

capital came to gain in import over the 19th century, particularly the ability to convert economic or cultural capital into political influence, these “new elites” became important players in the regions social and political life. They included the wealthy bourgeoisie and the cultural leaders of the developing middle class—the intelligentsia. Relatively low economic development made for a small bourgeoisie and a relatively small proletariat (Wandycz 1967:217–8). Cities were a small part of the Galician landscape. In 1893, there were 93 cities with 848,741 inhabitants and 221 towns with 581,843 inhabitants in Galicia. In comparison, there were nearly 11,000 villages, including rural estates, with 5,177,232 inhabitants. (Rutowski 1887:12) Thus, urban dwellers accounted for about a fifth of Galicia’s population. Members of Galicia’s wealthy bourgeoisie amassed their fortunes through the growing, though small, industrial sector, commerce, high bureaucratic offices or the wealthier free professions (Demel 1958:537). While many members of the big bourgeoisie had aristocratic backgrounds or ties, others did not. As such, they often sought to forge alliances with the regions’ aristocrats through marriages or business partnerships (Demel 1958:535–41).

Traditional Intelligentsia: Clergy

During the course of the 19th century, the intelligentsia grew not only in number and heterogeneity, but also in influence. It included clergy, estate administrators, bureaucrats, educators and other professionals with significant amounts of cultural capital. As a group, intellectuals wielded relatively little influence prior to the mid-19th century in Galicia. The clergy, however, were an exception. In addition to their local social importance in communities, members of the clergy had the organizational and political power of the Church. The clergy played an important part in Galician, particularly rural, society. (Homola 1984:147, 149–150). Due to its natural tie to rural communities and their position of leadership and authority, the clergy played an important part in founding and organizing rural public life. Many agricultural circles were founded by priests, and priests played an active part in their functioning (Gurnicz 1967:102–4). Within local agricultural circles in the late 19th century, members of the clergy were the second most likely to hold positions of leadership (Gurnicz 1967:107). While Roman Catholic clergy was more commonly seen in western Galicia, Greek Orthodox clergy played an important part in rural Eastern Ukraine. For a long time, Orthodox priests aligned themselves with Polish and Ukrainian landlords. In return for the patronage, Orthodox clergy aided Polish⁸³ elites in controlling Eastern Galicia’s Ukrainian peasants. This alliance and its social implications survived until the Habsburg state took interest in the Orthodox clergy and won their support—and thus influence among Ukrainian peasants—for itself (Wereszycki 1867:300).

“Modern” Intelligentsia

Aside of the clergy, the majority of Galicia’s intelligentsia, as that in Congress Poland, at first largely came from the landed gentry and established urban classes, and later, from the intelligentsia itself. As the intelligentsia grew in social importance during the 19th century, its membership came to be increasingly diverse. More of its members came not only from the impoverished landed gentry, but also from urban and even in some exceptional cases, peasant backgrounds. Thus, by the 1880s the notion of the “proletariat intelligentsia,” referring to the impoverished background of many of its members’, became more common (Demel 1958:544–6). Much of the intelligentsia had immediate roots in gentry and

⁸³ Once more, due to the peculiarities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, local lords, despite their ethnic origins, held Polish (and sometimes dual) nationality and assimilated into Polish culture. Thus, there was a cultural, in addition to a social, schism between landed elites, even ethnically Ukrainian ones, and Ukrainian peasants.

aristocratic backgrounds well into the second half of the 19th century (Homola 1984:378–9). Yet by the last quarter of the 19th century, the number of intelligentsia members coming from aristocratic and landowning backgrounds decreased as the number of those with immediate intelligentsia roots increased. Intelligentsia professionals with peasant, artisanal and working class backgrounds were not unseen in the 19th century. However, their numbers only began to significantly grow right before World War I.

By the third quarter of the 19th century the intelligentsia began to largely reproduce itself. In the second half of the 19th century, about 54.6% of writers, publicists and journalists—the artistic intelligentsia—came from intelligentsia families, 31.6% came from landowning families, 7% from the petty bourgeoisie and 5.9% had peasant roots (Homola 1984:308–9). During this period, members of the free professions, such as medicine practitioners, similarly, and increasingly, themselves came from intelligentsia families. In 1870/1, already 51.6% of medical students in Kraków came from intelligentsia backgrounds, 23.4% from the bourgeoisie, 10.5% from landowning families, and only 6.6% from peasant backgrounds; by 1900/1, 60.6% of medical students in Kraków came from intelligentsia families (Homola 1984:202).

Elementary school teachers similarly reflected a self-replication of the intelligentsia. Elementary school teachers were the children of teachers, bureaucrats, administrators, some had merchant or artisan backgrounds. Like members of the free professions, they rarely came from peasant or landowning backgrounds. Children of wealthier aristocrats were less drawn to the intelligentsia's working—free or educational—professions. (Homola 1984:131) Higher education, however, was more mixed with respect to its members' parentage. Secondary school teachers had mixed backgrounds. At first, many came from landowning and bourgeoisie families. Such secondary school teachers significantly decreased over the 19th century, a change that corresponded to increasing of “proletarianization” and “self-replication” of the intelligentsia. The percentage of secondary school teachers with intelligentsia backgrounds increased from 30% in 1860 to 38% in 1910, teachers from artisans and the working classes accounted for about 10% of the group in 1910, and secondary school teachers with peasant backgrounds were, by 1910, not uncommon, accounting for about 20% to 30% of this intelligentsia group. (Homola 1984:117) Tertiary-school teachers, like their secondary school counterparts, came from diverse social backgrounds. Though most came from the intelligentsia, many had burgher and peasant backgrounds. During Galicia's five decades of autonomous rule, over 50 university “scientific workers” came from peasant families. (Homola 1984:99)

The majority of Galicia's intelligentsia was Polish with an increasing proportion of Jewish members.⁸⁴ Relying on religion as a close approximation of ethnic background—where Poles were mostly Roman Catholic, Jews were Jewish, Ukrainians were Greco-Orthodox Catholic and (Prussian) Germans were Evangelical—then various intelligentsia professions ranged from being 65.6% to 100% Polish in 1880 and 47.7% to 99% Polish in 1910 (see Table 1 in the Appendix III). At the same time, the range of intelligentsia positions occupied by Jews in Kraków increased from 0 to 32.5% in 1880 to 0 to 52.3% in 1910. Religion is often a good proxy for ethnicity in regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian

⁸⁴ It should be noted that while all of Galicia had significant numbers of Polish intelligentsia, Kraków was considerably different from the region's other cities. Cities west of Kraków had more bureaucrats with foreign backgrounds, and Ukrainian intelligentsia was increasing in size and importance in regions east of Kraków (Homola 1984:378).

Commonwealth.⁸⁵ However, it is more problematic in the Habsburg-ruled regions, as, in addition to Poles, Austrians and other ethnic groups, like Czechs, were also overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. With this in mind, a way of estimating the percentage of Poles is thus to subtract from the percentage of Roman Catholics the percent of foreign-born (mostly in other parts of the Habsburg Monarch) members of the intelligentsia. Thus, the percentage of Poles in intelligentsia professions, on average, was likely between 77.05% (91.34-14.29) and 79.88% (91.34-14.29+2.83) in 1880 and between 74.53% (85.49-10.96) and 75.86% (85.49-10.96+1.33) in 1910.⁸⁶ This suggests a modest decrease of the proportion of Poles in intelligentsia professions from 1880 to 1910. Despite the decrease of Poles in intelligentsia professions, Poles tended to be mostly proportionally represented in intelligentsia professions in Kraków with respect to their population proportions in 1890 and 1910 Kraków, and were significantly overrepresented with respect to their population proportions in all of Galicia in 1880 and 1910. Specifically, they were slightly overrepresented in the intelligentsia with respect to their population proportion in the city of Kraków in 1890 (70.33%) and slightly underrepresented in 1910 (76.8%). They were well overrepresented with respect to the Polish population in Galicia in both 1880 (45.43%) and 1910 (46.50%).

The proportion of both Evangelicals (likely Germans) and Greco-Orthodox Catholics (likely Ukrainians) in intelligentsia professions remained relatively steady throughout this period, the latter decreasing slightly from 2.4% to 2.25% and the former decreasing somewhat more noticeably from 2.83% to 1.33% from 1880 to 1910. While Ukrainians were largely underrepresented in Kraków's intelligentsia with respect to their Galician population in both 1880 (42.26%) and 1910 (42.11%), they were overrepresented with respect to their 1890 (0.79%) and 1910 (1.1%) population in the city of Kraków. Germans (assuming their categorization as Evangelical or Protestant or "other") were overrepresented in the intelligentsia with respect to their Galician 1880 (0.79% - "other") and 1910 (0.46% - "Evangelical") and Kraków 1890 (0.73% - "Evangelical") and 1910 (0.7% - "Protestant") population percentages in both periods. Assuming that most Protestants, Evangelicals and Others were German and knowing that most Austrians were Catholic, the overrepresentation of Germans and Austrians was likely even higher.

The proportion of Kraków's Jewish intelligentsia saw the most significant increase in the last decades of the 19th century, particularly in the free professions—doctors, pharmacists, etc. and especially lawyers (Homola 1984:275) (Table 1). Jewish lawyers accounted for 29% of its members in 1880 in Kraków (and an even higher 36.2% in all of Galicia), and 52.3% of the profession in Kraków (and 58% in all of Galicia) by 1910; 63.9% of law students were Jewish (Homola 1984:275). For instance, Kraków's proportion of Jewish bureaucrats increased slightly from 3% in 1880 to 4.7% in 1910, while its proportion of Jewish court employees increased significantly from 3.6% in 1880 to 10.1% in 1910 (Homola 1984:28–9). The proportion of Jewish intelligentsia members in Kraków increased around 6% during this period, growing from 8.69% in 1880 to 14.12% in 1910. Jews were underrepresented in the intelligentsia in 1880 with respect to both their Galician 1880 (11.52%) and city of Kraków 1890 (28.07%) population proportions. In 1910, they were slightly overrepresented with respect to their 1910 Galician (10.86%) population, yet remained to be significantly underrepresented with respect to their city of Kraków 1910 (21.2%) population. Hence, despite its significant increase during the second half of the 19th century, the Jewish minority

⁸⁵ Religion is particularly a good proxy for distinguishing between Jewish and non-Jewish populations. Yiddish was not recognized as a language in statistics. As such, Jews often reported Polish as their language of use; moreover public administrators often inflated number of Polish speakers (Polonsky 2010b:115).

⁸⁶ It should be remembered that the children of foreign-born members of the intelligentsia—like those of Hechel and Józef Louis, mostly and quickly assimilated into Polish culture and patriotism.

continued to be the only ethnic group to be significantly underrepresented in both 1880 and 1910, with respect to its proportion of the population in the city of Kraków.⁸⁷

The political situation in Galicia significantly impacted the region's intelligentsia. Policies of state inclusion, which allowed Poles to participate in state institutions meant that they could occupy various levels within the bureaucracy. Thus, while the second half of the 19th century saw Poles pushed out of bureaucratic offices in Congress Poland, it saw the creation of bureaucratic positions, open and mostly occupied by Poles, in Galicia. As the most prestigious and most numerous of Galicia's pre-WWI intelligentsia professions (Homola 1984:15, 380), the bureaucracy thus not only provided impoverished gentry with social positions that would provide for their material needs and that would fill their need for social distinction. Moreover, the phasing out of germanization policies, which had been implemented in Galicia since its incorporation into the Habsburg Empire, and in Kraków from 1846 until the late 1850s, opened up additional positions in the educational sector that could absorb the growing Galician intelligentsia. Table 2 demonstrates an increase in the proportion of Kraków's bureaucrats, free professions and educational professionals with respect to the city's population in the mid to late 19th century.⁸⁸

Occupational Types	Year				
	1850	1857	1869	1880	1910
Free professions	124 (2.5)	250 (6.1)	271 (5.4)		
High Level Bureaucrats	65 (1.3)	54 (1.3)	114 (2.3)		
Higher Education Teachers	47 (0.9)	40 (1.0)	108 (2.2)		
Low Level Bureaucrats	486 (9.7)	762 (18.6)	676 (13.5)		
Lower Education Teachers	65 (1.3)	197 (4.8)	228 (4.6)		
All Bureaucrats				~1000 (15.15)	~2700 (17.53)
Pop. in Kraków (in thousands)	50	41	50	66	154

Table 2. Number of Teachers and Bureaucrats in Kraków in 1850, 1857 and 1869, and their proportion per 1000 inhabitants.

Notes: Occupational data compiled from Demel (1958) p. 541, Homola (1984) p.18 and population statistics compiled from Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki (1915), Table 16, p. 27.

Like in Congress Poland, Kraków's 19th century intelligentsia attracted downwardly mobile aristocracy. While the first half of the century, its members had more aristocratic roots, the second half of the century witnessed the "proletarianization" of the intelligentsia as impoverished gentry and urban dwellers largely filled its ranks. At the same time, Galicia's intelligentsia was distinct from that in Congress Poland in at least three ways. First, in

⁸⁷ Population statistics for Galicia in 1880 and 1910 and for Kraków city in 1910 taken from Tables 30, 31 and 38 in (Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915:38, 58–9). Population statistics for Kraków city in 1890 taken from (Rutowski 1898, Table 12, page 13).

⁸⁸ The proportion of all three groups radically increased from 1850 to 1857 and then decreased from 1857 to 1869. This exaggerated increase from 1850 to 1857 and decrease from 1857 to 1869 can be explained by the significant decrease in the population within the city's limits from 50,000 in 1850 to 41,000 in 1857 and back to 50,000 in 1869. The slight decrease in absolute number of bureaucrats from 1857 to 1869 was most likely a result of the changing political landscape of Galicia, a result of its transition to autonomy.

Congress Poland, much of the intelligentsia came from the *déclassé* and impoverished gentry that lost its land and status due to involvement in political and military mobilization against the Russian state (Gella 1971:11; Jeziarski 1999:151). Gentry who lost their land in Galicia mostly did so due to economic mismanagement rather than to clear and direct action of the Austrian state. Thus, the latter, did not necessarily see the state as responsible for their economic and social mobility. Second, Galicia, unlike Congress Poland (Davies 2005:182–3, 196; Lukowski 2001:160, 170), did not experience a deluge of former gentry into intelligentsia professions. As can be seen in Table 1 (Appendix III), by the 1870s and 1880s, the intelligentsia was already mostly self-replicating. Third, western Galicia's intelligentsia was not only overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, but in most intelligentsia professions Poles were either proportionately represented or slightly overrepresented with respect to their city or regional population proportions (see Table 1). In particular, Galicia's Poles had a clear majority and likely overrepresentation in most bureaucratic posts. The overwhelmingly Polish background of Galicia's bureaucracy was thus vastly different to both Galicia's bureaucracy under the repressive Habsburg rule prior to the 1860s (Homola 1984:28) and to the bureaucracy of Congress of Poland, where russification policies led to a decline in Poles in bureaucratic positions after the 1860s (Chwalba 1999).

The lack of culturally repressive and politically exclusionary policies, such as the russification of education and of the bureaucracy in Congress Poland, meant that there were proportionately more bureaucratic, educational, administrative, etc. positions open to Poles seeking them in Galicia. There, impoverished gentry and urban middle classes could find a source of livelihood and prestige. Moreover, the lack of economic policies targeted at displacing Polish landed gentry meant that large parts of the aristocracy and impoverished *szlachta* remained in rural areas where they owned their manors or worked on the estate of others. Thus, unlike in Congress Poland, Galicia's impoverished gentry and the urban middle classes did not encounter fierce economic competition for increasingly decreasing intelligentsia positions. The oversaturation of the intelligentsia in Congress Poland and the absence of the same phenomenon—at least prior to WWI—in Galicia could further be seen in the significant percentages of Kraków's intelligentsia posts held by migrants from other regions of the partitioned Commonwealth (Table 1). Ample employment opportunities in the more desirable intelligentsia professions, particularly the bureaucracy, meant that Galicia's impoverished gentry and middle classes did not find themselves seeking employment in historically “less desirable” sectors—like commerce and artisan work. Thus, they did not find themselves in competition with the ethnic minorities that historically filled these professions, namely the Jewish minority, to the same extent as their counterparts in Congress Poland. Rather, it would be Galicia's upwardly mobile peasant, alongside urban working and middle classes that would try to break into historically Jewish-dominated professions in trade and artisan work, by, among others, fervently supporting ethnically chauvinistic nationalist ideals.

Other Significant Social Groups *The Jewish Minority*

During the second half of the 19th century and into the beginning of the 20th century, Galicia's population increased from 9.69% in 1857 to 11.63% in 1890, decreasing slightly to 10.86% in 1910 (Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915:38). Jewish minorities were concentrated mostly in cities and towns. For instance, according to the 1893 census, despite accounting for only 11.63% of Galicia's population, Jews made up 37.13% of city, 38.53% of town, and 25.05% of manor populations (Rutowski 1898:12). In 1869, within the city of Kraków, there were 17,700 Jewish inhabitants, accounting for 35.5% of the city's 49,800

population. Most of Kraków's Jewish minority, around 70%, continued to live in Kazimierz. However, every year since 1859 saw increasing movement of Kraków's Jewish inhabitants into non-Jewish neighborhoods, such as non-Jewish parts of Kazimierz, Stradom—a Kraków neighborhood near the train station, and into Kraków's center. By 1880, Jewish inhabitants made up 76% of Kazimierz and 31.9% of Stradom. (Żbikowski 1995:40) Though Kraków's Jewish inhabitants became less restricted and as a result migrated throughout the city in the later years of the 19th century, the proportion of Jewish inhabitants in Kraków decreased during the same period. In 1890s, there were about 20,900 Jews in Kraków, amounting to only about 28% of the city's population. In 1909, suburbs of Kraków, which were mostly non-Jewish, were incorporated into the city, radically increasing the population to 140,000. Thus, by 1914, Kraków's Jewish inhabitants accounted for only about 22.5% of the city's total population. (Żbikowski 1995:41)

Increasing Political Rights

The 1860s brought Galicia's Jewish population increasing political and economic rights. The most important law was passed on December 21, 1867 and granted the region's Jewish populations equality. After 1867 Galicia's Jewish citizens had the legal right to use all public institutions and administrations, to live and buy property anywhere, and to pursue any occupation. Actual changes, however, lagged behind legal ones. (Śliż 2006:28–9, 150–1) Further important milestones included an 1868 educational law that greatly limited the public powers of the Roman Catholic Church, and another law passed in October of that same year, which gave Galicia's Jewish citizens the same status and laws as all other groups. Thus, after 1868, Galicia's Jewish minority was no longer a distinct legal group, but merely a distinct religious one. (Żbikowski 1995:109)

Jewish Assimilation

Before 1868, Jewish integrationists in the greater Galician region had debated the virtues of promoting Polish or German assimilation. As briefly mentioned in Part III, Jewish elites in *eastern* Galicia favored German over Polish assimilation (Wróbel 1994:6). The political organization *Schomer Israel*, which viewed the Austrian state as the bearer and protector of Jewish rights, was founded in Lviv (eastern Galicia) to promote germanization of Jews and to gain support from Vienna to improve Jewish rights. In addition to promoting germanization over polonization into the 1870s, Jews in *eastern* Galicia sought to forge political alliances with the similarly ethnically discriminated and politically excluded Ukrainian populations. In 1873, they established a central Jewish Electoral Committee in Galicia. The latter sought to ally itself with the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) council (*Rada Ruska*) rather than to cooperate with the Polish electoral committee, which was offering them four seats in a joined political campaign. (Polonsky 2010b:120–1; Wróbel 1994:6) However, such a Jewish-Ukrainian alliance was short lived. By 1879, Austrian liberals lost power in the national council. As clerical and conservative parties came to dominate the Reichsrat, the conservative Polish Club could recapture prominence in national and local politics. (Polonsky 2010b:121) The brief cross-ethnic political cooperation of Galicia's subjugated minorities (Jews, Ukrainians) was replaced with cross-ethnic alliances and concessions now forged with rather than against leaders of the regional, politically dominant majority—Poles.

Despite Polish elites' rise to regional power in the second half of the 19th century, preference for germanization and cooperation with the central Austrian state continued to have important adherents, like members of Lviv's *Shomer Israel* (Israeli Guard). Hence Polish-Jewish cooperation in eastern Galicia continued to be contentious, shifting with each groups' changing interest (Feldman 1907:274; Wróbel 1994:5–6). Assimilationism, which

first appeared in Lviv after the Spring of Nations, only began to take off in the 1880s among Lviv's Jewish intelligentsia. This growth in the popularity of Polish assimilationism was partly a result of the polonization of schools in the 1860s (Feldman 1907:277; Wróbel 1994:7). At the same time, in most of *western* Galicia, upper class Jews—members of the wealthy bourgeoisie and intelligentsia—tended to assimilate into Polish rather than German culture, especially after Galicia received its autonomy in 1867 (Rudnicki 2008:11; Wróbel 1994:5–7). Kraków was at the far end of the popularity of Polish assimilation, as Jewish integrationists in Kraków supported Polish over German assimilation *throughout* the 19th century (Żbikowski 1995:57, 69).

One reason for the continual and growing Polish assimilationist movement in Kraków was its distinct history of Polish political dominance. With Polish as the working language and culture of the Republic of Kraków, Jewish elites were incentivized to adopt Polish culture to advance socially and economically just as their counterparts under Austrian rule were incentivized to adopt German language and culture. A second reason was the movement's relative success in Kraków, a result of not simply longer Jewish preference for Polish assimilation and support of Polish political causes, but also a more receptive Polish society. There was a noticeably lower level of discrimination or higher level of acceptance of Jews by Kraków Polish society. In the second half of the 19th century, while there were only five (5%) Jewish deputies out of 100 in Lviv's city council, there were 11 (18.3%) out of 60 in Kraków's city council (Wróbel 1994:3). Jews were underrepresented in each council with respect to their populations in both Lviv and Kraków, accounting, for example, for about 28% of each city's population in 1890 (Rutowski 1898:13). However, the level of underrepresentation in Lviv was much more significant. A third reason, similar to the first, was Kraków's long history of cultural autonomy, and thus the ability of Polish elites to use public educational institutions to polonize local ethnic minorities.

Jewish assimilation into Polish or German culture through educational institutions reached back to the turn of the 19th century. The first Jewish University student, whose enrollment can be verified with existing documentation, appeared in Kraków in 1802 (Śliż 2006:52–3). During the 19th century, Kraków's Polish higher education institutions saw an increase of Jewish students. In 1826 there were three Jewish students recorded at Kraków's university, while in 1846 there were 12. In 1865 there were 26, accounting for 7.7% of its student body. (Polonsky 2010:261). By 1911, there were 419 Jewish university students in Kraków, making up 15% of the student body. The percentage in Lviv was even higher, matching eastern Galicia's higher Jewish population, with 1386 Jewish university students, or 26% of the student body, in 1911. (Śliż 2006:54). Cultural autonomy meant that all public institutions in all of Galicia—both east and west, could provide instruction in Polish rather than German. An increase in public education was accompanied by an increase in the attendance of Jewish children in public, secular rather than religious, schools. The number of Jewish children attending public, secular—as opposed to religious—schools in Lviv increased from 1,261, or 21% of Jewish children in public schools, to 5,668, or 74% of Jewish children in public schools by 1902 (WIERZBIENIEC, Kogut, and Dabrowski 2000:233–4). This increase in secular education led to the emergence and growth of a Jewish intelligentsia composed of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, and to their polonization. The push for Jewish assimilation through attendance in public, secular, rather than private, religious schools was not only supported by Polish leadership, but since the 1860s was also promoted by Jewish assimilationist leaders, particularly in Kraków (Demel 1958:511). While a significant portion of Galicia's Jewish intelligentsia and part of its middle class had assimilated into Polish culture, most of Galicia's Jewish masses remained culturally distinct (Rudnicki 2008:11–2; Żbikowski 1995:57, 69).

The rise of Anti-Semitism in Galicia

Like in Congress Poland, Galicia experienced increasing anti-Semitism in the 1880s, visible in the growth of stereotypes and anti-Semitic speeches (Żbikowski 1995:280). The 1890s further saw growth in anti-Semitic actions, including attacks on Jewish property (Żbikowski 1995:290-292). However, late 19th century and early 20th century anti-Semitism that arose in Kraków was not on the same scale as that which arose in Congress Poland. The anti-Semitic society that arose in Kraków, which concentrated itself around *Głos Narodu*, was small, weak and did not have much influence (Żbikowski 1995:312). Furthermore, as anti-Semitic campaigns in Warszawa steadily increased prior to WWI, anti-Semitic campaigns in Kraków *decreased* after 1907 (Żbikowski 1995:294). This regional variation stemmed from the distinct social development of Kraków and Warszawa, particularly the divergent development of each region's elites, their positions and interests, and the regional variation in which social group eventually supported anti-Semitism to pursue its own interests.

As in Congress Poland, urban middle classes involved in commerce had a long history of ethnic-economic competition. However, it was Galicia's peasantry that, due to its economic interests, clerical ties, and its significant size became the largest proponent of anti-Semitism in Galicia. On the one hand, the peasantry's support for ethnic, anti-Semitic slogans rather than for economic, class-based ones is surprising. Scholars suggest that there is some evidence that even still in the mid-19th century, Galicia's peasants trusted Jews more so than they trusted their Polish landlords (Polonsky 2010:264). It was Polish landlords, not Jewish administrators or merchants, who had for centuries oppressed Galicia's peasants and who continued to fight for policies that favored elites' at the cost of peasants' interests. On the other hand, Galicia's peasantry's support for ethnically-based slogans made as much sense as that of Galicia's merchants and Congress Poland's middle classes.

First, while Galicia's peasants were skeptical of members of other social groups, they trusted and listened to the Church and its representatives. Not only did the Catholic Church fail to stop anti-Semitic action, it fueled anti-Semitism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and continued to do so in 19th century Galicia (Feldman 1907:266; Grzybowski 1959:80; Rudnicki 2008:12; Żbikowski 1995:280). Second, historically, Polish lords had used Jewish intermediaries to mediate between themselves and peasants. Growing rural mobilization altered this dynamic. In western Galicia, landed elites responded to growing social organization in the countryside by trying to forge culturally-based and nationalistic bonds between themselves and peasants against the religious and ethnic "other." (Stauter-Halsted 2001:116) In eastern Galicia, Ukrainian peasants viewed Jewish intermediaries as tools of Polish repression. They resented what they saw as Jewish collusion with their Polish oppressors, blaming both for their poverty (Polonsky 2010:265).

Third, in order to increase its own abysmal economic status, landed, though generally poor peasants sought to improve their economic status by moving into economic activities that historically, due to feudal policies, had been carried out by the Jewish minority. Rural agricultural circles promoted the development of rural economies by not simply trying to modernize Galicia's agriculture, but also by encouraging peasants to pursue entrepreneurial activities. To cut costs for its members, the Circles often opened, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes by leasing rights to retailers, village stores. The entrepreneurial activity of the Circles was meant to aid rural development. However, it often did so by adopting nationalistic slogans of "liberating" villages from Jewish "monopolies." The "liberation" of the countryside from Jewish merchants, however, often simply meant that wealthier, land-

owning peasants took their place in running stores and inns to fulfill their own economic aspirations. (Gurnicz 1967:243–6; Kieniewicz 1969b:212; Stauter-Halsted 2001:136–7)

Similar slogans that tied rural development to anti-Semitism and nationalism were adopted by peasant parties. When peasant parties, such as the Polish Peasant Party (*Polska Partia Ludowa*), the Christian People's Party (*Stronnictwo Chrześcijańsko-Ludowe, Ch-Lud*) and the Peasant Party Alliance (*Związek Stronnictwa Chłopskiego*), emerged in the 1880s, they blamed Galicia's rural poverty on Jewish merchants and tavern owners. A 1898 campaign led by Stojałowski, one of Ch-Lud's leaders, stoked massive anti-Semitic violence, the levels of which had not been seen in Galicia since the 18th century. The high levels of violence discredited Stojałowski among Galicia's peasants, and led to the victory of the anti-Semitic Peasant Party over its more anti-Semitic Ch-Lud or ND competitors. Moreover, the state took action against rioters and charged between 8% to 23% of inhabitants of various towns with crimes for their involvement. (Polonsky 2010b:132–4) Nonetheless, the events that transpired showcased the ease with which Galicia's peasants were willing to view the Jewish minority as the source of their economic plight and the willingness of some, if not many, to support violent actions against those that they viewed as their oppressors. In 1846, it was the Polish landed gentry that peasants blamed for rural poverty. By the end of the 19th century, Galicia's Jewish minority increasingly received that blame.

In addition to peasants, parts of the urban middle and working classes utilized anti-Semitic slogans in service of their economic aspirations. In Congress Poland, it was the intelligentsia and new middle class, urban *déclassé* gentry that came into fierce competition with Jews for urban, middle class professions. In Kraków, however, the intelligentsia and Polish elites, many of whom remained landed, were mostly not in economic competition with Jews. As previously discussed, Galicia did not reach an oversaturation of its intelligentsia. The latter was, at least in part, tied to the fact that posts in political, administrative and educational institutions in Galicia were open to Poles. In Galicia, like in Congress Poland, it was the groups that came into direct economic competition with the Jewish minority, or rather those that aspired to enter into sectors heavily dominated by the Jewish minority, that were the most enthusiastic supporters of anti-Semitic slogans. Existing sources suggest that in 1899, Jews accounted for 34% of Kraków's artisanal professions and about 63%, of commercial professions. Like in Congress Poland, Jews made up larger and smaller percentages of subsets of the commercial sector, accounting for over 90% of those involved in commerce of wheat, leather and textiles, money exchange and banking, and a significant 80% to 90% of those possessing their own businesses or workshops (Żbikowski 1995:47). As the Jewish population made up 28% of the city of Kraków, they were considerably overrepresented in professions tied to commerce and artisanal work. At the same time, as has already been pointed out, the Jewish minority was considerably *underrepresented* in other professions, many of which were much more desirable in terms of social status and prestige (Homola 1984:380), such as bureaucratic positions (Table 1).

The overrepresentation of Kraków's Jewish minority in some sectors, particularly certain kinds of trade, and their underrepresentation in other sectors, particularly bureaucratic positions, does not distinguish Kraków from Warszawa. The latter also saw an overrepresentation of Jews in certain professions, particularly trade, and their gross underrepresentation in others. What does distinguish the case of Kraków from that of Warszawa is that the urban, middle class individuals who aspired to enter heavily Jewish sectors in Kraków were, unlike in Warszawa, a small minority, a fact that likely contributed to the rarity of anti-Semitic actions in the city and the general periods of peaceful co-existence between the city's Poles and Jews (Żbikowski 1995:295). In other words, despite the presence of similar patterns of Jewish overrepresentation and underrepresentation in

Kraków's and Warszawa's professional landscapes, the cities diverged in the level of anti-Semitism on the one hand, and continual Polish-Jewish cooperation and Jewish support for Polish assimilation that each city saw. This difference, as argued in Chapter II, was not a result of Jewish labor participation. Rather, in Congress Poland, it could be attributed to (1) state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination aimed at the masses, which provided urban, increasingly socially powerful, Polish elites with a real, shared interests with Polish workers and peasants, and (2) the ability of Polish elites, particularly urban elites, to marry their long-term political struggle against the Russian state with their goal to displace the Jewish minority for their own economic gain. Lacking the ability to mobilize Polish masses on cultural grounds, and the economic and political incentives to do so, Kraków in western Galicia saw little elite-group led mobilization against its Jewish minority.

The decline of Jewish-assimilationism

As in the other partitions, the onset of anti-Semitism in Galicia contributed to declining assimilationist ideology and growing Jewish nationalism (Rudnicki 2008:11–2; Żbikowski 1995:99). The 1890s saw the end of Lviv's short-lived integrationist organizations, such as the *Agudat Ahim* and that of assimilationist newspapers, such as *Ojczyzna*. These were only founded in the previous decade, in 1882 and 1880, respectively (Feldman 1907:276). Jewish nationalism found supporters in every region of Galicia, particularly in eastern Galicia (Żbikowski 1995:105). Lviv, in eastern Galicia, saw the creation of the Zionist organization *Ahawath Zion* (Love of Zion) in 1882 and in 1883 the founding of the first Jewish-national association, first named *Mikra Kodesch* (Sacred Thing) and renamed *Zion* in 1888. Moreover, in 1892, the assimilationist paper *Ojczyzna* (Homeland) ceased to be published in Lviv and the Zionist newspaper *Przyszłość* (Future, later transformed into *Wschód*—East) appeared (Feldman 1907:285–6; Wróbel 1994:10–1).

Nonetheless, despite its rise at the turn of the 20th century, Zionism, like anti-Semitism, was relatively less prevalent in Galician, particularly western Galicia, than in Congress Poland. Whereas Zionism replaced assimilationism as the dominant ideology in Congress Poland by the start of the 20th century, Zionism in Galicia lagged behind the continual popularity of assimilationism,⁸⁹ *even in eastern Galicia*. While old preferences for germanization could be seen among the older, but not the younger, generations in eastern Galicia, polonization had so permeated integrationist Jewish circles that, by the turn of the century, not only was Polish typically spoken among members of the Jewish middle class, but even Zionists in western Galicia published their papers in Polish. (Feldman 1907:292–5) Furthermore, despite the emergence and growth of radical Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism, this ideology—which saw emigration rather than integration as its final goal—alienated various groups of Galicia's Jewish society, including assimilated Jews that were part of mixed ethnicity movements, assimilated and non-assimilated liberal Jews who simply wanted a more democratic state, and orthodox Jews. Thus, before World War I, Zionists in Galicia were unable to form any political coalitions. (Żbikowski 1995:100–101)

Cross-ethnic, Polish and Jewish cooperation and political alliances

As a sizeable minority in Galicia, Jews had always played an important part in the region's politics. Furthermore, as in the other regions of the former Commonwealth, the local

⁸⁹ Feldman notes that Jewish assimilation made important and significant progress in the region. First of all, economic assimilation saw Jews entering professions and activities from which they were previously excluded, such as farming, fishing, production of machines, etc. (Feldman 1907:293–4). Cultural assimilation went so far that even Zionists in Western Galicia printed newspapers in Polish. (295) Political assimilation meant that Jews could be found both among Kraków's conservatives (*Stańcyzy*) and the National Democrats (296).

Jewish minority was not considered a national group in its own right. Thus both Poles and the partitioning powers looked to the Jewish minority to support their rule. In a catch-22, the lack of enthusiastic support for one's side was viewed as support for the other, thus forcing Jews to either face the wrath of one group by "enthusiastically" embracing the other or of both for failing to "enthusiastically" embrace either. Galicia was no different, with both Poles and Austrians looking to its Jewish population to legitimize their rule through political support and acculturation (Feldman 1907:270; Wróbel 1994:4).

Political cooperation between certain Polish and Jewish groups and tension between others was a staple of post-1860 Galician politics. Polish political elites, particularly the western conservatives—*Stańczycy* (Feldman 1907:276), sought the political support of Galicia's Jewish minority. Jewish political power, and thus the group's appeal as a political ally, increased after Jewish inhabitants were granted equal rights in Galicia. After 1867, Jews could once again buy land, and by 1912, already 22% of landowners were Jewish. In addition to supporting Jewish economic integration, Jewish land ownership raised the importance of Jewish votes in Galicia as the Austrian electoral system continued to privilege landowners (Polonsky 2010b:128). In 1868, to pre-empt the Austrian state doing so, the Galician diet dissolved remaining restrictions on Galicia's Jews, such as restrictions placed on the number of Jews that could sit on Lviv's city council and that of other towns. (Polonsky 2010b 113-4) The increase in Jewish political participation and power still further augmented their importance as political allies.

In addition to viewing Galicia's Jewish population as either allies or foes in their struggle for power with the Austrian state, Polish elites sought an alliance with the group on the basis of mutual ethnic interests—a mutual fear of growing Ukrainian nationalism in eastern Galicia. Jews in eastern Galicia feared growing power of the more hostile Ukrainian peasants, while eastern Galicia's Polish elites believed that the polonization of its Jewish minority would aid their political cause—their continuing political leadership—in this heavily Ukrainian (65%) region. (Polonsky 2010b:119) While a Polish-Jewish alliance was eventually formed, *eastern* Galicia's Jewish leaders who, for previously discussed historical reasons, preferred germanization over polonization and resented their political marginalization by Poles, had at one point sought to forge an alliance with eastern Galicia's Ukrainian representatives. In the first direct elections to the Reichsrat in 1873, Jewish germanophilic representatives in Lviv entered into formal electoral arrangements with Ukrainian representatives (Feldman 1907:274). However, already by the next election the group shifted its strategy and joined the Polish Circle. This Polish-Jewish alliance, which continued in the Reichsrat until the First World War, tended to be represented by eastern and western Galicia's Jewish representatives aligning themselves with the Kraków conservatives or "*Stańczycy*" and Polish democrats in the Galician diet. (Polonsky 2010b:128; Wandycz 1967:222; Wróbel 1994:7)

The alliances between Galicia's Jews and Polish landed elites grew in the 1880s, as they united against a common political foe: populist Polish parties. Peasant parties, including the Populists—the party of wealthier peasants, and the Christian-Socialists—the party of poorer peasant masses led by Stojałowski, stoked anti-Semitic sentiment, blaming Galicia's Jews for the poverty in rural Galicia (Polonsky 2010b:132-4). Alongside Galicia's Jewish minority, Populists and the Socialist Peasant party also blamed Polish conservatives for Galicia's rural poverty (Feldman 1907:59, 67, 239). In addition to being targeted by peasant political slogans, Galicia's Jews and landed elites had a shared fear of peasant violence. Jewish fears were rooted in anti-Semitic demonstrations and attacks on Jews and Jewish property. Fears of landed elites could be traced to the 1846 Galician slaughter. The reality of Polish landed elites' fears of peasant violence could be seen, for instance, in their reaction to

a rumor in 1886. Upon hearing reports of an impending peasant attack, nobility from Tarnów and other regions abandoned their manors and fled to cities (Feldman 1907:59). No peasant uprising occurred. Yet the landed elites' belief that it could certainly did not signify a softening of tensions with Polish peasants.

The Jewish Minority and Socialism

Probably the most fruitful, though not without its own tensions, political alliance between Poles and Jews in Galicia was between Polish and Jewish socialists. Like in Russian-ruled lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Galicia's socialists and their PPS party was accepting of Jews, wanted to win support from Galicia's Jewish working classes, and in turn found supporters among Galicia's Jewish minority (Śliwa 1991:275–6). Jews played an important part in the leadership of Polish Social-Democrat Party (*Polska Partia Socio-Demokracja*, PPSD), both Polish and Jewish members were active agitators for the party. At a conference held by the socialist party in 1904 in Kraków, 60 out of 100 delegates were Christian, while 40 were Jewish (Feldman 1907:130)

Despite its theoretical and practical inclusivity (Feldman 1907:111, 118), Galicia's socialist movement splintered into separate Polish— though still multiethnic, and Jewish movements. While this separation mirrored and was inspired by what transpired in Russian-ruled lands of the Commonwealth (Feldman 1907:137), it took on a more conciliatory tone in Galicia. In Russian Poland, Jewish socialist left the PPS to form their own Jewish Socialist Party, Bund. To prevent a similar split in Galicia's socialist party, Jewish representatives formed a separate, Jewish branch of the PPSD. The latter was formed to address Jewish concerns overlooked by the PPSD. Despite efforts of Galicia's multiethnic socialists, in 1905, Jewish separatists formed a distinct Jewish Social Democratic Party (JSDP). Feldman (1907), however, argues that separatists were not the majority voice of Jewish socialists in Galicia. At the previously mentioned 1904 conference held in Kraków, out of the 40 Jewish representatives only 14 were separatists (Feldman 1907:130). Moreover, despite strife between the Polish and Jewish socialist groups, largely caused by the first's attempts to block the formation of the second, in 1911 the PPSD reached an agreement with its Jewish members. The PPSD allowed its members, including members of its Jewish section, to also join⁹⁰ the JSDP. (Feldman 1907:137–40, 301; Polonsky 2010b:135–8; Wróbel 1994:12)

Jewish support of the National Democratic Party

Probably the strangest alliance was between some eastern Galician Jews and the National Democratic (*Narodowa Demokracja*, ND) party. The latter was the pre-WWI and interwar nationalist party, and the precursor of Polish interwar fascist organizations. Though the ND's anti-Semitic slogans certainly increased during the interwar period, they were already strong and used to launch politically and economically motivated boycotts against the Jewish minority before WWI in Congress Poland. In Galicia, however, the National Democrats and their right-wing Nationalist Alliance (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*, SN) had to veer away from the radical and unapologetic anti-Semitic strategies that it adopted in other pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth. In Galicia, the party had to adapt to the “realities of the region” (Wątor 1993:41). Unlike in Congress Poland, the Nationalist Alliance accepted assimilationist tendencies of Galicia's Jews, pitting itself against Jewish nationalism (Wątor 1993:41). Moreover, it received financial and electoral support from Jews in *eastern* Galicia,

⁹⁰ In general, many political or politically tied organizations in pre-WWI and WWII Polish lands tended to have clauses in their statutes that prevented their members from belonging to similar organization, particularly when they had different political orientations.

it had to curb its pre-election anti-Semitic slogans, and only revert to them after elections (Wątor 1993:41).

Wątor's (1993) assessment of the ND's and SN's use of Jewish support once more underlines the difference between both Congress Poland and Galicia on the one hand, and of eastern Galicia and western Galicia on the other. The National Democrats general failed to muster much social and political support within western Galicia, particularly in Kraków (Wątor 1993:16). In *eastern* Galicia, however, they were more successful. In Congress Poland the Jewish minority was the ND's target group for mobilizing Polish, ethnically chauvinistic nationalism. Yet in eastern Galicia it was the Ukrainian *majority* that was painted as the greatest danger to Polish nationhood, and which certainly posed the greatest threat to eastern Galicia's Polish landed elites. Thus, it is no surprise that ND's were generally more successful in peddling a fear-filled, ethnically-exclusionary nationalist ideology in eastern Galicia. Furthermore, it is not surprising the ethnically chauvinistic ND sought the support of eastern Galicia's other significant, Jewish minority, that it adjusted its strategy to accepted Jewish assimilation and that some of eastern Galicia's Jews supported the anti-Semitic party out of their mutual fear of eastern Galicia's Ukrainian majority.

The Ukrainian Minority

While relations between Galicia's Jews and Poles were far from smooth, the region's most politically and socially tense ethnic relations, especially in eastern Galicia, were between Galicia's Polish majority and the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) minority. These relations were intensified in eastern Galicia where Ukrainians made up the actual demographic *majority*. In 1865, Ukrainians accounted for 65% of the population in Eastern Galicia, where they historically dominated rural areas and the poor peasant masses. At the same time, though Poles historically held political and economic power in eastern Galicia, they only made up 22% of the region's population. (Polonsky 2010b:119; Wandycz 1974:221) Thus, despite its lack of social domination, Poles kept their dominant position in eastern Galicia through "social privileges of the landed nobility and the upper middle class" (Rudnytsky 1967:405–6). In western Galicia, Ukrainians and Germans together accounted for only 4% of the population and Poles account for 88.2% of the population in 1869 (Polonsky 2010b:119; Wandycz 1974:221). Thus, the Ukrainian question had a different meaning in each region. Whereas Polish elites in western Galicia saw Ukrainian nationalism as threatening Galician unity, but not their local political or economic power, Polish elites in eastern Galicia saw Ukrainian nationalism as aimed at undermining their local political and economic control of the region. In other words, Polish-Ukrainian relations in eastern Galicia consisted of ethnic cleavages that historically had been reinforced by class (estate) lines forged by a state-backed ethnic division of labor.

Prior to the 1860s, the Habsburg state targeted these historical and ethnic tensions to undermine the power of Polish local elites, particularly in eastern Galicia. Before Galicia received its autonomy, laws in *eastern* Galicia were written in German and Russian as a means of promoting Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nationalism and dividing local Ukrainian populations from Poles (Wandycz 1974:144–5). Moreover, once the Habsburg state realized that Polish elites largely controlled Ukrainian peasants through the Greco-Catholic clergy, it aimed to leverage the Ukrainian peasants' subservience to Greco-Catholic clergy for itself. By removing the bonds of patronage of the clergy on local landed elites and shifting them onto the state, they aimed to "make use of the Greco Catholic hierarchy to influence the Ukrainians to support them in countering the efforts of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia" (Wereszycki 1867:300). Thus the direct Habsburg rule of the late 18th and early 19th century

did what we would expect direct colonial or imperial rule to do. It undermined the power of local elites and fostered the drive for self-determination of a repressed regional *majority*. Yet once local Polish elites began to regain power—nationally through the Reichsrat and regionally through the bureaucracy and the Galician Sejm, landowning conservatives from eastern Galicia returned to strengthening their political, economic and cultural power in Galicia at the cost of the Ukrainian majority (Grzybowski 1959:75).

Galicia's return to semi-autonomous rule did not have to lead to the reversion of old Polish-Ukrainian relations and to the flaring of ethnic tensions between the two groups. Though autonomy revived the power of local Polish elites, Galicia's eastern and western elites had distinct positions on the Ukrainian question. With respect to the Ukrainian question, Galicia's *western* conservatives were mostly concerned with protecting and promoting regional unity. Thus, they were willing to support policies that would ease tensions between Ukrainians and Poles. In the 1860s and 1870s, when the Ukrainian movement was coming into being, there was a chance for Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. Some Kraków (western) conservatives sought to reform Polish-Ukrainian relations. The Polish historian Szujski proposed including Ukrainians in positions of power in political and cultural institutions. Ukrainian representatives were willing to support a united Galicia so long as it would preserve the equality of ethnicities. Yet such schemes to ameliorate Polish-Ukrainian tensions by granting to Ukrainians the same freedoms and inclusion that Poles had were staunchly opposed by Polish landed elites from eastern Galicia—the Podolacy. The latter prioritized their ability to retain economic and cultural control in eastern Galicia over reducing ethnic tensions. They preferred to support short-term solutions by forming alliances with Ukrainian (Greco Orthodox) clergy rather than fostering discussion and cooperation with young nationalists. Their staunch refusal to recognize Ukrainians as a separate and equal national group undermined this 19th century hope for a Polish-Ukrainian settlement. (Wandycz 1974:221, 279–80) In other words, western Galician elites were willing to give up some of their political power in order to preserve their benefits that stemmed from a united Galicia. Eastern elites, however, were unwilling to pursue compromises they believed would mostly and immediately undermine their political and economic privileges.

The transition to a more *indirect* Habsburg rule, and thus to increasing Galician autonomy after the Constitution of 1867 resulted in a return of pre-partition social, political and economic relations with respect to Poles and Ukrainians. In addition to having power over all local matters not reserved for the national government, Galicia's Sejm shared control over regional education with the national state. The *Rada Szkolna Krajowa* (the National School Board) was the most important educational administrative institution in Galicia. The polonization of the bureaucracy, education and the judiciary “virtually excluded non-Poles from positions of authority,” despite special provisions that protected the use of Ukrainian in eastern Galicia and some institutions. (Wandycz 1974:220) Podolacy pushed for policies that would either leave exclusive and discriminatory policies untouched, or ones that would further exclude Ukrainians (and Polish peasants) from political institutions.

Political exclusion of Ukrainians was visible in their underrepresentation in political organs. After Galicia received regional autonomy, voting rules became more biased ethnically—in favor of Poles, and economically—in favor of groups that paid higher taxes, and particularly of landowners, for both the Galician Sejm and the national Reichsrat. Not only were Ukrainians generally underrepresented in the Galician and national councils, but their representation, like that of peasants in general, declined over the 1860s and 1870s. In 1861 there were 49 Ukrainian deputies and 101 Polish ones in the Galician Sejm, while in 1867, there were 14 Ukrainians out of a total of 144 representatives. In 1879 there were only three Ukrainian and 57 Polish deputies in the Austrian Reichsrat. (Rudnytsky 1967:404;

Wandycz 1967:220) In 1895, Ukrainian representatives received only 17 seats in the Galician Sejm, while in 1898 they received only eight out of 78 seats garnered by Galician representatives in the Reichsrat. At the same time, members of the Polish Club received 64 seats, and members of the Polish opposition garnered six. (Polonsky 2010b:118–9) Discriminatory policies, aimed at undermining the power of Galicia’s Ukrainians, continued in the 20th century. Despite Austria-Hungary’s increasing democratization, which led to universal male suffrage, eastern Galicia’s Polish elites succeeded in securing discriminatory policies. The electoral changes created special voting parts of eastern Galicia where Poles were the minority. These two-mandate regions (*okręgi dwumandatowe*) were allowed two, rather than one, representatives—one for the majority and one for the minority (Grzybowski 1959:171). Unsurprisingly, such special voting rules were not established for areas where Ukrainians, rather than Poles, were the minority.

Ethnic tensions between Poles and Ukrainians increased during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Policies, which came at the cost of Ukrainian interests, were divisive and fueled ethnic tensions between Poles and the “culturally awakened” Ukrainians (Grzybowski 1959:75). While all of Galicia was concerned with the Ukrainian question and what it would mean for the region, it was eastern Galicia—the region which continued to be ruled by the politically, economically and culturally dominant Polish minority and where that minority continued to politically marginalize and culturally repress the Ukrainian majority—where tensions grew. Moreover, it was eastern Galician Polish elites that were unwilling to forge compromises with Ukrainian representatives. Their western counterparts, caught between eastern Polish elites and Ukrainian masses, tended to side with the former throughout the 19th century. This, however, changed with in the 20th century. The introduction of mass politics highlighted the difference in interests and fears of eastern and western elites, and caused them to come to a head. It was in the early 20th century that western elites gave up their elite, class and ethnic based alliance with the eastern Galician Podolacy. In the 20th century the continuation of this alliance would have require sacrificing its class-based orientation and for an entirely ethnic one. Instead, western conservatives forged an ethnically inclusionary alliance with Galicia’s Ukrainian and Jewish minorities despite the protests of the Podolacy and nationalist middle classes. I discuss this further in the last section of this chapter.

Peasants

By the end of the 19th century, about 61% of Galicia’s land was owned by peasants. However, most peasant-owned plots were small, ranging from about 2.5 to 12 acres. As previously discussed, the uneconomical, and constantly decreasing, size of Galician peasants’ plots, overpopulation and low productivity contributed to Galicia’s economic backwardness. (Stauter-Halsted 2001:22–4; Wandycz 1974:223–4) Thus, despite having been emancipated from feudal obligations comparatively early on in the 19th century (1848, as opposed to 1864 in Congress Poland) there were very few wealthy peasants in Galicia by the start of the 20th century. In 1902, only one out of 100 of Galicia’s peasants was wealthy. In some regions of Galicia, over 90% of peasant-owned plots were dwarf holdings. Moreover, those who were considered wealthy were not that distinguishable from poorer peasants. As such, Galicia did not see the same levels of polarization between poor and wealthy peasants that existed elsewhere. This does not mean that there was no stratification within Galicia’s peasantry. The sons of wealthier peasants were more likely to be upwardly mobile, as they were more likely than their poorer counterparts to pursue higher education at seminaries or universities. (Kieniewicz 1969b:212–3)

Emergence of Rural civil and political society

Rural Political Society

Like Congress Poland, Galicia experience growth in rural organization and mobilization over the course of the 19th century. The mobilization of Galicia's peasants, like that of Congress Poland's, was at first fostered by members or descendants of traditional elites, particularly the clergy and members of the surviving or *déclassé* gentry. Yet there were significant differences in the way that peasant movements developed in Galicia, particularly in Kraków, and in Congress Poland. In the second half of the 19th century, Poles in Congress Poland were increasingly excluded from political participation and real political power. Even the state's brief attempts to include peasants in political participation were quickly ended once the former realized that allowing peasants to choose local political figures could lead to undesirable—according to Russian officials—results. Moreover, the lack of peasant incentives to self-organize in Congress Poland, for instance for political participation, was paired with elites' incentives to organize social support for their struggle with the exclusive Tsarist state (Chapter II). Unlike in Congress Poland, Galicia's peasants increasingly participated in political institutions. First, participation in and involvement with political institutions fostered the emergence of rural movements led by *peasants*. Second, Galicia's elites' lacked the impetus of their counterparts in Congress Poland to organize rural mobilization, thus giving Galician peasants more freedom—and necessity—to self-organize.

The inclusion of peasants in political institutions provided them with an incentive for self-mobilization and self-organization. Participation with and within political institutions helped foster the emergence of rural movements led by peasants and focused on pursuing peasants' interests. The Austrian Commune Law of 1866 established self-administration of villages. In addition to encouraging peasants to take part in local political institutions, the state took steps to further ensure that peasants would fill local leadership roles by prohibiting members of the gentry, government officials, clergy and teachers from holding local rural offices. (Stauter-Halsted 2001:76, 80) Thus the creation of rural administration allowed for, and even more so, necessitated the participation of peasants in local level governance. In addition to participating in rural government, peasants could elect representatives to Galicia's regional diet and the national state council after 1861. The former had input on local affairs, such as education, agricultural development. Both Polish and Ukrainian peasants also had representatives in the Galician Sejm, though their seats were often state-sponsored. The robust, though mostly local, practice of political participation by Galicia's peasants led to the founding of a peasant party in Galicia before the end of the 19th century (1895). Galicia's peasant-oriented parties were among the first non-traditional elite political movements to emerge (Polonsky 2010b:132-3).

After 1867, Galicia's elites had no real incentive to mobilize peasants outside of political institutions and against the state. Rather, they focused on trying to retain their political dominance by supporting political, mostly class-based, discrimination that devalued peasants' voices vis-à-vis those of elites. Landed elites, particularly those in eastern Galicia, retained their land and involvement in political institutions (Wandycz 1974:226). Thus Galicia's landed elites focused on trying to retain their political, and economic, dominance by supporting discrimination that devalued peasants' political voices vis-à-vis those of elites. For instance, landed elites safeguarded their political privileges by supporting limitations on peasant representation in the Reichsrat. They supported the continuation of voting curiae—a system of stratified electoral votes, with the wealthiest and least populous social groups, such as landed elites, having much fewer votes per delegate. For instance, peasants made up about four fifths of the population. Yet they received only half, 74, of the Sejm's 150 seats. (Kieniewicz 1969b:206) In addition to reducing peasants' electoral power, political rules

were often leveraged to undermine the political choices of peasants. Whereas peasants frequently chose deputies based on their support for their knowledge, skills, opinions or sentiments, representatives of upper classes would disqualify peasants' chosen representatives based on legal standards imposed on potential deputies, such as regulations about landownership. (Stauter-Halsted 2001:69–72)

The conservative elite's attempts to retain economic and political privileges by obstructing and limiting peasants' participation in regional and national political institutions was temporarily successful. However, it was also shortsighted. On the one hand, peasants were nearly excluded from regional and national institutions for over a decade. There was no peasant presence in the Galician Sejm from 1877 until 1889. Similarly, peasant representation radically decreased in the Reichsrat. There were 33 Galician peasant representatives in 1848. In 1873, only two Galician smallholders were elected, while in 1873 and 1886 there was only one Galician peasant in the Reichsrat. (Grzybowski 1959:75; Stauter-Halsted 2001:80) On the other hand, the marginalization of peasants did not undermine their self-organization. Rather, it fostered the development of a rural based civil society that eventually provided important organizational support to peasant political parties (Stauter-Halsted 2001:76).

The marginalization of peasant deputies in parliament led to an inward political turn of peasants. Rather than continuing to struggle for a voice in regional and national institutions, peasant leaders turned to the village. The inclusion by the Austrian state of peasants in local level politics, and their initial marginalization by local elites in regional and national institutions spurred the development of a true, peasant-led and peasant-oriented rural public sphere in Galicia. The inward turn of rural politics provided villagers with the opportunity to learn how to engage with political institutions in Austria. Within this decade (1877-1889) of regional and national marginalization, villagers learned how to use written law to hold their representatives accountable and to replace those who were not. To discipline local officials, villagers utilized civil and political institutions to demand accountability from their representatives. For instance, they appealed to district offices to appear to higher, district-level offices or courts to put pressure on incontinent local ones, and used newspapers to critique and demand compliance from and to apply pressure on representatives. (Stauter-Halsted 2001:78–92)

Rural Civil Society

In addition to growing peasant political participation, various village-based associations emerged in the Galician countryside in and after the 1870s, corresponding to an associational boom in the 1870s in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Hoffmann 2006:50, 63).⁹¹ These included coalitions based on peasants' economic mutual interests, such as cooperatives and credit associations, and social and cultural associations, such as reading clubs. In 1881, there were only 11 agricultural associations reported in Galicia. These increased to 492 by 1890, and by 1895 there were already over a thousand agricultural associations in Galicia (See Tables 5a and 5b in the Appendix III). The growth in agricultural cooperatives was particularly rapid in the 1890s. This growth was not driven by population increases, as the population of Galicia grew by a mere 4.4%, going from 6.6 million in 1890 to 6.89 in 1896

⁹¹ The associational boom took place after the 1867 law regarding the foundation of associations was relaxed. The new law did allow the state to prohibit the foundation of associations, which would be seen as endangering the state. In reality, this was mostly only applied to overtly political associations, and even this prohibition relaxed with time (Hoffmann 2006:50), as can be seen from the presence of political organizations and parties on the Galician associational registry already in the 1880s. *TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv*: Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg. 18258, 18259.

(Table 4 in Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki 1915:5–6). Rather, the rapid increase in the number of cooperatives in the 1890s was representative of general associational growth in late 19th century Galicia (Tables 5, 6a-d, Appendix III). Credit cooperatives, where farmers were by far the largest member group (Table 6d, Appendix III), also saw significant growth in the last decade of the 19th century. While there were approximately 213 active credit associations in 1890, there were approximately 366 active credit associations just five years later (Table 6c, Appendix III), amounting to an increase of 72%, well above the approximate population increase. The number of reading associations, many of which were located in villages and small towns, similarly grew by 72% from 1890 to 1895, with Polish reading association seeing the most growth (96%), the number of Ruthenian reading associations increased by 70% and the number of reading associations with no ethnic affiliation or a clear multi-ethnic base only increased by 33%, going from a 18 to 24 (Table 6a). The general associational landscape in Galicia saw an approximate growth of 60% from 1890 to 1895 (Tables 5a and 5b, Appendix III), which, far outpaced the region’s population growth of over the same period.

Tables 7a and 7b list the types of associations registered in the Galician Associational Registry in villages and towns in the lands of the former Republic of Kraków. The tables also list the ethnic or religious affiliation implied in associations’ names. All associations were listed as officially registered after 1866.

	Austrian	Jewish	None	Other	Polish and Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	145	-	-	-	145
Cultural	-	-	11	-	-	1	12
Economic	-	-	18	-	-	-	18
Educational	-	-	9	-	-	-	9
Interest	-	-	6	-	-	-	6
Mutual Aid	-	-	7	-	-	-	7
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Philanthropic	-	2	2	-	2	-	6
Political	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Professional	2	-	20	-	16	-	38
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
Recreational	-	-	16	1	3	-	20
Religious	-	3	-	-	3	-	6
Service	-	-	21	-	-	-	21
Sport	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Sport/Nationalist	-	-	27	-	16	1	44
Total	2	5	286	1	41	2	337

Table 7a. Associations, by Type and Ethnic or Religious Affiliation, in Villages and Towns in the Kraków and Chrzanów Provinces (the former Republic of Kraków).

Notes: Data from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146: Nr: 25: Syg: 18258, 1825

	Austrian	Jewish	None	Other	Polish or Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	43.0	-	-	-	43.0
Cultural	-	-	3.3	-	-	0.3	3.6
Economic	-	-	5.3	-	-	-	5.3
Educational	-	-	2.7	-	-	-	2.7
Interest	-	-	1.8	-	-	-	1.8
Mutual Aid	-	-	2.1	-	-	-	2.1
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.3
Philanthropic	-	0.6	0.6	-	0.6	-	1.8
Political	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.3
Professional	0.6	-	5.9	-	4.8	-	11.3
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	0.6
Recreational	-	-	4.7	0.3	0.9	-	5.9
Religious	-	0.9	-	-	0.9	-	1.8
Service	-	-	6.2	-	-	-	6.2
Sport	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.3
Sport/Nationalist	-	-	8.0	-	4.7	0.3	13.1
Total	0.6	1.5	84.9	0.3	12.1	0.6	100

Table 7b. Percent of Associations by Type and Ethnic or Religious Affiliation in Villages and Towns in the Kraków and Chrzanów Provinces.

Notes: Data from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146; Nr. 25; Syg: 18258, 18259.

In 1895, agricultural cooperatives accounted for only 23.9% for all associations recorded in Galicia (Rutowski 1887:136). Out of all associations registered in the lands of the former Republic of Kraków in the Galician Associational Registry, agricultural cooperatives amounted to an even smaller associational proportion, accounting for only 11.1% of all registered organizations (Table 4a, Appendix III). At the same time, agricultural cooperatives were a cornerstone of rural civil society. Of the 1514 organizations registered in the Provinces of Kraków and Chrzanów, 337 (22.3%) were outside of the five main cities of Kraków, Chrzanów, Jaworzno (declared a city in 1901), Nowa Góra and Trzebina (Bałaban 2013:597). Of these, 43% were agricultural circles. In addition to being ubiquitous, agricultural circles played an important part in promoting not only technical agricultural advances, but they also promoted entrepreneurship, leadership and local interest in politics (Stauter-Halsted 2001:131, 136–7). A distant second in their rural prevalence were sports associations, mostly the nationalist leaning Association “Sokół.” Such sports associations accounted for 13.1% of associations registered outside of the five major cities in the provinces of Kraków and Chrzanów.

Agricultural associations were central to rural civil society in both western and eastern Galicia. However, there were important differences between the association landscapes in each region. There were 656 associations registered in the eastern Galician province of Lviv, outside of the city of Lviv. The breakdown by type and ethnic or religious affiliation of these associations is found in Tables 8a and 8b

	Catholic	German	Jewish	None	Other	Polish	Ukrainian or Greco Orthodox	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	106	-	-	75	181
Cultural	1	-	1	37	-	2	139	180
Economic	-	-	-	31	1	-	1	33
Educational	-	1	-	9	-	-	-	10
Interest	-	2	-	2	-	-	1	5
Interest/Economic	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
Nationalist	-	-	4	-	-	-	2	6
Philanthropy	-	-	17	1	-	-	-	18
Political	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Professional	-	-	-	11	-	-	5	16
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
Recreational	-	7	-	13	1	-	-	21
Religious	5	-	8	-	-	-	1	14
Service	-	-	-	44	-	-	6	50
Sport	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	23	-	20	63	106
Student	-	-	-	5	-	-	1	6
Youth	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	6	10	31	290	2	23	294	656

Table 8a. Associations, by Type and Ethnic or Religious Affiliation, in Villages and Towns in Lviv Province.

Notes: Data compiled from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg: 18258, 18259.

	Catholic	German	Jewish	None	Other	Polish	Ukrainian or Greco Orthodox	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	16.2	-	-	11.4	27.6
Cultural	0.2	-	0.2	5.6	-	0.3	21.2	27.4
Economic	-	-	-	4.7	0.2	-	0.2	5.0
Educational	-	0.2	-	1.4	-	-	-	1.5
Interest	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	0.2	0.8
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.2
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.5
Nationalist	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	0.3	0.9
Philanthropy	-	-	2.6	0.2	-	-	-	2.7
Political	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.2
Professional	-	-	-	1.7	-	-	0.8	2.4
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.5
Recreational	-	1.1	-	2.0	0.2	-	-	3.2
Religious	0.8	-	1.2	-	-	-	0.2	2.1
Service	-	-	-	6.7	-	-	0.9	7.6
Sport	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.2
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	3.5	-	3.0	9.6	16.2
Student	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	0.2	0.9
Youth	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.2
Total	0.9	1.5	4.7	44.2	0.3	3.5	44.9	100

Table 8b. Percent of Associations by Type and Ethnic or Religious Affiliation, in Villages and Towns in Lviv Province.

Notes: Data from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg: 18258, 18259.

As in the western Galician provinces of Kraków and Chrzanów, agricultural associations were the most common type of organizations registered outside of the city of Lviv. However, they made up a much smaller percentage in the eastern province, accounting for only 27.6% of associations. A very close second were cultural associations, the bulk of which (77%) were Ukrainian. Despite only being the third most common associational type in Lviv province, sports associations with paramilitary (the Ukrainian “Sicz”) and nationalist tendencies (the Ukrainian version of “Sokół”—“Sokil”) accounted for a larger proportion of rural associations in Lviv (16.2%) than in Kraków and Chrzanów (13.1%). In addition to such sports nationalist organizations, associations that, prior to WWI, were frequently used to promote the development of a repressed culture, often further politicizing culture and promoting nationalist aims largely presented themselves as culture and education promoting associations. Cultural, educational, nationalist and sport/nationalist associations accounted for 46% of the associational landscape of the latter, and only 19.7% of the associational landscape of the former.⁹² Thus, in comparison to the rural associational landscape of the eastern provinces featured in Tables 7a and 7b, the rural associational landscape of the western province had a significantly lower proportion of associations with cultural-nationalist aims. In this respect, the rural eastern Galician associational landscape was more similar to that of the Warszawa Governorate in Congress Poland (Chapter II).

The difference between western and eastern Galicia on the one hand, and the similarities between eastern Galicia and Congress Poland on the other hand are neither surprising nor do they dispute the hypotheses posed in this study. Rather, they support the assertion that (1) political inclusion or exclusion of local elites and (2) cultural repression or toleration of local masses, rather than the level of economic development, steer the character of civil society. The political inclusion of local (and ethnic majority) elites and the cultural autonomy of the local masses (Poles) in western Galicia allowed for the development of a less politicized and less ethnically-fragmented civil society in western Galicia, including its countryside. The political inclusion of local (minority, Polish) elites, the marginalization of local (majority, Ukrainian) leaders, and the cultural repression of the (Ukrainian) masses in western Galicia led to a civil society that was more politicized and dominated by excluded majority elites. Landed elites in eastern Galicia, even ones with Ukrainian roots, tended to identify with Polish rather than Ruthenian (Ukrainian) culture. It was the politically marginalized cultural elites—the Ukrainian intelligentsia—who became the bearers of the revival of Ukrainian culture, the proponents of nationalism and who played a crucial part in the emergence of Ukrainian, urban and rural, associations (Magocsi 2002:53-8). Thus, Lviv’s rural countryside was dominated by cultural and sports associations with nationalistic leanings. These, just like the cultural, educational and nationalist youth and sports associations in Congress Poland aimed to politicize culture and, through this common goal, mobilize the masses in support of their ethno-cultural nationalism.

Rural Leadership

Like in other regions of the partitioned Commonwealth, elites, particularly urban intellectuals and members of the clergy, played an important role in the development of Galicia’s rural civil society (Stauter-Halsted 2001:115, 117). However, their relationship to the countryside and to peasants was different from that of Congress Poland. As the land

⁹² In comparison, 30% of legal associational landscape of the Warszawa Governorate was considered to have been “politicized.” Outside of the city of Warszawa, simply counting school and cultural associations already puts the estimate at 48.5% (146 out 301 organizations). Schools founded by *Polska Macierz Szkolna* alone account for 32% of associations registered in the Warszawa Governorate outside of the city of Warszawa. My calculations, based on data from AP Warszawa, WGUSS, C. 1155: Syg. 1212.

rights of Galicia's landed elites were not being undermined by the state, it was the peasantry and not the imperial, in this case Austrian, state that was the main antagonist of elites' economic interests. In addition to having opposing economic interests, most of Galicia's landed elites also harbored a patriarchal (Wandycz 1974:226) and untrusting attitude towards peasants. For these reasons, some of Galicia's elites, like their counterparts in Congress Poland, feared and thus attempted to prevent the self-organization of peasants. Yet unlike in Congress Poland, their efforts were generally unsuccessful. Nonetheless, though they focused on preventing peasant organization and participation in regional and national political institutions (Wandycz 1974:226), landed and cultural elites made some attempts to control the countryside. An example of traditional elites' attempts to control rural association and prevent the self-organization of Galician farmers can be found in the history of the Agricultural Circle Society (*Towarzystwo Kółka Rolniczego*, TKR), the largest and most influential network of cooperatives in Galicia.

The history of the Agricultural Circle Society's leadership was wrought with intra-elite competition as well as elite competition with peasant leaders. The TKR was officially established in 1882, yet its beginnings reach back to 1877 (Stauter-Halsted 2001:117). The reach and membership of the TKR rapidly increased in the late 19th century, as the organization quickly gained new circles and members.⁹³ The TKR developed out of the initiative of a member of the traditional—church—elite. Father Stojałowski was a Catholic priest born to a tenant farmer from a mid-level gentry background (Feldman 1907:237). Stojałowski was not a radical. He did not aim to upset the social hierarchy of the region. However, he championed a decentralized approach to organizing the TKR, one meant to encourage the self-organization of peasants. Neither conservatives nor urban liberal intellectuals supported such a populist agenda, “fearing” that the self-organization of peasants would harbor “asocial” tendencies in the countryside rather than tendencies that would be good for the “nation.” To protest Stojałowski's peasant-oriented approach, landed elites took control of the TKR's top leadership positions, sent the police to harass peasant meetings, and launched a “slander campaign” against Stojałowski. In response, Stojałowski became even more critical of the Polish nobility. By 1887 he was organizing peasants to vote, and when doing so, to only support peasant representatives. (Kieniewicz 1969b:208–9)

In his approach and views of the peasantry, Stojałowski was an exception to traditional elites, including the clergy. The majority of clerics, despite their own often peasant background, were strictly loyal to the church. Moreover, they utilized their influence among Galicia's peasants to keep them under their control and in line with the political interests of the Church. An example of this can be found in the diaries of a farmer, who was also the local village mayor (*wójt*) in the Tarnobrzeg district (*powiat*) in western Galicia. In his diaries, he noted how a local priest wanted to repair the buildings of his parish and to change its administrative assignment. The *wójt* attempted to reconcile the desires of the priest and of the local municipality. Yet, according to his diaries, he was unable to do so. When he did not “fall in line with the priests' wishes” (“nie szedłem [jemu] na rękę”), the priest tried to pressure the mayor by “shaming him from the pulpit, harassing him, and dragging him through multiple courts” (“byłem przez niego z ambony hańbiony, prześladowany, po sądach

⁹³ The TKR had only 36 circles in 1882 and 1,034 members. By 1890, there were 607 circles with 23,203 members, and a yearly increase of 121 circles and 4,005 members. In 1900 there were 529 circles with 26,117 members and a yearly increase of 194 circles and 8179 members, while in 1910 there were 1536 circles with 65,815 members and a yearly increase of 66 circles and 3,612 members. The yearly increases varied from 6 to 219 new circles per year from 1882 to 1914, and 554 to 11,023 new members in a year. In 1914, there were 2,081 TKR circles with about 82,000 members, and a yearly increase of 219 circles and 3,000 members. (Gurnicz 1967:78–80)

włóczyony”) (Anon 1937:227–8).⁹⁴ Even Stojałowski, who had championed the *peasants’* cause, eventually gave in to pressure from the Catholic Church and abandoned the radical beliefs that he had once preached (Gurnicz 1967:102). However, his initial sparking of the rural movement allowed it to grow despite the dearth of traditional elites, including clergy, willing to back it.

In 1882, the TKR merged with the Galician Farmers Society as landed elites attempted to centralize the leadership of the TKR’s numerous and widespread agricultural circles and to bring them under elite leadership. Furthermore, they instituted changes to decrease and discourage peasant participation. For instance, in 1885, they phased out the requirement—and ability—of all local circles to send one elected delegate with voting rights to the organization’s annual general assembly. Thus, they slowly pushed out peasants from the organization’s *regional* leadership. In 1886 only 60 of 200 delegates at the general assembly were peasants. (Stauter-Halsted 2001:132) Yet the spirit and practices of rural self-organization already had started to develop due to peasant participation in rural self-governance and in the burgeoning local rural civil society, as well as due to the absence of an elite—save for clergy—presence and influence in the countryside. Thus, despite the gentry’s attempts to reign in the TKR from peasant self-rule, local branches of the TKR continued to largely remain outside of the control of the increasingly centralized TKR hierarchy (Stauter-Halsted 2001: 132).

Urban intellectuals and traditional elites, save for members of the clergy (Gurnicz 1967:102), lacked the willingness to involve themselves in local rural activity (Gurnicz 1967:101). Unfettered by active local elites, peasant leadership in the local branches of the TKR continued to grow over the course of the last decades of the 19th century (Stauter-Halsted 2001:118–9). This can be seen in the yearly reports submitted by the circles. In 1889, 529 local TKR circles submitted such yearly reports. Of these, 49% local circles were led by peasants and 31% by clerics. Large landowner (*właściciele ziemscy*) presided only over 8% of local circles and held secretary positions in only 0.5% of these 529 local circles. Peasants were the vice-presidents in 80% of these agricultural circles. In 1908, 1340 local circles submitted yearly reports. Of these 56% had peasant presidents and 83% had peasant vice-presidents. The number of local circles where landowners held the position of presidents dropped to only .05%, while the number of circles with clerics at the helm decreased to under a quarter (24%). In 1911, 1641 circles submitted yearly reports. These reflected nearly identical leadership percentages, with slight changes. For instance, the number of circles led by clerics dropped to 22% and the number of circles led by teachers increased from 6% to 8%, mirroring the growing presence and influence of intellectual elites and the somewhat waning influence of clerics in the countryside (Gurnicz 1967:106–7; Stauter-Halsted 2001:123) Thus, despite being increasingly blocked from *regional* and *district* level participation in the TKR (Gurnicz 1967:105–8), peasants remained very active locally. These reports also demonstrate that, at least, local agricultural circles, which accounted for the clear majority of rural associations in western Galicia and for a substantial part of associations in eastern Galicia, were dominated neither by traditional elites nor the intelligentsia. The overwhelming presence of peasants at the helm of these organizations makes a strong case for the claim that rural civil society in western Galicia was far from being elite-dominated.

In response to the populist ideology and movement launched by Stojałowski, Polish elites renewed their efforts to gain control of the TKR. Yet rather than increasing their control over local branches of the TKR by increasing their control of its regional-level positions, their efforts led to a decline in the registration of new circles and to old local

⁹⁴ My paraphrasing and translation.

circles increasingly losing touch with central administration. In other words, while they may have been successful in dominating the top levels of the association, their play for control further decentralized the TKR, making local circles even more independent from the TKR's hierarchical structure. Moreover, local circles were expanding their local endeavors. An increasing number opened village stores in the 1880s. By the 1890s, there were more new local stores recorded than new circles. Furthermore, local circles became active in rural development. They implemented programs to improve the local economy, such as distributing seeds in times of failed harvests, and many provided scholarships to peasants pursuing education in handicrafts. (Kieniewicz 1969b:212; Stauter-Halsted 2001:132–3)

Galicia's agricultural circles were not only largely organized and led by peasants, but they helped peasants organize and mobilize to pursue their interests. In addition to increasingly gaining power within associational circles, peasant members often adapted local organizations to suit their needs and purposes. For instance, though TKR circles were mostly founded with the intent to educate peasants in new farming methods and to foster Polish culture, they were often transformed by their members into largely social organizations. Many were turned into centers for organizing recreational activities, such as choirs, amateur theater, fire departments, etc. (Gurnicz 1967:85–6; Kieniewicz 1969b:212; Stauter-Halsted 2001:128) Not only did local circles often adjust their function to the actual needs and wants of rural populations, but on some occasions, they did so in direct conflict with orders from the TKR's leadership. One circle, for instance, expanded its cooperative store for the express purpose of selling alcohol, an activity prohibited by the TKR (Stauter-Halsted 2001:129–30).

Peasants were generally excluded from positions of *regional* power in the pre-WWI TKR, with their participation being increasingly limited in the 1880s. However, the elites' strategy for blocking peasants from centralized positions of power was only temporarily successful. Peasants' influence in district and regional levels of the TKR began to grow in the early 20th century. In 1890, out of the 34 of the central leadership positions of the TKR, nine were held by clerics, eight by goods owners, seven by high level bureaucrats, three by professors, three by school advisors, one by an industrialist, one by a writer and two by individuals with "other" professions. In other words, in 1890, none of the TKR's main leadership positions were held by peasants. This began to change before the onset of WWI. From 1911-1914, out of the 42 central leadership positions in the TKR, 12 were held by higher bureaucrats, 11 by land owners, nine by clerics, six by *peasants*, three by professors and one by a member of another profession. (Gurnicz 1967:105)

The emergence of the TKR in Galicia was similar to that of the Central Agricultural Association that emerged under the Russian partition. Traditional (clergy, landlords) and cultural (intellectuals) elites played an important role in the initial emergence of both. Like in Congress Poland, the central organ and the administrative hierarchy of Galicia's TKR was ruled by land-owning aristocratic and cultural elites (Gurnicz 1967:105–6). Moreover, traditional elites in Galicia, like in Congress Poland, made some effort to prevent the self-organization of peasants. However, their efforts were considerably less successful in Galicia. Unlike that of its counterpart in Congress Poland, the history of the TKR in Galicia was marked by conflict between traditional—namely landed and church—elites, and by significant competition for leadership from peasants.⁹⁵ The latter emerged at first on the local, and with time, even on the regional level. Moreover, in comparison to Congress Poland, Galician Polish elites' efforts were tempered by a lack of immediacy to mobilize against an oppressive state. Rather, in the later decades of the 19th century, traditional, bourgeois and to some extent cultural Polish elites focused on excluding peasants from *regional* and *national*

⁹⁵ Significantly lower rates of leadership positions held by peasants in local agricultural circles in Congress Poland are noted in Chapter II.

political institutions. They were successful in doing so until the end of the 19th century. As seen in the history of the TKR, Galicia's elites applied the same strategy to civic associations, hoping to retain their privileges by focusing on blocking peasant ascension into district and regional level leadership positions.

Galicia, including its countryside, saw the development of a rural civil society in the 19th century, and its rapid growth at the turn of the 20th century. Both the state and local elites played an important part in fostering and allowing for the emergence of rural, peasant-led civil and political societies. Galicia's elites' played an important part in fostering the initial development of rural associations. At the same time, their focus on preventing peasants from rising to roles of leadership in regional and national civil societies gave peasants the room to gain experience in local leadership positions. They would subsequently use that experience to engage both in district and regional level civil society and to further their engagement in political society. In addition to traditional and cultural elites, the Austrian state played a crucial role in developing a rural peasant civil society and fostering peasant involvement in political institutions. By prohibiting elites from holding local rural administrative offices, the Austrian state both allowed and necessitated peasants to self-organize and to engage in political institutions.

The freedom and degree of self-determination that peasants experienced in local political institutions and in local level rural associations allowed them to develop a culture of local participation. The rural political and civil societies that developed in the 1870s and 1880s grew in political importance at the end of the 19th century. When peasant parties emerged in the 1890s they were able to create links between regional and national politics to the countryside through the rural civil societies that had developed in previous decades (Stauter-Halsted 2001:77). Rural organizations, like agricultural circles and rural newspapers became the cornerstones of rural political mobilization (Stauter-Halsted 2001:182–3). They were important local, decentralized centers for political mobilization by providing organizational scaffolding and networks for political movements to utilize. They also trained local, peasant in associational life, organization and civic engagement.

Ethnic relations in political and civil society

Political Alliances and Coalitions

Social alliances and coalitions were best seen in Congress Poland during periods of military mobilization. During these periods, leaders had to turn to the public sphere to both articulate concessions through which they aimed to win the alliances of other groups and to form networks and organizations through which they could mobilize their supporters. Periods of military mobilization—those that took place in Galicia and those fought in other regions of the partitioned Commonwealth—provide similarly important events which allow for an analysis of elites' and other social actors' interests, preferences and strategies in Habsburg-ruled Galicia. As such, Galicia's cross-group coalitions that were formed during each uprising prior to 1867 were utilized as points of focus for the analysis presented in the previous parts of this chapter. However, following the liberalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and the political inclusion of elites and non-elites in political institutions, elites' and other significant social groups' conflicts, interests and the coalitions and strategies they pursued could also clearly be seen in Austria's and Galicia's political institutions.

Prior to the end of the 19th century, the most significant political groups were the western, Kraków, conservatives, the eastern conservatives known as Podolacy, and the Democrats, who mainly represented the urban middle classes. The Kraków conservatives were generally the best organized, had ties to the Polish émigré leadership in France, and to

the popular newspaper *Czas* (Time). The Podolacy were composed of Polish landed elites in eastern Galicia, and were mainly concerned with protecting their political, social and economic power in the region. As the ethnic and economic minority, the retention of their privileges thus required them to pursue a policy of both class and ethnic interests and privileges. The latter materialized as a steadfast rejection of Ukrainian national appeals. The democrats were opposed to the absolutist monarchy. They also did not want a state built on autonomy of its various regions, which would simultaneously preserve feudal privileges and a hierarchy between the empire's various nationalities. Rather, they sought to forge a federalist state that would respect individual freedoms, treat all nationalities equally and reduce the political power of the clergy. Despite their differences, these three main Polish political groups cooperated within the Austrian Reichsrat as members of the Polish circle, pursuing their class-based, ethnic and regional interests. (Pajakowski 1995:22–3, 65–6)

The Polish Circle saw its economic and regional interests as best served by a strategy of loyalty to the Austrian state. While the Circle's loyalty to the Habsburg crown was generally unwavering, prior to 1907, Polish politicians pursued various cross-class and cross-ethnic alliances with representatives of other Galician groups both on the regional or national level. On the one hand, such coalitions tended to be short lived, often ending once representatives of subordinate groups realized that an alliance with Polish conservative elites would not usher in substantial change. On the other hand, *western* Polish elites' increasingly frequent attempts at forging cross-ethnic and cross-class coalitions after the 1870s signals a mounting willingness of at least some, mainly western Galician, Polish elites to forge cross-ethnic and cross-class alliances to pursue their political or economic interests. In other words, it showcases a claim supported by Polish historians that western Galicia's Polish elites, known as the Kraków conservatives, were, unlike their eastern Galician counterparts, more willing supporters of a slow liberalization—both along ethnic and class, lines.

In 1866, the Polish Circle found itself in negotiations about Galician autonomy. Polish elites sought to secure an absolute regional autonomy, whereby Galicia would be under the total control of a provincial assemble. German and Ukrainian representatives in the Reichsrat joined forces to reject this proposal. In response, Polish representatives sought a regional alliance with Ukrainians. They wanted to gain Ukrainian in exchange for guaranteeing to Ukrainians some linguistic rights in eastern Galicia. Following the 1876 election, the number of Ukrainian representatives in the Reichsrat fell from 28 to 11. With the decrease in Ukrainian political power in the Reichsrat came a decreased in the Polish Circle's need to seek further political reconciliation with Ukrainians on either a regional or national level. As such, relations between Polish and Ukrainian representatives further deteriorated. (Pajakowski 1995:28–32, 108, 120–1)

The 1890s once more saw an attempt at Polish-Ukrainian political cooperation. In 1890, the Polish Circle finally implemented a strategy “long-favored” by the Kraków Conservatives and feared by the eastern elites—Polish representatives agreed to support ten Ukrainian candidates in elections to the national council and to acknowledge “Ukrainian” as a separate and valid national identity. In exchange, Polish elites asked Galicia's Ukrainian representatives to support the political and geographic integrity of Galicia. (Pajakowski 1995:296–7) Yet with time, this alliance also faltered. Ukrainian representatives sought Polish support for national legislation to fund Ukrainian schools in Galicia; Poles, however, did not want to conceded questions relating to the regional autonomy of Galicia—including its autonomy over education institutions—to a national vote. Thus, they did not back their Ukrainian allies and instead insisted that the issue be brought to the Galician diet. In addition to not backing their educational demands, Ukrainians accused Polish representatives of blocking them from gaining access to committees and important national officials. Viewing

Poles as undermining rather than supporting their progress, Ukrainians abandoned the political alliance between them. (Pajakowski 1995:297–8)

The Polish Circle's repeated attempts at cross-ethnic alliances in the last decades of the 19th century demonstrate two things. First, Polish elites were not categorically opposed to forging cross-ethnic alliances, especially when such alliances appeared beneficial to them. Second, their pre-1907 continual domination of political, economic, and to some extent social-organizational power (through control over social institutions, such as schools and churches), weakened Polish elites' need to obtain and sustain such alliances. Yet the turn of the 20th century brought political and social transformations significantly transformed the political landscape. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries brought growing social mobilization and political inclusion of previously marginalized groups. The rise of populist movements, introduction of universal and equal suffrage and the possibility of war forced Polish elites to re-evaluate their interests and adapt their political strategies.

Threat of war: state vs. local elites' interests

Polish landed elites played a key role in buttressing the Habsburg Monarchy's imperial rule. In the 1860s, their loyalty was rewarded with Galicia's regional autonomy. The concessions to Polish landed elites came at the cost of marginalizing Galicia's second largest ethnic population—Ukrainians. In the Reichsrat, Ukrainians were often supported by the German Democrats, as both groups were united in their antagonism to the Polish elites and the monarchic state. However, Ukrainians generally received few concessions from the state. However, the 20th century brought the threat of war and the Austrian empire's renewed interest in the large Ukrainian minority. Facing the possibility of war and the need for the loyalty of its diverse ethnic populations, the Austrian state pressured Galician elites to make additional concessions to Ukrainians (Pajakowski 1995:339–340). It was under this pressure from the Austrian state that Galicia's Viceroy, Count Michał Bobrzyński, spearheaded electoral reforms, which increased the representation of previously marginalized groups, particularly Ukrainians, in the Galicia Diet (Pajakowski 1995:339–340). True to form, the western—Kraków—conservatives supported Bobrzyński's efforts while the eastern conservatives—Podolacy, whose political and local power would be directly diminished by increasing Ukrainian participation, opposed Bobrzyński. The former were joined in their efforts by the Populists, Social Democrats and Democrats, while the latter joined forces with the National Democrats. The Podolacy's and National Democrats offensive against Bobrzyński led to his resignation in 1913 (Pajakowski 1995:339–340).

Rise of populist movements and a changing political landscape

The rise of populist, socialist and minority-nationalist parties heralded the end of the Polish landed elite's uncontested political dominance. The 1897 election to the Austrian Reichsrat was a significant turning point for Galician politics. For the first time since 1878 some Polish delegates refused to join the elite-directed Polish circle. The Galician "opposition" consisted of Social Democrats (two representatives), Ukrainian radicals (three representatives) and Stojałowski's followers (six delegates) (Pajakowski 1995:302–3). The ascension of populist and socialist parties reflected and came about as a result of growing social mobilization and organization that had been building in Galicia throughout the second half of the 19th century. A second significant political turning point came after the 1907 elections, the first conducted after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. It was in 1907 that Polish conservatives lost their political hold over the Polish Circle in the Reichsrat. The National Right coalition won the majority of seats in the Austrian national assembly (Pajakowski 1995:338). The Galician populists also received considerable mandates: Polish

populists received 17 seats and Ukrainian Populists received 27 seats in the Reichsrat (Kieniewicz 1969b:216–8).

The changing political landscape eroded the Polish landed elites' hold on regional and national politics. The eastern Podolacy, who needed and depended on a double ethnic and class privilege (Grzybowski 1959:96), chose the only option that could in theory prolong their increasingly weakening hold—an alliance with the nationalist, ethnically-exclusionary National Democrats (Grzybowski 1959:96). The latter were the only Polish party to gain in popularity in *eastern* Galicia after 1907 (Grzybowski 1959:95). The National Democrat's agenda of ethnic exclusion and staunch opposition to leftist and socialist movements aligned their interests with those of the eastern Podolacy and Christian Populists (Ch-Lud). These three parties were particularly aligned in their mutual antagonism to the group they saw threatening their class and cultural dominance in Galicia: the Ukrainian, eastern Galician majority (Grzybowski 1959:96; Polonsky 2010b:142). In 1907, this National Right coalition, composed of the Podolacy, the National Democrats and Christian populists, took control of the Polish Club in the Reichsrat (Polonsky 2010b:142). However, the National Right did not control the Polish Club for long. In response to the victory of the National Right, the western conservatives, democrats, socialists, the Polish Peasant Party and most Jewish groups, save for Zionists, formed an alliance coming into the 1911 election. The cross-ethnic cooperationist block won a decisive victory against the Podolacy and the National Democrats (Polonsky 2010b:144–5). In the 1911, the National Democrats received only 7.5% of Galicia's cast votes, coming in third after the Polish Populist Party (PSL, 17.4%) and the Conservatives (10.3%) (Bureau Der K.K. Statistischen Zentralkommission 1912:140–1).

The majority of support for the National Democrats came from ethnically-tense and fragmented eastern Galicia. Despite it being overwhelmingly Polish, National Democrats received only 20.9% of urban votes and 8.1% of rural votes in western Galicia, the same amount as socialists (Grzybowski 1959:94). Though Ukrainian parties received the bulk of votes (65.3%) in the Ukrainian-dominated eastern Galicia, National Democrats received 20.9% of eastern Galicia's urban vote and 7.3% of its rural vote (Grzybowski 1959:94). Once more, Poles were the clear majority in western Galicia, and a small minority in eastern Galicia. As such, the National Democrats receiving the same amount of the total vote in both regions means that a disproportionately higher percentage of Polish votes supported the National Right in eastern in comparison to western Galicia. This variation underscores the importance of ethnic tensions and nationalist ideals for eastern Galicia as opposed to western Galicia. The same conclusion—that National Democrats received the bulk of their support in eastern rather than western Galicia—can be seen through a comparison of votes cast for the National Democrats in the 1911 elections in Lviv and in Kraków. In the former, ND representatives received 6,616 votes, while in the later they received no votes (Bureau Der K.K. Statistischen Zentralkommission 1912:119).

The transformation of the political landscape presented western conservatives with new parties and options for trying to remain politically relevant (Shedel 1984:39). To secure their political relevance, western Galicia's conservatives sided with Galicia's bourgeois-liberal democrats against their common political foes—the National Democrats on the one hand and the Socialists on the other (Grzybowski 1959:95). The alliance between western conservatives and Galicia's bourgeois liberal democrats was rooted in shared political, class-based, interests. Both groups had, historically, supported the exclusion of other social groups, such as workers and peasants, from political participation as a means of sustaining the importance of their own votes. Faced with the rising popularity of National Democrats, particularly among Polish peasants and Poles in eastern Galicia, and with the antagonistic stance that the National Democrats took towards the Habsburg-loyalist aristocracy, western

conservatives also saw the relatively conservative Populists as potentially useful allies. The political leaders of the Populists were, as previously discussed, largely composed of wealthier, landowning peasants. Once they came into a position of significant political power, they sought to compromise and cooperate with conservative traditional elites to support their economic interests. For instance, neither the conservatives nor the leaders of the Populists wanted land reforms that would distribute land into the hands of poor peasants. Rather, the latter wanted the better-off peasants, such as themselves, to be able to buy gentry-owned land (Kieniewicz 1969b:216–8; Polonsky 2010b:142). Thus, the populists joined forces with western Galician conservatives and bourgeois-liberal democrats to undermine the National Democrats and drive out the Nationalist chairmen from the Polish Club (Kieniewicz 1969b:216–8).⁹⁶

In 1908, a Ukrainian student assassinated the then governor of Galicia, Andrzej Potocki. Potocki was replaced by Michał Bobrzyński, a historian with ties to the Kraków conservatives. Bobrzyński's appointment carried with it high hopes that the historian could resolve Galicia's Ukrainian question. The Kraków conservatives, liberal Democrats and the socialists (PPSD) supported Bobrzyński's efforts to broker a compromise with Galicia's Ukrainian representatives. The Podolacy and the National Democrats opposed such a compromise (Polonsky 2010b:143). To pacify rising Ukrainian nationalism, Bobrzyński's proposed a number of concessions to Galicia's Ukrainian representatives. These included the creation of a Ukrainian University, raising the level of Ukrainian representation in provincial bureaucratic posts, and implementing further democratic electoral reforms (Polonsky 2010b:144). With respect to the Jewish minority, he wanted to strengthen Jewish groups that supported Polish-Jewish cooperation, namely assimilationists and Jewish Orthodox leaders. By abolishing requirements for the secular certification of rabbis, Bobrzyński successfully mustered Orthodox support, and with it greater Jewish support in Galicia (Polonsky 2010b:145). In 1913, he also proposed electoral reforms that were acceptable to most Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian representatives (Polonsky 2010b:145). Despite having cross-ethnic support for his reforms, Bobrzyński resigned from his post under the pressure of Galicia's Catholic Bishops. Though his successor, Witold Korytowski, faced similar opposition from the Church and the eastern Nationalist coalition, he was able to finally pass these reform with the help of the Austrian state (Polonsky 2010b:145).

Thus, before the outbreak of World War I, Galicia's politics had significant similarities and differences to the political landscape in Congress Poland. On the one hand, Galicia saw the rise of a Catholic-Nationalist coalition that promoted ethnically chauvinistic slogans. The coalition of the National Right drew its support from eastern Galician Polish landed elites, from some urban populations in western and much of the urban Polish populations in eastern Poland, and from some peasants in both halves of the region. The strong support for Polish nationalism in eastern Galicia came as no surprise, as the region was characterized by a historical oppression of the mostly Ukrainian peasant masses by mostly Polish (and Polish assimilated) landed elites. In the political marginalization and cultural repression of eastern Galicia's masses the region resembled more Congress Poland than it did western Galicia. On the other hand, despite the growing popularity of

⁹⁶ The Populists' alliance with the conservatives highlighted a significant divergence in economic interests that existed in rural Galicia and led the party to fragment. Wincenty Witos, a populist leader from a well-to-do rural background became the leader of the new, moderate-right PSL-Piast. The latter was ready and willing to cooperate with middle-class urban interests, including the anti-Ukrainian National Democrats and the anti-Semitic clerical parties (Wandycz 1974:327). Stapiński, a peasant of humble origins, became the leader of the PSL-Left and of Galicia's poor peasant masses. The latter was willing and would cooperate with the Socialists. (Kieniewicz 1969b:219–20)

nationalism—Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian, politics in Galicia unfolded on a path distinct from the political trajectory of Congress Poland. The political, economic and social power of conservative elites in western Galicia, unlike their eastern counterparts, did not depend on an ethnic privilege. As the majority of peasants and elites in western Galicia were Polish, the region lacked an ethnic division of labor. As the western elites' privileges were entirely class-based they could better preserve it through cross-ethnic, class-based coalitions and political concessions that would slowly incorporate previously marginalized groups. Thus, unlike Congress Poland, landed, conservative and cultural elites in western Galicia forged cross-ethnic alliances to that would further their economic interests while preserving some of their political power.

Whether the cross-ethnic coalitions, led by western Galicia's conservative traditional and urban (the liberal Democrats) elites, could have led to a slow, class-based democratization of the region is unknown. On the one hand, previous attempts at cross-ethnic political coalition, particularly between Polish conservatives and Ukrainians, ended due to the former's paternalistic approach and resistance to change. On the other hand, the mere fact that the western conservative elites and marginalized groups repeatedly forged cross-ethnic alliances, that all groups were willing to compromise, and that all sought to do so within the established institutions of the state highlights, if nothing else, the different positions in which Congress Poland and western Galicia found themselves before WWI. While the former had been taken over by nationalist and ethnically chauvinist politics, the latter saw the emergence and domination of cross-ethnic—Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian—coalitions formed, at least in part, against the emergence of Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalism.

Ethnic Relations in Civil Society

Growing political cooperation between Galicia's Jews and Polish elites was mirrored in public discourse. There were two main newspapers in 19th century Kraków: the liberal *Kraj* (Country) and the nationalistic *Czas* (Time). Distinction in the discussion of the city's Jews, and their place as part of Polish society, was evident in the papers. The former generally supported and the latter generally attacked Kraków's Jewish community. For instance, while *Kraj* harshly critiqued the assault of a Jewish man that took place during a religious procession in 1870, *Czas* did not mention the incident, condoning it with its silence. However, after the 1870s saw increasing Polish-Jewish political alliances in the national assembly, *Czas*' attacks on Galicia's Jews became less frequent. (Żbikowski 1995:269–274) According to Kraków's socialists and democrats, the tapering in *Czas*' harsh treatment of Jews was "forced by the awareness of the inevitability of a political-electoral alliance with at least a subset of Jewish society" (Żbikowski 1995:285).

Growing cooperation and interaction between Galicia's Jews and Poles in western Galicia and increasing tensions between Poles and Ukrainians in eastern Galicia were also visible in the associational landscape, particularly in Polish patriotic mobilization and assimilation. As had occurred in both pre-1864 uprisings in Congress Poland, and in the 1846 Kraków uprising, Jewish-Polish patriotic mobilization could be seen in pre-WWI Galicia. Yet unlike in previous instances, patriotic military organization in Galicia did not organize against the ruling state—Austria—but rather, organized for the Austrian state, and for what a war could mean for the Polish desires of independent statehood. In 1908, Józef Piłsudski, the man who would become Poland's interwar dictator, began to organize, with permission from the Austrian state, A Union of Active Struggle (*Związek Walki Czynnej*) (Wandycz 1974:328). Despite the failure of the numerous military campaigns fought in the name of Polish independence, Piłsudski was convinced that when war between the partitioning powers broke out, a strong Polish military, fighting on the side of Austria, would be crucial

for reinstating an independent Polish state (Wandycz 1974:328). By 1914, Piłsudski's association, which came to be known as the Polish Legionaries, had as many as 7,000 members; of these, many were young Jews "attracted by Piłsudski's charisma and his brand of Polish revolutionary patriotism" (Polonsky 2010b:144). Thus, while Polish-Jewish patriotic cooperation was waning in Congress Poland since 1863, in Galicia it was on the rise.

In the early and mid-19th century most of the recorded cross-ethnic Polish and Jewish interaction and cooperation that took place, whether in Congress Poland or in Galicia, did so for patriotic military mobilization, such as in the case of Piłsudski's Legionaries. However, as the associational landscape expanded over the second half of the 19th century, increasing cross-ethnic interaction and cooperation could be seen in various social—recreational, philanthropic and professional movements and organizations. Demel (1958) notes that after the 1863 January Uprising in Congress Poland, Polish and Jewish relations improved in Kraków, leading some activists to institutionalize the improvement in cross-ethnic relations. Aurel Borucki, for instance, sought out to create a multiethnic artisanal association (Demel 1958:518). The largest cultural-educational association in Galicia, the Folk School Association (*Towarzystwo Szkoły Ludowej*, TSL) was multiethnic in its membership and leadership. Despite being a Polish association meant to promote Polish education and culture in Galicia, the TSL did not have discriminatory rules about who could and could not join the association. As such, it was implicitly ethnically inclusive.⁹⁷ In addition to being implicitly cross-ethnic, notes from the association's meetings⁹⁸ as well as the organization's yearly reports⁹⁹ show that (1) the general membership of the association was certainly multiethnic (with Polish and Jewish members) and to some extent cross-class. While the TSL certainly had, alongside its large intelligentsia membership, members who were farmers, speakers at a conference pointed to a general absence of workers and peasants in the association.

Documents left behind by other 19th century organizations also show that, at least within some associations, there was a general movement towards cross-ethnic inclusivity. The statute of the Polish Philatelic Circle (*Kółko Filatelistów Polskich*, KFP), did not have any religious or ethnic restrictions on its members, but also clearly was against any political or religious tendencies being brought into the association itself. In other words, the association rejected being used as a platform for political or religious movements. Furthermore, the association altered its name, changing it from the Polish Philatelic Circle to Philatelists' Club (*Klub Filatelistów*), a move that reflected its desire to distance itself from nationalist ideals that its previous name might have erroneously given to non-members.¹⁰⁰

Another movement towards greater ethnic integration could be seen within Kraków's Guild of Painters (*Cech malarzy i lakierników w Krakowie*, CMLK). A book listing the Painter Masters from 1844-1901, shows 44 names, most of which were most likely Polish. Yet among a few potentially names only one had a Jewish first name. Thus, as it is more likely that members were Poles rather than Jews, it cannot be assumed that there was more than one Jewish master listed in the book.¹⁰¹ A second list of Kraków's painter masters that is dated 1907, includes 95 names with multiple listings of Jewish individuals (denoted by a Jewish first name: e.g. Abraham, Izaak, etc.).¹⁰² A membership book for the Association of

⁹⁷ AP Kraków, Wydział 3, ul. Sienna, TSL 1: Odezwa o powstaniu 1892, TSL 6: Statut 1922.

⁹⁸ AP Kraków, Wydział 3, ul. Sienna, TSL 42: Protokół Walnego Zjazdu TSL w Tarnowie w dniach 28 i 29 września 1913; and TSL 39: Protokoły z walnych zjazdów 1903-1922, p. 512, 521-543.

⁹⁹ AP Kraków, Wydział 3, ul. Sienna, TSL 31: Sprawozdanie 1913.

¹⁰⁰ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv, Syg. 556: Col: 146: nr. 25; Kółko Filatelistów Polskich, 1901-1913.

¹⁰¹ AP Kraków, ul. Sienna, Syg. 2 (AD 999): Księga majstrów malarskich 1844—1901

¹⁰² AP Kraków, ul. Sienna, Syg. 3 (AD 1000): Księga majstrów cechu malarzy w Krakowie, 1903-1910.

Room and Sign Painters in Kraków (*Stowarzyszenie Malarzy Pokojowych i Szyldowych w Krakowie*) contains entries dating from 1883 to 1926 and shows Polish and Jewish names (using, once more, first names to distinguish between likely Polish and likely Jewish members) for all periods.¹⁰³

The increasing Polish-Jewish interaction and alliance in some spheres, was accompanied by growing Polish and Jewish nationalism, and thus tendencies for *active* separation and exclusion, in others. Though assimilationism remained popular in western Galicia before WWI, both western and eastern Galicia, like the other regions of the partitioned Commonwealth, saw an increase in nationalist—Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian—ideology. This growth in nationalist ideals could be seen in the associational landscape, for instance, in an increasing number of Galician associations joining the Polish National Association (*PolSKI Związek Narodowy*, PZN), thereby adopting the ethnically chauvinistic membership rules and nationalist ideology of the PZN. The pre-1907 statute of the Association of Catholic Workers “Friendship” (*Stowarzyszenie Robotników Katolickich, “Przyjaźń”*), already specified that in order to be a members, one had to be a Catholic worker or the Catholic son of a land owner.¹⁰⁴ In 1907, the Association “Friendship” joined the Polish National Association, thus, in accordance with the statute of the PZN, “Friendship” had to make sure that its own regulations were in line with those of the PZN. As such, in addition to its religious restriction on membership, “Friendship” adopted a change to its regulations that its members also had to be “ethnically Polish” (*Narodowości Polskiej*). Thus, while a Christian convert of ethnically Jewish descent could technically join prior to 1907, he or she would no longer be able to join the association after 1907.

A similar transformation could be seen in various other organizations. The Catholic Association of Guards (*Katolickie Stowarzyszenie Stróżów*) also joined the PZN in 1907, thus adding an ethno-national restriction its previous religious restrictions on membership.¹⁰⁵ The Polish Kontush Circle (*Kółko Polskie Kontuszowe*, KPK), was a cultural association meant to uphold Polish religious and cultural customs. Though its 1898 statute did not have explicit religious restrictions on its membership, it did require its members to “uphold all rules of the statute and to be faithful to God and the motherland.” Thus, its members could include assimilated, converted and patriotic Jews. However, in 1907 the KPK joined the PZN, and in 1908 altered its statute to explicitly limit its membership based on one’s religious and ethnic background.¹⁰⁶ The creation of the PZN and the enrollment of multiple organizations into its ranks demonstrate an intensification of nationalist ideology, but not necessarily an increase in the numbers of individuals and organizations that ascribed to ethnically-exclusionary ideals. Even before joining the PZN, the associations mentioned above would have been classified as “implicitly” ethnically or religiously exclusionary due to the presence of an ethno-national or religious qualifier in their name.

While simply joining the PZN might not have symbolized a change in organizational ideology, other associations saw not only their religious and nationalist radicalization but also ideological transformation. A letter from the Union of Catholic Bakers in Kraków (*Związek Katolickich Piekarzy w Krakowie*, ZKP), written to the office of the Lviv Viceroy (*Namiestnik Lwowski*) on November 14, 1898, expresses the association’s desire to move away from the union’s affiliation with Social-Democratic parties, and instead of organizing

¹⁰³ AP Kraków, ul. Sienna, Syg.5 (AD 1002): Księga członków Stowarzyszenie malarzy pokojowych i szyldowych w Krakowie, 1900-1927.

¹⁰⁴ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv, Syg. 344: Col: 146: Nr. 25: Stowarzyszenie Robotników Katolickich, “Przyjaźń,” 1896-1911.

¹⁰⁵ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv, Nr. 25: Col 146: Syg. 509: Katolickie Stowarzyszenie Stróżów, 1900-1910.

¹⁰⁶ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv, Nr. 25: Col 146: Syg. 404: Kółko Polskie Kontuszowe, 1898-1911.

youth in the social-democratic spirit, to indoctrinate them in the ideology of National-Catholic Parties. Thus, while the ZKP did not alter its statute in 1898 to include ethnic membership restrictions alongside its Catholic ones, it did intend to move its association away from a more cross-ethnic political alliance and towards a religiously and ethnically-exclusionary one. Hence, just like in the other pre-WWI lands of the former Commonwealth, and just as in other regions of central and Eastern Europe, pre-WWI Galicia saw a growth in the intensity and presence of ethnically chauvinistic, nationalist associations and ideals.

Analyzing individual associations thus shows that in Kraków there was a divergence in some organizations attempting to, if nothing else, portray themselves as more ethnically or religiously inclusionary and other associations if not becoming more ethnically and religiously exclusionary, then at least making their exclusionary stance clearer. The growth of what we may call liberal, inclusionary ideologies on the one hand, and illiberal, exclusionary ones on the other is, by itself, not that surprising. Both types of ideologies and movements were growing throughout late 19th century and early 20th century Central and Eastern Europe. As such, an analysis of civil society in Galicia—Kraków, and eastern Galicia—Lviv, must be contextualized, for instance, through an examination of its relative development in each of the two halves of Galicia and in Russian-ruled Congress Poland.

An analysis of the Galician Associational Registry, with a focus on the province of Kraków and the province of Lviv, and its comparison to the Associational registry of the Warszawa Governorate can provide some context for how cross-ethnic exclusion or membership in pre-WWI Galicia compared to that in pre-WWI Congress Poland. Tables 3a to 3d (Appendix III) show the associations listed in Galicia's registry. Tables 3a shows all associations classified by type and ethnic and religious affiliation found in the registry for the Kraków and Chrzanów provinces, thus for the areas that prior to 1846 belonged to the Republic of Kraków. Table 3b shows all associations from the Lviv province listed in the associational registry. Tables 4a and 4b show the proportions of all associations with respect to all associations included. Tables 3c and 3d mirror Tables 3a and 3b. However, the former limit the associations in each area to those registered after 1906, thus beginning in 1907. Tables 4c and 4d show the percentages of associations registered in the districts of Kraków and Chrzanów (4c) and Lviv (4d) after 1907, categorized by type and ethnic or religious affiliation. The reason for including tables with only associations registered after 1906 is twofold. First, the associational registry for the Warszawa Governorate that was introduced in Chapter II, lists only associations registered after 1906. Secondly, as discussed earlier, the early 20th century saw increasing nationalism in all regions. A comparison of all associations to only those registered after 1907 in both the former Republic of Kraków and Lviv province confirms this. The proportion of ethnically and religiously affiliated associations increased in each region, while the proportion of associations with no implied ethnic or religious affiliation decreased in both regions. Hence, due to this general cross-regional and international trend, the associational registry from the Warszawa Governorate is best compared to a limited sample of associations from other regions similarly registered after 1906. Table 9, found on the next page, summarizes key findings from Tables 3c-d, 4c-d, and the Warszawa Governorate Associational registry from Chapter II.

	Republic of Kraków	Republic of Kraków post 1906	Lviv Province	Lviv Province post 1906	Warszawa Governorate post 1906	
Types of Organization Ethnic or Religious Affiliations, as percentages of all registered associations ^c	Polish, Polish + Catholic, Catholic	14.9	22.7	10.6	13.1	30.0
	Cross-Ethnic	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.6 ^d
	Jewish	12.9	9.1	13.6	8.8	12.6
	Ukrainian	0.6	1.0	18.9	33.2	-
	Russian	Na	Na	Na	Na	2.1
	Austrian	4.2	5.6	1.2	1.8	Na
	German	1.3	1.0	1.9	3.1	Na
	None	65.0	59.2	52.9	47.3	53.4
	None, Cross-Ethnic, Austrian	69.3	65.0	54.2	49.3	54.0
	Number of Organizations	1514	591	2235	959	609
	Population by religion in percentages ^a	Roman Catholic		89.5		32.0
Jewish			9.9		15.1	20.2
Greek-Orthodox			0.4		51.8	1.8
Evangelical ^b			0.2		1.0	4.7

Table 9. Comparison of ethnic and religious affiliation, by percentages of all registered organizations, of associations registered in the lands of the former Republic of Kraków, Lviv province and the Warszawa Governorate.

Notes:

^a Population statistics for Kraków and Lviv Provinces based on the 1910 census, based on calculations of Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki (1915), printed in Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki (1915), p. 38, Table 31. Population Statistics for the Warszawa Governorate from 1913, printed in Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki (1915), p. 37, Table 29.

^b While separating ethnicity by religion works well for Congress Poland, for Lviv and Kraków Evangelical does not properly map onto the region's Austrian population, as most Austrians, like Poles, were Roman Catholic. Thus, for these two regions the local Austrian population is underestimated by using the Evangelical religion as its proxy, while the Polish population is overestimated by using the Roman Catholic religion as its proxy. However, the Austrian and non-Polish Roman Catholic situations were not significant enough to radically alter these percentages for the comparative purposes of this table.

^c Percentages of ethnic and religious affiliation compiled using Tables 3a-3d and Tables 4a-4d. Data compiled from archival sources cited in these tables.

^d The three associations included in this category in the Warszawa Governorate did not imply a cross-ethnic affiliation in their name, as was the case with the few associations categorized as such in Lviv and Kraków. The detailed descriptions, written by noting bureaucrats, identify these associations as explicitly cross-ethnic in their statures. Thus, the different nature of the data used for categorization in each region does not allow for a direct comparison.

The findings presented in Table 9 support the hypothesis that the associational landscape in the regions formerly belonging to the Republic of Kraków, i.e. western Galicia was less ethnically and religiously exclusionary than its counterpart either in eastern Galicia—the province of Lviv, or in Congress Poland—the Warszawa Governorate. Kraków’s associations were, on average, generally significantly less likely to imply a religious or ethnic affiliation in their name (65% for all years, 59.2% after 1906) than those registered in Lviv (52.9% for all years, 49.3% after 1906) or in the Warszawa Governorate (53.4% after 1906).

An adjusted category of implicit inclusivity includes associations classified as “None”—having no implicit ethnic affiliation, those classified as “Cross-Ethnic”—explicitly identifying as cross-ethnic in their name (save for the Warszawa Governorate where additional descriptions, not names, identified the three associations included in this category as such), and associations categorized as having an “Austrian” affiliation in Galicia. The reason for counting “Austrian” associations as ones lacking an ethnic identification is twofold. First, like Polish and Poland, the use of Austrian and Austrian was often in reference to either the political or geographic boundaries of the Austrian empire. The associations that included the term Austrian or Viennese, and which were categorized as “Austrian,” were for the most part local branches of “national” Austrian associations, mostly national labor unions. Secondly, the associations in Galicia that referenced the ethnicity of Austrians did so by underscoring their *German* ethnic affiliation. These, hence, were categorized as German rather than Austrian. This adjusted category of associations with no implicit ethnic or religious affiliation shows an even greater difference between the regions, with Kraków having even more implicitly cross-ethnic associations (69.3% in all years, 65% after 1906). The same argument could be made for the 2% of associations identified as “Russian” in Congress Poland. These, however, were cultural and social associations, which, unlike their “Austrian” counterparts in Galicia strongly implied an ethnic affiliation, which was confirmed by additional notes in cases where such notes were present (e.g. The Russian Society of Warszawa, Warszawa Russian Education Fund, Association of Russian Homeowners, etc.).

Lastly, in addition to having a clearly larger percentage of non-ethnically or religiously affiliated associations, Kraków also had, compared to the Warszawa Governorate, a lower percentage of associations classified as Polish. At the same time, a larger proportion of Kraków’s population was Polish (around 89% as compared to 73% in the Warszawa Governorate), thus further underscoring its significance in having a lower proportion of “Polish” associations as opposed to the Warszawa Governorate. At first glance, Lviv has the lowest percentage of ethnically Polish associations, even after 1906. This, however, also must be considered alongside the comparatively very small Polish population in Lviv. In 1910, Lviv’s population was only approximately 32% Polish. Taking both into account, Kraków had the lowest proportion of associations with an implied Polish association with respect to its Polish populations (.25), while Lviv and the Warszawa Governorate had considerably higher proportions of Polish¹⁰⁷ populations with respect to their Polish populations (.41 each).

Thus, once more, lands of the former Republic of Kraków in western Galicia appear to have the most cross-ethnic and least ethnically affiliated associational landscape when compared to Lviv in eastern Galicia and the Warszawa Governorate in Congress Poland. What is also interesting is that Lviv, as compared to the Warszawa Governorate, has even

¹⁰⁷ As religion is used as a proxy for population percentages, the Polish population was likely lower and thus the proportion of Polish associations to the Polish population in Kraków was likely higher. However, the discrepancy would have to be significant for Kraków’s proportion to match those of Lviv and Kraków’s. To do so, its actual Polish population would have to only account for 56% rather than the assumed 89% of the district. Given the overwhelmingly Polish character of the western Galician countryside, this was not the case.

fewer associations that have no implied ethnic or religious affiliation after 1906. This finding is not surprising, as Lviv, due to its particular population dynamics and policies akin to political marginalization and cultural repression of its Ukrainian majority, was more similar in these respects to the Warszawa Governorate than to Kraków. In other words, these findings support the hypothesis that the cultural repression or forced assimilation of the masses allows for and promotes the development of a less liberal—i.e. more ethnically-exclusionary—civil society.

The use of associations' names to determine their legal (according to their bylaws) or actual ethnically-exclusionary or multi-ethnic membership is somewhat tenuous. Certainly not all associations that were implicitly exclusionary in name were actually exclusionary in either their statutes or actual membership. For instance, some organizations that called themselves “Polish” were explicitly ethnically inclusive in their bylaws or even more so had an actually multiethnic membership. The Polish Philatelist Circle, which was discussed earlier, is such an example. Similarly, not all association that were implicitly inclusionary in name were necessarily inclusive in their bylaws or actual membership.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, the relationship between implicit inclusivity or explicit exclusivity in name appears to be strongly correlated with actual organizational rules in pre-WWI Kraków.

Unofficial Exclusion (implied in name and/or function of the organization)											
Official Exclusion	Austrian	Catholic	Catholic, Polish	German	Jewish	Lith.	None	Polish	Ukrainian	Na	Total
Catholic	-	10	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	13
Catholic+ Polish	-	2	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	6
Jewish	-	-	-	-	8	-	1	-	-	-	9
Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
None	1	-	-	-	14	-	94	10	-	-	119
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2
Ukrainian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Unknown	-	-	-	13	-	-	1	-	-	4	18
Total	1	12	3	13	22	1	101	11	1	4	169

Table 10. Official Exclusion (written, explicit exclusivity in membership) vs. Unofficial Exclusion (implied by the name of an organization)

Notes: Random sample of 169 Associations registered in pre-WWI Kraków.

Data compiled from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg: 14, 17, 20, 24-5, 73, 79, 80, 86, 123, 126, 140, 145-6, 159, 160, 166, 172, 177, 178, 181-2, 189, 195, 210, 221, 237, 244-7, 275, 277, 313-5, 316-20, 344, 347, 357-9, 360-2, 364, 387, 403-6, 420, 443-5, 497, 499, 501-5, 507-9, 546-7, 550, 556-7, 559, 560-1, 584-6, 610-1, 617-9, 620, 622, 651, 659, 660, 682-4, 686, 688-9, 690, 692-4, 745, 754, 793-4, 761, 798, 802, 806-7, 809, 811-5, 817-8, 881-2, 912, 918-9, 923-4, 929, 932, 990, 998, 1001-2, 1004, 1054, 1056, 1059, 1061, 1064-9, 1071-4, 1079, 1208, 1269, 1273, 1275, 1280-1, 1288, 1290, 1293, 1296, 1298, 2329, 2347, 2350, 2352, 2357, 2360, 2364, 2372, 2376, 2378-9, 2380-1, 2388, 2397, 2404, 3229.

¹⁰⁸ TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv, Syg. 1269 :146: 25: Tow. Wzajemnej Pomocy Uczniów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1906.

Unofficial Exclusion (implied in name and/or function of the organization)											Total
Official Exclusion	Austrian	Catholic	Catholic Polish	German	Jewish	Lith.	None	Polish	Ukrainian	Na	
Catholic	-	83.3	-	-	-	-	3.0	-	-	-	7.7
Catholic+ Polish	-	16.7	100	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	3.6
Jewish	-	-	-	-	36.4	-	1.0	-	-	-	5.3
Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	0.6
None	100	-	-	-	63.6	-	93.1	90.9	-	-	70.4
Polish	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	9.1	-	-	1.2
Ukrainian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	0.6
Unknown	-	-	-	100	-	-	1.0	-	-	100	10.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 11. Official, Explicit Exclusion of associations (written membership exclusivity in associations' statutes) as a percentage of the Unofficial, Implied Exclusion (implied ethnic or religious affiliation in an organization's name) of organizations.

Random sample of 169 Associations registered in pre-WWI Kraków. Data compiled from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146; Nr. 25; Syg: 14, 17, 20, 24-5, 73, 79, 80, 86, 123, 126, 140, 145-6, 159, 160, 166, 172, 177, 178, 181-2, 189, 195, 210, 221, 237, 244-7, 275, 277, 313-5, 316-20, 344, 347, 357-9, 360-2, 364, 387, 403-6, 420, 443-5, 497, 499, 501-5, 507-9, 546-7, 550, 556-7, 559, 560-1, 584-6, 610-1, 617-9, 620, 622, 651, 659, 660, 682-4, 686, 688-9, 690, 692-4, 745, 754, 793-4, 761, 798, 802, 806-7, 809, 811-5, 817-8, 881-2, 912, 918-9, 923-4, 929, 932, 990, 998, 1001-2, 1004, 1054, 1056, 1059, 1061, 1064-9, 1071-4, 1079, 1208, 1269, 1273, 1275, 1280-1, 1288, 1290, 1293, 1296, 1298, 2329, 2347, 2350, 2352, 2357, 2360, 2364, 2372, 2376, 2378-9, 2380-1, 2388, 2397, 2404, 3229.

Table 10 categorizes 169 randomly sampled associations registered in pre-WWI Kraków based on their unofficial implied inclusivity or exclusivity (suggested in their name) and explicit exclusivity (written into their bylaws) or statute implied (lacking any mention of restrictions) or explicit inclusivity. Table 11 presents the official, explicit exclusion of associations as a proportion of the unofficial, implied ethnic or religious affiliation of associations. In the sample, there were 101 associations with no unofficial implied exclusion (based on their name). Of these, 94 associations, or 93.1% had no explicit exclusion written into their bylaws. In other words, of the 101 associations classified as not being ethnically-exclusionary based on their name, 93% were classified as not being ethnically-exclusionary based on their statutes. The reverse relationship is not as strong. Of the 119 associations categorized as not being ethnically-exclusionary based on their bylaws, only 79% were classified as not ethnically-exclusionary according to their names. Hence, based on this sample, it is safer to assume that associations with no ethnic or religious affiliation in their name actually had no ethnic or religious membership restrictions in their bylaws than the reverse. Furthermore, based on this sample, classifying associations as implicitly inclusive by name likely underestimates the percentage of associations that, according to their statutes, were not ethnically or religiously exclusionary according to their bylaws.

In this sample, by using associations' ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name, 25 associations (14.8%) were misclassified as implying an ethnic exclusion, when, according to their statutes they had no ethnic or religious restrictions on their membership (and in fact might have been explicitly inclusionary). This was the case for 100% of Austrian associations in the sample (one organization in the random sample), for 64% of Jewish associations in the sample (14 organizations) and for 90% of Polish associations (10 organizations) included in this random sample of 169 associations registered in the city of Kraków. Most other markers of ethnic or religious affiliation (Ukrainian, German,

Lithuanian, etc.) were correlated with official religious or ethnic exclusion written into their bylaws that matched their name-implied exclusivity. Seven associations (4%) were incorrectly classified as being implicitly inclusionary based on their name, when, in fact, their bylaws had explicit ethnic or religious membership exclusions.

Overall, this random sample of 169 associations suggests that an implied exclusion or inclusion in an organization's name correlates with its implied or explicit inclusion or exclusion written into its statutes. This method is not as reliable with associations whose name or language ties it to the dominant cultures, geographic area where the organization is located, and in some cases, to ruling political institutions. In this sample both Polish and Austrian were used to refer to either a geographic area or (a former) ruling political body. It is also not reliable with respect to Jewish associations. However, while Jewish associations might have been explicitly inclusive in their name, it would be much more unusual to encounter non-Jewish members in these "minority" organizations, as opposed to encountering non-ethnically Polish and non-ethnically Austrian members in Polish or Austrian associations where the word Polish or Austrian is used to refer to a geographic region or state.

The high proportion (90%) of "Polish" associations in Kraków that did not have ethnic or religious exclusions written into their bylaws raises the question of the degree to which the significantly higher proportion of Polish associations in the Warszawa governorate as opposed to the province of Kraków lacked similar ethnic or religious exclusions in their bylaws. First, it is very likely that a large portion of these associations in each region either allowed multiethnic memberships, or actually had members from various ethnic or religious backgrounds. However, an analysis of an interwar cross-regional sample presented in Chapter IV will show that whereas the relationship between an association's implied ethnic or religious affiliation was relatively high and consistent across the interwar regions, the relationship between the former and the actual likelihood of a multiethnic membership varied significantly across the regions. For instance, the interwar sample from Lviv, which like Congress Poland, experienced high degrees of ethno-racial discrimination prior to WWI, had significantly lower proportions of "Polish" organizations with no ethnic or religious exclusions. As such, it would be tenuous to make the claim that a similarly high proportion of Polish associations in fact had no ethnic or religious membership restrictions. To address this question properly, future research ought to acquire a similar pre-WWI sample from Warszawa to compare to the one from Kraków. However, it would not merely be challenging but rather impossible to acquire a large enough sample of associational statutes for pre-WWI Warszawa due to the city's destruction during WWII. Such a feat would be more possible for other pre-WWI Russian-ruled regions, such as the city and region of Vilnius. [*Note: And in fact I intend to will attempt to collect a similar sample for Vilnius and Lviv next year*]

Lastly, one might question the extent to which the lack of official or unofficial implicit exclusion—and thus implicit inclusion, corresponds to a likelihood that associations actually had a multiethnic membership. Table 12 sheds some light on this question.

Organization Type	Year Founded	Explicitly Exclusive	Explicitly Inclusive	Implicitly Exclusive	Membership Base	Membership List implies a mixed membership
Economic	1870	N	N	N	Farmers	No
Economic	1901	N	N	N	Industrialists	Maybe
Economic	1901	N	N	N	Factory workers	Maybe
Interest	1906	N	N	N	Prohibitionists	Maybe
Professional	1906	N	N	N	Dentists	Maybe
Professional	1873	N	N	N	Artists	No
Professional	1902	N	N	N	Servants	Yes
Recreation	1899	N	N	N	Open	No
Recreation	1901	N	N	N	Photographers	No
Recreation	1891	N	Yes	N	Class/Region Class	No
Recreation	1903	N	N	N	/Professionals	Yes
Student	1906	N	N	N	Students	Yes
Professional	1901	Na	Na	N	Profession	Yes

Table 12. Organization, by Type, Explicit Exclusivity, Explicit Inclusivity, Implicit Exclusivity in Statute and Name, adjusted by Membership Information.

Notes: Out of the sample of 169 organizations, 13 associations had additional documentation, such as a membership list or registration documents that included a list of members or founding members.

Data compiled from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146: Nr. 25: Syg: 14, 17, 20, 24-5, 73, 79, 80, 86, 123, 126, 140, 145-6, 159, 160, 166, 172, 177, 178, 181-2, 189, 195, 210, 221, 237, 244-7, 275, 277, 313-5, 316-20, 344, 347, 357-9, 360-2, 364, 387, 403-6, 420, 443-5, 497, 499, 501-5, 507-9, 546-7, 550, 556-7, 559, 560-1, 584-6, 610-1, 617-9, 620, 622, 651, 659, 660, 682-4, 686, 688-9, 690, 692-4, 745, 754, 793-4, 761, 798, 802, 806-7, 809, 811-5, 817-8, 881-2, 912, 918-9, 923-4, 929, 932, 990, 998, 1001-2, 1004, 1054, 1056, 1059, 1061, 1064-9, 1071-4, 1079, 1208, 1269, 1273, 1275, 1280-1, 1288, 1290, 1293, 1296, 1298, 2329, 2347, 2350, 2352, 2357, 2360, 2364, 2372, 2376, 2378-9, 2380-1, 2388, 2397, 2404, 3229.

Table 12 lists the implied and explicit inclusivity or exclusivity of a sub-sample of 13 associations included in the larger random sample of 169 associations in Tables 10 and 11, for which archival materials included membership or leadership lists. Of the 13 associations whose archival materials included membership or leadership lists, all were unofficially implicitly inclusive. In other words, all associations had no ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name. Moreover, 12 of the associations had no explicit ethnic or religious membership exclusion written into their bylaws. One association was officially explicitly inclusive, meaning that its bylaws explicitly stated that members of all religions and ethnic groups could join this association. The membership list of this association, however, provided no support that its actual membership was multiethnic. The official membership restrictions for one association were unknown, and thus are classified as “Na.”

Out of the 13 organizations in the sub-sample, the membership and leadership lists of four associations provided strong support that these associations had a multi-ethnic membership. These associations had members who were most likely Polish (with Polish first and last names) and members who were most likely not Polish (had non-Polish first names, e.g. Izaak, Abraham, Boris, etc.).¹⁰⁹ The membership and leadership lists of four other

¹⁰⁹ Using last names to determine ones ethnicity is very unreliable. All regions of the Commonwealth had significant Poles from assimilated backgrounds, thus many with German, French or Russian, for instance sounding last names. Relying on first names is more likely to correctly identify individuals from mixed Polish and completely assimilated backgrounds as Polish. This approach, however, does underestimate the level of multi-ethnicity in associations, as it correctly misidentifies some individuals who considered themselves to be of multiethnic background (or a non-Polish ethnicity yet Polish nationality) as Polish. However, short of knowing

associations suggested that these associations also could have been cross-ethnic (for instance, had last or first names that were unusual for Poles at the time, however, not definitively so, e.g. Wilhelm). Thus, 31% of the organizations found in the sub-sample were very likely to have had a multi-ethnic membership. An additional 31% may have had a multi-ethnic, while 38% had, most likely, a mono-ethnic membership. Of the 12 associations identified as implicitly (but not explicitly) inclusive, three, or 25%, had, very likely, a membership that was actually multi-ethnic. Of all associations registered in the lands of the former Republic of Kraków prior to the First World War, there 65% of all associations, and 59.2% of those registered after 1906 had no implicit ethnic or religious affiliation. Even a quarter of these (16% of all associations, 14.8% of those registered after 1906) and not counting associations classified as Austrian or Polish, having an *actual* multi-ethnic membership would suggest a significant level of cross-ethnic affiliation in the lands of the former Republic of Kraków.

If the same proportions could be applied to the other regions, then the associational landscapes in the Warszawa Governorate and in Lviv after 1906 would be expected to have a slightly lower proportion of associations, approximately 13.35% and 11.83%, respectively, with an actual multiethnic membership. Yet, as will be shown in Chapter IV, making such an inference is inappropriate. A cross-regional dataset for the interwar period found that the relationship between an association's lack of a religious or ethnic affiliation implied in its name and its likelihood to have no ethnic or religious restrictions in its statute, and vice-versa, largely held, though with some variation, across the regions. The same, however, was not true for the degree to which either of these indicators was related to the likelihood of an association having an actual multiethnic membership. This relation varied significantly across the interwar regions, and thus should not be assumed to have been relatively constant in the pre-WWI period.

In summation, in the least, the data presented in this section does not refute the claim that the legal associational landscape was characterized by higher cross-ethnic cooperation and lower ethnic fragmentation in Kraków as opposed to the legal associational landscape in either Lviv or Warszawa prior to the First World War. At most, these findings support rather than refute the claim that the cultural repression or forced assimilation of the masses allows for and promotes the development of a less liberal—i.e. more ethnically-exclusionary—civil society, while the absence of ethno-cultural discrimination, particularly that aimed at the masses, promotes the development of a more liberal—i.e. more ethnically inclusionary—associational life.

Conclusion

In 1846 the Republic of Kraków joined the rest of Galicia under Habsburg rule. Prior to 1848 that rule was harsh and repressive, even more so than in the Russian and Prussian partitions of the Commonwealth. While the Habsburg Empire flirted with liberalization following the 1848 Spring of Nations, it was not until the 1860s that it took permanent steps towards political liberalization. As the Habsburg Empire underwent liberal transformations, Russian-ruled lands of the former Commonwealth came under increasingly repressive policies following the 1863 January Uprising. By the turn of the 20th century, civil and political societies of *western* Galicia, as represented by the district of Kraków, were significantly different from the civil and political societies of Russian ruled Congress Poland, as represented by the Warszawa Governorate, and from those found in *eastern* Galicia, as

the individual histories of listed members, relying on first names is the best way to identify associations with an actual, and not just permitted, multi-ethnic membership.

represented by the province of Lviv. In comparison to that found in Congress Poland and eastern Galicia, Kraków's civil society was considerably more liberal—less dominated by local elites and characterized by increasing cross-ethnic cooperation. Kraków's and Lviv's civil societies were both relatively more autonomous from elite domination than their counterparts in Congress Poland, though Kraków exhibiting the highest levels of autonomy from local elites out of all of the three cases. However, whereas Kraków's civil and political societies were marked by significantly more cross-ethnic cooperation at the turn of the 20th century, their counterparts in eastern Galicia and Congress Poland saw comparatively more ethnic fragmentation and the rise of ethnically-exclusionary nationalist ideologies and associations.

(1) Autonomy from elite domination, as seen in rural civil and political society

The second half of the 19th century saw a divergence in the political, economic and social development of Russian-ruled Congress Poland, and Austrian-ruled eastern and western Galicia. Congress Poland saw a period of rapid industrialization accompanied by the political exclusion of Polish elites and cultural repression of the masses. Both eastern and western Galicia experienced a period of economic stagnation accompanied by increasing political inclusion of Polish elites and cultural, Polish, autonomy. The political inclusion of Polish elites in Galicia, and their exclusion in Congress Poland led to the development of a civil and political landscape that was relatively more autonomous from elite domination, particularly by a single elite, in Galicia prior to World War I. At the same time, there was a noticeable divergence in the associational landscape between western and eastern Galicia, with the former experiencing a relatively higher level of associational autonomy from cultural elites in comparison to the latter.

Both Galicia and Congress Poland witnessed the self-organization of the new—cultural and economic—middle and upper class elites and some self-organization of the working class. Yet Congress Poland experienced relatively little self-organization of the peasant masses. At the same time, the Galician countryside was characterized by rapidly increasing levels of peasant associations, particularly agricultural circles, led by peasants and organized for their interests. Moreover, rural Galicia saw significant peasant participation in local-level political institutions and, by 1895, a peasant party organized and led by peasants. At the turn of the 20th century, Galicia's peasant associations and parties were increasingly autonomous from traditional elites. Those that were dominated by elites, such as the regional level offices of the Agricultural Circles' Association, were yielding to peasant participation.

Like in Congress Poland, local elites and the Austrian state played an important part in fostering the emergence of rural associational and of rural political life. The Russian state temporarily allowed peasant participation in local politics, quickly reverting to old policies of political exclusion when it disapproved of the results of participation. At the same time, the Austrian state not only allowed peasant political participation, but also encouraged it by prohibiting elites from holding local rural offices. While peasants were included in local political institutions, Polish elites dominated regional political offices and the Polish Circle in the national assembly (Reichsrat). Unwilling to share their power and concerned with prolonging the status quo, Polish elites focused on limiting peasant participation in regional and national institutions. The elites' focus on regional and national institutions in which they were included and which they dominated shifted their focus away from the local level, allowing more space for peasant leadership to develop. At the same, the state's targeted support for local-level peasant political participation promoted peasant political society in the Galician countryside, thus fostering peasant leadership.

Polish elites applied a similar strategy to civil society. Thus, as with the Agricultural Circles' Association, they focused their efforts on gaining associational control on the regional and national level, thereby overlooking and losing their chance at dominating local associations in the countryside. The freedom and degree of self-determination that peasants experienced in local political institutions and in local rural associations allowed them to develop both a culture of local participation and local peasant networks. Once peasant parties emerged, rural associations became important tools through which they could mobilize peasant support. Moreover, Galicia's *Polish* peasants and elites lacked the cross-class mutual interests that a politicized culture, courtesy of an ethnically discriminatory state, had furnished in Congress Poland. As such, Galicia's Polish peasants did not mobilize in support of cultural and economic middle class actors and their interests. Rather, since their first (temporary) entrance into the political landscape in 1848, they had supported peasant interests and peasant representatives.

Despite the significantly lower degree of domination of agricultural cooperatives by elites, especially landed elites, in Galicia as opposed to Congress Poland, eastern and western Galicia had visible differences in the degree to which their associational landscapes were dominated by cultural elites. Western Galicia's rural associational landscape, as characterized by the province of Kraków, was largely composed of economic associations. Eastern Galicia's rural associational landscape, as characterized by the province of Lviv, had a significantly higher proportion of nationalist and cultural associations. As such, the latter resembled the associational landscape of Congress Poland in terms of politicization and domination by cultural elites. This difference between western and eastern Galicia, and the similarity between eastern Galicia and Congress Poland supports the assertion that (1) political inclusion or exclusion of local elites and (2) cultural repression or toleration of local masses, rather than the level of economic development, steer the character of civil society. Regional political and cultural autonomy meant the inclusion of Polish elites and the absence of ethno-cultural discrimination against Poles, including Polish peasants in *western* Galicia. However, for eastern Galicia, it meant the marginalization of local ethnic majority elites and the ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of the Ukrainian masses. Thus, like the political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination of Poles in Congress Poland, the political marginalization and ethno-cultural repression of Ukrainians in western Galicia fostered a higher level of associational domination by marginalized, Ukrainian cultural elites, as compared to that which arose in Kraków.

(2) Continuation of cross-ethnic cooperation and privileging of class over ethnic alliances

Jewish-Polish cooperation

Both Kościuszko's rebellion and the January 1863 Uprising in Congress Poland showcased considerable willingness on the part of Warszawa's Polish elites to compromise and cooperate with the Jewish minority, and significant support for and participation in these patriotic endeavors on the part of Congress Poland's Jewish minority. The comparatively more subdued Jewish response in Kraków suggests that Polish-Jewish relations were, prior to the 1860s, *stronger* in Congress Poland. This changed over the course of the 19th century. By the turn of the 20th century, Kraków's political and civil societies were marked by more cross-ethnic (particularly Polish-Jewish) alliances than those in Warszawa.

The late 19th century saw growth in anti-Semitism and nationalism (Polish and Jewish) on the one hand, and a decrease in assimilationism, on the other hand. However, compared to that in Congress Poland, the anti-Semitic society that arose in Kraków was small, weak and did not have much influence. Furthermore, as anti-Semitic campaigns in

Warszawa steadily increased prior to WWI, anti-Semitic campaigns in Kraków decreased after 1907. Whereas Zionism replaced assimilationism as the dominant ideology in Congress Poland prior to WWI, Zionism in Galicia lagged behind the continual popularity of assimilationism, even in eastern Galicia. While preferences for germanization were visible among older generations, particularly in eastern Galicia, polonization had become more popular among Galicia's younger Jewish populations. In fact, it had gone so far that, by the turn of the century, Zionists in western Galicia published their newspapers in Polish.

One reason for the relative success of Jewish assimilationism in Kraków in comparison to both Lviv and Congress Poland was the district's distinct history of regional autonomy and the historical prevalence and dominance of Polish culture. With Polish as the working language and culture of the Republic of Kraków, Jewish elites were incentivized to adopt Polish culture to advance socially and economically. At the same time, their counterparts living under Austrian rule, for instance, in Lviv, were incentivized to adopt German language and culture for the same reasons. A second reason for the relatively more successful assimilationist movement in greater Galicia, as compared to Congress Poland, was the autonomy and growth in Galicia's Polish educational institutions after the 1860s. A third, tied to the first two, was a relatively more receptive and supportive Polish society, particularly in Kraków.

The relative higher receptivity of Jewish assimilationism in Kraków as opposed to Lviv and Congress Poland was rooted in Kraków's significantly longer history of Polish cultural and political autonomy. The longer history of Polish education meant that Kraków's Jewish intelligentsia assimilated into Polish culture, thus promoting a longer history of cross-ethnic Polish-Jewish interaction amongst Kraków's intellectuals. The lack of culturally repressive policies, such as the germanization of educational and state institutions, prior to 1846 in Kraków and in all of Galicia after the 1860s meant that there were proportionately more bureaucratic, educational, administrative, etc. posts open to Poles in Galicia than there were in Congress Poland. Moreover, the absence of policies targeted at displacing Polish landed gentry, as there were in Congress Poland, meant that many members of the impoverished gentry could remain in rural areas, where they worked their own land or were employed on the estates of others. Cultural autonomy, political incorporation (including in bureaucratic posts) and lower levels of rural displacement of Polish gentry meant that Galicia's impoverished gentry and the urban middle classes did not encounter economic competition for intelligentsia positions on par with the competition faced by their Congress Poland counterparts. With better paths of employment open to them, Galicia's urban *déclassé* gentry and urban middle classes generally did not have to seek employment in historically "less desirable" sectors—like commerce and artisan work. Thus, they did not find themselves in competition with the Jewish minority, which historically filled these professions. Rather, it would be Galicia's upwardly mobile peasants that would try to break into historically Jewish-dominated professions and thus put themselves in economic competition with parts of the Jewish minority. Thus it would be Galicia's peasantry, along with urban Christians already employed in commerce and artisan works, that would provided the economically-motivated social base for the region's anti-Semitic slogans.

Lastly, a large portion of Galicia's Polish elites, and the most influential elites of the region until the end of the 19th century, were landed elites. It was the Polish and Ukrainian peasants, and not urban minorities, that formed the largest economic threat to Polish landed elites. *Eastern* Galicia's traditional elites forged nationalistic, ethnically-exclusionary alliances with the previously mentioned Polish urban and rural elements.¹¹⁰ Yet whereas

¹¹⁰ Once more, the latter sought such alliance as a means to advance into professions heretofore largely occupied by the Jewish minority.

eastern Galicia's elites sought ethnically-based alliances to protect their economic and political interests against Ukrainian peasants, their Polish urban and rural partners sought such alliances to push the Jewish minority out of professions which they wanted to fill. At the same time, the lack of threat for their economic security and thus their unfettered concern for their political and long-term economic interests led *western* Galicia's traditional and intelligentsia elites to champion class-based, cross-ethnic politics. With their economic interests unaffected by ethnic minorities, western Galicia's traditional and intelligentsia elites formed the region's pre-WWI cross-ethnic politics *against* the rising popularity of ethnically chauvinistic nationalism to protect their own regional, political and class interests.

Ukrainian Polish tensions

Galicia, like Congress Poland, saw increasing anti-Semitism prior to World War I. Yet, whereas Polish-Jewish relations formed the basis of nationalist, ethnically-exclusionary ideology in Congress Poland, it was Polish-Ukrainian tensions that fragmented Galicia's civil and political societies. While both western and eastern Galician Polish elites were concerned with the "Ukrainian question," Polish-Ukrainian relations were particularly tense in *eastern* Galicia, where Poles were the ruling minority and Ukrainians were the historically exploited majority. Ukrainians, however, were a small minority in *western* Galicia. Moreover, the vast majority of western Galician peasants and landed elites were Polish. Hence, whereas Polish elites in western Galicia were concerned with Ukrainian nationalism because of the threat that it posed to Galician unity, Polish elites in eastern Galicia were concerned with Ukrainian nationalism because of the threat it posed to their economic and political power.

Eastern Galicia's ethnic conflict—characterized by the political, economic and cultural repression of a Ukrainian majority by a Polish minority—and its relative absence from western Galicia, was mirrored in the civil and political societies of each region. In comparison to both Lviv and Warszawa, Kraków's pre-WWI associational landscape had both fewer associations that were ethnically or religiously exclusionary and more associations that were likely to be ethnically and religiously inclusive in their membership. Not only was Lviv's associational landscape characterized by ethnic fragmentation to a higher degree than that of Kraków, it was even more fragmented than Warszawa Governorate's legal associational life. The difference between western and eastern Galicia on the one hand, and the similarities between eastern Galicia and Congress Poland on the other hand, once more do not dispute but rather support the claims posed in this dissertation. Despite being under the rule of different states and despite their different levels of economic development, both Congress Poland and eastern Galicia were characterized by the rule of an ethnic minority, Russian and Polish, respectively, which pursued policies of political exclusion or marginalization and ethno-cultural discrimination of the local, Polish and Ukrainian, respectively, majority.

The political inclusion of local (and ethnic majority) elites and the cultural autonomy of the local masses (Poles) in *western* Galicia allowed for the development of a less ethnically-fragmented civil society in western Galicia. The political inclusion of local (minority, Polish) elites, the marginalization of local (majority, Ukrainian) leaders, and the cultural repression of the (Ukrainian) masses in *eastern* Galicia led to a civil society that was significantly more ethnically-fragmented. Just like in Congress Poland, culture in eastern Galicia was heavily politicized. The political exclusion of Ukrainian new—cultural—elites, the cultural repression of the Ukrainian masses, and the historical ethnic division of labor between Polish elites and Ukrainian peasants allowed the Ukrainian intelligentsia to forge alliances and mobilize Ukrainian masses not only on common cultural, but also common ethnic-economic interests. Thus, it is no surprise that Lviv's rural countryside was

dominated by cultural and sports associations with Ukrainian nationalist leanings. These, just like the cultural, educational and nationalist youth and sports associations in Congress Poland, aimed to politicize culture and mobilize the masses against Galicia's politically, culturally and economically repressive local Polish elites.

Eastern and western Galicia's distinct ethnic dynamics and levels of ethnic fragmentation were also reflected in the regions' political landscapes. The political, economic and social privileges of traditional, conservative elites in western Galicia, unlike those of their eastern counterparts, did not depend on an ethnic privilege. As the former's privileges were class, rather than ethnicity based, they could be preserved through cross-ethnic, class-based coalitions. Yet despite their willingness and repeated efforts over the course of the late 19th century to pursue cross-ethnic coalitions, western conservatives tended to align with their eastern traditional elite counterparts. This, however, changed with the onset of mass politics and universal and equal suffrage in the 20th century.

The introduction of mass politics forced Polish elites to choose ethnic or class alliances as a means of securing their interests. Eastern Polish elites, who required both a class and ethnic privilege to retain their position in eastern Galicia, chose to forgo cross-ethnic alliances and cooperation with the Ukrainian majority. Instead, they sought a nationalist, ethnically-exclusionary and chauvinist alliances with the National Democrats and clerical parties. The strong support for Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish nationalism in eastern Galicia came as no surprise. Characterized by the historical oppression—economic, political and cultural—of the Ukrainian peasant masses, eastern Galicia resembled Congress Poland more so than western Galicia. Once more, the privileges and power of western Galicia's Polish elites rested primarily on class rather than ethnic privileges. Thus, Galicia's western traditional elites aligned with the region's economic and cultural, Polish and non-Polish (mainly Jewish and Ukrainian), bourgeois and middle class representatives to forge cross-ethnic coalitions that would protect class rather than ethnic privileges. As WWI broke out soon after, the outcome of this cross-ethnic coalition will never be known. Nonetheless, its existence, along with a history of repeated attempts by *western* Polish and minority elites at cross-ethnic compromises in the second half of the 19th century highlight, if nothing else, the significant differences between Congress Poland and eastern Galicia on the one hand, and western Galicia on the other hand. The former were characterized by nationalist and ethnically chauvinist politics and associations. The latter saw the emergence and domination of cross-ethnic—Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian—coalitions and organizations, which organized, at least in part, *against* the emergence of Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalism.

Chapter IV. National convergence in associational character and the perseverance of civil legacies in the associational life of interwar Poland, ca. 1918-1939.

Introduction

Chapters II and III examine how policies of political exclusion or inclusion and ethno-cultural repression or cultural autonomy shaped the character of civil society in Russian-ruled Congress Poland and Austrian-ruled Galicia. The political exclusion of Polish elites and the cultural repression of the Polish masses in Congress Poland led to the rise of an illiberal civil society characterized by elite domination and ethnic fragmentation. Conversely, the political inclusion of Polish elites and cultural autonomy in the Duchy of Kraków fostered the emergence of a more liberal civil society characterized by relative autonomy from political domination and a higher degree of ethnic inclusion. This chapter analyzes the extent to which imperial civil legacies persevered, and examines the political and economic pressures under which they began to wane in the re-emerged interbellum Poland. To achieve this end, this chapter is divided into two parts.

Part I analyzes how political actors' responses to interwar policies of political inclusion and marginalization or exclusion, and to ethno-cultural discrimination and repression mirrored those of their pre-WWI counterparts. As in previous chapters, it focuses on significant periods of political transformation of the interbellum state. Though interwar Poland began as a formal democracy, the democratic state pursued political marginalization of ethnic minorities, ethnic discrimination and policies akin to forced assimilation. Piłsudski's 1926 military coup brought Polish democracy to an end, leading to Poland's transformation into an increasingly politically exclusionary, yet—until 1935—a relatively ethnically inclusionary and tolerant, autocratic state. As in pre-WWI Congress Poland, the progressive exclusion of Polish political elites shifted political competition from formal state institutions into the public sphere, leading to the politicization and growing political domination of associational life through all regions of the interbellum state. The state's temporary transition away from ethnic discrimination and towards ethno-cultural toleration in 1926 fostered increasing cooperation between the state and ethnic minority political elites. However, the rise in popularity of ethnically-exclusionary notions of nation, and the state's post-1935 return to policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination fueled ethnic fragmentation in interwar Poland. Ethnic fragmentation was reflected and perpetuated by civil society as some associations placed ethnic restrictions on their memberships and others saw the exodus of minority members to separate organizations.

Part II examines the extent to which differences in the political autonomy and ethnic fragmentation of civil society that arose across Polish regions prior to WWI continued to shape variation in civil society character across Poland's regions after the war. As in the pre-WWI era, political groups and actors responded to political inclusion by pursuing their aims through cooperation with the state. Conversely, they responded to political exclusion by turning to civil society to mobilize support against an uncooperative and exclusionary state. The interwar period was no different, as political leaders pursued similar strategies of cooperation with the state or mobilization through civil society against it. In addition to reconfirming patterns of response to political marginalization or exclusion and to ethno-

cultural discrimination, interwar Poland allows for a fruitful analysis of the extent to which civil legacies embedded in associational life prior to WWI persisted through the interwar period. To do so, Part II examines the degree of political domination and ethnic fragmentation of civil societies in two voivodeships¹¹¹ of interwar Poland that had developed under distinct pre-WWI imperial states. Specifically, it compares the degree of political domination and ethnic fragmentation of Vilnius, which prior to WWI had been under the politically exclusionary and culturally repressive Russian rule, and of Kraków, which prior to WWI experienced significant periods of political inclusion and cultural autonomy of local elites under Austrian rule. The analysis shows that, despite progressive national convergence in character, civil society in Kraków was more resistant to political domination and ethnic fragmentation than its counterpart in Vilnius.

A brief note on methodology and data

Part I employs historical narrative analysis to paint a picture of the convergence in associational character across two regions of interwar Poland—Kraków and Vilnius—that, prior to WWI, were rule by distinct imperial states. To do so, it utilizes documents and reports compiled by the interwar state, primarily by city and regional offices of the Ministry of Public Security, which monitored the life of Poland's political, social and economic organizations. The interwar Polish state was active in surveillance of political and civil society, the results of which were compiled in daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly reports on the political and social life of every voivodeship. Not all reports survived WWII, and not in equal measures across the former voivodeships. Nonetheless, a significant number of reports remain. These shed a light on Poland's social and political life, as well as the changing attitudes of the individuals and agencies that compiled the reports. Numerous reports suggest that the compiled data came not only from official agencies of state surveillance, namely local police, but also from state agents who infiltrated various associations in order to report on their activities.¹¹² On the one hand, the extensive surveillance of associational life by the interwar state provides copious details on interwar Polish civil and political societies. On the other hand, the reports are clearly biased toward larger associations with more extensive networks, which were seen as posing a greater political threat. Small associations with tight-knit networks could largely escape state detection and surveillance.¹¹³ Nonetheless, surviving state reports provide a fruitful view into the civil and political associational landscape of interwar Poland, how the two intersected, and how they developed in response to fluctuations in interwar politics.

Part II draws on a database of interwar associations compiled from archival documents, including registries and individual registration sheets found in the Polish State Archives of Warszawa and Kraków, the State Archives of Vilnius in Lithuania, and the

¹¹¹ An administrative division, similar to a "province."

¹¹² For an example in which a report acknowledges that information about meetings of oppositional parties, for instance, comes from informants placed in their ranks, see Kraków's Situational Reports (*Sprawozdania sytuacyjne z Krakowa*), AP Kraków, Col. 218 (St.G.Kr.): Syg. 108, Reports from 1928-1929.

¹¹³ The concern of the state to identify and monitor associations that might pose a potential political threat ran deep. While the state may not have been able to infiltrate all organizations or meetings to monitor their political leanings or activities, it took care to identify the associations on which it should focus. For instance, a letter from a local Starosta to the Vilnius Governor's Security Division described a Jewish philanthropic association not in need of monitoring. The letter notes that the organization is only concerned with aiding Jewish orphans. Furthermore, it comments that in addition to being loyal to the Polish state, its leaders are not politically active. This level of monitoring new associations and their founders was not uncommon. LVIA, Col. 51 (U.W.W.): Syg. 1658, Letter dated October 8, 1927.

Central Archives of Modern Records in Warszawa. State situational reports, discussed above, provide important insights into associational life, suggesting how and why it continued to differ across the regions of interwar Poland. In addition to the situational reports, the Polish state collected detailed information on civil and political associations. The more systematic nature of this data facilitates the comparison of regional variation in political domination and ethnic fragmentation of interwar Poland's associational life. Vast portions of governmental documents were destroyed during World War II. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of documents remains. Among others, these include associations' statutes and registration sheets that detail the political affiliation of organizations and of their members. Though no records on the political affiliations of local associations' members from the Warszawa voivodeship survived, large amounts of detailed registration sheets remain for both the Vilnius and Kraków voivodeships. As such, Vilnius and Kraków, rather than Warszawa and Kraków, are utilized in the systematic comparison of how pre-WWI legacies of (1) political exclusion and cultural repression or (2) political inclusion and cultural autonomy, respectively, continued to shape regional variation in the character of civil society during the interwar period.

I. The national convergence in associational character of interbellum Poland: politicization, political domination, and ethnic fragmentation

A Brief Historical background: The Re-emergence of Poland after WWII (1918) as an autonomous state

The end of the First World War brought the re-emergence of an independent Polish state. Among others, the reconstructed Republic of Poland included the pre-WWI Prussian ruled (German after 1871) Duchy of Poznań, the pre-WWI Russian-ruled Congress Poland and the formerly Austrian-ruled western Galicia, including the Duchy of Kraków. Lviv and its surrounding areas did not join the Polish state until 1920, while the Russian-ruled Kresy (Borderlands) and easternmost regions of Austrian-ruled Galicia did not come under Polish rule until the conclusion of the Polish-Russian war (1919-1921, also known as the Polish-Ukrainian war). In addition to constant conflicts over borders with its neighbors, interwar Poland was characterized by political, economic and social instability brought about partly by the significant pre-WWI variation of the rejoined regions and partly by the political and economic crises that swept through interwar Europe.

Political Instability

The interwar Polish period can be divided into four distinct political periods: an ethnically-exclusionary democracy (1918-1926), a multiethnic and partially democratic autocracy (1926-1930), an increasingly repressive dictatorship (1930-1935), and a turn towards radicalism and fascism (1935-1939). Founders of interwar Poland aspired to develop a democratic state. Yet from the beginning, Polish politics were characterized by intense conflict and discord wrought by competing groups, each with distinct ideals and interests. Deeply rooted contestation of how the new Polish state would and should look was already visible during the drafting of the Republic's constitution. The views that came to dominate the interwar Polish debate were, early on, represented by two of interwar Poland's founders and political rivals—Józef Piłsudski, a military leader who played a key part in constructing and leading Polish legionaries during WWI, and Roman Dmowski, a leader of the pre-WWI and interwar Polish national right (Rothschild 1974:46–7). Both figures were influential in

Poland's early political scene. Yet as a celebrated and charismatic war hero, Piłsudski had the upper hand.

Upon his post-war return to Warszawa, Piłsudski was granted power as the Chief of State and as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Rothschild 1974:46). Piłsudski was one of the leaders of the pre-WWI Polish Socialist Party (PPS, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) in Austrian-ruled Galicia. As such, the left saw him as their ally in the newly emergent Polish state. They hoped that thanks to his popularity and position of power, Piłsudski would push for and institute social reforms such as land reform, nationalization of industries, social security, etc. However, after the reconstruction of independent Poland, Piłsudski began to gravitate away from socialist ideals and towards an apolitical vision of the state. Thus, in an ironic turn in the light of his 1926 coup d'état, Piłsudski argued that the responsibility for shaping the contours of the future state should rest solely in the hands of the democratically elected assembly.

To the chagrin of Poland's socialists, the first democratic elections brought the Polish nationalist right into power. Part of the reason for the success of the right was the absence of large sectors of Polish society, most notably large parts of its ethnic minorities, from the election. While a large part of interwar Polish minorities resided in still-disputed territories, and thus were excluded from the first vote, large parts of the Ukrainian population already residing within Poland's borders boycotted the elections (Rothschild 1974:46–7). The first assembly, which was led by the right-wing, made multiple politically motivated and historically criticized decisions that shaped the state's first constitution and thus political development during the interbellum era. Believing that Piłsudski would fill the office of president, they purposely weakened presidential powers and increased those of the legislature. Thus, Poland's democracy, which lasted from 1918 until 1926, was one of an unstable, deeply fragmented democratic state. Between 1918 and 1926 there were 26 Polish and 33 ethnic minorities parties that were elected to the Senate and Sejm (Rothschild 1974:31). Moreover, the cabinet, which held executive power, was dependent on the majority in the Sejm. The unstable nature of the Sejm meant that in the eight years of Polish democracy, there were 14 different cabinets (Rothschild 1974:50). Historians have argued that the disproportionate power that was granted to the legislature contributed to the unstable and ineffectual nature of the pre-1926 state, and thus contributed to Piłsudski's military intervention and the end of the democratic state (Bernhard 1998; Rothschild 1974:46–48).

Scholars have separated the period after Piłsudski's coup into two phases: a multiethnic autocracy that spanned Piłsudski's rule (1926-1935), and a turn towards nationalist fascism that lasted from Piłsudski's death in 1935 until the start of WWII (e.g. Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010). In discussing the variation in the autocratic regime under Piłsudski's rule and after his death, Kopstein and Wittenberg (2010) define Piłsudski's multiethnic autocracy by its undemocratic and authoritarian yet ethnically inclusive political institutions. Piłsudski's *Sanacja* regime, later known as the *Bez Partyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem* (BBWR, Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government), not only included minorities in politics but also protected minority rights and sought to lessen, rather than increase, ethnic discrimination. Though the increasingly right-wing, nationalist and ethnically-exclusionary regime that followed Piłsudski's death was not fully fascist, it was close to it. The post-1935 Polish state was defined by both the dissolution of democratic institutions and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from power.

The division of the interwar state into three distinct periods sufficiently captures the relationship between the state and ethnic minorities. However, it overlooks qualitative differences in the political inclusion of Piłsudski's dictatorship that marked its first and last years. From 1926 to 1930, despite the growing strength of executive posts (Rothschild

1974:57–8), Piłsudski's dictatorship was characterized by a continuation of democratic institutions and hopes, particularly the continuation of a legislative body, which though weaker, was largely seen as still legitimate. It was not until 1929, and more so the early 1930s that most political parties and actors gave up on the hope for the revival of democracy under Piłsudski's leadership. Prior to 1930, Piłsudski's rule was still largely inclusive of democratically elected political actors. Yet in the 1930s, it was characterized by the dissolution of democratic institutions and the repression of parties and actors opposed to Piłsudski's BBWR regime (Rothschild 1974:64). For instance, while historians generally accept the veracity of the 1928 legislative election results, the results of the 1930 elections are viewed as corrupt and skewed in favor of the ruling regime (Davies 2005:424).

Economic Instability

Significant challenges faced by interwar Poland resulted from the wide variation across its regions that, prior to WWI, had been ruled by different states. In addition to fostering political variation across these regions, which contributed to the political fragmentation of the interwar state (Rothschild 1974:29), a century of development under different regimes contributed to significant economic and infrastructural variation across interwar Polish states. These differences, in turn, created further obstacles to economic development. For instance, lands under former German rule were more economically developed, ranging from the agriculturally modernized region of Poznań to Śląsk (Silesia), which was the most industrially developed area of the interwar state (see Table 1, below). Regions formerly under Russian rule were divided between the economically advanced areas surrounding industrial centers, particularly Warszawa and Łódź, whose industries were “second only to Silesia,” and between highly underdeveloped and agrarian areas, including those that had been part of the eastern borderlands (*Kresy*) (Rothschild 1974:29). Industrialization and agricultural development in southern Poland, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian state, lagged behind formerly German regions and the industrial belt of the Russian-ruled Congress (Warszawa and Łódź) Poland. Most of this region's industrial development concentrated in the vicinity of Kraków and Lviv, as well as two additional counties of the Kraków voivodeship (Biała and Chrzanów), which bordered Polish Silesia.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴The county of Biała was not part of the historic Galicja, but rather of Cieszyń-Silesia, which though under Austrian rule, had a development path different from the rest of Austrian-ruled Polish lands. Similarly, the county of Chrzanów had, along with that of Kraków, a distinct historical trajectory as part of the Free City of Kraków before coming under Austrian rule. This was discussed in Chapter III.

Pre-WWI	Voivodeship (<i>Województwo</i>)	County (<i>Powiat</i>) or City	Agriculture	Industry	Commerce	Transportation
	Warszawa (Warszawa)	<i>all</i>	60.8	21.2	5.5	3.5
		Warszawa	26.5	39.1	9.1	8.1
	Łódź	Warszawa city	0.4	42.6	20.1	8.9
		<i>all</i>	48.6	31.4	8.2	3.0
Russian	Vilnius (<i>Vilnius</i>)	Łódź	32.5	49.5	6.3	3.4
		<i>all</i>	72.3	10.2	4.8	2.8
	Kraków	Vilnius	83.3	7.1	1.6	1.9
		Vilnius city	2.6	34.7	18.1	10.1
Austrian	Lviv (<i>Lwów</i>)	<i>all</i>	59.5	18.6	5.9	4.2
		Kraków	46.9	28.8	3.9	7.0
	Poznań	Kraków city only	0.9	30.6	20.7	7.5
		<i>all</i>	68.8	11.9	6.2	3.0
German	Śląsk (Silesia)	Lviv	32.5	49.5	6.3	3.4
		Lviv city	0.3	62.2	17.1	4.8
	Poznań	<i>all</i>	47.1	22.5	6.5	7.3
		Poznań	47.4	27.1	4.3	7.1
	Śląsk (Silesia)	Poznań city	0.8	36.1	17.4	13.7
		<i>all</i>	12.2	54.6	5.2	19.4

Table 1. Percentage of the Population living off Agriculture, Industry, Commerce or Transportation, by region and pre-WWI imperial state.

Notes: Data from 1931, *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny* (1938), Part II, Table 23. (Poland 1939:32–4)

In addition to facing the challenge of reconciling regions with a century of distinct development, the young Polish democracy was faced with multiple economic crises. Prior to Piłsudski's coup, the Polish economy was in disarray. Throughout March and April, 1926 the Polish *złoty* crashed, runs on banks led to the collapse of multiple financial institutions, and unemployment swelled (Rothschild 1974:52–3). The public blamed the constantly quarreling legislature for the country's economic plight and "calls for a dictatorship became ever more general and open" (Rothschild 1974:52). Following Piłsudski's coup, some of the country's economic troubles were alleviated due to Piłsudski's leadership, technocratic approach and favorable international changes (Rothschild 1974:61, 66). However, fundamental socio-economic problems, such as the lack of land reform, went largely unaddressed (Rothschild 1974:66–7), leading historians to judge Piłsudski's approach as one of attempting to fix the country through minimal, technocratic development that largely sought to preserve the status quo (Bernhard 1998). The lack of real reform compounded the economic crises brought on by the Great Depression, whose effects reached Poland in the early 1930s (Rothschild 1974:68). The depth of the crisis, compounded by Piłsudski's increasingly dictatorial and repressive state, increased social discontentment, leading to former supporters—including Socialists, Populists and their social bases—to abandon support of the charismatic leader. With the state unable to answer the public's demands, social support grew for both the radical left and radical right opposition (Rothschild 1974:72).

Interwar national convergence in associational character: growing politicization and political domination of associational life

Political transformations

Prior to 1926, the interwar Polish state was best described as an ethnic democracy. Though the nation's minorities faced state-backed and state-led discrimination, the state was ruled by a democratically elected legislature. Besides the radical communist left, political actors of all ideologies were allowed to participate in the state's political institutions. Poland's democracy officially came to an end in 1926. The first years following Piłsudski's coup saw the continuation of democratically elected institutions and the hope of Poland's political actors that their continual participation *within* official state institutions could lead to compromise and change. For example, notes sent from the Kraków *Starosta* (Mayor) to the *Wydział Bezpieczeństwa Państwowego* (WBP, Department of State Security), which detail a September 9th, 1928 meeting of the *Związek Ludowo-Narodowy* (ZLN, the Popular National Union), state how the ZLN's leaders proclaimed their "confidence" that they can take power in the country; and, that though *Sanacja* had been able to break up other coalitions, the ZLN is strong. During the meeting, the ZLN's leadership further proclaimed that the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), which previously had seen Piłsudski as its ally, was also unhappy with the war hero. In response, it was suspected that the Polish Socialists were preparing to form a coalition poised to take power once Piłsudski "retires." Though the PPS approached the ZLN with a proposal, the ZLN refused. Subsequently, its leaders assured the ZLN membership that they would be able to rise to a position of power once Piłsudski's supposed successor—Rydz-Śmigły—took charge. They claimed that "he [would] be easier to sway by the senate and parties."¹¹⁵ This account of a 1928 meeting of the Popular National Union shows that not only did some political parties not yet view themselves as completely excluded from political institutions and power, but that they still believed that they could be able to further their agendas by participating in rather than against formal political institutions.

Yet the hope that the state could be changed through official institutions did not last long after the coup. Already in 1928 and 1929 state repression of the "opposition,"¹¹⁶ sidelining of non-regime political parties, even pro-government parties, such as the PPS,¹¹⁷ and a politically motivated cleansing of the bureaucracy¹¹⁸ was visible. The years after 1930 saw further progression towards the exclusion and repression of political parties from the state—a move that Piłsudski believed would save Polish politics from "corrosive" political parties and conflict (Rothschild 1974:59, 61). Public meetings held by oppositional parties were targeted. Some were prohibited, others were shut down if they took place without a permit or deviated from specified regulations.¹¹⁹ Sympathizers and members of oppositional

¹¹⁵ AP Kraków, Col. 206 (U.W. Kr.): Syg. 637 (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy, 1927).

¹¹⁶ For example, a situational report recounts how on February 13th, 1929 a local municipal council in Sieniawa was dissolved due to being "under the influence" of the left-wing, populist *Wyzwolenie* party. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699, Monthly and Weekly Reports for 1923, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932.

Another report from May 1929 notes how the ZMKP (CC) was inactive following police repressions that occurred during May 1st celebrations. AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 108, Kraków Situational Reports, 1928-9. Moreover, though the famous and high-profile arrests and Brześć trials of oppositional leaders did not take place until September 1930 and October 1931, respectively, local populist "agitators" were awaiting trial for "illegal gatherings" in the Limanowa Powiat in the Kraków voivodeship in July 1930. AP Kraków, Col. 216: Syg. 698, Weekly and Monthly reports from Limanowa county.

¹¹⁷ A government memo, dated August 19th, 1929, notes the dissatisfaction of pro-government parties at being sidelined by *Sanacja*/BBWR regime and having no say in organizational and local government matters. AP Kraków, Col. 206 (U.W. Kr.): Syg. 642, p. 265.

¹¹⁸ Among various critiques of the state that were recorded during a pre-election meeting of the Polish Railroad Workers Association in February 1928, one included the criticism that bureaucrats who support oppositional parties are losing their positions. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 637.

¹¹⁹ For example, August 1933 Situational Reports from Limanowa County, AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 698.

parties were arrested during manifestations and political actions for “causing disorder,” a means by which the state aimed to deter those who would support the opposition.¹²⁰ The post 1930 regime was criticized for “brutal beatings” and the arrest, trial and incarceration of famous oppositional left-wing leaders, an affair known as the Brześć Trials (Rothschild 1974:64). Thus, the period from 1930 to 1935 was characterized by visible growth in state-led exclusion and repression of the regime’s opposition, thus marking a definitive transition away from democratic institutions toward a fully autocratic regime.

Even before Piłsudski’s death, 1935 heralded further significant changes for the Polish state. The new constitution of 1935 once more increased executive power. Among other rights, the president was granted the power to dissolve the legislature, to dismiss the whole cabinet or individual ministers, to issue ordinances equal to laws, and the right to appoint one or two candidates to succeed him. The new constitution, and the further solidification of dictatorial power that it brought, was protested by oppositional parties, which abstained from the 1935 elections (Rothschild 1974:69). After Piłsudski’s death the BBWR splintered between the older camp, which wanted to resume its former alliance with the socialists, technocrats who wanted to focus on the economy and continue Piłsudski’s attempts to de-politicize the state, and a right-wing faction that sought to legitimize its rule by utilizing civil society to mobilizing social support (Rothschild 1974:70–1). Seeing the rising popularity and organizational power of the radical (fascist) far-right, the third faction believed that it could muster similar social support by adopting the right’s strategies and ideologies (Rothschild 1974:71). Yet despite its attempts to do so, the ruling regime failed to muster significant social support. Local elections which, unlike national-level ones, were less corrupt, showed overwhelming social support for the opposition—both left and right (Rothschild 1974:72). Yet before the theater of interwar Polish politics could further play out, World War II brought it to an end.

Hypothesis

If political inclusion encourages the de-politicization of civil society in favor of negotiation and cooperation within the confines of political institutions, then we would expect a relatively de-politicized pre-1926 Polish associational landscape. In other words, we would expect that, prior to 1926, interwar Poland ought to have been characterized by a vibrant political society, including political parties, and a vibrant but largely apolitical, or in the least free from political domination, civil society. Conversely, if political exclusion leads to the politicization of civil society, then, beginning with 1926 to some extent, and in 1928-1930 to a much greater degree, we would expect the increasing politicization and political domination of Poland’s associational landscape. Officially, democracy in interwar Poland ended in 1926. However, as argued above, it was 1930 rather than 1926 that signifies the more significant shift in state politics and the attitudes and perceptions of political actors. It was not until 1928, to some degree, and 1930 fully, that non-*Sanacja* (BBWR) political actors felt themselves effectively excluded from real political power. As they came to understand that change could no longer be effected through their participation within state institutions, members of the opposition returned to pre-WWI strategies of social mobilization

¹²⁰ A situational report from September 9, 1933 notes that there is reduced rural support for the People’s Party (SL, *Stronnictwo Ludowe*) out of fear or being arrested, due to arrests of rural sympathizers and activists during a previous manifestation (“disorderly events,” *zaburzenia*) that took place. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700, Situational Reports from Ropczyce, 1923-1933.

within and throughout civil society. Once oppositional political actors moved political contestation from political into civil society, the state had to follow.

Political exclusion and associational politicization

The narrative that emerges from state reports of political, social and organizational life suggests that the politicization and political domination of civil society significantly grew after 1926, and even more so in the 1930s. Nonetheless, the eight years of Polish democracy were not completely devoid of the domination of civil society. Some political actors created new or co-opted existing associations, and planned to use them to mobilize social support. This, however, was largely limited to social mobilization and agitation of the left. While socialists felt themselves to be marginalized in state institutions, the radical (communist) left was actively excluded and repressed by the interwar state. The former tended to utilize its pre-WWI ties to certain sectors of civil society, namely to labor unions, to mobilize strikes and protests. Such actions aimed to push economic change—such as higher pay—that would benefit the working class. Moreover, in addition to mobilizing labor unions to show support for the left-wing political agenda, left-wing parties mobilized their civil society allies to protest state repression of the left, particularly of the radical left, which had been a cornerstone of the interwar Polish state since its inception. For instance, in 1923 the PPS was active in strikes against the confiscation of left-wing papers by state agencies.¹²¹

The use of labor unions by the left to mobilize not only for immediate, economic, but also for political goals is a clear example of the politicization of civil society—the use of seemingly non-political civil society networks, institutions or associations to further a political group’s agenda—that characterized pre-1926 interwar Poland. Yet even in the face of the state-repression of the radical left, pre-1926 politicization of civil society by the marginalized—yet not repressed—legal left remained limited. Despite their use of alliances and ties with certain civil society organizations, left-wing political actors continued to mostly rely on their inclusion in state institutions to further their goals. In other words, despite its marginalization, the left continued to seek to work through formal state institutions rather than to turn society against the state.¹²²

Following the fall of Polish democracy, political mobilization outside of official political institutions and organizations increased. Yet while it was the political left which felt marginalized in the pre-1926 period, it was the political right that was first to fear political exclusion after Piłsudski, a former Socialist leader, overthrew the democratic state. By 1927 local government agencies increasingly took note of the politicization and attempts at co-optation, if not yet domination by single parties, of local associations.¹²³ An April 1927 police report noted the presence of ZLN (right-wing) activists and the broaching of political topics at a local Sokół meeting. Another report, in discussing the National Coalition’s (SN, *Stronnictwo Narodowe*) plans to develop branches of the nationalist National Guard within local circles of the Gymnastics Association “Sokół,” noted that though the SN had always been active, its mobilizing activity was not “intensive” until the 1926 coup.¹²⁴ Such

¹²¹ For further examples, see the Monthly Situational Reports from the Kraków voivodeship, AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg.: 534, Syg.: 535.

¹²² In a Monthly Situational Report from November 1923, it is noted that the Party of Independent Socialists, though critical of the arresting of communists in Kraków, utilized political, not civil, society—namely to party meetings, to critique the state’s actions. (AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 534)

¹²³ For examples, see AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 706: Komenda Policji: Organizacje Polityczne, 1927-1933, 1936. Examples cited in the text: February, March, April 1927.

¹²⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 640.

examples show that correctly fearing that Piłsudski's successful power grab would limit the right-wing voice within the state, right-wing organizations joined the radical left in mobilizing civil society as a means to leverage power against a state from which they felt increasingly excluded.

Right-wing political organizations were not the only ones to react to Piłsudski's coup by turning towards the politicization of civil society and the expansion of their political networks of civil society allies. Some police reports on seemingly non-political associations, such as agricultural circles that still did not have political ties, noted how discussion often turned political and involved critiques of the state and its repression of oppositional parties and the press.¹²⁵ Other reports further highlighted not merely growing political interest and discussion in non-political associations, but the attempts of political groups to co-opt non-political associations into their political networks. For instance, a report from March 1927 noted that the Monarchist Association was trying to gain support of civil society associations, such as a labor union of masonry workers. To do so, the former had promised to find work for politically sympathetic workers. Furthermore, it sought to win support among the unemployed by planning to open a Credit Association.

Despite their turn towards politicizing civil society following the coup, non-regime political parties did not fully shift their efforts away from participation within political institutions and towards civil society organizations until the late 1920s and early 1930s. Until the intensification of state exclusion and repressions of the opposition in 1930, as noted by the disbanding of Parliament and the corruption of the November 1930 elections, non-regime political actors believed that they could regain power through existing political institutions. Notes sent from the Kraków *Starosta* (Mayor) to the *Wydział Bezpieczeństwa Państwowego* (WBP, Department of State Security), which detail a September 9th, 1928 meeting of the *Związek Ludowo-Narodowy* (ZLN, the Popular National Union), state how the ZLN's leaders proclaimed their "confidence" that they can take power in the country, that though *Sanacja* had been able to break up other coalitions, the ZLN is strong. During the meeting, the ZLN's leadership further proclaimed that the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), which previously had seen Piłsudski as its ally, was also unhappy with the war hero. In response, the Polish Socialists were cited to be preparing to form a coalition poised to take power once Piłsudski "retires." Though the PPS approached the ZLN with a proposal, the ZLN refused. Subsequently, its leaders assured the ZLN membership that they would be able to rise to a position of power once Piłsudski's supposed successor—Rydz-Śmigły took charge—as, they claimed, "he [would] be easier to sway by the senate and parties."¹²⁶ This account of a 1928 meeting of the Popular National Union clearly demonstrates that not only did some political parties not yet view themselves as completely excluded from political institutions and power, but that they still believed that they could reach their political goals by participating in rather than against formal political institutions.

Once more, the degree of politicization and political domination of associational life visibly increased by the late 1920s and early 1930s. Corresponding to the changes in Poland's political institutions were noticeable changes in details and tone of state reports written at the time. Unlike in earlier reports, such as those cited from 1927, reports of the late 1920s and early 1930s rarely deemed it important to cite the presence of political discourse that took place in "non-political" civil society associations. Rather, testifying to the heightened political engagement of associational life, they frequently noted how seemingly non-political associations actively carried out political activity under the stewardship of political parties. In

¹²⁵ For examples, see AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 706: Komenda Policji: Organizacje Polityczne, 1927-1933, 1936. Examples cited in the text.

¹²⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206 (U.W. Kr.): Syg.637 (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy, 1927).

the *early* 1930s the authors of reports still took the trouble to point out how such activity went against the regulations of such associations, which, either on the surface or in their statutes, claimed to be apolitical.¹²⁷ However, such notes on the discord between the apolitical self-presentation and politicized actions of associations disappeared from later reports. The latter no longer mentioned statutes or self-presentation, and simply noted associations' political leanings, degree of domination by particular parties and significant politically motivated endeavors.

Like the opposition, the ruling regime sought to build strong civil society ties. However, the government's turn towards the politicization and attempted co-optation of civil society did not precede that of the opposition. Rather, the regime's attempts were a response to the opposition's successful attempts to foster support through the infiltration and co-optation of civic associations. Piłsudski viewed interwar Polish society as immature (Rothschild 1974:61). Thus, following the coup, the *Sanacja* regime tried to divorce the state from society.¹²⁸ Rather than attempting to independently mobilize broader social support, the BBWR largely focused on controlling state institutions and fostering political allies, believing that by securing popular political leaders, they would secure popular support.¹²⁹ As previously discussed, the regime's increasing exclusion of other-minded political actors and parties incentivized the opposition to move its political competition out of political institutions and into civil society. At the same time, the state's dismissal of society left it disillusioned and ripe for politicization and political domination by the excluded opposition.

Local state representatives witnessed and reported the negative effect of a relative state absence from both civil and political local societies. Observing the active local political and civil mobilization of the opposition, local BBWR representatives urged the regime to follow suit. For instance, in a November 27th, 1929 letter to the Governor of Kraków, the office of the Mayor of Żywiec wrote that while the BBWR has strong support among the local population, "the lack of visits from BBWR representatives of general social mobilizing activity is felt, particularly when all the other parties constantly have such actions." The letter went on to highlight the strong ties that oppositional parties forged with local associations. It noted that while the National Coalition (SN) controlled 80% of local Sports-Gymnastics "Sokół" Associations, the socialists (PPS) were united and linked to various labor unions.¹³⁰

The call of local branches of the ruling regime for intensified activity and mobilization through local political associations and the co-optation of or cooperation with

¹²⁷For example, a March 1931 situational report takes note of how rural youth associations work "against their own statutes" as they carry out intense political activity and promotion for the Populist Coalition (SL). AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 693.

¹²⁸ Piłsudski's opposition, particularly right wing groups, were critical of Piłsudski trying to free the state from society's control. Already in 1929 his critics pointed to Germany and Italy as examples where the state was successful not because it was trying to cut itself off from society, but rather because it was working with social groups. AP Kraków Col. 206: Syg. 638, p. 63.

¹²⁹ For instance, in a situational report from Ropczyce dated September 1930 the author writes that Piast *poseł* (representative) left the populist party due to disagreements with its leader—Witos. Noting that his exist can cost the populist party about 8000 votes, the local Mayor notes that he wants to see whether the *poseł* is willing to compromise with the regime and if he can be won over to support the BBWR. The report further notes that the cooperation with the Catholic-Populist Union (Kat-Lud) for the election is "paying off." Thus, the report suggests that BBWR was active in forging high-level alliances—either with individual actors or groups—as a means of garnering social support that such actors and groups had already fostered. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700.

Another situational report from the same period (October 1930) but a different region (Brzesk), notes that a local mayor was successful in persuading a local Piast activist to leave the Piast populist party. Though the activist was unwilling to write a letter to farmers to vote for BBWR directly, he was willing to write a letter to farmers to vote for farmer groups that support the state. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 693.

¹³⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 638, File 22.

local civic associations was not limited to Żywiec. In a December 1929 situational report from Limanowa county, the author noted that local authorities persuaded the BBWR to “finally” take interest and undertake activity in the region, resulting in a BBWR meeting with about 800 people in attendance.¹³¹ Another situational report from Ropczyce described a decrease in rural support for the ruling regime and growing support for the opposition. Furthermore, it went on to recount how the local Mayor accused the regime for the decrease in support. The Mayor noted how the BBWR had secured 6,000 votes in the last election, a show of support for which the people wanted and expected their chosen representatives to make public appearances and relay his political plans. However, no BBWR representatives had visited the region, of which the Mayor was very critical.¹³² Nonetheless, though Piłsudski’s regime may have lagged behind the opposition it was not completely devoid of civil society ties. A report from October 1929 noted that a new branch of the Polish Carpathian Association, which was being developed in Żywiec, was “completely under BBWR influence,”¹³³ while a December 1929 report from Nowy Targ stated that the local BBWR was undertaking intense local activity through local government, Credit Associations and the Legionaries’ Association.¹³⁴ Yet another, March 1931 report,¹³⁵ informed that the new officers of the local *Strzelec* (Riflemen’s Association)—a youth, sports and paramilitary-like association—in Brześć were now *all* BBWR members or supporters.

The next section focuses on some sectors of civil society which were characterized by high levels of politicization and political competition. However, it ought to be noted that bulk of state reports which highlighted the high levels of politicization, political competition and political domination of association life come from the 1930s. Though the interest of political actors in associational life and ties between civil society and political society were visible prior to 1930, both phenomena were visibly intensified following the state’s turn towards increasing autocracy and the political exclusion of the state’s opposition. The most visible, significant and historically noted upon transition took place in 1936, after Piłsudski’s death, with the state’s creation of the OZN (*Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego*, The Camp of National Unity) and its direct incorporation of various civic associations directly under its political leadership (Wynot 1971).

Politicization, Political Competition and Associational Types

State reports show that political competition seeped into diverse sectors of civil society as interwar parties and the interwar state targeted various types of associations for politicization. However, certain types of associations garnered more interest among political actors than others. Political actors viewed such organizations as particularly useful for mobilizing politically desirable sectors of society; hence, they became fertile grounds for political conflict and competition. They included youth associations, ranging from sports to university to rural associations, cultural associations, professional associations—rural and urban—and associations that provided aid, such as credit associations, which were seen as optimal for leveraging social support. In many cases, political actors targeted pre-existing organizations. Political groups would send members to join desirable associations and would set their sites on dominating their leadership. In addition to attempting to co-opt already established organizations, political groups also created new associations. These were

¹³¹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 698.

¹³² AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700.

¹³³ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 540.

¹³⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699.

¹³⁵ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 694.

designed with the express purpose of spreading a particular group's ideology and mobilizing society to support its political cause.

Youth Associations

Government reports were particularly keen on keeping tabs on the political activities of youth groups. In addition to presenting a large demographic, youth were seen as energetic and politically active. High levels of political engagement earned youth groups an important place in government surveillance and reports. Youth groups were repeatedly noted as being targeted for politicization and infiltration, or as already being known extensions of political groups. For instance, the Populist Coalition targeted rural youth circles, such as the local Circles of Catholic Youth, as they had done with rural cooperatives.¹³⁶ Though the Catholic Men and Women's Youth Associations (*Katolickie Stowarzyszenie Młodzieży Męskiej i Żeńskiej*) and the Association of Rural Youth Educational Cooperative varied in their level of politicization and radicalization, both national-level, hence cross-regional, associations had close ties to the Populist Coalition (SL).¹³⁷ The Populist Coalition had a strong hold on rural society and associations, particularly in former Galicia, where pre-WWI Polish populist parties were born. Nonetheless, not all rural associations were under Populist control. A situational report from October 1933 notes how a month prior to its publication, the Popular Youth Association attached to the *Małopolskie Towarzystwo Rolnicze* (MTR, the Małopolska Rural Association) was undertaking a "cleaning" to rid its ranks of SL activists who had infiltrated the organization. This report showcases the seemingly covert tactics that political actors utilized in their attempts to gain control of civic associations. Furthermore, it highlights the awareness of associations' members that their organizations were being targeted by political society and its actors for infiltration, co-optation and politicization.¹³⁸

In addition to rural associations, youth sports associations were the focus of government surveillance and political co-optation. For instance, a July 1929 report from Kraków notes how a political group was organizing a sports club for purpose of drawing youth and winning their support for its cause.¹³⁹ Youth sports organizations were of general political interest due to their ability to connect political actors with Poland's youth. At the same time, there was a subset of sports-youth organizations that were of particular interest to both the state and its opposition as they straddled the line between sports and recreational associations on the one hand, and paramilitary associations that trained and indoctrinated youth in a militaristic and hierarchical environment on the other. These, which most famously included the Sports-Gymnastics Association *Sokół* (Falcon), *Strzelec* (Riflemen's Association), and *Polski Związek Harcerski* (PZH, Polish Scouts Association) had roots in pre-WWI nationalistic and paramilitary associations that had emerged in Polish lands under partitions. After the reconstruction of the Polish state, they continued to be the major youth sports associations associated with political parties and political conflict during the interwar period. As with any network of associations, all three had variation within their local and regional branches. Nonetheless, each association had strong linkages to specific political groups. *Strzelec*, for instance, was known for its local and national ties to the ruling regime, and hence for close cooperation between local BBWR political leaders and local *Strzelec*

¹³⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Situational Report, Nowy Targ, Febraury 1931.

¹³⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-Annual Situational Reports on the life of Polish unions and associations, 14.10.1937.

¹³⁸ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 549: Quarterly Report 1933.

¹³⁹ AP Kraków, Col. 218 (StGKr): Syg.108. Situational Report from Kraków, July 1929.

associations.¹⁴⁰ Though Sokół had stronger historical ties to the nationalist right, its local and regional circles were highly contested between the BBWR and the right-wing opposition, particularly the National Coalition (SN).¹⁴¹ Due to its ties to Piłsudski's WWI Legionaries, top leadership positions of the Scouts had ties to the ruling regime.¹⁴²

The state's notes on Sokół's, Strzelec's and the Scout's political ties, as presented in situational reports, are supported by a sample of the three associations, which contains the political affiliation, by percentage, of the members from the local branches of each organization. The sample was compiled from registries and individual registration sheets and collected in the State Archives in Poznań and in Kraków, and the Lithuanian Central State Archives in Vilnius, and is a sub-sample of a larger set that is further discussed in Part IV of this chapter. The sample contains information on the political affiliation of four Scouts associations, 45 Sokół associations and 124 Strzelec associations. The overwhelming majority of Strzelec associations (102, 82%) were noted as having a predominantly BBWR influence or affiliation, while the rest were either contested by multiple parties (often BBWR and SN) or under left-wing influence. This thus supports the observation that Strzelec was mostly a civil society extension of the BBWR. Of the 45 Sokół associations 12 (27%) were predominantly under BBWR influence, 13 (29%) under the National Coalition (SN), 6 (13%) were registered as having no political association, 5 (11%) were under the influence of the Christian Democrats (ChD) and the rest under various populist associations. This sample, though relatively small, provides some convincing support for the assertion that though right-wing associations had a strong influence in Sokół, control over this association was much more disputed. It is important to note that the political affiliation data for local Sokół branches was only available for the Kraków voivodeship, where scholars have asserted that Sokół was more resistant to infiltration and domination by the nationalist right than in other regions (Snopko 1997). Of the four Scouts associations three (75%) are listed as under BBWR influence and one (25%) as having no political affiliation. Though this small sample does not refute the assertion that the Scouts were predominantly under BBWR influence, it is too small to provide significant evidence in support of it.

The third type of youth association that garnered copious interest and notoriety for its political, as well as anti-Semitic, involvement and actions during the interwar period was composed of Academic Youth Associations. Multiple government reports commented on the ongoing conflict between pro-government youth, who in the earlier 1930s in Kraków supported and were joined by Jewish youth, and nationalist youth for the control of university associations, such as *Biblioteka Stowarzyszenia Prawa UJ* (UJ Law Association Library), *Stowarzyszenie Studentów Prawa* (Law Students Association) and *Bratnia Pomoc Medyków UJ* (Brotherly Aid of UJ Medicine Students).¹⁴³ Though university students focused on ideological competition within such associations, their conflicts were part of the broader political battles that swept through Poland's civil society. Situational reports informed how certain groups had the backing of university professors and administrators with similar

¹⁴⁰ A December 1932 situational report from Nowy Targ notes that Strzelec held a countywide conference, at which the presidents of all local BBWR associations were present.

¹⁴¹ A situational report notes that while Sokół's members mostly belong to the SN and ChD in Biała county, they are mostly BBWR members or sympathizers in Kraków. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 549: Quarterly Reports, September 1933.

¹⁴² AP Warszawa, Col. 3054: Syg. 14. Błażejowski Waclaw (1933). *Historja Harcerstwa Polskiego*. Harcerskie Biuro Wydawnicze przy naczelnictwie związkzu harcerstwa Polskiego.

¹⁴³ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 109, Monthly and Quarterly Reports, April 1933.

political leanings. Rather than being left to their own devices, student groups were backed by political sympathizers in their struggles for the domination of key student associations.¹⁴⁴ Student groups like Brotherly Aid were of particular interest, for as service and mutual aid providing associations, they granted their leaders additional leverage among its members and the broader student population.

Women's, Rural and Cultural Associations

In addition to youth, adult women were identified as important political allies by the ruling regime, as well as by right-wing and left-wing opposition groups. While one report identifies rural women as the BBWR's key supporters in resisting the mobilization efforts of Polish Socialists (PPS) in the countryside,¹⁴⁵ another notes that the Populist Coalition (SL) is attempting to mimic the BBWR—and its close ties¹⁴⁶ to the socially and politically engaged Women's Civic Work Association (OPK, *Zw. Obywatelski Pracy Kobiet*)—by organizing women “everywhere.”¹⁴⁷ While the OPK was known to have close ties to the BBWR, the National Women's Organization (NOK, *Narodowa Organizacja Kobiet*) was known to have close ties to the national right.¹⁴⁸ Other associations which received considerable concern with respect to their political affiliation, and which were obviously targeted for infiltration and co-optation by the ruling regime as well as its political opposition included rural and cultural associations.¹⁴⁹

Social or economic service providing associations

¹⁴⁴ A voting for leaders of the *Bratnia Pomoc* (Brotherly Aid) at Jagiellonian University (UJ) in Kraków was noted in a quarterly report from the first quarter of 1934. The author of the report wrote that it was claimed that the nephew of a Nationalist Coalition (SN) professor was present at the meeting, where he took down the names of those who voted for members of the nationalist *Młodzież Wielkiej Polski* (MWP). The report states that supposedly younger youth was afraid that he was also noting names of those who did not support MWP candidates in the election and they he would also pass these on to the professor. The latter would then “treat them appropriately” during exams. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 552.

A 1938 bi-annual informed its readers that nationalist youth continued to dominate social life at UJ, imposing their ideology on students. The MWP nationalist youth has support from a group of professors and administrators at the university in pursuing their political agenda. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581, October 22, 1938.

Also see AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-Annual reports on the life of Polish unions and associations, 14.10.1937, p. 6-7.

¹⁴⁵ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and Weekly Situational Reports, May 1930.

¹⁴⁶ For example, a report from September and October 1930 notes the newly elected leadership of the local OPK in Nowy Targ. The elected representatives included the wives of the local mayor, of local industrialists, of the director of the county BBWR association, of a bureaucrat and judge. All but the industrialists can be safely assumed to be members of sympathizers of the BBWR (as they all are tied to the local bureaucracy, particularly in the Kraków voivodeship), which as mentioned before, had been undergoing a cleansing by the BBWR to ensure that government administrators and bureaucrats were BBWR supporters. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and Weekly Reports.

¹⁴⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and Weekly Reports, March 1933.

¹⁴⁸ For example, a January 1933 report notes that there were 40 people present at a local Christmas celebration (*opłatek*) organized by NOK, including local SN leaders and sympathizers. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and Weekly Reports.

¹⁴⁹ For regime interest in rural associations see, for example, AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700, Starostwo Ropczyce, Situational Report from December 1932 and from May 1933.

For the politicization (such as significant ties to political parties or domination by political groups) and political competition within cultural associations, such as the Folk School Association (TSL, *Towarzystwo Szkoły Ludowej*) or the Polish Educational Association (PMS, *Polska Macierz Szkolna*) see AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 697, Starostwo Powiatowe w Dąbrowie, Monthly and Weekly Situational Reports for October 1929, or AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9 (MSW-dopływ): Syg. 1046 Quarterly Reports on the Life of Legal Polish Unions and Associations, 1933.

Youth, rural and women's associations, among others, were targeted by political actors due to their ability—whether real or assumed—to aid political groups in organizing, mobilizing and indoctrinating demographic groups of particular interest. Organizations that provided crucial social or economic services were of particular interest not because of the specific groups that they would mobilize, but because of the leverage—or incentive—with which they armed their leaders to exert pressure on the associations' members or beneficiaries. Associations that provided crucial social services to its members included, among others, university mutual aid associations.

The competition for political and ideological influence over university mutual aid associations was one of the most recurring political conflicts within civic associations that occupied the pages of interwar reports furnished by the Public Security Division (*Wydział Bezpieczeństwa*). While other regions, such as Vilnius, had ideological, largely ethnically focused, tensions within their universities already in the 1920s,¹⁵⁰ Kraków's main university—Uniwersytet Jagielloński (UJ)—did not exhibit ideologically strained relations and competition in its associations until the early 1930s. Government reports only mentioned the issue when relevant, usually when reporting an incident or generally commenting on the ideological sway of associations. Nonetheless government reports on the political conflict that swept UJ's associations, and particularly its mutual aid and social service providing associations, presents a clear view into why such associations were so politically desirable. Earlier reports, dating from 1932, merely mentioned the struggle between state-sympathizing and state-tied groups over the control of mutual-aid organizations at Kraków's Jagiellonian University. UJ *Bratnia Pomoc*, the main mutual aid association at the University, was already “controlled” by members of the pro-BBWR Union of Polish Democratic Youth (*ZPM*, *Zw. Polskiej Młodzieży Demokratycznej*) in 1931 and retained its control until at least 1934.¹⁵¹ By 1934, University mutual aid associations, including *Bratnia Pomoc* and the Library of Law Students were the sites of politically and ideologically motivated competition between pro-state and nationalist youth groups.¹⁵² The intense conflict was motivated by the power over the student body that such control would bring. Those in charge of these associations could decide who would benefit from the services that they allotted. The Association of Brotherly Aid, for instance, decided who would be assigned to the coveted low-rent university housing. It is not surprising that leaders of the association were frequently critiqued for using the services to “reward,” and thus increase, their supporters. After all, that was the association's appeal.¹⁵³

The desire for political control over such associations was further made clear by the strategies that political youth groups adopted to attain it. A report from 1937 describes the length to which MWP went in order to ensure its control of UJ's *Bratnia Pomoc*. In addition to taking names of supporters of MWP youth—and their opposition—during elections, which were subsequently passed onto professors who would treat supporting and opposing students “appropriately,” the MWP was accused of coercively filling the ranks of *Bratnia Pomoc*. Prior to elections, the MWP informed its members that if they did not sign up for *Bratnia Pomoc* they would be thrown out of the MWP. Moreover, it notified its members that if the 3zł required to join the mutual aid association posed a problem for anyone, he or she could come to the MWP office for help. There they would receive the small sum necessary to

¹⁵⁰ For example, at the Medical Department at the Stefan Batory University of Vilnius, LVIA, Col. 51: Syg. 294, *Ruch Narodowościowy*, March 12, 1926.

¹⁵¹ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 739: OWP, 15.5.1931-6.1.1932.

¹⁵² AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 578: Quarterly Reports, July 24th, 1934.

¹⁵³ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 578: Quarterly Reports, July 24th, 1934.

join.¹⁵⁴ The MWP's organizational tactics, along with growing support for nationalist ideology amongst Polish youth meant that by 1938 UJ's mutual aid associations were under the complete control of nationalist youth. As such, by the end of the 1930s it was pro-nationalist, rather than pro-regime, youth that received the benefits and services allotted by UJ's *Bratnia Pomoc* and other mutual aid associations.¹⁵⁵

University mutual aid associations were certainly not the only associations the domination of which provided their leaders considerable leverage over members and target populations. However, these received copious amounts of coverage in the pages of governmental situational reports. As such, they are good example of just why the politicization of such associations was so desirable to political actors and thus so susceptible to political competition for their domination. Other mutual aid and service providing associations that were targeted by political groups included, among others, credit associations, health insurance organizations, and associations that provided some sort of needed services as one of their aims, such as educational courses or economic aid. For instance, a 1927 police report notes that the Monarchist (political reactionaries) association was trying to open a credit association. The former aimed to use the latter as a means of gaining political support, particularly among the unemployed.¹⁵⁶ Another government report from 1930 notes how the regime successfully carried out a takeover of health insurance associations that had previously been under the influence of socialists. Following the state-enacted cleansing of their top ranks, the associations' leadership positions were staffed by government commissioners, effectively bringing them under the "vigilant control of the state."¹⁵⁷ Showcasing another example of this pattern, a letter from the Investigative Division (*Komenda Śledcza*) to the Mayor of Vilnius notes that despite its benign name and focus on the development of the region, the Association for the Economic Development of Vilnius (*Towarzystwo Gospodarczego Rozwoju Wileńszczyzny*) aims to "organize members of narrow views and ideologies" with socialist leanings.¹⁵⁸

In addition to associations that were purely focused on supplying economic aid, associations that provided for some sort of local need were similarly sought out for politicization. For instance, agricultural circles under BBWR stewardship mixed politics with the provision of real and needed economic and agricultural advice, including technical agricultural courses.¹⁵⁹ In other instances, political groups cutout the middle man, and took it onto themselves to provide for local needs. For example, the nationalist OWP (*Obóz Wielkiej Polski*, Camp of Great Poland) was noted for organizing an event for the children of the unemployed, during which its members gave out tea, and which aimed at "recruiting as many sympathizers as possible."¹⁶⁰ In a different area, the OWP was cited as trying to break the Polish Socialist Party's (PPS) local political "monopoly." To do so, the nationalist organization organized meetings at which, in addition to campaigning for the boycotting of Jewish stores, it provided two loans for the opening of two stores by local OWP

¹⁵⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 137: Public Safety reports, 1937, file page 43-7.

¹⁵⁵ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual reports from the life of Polish unions and associations, dated 22.10.1938, file page 105.

¹⁵⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 706: Komenda Policji: organizacje polityczne, 17.3.1927.

¹⁵⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 693: Starostwo w Brzesku, Weekly and Monthly reports, January 1930.

¹⁵⁸ LVIA, Col. 53: Syg. 3224: Towarzystwo Gospodarczego Rozwoju Wileńszczyzny, letter dated 11.1.1938.

¹⁵⁹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700: Starostwo Ropczyce: Situational Report, February 1932.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 697: Starostwo Powiatowe w Dąbrowie: Situational Weekly and Monthly Reports, January 1933.

¹⁶⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 109: Monthly and Quarterly Reports, February 1932.

sympathizers. The OWP's actions were thus simultaneously viewed as "aiding" the local Christian community broadly and OWP supporters specifically.¹⁶¹

Government reports provide persuasive evidence that political parties in interbellum Poland targeted specific types of associations as tools for mobilizing social support and furthering their political agendas. These included associations that targeted demographic groups that were seen as important civil society mobilizers—such as women or youth—and associations that either existed solely to provide for an actual local need or which provided needed local services as one of their agendas. Such service-providing associations allowed their controlling groups to leverage the provision of service to further garner local sympathy and support. Yet just because political actors may have targeted specific associations, it neither follows that they targeted all associations of a particular kind nor that they were successful in their attempts at achieving politicization or political domination. Table 2 (below) provides a different view of the interwar Polish associational types and their likelihood of political domination. Drawing on a random sample of 3144 associations from interwar Kraków, Vilnius and Volyn, Table 2 lists the average highest single party political affiliation of each listed associational type. In other words, Table 2 lists, by type of organization, the mean of the highest percentage of members of each association that belonged to or supported a single political party. For instance, if 60% of members of one cooperative belong to the PPS, 20% to the SN and 20% to the BBWR, and 80% of members of another cooperative belonged to the SN, and 20% to the BBWR, then the average highest single party affiliation for these two cooperatives would be 70% $(60+80/2)$. The highest single party political affiliation thus aims to compare the degree to which the membership of various types of associations within and across regions tended to be dominated by, or support, a single political party.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 696: Powiat Brzeski, Monthly Reports, August 1933.

¹⁶² For a detailed key of types of associations classified under each organizational type, see Appendix IV A, Table 1. Additional details regarding how the highest average single party affiliation was calculated can be found on page 196 in this chapter.

Organization Type	Voivodeship (<i>Województwo</i>)		
	Kraków	Vilnius	Volyn
Agricultural	66.17 [271]	70.46 [27]	-
Credit	51.37 [51]	80.38 [13]	-
Cultural	78.64 [171]	75.28 [18]	-
Interest	78.47 [72]	81.53 [61]	-
Mutual Aid	66.00 [5]	83.00 [5]	-
Nationalist/Paramilitary	76.14 [200]	87.89 [24]	-
Philanthropic	74.28 [69]	77.41 [22]	-
Professional	66.16 [132]	80.77 [79]	81.5 [351]
Recreational	65.00 [103]	80.84 [19]	-
Religious	77.86 [37]	55.00 [1]	-
Volunteer Fire Fighters	69.72 [907]	71.33 [8]	-
Military	78.86 [44]	86.70 [52]	-
Youth	61.60 [166]	77.92 [80]	-

Table 2. Average highest single party membership affiliation by organizational type.

Notes: [] denotes sample size

Data compiled from AP Kraków, ul. Grodzka 51 Col. 206 (UW.Kr.): Syg. 131, 132 and Col 25/231 (St.Ż II): Syg. 60, 62 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76; AAN, Col. 1181 (UW. Łuck): Old Syg. 979/62 (UW. Wołyń); and LVIA, Col. 53/23: Syg. 854.

The average highest single party membership data presented in Table 2 suggest that associations that the state reports painted as frequently targeted by political domination were not necessarily those that had the most homogenous political make-up. The lack of political domination by a single party is not the same as the lack of the politicization of an association. As previously discussed, some associations were highly politicized; yet they were not necessarily and not at every period in time dominated by one political ideology or group. For instance, throughout the 1930s, university associations witnessed intense and drawn out competition between nationalist and pro-Sanacja youth. However, both the leading ideology and the amount of complete domination varied throughout the period.¹⁶³ Thus, despite their high degree of politicization, academic associations in particular and youth organizations in general were not always successfully dominated by a single political ideology or group.

Organization types with the highest average single party political affiliation in the

¹⁶³ Ironically, though youth associations in general had a higher degree of political domination by single parties in Vilnius in comparison to Kraków, academic associations in Kraków had a much higher average percentage of highest political affiliation (85.7% out of a sample of seven associations), then those in Vilnius (65.3% out of a sample of 34). Whereas the data for Vilnius was from 1934—during the years of heated competition for domination of university associations, the date for Kraków was, on average, from 1930, when its university associations were largely dominated by pro-government youth. This is reflected in the data, with the Kraków sample being dominated by the BBWR (4 out of 6 associations, two were mostly affiliated with the PPS), and the Vilnius sample being nearly evenly split between the association's maximum affiliation lying with the BBWR and the SN.

Kraków voivodeship were educational, military, interest, religious, cultural and nationalist/paramilitary. On average, over three quarters of the members of these associations were affiliated with or supported a single political party. Organization types with the five highest average single party political affiliation in the Vilnius voivodeship were military, nationalist/paramilitary, mutual aid, interest, recreational, professional and credit. On average, over 80% of the members of these types of associations were affiliated with the same political party. This sample suggest that associations in both Vilnius and Kraków tended to have relatively high levels of political domination by a single political party, despite the presence of multiple, significant political parties at any given time in interwar Poland. However, Table 2 also suggests that in general, nearly all types of associations tended to be more under the control of a single party than the associations in Kraków. Only religious and educational associations have a higher level of single political party affiliation in Kraków than in Vilnius. The comparison in the variation in the politicization and political domination of the associational landscape in Kraków and Vilnius is the topic of the first section of the second part of this chapter.

Summary

At the end of WWI, various lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were reunited under the rule of the independent, democratic Second Republic of Poland. While interwar democracy brought the inclusion of disparate political, particularly Polish, elites and ideologies into state institution and political power, Piłsudski's 1926 military coup brought Poland's interwar democracy to an official end. Despite its ethnically chauvinistic tendencies, interwar Polish democracy exhibited relatively higher political inclusion—particularly with respect to ethnically Polish—leaders and political elites under democratic rule, in comparison to both the pre-WWI period and the dictatorship that followed. If political inclusion breeds a relatively more autonomous and heteronomous civil society, and political exclusion leads to a more politicized and political dominated associational life, then the years under Piłsudski's rule ought to have been marked by increasing politicization and political domination in comparison to the first years of democratic rule. This section has argued that this was in fact the case.

Furthermore, though 1926 marked the official end of democracy and the beginning of autocratic rule that would last until WWII, it was merely the first of the period's significant political transitions, and thus the first of shifts to have altered the associational landscape. This section has shown that it was not until the late 1920s and early 1930s that the autocratic state pursued visible and significant dismantling of democratic institutions and the exclusion and repression of its political opposition. This shift towards increasing political exclusion and repression was further felt in associational life, as the left-wing opposition, the right-wing opposition and eventually the state turned to increasingly politicizing civil society in their attempts to dominate and subsequently utilize civic associations in their political struggles. Some regions, such as Kraków, were relatively more resistant to the political domination of associational life. This regional variation is discussed in Part II of this chapter. Yet despite such relative differences, regions under pre-WWI Russian and pre-WWI Austrian rule¹⁶⁴ witnessed an increasing politicization, mobilization and political domination of associational

¹⁶⁴ The same national phenomenon was observed under regions that, prior to WWI had been under German rule. Some would argue that these westernmost regions of interwar Poland had seen the highest degree of associational politicization and domination, particularly by the chauvinistic nationalist right (Lisiak 2006). The discussion of these regions has been left out due to practical limitations.

as a response of the growing political repression and exclusion of opponents of the regime after the instantiation of autocratic rule in interwar Poland.

Ethnic exclusion, Discrimination and the Growth in Political and Civic Ethnic Fragmentation

While interwar Polish politics had three significant shifts in politics of ideological inclusion and exclusion (1926, 1929/1930, 1935), Poland's interbellum period can be divided into three periods of distinct ethnic politics, or three phases of varying relationships between the state and ethnic minorities: 1918-26, 1926-35, and 1935-9). Though during its first eight years Poland was officially ruled by a democratically elected legislature, interwar Polish democracy marginalized the nation's ethnic minorities, which accounted for approximately a third of the population of interwar Poland (Jeziński 2003:382-5),¹⁶⁵ and pursued ethnically discriminatory policies (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010; Rothschild 1974:41-3). Among others, state-backed ethnic discrimination included policies that amounted to forced assimilation.¹⁶⁶ For example, a bulletin from 1924, which focuses on Poland's eastern regions, reveals the discriminatory nature of language instruction laws. It outlines language guidelines for schools located in communities where at least a quarter of the population was Russian speaking, noting that if such communities also have at least 40 Russian-speaking school-age children, then local schools must adopt Russian as their primary language of instruction. However, the bulletin goes on to inform that if the communities also have 20 or more children who desire a Polish education, then half of the lessons must be in Polish and half in Russian.¹⁶⁷ The bulleting, which in effect shows that the cultural needs of Russian-speaking children were valued at half of those of Polish-speaking children, highlights the ethnic and cultural discrimination of the Polish democratic state.

Despite its gravitation towards political exclusion of the opposition, Piłsudski's post-1926 autocratic regime embraced a multiethnic notion of Poland. Many, though not all, discriminatory policies were dissolved, the state criminalized ethnic discrimination and it pursued more ethnically inclusive policies. The policing and punishing of ethnically or religiously discriminatory crimes and violence was particularly visible in government reports in the early 1930s—corresponding to growth in ethnically-exclusionary nationalism amongst Polish society, and particularly in anti-Semitic slogans and movements, yet preceding the state's own turn towards increased ethnic, particularly anti-Jewish, discrimination. State reports from 1933 note a large number of anti-Semitic activities that took place that year and the state reactions that they incurred. For example, a report from February 1933 notes that the local state expected significant anti-Semitic activity during a sporting event of the Makkabi organization (a Jewish youth sport organization) in Zakopane to be perpetrated by the local

¹⁶⁵ The percentage of the Polish majority and ethnic minorities varies slightly depending on whether ethnicity is calculated using census categories of nationality or language, and varies more visibly if the census category of religion is used to determine ethnicity. According to the national census from 1921, 69.2% of the population of Poland were "nationally" Polish, 14.3% were Ukrainian, 3.9% were Belarusian, 3.9% German, 7.8% Jewish and 0.9% other or unknown. According to the same census, 68.9% of Poland's inhabitants considered Polish as their native language, 10.1% Ukrainian, 3.8% Ruthenian (an older term later phased out in favor of Ukrainian, used by some as being synonymous), 3.1% Belarusian, 0.4% Russian, 2.3% German, 8.6% Yiddish or Hebrew, and 2.8% as other or unknown. According to the 1921 census, 63.8% of Poland's population was Roman Catholic, 11.2% Greco-Catholic, 10.5% Eastern Orthodox, 3.7% Evangelical, 10.5% Jewish and 0.3% other or unknown. Census data printed in Jeziński (2003), Tables 108, 109 and 110, pp. 382-5.

¹⁶⁶ For other examples, see state reports on minority life, 1926-1928. AAN, Warszawa. Poland. Col. 9 (MSW-dopływ):Syg. 1021.

¹⁶⁷ AAN, Warszawa, Poland. Col. 88: Syg. 286. *Towarzystwo Szkoły Ludowej* (Folk School Society), 1932-1939.

OWP. However, no anti-Semitic activity took place, which local authorities attributed to actions taken by the state to deter such future occurrences, including a court verdict of several months of jail time for the more active members of anti-Semitic actions that took place in the nearby Jaszczurowce in 1932.¹⁶⁸ Another report from March 1933 cites the dismantling of the local branches of Zw. Hallerczyków, a right-wing paramilitary-like sports association, due to its role in local anti-Semitic propaganda that led to “excesses” in Żywiec county. The latter included attacks on local Jewish inhabitants and robberies.¹⁶⁹ A July 1933 report notes further anti-Semitic activities of the nationalist OWP, which included the destruction of Jewish merchants’ stalls. Those responsible were captured by the local police and handed over to the court.¹⁷⁰ Another report, from October 1933, noted further state responses to local anti-Semitic action. Following meetings organized by the National Coalition (SN), a building owned by a Jewish owner was attacked and its windows were broken. The author followed the details of the incident with a note, which highlighting the necessity of returning a local police headquarters to the town.¹⁷¹

The more inclusive and less discriminatory nature of the post-1926 state can further be seen in the backlash and accusations of ethnic favoritism launched at Piłsudski’s early regime from the Polish right. For instance, according to a government report on a ZLN meeting held on February 29th, 1928, the state was criticized for its inclusion of ethnic minorities and for giving minorities “too much power.” To demonstrate the grounds for this critique, the speaker noted that, among others, the local auditor (kontroler) is Jewish, that he receives a high salary, and that the government also nationalized (*upaństwowił*) 60 Jewish municipalities.¹⁷² Many other meetings of oppositional parties—both right-wing oppositional parties and centrist, Christian and populous, parties—often resorted to anti-Semitic propaganda to stir support and critique the visibly more ethnically inclusive state. For instance, during a June 20th, 1927 meeting of the Catholic Folk Party (*Stronnictwo Kat-Lud*), a priest accused the current government of “being favorable to Jews.” To bolster his critique, he noted that that local election dates had been moved accommodate the requests of a rabbi. Furthermore, he accused the temporary head of the local municipal government for trying to bring Jews into the local government “at the cost of Catholics.”¹⁷³

Most, but not all, accusations of ethnic “favoritism” targeted the lack of—or at least a visible decrease in—state discrimination against Jewish minorities. A report from 1926 notes the events that transpired during a June 19th meeting of the populous Piast party. During the meeting the speakers critiqued the state, including its treatment of minorities. Yet this time, the target was not only the Jewish, but also the Ukrainian minority. The speaker accused the state of giving Ukrainians more regional autonomy. Not stopping there, he went on to further criticize the state by referencing the attendance of Lviv’s Governor at a Jewish ball a gesture of the state daring to “accommodate” Jews.¹⁷⁴ General slogans of favoritism launched against Piłsudski and his regime support the claim that the post-1926 government was, at least, perceived as being more ethnically inclusive. At the same time, more specific accusations launched by Piłsudski’s ethnically chauvinistic critics, such as those cited above, lend further details of the ways in which the autocratic state actually was more ethnically inclusive than its democratic predecessor.

¹⁶⁸ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and weekly reports, February 1933.

¹⁶⁹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 548: Monthly situational report, March 1933, file page 112.

¹⁷⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and weekly reports, July 1933.

¹⁷¹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 696: Powiat Brzeski, Monthly situational reports, October 1933.

¹⁷² AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 637: Folder 20: Związek Ludowo-Narodowy, 1927.

¹⁷³ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 697: Starostwo Powiatowe w Dąbrowie: Monthly and weekly situational reports, June 1927.

¹⁷⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700: Starostwo Ropczyce: Situational Reports, 1929.

The transition from Poland's pre-1926 ethnically-exclusionary democracy to its post-ethnically inclusionary autocracy was the first significant period that transformed relations between the Polish state and Poland's ethnic minorities. The second significant transition occurred in the mid-1930s. Though ethnic actors who opposed the state were increasingly marginalized since 1930, alongside the Polish left-wing and right-wing opposition, it was not until 1935 that the interwar state returned to not only condoning but also perpetrating ethnically discriminatory actions and policies. After Piłsudski's death in 1935, both the ruling regime and large parts of the Polish political and civil society gravitated towards increasingly exclusionary nationalist and fascist slogans and ideals. The preaching of boycotts of Jewish merchants was common in churches, and at the meetings of Christian, populist and right-wing political parties.¹⁷⁵ Civil society organizations with ties to such political movements similarly urged their supporters to boycott Jewish merchants and stores.¹⁷⁶ While some were content to preach incentivizing Poland's Jewish minority to emigrate through economic pressure, others went much further, organizing and carrying out violent and criminal activity, which, unsurprisingly, often targeted Jewish merchants.¹⁷⁷ Economic downturns further fueled tensions between Poles and other ethnic minorities. The economic development of the German minority, for instance, was seen as working against rather than for Polish interests.¹⁷⁸ Though other minorities also came under the attack of discriminatory policies and actions, Poland's Jewish minority became the main target of economically-fueled discrimination. Unable to deal with the economic condition, anti-Semitism became the golden key to end all economic woes.¹⁷⁹

The anti-Semitism that flourished in interwar Poland, particularly, in the 1930s, was rooted in a history of ethnic separation, prejudice, misunderstanding, and mistrust. Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to dismiss the relationship between the political

¹⁷⁵ For example, see:

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700: Starostwo Ropczyce, Situational Report, June 19, 1929, p. 13, and July 1932, file page 58-9.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 638: Case 22: Narodowa Partia Pracy, 1925-1927; Stronictwo Narodowe 1929, 1938.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 562: Monthly situational report on social-political and minority life, 1939, file page 158.

¹⁷⁶ For example, see:

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700: Starostwo Ropczyce: , Situational Report , August 1928.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report on the life of Polish unions and associations, April 26, 1938, and the report from October 1938 to March 1939.

¹⁷⁷ For example, see:

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Monthly and Weekly Situational Reports, July 1933.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 696: Powiat Brzeski, Monthly Reports, June 1933.

¹⁷⁸ For example, a letter from the Mayor's Office in Biała to the National Security Division office in Kraków reported a meeting of ZLN supporters during which the speaker, a known right-wing leader, spoke about Poland's many "internal foes," especially Germans and Jews, who "work against the country." AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 636, April 12, 1927, file page 10-11. In a similar vein, a 1926 state report on minority life tied the economic development of the German minority to international rather than national interests, noting that it was aided by German banks and credit associations. AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9. Vol. 4: Syg. 1021, 1926 Report, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ During a SN meeting on August 14th, 1938 in Dębica, the speaker critique the regime and the OZN, noting that only the National Coalition can truly deal with the problem of "internal foes." Subsequently the speaker proclaimed that the emigration of Poland's eight million (number cited at the meeting) Jews would certainly solve the problem of unemployment, as "Poles" (Christian Poles) would simply take their jobs. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 638: Narodowa Partia Pracy and Stronictwo Narodowe, Case 22, dated 4.8.1938

exclusion of the nationalist right-wing, the economic downturns of the interwar period,¹⁸⁰ the ethnic competition that ensued—particularly among the middle sectors of Polish society, including wealthier peasants and professional, urban Poles—and the rapid rise in ethnically chauvinistic nationalism and public anti-Semitic sentiment and demonstrations. It is not surprising that public support for anti-Semitism in particular, and ethnic discrimination in general, was heavily concentrated in economic spheres where ethnic Poles faced significant and strong competition from ethnic minorities. In urban areas this included intelligentsia professions—and thus, by extension, institutions of tertiary education which prepared their students for such positions—as well as economic sectors into which Christians sought to expand (Tomaszewski 1998:58–9). In rural areas, particularly in regions formerly under Austrian rule, this included local trade—a sector that held the aspirations of wealthier rural farmers since before the First World War (Stauter-Halsted 1998:136–7).

While nationalist political and civil society associations that touted anti-Semitic and anti-ethnic slogans claimed to push for policies that would benefit the Christian peasant and working class masses, in reality their interest lay with the Christian rural and urban middle classes. Firstly, there was a clear discrepancy between the leadership and membership of such associations. While their leaders were mostly members of the *petite bourgeoisie*, including free professionals, bureaucrats, administrators, teachers, professors, etc., their memberships were largely made up of government pensioners and the unemployed, especially unemployed youth.¹⁸¹ Secondly, such organizations proclaimed to seek the improvement of economic conditions of the lower classes.¹⁸² Yet the changes that they proposed would not reduce, but rather increase, Christian peasants and workers' competition with members of the Jewish minority by pushing the latter away from middle and upper class professions and into low-skilled, low-pay employment. For instance, the demands that such organizations voiced included stripping the Jewish minority of Polish citizenship rights, limiting its number in public institutions and professions, removing members of the Jewish minority from schools, the radio, newspapers, etc.¹⁸³ Hence, though such associations asserted their anti-Semitic slogans and proposals as a means of alleviating the poverty of peasants and the working classes, their leadership make-up and their actual demands betrayed their actual agenda of decreasing ethnic competition for Poland's Christian middle class, particularly intelligentsia professionals and the goods-owning *petite bourgeoisie*. In selling cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary coalitions as benefiting the lower classes, yet in pursuing policies that would bring economic benefits to Polish middle classes, at least in the short term, and political

¹⁸⁰ The government's situational reports frequently warned that no degree of political and civil society mobilization will be enough to maintain social belief in and support of the state if the government keeps on failing address local demands to deal with the economic crises. For example, see: AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 700: Starostwo Ropczyce: Situational Reports, April 1932, August 1932, December 1932.

¹⁸¹ Notes on Nationalist Organizations from March 1937 lists the professional and socio-economic backgrounds of the leaders and members of the National Coalition (SN), the Professional Union "Polish Work" (*Zw. Zawodowy "Praca Polska"*), the Christian-Democrats (*Polskie Stronnictwo ChD*), the Christian Economic Front (*Chrześcijański Front Gospodarczy*), and the Christian Union of Professional Unity (*Chrześcijańskie Zjednoczenie Zawodowe*). AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 737: Organizacje Narodowe, dated 19.3.1937, file page 191.

¹⁸² A 1938 report provides notes from the meetings of the Christian Economic Front. During one meeting, speakers voiced their concern for Poland's Polish lower classes, stating "why do Polish peasants and workers must engage in economic competition with Jews." AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, April to September 1938, file page 91.

¹⁸³ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, April to September 1938, file page 92.

benefits to Polish cultural elites, interwar Poland nationalism was no different from the fascism that gripped interwar Europe.¹⁸⁴

The rise in ethnically chauvinistic nationalism in civil and political society during the 1930s was striking. However, what unquestionably distinguished the period following Piłsudski's death was the state's return to state-backed ethnic and cultural discrimination. Prior to 1935, it was the state's opposition, specifically right-wing and the centrist Christian and Populist parties, along with their civil society counterparts, that utilized ethnically-exclusionary slogans to stir support against the "ethnically inclusionary" and minority "accommodating" state. However, after 1935, the state once more picked up the mantle of ethnic exclusion and discrimination. Whereas prior to 1935 state agencies punished ethnic discrimination and ethnically motivated actions, violence and crimes, the post-1935 state largely condoned such activities (Tomaszewski 1998:49–60). In addition to condoning ethnic discrimination and violence, the state began to use ethnically-exclusionary slogans and organizations to gain social support. As discussed earlier, in 1936, the ruling regime established the *Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego* (OZN, Camp of National Unity) in an attempt to capture the growing social and organizational support fostered by the radical right. The new ruling regime and its new leader—Edward Rydz-Śmigły—believed that by mimicking the social organizational movement of the radical right in both form and ideology,¹⁸⁵ that the ruling regime could scoop the right-wing's social support, particularly among the nation's nationalist youth, for itself (Rothschild 1974:71)

The changes in the ruling regime's leadership and direction, and specifically its new willingness to take up anti-Semitic slogans, did not go unnoticed. Leaders of oppositional parties who touted similar ideals, such as the Populist Coalition, began to proclaim that perhaps they could cooperate with the new, "transformed" state.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, just as in the years before Piłsudski's coup, government reports produced in the years after his death reflected ethnic chauvinism, particularly anti-Semitism, inherent in the members of the bureaucracy and accepted by the old—and the new—chauvinistic regime. For example, the author of a report, which spanned the period from October 1st, 1938 to March 31st, 1939, wrote about the picketing of Jewish stores organized by the Union of Young Poland (*Zw. Młodej Polski*), a nationalist youth association. The author noted that the picketing led to clashes between the demonstrators, Jews and members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), "whom the Jews most likely hired."¹⁸⁷ Descriptions of anti-Semitic actions and clashes can be found in state reports during all political periods of the interwar Polish state. However, anti-Semitic interpretations of or comments about such events—ones that question the loyalty of the Jewish minority or the ideological and social motives of their non-Jewish allies, for instance—are found in reports that correspond to periods of ethnically-exclusionary state politics. This suggests either a change in attitudes towards ethnic minorities of those writing the reports, or, what is more likely, a change in the opinions and beliefs that they thought to be expected and acceptable. Regardless, the reappearance of anti-Semitic commentary in government reports suggests that such observations and assessments were not only seen as acceptable but as viable by the new regime.

¹⁸⁴ For example, see Poulantzas (1974).

¹⁸⁵ For instance, the OZN publically announced its support for the elimination of Jewish minorities from Polish associational life. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 580: Monthly report from the life of political organizations, June 1936, file page 473.

¹⁸⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 580: Monthly report from the life of political organizations, January 1938, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, October – March, 1939. In reality, it was not unusual for left-wing activists, particularly in larger cities, created special networks meant to act to prevent pogroms (Tomaszewski 1998:50).

Hypothesis

The interwar Polish state began with ethnic marginalization and discrimination. If the political exclusion of groups, particularly of a group's elites, leads to the growth of a politicized and elite-dominated civil society and if ethno-cultural discrimination leads to the politicization of culture, turning it into a tool of political oppression and resistance, then the pre-1926 Polish state should have been characterized by growing ethnic fragmentation and nationalism among Poland's minorities' political and civil societies. If, conversely, political inclusion leads to the de-politicization of associational life and if increased cultural autonomy and decreased ethno-cultural discrimination de-politicizes culture, then following the 1926 political transformation, Poland should have been characterized by increasing ethnic cooperation through political institutions with the state and through civil society with Polish society. In general, the first years following Piłsudski's coup were characterized by state-overtures to ethnic inclusion and a positive, though often cautious, response on the part of ethnic minorities who felt their discrimination and repression lessen under the new regime.

The second significant shift in interwar Polish ethnic politics came in the mid-1930s. The state's return to ethnic exclusion and state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination should have, and did, lead to the rise of minority nationalism and ethnic fragmentation in both civil and political societies. However, as noted earlier, the transition of the Polish state towards increasing ethnic exclusion and discrimination not merely overlapped with, but followed a similar transition within large parts of Polish civil society. Thus, though the growth in nationalism among Poland's minorities was augmented by the state's return to ethnically-exclusionary politics, it was largely driven by Polish nationalism and the failure of integration within society and public life. In other words, these two distinct yet, as argued above, interrelated phenomena cannot be disentangled in the analysis of the role they played in perpetuating not only growing ethnic fragmentation, but also minority nationalism in interwar Polish civil and political societies.

From ethnic exclusion to ethnic inclusion, the political transformation of 1926

The pre- and post-1926 interwar Polish state pursued similar policies with respect to Poland's various ethnic minorities. However, as the situation, political possibilities and thus group interest varied, so too did the responses of each group to the political transformation and actual and potential changes that it entailed. To analyze the ethnic responses to Piłsudski's coup, this section draws on reports on minority life compiled by the Ministry of the Interior from 1926 to 1928. As such reports were not available for the mid and late 1930s, the second part of this section draws on disparate state reports on associational and political life in order to gauge the response of Poland's ethnic minorities to the rise in ethnically chauvinistic nationalism in the state, and in Polish civil and political societies in the mid and late 1930s.

German Minority

The weight of the German minority resided in western regions of interwar Poland, which, prior to WWI, had been under German rule. Thus, like eastern Poland's Russian minority, Poland's ethnic Germans could migrate to a nearby state where they would be part of the ethnic majority. Furthermore, in addition to being able to imagine their own migration to Germany, the German minority that resided in western Poland could also imagine the re-appropriation of the lands that they inhabited, and which bordered Germany, to the German state. After all, prior to WWI these same lands had been part of the German state. In addition to having a "viable" political option to the Polish state, the German minority was more

economically secure than other ethnicities in interwar Poland. Some Germans, dissatisfied with its poor economic development, left interwar Poland. Those who stayed opposed Polish assimilation and educational discrimination. (Rothschild 1974:41–2) Though Piłsudski's coup improved the state's treatment of Poland's minorities, discriminatory measures did not entirely disappear. For instance, two years after the coup, the German minority continued to struggle against the polonization of German schools, which entailed the replacement of German teachers with Polish ones, particularly in secondary schools.¹⁸⁸

The response of German civil society to the pre-1926 ethnically-exclusionary state was, as expected, one of self-segregation. Particularly responding to the state's efforts at assimilating the population, German society reacted by drawing inward to preserve German culture and separate identity. By 1926 the German minority had created a separate associational life. Where possible, Germans created separate civic associations, and where unable, they created separate German sections of Polish associations. Following Piłsudski's coup, Poland's German minority responded "favorably," hoping that the change in leadership would lead to political inclusion of ethnic minorities and to increased autonomy of minority cultures.¹⁸⁹ Thus, the early dictatorial state saw some positive response from the German minority. For the most part, Germans continued to support the Bloc of National Minorities (BMN, *Blok Mniejszości Narodowych*) in 1928, just as they had done in the 1922 elections. The minority bloc sought to cooperate with Piłsudski's state, with Germans predicating cooperation on the expectation of a favorable resolution of the question of cultural autonomy, particularly the question of German education in Poland. Though the German nationalist minority members sought to preserve their cultural autonomy, a topic that was at the forefront their discussion and concern,¹⁹⁰ they were eager and willing to cooperate with the new state to do so.¹⁹¹ The German minority continued to view the political situation in 1928 as favorable—not only was the legislature not dominated by Polish nationalists, as prior to the coup, but they believed that the inability of the BBWR to secure a majority in the legislature meant that the ruling regime had to seek compromise and coalition with others, such as the Minority Bloc.¹⁹² German Socialists, however, forwent cooperation with the cross-ethnic minority bloc for direct cross-ethnic cooperation with Polish Socialists (PPS). German socialists, like their Polish counterparts, opposed the dictatorial state.¹⁹³ However, their stance was one that bridged ethnic fragmentation more so than the cooperationist attitude of the Minority Block. German Socialists reacted to the increasing marginalization of the left-wing by the autocratic state, thus placing questions of class and class conflict above those of cultural autonomy.

Ukrainian minority

The Ukrainian minority was the largest ethnic group in interwar Poland after the Poles. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter III, the Ukrainian minority had a historically strained relationship with Poles, who for the most part had carried out policies of cultural

¹⁸⁸ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1928 Report, p.3, 5-6.

¹⁸⁹ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1929 Report, p.1.

Note: We can, and to a degree ought to, be skeptical about the content of these reports. However, these were not public but secret reports created by the state for the state as a means of ascertaining the social situation to appropriately handle it. Thus, mistakes were much more likely a result of ineptitude or misinformation rather than purposeful deception.

¹⁹⁰ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: March – April 1928 Report, p.1.

The question of cultural autonomy has moved to "first place" in German discussion/concern.

¹⁹¹ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928 Report, p. 12.

¹⁹² AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: March – April 1928 Report, p.1.

¹⁹³ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928 Report, p. 12.

repression and forced assimilation in eastern Galicia where Ukrainians, rather than Poles, were the majority. In addition to parts of former Galicia, interwar Poland included areas that prior to WWI had been under even more politically and culturally repressive Russian rule. Hence the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland was shaped by cultural repression prior to WWI, which fostered a strong nationalist movement and the drive for an independent Ukrainian state among many of its members. Instead, they found themselves under either Polish or Russian interbellum rule. Though Piłsudski's regime brought a lessening of discrimination against Poland's Ukrainians, it did not bring it to a complete end. Rather, as could be seen in both government reports and the actions of some associations, Ukrainians, along with the other Slavic ethnic minorities, were continually targeted by assimilationist policies and efforts. Aggravated by the exploitation, Polish colonization, forced cultural assimilation and discriminatory policies, eastern regions of interwar Poland saw the emergence of not just political and civic contention, but the rise of military conflict in the form of guerrilla warfare in the 1930s (Rothschild 1974:43).

According to a 1926 state report on minority life, just as the German minority responded to Piłsudski's coup favorably, so too did the political transformation lead to the tapering of Ukrainian radicalism. The report notes that, prior to 1926 Ukrainian leaders were promoting radical calls for a revolution to "throw off the yoke of Polish rule." After the transformation, the same groups began to change their tactics. Though the ultimate goal continued to be one of national independence, the previously rebellion-focused groups turned their attention to "a fight for national rights on the domestic scene," thus effectively replacing calls for a revolution with ones for legal transformation achieved through participation and cooperation with the new state. Hence, rather than organizing revolutionary associations, Ukrainian leaders turned to forming associations and networks for voting purposes to strengthen their chances of securing their goals by working through and within political institutions.¹⁹⁴ Poland's Ukrainian minority, just as Poland's Germans, therefore responded to Piłsudski's coup—and its promise and hope for political inclusion—with a shift towards participation with and within the new state rather than in opposition to it. Nonetheless, Ukrainians, like Germans, continued their pursuit of cultural autonomy. Both groups did so by petitioning the state on the one hand, and by fostering an independent cultural life through civic associations such as *Proswita* (Education) and *Ridna Szkoła* (Mother School) on the other hand.¹⁹⁵

The government's reports fail to paint a consistent picture of the relationship between Ukrainian groups and the state in the first few years following the coup. On the one hand, a report from 1927 suggests that the state really was seeking to appease the Ukrainian populations and that changes implemented after 1926 worked to win some Ukrainian support for the new regime. It suggests that Ukrainian nationalist movements in Volyn (an eastern Polish voivodeship, formerly under Russian rule) were trying to counter the state not because its policies were harmful to the local population but, on the contrary, because they feared that improved policies would de-politicize local Ukrainian populations, thus eroding the nationalists' support.¹⁹⁶ At the same time, the report informs that other radical Ukrainian nationalist groups continue to oppose the state, accusing it of being just like its predecessors—aristocratic and bourgeois Polish states that sought to make a greater Poland at the expense of and by building on the work of Ukrainians.¹⁹⁷ Thus, while the initial Ukrainian

¹⁹⁴ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1926 Report, p. 7-8.

¹⁹⁵ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1926 Report, p. 12; December-March 1927 Report, p. 14.

¹⁹⁶ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1927 Report, p. 8.

¹⁹⁷ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1927 Report, p. 10.

reaction to Piłsudski's coup seemed favorable, or at least hopeful, it quickly returned to its former strategy of skepticism, focusing on the ultimate goal of establishing an independent Ukraine rather than pushing for Ukrainian rights and autonomy within the Polish state.

On the one hand, the quick return to an oppositional politics and to fostering nationalist and cultural civic associations suggests that increased ethnic inclusion in the state did not incentivize Ukrainian leaders to cooperate with the state in order to fulfill their goals. On the other hand, the report suggests that the concessions provided by the Polish state were simply too small and too few to make a lasting difference.¹⁹⁸ The minority report from the following year appears to bolster the second interpretation. In it, the author writes that the Ukrainian minority accused the government of using liberal slogans while continuing the policies of previous regimes. As such, Ukrainian leaders asserted that they should not expect anything from the state. Rather, they should look to themselves to improve their situation. Hence, by 1928, most Ukrainian elites opposed cooperation with the Polish state and with ethnic minorities that supported its rule.¹⁹⁹ Lastly, after Piłsudski's regime moved further towards embracing politics of exclusion, Ukrainian further embraced a strategy of contesting the legitimacy of the Polish state by organizing contentious, politically-oriented and military-like organizations and networks within civil society. These were later utilized in the guerrilla like warfare that increasingly characterized eastern Poland and Polish-Ukrainian relations in the 1930s.

Belarusian minority

The Belarusian minority resided in central and northeastern regions of interwar Poland, where they accounted for a significant part of the population. For example, Belarusians were the largest minority group of the interwar Vilnius voivodeship, accounting for approximately a quarter of the department's population (Jeziński 2003:382–5). The Belarusian population in interwar Poland was largely poor and illiterate. Moreover, the Belarusian minority resented Polish rule and its policies of “forced assimilation,” which presented local Belarusian populations with a choice of either attending Polish schools or not attending school at all (Rothschild 1974:42).

According to the state reports on minority life in Poland, the Belarusian majority reacted to transition from the pre-1926 ethnically-exclusionary state to the post-1926 more ethnically inclusionary one with caution. Following the coup, the Belarusian minority continued to doubt that their needs would be addressed by the Polish state.²⁰⁰ Moreover, unlike other minorities, the Belarusian minority, which harbored significant sympathies for the communist left, faced increasing state repression of Belarusian associations and the arresting of radical left Belarusian representatives in the first few months of 1927. Though the state might have been targeting communist leaders and supporters, the significant effect of its actions on the Belarusian minority further undermined the latter's faith in the interwar regime. Rather than fostering support for the state, it strengthened the position of Belarusian nationalists.²⁰¹

Following the March 1928 legislative elections, there was a general decrease in Ukrainian representation (hence political power). The author suggests that this was due to the unwillingness of Ukrainians to cooperate with other minorities, particularly the Jewish minority. However, the decrease in support for Ukrainian representatives was called out by Ukrainian journals, which saw it as a result of state repression of Ukrainian leaders; thus calling for protests in response. AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928 Report, p. 4-6.

¹⁹⁸ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1927 Report, p. 8-10.

¹⁹⁹ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928 Report, p. 1, 4-5.

²⁰⁰ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1926 Report, p. 17.

²⁰¹ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: December-March 1927 Report, p. 16.

Despite the earlier repressions of the Belarusian minority—a side-effect of state repression of the radical left—by 1928 relations between then Belarusian minority and the more ethnically inclusive Polish state improved. In a February-March 1928 report, the author notes that, as compared to the 1922 election, the 1928 election saw a decrease in support for Belarusian parties. While the author credits this in part to the “incompetence” of Belarusian political leaders, they also credit the change to increasing responsiveness of and cooperation with local states, particularly with respect to issues in which Belarusian populations were “right.” These, according to the author, mostly revolved around education, and included the opening of new Belarusian schools, granting of state aid to existing Belarusian schools and of economic aid to Belarusian villages.²⁰² Nonetheless, while general relations between the Polish state and the Belarusian minority might have improved, the continual and increasing repression of the left and its overlap with significant parts of Belarusian political leadership strengthened the politicization of Belarusian civil society. For example, state repressions of a political far left Belarusian organization in the first quarter of 1928 led leaders of the former to move into cultural and educational associations, which they did “without a doubt” in order to continue their political work. The author, however, expressed certainty that such efforts would not succeed, claiming that daunted by the failure of political activity, the Belarusian minority preferred to return to a strategy of organic works—i.e. to form associations aimed at raising the cultural, educational and economic level of the Belarusian minority.²⁰³

The response of the Belarusian minority to the 1926 political transformations was somewhat different from that of the original German and Ukrainian response. Whereas 1926 brought the alleviation of ethnic discrimination of the German and Ukrainian minorities, the Belarusian minority was faced with an increasingly ethnically inclusionary, yet increasingly politically repressive state. Thus, though it was not targeted by ethnically discriminatory measures, it felt the increased state repression of the radical left. Thus, unlike other minorities, the Belarusian population was more skeptical of potential improvements under the Polish state.

Jewish minority

The Jewish minority was the third largest ethnic group in interwar Poland after Poles and Ukrainians. In 1931, it accounted for approximately 10.5% of the state’s population.²⁰⁴ Polish Jews faced discrimination and prejudice throughout the interwar period. However, both the intensity of anti-Semitism faced by the Jewish minority within Polish society and the relationship of the Polish state to its Jewish inhabitants varied across the state’s distinct political phases. Anti-Semitism was higher in frequency and intensity both in the period prior to the 1926 coup and in the years after Piłsudski’s death, with both reaching their peak between 1935 and 1937. The state’s relationship to anti-Semitism—whether it condoned or prohibited and punished anti-Semitic actions—followed a similar pattern (Tomaszewski 1998:49–60). Whereas the pre-1926 state condoned and itself perpetrated discriminatory actions against Poland’s Jews, during Piłsudski’s reign, and particularly in the first years of his dictatorship, the ruling regime penalized anti-Semitism. However, following Piłsudski’s death and the end of his “multiethnic autocracy,” the Polish state once more not only condoned anti-Semitism but also enacted and backed anti-Semitic policies (Rothschild 1974:41).

Like most of Poland’s other minorities, Polish Jewish generally viewed Piłsudski’s coup and the subsequent transformation of the Polish state in a favorable light. Even

²⁰² AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928 Report, p. 7.

²⁰³ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopyw*): Syg. 1021: 1928 Report, p. 5.

²⁰⁴ See discussion in footnote 1.

members of the Minority Bloc who opposed cooperation with the Polish stance were willing to reconsider their stance and contemplated the possibility of improved Polish-Jewish relations in response to the BBWR's placement of two Polish Jews on its 1928 election list.²⁰⁵ Though Jewish moderates promoted a conciliatory and cooperationist stance towards the more ethnically inclusive Polish state, Jewish nationalists (Zionists), like the nationalists of Poland's other minorities, saw Jewish liberation not in the cooperation with Piłsudski's regime but rather in emigration from Europe and the formation of an independent Jewish state.²⁰⁶ Yet even Jewish nationalist groups, who sought to ultimately leave Poland, envisioned achieving their temporary and long-term goals through cooperation with and participation in the more inclusive post-1926 Polish state.

While the orthodox Jewish community supported the BBWR, as both sought to largely preserve the status quo, Jewish nationalists and socialists both supported the left-wing Polish opposition.²⁰⁷ Jewish nationalists and socialists joined with the Polish left to oppose the state not on cultural, but on political-ideological grounds; they cooperated in their critique of the state as the latter moved further away from democracy and toward dictatorship.²⁰⁸ Thus, despite the growth in Jewish nationalism during the interbellum period, Poland's Jewish minority was relatively strongly characterized by class-based divisions and interests. Its participation in civil and political society demonstrated the clearest fragmentation along class lines amongst the country's ethnic minorities.²⁰⁹ Poland's other ethnic minorities mostly focused on cultural—which for them also entailed to some degree political—autonomy throughout the interwar period, even during the years of the “multiethnic autocracy.”

From ethnic inclusion to discrimination and exclusion

The post-1935 transformations of the Polish state and civil society

The growing popularity of ethnically chauvinistic nationalism and the creation of vast civil networks with close linkages to the right-wing and left-wing opposition played an important part in the post-1935 development of the Polish state. At the same time, the post-1935 transformation of the state allowed nationalist and fascist right-wing political and civic actors to further fuel social tensions and foster support for their ethnically-exclusionary ideals. After 1935, and particularly between 1935 and 1937, anti-Semitism became noticeably more vibrant across interwar Poland's political and civil societies (Marcus 1983:349–59). State reports noted not only a rise in anti-Semitic feeling in “all” society,²¹⁰ but that generally “all” social organizational life had “become uniform” in viewing Jewish populations as “dangerous for the country.” According to such reports, though not completely absent opposing views were “few and rare.”²¹¹ The Jewish minority was not the only target of increasing Polish nationalism. For example, in addition to championing anti-Semitic demonstrations and slogans, members of the Youth of Greater Poland (MWP, *Młodzież Wielkiej Polski*) targeted Poland's other ethnic minorities. During the organization's meetings, its members spoke out against the government's stance on the “Ukrainian question,” proclaiming that the Ukrainian minority's “impunity” must end, and that the

²⁰⁵ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopływ*): Syg. 1021: February-March 1928, p.17.

²⁰⁶ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopływ*): Syg. 1021: 1927 Report, p. 22, 26.

²⁰⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 699: Nowy Targ, Weekly and Monthly Reports, December 4, 1929.

²⁰⁸ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopływ*): Syg. 1021: December-March 1927 Report, p. 22-5.

²⁰⁹ AAN, Warszawa, Col. 9: Vol. 4 (MSW-*dopływ*): Syg. 1021: December-March 1927 Report, p. 22-5.

²¹⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 564: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, October 1935 to March 1936, file page 20.

²¹¹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, October 1927 to March 1938, file page 30.

government must prohibit Ukrainian actions organized in support of a “greater,” presumably eventually independent, Ukraine.²¹² Nonetheless, though other minorities were also targeted by the growing wave of chauvinistic nationalism in interwar Poland, the Jewish minority became its primary target in the late 1930s.

It is tempting to assume that civil society *only* reflected general beliefs. Yet the role played by interwar Polish civil society in fueling ethnic tensions highlights that the relationship between the “general” attitude, the state and civil society is neither simple nor unidirectional. Scholarly interest in civil society precisely lies in its ability not merely to reflect—and thus symbolize or signal—particular or general ideals and beliefs, but to influence them. One indicator used to note the rise in the ethnically chauvinistic nationalism is the visibly significant rise in anti-Semitic demonstrations and actions, many of which included violence and attacks perpetrated on members of the Jewish community (Tomaszewski 1998:49–50). The frequency and intensity of these attacks showcases that the Polish population not only condoned but also supported such actions. At the same time, state reports on such violent and discriminatory demonstrations and activities reveal the extent to which they were not spontaneous but carefully orchestrated by right-wing activists and associations. For instance, a report from September 29, 1936 notes how the National Coalition recruited young men of “not a reputable opinion” to make sure that Jewish stores were not conducting business during Christian holidays, and how the event turned violent when one of the young men attacked a Jewish passerby.²¹³ Additional reports, from October 3, 1936 and December 28, 1936, noted how the SN was recruiting young men under 18 with the promise of boxing classes—and recruiting them with the express purpose of training them in these courses to attack Jewish Poles.²¹⁴

Highlighting the role that organizations and networks played in planning and preparing such demonstrations is not meant to suggest that they did not find support among local populations. Rather, the purpose of doing so is to identify the interrelated role played both by the state and by civil society in shaping general attitudes towards them. By failing to penalize these crimes and their perpetrators the state effectively condoned anti-Semitic displays. As such, it played a key role in shaping general attitudes by making anti-Semitism acceptable, and neither legally nor morally reprehensible. Similarly, by planning and orchestrating visible and violent anti-Semitic actions, associations promoted the further spread of anti-Semitism by making it into an acceptable attitude to have. Such networks and associations did this by both showcasing the wide support for anti-Semitic actions and highlighting the lack of punishment of—thus silent consent for—anti-Semitism on part of the state. Regardless of the extent to which the rise in ethnic exclusion in civil and political society was fueled by the return of the state to ethnically-exclusionary and discriminatory politics or the machinations of the nationalist right, the mid 1930s, and particularly the period following Piłsudski’s death, witnessed a significant growth in the popularity of an ethnically chauvinistic nationalism and ethnic fragmentation within civil society. The latter was characterized by the increase of ethnically-exclusionary and fascist associations and movements on the one hand, and by increasing ethnic segregation of previously multiethnic associations on the other hand.

The growth in ethnic fragmentation in Poland’s civil society was particularly visible as previously multiethnic associations adopted new, ethnically-exclusionary membership

²¹² AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report on the life of Polish unions and associations, October 1938 to March 1939, p. 10.

²¹³ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 737, Organizacje Narodowe, file page 132, dated 29.9.1936.

²¹⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 737: Organizacje Narodowe, report from 3.10.1936, file page 173 and report from 28.12.1936, file page 181.

requirements. In a letter dated January 14, 1938, the Association for the Economic Development of Vilnius (TGRW, *Towarzystwo Gospodarczego Rozwoju Wileńszczyzny*) informed the Vilnius' Mayor's office that membership in the association was no longer simply restricted to graduates of a Polish University. The association had adopted a new statute that officially excluded Eastern Orthodox Poles (who, in the Vilnius region, were mostly ethnically Belarusian) from its membership, citing the cause of their exclusion as the Belarusian minority's "unfavorable attitude to the Polish state."²¹⁵ The Association of Polish Mechanical Engineers similarly transformed from a multiethnic to an ethnically-exclusionary organization. On March 11, 1937, forty three of the association's members introduced a clause that would prohibit Jews from joining the association. The proposal was adopted, leading to the expulsion of the association's Jewish members (Piłatowicz 1988:729).

Numerous student organizations at Polish Universities similarly adopted nationalist ideology and ethnic restrictions on their membership. Nationalist propaganda and anti-minority, particularly anti-Semitic, rhetoric was present in university associations throughout the interwar period. However, it was not until the mid 1930s that universities and their associations saw increasing ethnic tensions and moved towards official ethnic segregation. University student organizations in Kraków discussed restricting their membership based on ethnic and religious grounds to exclude their Jewish members as early as 1935 and 1936.²¹⁶ Various student associations at Kraków's Jagiellonian University added ethnically-exclusionary measures, known as "Aryan paragraphs," to their statutes 1937.²¹⁷ Following the addition of ethnically-exclusionary membership restrictions, Jewish members were expelled from previously multiethnic associations such as the mutual-aid association *Bratnia Pomoc* (Brotherly Love) and the *Towarzystwo Biblioteki Słuchaczy Prawa UJ* Library Association of Law Students (TBSP, Library Association of Law Students).

In previous periods youth that belonged to university associations tied to Piłsudski's regime had opposed anti-Semitic actions at UJ. Yet after the end of Piłsudski's rule, Polish youth willing to support their Jewish classmates were few and far between. This does not mean that there were no Polish youth or associations that continued to struggle against anti-Semitism at the University. The occasional Polish student was harmed during anti-Semitic actions at the University when trying to stop them. Similarly, *Legja Młodych* (Youth Legion) passed out pamphlets protesting anti-Semitic seating segregation at UJ.²¹⁸ However, the domination of key associations, such as those mentioned above, by nationalist youth²¹⁹ and the rapid increase in general support of ethnically chauvinistic ideology among university youth was startling. For instance, during the 1935/6 academic year, the proposal to introduce the "Aryan paragraph" to the statute of the TBSP was voted upon but did not pass.²²⁰ In January 1937, the association held another vote to introduce official ethnic membership restrictions to its statute. Out of the 321 students present for the vote, 55 Jewish students voted against the introduction of the restriction, only one Polish student abstained from the

²¹⁵ LVIA, Col. 53: Syg. 3224: Towarzystwo Gospodarczego Rozwoju Wileńszczyzny.

²¹⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 564: Bi-annual report from the life of Polish unions and associations, October 1935 to March 1936, p. 9.

AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 557: Monthly report on the state of public safety, December 1936, file page 207.

²¹⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 137: Public Safety, February 21, 1937, file page 49.

²¹⁸ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 136, file page 877.

²¹⁹ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 137: Public Safety 1937-1939, file page 169.

²²⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 564: Bi-annual report on the life of Polish unions and associations, October 1935 to March 1936, p. 9.

vote and the rest supported the change,²²¹ resulting in the subsequent expulsion of 120 Jewish members from the organization.²²²

Once nationalist youth at Kraków's Jagiellonian University had succeeded in taking over key university associations, and once they had ensured the passing of ethnically-exclusionary membership regulations in these associations, they shifted their efforts to institute seating segregation and *numerus clausus*—which would limit the university acceptance rates of Jewish students to 10%, the population proportion of the Jewish minority in interwar Poland. The former, referred to as the creation of “seating ghettos,” aimed to institute separate seating for Jewish students in the back of classrooms and lectures. From 1935 to 1938, Jagiellonian University saw numerous instances of demonstrations and violence perpetrated in the name of institutionalizing seating segregation at the university.²²³ On October 5th, 1937, the state officially approved the institution of seating ghettos in Polish universities (Rabinowicz 1964:155), thus not only condoning but showing its active support of such ethnically discriminatory measures. There was only one Department at one university, the Children's Clinic at Piłsudski's University in Warszawa, that did not introduce seating segregation in interwar Poland (Rabinowicz 1964:157). By 1937, nationalist youth were also successful in implementing *numerus clausus* at, among others, Jagiellonian University.²²⁴ Once *numerus clausus* was achieved, nationalist students moved onto the next item on the agenda: *numerus nullus*—the barring of Jewish youth from Polish universities.²²⁵

...and the response of the increasingly excluded and discriminated minorities

The post-1935 growth in ethnically chauvinistic nationalism in civil society, political society and the state did not go unnoticed amongst Poland's ethnic minorities. The Jewish minority reacted to the regime's transformation with apprehension “in anticipation” of its introduction of anti-Semitic laws. A turn towards more radical nationalism and fascism was “expected” amongst the country's right-wing, and even its centrist—Christian and populist—parties. However, the growth in anti-Semitic views among the left, including the Polish Socialists, worried their Jewish allies, specifically Bund.²²⁶ The awareness of increasing ethnic chauvinism in Poland fueled ethno-cultural solidarity amongst members of the discriminated minority. Prior to WWI, Polish elites forged cross-class coalitions based on mutual ethno-cultural interests under discriminatory imperial states. Similarly, during the interwar period, growing anti-Semitism in Polish civil society, political society, and the state fueled cross-class cooperation among most Jewish groups, save for the socialist Bund, based on mutual cultural and ethnic discrimination.²²⁷

²²¹ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 137: Public Safety 1937-1939, dated 30.1.1937, file page 49.

²²² AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 137: Public Safety 1937-1939, dated 21.2.1937, file page 21.

²²³ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 136: dated 18.11.1938, file page 873.

AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 136: file page 877.

AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 136: dated 1.12.1936, file page 963.

AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 136: dated 2.12.1936, file page 971.

²²⁴ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report on the life of Polish unions and associations, 4.1937-3.1939.

²²⁵ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581: Bi-annual report on the life of Polish unions and associations, 4.1937-3.1939.

²²⁶ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 562: Monthly situational report on socio-political and minority life, January 1939, file page 33.

²²⁷ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 562: Monthly situational report on socio-political and minority life, January 1939, file page 33.

The growth of anti-Semitism in civil society elicited similar responses. On the one hand, Jewish political²²⁸ and civic²²⁹ associations organized demonstrations to protest the growth in discriminatory slogans and measures. On the other hand, just as in political society, Jewish civil society responded to the rise in anti-Semitism and ethnic exclusion with a turn towards increasing intra-ethnic cooperation. In response to a radio announcement that the OZN (Camp of National Unity, a state organization aimed to foster strong state linkages to civic associations) supported eliminating Jews from Polish social (associational) life, Jewish society launched a campaign that Jewish individuals should only support Jewish cooperatives and associations.²³⁰ In another instance, when no Jewish members of a craftsmen organization, whose membership was one third Jewish, were elected to any leadership positions, Jewish members reacted to the organization's anti-Semitic turn by agreeing to form a separate Jewish organization.²³¹

The spread of an ethnically-exclusionary Polish nationalism supported the growing popularity of nationalist ideologies among Poland's ethnic minorities. Among the Jewish minority, this particularly meant the growth of Zionist ideology. As anti-Semitic actions and ideologies grew, Jewish society and Jewish associations promoted emigration from Europe as the answer to increasing discrimination and persecution.²³² While the turn towards nationalism amongst the Jewish minority meant increasing support for Zionism as a form of self-preservation, Poland's other ethnic minorities—which hoped for a future independent state in Europe—increasingly championed a cultural and social turn inward. A meeting of the Ukrainian student association *Hromada* (Community) at Jagiellonian University showcased the tenants of Ukrainian nationalist-separatist ideology. During the meeting, a speaker argued that the Ukrainian minority ought to model its own self-preservation on the German nation—that for the Ukrainian nation to persevere until an independent Ukrainian state can be established, Ukrainian society must be urged to not intermarry. While the speaker noted that there was no danger of Jewish-Ukrainian marriages, there was a danger of intermarriage between Ukrainians and other Slavs, particularly amongst the Ukrainian intelligentsia and especially Ukrainian members of Kraków's free professions (doctors, lawyers).²³³

Summary

Following the fall of interwar democracy, the Polish state shifted from policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination towards ones of ethnic inclusion and tolerance. Most ethnic minorities reacted to the state's increasingly ethnically inclusionary and culturally tolerant politics cautiously but optimistically. Hence, the transition from Poland's ethnically-exclusionary democracy to an ethnically inclusionary autocracy saw increasing willingness on the part of significant, though not all, minority groups to cooperate through and within state institutions in pursuit of their political and cultural goals. Nevertheless, the

²²⁸ For instance, in response to anti-Semitic actions in Brześć, Zionist associations from Chrzanów and Trzebina (nearby cities) organized Jewish stores to close in protest. AP Kraków, Col. 205: Syg. 687: Monthly situation report for May 1937, Starostwo Powiatowe w Chrzanowie.

²²⁹ For instance, in November 1936, Jewish students organized a protest against anti-Semitic actions and the unfair and unfounded dissolution of a peaceful march at Kraków's Jagiellonian University. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 557, Situational reports on the state of public safety and order, November 30th, 1936, file page 179.

²³⁰ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 580: Monthly report on the life of political organizations, June 1938, file page 473.

²³¹ AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 687: Monthly situational report, Starostwo Powiat w Chrzanowie, August 1937.

²³² AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 139: Jewish associations, organizations and unions, October 1932, file page 457. AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 687: Monthly situational report, Starostwo Powiat w Chrzanowie.

²³³ AP Kraków, Col. 218: Syg. 138: German and Ukrainian associations, organizations and unions, dated 26.11.1936, file page 283.

improvement in Poland's ethnic relations was short lived. Though Piłsudski's regime pursued increasingly ethnically inclusionary and culturally tolerant policies, it also gravitated towards the exclusion and repression of its political opposition. In some instances, as was the case of the state's persecution of communism and the Belarusian minority, political suppression overlapped with ethno-cultural repression, undermining minorities' belief that cooperation with the Polish state was possible. Moreover, the state's repression of its political opposition contributed to increasing politicization and political domination of associational life.

The growing organizational power of the opposition, particularly of the ethnically chauvinistic center and right-wing parties, combined with increasing economic crises to foster the popularity and prevalence of ethnically chauvinistic nationalism. The rise in ethnic discrimination and rejection of integration by large parts of Polish civil and political societies, and the state's return to policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination, further fueled ethnic fragmentation and cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary nationalist ideologies and associations.

II. Colonial Legacies

The regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under pre-WWI Russian rule and pre-WWI Austrian rule both saw the development and growth of civil society in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Chapters II and III explored the extent to which variation in state policies of political inclusion and exclusion and ethno-cultural repression and tolerance shaped the character of civil society in each region. Chapter II argued that political exclusion of Polish elites and cultural repression of the masses fostered the emergence of a politicized, elite-dominated and ethnically-fragmented associational life in Polish lands under Russian rule. Conversely, Chapter III argued that the relatively higher political inclusion of Polish elites fostered the emergence of a civil society more autonomous from elite domination. Moreover, political and cultural autonomy of the Polish ethnic majority in western Galicia fostered higher degrees of cross-ethnic cooperation, specifically in the Duchy of Kraków, as compared to both Russian-ruled "Polish" lands and Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia. The ethnic majorities in both regions, Polish and Ukrainian, respectively, experienced cultural repression and ethno-cultural discrimination that promoted cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary notions of nation and ethnic fragmentation.

Following the end of WWI, parts of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were reunited in the Second Polish Republic. Part I of this chapter explored how policies of political inclusion or exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination or tolerance promoted systematic nation-wide responses by the Polish opposition and Poland's minorities. As such, it explored how political transformations and economic pressures promoted the convergence in the character of civil society across interwar Poland's diverse regions. Part II explores the extent to which the pre-WWI legacies of two regions of interwar Poland—pre-WWI Austrian-ruled Kraków and pre-WWI Russian-ruled Vilnius—persevered throughout the interbellum. To do so, it examines the degree of distinct and persistent variation in the degree of political domination and ethnic fragmentation of the associational landscape in each region.

Imperial legacies and the political domination of associational life

The associational landscape that arose under the politically inclusionary Austrian state was more autonomous from the domination of elites, particularly the control of a single elite. At the same time, the associational landscape that arose under the politically exclusionary

Russian state was more politicized and under the influence of Polish elites excluded from political participation and power. This section explores the extent to which these pre-WWI legacies in the variation of politicization and political domination of lands formerly under Russian rule and formerly under Austrian rule continued to shape interbellum Polish civil society. This comparison focuses on two interwar voivodeships: Kraków, which had a long history of political and cultural autonomy of the Polish majority before and during Austro-Hungarian rule, and Vilnius, which had been under politically exclusionary and ethno-culturally repressive Russian rule for over a century before the end of the First World War.

It would be wrong to suggest that Congress Poland or other regions of the former Commonwealth, and later interwar Poland, did not have associations that aspired to remain independent from political domination. Associations that were both politicized and apolitical existed across all regions of the former Commonwealth and later interwar Poland. However, as Chapters II and III demonstrated, lands under Russian rule and those under Austrian rule developed distinct variation in the character of their associational landscapes. For instance, Galicia not only developed a strong rural movement that included both civil and political associations, but one where peasants were an important and significant part of the leadership. This was contrasted with Russian-ruled Congress Poland, where the largest peasant association network was created and controlled by traditional Polish elites even on the local level. In addition to facilitating the emergence of diverse organizations that represented the interests of different groups and classes, the more politically autonomous character of civil society in Kraków fostered ideals of associational independence from political parties (e.g. Snopko 1997). The perseverance of these ideals was visible in the resistance of associations, particularly of their older members,²³⁴ to the wave of politicization and political domination that swept through the interwar associational landscape.

State reports provide important insights into the character and functioning of interwar Polish associations. They can suggest not only the ways in which civil society differed across interwar Poland, but also why it did. However, the large destruction of documents during WWII and the resulting disparity in reports available across the regions hinder systematic comparisons using such reports. In addition to situational reports, the interwar Polish state produced copious amounts of data on interwar associations, including information on individual, local level associations. For instance, as part of its vast surveillance of political and civic associations, local government agencies collected information on the political affiliation of members of various local and regional level organizations. As with other types of interwar documents, many collections of such detailed organizational informational sheets and lists were destroyed during the Second World War. Though no such records remain from the Warszawa voivodeship (*województwo*), significant amounts of detailed informational sheets survived for both the Vilnius and Kraków voivodeship. These are available at national archives in Vilnius and Kraków. The analysis in this section is based on a database of information on individual, mostly local-level associations compiled from such individual informational sheets and some detailed informational lists from the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships.

Data on the political affiliation of associations' members was collected for 2,228 organizations from the interwar Kraków voivodeship and for 409 associations from the Vilnius *województwo*. Additional data was found for 351 associations from the Volyn voivodeship, which, like Vilnius, was under Russian rule prior to WWI. This sample, however, only included professional associations. Organizations for which the collected data

²³⁴ For example, a report from February 18, 1930 notes how "old traditions of liberalism still live in older." AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581, Bi-annual reports from the life of Polish unions and associations, 4.1937-3.1939, case page 113-5.

on political affiliation survived were compiled into a single database. Each association was classified into an “organizational type,” which are listed and explained in Appendix IV A. The percentage of association’s political affiliation, based on an association’s membership in distinct parties, was recorded. To compare the level of political affiliation a new variable “Max Affiliation” was created, which cataloged the highest percentage of members with the same political affiliation. For instance, if an association was recoded as having 30% of members that belonged to or supported the BBWR, 20% that supported the National Coalition and 50% that supported the Christian-Democrats, then the variable was coded as 50%, denoting the largest single affiliation group. If an association was noted as being completely under the influence of one party, then the association was coded as 100%. If an association was noted as being apolitical it was coded as 0%. In total, 207 associations—65 from Volyn (42% of this subsample), two from Vilnius (0.4% of the subsample) and 140 from Kraków (6.3% of the subsample)—fell into this category. The inclusion or exclusion of these associations does not significantly alter the results.²³⁵

The information on the political affiliation of associations’ members was collected and recorded by interwar government agents. One could argue that for this reason it cannot be treated as objective, as government employees could have been motivated to either overestimate or underestimate the political affiliation that an organization had either to opposing parties or to the ruling regime. However, such an assumption is unlikely to have been true. The data collected on these associations was not made public. Rather it was collected and recorded for the use of the government’s Security Division to monitor associational and political life. Introducing conscious bias would have obstructed the purpose of government surveillance. Thus, it is unlikely that employees who created and compiled these reports altered the data for political reasons. It is more likely that the recorded data contains errors introduced either by the monitoring and reporting agents or by those who compiled and copied the information with which they were provided. So long as such unconscious errors were random, we can assume they are randomly present across various associations and localities, and thus do not bias the results.

	Kraków	Krakowa	Vilnius	Vilnius ^b	Volyn
Max Mean	69.83	69.83	80.16	75.93	81.48
	[2228]		[409]		[351]

Table 3. Regional Comparison of Interwar “Political Domination” of Associations

Notes:

^a Proportions adjusted based on Vilnius organizational type proportions

^b Proportions adjusted based on Kraków organizational type proportions. The significant decrease in the weighted mean maximum political affiliation of associations in Vilnius is mostly driven by the significant weight added to the “max mean” of service associations (volunteer fire fighters), which have the lowest “max mean” of all associational types for Vilnius (but not for Kraków).

[] denotes sample size

Data source: same as Table 2.

²³⁵ The region most affected by the inclusion of these associations is Volyn, whose associations were categorized as being either 100% dominated by a political party or as being apolitical. Nonetheless, the exclusion of these associations did not influence *significance levels* of the results of matching tests used to assess the statistical significance of the variation in maximum political affiliation of associations across the regions. Though significance levels were not altered, the exclusion of these organizations did slightly decrease the p.values of the matching analysis, strengthening the claim that the variation in the political domination across regions was in fact statistically significant.

Table 3 lists the average, by region, highest percentage of associations' members that belonged to or supported a single political party, calculated using the database described above. As can be seen in Table 3, on average, 69.8% of members of a single association in Kraków had the same political affiliation, meaning that they belonged to or supported the same political party. At the same time associations in Vilnius has, on average, 80.2% of members with the same political affiliation. Both means are relatively high, reflecting the phenomenon described in Part I—that the associational landscape of interwar Poland was highly politicized, and that political groups attempted to gain control of civil society associations in order to utilize them to build a strong social base. Nonetheless, the data suggests that there was significant variation in the level of political domination in these two regions. Moreover, it supports the prediction that interwar Kraków's civil society associations were, on average, less dominated by single political groups than those found either in pre-WWI Russian-ruled Vilnius or Volyn.

Table 2, introduced in Part I of this chapter, breaks down the average highest percentage of an association's members' political affiliation by organization type. As discussed earlier, associations varied in the degree to which they were dominated by political parties, with some associations being targeted by political groups for infiltration and co-optation. In addition to variation in "political domination" among organizational types, Table 2 shows that similar types of associations did not have the same level of politicization and political domination across the different regions. For instance, whereas credit associations in Kraków tended to have more diverse political views amongst its members—as on average, only about half of the members in credit associations shared political allegiances—credit associations in Vilnius tended to be much more likely to be dominated by single political parties—as 80.4% of their members, on average, had the same political affiliation. Table 4 is a slightly altered version of Table 2, with two organizational type categories collapsed. These categories were collapsed due to their very small number of observations. Agricultural associations were changed to a broader category "Co-op." In addition to including agricultural cooperatives, the latter was altered to now also include food cooperatives that were previously classified as "Mutual Aid." Three other "Mutual Aid" associations, which provided services such as funeral aid to their members, were re-classified as "Philanthropic" associations. Due to there only being one religious association with the appropriate membership data in Vilnius, religious associations were grouped under the broader category of "Interest" associations. For additional details on individual categories see Appendix IV A.

Organization Type	Voivodeship (<i>Województwo</i>)		
	Kraków	Vilnius	Volyn
Co-op	66.05 [273]	72.42 [32]	-
Credit	51.37 [51]	80.38 [13]	-
Cultural	78.64 [171]	75.28 [18]	-
Interest	78.27 [109]	81.1 [62]	-
Nationalist/Paramilitary	76.14 [200]	87.89 [24]	-
Philanthropic	74.38 [72]	77.401 [22]	-
Professional	66.16 [132]	80.77 [79]	81.5 [351]
Recreational	65.0 [103]	80.84 [19]	-
Service	69.72 [907]	71.33 [8]	-
Veterans/Military	78.86 [44]	86.70 [52]	-
Youth	61.60 [166]	77.92 [80]	-

Table 4. Interwar “Political Domination” of Associations by Region and Type

Notes: [] denotes sample size. Data source: same as Table 2.

As can be seen in Table 4, there are significant discrepancies in the proportion of various associational types across the regions. This variation in organizational type proportions could be driven by actual variation that existed in the associational landscapes in the different voivodeships. If this is the case, then some may argue that the disparity in proportions of organizational types is itself a manifestation of the variation across the regions, and should be treated as such. However, the variation could also be driven by the smaller size of the samples from Vilnius and Volyn, by randomness in the types of organizations on which data was either compiled or survived. In this case, some might argue that the variation in organizational type proportions, and any disparity in the regional average of the highest members’ political association that this proportional variation drives, does not reflect actual regional variation in the “political domination” of associational life that existed. To account for this possibility, Table 3 lists “Max Means”—the regional averages of the highest percentage of each association’s members’ political affiliation with a single party—for Kraków and Vilnius that are weighted based on the proportions of the organizational types found in the other region. In other words, the weighed mean for Kraków was adjusted by weighing the “Max Mean” for each organization type in Kraków by the proportion of that type of association found in Vilnius. The weighted “Max Mean” for Vilnius was calculated by weighing the maximum affiliation mean for each type of organization in Vilnius by the sample proportions of that organizational type found in the Kraków sample.

If we believe that the random samples may not represent the actual associational landscape for the regions, particularly for those with smaller samples, or if we believe that we should consider how the types of associations in the regions might have driven regional variation in the level of “political domination,” then the weighted mean of each sample should be compared to the original mean of the other region. In other words, we should compare the Kraków “Max Mean” of 69.83% to the Vilnius “Max Mean” of 76.2% (which is considerably lower than the mean from the original sample), and the Vilnius original mean

of 80.16% ought to be compared to the weighed mean of 69.83% from Kraków (which in this case is the same as the observed mean). Whichever comparison is chosen, there is still a noticeable difference between the regions, ranging from 6.38% to 10.33%. Thus, the results continue to support the original proposition that Kraków's associational landscape continued to be more resistant to the domination by single political groups than the associational landscape of Vilnius during the interwar period.

To analyze the significance of "Max Mean" variation in the highest political affiliation of Kraków's associations compared to that of Vilnius and Volyn while controlling for organizational type, a linear regression model and a multivariate matching test²³⁶ were used. A "Regime" treatment variable was coded as one for all associations from the Kraków województwo, which prior to WWI was under Austro-Hungarian rule, and as zero for all associations found either in Vilnius or Volyn voivodeships, both of which were under Russian rule prior to the First World War. When the entire sample was used, both tests found that the variation in the "Max Mean" in Kraków in comparison to that in Vilnius and Volyn is statistically significant. The multivariate matching algorithm was utilized to check whether adjusting for the balance in organizational type would erode the statistical significance in the variation of "Max Mean" between the regions. When balance was achieved on all organizational types, the difference between the highest political affiliation of associations in Kraków as opposed to those in Volyn and Vilnius was significant at the $p < .01$ level (p-value is .00626). The average treatment effect was -8.6, suggesting that the highest proportion of associations' members affiliated with the same political affiliation was 8.6 points lower in Kraków in comparison to Vilnius and Volyn. For detailed results see Appendix IV B1.

²³⁶ The GenMatch function in R was utilized for each multivariate matching test.

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	72.700	3.234	22.477	< 2e-16	***
Region	-10.270	2.761	-3.720	0.00020	***
YearOfData (Y2)	0.230	2.203	0.104	0.91691	
Membership	0.001	0.001	0.480	0.63094	
<u>Urban</u>	-2.822	1.404	-2.010	0.04453	*
Interest	13.150	2.953	4.454	0.00001	***
Credit	-11.080	4.529	-2.447	0.01446	*
Cultural	13.380	2.877	4.650	0.00000	***
Youth	1.320	2.747	0.481	0.63083	
Nationalist	12.680	2.772	4.576	0.00000	***
Philanthropy	10.590	3.616	2.930	0.00342	**
Professional	9.004	2.659	3.387	0.00072	***
Recreational	5.821	3.304	1.762	0.07823	.
Service	9.218	2.036	4.527	0.00001	***
<u>Military</u>	16.000	3.590	4.456	0.00001	***
Y2: Youth	-3.134	2.071	-1.513	0.13046	
Y2: Recreational	4.900	2.792	1.755	0.07938	.
Y2: Region	0.590	2.373	0.249	0.80365	
Y2: Nationalist	5.415	2.418	2.239	0.02522	*

Table 5a. Linear Regression Model results for associations registered in the Kraków, Vilnius and Volyn voivodeships for the Whole Sample.

Data compiled from AP Kraków, ul. Grodzka 51 Col. 206 (UW.Kr.): Syg. 131, 132 and Col 25/231 (St.Ż II): Syg. 60, 62 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76; AAN, Col. 1181 (UW. Łuck): Old Syg. 979/62 (UW. Wołyń); and LVIA, Col. 53/23: Syg. 854.

Notes: Intercept: Coop (organization type), Rural (municipality type), pre-WWI Russian-ruled regions (Vilnius and Volyn).

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 28.99 on 2820 degrees of freedom

149 observations deleted due to missingness

Multiple R-squared: 0.06056, Adjusted R-squared: 0.05457

F-statistic: 10.1 on 18 and 2820 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	71.905	3.832	18.762	< 2e-16	***
Region	-6.896	2.586	-2.667	0.00778	**
YearOfData (Y2)	1.762	1.634	1.079	0.28097	
Membership	0.002	0.001	1.313	0.18933	
<u>Urban</u>	-3.378	2.162	-1.563	0.11847	
Interest	11.261	4.423	2.546	0.01105	*
Credit	-13.607	6.674	-2.039	0.04173	*
Cultural	7.335	4.968	1.477	0.14011	
Youth	-0.745	4.311	-0.173	0.86287	
Nationalist	17.672	5.089	3.473	0.00054	***
Philanthropy	8.716	5.836	1.493	0.13564	
Professional	11.021	4.257	2.589	0.00977	**
Recreational	9.946	5.708	1.743	0.08172	.
Service	-8.657	5.196	-1.666	0.09599	.
<u>Military</u>	17.544	5.045	3.478	0.00053	***
Y2: Youth	-6.497	3.390	-1.917	0.05558	.
Y2: Recreational	4.697	5.166	0.909	0.36339	
Y2: Region	-0.755	2.810	-0.269	0.78817	
Y2: Nationalist	2.214	5.959	0.371	0.71037	

Table 5b. Linear Regression Model results for associations registered in the Kraków, Vilnius and Volyn voivodeships, using data collected *after 1933* only.

Data Source: Same as Table 5a.

Notes: Intercept: Coop (organization type), Rural (municipality type), pre-WWI Russian-ruled regions (Vilnius and Volyn).

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 27.24 on 1017 degrees of freedom

(42 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.1003, Adjusted R-squared: 0.08439

F-statistic: 6.3 on 18 and 1017 DF, p-value: 6.395e-15

Tables 5a and 5b present the results of linear regression models. Table 5a presents the results using the whole sample, while Table 5b presents the results using only data collected after 1933.²³⁷ In addition to the types of associations, as those presented in Table 4, the year of data collection (Y2),²³⁸ municipality type where an association was registered, and the number of members were included in the model. An additional 149 associations were excluded from the model due to the lack of information on the number of members in each association. Thus, in total, the model included 2,840 observations. The organization type and type of municipality were coded as dummy variables. Cities and towns were coded as “Urban” and villages, farms and manors were coded as “Rural.” The municipality type of

²³⁷ The reason behind using only data after 1933 was to show the increase in the R^2 and adjusted R^2 between the samples. This suggests that the poor quality of the data is at least in part driven by the significant lack of data overlap, both with respect to sample size and to variation in organizational type across regions, between the regions prior to 1934. Nonetheless, even the reduced model explains only approximately 8% to 10% of the variation across organizations’ highest proportion of members’ single party affiliation.

²³⁸ The variable Y2 (year of data collection) was normalized.

locations in which associations were registered was classified using the *City Index of the Polish Republic* (*Skorowidz Miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polski*, 1931, ed. Byrzycki, Tadeusz). Controlling for organization type, year of data collection, rural or urban location, and membership size, associations' highest percentage of members with the same political affiliation in Kraków was on average 10% lower than associations' highest percentage of members with the same political affiliation in Vilnius and Volyn. In other words, being under pre-WWI Austrian rule lowered the maximum single party affiliation of an association by 9.6% as compared to being under pre-WWI Russian rule. In addition to the region where an association was found, being in an urban as opposed to a rural setting decreased the estimated political domination of associations by decreasing the associations' estimated highest percentage of members with the same political affiliation by 2.8%. Moreover, in comparison to Cooperative associations, Interest, Cultural, Nationalist, Philanthropy, Professional, Recreational, Military and Service associations were estimated, on average, to have a greater highest percentage of members' affiliation to a single party. In comparison to Cooperative associations, only Credit associations were estimated to have a lower highest percentage of members' affiliation to a single party on average.

Nearly all (97%) of the data in the total sample was collected after 1926, hence following Piłsudski's coup. However, only three quarters of the records were dated after 1930. The linear regression model results provided above suggest that the year of data collection did not significantly impact the highest membership proportion of a single party political affiliation of associations. At the same time, the introduction of an interaction effect between the year that data was collected and region erodes the latter's statistical significance. This is likely due to both (1) the lack of overlap in the exact years of data collection for the region (Table 6)²³⁹ and (2) the rise in convergence in associational character across regions during the progression of the interwar period (as argued in Part II of this chapter). To account for the lack of significant overlap between years of data collection across regions, I separate the data into theoretically driven categories. These included associational information collected prior to 1927 during interwar Polish democracy, information collected between 1927 and 1929 during the earlier and less repressive years of Piłsudski's dictatorship, and data collected in or after 1930 after the regime's significant and visible shift towards political exclusion and repression of oppositional parties.

²³⁹ The only years that have substantial overlap, with more than five observations for each region, between Kraków and one region ruled by Russian prior to WWI (Vilnius or Volyn), are 1930, 1934 and 1935. In each of these three years, the average "Max Mean" in Kraków is at least 9% lower and at most 14.8% lower than in a region under Russian rule prior to WWI.

Year2	Kraków		Vilnius		Volyn	
	Sample Size	Max Mean	Sample Size	Max Mean	Sample Size	Max Mean
<1919	8	56.0	-	-	-	-
1920	2	100.0	-	-	-	-
1921	2	70.0	-	-	-	-
1922	3	76.7	-	-	-	-
1923	11	55.5	-	-	-	-
1924	9	82.2	-	-	-	-
1925	27	64.6	-	-	-	-
1926	55	66.0	-	-	-	-
1927	283	69.2	2	50.0	-	-
1928	189	63.4	1	100.0	-	-
1929	164	70.4	-	-	-	-
1930	947	71.9	1	0.0	68	80.9
1931	48	66.1	-	-	-	-
1932	11	61.8	1	50.0	-	-
1933	80	71.7	-	-	-	-
1934	318	69.5	372	79.3	-	-
1935	22	66.8	-	-	283	81.6
1936	18	61.7	-	-	-	-
1937	33	73.9	2	100	-	-
1939	-	-	30	95.2	-	-

Table 6. Average highest proportion of associations' members with the same political affiliation, by year of data collection and region.

Data compiled from AP Kraków, ul. Grodzka 51 Col. 206 (UW.Kr.): Syg. 131, 132 and Col 25/231 (St.Ż II): Syg. 60, 62 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76; AAN, Col. 1181 (UW. Łuck): Old Syg. 979/62 (UW. Wołyń); and LVIA, Col. 53/23: Syg. 854.

The first sample, which excluded any data collected prior to 1927 and prior to Piłsudski's coup, excluded 3% of the original dataset: 95 associations from the Kraków województwo. The second sample included data collected in 1929 or later, after the transition from democracy to autocracy and the onset, but not yet full bloom, of state repression of its political opposition. This sample reduced the original sample by 20%, excluding 587 associations from the Kraków voivodeship and three associations from Vilnius. The last sample included only data collected for the year 1930 or later, after further transition away from democratic participation by non-regime parties and actors and closer to a politically exclusionary dictatorial state. This sample excluded 25% of associations from the whole dataset: 751 organizations from Kraków and three organizations from Vilnius.

	Kraków	Krakowa	Vilnius	Vilnius ^b	Volyn
Max Mean	70.01 [2133]	72.41	80.16 [409]	75.87	81.48 [351]

Table 7. Regional Comparison of Interwar "Political Domination" of Associations Excluding data collected before 1927. Data Source: Same as Table 6.

^a Proportions adjusted based on Vilnius organizational type proportions

^b Proportions adjusted based on Kraków organizational type proportions.

Table 7 presents the mean maximum political affiliation of associations' members for Kraków and Vilnius for data collected after 1926. The exclusion of associations with

information recorded prior to 1927 increased the mean maximum political affiliation from 69.83% to 70.01% for the Kraków voivodeship but did not change the “Max Mean” for Vilnius. Table 6 also presents the adjusted regional means, based on the new organization type means and proportions for the Kraków voivodeship. In addition, a multivariate matching test was conducted on the reduced sample size. When balance was achieved on all organizational types, the difference between the highest political affiliation of associations in Kraków as opposed to those in Volyn and Vilnius continued to be statistically significant at the $p < .005$ level (p-value was .00499) When balance was achieved on all but one organizational type (Credit) but was also achieved on urban municipalities, the average maximum political affiliation of associations’ members for Kraków in comparison to that in Vilnius and Volyn was significant at the $p < .01$ level (p-value was .00539). The average treatment effect was -9.1% for the first test and -9.07% for the second test. Thus, both tests support the conclusion that, on average, the highest proportion of associations’ members affiliated with the same political affiliation was nine points lower in Kraków in comparison to Vilnius and Volyn. The results are presented in Appendix IV B2 i and ii.

	Kraków	Krakowa	Vilnius	Vilnius ^b	Volyn
Max Mean	70.90 [1641]	73.42	80.26 [406]	75.50	81.48 [351]

Table 8. Regional Comparison of Interwar “Political Domination” of Associations Excluding, excluding data collected before 1929. Data Source: Same as Table 6.

^a Proportions adjusted based on Vilnius organizational type proportions

^b Proportions adjusted based on Kraków organizational type proportions.

Table 8 presents the mean maximum political affiliation of associations’ members for Kraków and Vilnius for data collected after 1928. The exclusion of associations with information recorded prior to 1929 further increased the mean maximum political affiliation to 70.90% for the Kraków voivodeship and slightly increased the max mean for the Vilnius voivodeship, to 80.26%. As all data from the Volyn region remained in the sample, its mean for the maximum political affiliation of associations’ members did not change. Table 8 also presents the adjusted regional means, based on the new organization type means and proportions for the Kraków voivodeship. In addition, a multivariate matching test was conducted on the reduced sample size. When balance was achieved on all organizational types, the difference between the average highest political affiliation of associations in Kraków as opposed to those in Volyn and Vilnius continued to be statistically significant at the $p < .005$ level (p-value was .0049). The average treatment effect decreased from the previous samples to -7.1%. Thus, this test once more supports the conclusion that, on average, the highest proportion of associations’ members affiliated with the same political affiliation was lower in Kraków (on average by 7%) in comparison to Vilnius and Volyn. The results are presented in Appendix IV B3.

	Kraków	Krakowa	Vilnius	Vilnius ^b	Volyn
Max Mean	70.96 [1477]	72.01	80.26 [406]	75.23 ^c	81.48 [351]

Table 9. Regional Comparison of Interwar “Political Domination” of Associations, excluding data collected before 1930. Data Source: Same as Table 6.

^a Proportions adjusted based on Vilnius organizational type proportions

^b Proportions adjusted based on Kraków organizational type proportions.

^c As in Table 3, the significant decrease in the weighted mean maximum political affiliation of associations in Vilnius is mostly driven by the significant weight added to the “max mean” of service associations (volunteer fire fighters), which have the lowest “max mean” of all associational types for Vilnius (but not for Kraków).

[] Denotes sample size

Table 9 provides the actual and adjusted means for the subset of associations for which political affiliation information was collected on or after 1930. The exclusion of data recorded prior to 1930 once more makes a small, though more noticeable difference for the actual mean of highest affiliation of associations’ members for the Kraków region, raising it to 70.96%. The “Max Mean” for the Vilnius region increased slightly to 80.26%. The increase of the observed “Max Mean” for Kraków further reduces the comparative difference between Kraków and the adjusted Vilnius mean (which once more is significantly decreased due to the overwhelming effect of increasing service associations, which in Vilnius, but not in Kraków, have the lowest regional maximum political affiliation mean) from 6.1% in the total sample, to 5.86% in the first reduced sample, to 4.6% in the second reduced sample to a mere 4.27% in the last sample. The weighted Kraków “Max Mean” increased to 72.01%, thus decreasing the comparative difference between the maximum associations’ membership percentage with a single political affiliation from 10.34% for the total sample, to 7.75% for the first reduced sample, to 6.84% for the second reduced sample, and to 8.25% in the last sample.

The progressive exclusion of associational data collected prior to 1930 corresponds to a gradual decrease in the difference between the average maximum single-party political affiliation of associations’ members in the Kraków województwo as compared to the Vilnius and Volyn voivodeships. Despite the decrease, the difference in the “Max Means” for each region ranges from 9.3% (for the observed samples), to 8.25% for the comparison of the observed Vilnius “Max Mean” to the weighted Kraków “Max Mean,” and lastly to a significantly smaller 4.27% for the comparison of the weighted Vilnius “Max Mean” to the observed Kraków “Max Mean.” The continuation of significant (though decreasing) differences in the means between these regions suggests that the associational legacies developed in the pre-WWI area continued to shape variation in political domination of associational life in at least these three voivodeships.

A multivariate matching analysis was once more conducted on the reduced sample size. When balance was achieved on all organizational types, and near balance was achieved on the urban municipality variable, the difference between the average highest proportion of members with a single political affiliation in Kraków’s associations in comparison to that of associations located in the Volyn and Vilnius voivodeships continued to be statistically significant, however only at the $p < .1$ level (p -values was 0.094). The average treatment effect decreased from the previous samples to -6.2%. In other words, this test also supports, though with a lower certainty, the conclusion that, on average, the highest proportion of associations’ members affiliated with the same political affiliation was lower in Kraków (on average by 6.2%) in comparison to Vilnius and Volyn. The results are presented in Appendix IV B4. Appendix IV B5 and B6 present results of multivariate analysis utilizing data

recorded in 1934 only and data recorded after 1933 only, respectively. Both tests support the hypothesis that on average, the highest single political affiliation amongst associations' members in Kraków is approximately 7% and 8%, respectively, lower than in Vilnius and Volyn. Both test achieved perfect balance on all organizational types and near perfect balance on the variable urban, and their estimated treatment effects are significant at the $p < .1$ and $p < .01$ level, respectively.

Summary

The analysis presented in this section suggests that pre-WWI historical legacies of political exclusion under Russian rule and political inclusion under Austrian rule largely preserved into the interwar period. State reports suggest that the habits and memories of older actors, frequently referred to in government reports as the “older generations”²⁴⁰— meant that Kraków's associations, where civil society prior to WWI had been relatively more autonomous from political domination, were more resistant to political domination by single parties during the interbellum. The state's transformation from a democracy in 1926, and later its progression towards increasing political exclusion, particularly after 1930, incentivized excluded actors to seek to politicize and create strong ties with civic associations. In the face of mounting political competition for control over civil society, Kraków's associational landscape proved more capable to withstand, if not politicization and political competition, then the domination of associations by single political groups.

Imperial legacies and the ethnic fragmentation of associational life

Part II of this chapter focused on how the shifts in the political and civic landscape shaped and re-shaped the ethnic relations in interbellum Poland. This section focuses on how, despite the general national trend of increasing ethnic fragmentation in political and civil society, pre-WWI legacies could be seen in the relative ethnic fragmentation of associational life in two regions of interwar Poland: the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships. Following the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Kraków's ethnic majority enjoyed a long history of cultural autonomy combined with periods of completely and relative political independence. The cultural and political hegemony of the local ethnic majority promoted an atmosphere where local minorities were incentivized and coerced (through discriminatory policies that favored dominant cultural practices), but not forced, into assimilation. Thus, western Galicia, and specifically the regions of the former Republic of Kraków, developed a relatively higher level of cross-ethnic cooperation and integration in comparison to regions of the former Commonwealth under Russian rule and to Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia, where the local ethnic majorities—Polish and Ukrainian, respectively—faced politically exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination.

Vilnius, like Congress Poland, was under Russian rule prior to WWI. The demographic landscape of Vilnius, however, was somewhat different from that of Warszawa. Poles accounted for approximately 60% of the local population in the Vilnius województwo and were largely concentrated in cities and towns. Belarusians made up the region's second largest ethnic minority, and were mostly concentrated in some rural areas. At the same time, Poles made up 85% of the population of the Warszawa voivodeship where they were

²⁴⁰ For example, see AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 581, Bi-annual reports from the life of Polish unions and associations, 4.1937-3.1939, case page 113-5.

generally, though not exclusively, the ethnic majority across urban and rural settings.²⁴¹ Despite the demographic variations, the two regions were similar not only in that Poles were, in the end, the local ethnic majority, but also in that populations of both regions faced political exclusion, ethno-cultural discrimination and forced assimilation under pre-WWI Russian rule. Thus, like Congress Poland, the Vilnius voivodeship should have experienced a relatively lower level of cross-ethnic cooperation and civil society integration than Kraków in the second half of the 19th century. As such, we would expect interwar civil society in Vilnius, like in Congress Poland, to have lower levels of cross-ethnic integration and higher levels of ethnic fragmentation as compared to the associational life in interbellum Kraków.²⁴²

Neither Kraków nor Vilnius was impervious to the wave of nationalism, ethnic discrimination, ethnic fragmentation and cross-class, ethnically-exclusionary, cooperation that swept across all regions of interwar Poland, particularly in the 1930s. However, just as pre-WWI policies of political inclusion and exclusion shape regional variation in associations' resistance to politicization and political domination after WWI, so too did pre-WWI imperial policies of cultural repression and ethno-cultural discrimination continue to shape the degree to which interwar civil society was susceptible or resistant to ethnic fragmentation.

Table 10 below presents the integrated results of two organizational samples from the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships. The first sample includes 2,548 associations from the Kraków voivodeship and 719 associations from the Vilnius voivodeship. Information on associations in both regions was compiled from various lists and individual registration and informational documents located in the Polish National Archives in Kraków and in the Lithuanian Central State Archives in Vilnius. No full registration books or lists of associational life could be located in either archive. Moreover, the amount and type of information available for individual associations varied. While there was no additional information provided for some associations besides their name, details on other organizations included specific locations, years of original registration, number of members, ethnic make-up, political affiliation of members and purpose. Table 1a and 1b in Appendix IV C provide information on the total sample from each region, detailing the number of observations by type of association and the ethnic or religious affiliation implied in an association's name. Each organization was coded as implying an ethnic or religious affiliation if its name included a specific ethnic adjective, such as Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, German, or if the name of the association was in a language other than the official state language (Polish). Table 10 lists only associations coded as having a Polish, Christian (including Catholic), Jewish or no implied ethnic or religious affiliation. Tables 1a and 1b in Appendix IV C include associations with other implied ethnic or religious affiliations.

The second sample presented in Table 10 is a random sub-sample of 73 associations from the Kraków województwo and 114 associations from the Vilnius voivodeship. This random sample is used to compare the correlation between the ethnic or religious affiliation implied in an association's name and ethnic or religious membership restrictions found in its statute. Tables 2a to 3c in Appendix IV C present additional information, including sample size and more detailed categories, on the correlation between specific ethnic or religious affiliations implied in an association's name and ethnic or religious restrictions found in its statute.

²⁴¹ Population statistics from Jezierski, A. and A. Wyczański (eds.). 2003. *Historia Polski w liczbach*. Vol. I. Główny Urząd Statystyczny Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych: Warszawa, p. 382-387.

²⁴² As mentioned in the previous section, the decision to compare ethnic fragmentation in Kraków with that in Vilnius, rather than in Warszawa, was driven by data availability in the former and lack of data, due to WWII, in the latter.

Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in Associations' Names	Percentage of Associations with an Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in their Names				Percentage of Associations with no Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions ^c	
	Kraków	Vilnius	Adjusted Krakowa	Adjusted Vilnius ^b	Kraków	Vilnius
None	85.4	53.1	67.9	72.8	85.8 [113]	69.6 [77]
Polish	3.7	31.2	7.4	16.5	100 [3]	37.5 [8]
Christian	4.4	8.8	13.6	4.5	35.5 [17]	0 [10]
Jewish	5.6	6.7	10.4	6.0	- [0]	68.8 [16]
Total	99.1 ^d [2548]	99.8 ^d [719]	99.3 ^d [2548]	99.8 ^d [719]	79.4 [136]	59.9 [114]
Estimated proportion of associations without ethnic or religious membership restrictions	78.5^c	53.5	70.5^c	61.0		

Table 10. Percentage of Kraków's and Vilnius' associations with an implied ethnic or religious affiliation and estimated percentages of associations without official ethnic or religious membership restrictions

^a Kraków associational proportions based on the organizational type proportions found in Vilnius.

^b Vilnius associational proportions based on the organizational type proportions found in Kraków.

^c Underestimated as it excludes all Jewish associations that did not include ethnic or religious membership restrictions in their statutes, but overestimated due to the small, likely skewed sample of only three associations marked as "Polish."

^d Do not add up to 100% due to associations with other affiliations being excluded from the table.

^e Based on a random sample of associations and their membership regulations as written in their statutes. For more comprehensive charts, see Tables 2a to 3c in Appendix IV C.

[] Denotes sample size.

In the random sample of associations in the Kraków voivodeship, 85.8% of associations with no ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their names also had no ethnic or religious restrictions in their statutes, 100% of three associations in the sample that were labeled as "Polish" did not have any official ethnic or religious restrictions, while 35.5% of associations labeled as Christian or Catholic did not have any official ethnic or religious membership restrictions. In the random sample of associations in the Vilnius województwo, 69.6% of associations with no implied ethnic or religious affiliation also had no official ethnic or religious restrictions, 37.5% of "Polish" associations had no official ethnic or religious membership restrictions, 68.8% of "Jewish" associations had no official ethnic or religious restrictions while no associations marked as "Christian" or "Catholic" had any official ethnic or religious restrictions. Out of the 136 associations in the random sample from the Kraków region, 79.4% of associations had no ethnic or religious membership restrictions written into their statutes. Out of the 114 associations in the sample from the Vilnius voivodeship, only 59.9% of associations did not have official ethnic or religious membership restrictions. These random samples suggest that around 20% more of the interwar associational landscape in the Kraków voivodeship, as opposed to that of Vilnius, was implicitly ethnically inclusionary (did not officially exclude members based on their ethnic or religious affiliation).

Tables 5 in Appendix IV C presents the ethnic or religious affiliation implied by associations' names as a proportion of organizational types from the first, larger sample of 2,548 associations from the Kraków województwo and 719 associations from the Vilnius województwo. Moreover, Table 5 provides the weighed percentages of associations with no implied ethnic or religious affiliation as well as the percentages of associations with specific ethnic or religious affiliation in each region. The weighted totals for the Kraków województwo are based on the proportions of associational types found in the Vilnius sample, while the Vilnius proportions are based on the percentages of associational types found in the Kraków sample. As in the previous section, the weighed averages allow for a better comparison between the regions if we believe that the variation in the percentages of types of associations found in the random sample in each region introduces a bias to the comparison. While some may argue that the variation in the proportions of associations across regions is a reflection of the regions' differences, others would suggest that, due to the random destruction of archival data during WWI, and the fact that some archival collections group associations by type, the variation in proportions of associations across regions can be driven by error introduced in the survival of some clusters of collections of organizational information and not others. By weighing Kraków's percentages of the implied ethnic or religious affiliations of associations by the organizational proportions from Vilnius, and vice-versa, we can control for regional differences driven by this potential sampling bias.

Both the actual and weighted proportions of implied ethnic or religious affiliations of associations in Kraków and Vilnius were used in the compilation of Table 10. The observed percentages were utilized to yield the estimated proportions of associations without ethnic or religious membership restrictions that were discussed above. The adjusted proportions yielded slightly different results. The adjusted estimate of associations without official ethnic or religious membership restrictions in Kraków was 70.5% (as opposed to 78.5%), while the adjusted estimate for Vilnius was 61% (as opposed to 53.5%). Comparing the weighted estimate for Kraków with the observed estimate for Vilnius yields a regional difference of 17%, while comparing the adjusted estimate for Vilnius with the observed estimate for Kraków yields a regional difference of 17.5%. Thus, despite the slight variation in the observed and adjusted estimates, 17% to 20% of Kraków's interwar associational landscape appears to be composed of associations that did not include official ethnic or religious restrictions on their membership.

The samples of associational life from the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships demonstrate that civil society organizations in the latter region were more likely not to exclude members based on their ethnic or religious affiliation than in the former region. In order to analyze the degree to which the lack of official ethnic or religious exclusion in associations corresponded to an actual presence of multiethnic or multi-religious membership in interwar Polish associations, a sub-sample of 68 associations from various regions was compiled. Information on these associations included documentation regarding the make-up of their membership, such as membership lists or, in some cases, government compiled information. Government documents on the ethnic make-up of some associations provided definitive information of whether an association was multiethnic. Associations with other membership information, such as membership lists, were coded as being multiethnic only in the case that there was strong evidence to support this claim. For instance, association lists with a majority of likely Polish names—thus names where both the first and last names were most likely Polish—yet with at least one name that was very likely not Polish, were categorized as showing evidence of cross-ethnic membership. Otherwise, associations were coded as either maybe or most likely not showing evidence of multiethnic membership.

The tense ethnic relations and general ethnically-fragmented nature of interwar Polish society means that, in the absence of strong proof of cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership, associations should be assumed as being homogeneous in their ethnic make-up. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter II, first names, rather than last names, ought to be utilized in Poland as the better signifier of a non-Polish ethnicity. Due to the long, multiethnic history of the region, many inhabitants had, among others, Polish, German, Ukrainian, and French sounding last names, yet, would have classified themselves (and would have been classified by others) as ethnically Polish despite having a potential, whether recent or remote, foreign heritage. Unlike last names, ethnic first names tended to be less likely to be adopted by Poles. Some assimilated members of ethnic minorities could have completely Polish sounding first and last names, yet continue to identify themselves as belonging to a different ethnic or religious group. Assimilated members of ethnic minorities, mostly likely of the Jewish minority, who would continue to identify themselves and be identified as members of ethnic minorities were a relatively small part of the population. Once more, it is more likely that associations, like society in general, were ethnically-fragmented. As such, individual organizations should be assumed as ethnically homogenous rather than ethnically heterogeneous save in cases where there is evidence to the contrary.

Region	Implied Ethnic or Religious Affiliation in an Association's Name	Evidence of Cross-Ethnic Membership		
		Yes	Maybe	No
Kraków	Yes	1	1	1
	No	12	2	18
Vilnius	Yes	-	-	2
	No	3 (+1) ^a	2	20 (+1) ^a
Warszawa	Yes	-	2	-
	No	1	-	-
National	Yes	1	-	-
	No	1	-	-
Lviv	Yes	1	-	-
	No	-	-	-

Table 11. Implied Ethnic or Religious Affiliation and Evidence of Multiethnic membership in interwar Poland's associations.

^a Includes an association which altered its membership regulations from not ethnically or religiously exclusionary to a religiously and ethnically-exclusionary one in 1938.

Table 11 presents, by region, the number of associations with an implied ethnic or religious affiliation in their name ("Yes") or with no implied ethnic or religious affiliation ("No") that either had evidence that supported ("Yes"), did not support ("No"), or may have supported ("Maybe") the claim that they had a multiethnic or cross-religious membership. Table 12, below, provides a further analysis of this sample.

Implied Ethnic or Religious Affiliation (Name)	Evidence of Cross-Ethnic Membership	
	Yes	No ^a
Yes [Sample Size]	33.3% ^b [3]	67.7% [6]
No [Sample Size]	27.3% [17]	72.7% [44]

Table 12. Proportion of associations with or without an implied Ethnic or Religious Affiliation and with sufficient or insufficient evidence of a multiethnic membership.

Notes: The one association in the sample whose membership restrictions were altered in 1938 was excluded from the calculations presented here.

^a Includes organizations coded as both “No” and “Maybe

^b The ethnic affiliation implied in *all* associations with an implied ethnic or religious affiliation but with evidence of a cross-ethnic membership was “Polish.”

Within the sample of 68 associations, only nine associations had an ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name. Of these, three associations (33%) had strong evidence of having a cross-religious or cross-ethnic membership despite their implied affiliation. It is important to note that all three of these associations had the adjective “Polish” in their name. Of the nine associations with an implied ethnic or religious affiliation, seven were “Polish,” one was “Jewish” and one was “Lithuanian.” Hence, of the seven “Polish” associations, 43% had strong evidence of a multiethnic membership. This, once more, supports the claim made in the previous chapters, that associations with an ethnic affiliation that corresponded to political boundaries were likely to be communicating a national (political) rather than an ethnic affiliation. This was also noticeable earlier, in Table 11, where the only Polish association from Kraków did not have official ethnic or religious membership restrictions and three of the eight “Polish” associations from Vilnius also did not have ethnic or religious restrictions written into their statutes. More detailed information on organizational type, region, implied ethnic affiliation, official ethnic or religious membership restrictions and evidence of a cross-ethnic membership is presented in Appendix IV C, Table 6.

Of the associations with no implied ethnic or religious membership restrictions, 17 organizations (27.3%) had strong evidence of having a multiethnic membership, while 44 (72.7%) organizations did not have strong evidence to support the claim that they had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership. There were similar proportions of associations with (1) an ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name and of associations with (2) no implied ethnic or religious affiliation which either (a) had or (b) did not have sufficient evidence to support the presence of a cross-ethnic membership. This similarity in proportions (a, b) of both types of associations (1, 2) suggest that the use of ethnic or religious affiliation implied in an association’s name is not a good measure, by itself, to determine the actual presence or absence of multiethnic memberships in the associational landscapes of the two interwar regions in question. The relatively smaller sample of associations with an implied ethnic or religious membership (only nine associations) may be driving these results. Nonetheless, despite the size of the small sample, and specifically of the sub-sample of associations with an implied ethnic or religious membership, Tables 11 and 12 suggest that, by itself, the proportion of associations with ethnic or religious affiliation implied in their name cannot be used to make inferences about actual cross-ethnic nature of civil society in interwar Poland. Moreover, based on the data presented in Table 11, it appears that such claims are even more tenuous for the Kraków voivodeship. Whereas there were *no* associations from the Vilnius subsample that had evidence of a multiethnic membership

despite an implied ethnic or religious affiliation, there is one such association in the Kraków subsample.

Out of the 68 associations included in the previous sample, a smaller number—44—could be paired with official associational statutes in addition to membership data. This smaller subsample, unlike the one above, had a more even spread of associations with official ethnic or religious membership restrictions (19 organizations) and those which had no ethnic or religious restrictions written into their statutes (25 organizations). Table 13 shows, by region, the number of associations with or without official membership restrictions and with or without evidence of a multiethnic membership. Table 14 presents the proportion of associations with and without official membership restrictions that either had or lacked sufficient evidence of a multi-ethnic membership.

Region	Official Ethnic or Religious Exclusion (statute)	Evidence of Cross-Ethnic Membership		
		Yes	Maybe	No
Kraków	Yes	-	-	1
	No	11	1	-
Vilnius	Yes	1 ^a	-	17
	No	2	1	4
Warszawa	Yes	-	-	-
	No	2	-	-
National	Yes	-	-	-
	No	2	-	-
Lviv	Yes	-	-	-
	No	1	-	-

Table 13. Official Ethnic or Religious Affiliation and Evidence of Multiethnic membership in interwar Poland’s associations.

^a Includes an association which was officially religiously exclusionary, as only Christians could join, but which had evidence of a cross-ethnic Polish and Ukrainian or Belarusian membership.

Official Ethnic or Religious Exclusion (statute)	Evidence of a Cross-Ethnic membership	
	Yes	No ^a
Yes <i>[Sample Size]</i>	5.3% <i>[1]^b</i>	94.7% <i>[18]</i>
No <i>[Sample Size]</i>	76% <i>[19]</i>	24.0% <i>[6]</i>

Table 14. Proportion of associations with or without official ethnic or religious membership restrictions and with sufficient or insufficient evidence of a multiethnic membership.

Notes:

^a Includes organizations coded as both “No” and “Maybe”

^b Includes an association which was officially religiously exclusionary, as only Christians could join, but which had evidence of a cross-ethnic Polish and Ukrainian or Belarusian membership.

Out of 19 associations with official ethnic or religious restrictions written into their statutes, one association had evidence of a cross-ethnic membership. The remaining 18 organizations did not have any evidence of having a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership. The one outlier from this subset was a youth organization in Vilnius. Though this association had religious restrictions on membership, as only Christians could join, it had

no ethnic restrictions on membership. This association also had a cross-ethnic membership that consisted of Polish and other “Slavic” minority members, most likely members of the Ukrainian or Belarusian minority. This sample thus provides strong support for the claim that associations that had ethnic or religious restrictions written into their membership were generally ethnically and religiously homogenous. Out of the 25 associations that did not have any ethnic or religious restrictions written into their statutes, six (24%) did not have strong evidence suggesting that they had a multiethnic or religiously heterogeneous membership. However, 19 of these organizations, or over three quarters, had strong evidence suggesting that they had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership. As such, this sample provides strong support for the claim that associations with no official ethnic or religious restrictions were likely to have a multiethnic membership.

As previously discussed, Table 10 provides two estimates of the percentages of associations in both the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships which did not include official ethnic or religious restrictions on their membership. According to a random sample of 136 associations from Kraków and one of 114 associations from Vilnius, 79.4% of associations in the former and 59.9% of associations in the latter did not have official ethnic or religious restrictions on membership written into their organizational statutes. A second set of estimates was attained by utilizing the results of these random samples on the larger samples of associational life in Kraków and Vilnius. These, as discussed earlier, estimated that between 70.5% and 78.5% of associations in interwar Kraków and between 53.5% and 61% of associations in interwar Vilnius did not have official ethnic or religious restrictions on their membership. The analysis of a third sample of associations with both information on official ethnic or religious restrictions and evidence of ethnic membership, presented in Table 13, suggests that, on average and across regions, 76% of associations with no membership restrictions had cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership while 5.3% of associations with such restrictions also had multiethnic or multi-religious membership. Using these cross-regional results, and combining them with those presented in Table 10, we can estimate that between 53.6% and 60.3% of associations in the Kraków województwo had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership. At the same time, we can estimate that between 40.7% and 46.4% of the associations in Vilnius had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership.

The data provided in Table 12 can also be divided by region. Out of 12 associations with no ethnic or religious membership in Kraków 11 (92%) had strong evidence of a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership base. At the same time, out of a smaller sample of only seven associations in Vilnius that did not have official ethnic or religious membership restrictions, only two (29%) associations had strong evidence to support the claim that they had a multiethnic or multi-religious membership. No associations with official ethnic or religious restrictions in Kraków had evidence of a multiethnic membership, while one out of 18 (5.6%) of such associations in Vilnius did have evidence of a cross-ethnic membership despite having official religious membership restrictions. We can apply these regional-level estimates to the larger regional samples of proportions of each region’s associations with and without official ethnic or religious membership restrictions. Doing so, we can estimate that 29% of 59.9% (17.37%) and 5.6% of 40.1% (2.25%), thus a total of 19.6% of associations in Vilnius had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership. At the same time, this approach suggests that 92% of 79.4%, or a total of 73% of Kraków’s associations had a cross-ethnic or cross-religious membership.

A third and final approach to estimate the potential proportion of associations that had a multiethnic or multi-religious membership in each region is to simply utilize the full sample from Table 11, which provided all associations from the random sample with additional membership information. Out of the total random sample of 68 associations, there were 35

organizations from the Kraków województwo and 27 (28 including an association noted as changing from a cross-ethnic to an ethnically-exclusionary one) in the Vilnius voivodeship. Out of 35 associations in Kraków, 13 or 37.1% had substantial evidence to suggest a cross-ethnic membership. Out of 27 associations in Vilnius, three or 11.1% had substantial evidence to suggest a cross-ethnic membership. If the additional association from Vilnius, which switched from a cross-ethnic to an ethnically-exclusionary one in 1938, is included in the sample than the proportion of Vilnius' associations with a cross-ethnic membership changes from 10.7% to 14.3%, depending on how the additional association is counted.

Summary

The various approaches described in this section yielded a widespread of estimates for the proportion of associations in Vilnius and Kraków with a multiethnic membership. The estimates for the Vilnius województwo range from 10.7% to 46.4%. The estimates for the Kraków województwo range from 37.1% to 73%. The estimates for the two regions overlap on the high end for Vilnius and on the low end for Kraków. Nonetheless, each method yielded considerably higher estimates of multiethnic membership for associations in Kraków as opposed to those in Vilnius. In the least, the data provided in this section does not refute the claim that civil society in Kraków continued to be more cross-ethnic than associational life in Vilnius, in both perception—as suggested by the higher proportion of associations without implied ethnic or religious affiliations in their name—and in membership—as suggested by the consistently higher estimates of multiethnic membership in associations found in Kraków in comparison to those found in Vilnius. At most, the various approaches suggest that on average, associations in Kraków were more likely to have a multiethnic membership than those found in Vilnius. This more generous interpretation supports the claim that despite the growing popularity of ethnically chauvinistic nationalism and ethnic fragmentation throughout interwar Poland, associational life in Kraków was more resistant to ethnic fragmentation than was its counterpart in Vilnius.

Conclusion

The end of the First World War brought the re-emergence of a Polish state. During its two decades of existence, the Second Polish Republic was marked by three significant political transformations: the 1926 military coup, the 1930 shift towards political exclusion and repression, and the 1935 fascist turn toward increasing political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination. The Republic's brief democratic experiment ended with Piłsudski's 1926 intervention. Interwar Polish democracy exhibited relatively high levels of cross-class political inclusion on the one hand, and the political marginalization and ethno-cultural discrimination of Poland's ethnic minorities on the other hand. While Piłsudski's coup brought an official end to democracy, thus ushering in progressive political exclusion, it also brought forth a decrease in ethnic discrimination. Most ethnic minorities reacted to the state's increasingly ethnically inclusionary and culturally tolerant politics cautiously but optimistically. As such, the transition from Poland's ethnically-exclusionary democracy to an ethnically inclusionary autocracy saw increasing willingness on the part of significant, though not all, minority groups to cooperate through and within state institutions in pursuit of their political and cultural goals. Unfortunately, the improvement in Poland's ethnic relations was short lived.

Though Piłsudski's regime pursued increasingly ethnically inclusionary and culturally tolerant policies, it also gravitated towards the exclusion and repression of its political opposition. In some instances, as was the case of the state's persecution of communists and the Belarusian minority, political suppression overlapped with ethno-cultural repression, undermining minorities' belief that cooperation with the Polish state was possible. Moreover, growing political exclusion of the opposition, particularly of the right, and repeated economic crises fostered a rapid rise in the popularity of nationalist, ethnically chauvinistic and exclusionary ideology. Though democracy officially ended in 1926, it was not until increasing state repression—criminalization and penalization of the opposition, and the corruption of the heretofore democratically elected legislature—in 1929 and 1930 that the opposition realized it could not reclaim political power through participation and cooperation within political institutions. Both the opposition and the state had some linkages to various civil society sectors before Piłsudski's coup. Yet it was the state's continual gravitation toward increasing political exclusion and repression that led excluded and marginalized parties to politicize and dominate further sectors of civil society. Aware of its opposition's increasing attempts at social mobilization within and through associational life, the state responded in kind. Like the marginalized and repressed political elites, it intensified its linkages to local political and social associations. The growing organizational power of the ethnically chauvinistic center and right-wing parties combined with the interwar period's continual economic crises to foster the popularity and prevalence of ethnically-exclusionary and chauvinistic nationalism.

Piłsudski's death in 1935 corresponded to the state's further dismantling of democratic institutions. Moreover, it resulted in the state's not only condoning, but also supporting and perpetuating ethno-cultural discrimination and exclusion. After Piłsudski's death, the ruling regime splintered into left-leaning, centrist, and right-leaning factions. In the end, Piłsudski's successor, Rydz-Śmigły, chose to side with the right-wing faction. In the face of continual economic downturns and the rising popularity and organizational power of the radical (fascist) far-right, the new ruling regime sought to win back social support by adopting the strategy and ideology of the right. On the one hand, the state's growing engagement in shifting political competition into civil society worked to intensify political interest in and domination of associational life. On the other hand, the state's return to not merely condoning ethnic discrimination, but also to backing ethnically discriminatory policies, fueled ethnic tensions and segregation within civil society.

In its last years, interwar Poland saw a rapid growth in the nationwide politicization, political domination and ethnic fragmentation of the associational landscape. Yet despite the growing convergence in the character of civil society across its regions, interwar Poland continued to harbor cross-regional ethnic variation. In the face of mounting political competition for control over civil society, and in comparison to that of Vilnius, Kraków's associational landscape proved more capable to withstand if not politicization and political competition, then the domination of associations by single political groups. In addition to proving more resilient to political domination, the associational life in the Kraków voivodeship was relatively more impervious to ethnic fragmentation.

The first part of this chapter utilized significant political transformations of the interwar Polish state to examine how (1) state policies of political exclusion, either of Polish or minority political actors, led to the increasing politicization of civil society, and how (2) state policies of ethnic discrimination and cultural repression fostered nationalist movements among the state's minorities and ethnic fragmentation in associational life. As such, Part I highlights how strategies pursued by political elites in interbellum Poland mirrored those pursued by their pre-WWI counterparts across the lands of the partitioned Commonwealth.

The second part of this chapter utilized the redrawing of political boundaries to examine the extent to which, despite a convergence in political actors' interests and strategies across interwar Polish regions, legacies of distinct pre-WWI rule in various regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth persevered during the interbellum. As such, Part II highlights how political legacies of previous regimes became embedded in social networks and institutions through the habits and approaches of their members, and through the popularity and strength of the ideologies that they fostered. The findings show that civil society that emerged in Kraków under pre-WWI policies of political inclusion and cultural toleration was relatively more resistant to political domination and ethnic fragmentation than that which emerged in Vilnius under pre-WWI policies of political exclusion and cultural repression. On the one hand, the analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of institutional stickiness in the face of external pressures. Moreover, it demonstrates specific *internal* institutional mechanisms of reproduction that allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period in the face of *external* pressures for change. On the other hand, though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was waning. Thus, the findings demonstrate that though historical civil legacies can be persistent in the face of external transformations and pressures, they are not immutable.

This chapter focuses on how the state shaped civil society. Yet in analyzing how transformations of the interwar Polish state altered civil and political societies, it also highlights the role that political and civil society played in shaping the state's transitions. For instance, interwar political society re-shaped the regime's relations to society by drawing the latter into political competition within the bounds of civil society. As the left-wing and right-wing opposition increased its efforts to forge widespread networks and strong ties in and through civic associations, so too did the state turn to fostering strong linkages with society and associational life. Furthermore, political and civil societies played a crucial role in shaping the post-1935 Polish state. Following Piłsudski's death, the ruling regime faced fragmentation and indecision about whether to pursue reconciliation with the left, continuation on a technocratic path or transformation in the image of the right. Piłsudski's successor oscillated between following the technocrats and the right-wing sympathizers. In the end, the state attempted to secure a social mandate for the continuation of the ruling regime by mimicking the successful strategy of the right. In other words, the ruling regime sought to regain social support by creating a politically dominated widespread network of civil associations under the regime's guidance and rule, and by adopting the slogans of the ethnically chauvinistic right. Thus, just as the excluded opposition drew the state into political competition for domination of associational life in the late 1920s and early 1930s, so too did the political power of the opposition's vast associational networks and mounting social support play a significant role in shaping the development trajectory of the post-1935 Polish state.

Chapter V. A Conclusion.

Introduction

This dissertation examined how states shape civil society. The end of the 18th century marked the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the Russian, Prussian and Habsburg (Austro-Hungarian) states. Prior to the First World War, the lands of the former Commonwealth saw significant variation in economic development, political exclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural discrimination under the rule of diverse imperial states. In other words, the partitioning of the former Commonwealth by three states introduced significant political and economic variation into lands of former Poland-Lithuania. The introduction of such variation into regions that had previously been shaped by the culture, politics and economic policies of one state allows for a fruitful analysis of how state policies and economic transformations influence the development and character of civil society.

After the partitioning of the Commonwealth and the fall of the Duchy of Warszawa, Congress Poland came under Russian-rule, where non-Russian elites experienced increasing political exclusion throughout the 19th century. Furthermore, after the 1860s, the Kingdom of Poland was characterized by growing ethno-cultural discrimination of its non-Russian masses. Lastly, political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination were accompanied by economic development and, starting in the 1850s, an industrial revolution of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland. While the second half of the 19th century witnessed increasing repression in Congress Poland, it saw the political liberalization of the Austro-Hungarian state. After the 1860s, the regional autonomy of Austrian-ruled Galicia was accompanied by industrial and agricultural underdevelopment in the region's eastern²⁴³ and western²⁴⁴ halves. Galician regional autonomy translated into the political inclusion of local elites and lack of ethno-cultural repression of the mostly Polish masses in western Galicia. However, in eastern Galicia, regional autonomy meant the political inclusion of local ethnic *minority* traditional and bourgeois elites, the political marginalization of local ethnic *majority* cultural elites, and the ethno-cultural discrimination of the mostly Ukrainian masses. Moreover, the historical division of labor, which was characterized by mostly Ukrainian peasant masses ruled by mostly Polish and Polish-assimilated landed elites, persisted in the region. As such, eastern Galicia was the only region of the former Commonwealth worthy of being classified as having an ethno-racial division of labor, where ethnicity and culture substantively aligned along class lines, into the late 19th century.

Drawing on a comparative and narrative analysis of three pre-WWI regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, each marked by distinct state-society relations and paths of economic development, I argued that states rather than markets shape the character of civil society. Moreover, I suggested that states do so by molding the interests, viable strategies and cross-group alliances that elites can successfully pursue to secure their own interests. Table 1 summarizes the variation in the economic development, political inclusion or exclusion of local ethnic majority elites, ethno-cultural discrimination of the local ethnic majority and continual presence or absence of an ethno-racial division of labor found in the three regions of the former Commonwealth that were utilized in the pre-WWI comparative analysis of civil society development.

²⁴³ As characterized by Lviv.

²⁴⁴ As characterized by Kraków.

Region	Relative Economic Development	Ethnic Majority	Ruling Local State Elites	Political Inclusion of Ethnic Majority Elites	Forced Assimilation of the Masses	Ethno-Racial Division of Labor	Civil Society Outcome
Warszawa	Higher	Polish	Russian	No	Yes	No	More Illiberal
Kraków	Lower	Polish	Polish	Yes	No	No	More Liberal
Lviv	Lower	Ukrainian	Polish	Partial	Yes	Yes	More Illiberal

Table 1. Pre-WWI Case Comparisons and Civil Society Outcomes (Chapters II and III)

Considerable variation in economic development, political inclusion of local elites, and ethno-cultural discrimination aimed at the masses across the partitioned regions of the former Poland-Lithuania enabled an analysis of how state-backed cultural repression and political exclusion interacted with distinct paths of economic development and local ethno-cultural dynamics to shape the character of each region's civil society (Chapters II and III). Significant political and economic transformations within each case further facilitated the examination of how political and economic changes affected the developmental trajectory of each region's civil societies. Such cross-regional and cross-time comparisons assisted both an assessment of existing theoretical approaches to understanding and predicting the development of civil society and its character, and the development of an alternative approach focused on the relationship between the state and non-state elites. In 1918, Poland re-emerged as an autonomous regime, reuniting many, though not all, regions of the former Commonwealth under Polish rule. The Second Polish Republic's significant political transformations (Chapter IV) enabled an auxiliary examination of existing theoretical approaches and of the proposed alternative explanation, with a focus on how political inclusion and ethnic discrimination shaped and reshaped elites' interests, thereby impacting associational life. These included the state's transition from an ethnically-exclusionary democracy to a more ethnically inclusionary dictatorship in 1926, its subsequent shift towards more visible repression of its political opposition in 1930, and its return to increasingly ethnically discriminatory and exclusionary policies in 1935.

I. Existing or Alternative Explanations in light of Pre-WWI and Interwar Poland

This section briefly revisits the explicit and inferred implications of economic development and state-centered theoretical approaches to understanding the development of civil society and of its liberal or illiberal character. In it, I highlight the significant contributions and limitations of each approach in light of the analysis of the development and character of civil society in Russian-ruled Congress Poland, Austrian-ruled eastern and western Galicia, and the interwar Polish state. For a summary of the examined approaches and their theoretical and contextual contributions and limitations, see Tables 2a and 2b, which are located at the end of each theoretical sub-section.

Economic development explanatory approaches

A Brief Summary

Economic development explanatory approaches view the market as the main force driving social transformations, including the growth and development of civil society. This dissertation has highlighted two types of such economic approaches: a cultural-economic, Polanyian view and an economic-interest focused approach. The former posits

associationalism as a form of self-protection of society that emerges in reaction to social upheaval caused by a socially unfettered market. The latter ties economic modernization to the development of civil society through the emergence and self-organization of the working and middle classes. Unlike the more cultural Polanyian claims, interest-based arguments do not view capitalism as endangering social life. Rather, they see market-induced breakdowns of traditional social rules and structures as leading to increasing social freedom. Thus, they view the market-induced unfettering of individuals from former social controls as allowing, rather than necessitating, their self-organization with other newly unfettered individuals in pursuit of their shared, mainly economic, interests.

Both Polanyian and economic-interest theories view capitalist development as driving growth in associationalism, and thus both approaches predict that economic development ought to lead to the emergence and growth of the number of associations. Furthermore, both suggest that the emergent social organizations ought to be free from domination by elite-groups, particularly by a single elite. Yet while interest-based arguments make this claim clearly, Polanyian claims are less direct and less forceful in putting forth such a proposition. The former argue that economic development leads to the emergence of working and middle classes and their self-organization based on and *for* their mutual, economic, interests. Such a formulation precludes the organization of classes for interests of other classes or groups.²⁴⁵ A Polanyian approach can be inferred to predict that, as market-driven social organization is mobilized in the name of protecting interests of “various collectivities,” it is, in the least, autonomous from domination by *one* elite-group. Lastly, interests-based approaches clearly assert that economic development raises the importance of economic interests of newly emergent classes, thereby elevating class-identity over other social cleavages. A Polanyian approach is once more less clear or forceful in its predictions. On the one hand, it avoids conceptualizing the types of identities or interests that a disembedded market will mobilize, thereby offering no predictions as to the types of cleavages new social organization will replicate or undermine. On the other hand, though a Polanyian approach expressly avoids underscoring economic identities as the only type of social mobilization driven by a socially unfettered market, to the extent that it does suggest one identity as potentially dominating others, it underscores the “decisive influence” of class interests (Polanyi 2001:169, 174–81).

Contributions and Limitations of economic development explanatory approaches in light of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and interwar Poland

Economic approaches highlight the key role played by capitalist development in undermining former social relations. Whether they view the “free” market’s dismantling of former social structures as destructive or productive, both approaches conceive of the market as driving, through need and newfound ability, social re-organization based on shared group interests. In other words, they see economic development as providing the opportunity and the impetus for the emergence of associational life. While interest-based arguments stress the role of material interests in shaping the character of civil society, particularly its autonomy from elite-groups and proclivity to reinforce or undercut non-economic social cleavages, a Polanyian view is more ambiguous about the extent to which new networks and associations will reinforce or cut across significant, non-economic social cleavages. On the one hand, the

²⁴⁵ Moreover, variation in classes and class interests precludes the domination of the emergent associational life by one group unless that group can organize others based on overarching mutual interests. In other words, by definition, successful mobilization of various groups must be based on and for shared mutual interests, and as such must be of the group—though perhaps one with redrawn boundaries—and for the group. As such, by definition, it precludes the domination of subordinate groups by elite-groups.

former provides a stronger and clearer prediction of how economic development ought to shape associational life. On the other hand, while the flexibility of the Polanyian approach undermines its ability to *predict* specific outcomes, that flexibility also endows the approach with a stronger *explanatory* power. For while the Polanyian approach highlights the importance of economic interests, it allows the market to reinforce identities other than just economic ones in shaping the character of the emergent organizational life.

Across all three pre-WWI regions examined in Chapters II and III, economic development, and particularly the transition away from feudalism and towards capitalism, corresponded to a general growth in at least the *scope* of associational life. Civil society associations that arose in Warszawa in the first half of the 19th century, hence prior to the permanent end of feudal relations, were primarily organized by and for members of the traditional and new, both economic and cultural, elites. Associations that arose in the last decades of the 19th century—hence, after the final transition to capitalism in Warszawa, some economic modernization in Kraków and the emergence of new middle and working classes in both regions, though to different degrees—included organizations created for and by increasingly varied economic and social groups. These ranged from agricultural cooperatives organized by emancipated peasants to niche social associations, such as recreational and social²⁴⁶ or political interest groups. This general, cross-regional trend bolsters the claims of economic approaches that view a market-driven dismantling of previous social structures as contributing to the growth of a new associational life in the public sphere. Moreover, the wealth of recreational and social interest associations that emerged, particularly in urban settings, provides further support for a Polanyian approach that sees the market as driving association in pursuit of various, not just economic, interests. As such, analyses of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth support the claim that capitalist growth drives, at least in part, the development of associational life by, if nothing else, expanding the scope of association from elite-groups to new sectors of society.

While the cases examined do not disprove the claim that economic development contributes to associational growth, once more, in at least their social scope, they do disprove claims that economic development is the only, or necessarily the main, driver of associational growth. Prior to each failed uprising, Congress Poland saw the development of organizations and networks in preparation for each revolt. Similarly, interwar Poland saw growth of an increasingly politicized and politically-oriented civil society following the dissolution of its democratic institutions and progressive exclusion of oppositional parties. Both examples demonstrated how excluded elites not only infiltrated and co-opted existing associations, but also how they formed new organizations to buttress their struggle against a repressive and exclusionary state. Such examples highlight *state-driven* associational growth and the formation of social organizations based on mutual political, rather than economic, interests.

Furthermore, the cases analyzed in this dissertation undermine propositions about the extent to which markets shape the character of civil society. Neither the main economic development argument nor its qualified version accurately predict the development of a more liberal civil society in pre-WWI Kraków in western Galicia and the emergence of a more illiberal civil society in pre-WWI Warszawa in the Kingdom of Poland. The development of an illiberal, elite-dominated and ethnically-exclusionary civil society in late 19th century Congress Poland was accompanied by capitalist growth and industrialization. Despite the absence of an ethno-racial division of labor, the region saw increasing class-based, ethnically-exclusionary alliances in public life. Economic development, marked by significant industrialization, saw the increasing ethnic fragmentation, politicization and

²⁴⁶ Organizations forged for niche social interests, such as Temperance groups or Esperanto Societies

continual elite-domination of associations in the Warszawa Governorate. Yet relative economic underdevelopment, marked by the lack of industrialization and of technological innovation in agriculture, in the Duchy of Kraków, was accompanied by the emergence of a civil society relatively more autonomous from elite domination and marked by more ethnic integration. The development of a more illiberal civil society in Congress Poland and that of a more liberal associational life in western Galicia undermines the predictions of by interest-based economic development theories. These would suggest that Warszawa, not Kraków, should have developed a more liberal civil society marked by a higher preference for class-based organization and autonomy from elite domination. Thus, a comparative analysis of pre-WWI Kraków and Warszawa does support, or at least does not refute, the claim that the replacement of feudalism by capitalism paved the way for the *growth*, at least in scope, of civil society. However, by themselves economic development approaches could not predict the *character* of civil society that emerged in each region.

Capitalist Economic Development Explanatory Approaches

	<i>Cultural/Polanyian</i>	<i>Economic interest claims</i>
Mechanism or Qualifiers	Self-protection of society against socially unfettered markets drives associational development.	Capitalist growth drives the emergence and self-organization of class. An ethno-racial division of labor can disrupt class-based social organization.
Predictions of Civil Society Development	Economic development leads to associational growth. Associations should be autonomous from elite domination and characterized by self-organization of groups to protect group interests. Associations can replicate social cleavages, but class interests should matter most.	Economic development leads to associational growth. Associations should be autonomous from elite domination and characterized primarily by organization based on class interests.
Predictions for pre-WWI cases	Warszawa: a liberal and dense associational life: autonomous from elite domination and characterized primarily by class-based cleavages. Kraków and Lviv: a less dense, less liberal civil society: more traditional, less autonomous from traditional elites, characterized by traditional cleavages.	
Applicable in the case of Warszawa, Kraków and Lviv?	Yes to the extent that economic development expanded the scope of associational life in all regions. No with respect to predictions. Civil society was relatively more autonomous from elite domination and less ethnically-fragmented in Kraków than in Warszawa. Ethno-racial division of labor was highest in Lviv, yet both Warszawa (low and decreasing EDOL) and Lviv had high levels of ethnic fragmentation.	
Contributions	Provides a mechanism for how economic development allows for the development of civil society: the destruction of former social relations by the market. Allows for groups to organize in response to the unfettered market on other than just economic interests.	Provides a mechanism for how economic development allows for the development of civil society: the destruction of former social relations by the market.
Limitations	Though class “matters most” for self-organization of groups, there are no definitive prediction on when associations cut-across or reinforce significant social cleavages. Predictions of who organizes society’s self-organizational response are not clear.	Overlooks group organization on non-economic grounds and non-economic incentives of elites. Cannot predict the character of civil society.

Table 2a. Capitalist development explanatory approaches.

State-centered explanatory approaches

A Brief Summary

State-centered approaches view political institutions as driving and shaping the development of civic society. The most basic claims highlight the state's ability to legislate social organization. Such claims point to state policies, rather than changing economic relations, as responsible for both the dismantling of old social structures and for the molding of new frameworks to which social organization adapt. States can shape such frameworks by, for instance, legislating which groups can and which groups cannot form voluntary associations. Other state-centered approaches give the state a more active role in not merely shaping the character of associations but also in providing them with an impetus for their emergence. Such, for instance, is the case of contentious civil societies that develop out of societal actors' struggles with the state.

On the one hand, such broad state-centered approaches persuasively argue that the state plays a fundamental role in allowing civil society to develop, in shaping its structural contours, and in some instances even in providing social actors with an incentive to organize—against the state. On the other hand, like a Polanyian economic development approach, they lack specific assertions, thus sacrificing predictive for explanatory power. Despite the general tendency of state-centered approaches to both view the state as a more passive structure against which social organizations develop and the tendency towards broad generalizations that are better at explaining than predicting civil society outcomes, some scholars conceive of state-level influence on the development of civil society in terms of more specific policies or institutional dynamics. Such three approaches can be classified as (1) institutional developmental order claims, (2) state responsiveness and legitimacy arguments, and (3) elite- and discrimination-focused approaches derived from the postcolonial and nationalism literatures.

Some scholars argue that to develop a liberal character civil society must emerge before political society. Such claims rest on the assumption that if civil society develops before participatory political institutions, then it can organize autonomously from political elites and represent grass-roots interests. Once mass politics develop, political elites are confronted with an already developed associational life. Hence, they must win political backing through concessions to organized grass-roots interests. Conversely, the development of political society before civil society can cause political institutions to not develop strong ties to society, thereby resulting in an unresponsive state, and presumably, a contentious and illiberal associational life. A second version of the institutional developmental order thesis similarly focuses on the relationship between liberal civil society and responsive states. However, rather than proposing that civil society must develop before political society, it asserts that in order for civil society to develop a liberal character, autonomous yet efficacious political institutions must emerge before mass association. Such claims imply that associations forged for political reasons under a responsive state are mobilized as a means to cooperate and negotiate with the responsive state rather than to organize against it. Conversely, they assert that an unresponsive state will foster a contentious, discontented, associational life susceptible to domination by politically-oriented actors.

A third important approach develops out of studies on colonial rule and nationalism, which provide valuable, though sometimes contradictory, insights on how the political inclusion or exclusion of local elites and state-backed ethno-racial discrimination influence social organization. Postcolonial research suggests that the exclusion of local elites from power should promote associational development by preventing local elites from suppressing the self-organization of subordinate groups. Furthermore, such an approach suggests that

state-backed discrimination ought to reinforce social cleavages through unequal discrimination of subjugated groups, or undermine social cleavages through equal discrimination of different groups. Social cleavages should be further augmented when discriminatory policies align multiple identities, particularly when they align class with ethno-racial identification, leading to an ethno-racial division of labor.

Contributions and Limitations of state-centered approaches in light of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and interwar Poland

State-centered approaches underscore the importance of political institutions in shaping associational life. Yet despite agreement across various literatures that states influence the character of civil society, there is a lack of accord both on how they do so and which conditions are more likely to lead to a liberal or an illiberal civil society. For instance, some scholars argue that civil society must develop before the emergence of political society to ensure a liberal associational outcome. Others claim the opposite, that civil society must follow the development of a political society, specifically of participatory political institutions such as parliaments and parties. The analysis of pre-WWI Kraków and Warszawa presented in this dissertation supports the latter hypothesis, thus also demonstrating the historical limitations of the former. The Warszawa Governorate saw the dissolution of participatory institutions under Russian rule and the emergence of an increasingly illiberal civil society before the emergence of political parties and the introduction of mass participatory institutions at the turn of the 20th century. In contrast, the independent and subsequently Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków saw the slow but progressive development of participatory political institutions and political society before the emergence of civil society. For instance, historians of Galicia have argued that the development of the region's rural civil society was partly *driven* by the political participation of peasants in local state institutions. At the turn of the century Kraków's associational landscape was relatively more autonomous from elite domination and characterized by greater preference of cross-ethnic, class-based alliances than its counterpart in the Warszawa Governorate. Thus, if developmental order matters, then the cases presented in this dissertation suggest that in order for a liberal civil society to develop, political society, and particularly participatory institutions, cannot follow but rather must precede or emerge simultaneously with civic associations.²⁴⁷

Scholars that argue that civil society must grow under responsive and legitimate institutions in order to develop a liberal character provide the most accurate predictions for which of the regions of the former Commonwealth would develop a more liberal, and which a more illiberal, associational life. They also correctly predict the increasing radicalization, politicization and ethnic fragmentation of civil society that took place under the interwar Polish state. However, by failing to explore mechanisms that (1) led to the emergence of unresponsive states, (2) contributed to the absence or even hindered the slow political incorporation of emergent classes, and (3) promoted the development of a civil society susceptible to political domination by a single, and especially an illiberal, group, such theories cannot *explain* the development of liberal civil societies in some cases and of illiberal associational landscapes in others. Berman (1997), in explaining the co-optation of German civil society by a single political group, points to two qualities of interwar German associational life: its replication of ethnic cleavages and its lack of strong linkages to political

²⁴⁷ The emergence of civil society tends to be piecemeal. For instance, in Kraków, the emergence of urban, upper class civil society occurred after the institution of participatory institutions that included its first members. However, as mentioned above, Galicia's rural civil society developed later, following both the emergence of urban political and civil society and rural participatory institutions that promoted peasant participation in local politics.

parties. Though she does not explore which mechanisms led to the development of these characteristics in civil society, she does suggest that the blame for both rests with the state.

Like Berman (1997), I view the degree to which civil society replicates or undercuts significant social cleavages as an important determinant of its likelihood to foster a liberal or illiberal character. However, the cases examined in this study question the importance of a mere presence or absence of strong linkages between civil and political societies as promoting or predicting either a liberal or illiberal outcome or a responsive or unresponsive state. In 1935, the Polish interwar state radically shifted to the right in response to the growing popularity of and support for its right-wing opposition in civil society. One could argue that the interwar Polish state's post-1935 choice to take up the mantle of right-wing ideals and strategies was fueled by its own previous unresponsiveness to civil society, and that the state's rightward shift was a late attempt to remedy this oversight. Yet the interwar Polish state had worked to foster strong linkages to society through political and non-political associations already since the late 1920s. Hence, a more apt interpretation is one that focuses on the "effectiveness" rather than the "responsiveness" of the state. In other words, it was not the interwar state's lack of linkages to society or its inability to perceive, hear or consider social demands, but rather its unwillingness or inability to effectively address the social and economic crises that fueled both (a) mass support for the opposition and (b) the state's subsequent attempt to maintain its power by mimicking slogans and strategies of its most popular competitor.

While state-centered claims generally highlight the importance of political institutions in shaping the character of civil society, approaches that emerge from postcolonial and nationalism studies propose *specific* policies that shape civil society outcomes. Often stemming from analyses of cases where class was not the only social cleavage, such approaches provide more insight about when civil society develops in a way that replicates or undermines such social cleavages. For instance, they propose that state inclusion or exclusion of local elites from political power can shape social mobilization and political outcomes. Furthermore, they underscore the importance of shared cultural codes that local elites can utilize to mobilize society. Nevertheless, just as approaches that overvalue economic interests or state-society ties cannot fully explain the eventual character of civil society, a focus on local elite political incorporation cannot by itself fully explain the civil society outcomes examined in this dissertation.

Analyses of direct and indirect forms of colonial rule argue that the political inclusion of local elites in semi-autonomous institutions should obstruct the development of liberal civil society, since by retaining control of local institutions elites can repress subjugated groups and prevent their self-organization. Conversely, the exclusion of local elites from local institutions ought to allow for the political participation and self-organization of previously subjugated groups. Out of the three pre-WWI cases examined in this dissertation, the pre-WWI region of eastern Galicia most accurately bears out this proposition. When Polish traditional elites received relative autonomy under the rule of the Austrian state, eastern Galicia's landed elites utilized the continuation of their local power to stifle any change, particularly to continue the ethno-cultural discrimination and repression of their Ukrainian peasant masses. Hence, the case of eastern Galicia was one where inclusion of local elites led to the development of an illiberal civil society. Moreover, in addition to underscoring how local elites can repress the emergence of a liberal civil society, the case of Austrian-ruled Galicia highlights additional benefits of the political exclusion of local elites. Though the Austrian state granted regional autonomy to Galicia's traditional elites it limited their ability to hold local rural political offices. Thus, by excluding local elites from low-level rural office, the state fostered peasant political participation.

Alone, the above-cited examples support the generalization of the benefits of “direct” imperial rule for the development of a liberal civil society. However, when analyzed in depth and in comparison to Congress Poland and western Galicia, they are better at circumscribing the generalizability of such approaches by highlighting the importance of regional demographics and the presence of an ethno-racial division of labor for accurately predicting civil and political outcomes. The development of a more illiberal civil society in Congress Poland followed the implementation of a more direct form of rule by the Russian state. Moreover, unlike in eastern Galicia, where ethno-racial division of labor continued to characterize much of the region’s society, the rise of ethnically-exclusionary nationalism in Congress Poland was accompanied by a decrease in state-backed ethnic division of labor and an increase in equal discrimination of all non-Russian groups. Thus, claims that the political exclusion of local elites should lead to a more liberal civil society, even when qualified by the presence of an ethno-racial division of labor or of unequal discrimination of subjugated groups, cannot account for this outcome. Rather, this dissertation has argued that it was the political exclusion of local elites and the Russian state’s move towards increasingly direct rule in Congress Poland that led to elite-domination of associational life and ethnic fragmentation of civil society.

The presence of an ethno-racial division of labor cannot explain the development of an increasingly illiberal civil society in Congress Poland. However, a comparative analysis of eastern and western Galicia suggests that the *presence* of an ethno-cultural division of labor does play an important role in the development of an illiberal associational landscape. Despite being part of the more liberal and inclusive Austrian state, eastern Galicia saw the persistence of a historical ethno-racial division of labor and the political marginalization of and discrimination against the region’s Ukrainian masses. Economic, political and cultural discrimination of eastern Galicia’s Ukrainian minority was perpetuated by the local autonomy and political inclusion granted to the local Polish, ethnic minority, elites. Exclusion of local, Ukrainian elites and cultural and economic repression of the Ukrainian masses incentivized the former to mobilize a contentious civil society to dispute the power of local, Polish elites and the latter to join and support such politically-oriented and ethnically-fragmented associations. Conversely, the political inclusion of Polish elites in Austrian-ruled western Galicia, which lacked a historical and perpetual ethnic division of labor between the peasantry and local elites, facilitated the emergence of a more liberal civil society. The latter was both relatively autonomous from elite domination and better than its counterparts in either Congress Poland or eastern Galicia at bridging ethnic cleavages.

Thus, taken together, these three cases demonstrate (1) that the political inclusion or exclusion of local elites is crucial for the development of a liberal or illiberal associational life, and (2) that its impact is shaped and thus can be mitigated by socio-economic factors or state actions. On the one hand, the inclusion of elites—*both* of local elite-groups and of elite-individuals—is necessary, and the analyzed cases suggest may even be sufficient, for the emergence of a more liberal associational landscape. On the other hand, the exclusion of elites—whether elite-groups or elite-individuals—is necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of an illiberal civil society. Particularly in the case of elite-group exclusion, or in the case of the exclusion of elite-individuals who represent a relatively small social group, broad state-backed or systemic discrimination is necessary to create mutual interests or identities between excluded elites and social masses. Such discrimination, whose extreme can be characterized by an ethno-racial division of labor, can furnish mutual identities that facilitate excluded elites’ efforts to mobilize and dominate civil society. It can also promote the development of associations along the lines and identities of exclusion and discrimination, thus leading to an ethnically or racially fragmented associational life.

State-Centered Economic Approaches

	<i>Developmental Order</i>	<i>State Responsiveness</i>	<i>Political Exclusion of local elites</i>
Mechanism or Qualifiers	Civil society must develop before political society to be autonomous from political elites.	Strong linkages between civil society and the state promote a more responsive state and prevent the emergence of a contentious and elite-dominated civil society.	Exclusion of local elites limits their ability to repress the organization of subordinate groups. Unequal discrimination between groups supports ethno-racial fragmentations.
Predictions of Civil Society Development	When unfettered by political actors, civil society can be driven by non-political, grassroots motives. Once electoral institutions arise, political actors must seek associational support by catering to grassroots needs and interests.	A responsive state leads to a cooperative civil society; an unresponsive state leads to growth of <i>contentious</i> civil society susceptible to domination by political actors.	Political exclusion of local elites promotes the development of autonomous association of subordinate groups. The absence of unequal discrimination promotes the development of associations that cut-across significant social cleavages.
Predictions for pre-WWI cases	Warszawa: civil society developed before participatory political institutions, hence we expect associations to be autonomous from elite domination and eventual parties to be responsive to civil society needs. Kraków and Lviv: a less liberal civil society as associations arose around the same time as participatory political society.	Warszawa: an illiberal civil society. Kraków: a liberal civil society. Lviv: a liberal civil society if predictions are based on national state character; a more illiberal civil society if predictions are based on regional or local state character.	Warszawa: a liberal civil society autonomous from elites and characterized primarily by class-based cleavages amongst non-Russian ethnic groups. Kraków: a less liberal civil society characterized by elite control, domination and replication of traditional social cleavages. Lviv: a less liberal civil society characterized by elite control, domination and significant replication of ethno-cultural cleavages, reinforced by an ethno-racial division of labor.
Applicable in the case of Warszawa, Kraków and Lviv?	No, civil society developed before participatory state institutions in Warszawa, yet the latter saw a more illiberal civil society. Civil society in Kraków developed alongside participatory political institutions yet was comparatively more liberal.	Yes, in Warszawa an unresponsive state led to a more illiberal civil society marked by politicization and elite-domination. In Kraków a more responsive state fostered a liberal civil society. In Lviv an ethnically-fragmented and somewhat elite-dominated civil society arose under a nationally responsive yet locally more repressive state.	No, political exclusion of elites increased rather than decreased elite attempts at domination of associational life. The presence of an ethno-racial division of labor did increase ethnic fragmentation (Lviv) but the converse was not true; its absence did not prevent ethnic fragmentation (Warszawa).
Contributions	Underscore the importance of political institutions in shaping associational life.	Underscore the importance of political institutions in shaping associational life. Suggests that the state is responsible for the replication of social cleavages in civil society.	Underscores the importance of alignment of ethnic cleavages with class or political divisions. Predictions may be appropriate in cases where the local, excluded elite is an ethno-racial minority.
Limitations	No prediction on whether civil society should organize on class-based or other solidarity group interests.	Does not suggest how states are responsible for the replication of social cleavages in civil society. Overlooks such non-economic mutual interests as cultural capital, thus cannot account for why elites could gain the support of masses that owed their emancipation to a different state. Overvalues the importance of linkages between the state and civil society; overlooks the importance of state effectiveness.	Exclusion of local elites had the opposite effect of that which was predicted. Ethno-racial division of labor matters, particularly in that its presence heralds the replication of ethno-racial cleavages in civil society. However, its absence does not guarantee a more liberal, ethnically integrated associational life.

Table 2b. State-centered explanatory approaches.

II. The Argument Revisited

This dissertation builds and expands on economic development and state-centered approaches to propose a state-centered explanation of civil society development and of its liberal or illiberal character. This state-centered explanation embeds an elite-focused analysis of group interests and intergroup conflicts in a structure-oriented analysis of political and economic transformations. It draws on state-centered approaches that highlight the importance of state effectiveness and political society in shaping the development of civil society, and especially of its liberal or illiberal character. Though studies of the global north have shifted away from elite-centered to group or class-oriented analyses, this dissertation argues that, like the state, elites and their inclusion or exclusion from political institutions are integral to understanding the initial and subsequent character of civil society. Combining insights from disparate literatures, this dissertation argues that institutional approaches to understanding democratic successes and failures can benefit from a reformulation of class conflicts and coalitions as dynamics between old elite-groups, new elite-groups and individual elites—leaders of subordinate but organized groups.²⁴⁸ Applying this reconceptualization, a responsive and legitimate state, for instance, should not be viewed as one where all or a part of the bourgeoisie cooperates with parts of the working class to ensure the latter's stable and non-threatening political incorporation. Rather it ought to be viewed as a political elite willing to facilitate the incorporation of new elites, such as the leaders of organized sectors of the working class, into political institutions.²⁴⁹

Specifically, I draw on the postcolonial and nationalism literatures to focus on two state policies or relations to society as crucial to understanding the character of civil society: (1) the degree of elite inclusion in state institutions and power and (2) the degree of state-backed discrimination and repression, whether ethnic, cultural, ethno-racial or ideological. I follow the claims of colonial theorists in arguing that ethno-racial discrimination prevents the formation of alliances between differently favored groups. However, I diverge from the previously discussed theories regarding the implications for civil society of elite political inclusion or exclusion. While some suggest that the exclusion of local elites from political power breaks down their control and thus allows for the autonomous development of associational life, I argue that the exclusion of elites—whether elite-groups or elite-individuals—leads excluded elites to pursue strategies of politicization and domination of civil society. Whether elites pursue more liberal or illiberal ideals depends on the social alliances that are best poised to secure their interests, particularly their political and economic interests. The degree to which such strategies are successful, or the degree to which certain strategies and alliances are more viable than others, depends on the existence of mutual interests through which elites can mobilize greater social support. These are similarly shaped by states, specifically by the reinforcement of certain identities or cleavages through state-backed repression or discrimination against certain groups.

Lastly, the argument proposed in this dissertation also draws on economic development approaches. First, it agrees that the development of classes matters. It acknowledges that economic interests can be a powerful incentive for undermining other significant social cleavages, which unlike class membership (at least in theory) usually are determined a priori and intractable. Second, the proposed argument agrees that economic

²⁴⁸ As such, leaders of organized groups, regardless of the group's social status or lack of control as a group over any capital, have control of at least a significant amount of social capital.

²⁴⁹ For example, in pre-WWI Galicia, despite the relatively small bourgeoisie's inclusion in local and national political institutions, it was the struggle between the Austrian state and Polish traditional elites that facilitated the slow political incorporation of the peasantry and emerging working class

development matters, particularly when it fails. Economic downturns, like other crises, provide potential moments of upheaval. The inability of states to address concerns effectively undermines their legitimacy, thus enabling excluded or marginalized actors to gain broader social backing. Further, like states, economic transformations or crises shape and thus can reshape the interests of elites and the strategies that are available to them by transforming the needs of the masses. Third, the proposed argument agrees that economic development plays a part in the growth, at least of the scope, of civil society. Like economic development approaches it assumes that capitalist development, along with the state, can undermine previous social structures thus allowing new forms of organization to emerge. Furthermore, it accepts the claim that in addition to making new social organization possible, economic development provides individuals with new group identities and interests that incentivize them to form associations in the public sphere in pursuit of their mutual economic interests. Thus, this dissertation does not dispute the claim that economic development matters for the emergence and growth of specific sectors of civil society. It does, however, argue that economic development and economic interests do not drive the development of all, but merely of some sectors of civil society. Once more, the state also plays an important part in incentivizing the emergence of civil associations—in particular those that arise to cooperate with the state and those that arise to struggle against it.

In summation, the broad argument presented in this dissertation highlights the role that states play in shaping elites' conflicts, elites' interests, and the strategies available to elites to pursue their interest, as central to understanding the development of liberal or illiberal civil societies. In Chapter I, I put forth four specific propositions about how states shape elite preferences, the potential for significant mobilization of discriminated or subordinate groups and the character of civil society. These are restated below, along with short summaries of how the case studies analyzed in Chapters II to IV support each proposition.

1) The political inclusion or exclusion of elites drives the degree to which civil society is politicized and dominated by excluded elites or is relatively autonomous from elite domination. Political inclusion of elites facilitates the development of a more autonomous associational landscape, while their exclusion promotes the emergence of an associational life dominated by one or a few groups. So long as the inclusion of existing elites in political institutions is not merely symbolic and so long as elites can viably pursue some interests through negotiation within formal institutions, then their attention and resources should be focused on ensuring their continual participation in state institutions. Elite preoccupation with political society should facilitate, by failing to obstruct, the self-organization of newly emergent and non-elite groups. At the same time, the exclusion of elites, whether of elite-groups or elite-individuals, from political participation and power promotes elite domination of associational life as excluded elites seek to mobilize support within and through the public sphere in order to counter an exclusionary state. In their attempts to mobilize social support against the state, excluded elites seek to form new associations and networks, and to infiltrate, dominate or co-opt existing organizations and networks. Once included in formal political institutions, whether as a result of state-sponsored inclusion²⁵⁰ or through a successful takeover of the state, the now-included elites ought to abandon their previous focus on associational life. Thus, the shift of elite competition, negotiation and compromise into formal political institutions ought to create a space for civil society to further develop with a higher degree of autonomy from domination from the now included elites.

²⁵⁰ State-sponsored inclusion can be, and I suggest usually is, a strategy adopted by ruling elites to minimize the loss of their power in the face of a mounting and viable threat.

Following Russia's annexation of the Kingdom of Poland, the progressive exclusion of Polish elites from political power incentivized the latter to seek support through mobilization within the public sphere. The initial inclusion of Polish elites in formal institutions of Congress Poland led elites to earnestly seek cooperation and compromises with the Russian state through formal political institutions. Yet as the Tsarist state responded to elites' efforts by limiting the power of participatory institutions and dismantling previous political rights and freedom, the increasingly marginalized elites progressively shifted their efforts away from state institutions to civil ones. The progressive exclusion of Congress Poland's elites resulted in the latter's fostering of seemingly non-political associations and clandestine social and military organizations and networks subsequently utilized in the region's multiple uprisings and revolts. After the failure of the 1863 uprisings, Congress Poland saw no further military revolts until the First World War. However, the absence of uprisings did not mean the presence of a cooperative, depoliticized or autonomous associational landscape. Rather, the region's elites intensified their efforts at mobilizing the public sphere. Thus, political exclusion promoted the development of an illiberal civil society marked by elite domination. Similarly, exclusion of political elites and the progressive dismantling of democratic institutions in interwar Poland following Piłsudski's coup contributed to the rise of elite—both state and non-state—efforts at infiltrating, co-opting and dominating associational life as part of their political struggle.

Conversely, the political inclusion of local traditional, cultural and economic elites in pre-WWI Austrian-ruled Galicia promoted the emergence and growth of a civil society that was relatively more autonomous from elite domination. First, elite inclusion in political participatory institutions contributed to the relatively autonomous development of associational life by shifting the attention and resources of elite-groups toward strengthening their position and power in formal political institutions rather than by trying to improve their political standing by dominating civil, particularly local, associations. Second, though the political inclusion of elite-individuals—leaders of non-elite groups—mostly occurred at the local level, it was nonetheless crucial in encouraging the emergence of local leaders amongst subjugated groups. The development of such local leaders increased the ability of non-elite groups to self-organize, thus increasing the likelihood that associations would be founded and led by local leaders that emerged from non-elite groups.

In summation, the cases examined in this dissertation support the claim that the degree of political inclusion or exclusion of elites contributes to shaping the level of politicization and elite domination of civil society by incentivizing elites to carry out their political conflicts within or outside formal state institutions. The following propositions suggest which state and other factors, such as economic factors, promote the success or failure of such efforts.

(2) *The degree to which excluded elites are successful in mobilizing, politicizing and dominating associational life relies on their ability to forge alliances with other significant social groups to which they can make a persuasive claim of shared identity or interests.* The exclusion of elites from political power incentivizes them to turn to the public sphere in search of means either to reclaim their lost political position or to gain a share of political capital to which they feel entitled. Such campaigns, however, will fail when excluded elite-groups cannot forge alliances with other social groups by convincing the latter of shared identities or interests. Similarly, such campaigns will fail when representatives of non-elite groups cannot convince enough groups, or members of groups of which they are a part that their inclusion in political institutions bears on the interests of the group or groups that they would represent. As such, the ability of elite-individuals to mount a successful campaign

against the state will depend on the amount of social capital which they can hope to, and which they can effectively, control.

Successful mobilization of the public sphere and domination of associational life by elites could be noted, for example, in post-1863 Congress Poland. To some extent, though one less thoroughly explored in this dissertation, it could also be noted in late 19th century *eastern* Galicia. Failed mobilization through and domination of civil society could be seen in the burgeoning associational landscape of pre-1863 Congress Poland. Lastly, the absence of serious efforts at elite-domination of civil society, particularly by elite-groups, could be noted in post-1860 *western* Galicia. This dissertation has argued that the absence of elite domination of civil society in western Galicia after the 1860s ought to be attributed to the political inclusion of local elites, and thus the elites' focus on dominating political institutions rather than civil ones. Moreover, to the extent that the politically included elite-groups attempted to gain influence over associations that organized subordinate groups, such as agricultural cooperatives, they mostly did so by focusing on the regional level. As such, they left the space for the self-organization of non-elite groups, such as peasants, on the local level. The failure of elite domination of and mobilization through civil society in pre-1863 Congress Poland, however, did not result from the lack of significant elite effort. Rather, the inability of local elites to foster widespread, elite-led and elite-dominated associations and networks in Congress Poland prior to 1863 lay in their unwillingness to pursue strategies that, at the time, would have facilitated a successful outcome.

Like their post-1863 counterparts, Polish elites in pre-1860s Congress Poland sought to win the support of Polish peasants for the region's recurrent uprisings. However, the organizations and networks that emerged prior to these revolts were based more on class interests, and thus generally were marked by higher cross-ethnic, class-based integration and cooperation than cross-class, ethnically based alliances. Polish elites did attempt to muster the support of Polish peasants through calls of mutual cultural and ethnic interests. However, such attempts fell on deaf ears as, prior to the 1860s, ethno-cultural discrimination mostly obstructed the lives of Polish elites and had little impact on the daily life of Polish peasants. Thus, the region's pre-1863 Polish elites were unwilling to forge cross-class organizations and to pursue cross-class alliances through economic concessions. In turn, they were unable to win the cooperation of Polish masses through cultural appeals.

Conversely, successful mobilization of the public sphere and domination of associational life by elite-groups could be seen in post-1863 Congress Poland. To a lesser extent, the domination of associational life by elites (such as Ukrainian cultural elites) could also be seen in late 19th century *eastern* Galicia. In both cases, such mobilization was successful precisely because elites could make viable appeals of shared identities and interests to broader sectors of society through strategies that they were willing to pursue. In each case, excluded elites launched successfully appeals of mutual cultural identities and ethno-cultural interests. Polish elites and Polish peasants faced ethno-cultural discrimination in post-1863 Congress Poland while Ukrainian cultural elites and Ukrainian peasants faced ethno-cultural discrimination in eastern Galicia. In both cases, local excluded and marginalized elites could organize associations and forge alliances with peasants precisely because of their shared feeling of cultural oppression.

In summation, the examined cases support the claim that the degree to which elites successfully mobilize, politicize and dominate associational life relies on their willingness and ability to forge alliances with other significant social groups to which they can make a persuasive claim of shared identity or interests.

(3) *The state plays a significant role in creating the strategies that elites can pursue to form cross-group coalitions.* States create the successful strategies that elites can follow to

garner broader cross-group support by shaping groups' shared interests or identities. Excluded elites, for instance, can utilize such points of mutual interests to forge organizations, networks and alliances with other groups, thereby gaining their support in their competition with the state or other elites. One way in which states shape such points of shared interest or identities is through marginalization or discrimination based on specific characteristics of individuals or groups, such as religious, racial, ethnic, or geographic identity. By utilizing such characteristics to determine to whom privileges are granted and from whom they are withheld, states can heighten pre-existing or create new significant social cleavages. State-backed discrimination can be based on political privileges, such as voting rights, or other privileges that are within the state's immediate sphere of influence. For example, states can decide who can be employed in state agencies, such as bureaucracies or schools, or they can simply prohibit some groups from pursuing certain paths of employment or holding certain economic rights, like property rights. Furthermore, states can decide the languages and customs to be used in political and other formal institutions, thereby privileging groups familiar with such skills and customs and disadvantaging other groups. Through such state-enforced or state-permitted discrimination, states provide elites with potential points of mutual interest through which the latter can forge coalitions or organize associations and networks with members of other groups. Thus, the state is a significant player in shaping the potential cross-group coalitions that elites can forge.

Ethno-cultural discrimination existed in all regions of the partitioned Commonwealth under Russian and Austrian rule. Yet after the uprisings of 1863, discrimination against Poles intensified in Russia. Prior to 1863, the Russian state implemented discriminatory policies meant to undermine the economic and social standing of Polish elites. Following the 1863 January Uprising, the Russian state expanded its discriminatory and repressive measures to target all of the region's non-Russian inhabitants. For instance, the state required priests to preach and educators to teach in Russian. By expanding ethno-racial discrimination to obstruct the daily life of the masses, the state provided Polish elites with shared points of discontentment with the masses. Thus, the state furnished excluded elites with mutual interests that the latter could wield to forge cross-class coalitions with similarly discriminated non-elite groups. Once state-backed cultural and religious repression reached the daily life of the peasant masses, Polish elites were successful in fostering associations and cross-class alliances with Polish peasants based on their now-shared ethno-cultural interests. Thus, the case of pre-WWI Congress Poland showcases how the state made cross-group and cross-class alliances possible by forging common identity and interests through widespread ethno-cultural discrimination.

Conversely, the case of pre-1860s Galicia showcases how the state undermined the ability of elites to forge cross-group and cross-class alliances on either cultural or economic grounds. The 1846 Kraków uprising highlights a case where, despite their willingness to form cross-class coalitions through providing economic and political concessions to the peasantry, Kraków's cultural urban elites failed to secure peasant backing in greater Galicia. This failure occurred in spite of the Republic of Kraków's having made such a radical cross-class coalition not only possible but also viable within its boundaries. The dissolution of feudal servitude in the early 19th century and general improvement of peasants' rights under early Polish rule made the peasants susceptible to appeals to join the organizations and associations of Kraków's Polish elites. Lacking a strong cultural impetus that a culturally repressive state would provide, Kraków's elites sought to forge such a coalition through further economic and political concessions to peasants. Yet whereas Kraków's peasantry joined Polish elites, Polish peasants in Austrian-ruled Galicia answered the elites' call to arms with a counter-revolt. The latter targeted not Austrian, but local Polish elites. For whereas the Republic's state made such a coalition possible through long-term, Polish-led transformations of the peasants' lot,

the Austrian state had pursued measures that solidified the economic, social and political conflict between Galicia's Polish elites and peasants. Not only did the latter not possess the same privileges as their Krakovian counterparts, but it was the Austrian state, not Polish elites, that brought any improvements to their situation. As such, it is not surprising that Galicia's peasants did not believe that Polish landed elites would further peasants' interests at the cost of their own. Lastly, the lack of ethno-cultural repression of the region's peasant masses further limited claims of mutual interests that Polish elites could make and which peasants would believe. In other words, from the perspective of Galicia's peasants, it was the Polish elites and not the Austrian state that were their economic, political and cultural²⁵¹ foes.

Though the analysis found in this dissertation has largely focused on political institutions, the state is not the only one capable of shaping potential cross-group alliances. Other significant institutions, such as religious or economic ones, can promote the significance of some social distinctions, erase others, and alter the economic, social or political position of individuals and groups. Significant socio-economic transformations, such as those brought about by war or by the transition from feudalism to capitalism, can have the same effects. These institutions and transformations, too, can perpetuate old social cleavages or create the potential for significant new ones. This potential of non-state factors to alter the likelihood of cross-group alliances could be seen, for instance, in the increased willingness and ability of Congress Poland's post-1863 Polish elites to pursue cross-class alliances.

Prior to 1863, Polish elites, many of whom were still landed, were concerned with preserving the economic status quo. Following the 1863 uprising, Polish elites were not only better able to make cultural appeals due to growing ethno-cultural discrimination targeted at all classes, but they were also more willing to make economic compromises with Polish peasants. Following the 1830 and 1863 Uprisings, Russian-ruled Congress Poland saw the transformation of many Polish elites from landowning to landless, mostly urban and *déclassé* gentry. State-targeted economic displacement of disloyal gentry was responsible for this transformation of many landed elites. Yet others lost their economic status due to their inability to adjust to the demands of the capitalist market. Large transfers of land from the hands of Polish landed elites to those of Russian dignitaries, and the movement of landed elites into the middle class, transformed Polish elites' economic conflict from being mainly centered on peasants to being increasingly centered on urban minorities. As such, peasants were no longer the economic rivals of Polish, now largely cultural and urban, elites. Rather, peasants could be mobilized as both political and economic allies through shared ethno-cultural interests and through economic and political promises against both the Russian state and urban minorities. In other words, following the transformation of the economic position of large parts of the Polish elite, economic promises and compromises with Polish peasants would no longer undermine but rather would serve the economic and political interests of most Polish elites.

In summation, the pre-WWI cases examined in Chapters II and III support the claim that states play a crucial role in shaping the strategies that elites are able and willing to adopt in pursuit of their interests. Furthermore, the case of pre-WWI Congress Poland demonstrates that in addition to states, other factors, such as market transformations, can alter elites' position and interests, thereby similarly shaping the strategies that they are willing to implement in pursuit of their interests.

²⁵¹ As discussed in Chapter II and III, Polish elites and peasants, despite sharing a common religion and language, followed customs that perpetuated cultural distinctions between the groups. It was not until educational institutions spread to the countryside, and even more so, until Russia, Poles in eastern Galicia (and Prussia) pursued widespread policies of forced assimilation, that Polish culture was used to bridge rather than reinforce social distinctions between peasants and lords.

(4) *Though states play a crucial role in shaping the potential and viable cross-group alliances that can arise, it is elites' interests that dictate which strategies they will pursue.* At any point, a multitude of strategies is available to elites in their conflicts with other state or non-state elites. However, elites do not always pursue a winning strategy. They can forgo doing so when implementing a winning strategy in one conflict would jeopardize their position in another, presumably a more important or preferred conflict. For instance, the historical analysis of lands of the former Commonwealth has shown that elites engaged in political conflicts are rarely willing to pursue strategies or coalitions that would undermine their economic power, particularly if they believe that doing nothing will avoid jeopardizing their total, or at least their economic, capital. This was the case during the numerous struggles of the pre-1863 Congress Poland. Despite wanting the support of Polish peasants, Polish—still significantly landed—elites were not willing to make concessions that would jeopardize their economic standing. At the same time, a change in the position or interests of elites may render them more willing to pursue previously shunned alliances. Once more, this was the case in post-1863 Congress Poland.

Having lost their land due to economic displacement wrought by the capitalist market and the Russian state, Polish elites were mostly not landed in the late 19th century. As cultural and bourgeois urban elites rose in importance by the turn of the 20th century, economic concessions to Polish peasants no longer posed a threat to large parts of Polish elites. Furthermore, after 1863, the Russian state expanded the scope of state-backed cultural discrimination from targeting elites to affecting the daily practices of the masses. The extension of state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination from Polish elites to the masses provided the former with shared points of contention, or mutual interests with which to forge cross-class coalition with broad sectors of society. As economic competition for many Polish elites shifted from being centered on peasants to being centered on urban minorities, such ethno-cultural alliances would not only bring support to Polish elites' new economic conflicts, but also to their political ones. Eager to expand into economic sectors, the Polish (Christian) bourgeoisie happily intensified the politicization of culture. Faced with political competition from the state on the one hand, and economic competition with urban minorities on the other, the Polish *déclassé* gentry favored cross-class, ethnically based cooperation as a means to gaining support for both their economic and political struggles. In other words, elites pursued cross-class coalitions based on non-economic interests when doing so meant at least avoiding an upheaval of economic relations and at most bolstering elites' economic interests. In addition to demonstrating the state's role in making cross-group alliances possible, the case of pre-WWI Congress Poland showcases how elites' interests shaped their willingness and ability to successfully forge cross-class alliances with peasants only after 1863, and not before.

A comparison of Polish-Jewish relations in Congress Poland and western Galicia in the second half of the 19th century similarly demonstrates how elites' interests dictate their choice of strategy. Like in Congress Poland, late 19th century Galicia saw growth in anti-Semitism and nationalism. Regional autonomy and lower levels of rural displacement of Polish gentry meant that, unlike in Congress Poland, western Galicia's impoverished gentry and the urban middle classes did not encounter fierce economic competition for decreasing intelligentsia positions. With better paths of employment open to them, Galicia's lower gentry and the middle class did not seek employment in "less desirable" sectors, such as commerce and artisan work, that had historically been filled by the Jewish minority. Lacking a viable threat to their position and power, such as the threat of economic or political competition, western Galicia's traditional and intellectual elites continued to champion class-based, cross-ethnic politics. Furthermore, when the potential of universal and equal suffrage brought the continued political power of Kraków's elites into question, they chose to retain

their economic and social status, as well as some of their political influence, by seeking to forge cross-ethnic, class-based alliances with representatives of other elite and non-elite groups.

In summation, the examined cases support the claim that though states and economic factors, such as economic transformations, play a crucial role in shaping the potential and viable cross-group alliances that can arise, it is elites' interests that dictate which strategies, and thus which alliances, are pursued.

An additional proposition

The partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth provides a fruitful opportunity to examine how different political transformations of regions that formerly developed under one state contributed to the development of a distinct civil society in each region. The redrawing of political boundaries after the First World War promotes further research on the extent to which imperial policies waned and the extent to which they persisted in the face of interwar political and economic pressures. Paired with studies of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth, the case of interwar Poland facilitates analysis of the extent to which historical legacies embedded in the public sphere are resilient and continue to shape civil and political societies—thereby influencing future economic, social development—and the extent to which they are malleable and respond to new political and economic conditions. The examination of the interwar Polish associational landscape in Chapter IV furnished a new proposition about the extent to which, and the mechanism through which, historical legacies shape civil life even after radical transformations such as wars, economic crises and regime change.

(5) *Once instilled in civil society, historical legacies of previous regimes continue to influence the development and character of the associational landscape even after significant political transformations. Yet though persistent, such legacies are not immutable.* As argued in the previous propositions, states play a crucial part in shaping the liberal or illiberal character of civil society, particularly with respect to the relative autonomy from elite domination and degree of ethnic or class fragmentation. On the one hand, if states promote civil societies to develop a more liberal or illiberal character in the first place, then it should follow that changes in state policies ought to reshape associational character. On the other hand, institutional theories suggest that, once formed, internal mechanisms drive institutions to replicate themselves.²⁵² The mechanisms for replication of institutions can be rooted in the knowledge, ideals and habits of individuals. This can be seen, for instance, when actors follow strategies or paths that they know and that worked for them in the past. These mechanisms can also be rooted in institutional rules, including internal rules formed at the inception of institutions and external rules that fostered specific forms of institutional development in the first place. Thus, institutional replication can be internally driven by actors and rules within institutions, or externally driven by political, economic and social rules, changes or actors found outside of the institutions in question. By examining the persistence of political legacies in civil society after a radical political transformation—characterized by the re-establishment of a Polish state after over a century of rule under three different imperial regimes—the case of interbellum Poland facilitates an analysis of the relative importance of internal as opposed to external institutions in shaping associational life.

The end of the First World War brought the reemergence of an independent Polish state. Among others, the reconstructed Republic of Poland included the pre-WWI Duchy of

²⁵² For an overview on the extensive literature on institutional reproduction and change see Campbell (2010).

Poznań under Prussian and then (after 1871) German rule, the pre-WWI Congress Poland under Russian rule, and western Galicia, including the Duchy of Kraków, under Austrian rule. After 1920 and 1921, Poland incorporated formerly Austrian-ruled Lviv, its surrounding areas, as well as the formerly Russian-ruled Kresy (Borderlands), including Vilnius. Though it was founded as a democratic state, interwar Poland was characterized by political turmoil. Prior to 1926, the interwar Polish state was best described as an ethnic democracy where, despite the democratic nature of political institutions, the nation's minorities faced state-backed and state-led discrimination and marginalization. Poland's democracy officially came to an end in 1926 with a military coup and the establishment of an autocracy. Though at first political actors retained hope for the return of democracy, by 1930 such hopes waned as the state continued to dismantle democratic institutions and to increase its repression of oppositional parties. In addition to the charismatic dictator's death, 1935 heralded further transformations that moved interwar Poland closer to fascism, adding ethnic discrimination and exclusion to increasing repression of the political opposition.

As in the pre-WWI era, elites responded to increasing political inclusion by pursuing their aims by cooperating with the state and to increasing political exclusion by mobilizing support against an uncooperative and exclusionary state through and within the associational landscape. For instance, following the fall of interwar democracy, the Polish state shifted from policies of ethnic exclusion and discrimination towards policies of greater ethnic inclusion and toleration. Most ethnic minorities reacted to the state's ethnically inclusionary and culturally tolerant politics cautiously but optimistically. Thus, the transition from Poland's ethnically-exclusionary democracy to an ethnically inclusionary autocracy saw an increasing, albeit temporary, willingness on the part of minority groups to cooperate within state institutions in pursuit of their goals. At the same time, the regime's repression of the political opposition contributed to increasing politicization and political domination of associational life. Hence, once more excluded from political power, political elites quickly returned to pre-WWI tactics of fostering close, top-down ties to civil society as a means to challenge the state. Exclusion of political actors combined with a serendipitous—for excluded elites—economic downturn to lead the masses to abandon support of a state incapable of addressing their economic concerns. Instead, increasingly discontented with their worsening lot they looked to excluded elites who promised economic salvation by embracing an ethnically-exclusionary concept of nation. Thus, in its last years, interbellum Poland saw rapid growth in the nationwide politicization, political domination and ethnic fragmentation of civil society driven by the exclusion of cultural and economic, particularly right-wing, elites.

Despite the growing convergence in the character of civil society across its regions, interwar Poland continued to harbor cross-regional variation in the degree of political domination and ethnic fragmentation that, I argued, arose in the pre-WWI era. Prior to the First World War, the city and region of Vilnius had been under the politically exclusionary and culturally repressive Russian state. Chapter II demonstrated that the political exclusion, discrimination and repression pursued by the Russian state and targeted at all non-Russian ethnicities contributed to a relatively high level of elite domination and ethnic fragmentation of associational life in the Russian-ruled Warszawa governorate. The same pre-WWI outcome would be expected for pre-WWI Russian-ruled Vilnius, where, despite some demographic variation, Poles still constituted the ethnic, politically excluded and discriminated, majority. Furthermore, if anything, Vilnius experienced higher and longer periods of political exclusion and cultural repression as part of the *Kresy* (Borderlands) where the Tsarist state pursued policies of forced cultural and political assimilation much earlier than in Congress Poland. Having experienced such repression, Vilnius ought to have had higher levels of pre-WWI ethnic fragmentation and elite domination than Warszawa.

At the same time, the city and region of Kraków experienced regional autonomy characterized by political inclusion of local elites and cultural autonomy of the ethnic majority under pre-WWI Austro-Hungarian rule. Thus, more liberal Austrian rule in Kraków promoted the emergence of a civil society marked by a higher degree of autonomy from elite domination and higher ethnic integration than observed in pre-WWI Warszawa or expected in pre-WWI Vilnius. Chapter IV argued that, despite observed progressive national convergence in character, civil society in interbellum Kraków was more resistant to political domination and ethnic fragmentation than its counterpart in interwar Vilnius. In the face of mounting political competition for control over civil society, and in comparison to that of Vilnius, Kraków's associational landscape proved more capable of withstanding, if not politicization and political competition, then the domination of associations by single political groups. Furthermore, associational life in the Kraków voivodeship was relatively more impervious to ethnic fragmentation than its counterpart in interbellum Vilnius.

On the one hand, the (1) mirroring of strategies adopted by elites excluded and included from political power during the pre-WWI period by elites during the interwar period and the (2) convergence in national civil society character, as marked by increasing politicization, party domination and ethnic fragmentation of associational life across all regions of interwar Poland, support the claim that external factors and pressures wield significant influence in driving institutional reproduction and change. On the other hand, the (1) small though significant variation in the level of domination by a single political party, and the (2) variation in ethnic fragmentation of the associational landscapes in the Vilnius and Kraków voivodeships support the claim that internal organizational factors drive institutional reproduction, at least to some extent. Moreover, the narrative analysis of interbellum Polish civil society proposes a few such internal mechanisms through which some associations resisted national political and economic pressures, as well as internal mechanisms through which other associations gravitated towards the a common national character. For instance, conference notes and discussions highlighted in Chapter IV underscored how the ideals and habits of members influenced the internal structure and character of associations through debates that took place within organizations over the degree to which members should resist the politicization and ethnic fragmentation of associations that were seen to be sweeping the nation. Chapter IV also highlighted how members' habits and beliefs led some associations to give into external pressures through the transformation of members' beliefs, a phenomenon clearly and frequently noted by state reports as caused by the generational gap²⁵³.

Organizational notes and surveillance reports cited in Chapter IV also demonstrate the power and importance of institutional regulations and norms in preventing, or postponing, organizational change. Such an example could be noted, for instance, in debates that took place in Jagiellonian University's mutual aid associations about the passage of ethnically-exclusionary membership rules. State reports note the progression of discussions and referendums on the issue of the "Aryan paragraph," detailing their initial contestation and eventual acceptance. Part of the eventual success of such exclusionary measures was rooted in the growing acceptance of ethnically chauvinistic attitudes by the university's students. Another part was rooted in strategic steps taken by the nationalistic members of the Greater Poland Youth (MWP). The latter urged and pressured its members to join the ranks of associations targeted for take over and transformation. By ensuring that their members joined

²⁵³ On the one hand, mentions of the generation gap underscored the importance of individual members' goals and convictions in perpetuating the constant character of certain associations. On the other hand, the wide gap that existed between young and old members of associations reflected the importance and influence of external factors in shaping associations not immediately but eventually, by molding the goals and convictions of their future leaders and members.

such associations, the MWP guaranteed their domination of desired organizations from within. Once a critical mass was reached, the formerly multiethnic structure of associations gave way to a clear ethnic dominance by Polish, largely and increasingly ethnically chauvinistic students. Thus, due to both growing support for ethnically-exclusionary nationalist ideals and to an internal transformation of associations' membership, the MWP could finally and easily transform targeted organizations from within.

In summation, a cross-regional and narrative analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of some institutional resilience in the face of external pressures. Moreover, it demonstrates certain internal mechanisms, both ones rooted in the ideals, habits and goals of members and ones rooted in associations' institutional rules and structures, which allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period. At the same time, though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was not only small, but, as argued in Chapter IV, waning. This suggests that though historical legacies driven by internal pressures are persistent in the face of external transformations, they are not immutable. For instance, the generational gap in attitudes towards both the import of cross-ethnic alliances and of the value in political autonomy of associational life visible in Kraków's civil associations highlights the degree to which state transformations and policies can reshape civil society, albeit slowly, by molding the interests, convictions and thus strategies pursued by political and civil actors.

III. Limitations of the Proposed Argument and Findings

On the one hand, the historical peculiarities of the partitioned regions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and their subsequent return to Polish rule during the interwar period enabled an analysis of the extent to which the exclusion or inclusion of local elites and ethno-cultural discrimination of the masses shaped late 19th and early 20th century civil society. On the other hand, the same historical peculiarities bring into question the applicability of the theoretical claims proposed by this analysis. The generalizability of the presented findings is brought into question by: (1) the specific ethno-cultural make-up of each region and the extent to which ethnicity overlapped with political, economic and social capital; (2) the historical and geographic limitations of the examined cases; and (3) the types of associations on which the analyses focused and the types that were overlooked due to data or conceptual limitations.

(1) Demographic applications and limitations

In addition to variation in state policies and economic development, the cases examined in this study allowed for an assessment of how the alignment of (1) significant social cleavages with (2) control over one or a combination of (a) political, (b) economic, (c) cultural or (d) social capital affected the character of civil society in the pre-WWI and interbellum era. Though the social cleavages in question were ethno-cultural, they were significant and easily identifiable, because ethnic and cultural identity largely overlapped with visible social markers such as language or dress. The observed findings and proposed claims should therefore be applicable to other cases with similarly easily identifiable significant social cleavages. At the same time, the alignment of ethno-cultural cleavages with political, economic and especially social power does limit the certainty with which the findings reported can be applied to predict or explain civil society character in other cases. Despite the demographic variation across the pre-WWI and interwar cases and the presence of discrimination and exclusion targeted at both local ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities,

this dissertation focused on the impact of political exclusion of and ethno-racial discrimination against local ethnic *majorities* on the character of civil society. Thus, the presented claims—that the political exclusion of elites coupled with ethno-racial discrimination ought to promote the development of an illiberal civil society—can only be applied with confidence to cases where the excluded elites and discriminated groups are ethnic majorities.

To some extent this dissertation has also examined the effects of political exclusion and ethno-racial discrimination of ethnic *minority* elites. For instance, analyses of the pre-WWI cases and of interwar Poland highlighted the effects of political exclusion and ethno-cultural discrimination of the Jewish minority. The findings suggested that political exclusion and ethno-racial discrimination of local ethnic minority elites leads to some consequences similar to those what arise when such policies target ethnic majority elites. As with majority elites, political exclusion of minority elites incentivizes minority elites to view mobilization through civil society as a means of gaining support against an exclusionary state. Furthermore, political exclusion and discrimination targeted at ethnic minorities similarly can promote growing ethnic fragmentations as well as the popularity of ethnically-exclusionary ideals. However, unlike in the case of ethnic majorities, a turn to ethnically-exclusionary notions of nationalism is only likely to arise when an ideal of an ethnic minority nation-state is deemed possible.²⁵⁴ The absence of such a possibility and its implications for elites strategies could be seen in the case of the Republic of Kraków, where new, economic and cultural, Jewish elites sought to form civil associations as a means of cooperating and negotiating with the state for the expansion of minority rights. The increasing likelihood of an independent nation-state and its implications for elite strategies, could be seen, for instance, in the rising popularity of Zionism and the waning support for assimilationism amongst pre-WWI and interwar Jewish populations. Though the Jewish minority faced social and state-backed ethno-racial discrimination and continual social rejection in both instances, only when the creation of an independent Jewish state began to be seen as a true possibility did significant numbers of Jewish leaders begin to support emigration over integration.

Thus, the findings support the claim that local ethnic *minority* elites should, when able to do so, adopt strategies similar to those pursued by their ethnic *majority* counterparts in response to political exclusion and ethno-racial discrimination. However, the choices pursued by ethnic minority elites were not the focus of this study. As such, this dissertation can only suggest that politically excluded ethnic minority elites should mobilize social support within and through civil society as they seek to negotiate for their inclusion in political institutions with ruling elites. Yet once more, as leaders of a demographic minority, they are limited in the amount of social capital that they can wield. Hence, the successful strategies available to them, and thus likely the strategies that they pursue, should also be distinct from those implemented by ethnic majority elites, particularly when they rely on their ability to wield a

²⁵⁴ The development of “new”—economic and cultural—ethnic minority elites in all regions, along with their political exclusion and often ethno-cultural discrimination corresponded with the growth of nationalist movements in the 19th century. The Jewish minority was the only major ethnic group in the lands of the former Commonwealth that was not a local ethnic majority in any of the former Commonwealth’s regions or sub-regions (see the next footnote). Thus, it is not surprising that the Jewish minority was the only ethnic minority whose excluded, marginalized and discriminated “new” elites championed an assimilationist rather than a nationalist ideology. However, the growing potential of the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, particularly after WWI and the Balfour Declaration, and the failure of assimilationism corresponded with the development and growth of Jewish nationalism. The latter, unsurprisingly, was tied to Zionism. This dissertation has merely mentioned and noted the overlapping development of these events. Therefore, the claim that Jewish nationalism, like that of any other ethnic minority in the 19th century in the lands of the former Commonwealth, was driven in interwar Poland by the exclusion of Jewish elites (and the potential for an independent Jewish state) requires further research to substantiate.

significant type of capital, including social capital. In other words, unless they are also an elite-group, ethnic minority elite-individuals likely²⁵⁵ do not possess the capital to pose a significant threat to the political, social or economic stability of an existing order. If ethnic minority elites are not able to pose a significant threat to the status quo, and thus to ruling elites, then the latter lack the motivation to seek a stable resolution of the conflict by expanding the political inclusion of previously excluded or marginalized elites.

The distinction between those strategies that were available to and actually chosen by ethnic minority elites, as opposed to the strategies available to and chosen by ethnic majority elites, could be observed in the distinct behavior of the pre-WWI and interwar Jewish minority. The Jewish minority was the only ethnic group that did not constitute an ethnic majority in any region or sub-region of the analyzed cases.²⁵⁶ As such, Jewish elites were the only minority elites of the pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth and interwar Poland that made no claims to an independent, ethnic statehood to be founded in the region. With no real possibility of establishing an independent Jewish state on the lands of the former Commonwealth, it is not surprising that Jewish traditional elites sought the preservation of medieval-like institutions that granted them some social and political autonomous rule over the Jewish minority *within* the borders of existing states. Moreover, it is not surprising that it was the newly emergent economic and cultural, middle class Jewish elites, and not traditional elites who already had considerable power over the Jewish minority, who sought the dissolution of discriminatory measures that enforced ethnic separation and incorporation into the economic, social and political institutions of the states of which they were a part. This conflict between traditional and new Jewish elites could be seen during the reign of the Free City of Kraków and subsequently in the tensions between traditional (orthodox) and new (assimilationist and nationalist) Jewish elites in the late 19th century (Chapter III).

In summation, this dissertation's propositions and findings might be applicable to cases where local ethnic minority, rather than ethnic majority, elites are the targets of political exclusion and ethno-racial discrimination. However, such cases were not the focus of this study. For the most part, local ethnic minority elites and groups were analyzed in relation to the interests and strategies of ethnic majority elites. Therefore, for the most part, they were examined not as agents in and for themselves, but rather as members of the social landscape that shaped the strategies available to and pursued by elite-groups and ethnic majority elite-individuals. Thus, further research is necessary to better determine the extent to which the proposed findings can predict the civil society outcome of policies of political exclusion and ethnic discrimination targeting ethnic minority elites and groups.

(2) *Historical Limitations*

A second major limitation of the proposed argument is one that questions the extent to which its findings may be generalized outside of the specific regions and periods on which they are based. The 19th and early 20th centuries in the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were a unique period of economic, social and political transformations marked by the end of feudalism, by war and by frequent regime change. Furthermore, the early 20th century was an era of ideological competition between possible types of political

²⁵⁵ Depending on the relative size of the ethnic minority and the ethnic homogeneity of the rest of the population.

²⁵⁶ Poles were the ethnic majority throughout most, but not all regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with the Ukrainian or Belarusian minorities being the local ethnic majorities in some regions. It follows that though Poles were the ethnic majority in interwar Poland, they were not the ethnic majority in all of the interwar voivodeships. This was particularly the case in the eastern regions. The Jewish minority, however, was spread throughout various regions and, not counting individual cities, never made up a local ethnic majority.

institutions throughout all of Europe. On the one hand, it is these transformations and their variations across the examined regions that allow such a fruitful analysis of how states shape civil society. On the other hand, the frequent and varied transformations bring into question whether findings derived from this region and era can be applied to less tumultuous cases.

One could argue that claims derived from the analysis of the exclusion of local elites during the pre-WWI era, and the return of exclusionary politics during the interwar period, have limited applicability in contemporary cases, because of the undisputed hegemony of democratic institutions and ideals in most modern states. In other words, such critiques argue that much of the world no longer questions the desirability of democratic institutions, as opposed to, say, autocratic ones. Thus any claims derived from the pre-WWI and interwar period may very well shed no light on contemporary relations between civil society, political society and the state. Such critiques, however, misunderstand not only contemporary political realities, but also the claims proposed in this dissertation. It is true that this dissertation has analyzed the impact on civil society of mostly autocratic regimes. However, rather than focusing on types of states, it has focused on specific policies and relations between the state and non-state elites. The political exclusion of elites and ethno-racial discrimination of certain groups may appear, or in fact be, more likely to occur in autocratic regimes. However, neither is exclusively limited to non-democratic states. As warned by Tocqueville (1969) in his initial assessment of American democracy and by contemporary scholars (e.g., Mann 2005), such political exclusion and state-backed discrimination is just as, if not more so, likely to occur in modern and democratic states. Thus, as suggested in the previous section on demographic limitations, it is neither the historical period nor the type of regimes of the examined cases that leads to the most important limitations in the applicability of the claims proposed in this dissertation. Rather, it is the focus on the exclusion of ethnic majority elites, and the relatively little attention given to the exclusion of ethnic minority groups and elites, which poses the most important limits on the generalization of the presented findings.

A second, stronger critique would question the extent to which the findings presented in this dissertation could be applied to historical or contemporary cases with significantly different developmental or historical trajectories. On the one hand, the history of imperialism or “internal colonialism” experienced within the examined regions potentially allows for the generalization of the proposed findings to regions with similar experiences of imperial or colonial rule. Such a reading would suggest that, like in the regions of the former Commonwealth, political inclusion or exclusion of local ethnic majority elites ought to promote the development of a more liberal or illiberal associational life, respectively.²⁵⁷ On the other hand, the political exclusion of local elites historically overlapped with the end of feudalism in the pre-WWI cases, and the transition to capitalism was complete prior to the interwar case. These developments bring into question the extent to which capitalism either allowed for or facilitated the use of civil society by excluded elites as a means of mounting a challenge to an exclusionary state. The analyzed pre-WWI cases had significant differences in the level of economic development. However, all three had begun their transition away from feudalism and into capitalism during the 19th century. Thus, the presence of capitalist markets in all cases limits the generalizability of the findings. We should be cautious about extrapolating the proposed claims to cases where political exclusion of local elites did not overlap with or follow transitions to capitalism.

In the absence of capitalist transformations, the proposed findings can only be applied in cases where other political or economic transformations have dismantled communal social structures, thereby creating “individuals” capable of association and enabling the formation

²⁵⁷ At the same time, the political inclusion of ethnic *minority* elites, which might lead to the exclusion of other ethnic, minority or majority, elites, as was the case in eastern Galicia, is more likely to lead to a more illiberal civil society, particularly when paired with ethno-racial discrimination.

of civil society. The development of civil societies largely limited in scope to higher and middling urban classes in the first half of the 19th century strongly suggests that, while the market may have played a small part in comparison to the state in shaping the character of civil society, the market still was crucial for dismantling previous social structures and providing the space and means that made such voluntary but formal or institutionalized associations possible. Therefore, the analysis presented in this study strongly suggests that its findings are limited to cases where either the state or the free market has made the voluntary association of individuals, relatively unfettered by pre-existing social ties or cleavages, possible in the first place.

(3) Associational Types

A third major limitation of this study stems from the types of associations that were included in each case and the types of associations on which the analyses focused. As discussed in Chapters II and III, data limitations for the types of associations examined posed concerns for potential biases in the analyses of the pre-WWI cases. While these were largely dismissed for the pre-WWI cases, they posed more important concerns for the analysis of interwar Polish civil society. As mentioned in Chapter IV, much of the narrative analysis of the convergence of national associational character across regions of interwar Poland drew on reports written and materials preserved by the interwar state. The Polish state focused its surveillance on associations that either were politically active or were perceived as having significant potential to become active. Hence, associations perceived as being more benign were largely overlooked and under-monitored. As such, state documents could lend themselves to the overestimation of the politicization and nationalization of civil society, and thus to an overestimation of the magnitude and speed of external factors, such as state exclusion of the political opposition and economic crises, in fostering a national convergence in the character of civil society.

Similarly, the types of associations that were conceptually included in and excluded from civil society, and thus which were included and excluded from the analysis, likely shaped the observed outcomes. Chapter I presented a careful definition of civil society that purposely excluded strictly religious organizations from the associational landscape. The justification for excluding such institutions from the analysis was that, at least for the period and regions in question, membership in religious institutions was not voluntary. Not only were members mostly born into specific religious institutions, but they also faced implicit if not explicit pressure and coercion to remain within such institutions.²⁵⁸ The distinct aims and membership structure of such associations limits any claims that this dissertation and its findings can make about the ability of such organizations to withstand external pressures and the mechanisms through which they do so. Such claims are outside of the scope of this study. First, as their regulations are usually not easily altered, and more so, only allow change pursued by their leaders, they may arguably be more structurally resistant to external pressures for change. Second, such associations are likely more focused on shaping individuals' perceptions or ideals, and furthermore, on doing so from a young age, than are associations that were conceptualized as being part of civil society. As such, in addition to their regulations being more resistant to member-driven change, their members themselves may also be more resistant to ideas or beliefs that would encourage them to pursue changes in such organizations. These institutions would therefore be even more immune to external pressures. Third, the hierarchical and inflexible nature of religious associations may render them less likely to be targeted for domination or co-optation by elites external to the

²⁵⁸ Strictly economic institutions, namely businesses, or strictly political ones, such as political institutions, were categorized as belonging to the economy or the state, respectively.

organization. Thus, external elites seeking the political support of such institutions may be more willing to simply negotiate with their leaders rather than try to co-opt such institutions from within. Yet once more, such strictly religious institutions were excluded from the definition of civil society, and thus mostly from the analyses undertaken. Thus, this dissertation can only speculate about their internal mechanisms of change and their ability to resist externally-driven change.

The extent to which associations can place rigorous limitations on potential members leads to a second type of variation in associations' membership regulations or structure that may impact the ability and means of such organizations to resist external pressures for change. Associations that can undertake an exhaustive vetting of future members may be more resistant to external pressures for change. By only accepting members who already fit a specific profile and subscribe to desirable convictions or ideals, such institutions may be better able to prevent the transformation of their internal goals or regulations. In other words, such filtering mechanisms may render associations better able to resist external pressures for change by preventing infiltration by individuals who would support such transformations. Furthermore, they may be able to do so as long as there is a sufficient supply of willing members who continue to harbor the same ideals and convictions. Yet once more, as such associational variation was not a part of the analysis, the findings presented cannot be confidently generalized to associations with significant membership limitations placed upon them. Such organizations include both those that prevent the exit of existing members, like religious associations or ones that significantly limit the entrance of new ones.

Concluding Remarks

This research has argued for a reconceptualization of civil society. Some scholars have critiqued normative claims that equate civil society with liberal democratic outcomes. Nonetheless, much contemporary political and sociological literature continues to conflate structural claims about civil society, such as organizational density, with normative claims that define civil society through its ability to support democratic consolidation. I have proposed that to understand the relationship between civil society and the state, future research must analyze both the normative implications of specific structural aspects of associational life and the developmental mechanisms of those structural aspects of civil society. Following these recommendations, the research presented in this dissertation focused on how states, and to some extent economic and social factors, shaped two distinct characteristics of civil society which existing research has persuasively linked to liberal or illiberal political outcomes. The first characteristic—the ties or linkages of civil society to elites, was conceived of as the degree of domination by or autonomy from elites, particularly one or a few elites. The second characteristic—the ability of associations to reinforce or traverse significant social cleavages, thereby promoting or undermining radicalism, was conceived as the degree of cross-ethnic cooperation and integration or fragmentation within civil and political society.

This dissertation sought to answer why associations arise and what leads them to become civil or uncivil in character. In response to this question, I expanded upon existing economic development and state-centered approaches to propose an explanation of the development of civil society and of its character that embeds an elite-focused analysis of group interests and conflicts in a structure-oriented analysis of political and economic transformations. Furthermore, I suggested that conflicts between the ruling and non-state elites, both elite-groups and elite-individuals, play a crucial role in shaping the character of

civil society, and thus subsequently bear on political outcomes. By drawing on insights from disparate literatures, I argued that, like an analysis of civil society development, analyses of democratic successes and failures can benefit from a reformulation of class conflicts and coalitions as dynamics between old and new elites. Thus successful democratizers, for instance, should not be simply viewed as states where the bourgeoisie efficaciously guided a slow and peaceful political incorporation of the working class. Rather they should be viewed as states where the ruling elites had been sufficiently incentivized, often through the threat of a growing contentious civil society and the promise of not losing too much of their power, to facilitate the incorporation of new elites, such as the leaders of organized sectors of the working class, into political institutions.

Moreover, this research has contributed to empirical knowledge of civil society in Eastern Europe. Polish civil society has been researched extensively in the post-communist context. Yet there are few studies of associational life of the 19th and early 20th century Eastern Europe's ethnically diverse societies, particularly of Poland. This dissertation addressed this gap in existing research, thus setting the groundwork for future studies on associational life in Eastern Europe and on the role of civil society in interwar and post-WWII politics. In addition to being intrinsically important for its contributions to historical knowledge, an analysis of the development of civil society in 19th and early 20th century Eastern Europe is theoretically valuable. The bulk of contemporary knowledge of civil society in the European context is rooted in historical analyses of ethnically homogenous western states, and thus it gravitates to class-based understandings of associational life. As such, testing theories that emerged from more homogenous cases in a context of historically salient class and ethnic cleavages is theoretically informative. Lastly, a historical analysis of factors that shaped the associational landscape in interwar Poland can shed light on the civil and political implications of social, political and economic policies pursued by modern, multi-ethnic states with growing civil societies and uncertain paths to democratization. Hence, the findings presented in this dissertation can bear on modern debates by helping to identify the types of policies, social or economic, that support the development of liberal, rather than illiberal, civil society, and thus by definition, of an associational life more likely to promote liberal rather than illiberal states.

The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that historical trajectories matter for civil and political outcomes as they become ingrained in social relations and organizations. However, they also suggest that social institutions—whether civil society associations, social cleavages or social relations—are in no way immutable. Though real and persistent, historical legacies are not permanent. Just as the character of civil society can be established by the configuration of a specific regime within existing socio-economic structures, so too can it be altered by accidental or purposeful political, economic or social transformations. While civil organizations can resist such external pressures for change, their membership can also give way to such pressures, leading to eventual change from within. By cataloging the consequences of specific policies, and of their ability to alter or perpetuate particular historical legacies, we may attempt to avoid historical failures in our attempts to emulate historical successes.

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
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APPENDIX I

Map 1. Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1793, 1795.



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Map 2. The boundaries of the Duchy of Warszawa (1807-1815): Including the city of Kraków and the Duchy of Poznań (Posen).



Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADuchy_of_Warszawa_and_Republic_of_Danzig.JPG.

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Map 3. Boundaries of Congress Poland in 1815 (Kingdom of Poland (1815-1867), later named Vistula Land (1867-1915)) and the now separate territories of the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Posen) and the Free City of Kraków and Its Territories.



Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_evolution_of_Poland

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APPENDIX II

Table 3. Classifications of Organization Types

Agricultural: Agricultural cooperatives.

Bureaucratic: District management associations.

Credit: Credit societies, including philanthropic and mutual aid credit associations.

Cultural: Culture-promoting associations; mostly the Polish Culture Association; also includes Jewish and Russian culture associations.

Economic: credit, saves and loans societies, usually targeted at broad sectors or groups. E.g.: Jewish merchants or artisans, poor workers, small business owners, etc.).

Educational: Interest societies focused on raising the level of general literacy and education, as well as those interested in promoting more specialized education. E.g.: Lovers of Education Society, Society Courses for Illiterate Adults, Society of Cultivation of Technological Education, the Society of Preschool Education, etc.

Interest: Societies based on mutual non-economic interests, such as the Society of Women's Equality, German Society of the Polish Kingdom, Society of Sobriety "Future," Polish Esperanto Society, Society for the Cultivation of the French Language, etc.

Interest/Economic: Societies based on mutual economic interests such as: to contribute to the improvement of small-scale metallurgic industry, to assist in the development of trade and craft, etc.

Interest/Nationalist: Societies based on mutual political and cultural interests of specific ethnic or national groups. E.g.: the Russian Society of Warszawa, with the aim to unite the Russian population residing in the Polish Kingdom, and to protect its national, religious, and economic interests, as based on the High Manifesto of October 17.

Interest/Political: Societies based on specific political interests or issue, also includes official or unofficial, political party-like organizations. E.g.: Society for the Equality of Polish Women, founded to attain equal rights and equal public freedoms for women of all social classes; The National Jewish Voters Club of the Polish Kingdom; or the Polish Progressive Union.

Mutual-aid: Mutual-aid associations created on non-economic mutual interests or solidarities such as ethnic, religious, familial, etc. Includes mutual-aid associations of specific families and general mutual-aid societies for members of the associations or members of a specific ethnic group.

Philanthropic: Social aid societies, such as orphanages, charities, financial aid for students, care for the poor, etc. Many are tied to religious institutions.

Professional: Associations of doctors, lawyers, journalists, maids, and other professions, whose main goals are to protect the economic interests of their members and professions. Includes mutual-aid associations created by members of specific professions, firms or businesses.

Recreational: Sports clubs, choirs, theater and dance groups.

School: All but one are local branches of the nationalist Polish School Association "Macierz Szkolna."

Occupational Categories	Warszawa Governorate		Warszawa City	
	%Poles	%Jews	%Poles	%Jews
Administration, Court, and Police	60.5	1.1	61.5	1.2
Public and Social Services	86.2	6.3	86.0	7.9
Private Juridical/Law Practice	91.9	4.0	92.6	3.7
The Military/Armed Forces	2.9	4.3	3.2	3.1
Clergy of the Eastern Orthodox faith	25.3	2.2	17.6	2.9
Clergy of other Christian faith	88.9	0.7	95.0	0.0
Clergy of non-Christian faith	5.6	92.2	14.2	84.7
Employees of churches & cemeteries	31.8	65.6	25.5	72.8
Pedagogues, mentors, teachers	38.5	38.9	43.3	28.9
Science, Literature, and Arts	78.7	9.3	80.9	6.8
Medicine and Sanitation	72.4	15.3	74.9	13.0
Charity Organizations	82.5	4.8	82.6	4.5
Servants and (temporary) day-laborers	84.9	10.5	80.8	15.2
Assets & real estate dividends; support from families	71.4	19.2	73.7	16.0
Fiscal Workers	80.2	5.7	72.2	7.7
Incarcerated	73.3	17.8	70.9	19.3
Crop farming	93.7	0.3	91.0	3.0
Beekeeping (apiculture) & Silk farming (sericulture)	95.2	2.1	78.3	0.0
Cattle/livestock farming & breeding	94.2	1.5	46.0	51.3
Forestry and Forest industry	76.7	10.8	58.6	37.7
Fishing & Hunting	85.5	6.9	68.8	23.4
Mining (metals & minerals)	81.5	3.9	86.7	5.8
Metallurgy	94.7	3.0	96.5	0.9
Processing of Fibers (natural & synthetic)	64.7	20.9	40.6	50.1
Handling & Processing of Animal Products	63.4	32.2	63.8	31.6
Processing of timber	78.6	16.8	75.2	22.3
Processing of metals	80.7	13.4	81.0	14.4
Processing of minerals (ceramics)	88.5	5.5	82.4	13.6
Production of chemicals and related products	81.0	12.4	75.3	17.0
Winemaking & Brewing	82.5	11.6	81.6	12.2
Other beverages and fermenting substances	45.5	51.1	37.1	58.0
Handling & manufacture of foods	73.0	21.7	62.8	33.7
Tobacco and tobacco goods	28.2	68.2	28.5	67.9
Polygraphic/printing industry	56.3	40.8	59.3	37.7
Physical instruments, optics, clocks, toys.	48.7	42.9	53.7	37.2
Jewelry, luxury products, etc.	59.9	35.3	62.8	32.4
Clothes manufacture	54.0	43.9	60.5	37.4
Building & Construction; repairs	79.7	14.1	83.6	13.1
Building & Manufacture of wooden sail vessels	80.0	10.2	80.5	15.3
Building: other or unidentified	87.4	6.1	85.9	7.9
Courier via waterways	72.6	8.3	85.2	6.1
Railways/ railroads	88.2	1.4	85.0	1.8
Drivers	58.8	39.1	70.8	27.1
Other ground transportation services	61.1	36.8	55.7	42.2
Post, Telegraph, and Telephone services	71.6	2.5	67.6	1.4
Credit and public commerce associations	82.2	11.4	82.4	11.1
Trade dealers (2nd party trade intermediaries)	34.1	61.2	37.6	57.0
Trade (general)	24.4	71.5	32.7	61.5
Livestock trade	19.8	79.7	16.9	82.2
Grains trade	11.5	87.2	30.4	66.4
Trade of other agricultural products	29.7	68.0	34.5	63.1
Trade of building materials & fuel	36.2	61.7	51.9	45.6
Trade of domestic goods & utilities	26.2	70.9	27.3	68.8
Trade of metal goods, machines, and arms	16.0	81.7	19.2	77.4
Trade of fabrics and clothing	18.2	76.5	24.2	68.8
Trade of leathers, furs, etc.	11.4	87.0	15.9	82.0
Trade of luxury products, artworks, etc.	44.1	50.2	44.9	49.8
Trade of other	44.3	51.6	51.2	43.5
Peddling (trade)	8.6	90.0	8.5	90.1
Hospitality (hotels, clubs, pubs, inns, taverns)	60.9	34.4	63.1	32.5
Trade of beverages	47.3	47.2	33.2	63.2
Cleanliness & Hygiene	81.4	14.3	85.4	11.4
Unidentified professions	57.3	36.4	38.6	54.4
Prostitution	71.6	22.1	68.6	24.4

Table 4. Polish and Jewish employment by census occupational categories.

Notes: Percentages compiled using data from the 1897 Imperial Russian Census. Первая Всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи (*The First General Census of the Imperial Russian Empire*). 1897. Edited by N. A. Troinitskii. S.-Peterburg. 1899 (1904). Vol. 51, Table XXII, p. 192-5, 206-7.

APPENDIX III

Profession	Religious Background ^a										Place of Birth ^a							
	Roman Catholic				Jewish		Greco-Catholic				Evangelical		Galicia		Other Partitions		Other non-Polish regions	
	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910	1880	1910
Bureaucrats	~95	93.3	3	4.7	~2	2	-	-	84.3	86.8	11.3	9	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.2
Court Functionaries	96.4	89.9	3.6	10.1	-	-	-	-	87.5	94.1	5	5	7.5	0.9	7.5	0.9	7.5	0.9
Postal Functionaries	~95	94.7	~5	5.3	-	-	-	-	88.2	74.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rail Functionaries	-	86.3	-	9.7	-	-	-	4	51.9	85.3	7.6	4	40.5	10.7	40.5	10.7	40.5	10.7
Bank and Finance Functionaries	94.5	76.7	5.5	23.3	-	-	-	-	73.9	72.9	15.2	11.1	8.7	19.6	8.7	19.6	8.7	19.6
Private Sector Functionaries	65.6	64.4	32.5	33.2	1	1	0.9	1.4	83.4	85.4	12.1	10.6	~5	~5	10.6	~5	~5	~7
University Professors*	~85.2	~88.2	~7	~4.5	~5	~5	~2.8	~2.3	73	56	27	35	-	9	35	-	-	9
Secondary School Teachers	100	99	-	~1	-	-	-	-	~Most	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elementary School Teachers	98	86	2	14	-	-	-	-	87	86.8	8.6	6.2	4.6	3.7	6.2	4.6	4.6	3.7
"Secular" Clergy**	~98	~98.5	-	-	~2	~1.5	-	-	64.6	74.1	~Many	~Many	-	-	~Many	-	-	-
Technicians	-	~76.1	-	23.5	-	-	~3.1 ^m	~4 ^m	60 ^k	-	-	-	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m
Civil Engineering	-	-	-	-	-	-	~3.1 ^m	~4 ^m	56 ^k	-	-	-	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m
Architects	~86.9	~82.4	10	17.2	-	-	~3.1 ^m	~4 ^m	50	64	23	~25.7	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m
Engineers	~92.3	~83.1	4.6	16.5	-	-	~3.1 ^m	~4 ^m	76.3	67.6	20	~22.1	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m	~22.1	~24 ^m	~24 ^m	~10.3 ^m
Doctors	81.5	74	18.5	24	-	2	-	-	90.6	79.8	7.2	13.8	3	6.4	13.8	3	3	6.4
Pharmacists	96.3	~88.5	-	11.5	-	-	~3.7	-	96.2	90.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lawyers	71	47.7	29	52.3	-	-	-	-	96.7	93.2	~3.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Writers, Publicists and Journalists	95	92.1	5	7.9	-	-	-	-	52.5	56.4	30.3	25.8	17.2	17.8	25.8	17.2	17.2	17.8
Painters and Sculptures	98.3	96.5	1.7	3.5	-	-	-	-	82.7	51.1	15.5	35.7	1.8	13.2	35.7	1.8	1.8	13.2
Musicians	~83.4	~79.6	16.6	12.8	-	-	-	7.6	66.6	-	-	-	-	30.7	-	-	-	30.7
Actors	~93.4	~90.4	~5	~8	-	-	~1.6	~1.6	62.4	-	26.2	52.4	11.4	-	52.4	11.4	11.4	-
Average	91.34	85.49	8.69	14.12	2.4	2.25	2.83	1.33	74.19	76.18	15.16	19.72	14.29	10.96	19.72	14.29	14.29	10.96

52 Table 1. Intelligentsia professions in 1880 and 1910 by members' religion and place of birth.

Notes: In some cases no year was given and the distinction of during the 19th century and right before WWI was made—these were classified as 1880 and 1910 numbers, respectively.

* For University Professors, no religious percentages were given. These were calculated averaging the number of professors in 1875/6 (57) and 1886/7 (86) to estimate 71 professors, and their actual number for 1910/11 (133) was used for the 1910 percentages. We are told that generally Roman Catholics dominated in the 19th century and before WWI, save for a “few Greco-Catholics”, two to three evangelicals and five to six Jews. Thus, the calculated percentages are symbolic, at 2/71, 3/133 for Evangelicals, 5/71 and 6/133 for Jews and a symbolic five percent in both periods for Greco-Catholics, to signify their presence yet insignificant numbers. (Homola 1984:98-99)

**Estimated using 97 clerics in Kraków in 1880 and 135 in 1990, and there being mostly RC and only two GC ones. (Homola 1984:148)

k denotes percentages of members born in Kraków only (as opposed to all of Galicia)

m denotes an average for all members from a broader profession- ex, all technical professions. When individual professional-level data was not supplied, the average for a profession was written across sub-professions.

a Each category should sum to 100%

~ denotes an approximation, calculated taking other given percentages in situations where a sum of 100 from all percentages given is implied in text, for example, when only the percentages of Jewish members is given alongside a statement that the group was mostly Roman Catholic.

	Austrian	Catholic	Christian+ German	Cross- Ethnic	Evangelical	German	Jewish	KTBCE ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	167	-	1	-	-	168
Cultural	-	1	-	-	-	-	13	2	31	1	1	2	2	53
Economic	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	1	-	-	49
Educational	1	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	47	1	4	-	-	57
Interest	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	38	1	2	1	-	46
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
Mutual Aid	1	3	-	-	1	-	4	-	16	-	-	-	-	25
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	1	-	6	-	-	12
Philanthropic	2	24	-	-	-	2	73	-	49	-	7	-	-	157
Political	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	-	18	-	6	-	1	30
Professional	54	42	-	-	2	11	27	-	261	2	25	17	1	442
Professional/ Mutual Aid	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	37	-	1	-	-	41
Recreational	3	5	-	1	-	3	4	1	116	2	7	1	-	143
Religious	-	17	1	-	2	-	53	-	2	-	-	4	-	79
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	1	-	-	29
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	9	-	1	-	-	13
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	2)	-	2	59
Student	-	3	-	1	-	-	3	-	73	-	9	1	3	93
Youth	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3	1	-	10
Total	64	103	1	2	5	18	196	3	984	7	95	27	9	1514

Table 3a. Kraków and Chrzanów Powiaty (lands of the former Republic of Kraków) organizations by type and ethnicity.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^a KTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Austrian	Catholic	Catholic+ Ukrainian	Cross- Ethnic	Evangelical	German	German+ Christian	Greek Orthodox	Jewish	KTBCB ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish+ Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	117	-	-	-	81	198
Cultural	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	-	58	2	3	-	154	227
Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	73	1	2	-	5	83
Educational	-	3	-	-	2	1	1	-	13	-	72	1	8	-	12	112
Interest	-	4	-	-	2	5	5	1	6	-	40	-	2	1	6	67
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	-	5
Political	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	11	-	30	1	6	-	1	51
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	3
NA	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	14	-	2	-	5	2	6	30
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	113	-	36	2	3	-	-	175
Philanthropy	-	15	-	-	1	-	-	4	6	-	12	-	10	-	5	37
Political	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	334	2	21	4	34	500
Professional	27	19	1	-	13	-	-	-	7	-	90	-	2	-	1	110
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	6	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	205
Mutual Aid	-	3	-	-	5	5	5	-	9	2	153	5	15	-	5	205
Recreational	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	5	56	-	2	-	-	-	-	103
Religious	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53	-	-	-	7	60
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	3	-	1	19
Sport	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	-	31	-	33	-	73	138
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	138
Student	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	57	-	5	-	15	81
Youth	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	-	6	-	14	-	-	27
Total	27	96	2	3	30	11	11	13	305	2	1182	14	133	7	407	2235

Table 3b. Lviv Province organizations by type and ethnicity.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^aKTBCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTBCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Austrian	Catholic	Christian+ German	Cross- Ethnic	German	Jewish	KTCBE ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	-	1	-	-	32
Cultural	-	-	-	-	-	8	1	13	1	-	-	1	24
Economic	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	1	-	-	13
Educational	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	17	1	1	-	-	21
Interest	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	17	1	2	1	-	24
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Mutual Aid	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	5
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	6
Philanthropic	1	8	-	-	1	9	-	21	-	6	-	-	46
Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	6	-	-	15
Professional	27	19	-	-	3	8	-	107	1	13	16	1	195
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	1	-	-	13
Recreational	2	1	-	-	1	1	1	38	1	4	-	-	49
Religious	-	6	1	-	-	22	-	2	-	-	3	-	34
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	1	-	-	10
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	7	-	1	-	-	10
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	-	20	-	2	49
Student	-	3	-	1	-	-	-	24	-	9	-	2	39
Youth	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Total	33	42	1	1	5	54	2	350	5	72	20	6	591

Table 3c. Kraków and Chrzanów Powiaty (lands of the former Republic of Kraków) organizations by type and ethnicity, registered after 1906.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146; Nr. 25; Syg 18258, 18259.

^a KTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Cross-				German+				Polish+				Total			
	Austrian	Catholic	Ethnic	Ethnic	Evangelical	German	Christian	Orthodox	Jewish	KTBCB ^a	None	Other		Polish	Catholic	Ukrainian
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	80	112
Cultural	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	17	1	2	-	52	75
Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	2	23
Educational	-	1	-	-	-	2	1	-	4	-	28	-	5	-	6	47
Interest	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	3	-	20	-	1	-	2	32
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	3
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	16	1	3	-	1	26
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	1	-	4	1	5	15
Philanthropy	-	5	-	-	-	1	-	1	20	-	8	2	2	-	-	39
Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	6	-	10	-	1	19
Professional	17	7	-	-	-	6	-	-	13	-	141	2	14	3	18	221
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	28	-	-	-	-	32
Recreational	-	1	2	-	-	4	5	-	5	2	63	1	10	-	2	95
Religious	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	2	15	-	1	-	-	-	-	28
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	3	13
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	8	-	2	-	1	16
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	21	-	29	-	52	103
Student	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	28	-	4	-	8	43
Youth	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	2	-	8	-	-	15
Total	17	27	2	1	18	11	3	84	2	454	7	95	4	234	959	

Table 3d. Lviv Powiat organizations by type and ethnicity, registered after 1906.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^a KTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Austrian	Catholic	Christian+ German	Cross- Ethnic	Evangelical	German	Jewish	KTCBE ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.0	-	0.1	-	-	11.1
Cultural	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.9	0.1	2.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	3.5
Economic	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.9	-	0.1	-	-	3.2
Educational	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	-	3.1	0.1	0.3	-	-	3.8
Interest	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	2.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	3.0
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.3
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.2
Mutual Aid	0.1	0.2	-	-	0.1	-	0.3	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	1.7
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.4	-	-	0.8
Philanthropic	0.1	1.6	-	-	-	0.1	4.8	-	3.2	-	0.5	-	-	10.4
Political	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	1.2	-	0.4	-	0.1	2.0
Professional	3.6	2.8	-	-	0.1	0.7	1.8	-	17.2	0.1	1.7	1.1	0.1	29.2
Professional/ Mutual Aid	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	2.4	-	0.1	-	-	2.7
Recreational	0.2	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.2	0.3	0.1	7.7	0.1	0.5	0.1	-	9.4
Religious	-	1.1	0.1	-	0.1	-	3.5	-	0.1	-	-	0.3	-	5.2
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	0.1	-	-	1.9
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.6	-	0.1	-	-	0.9
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	-	1.3	-	0.1	3.9
Student	-	0.2	-	0.1	-	-	0.2	-	4.8	-	0.6	0.1	0.2	6.1
Youth	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.2	0.1	-	0.7
Total	4.2	6.8	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.2	12.9	0.2	65.0	0.5	6.3	1.8	0.6	100

Table 4a. Kraków Province organizations by type and ethnicity, in percentages.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^aKTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Austrian	Catholic	Catholic+ Ukrainian	Cross- Ethnic	Evangelical	German	German+ Christian	Greek Orthodox	Jewish	KTBCCE ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish+ Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	-	-	-	3.6	8.9
Cultural	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	2.6	0.1	0.1	-	6.9	10.2
Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	-	0.1	-	0.2	3.7
Educational	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.6	-	3.2	-	0.4	-	0.5	5.0
Interest	-	0.2	-	-	0.1	0.2	-	-	0.3	-	1.8	-	0.1	-	0.3	3.0
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.2
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.2
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	1.3	-	0.3	-	-	2.3
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	0.1	-	0.2	0.1	0.3	1.3
Philanthropy	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	5.1	-	1.6	0.1	0.1	-	-	7.8
Political	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	0.4	-	0.2	1.7
Professional	1.2	0.9	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	2.0	-	14.9	0.1	0.9	0.2	1.5	22.4
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.3	-	4.0	-	0.1	-	-	4.9
Recreational	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.4	0.1	6.8	0.2	0.7	-	0.2	9.2
Religious	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	2.5	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	4.6
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	-	-	-	0.3	2.7
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.4	-	0.1	-	-	0.9
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	-	1.5	-	3.3	6.2
Student	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	2.6	-	0.2	-	0.7	3.6
Youth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.6	-	-	1.2
Total	1.2	4.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.5	0.6	13.6	0.1	52.9	0.6	6.0	0.3	18.2	100

Table 4b. Lviv province organizations by type and ethnicity, in percentages.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^a KTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Austrian	Catholic	Christian+ German	Cross- Ethnic	German	Jewish	KTCBE ^a	None	Other	Polish	Polish + Catholic	Ukrainian	Total
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	-	0.2	-	-	5.4
Cultural	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	0.2	2.2	0.2	-	-	0.2	4.1
Economic	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	0.2	-	-	2.2
Educational	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	2.9	0.2	0.2	-	-	3.6
Interest	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	-	2.9	0.2	0.3	0.2	-	4.1
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.3
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.3
Mutual Aid	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	0.8
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	1.0
Philanthropic	0.2	1.4	-	-	0.2	1.5	-	3.6	-	1.0	-	-	7.8
Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	1.0	-	-	2.5
Professional	4.6	3.2	-	-	0.5	1.4	-	18.1	0.2	2.2	2.7	0.2	33.0
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	0.2	-	-	2.2
Recreational	0.3	0.2	-	-	0.2	0.2	0.2	6.4	0.2	0.7	-	-	8.3
Religious	-	1.0	0.2	-	-	3.7	-	0.3	-	-	0.5	-	5.8
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	0.2	-	-	1.7
Sport	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	1.2	-	0.2	-	-	1.7
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.6	-	3.4	-	0.3	8.3
Student	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	-	-	4.1	-	1.5	-	0.3	6.6
Youth	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3
Total	5.6	7.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	9.1	0.3	59.2	0.8	12.2	3.4	1.0	100

Table 4c. Kraków Province organizations by type and ethnicity, in percentages, in percentages; only organizations registered after 1906.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146; Nr. 25; Syg 18258, 18259.

^a KTCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

	Cross-			German+			Greek			Polish+			Total		
	Austrian	Catholic	Ethnic	Evangelical	German	Christian	Orthodox	Jewish	KTBCB ^a	None	Other	Polish		Catholic	Ukrainian
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	-	-	-	8.3	
Cultural	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.2	-	1.8	0.1	0.2	-	5.4	
Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	-	-	0.2	
Educational	-	0.1	-	-	0.2	0.1	-	0.4	-	2.9	-	0.5	-	0.6	
Interest	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.3	-	2.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	
Interest/ Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.1	-	-	
Mutual Aid	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.4	-	1.7	0.1	0.3	-	0.1	
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.4	0.1	0.5	
Philanthropy	-	0.5	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	2.1	-	0.8	0.2	0.2	-	-	
Political	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.6	-	1.0	-	0.1	
Professional	1.8	0.7	-	-	0.6	-	-	1.4	-	14.7	0.2	1.5	0.3	1.9	
Professional/ Mutual Aid	-	0.2	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	-	2.9	-	-	-	-	
Recreational	-	0.1	0.2	-	0.4	0.5	-	0.5	0.2	6.6	0.1	1.0	-	0.2	
Religious	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	0.2	1.6	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	
Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	0.3	
Sport	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.4	-	0.8	-	0.2	-	0.1	
Sport/ Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	2.2	-	3.0	-	5.4	
Student	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	2.9	-	0.4	-	0.8	
Youth	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	0.8	-	-	
Total	1.8	2.8	0.2	0.1	1.9	1.1	0.3	8.8	0.2	47.3	0.7	9.9	0.4	24.4	
															100

Table 4d. Lviv province organizations by type and ethnicity, in percentages, registered after 1906.

Notes: Data compiled from the Galician Associational Registry, TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv: Collection 146: Nr. 25: Syg 18258, 18259.

^aKTBCBE denotes Known to be cross-ethnic. Associations were denoted as such based on information not available in the registry. Only one association, the Esperanto club, was marked as KTBCBE, in order to parallel the same treatment of the organization in the analysis of the Associational Registry of the Warszawa Governorate.

Combined Political, Social, Scientific, Artistic, Economic, Humanitarian, and Other Associations

Year	1881	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895
Political, social, social, scientific and artistic associations	426	830	916	999	1017	993	1128	1205	1298	1404	1524	1657
Economic Associations	252	357	372	379	381	719	915	2	9	7	6	0
Humanitarian Associations	345	444	464	496	506	541	582	641	669	714	770	827
Other Associations	10	15	17	18	16	17	14	15	17	21	23	29
Total	1033	1646	1769	1892	1920	2270	2639	2873	3183	3496	3833	4213
Population Statistics for Galicia ^a (in millions)	5.96	6.18	6.24	6.31	6.39	6.48	6.60	6.61	6.65	6.73	6.82	6.88

Table 5. Associational Growth in late 19th century Galicia

Notes: Associational data from Table VII printed in Rutowski (1887, p.135-7).

^a Population statistics printed in Table 4 in Krzyżanowski and Kumaniecki (1915:5-6)

Year	1890	1896
Ruthenian/Ukrainian	449	764
Polish	53	104
Multi-Ethnic or with no ethnic affiliation	18	24
Total	520	892

Table 6a. Reading Associations in Galicia

Notes: Associational data from Table VII.2 printed in Rutowski (1887:138)

Year	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895
Number	23	23	23	25	25	26	26	27	27	28

Table 6b. Savings Associations in Galicia

Notes: Associational data from Table XIII. 4.1 printed in Rutowski (1887: 285)

Year	Number of Self-Reported Organizations	Number of Active Organizations
1876	74	74
1877	79	79
1878	90	90
1879	100	100
1880	112	112
1881	122	122
1882	140	140
1883	162	162
1884	173	173
1885	182	197
1886	175	195
1887	174	185
1888	179	189
1889	182	198
1890	196	213
1891	192	222
1892	226	265
1893	282	300
1894	301	330
1895	347	366

Table 6c. Credit Associations in Galicia

Notes: Associational data from Table XIII 3.1 printed in Rutowski (1887:290)

Down Payment and Credit Cooperatives

Year	Craftsmen And Industrialists	Merchants And Traders	Manufacturers	Farmers	Owners And Tenants Of Large Estates	Working Intellectually	Capitalists And w/o Specific Classes	Institutional	Total
1880	7,657	3,816	157	25,772	1,243	7,123	2,146	56	47,970
1881	8,665	6,116	131	33,474	1,491	10,113	2,633	102	62,725
1882	10,860	10,149	183	39,693	2,814	11,437	3,353	140	78,629
1883	11,660	11,599	219	46,428	2,952	12,533	3,623	135	89,149
1884	12,922	13,655	264	53,882	2,844	13,143	3,644	217	100,571
1885	13,050	16,594	192	60,367	2,124	13,493	3,615	249	109,684
1886	13,263	17,749	231	64,698	1,774	13,954	3,571	171	115,411
1887	14,269	16,884	220	65,602	3,186	14,343	3,221	370	118,095
1888	14,047	18,570	193	67,591	3,163	14,158	3,289	217	121,228
1889	15,254	20,015	243	74,573	2,993	14,324	4,521	273	132,196
1890	17,362	23,106	303	81,077	3,453	15,101	4,466	337	145,205
1891	17,963	27,272	285	83,731	3,246	16,002	4,920	341	153,760
1892	15,596	33,944	279	90,786	3,817	15,543	5,387	311	165,663
1893	19,589	43,940	595	104,360	4,545	16,764	7,000	283	197,076
1894	19,534	53,171	569	116,823	4,501	17,702	9,133	345	221,778
1895	22,284	21,331	680	125,038	4,430	19,416	57,986	471	251,636

Table 6d. Membership in Credit Cooperatives in Galicia, by members' professions.
Notes: Associational data from Table XIII 3.4 printed in Rutowski (1887:292)

Appendix IV A

Classifications of Interwar Organization Types

Agricultural: Agricultural cooperatives.

Co-op: Agricultural, other rural-economic and food cooperatives.

Credit: Credit and loan societies, including philanthropic and mutual aid credit associations, often targeted at broad sectors or groups.

Cultural: Culture and education promoting associations, including libraries, reading rooms and ethnic-cultural associations, such as the Ukrainian Proswita, the Polish Folk School Association or the Jewish Cultural-Educational “Tarbut” association.

Interest (or “Other”): Societies based on mutual interests that did not fit into other exiting classifications, such as the Siberian League, the Friends of Hungary, the Anti-Tuberculosis Association, the Colonizers Society, National Women’s Association, Community Beautification Associations, and other religion, gender or ethnicity based associations, among others.

Mutual-aid: Mutual-aid associations created on non-economic mutual interests or solidarities such as ethnic, religious, familial, etc. Includes mutual-aid associations of specific families, general mutual-aid societies for members of the associations or members of a specific ethnic group, and material mutual-aid associations such as food cooperatives.

Nationalist/Paramilitary: Nationalist associations, mostly sports associations that targeted youth and had strict hierarchical, military like organizational structures. Members of such associations that existed prior to WWI, for instance, filled the ranks of Polish legionaries during the war. These mostly included *Sokół*, *Strzelec* and the Polish Scouts.

Philanthropic: Social aid societies, such as orphanages, charities, financial aid for students, care for the poor, etc. Many are tied to religious institutions.

Professional: Associations of doctors, lawyers, journalists, maids, and other professions, whose main goals are to protect the economic interests of their members and professions. Includes mutual-aid associations created by members of specific professions, firms or businesses.

Recreational: Sports clubs, choirs, theater and dance groups.

Religious: Religious, worship-oriented associations.

Service/Volunteer Fire Fighters: All are Volunteer Fire Fighting Associations.

Veterans/Military: Sports clubs, choirs, theater and dance groups.

Youth: Urban and rural youth associations, including academic student organizations, non-paramilitary youth sports associations, religious rural youth associations, etc.

APPENDIX IV B: Matching Results and Variable Balance for Genetic Matching Tests

1. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Whole Sample

Results	
Estimate.	-8.6487
AI SE.	3.1633
T-stat	-2.734
p.val.	0.0062563
Original number of observations	2988
Original number of treated obs.	2988
Matched number of observations.	2988
Matched number of observations(unweighted).	100342

Variable Balance

	mean treatment	mean control	std mean diff	mean raw eQQ diff.	med raw eQQ diff	max raw eQQ dif.	mean eCDF diff	med eCDF diff	max eCDF diff	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p- value
<u>(V1) Rural</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.70197	0.03552	145.67	0.6657	1	1	0.33322	0.33322	0.66645	6.1004	<2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.53246	0.08032	90.604	0.1684	0	1	0.08424	0.084247	0.16849	3.3701	<2.22e-16
<u>(V2) Urban</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.2482	0.63421	-89.339	0.3855	0	1	0.193	0.193	0.38601	0.80365	<2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.34639	0.34471	0.35162	0.0004	0	1	0.00022	0.00022	0.000448	1.0023	0.025298
<u>(V3) Credit</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.021095	0.01184	6.4376	0.0092	0	1	0.00462	0.004626	0.009253	1.7632	0.062746
<i>After Matching</i>	0.018742	0.01874	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<u>(V4) Coop</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.12253	0.04210	24.522	0.0802	0	1	0.04021	0.040213	0.080426	2.6635	2.22E-15
<i>After Matching</i>	0.10207	0.10207	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

2. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Data Collected After 1926 Only

Results for Test 1.

Estimate.	-9.1044
AI SE.	3.243
T-stat	-2.8074
p.val.	0.0049938
Original number of observations	2873
Original number of treated obs.	2113
Matched number of observations.	2873
Matched number of observations(unweighted).	92631

Variable Balance for Test 1.

	mean treatment.	mean control	std mean diff	mean raw eQQ diff	med raw eQQ diff	max raw eQQ diff	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	Max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p-value
<u>(V1) Rural</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.71652	0.035526	151.06	0.68026	1	1	0.3405	0.3405	0.68099	5.9231	< 2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.53637	0.076575	92.188	0.24742	0	1	0.12371	0.12371	0.24742	3.5168	< 2.22e-16
<u>(V2) Urban</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.23568	0.63421	-93.876	0.39868	0	1	0.19926	0.19926	0.39853	0.77584	< 2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.34111	0.34111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<u>(V3) Credit</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.02319	0.018421	3.1677	0.0052632	0	1	0.0023844	0.0023844	0.0047687	1.2517	0.41732
<i>After Matching</i>	0.018244	0.035702	-13.042	0.026071	0	1	0.013036	0.013036	0.026071	0.52027	1.03E-05
<u>(V4) Cultural</u>											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.055845	0.0026316	23.169	0.053947	0	1	0.026607	0.026607	0.053213	20.072	< 2.22e-16

Results for Test 2.

Estimate.	-9.0699
AI SE.	3.2591
T-stat	-2.7829
p.val.	0.0053872
Original number of observations	2873
Original number of treated obs.	2113
Matched number of observations.	2873
Matched number of observations(unweighted).	82859

Variable Balance for Test 2.

	mean treatment.	mean control	std mean diff	mean raw eQQ diff	med raw eQQ diff	max raw eQQ diff	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	Max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p-value
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.71652	0.035526	151.06	0.68026	1	1	0.3405	0.3405	0.68099	5.9231	<2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.53637	0.076575	92.188	0.17786	0	1	0.088928	0.088928	0.17786	3.5168	2.22e-16
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.23568	0.63421	-93.876	0.39868	0	1	0.19926	0.19926	0.39853	0.77584	<2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.34111	0.33867	0.51385	0.0011827	0	1	0.00059137	0.00059137	0.0011827	1.0035	0.008
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.02319	0.018421	3.1677	0.0052632	0	1	0.0023844	0.0023844	0.0047687	1.2517	0.417
<i>After Matching</i>	0.021928	0.021928	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.11406	0.035526	24.698	0.078947	0	1	0.039265	0.039265	0.07853	2.9466	6.66E-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.093282	0.093282	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.055845	0.0026316	23.169	0.053947	0	1	0.026607	0.026607	0.053213	20.072	<2.22e-16

3. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Data Collected After 1928 Only

Results	
Estimate.	-7.0656
AI SE.	3.5893
T-stat	-1.9685
p.val.	0.049007
Original number of observations	2398
Original number of treated obs.	1641
Matched number of observations.	2398
Matched number of observations(unweighted).	41553

Variable Balance

	mean treatment.	mean control	std diff	mean raw eQQ diff	med raw eQQ diff	max raw eQQ diff	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	Max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p-value
(V1) Rural											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.78184	0.035667	180.62	0.74505	1	1	0.37309	0.37309	0.74617	4.9555	< 2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.56714	0.06839	100.64	0.32443	0	1	0.16221	0.16221	0.32443	3.8531	< 2.22e-16
(V2) Urban											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.17367	0.63408	-121.5	0.46103	0	1	0.2302	0.2302	0.46041	0.61809	< 2.22e-16
<i>After Matching</i>	0.31902	0.31735	0.3578	0.0013477	0	1	0.00067384	0.00067384	0.0013477	1.0028	0.045433
(V3) Credit											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.024985	0.018494	4.1573	0.006605	0	1	0.0032454	0.0032454	0.0064907	1.3411	0.29795
<i>After Matching</i>	0.022936	0.022936	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
(V4) Coop											
<i>Before Matching</i>	0.092626	0.035667	19.641	0.056803	0	1	0.02848	0.02848	0.056959	2.4418	8.02E-09
<i>After Matching</i>	0.074646	0.074646	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

(V5)	<i>Before</i>	0.035954	0.002642	17.887	0.033025	0	1	0.016656	0.016656	0.033312	13.145	2.44E-11
Cultural	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.025438	0.025438	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V6)	<i>Before</i>	0.10238	0.031704	23.306	0.070013	0	1	0.035336	0.035336	0.070673	2.9913	8.81E-13
Nationalist	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.080067	0.080067	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V7)	<i>Before</i>	0.021938	0.029062	-4.8621	0.006605	0	1	0.0035621	0.0035621	0.0071242	0.75986	0.31584
Philanthropy	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.024187	0.024187	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V8)	<i>Before</i>	0.021938	0.56407	-369.99	0.54161	1	1	0.27107	0.27107	0.54213	0.087197	<2.22e-16
Professional	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.19308	0.19308	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V9)	<i>Before</i>	0.037172	0.025099	6.3799	0.011889	0	1	0.0060367	0.0060367	0.012073	1.4616	0.10117
Recreational	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.033361	0.033361	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V10)	<i>Before</i>	0.50091	0.010568	98.039	0.49009	0	1	0.24517	0.24517	0.49035	23.892	<2.22e-16
Service	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.34612	0.34612	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V11)	<i>Before</i>	0.017063	0.068692	-39.855	0.051519	0	1	0.025815	0.025815	0.051629	0.26198	1.43E-07
Military	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.033361	0.033361	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											
(V12) Youth	<i>Before</i>	0.074954	0.10568	-11.665	0.030383	0	1	0.015363	0.015363	0.030726	0.7331	0.017668
	<i>Matching</i>											
	<i>After</i>	0.084654	0.084654	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<i>Matching</i>											

4. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Data Collected After 1930 Only

Results	
Estimate.	-6.2097
AI SE.	3.7055
T-stat	-1.6758
p.val.	0.093779
Original number of observations	2234
Original number of treated obs.	1477
Matched number of observations.	2234
Matched number of observations(unweighted).	37030

Variable Balance		mean treatment.	mean control	std diff	mean raw eQQ diff	med raw eQQ diff	max raw eQQ diff	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	Max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p-value
(V1) Rural	<i>Before Matching</i>	0.78876	0.035667	184.43	0.75297	1	1	0.37655	0.37655	0.75309	4.8411	<2.22e-16
	<i>After Matching</i>	0.55595	0.06983	97.817	0.31218	0	1	0.15609	0.15609	0.31218	3.8007	<2.22e-16
	<i>Before Matching</i>	0.16588	0.63408	-125.83	0.46896	0	1	0.2341	0.2341	0.46821	0.59595	<2.22e-16
(V2) Urban	<i>After Matching</i>	0.32453	0.32274	0.38234	0.0015123	0	1	0.00075614	0.00075614	0.0015123	1.0029	0.045428
	<i>Before Matching</i>	0.027759	0.018494	5.6377	0.009247	0	1	0.0046325	0.0046325	0.0092649	1.4858	0.15444
	<i>After Matching</i>	0.02462	0.02462	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
(V3) Credit	<i>Before Matching</i>	0.079892	0.035667	16.306	0.043593	0	1	0.022112	0.022112	0.044225	2.1358	6.23E-06
	<i>After Matching</i>											

5. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Data Collected in 1934 Only

Results	
Estimate.	-7.749
AI SE	2.847
T-stat.	-2.722
p.val	0.006
Original number of observations	690
Original number of treated obs.	318
Matched number of observations.	690
Matched number of observations (unweighted).	8098

Variable Balance

	mean treatment	mean control	std diff.	mean raw eQQ diff.	med raw eQQ diff.	max raw eQQ diff.	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co).	T-test p- value
(V1) Rural											
<i>Before</i>	0.761	0.000	178.160	0.761	1.000	1.000	0.381	0.381	0.761	Inf	< 2.22e-16
<i>Matching</i>											
<i>After</i>	0.512	0.000	102.270	0.702	1.000	1.000	0.351	0.351	0.702	Inf	< 2.22e-16
<i>Matching</i>											
(V2) Urban											
<i>Before</i>	0.201	0.355	-38.245	0.151	0.000	1.000	0.077	0.077	0.154	0.703	0.000
<i>Matching</i>											
<i>After</i>	0.284	0.281	0.642	0.002	0.000	1.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	1.006	0.157
<i>Matching</i>											
(V3) Credit											
<i>Before</i>	0.060	0.024	14.977	0.038	0.000	1.000	0.018	0.018	0.036	2.381	0.022
<i>Matching</i>											
<i>After</i>	0.041	0.041	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Matching</i>											
(V4) Coop											
<i>Before</i>	0.097	0.083	4.763	0.016	0.000	1.000	0.007	0.007	0.014	1.152	0.520
<i>Matching</i>											
<i>After</i>	0.090	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Matching</i>											
(V5)											
<i>Before</i>	0.107	0.048	18.912	0.060	0.000	1.000	0.029	0.029	0.059	2.075	0.005

6. Matching Results and Variable Balance for the Data Collected after 1933 Only

Results	
Estimate.	-8.004
AI SE	4.431
T-stat.	-1.807
p.val	0.071
Original number of observations	1078
Original number of treated obs.	391
Matched number of observations.	1078
Matched number of observations (unweighted).	10352

Variable Balance

	mean treatment	mean control	std mean diff.	mean raw eQQ diff.	med raw eQQ diff.	max raw eQQ diff.	mean eCDF diff.	med eCDF diff.	max eCDF diff.	var ratio (Tr/Co)	T-test p- value
(V1) Rural											
Before Matching	0.772	0.036	175.300	0.737	1.000	1.000	0.368	0.368	0.736	5.019	< 2.22e- 16
After Matching	0.416	0.109	62.087	0.435	0.000	1.000	0.218	0.218	0.435	2.492	< 2.22e- 16
(V2) Urban											
Before Matching	0.192	0.600	103.460	0.407	0.000	1.000	0.204	0.204	0.408	0.646	< 2.22e- 16
After Matching	0.452	0.450	0.373	0.002	0.000	1.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	1.001	0.157
(V3) Credit											
Before Matching	0.049	0.013	16.486	0.036	0.000	1.000	0.018	0.018	0.035	3.580	0.003
After Matching	0.026	0.026	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
(V4) Coop											
Before Matching	0.090	0.047	15.020	0.043	0.000	1.000	0.021	0.021	0.043	1.837	0.010
After Matching	0.062	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

APPENDIX IV C

Organization Type	Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name											Total
	Catholic/Christian	German	Jewish	None	Other	Polish	Polish+Christian	Polish+Other	Ukrainian	Total		
Agricultural	-	-	-	281	-	1	-	-	-	-	282	
Cultural	1	2	26	93	-	-	-	1	10	-	133	
Economic	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	
Educational	-	-	2	49	-	1	-	-	-	-	52	
Interest	2	-	9	57	-	4	4	2	-	-	78	
Interest/	-	-	1	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	10	
Economic Interest/	-	-	1	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	10	
Political	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Military	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	
Mutual Aid	1	-	2	54	-	-	-	-	1	-	58	
Nationalist	1	-	3	5	-	14	-	-	-	-	23	
Philanthropic	8	-	43	20	-	7	-	-	-	-	78	
Political	-	-	-	110	-	-	-	1	-	-	111	
Professional	7	-	6	117	-	27	1	-	-	-	158	
Professional/	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mutual aid	1	-	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	
Recreational	3	-	4	69	-	9	1	-	-	-	86	
Religious	13	-	26	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	42	
Service	1	-	-	941	-	-	-	-	-	-	942	
Sport	1	-	11	18	-	-	-	-	1	-	31	
Sport/Nationalist	-	-	-	190	-	8	-	-	4	-	202	
Student	-	-	-	9	-	1	-	-	-	-	10	
Veterans	-	-	2	37	-	8	-	-	-	-	47	
Youth	4	-	4	97	1	14	61	-	-	-	181	
Total	43	2	143	2176	1	95	68	4	16	-	2548	

Table 1a. Kraków województwo. Ethnic or religious alliances implied in associations' names by organizational type. Data compiled from AP Kraków, Col. 206: Syg. 108, 131-4; 259, 636; Col: 218: 737; Col. 25/231 (St. Ż II): Syg. 60-71.

Organization Type	Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name										Total
	Catholic/Christian	German	German	Jewish	None	Other	Polish	Polish+Christian	Polish+Other	Ukrainian	
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	33
Cultural	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	6
Economic	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	9
Educational	1	-	-	2	15	-	8	-	-	-	26
Interest	13	-	-	6	44	1	3	3	-	-	70
Interest/	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	9
Economic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interest/	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	6
Political	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	28
Military	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	9
Mutual Aid	2	-	-	6	9	-	-	1	-	-	18
Nationalist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philanthropic	15	-	-	19	22	1	11	1	-	-	69
Political	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
Professional	5	-	-	5	51	-	20	1	-	-	82
Professional/	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mutual aid	-	-	-	1	19	-	1	-	-	-	21
Recreational	-	-	-	-	13	-	4	-	-	-	17
Religious	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Service	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	9
Sport	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	6
Sport/Nationalist	-	-	-	1	19	-	4	-	-	-	24
Student	1	-	-	-	32	-	2	-	-	-	35
Veterans	-	-	-	-	30	-	1	-	-	-	31
Youth	19	-	-	1	26	-	169	-	-	-	215
Total	57	-	-	48	382	2	224	6	-	-	719

Table 1b. Vilnius województwo. Ethnic or religious alliances implied in associations' names by organizational type. Data compiled from TsDIAL of Ukraine in Lviv. Col: 146; Nr. 25; Syg: 18258, 18259

Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total
		Christian	Explicitly Inclusive			Polish	Polish+		
			German	Jewish	None		Christian		
Austrian	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	
Christian	11	-	-	-	6	-	-	17	
German	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
None	10	-	-	-	97	1	5	113	
Polish	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	
Polish+ Christian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
Total	21	-	1	-	108	1	5	136	

Table 2a. The Correspondence of An Organization's Written Membership Restrictions and the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in its Name for the Kraków Voivodeship.

Data compiled from AP Kraków, Col 218: Syg. 191, 198; AAN, Col: 112: Syg 1.

Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total
		Christian	Explicitly Inclusive			Polish	Polish+		
			German	Jewish	None		Christian		
Austrian	0.0	-	-	-	1.9	-	-	-	
Christian	52.4	-	-	-	5.6	-	-	-	
German	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	
Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
None	47.6	-	-	-	89.8	100	100	91.3	
Polish	-	-	-	-	2.8	-	-	8.7	
Polish+ Christian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	100	-	100	-	100	100	100	100	

Table 2b. The Correspondence, by Percent, of An Organization's Written Membership Restrictions and the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in its Name for the Kraków Voivodeship.

Data compiled from AP Kraków, Col 218: Syg. 191, 198; AAN, Col: 112: Syg 1.

		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total
		Explicitly				Polish+			
		Christian	Inclusive	German	Jewish	None	Polish	Christian	
Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name	Austrian	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-
	Christian	64.7	-	-	-	35.3	-	-	100
	German	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-
	Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	None	8.8	-	-	-	85.8	0.9	4.4	100
	Polish	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-
	Polish+ Christian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	15.4	-	0.7	-	79.4	0.7	3.7	100

Table 2c. The Correspondence, by Percent, of the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in an Organization's Name and its Written Membership Restrictions, for the Kraków Voivodeship.

Data compiled from AP Kraków, Col 218: Syg. 191, 198; AAN, Col: 112: Syg 1.

		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total	
		Explicitly				Polish+				
		Christian	Inclusive	German	Jewish	None	Polish	Christian		Na
Implied Ethnic or Religious	Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Christian	6	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	10
	German	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Jewish	-	-	-	5	11	-	-	-	16
	Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	None	20	1	-	-	55	1	-	2	79
	Polish	2	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	8
	Polish+ Christian	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
	Total	28	1	-	5	69	4	7	3	117

Table 3a. The Correspondence of An Organization's Written Membership Restrictions and the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in its Name for the Vilnius Voivodeship.

Data compiled from LVIA, Col: 53: Syg: 280, 310, 321, 499, 760, 855, 924, 3217, 3224, 3250, 3252.

		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total
		Christian	Explicitly Inclusive	German	Jewish	None	Polish	Polish+ Christian	
Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name	Austrian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Christian	60.0	-	-	-	-	-	40.0	100
	German	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Jewish	-	-	-	31.3	68.8	-	-	100
	Lithuanian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
	None	25.3	1.3	-	-	69.6	1.3	-	100
	Polish	25.0	-	-	-	37.5	37.5	-	100
	Polish+ Christian	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	100
	Total	23.9	0.9	-	4.3	59.0	3.4	6.0	100

Table 3b. The Correspondence, by Percent, of An Organization's Written Membership Restrictions and the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in its Name for the Vilnius Voivodeship.

Data compiled from LVIA, Col: 53: Syg: 280, 310, 321, 499, 760, 855, 924, 3217, 3224, 3250, 3252.

		Ethnic or Religious Membership Restrictions Written into an Organization's Statute							Total
		Christian	Explicitly Inclusive	German	Jewish	None	Polish	Polish+ Christian	
Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in An Organization's Name	Austrian	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
	Christian	21.4	-	0	-	-	-	57.1	-
	German	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
	Jewish	-	-	0	100	15.9	-	-	-
	Lithuanian	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	33.3
	None	71.4	100	0	-	79.7	25.0	-	66.7
	Polish	7.1	-	0	-	4.3	75.0	-	-
	Polish+ Christian	-	-	0	-	-	-	42.9	-
	Total	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3c. The Correspondence, by Percent, of the Ethnic or Religious Affiliation Implied in an Organization's Name and its Written Membership Restrictions, for the Vilnius Voivodeship.

Data compiled from LVIA, Col: 53: Syg: 280, 310, 321, 499, 760, 855, 924, 3217, 3224, 3250, 3252.

	Kraków				Vilnius							
	None	Polish	Christian	Jewish	Sample Size	Sample Proportions	None	Polish	Christian	Jewish	Sample Size	Sample Proportions
Agricultural	99.6	0.4	-	-	282	6.1	100	-	-	-	33	4.6
Cultural	69.9	-	0.8	19.5	133	2.8	50.0	-	-	50.0	6	0.8
Economic	100	-	-	-	8	0.4	100	-	-	-	9	1.3
Educational	94.2	1.9	-	3.8	52	2.5	57.7	30.8	3.8	7.7	26	3.6
Interest	73.1	5.1	7.7	11.5	78	3.5	62.9	4.3	22.9	8.6	70	9.7
Interest/ Economic	80.0	10.0	-	10.0	10	0.6	88.9	-	-	11.1	9	1.3
Interest/ Political	-	-	-	100	1	0.1	100	-	-	-	6	0.8
Military	100	-	-	-	4	0.6	100	-	-	-	28	3.9
Mutual Aid	93.1	-	1.7	3.4	58	1.8	50.0	-	16.7	33.3	18	2.5
Nationalist	21.7	60.9	4.3	13.0	23	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philanthropic	25.6	9.0	10.3	55.1	78	3.2	31.9	15.9	23.2	27.5	69	9.6
Political	99.1	-	-	-	111	2.2	50.0	50.0	-	-	2	0.3
Professional	74.1	17.1	5.1	3.8	158	19.4	62.2	24.4	7.3	6.1	82	11.4
Professional/ Mutual aid	63.6	-	9.1	27.3	11	0.8	90.5	4.8	-	4.8	21	2.9
Recreational	80.2	10.5	4.7	4.7	86	4.6	76.5	23.5	-	-	17	2.4
Religious	4.8	-	33.3	61.9	42	1.0	-	-	33.3	66.7	3	0.4
Service	99.9	-	0.1	-	942	29.5	100	-	-	-	9	1.3
Sport	58.1	-	3.2	35.5	31	1.7	83.3	-	-	16.7	6	0.8
Sport/Nationalist	94.1	4.0	-	-	202	7.5	79.2	16.7	-	4.2	24	3.3
Student	90.0	10.0	-	-	10	0.9	91.4	5.7	2.9	-	35	4.9
Veterans	78.7	17.0	-	4.3	47	1.8	96.8	3.2	-	-	31	4.3
Youth	53.6	7.7	35.9	2.2	181	8.6	12.1	78.6	8.8	0.5	215	29.9
Total	85.4	3.7	4.4	5.6	2548	100	53.1	31.2	8.8	6.7	719	100
Total (re-adjusted) ^a	67.9	7.4	13.6	10.4			72.8	16.5	4.5	6.0		

Table 5. Sample of associations in the Kraków and Vilnius voivodeships, according to organization type and ethnic or religious affiliation implied in associations' names.

Notes: ^a Kraków re-adjusted based on organizational type proportions found in Vilnius and vice-versa. Contain slight rounding error

∞ Data compiled from Tables 1a, 1b in Appendix IV C.

Organization Type	Region	Number of Associations	Implied Ethnic or Religious Affiliation in the Name		Ethnic or Religious Exclusion in the Statute?			Additional Materials Suggest Mixed Membership?		
			Yes	No	Yes	No	Unknown	Yes	Maybe	No
Academic	National	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-
	Kraków	2	-	2	-	2	-	2	-	-
Agricultural		1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Vilnius	1	Lithuanian	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Cultural	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Vilnius	2	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2
Economic	Kraków	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
Interest/	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	1	-	Pre-1938 ^a	-	Post-1938 ^a
Economic	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Vilnius	1	Jewish	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Philanthropic		1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
	Kraków	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-
Professional	Kraków	14	-	14	-	-	14	-	-	14
	Kraków	1	Polish	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
		2	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	2
		8	-	8	-	8	-	8	-	-
		1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
	Warszawa	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
		1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
	Vilnius	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
Recreational	Kraków	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-
	Kraków	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Service	Vilnius	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
	Kraków	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Sport		1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	Lviv	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
		1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	National	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Sport/Paramilitary	Vilnius	1	Polish	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
	Warszawa	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1
Youth	Vilnius	2	-	2	-	2	-	-	1	1
	Vilnius	17	-	17	-	Christian (17)	-	-	1 ^b	16
Total		70	9	60	18	25	26	21 (22)	7	41 (42)

Table 6. Organization, by Type, Explicit Exclusivity, Explicit Inclusivity, Implicit Exclusivity in Statute and Name, adjusted by Membership Information. Data Source: AP Kraków, Col 218; Syg. 191, 198; AAN, Col: 112; Syg 1., LVIA, Col: 53; Syg: 280, 310, 321, 499, 760, 855, 924, 3217, 3224, 3250, 3252.

Notes: ^a The association altered its statute, changing its membership regulations to include ethnic or religious restrictions after 1938.

^b One association had religious restrictions on its membership, but had evidence of multiethnic (but not cross-religious) membership