UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Rodar con los Golpes:

State Responses and Protest Tactics in the Chilean Student Movements (2011–2015)

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Latin American Studies (Sociology)

by

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The Thesis of Weijun Yuan is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Rodar con los Golpes:
State Responses and Protest Tactics in the Chilean Student Movements (2011–2015)

by

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Master of Arts in Latin American Studies (Sociology)

Professor Leon Zamosc, Chair

This thesis examines how the protest tactics utilized in the Chilean Student Movements (2011–2015) are contingent on the state actions. It seeks to provide what is lacking in current literature by including a more nuanced typology of state responses (i.e. toleration, concession and repression) and a more precise conceptualization of protest forms which measures four dimensions: the level of disruption, the level of violence, the level of innovation, and the escalation of protest demands. Based on a content analysis of

the news archives in *La Nación* and *El Mercurio*, Facebook posts of the *Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile* (*Confech*), and interviews data, this thesis presents the pattern of variance in protest tactics. When the government was unresponsive, or vacillating, students tended to innovate and escalate their demands, increasing media publicity and social influence. Facing repression, the students tended to legitimize their actions by adopting conventional performances that would arouse historical memories of the dictatorship and by limiting their demands. Under concession, to effectively exploit the opportunity for dialogue, students showed less interest in innovation and they made radical claims to counter the threat of co-optation. The thesis further illustrates the causal mechanism considering the agency of protesters. It argues that the students framed the changing political context as a combination of political opportunity and threat. From their perspective, state toleration, repression, and concession respectively challenge as well as create the opportunity to increase the visibility, legitimacy, and efficiency of the students' actions. In response to the changing political context, the protesters adjust their tactics in order to strategically mobilize people and urge government concessions.

INTRODUCTION

What if Martin Luther King Jr. had led a violent protest in the Montgomery Bus Boycott? Would the masses and the churches have still supported him? Would the state have strangled such protest in its cradle? Would the history from the 1960s have been rewritten?

Tactics do matter. They are specific protest actions carried out at specific times and spaces. Though they may appear to be trivial compared with the strategy, they are nothing less important than the latter. In fact, as organic components of the strategy, they can make a critical difference to the mobilization, the trajectory, and the outcomes of the movement.

About fifty years after the Civil Rights Movements in the United States, Chile, the democratic model of Latin America, witnessed a huge wave of protests against the segregation of educational resources. In this recent cycle of movements (2011–2015), the young students astonished the audience with a greater variety of contentious performances than what their remote counterparts did. Such protest tactics range from the *cacerolazos* which are deeply rooted in the tradition of Chilean mass mobilization to occupations which had diffused around the world; from the conventional forms such as marches, hunger strikes, and sit-ins, to innovative actions including flash mobs, zombie walks[1], kiss-ins, and a massive "pillow fight for education"; from protests taking place in

[1] The zombie walk is a metaphor for Chile's "walking dead" educational system.

physical spaces, to campaigns organized through *Facebook* and *Twitter*; from modest *bandera* (flag) demonstrations to highly disruptive *tomas* (take-overs).

Free as they may seem, these performances are by no means unconstrained monolog of the students. In contrast, the protesters are rolling with the punches (*rodando con los golpes*), whose moves are largely contingent on the moves of their opponents. In the case of Chilean student movements, the students and the state form a pair of opponents; the former posed challenges to the latter and urged reforms, while the way that the latter responded affected subsequent tactical choices. How did the students' tactics vary over time? How did the previous state responses, in alignment with other socio-political factors, shape the evolution of protest forms and protest goals? These are the questions that this thesis is concerned with. It seeks to provide what is lacking in current literature by including a more inclusive typology of state responses (i.e. toleration, concession and repression) and the multiple dimensions of protest forms, which include 1) the level of disruption, 2) the level of violence, 3) the level of innovation and 4) the escalation of demands. Furthermore, by analyzing both the opportunity structure and the participants' framing, this research looks to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the impact state behaviors have on protests—on both strategic and cultural terms.

To identify and make sense of the various patterns, I rely on a protest event analysis based on news archives from two sources, Facebook posts of a major student organization, and data from semi-structure interviews. The multiple sources of data allow for more precise representation of protests and uncover more details about the dynamics.

The current research finds that when the government was unresponsive, or vacillating, students tended to innovate and escalate their protest goals, increasing media publicity and social influence. Facing repression, the students tended to legitimize their actions by adopting conventional performances that would arouse historical memories of the dictatorship, and limiting their demands. Under concession, to effectively exploit the opportunity for dialogue, students showed less interest in innovation and stick to radical claims to avoid co-optation. It further argues that students framed the changing political context as a combination of political opportunity and threat. State toleration, repression, and concession respectively challenges the visibility, legitimacy, and efficiency of the students' actions, as well as creates the opportunity to increase them. The tactical selections they made under each condition share the strategic goal of gearing up the mobilization, urging government concessions, and facilitating social changes.

The present thesis begins by reviewing the literature on the interplay between the state and protesters which is followed by a recount of the background of the recent Chilean student movements in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 explains the selection of methodology and measures used in the research. Statistical findings and analysis are presented in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 goes into more details about the state-protesters interaction over the movement process. Chapter 5, the closing chapter, discusses the contribution of the current study and the aspects that future studies could make further advancement.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 State responses and protests

Scholars of contentious politics have long examined the interaction between state responses and challenging behaviors. However, most of them have focused on how the latter influence the former (Moore, 2000; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Krain, 2000; Franklin, 2009); whereas, what impacts varying state actions may have on movement trajectories has received less empirical attention (exceptions see Rasler, 1996; de la Luz Inclán, 2009). Within the limited efforts to fill this gap, research has largely concentrated on the outcomes of state repression, while overlooking its alternatives, such as concession, co-optation, toleration, or a combination of such responses, with very few exceptions (Rasler, 1996; Schumaker, 1985).

Scholars agree that repressive force significantly raises the costs of engagement and alters the context in which challengers make decisions (McAdam and Sewell, 2001; Hess and Martin, 2005). However, the empirical findings are greatly divided. Repression has been found to have every possible impact on the ensuing protests, including deterrence (Hibbs, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Olzak and Oliver, 2002; Williams, 2005), backfire (White, 1989; Francisco, 2004; Almeida, 2003; Hess and Martin, 2006; Ondetti, 2006; Moore, 1998), and a more complicated U-shape model where repression immediately intimidates protest but increases it in a long run (Muller and Weede, 1990; Rasler, 1996). In light of the conflicting results, it remains unclear how exactly repressive behaviors shape protests.

Furthermore, compared to studies that explore the effects of state responses on the protest rate, there is less attention paid to the way state actions influence protest forms. Current findings are drawn from examining tactical alteration under repression. Some argue that under the threat of repression, protesters may adopt more confrontational protest tactics (Opp and Roehl, 1990; Lichbach, 1987; O'Brien and Deng, 2013). However, almost all focus on a single dimension of tactical shift—the level of violence[2]. Others discuss how repressions transform public challenges to private mobilization (Moore, 1998; Chang, 2008; Loveman, 1998; Chang and Kim, 2007). Growing literature in this regard reveals the unintended consequences of repression, but appears to distract from focusing on the direct contentious interaction between protesters and the state. In this sense, current literature provides insufficient insight as to how various state responses shift protest tactics from one to another.

As for the mechanism that explains the outcome of varying state responses, existing literature is mostly informed by the dynamics of the political opportunity structure (e.g. Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982, 1999; Tarrow, 1983, 1994) Here, political opportunity is defined as "the perceived probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome" (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001, p. 182). Therefore, any changes "that shift the balance of political and economic resources between a state and challengers, that weaken a state's ability to reward its followers or opponents or to pursue a coherent policy, or that shift domestic or outside support away from the regime, increases opportunities" (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001, pp. 182–183). Such approach

[2] For a test of conflicting theories, see Moore 1998.

explains why movements do not necessarily emerge or develop in direct response to grievances or access to resources; they require political openings to link the potential of mobilization to conducive empowerment. State concession (or facilitation), as an indication of expanding opportunity, signals a political environment that favors protests. On the one hand, movement participants may perceive a higher possibility of achieving their demands. On the other hand, a more responsive context provides incentives for the mobilization of resources external to the protesting group—the availability of potential allies, increasing institutional access, and divided elites. As a result, massive protests accelerate and expand, which in turn generate more opposition activities (Rasler, 1996). Yet this logic does not hold in all cases, de la Luz Inclán (2009, 2011), for instance, points out that procedural concession had a negative initial and delayed effect on protests.

In addition to the influence on protest rate, Tilly (1978) argues that change in contentious repertories also depends on fluctuations of opportunity. Protesters constantly adjust their protest forms to the changing socio-political setting to obtain the tactical advantage in making claims to the state. During the period of democratic transition, challengers are found to carve out new tactics.

Threats, nevertheless, are often seen as the negative side of opportunities, which in contrast, refer to the costs, rather than the chances of success. That is, while the openness of opportunity introduces contention and new demands, constraints or closures quell activism of protesters in fear of losing current benefits (Tarrow, 1998; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). State repression, viewed as a critical threat to the movement, is supposed to mitigate protests by indicating the extremely high costs of participation. Yet as mentioned, some empirical studies show the opposite—repression can also lead to

heightened and confrontational protest (Almeida, 2003). Despite the dominance of the political opportunity/threat approach within the field, the conflicting empirical findings call into question the applicability of the model to understand social movements.

Furthermore, as a conceptual framework, "political opportunity" is in danger of becoming an "umbrella" concept that covers all relevant aspects of socio-political change, such as institution, elite support, crises of all sorts, policy shift and so on (Gamson and Meyer, 1997, p.275). Nevertheless, these are actually very different variables; though all seem to promise a more favorable environment for mobilization and protest, each may have a unique effect on protest rate and form. Therefore, it is necessary to define the particular dimension or aspect of "opportunity structure" in order to advance the established literature. The present research is one of such efforts to nuance the concept of opportunity/threat by focusing on specific state responses and the subsequent form of student mobilizations[3].

The hegemony of the political process theory, moreover, suffers the structural bias and overlooks the importance of perceptual aspects—the expansion or contraction of political opportunity does not directly transform to action; through a series of cultural dynamics, activists perceive, construct, interpret, signify, and assess the changing nature of the socio-political context in which their activism is situated (Benford, 1997). This cultural perspective of dynamics is formidable.

[3] For more examples, see Koopmans et al. (2005) which discusses the specific opportunities for the protest concerning immigration and ethnic politics, and Giugni et al. (2009) which adopts an institutional approach to identify favoring short-term changes that affect the movement of the unemployed.

Drawing on the aforementioned critiques, we realize that the dichotomy of opportunity and threat is not at all unquestionable. Is the threat merely a negation of opportunity? Does the presence or increase of threat necessarily indicate reduced opportunity? If the answer is not a firm "yes", it means that future studies need to figure out the way that threats and opportunities converge as well as interact with each other. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) have made such attempt, offering a remedy to the traditional model that Tilly (1978) first proposed. They point out that both the protesters and the countermovement engage in a chain of interaction, during which they made a series of choices regarding the actions and discourse. What required in the further studies is a dynamic view of the role of threat and opportunity, to see how they combine to shape movement trajectories.

To contribute to the ongoing debate, the ensuing work focuses on what has been understudied in the field: the way that state actions influence protest tactics. It not only discusses the outcome of the most examined action—the repression; but also includes the cases of concession and state inaction. Meanwhile, it seeks to provide a more comprehensive scenario of the movement trajectory by examining the level of disruption, violence, innovation, and radicalism of tactics. Based on the findings on state-movement relations in the Chilean student movements (2011–2015), this research goes further to examine the protesters' changing frames, so as to explore the mechanism linking political context to protest action.

1.2 Overview of the Chilean student movement

To understand the 2011 Chilean student movement, we have to first take a look at the market-oriented educational system in Chile.

Prior to 1980, the Chilean school system's administration was fully centralized in the Ministry of Education. In addition to designing curricula for schools across the country, the Ministry also oversaw all public schools, which accounted for 80% of all enrollments across the country. Meanwhile, the Ministry was responsible for the assignment of teachers and principals, and the payment of expenses (Mora, 2005). This system lasted until 1981, when Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet implemented an array of neoliberal reforms. Among them was a nationwide privatization of education which led to the decentralization of public schools (by creating *escuelas municipals*, which are administered by the respective municipality), and allowed public funding in private schools (referred to as *escuelas particulares subvencionadas*), while the public schools struggled under a tight budget. Likewise, in higher education, new regulations and financial initiatives were created to encourage privatization of educational supply (Brunner, 2009). By 2012, public expenses for public education has declined from 78% to 37%, whereas financial support for schools that enjoy particular subsidies has increased from 15% to 55% over the past three decades (*Ministerio de Educación*, 2013). The higher education in Chile suffers an even more drastic gap between public and private support. Only 16.1% of the investment comes from the public sector, significantly lower than the average level of the OCDE countries where 69.4% of the general investment is covered by public funds (*Fundación Terram*, 2011).

The consequence of the reforms is a legacy of educational disparity associated with socioeconomic stratification. Table 1 shows the socio-economic origin of students in municipal schools, particular subsidized schools, and private schools[4], through which we can get a clear impression of the segregation in educational access: children of the upper class attend private schools; children from middle-class background tend to attend private-voucher schools while those from low-income family more likely end up in underfunded public schools[5]. Under the privatization schema, the amount of tuition in Chile rises greatly. In 2009, over 60% of students in the three lowest income quintiles have to rely on educational loans. On average, the student debt represented 174% of their projected annual income, compared to a rate of 57% in the US (Meller, 2011).

Table *1. Socio-economic Background of Students in Different Schools*

Socio-economic location of students	Municipal schools	Particular Subsidized Schools	Private Schools
Lower class	80.0%	20.0%	—
Middle-lower class	79.3%	20.7%	—
Middle class	38.2%	61.8%	—
Middle-upper class	10.5%	89.5%	—
Upper class	—	12.0%	88.0%

Source: Ministerio de Educación 2013.

Moreover, due to the unbalanced allocation of educational resources among these schools, there is a disparity in the quality of education. 90% of the private high school alumni are admitted to universities, while only 10–15% of those in municipal schools and

[4] Private schools here refer to schools funded in whole by charging their students tuition fees.
[5] Also see Mizala and Torche (2010).

particular subsidized schools have the chance to pursue higher education. In this way, economic inequality is further reinforced because the poor received poor quality education and remained low-income.

It was in such background that on April 24, 2006, Santiago's public schools organized demonstrations on Alameda Avenue, demanding the waiving of bus fares and university admissions tests fees. These demonstrations quickly escalated into outbursts of violence and ended up with the arrest of 47 secondary students two days later. In the following two months, high school students in black and white uniforms—nicknamed Penguins—surged into the streets and rocked the presidency of Socialist Michelle Bachelet. Their claims grew increasingly politicized, as they demanded the repealing of the Organic Constitutional Law on Education and the overall reform of the unequal educational system. Although the Penguin Revolution was gradually co-opted and generated limited policy outcomes, it posed an enormous challenge to the educational system and established a key precedent for the 2011 mobilization.

In 2010, Sebastián Piñera was elected President of Chile, supported by *Coalición por el Cambio*, a coalition of the center-right. Upon inauguration, his government announced a reform project for higher education which will reformulate the funding system. It proposed that public resources should be allocated according to performance indicators (e.g. through scholarship reforms), and encouraged competition between public and private universities (Brunner, 2010).

In April 2011, paralleled with the process of policy making, students of *Universidad Central* first initiated occupation protests, blaming the stakeholders of illegal profit-making operations and lack of high-quality education in the private university.

Then students of both private and public universities got involved under the organization of the Confederation of Chilean Students (Confech). Their demands escalated from the scholarship reform to quality and free public education for all. Marked by a series of mobilization, conflicts, government responses, and negotiations (or breakdowns of negotiations), this wave of student demonstration peaked when, on August 4, 2011, almost 900 protesters were detained, and many injured. The tide diminished with the re-election and promises of President Michelle Bachelet, and the entry of former student leaders into parliament. Although this cycle of student movement has declined since 2012, positive policy responses have followed as a result. In November 2015, Chilean congress approved a new proposal for free education along with the next year's education budget. This means in 2016, 170,000 low-income students will be eligible for tuition-free university education[6]. Table 2 presents the landmark dates of the student movements. Referred to as *Chilean Winter,* by *The New York Times* comparing it to *Arab Spring*, this cycle of student movements marked the most massive and original protest in Chile after the restoration of democracy.

[6] However, the student activists expressed their discontent with the program. They claim that there are a great number of students in need of financial aids but ineligible for the support. And they asserted that the current solution does not address the core problems nor shake the foundation of the unequal system (O'Boyle 2006).

Table *2. Chronology of the Chilean Student Movements (2011–2015)*

Apr 2011	Students initiated protests against privitization policies
Jun 2011	Over 100 schools were taken over (*en toma*) by students
Jul 2011	First government proposal; Minister of Education Joaquín Lavín replaced by Felipe Bulnes
Aug 2011	Second government proposal; most confrontational month; third reform proposal
Oct 2011	Breakdown of negotiation
Dec 2011	Minister of Education Felipe Bulnes replaced by Herald Beyer
Apr 2012	New university funding plan; new wave of student marches and occupations
Dec 2013	Michelle Bachelet won presidential election and introduced policies aiming at free public education by 2020; two student leaders[7] elected as parliament members
Mar 2014	New wave of student movements
Mar 2015	Bachelet implemented tax reform and instituted a law to gradually transform private primary and secondary schools to nonprofit enterprises
Apr 2015	Student protests again surged
Nov 2015	The creation of Higher Education Reform Advisory Council; Bachelet introduced new policies to develop a common access to higher education for the lower-class

The selection of this case takes into consideration the variety of tactics that the students performed. Such protest tactics range from the *cacerolazos* which are deeply rooted in the tradition of Chilean mass mobilization, to occupations which had diffused

[7] Camila Vallejo and Gabriel Boric. Camila Vallejo was one of the most prominent leaders of the student protests in 2011, as the president of the University of Chile Student Federation (FECh) and main spokesperson of the Confederation of Chilean Students (Confech). Gabriel Boric was president of the FECH in 2012. He is also part of the student movement *Izquierda Autonoma* and director of *Fundacion Nodo XXI*.

around the world; from the conventional forms such as marches, hunger strikes and sit-ins, to innovative actions including flash mobs, zombie walks[8], kiss-ins, and a massive "pillow fight for education"; from protests taking place in physical spaces, to campaigns organized through Facebook and Twitter; from modest *bandera* (flag) demonstrations to highly disruptive *tomas* (take-overs).

Meanwhile, the multiple rounds of negotiations along with the rock and tear-gas exchanges between the students and the police provide a valuable opportunity to observe state–movement interactions. As the protest demands escalated, the protest became not just about policy reform, but also about changing the underlying structure of the Chilean economic model. Such being the case, the way that the students and the government view and deal with the legacy of Pinochet is also an issue intertwined in their dynamics of their interaction.

Furthermore, the analysis of this case enables comparison across time and space. Among the numerous tempestuous revolutions and movements in 2011, and during an era when information is rapidly transmitted through the internet, the Chilean student movements may have potential connections to contemporary movements, such as the Arab Spring, the 15'M Movement in Spain, the Occupy Movement across the US, and the cluster of ongoing anti-liberalism movements in Latin America. It is interesting and relevant to examine the dissemination of protest tactics and claim-framing strategies. In addition, this wave of student movements can be compared to the 2006 student

[8] The zombie walk is a metaphor for Chile's "walking dead" educational system.

movement (*Pingüinos Revolución*) and to those before the return of democracy, in light of Chile's rich student-mobilization tradition.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Data and Methods

Data for this research comes from a protest event analysis based on news archives and Facebook posts, eight semi-structural interviews with student leaders and two with government officials.

Protest event analysis. Protest event analysis (PEA) originally emerged within the field of social movement studies, and has been refined to study other research topics. Since its first use in the 1980s, it has become one of the key methods of social movement research.

As a type of content analysis, PEA systematically assesses the amount and features of protests across time and space. “It seeks to make replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). Although all analysis of texts is ultimately qualitative, PEA looks to convert certain characteristics of a text into numbers and analyze them with the help of various statistical tools. In this sense, it implies a quantitative approach.

PEA is especially useful to depict and analyze the political process of a movement, as it provides a way of measuring the effects of political opportunities from a comparative perspective. The longitudinal data it collects can be utilized to map occurrences of protests, disentangle protest waves and study how various characteristics of protest vary across time. Moreover, it has been used to show how protests co-vary with the changes in the context, attempting to capture the relational aspect of political

contention (Tilly, 2008, pp. 3–4). More concretely, scholars have managed to understand how the changes in elite support (Tarrow, 1989), organizational resources (McAdam, 1982), economic environment or election cycle has influenced the trend of protests with the assistance of PEA (Davenport, 2009).

Traditionally, scholars rely on newspaper articles as textual sources to extract information about the protests. Recently, the range of sources has expanded and includes police reports, social movement organization documents, and social media data, among others. For the current research on the Chilean student movements, I include news archives from *La Nación* and *El Mercurio*, and Facebook posts of *Confech* during the time period from January 2011 to December 2015. All relevant stories in both media resources were searched using the key word *movimiento estudiantil* and *educación* within the time span of 2011-2015. These stories were read and content-coded along a variety of dimensions.

La Nación (LN)[9] is subsidized by the Chilean government, and reflects the views of the authority, whereas *El Mercurio (EM)*, one of the most popular newspapers in Chile, presents relatively balanced and fair reports. I can hardly claim that the events covered in these resources are a representative sample of all protest events that took place. The coverage is selective, but knowing their bias structure helps to interpret the findings.

[9] *La Nación* is a Chilean newspaper created in 1917. It was a private company until 1927, when it was expropriated by president Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, and since then has remained a state property. Now, 69% of its shares are in the hands of the state. During the 1980s, *La Nación* became the official propaganda machine of Augusto Pinochet. In March 2010, upon his inauguration, Sebastián Piñera appointed new directors for La Nación, who are all close to his party, Coalición por el Cambio.

The use of data from news archives may raise the possibility of selection bias (Earl et al., 2004; Biggs, 2015, McCarthy, 1996). First, more disruptive and violent events tend to receive more coverage than nonviolent ones. This is what della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 171) refer to as the "logic of number" and the "logic of damage"[10]. Second, the probability that a protest will receive news coverage could be influenced by political reasons, like government pressure or elite support (e.g., Hocke, 1998; Myers and Schaefer Caniglia, 2004). Third, other political news such as reports about the presidential election, competes with protest news for media space. Otherwise, this phenomenon can be understood as the natural process of an "issue attention cycle" (Downs, 1972)—after a certain period of time, protests were no longer able to resonate with the public concerns and the media need to resort to other stories to attract public attention. Finally, description bias also exists, which may create challenges for the classification of protest actions. The inclusion of two media resources, which have different bias structures given their ideological orientations, is to address the potential bias at least to a certain extent, so as to get closer to an understanding of the conflict dynamics at play.[11]

For an event to be included in the database, it had to satisfy certain criteria. First, it took place in Santiago, the capital city of Chile. In a highly centralized country like Chile, the visibility of protests, risks for violent and/or disruptive tactics and availability of mobilizing resources in the capital city can be much higher than elsewhere. I focus on

[10] See also McCarthy et al. (2008), Oliver and Maney (2000).
[11] For reviews about the ways to address the selection bias, see Davenport (2009), Earl et al. (2004), Ortiz et al. (2005).

the protests in Santiago to avoid introducing the variable of "location"[12], since given the data available, it is hard to get reasonable information of the protest events around the country. Second, it had to be relevant to the general topic of the student movement or education reforms. That is, events concerning student protests for other issues such as free health care were excluded from the analysis. Disturbances initiated by anarchists with no relation to the demands of students were also excluded. Individual actions, like leaders making demands in interviews, were not coded, either. To be coded, the story had to be judged as unambiguous as to a) the nature of the event (e.g. march, occupation, strike, government response, interaction between the students and the government), b) initiator of the action, and c) geographic location of the events being reported. Other dimensions of information were also coded such as claims, consequences, police intervention, violence and counter-protesters.

To further counteract the bias of media coverage, I also drew data from the posts on the Facebook (*FB*) page of the Confederation of Chilean Students (*Confech*), one of the most active and longstanding organizational platforms among university students. I chose *Confech* taking into account its inclusive nature. Among all the student organizations' webpage, *Confech* has the largest number of followers (37,892 as retrieved on November 16, 2015). Moreover, its audience includes students of all levels. Therefore, it not only posts updates of university student protests, but also disseminated news about the high school students' actions. This comprehensive coverage of protest events may compliment the report of mainstream media. Furthermore, the posts are much more

[12] For the impact of location on protest tactics, see Van Dyke, Soule and Taylor (2004).

versatile compared to conventional news stories, as the photos and videos offer a more vivid and dynamic representation of the movements.

Table 3 depicts the distribution of protest event coverage by source and confirms the importance of using multiple sources. In total, I coded the information of 173 protest events based on the news stories from *La Nación* and *El Mercurio*, and posts from Confech's page. None of the three sources alone keep records of more than one-third of the total events. Taking either two, the data space largely increases. Still, the combination of two sources can only cover at best 69% of the total events.

Table *3. Protest events by source, 2011–2015*

Source	**Number of Events**	**Percentage (%)**
LN only	21	12
FB only	39	23
EM only	51	29
LN and *FB*	11	6
LN and *EM*	8	5
FB and *EM*	29	17
LN, FB and EM	14	8
Total	**173**	**100**

The dispersal can be explained by the different political stances of these three media sources. *La Nación* is located on the leftist side of the political spectrum. Much of its focus has been on the portrayal of the conflicting relationship between the protesting students and the authority. 41% of its reports of the student movement frame the violence of the police or victimization of students. In contrast, *El Mercurio* is considered the country's paper-of-record, with the broadest audience across the country. *El Mercurio* articles show a clear emphasis on the radicalization of the movements. In addition to

reporting remarkable large-scale manifestations, it covers a large number of movements of secondary students. Compared to university students, their actions are usually more radical, including months of *tomas*, and national *paros*. Furthermore, *El Mercurio* also provides more information about the dialogue between the government and students, which is important when analyzing the changing tactics and outcomes of the movement. Unlike these two formal and traditional media, the *Confech* Facebook page presents a panoramic view of the protest of the university students in particular, with images, videos, timely announcements of actions and processing of proposals. In this sense, the three data sources are complementary for each other, and altogether contribute to a more comprehensive coverage of all facets of the student movement in Chile.

Interview data. Semi-structured interviews are used to collect data about the decision-making process, and the motives and perceptions of the protester. The eight interviews with student leaders include a consistent set of questions about the respondents' life stories, role in movement organization and leadership, and considerations for deciding tactics. The interviews provide greater breadth and depth of information about the interpretation of the student action and the government's reactions. These data unravel some cultural and humanist elements of the movement, and serve to elaborate upon the mechanisms that connect state responses and contentious performances.

2.2 Measures of state responses and protest tactics

To describe the variety of protest tactics and state responses, I mainly extract information from five coding categories: the date of the event, the initiator of events (i.e.

students, the government, the police), the nature of the event being reported, the action (tactic or response) of the initiator, and claim, if applicable. Because the unit of analysis of this research is the protest event, different news stories or posts reporting the same event are conflated. Below are examples of coded events.

An example of a protest event in a news story in *El Mercurio* (April 28, 2011):

> *On April 28, 2011* (*date*), *over 7000 students* (initiator of action) went on a *march* (tactic) from La Plaza Italia to the Ministry of Education *protesting* (nature of action) *against education debts increase* (demands). The university students *protested in a peaceful manner* (tactic), whereas the march of secondary students ended with *some disturbance* (tactic). During the march, students *wearing thrill make-ups took a zombie walk* (tactic).

An example of a response event in the same piece:

> (*On April 28, 2011*, (*date*) *[T]he police* (*Carabineros*) (initiator) arrested (state response—repression) 21 students who were later released. These included 15 university students and 6 secondary students.



Figure *1. Monthly Counts of Protest Events, 2011–2015*

Figure 1 shows the frequency of protest events during the time between 2011 and 2015 where the protest emerged in April 2011, reached its peak in July and August 2011 and declined after October 2011. During each of the ensuing years, less significant waves of movement consistently peaked from June to August.

Based on the coding of "tactic" used in each reported event, I compare the frequency in which various tactics were used. Table 4 shows the frequency of the six most often used tactical forms by students. These include marching, occupation, *toma* (take-over), hunger strike, *Cacerolazo* (banging pots and pans), and symbolic demonstration.

Table *4. Six Most Frequently Used Tactical Forms by Students, 2011-2015*

Tactic	**Frequency**	**Percent in repertoire (%)**
March[13]	88	50.6
Occupation	27	15.5
Toma	19	10.9
Cacerolazo	12	6.9
Hunger Strike	9	5.2
Demonstration	8	4.6
Total	**163**	**93.7**

[13] A march normally consists of walking in a mass march formation and either beginning with, or meeting at, a designated endpoint, or rally, to hear speakers. In the case of Chilean student movements, the most common place to convene were the plazas (most frequently la Plaza de Italia), public parks, or at a metro station near a university). For most of the cases, students marched along Avenue Alameda from westwards until they arrive at *La Moneda* where the parliament, the judicial, and administrative institutions are located, the Ministry of Education included.

According to Table 4, the Chilean students have a tightly constrained repertoire, with the six most frequently used tactics altogether accounting for 93.7% of all the tactics used. Other tactics include funeral, cycling and running, street theater and picketing. Figure 2 shows the use of various tactics over time. March appears to be the most available tactic at all times. Yet during the highest wave of protest from June to November 2011, protest tactics reached their greatest diversity. In July and August 2011, occupation exceeded march, and became the dominant form of activism. *Toma*, though it powerfully seized the media's attention in July 2011, declined in the subsequent years.



Figure *2. Counts of the Six Most Used Tactics over Time (2011–2015)*

2.2.1 Variance in State Responses

I capture state responses using a tripartite measure: (1) concession (with no repression), (2) repression (with no concession), (3) toleration (i.e., no concession or repression).

Repression refers to the use of coercion by political authorities. It includes both violent acts meant to cause physical harm to the targets, and nonviolent acts that restrain a target's freedom of action or impose economic penalties.

Concession is defined here as action taken by governmental authorities to positively respond to a political challenge. Such positive responses may include instituting policy changes, expressing support for the movement's cause, and providing material resources (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). Considering that reform is a spiral process, and that, in this research, only a short span of time and limited cycles of movement are examined, it is more operative to define "positive response" as taking action for potential reform, rather than completely conforming to the demands of the challenger. That is, the following responses are indicative of concession. First, major local or department leaders engaged in a dialogue with the students or present open instructions on tackle the protested issues. Second, the government set up a special work or investigative team or convened a special meeting to discuss how to deal with the protest. Third, the government met part or all of the protesters' demands.

Toleration refers to an absence of either repression or meaningful concessions. For example, when the speech of a government official mentioned only the protest and did not report any official measures, I would assume there being no substantial concession.

Most previous theories and empirical studies consider only one or two of the responses: literature on the political outcome of social movements only take into account concessions; literature on political repression, in contrast, usually exclusively examines repression; and others (Moore, 2000; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; and Krain 2000)

consider the choice between repression and concessions. While these theories lead to new insights on governmental responses, they do not explicitly address the option of governments to not use repression or concessions, or, in other words, to tolerate the challenge. The present research goes beyond the existing literature in considering each of the three state responses as distinct actions. By analyzing the students' reactions and interpretations of these state practices, I argue that they are viewed to create different opportunity structures for the protesters.

2.2.2 Variance in protest tactics

I use four dimensions to define the variation of protest tactics: the level of violence, the level of disruption, the level of innovation, and the escalation of protest demands.

The level of violence. A violent protest inflicts, or attempts to inflict, physical injury, or economic damage and loss of life. Such examples include throwing stones, bombing, and rioting. Violence is generally considered unlawful, and is deemed illegitimate, and therefore, both invites criticism from, and attracts the attention of, the media and international community. (Gurr, 1986; White, 1989; Gartner and Regan, 1996; Davenport and Inman, 2012; Earl et al., 2003). For instance, *toma* is one of the violent tactics used in Chilean student movements, particularly among the *secundarios* in 2006. Different from an occupation that always conducts a demonstration in a pacific fashion, *toma* is considered violent because it usually involves performances like vandalizing desks and chairs. Moreover, it is an illegitimate seizure of the school power and the

space—jamming chairs and desks through barred school gates, the students blocked the entrances and signaled that a school is in *toma* (taken). In this sense, *toma* in the family of protest tactics is more closely connected to the violent grain seizure by tearing down poorhouses back in 19th century France and Britain than to the occupy movements that widely emerged in 2011.

The **level of disruption** refers to the disturbance that protest poses on regular social life in terms of the time and public space it occupies. Prior theory suggests that more disruptive forms of contention increase the financial cost of the government, thus giving rise to the likelihood of concession (Luders, 2006; Piven and Cloward, 1977; DeNardo, 1985; O'Brien and Deng, 2013). Protesters usually attempt to achieve the goal of disruption, or at least create the perception of great disruption, through two strategies: first, presenting the magnitude of an aggrieved population, and second, causing disruption in locations that have practical, or symbolic significance. Marching, for instance, is one of the tactics that follows this "strategy of numbers". As the most used protest form, a march is collective in nature, and can last for hours occupying the main street, causing an enormous disruption to the quotidian, as the spokesman of the Chilean government, Andrés Chadwick puts it, "*una marcha por la Alameda rompe con la tranquilidad de Santiago*". This strategy is prove effective in terms of increasing media coverage. It is even incorporated into the framing of news to demonstrate popular grievances. While covering the march on June 30, 2011 which aggregated 400,000 protesters, all major national media, i.e. *El Mercurio*, *La Segunda*, *La Tercera*, and *La Hora* used photos from an elevated position for their front page. These photos presented the huge cluster of a marching crowd taking up the street. Through march, students

expected to present their dissident using the number. Likewise, by using an elevated positioned photo, the media intended to present the disruption caused by the march through emphasizing the massive size. Picketing, on the other hand, causes disruption using "the strategy of location", blocking the entrance to schools or government buildings. *Toma* in spirit presents a combination of both strategies. Demonstrating with the "number", the students rapidly captured over 100 schools in July 2011. Meanwhile, the space that *toma* took place also has symbolic implications—*tomas* on campus were infused with the symbolic meaning of student autonomy over school administration.

Figure 3 shows the categorization of some tactics in a two-dimensional chart defined by the level of disruption and violence.



Figure *3. Protest Tactics Characterized by Level of Disruption and Violence*

The level of innovation. The measure for the level of innovation introduces a fundamental distinction between repetition, adoption, and innovation (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1983)[14]. Highly repetitive and sufficiently familiar tactics include marching, striking, and symbolic demonstration. Adoption refers to borrowing a tactic already used by another protest group in either similar or different contexts. Take the instance of occupation. It is coded as an "adoptive" tactic because the frequent use of occupation in 2011 was largely inspired by the Occupy movement in the US and Spain; occupation's growing, global reputation as a successful strategy for protest allowed it to eventually become modularized into the current contentious repertoire. In this process of tactical diffusion, not only the feasibility and effectiveness were taken into consideration, activists also sought a consistency in form, content, and meaning, with uniformity being further reinforced through the adaptation to local settings.

Toma, in contrast, is coded as a repetition, as its height can date back to the *Revolución de los Pingüinos* in 2006. To the protesters in 2011, it is a tactic that has proved effective in previous experiences. *Cacerolazo* (hitting pans and pots), as another example, is a signature protest performance in Chile. Although it may find some similarity with the "rough music"[15] tactic used during Britain's grain riots in the 19th century, this particular type of protest first occurred in Chile in the form of food shortage

[14] Alternatively, McAdam et al. (2011) constructed a distinction between "constrained" and "transgressive" forms of collective action. The former refers to the cases where all parties are previously established using well-established means of claim making," whereas the latter refers to action by "newly self-identified political actors" or cases in which some parties utilize new actions. That is, whether an action is innovative is defined by both the identity of the actors and the novelty of the form.

[15] In rough music and charivaris, villagers gathered at the offender's house to sing songs and shout taunts. See Johnston, H. (2014). What is a social movement?. Cambridge: Polity Press.

protests during the Salvador Allende administration. During the administration of Augusto Pinochet, it had become a common protest practice during the economic crisis.

The definition of a movement as involving "extra-institutional" protest might appear to suggest action free from social constraint. However, it is surprising to observe that the great majority of the protest forms are repetitive, and sufficiently familiar to participants so they know, more or less, how to behave, and what to expect (McPhail, 1991). Innovation, by contrast, only occurs on a limited scale. Such insight of Tilly (1978) is consistent with the tactical structure of the Chilean student movements. None of the six most-used tactics is an invention of this episode of contention. 18% of all the events borrowed perceivably conducive tactics from other movements. The vast majority of the tactics (82%) were conventionally tested, that is, repetition is far more likely than adoption, and adoption is far more likely than innovation. Participants in social movements typically choose their tactics from a tightly constrained set of repertoire.

I further examined the various tactics used during the process of marches and occupations. Consistent with Tilly's prediction, creative adoption and new performances "arise chiefly through innovation within existing performances" (2008, p. 68). In the process of march, regular activities Chilean students performed are marching, chanting the slogans, singing, and dancing. In addition to these conventional practices, some innovations, or adoptions of actions from other contexts, were put on stage. For instance, on July 29, 2011, when the marchers arrived at la Plaza de las Armas, they collectively performed a *Genkidama for Education*. *Genkidama* (元気玉), or "spirit bomb," is considered to be the most powerful attack in the manga *Dragon Ball Z*. In the march, protesters passed a *Genkidama* of 3-meters in diameter from one flock of protesters to

another until the marching rally arrived at *La Moneda*, where the students performed a flash mob. To constitute collective identity, and attract participation, this performance drew inspiration from manga scenes, and re-contextualized its narrative into collective action. Here, we see that the boundaries between innovative and adaptive tactics are blurred. The difference is more of a degree rather than kind (Bigg, 2013). For the operational purpose of this paper, I categorize this *Genkidama for Education* as an "innovative tactic" because this was the first time in history this tactic was ever used in a protest event. The use of *Guy Fawkes* masks in protest, on the contrary, is categorized as an adoption. Like *Genkidama*, it became popular through a fictional work (*V for Vendetta* 2006); nevertheless, before 2011, it had already become a symbol of hacktivism, and was widely used in the Occupy movement around the world. Therefore, the use of it in Chilean student movements was an adoption.

Another example of tactical innovation is *Una playa para Lavín.* Students aggregated before the center hall of the University of Chile on Avenue Alameda. As the title indicates, they performed a scene on the beach, some taking a sun bath in bathing suits under sun umbrellas, some playing poker games, or dancing with swimming goggles. The intention was to "invite" the Minister on a vacation, which was a "*pequeño desquite*" (little revenge) against his decision to extend winter break for schools under *toma*. The demonstration is also a bit of innuendo about the artificial beach in the Parque Los Reyes that Lavín installed when he was mayor of Santiago. We can see from this example that even the most innovative practices in the movement were not created out of nothing; they had deep roots in the trajectory of its resistance history, and were heavily influenced by previous state actions.

The escalation of protest demands. A critique of Tilly's theory points out that his theater of conflicts appears full of "pantomimes," where the actual claims are unheard. In my work, I take into account the messages that each protest intended to convey. These are different from the claims written in the formal proposal, or presented in the dialogue with government, or congress. These messages are on the posters, flyers and in Facebook posts. They are the most concise, and considered the most important to communicate to the public, and its political incumbents.

To present the radicalism of demands, I developed a span containing all demands. Demands related to the students' scholarship are the most moderate. What follows are demands for ceasing privatization, reforms within school, and more state involvement in financing education. As the protest escalated, students started to demand a free and quality education for all. Figure 4 presents the demands, roughly sorted by the level of radicalism. The demands for political reform brought up by the students are also included, in parallel with the radicalization of demands for education reform.



Figure *4. Radicalism of Demands*

Since the majority of the protests expressed more than one demands, I figured out that it would be feasible to constitute a dummy variable, the inclusion of radical demands (coded 1 if yes) in order to operationalize the variable of the radicalism of protest demands. By the radical nature of demands, I refer to demands that urge fundamental and institutional reforms to be satisfied, or else, straightforward anti-systemic demands. Demands for free education for all, constitutional change and renationalization of copper industry are demands with a radical nature. In contrast, increase in scholarship, opposition to further privatization, reform within school are considered moderate educational initiatives while opposition to repression and the demand for official resign are categorized as moderate political initiatives. During the ferment period of movement (April to June 2011) when there was no presence of these most radical claims, I coded the inclusion of new demands as 1 to depict the escalation of protest demands.

2.2.3 Hypotheses

What accounts for the wide range of protest changes in terms of the level of disruption, violence, innovation and radicalism? Adjustment of tactics is not a "blind reflex" (della Porta and Diani, 1999, p. 185). They are produced through an interactive process (Jasper, 1997, p. 295; Tarrow, 1998, p. 102) that entails "incessant improvisation on the part of all participants" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, p. 138), and "a series of reciprocal adjustments" (della Porta and Diani, 1999, pp.186-187). This depends on strategic decisions by protest leaders that correspond to changes in the external political environment as the latter affect their expectation for success and failure. Tilly (1978, 2006) argues that the changing level of democracy, and that of government capacity, have an

impact on contentious repertoire. More democratic, and more politically capable regimes lead an openness for new actors, under which, depending on circumstances, repertories tend to be modified. McAdam (1982, 1983) further examines political opportunity within a democratic regime. He contends that tactical innovation in the civil rights movement came about because the movement was organizationally ready to expand its repertoire of strategic actions, and because political opportunities (in the case of the black movement this refers to the alignment of indigenous groups) prompted a movement's actors to engage in new actions. To advance the existing literature, it is important to move our focus from the static structures of governments to the more dynamic contours of policy-making, enforcement, and adjudication. This perspective enables scholars to examine the positioning of various actors within the polity structure, which makes some tactics more attractive, and potentially more efficient than others (Meyer, 2004).

Scholars of political opportunity theory argue that state actions, such as new policing practices, greater toleration for protests, and opening greater access to the polity, will influence the costs and benefits associated with ensuing protest actions. Through this political window, protesters perceive a higher possibility of winning policy responses so that they become more willing to take the high risk of movement (Tilly, 1978; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Seippel, 2011; McAdam et al., 2005; Soule and Earl, 2005). Repression, on the contrary, brings down the perception of success, and deters movement participation. Based on the above argument, I suggest the following proposition that associates tactical changes with political opportunity:

Proposition: Higher levels of political openness provide protesters with more incentive to choose more confrontational tactics.

Furthermore, I specify various forms of state action that lead to different levels of political openness, as well as segment various dimensions of tactic, and raise four hypotheses to be tested in the following part of this paper.

Hypothesis 1: Disruptive protest is more likely in light of concession or toleration, whereas repression leads to moderate activism.

Hypothesis 2: Violence is more likely to occur when the state practices concession, or shows toleration, whereas, under repression, protesters are inclined to protest peacefully.

Hypothesis 3: Innovation is most likely when the government concedes, whereas, under repression, protesters default to conventional tactics.

Hypothesis 4: During the period of state concession, the demands of protesters are more likely to become escalated or radicalized.

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSES

3.1 Descriptive findings

Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the variable used in the models, including a breakdown by the three types of state responses, the level of innovation, the level of disruption and violence and the level of radicalism. Although nearly all of the measures described in Table 5 are binary, I report percentage values in the interest of clarity.

Table *5. Descriptive Statistics*

	STATE RESPONSE			ALL RESPONSES	TOTAL *N*
	Repression	Toleration	Concession		
State Response:					
Repression				21.97	38
Toleration				38.73	67
Concession				39.31	58
Total				100.00	173
Level of Disruption and Violence:					
Moderate and Peaceful . .	21.05	14.93	13.24	15.61	27
Disruptive and Peaceful .	57.89	71.64	73.53	69.36	120
Disruptive and Violent . .	21.05	13.43	13.24	15.03	26
Moderate and Violent . .	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	173
Level of Innovation:					
Repetition	73.68	73.13	80.88	76.30	132
Adaptation	21.05	8.96	11.76	12.71	22
Innovation	5.26	17.91	7.35	11.00	19
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	173

Notes: All values are percentages, except as indicated. Percentages are subject to rounding error.

First, we identify that the rate of state toleration and that of concession are of similar level, altogether taking up 78.03% of the state actions, whereas repressive practices were adopted in 21.97% of the cases. That is, for most of the time from 2011 to 2015, the state presented a moderate gesture facing the student mobilization. However, this pattern is not stable over time, as illustrated in Figure 5 which includes the breakdown of all responses across the three types during the period analyzed. While toleration is an attitude that the state adopted once in a while, Concession mostly concentrated in 2011; after 2011, the government shows less interest in immediate concessions to the students' demands. This may seem to contradict the students' definition of the year 2012, "*Año de Propuestas*" given which we may expect more cooperation and dialogue. However, the decrease of concession in 2012 as displayed in Figure 5 may be explained by the fact that in 2012, the government attempted to routinize and institutionalize the students' demands into a regular political framework and this takes time. That is, the state could hardly offer prompt responses to the students exactly because it began to take the responses seriously. Therefore, measured in the way that the present thesis proposed, the government showed more toleration (neither repression or concession) during the preparation period between two dialogue.

As for the distribution of repressive practices over time, although in the general pattern, the state represses in the least frequent manner, at some point of time such as June 2011 and June 2012, the number of repressions suppressed that of state concession or toleration.



Figure *5. Counts of State Responses by Month*

According to Table 5, we find initial support for Hypothesis 1. Although disruptive and peaceful forms of protest have been the mainstream of the student activism; if we compare the difference of the percentage it takes up given the three state responses, we can find that disruptive protest is more likely in light of concession or toleration while repression leads to moderate activism.

However, Hypothesis 2 contradicts with the result of the cross-tabulate analysis; the rate of violent tactics is higher under the circumstances of state repression, whereas when the state practices concession, or shows toleration, protesters tend to protest in a more pacific fashion.

Regarding the level of innovation, repetitive tactics prevail, utilized in more than 70 percent of the total events, the students facing whatever state action. This again confirms the stability of contentious repertoire. That is, even though protests or social movements appear to be unconventional political practices, they are not that innovative at

all—the state's strategy of routinizing contentious activity as well as the limitation of organizing resources might have restricted the range of tactics available to the students. Furthermore, the distribution of the comparatively limited number of innovative or adaptive actions across state responses shows that state toleration, rather than concession, tends to elicit more innovation, and repression is more likely associated with adaptive protest forms. This does not coincide with Hypothesis 3 which assumes that state concession would more likely lead to innovative protests.

Would these patterns of association still hold constant if we fixate other socio-political factors that may influence the students' tactical choice? To disentangle the impact of state response on protest tactics, I controlled such factors as initiating groups, the presence of organizations and the special timing of protests when building multinomial logistic regression models to assess the relationship between state responses and protest tactics.

3.2 State responses and protest tactics

It is worth noting that only short-term state-movement interactions are measured, since it is not feasible to measure long-term effects based on the available data. Although I have to admit that state responses may have a lagged and/or accumulative impact on protest tactics, short-term interactions are also a valid and helpful indicator of the students' concern and immediate action in response to the state action. Likewise, if a protest fails to catch the attention of the state and the public in a limited period of time, it is unlikely to get any substantial response afterward.

3.2.1 Dependent Variables

I constructed a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the form of a particular protest action is disruptive, and coded 0 if it is moderate. Likewise, I adopt a dummy variable to measure the level of violence. It is coded 1 if the tactics used are violent in a protest event, and coded 0 if they are peaceful. For the level of innovation, I constructed a categorical variable which includes three categories: "repetition" (coded 0), "adaptation" (coded 1) and "innovation" (coded 2). For the level of radicalism, a protest event is coded 1 if it contains demands for fundamental change of the system. During the emerging period of the movement (April to June 2011), protests that proposed new demands are coded 1 to assess the process of escalation.

3.2.2 Independent Variables

Control Variables Besides protest tactics as the dependent variable and ex-ante state responses as the independent variable, some controlled variables are considered to alienate the impact of state responses.

Initiating Groups Although the major participants of the protests since 2011 were university students, high school students also took this chance to re-energize their mobilization in 2006 as well as extending their demands. At the same time, family members and teachers also got involved in the protests once in a while. In addition, *los encapuchados*, small groups of radical anarchists who covered their faces during the protests act by destroying public and private property and crashing with the policy directly. Therefore, I included categories of initiating groups: 1=university students, 2=high school students, 3=students, family members and teachers, 4=*los encapuchados*,

5=organized workers involved (acting as an alliance to the students demanding renationalization of the copper industry).

Presence of Organizations the variable that measures the presence of organizations has a value 1 if the presence of some formal organization (for example student organizations, teachers' unions, NGOs related to education issue, etc.) is mentioned in the description of the protest and/or posted on the Facebook page of *Confech* and 0 if it is not.

The timing of Protests. Protests at special times seem more likely to elicit substantial governmental responses. For one thing, protesters can probably better catch the attention of the local leaders who often attend important local events such as festivals or important meetings. In addition, those events are political rituals that symbolize legitimacy and stability. Therefore, local governments usually make great efforts to avoid protests or dissolve them as quickly as they can. Meanwhile, for the protesters, these are great political opportunities for them to perform more disruptive and radical protests as they perceive a higher possibility of winning responses. (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1982) Under the following circumstances, an event was coded as taking place at a special timing: a. during the presidential campaign[16]; b. the presence of honeymoon (four first months of each government[17]); c. important local events such as festivals (i.e.

[16] Chile experienced a presidential campaign in 2013, through which Michelle Bachelet assumed re-election in March 2014. Although August 19, 2013 was the deadline to register candidacies, as early as in July, Bachelet has announced that she would run for the president again. And since then, the education reform geared towards public education and the end of educational inequality had served as the pillar of her campaign proposals. In this case, I define August to December 2013 as the period of presidential campaign. Events that took place during this period are coded 1. Details of the interaction between the students and the state during this period will be further elaborated in the following part of this theis.

[17] In the case of Chile, this honeymoon period starts from March to July 2014.

September 19, the day of *Fiestas Patrias*), important meetings (i.e. May 21, the day of annual presidential speech; Meetings for the next year's fiscal plan in December), and important memorial days for mass mobilization (i.e. April 21, anniversary of Revolución de los Pingüinos and October 5, the ouster of Pinochet). In this dummy variable, any protest strikes in such special periods are coded 1, and all others 0.

In addition, it is to note that given the time frame and the cluster of protests analyzed in the present research, we have actually controlled some of the crucial variables that are usually taken into consideration in established research, namely, the issue of protest—education reform, general claims—educational equality, location—Santiago, Social movement organizations—Confech, university student organizations among others. These factors are relatively stable during 2011 to 2015.

3.3.3 Findings

Table 6 presents the frequencies and percentages of the independent variables used in the study. And Table 7 presents the results of four sets of logistic regression models. These models respectively explore the co-variation between state responses and the four dimensions of change in protest tactics, controlling the presence of organization, the initial groups, and the timing of protests.

Logistic regression model is useful to predict the placement or the probability of two or more variables which are categorical. In this case, the probability of falling in one of these categories (p_i) should satisfy $0 < p_i < 1$. Therefore, transforming the data into odds ratio expresses this fact naturally, while the untransformed data does not. Also, it is

considered an attractive analysis because; it does not assume normality, linearity, or equality of variances. The independent variables can be either continuous or discrete. Taking the example of the current case, the presence of organization and the timing of protest are binary variables, while the initial groups and protest tactics are subjected to categorization.

Table *6. Description of independent variables*

	PERCENTAGE	TOTAL *N*
State Response:		
Repression	21.97%	38
Toleration	38.73%	67
Concession	33.53%	58
Total	100.00%	173
Initiating groups：		
Los universidarios	76.30%	132
Los secundarios	14.45%	25
Students, families and teachers . .	3.47%	6
Los encapuchados	2.31%	4
Organized Workers involved	3.47%	6
Total	100.00%	173
Presence of organizations:		
Yes	60.69%	105
No	38.73%	67
Total	100.00%	173
Special timing of protests:		
Yes	12.14%	21
No	87.28%	151
Total	100.00%	173

Since the variables of the level of disruption, violence and radicalism are dichotomous outcome variables, standard logit models are used to explore the relationship. In the logit model, the log odds of the outcome is modeled as a linear combination of the predictor variables.

Model 1 (State responses ~ the level of disruption)

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{P(prog = disruptive)}{1 - P(prog = disruptive)}\right) = b_0 + b_1(sr = 2) + b_2(sr = 3)b_3(ig = 2) + b_4(ig = 3) + b_5(ig = 4) + b_6(ig = 5) + b_7 org + b_8 time + \varepsilon_i$$

Model 2 (State responses ~ the level of violence)

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{P(prog = violent)}{1 - P(prog = violent)}\right) = b_0 + b_1(sr = 2) + b_2(sr = 3)b_3(ig = 2) + b_4(ig = 3) + b_5(ig = 4) + b_6(ig = 5) + b_7 org + b_8 time + \varepsilon_i$$

Model 4 (State responses ~ the escalation of demands)

$$\text{Log}\left(\frac{P(prog = disruptive)}{1 - P(prog = disruptive)}\right) = b_0 + b_1(sr = 2) + b_2(sr = 3)b_3(ig = 2) + b_4(ig = 3) + b_5(ig = 4) + b_6(ig = 5) + b_7 org + b_8 time + \varepsilon_i$$

I use a multinomial regression model to assess the impact that state responses have on the students' innovation level, because for this responsive variable, we have defined three categories, namely, repetition, adaption and innovation. The category of "adaptive tactics" is set as the reference, after which each tactic will be examined around it. That is, the regression accesses the odds of "repetitive" versus "adaptive", and the odds of "innovative" vs "adaptive". In essence, in the multinomial regression, we are

running two logistic regressions, respectively treating "repetitive" and "innovative" as 1, and both treating the presence of "adaptive" tactics as 0. Here follow the two equations that correspond to this model (Model 3 in Table 7):

Model 3 (State responses ~ the level of innovation)

$$ln\left(\frac{P(prog = repetitive)}{P(prog = adaptive)}\right) = b_{10} + b_{11}(sr = 2) + b_{12}(sr = 3) + b_{13}(ig = 2) + b_{14}(ig = 3) + b_{15}(ig = 4) + b_{16}(ig = 5) + b_{17}org + b_{18}time + \varepsilon_{1i}$$

$$ln\left(\frac{P(prog = innovative)}{P(prog = adaptive)}\right) = b_{20} + b_{21}(sr = 2) + b_{22}(sr = 3) + b_{23}(ig = 2) + b_{24}(ig = 3) + b_{25}(ig = 4) + b_{26}(ig = 5) + b_{27}org + b_{28}time + \varepsilon_{2i}$$

According to Table 7, the parameters in Model 3 provide evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis 4: state toleration and concession respectively contribute to a 1.05 and 1.3 increase in the relative log odds of radicalization, compared with state repression. The association is more significant between concession and the escalation of demands. These findings confirm Hypothesis 4 which argues that before state concession, the demands of protesters are more likely to become radicalized.

However, the hypotheses regarding the level of innovation and the level of violence of protest tactics are rejected by the results of Model 2 and Model 3.

Table *7. Logistic regressions of the protest tactics*

	PROTEST TACTICS				
	MODEL 1 Level of Disruption	MODEL 2 Level of Violence	MODEL 3 Level of Innovation *with Adaptive Tactics as baseline category*		MODEL 4 Level of Radicalism
			Repetitive	Innovative	
State Response:					
Repression					
Toleration	0.38	-1.27	0.49	2.49**	1.05*
Concession	0.40	-1.34*	1.34*	1.28	1.30**
Initiating Group:					
Los universitarios					
Los secundarios	(0)	2.58***	-0.01	0.77	-0.17
Students, families and teachers .	-1.13	(0)	14.88	15.91	-0.15
Los encapuchados	(0)	(0)	15.64	0.19	0.48
Organized Workers involved . .	-1.22	0.85	15.30	0.24	(0)
Presence of organizations	-0.75	0.77	-0.04	0.50	0.31
Special timing of protests	-0.64	-0.58	0.60	-0.56	1.26
_cons	1.96	-0.94	0.87	-2.01	-0.12

Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Hypothesis 2 expects that concession and toleration would open space for more violent protests. The regression result, in contrast, shows that compared with repression, state concession leads to a 1.34 decrease in the log odds of violent protests. This is to say, in response to state concession, protesters tend to protest in a peaceful manner; whereas repression will introduce more violent performances.

In terms of the level of innovation, we identify that comparing with repression, state concession is associated with a 1.34 increase in the relative log odds of using repetitive than adaptive tactics; while toleration is associated with a 2.49 increase in the relative log odds of using innovative than adaptive tactics. The result coincides with what we observe from the tabulation of state responses and protest tactics (shown in Table 4)—in response to state inaction (toleration), the students became engaged in new tactics such as kiss-in and pillow fight, whereas concessive gesture of the state tended to elicit more conventional forms of protest such as march, sit-in, and hunger strike. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 which assumes that concession will result in the most innovative protests is rejected.

Through these findings, we understand the need to distinguish state toleration from state concession. Even though they both open certain space or political window for the protesters, the structure they create or the way protests perceive may be different. This is a point that the established theory and empirical studies have overlooked. I will discuss it in more detail in the next Chapter.

Hypothesis 1 expects that concession and toleration would open space for more disruptive protests. The regression result, however, only finds statistically insignificant positive association between state concession or toleration, and disruptive protest.

In addition, among the control variables, only *los secundarios* can predict the usage of violence with statistical significance. This pattern is hardly surprising if we recall the explosive use of *toma* during the 2006 *Revolución de los Pingüinos*. In 2001, few people knew how to *tomarse* their schools. "You capture your school, and the next day they simply would evict you [*te echaban*]… But in 2006 it was different". According to Alberto, one of the active participants in the *Revolución de los Pingüinos* and organizers of the 2011 mobilization, in 2006 when the student organization of *los secundarios* were becoming co-opted by the leftist. "We were forming this tradition of *tomas*, we jammed the chairs and desks into the gate bars, signaling the take-over of schools… it feels like I was part of something really grand." *Los universidarios*, on the contrary, showed an inclination for peaceful occupation of an open area, e.g. on plazas, before school buildings and in parks. This division between actions of university students and high school students may be explained by the geographic structure of the spaces available to them (Naritelli, 2014), or the different ideology orientations they held (Somma, 2012).

Table 8 presents the patterns of co-variation between state responses and the different dimensions of the protest tactics we are interested in.

Table *8. State Responses and Protest Tactics*

State Response	Level of Disruption	Level of Violence	Level of Innovation	Level of Radicalism
Repression	Base outcomes			
Toleration	(+)	(−)	+	+
Concession	(+)	−	−	+

Notes: + or – in parentheses indicates that the parameter is statistical insignificant

These patterns appear to add on conundrum around the theory of political opportunity structure.

First, repression is normally considered as a threat to the development of social movement; because state repression raises the direct cost to protest as it disrupts the movement, and causes injuries and detentions (Tilly, 1978). It also has an indirect negative effect as it deters provision of resources. Moreover, government sanctions affect rational choice perspectives—when individuals perceive repression, they will be less likely to participate in protests (Olson, 1965; Lichbach, 1987). This being the case, it may be intuitive to expect a shift to less confrontational demonstrations in the post-repression period. Table 8 shows that the expectation is met in terms of the radicalism and innovation of tactics, as the protests shift to more moderate demands and more conventional tactics. However, repression did not seem to succeed in intimidating protesters in all sense—on the contrary, such strategy backfires, more violent protests serving only to reinforce challenges against the repression.

Toleration and concession, on the contrary, are considered examples of political windows for mobilization. Comparing these two state actions, concession opens even more opportunity for movement success because it brings the protest demands onto an institutional track. Nevertheless, both toleration and concession induced more radical demands on the one hand. On the other hand, both give rise to non-violent tactics. Moreover, as already mentioned above, toleration and concession divide in the way they influence the level of innovation of the tactics. While toleration is associated with more innovation, concession predicts tactical repetition.

To further the analysis, we find that the variance in the escalation of demands and the innovation of protest tactics generally agrees with the assumption of political opportunity theory. In contrast, the presence of violent protests appears to suggest that threats instead intensify protest. These results urge us to abandon the general conclusions about whether it is the case that closing political window deters mobilization while emerging opportunities fuel the movements. Instead, we need to specify "which dependent variable we are seeking to explain and which dimensions of political opportunity are germane to that explanation" (McAdam, 1996, p. 31). This is also the way that the present research seeks to contribute to the established literature on the political process of social movements. Why and how does the movement mobilize under both contracting and expanding political windows? Does this imply that the applicability of political opportunity structure only exists in the analysis of discursive structure rather than behavioral structure? How can we disentangle the impact of opportunity and threats? What are the mechanisms that necessarily mediate the causal influence of political opportunity on movement trajectory? The answers to these questions not only requires an understanding of the changing structure for mobilization and contentious interaction; but also stresses the importance of analyzing the "agent". It is notable that both opportunity and threats are by no means objective; they exist in the perception of protesters. In other words, the occurrence of political opportunity and threats, as well as their respective effects, is mediated by the protests' subjective judgment (whether accurate or inaccurate), which shapes their ensuing selection of tactics accordingly. After all, change in the political context becomes an actual "opportunity" only if it is identified as such and taken advantage of by movement agents. Moreover, their interpretation of the changing

environment also affects the way they make sense of their own action, their interaction with the state, and their expectation and evaluation of movement outcome. In this sense, the protesting behavior is as much a cultural construction by itself as it is a production of the environment. This perspective encourages us to develop a more consistent explanatory framework that gets beyond the opportunity/threat binary.

In what follows, I am going to take a closer examination of the political process and the insiders' framing process of the Chilean student movements (2011–2015), focusing on the inner mechanism that determines how the perceived emergence of political opportunity and/or threat introduced and/or manifested by different state responses is related to changes in tactical choices.

CHAPTER 4: STATE RESPONSES, TACTICAL CHOICES, AND FRAMING

4.1 Toleration: inspiring innovative protests and radical demands

The first two months has seen the Chilean student movements begin to take shape. On June 5, the students in the name of *Confech* wrote a petition letter to the Minister of Education, Joaquín Lavín, seeking dialogue. The demands made in the letter were relatively moderate and feasible which include increasing investment in education, equal access to education for social-economically vulnerable students, and increasing the quality of education.[18] However, this letter did not receive a serious response from the government. On June 19, Joaquín Lavín, to whom the letter was addressed, still avoided direct response to the students' demands and instead informed the public of "alternative locations" for the immobilized students to prepare for the *Prueba de Selección Universitaria*[19] in spite of the injury of massive march on June 16 which had made history with about two million participants across the country[20]. By then, the student movement was facing not only the toleration/inaction of the government but also the potential demobilization of its constituents.

[18] Confech (2011) Carta a Lavín. Available at http://movimientoestudiantil.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2011-06-05-carta-a-lavin.pdf [retrived on June 10, 2016]
[19] http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/06/680-374070-9-mineduc-habilitara-lugares-alternativos-para-estudiantes-que-quieran-volver-a.shtml
[20] Confech Facebook post July 16, 2011

4.1.1 "*Hay un momento en que (…) ahora está apareciendo la verdad*"

On June 19, the Confech convened to discuss further acts. For the first time, the students declared that they are bound to intensify the movement by "re-adopting the historical demands": free education for all. Once proposed during the 2006 *Revolución de Pingüinos*, this claim was eventually abandoned due to state co-optation of the movement. Retrieving this demands, the students show more determination this time by proposing a development project at the national level which includes a fundamental change to the current neo-liberalism education model[21].

What accompanied the radicalization of protest demands was an innovative form of protest: a mass performance of flash mob dancing to Michael Jackson's "Thriller" whose lyrics contain frightening themes and elements. Students of the University of Chile were the major organizers of the event, who rehearsed the dance three times respectively on June 20, 21 and 23 before the Central Hall on La Alameda. On the afternoon of June 24, nearly 3000 students suddenly assembled on Plaza de la Ciudadanía before La Moneda. Many of the activists, or perhaps I should say, undead revelers with sinister faces, had a hang tag upon their chests that read: "*Morí debiendo $17.250.530* (Chilean Pesos, around 36701 US Dollars by the exchange rate of June 2011)."

This is by no means the first Thriller tribute; there had been flash mobs to *Thriller* taking place in Birmingham, Tunis and the more notable was by prison inmates in the Philippines in 2008. While these dances were merely for entertainment purposes, such as satire or live television shows; the Chilean students' flash mob is the first example that

[21] For more details, see Confech (2011) resumen actas (2011-06-19). Available at http://movimientoestudiantil.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2011-06-19-resumen-actas-confech.pdf [retrieved on June 10, 2016]

was linked to an event of protest. Moreover, the performance went way beyond simply a dance consisting of standard zombie moves. In fact, it is a complete version of street theater addressed to urge government responses. The students created new moves to fulfill the significance of the flash mob. For example, after the herky-jerky zombie dance, the performers tumbled themselves to the ground, pretending to be dead of the fatally unfair education system. Some "zombies" acted the role of doctors rescuing the others. At the end of the performance, a couple of students upheld a performer wearing a mask of the Minister of Education, while the crowd broke into cheers and applauses. In this way, the choreography evoked the dying system, the awakening of social awareness, and probably the necessary reconciliation with the government as well.

The deployment of the flash mob took the public and the government by surprise, and it provided the student movement with a tactical advantage—the sudden assemble of protesters could disturb the planning of counter measures by the police. Moreover, it attracted great attention from the media. Different sources of media scrambled to cover and comment on the novel form of protest. Video of the performance went viral in Chile, with multiple YouTube posts gaining tens of thousands of views, not to mention the continuing extolments on social media. As a result of the fast dissemination online, this "alternative form" of protest was quickly adopted by the Occupy movement later in the same year. As the Facebook advertisement of the Occupy movement stated, the flash mob to Thriller, this "*new forms of action with a creative spirit*" would be a "*better way to breathe new life into the Occupy demonstrations and perhaps show the 1 percent that the 99 percent can do more than just occupy — they can dance, too.*"

The innovative practice and the escalated protest demands were the students' response to a fairly long period of state toleration. Interestingly, it seems that for the students, "toleration" which I defined as neither repressing or conceding, contains more negative significance—it is an inaction, a disregard of what the students have been fighting for. One of my interview respondents, Camila Soto, a student activist during the 2011 movement, comments on Lavín's equivocations as follows "*El Ministro de Educación no puede centrar su discurso en los hechos que nos preocupados. Habla hueás*[22]*, dice hueás, piensa hueás!*" This resentful sentiment towards the state "toleration" is not what the previous scholarship has illustrated. In the established literature, the "toleration" has been viewed as an opportunity for the dissidents through which they could cultivate social movement organizations or even stage on protests of resistance (Tarrow, 1998; Wood, 2003). However, I suspect that this logic may only coincide with what happens during the transitional period from authoritarianism to the democratic regime; in which context, the state toleration is a clear signal of expanded spaces for political expressions and activism. Whereas, in a democratic regime like Chile, the protesters would not satisfied with the opportunity to protest itself—which is considered a due human right in the democracy—what they pursue is actual changes in the policy or even the institution fundamentally. Therefore, the toleration is more interpreted as "inaction" thus provoking more radical demands and unexpected forms of demonstration so as to gain visibility before both the public and the government.

[22] "*Hueás*" is a word in Chilean street talk, the shortened version of the word "*huevonada*" which means "bullshit" in English.

The subsequent movement trajectory did turn out to develop in a positive direction. It seems that the creative performance has aroused the sympathy of those bystanders that were not impressed by the traditional tactics. Notably, a great number of celebrities in the field of media and entertainment[23] in Chile initiated a campaign online with the hashtag #YoApoyoALosEstudiantes#, in which they recorded videos to express their sympathy towards the students. "*Hay un momento siempre llegue, en que la verdad aparece, y ahora está apareciendo la verdad*", said Hector Noguera emotionally, a well-renowned actor in Chile, "*los estudiantes están saliendo a La Moneda, están saliendo a flote. Gracias a todos los estudiantes*." Alejandro Trejo also presented in the video: "C*reo que es un movimiento importante, lo que la nación chilena necesita, un cambio radico. Ya basta de promesas inutiles, promesas vacias. Ya se comprobó, ya se vio con la revolución pinguina; lo que se hizo fue muy poco, casi nada. Entonces esto es una burla.*"

The public opinion also exerted certain pressure to the responsiveness of the government. Joaquín Lavín finally replied to the students' petition letter expressing the willingness to discuss with the students about the following issues: funds for revitalizing the education of public uniFversities, lessening the financial burden of the families, increasing the participation of students in the decision-making process related to the education. After several rounds of dialogue with the students, the government eventually put forward the first proposal of educational reform on July 5. And Minister Lavín was soon replaced by Felipe Bulnes.

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[23] These include Héctor Noguera, Diego Muñoz, Julio Milostich, Daniel Muñoz, Néstor Cantillana, Alejandro Trejo, Daniel Alcaíno, among others.

4.2 Repression: triggering waves of moral protests

August 4, 2011 marked the most confrontational day in the history of the "Chilean Winter". On that early morning, upon knowing that the Chilean government refused to approve marches called for this day, both high school and university students defied the authorities and announced a march on *La Alameda* Avenue respectively at 10am and 18:30pm. *Carabineros* installed fences in Plaza Italia which served as the students' meeting point. The banning immediately provoked the anger of the students—before 8am, 14 organizations of university students declared to participate in the protest. Cecilia Perez, the Metropolitan Intendant, insisted on tarnishing the movement (*empaña al movimiento*) before it grew too radical and accused the students of being intransigent and non-cooperative. In her interview[24] with *Cooperativa*[25], she assured the public that the police has been dispatched. "*Carabinero va a cumplir el protocolo garantizando la seguridad*". At the same time, the government's spokesman Andrés Chadwick went even further, claiming that "*los estudiantes no son los dueños de este país*".

It was a typical cloudy day of Chilean winter. The cold iron fences rubbing against each other in the wind, all-armed Carabineros were patrolling in the major streets, poker-faced, ready for the arrival of challenges. At about 10am, when students flocked into La Alameda, Plaza Italia witnessed the first series of detentions. Besides the concentration of police force on the major avenue, deployed Carabineros crashed the students when they were crossing the bridge of Arzobispo. Utilizing tear gas and water

[24] For more details, see Cooperativa (2011).
[25] *Cooperativa* is a radio station operated by *Compañía Chilena de Comunicaciones S.A.*. Founded in 1935, the station is one of the the most influential in Chile. It is notable for criticizing Pinochet of human rights violation.

cannons, the police evicted the crowds occupying Valentín Letelier de Recoleta College and dispersed the students at the University of Chile. In the afternoon, the UOCT reported riots in east Alameda, at the height of Arturo Prat Transit. The government called the *Confech* to cancel the demonstration this afternoon, whereas the latter eventually decided to carry out the protest as planed. At about 3pm, the high school students' demonstrations in downtown Santiago declined, while university students were getting ready for their part. *Los encapuchados* took advantage of this time slot and initiated crashes with the police at the Centre Hall of the University of Chile on La Alameda. By 4pm, the number of people arrested had reached 235 and 12 of the police personnel were injured. The police presence remained strong in the city center while clashes at the skirmishes were sometimes recorded. At 17pm, a group of Special Forces of Carabineros entered the University of Santiago seeking to stop the university students from gathering for the march.

Surrounding the repression, emerged a framing of legitimacy on the both sides. On the one hand, the government intended to criminalize the students' mobilization, accusing them of practicing protests without official approval, which is "*fuera del margen legal*", as well as having violent intentions—according to Cecilia Perez, the students were in the street only to create disruption and disorder, "*porte de arma blanca y artefacto incendiario*." The mayor of Santiago, Pablo Zalaquett also criticized the students in an interview with *Cooperativa* on the afternoon of August 4, 2011: "*Los gobiernos están hechos para gobernar, a los estudiantes se les ofreció una oferta educacional y diversas posibilidades para poder marchar. Ellos tienen derecho a expresarse, pero de ahí a la intransigencia, creo que ahí están mal.*"

At the first heard, this may sound like expressing a willingness of future dialogue. However, in a deeper sense, the Mayor not only tried to justify why the government had not been sufficiently responsive to the students' claims, but more importantly emphasized the subjectivity of the government as the "gobernador", the one who has the authority to regulate the society as well as the responsibility to lead and protect its citizens; through which he implied that the decision and the action of the government was well-considered, responsible, and took into account the greater good. At the end of the interview, he added that students did have their reason to complain about the repression, but it is important for them to understand that the ones who generated the repression were those who "*pasan a llevar a la autoridad y al estado de derecho*." By stressing the crucial role of the government, he in fact meant to legitimize what the government had done and placed the students to the opposite side of the government.

On the other hand, the students, in a similar vein, denunciated the state's disapproval of their registration for protest and the intense repression which was considered morally unacceptable. First of all, from the point of view of the students, the government's negation of their planed demonstrations was nothing but a violation of the freedom of speech and the human right to protest and assemble.[26] Accordingly, the students' insistence on continuing the marches were by no means viewed illegal by these insiders. Instead, it was a courageous posture of civil disobedience and their protest was to demonstrate that the prohibition was unconstitutional[27]. Furthermore, the students

[26] "¿Dónde nos queda el derecho a libre expresión?", cuestionó Paloma Muñoz, dirigenta de la Cones.
[27] Echoing with the students' accusation, the teachers joined in the part to denunciate the state repression. The president of Colegio de Profesores, Jaime Gajardo, asserted that the repression reminded him of the

expressed their censure against the brutal repression, the main accusation of whom was around the issue of human rights violation. "*Es vergonzoso para el país*", said Jaime Gajardo. The shame was that "*hoy se vulnera el derecho ciudadano de congregarse en Plaza Italia*" and "*la derecho*" (referring to *Concertación*) again acted in contrast to the democratic principals, as Camila Vallejo, the then president of *Confech* tweeted and millions of others retweeted. It is interesting that instead of conveying their grievances of being repressed or portraying themselves as the victims of the repression, they called in question the state action in words of justice. Moreover, they started to frame themselves as dauntless young people remaining unyielding and unfearful of any challenge—"*ni con bombas lagrimogenas más fuertes nos amedrentan.*" In align with this heroic declaration was the blame of the abusive and illegitimate use of violence. Laura Ortiz, one of the spokespersons of the high school students recalled that "*nos reprimieron absolutamente de manera muy violenta*". While they were marching, they even heard the sound of gunshot. [28]

The large-scale repression on August 4, 2011 significantly changed the scenario and form of the movement in terms of all the three dimensions we have discussed in the previous chapters.

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method of "apartheid" and he called on Hinzpeter, the Minister of Interior to reconsider his position. Also, the disputes Sergio Aguiló (independent), Hugo Gutiérrez (PS) y Lautaro Carmona announced a constitutional accusation against Rodrigo Hinzpeter

[28] Interview with the author.

4.2.1 "*Me imagino que habrá sido así hace 30 años Chile*"

At 11am after the first reported crashes between the students and the police, Camila Vallejo and the university student leaders met up to analyze whether they should carry out the planed march at 18:30pm regardless of the severe situation. All agree that the student movement came at a shifting point. They needed to define a new strategy to confront the changing scenario. Some of the representatives argued that the brutal repression would greatly deter the mobilization of the students. Moreover, it would create the chance for the government to criminalize the movement as a whole. But a majority of them agreed to stick to the march as a presentation of courage and determination.

At the end of this meeting, the representative of the Facultad de Farmacia - Universidad de Concepción pointed out that it is important to cooperate with the high school students and propose a protest of *cacerolazo*. Through discussion, the students decided to react with a *cacerolazo* "*en repudio a la represión contra los estudiantes*" at 9pm the same day. The information quickly spread on social media and the hashtag #Cacerolazo# quickly became the most popular and highlighted on Twitter.

The march started from 6:30pm as agreed, whereas Special Forces of *Carabineros* again violently dispersed the crowds at *Plaza Italia* using tear gas. "*Carabineros ha actuado conforme a la ley y está cumpliendo con su responsabilidad y cuenta con el respaldo del Gobierno*" said Chadwick before the media, which further provoked grievances among the students and the public. At about 9pm, Santiago people took to the streets and formed large groups, banging pots, pans as well as other tools to express

support for the students. [29] Aggrieved people, men and women, young and old, aggregated in public spaces trying their best to make a noise, accompanied by the honking of passing motorists.

In the month following this event of repression, *Cacerolazo* became a modular practice of not only the students but also the newly recruited Santiago citizens. Almost on every night starting from 9:30pm, there were *cacerolazos* around the capital city. Surprisingly, the *cacerolazos* were even more intense in the upper-class neighborhoods of Eastern Santiago, suggesting that some of the better-offs got engaged to support the movement despite their traditionally rightist preferences after the repression (Somma, 2012).

The frame surrounding the adoption of *cacerolazo* appeared to be deeply rooted in the nation's historical memory of dictatorship and the action itself is a representation of the resistance during the Pinochet era. "*Me imagino que habrá sido así hace 30 años Chile*," said Alfonso, a high school student activist in 2011 and one of the leaders of the University of Chile in 2013, whose words resonate with what Camila Vallejo expressed on Twitter:

> *El gobierno ha tratado de separarse de nuestro pasado oscuro que muchos recuerdan, que no se quiere volver a repetir, sin embargo hoy día nos hace mucha alusión a eso, a como era nuestro país hace treinta años atrás y por más que hoy día se diga que hay una nueva forma de gobernar, parece una forma muy añeja, dictatorial, que se repite con los mismos que fueron autores y protagonistas de esos hechos de represión.*

[29] Some of the major sites include Plaza Brasil, Salvador and Carlos Antunez in Providencia. In the south of Santiago as well as in Barrio el golf and Dominicans, there were also cacerolazos in a relatively small magnitude. The demonstration was repeated in other cities such as Valparaiso, Viña del Mar, Arica and Concepción.

Cacerolazo, a conventional protest tactic particularly useful during the dictatorship, accordingly, has been entitled a double sense of metaphor facing repression. On the one hand, it is a demonstration of fearlessness for the state intimidation. On the other hand, it is an expression in a repressive context—when people are prohibited speaking out their appeals with words, they can only choose to make noise to show their discontent. For the students, adopting conventional protest tactics such as *cacerolazo* in this case is the optimal choice because they are more effective to recall the memory of dictatorship, familiar to the potential supporters and directly attack the counter-movement of illegitimacy. It was since the August 4 repression and the responsive *cacerolazos* that the constituency of the student movement got beyond students, and more citizens got engaged as they perceived the threat of the return to dictatorship or the violation of democracy.[30] More importantly, this tactic which appeals both to the pathos and ethos of the both sides' discourse and action, increases the cost of subsequent repression for the government. The latter would face a moral dilemma after the heavy repression—while they are reluctant to authorize protests whose demands can be intransigent, they are also afraid of losing popular support. In fact, the repression had greatly influenced the popularity President Sebastian Piñera who only had a meager 26 percent approval rate in the polls; the figure in April 2011 when the movement first emerged, was as high as 78%. In this context, if the government should continue repressing on its people in the subsequent demonstrations, it might suffer more renunciation. Piñera apparently was not

[30] "Se debe enfocar en hinzpeter el asunto de la violencia. Cambiar la lógica de las movilización, marchar por los sectores donde viven los acomodados." Sesion Confech 13 de Agosto de 2011, http://movimientoestudiantil.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2011-08-13-Acta-Confech.pdf

about to risk his political career. After the repression, the rate of state concession reached its peak in August 2011.

4.2.2 "*Debemos tomar desiciones más radicales como oposición*"

The August 4 repression is shown to elicit more disruptive and more violent protests. This tendency was especially true among high school students. Bombs and riots were reported in Liceo Valentín Letelier. Laura Ortiz, one of the spokespersons of the high school students called on her fellow students to cluster in the streets. A few high-school students event carried out hunger strikes that lasted for weeks, which caused great disruption and led the Health Minister to voice polemic opinions that put the government in an uncomfortable situation. The university students, while sticking to their fundamental principle of avoiding violent protests, also decided to radicalize the movement by creating more disrupting protests with more demonstrators and impelled strikes on the national level.[31] Instead of being intimidated by the repression, Chilean students became more aggressive. Why is this the case? It may have to do with the characteristics of the current generation of Chilean students compared with the older generations.

The grandparents of the current generation of Chilean students had witnessed Salvador Allende's rise to power and the coup against him, while the parents of whom grew up in the Pinochet's era. Different from their elder generations, the young people in

[31] Sesion Confech 13 de Agosto de 2011, http://movimientoestudiantil.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2011-08-13-Acta-Confech.pdf

Chile who were born after the return of democracy in 1990, claim to have no fear—"*El miedo ya se perdió*":

> *La vida de los padres, la de ellos fue peor. Sobre todo la vida era más peligrosa. Salir a las calles… No sabias si te podían tirar un balazo. Muchos de los mayores fueron reprimidos por la dictadura y tienen miedo de ser reprimidos, debido a su adolescencia. ¿Y Ustedes? Se ha ido rompiendo el miedo hacia el Gobierno. El miedo de expresar lo que pensamos hacia el Gobierno.*
>
> *(…) Nosotros no vivimos lo que fue el tema de la dictadura. Y esto cambia mucho la visión de Chile en ese caso, y del mundo. Porque los adultos tienen miedo a que vuelva a suceder lo mismo. (…) Nosotros vamos con menos medio. (…) [P]orque nuestros papas lucharon porque no estuvieran los milicos16 en la calle. Lo ganaron y ahora nosotros tenemos que seguir haciendo el cambio.*

In high-risk situations, fear may threaten to decreases or undermine collective actions. However, Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) also show that factors such as intimate social networks, strong collective identities, shaming and a belief in divine protection directly or indirectly helped mitigate fears of police repression. These factors encouraged people to protest despite and even because of the repression. The testimony of this young student clearly makes a separation between his generations and the previous ones. He reminded us that the Chilean student movements had entered a new era.[32] Although the repression still arose now and then and might also exist in the future, their generation has better chance to make a difference. It should be safe to say that the current generation of Chilean students show a sufficient confidence in the democratic regime and did not necessarily regard repression as a sign of returning to dictatorship. In this case, the repression seems to be considered more of an opportunity to create discursive space and

[32] Edmunds and Turner (2005) offer a valuable explanation to understand the shift from a passive generation to an active one. For them, this change occurs when a generation is "able to exploit resources (political/educational/economic) to innovate in cultural, intellectual or political spheres" (p. 562).

win public support through criticizing the government and firing back with more radical protests, than a real threat to the mobilization or the institution. In this sense, the riots, bombing, or more intensive *tomas* initiated after the August 4 repression were a demonstration of this "*perdida del miedo*" as well as taking advantage of the moral stance denunciating the government.

Moreover, the students' radical stance might also be a result of the support of the Leftist Party. Fulvio Rossi, the interim president of Partido Socialista de Chile, immediately after the arrests on the morning, pointed out that it is impossible to tolerate what the government had done to the high school students. "*Debemos tomar desiciones más radicales como oposición*", he suggested on Twitter.

To sum up, here we can depict a situation where the students and the state interact in the way that the warring parties interplay with each other. While the state is trying to frighten mobilization of the movement; the students need to defuse this opposing effort. The police are "trying to goad you into a mistake made out of anger" while the students are "trying to do the same to the government." (Goodwin, 2004, p. 417) Each side works to surprise the other with an unexpected move, i.e. violent, disruptive or innovative tactics. There is thus an element of psychological and moral warfare.

In other words, the logic behind such kind of "warfare", as well as the support for radical protests lies in a frame of legitimacy or justice/injustice (Gamson et al., 1982). The more "repressive" the state, therefore, the higher the potential benefits of collective action, since the "punishment" of the unfair state would become part of the expected rewards, and the need to "do something" would appear more urgent to some activists.

4.2.3 "*No haya un dialogo vinculante*"

Despite the confrontational protest tactics, the demands of the students directly expressed during the demonstrations became less radical—they constrained their focus on some concrete claims related to the repression (i.e. the resignation of Hinzpeter and Lavín, and the blame on state repression), rather than continuing requesting all free and public education for all which is more of an abstract and ultimate goal. This transition can be explained to a certain extent by a changing focus due to the shifting context. However, what is more relevant might have been the students' lack of confidence in effective dialogue. By the time when the overrule of protest registration and the ensuing repression took place, the government had promised to develop a proposal for educational reform to discuss with the students. However, the repression brought about frustration for the students in the way of unilaterally break the previous framework of cooperation. The leader of the high school students' organization *Coordinadora Nacional Estudiantes Secundarios* (CoNES), Freddy Fuentes said that "*creemos que la repuesta y el diálogo se nos están cerrando*". Likewise, the President of the Federation of the University of Santiago also believe that this should be disappointedly predicted that "*no haya un dialogo vinculante*".

In this background, the students started to reconsider their position and reform proposal. They decided to call on a plebiscite, in order to support and reinforce the legitimacy of their radical demands to completely overthrow the basis of the education system which was a legacy of the Pinochet's neoliberalism policy.

By far we can conclude that the contentious scenario after the repression on August 4, 2011 was a game between the students and the state over the issue of

legitimacy. The students shifted to adopt conventional tactics (mainly marches, and *cacerolazos*) as opposed to innovative protests, as they frame the repression as a repetition of the persecution against opposition during the dictatorship, accusing the government of illegitimate use of police force towards the students. They tended to produce an image of "unfair state", delegitimizing the institution as dictatorial (della Porta, 1995); in which way, the students attracted the support of the mass constituents across Santiago. Furthermore, the repression provoked more violent and disruptive demonstrations (i.e. bombings, riots, and *tomas*) as opposed to merely peaceful or moderate protests, as the students viewed repression as an opportunity to showcase their courage rather than a threat.

In alignment with these radical practices were surprisingly the shift to concrete and less radical demands (i.e. resign of relevant officials). They called for a national referendum to determine an educational reform proposal as opposed to continuing urging radical institutional change. This change is also to legitimize the students' claims through a convincingly democratic process.

4.3 Concession: considering the efficiency

After the large-scale demobilization since September 2012[33], the students resumed protests in 2013, in light of the educational reform proposals of Michelle Bachelet who started pursuing re-election in March 2014. In March 2013, Bachelet announced that she would run for the president again. And since then, the education

[33] The lapse of tranquility in 2012 can be partly explained by the fact that the majority of the high school and university student leaders were finishing up the year and concentrating on their studies and their future.

reform had served as the pillar of her campaign proposals, which won her a resounding primary victory—51% of voters in a poll held in May, ahead of any other candidate. Her proposals put forward for the presidential campaign included an array of reforms to end profits in education (*fin al lucro*), improve the quality of education (*calidad*), end the segregation of educational resources (*fin al segregación*); and "substantively advance to a universally free education (*avance sustantivo hacia la gratuidad universal*).[34] These proposed reforms, despite the absence of detailed measures, stay in accord with the most radical demands of the student movements. Meanwhile, they dramatically contradict with what the *Concertación* had proposed and achieved in its radical nature. Facing the proposal of the candidate, the students expressed distrust in Bachelet while they were somehow delighted to witness the antagonistic division between the Left who was seeking power and the Right who was afraid of losing power. "*Basados en lo que ha sido la política histórica de esa coalición (*rebranded as *Nueva Mayoría), dudé de que efectivamente las propuestas fortaleciera la educación pública y terminen con el lucro y la segregación, sin referirse concretamente a cómo implementar la gratuidad.*"

At the same time, the students, nevertheless, took advantage of the radical posture of Bachelet to urge positive responses from the *Concertación*. In a petition letter addressed to the Minister of Education, the *Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile* (*Feuch*), by mentioning what its opposition had promised and how the other stakeholders had responded to the promises, attempted to exert pressure on the ruling coalition and urge a resolution to the current stalemate.

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[34] For a complete proposal, see http://michellebachelet.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Reforma-Educacional-14-21.pdf

> *Caludia Sanhueza, miembro del equipo de educación de Bachelet, hablando a título personal, explicó cómo ella concebía la educación gratuita. (...) El rector de la Universidad de Concepción, Sergio Lavanchy, le agradeció, (...) Hoy el debate en educación, y especialmente desde el comando de Bachelet, se ha centrado en "titulares" y consignas sin contenido. Chile se merece un debate mas profundo, pero, fundamentalmente, se merece una educación que sea gratuita y para todos.*

Another factor that had greatly changed the position of Piñera's government in 2013, as well as the trajectory of the student movement was the entry of former student leaders into congressional politics. Among them were Camila Vallejo and Camilo Ballesteros, the most critical figures in the 2011 student movements. As members of Chile's Communist Party and Autonomous Left party respectively, they were poised to bring their party into the Concertación, for the first time since the formation of the coalition, in order to pull the coalition to the left from the inside. (Frens-String, 2013)

These changes[35] of the political environment in the election year seduced more state concessions as well as gave rise to the political leverage of the student movements. In late September 2013, the government re-initiated dialogues with the students, which culminated in an array of proposed concrete reforms for all levels of education to be realized in 2014. These include guaranteed resources for 60 Bicentenario de Excelencia high schools, increasing the amount of the grant school preferential and extend its coverage from basic education to secondary education, and from the most vulnerable sectors towards sectors of the middle class. With regard to the higher education, for the

[35] The ruling of Piñera in his last year extremely difficult. On the campaign trail, candidates of the center-right had prevented Piñera from pursuing re-election through the revelation of two scandals. The presidential candidate primarily chosen by the Concertación resigned for health problems and the process culminated in the defeat of the candidate ruling. In addition, the government had to tackle the tensions with neighboring countries, the conflict in Araucanía, and the impeachment of ministers. The year ended with a crushing defeat in the polls and promised the return of Bachelet.

first time, the government planed to secure the necessary funding for a scholarship of merit, and ensure that 60% of the receivers are from the most disadvantaged family.[36]

4.3.1 "*Mediante la organización propia es la forma más eficiente*"

Facing responsive state actions, however, the students did not mean to cease the fire—a new wave of protests took place despite the concessions. However, almost all protests in September and October 2013 whose information is available, were marches on La Alameda, and the scale was not of great magnitude—the largest among them had reportedly (by *Confech*) 50,000 participants. In addition to the peaceful and less disruptive marches, there were also a fairly moderate demonstration of *bandera*—a huge national flag of Chile read "*Educación Pública, Gratuita y de Calidad*" were hang in different locations such as the plaza before La Moneda, the shopping mall at the city center and the culture center of Gabriela Mistral. The various spaces determine to which audience the demonstration is addressed to. In contrary to the peaceful, moderate and conventional protest tactics which showed a retreat of the students, the demands of protest remained radical aiming at free and quality public education.

This round of interaction indicates that concession may have a dual effect on the movement. On the one hand, concessions lead to demobilization through institutionalization; on the other hand, they may as well increase the protesters' appetite.

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[36] La Tercera, (September 29, 2013) Piñera centra en siete ejes su última propuesta de presupuesto y plantea US$ 600 millones de libre disposición para el próximo gobierno. http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2013/09/674-544746-9-pinera-centra-en-siete-ejes-su-ultima-propuesta-de-presupuesto-y-plantea-us-600.shtml

First, after Piñera expressed the willingness of reconvening dialogue, the number of protest participants has largely shrunk. In this sense, there might have been a tipping point, after surpassing which, the movement no longer benefits from the opportunity brought about by the opening space; instead, it would suffer the lack of support. After all, to many of the participants who are not super committed to the movement, when a sufficient number of demands are already met, and/or the movement goals or ideologies are already adopted by the ruling party, there seems to be little need to continue with the movements. Given this larger picture of movement declining mainly due to institutionalization in 2013, the organization of a protest confront much more difficulties.

Under this condition, the efficiency of the protest is the primary concern; since the movement has less mobilizing resources, how to focus limited resources on doing what is likely to yield the greatest result—in terms of the constituency, goals and the weakening of the opposition—stands out to be the most important. Conventional protests such as the march and flag demonstration are among those that are the most familiar to the potential participants and the easiest to mobilize and organize with limited resources. It almost requires no preparation to get involved in a march, while the flag demonstration even costs almost no human resources at all; it conveys the students' appeals through its presence in public spaces.

Second, after the concession, the students' protests demands remained radical, raising fundamental questions about Chile's political and economic model. In the present situation, this is not only because "*las medidas no dan respuesta a los problemas de*

fondo de la educación"[37], but also because at this crucial moment, it was necessary for the student leaders and the movement to present a position against co-optation through maintaining radical in terms of demands.

During the campaign of Bachelet and before concessions of Piñera, there is an emerging frame of "autonomy" in the rhetoric of the student leaders. In a great vein, they stressed their independence from any political alignment despite the support from the both sides. For instance, Andrés Fielbaum, president of the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh) stayed skeptical of Bachelet's initiatives and constantly criticized her proposal as empty promises: "*(...) porque en el fondo cuando permitimos que sean otros, cuando permitimos que sea la política tradicional la que traduzca nuestras demandas en su lenguaje, siempre salimos perdiendo.*"

Moreover, he drew a separation between the demands of the students and the proposals of Bachelet. Although the both may appear similar in the sense that both claim to aim at ending profits in education, he argues that they are different in ideological basis: "*(...) Cuando hablamos de fin al lucro, de gratuidad, de democratización, de desmunicipalización, en el fondo es un gran paragua que entiende que la educación debe ser un derecho y no un negocio. Y eso es en todos los niveles.*"

At the same time, the new leaders also openly cut off ties with their predecessors who have assumed seats in the Congress. Melissa Sepulveda, the head of the Universidad

[37] The results of an online survey conducted by *La Segunda* in July 2011 showed that while answering the question "cree usted que luego de los anuncios del presidente Piñera deben parar las protestas de los estudiantes", 75% of the respondents agreed that the students should continue with the protest because their demands have not been fully met.

de Chile's student organization in 2014 who holds an anarchist ideology, publicly expressed her critique of Camila Vajello "selling out the movement"[38].

In the complicated environment where various political powers are competing for popularity and the issue of the student movement and educational reform can be one of the most useful card to play, the movement was facing a threat of co-optation. The new generation of student leaders were fully aware of this threat to the movement as well as to their newly-established leadership. "*Entendemos que mediante la organización propia es la forma más eficiente que tenemos de ir asegurando el buen transcurso de la marcha,*" stated Andrés Fielbaum. Accordingly, adhering to the previous radical demands is an important means to preserve and present their independence.

4.4 Summary: visibility, legitimacy, and efficiency

In this chapter, I examined in more depth three specific situations of the Chilean student movements when the movement was facing state toleration (June 2011), state repression (August 4, 2011) and state concession (September 2013), respectively manifesting the emerging phase, the peak, and the decline of this cycle of student movement. Although they can by no means represent all interactions between the students and the state across these years of mobilization, the dynamics in these three particular moments provide a window to observe how the protesters framed the various

[38] Her claims have merit; Vallejo and Jackson have been lambasted as sellouts across the web. Meantime, these ex-leaders themselves also seemed to estrange with their previously committed cause. Camila Vallejo who now heads the Education commission of the Congress, for instance, has taken a more pragmatic stance, promoting Bachelet's gradualist program as the most practical way to eliminate profits in education.

state actions, how they identified their subsequent tactics and demands, and how they made sense of their actions and claims.

These patterns agree with the results of the empirical analysis in the previous chapter (see Table 7 and Table 8). Furthermore, they show the mechanism of subjective framing that links state responses and protest tactics. State toleration, repression, and concession respectively elicit three different frames that create the conditions for tactical selection: visibility, legitimacy, and efficiency. When the government didn't respond, the students had more incentive to innovate tactics, increasing media publicity and social influence. Under repression, the students utilized the frame of legitimacy to denunciate the repression, justify their violent and disruptive actions, adopting conventional performances that would arouse historical memories of the dictatorship, as well as legitimize their demands by calling for a referendum. And in the election year that favors concessions, to effectively exploit the opportunity of dialogue, lower the cost of mobilization, and maintain autonomy, the students showed less interest in innovation and held on with more radical claims.

In a more general sense, throughout the process of the movement, the students constitute tactical strategies mainly to pursue two goals: one is mobilizing more resources and constituents, the second is achieving goals through state concession. Although the former is more of the interest of the resource mobilization theorists who consider social movement as an entrepreneurship (McCarthy and Zald 1987) while the latter complies with the approach of political process (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, 1982), both perspectives share the similar basis of rational choice in structural constraints, altogether

building up the complete scenario of the tactical selection considerations of the Chilean students.

First, in the light of state inaction, the innovative tactics served to draw more public attention so as to reduce the cost of mobilization as well as exert pressure on the government. Second, the legitimacy framing facing the repression successfully increased the cost for further repressive action, while the confrontational protests increase the cost of disruption for the government, working together to elicit more subsequent concessions[39]. Last, the shift to conventional tactics made it easier for potential constituents to participate, while the insistence in radical demands present the firm stance and contribute to the efficiency of the organization. These efforts to augment legitimacy, efficiency and visibility altogether increased repression and disruption costs, and reduced concession cost, thus were expected to result in continuous government concessions.

[39] For the economic opportunity structure and the predicted responses of economic actors to movement demands, see Luders (2006, p. 969).

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

The present thesis has discussed the way that state responses influenced protest tactics in the Chilean student movements (2011–2015). The former is divided into three coding categories—repression, toleration, and concession. And the latter is measured by the level of violence, the level of disruption, the level of innovation, and the escalation of demands. When the government was unresponsive, or vacillating, students tended to innovate and escalate their protest goals, increasing media publicity and social influence. Facing repression, the students tended to legitimize their actions by adopting conventional performances that would arouse historical memories of the dictatorship and limiting their demands. Under concession, to effectively exploit the opportunity for dialogue, students showed less interest in innovation and continued with the radical claims.

Based on the pattern of association between the state actions and the protest forms, I identify a conflicting influence of the political opportunity (toleration and concession) and threats (repression) on the intensity of protest. To disentangle the contrary effects of opportunity, it is important to discuss the agency of the protesters because neither opportunity or threat is objective; they are perceived and made sense of by the actors. For this purpose, I further analyze three moments of tactical shifts that different state actions elicited: 1) the period that witnessed endured state toleration (June 2011); 2) the dynamic interaction on August 4, 2011, the most confrontational day with fierce repression and over eight hundred arrests; 3) a concession period during the presidential campaign in September 2013. For these periods selected, I analyze the way

that the students framed the changing environment and the way they justified their actions. I argue that state toleration, repression, and concession all presented a combination of political opportunity and threat. Facing state toleration, repression, and concession, the students respectively adopted the frame of visibility, legitimacy, and efficiency. The tactical selections they made under each condition share the same goal of gearing up the mobilization and facilitating government concession and social changes.

The major contributions of this research lie in a more sophisticated conceptualization and operationalization of the variables, the mixed methods that include the original use of various sources of media archives and social media data, and the attempt to assess the patterns using regression analyses. Moreover, this research contributes to the established debate by going beyond the dichotomy of political opportunity and threat. Previously, state concession and toleration are merely considered opening opportunity, and repression is considered posing threats to the movement. Based on these assumptions, scholars were not able to find a logically consistent result of the association between the opportunity structure and protest. The current research points out that the definition of opportunity and threat is questionable because the actors subjectively perceived them, whose judgment can be affected by the changing socio-political context. Protesters choose certain tactics because they believe that in the contingent and specific situation, such tactics can increase the legitimacy, visibility, and/or efficiency of the movement. Whether their perceptions of efficacy are accurate or not, such perceptions reflect protesters' understanding of their relationship with the authorities.

This being the case, even under the most brutal state repression, the protesters can detect and take advantage of the discursive opportunity to reinforce mobilization through moral framing. Likewise, in the case of toleration and concession, the protesters can see themselves exposed to the threat of disregard, demobilization, and co-optation. Therefore, they adopt tactics as well as escalate their demands to ensure the visibility and efficiency of their protest actions in order to counteract unfavorable movement trajectory.

Since its emergence, the political opportunity theory has been criticized as being an "umbrella concept" that can potentially include all favorable factors (Tarrow, 1998). The reason for this conflation may lie in the ambiguity around the perception of opportunity and its overlapping area with the threat—when we take into consideration both the structural elements and the agency, there seems to be no such clear cut between political opportunity and threats. That is, opportunity always comes in alignment with threats; perceived opportunity and threat combine to influence tactical choice.

The conceptualization, however, can be more sophisticated by unpacking each category of state action. Within the category of state repression, for instance, the impact of mild repressions such as denial of petition or request can by no means compare that of a heavy repressive action such as legal prosecution or harsh treatment of the detainees. Furthermore, different state actors—the federal government, the local government, the president, the police may have different levels of repressive and concessive capacity. It would be helpful to take a closer examination of the various state responses and discuss the effects they have on the protest.

Moreover, the protest tactics can be further studied by relating the protest actions undertaken in specific times and spaces to the systematic outline of protest strategy.

Future studies would be valuable by analyzing the way that protest tactics serve the strategy, target the audience, and achieve protest goals. The current study only slightly touches on this point, while more substantial research is required.

In addition, it is possible that in authoritarian and democratic regimes, there can be different structures of opportunity. Through the testimony of the young protesters we have seen that compared with their parents and grandparents, the younger generation of student protesters share a more optimistic and dauntless attitude towards state repression. How exactly are the situations in various regimes different from each other and what institutional factors have contributed to the difference? These questions may serve as the starting point for further studies.

Last but not the least, this research largely conflates the protests initiated by the secondary and university level students. These movements, in fact, have had different trajectories of development and diverging strategies. Considering the space of this thesis, I did not go further to elaborate on the division and tension between them. Future studies may focus on the characteristics of each movement, and the complex way they interacted with each other.

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