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‘George Washington Must Go’:

The Causes and Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
Requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by

Dov Haim Levin

2014

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

‘George Washington Must Go’:

The Causes and Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions

by

Dov Haim Levin

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014
Professor Arthur A. Stein, Chair

This study assesses the causes and effects of partisan great power interventions in the elections of other countries. Such interventions have been a quite common phenomenon extending back to the beginnings of competitive elections and even including the 1796 U.S. Presidential elections (the source of this study’s title). Since World War II, such interventions have become quite common: a dataset I constructed of U.S. and Soviet/Russian electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000 finds that there were such interventions in approximately *one of every nine* competitive national level executive elections during this period. In today’s world, in which competitive national level elections are a significant feature of domestic politics in more than half of the states in the international system, partisan electoral interventions will likely become an even more prominent tool in the great powers’ arsenal. Nevertheless, there has been scant scholarly research on this topic.

As for the causes of electoral interventions this study argues that electoral interventions usually occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first is the consent and cooperation of a significant domestic actor within the target with a proposed intervention by the great power. The

second is that the intervener sees its interests as being endangered by the very different and inflexible preferences held by another significant candidate/party within the target. As for the electoral consequences of electoral intervention, this study argues that they usually significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. Likewise, electoral interventions will be less helpful to the aided party/candidate in founding elections than in later elections.

These hypotheses are tested using multiple methods. The first argument concerning the causes of electoral interventions is tested largely through the in-depth analysis of four case studies (utilizing archival documents) in which such interventions were done or seriously considered by a great power chosen out of the abovenoted dataset of electoral interventions. The second set of hypotheses, about the electoral consequences of such interventions, is tested in two different ways. The first is a large N statistical study utilizing a new dataset of all U.S. and USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000 constructed by the author. The second is a single election level examination of the electoral consequences of such interventions (utilizing exit polls etc.) in four select intervention cases. Utilizing these methods, this study finds strong evidence in support of the arguments presented here as to both questions.

The dissertation of Dov Haim Levin is approved

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Introduction

“[George] Washington must go...a friend of France must succeed him in that eminent office...use all the means in [your] power in the United States to bring about... Washington's replacement”

French Foreign Minister Delacroix to French Ambassador to the U.S Adet, January 16, 1796¹

This study investigates what causes a great power to attempt to intervene in a partisan manner in another country's elections as well as the effects of such interventions. In democracies, national level elections are pivotal events, enabling a peaceful change in the makeup of the main decision-makers and their domestic coalitions. Such changes often lead to major shifts in a country's domestic and foreign policies and affect its propensity to suffer from both domestic and international conflict. Likewise, in quite a few regimes which are far from being full democracies, relatively competitive elections can have significant effects, in some cases even leading to the fall of the existing leadership or regime and a full scale transition to democracy as occurred for example, in the Philippines due to the 1986 Presidential elections. As a result, competitive elections, now a significant feature of domestic politics in more than half of the states of the world (Freedom House 2013), are an important potential avenue for intervention and influence by foreign powers. Much of the venerable game of great power politics can now increasingly be played with a new and different tool.

Not surprisingly, partisan electoral interventions by the great powers began to be employed almost as soon as meaningful competitive elections began to occur.² They have

¹ In Bemis (1934:258-259)

² Pre-modern elections, albeit to non-electoral positions, also frequently became the target of great power interventions. For example, the Polish elections for king in the 17th and 18th century, which had an 'electorate' composed of the entire Polish nobility (which was then almost 7% of Poland's population), were so well known,

continued to be used ever since. For example, one of the first competitive national level elections ever conducted, the 1796 U.S. Presidential elections, was also the target of an overt French intervention (see quote above) designed to prevent the reelection of George Washington and then (after Washington decided to retire on his own volition), the election of John Adams (DeConde 1958).³ A year later a French general election (the election of year V) was itself a target of a covert British intervention designed to elect a parliament (and directory) more amendable to ending the French Revolution and eventually the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy (Fryer 1965). As competitive national level elections became a somewhat more common phenomena in the 19th and early 20th century, other great powers occasionally used this tool as well- from Bismarck's interventions in multiple elections in Belgium, France and other Western European countries in the 1870s and 1880s (Lowe 1967:62-63; Stone 2010) to Hitler's attempt to prevent FDR's reelection for a third term in 1940 (Stout 1997).

During the Cold War, electoral interventions became a common feature of great power politics. Indeed, according to a new dataset constructed by the author (see later description), the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in this manner 117 times between 1946 and 2000- that is in about **one of every nine** competitive national level executive elections during this period.

In the early 21st century, interventions of this kind have continued apace with the use of various 'true and tried' tools: from covert funding for the preferred candidate and various "dirty

among other things, as a target of meddling by Russia, Austria and Prussia, that they served as one important "anti-model" for the American founding fathers during the U.S. constitutional convention (Pasley 2013:370-371). Indeed, as early as 1787, Jefferson, rather ironically given later developments, was already quite worried about the possibility of the European great powers meddling in American elections (Pasley 2013:61).

³ See a description of this intervention, and an analysis of its effects, in chapter 7

tricks” including perhaps, in one case, the poisoning of the “wrong” unwanted presidential candidate (i.e., by Russia in the 2004 Ukrainian elections (Kuzio 2005)), to public threats made by the intervening governments’ officials to cut off all foreign aid if the ‘wrong’ party or candidate won (i.e., the U.S. in the 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections if Hezbollah won (Ghattas 2009)).

Electoral interventions (when known or subsequently exposed) have frequently been credited or blamed by observers for having influenced electoral outcomes. For example, in the 2000 Yugoslavian elections, one of the main figures in the successful campaign of the democratic opposition headed by Vojislav Kostunica against Slobodan Milosevic admitted in an interview shortly afterwards that “The foreign support [to the campaign] was critical” for its electoral success.⁴ Fifty two years beforehand, and less than three days after the conclusion of the overt U.S. intervention against the Communist party in the 1948 Italian elections, Palmiro Togliatti, the head of the Italian Communist party, openly blamed the surprising defeat of his party on what he described as the “brutal foreign intervention” of the United States.⁵ Likewise, the CIA and the KGB, when reviewing their electoral intervention record frequently claimed, in secret classified analyses, that they were quite effective in this regard. For example, one 1969 analysis by the CIA claimed that “there have been numerous instances when, facing the threat”

⁴ Michael, Dobbs “U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition” *Washington Post*, December 11, 2000.

⁵ For quote see “Togliatti Accuses U.S.” *NYT* April 22,1948. For other examples see (Kitzinger 1960:251;Arens 1995:9,301); “Japan Holds to Conservative Line” *NYT* April 26,1953;“The Difference between a Holy Land and a Hole in the Ground” *Guardian* August 22,1992;“The West should back Russia, not Tsar Boris” *The Observer (UK)* August 11,1996.

of a hostile party achieving an “election victory”, the CIA “met the threat and turned it successfully”.⁶

Yet in spite of the long history, ubiquity and possible importance of partisan electoral interventions as a type of external intervention, little scholarly attention has been paid to their causes or to their effects. Accordingly, in this study I am examining two separate issues regarding electoral interventions:

- a. The causes of great power electoral interventions
- b. The effectiveness of electoral interventions-i.e., how effective has this tool been in affecting the election results in favor of the preferred candidate/party in the intervened country.

This introduction will be divided into three parts. In the next part I provide a short summary of the arguments presented and tested in this study. The second part consists of a brief discussion of key ideas and assumptions underlying my arguments and further illustrating the theoretical importance of electoral interventions. The third part will consist of a brief review of the scholarly literature on electoral interventions.

1.1 A summary of the arguments

As for the first question, the causes of partisan electoral intervention, I argue in this study that they occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first condition is that the great power perceives its interests as being endangered by another significant candidate/party within the target. This candidate/party has different and inflexible preferences on important issues-i.e., the

⁶ Frus 1969-1976 12: Document 149. For KGB examples see (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2006:72,318,350).

actor is either greatly constrained by his political base on these issues and/or ideologically committed to particular positions. The second condition is that a significant domestic actor within a democratic target wants or is willing to be aided by the great power in this risky manner. Without such an actors consent and active cooperation the feasibility of an electoral intervention becomes so low that a great power will rarely if ever try to intervene in an election. When one or both of these conditions are missing partisan electoral interventions will rarely if ever occur.

When the first condition is missing, i.e. the relevant domestic actor is seen as someone with which “one can do business” (even if somewhat unfriendly), the great power is expected to prefer not to intervene. Such interventions, while being cheaper than a war, are nevertheless costly. Likewise, the ability of the great power to use its surplus and wide range of resources in order to secure its interests through low-cost conventional diplomacy with most types of actors, as well as the danger of turning the unfriendly but still “reasonable” domestic actor into an outright enemy, will all usually prevent an electoral intervention from being used.

When the second condition is lacking, i.e. no significant domestic actor (significant presidential candidate/major party) within that country who is willing to be aided in this manner, the great power is expected to prefer not to intervene in an election *even when* the first condition is present. This is due to the fact that an electoral intervention is essentially an attempt to strengthen or create a domestic election campaign for a particular party and/or candidate in the target. However, such an intervention requires the type of high quality private information on domestic conditions (the preferences of the target’s electorate, where and which resources to invest in each district, etc.) which the major domestic actors use for campaigning. Given the limited understanding that policymakers usually have of the domestic politics of other nations, the would-be intervener usually wouldn’t have, or be able to collect, a sufficient amount of the

needed information. Accordingly, without the cooperation of a major domestic actor in the target, the great power will lack the information required in order for the electoral intervention to work. When, as a result, an electoral intervention has low chances of success, the great power will usually prefer other, more feasible, options.

Of course, electoral interventions are not the only type of foreign policy activities or type of interventions in which “invitations to intervene” play or can play a role in the decision-making process. Even a cursory look, for example, in Thucydides’ famous history of the Peloponnesian War would note many cases in which the help by a domestic faction (or the expectation of such help) played an important role in Athens’s or Sparta’s decision to attempt to conquer particular city-states during this war (see a few examples in Thucydides ([1972]:318,368-369,388)). Likewise, many U.S. interventions in Latin America during the Cold War (from secret coups to full-scale military invasions) seem to have been “invited” by significant domestic actors within the target (see for example Grow (2008:193-194)).⁷

The big difference, however, between electoral intervention and other kinds of military operations and/or interventions is the centrality of finding such allies to its operational feasibility and therefore to the decision-making process of the operation. Successful interstate wars, for example, have frequently been prosecuted both in the ancient and the modern era without the victor getting any cooperation whatsoever from a domestic actor within the rival state. As will be later described in detail, this is rarely if ever the case in electoral interventions, making the role of finding “domestic help” within the target absolutely essential for such an intervention to be worthwhile for the intervener.

⁷ For similar findings about such U.S. interventions during the Cold War outside of the Americas see (Karabell 1999:225,227-228).

As for the second question, the effectiveness of electoral interventions in affecting the intervened elections results, I have three main hypotheses. I argue that such interventions usually increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate. I also claim that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. Likewise, all else being equal, electoral interventions are much less likely to effectively help an aided party/candidate competing in a founding election than in a non-founding/late election and will many times harm it. I further examine two competing explanations as to whether incumbents or challengers benefit more from such interventions.

Based on my model of the causes of electoral interventions, I claim in the first argument, that while such interventions are not the only factor which can affect the results of a particular election, they nevertheless can significantly increase the electoral chances of the supported candidate/party. This is the result of the selection effects which occur due to the process by which a would-be intervener and a would-be client 'choose' each other.

The great power will avoid aiding perceived 'lost causes', usually preferring to avoid the costs involved in a futile intervention. Likewise, when the potential client believes that it is quite likely to win without such aid, it will prefer to forego it and the potential risks and costs that it may incur (i.e., being tagged as a "stooge" of the great power, or if it wins, needing to 'pay back' the great power for its aid). Nevertheless, the more resources that a particular candidate/party has, the more likely they are to win. Accordingly, most interventions will occur in marginal elections where such aid can have a significant 'helpful' effect-that is, when the results are highly uncertain or the race is relatively close.

As for the second argument, I argue that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom and the expectations of many scholars of the general uselessness of public interventions of any kind in

the domestic affairs of other nations, overt interventions will often be more effective than covert interventions. This is due to the selection effects which are created by the information provided by the aided domestic actor during the intervention (see causes description).

A great power will intervene publicly only when it knows (from the aided domestic actor) that the intervention won't lead to a domestic backlash prior to the elections. Such a backlash can lead to the opposite effect (hurting the preferred actor) so if it is likely to occur the great power will prefer to intervene covertly. However, in situations in which a backlash is unlikely, an overt intervention is usually more effective than a covert one.

The greater effectiveness of overt interventions in such situations is due to the fact that the great power usually has a resource advantage over the target's politicians and can thus publicly out-promise the transfer (or denial) of various goods to the target's public in return for it voting for the great power's preferred candidate/party. Following the logic of Dixit and Londregan famous distributive politics model, such larger promises by the great power should greatly help the preferred candidate/party win the elections. In contrast, a covert intervention, from its very nature, is limited in the amount of or type of resources it can provide without 'blowing the cover'. As a result of this strategic behavior, when an overt electoral intervention is used, the intervener is more likely to succeed than when it uses a covert intervention.

As for the third main argument, I argue that the political information that the client has about voter preferences and the best ways to manipulate an election comes largely out of its own political experience. The client's experience, in turn, is based on its previous efforts of running in competitive elections. Accordingly, in situations where a particular country has had no recent experience with competitive elections, the quality of the information that the client can provide to the intervener regarding how to help it win the elections would be quite low. In such situations

the chances are quite high that the electoral intervention will be insufficient and/or counterproductive (leading to a public backlash etc.), thus reducing the chances of the aided candidate/party success.

Some readers may wonder as to the reason for the focus of this study only on electoral interventions done by a great power. Partisan electoral interventions can indeed be done and have been done by states which don't belong to this category. Iran, for example, probably intervened in the 2010 Iraqi elections.⁸ Libya under Muammar Kaddafi may have intervened, among other cases, in the 2009 French elections with covert funding to Nicolas Sarkozy's campaign.⁹ Likewise, Hugo Chavez, the former leader of Venezuela, intervened in some elections conducted in nearby Latin American countries such as in Peru (2006) and Nicaragua (2006,2011) (Vanderhill 2013:105-106,118-120). Nevertheless, the present study will not discuss electoral interventions by non-great powers.¹⁰ This is due to three methodological and theoretical reasons.

Firstly, due to the unusual nature of great powers, the dynamics that lead it to intervene in other countries elections may differ from those operating in non-great powers. Great powers, for example, tend to usually have a surplus of resources and variety of available policy tools to deal with a would-be target besides meddling in its elections. Likewise, one of the basic components

⁸ David Ignatius "Tehran's vote-buying in Iraq" Washington Post, February 25, 2010

⁹ "French television broadcasts interview in which Gaddafi says he funded former president Sarkozy's election campaign" *Daily Mail* January 29, 2014. This case is currently under a criminal investigation by the French government.

¹⁰ Likewise interventions by non-state actors (transnational terrorist groups, NGOs, IOs, global media conglomerates etc.) are excluded unless they are directly controlled by an intervening great power (via funding etc.) or clear evidence exists that their intervention was done on the request of, or due to the pressures upon by, such an intervening state.

of being a great power is the limited ability of other countries to ‘punish’ it for its various activities (Bull 1984:1). The decision- making calculus leading (or not leading) to an electoral intervention by smaller powers, who do not usually enjoy either benefit, may as a result be quite different.

Secondly, while collecting the electoral intervention data for this study I discovered that the majority of such interventions are covert in nature. In order to be reasonably certain that all interventions of these countries have indeed been located, the standard technique for gathering cross-national event data for the post-WW2 era- various newspaper indexes and databases (for one example see (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004)) would not suffice. Access to and research in dozens of state archives around the world would be required as well– a task not possible at present due to the inaccessibility of many of these archives to foreign scholars as well as obvious time, language and funding limits.¹¹

Third, from the data that is available about such countries activities, it became clear that a vast majority of partisan electoral interventions (like most other forms of intervention (Bull 1984:1-2)), are indeed being done by the great powers. Accordingly, the analysis in subsequent

¹¹ If to give two typical examples, even among democracies, the Israeli government recently extended the period under which the archival materials from the military and intelligence services are to remain classified from 50 to 70 years, preventing any access even to many such files from the early 1950s. “State archives to stay classified for 20 more years, PM instructs” *Haaretz* July 28,2010. Likewise, the South Korean archives are so incomplete, even as to the decisions and actions of South Korea’s leaders during the first decades of independence, that Korean researchers are forced to use U.S. archives in order to “fill in the blanks”. This is true even as to topics which are not directly related to the U.S.-South Korea relations (personal communication with Dane Swango August 2010).

chapters is probably applicable to most electoral interventions done overall around the world.¹² Nevertheless, I hope in future research to address such interventions as well.¹³

1.2 Key underlying ideas and assumptions

Before beginning an in-depth development of the arguments presented in the previous section, as well as describing alternative explanations, certain key ideas or assumptions need to be clarified. These assumptions underlie the logic of the arguments presented here. They provide some theoretical reasons for why we should care about partisan electoral interventions and not just treat such activities as unimportant curios. Also one or more of these assumptions are not necessarily uncontroversial among some scholars of International Relations or Political Science. Accordingly, it is best to briefly explain and justify these key ideas rather than ‘bury’ the assumption in a later footnote or assuming, in advance, that the reader agrees with me in this regard.

The first key idea is **that the preferences of the leaders (or parties) in power can matter.** States, and the decision-makers within them, have multiple plausible options in most situations and different leaders may choose differently between them. The constraints posed by the

¹² As will be discussed in chapter 2, many electoral interventions done by non-great powers are part of a multilateral electoral intervention with a friendly great power. Such interventions are, of course, included in the dataset.

¹³ This is not an unusual limitation for a Ph.D dissertation. For example, the initial data gathering effort for the MID project (which came out of the doctoral dissertations of Gochman, Mihalka, and Maoz) also limited itself to the great powers (Jones Bremer and Singer 1996:5,46) despite the fact that all of the data that they were looking for was, by definition, overt. The later expansion of the MID data to include other countries took more than a decade and was the result of a collective effort by dozens of scholars and research assistants –means unavailable to me at this point.

international environment or domestic conditions on states, even small ones, are rarely so tight so as to preclude more than one policy option to the decision-makers. Indeed, many factors in IR which are seen as constraints on decision-makers' choices (such as the lack of resources etc.) can nevertheless often permit a rather wide range of possible behaviors (Stein 2006:191-192,194). As Arnold Wolfers has noted, with the rare exception of situations in which the states immediate survival is at stake (the international equivalent of a house being on fire), "it is hard to conceive of situations which leave no room at all for choice and thus for the expression of differences" among decision-makers (Wolfers 1962:15-16).¹⁴

Even if leaders are assumed to be rational that doesn't mean that most, or all, of them will choose the same way when facing the same situation. Perfectly rational actors can differ in their decision criteria- i.e. whether (for example) they prefer relative or absolute gains, short term or long term gains (i.e. their discount factor), risk acceptance etc. (Stein 1990: 106-107,109-110,137-140,173-174).¹⁵ Likewise, such rational actors can differ as to any given, or potential, cooperative interaction with another player in their view of the long term viability of that cooperative interaction or even of that particular actor in the long term (i.e. the 'shadow of the future'). Furthermore, they can differ in the assessments of their country's ability to afford at least one act of defection by the other actor (the latter being a prerequisite for any act of cooperation) (Stein 1990:100-102,108).

¹⁴ For a similar view see (Jervis 1997:205)

¹⁵ Indeed, from such possible differences between rational actors must come much of the idea of "types" common in many game theoretic models which include incomplete information. Unless one assumes that one of the possible types of actors on one or both sides (Hawk/Dove, softliner/hardliner etc.) is always inherently irrational in its preferences, then there must exist some rational decision criteria (or plausible situations) under which rational actors can be of either type.

For example, a rational leader who believed in the early 1950s that the capitalist system is doomed to failure in the long term and that socialism is the “wave of the future” (a belief, one should note, shared by many intelligent, well informed people during much of the 20th century), would, all else being equal, probably make a different choice on whether to ally with the U.S. than a similarly rational leader who thought that capitalism had a fighting chance or is economically superior. If the rationality assumption is relaxed somewhat, and it is accepted that things like the particular personalities or other psychological traits of certain leaders may affect their decision making in certain situations (for two examples see (Etheredge 1978;Greenstein 1992)) then the scope for “leader effects” can of course be even greater.

Indeed, even the favorite realist example for such systemic constraints with the “weak suffering what they must”, Thucydides famous Melian dialogue, has the Melian leadership eventually deciding to fight the Athenians despite heavy odds largely in the hopes of receiving Spartan help due to its alliance with them ([1972]:404-406). This was not an unreasonable decision, unlike the way the Athenians (and realists ever since) had portrayed it in the dialogue, given that the Spartans frequently came to the help of even rather minor allies during the war (see for example (Ibid,389)) and the Melians were able to withstand the subsequent Athenian siege for a few months, eventually surrendering only due to an act of treachery within Melos. Had the weak, in this case, been a bit more fortunate they may have not needed to suffer whatsoever.

Nor, for that matter, do the exigencies of electoral competition, the constraints that democracies usually place on the executive, and the near universal desire of incumbents to remain in power always force all elected democratic leaders or parties, regardless of their own personal preferences, into enacting the preferred policies by the ‘median voter’ in their country.

Firstly, as many scholars have noted (Grosman and Helpman 2001 chp 2;Osborne 1995:279-281; Kartic and McAfee 2007), any relaxation of the assumptions of the Downsian median voter theorem (from where this logic is usually derived) with more realistic assumptions, such as there being more than two significant candidates/parties (the norm in most democracies outside of the U.S.) or that the candidates have character and are not merely faceless party functionaries, would lead to results permitting the victorious candidate/party to promise (and/or implement) different policies than those that the losing candidate/party would have.

Second, a leader, once in power, can many times use the ‘bully pulpit’ and the powers of her office to shift the median voter (or a majority of the public) towards her preferred policies. Indeed, one study estimates that at least one quarter of all significant policy preference changes within the American public between 1935 and 1979 were a result of such efforts (Page and Shapiro 1983,1992).¹⁶ Third, in some real life situations the various constraints imposed by democratic institutions and public opinion, even in the most consolidated of democracies, leave nevertheless a certain latitude for the incumbent to shape policies in various issue areas as she sees fit (Nordlinger 1982; for examples see Byman and Pollack 2001:141-142).¹⁷

Indeed, the recent wave of quantitative research on “leader effects” has been providing increasing amounts of systematic, empirical evidence in support of this assumption. For example, growing quantitative evidence exists for the effects of leader characteristics (or “leader

¹⁶ For one foreign policy example of such abilities describing how Felipe Gonzales persuaded a highly anti-NATO public to let Spain remain in NATO in 1986 see (Maravall 1999).

¹⁷ Indeed as Przeworski (2010:147-148) notes, any system that tries to make an elected government accountable to its public needs, in order to provide the elected officials with the necessary incentives, to also give the elected officials a certain amount of slack or “agency costs”. If the relevant public is largely indifferent to many foreign policy issues in general and/or they have little effect on its vote choice (as may be at times the case) the leaders latitude would of course be even wider.

effects”) such as age and tenure in office of the executive (Horowitz, McDermott and Stam 2005;Potter 2007;Bak and Palmer 2010), tenure in office and personal reputation of the executive (Chiozza and Choi 2003), leadership style (Keller and Foster 2012), the executives religion (Brown 2012) and previous military service and education levels (Horowitz 2012) on various aspects of their country’s foreign policy (such as the chances of entering a militarized dispute).¹⁸ Likewise, effects of leader characteristics have been found also as to various domestic policies such as, for example, economic growth (Jones and Olken 2005) and infant mortality and primary education (Franck and Rainer 2012). In other words, contra to Waltz’s famous claims about the first image (1959:19-20,27-30, 64,231-232), we have both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that different leaders may have both different and generalizable effects as well as evidence that such effects actually exist in some cases. Accordingly, it may indeed be rational, at least in some situations, for a great power to care as to who is in power (or may come to power) in another country.

The second key idea is that **decision-makers believe that the preferences and nature of the leaders (or parties) in control of another country that they are dealing with matter.**

Although systematic research related to this assumption has been rather limited to date, significant evidence nevertheless exists in its support. As one scholar notes, policy-makers in the U.S “take it as an article of faith” that the identity and preferences of foreign leaders have a significant effect on their countries policies (Byman and Pollack 2001:108). Even American

¹⁸ Likewise medium N research on significant foreign policy shifts found that leader preferences had a “critical importance” in most cases it examined (Holsti 1982:208-209). A similar conclusion is found in a recent edited volume comparing the effects of power to those of leader preferences (among other factors) (Rosecrance and Steiner 2010:361). For some recent qualitative research on this topic see (Solingen 2007;Saunders 2011).

statesmen known for their adherence to realist tenants were no different in this regard. Henry Kissinger, for example, one such self-described realist, admitted after his retirement from office that “As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make” (Isaacson 1992: 13). Not surprisingly, we now know that Kissinger was personally involved in numerous attempts to get rid of “problematic” foreign leaders in various electoral and non-electoral ways during the Nixon and Ford administrations (such as Salvador Allende) (Gustafson 2007;Weiner 2007:294-295).

This is true even for leaders of non-democratic states. Recent historical research on Bismarck, for example, has found that much of his foreign policies in the 1870s towards various European democratic and semi- democratic regimes (such as Third Republic France or Belgium) were based on Bismarck’s belief in “the primacy of the domestic politics of other countries” and the need to strengthen the factions/parties within the relevant countries which had domestic and/or foreign policy preferences which happened, directly or indirectly, to be congruent with current German interests (Stone 2010:36,56-57,65,90-92). Likewise, their public propaganda about liberal democracy being merely an elaborate capitalist charade notwithstanding, Soviet leaders seemed to have frequently believed that who won power in the U.S. (and other democracies) mattered and would have important effects upon their country’s foreign policies (Shevchencho 1985:198,214-216,277-278; Jakobsen 1998:67;Fursenko and Naftali 2006:296-297,338-340,356, 413,498).¹⁹

¹⁹ For examples of views by decision-makers elsewhere see for example (Byman and Pollack 2001:118,125-126,132-133); Thomas Kanza “American Elections -- An African View” *New York Times* May 26, 1972; Joseph Kraft “ The importance of personalities” *Washington Post* March 13,1983; Jim Hoagland “What About Mrs. Dukakis?” *The Washington Post* July 21, 1988.

Indeed, in one of few empirical studies indirectly related to this assumption, that of Schultz (2001), finds that both democracies and non-democracies, when dealing with a democracy, will take into account the behavior and beliefs of the major political parties within that country's political system, both those within and outside the government. Indeed they will frequently even base their decision whether to escalate (and perhaps bring about a war) in a crisis situation on the behavior of both the government and the opposition.²⁰

The third key idea **is that it's (not just) the economy, stupid - and politicians know that that is indeed the case.** A cursory reading of much of the scholarly research in American and Comparative politics may lead a reader at times to reach the conclusion that the aggregate economic performance of the economy (however exactly it is measured by scholars or conceptualized by the voters) is the only really important factor in predicting election results in consolidated democracies (for some examples see Tufte 1978:65,121-124; Fiorina 1981:26-27; Erikson 1989; Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000:183; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias 2008). Accordingly, the quality of the election campaigns run by the various candidates, election year events and the various issues raised during it should have little to no significant effect on the results. Likewise, barring foreign policy events in the magnitude of a WW2, foreign policy is expected to have little effect as well.

The aggregate economic situation in the run up to the election usually has, of course, an important effect upon election results in many cases. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence from multiple research agendas in Political Science that it is far from the only important systematic

²⁰ Schultz's model holds even when the opposition parties have ideological/policy preferences and not just electoral considerations (2001:101-107).

factor. For example, some scholars of the economic vote have increasingly acknowledged that the pre-election political and institutional context in a particular country (or the “clarity of responsibility”) may have significant effects on the perceived responsibility of the incumbent for her administration’s recent performance (Powell and Whitten 1993). As a result, in some elections in some democratic countries the effect of the economic conditions on the vote choice has been found to be overall quite small (Duch and Stevenson 2008:81-85).

Even in cases in which the “clarity of responsibility” is usually high, recent research on the effects of election campaigns estimates that a well executed election campaign can have an effect as large as 6% of the vote- an amount as large as the vote margin between the losing and winning side in many elections (Vavreck 2009:20,108-109).²¹ Likewise, evidence has been found recently from some pre-election surveys (Blais et. al 2004:561) that at least in some elections in some countries the main issues debated during the election affected the vote of at least one of every ten voters- an average effect larger than that of the economy in most the elections that were investigated.

Furthermore, as even some proponents of the economic vote have long acknowledged, incumbents are not helpless captives of the fickleness of the business cycle (or of their past record in managing the economy) and can in many cases do various actions in the run up to the election in this regard that can improve their reelection chances. Known examples in modern democracies range from trying to ‘goose’ the aggregate economy in the run up to the election (Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978; Canes-Wrone and Park 2012) to promising or providing various

²¹ For some of the related research finding some effects of campaign spending in elections see (Jacobson 1978; Kenny and McBurnett 1997; Forrest 1997; Palda and Palda 1998; Carty and Eagles 1999; Shin et.al 2005; Benoit and Marsh 2010). Likewise, being involved in scandals of various kinds (usually, where relevant, a major campaign topic), has been found to have significant negative effects on a U.S. congressperson’s reelection chances (Basinger 2013).

kinds of pork to select groups of voters (for some examples see (Mayhew 1974; Denmark 2000; Stokes et.al 2013)).²² In the case of pork, at least, clear evidence exists that its provision can indeed significantly improve the incumbents reelection chances (Stein and Bicker 1994; Ames 1995; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995; Costa-i-Font et.al 2002; Litschig and Morrison 2010).²³

Foreign policy in general and specific foreign policy issues in particular can also have a significant effect in many elections, even when the issue or event in question is not a WW2 style cataclysm. As for Israel, for example, the scholarly consensus is that government performance on foreign and security affairs the main factor usually determining Israeli vote choice in the past few decades (Arian and Shamir 1999:268). Even outside of this perhaps unusual case one can frequently find elections, even in OECD countries, in which various foreign policy issues, from the contribution of troops to an ongoing war fought by other countries (Australia 1966) to the accession to a trade agreement (Canada 1993) to relations with the U.S. (Germany 2002) are believed to have played an important role in the voter's choice (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 86-87).²⁴

²² As Stokes et.al (2013: chp 1) note, in nearly every democratic country investigated by scholars on this topic, including the most consolidated of Western European democracies, evidence of pre-election pork at one or another point in time has been found. In countries where voting 'early and often' is common, the incumbent can of course sometimes also create clientelistic relations with voters utilizing government resources or even directly 'buy' the necessary votes (or their turnout) with various methods (such as providing various gifts to 'buyable' voters) etc..

²³ Most of the evidence for pork's effectiveness noted above is at non-executive elections, usually it seems due to the various methodological difficulties that scholars face in examining its effects in executive level elections. Nevertheless, if pork has significant effects in say mayoral or congressional elections (in presidential systems) there is no reason to believe that the executive, who usually has at her discretion far more tools for this purpose (and who quite frequently may have had past experience in using such tools for this purpose in her preceding lower level offices), is unable to use it well in an effective manner.

²⁴ See also "Vietnam the Issue at Australian polls" *Guardian* November 21, 1966

Indeed, even the democratic country which is usually given as the paradigmatic example of how foreign policy issues ‘don’t matter’ in national elections, the U.S., this is far less the case than it may initially seem. When asked in presidential election year surveys done between 1952 and 2008 (fifteen in total) whether foreign or economic affairs are the most important problem facing the U.S., a fifth or more of American voters rated foreign affairs as the most important problem in eight (or 60%) of them. Foreign affairs were even perceived by a majority of American voters as a more important problem than the economy in a third of U.S. election years during this period (data in Vavreck 2009:29). Likewise, some researchers have found various foreign policy issues to be either important campaign issues or that the views of the different candidates on many of these issues were, in many presidential elections, an important but indirect component in the voters formation of their general evaluation of the candidates (Nincic and Hinckley 1991: 334-335,350-352;Nincic 1992:92, 97-99,102-103). Furthermore, some researchers which have included measures of foreign policy performance into models predicting U.S. presidential elections since 1948 have found substantially significant effects for this factor, especially among (quite ironically) low information voters (Zaller 2004).²⁵

Foreign policy issues may also have had, in some American elections, important effects even on who became eventually the presidential candidates. For example, scholars have found that one important factor in the narrow defeat of Hillary Clinton to Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic primaries was the latter’s clearer anti-Iraq war stand. On the Republican side McCain surprise victory in the Republican presidential primaries seems to have also stemmed, to

²⁵ For a recent review of the academic literature which reaches similar conclusions see (Aldrich et.al 2006).

a significant part, from being seen (at least among Republicans) as the candidate better suited to deal with the Iraq war (Norpoth and Perkins 2011).

Not surprisingly, there seems to be a near universal belief among politicians and their advisors that their (re)election campaigns, their responses to various major domestic issues arising during the election period, as well as how effective they are in “goosing” the economy and/or in “bringing home the bacon” all have important effects on their electoral chances (see examples in Mayhew 1974:57; Tufte 1978:5-8; Vavreck 2009:9-10). Likewise, although they tend to be quite tight-lipped in acknowledging this (at least as to their own behavior in this regard), politicians seem to be quite aware of the possible effects that their foreign policy performance and/or their stands on various foreign policy related issues can have, at times, on their electoral chances (Nincic 1992: chp 4; Gaubatz 1999:85-86; Grow 2008: xii,45-49,155-156,171-172).²⁶

Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that the aggregate economic conditions, important as they may well be in many cases, leave no space for other significant factors to affect national level elections. Foreign powers should therefore have, at least in theory, various ways to effectively aid at times the preferred candidates/parties in many elections of interest.

²⁶ See also Frus 1955-57: document 140.

1.3 Research on Electoral Interventions

1.3.1 Research on the causes of Electoral Interventions

As previously noted, in spite of the ubiquity and possible importance of electoral interventions, little scholarly attention has been paid to them. Foreign interventions of various kinds and for different purposes have been a common research topic in IR over the past two decades with significant research (on both the causes and the effects of such interventions) done for example on covert interventions (mostly covert coups) (Forsyth 1992; Kibbe 2002;Downes and Lauren 2010), overt military interventions in general (Levite, Jentleson and Berman 1992; Kegley and Hermann 1995; Vertzberger 1998; Tures 2001; Koch and Sullivan 2010; Saunders 2011), interventions, usually military, in civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000;Regan 2002;Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2008; Kathman 2011), and external military interventions for the purpose of regime change or democratization (Meernik 1996; Kegley and Hermann 1997; Peceney 1999; Owen 2003;Pickering and Pencey 2006;B.Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Willard 2012;Downes and Monten 2013).

Nevertheless, electoral interventions have received little to no attention in IR. Indeed, when such interventions are mentioned, if at all, in the academic IR literature (Drezner 1999:2-3; Gaubatz 1999: 112-113; Downes and Lauren 2010:285-286), it is usually as a short prelude to the discussion of other phenomenon.

The Comparative politics literature on democratization and democracy promotion has, at times, briefly noted such interventions, especially those conducted in the last two to three decades (see for example Lowenthal 1991;Reichhardt 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and

Wolchik 2011). However, even when partisan electoral interventions are noted in this literature, they are usually classified and aggregated with other acts under the general rubric of “external influences on democratization” or “democracy promotion abroad”. As a result of this classification, scholars in this literature do little to separate between partisan interventions and neutral interventions (such as a generic statement supporting the proper conduct of an upcoming election etc.), completely non-electoral external influences or in some cases, even between actions of state and non-state actors- all very different kinds of activities carried out by different actors for different purposes. That, in turn, leads this literature to overlook the very important differences that usually exist between partisan electoral interventions and the other abovementioned acts as to the level of politics involved, the level of top decision-maker attention in the intervener, resources committed and potential costs involved, effects, etc.

Only two²⁷ significant exceptions to these patterns exist. Both are very recent. The first is that of Weinberg (2011:94-97).²⁸ Largely focusing on U.S. Interventions in Israeli politics since 1977, Weinberg argues that such interventions will occur when two main conditions exist. The first is that the President has a significant interest in the policies of, or events within, a particular country. The second is the President’s leadership style. Presidents with a “hands on” management style, such as Bush Senior or Clinton, will be far more likely to intervene in this manner than presidents with a “hands off” management style such as Reagan or Bush Junior.

²⁷ A third exception, which focuses only on the effects of electoral interventions, a recent paper by Shulman and Bloom (2012) will be discussed in the literature review of the next subsection. For another recent related AER article by (Berger et.al 2013) see Appendix 1.1

²⁸ Weinberg also discusses other kinds (non-electoral) domestic interventions. I focus here only on his explanations for partisan electoral interventions.

Weinberg argues that these two conditions are required for an electoral intervention to occur because of the extremely controversial nature of electoral interventions both within the U.S. as well as in the target. Any attempt to do them in an overt manner would lead to negative, costly domestic reactions at home and a failure of the intervention in the target. As a result, such interventions must always be conducted in secret with only the President's most senior advisors etc. "in the know". As a consequence of this need, only under the abovementioned conditions would the president be willing or able to actually cause such an intervention to occur in practice (Weinberg 2011:96).

This theory however suffers from a few problems. Firstly, given its underlying assumption about the direct domestic costs of partisan electoral interventions, this theory is inapplicable to authoritarian interveners (such as the USSR/Russia or China) who are largely insulated from such domestic pressures. Furthermore, even in the case of the U.S., there is little evidence, outside perhaps of the highly unusual case of U.S-Israel relations, that there are any significant direct domestic costs for the intervener (i.e. within the interveners own country) for doing an electoral intervention.²⁹ As is many times the case in the use of other non-military policy tools (such as economic sanctions see (Cox and Drury 2006:711)), the use of this tool, even when its use is overt and it is well known to the target's public, is frequently not widely known within the intervener's public. For example, it is quite doubtful, despite the attention that the Middle East usually gets, that most Americans knew at the time that the U.S. overtly intervened against Hezbollah in the 2009 Lebanese Parliamentary elections publically threatening to cut off all U.S. foreign aid if it won.

²⁹ As separate, of course, from the potential indirect domestic costs of say giving a trade concession as part of an electoral intervention at the possible expense of one's domestic manufacturers etc.

Even when such interventions do become widely known within the U.S., they rarely become an object of significant controversy. Indeed, the reverse is many times the case. For example, from the evidence available, it is clear that there was widespread U.S. public (and congressional) support for Truman's decision to overtly intervene in the 1948 Italian elections (Miller 1983:42-43,48-51).³⁰ Likewise, one can frequently find in the American press editorials or opinion columns by 'mainstream' opinion-makers supportive of such overt U.S. interventions, if not openly calling at times for electoral interventions in other "problem" countries as well.³¹

As a result, while electoral interventions can have, of course, other significant costs to the intervener (as will be later described), domestic 'blowback' or a decline in public support within the public of the intervener for meddling in the elections of another country is rarely if ever one of them. Accordingly, there is little to no reason to believe that the possibility of such direct domestic costs is, in most cases, a factor in the intervener's decision-making process which leads or fails to lead to such electoral interventions.

Secondly, while an overt intervention in an election can indeed be at times counterproductive as to the target that is not always the case.³² As a result, decision-makers in

³⁰ Had Truman failed in this intervention in the 1948 Italian elections and the Communist party had nevertheless come to power there it is, of course, quite likely that he would have suffered significant domestic costs within the U.S. in a subsequent "who lost Italy" debate. However, these costs would have been incurred because of the failure of Truman to prevent such an unwanted outcome in the eyes of many Americans - *not* because of the fact that the U.S. intervened in these Italian elections.

³¹ For a few examples: Walter Lippmann "Franco and Peron", *Washington Post* March 5, 1946; Marquis Childs "Washington Calling", *Washington Post* March 4, 1948; "Interventionism, Without Humbug", *NYT* (editorial) May 20, 1984; Mary McGregory "A Powerful, Positive 'No'", *Washington Post* October 13, 1988; Flora Lewis "Year of Elections", *NYT* January 9, 1990; "The U.S. and the Serbs", (editorial) *Washington Post* December 18, 1992; "This Ain't Your Momma's CIA", *Washington Monthly* March 2001; Charles Krauthammer. "From Freedom Agenda to Freedom Doctrine", *Washington Post*, February 10, 2011; Ray Takeyh "U.S. Must Take Sides to Keep Arab Spring from Islamist Takeover", *Washington Post*, March 23, 2011; Masha Gessen "For 15 Years, Putin Has Been Planning His Revenge for the U.S Bombing of Kosovo. Crimea Is That Revenge." *Slate* March 21, 2014

³² Indeed one of Weinberg's (2011: 102) own examples of a successful U.S. intervention in Israeli politics, the case of the American intervention in the 1992 Israeli election, was despite Weinberg's claim in this regard, quite overt-

the intervener will at times choose such overt interventions. Indeed, if Weinberg's assumption was always true, then overt electoral interventions would be an inherently irrational act and, at a minimum, would become very rare over time. This is not what we see. Indeed, as will be seen in chapter 5, overt interventions can, in many situations, be quite an effective tool. Likewise, a recent field experiment failed to find evidence of a backlash in the abovementioned U.S. overt electoral intervention in Lebanon (Costange and Marinov 2012:13).

Thirdly, there is, in general, little evidence that the particular President's management style has much of a systematic effect on the chances of an electoral intervention occurring. For example, taking one of Weinberg's (2011:96-97) major examples of how this factor can have important effects (Reagan vs. Bush senior), once one controls for the amount of opportunities available for electoral interventions (i.e. the number of competitive elections during their respective presidencies), Reagan, with his "hands off" management style, was not significantly less likely to intervene in this manner than Bush Senior with his "hands on" style.³³

The second exception is a first of its kind field experiment by Corstange and Marinov (2012:4,9-13) on the effects of an overt foreign intervention on the views of the targeted voters

as even a cursory look in the Israeli media during this period can indicate. For a few English language examples see "Loan guarantees' fate now linked to elections" David Makovsky The Jerusalem Post February 23, 1992; "Baker's choice" (editorial) The Jerusalem Post February 26, 1992; "Going after Shamir" (editorial) The Jerusalem Post March 5, 1992; "US administration hoping for Rabin win" The Jerusalem Post June 18, 1992. Indeed for Israelis who were alive at the time and politically aware (such as the author who was thirteen in 1992 and just began to be interested in politics) the fact that the U.S. intervened in this manner was 'common knowledge'. See chapter 6 for an analysis of the effects of this intervention.

³³ Calculated using the cumulative binomial probability test (for method see Gaubatz 1999:chp.6). One should also note that in the post-WW2 era American presidents tended to have a "hands on" management style. Indeed, Reagan and perhaps Bush junior seem to be the rather unusual exceptions. Even Eisenhower, which was seen as a "hands off" president while in power, was later found to be quite a "hands on" president behind the scenes (Greenstein 1981). The same may well be the case with Bush junior once the relevant archival documents become available. Accordingly, there may well be far too little variation on one of Weinberg's main variables for it to be of significant explanatory value.

towards the intervener. Conducted in Lebanon two months after the 2009 parliamentary election, it found that an overt intervention in favor of one of the sides contesting the elections (i.e., the intervener explicitly declaring its support) has a polarizing effect on the electorate, with those who support the side favored by the intervener viewing the intervening power in a more favorable light and vice versa. In contrast, a neutral or process intervention (one which calls for fair elections for instance) seems to have no significant effects on the electorate's attitudes.

To these results Corstange and Marinov add a proposed explanation as to why such interventions occur. Corstange and Marinov first argue that partisan interventions are more likely when ideologically distinct contenders in the election exist in a particular target. Such a distinction creates an incentive by the intervener to intervene on the side which is more favorable to it (Corstange and Marinov 2012: 3-4). Three further factors greatly increase the chances that such an intervention will occur given the above factor. The first is whether another power, hostile to the intervener, is intervening in these elections as well. Such an intervention, by increasing the cost to the other power of not intervening, will encourage an intervention of it as well (Ibid:4). The second factor is the strength of the would-be intervener vis-a-vis the potential target: the greater the former, the more likely an intervention is to occur. The third is whether a given country has a new/fragile democracy. In such countries, the electoral institutions are easier to corrupt which, in turn, makes an intervention in such targets easier to accomplish. Likewise voters, more fearful of the possible collapse of democracy if the 'wrong side' wins, are more likely to look favorably upon such an outside intervention (Corstange and Marinov 2012:2,4). Accordingly an intervention in such countries is more likely.

Without doubt, this paper is an important, path-breaking step in the study of electoral interventions in general and the effects of such interventions in particular. Nevertheless, it too

suffers from a few problems. Firstly, the method and the loci of testing (a survey experiment on voters in the target) is problematic as to examining the argument on the causes of such interventions. The process that leads to an intentional foreign intervention, by definition, requires some process of decision-making on the part of the relevant decision-makers in the intervener. Accordingly, the research design used here and the target that it analyzes are not sufficient for the purpose of examining the causes of a particular behavior by the intervener. For example, the fact that a partisan intervention (as found in this survey experiment) increased the subsequent amount of political polarization in the target does not necessarily mean that the pre-intervention level of polarization led to the foreign intervention. In order to understand the interveners behavior, a measure of specific characteristics on the intervener's side or, when possible, an in-depth analysis of how the target was perceived and the process that led the intervener to act are required as well.³⁴

Secondly, by focusing on the expected behavior of the voters, this argument ignores the important active role (as separate from a passive role of being seen as ideologically compatible or not) that the preferred leader or party in the target can play in the process that leads, or fails to lead, to an intervention. As will be described in chapter 1 in greater detail, in an overt partisan intervention a lack of coordination between the local campaign of the preferred candidate and the intervention by the foreign power may lead to the opposite effects and a pareto inferior result for both sides (i.e. the preferred candidate/party losing the elections etc.). Accordingly, a refusal to cooperate by the preferred party/candidate will usually make such an intervention not worthwhile to the intervener regardless of the preferences of the voters. Likewise, many such partisan

³⁴ See (Corstange and Marinov 2012:4) for a partial admission of this point.

interventions are covert. In such situations, the voter's preferences as to an outside intervention (about which they don't know) may often be secondary to the preferences of the relevant party/leader in this regard. Accordingly, the behavior and preferences of the preferred party/candidate are likely to have far greater weight in the process that leads, or fails to lead, to an intervention than those of the voters in the target.³⁵

Thirdly, there is little evidence for the claim that factors such as whether the potential target is a new/weak democracy or the intervention of another country increase the chances of such an intervention occurring. As will be described in detail in chapter 2, in a new dataset of significant Soviet/Russian and U.S. partisan interventions constructed by the author little evidence could be found for either factor being usually of significant importance (for a discussion of this paper's findings about effects see the next section).

1.3.2 Research on the Effectiveness of Electoral Interventions

As noted in the previous subsection, little scholarly attention has been paid to partisan electoral interventions in Political Science. Any scholarly interest shown in the effects of electoral interventions has usually come from qualitative scholars from two very different subfields. The first are diplomatic historians who note such interventions as part of a larger study on a particular era or dyadic foreign relations of interest. The second are scholars in intelligence studies which discuss a few cases of such interventions as part of a larger qualitative analysis of the

³⁵ Although, as will be seen in chapter 1, the public's expected response to an overt intervention may of course affect indirectly which general subtype of intervention (overt or a covert) is requested by the preferred candidate/party from the intervener.

effectiveness of various activities conducted by the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Among these scholars significant controversy exists as to the effects, if any, of such interventions. For example, quite a few historians studying particular cases in which electoral interventions had occurred either largely dismiss their effects on the results of the relevant elections or even view them as counterproductive (DeConde1958:chp 13-14;Barnes 1982:663-664; Miller 1983: 52-53; Gustafson 2007:49,73-74).

In contrast, other scholars usually from intelligence studies, see electoral interventions as being quite effective and decisive, at least so as to affecting the results of the intervened elections (Daughtery 2004:4-7; Haslam 2005:13-15; Prados 2006:627).³⁶ Interestingly enough, many of the same scholars who claim that electoral interventions are effective are also, at the same time, very harsh critics of the utility of various other types of interventions (such as covert coups or paramilitary activities).

Two very recent quantitative exceptions to this overall qualitative research on the effects of such interventions exist as well. The first is the abovenoted paper by Corstange and Marinov (2012:4,9-13) on the effects of an overt foreign intervention on the views of the targeted voters towards the intervener. Conducted in Lebanon two months after the 2009 parliamentary election, it found that an overt intervention in favor of one of the sides contesting the elections (i.e., the intervener explicitly declaring its support) has a polarizing effect on the electorate, with those who support the side favored by the intervener viewing the intervening power in a more favorable light and vice versa.

³⁶ As one of these scholars notes in a concluding chapter in which most covert activities of various types are dismissed as unnecessary and costly failures to boot, “The CIA Political Actions [electoral interventions] were successful within their immediate parameters” (Prados 2006:627).

As previously noted, this paper is an important, path-breaking step in the study of electoral interventions in general and the effects of such interventions in particular. Nevertheless, it suffers from a few problems also as an explanation for the effects of such interventions. Firstly, the authors didn't examine how their manipulation affected overall vote choice- only the intervener's popularity. This vote choice may not necessarily be correlated with the intervener's popularity- some voters may dislike the great power more because of the intervention (especially if it includes, as it did in this case, threats). Nevertheless, due to fear of possible punishment, voters may nevertheless vote for the "correct" candidate.

Secondly, a survey experiment in a particular country at a particular point in time may not necessarily be representative of the effects of such interventions within other countries or other periods of time. For that purpose, data from multiple countries and for a significant period of time is necessary.³⁷

The second exception is a conventional public opinion survey on domestic reactions to electoral interventions conducted by Shulman and Bloom (2012:460-464) in the Ukraine fourteen months after the 2004 presidential election in which such an intervention had occurred. In this representative nationwide survey about the partisan electoral intervention which occurred during the 2004 elections, it finds that such interventions are universally seen as improper by the public, with American/Western interventions of this kind perceived as more improper than Russian interventions of this type.

³⁷ Furthermore, even this particular effect wasn't found when, in an alternative experimental treatment, the research subjects were presented with a description of an Iranian rather than a U.S. intervention in favor of one of the two sides contesting these elections (Corstrange and Marinov 2012:12). One must be somewhat cautious of the generalizability of experimental results which seem so dependent on the exact identity of the intervener in the treatment effect.

Although this is also an important and useful study, it nevertheless also suffers from a few problems. Firstly, as in the abovenoted paper by Corstrange and Marinov, there is no attempt here to ascertain what was the relationship between this public view of the electoral intervention and their voting choices at the time. Nor is it clear how representative is this one case for such interventions in other times and places.

Secondly, given the significant amount of time (more than a year) which had passed between the 2004 elections and the conduct of this survey, one may wonder whether these results had been significantly affected by developments in the interim (such as disappointment in the performance of the ‘Orange’ parties once in power, subsequent levels of Western assistance to the Ukraine etc.) rather than from the intervention itself.³⁸ This is an especially pertinent concern in this case given that this survey was conducted right before the 2006 Ukrainian midterm/parliamentary elections- elections which in presidential and semi-presidential systems (such as that of the Ukraine at the time) are notorious for their tendency for results that “punish” the recently elected incumbent’s party (or parties) as indeed was the case in these midterm elections.³⁹

³⁸ For these well known concerns in retrospective survey research see, for example, (Pearson et.al 1992).

³⁹ See the 2002 and 2006 election results in Nohlen’s et.al (2010) chapter on the Ukraine. Another problem may be that the authors are comparing in these survey questions the Western vs. the Russian interventions which are somewhat different things in this case. In other words, a pre-election intervention by the Russian Government vs. one conducted by various private non-state western bodies such as the Soros Foundation (pre-election), and a post-election official yet unplanned intervention by Western governments after the second (and at the time final) round, largely due to the mass demonstrations by the ‘Orange’ parties which erupted following these elections. Interventions designed by a foreign government to affect voter choice prior to the election are quite different than post-election interventions meant to overturn these results and/or the various acts done by private Western organizations. The latter two types of interventions may be seen as less acceptable by public than the first type- regardless of the exact identity of the intervener.

1.4 Overview of the study

The next chapter (chapter 1) will develop my arguments as to the causes and the effects of electoral interventions on election results in further detail as well as the methods by which I will investigate and test these arguments. Chapter 2 will be a descriptive overview of my new constructed dataset describing the initial results and general patterns found as to the U.S. and USSR/Russian interventions. The following two chapters (3 and 4) will be the in-depth qualitative examination of the process which led (or didn't lead) to electoral interventions in four case studies and check whether the findings are congruent with the argument presented in chapter 1. The next chapter, (chapter 5), presents the large N statistical analysis testing the hypotheses presented on the effectiveness of electoral interventions. The following two chapters, (chapters 6 and 7), are an in-depth analysis of the effects, if any, of the electoral interventions in the case studies in which interventions had occurred as well as other cases of intervention for which we have relevant polling and other data. Finally, chapter 8 will conclude this dissertation with a summary and analysis of the results of chapters 1-7 as well as describe the contributions of these results to IR and Comparative Politics.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Arguments and Methodology

Introduction

In this chapter I present in greater detail my arguments as to the causes of partisan electoral interventions as well as their effects on election results. I then describe the methods by which I plan to test these arguments. Both the causes and the effects of electoral interventions are examined here in a theoretical framework in which a great power is in the position to provide costly election resources to a domestic actor who is contesting the elections within another country. The great power and the domestic actor then decide whether to undertake (or agree to) an electoral intervention and how to do it.

An electoral intervention is defined as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country.⁴⁰ Election resources are defined here as in much of the elections literature in Comparative and American politics (for two examples (Nimmo 2000:45; Denver & Hands 1997b: 77)): any factor which may increase the electoral chances of a given candidate/party regardless of its nature (in the domestic context money, endorsements, volunteers etc.).

⁴⁰ See the operationalization of this definition in the methodology section.

1.1 Causes of Electoral Interventions

I argue that partisan electoral interventions occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first is that a significant domestic actor within the target wants or is willing to be aided by the great power in this risky manner. Without such an actors consent and cooperation the feasibility of an electoral intervention becomes so low that a great power will rarely if ever try to intervene. The second is that the great power perceives its interests as being endangered by another significant candidate/party within a democratic target. This candidate/party has very different and inflexible preferences on important issues-i.e., the actor is either greatly constrained by his political base on these issues and/or ideologically committed to particular positions.

As noted in the introduction, Electoral interventions, in general, assume that the preferences of leaders matter and that the leaders in other countries are, accordingly, concerned with the preferences of both those who are in power as well as their potential replacements. Nevertheless, a great power will have, in most times and in most countries, very little incentive to invest significant resources (which an electoral intervention requires) in affecting the nature of the leader and/or the ruling coalition of another country. This is true even when a less than “perfect” leader/party may come to power. The ability of the great power to use its surplus and wide range of resources in order to secure its interests through low-cost conventional diplomacy, the costs of such interventions, as well as the danger of turning the unfriendly but still “reasonable” domestic actor into an outright enemy,⁴¹ will all usually prevent an electoral intervention from being seriously considered or used.

⁴¹ For example, much of the difficult relations between the Obama administration and Hamid Karzai, which have seriously hampered recent American policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan, seem to have been due to Karzai’s anger over

Things are different however, if in the relevant country there exists an important political actor of a type which has (or is perceived to have) very different and inflexible preferences on issues of significant interest to both it and the great power. Such situations may be the result of two possible conditions. The first is the domestic actor's political base. Many of the voters who are part of its "core" constituency may themselves hold these different preferences and be willing to punish the actor if she makes any compromises. In such situations, even if the party leadership privately holds more "pragmatic" views, the fear of severe political punishment will force them to be very inflexible when negotiating with the great power on this issue.⁴² The second, is the domestic actor's own preferences on this issue. The party leaders may be of a type which is very committed to those different preferences, unwilling to enact policies which are incongruent with them.

Following Fearon's (1995) logic, in order to create a bargaining range on the issue in dispute under either of these two conditions (i.e. one in which an "acceptable solution" to the "obstinate" domestic actor now includes a solution of the kind preferred by the great power), the great power will need to use (or credibly promise) very costly policy options (military coercion, very large amounts of foreign aid etc.).

For example, the U.S. would have needed to use extraordinary measures in the early 1950s in order to convince a hypothetical W. Germany under the SPD's Karl Schumacher to join

the (unsuccessful) intervention of the former in the 2009 Afghan presidential elections in an attempt to prevent his reelection "US 'tried to oust Hamid Karzai by manipulating Afghan Elections'" *The Guardian* January 10, 2014

⁴² For a similar logic as to the causes of forcible regime change see Willard (2012). Likewise, recent research (Lupu 2014) has found that one of the main reasons for sudden dramatic collapses in public support for major political parties in democracies is their abandonment of major, long standing policy positions for short term gains. Such policy shifts may lead in some cases to a mass, irreversible desertion by core supporters- especially if those short term gains fail to materialize or aren't long lasting. Accordingly, politicians frequently have a good reason to fear a break with their core supporters on "hot button" issues of these kinds- even if these core supporters are, as is usually the case, a minority (or even a small minority) of the voting population.

the European Defense Community (EDC). Given that the EDC was widely believed to make German reunification impossible until the Cold War ended (Ninkovich 1988:94), for Schumacher to join it would have meant abandoning his deeply held commitment to quick reunification. Indeed, as will be later seen, U.S. decision-makers thought that this goal would be unattainable under a SPD government.

In such situations the great power has an incentive to find an effective yet lower cost option by which to promote its interests in the target (i.e. create a “*better*” bargaining range). In countries with competitive elections, intervening in an election in order to bring, or to keep, in power a domestic actor which is less domestically constrained⁴³ and/or of a “friendlier” type can potentially be such a low cost yet effective solution. Competitive elections are usually one of the least costly ways by which unwanted incumbents can be replaced by their electorate (Przeworski 2010:167). Accordingly, when dealing with such obstinate domestic actors, if a great power is able to find a way to effectively harness this domestic institution in the would-be target for its own needs, an electoral intervention could potentially be both the cheapest way to replace it (or prevent its coming to power) as well as cheaper than bargaining with it. In summary, electoral interventions are usually considered in order to prevent (or to change) an undesirable situation rather than somewhat improve an overall preferable or acceptable situation.

However, the existence of this situation is merely a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for an electoral intervention, even in regard to democratic targets. An electoral intervention is usually not the only available option to the great power and it can choose or

⁴³ In other words, a domestic actor whose political base is largely composed of voters with different and/or more moderate preferences on the issue in dispute who will accordingly be less likely to punish (and may even reward) this actor if it compromises with the great power on this issue.

substitute (Most & Starr 1989) other options as well. These other costly options range from attempting nonetheless to negotiate with the unfriendly domestic actor to removing it by various violent means (from aiding coups to a military invasion). While, as noted, an electoral intervention is usually cheaper than the other options, its *feasibility* (i.e. chances of success) can greatly vary even between democratic targets. Accordingly, except for the very rare *in extremis* cases in which it has no other options, if the feasibility of an electoral intervention is low, the great power will prefer other, more feasible, options.

I argue that in order for an electoral intervention to be feasible, and therefore be the chosen option, the great power must obtain the cooperation of a significant domestic actor within the target which can, with such aid, win the election. Electoral interventions, unlike other types of interventions, are usually an “inside job”. This is due to the fact that an electoral intervention is essentially an attempt to strengthen (or create) a domestic election campaign for a particular party and/or candidate in the target. Indeed, as one scholar notes, the secret agents in charge of covert electoral interventions many times “resembled nothing less than a group of political campaign consultants” (Johnson in Daugherty 2004:82). The roles of the overt interveners in the intervened elections have also been frequently described in such terms.⁴⁴ As a result, in order for an electoral intervention to work, the intervener needs the type of high quality private information that the top politicians and/or the major parties within that country have and use in order to campaign- such as what the relevant voter groups’ preferences are, which messages to use and/or how to package and deliver the messages in order to be productive in that particular

⁴⁴ For example, the U.S. (and President Clinton’s role) in the American interventions in the 1996 Israeli and Russian elections was frequently described as being Peres and Yeltsin’s “campaign manager” and “impresario”. “The Biggest Election” *New York Times*; May 2, 1996; “Just Whose Elections are They, Anyway?” *New York Times* May 26, 1996.

context and where to invest resources in the various campaign activities so as to maximize vote/seat share, etc.⁴⁵

One of the important roles of political parties around the world has been to serve as aggregators of such private political knowledge to the benefit of the candidates running on their behalf. As some researchers on parties and campaigns note, even in the American case (well known for its “skeletal” or “thin” parties), the two political parties have served, among other things, as important sources for various kinds of information on voters and GOTV (voter mobilization/Get out the vote) activities for the candidates which compete in their name at various levels of government (Bohne, Prevost & Thurber 2009:498,503).⁴⁶ Indeed, it seems that one of the main reasons why U.S. campaign consultants tend to work with only one of the two main parties is that in order to do their job, they are provided by them with such sensitive, high quality information (Bohne, Prevost & Thurber 2009:501-502). In the other main subtype, the “thick” “mass” and/or “clientalistic” parties, in which the connections with the voters are far deeper and more frequent, the party performs this role as well (for developing world examples see (Chandra 2004:139;Stokes 2005:316-319)).⁴⁷

⁴⁵ From my examination of who was exactly aided in such intervention in my dataset it is clear that the great powers do not usually have the ability to create significant parties/parties in other independent countries (i.e. create its own ‘opportunity’). The most that the great powers have been able to usually do in this regard is to convince some preexisting grassroots parties and/politicians in the target to agree on a single presidential candidate and/or a common candidate slate for a parliamentary election- both acts naturally requiring quite heavy cooperation with the intervener on the side of the relevant local actors etc..

⁴⁶ Likewise, one should note that this need for information is true even for most of the various independent domestic groups which sometimes also aid candidates running in U.S. elections. As one scholar noted, despite recent changes in U.S. campaign finance law banning such coordination “in the 2004 election, [the presidential] campaigns engaged in a surprising amount of communication with purportedly independent 527 organizations” (Johnston 2006:1169,1178-79,1184-1185) See also Rutenberg & Zernike (2004).

⁴⁷ For some of the most recent methods by which parties have been performing this role see Sasha Issenberg “America Exports Democracy, Just Not the Way that you think” *NYT* March 14,2014.

Such information can be quite important for a successful electoral intervention given that even supposedly minor details may have a significant effect on how a particular message is received by and affects the relevant foreign audiences. For example, even an apparently minor issue such as whether, in a speech to a foreign audience, President Obama noted his name with or without one of its components can lead different foreign audiences to have significantly different reactions to it (Weismal-Manor and Stroud 2010). Likewise, significant differences continue to exist in the nature of election campaigns and their main features in different democracies (Plasser 2009;Plasser and Lengauer 2009:266-268). As a result, knowing how to campaign in one democracy does not necessarily mean knowing much of, or enough on, how to do so in another democracy. Furthermore, even if the intervention is limited to the covert supply of campaign funds, the intervener still needs to know at the very least how much funds to supply, when and where to give them, and to whom within a particular campaign in order to achieve the desired results without exposure.⁴⁸ This type of information is also not easy to locate.

Given the limited understanding that both American and non-American policymakers usually have of the domestic politics of other nations (Drezner 2010),⁴⁹ the would-be intervener

⁴⁸ As one former senior CIA official (Richard Bissel) once noted in a closed talk, when the U.S. gave such covert funding the side it supported usually knew about it, but was, of course, unwilling to publically admit that fact (Marchetti and Marks 1983:335-336). The current method of campaign financing in American elections, in which large amounts of campaign funding can openly (and legally) come from private and corporate donors, may at least in theory, make it relatively easy for a foreign power to covertly intervene via covert funding by using a domestic American firm/individual. For example a foreign power could pressure U.S. firms/individuals who do work for it to direct their campaign donations to the preferred presidential candidate or “pad” their contract by an amount that they then use for this purpose. However, no evidence was found for the use of such methods (i.e. such interventions in U.S. elections without any contact with the candidate/party) in practice. Furthermore, the current U.S. campaign finance system is quite unique in comparative perspective- so such methods of intervention are anyway unavailable to the great powers elsewhere.

⁴⁹ For the general ignorance of CIA agents of local conditions or even the local language in the countries to which they were posted see (Godson 1995:48,61; Weiner 2007: 471). For similar problems encountered by the KGB see (Corson and Crowley 1985: 250; Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999:54,555,557).

usually wouldn't have, or be able to collect, a sufficient amount of the needed information. As a result, in order to have a significant chance of success, assisting a particular party/candidate without any coordination between them will not suffice and may even harm their chances. Instead, the intervener needs the cooperation of the preferred candidate/party which has this information.

Not surprisingly, such cooperation between the intervener and the aided candidate/party and its centrality to the intervention process is usually quite evident in cases of electoral interventions. For example, the U.S. intervention in the October 1952 Japanese elections was, to a significant extent, the result of repeated requests by then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida for a U.S. intervention in his and the Liberal Party's favor. Furthermore, each one of the acts that U.S. did in order to help Yoshida in the runup of the election was the result of detailed Japanese requests for this purpose such as a public statement by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan a week before the election promising continued U.S. foreign aid in the near future.⁵⁰ In other words, even in a country in which the great power intervener recently ended a six year long occupation, and whose new political institutions and constitution were, to a large extent, unilateral impositions by its former occupation regime,⁵¹ still needed the cooperation of and the private political knowledge supplied by the domestic party on whose behalf it was intervening in order

⁵⁰ For details on this U.S. intervention see for example FRUS 1952-1954 14(2): 1178,1181-1182,1186-1189,1268, 1273,1275-6,1280-1286, 1328-1332.

⁵¹ For example, the 1946 Japanese constitution (still in force), was originally written in English by American officials in the U.S. Occupation Authority and then translated into Japanese.

to know how to effectively assist it.⁵² Other examples of this pattern will be seen in the detailed case studies in later chapters.

Such cooperation, however, is not automatic. Even if such aid could be useful, the domestic actor will often reject such an external offer (or not request it) thus preventing an intervention from occurring. For example, in the 1968 U.S. presidential election, the Democratic presidential candidate, Hubert Humphrey, despite a severe shortfall of campaign funding, flatly rejected a secret Soviet offer to provide covert financial and other aid to his campaign. As a result, the Soviets dropped all further attempts to intervene in that election (Dobrynin 1995:174-176).⁵³

Such rejections occur because electoral aid, while potentially useful, also carries significant costs and/or risks for the domestic actor. First, its intentional and/or inadvertent exposure may hurt the actor's standing in future elections. If the intervention is overt, the electorates knowledge of the intervention may hurt the aided actor in later elections even if it is helpful in the short term. Considerations of nationalism, xenophobia, and/or a rational desire that their candidate/party be accountable only to them, may lead many otherwise supportive voters to be wary of such actors, reducing their long-term electoral viability and/or domestic legitimacy. Even if the intervention is covert, the possibility of exposure remains a significant risk to the target. For example, in a hypothetical alternate universe, had Humphrey agreed to

⁵² Likewise, as one researcher of the U.S. intervention in the 1948 Italian elections notes, the intervention heavily "drew on the unflinching support of Tarchiani [the Italian ambassador to the U.S.] and his expertise in assessing Italian politics" (Karabell 1999:42-43,47-49).

⁵³ This Soviet offer was due to their great fear of Nixon, then seen as extremely anti-Soviet or, as Khrushchev once described him (in private), "a typical product of McCarthyism, a puppet of the most reactionary circles in the United States. **We'll never be able to find a common language with him**" (my emphasis) (Shevchenko 1985:108;Dobrynin 1995:176). For other examples of such rejected offers see Andrew & Gordievsky (1990:496).

accept the proposed covert Soviet electoral intervention, the damage to his and to the Democratic Party's political standing, if this intervention had been subsequently exposed, would have been immense.

Second, by reducing its dependence upon domestic resources to win elections, such aid may also inadvertently reduce that actor's contacts with and feedback from the electorate, damaging its ability to understand the public's desires and therefore its electoral viability in the longer term.⁵⁴ Thirdly, such electoral aid includes many times a quid pro quo between the intervener and the aided actor as to particular policies once (re)elected. Such promises impose upon the domestic actor "sovereignty costs", reducing its freedom of action once in power more than it would have otherwise (at least as to the policies in question). Even if the actor would eventually find ways to evade fulfilling these promises, the potential costs involved in breaking them (i.e., deteriorating relations with the "betrayed" great power) may be significant.⁵⁵

Accordingly, external electoral aid will be accepted or requested only by domestic actors who believe that it will overall rebound to their advantage. From the various scholarly literatures which discuss when domestic actors decide to use "unconventional" measures in order to ensure their political survival and/or promote policy goals (i.e., from changing the electoral system (Boix 1999), to requesting IMF loans (Vreeland 2003), to attempting to enlist foreign/transnational actors to help stop various domestic human right abuses (Keck and Sikkink 1998)), we would expect two major types of actors to agree to accept or request such electoral aid.

⁵⁴ A milder version of this problem seems to sometimes exist even in relations between domestic big donors and the parties they donate to. For the increasing complaints, even by some reformist Republicans, that the GOP's post-Bush political renewal is being increasingly hindered by its dependence on wealthy donors (and their preferences) see, for example, Ross Douthat "The Republican Party's "Donorism" Problem", NYT blog post March 6, 2013

⁵⁵ For related arguments on the potential downsides of external aid to the recipient in a civil war or non-violent civil disobedience campaigns see Salayhan (2010:507) and Chenoweth (2013:54-55,175-176,225) respectively.

The first type is the fragile victor. By that type I mean that the relevant party has succeeded in winning power and is currently in control of the state. However the existing political balance of power or the ongoing structural domestic changes within the state are greatly reducing its ability/chances to win power in future elections.

The second type is the blocked/weakening loser. By that type we mean that the relevant party is officially or unofficially blocked from assuming power in the given state regardless of the political support that it musters among the public.⁵⁶ Alternatively, the party has repeatedly failed to win an election and/or has been suffering major political defeats which greatly hurt its ability to win power in the near- to medium-term. As a result, unless a viable domestic actor of either type exists in conjunction with a Great Power fearful of one of this domestic actor's opponents, an electoral intervention is highly unlikely to occur. The presence of only one of these conditions will rarely suffice to bring about an intervention.

H1: *A great power will not perform an electoral intervention unless it perceives, in a target with competitive elections, a significant actor with very different/inflexible preferences as endangering its interests*

⁵⁶ One reason why an excluded/blocked actor may nevertheless look for outside support (and for an outside power to be willing to support it) would be due to the belief that its exclusion from power could come to an end following certain electoral results. For example, if the excluded/blocked party won a sufficiently large number of seats in parliament or, in a presidential system its candidate defeated other candidates, then it would become impossible for the other incumbent political actor(s) to continue excluding it from power without the political system coming to a halt and/or unleashing massive public opposition (demonstrations etc.) which would force its hand. For example, one of the persistent fears of the U.S. (and many Italians) with regards to Italy during the Cold War was that if the Italian communist party became sufficiently strong it would become impossible to form a viable coalition in the Italian parliament without its support. That, in turn, would end its unofficial exclusion from power, forcing the ruling Christian Democrats into, at the minimum, a formal coalition government with the communist party if not even stepping down from power and accepting a Communist led government (see for example Njolstad 2002). Likewise, all else being equal, it would be easier for a military to do a coup against an 'unwanted' party/candidate who won the election by a 'squeaker' than a party/candidate that won it by a clear, convincing majority- if only due to the higher probability of mass civilian protests (and perhaps even disobedience by some of the common soldiers) against the coup in the latter scenario-situations most militaries loath to face. For evidence from related research in authoritarian politics, finding that opposition parties in non-competitive regimes are far more likely to turn to violence or other non-conventional tactics than their brethren in more competitive regimes see (Franklin 2002).

H2: *Domestic actors which are neither fragile victors nor blocked/weakening losers will not request (or agree to) an electoral intervention on their behalf by a great power*

H3: *Great power electoral interventions will not usually occur unless the domestic actor which is supposed to benefit from this aid agrees to accept it.*

1.2 Effectiveness of Electoral Interventions

I argue, based on the abovenoted model of the causes of electoral interventions, that while such interventions are not the only factor which can affect the results of a particular election, they nevertheless can significantly increase the electoral chances of the supported candidate/party. This is the result of the selection effects (i.e. the situations under which electoral aid is usually provided) which occur due to the process by which a would-be intervener and a would-be client ‘choose’ each other.

In situations in which a potential client has low (re)election chances, even if it would receive electoral aid from the great power, the great power is unlikely to support it, usually preferring to avoid the costs involved in such a futile intervention. It will choose other means by which to promote its interests. Likewise, in situations in which a potential client believes that it is quite likely to win an election without outside help, the client is likely to reject an offer of electoral aid by the great power. The potential client will reject such an offer in order to avoid the potential medium and long-term costs involved in receiving such an intervention in its favor (see the causes section for description of some of these potential costs).

As a result, most cases of electoral interventions are expected to occur in marginal elections: situations in which the result is highly uncertain and/or the would-be client is not too far behind. In such situations, we would expect an electoral intervention to have a significant

effect on the results of the election. Given that, all else being equal, the more resources that a particular candidate/party has, the more likely they are to win (Sudulich & Wall 2010:1; Benoit & Marsh 2008:874). We would expect an electoral intervention to usually increase the electoral chances of the aided party/candidate.⁵⁷

H4: *An electoral intervention for a particular candidate/party will increase its electoral chances*

One important factor which affects the effectiveness of an electoral intervention is the subtype of electoral intervention used (covert or overt). The conventional wisdom as to the effects of public foreign interventions of any kind would expect overt electoral interventions to rarely work as intended. Instead such a public intervention would lead to a massive backlash against the intervener, harming the side that the intervener is trying to help.⁵⁸ This view implies that a covert intervention, so long as it remains hidden, is more likely to work.

I argue however that such an expectation ignores both the potential benefits of overt interventions and the way that the foreknowledge of such a possible backlash by the intervener (usually thanks to the information provided by the client) affects its strategic behavior as to the particular type of electoral intervention chosen. When those are taken into account, the reverse is more likely to be true. Firstly, the reactions of a foreign public to an external intervention in their domestic affairs may not always be negative. If this conventional wisdom was always true, then

⁵⁷ In a similar manner to the arguments of scholars of the 'economic vote', I don't, of course, argue that a successful partisan electoral intervention would guarantee a victory of its beneficiaries- just significantly increase its vote share then it would have been otherwise, all else being equal.

⁵⁸ To give one example of this view, Huntington (1999:39) claims that "the more the United States attacks a foreign leader, the more his popularity soars among his countrymen who applaud him for standing tall...the best way for a dictator of a small country to prolong his tenure in power may be to provoke the United States into denouncing him as the leader of a 'rogue regime' and a threat to global peace".

overt electoral interventions would be an inherently irrational act and, at a minimum, would become very rare over time. This is not what we see in the dataset (see chapter 2). Furthermore, a recent field experiment failed to find evidence of a backlash in one such U.S. overt electoral intervention in Lebanon (Costange & Marinov 2012).

Secondly, each subtype of electoral intervention has a different mix of risks vs. benefits. An overt electoral intervention has a higher chance of succeeding but does carry higher risks. Following the logic of the famous distributional politics model of Dixit & Londregan (1996) in which politicians can win elections by promising the transfer of resources to various voter groups (thus “buying” their votes), the great power, due to its resource advantage, will usually have a superior ability to promise the foreign population the transfer of particular resources (or threaten the loss of existing resources) compared with any of the local politicians.⁵⁹ As a result, direct messages from the great power conveying threats or promises to the target’s public (which can only be provided overtly) can be more effective than those given by the local contenders. This may lead to a significant shift in the public’s voting patterns.

However, as decision-makers have long known,⁶⁰ overt electoral interventions are quite risky: if the public in the target country dislikes the intervener, the way the overt intervention is

⁵⁹ In a two related domestic analogs, recent research in American politics has found that the ability of Congresspersons to publically claim credit for particular pork (or government spending) is far more effective method for them to get votes etc. than merely “bringing home the bacon” and letting the facts “speak for themselves” or, for that matter, conventional campaigning and advertising (Grimmer et.al 2012). Likewise, scholars have found that when U.S. presidents actively and openly campaign on behalf of their own parties senatorial candidates in midterm elections, activities strategically targeted so as to favor candidates who are fighting close senate races, these candidates are significantly more likely to be elected than they would have otherwise (Cohen et.al 1991).

⁶⁰ For German and British examples from the early 1940s see Stout (1997). For an American example from the early 1950s see (Frus vol.6 (W. Germany) 1952-1954 Dulles to Conant July 30,1953 pg 499-500); frus 14(2):1329 . In Dixit & Londregan’s (1996:1135,1138-39) terms, this is the situation when the voters have strong ideological preferences vis- a-vis the Great Power or the relevant issues which overwhelm any other economic preferences, etc..

done and/or the details of the conveyed message, such an intervention can lead to a backlash against the preferred candidate, hurting rather than helping its chances of being elected.

In contrast, a covert intervention carries far lower chances of a backlash due to the inherent secrecy in the provision of the electoral aid. However, the lower risk comes with reduced effectiveness. This is due to the nature of covert interventions. A covert operation needs to provide enough assistance to the client so it will have a good chance of winning the elections while being, at the same time, greatly limited in the means (or the magnitude of the means) which it can use in order to avoid exposure and to enable “plausible deniability” (for this general feature of covert operations see (Lowenthal 2003:173-174)). As one former senior CIA official noted, maintaining covertness “almost always” imposes a significant “operational penalty” on the relevant operation (Bissell 1996:214-215).⁶¹ Accordingly, the chances that this delicate balancing act will lead to the under provision of electoral aid to the client, no significant improvement in its prospects and a subsequent defeat in the elections are far higher than in overt interventions.

The intervener, knowing the benefits and risks of each subtype, will act strategically when choosing the method of intervention, using the information it has on the target public’s preferences (as usually provided by the client) in order to maximize the client’s electoral prospects. For example, in the American electoral intervention in the 1969 Thai elections the U.S. government seems to have chosen to intervene in a covert manner largely because the side that it was aiding demanded complete secrecy in the provision of the U.S. electoral aid, claiming

⁶¹ As he notes “the penalty usually takes the form of limiting funds, logistic support, personnel or the level of technology” among other factors (Bissell 1996:215).

that “A leak would destroy them”.⁶² Likewise, one major reason why the U.S. decided to intervene in an overt manner in the 1953 West German Elections was because of Adenauer’s pressure for various overt acts of intervention in his favor. As will be later seen in greater detail, Adenauer was of the belief throughout the pre-election period that overt acts by the U.S. in his favor would improve his electoral chances. Indeed Adenauer even needed, in a few instances, to reduce the increasing fears of some American officials in the runup to the elections of a possible backlash against him as a result.⁶³

As a result, when the intervener knows or receives information from the client indicating that an overt electoral intervention is likely to lead to a backlash in the target public, it will choose a covert intervention. However, because of the lower effectiveness of covert interventions, the intervener is more likely to fail in such cases. Alternatively, when the intervener knows or receives information indicating that much of the target public is likely to positively respond to an overt intervention, it will choose this option. In such cases, where a backlash is unlikely to occur (or the expected backlash is far smaller in magnitude than the expected wave of increased support), the greater expected effectiveness of an overt intervention will lead the intervener to choose this option, increasing its chances of success. As a result of this strategic behavior, when an overt electoral intervention is used, the intervener is more likely to succeed. In contrast, when the intervener uses a covert intervention, it is more likely to fail.

H5: *Overt electoral interventions are more likely to benefit the aided candidate/party than covert electoral interventions*

⁶² Frus 27 1964-1968:Document 398.

⁶³ See for one example James Conant Oral History pg 4-5 box 138 in Conant Papers Pusey Library, Harvard

Another factor which affects the effectiveness of electoral interventions is the target's experience with competitive elections. The political information that the client has about voter preferences and the best ways to manipulate an election does not come "out of the blue". Rather it is usually derived from its experience in conducting one or more previous competitive (or relatively competitive) elections in the target.⁶⁴ As a result, in situations where a given country has no experience, or no recent experience, with competitive elections, the quality of the information usually available to the client is quite low or insufficient. For example, as one anonymous member of the IRI team sent by the U.S. government to help the Romanian opposition in the first post-Communist elections noted about the opposition's political experience and knowledge, "They were like children. They were at the sixth grade level politically" (in Carothers 1996:38).⁶⁵

In such situations, even perfectly rational domestic actors may frequently make significant tactical and strategic mistakes when trying to improve their political fortunes. For example, the literature on the adoption of electoral systems has found that, in many new democracies, the quality and quantity of information on voter preferences etc. available even to the major political actors were so meager or inaccurate that they often, in attempts to manipulate the electoral system in their favor, supported the adoption of, or changes to, an electoral system which severely damaged their political prospects. The rate of mistakes in electoral manipulation

⁶⁴ For the great importance of previous national level elections in teaching parties how to successfully compete for office see Anderson (2009:772) (summarizing his own previous research).

⁶⁵ See also Thomas Friedman "East Bloc Trip Buys Baker Yet Alerts Him to the Odds", NYT February 12,1990;"East Adrift as the Masters abandon Ship" Guardian December 10,1989.

was found to greatly decrease once the relevant actors acquired some experience with competitive elections within their polity (Kaminski 2002; Shvetsova 2003).

Likewise, research on the determinants of the number of presidential candidates in presidential systems has found that in founding elections, due to this initial deficit of information about the electorate's preferences, the various political parties are less likely to effectively coordinate on choosing a common candidate or candidates, thus running in many cases a suboptimally large number of presidential candidates given the presidential election formula. In the following election, when more information becomes available, this coordination failure is usually rectified by the relevant parties (Jones 2004: 81-83).

Accordingly, when the target has no experience with competitive elections, as is the case in founding elections, the quality of the information that the client can provide to the intervener on how to help it win the election is usually quite low. In such situations, where the intervener has little to no sound "inside information" to guide its intervention, it is more likely that the electoral intervention will be insufficient and/or even counterproductive. That, in turn, reduces the chances of the electoral intervention aiding in practice the preferred candidate/party.

H6: *Electoral interventions will be less likely to help an aided party/candidate competing in a founding election than in non-founding/later elections*

The third factor is the political position of the client prior to the election, i.e. whether it is the challenger or the incumbent. Two contrasting hypotheses can be derived depending upon the literature consulted. The first hypothesis for this factor comes from a major strand in the literature on campaign spending or "campaign effects". In this strand of literature, both in

American (Jacobson 1978; Kenny & McBurnett 1997; Jacobson 2006) and Comparative Politics (in many democracies) (Johnston & Pattie 1995; Forrest 1997; Palda & Palda 1998; Carty & Eagles 1999; Shin et.al 2005; Benoit & Marsh 2010), challengers usually benefit more than incumbents from an increase in campaign resources. Accordingly, we would expect an external intervention to benefit a challenger client more than an incumbent client.

This would be due to two reasons: Firstly, the incumbent will usually have higher name recognition and be a more well-known quality than the challenger. As a result, the ability of the incumbent to use various resources in order to shift public opinion in its favor is far lower (Jacobson 1978: 469; Jacobson 2006:205-206). Secondly, past election victories may make it harder for the incumbent, who usually starts with a higher base of prior support, to utilize available resources effectively, being at a more advanced stage of diminishing returns to campaign resources (Denver & Hands 1997a: 184).⁶⁶

H7: *Challengers who are the beneficiaries of an external electoral intervention are more likely to significantly benefit from it than incumbents who receive such electoral aid*

The second hypothesis on this question comes from the IR and Intelligence studies literatures. Extrapolating from this literature, we would expect that, given the international-domestic dimension of interaction that is involved, efforts by a foreign actor to aid its preferred candidate would suffer from decided difficulties which wouldn't normally exist in interactions

⁶⁶ Some literatures in IR, such as to interventions in civil wars (Gent 2008), would also make a similar prediction to that derived from the above Comparative politics literature- but from a very different theoretical direction. It would argue that given the benefits that incumbency usually provides, for an incumbent actor to request or agree to an outside electoral intervention it would probably need to be in a far worse "bad shape" than challengers in a "bad shape" would be (i.e. despite both being in a bad shape "fragile victors" are usually in a far worse electoral shape than "weak/blocked losers"). Accordingly, it would be harder for an intervener to help incumbents than to aid challengers.

between purely domestic actors (i.e. local donors-candidate). These difficulties would lead resources received by an external electoral intervention to differ in its effects from domestically gathered resources, aiding the incumbent client more than a challenger client. This would be due to two reasons:

Firstly, it is much easier for the external intervener to communicate and coordinate with the incumbent client than with a challenger client. As part of its control of the executive branch, the incumbent controls the state's foreign policy apparatus. Furthermore, due to being the legitimate government, secret recurring communication between it and other governments is an expected and legitimate part of its duties. As a result, communication and coordination between the incumbent and intervener in order to influence an upcoming election is relatively easy.

In contrast, the opposition has few established legitimate channels through which it can communicate with other governments. While such communication is, of course, achievable it is far harder to establish and regularly maintain. For example, in order to arrange a single meeting between himself and the leaders of the Chilean Christian Democratic party (when they were still part of the opposition) so as to determine whether to support it in the 1964 Chilean elections, President Kennedy had to organize a full academic conference on Latin America at George Washington University to which Eduardo Frei and other leaders of the Christian Democrats were invited as speakers. Their ostensible presence in Washington, D.C. for this purpose then created an opportunity for a secret meeting between Frei and the President (McCarthy 1972: 254-255).

As a result, coordination between the intervener and the challenger is harder to maintain for this purpose than between an intervener and an incumbent. Lower levels of coordination, in turn, increase the chances of miscommunications and mistakes by either side during the election campaign thereby reducing the chances of success.

Secondly, it is harder for the intervener to provide sufficient aid to a challenger client than to the incumbent challenger both in covert and overt interventions. As scholars of covert operations have long noted, it is harder for an intelligence service to carry out covert activities in countries, even democratic ones, where the government has cool or hostile relations with their own government (for examples see Godson (1995:44);Andrew & Mitrokhin (2005:Chp 17);Prados (2006:46)). As a result, when the challenger is covertly aided, the operational environment will make it harder for the intervener to convey the electoral aid and vice versa. As for overt interventions, it is easier to find an effective (or more effective) way to intervene when an incumbent is aided. For example, when the incumbent is aided, positive inducements which can be provided immediately to the target public (foreign aid, conclusion of favorable agreements etc.) are usually more feasible. Such positive inducements may often be more effective, than positive inducements which include components which can only be carried out after an election (promises etc.) as is usually the case when a challenger is aided in this manner.

H8: Incumbents who are the beneficiaries of an external electoral intervention are more likely to significantly benefit from it than challengers who receive such external aid

1.3 Methodology

Abstract theorizing is, of course, of limited value unless there are ways to examine one's claims empirically. In order to test the arguments given above as to each of these components, this project will use two main methods: statistical analysis and historical case studies. The methods used as to each case will depend on the nature of the problem investigated and data availability.

As for the first question, the causes of electoral interventions, given the nature of the argument proposed here, much of the data required in order to code and test this argument directly through statistical methods is very costly to collect and/or unavailable for many cases of Soviet/Russian and/or U.S. interventions. For example, the evidence required for testing a crucial component of this argument, the existence of extensive cooperation between the great power intervention and the aided domestic actor, is usually among the types of data (identifying characteristics/names of the sources of particular information, etc.) which are the last to be declassified when documents on such interventions are released by the U.S.. This is in contrast to the relatively more limited data needed for the coding for the other question (who intervened and when, which party was supported, methods of intervention, etc.). Likewise, some components (such as the great powers' threat perception) may be difficult to code cross-nationally in a fully satisfactory manner.

Nevertheless, three methods to test this argument are available and used here. The first is to measure a proxy of one of the key conditions of this argument (the need for cooperation with a significant local domestic actor)—i.e., whether the supported candidate and/or party is a fragile victor or a blocked/weakening loser. For that purpose I utilized a new dataset constructed by the author of all cases of partisan electoral interventions by either the U.S. or the USSR/Russia between 1946 to 2000 (see later description). Each one of the cases of partisan electoral intervention in this dataset were coded as to the abovenoted proxy based upon available data (from various primary and secondary sources) about the client's political situation prior to the intervention. If this argument (esp. Hypothesis 2) is correct, then we would expect that in most of the cases of electoral intervention the beneficiaries of this intervention will exhibit this proxy condition.

The second method will be the in-depth analysis of four case studies in which such interventions were done (or seriously considered) by a great power chosen out of the abovenoted dataset and auxiliary data.⁶⁷ A new article (Plumper, Troeger & Neumayer 2010:31-33) on qualitative case selection in such situations, based upon an in-depth Monte Carlo simulation of various suggested selection criteria in the literature, provides advice on case selection in such situations. It recommends completely ignoring the dependent variable and choosing the case studies based upon the independent variables in which the researcher is most interested. Within those independent variables the researcher should attempt to achieve as much variation as is possible. At the same time, variation on the other independent variables (or controls) should be minimized as much as possible. This case selection method also largely conforms with Seawright & Gerrings (2008: 300-301) description and recommendation of the “diverse” case selection design.

Figure 1.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria

Wants aid↓ / Implacable →	Yes	No
Yes	W. Germany 1953	Philippines 1965
No	Venezuela 1958	Greece 1967

⁶⁷ In the course of collecting the dataset of electoral interventions I also came across forty or so cases in which a partisan electoral intervention was seriously proposed or considered by the U.S. or the USSR/Russia but no intervention was eventually done. This auxiliary dataset of non-interventions (unlike that of the cases of interventions) is not comprehensive. As some senior NSC officials later noted, unlike in the cases of approved covert activities, the NSC would frequently destroy (or leave unrecorded) proposals of covert operations (including for electoral interventions) which were eventually not approved (see quote in Kibbe 2002:30; for one example see Ambrose 1981:297-298). Nevertheless, this auxiliary data, in combination with the electoral intervention dataset, could be useful as a locus from which cases for analyzing the causes of electoral interventions are chosen. See further description of case selection method in the methodology section in chapter 1.

Accordingly, these four case studies were chosen on the two main independent variables of interest to the first part of this dissertation (causes of electoral intervention): whether the great power perceives a particular domestic actor in the target as implacable or not and whether another domestic actor in the target wants or is willing to receive such electoral aid or not. Each one of the four cases will represent one of the four possible combinations that these two independent variables can create (see figure 2.1) while keeping other possibly important ‘control’ variables (period, intervener) as identical as possible (for example, examining only cases in which the U.S. intervened or seriously thought of intervening).

A further benefit of this choice of case studies is that it controls for two of the most potentially important control variables: who the intervener is and the period in which the intervention is occurring (or proposed), all cases occurring during the same period (the first half of the Cold War) and done (or not done) by the same intervener- the U.S.. Furthermore, each of these four countries was considered by American decision makers during this period to be of major strategic importance for various reasons. All four test cases are analyzed using structured-focused comparison (George & Bennett 2005) checking, via process tracing and congruence, for the same set of observable implications in each process in which a would-be intervener decides to intervene or not.

For example, if the argument proposed here is correct, we would expect in cases of intervention to find the intervener perceiving one of the significant domestic actors in a particular country as someone with whom “they can’t do business” either in general or on an issue seen as central to the relations between the two countries. We would expect that this perception about that actor to be a major reason for the great power to seriously consider intervening against it in an upcoming election. We would expect to find a major effort by the great power to locate a

suitable domestic partner for such an intervention and/or an “invitation to intervene” on its behalf by such an actor.

On the side of the domestic actor, we would expect the aided party to have agreed to, if not invited, the great power intervention. Likewise, we would expect a domestic actor which has invited such an intervention (or agreed to accept one) to have suffered from severe political damage prior to requesting and/or accepting this aid (repeated electoral failures, major party splits, official/ unofficial permanent exclusion from power, etc.) and/or, if in control of the executive, to be in a very tenuous political situation (weak/declining domestic support base, inferior organizational capabilities vs. main political rivals, etc.).

Furthermore, after an intervention is decided upon by the intervener, we would expect most of the significant specific acts done as part of the intervention (provision of covert funds, public threats/promises etc.) is to be decided upon and carried out in close cooperation between the intervener and the aided party/leader in the target. Indeed, the initiative for many of these specific acts (and the exact details of many of them) is expected to come from the target rather than the great power intervener.

Finally, if only one of the abovenoted conditions is present we wouldn't expect any significant electoral intervention to occur. A great power which sees all of the significant political actors in a given country as “acceptable” is expected to not be interested in intervening nor to allow itself to be pulled into an intervention by one of the domestic actors requesting its help in an upcoming election. Likewise, if the great power sees one of the domestic actors as one with whom “they can't do business” but is unable to locate domestic help within the target, it is expected to usually prefer to “sit out” the election, waiting to see the election results before taking any significant actions. As for the domestic actor, it is expected not to accept an offer to

intervene on its behalf nor make a request for a significant intervention when it perceives its political situation as relatively good or at least acceptable.

In order to collect the necessary data for this purpose I visited the various relevant archives where the required primary archival documents were available such as the U.S. National Archives at College Park, Maryland.⁶⁸ Secondary sources are used largely for factors not usually well covered by primary documents at these archives, such as the overall political situation of the relevant domestic actors.

A third indirect method will be done through the statistical tests of some of the arguments about the effects of electoral interventions. As was described in the previous section, the first three hypotheses on the effects of electoral interventions (hypotheses 4, 5 and 6) are directly derived from my argument about the causes of such interventions. Accordingly, if most or all of these three hypotheses are confirmed, that would also indirectly strengthen our certainty in the argument about the causes of such interventions and vice versa.

As for the second question the effects of such interventions on the election results in the target, it will be examined using two different methods. The first method is a large N statistical study utilizing a new dataset of all U.S. and Soviet/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000 (see further description below). This will be used to examine whether the probabilistic hypotheses posited as to the effects of such interventions are indeed accurate as to the universe of cases (i.e., whether the posited correlations exist).

In order to investigate the main independent variable, great power electoral interventions, in a statistical large N framework I constructed a dataset of all such interventions between

⁶⁸ See the list of archives visited for this purpose in the final bibliography.

January 1, 1946 and December 31, 2000⁶⁹ which were done by the US and the USSR/Russia. This focus was due to the unique availability of relatively complete data on covert electoral interventions performed by these two countries which wasn't available for other great powers. The former USSR/Russia is unusual among post-1945 authoritarian powers (i.e., China) in that summaries of the archives of its secret services for most of the 20th century were smuggled to the West by a defector (see later description). As for the U.S., due to a somewhat more relaxed declassification process for many of the relevant archives, the Pike and Church Committees, and greater public/international interest, far more information is available on its post-1945 covert activities than for any other democratic great powers (i.e. France or Britain).⁷⁰

Constructing this dataset out of scratch required a massive collecting data effort by the author which took nearly a year to complete and utilized a very large number of sources and multiple methods. Accordingly, for the sake of brevity, this section will only provide the general outline of the data collection methods and a small select list of the major sources utilized. A more detailed description of bibliographic sources consulted, the data collection methods as well as a detailed list of all 117 cases of partisan electoral interventions (and other cases which received close examination) is provided in Appendix 1.3.

⁶⁹ The dataset stops at the end of 2000 in order to give time for information on great power covert interventions from the most recent past to 'come out', thus reducing as much as possible the chances of missing cases of electoral interventions of this kind. Likewise, with the possible shift in U.S. foreign policy (and threat perception) following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the end of 2000 seemed like a good cutoff point for the dataset. Nevertheless, later versions of the dataset will further extend its coverage into the 2000s.

⁷⁰ Data availability issues for many 'smaller' states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia or North Korea (as well as various restrictions on access the archives of many democracies) makes the investigation of non-Great Power interventions of this kind also quite problematic at present- see the introduction.

For the purpose of constructing the dataset, I operationalized such interventions as follows: in order to be coded as an electoral intervention, the acts done by the intervener⁷¹ need to get a ‘yes’ answer to two questions: 1. Was the act *intentionally* done in order to help or hurt one of the sides contesting the election for the executive? 2. Did the act clearly carry significant costs which were either (a) immediate (cost of subsidizing the preferred candidate’s campaign/a covert intervention) and/or (b) longer-term/potential (loss of prestige/credibility if a public intervention fails and/or long-term damage to the relations once act is done or exposed).⁷² Each case which is found to fit to these criteria is then coded as to other relevant aspects (covert/overt, intervener, party/candidate supported, etc.).

For an example of the way this operationalization was applied in practice, in the previously noted case of the 1969 Thai elections, the evidence from U.S. primary documents indicated that the U.S. gave millions of dollars⁷³ in covert party funding to the UTPT party prior to the elections (i.e. a costly act). According to the records of the U.S. government body which made the decision on approving this covert funding (the 303 committee), this funding was provided by the U.S. government in order to improve the UTPT’s electoral chances in the

⁷¹ Acts done by private citizens of a great power on their own volition, such as American campaign consultants hired for pay by a candidate/party in another country to give it campaigning advice, are excluded. Activities by organizations largely funded by one great power, such as the NDI or IRI, are counted as a partisan intervention if the election related assistance provided in the run-up to an election in a given country is designed so as to exclusively help only one particular side contesting it rather than being available to all interested parties/candidates (as is usually the case with the above examples).

⁷² For the way that public acts of this type, like other kinds of coercive diplomacy, can have significant reputational costs if they fail and/or the intervener is caught bluffing, see George (1991) and Sartori (2005). For some of the ways that damage to the relations between two states can be costly to an intervener even if immediate military retaliation/war is not feasible for the target, see (Trager 2010). For a fuller description of the logic of this definition and operationalization see appendix 1.2.

⁷³ Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 “Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee” February 7, 1969. The exact sum has not yet been declassified but based on the context it was clearly significant.

upcoming parliamentary elections (i.e. partisan and intentional).⁷⁴ Given that this particular act fits all of the criteria noted above, it was coded as a case of a U.S. electoral intervention in the 1969 Thai elections. Other examples of acts which would fit these criteria are listed in the left column of table 1.1. Acts of a great power which don't fit one (or more) of these criteria are listed in the right column of table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Examples of Activities Coded or Excluded as Partisan Electoral Interventions

GP activities coded as interventions	Excluded great power activities
<p>“Symbolic” military exercises by the intervener before an election</p> <p>Covert provision of campaign funds to the favored side either directly (to candidate/party coffers) or indirectly (secret agents buying votes etc.)</p> <p>Training locals (of the preferred side only) in advanced campaigning and get out the vote (GOTV) techniques</p> <p>Covert dissemination of scandalous exposes/disinformation on rival candidates</p> <p>Efforts to covertly physically harm/destroy the ‘unwanted’ party/candidates HQ, campaigning materials or their candidates contesting the election</p> <p>Public & specific threats or promises by an official representative of intervening country</p>	<p>Invitation of preferred candidate to international conferences, IOs, a visit to another country (unless includes concrete concessions/promises, etc. as well)</p> <p>Photo-ops/meetings of candidate with world leaders/official representatives of the intervener with no concrete results otherwise</p> <p>Provision of foreign aid of various types in order to enable the holding of free elections and/or improve their quality (without subsequent attempts to affect the results)</p> <p>Generic/neutral statements of support for the proper conduct of the electoral process (with no endorsements of a particular candidate/side)</p> <p>Secret/open refusal of leader/officials of the intervener to publicly meet with a candidate or his/her representatives</p> <p>Positive/negative things said about a candidate/party</p>

⁷⁴ Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 “Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee” February 7, 1969

<p>Creation (for the preferred side only) of campaigning materials/ sending campaigning experts to provide on-the-spot aid</p> <p>Sudden new provision of foreign aid or a significant increase in existing aid</p> <p>Withdrawal of part or whole of aid, preferred trading conditions, loan guarantees, etc.</p>	<p>by the intervener before an election with no concrete threats/promises</p> <p>Leaks to the press of reports of disagreements between the intervener and the target, etc.</p> <p>“Regular” election monitoring</p>
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The method for collecting this data depended on its type (covert or overt) as well as whether it is a Soviet/Russian or an American intervention. For finding candidate cases of public electoral interventions by both powers, I used, as is common for the collection of overt acts, numerous keyword searches with the relevant terms in three online newspaper archives which cover the entire period: The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Guardian & Observer (UK). Overt interventions, to be effective, must be known to the target public prior to the election. As a result, they usually receive significant journalistic coverage and are unlikely to be missed.⁷⁵

For the covert Soviet/Russian interventions, I depended primarily upon the Mitrokhin Archive, a remarkable, relatively complete, archive of Soviet covert interventions created by a disgruntled KGB archivist over the course of twelve years which was smuggled to the West after the end of the Cold War (Andrew & Mitrokhin 1999,2006:Introduction). This source was then supplemented by the plethora of historical studies conducted since the end of the Cold War as to particular countries using the very selective and partial access sometimes granted to other Soviet archives in the 1990s, as well as research on Russian activities during the 1990s (for examples see (Hill & Jewett 1994;Gaddis 1997: Henderson 2002:Zubok 2007)).

⁷⁵ For the definitions of covert and overt interventions see chp.2

For the covert American interventions, as a starting point I used the list of such interventions constructed for a critique of post-WW2 U.S. foreign policy by Blum (2005:Chp 18); Blum utilized various journalistic accounts and memoirs of former CIA agents for this purpose. After each case was carefully cross-checked, I added to this initial list possible cases noted in reliable secondary sources. These include various Congressional investigations of CIA activities (such as the Pike and Church Committees' Reports), and histories of the CIA and of U.S. covert operations as well as of the Cold War (for examples see, (Woodward 1987; Johnson 1989;Westad 2005; Weiner 2007)).Finally, as a supplement and as a check on this list's inclusiveness, I conducted a keyword search of the State Department's FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) volumes. The online searchable versions are now available through the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections and the Office of the Historian in the State Department. Following these steps, any candidate cases for which doubts still exist as to their coding were further checked by consulting the relevant primary documents in U.S. archives over the course of two extended research trips to the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

The second method used in order to examine the second question will be the micro or single election level examination of the effects of such interventions in select intervention cases. For that purpose a careful qualitative analysis is conducted in the case studies noted here in which interventions had occurred as well as, where available, exit polling and survey data from elections in which such overt interventions had occurred and relevant questions were asked by the pollsters immediately before or very shortly after the election. That in turn, will be used in order to examine whether the findings at the large N level (and the theoretical arguments upon

which they are based) are congruent overall with the micro level patterns found in intervention cases (i.e. that the large N correlations are not spurious).⁷⁶

The following chapters will implement this research design and test the eight hypotheses proposed here. The next chapter (chp.2) will be a descriptive overview of my new constructed dataset describing the initial results and general patterns found as to the U.S. and USSR/Russian interventions.

⁷⁶ An even better method would have been to also test statistically for this selection effect by including proxies of this process. Unfortunately, given the nature of many of the factors involved (for example, the domestic actor's expected vote share in the next election without an intervention), such cross-national proxies were unavailable.

Chapter 2: Overview of the Electoral Intervention dataset

This chapter provides a brief overview of the dataset of U.S. and Soviet/Russian electoral interventions constructed by the author. Before diving in, head first, right into the case studies or the statistical analysis having a basic idea of the universe of cases of intervention from which the case studies are selected, and on which the statistical analysis is conducted, can provide useful context to later analysis and help remove any doubts about its reliability as a measure of electoral intervention. It may be able to supply some initial evidence as to the arguments proposed here as well as for alternative arguments proposed by other scholars. Finally, as an understudied phenomenon, the general patterns found in this first of a kind dataset of partisan electoral interventions should be of interest in their own right.

When feasible or analytically useful, some of the general patterns described in the following sections are examined using two forms of table statistics: the cumulative binomial probability test (see Gaubatz 1999:chp.6) and the Chi-square test. Accordingly any reference in the following sections to certain patterns being statistically significant (or not) refers to results found using these two methods.

2.1 Overview of dataset and data validity

Overall 117 partisan electoral interventions have been done by the U.S. and the USSR/Russia between January 1, 1946 and December 31, 2000.⁷⁷ Eighty-one (or 69%) of these interventions were done by the U.S., while the other thirty-six cases (or 31%) were conducted by the USSR/Russia. To put this number in the proper perspective, during the same period 937 competitive national level executive elections, or plausible targets for an electoral intervention, had been conducted within independent countries.⁷⁸ Accordingly, 11.3% of these elections, or about *one of every nine competitive elections* since the end of WW2, have been the targets of an electoral intervention.

Even in absolute numbers electoral interventions have been a more common form of intervention by these two powers than other, better known and usually costlier, methods. For example, during the same period only 18 foreign imposed regime changes or FIRCSs (a category which includes military invasions as well as significant covert coups such as in Iran in 1953) were conducted by either the U.S. or the USSR/Russia (Downes & Monten 2013). Likewise, between 1946 and 2000 there were 53 significant military interventions (i.e. including the deployment of at least 500 soldiers etc.) by these two countries (Sullivan 2007).

⁷⁷ For the data collection method, the definition and operationalization of partisan electoral interventions as well as the choice of cutoff point in 2000 see the methods section in chapter 1.

⁷⁸ I define an intervenable/competitive election, or the universe of cases in which such interventions can potentially occur, as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) electoral competitiveness index (executive election competitiveness) (Beck et.al 2001) with a small modification. For an election to get that score, multiple parties (in parliamentary systems) won seats in the election and the largest party got less than 75% of the vote, or, in presidential or semi-presidential systems, multiple candidates ran and the winning candidate won less than 75% of the votes (see a further description in chapter 5). Four cases of partisan electoral interventions had occurred in elections which weren't competitive following this criteria (Bolivia 1964, Chile 1988, South Vietnam 1961 and 1971) usually due to last moment boycotts of the elections by one of the major sides which were widely expected to contest them or (in the Chilean case) a rare example of a relatively competitive plebiscite. These cases are nevertheless included in the subsequent calculations unless noted otherwise.

As can be seen in figure 2.1, electoral interventions have occurred in every world region (except for Oceania) although their relative frequency greatly varied.⁷⁹ Overall, given the number of competitive elections in existence in every given region, elections in Europe and Asia were significantly more likely to be targets of such interventions ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.001$ significance respectively). In contrast, elections in Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania were significantly less likely to be targets of such interventions ($p < 0.001$ significance in both cases), perhaps due to the relative marginality of many of the states in both regions. As for specific interveners (figures 2.2 and 2.3) the main statistically significant differences between them were as to the most preferred target region. The Russians mostly intervened in Europe ($p < 0.01$ significance). In contrast, given the number of elections in each region, the U.S. was more likely overall to intervene in Asia ($p < 0.001$ significance).⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Regions were defined here in the following manner: North America- Canada, Mexico and the U.S.. Latin America- the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The Middle East- the Arab world, including the Arab states which are in North Africa (Sudan, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt), and the non-Arab states usually included in this region (Iran, Israel, Turkey). Europe-the whole continent including Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Russia and the Caucasus. Oceania: Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific Island states (Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu etc.). Asia-Central Asia (including Afghanistan), East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia (including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea). Sub-Saharan Africa- excludes the Arab parts of North Africa (see list above), includes Mauritius.

⁸⁰ Calculated using the cumulative binomial probability test (both directions). The above finding as to the U.S. is congruent with Prados (2006:627) claims, based on decades of research on CIA activities, as to overall rate of CIA covert interventions of this kind in different world regions.

Figure 2.1: Competitive vs. intervened elections by region- all interveners 1946-2000




Figure 2.2: USSR/Russia electoral interventions by region- 1946-2000





Figure 2.3: US electoral interventions by region- 1946-2000



As to specific countries in which electoral interventions had occurred, sixty different independent countries have been the targets of such interventions since 1946 (see figure 2.3). Targets of such interventions came from a large variety of sizes and populations, ranging from small states such as Iceland and Grenada to major powers such as West Germany, India and Brazil. As can be seen in table 2.1, with the unique exception of Italy, each Great Power tended to most frequently target different states for its electoral interventions.

Table 2.1: Top five targets of electoral interventions- the U.S. and the USSR/Russia

	U.S	Num. of interventions		USSR/ Russia	Num. of interventions
1	Italy	8	1	W. Germany	5
2	Japan	5	2	Finland	4
3	Israel	4	2	Italy	4
3	Laos	4	4	France	2
3	Sri Lanka	4	4	India	2

As for the subtypes of national level elections targeted by interveners, about 19.5% of all electoral interventions (or 22 cases) have occurred in founding elections.⁸¹ Given the number of founding elections overall during this period, no significant difference has been found between the chances of an electoral intervention occurring in founding vs. a non-founding elections.⁸²

About 44.4% of all intervention cases (40.6% with the exclusion of the Italian cases) are repeat interventions- in other words, cases in which the same great power after intervening once in a particular country's elections decided to intervene again in (one or more) subsequent elections.⁸³ Of course, a situation of "returning customers" may fit the argument as to the causes of electoral interventions proposed in chapter 1. In other words, a repeat intervention may simply indicate that the initial underlying conditions which led to an electoral intervention in one election weren't 'solved' by the first electoral intervention and persisted into later elections, sparking similar requests for electoral aid by the target and/or perceptions of threat by the great power. For example, in both the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections, the U.S. faced a similar threat- the plausible possibility of Salvador Allende, a presidential candidate who was perceived by the U.S. as an implacable foe, winning the Chilean presidential elections (Gustafson 2007). The

⁸¹ Using this study's definition of founding election (see appendix to chapter 5).

⁸² For these calculations I excluded the three intervention cases noted as occurring in non-competitive elections (see the second footnote). If one counts the fourth exception, Chile's 1988 plebiscite, as a founding election (whose criteria it fully fits except for its plebiscitary nature) the U.S. (at marginal significance of $p < 0.1$) is more likely to intervene in such elections.

⁸³ The share of 'repeat customers' among U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions is the same. During the data collections process whenever an intervention was found in a peculiar election in a given country special effort was put into checking later and previous elections for further possible interventions. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that this percentage of 'repeat customers' is underestimated in the data.

plausibility of this being the case is strengthened by the fact that 71% of the repeat interventions are in consecutive elections.⁸⁴

Furthermore, elections are also discrete events, each usually separated from the next (or previous) election by 3 to 6 years. Given that fact one would expect each such decision on whether to intervene or not in a particular election to be taken independently, many times with different decision-makers in charge in the great power in each new election in the target. That, in turn, should discourage new electoral interventions from being done merely due to the fact that in the previous election in the target such an intervention was done.⁸⁵

Nevertheless, given this finding, the possibility of bureaucratic inertia (on the side of the intervener)⁸⁶ or an ‘addiction’ (on the side of the aided candidate/party) being in these cases a significant cause for such repeat interventions can’t be completely dismissed out of hand. Given that two of the qualitative case studies in this study—the 1965 Philippine elections and the 1967 Greek elections, are cases of potential “returning customers”, the plausibility of such alternative explanations for an intervention occurring in such situations will be examined in the analysis of these cases. Likewise, the possibility that the great power’s past experience in conducting electoral interventions in a particular country will affect the effectiveness of its most up to date intervention will be examined in chapter 5.

⁸⁴ The exclusion of the Italian intervention cases has little effect on the results of this calculation.

⁸⁵ For descriptions of the overall decision process which led to many of the covert electoral interventions that indicate that the decision to intervene electorally indeed tended to be discreet see the secret internal CIA study of Jackson (1973 (3): 94-98) and for the Soviet case (Andrew & Mitrokhin 1999:295-297,468-469; 2006:71-72). See also later case studies.

⁸⁶ This is an accusation made at times against CIA/covert U.S. interventions of various types (including electoral ones). For one recent example see (Prados 2006:381).

As for the characteristics of the electoral interventions, the vast majority of electoral interventions (64.1%) were covert. Likewise, almost a quarter of the overt interventions (23.8%) also had some clearly covert components. This, in turn, indicates a need to control for such combinations when I later attempt to test for the possible different effects that each subtype may have. Incumbents and challengers are almost equally likely to be recipients of an electoral intervention on their behalf. Of the 111 intervention cases in which the identity of aided candidate/party is known, and there is a clear incumbent in the election, about 52.2% of the interventions were done in favor of the incumbent and 47.8% in favor of the challenger.⁸⁷

A wide variety of costly methods was used by the great powers in order to help the preferred side. Given, as previously noted, the large number of interventions which were covert (part of whose details still remain classified etc.), a full accounting of all of the specific methods used in order to help a client in a particular election, beyond the most general characteristics of the intervention, cannot yet be done in many of the intervention cases. Nevertheless, the data collected for this dataset indicates that many electoral interventions weren't limited just to 'generic' public threats/ promises by the intervener or, for that matter, to sending big bags of money to the preferred side's election campaign.⁸⁸

For example, in a few cases of intervention (such as Guyana 1968 or Chile 1964) parts or much of the intervention seems to have been designed to serve as pre-election 'pork' (for roads and other infrastructure) for particular constituencies in order to help the incumbent attract

⁸⁷ For the definitions of incumbents and challengers see chapter 5.

⁸⁸ It is also interesting to note in this regard that such interventions seem to quite rarely include (when covert) physical harm towards particular candidates/parties or when overt symbolic or actual use of military force by the intervener (less than half a dozen cases at most). Even, for example, the infamous track 2 in the Chilean 1970 election occurred only after the elections was concluded. Although partisan electoral interventions are, of course, a severe, blatant and usually coercive violation of the non-intervention norm it instructive how frequently they nevertheless observe another democratic norm- that of non- violence.

support. In at least one case (Malta 1971) one component of the intervention seems to have designed to ‘goose’ the economy in the months preceding the election- an example of what might be called the ‘transnational’ form of the political business cycle. Indeed in the abovenoted Chilean case one of the components of the American intervention seems to have included even smuggling frozen meat into Chile in order to deal with a severe shortage that had developed there in the pre-election period.⁸⁹

Nor were the costly methods of intervention limited to economic issues or means. For example, in some interventions the assistance also included, among other things, surrendering a strategically important military base to the target (Finland 1956), coming out in support of a highly contentious claim by the target for a particular disputed territory (Italy 1948), or enabling the release of convicted Nazi war criminals (Germany 1953).

The costly assistance given to the campaigns of the preferred candidate/party also was quite varied in many cases. Examples of some methods used by the intervener varied from, among other things, drugging the rival candidate right before he was about to have a major press conference (Philippines 1953), to providing various vitally needed campaigning equipment (such as in Laos 1955 or Romania 1990), to flying in, at the interveners expense, expert “spin doctors” (Russia 1996).


This variety indicates that many electoral interventions were “customized” by the intervener to fit a particular clients needs.⁹⁰ That, in turn, provides one indirect piece of evidence for one of the key components of the argument made here as to the causes of electoral

⁸⁹ All the data here and the following examples comes from the authors dataset

⁹⁰ This is unlike the common manner in which many forms of foreign assistance such as (to give two examples) IMF loans or World Bank grants, are frequently characterized.

interventions- that such interventions involve (and require) cooperation between the intervener and a particular candidate/party in the target.⁹¹

Figure 2.4: U.S. and USSR/Russia electoral interventions by decade 1946-2000



Turning to the temporal patterns exhibited by the electoral interventions (figure 2.4) they seem to be roughly congruent with the overall behavioral patterns of each power on other, heavily studied, dimensions during the Cold War. In the American case, the pattern of its partisan electoral interventions found here is concomitant overall with the way U.S. behavior during the Cold War is usually described by historians: a burst of activity during the early Cold War followed by a decline usually ascribed to the combined effects of Vietnam and Détente and then a renewed burst of activism during “the second Cold War” of the early to mid-80s (Smith 1990; Westad 2005). In the Soviet case, these patterns are also concomitant with the way

⁹¹ Furthermore, it is clear from the nature of virtually all of these interventions that, even if they weren’t successful it wasn’t due to a ‘desire’ by the great power to fail in this regard. In other words, there is little to no evidence that electoral interventions are done with the purpose of harming or giving a ‘kiss of death’ to the aided side (even if, in some cases, that is indeed the unintended result).

historians nowadays usually describe Soviet behavior on other dimensions during the Cold War: an overall increase in international activism over time peaking in the 1970s followed by a decline in overall activism ascribed first to the war in Afghanistan and then to Glasnost and Perestroika (Westad 2005; Zubok 2007).

The abovenoted finding that the U.S. has conducted more than twice as many electoral interventions as the Soviets/Russians did (69% to 31%) is also congruent with what we know from other datasets about each powers relative foreign policy activism- i.e. that the U.S. was overall far more active than the Soviets/Russians have been during this period. For example, of the above mentioned 18 FIRCS, 38% were done by the USSR/Russia while 62% were done by the U.S. (Downes & Monten 2013). A similar breakdown exists among the abovementioned significant military interventions with 36% being done by the USSR/Russia and the remainder (64%) by the U.S (Sullivan 2007).

A third indication of the reliability of the data collection process is the abovenoted fact that a majority of the interventions found (64.1%) were covert.⁹² Given that overt (or public) interventions, by their very nature, are far easier to find such a pattern would be unexpected unless the data collection process was quite thorough.⁹³ Nor is there any evidence that the covert interventions found here are an unrepresentative population of operational failures. For example, only five of the covert interventions found here, or 6.6% of the covert interventions in the dataset, are cases in which the covert intervention became public knowledge prior to the

⁹² The average for each intervener is roughly the same, with 65.4% of U.S. interventions being covert while 61% of USSR/Russian interventions are of this type, a statistically insignificant difference (Chi. sq test insignificance at 0.65, test statistic 0.2).

⁹³ In other words, a low quality data collection effort in this case could be expected to have a predominance of overt interventions rather than covert ones.

conclusion of the intervened elections- one of the major ways by which such “operation failure” is usually defined.⁹⁴

2.2 Preliminary evidence

As noted in the introduction, an overview of the complete dataset (or the universe of cases) may enable us to do a first cut examination of some of the arguments proposed in this study as well as some, or components of, plausible alternatives. Firstly, the dataset provides some strong yet indirect evidence for the argument in the first part of this study on the causes of partisan electoral interventions. As noted in chapter 1, I argued that one of the key factors required for an intervention to occur is the existence of a significant domestic actor within the target who wants or is willing to be aided in this manner. An overall overview of the universe of cases enables us to check a proxy measure of this component—i.e. whether the supported candidate and/or party is a fragile victor or a blocked/weakening loser.⁹⁵ Overall, out of the 114 intervention cases in which enough data is available to indicate who exactly was supported by the great power, at least 76.3% of the receivers of such support (or in 87 of these cases) belong to one of these subtypes. The share of supported domestic actors which fit this criteria on the Soviet/Russian

⁹⁴An additional case of exposure occurred in an overt intervention which had a covert part. Likewise, as noted in the methods section chapter 1, quite a few of the covert interventions were exposed via means not under the control of the relevant agencies/ executive branch such as blue ribbon investigative committees or defectors.

⁹⁵ As noted in chapter 1, a fragile victor is a situation in which the relevant party has succeeded in winning power and is currently in control of the state. However, the existing political balance of power or the ongoing structural domestic changes within the state are greatly reducing its ability/chances to win power in future elections. A blocked/weakening loser is the situation in which that the relevant party is officially or unofficially blocked from assuming power in the given state regardless of the political support that it musters among the public. In other words in such situations, for example, the recipients have suffered from severe political damage prior to receiving this aid (repeated electoral failures, major party splits, official/ unofficial permanent exclusion from power, etc.) and/or, if in control of the executive, are in a very tenuous political situation (weak/declining domestic support base, inferior organizational capabilities vs. main political rivals, etc.).

side (72.2%) is a bit lower than U.S. supported actors (78.2%)- however this difference isn't statistically significant.⁹⁶

Secondly, little evidence is found to back up other plausible alternative explanations. For example, one claim which is made at times is that electoral interventions are more likely when a dangerous opponent of that great power is known to be intervening in this manner (see for example (Corstange and Marinov 2012:4). However, as can be expected from table 2.1, only seven (or 6.3%) of the intervened elections in our dataset are cases of a double electoral intervention- i.e. that the U.S. was backing one side while the Soviets (or Russia) were backing another side during the same election (or vice versa).⁹⁷ This is despite a special effort made by the author during the data collection process to check the behavior of the other superpower whenever clear evidence of intervention by one of the great powers was found in a particular election. Two of the most famous cases of intervened national level elections- the 1948 Italian elections and the 1970 Chilean elections, were double interventions, but they are not typical.

Of course, during the Cold War the bipolar rivalry had an important part in the way in which each great power defined 'dangerous' or 'unacceptable' leaders/parties in third countries. Likewise, one can't completely dismiss the possibility that in a few cases of electoral intervention mistaken beliefs about the plans of the other superpower weren't an important factor in the decision-making process that led to it. Nevertheless, the relative dearth of such dual

⁹⁶ Using the Chi sq. test (insignificance at 0.48, test statistic 0.49)

⁹⁷ This percentage of double interventions is only slightly larger (7.8%) if only cold war interventions are counted. In another 5-6 cases of electoral interventions (such as U.S. electoral interventions in Lebanon 1957, Mauritius, 1982 or Israel 1996), claims were made by the sources consulted etc. that another power, one hostile to the intervener (such as Nasserite Egypt, Libya under Qaddafi or Iran respectively) was aiding the other side in the elections. However, even if this was true (and the evidence for an intervention actually being done by that other hostile power is quite weak in many of these cases) the overall number of double interventions still remains quite low.

interventions seems to indicate that this factor (the decision of the other superpower to electorally intervene) was in most cases a relatively minor part of the decision process which led or didn't lead to an electoral intervention. Indeed, in some cases there is even evidence that claims of such interventions, i.e. creating an impression of a double intervention occurring when only one country is intervening, are sometimes made as part of a disinformation campaign so as to hide the actual covert intervention in one's favor and/or to 'muddy the waters' in overt ones.⁹⁸

Third, under similar threat environments (or eras) little difference is found between Democratic and Republican presidents as to their electoral intervention propensity. During the Cold War, Democratic presidents would intervene electorally on average 1.35 times per year in power while Republican presidents did 1.37 electoral interventions per year, a minor substantive difference which isn't statistically significant.⁹⁹ Similar results are found as to Soviet General Secretaries until the end of the Cold War.¹⁰⁰

Fourth, contra to Corstange and Marinovs' suggestion (2012:4), no evidence exists that countries with fragile democratic institutions are more likely to be the targets of such interventions than 'full' democracies. In order to test this claim I used, as is the standard in the

⁹⁸ For example in 1953 W. German election, CDU leader Konrad Adenauer made intentionally spurious charges that some SPD members were covertly receiving money from the GDR- this while he was being overtly aided by the U.S. (Schwartz 1995:77-78). For other examples see (Volodarsky 2010:90; Selvon 2005: 470); "Hungary Charges U.S. Aid To Nagy, British Espionage" *New York Times* Jun 22, 1947;

⁹⁹ Using the Cumulative binomial probability test (both directions). A slightly different metric of the probability of intervention of U.S. presidents of each party in a given foreign election (as from the number of foreign competitive elections open to intervention in each year in power) during the Cold war gives the probability of a democratic president intervening during the Cold war in a given foreign election as 10.78% and a Republican president at 10.35%- the difference again being insignificant. In the Post Cold War era Democrats are significantly less likely to intervene than Republicans. However, given that this dataset ends in December 2000, this is largely the function of the Clinton presidency- which occurred during an unusually low threat environment (which famously was an important factor in enabling Clinton to win the presidency in the first place).

¹⁰⁰ Using the cumulative binomial probability test (both directions). If the last three years of Gorbachev's rule (which coincide with the end of the cold war) are included, he is found to be significant less likely to intervene in this manner ($p > 0.01$).

field, a 6 or above polity2 score in the year in which the electoral intervention occurred to indicate a fully democratic polity. When the share of electoral interventions in democratic polities under this definition was compared to probability of a competitive elections occurring in such polities during the same period, no statistically significant chances of such interventions overall occurring in such countries was found.¹⁰¹ The same thing was found (no statistically significant relationship) when this test was repeated for each separate decade in the dataset. This result is far from surprising given that in 72 cases (or 64.3% of all interventions) the target had a 6 or higher polity score. Indeed in 43 cases (or 38.4% of all interventions) in which an intervention had occurred the target had the combined polity2 maximum score of 10- a score usually reserved to countries whose democratic credentials are beyond doubt (such as the U.S., Sweden or the UK).

Finally, in about 18 cases of electoral interventions (or 15.3% of the dataset) there is evidence of the partisan electoral intervention being a multilateral affair. In other words, these are interventions in which the Great Power intervener cooperated with another country (or countries) in intervening in order to help a particular side contesting an election in a third country. Although the data for this particular measure, as well as the exact amount of extra “burden sharing” provided by the “wingman” is in some cases quite sketchy,¹⁰² the available

¹⁰¹ Using the Cumulative binomial probability test (both directions). This analysis only includes cases in which the polity dataset has scores. Breaking down to the level of intervener, the U.S. was somewhat more likely to intervene in non-democratic countries while the Soviet/Russians were more likely to intervene in more democratic countries. However this pattern becomes insignificant (at the 0.05 level) once one excludes the regions in which both powers intervened the most (i.e. Asia for the U.S. and Europe for USSR/Russia)- which suggests that this was largely due to the geopolitical interests of both powers in particular regions (which happened to be more or less democratic) rather than any underlying tendency by either great power to intervene in more or less democratic regimes.

¹⁰² A complete record of this aid would require consulting the many times unavailable wingman’s archives. Likewise the U.S. government has at times formal or agreements with other governments limiting what documents it releases about such joint activities. For example, the U.S. has a 1947 agreement with the UK (UKUSA) in which, among other things, any documents related to joint activities (covert or otherwise) held by the U.S. would not be released by the U.S. without the UKs explicit permission. Given the UKs far stricter standards of official secrecy

evidence from these cases seems to indicate that its contribution is usually secondary in size and complementary in nature.

For example, in the 1948 Italian elections, the U.S. (among other acts) repeatedly threatened in public to cut off all of its aid to Italy if the Communist party won, provided 55 million dollars in highly visible emergency pre-election aid (food etc.) and secretly sent at least 10 million dollars in covert funding for the Christian Democrats and other local bodies tasked with various GOTV activities. In contrast, the UK's main contribution was having one of its intelligence agencies, the IRD, secretly 'plant' a large number of propaganda articles in the Italian press- an ability which the newly formed CIA seemed to be still lacking (Lashmar & Oliver 1998:37). Likewise, the main component of the Soviet intervention in the 1969 West German elections was a public diplomatic note sent two weeks before the elections offering to negotiate the issues in dispute between it and West Germany, an opening proposal which included various major substantive concessions to Bonn's positions. In contrast, the GDRs main contribution was the unilateral seating of the E. German delegates from E. Berlin in the GDR parliament, a move which potentially opened the door to Brandt demanding voting rights for the (majority SPD) non-voting West Berlin delegation in the Bundestag.

Accordingly, little evidence exists that when multilateral electoral interventions occur the great power is "passing the buck" to other countries or "leading from behind"; rather such 'wingman' interventions usually just add somewhat to the hoped overall effect on the elections of the third country, of which the great powers' own contribution is still central.

and document release in many situations that means that many documents as to UK's cooperation, even on U.S activities which are already public knowledge, may still be classified (for a description see Mohl 1998:x-xi).

2.3 Conclusions

This brief overview chapter illustrated some of the main patterns found in the electoral intervention dataset which is utilized here. Some indirect ‘first cut’ evidence was found for the explanation proposed here for why electoral interventions occur with more than three quarters of the interventions (76.3%) being done for the type of actors that it would expect (fragile victor/blocked weakening loser). Likewise, clear evidence was found that many of these interventions are, as it would expect, “customized”.

In contrast, little evidence was found for alternative explanations for why electoral interventions occur. For example, no evidence was found to support the claim that such interventions are more likely to occur in countries with fragile democratic institutions. Likewise the differing patterns found here as to where each great power intervened as well as the quite small number of double interventions (6.3%) cast serious doubt on claims that such interventions are due to knowledge that another threatening power is intervening on the other side. In the following chapter I will begin to analyze the causes of electoral interventions directly via an in depth analysis of two cases where an electoral intervention was seriously considered by the great power.

Chapter 3: The causes of electoral interventions (Prt.1)- the cases of Germany 1953 and Greece 1967

Introduction

In chapter 1, I argue that electoral interventions usually occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first is that the Great Power perceives its interests as being endangered by a significant candidate/party within a democratic target. This candidate/party has different and inflexible preferences on important issues-i.e., the actor is either greatly constrained by his political base on these issues and/or ideologically committed to particular positions. The second is the existence of another significant domestic actor within the target who wants (or is willing) to be aided in this manner. When these two conditions are missing, partisan electoral interventions will rarely, if ever, occur.

As one component of investigating this argument, four cases were chosen from the authors larger dataset of U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions and auxiliary data (see chapter 1) using the diverse selection method as well as recent research on the best methods to choose cases for in-depth qualitative analysis from a dataset (Seawright & Gerring 2008:300-30;Plumper et.al 2010:31-33).

Figure 3.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria (investigated cases in this chapter are shaded)

Wants aid↓ / Implacable →	Yes	No
Yes	W. Germany 1953	Philippines 1965
No	Venezuela 1958	Greece 1967

In this chapter I investigate the first two of the four cases- the 1953 West German Elections and the 1967 Greek Election.¹⁰³ As can be seen from Figure 3.1, these are the cases in which both conditions were missing or both were available.¹⁰⁴ These two cases are analyzed (with primary archival documents) using structured-focused comparison (George & Bennett 2005) checking, via process tracing and congruence, for the same set of observable implications in each process in which a would-be intervening country decides to intervene in an election or not.

For example, if the argument proposed here is correct, we would expect in cases of intervention to find the intervener perceiving one of the significant domestic actors in a particular country as someone with whom “they can’t do business” either in general or on an issue seen as central to the relations between the two countries. We would expect that this perception about that actor to be a major reason for the great power to seriously consider intervening against it in an upcoming election. We would expect to find a major effort by the great power to locate a suitable domestic partner for such an intervention and/or an “invitation to intervene” on its behalf by such an actor.

On the side of the domestic actor, we would expect the aided party to have agreed to, if not invited, the great power intervention. Likewise, we would expect a domestic actor which has invited such an intervention (or agreed to accept one) to have suffered from severe political

¹⁰³ As will be later described in detail, although a successful coup had occurred prior to this election (which led to its cancellation), it was a surprise to both the various political groups within Greece as well as the U.S. government, which expected these elections to occur as planned and made its policies towards Greece accordingly.

¹⁰⁴ An alternative way to organize and present the testing of these four case studies would have been to focus in one chapter on the first condition and in the second chapter to focus on the second condition. However I found this method to be extremely confusing to most readers given the need to explain first the foreign policy and domestic context of four different countries in order for the provided evidence in each case to be fully comprehensible.

damage prior to requesting and/or accepting this aid (repeated electoral failures, major party splits, official/ unofficial permanent exclusion from power, etc.) and/or, if in control of the executive, to be in a very tenuous political situation (weak/declining domestic support base, inferior organizational capabilities vs. main political rivals, etc.).

Furthermore, after an intervention is decided upon by the intervener, we would expect most of the significant specific acts done as part of the intervention (provision of covert funds, public threats/promises etc.) is to be decided upon and carried out in close cooperation between the intervener and the aided party/leader in the target. Indeed, the initiative for many of these specific acts (and the exact details of many of them) is expected to come from the target rather than the great power intervener.

Finally, if only one of the abovenoted conditions is present we wouldn't expect any significant electoral intervention to occur. A great power which sees all of the significant political actors in a given country as "acceptable" is expected to not be interested in intervening nor to allow itself to be pulled into an intervention by one of the domestic actors requesting its help in an upcoming election. Likewise, if the great power sees one of the domestic actors as one with whom "they can't do business" but is unable to locate domestic help within the target, it is expected to usually prefer to "sit out" the election, waiting to see the election results before taking any significant actions. As for the domestic actor, it is expected not to accept an offer to intervene on its behalf nor make a request for a significant intervention when it perceives its political situation as relatively good or at least acceptable.

3.1 First case study: the U.S and the 1953 West German Elections

3.1.1 U.S. interest in Germany in the early 1950s

During the early Cold War, the United States had three important goals vis-a-vis Western Germany (and Western Europe). The first was protecting West Germany from future Soviet aggression. The second was creating a security framework which would tie Germany to the West and prevent the inevitable future increase in German material capabilities from leading it to threaten its neighbors yet again. The third was to create the conditions which would enable the eventual withdrawal of American troops from Germany in particular and from Europe in general, the long term presence of the latter there being seen by most American decision-makers of the 1940s and 1950s as neither desirable policy-wise nor politically feasible, in American domestic terms, in the long run (Trachtenberg 1999; McAllister 2002).

In this context, the creation of the European Defense Community (hence EDC) seemed to American decision-makers to be the perfect policy for achieving all three goals simultaneously. The EDC was to be an EU circa 1990s style organization differing from it in the focus of integration being on the military sphere rather than on the economic one. It was to create among its six would-be founding members (France, W.Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries), among other things, a common European military into which all German military units would be completely integrated and put under the control of a joint general staff. With such a large European military, of which West Germany would be an inseparable part, the 'German question' would be solved and Western Europe would have the independent military capability for defending itself from a possible Soviet attack thus enabling the U.S. to eventually withdraw

its military forces from Europe. Not surprisingly, getting W.Germany and the other five would-be members of the EDC to ratify the EDC agreement became the main policy goal of the late Truman administration specifically vis-a-vis W.Germany (McAllister 2002:171-173,214-215, 224).¹⁰⁵

The new Eisenhower administration was, if at all, even more dedicated to this policy. For example, as the new secretary of state John Foster Dulles described in the first State Department-JCS meeting in late January 1953 the EDC was so obviously superior to all other available options that the only reason that he saw for any further internal discussion of alternatives was in order to create ‘dummy options’ which he could use for bargaining pressure on signatories like West Germany who haven’t yet (at that point) ratified the treaties.¹⁰⁶

Likewise, Eisenhower firmly believed in the importance of approving the EDC as a way to achieve the three above mentioned policy goals. Indeed his decision as the commander of NATO to endorse the EDC in mid-1951 was probably one major reason why the Truman administration decided to pursue the EDC after some initial skepticism as to its military viability (McAllister 2002: 210-215).¹⁰⁷ Not surprisingly in the early Eisenhower administrations policy

¹⁰⁵ For details on the EDC see “NATO notebook series The European Defense Community” November 1,1953 briefing documents/Paris/RG84, U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland (hence NARA). The reduced sized divisions (or groupments) contributed by each member were to be without logistical support (which was to be supplied at the integrated European Corp level) thus making it virtually impossible for any German ground units provided to the EDC to function independently of the common European army.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum of discussion of state mutual security joint chiefs of staff meeting January 28, 1953 Foreign Relations of the United States (hence FRUS) 1952-1954 5:712-713

¹⁰⁷ Indeed Eisenhower even thought that the EDC, by creating a strong, prosperous and peaceful Western Europe would eventually enhance (if to use an anachronistic term) Western European ‘soft power’ to such an extent that Soviet control over East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe would eventually collapse due to internal public resistance in these countries, precluding the need for a war. DDE to Montgomery, July 14 1953, DDE Diary Eisenhower papers Whitman file box 3 in the Eisenhower Presidential Library (Hence DDEL). See also “NSC 160/1” August 17, 1953 in FRUS 1952-1954 7: 514

document as to Germany (the NSC 160/1) the EDC was described as the “most acceptable solution” to the various U.S. goals vis-a-vis Germany.¹⁰⁸ As a result, only after the EDC was eliminated once and for all as a viable option by its rejection in the French parliament in August 1954 was the U.S., despite its strenuous efforts, willing to give it up and accept other policy options for achieving these goals (McAllister 2002:230,242-243).¹⁰⁹

3.1.2 The “Shaky Victors”-Adenauer and CDU

The Christian Democratic Union (Hence CDU) is seen nowadays as a model of democratic political success, described by some as Germany’s “natural party of government” (Glees 1996:88). Likewise, its first chairman, Konrad Adenauer, who ruled Germany for a record-breaking fourteen straight years, is seen as one of Germany’s greatest leaders. Indeed, some historians nowadays even name this whole period in German history as “the Adenauer Era” (See citations in Irving 2002:xvii-xviii).

Few observers of West German politics would have expected these developments in the early post-war years (Schwarz 1995(1):420,449; Nicholls 1997:72; Germany 1964:170)). Indeed, this would have been seen as far more plausible occurrence as to its main competitor- the Social Democratic party (hence SPD) and its first two leaders Kurt Schumacher and Erik Ollenhauer.

¹⁰⁸ “NSC 160/1” August 17, 1953 FRUS 1952-1954 7: 514

¹⁰⁹ Some historians of this era may wonder why, if the U.S. cared so much about the ratification of the EDC, it didn’t make any attempt to intervene also in the elections in France, the country which eventually brought about the EDC demise. One main reason seems to be that the U.S. simply didn’t have any opportunity to do so due to the vagaries of the French election calendar. The 1951 French general elections occurred before the EDC became a major issue and by the time the following French elections had arrived (January 1956) the EDC treaty was already dead and buried. The U.S. nevertheless did try to intervene in other ways. For example, according to one source the CIA, during the debate in the French parliament over the EDC spent over half a million dollars bribing French deputies to vote for the EDC without much success (Mosley 1978:324-325).

The SPD was one of Germany's oldest and best known parties. It had begun gathering a significant following and already contesting elections in the late 19th century. During the Weimar era and until the rise of the Nazis in the early 30s, the SPD was Germany's largest party and the prototypical example of the mass party. While the SPD, of course, suffered during the Nazi era from persecution, it quickly rebounded after WW2, recreating a strong, effective and experienced party organization. By 1948, for example, it had nearly 900,000 members by 1948- or more than any other German party (Edinger 1965:104,139,142,194-195). In an era in which the mass party model still predominated (Duvarger 1954), this was a major competitive advantage. Furthermore, thanks to the efforts of its first Postwar leader, Kurt Schumacher, the SPD, in contrast to the Weimar era, was a relatively cohesive party, which suffered from little factionalism (Edinger 1965:111). It also benefited from its impeccable anti-Nazi credentials of many of its leaders (a major plus in the post-WW2 era) with Schumacher, for example, widely admired for his staunch resistance to the Nazi regime which culminated in spending ten years in a concentration camp (Edinger 1965:65,104,190).

Unsurprisingly, with much of the German right discredited, destroyed or illegal and all of the above advantages, the SPD was widely believed to be or would quickly become Germany's dominant party in the early post-war years. This belief was strengthened by the pre-1949 local election results in many of the occupied regions of West Germany in which the SPD greatly surpassed, by a significant margin, its pre-Nazi strength (Edinger 1965:139,195,199;Germany 1964:170).

The CDU's, and Adenauer's, situation was far less favorable. The Christian democratic party (the CDU) was a first of its kind attempt to create a center-right party which transcended the class and religion (Catholic/ Protestant) faultlines which characterized German politics

during Weimar and beforehand (Irving 2002:60;Schwartz 335-336). In that effort they had little pre-existing popular following to depend upon. For example, the Weimar era party which Adenauer and many other CDU leaders left, the Zentrum (the Catholic party) rarely got more than 10-14% of the votes during Weimar era elections (Edinger 1965:196;Nohlen & Strover 2010:776-777). Likewise, despite major efforts in this regard, the CDU still remained a in this period a Catholic dominated party both in membership and voting patterns (Nicolls 1997:88). Not surprisingly, the CDU consistently had far less members then the SPD, a problem which just became worse by 1953.¹¹⁰

The relatively low membership also reflected lower organizational strength and effectiveness of the CDU. The party organization was quite dysfunctional during the 1949 elections. After the 1949 elections, despite some efforts in this regard, little significant improvement had occurred. As one local CDU party functionary complained, the CDU organization was “a purely Platonic affair. The fact that it is such, constitutes one of our prime weaknesses” (Heindenheimer 1960: 197,200; Irving 2002:61,64, 159-160).

Konrad Adenauer’s own personal political position was not much better at this point. Before the coming of Hitler to power Adenauer’s highest political achievement was becoming the mayor of Cologne- the German equivalent of being say the mayor of San Diego. In that position, despite some local achievements, he was locally known for his financial mismanagement and wasn’t very popular. Indeed he barely won his last (pre-Nazi, pre-depression) mayoral election in 1929 (Irving 2002:34-37). After WW2, despite his centrality in

¹¹⁰ For example despite declines in membership in both parties in the early 50s for various reasons the CDUs party membership dropped far more drastically in both relative and absolute terms to a bit above a third of the SPD by 1954 (215,000 vs. 627000) (Edinger 1965:107;Irving 2002:159).

the creation of the CDU, he was a virtual unknown to the West German public. Indeed one post-election poll, conducted shortly *after* Adenauer was named as the first Post-WW2 German chancellor, found that only 34% of the West German public even knew who he was (Edinger 1965: 217-218).

To this was added the age factor. Adenauer was already 77 years old in 1953, an unusually old age for heads of government even by the more lax age standards of that era.¹¹¹ Adenauer also suffered from various age-related illnesses. Indeed, in order to convince the CDU leadership to let him become Chancellor in 1949 he had to bring a testimonial from his personal doctor confirming that he could do this job for about two years (Granieri 1996: 61-62). Therefore in early 1953, he was still widely seen as a temporary, transitional figure (Kastner 1999:8; Schwartz 1995(1):413-414,449). In this situation, any loss of power by the CDU was likely to completely end Adenauer's political career.

Due to all of the above factors, in the runup to the 1949 elections the SPD was widely expected to win and Schumacher was expected to become chancellor.¹¹² However, the CDU was able to eke out a bare victory over the SPD in this election (31% to 29.2%). Most likely this was due to a major last moment blunder by Schumacher-calling the German Catholic Church (of which a large number of Germans were still devout members) "the Fifth Occupation Power"

¹¹¹For example, Adenauer was the oldest member of the 487 member Bundestag after the 1953 elections "Dr. Adenauer to Remain Foreign Minister" *Guardian* September 10, 1953

¹¹² "Social Democrats Favored" New York Times August 9, 1949; "The Hard-Bitten Herr Schumacher" New York Times July 31, 1949; "Nationalism Is Ticket in Reich Today" The Washington Post; Aug 14, 1949; (Thayer 1957:138) the last citation is of a book written by a former us diplomat who was at the time stationed in Germany. See also (Edinger 1965: 139,195); Conant (former U.S. High Commissioner) "my Six years in Germany":3-4, 3-5, German ambassadorship drafts and diary entries, box 11 in Conant Papers Pusey Library, Harvard. Few people expected, of course, that the SPD would win an absolute majority. However in multi-party parliamentary systems a party can be an effectively dominant party without needing to win an absolute majority- as the examples of the Swedish Social Democrats & Mapai/Labor in Israel (till 1977) show quite well.

(Edinger 1965:208,248;Schwartz 1995(1):429-430). Despite their victory, Adenauer and the CDU had no illusions as to their true political situation. The weakness of the CDU's position was repeatedly noted in various internal post-elections discussions by Adenauer and other CDU members (Schwarz 1995(1):431,441;Irving 2002:77).

After the election the situation didn't improve for Adenauer and the CDU. Adenauer had to create a shaky, four party coalition, in order to have a majority in the Bundestag. It barely won its first vote of confidence by a majority of one (in a 402 member legislature); it was Adenauer's own vote (Irving 2002: 76). One reason why the SPD refused to join the government was its (widely shared belief) that a CDU dominated coalition wouldn't survive for long (Schwartz 1995,1:441, 449-450; Nicholls 1997:72). Indeed Adenauer's coalition was so shaky that one major reason why he successfully opposed the inclusion in late 1949 of West Berlin in the Federal Republic as the twelfth Lander (or state) was because of his fear that the addition of a few new MPs from West Berlin (a SPD stronghold), would suffice to endanger his coalition (Trachtenberg 1999:131).

After an initial honeymoon, Adenauer's unpopular domestic and foreign policies (such as support for early German rearmament)¹¹³ as well as economic difficulties led to a collapse in public approval with only 24% in support by the second half of 1950. The situation slightly improved by 1952 but then dropped yet again and by the last quarter of 1952 only 34% were in support (Noell & Neumann 1967:256-257;Drummond 1982:54-55). On the question of party support (the main issue of significance in a parliamentary system), the situation was even more dire. The CDU fell behind the SPD by August 1950 and remained consistently behind the SPD in

¹¹³ One should note that this was an initiative of Adenauer- not a policy encouraged or imposed on him by the U.S. who wasn't yet interested in 1950 in German rearmament (Schwarz 1995,1:522,527-528,590)

every poll taken until the spring of 1953 (when the U.S intervention began) (Noell & Neumann 1967:400).

This dire electoral situation wasn't reflected only in the opinion polls. In the multiple Lander elections between 1949 and 1952 (the German variant of midterm elections), the CDU vote share greatly dropped, winning on average only 25%. The SPD repeatedly defeated the CDU in these elections. Even worse, fragmentation on the right increased and various new smaller parties (such as the refugee party) began to siphon votes away from the CDU (Irving 2002: 78; Drummond 1982; 56-57,70-71). Indeed, a 1952 study done by the U.S. government based on the abovementioned Lander results estimated that, if these vote share trends continued, then the SPD would decisively defeat the CDU in the next general elections. A similar conclusion was reached in a subsequent, widely propagated, West German study.¹¹⁴ Many informed observers of the German political scene during 1952 saw Adenauer's political situation as precarious and the SPD's Schumacher as the likely next German chancellor (Felix 1952:72; Lania 1952:13).

Economically, things weren't much better. Although the German economy (after an initial crisis in early 1950) had begun to recover from the effects of WW2 under Adenauer, by the beginning of 1953 it still hadn't reached the "economic miracle" stage for which it was to be known later in the 1950s. In public perception at that time whatever economic gains were achieved were greatly offset by the great sudden jump in prices (of nearly 20%) due to outbreak of the Korean War. Not surprisingly, by late 1952 polls have consistently shown a large plurality

¹¹⁴ Source in (Edinger 1965:230). See a description of the German study in Bonn dispatch 1775 December 29,1952 762a.00 Record Group 59 (hence RG59) U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland (hence NARA). Indeed as late as July 1953, with the U.S. intervention in favor of Adenauer in full swing, the CIA in an optimistic study on Adenauer's elections prospects still expected the SPD to get more votes than the CDU in the upcoming elections (Current Intelligence Weekly July 31,1953 CIA Crest).

(47%) in support of the SPDs economic agenda (planned economy) while only 29% (a drop of 8% in comparison to a year ago) supported the alternative proposed by the CDU (Social market economy) (Spicka 2007:96-98,102).¹¹⁵

3.1.3 The U.S. view of the SPD and the decision to intervene

The U.S. problem with the SPD in the early 1950s had little to do with either its democratic character or its position towards the USSR or communism. The SPD was the only major German party which had opposed the 1933 enabling act that ushered in the Third Reich. Much of the SPD's postwar leadership was composed of people who had either spent much of the Nazi era in various concentration camps due to their open opposition to Hitler (such as Schumacher) or had been in exile, many actively aiding the allies during WW2 (such as Ohellander) (Mauch & Reimer 2003:174;Edinger 1965:48-53). Likewise, the SPD's anti-communist credentials, despite its socialist ideology, weren't in doubt. Schumacher and the SPD leadership, as well as its rank and file, became well known for their complete rejection of Communism in general and the USSR in particular, successfully resisting a Soviet attempt in the immediate aftermath of WW2 to amalgamate the SPD with the Communist Party throughout Germany (Edinger 1965: 99-104;Schwartz 1991:54). This staunch anti-communist position was openly admitted even by senior U.S. policymakers such as Dean Acheson who viewed Schumacher and the SPD as a

¹¹⁵ Not surprisingly, not until April 53 (after the U.S. intervention was already underway) was the % of those who believed that they were better off (24%) larger than that of those who felt like they were worse off (Spicka 2007 101).

major threat to U.S. interests (McAllister 2002:179).¹¹⁶ The problem instead came from severe disagreements with it over the EDC.

In the beginning of the postwar era the U.S. had no problem with the SPD being in power in W.Germany. For example, in August 1949 the U.S. government secretly concluded that the best post-election result from its point of view would be a coalition between the SPD and CDU. Indeed, a CDU dominated coalition (as was eventually the result) was seen as an inferior, even problematic result in the U.S. view.¹¹⁷ After the election, despite the fact that a contentious early November 1949 meeting between Schumacher and Secretary of State Acheson seems to have led Acheson to dislike Schumacher, the U.S., until at least the end of 1950, still saw a possible CDU-SPD coalition government as an acceptable if not the preferable option (Schwartz 1991:185-186).¹¹⁸ Indeed, after one rather stormy parliamentary debate between Adenauer and Schumacher in November 1949 the U.S. High commissioner John McCloy described both of them in a secret diplomatic cable as “problem children”.¹¹⁹

From the point of view of the Truman administration, the final break seemed to have occurred during 1951 mostly over U.S. plans for European integration, first over the ESCE and then over German rearmament and the EDC. Both treaties but especially the EDC were denounced in strong nationalist terms by the SPD. The EDC, for example, was opposed by the

¹¹⁶ See also “Germany Policy and Problems” February 1953 CF136 Dulles-Strassen trip/conference files/lot/RG59/NARA; memo “German Elections” July 28, 1953 box 3863 762a.00 both RG59 NARA

¹¹⁷ ORE 67-49 “Probable Consequences of the Forthcoming West German Elections” July 19, 1949 Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF Intelligence File box 257 HSTL

¹¹⁸ Any negative impressions developed as a result of this meeting were probably milder than the effects of later developments see FRUS 1949 3:312-314 vs. Princeton Seminars, October 10-11, 1953 box 75,767 Acheson papers HSTL

¹¹⁹ Bonn 50 November 25, 1949 in FRUS 1949 3:353

SPD as putting W.Germany in a position of permanent inferiority vis-a-vis other European countries and, far more importantly, killing all chances at German reunification. As a result, as Schumacher declared in the Bundestag after the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952, “whoever approved” of the EDC “ceases to be a true German”. The SPD then did everything possible to prevent the EDC’s ratification. Likewise, in response to subsequent claims by McCloy in front of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that he (Schumacher) would nevertheless eventually accept the EDC, Schumacher declared that if in power he would not be bound by it (Schwartz 1991:199,276-277;Kisatsky 2005:45).

The SPD’s continuing staunch public and private opposition to both treaties (but especially to the still unratified EDC) despite U.S. attempts to enlist its support increasingly led the U.S. government to believe that Schumacher and the SPD were unacceptable (Schwartz 1991:199, 228,245, 373). Accordingly, by mid-1952 Schumacher was viewed by the State Department as “the one man menacing the unity of Western Europe” (Edinger 1965:185). As Acheson described in a discussion with the French President Auriol in May 1952 following the signing of the EDC treaty the U.S., among other things, will need to “help him [Adenauer] to win the Bundestag elections of 1953” given “this alternative we have [to him]”- meaning Schumacher and the SPD (Schwartz 1995(1):687).

The SPDs staunch opposition to the EDC (and similar projects) came from a few sources. Firstly, because of the strong Soviet opposition during this period to a reunified Germany with a pro-western orientation, the EDC was believed by many Germans to make German reunification, which required Soviet consent to give up its dominance over East Germany, impossible. As a result, joining the EDC was seen by many as akin to completely giving up on reunification in the

short and medium terms.¹²⁰ Accordingly, the SPD's opposition to the EDC seemed to be based to a significant extent upon the genuine, deeply held preferences in many of the SPD leadership (shared by many Germans) for quick German reunification from patriotic or even personal motives. Ollenhauer, for example (like many SPD members) was born and grew up in what was, by the early 1950s, East Germany. Likewise, by late 1952, the only major thing that most of the party leadership could agree upon as to the SPD's foreign policy agenda was the primacy of doing everything possible to reunify Germany and opposing any acts which could prevent it (Drummond 1982:93,100-101).

Nevertheless, this opposition also had a domestic political/strategic component. Schumacher, like other SPD leaders, believed that the main flaw in the SPD's policies during the Weimar era, a flaw that they saw as having enabled the rise of Nazism, was in permitting the other political parties to portray the SPD as insufficiently nationalistic. By taking up hard-line, nationalist positions in favor of German reunification it was thought that this would protect the SDP in advance from any attempts to use this card against it (Vardy 1965:238-240,242-243;Schwartz 1991:55). Likewise, such positions were expected to be useful in getting the vote of the nine million German refugees then residing in W.Germany (Schwartz 1991:55).

Given the reasons above, and despite some initial American hopes to the contrary, Schumacher's death in August 1952 did little to change the foreign policy positions of the SPD. Schumacher's replacement, Erich Ollenhauer, was his trusted deputy and the man designated by

¹²⁰ For example, the March 1952 Soviet note explicitly made this demand a major prerequisite for Soviet approval of German reunification (Steininger 1990:80). For an early expression of this SPD belief see Bonn Dispatch 1962 January 9,1952, EDC Germany to January 1953, Records Relating to the EDC 1951-1954 box 32 lot RG59 NARA. See also Conant "my Six years in Germany":3-8. German ambassadorship drafts and diary Entries box 11 in Conant Papers Pusey Library, Harvard. In private discussions some U.S. decision-makers agreed with this SPD assumption. See for example Memo August 4, 1953 NSC 160.1 US position with respect to Germany (3) box 6 who ONSNSA policy papers subseries DDEL.

Schumacher as his successor. Although more soft spoken and mild mannered, Ollenhauer seemed to completely agree with Schumacher's foreign policy views and policies. As a result, in the party congress conducted a month after Schumacher's death, the SPD readopted his foreign policy program, with Ollenhauer openly declaring that Schumacher's foreign policy was the SPD's policy "yesterday, today and tomorrow" (Drummond 1982:93-96). Not surprisingly, U.S. officials concluded that the death of Schumacher would lead to no significant change in the SPD's positions in the short or medium term. Indeed, Ollenhauer's milder political persona was initially seen by many as even a better vote getter for the SPD than Schumacher's and his aggressive political style would.¹²¹

The following months showed little change in the SPD's position on the EDC. Using various political and constitutional delaying tactics the SPD forced Adenauer in December 1952 to not bring the EDC treaty to a third reading in the Bundestag as planned. Likewise, both publicly and in private talks Ollenhauer and other SPD leaders reiterated their staunch opposition to the EDC and the SPDs intention (among other things) to reject and renegotiate the EDC if victorious in the upcoming elections.¹²²

Not surprisingly, when the deputy high commissioner Reber was requested in mid-January 53 to meet with Ollenhauer again about the SPD's foreign policy positions as to the EDC etc. Reber demurred, claiming that such a discussion would be ineffective and have no chance of changing the SPDs positions.¹²³ Likewise, when Eleanor Dulles, a high ranking

¹²¹ Bonn 783 August 22,1952; Bonn 891 August 28,1952; Hamburg 116 August 29,1952 all 762a.00/RG59/NARA

¹²² Bonn 2873 December 19,1952 762a.00/RG59/NARA;Bonn dispatch 1754 December 18,1952 762a.00/RG59/NARA;Bonn 3451 January 27,1953 740.5/RG59/NARA

¹²³ Bonn 3355 January 21, 1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA

official in the State Department in charge of Berlin (and coincidentally John Foster Dulles' sister), visited Germany during January 1953 she concluded from the extensive conversations that she conducted that the national SPD's foreign policy positions were "doctrinaire and unreasonable".¹²⁴

The new Eisenhower administration however, while strongly committed to the EDC, was initially more open minded as to the political situation in West Germany. In sharp contrast to the attitudes which would later characterize the Eisenhower administrations' relationship with Adenauer, it initially was quite wary and distrustful of him.

For example, Eisenhower's first meeting with Adenauer (as the commander of NATO) in January 1951 didn't go well, with Eisenhower coming out of the meeting quite angered by Adenauer's behavior and what he saw as a ham-handed attempt to get further U.S. concessions in return for German military contributions to European defense (Schwartz 1995(1):621). Although later meetings went somewhat better Eisenhower remained quite distrustful of Adenauer. Indeed in early 1953 Eisenhower distrusted Adenauer and his claims to the point that one of the tasks that John Foster Dulles was given by Eisenhower during his visit and talks in Germany in February 1953 was to check whether Adenauer had actually hung up in his house a painting done by Eisenhower as he had claimed when asked about it in late 1952. Eisenhower, an amateur painter, had given a painting of his to Adenauer (among other such paintings given to various European statesmen) when he had retired as NATO commander a year beforehand (Schwartz 1995(2):46-48). When Dulles, during this trip to Germany, visited Adenauer's house and asked to see the painting, Adenauer who indeed didn't have Eisenhower's painting hung up,

¹²⁴ "My impressions and comments on trip to Germany January 4-24, 1953" undated Eleanor Dulles Papers box 31 DDEL

was able to distract Dulles in various ways until his staff got it hung up at the last moment in another room. Dulles failed to notice the deception.¹²⁵

Accordingly, the Eisenhower Administration's decision in February 1953 to invite Adenauer to visit the U.S. in April of that year (see later description) was initially just the fulfillment of a long promised courtesy visit by the Truman administration going back to late 1951, a visit which was repeatedly delayed at the last moment for various reasons.¹²⁶

As for Dulles, the evidence indicates that prior to his first meeting with Adenauer in February 1953 he was still somewhat skeptical of Adenauer's full commitment to the EDC¹²⁷ and even afterwards a certain level of distrust remained throughout 1953.¹²⁸ At the same time the SPD still seemed to Dulles to be a potentially acceptable option. Dulles seemed to have initially thought that the SPD leaderships' continued staunch opposition to the EDC was due to the SPD's belief (the result of various rumors circulating in Germany to that effect after the 1952 U.S. election) that the new Eisenhower administration would drop the Truman administration policy of strong support for the EDC, offering instead other, probably more palatable options, to the

¹²⁵ For the further rather amusing description of how Adenauer got Eisenhower's picture hung up in the last moment without Dulles noticing see *ibid*,2:47-48.

¹²⁶ (Maulucci 2003:578-579).The visit was also part of a preplanned set of visits by the major European leaders to the White House during March and April of 1953 with Adenauer's visit being the final one (Maulucci 2003: 579). One should note that at this point in time the Eisenhower administration was careful even in the minor protocol level to be impartial, making sure, for example, not to send to Adenauer an introductory letter (for his meeting with Dulles in February 1953) which was warmer in any way than the ones sent to other European statesmen. Memo MacArthur to Riddleberger January 22,1953 box 3460 740.5 RG59 NARA.

¹²⁷ State 3576 January 21,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA; February 1 memo of conversation FRUS 7:1554

¹²⁸ See for example State 5049 April 27,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA;State 4384 March 3, 1953 762a.00 box 3861;(Hershberg 1993:669-673). The available evidence (including a careful reading of Adenauer's own words on this issue) indicates that the Dulles-Adenauer friendship began at the earliest during the Berlin conference in January-February 1954 and probably much later than that (Grabbe 1990: 110-111,131).

SPD. Accordingly, once this misunderstanding would be corrected, the SPD could be persuaded to change their position on the EDC to one more favorable to it and to the U.S..¹²⁹

As a result, after the new administration publicly affirmed its commitment to the EDC, Dulles decided to meet with the SPD leadership as part of his February 1953 visit to Germany in order to observe their position on the EDC and, if necessary, reiterate this point.¹³⁰

The meeting did not go well. Despite the previously noted clarifications, Ollenhauer (and the other two SPD leaders who accompanied him) continued to oppose the EDC proposing instead other, rather vague solutions, for German defense. Dulles seems to have been so angered by the SPD's intransigence that he cut off Ollenhauer before he finished talking and gave a long monologue in which he described the SPD's proposals, as well as any other alternatives to the EDC, as unacceptable. He then repeated these positions in a subsequent press conference.¹³¹

Likewise, whatever hopes Dulles may have had for the effects of his harangue on the SPD's positions seem to have been quickly dashed. As multiple cables and analyses from the CIA and the High Commission in Germany indicated in the subsequent weeks, although after

¹²⁹ State 3605 Dulles to Reber January 22,1953 in FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):399-400. Dulles belief seemed to have been shared by some officials in the State Department see background paper December 13 1952 740.5 box 3459. For reports on these rumors & the SPDs possible belief in them, see Bonn 3297 January 16 box 3860 762a.00; Bonn dispatch 1718 December 17, 1952 box 3860 762a.00 RG59 NARA; Bonn dispatch 1666 December 11,1952 German political weekly box 3860 762a.00. This rumor seems to have been made credible in the eyes of the SPD by the claims to this effect former German chancellor Bruning (who was seen, due to his long exile in the U.S., as an expert on the latter) as well as other recent visitors to the U.S.. Background paper December 13, 1952 740.5 box 3459 RG59 NARA.

¹³⁰ For the Administration's public statements see FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):397-400. Dulles Telephone conversation with Conant January 23,1953 Telephone memoranda (except to WH) January 53-April 53(4), Dulles Papers telephone call series, box 1 DDEL; Memorandum of conversation February 1,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1554. Dulles meeting with the SPD was preceded by a similar private meeting for this purpose by Samuel Reber, the deputy high commissioner (and acting high commissioner) Bonn 3297 January 16 1953 in 762a.00 box 3860 RG59 NARA.

¹³¹ See the unsigned and undated memorandum of this meeting in CF137 Dulles-Strassen trip/Conference Files/lot/RG59/NARA. See also (Schwartz 1995(2):46; Drummond 1982:101) for a description of what occurred during and after this meeting

their meeting with Dulles Ollenhauer and the SPD leadership clearly understood the Eisenhower administration's position, their opposition to the EDC remained unchanged.¹³² Accordingly, by mid-March 1953, a secret briefing paper accompanying the NSC 149/2 noted that "Victory of the Social Democrats [in the upcoming elections] would mean control of [West] Germany by a party which is anti-EDC and which would be much less cooperative than the Adenauer government in contributing to the effective Defense of the NATO area". Besides guaranteeing the death of the EDC, such a SPD victory would also mean, among other things given the general international context, that there would be no German military contribution to Western defense in the foreseeable future and a general decline in European cooperation through other routes.¹³³

Not surprisingly, when Adenauer requested in the middle of March via a secret messenger to John McCloy (a former High Commissioner), that the U.S. government intervene in his favor in the upcoming German parliamentary elections through various measures to be provided during his upcoming trip to the U.S., the Eisenhower administration quickly decided to agree to his request and to help him in his upcoming election campaign. As Dulles described it, the Adenauer government must be helped in the upcoming elections because a SPD victory "owing to the SPD's strong anti-EDC position" would effectively kill the EDC.¹³⁴

¹³² Current Intelligence Bulletin February 11,1953 CIA Crest; Bonn dispatch 2385 February 12 ,1953; Bonn dispatch 2435 February 17,1953; Bonn 2871 March 19,1953 all 762a.00/RG59/NARA;

¹³³ "MSA title I Defense support analysis-Germany" NSC 149/2 background papers Disaster file series, NSC Staff Papers box 10 DDEL

¹³⁴ "Memorandum by John J. McCloy" March 16,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 7(1);405-408; Bonn 4340 March 24,1953 611.62a /RG59/NARA;Minutes of meeting April 17,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 7(1): 431-432,434; State 3773 March 19,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):778. State 7236 May 7,1953 May 1953/762a.00/RG59/NARA.See also High Commissioners Conant unfinished draft book manuscript "My Six Years in Germany":2-3, 2-5, German ambassadorship drafts and diary entries, box 11 in Conant Papers Pusey Library, Harvard. Another fear expressed by members of the U.S. high commission as well the State Department was that the SPD, given its strong desire to

Despite Adenauer's desire to obtain at least some of the items on his 'shopping list' of requested electoral aid (see later descriptions) as part of his April 1953 visit to the U.S., the Eisenhower administration was unable to immediately satisfy most of his requests for various reasons. This made Adenauer's visit largely symbolic in nature.¹³⁵ For example, the Eisenhower administration, less than three months in office, was still in the process of getting its 'sea legs', leading to various delays in getting some of the relevant requests done in time.¹³⁶ Likewise, during this period, Eisenhower Administration was facing heavy pressure from the Republican-held Congress to use the newfound Republican control of government to significantly cut foreign aid. This pressure was so severe that it led at one point to a shouting match between Eisenhower and Senate Speaker Robert Taft. As a result, the Eisenhower administration was politically incapable of granting one of Adenauer's requests for a new and very large grant or loan (100 to 250 million dollars) for resettling German refugees, although approximately fifteen million dollars in U.S. aid was eventually allocated before the election to German refugees in Berlin for this purpose (Ambrose 1990:319-320; Inginmundarson 1994:470-471).¹³⁷

reunify Germany may be tempted, once in power, to a future Soviet offer to trade the reunification of Germany in return for the neutralization of a united Germany, thus greatly harming the ability of the west to defend itself from a Soviet attack. However Dulles still seemed to believe during 1953 that the SPD's main leaders (such as Ollenhauer) as well as much of the rank and file in the SPD didn't share yet these neutralist preferences, indicating that this probably was not a significant factor in triggering the U.S. decision to intervene in favor of Adenauer in this election. See for example briefing papers Dulles visit January 29, 1953 political brief 7 in Bonn dispatch 2369 February 17 box 3861 762a.00; Bonn Dispatch 16 July 1, 1953 "The German Social Democratic party" 762a.00 box 3863 both in RG59 NARA;FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):534-535

¹³⁵ Although some relatively minor issues, like the long planned return of 350 confiscated German ships were nevertheless achieved.

¹³⁶ For examples see Conversation April 10,1953 Dulles papers, telephone call series, White House Telephone conversations January-April 53(3) box 10 DDEL.

¹³⁷ See also FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):439-440 where this problem is implied to Adenauer.

Nevertheless, partly as a result of the discussions during Adenauer's visit, over the following months the U.S. provided Adenauer with the costly requests on his list as well as later costly requests for electoral aid made by Adenauer.¹³⁸ The next section will describe the five major acts done by the Eisenhower administration for this purpose and the process by which they were accomplished.¹³⁹

3.2.1 The Intervention Part 1: Reviving the U.S.- German Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty

One significant way in which the U.S aided Adenauer's reelection chances was by reviving the 1923 U.S.- German Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty, a treaty which was suspended as a result of WW2. Despite its rather unimposing name this treaty was quite significant, offering multiple commercial concessions which expedited trade between the two countries such as equal treatment of exported products as to domestic taxes and the provision of treaty merchant visas to nationals of the other country.¹⁴⁰ The U.S. agreed to Adenauer's March 1953 request for the

¹³⁸ Other requests by Adenauer in the abovementioned memo which seem to have not been directly related to the West German election campaign (such as permitting Germany to start training some German soldiers in preparation for their later roles in western defense) seem to have been rejected by Dulles largely because of the fear of the possible effects that such acts may have upon the still pending ratification of the EDC by France if/once they became public knowledge. FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):416-417.

¹³⁹ See the introduction to this chapter for the observable implication of the argument presented here as to the way in which an electoral intervention would be expected to be executed. Other more minor acts included, for example, the ending of U.S. vesting of new German property in the U.S., the raising of the German Charge in D.C. (as well as the U.S. high commissioner) to a rank of Ambassador and torpedoing a nearly successful attempt by the SPD to enable West Berlin (then under complete allied control) to send directly elected, voting members to the bundestag. Due to space constraints these issues can't be discussed here in detail although they fit the argument presented here as well.

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum with attachments "Agreement for revalidation of 1923 U.S-German treaty of Friendship Commerce and Consular rights" June 5,1953 Treaty of friendship commerce and Navigation 1953/security-

revival of this treaty which Adenauer believed would help his election prospects. After speedy negotiations on an attached “small treaty”, largely added in order to update the 1923 treaty to the conditions of the early 1950s, a draft was concluded.¹⁴¹ Despite Adenauer’s initial plans of to have the reactivation of the treaty signed during his April 1953 visit, the abovementioned ‘start of administration’ difficulties of the Eisenhower administration prevented this from happening.¹⁴² The reactivation of the treaty nevertheless was signed in an official ceremony in Bonn on June 5, three months before the elections, this action receiving, as was hoped by Adenauer, quite favorable domestic reactions.¹⁴³

3.2.2 Establishment of mixed parole boards in order to release German War Criminals

Another significant way in which the U.S aided Adenauer’s reelection was by the establishment of a mixed German-U.S. parole board for the early release of convicted German war criminals in U.S. and allied prisons. Not long after the conclusion of the various war crime tribunals of the 1940s, a belief became widely entrenched in the general West German population that most of

segregated general files/RG466/NARA. Indeed one major reason that the original version of this treaty in 1923 was done by the Harding administration was in order to help to stabilize the Weimar Republic at the height of the Ruhr crisis (Jonas 1984:173-175).

¹⁴¹ Bonn 4340 March 24,1953;Bonn 4418 March 30,1953; March 24,1953 memo “Reactivation of treaty of 1923” all three 611.62a/RG59/NARA; brief “Reactivation of the treaty of 1923”;April 2,1953 “U.S.-German Political Talks both 762a.00/RG59/NARA. For the interdepartmental fight within the U.S. government over the reactivation of some of these provisions, a fight eventually concluded in favor of Adenauer’s requests see the March 24 memo above and State 4761 March 31 1953 in 611.62a box 2831 RG59 NARA

¹⁴² Bonn 3037April 3,1953 Treaty of friendship commerce and Navigation 1953/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA;State 4927 April 15,1953 FRUS 1952-54 7(1):450

¹⁴³ Memorandum with attachments “Agreement for revalidation of 1923 U.S-German”, Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Consular rights” June 5,1953 treaty of friendship commerce and Navigation 1953/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA;Bonn 4024 dispatch, June 11,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA

those Germans who were convicted for war crimes yet who weren't among Hitler's close associates were tried either as part of a vindictive "victors' justice" or as veiled political purges (Schwartz 1991:157-160).

Accordingly, despite some American public information efforts to explain the true nature of the crimes of those convicted on these charges, a survey conducted in October 1952 found that 63% of the W.German population believed that those who were still imprisoned for war crimes in Allied jails were innocent. Indeed by early 1953 the U.S. officials in Germany despaired of ever convincing them otherwise.¹⁴⁴ As a result, there was increasing public pressure within W.Germany for the release of the war criminals still imprisoned by the Allies and for the Adenauer government to do everything possible to achieve this goal. Indeed, at one point in 1952 this pressure was significant enough to endanger the continued survival of Adenauer's coalition (Buscher 1988:164-165).

Not surprisingly, Adenauer searched for a way in which this popular issue could rebound to his electoral favor rather than to his disfavor. Accordingly, when asking for U.S. help in his reelection effort he requested that, prior to the election, a mixed parole board composed of German and Allied members be set up to consideration of those cases of the convicted German war criminals still imprisoned by the Allies. This was among the top of the items on his list, a request to which Adenauer attached "great importance" because, as he described it, of the significant electoral benefits which could be accrued from the public perception within Germany

¹⁴⁴ Briefing papers for Dulles visit January 29,1953 political brief 5 in Bonn dispatch 2369 February 17,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA. For some of the U.S. public information efforts see Bonn 1781 October 20,1952 in 321.6 German war criminals 1949-1952 security segregated general files box 28 security segregated general files RG466 NARA

that this “problem” was on its way towards satisfactory resolution.¹⁴⁵ As a result of Adenauer’s April 1953 talks during the visit about this topic (among other things), Dulles decided to agree to this request, promising Adenauer “to do all that it can in this regard”.¹⁴⁶

The release or the creation of methods by which convicted war criminals could be speedily released were already in the 1950s acts with significant potential political costs both domestically and internationally, costs which clearly worried the Eisenhower administration.¹⁴⁷ Internationally, any such early releases was open to public condemnation in the countries which had felt the wrath of Nazi Germany. Many of these countries were among the United States’ most important democratic allies in this period (i.e. France and Britain). Even worse, for such a mixed board to be applicable to many of these German war criminals it required the consent of France and Britain, the leaders of both especially France were opposed to such acts.¹⁴⁸ Domestically, such acts had the potential of leading to a major public outcry, especially from groups whose brethren had suffered greatly at the hands of many of these war criminals during WW2.¹⁴⁹

The Eisenhower administration had a good reason to worry of such possible effects. For example, in January 1951 John McCloy, a previous U.S. High Commissioner, commuted the

¹⁴⁵ Bonn 4410 March 30,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):420;Meetings April 7&8,1953 FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):434,442-443; Bonn 4340 March 24,1953 611.62a/RG59/NARA

¹⁴⁶ FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):443-444;FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1589

¹⁴⁷ For the Eisenhower Administrations fears in this regard and Adenauer’s attempts to reassure them see FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):442

¹⁴⁸ FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1629-1630;Negotiating paper “War Criminals” April 1953 visit briefs U.S.-German political talks/762a.00/RG59/NARA

¹⁴⁹ Schwartz 1991:161;FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):442-443. For the explosive, domestic public relations nightmare nature of some of these German war crimes (such as the murder of American POWs) see Bonn dispatch 1658 December 22,1952 321.6 German war criminals/security-segregated general files/RG59/NARA.

penalties of 79 convicted war criminals in U.S. prisons. That act led to widespread and intense condemnations of U.S. actions throughout Western Europe (outside of Germany) as well as some within the U.S..¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, following repeated reminders by Adenauer of how helpful a mixed board would be to his reelection chances,¹⁵¹ the U.S., as promised, convinced the UK to agree to it. It then put increasing pressures over the spring of 1953 on the French government to agree to Adenauer's request¹⁵². The French eventually relented to U.S. pressure in July 1953, right before the Tripartite talks, proposing a few slight modifications of Adenauer's request (three separate mixed boards for the U.S., France and Britain respectively etc.) largely for face saving purposes, to which the U.S. (and Adenauer) agreed during the abovementioned talks.¹⁵³ A few days after the conclusion of the Tripartite talks the announcement of this decision was made public.¹⁵⁴

Following further pressure in mid-August 1953 from the German government for concrete, visible pre-election evidence that the mixed commissions had begun to function, High

¹⁵⁰ (Schwartz 1991:168-171,355). In theory this issue was already resolved with a special procedure (article 6) in the May 1952 EDC treaty which was supposed to come into effect once the EDC treaty was ratified by all signatories. However, the delays in the full ratification of the EDC (which by early 1953 wasn't seen as occurring before early 1954 at the earliest) coupled with the increasing possibility that the EDC might fail nevertheless due to French actions rendered this concession increasingly theoretical and meaningless (Buscher 1988:97). Furthermore, as shown above, creating a procedure for releasing war criminals earlier than would be the case if the U.S. just waited for the ratification of the EDC started anew the whole political/PR problem for those involved.

¹⁵¹ FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):468-469

¹⁵² FRUS 1952-1954 5(1):1591;State 7236 May 7,1953;London 6144 May 18,1953 both May 1953/762a.00/RG59/NARA; Brief "German war criminals" July 9,1953 396.1wa/RG59/NARA.

¹⁵³ Bonn 128 July 7,1953 321.6 war criminals-mixed board/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA; FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1629-1630. As the U.S. brief on this topic before the conference noted, solution of the war criminal issue is "considered urgent and important [in order] to help Adenauer in [the German] elections" Brief German war criminals July 9,1953 in 396.1wa box 1474 RG59 NARA

¹⁵⁴ Bonn 308, July 20,1953 321.6 war criminals mixed board/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA

Commissioner Conant quickly announced the establishment of the three mixed boards on September 1st, five days before the elections.¹⁵⁵ The American desire to help Adenauer in this regard can be seen from the fact that this declaration was so hastily done that it came prior even to the internal approval of the rules of the board or for that matter the naming of the chairmen of the U.S. mixed board.¹⁵⁶

After the elections, the mixed boards worked as planned, releasing in the following year and a half more than 85% of the 525 German war criminals still imprisoned at the start of 1953 by the U.S., Britain and France (Buscher 1988:110).

3.2.3 Creating a food aid program for East Germany

A third significant way in which the U.S. helped Adenauer's reelection chances was by agreeing to contribute 15 million dollars to a food aid program for East Germans. This program was the result of a completely unexpected event (both on the communist and the Western side)- a first of its kind popular uprising against a Communist regime in Eastern Europe.

On June 16, 1953 the East German uprising began. A demand for a 10% increase in work requirements from East German industrial workers served as the last straw to East German population. The East Germans were already quite angry at the crash collectivization conducted by the communist regime while, at the same time, encouraged by the rollback of some of the forced collectivization efforts which were included with this required increase in work

¹⁵⁵ Bonn 699 August 19,1953; Bonn 932 September 4,1953 both 321.6 war criminals-mixed board/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA

¹⁵⁶ Bonn 1249 undated; State 760 September 3,1953 both 321.6 war criminals-mixed board/security-segregated general files/RG466/NARA

requirements (Inginmundarson 1996: 388). As a result, massive demonstrations and strikes erupted over much of East Berlin and East Germany and the East German regime temporarily lost control of parts of East Germany until the Soviet occupation troops intervened and fully repressed the uprising over the next few months, leading to the deaths and injuries of hundreds of East Germans.

With the uprising erupting less than three months before the West German elections, Adenauer was under growing West German public pressure to show (among other things) that he was ‘doing something’ to help fellow Germans in East Germany suffering from the Soviet and East German crackdown (see next section for the public pressure for more reunification efforts). A food aid program providing individual East Germans with large food packages and thus helping them deal with the frequent food shortages East Germany suffered from during this period, was a good way to show that he ‘cared’.¹⁵⁷

In order, in Eisenhower’s words “to build Adenauer up”, among other reasons, the U.S. decided to start a food aid operation to East Germany and provide 15 million dollars in food. This ultimately came to more than 33 thousand metric tons of food of various types.¹⁵⁸ The U.S. also took a risk that such a plan, despite its non-violent nature, would nevertheless be seen as so provocative to the Soviets that it would lead to a second blockade of West Berlin or to other aggressive Soviet reactions which, in turn, could bring about an unwanted superpower crisis.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ “Adenauer regime under fire for inaction on Riots in East” NYT July 29,1953; FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1600-1603

¹⁵⁸ Conversation August 1,1953 WH Telephone conversations May-December 53(2) Box 10, Dulles papers, telephone call series DDEL; Bonn 1216 dispatch November 3,1953 "the East German food program" box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA. Another 13 thousand metric tons of food were taken out of the Allies emergency food stockpile for Berlin, requiring subsequent replenishment by the U.S..

¹⁵⁹ FRUS 7(2) 1952-1954:1620

The decision to implement such a food aid program was a classic example of “great minds thinking alike”; both the West Germans and the Eisenhower administration came up with this idea simultaneously in the days following the East German uprising. The idea of providing food aid to the East Germans on humanitarian and/or propaganda grounds was an idea which had long been discussed both within the West German government and within the Eisenhower administration, both rejecting it prior to the uprising for various reasons (Inginmundarson 1996: 395). When the uprising began, both sides began thinking independently about such a program in order to help Adenauer’s political chances, and in the American case, also to score propaganda points vis-a-vis the Soviet union (see later description of this goal).¹⁶⁰ Indeed, the decisions of the U.S. administration and the Adenauer government to actually create such a program during the first week of July, seems to have been made almost simultaneously with the German request for U.S. funding of such a program being sent as the U.S. government approved such a plan in principle.¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, once both sides began to coordinate in turning this general idea into action the West Germans began to increasingly dominate how the food aid program was put in practice into place. Adenauer’s initial plan was to have the food aid provided via the German churches and other private German relief organizations which had already been sending, long before the

¹⁶⁰For the American idea see for example June 19 memo “shortage in East Berlin food supply” PSB 430(1) (food and eastern Europe) DDEL; for the German plan see Bonn 5456 below and FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1600-1603. One should note nevertheless that the Eisenhower Administration when it was thinking about whether to implement such a plan knew that the West German government was probably also thinking about similar ideas, making German agreement to such U.S. plans very likely. For its knowledge of similar German plans see (Bonn 5456 June 25,1953 box 2139 462a.62b31;State 5 July 1,1953 862b.03 box 5259 both in RG59 NARA)

¹⁶¹ State 20 July 2,1953 862b.03 box 5259 RG59 NARA; FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1600-1603

uprising, food and other private aid to the East Germans. The U.S. government decided to largely accept Adenauer's plan for the distribution of this aid, even formally adopting it when the detailed food aid plan came up for approval within the administration on July 7, 1953.¹⁶² When Adenauer's plan was subsequently found to be unfeasible due to technical reasons as well as due to the refusal of the German churches and private relief groups to take part in a governmental propaganda effort, the U.S. decided by mid-July 1953 to adopt a different West German government plan. This plan, using West Berlin and German government officials to give out food packages from special aid centers located in municipal facilities in West Berlin, was one of the four options proposed by the West German cabinet.¹⁶³ This plan was to be the principal way through which the food aid was to be distributed in practice in the following months.

With the food aid program starting to become a reality, a disagreement still remained over the way in which the program's publicity/propaganda aspects were to be handled. The West German government wanted as low key an approach as possible toward the food aid operation. In order to deal with the West German public's sensitivity to any act which seemed like 'cheap' propaganda (and prevent a possible backlash to acts perceived in that manner), the food aid was to be, as much as possible, humanitarian in appearance, with the factual reporting of the 'good deeds' in and of themselves providing most of the PR benefits. Likewise, in order for Adenauer

¹⁶² memo July 7 food for E.Germany box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA

¹⁶³ Bonn 280 July 17, 1953, Germany folder CD Jackson records box 3 DDEL; Bonn 254 July 18 box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA. Another local German actor, West Berlin Mayor Ernest Reuter, seems to have also had an important role in process by which this option was developed and eventually approved.

to get the credit (and the electoral benefit), they wanted the U.S. role in this operation to be noted but not emphasized.¹⁶⁴

In contrast, the Eisenhower administration wanted far more publicity and propaganda operations involved. Initially, the other main goal of the food aid operation in the eyes of much of the Eisenhower administration (besides helping Adenauer's chances) was to achieve a major, European level propaganda victory in the Cold War. Not satisfied with the natural, 'local' (i.e. largely limited to the German population) propaganda benefits which were expected to be achieved from doing such an act in public, they wanted to step up the U.S. propaganda efforts in order to gain more large scale results. By first emphasizing the U.S. role in the food aid operation and providing very high amounts of publicity around the world to through all available means and then repeatedly forcing the Soviets to reject public American offers to permit such food aid into E.Germany (after the initial U.S. offer was turned down on July 11), the Administration was hoping to gain a major propaganda victory not just vis-a-vis Germany but in the general East-West struggle.¹⁶⁵ There was also significant pressure in the American media as well as within the Republican dominated congress for such a 'high key' approach.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴FRUS 1952-1954(2):1600-1603,1621,1629-1630;FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1588-1589; Bonn 353 July 23,1953 & Bonn 394 July 25,1953 both in box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA. For the importance of the program being done in this manner due to German electoral needs see esp. Bonn 1216 dispatch November 3,1953 "the East German food program" in the above location.

¹⁶⁵ FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1620 & 1631;July 8 memo O'Connor to Jackson in CD Jackson records Germany box 3 DDEL. Some in the administration (such as C.D. Jackson) seemed to have even hoped to use the food aid operation in order to lead to the "peaceful liberation" of East Germany following the Eisenhower's 1952 campaign rhetoric about "rollback" see for example (FRUS 7(2):1637).

¹⁶⁶ FRUS 1952-1954 7(2): 1638; secretary staff meeting July 31,1953 in secretary staff meetings January 7,1953-December 30,1953 minutes and notes of the secretary staff meetings 1952-1961 box 5 lot RG59 NARA

However, with the help of High Commissioner Conant, the low key approach was nevertheless eventually chosen by the Eisenhower administration. Probably because of Adenauer's electoral needs the Eisenhower administration decided to drop most of the proposed high key propaganda efforts (such as a second public offer of the food aid to the Soviets) largely leaving the food aid to 'speak' for itself.¹⁶⁷

As was hoped by its proponents, the food aid effort and the low key way in which it was publicized were a success. From the technical point of view, approximately 5.6 million food packages were provided to needy East Germans with few significant problems or interruptions by the time the program ended in early October 1953, a few weeks after the German elections. Likewise, the food aid program was very favorably seen within West Germany with, for example, a poll on this question conducted in August 1953 finding overwhelming approval (89%) of this project and the way it was handled by all who were involved.¹⁶⁸

3.2.4 Agreeing to a Four Power conference with the Soviet Union

A fourth significant way in which the U.S aided Adenauer's reelection was by publicly agreeing to a four power conference with the Soviet Union. In the context of the early 1950s such a meeting was far from being some kind of a 'talking shop' or a costless gesture. Having a high level U.S.-Soviet meeting of this kind was seen as an act that could have major effects in either positive or negative directions, as did the similar 'Big Three' conferences in Yalta or in Potsdam

¹⁶⁷Inginmundarson 1996:400;FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1638

¹⁶⁸ Bonn 1216 dispatch November 3,1953 "the East German food program";Bonn 550 August 6,1953 both in box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA

in the mid-1940s. If successful such a conference could lead to a major mutually beneficial agreement on any of the long list of major issues in dispute between the U.S and the Soviet Union, a major reduction in superpower tensions and perhaps eventually a true end to the Cold War and a 'new world order'. Failure, either due to being out-maneuvered (or duped) by the Soviets into signing an bad agreement harmful to U.S. interests or (thanks to Soviet propaganda etc.) being held responsible for the failure by either the domestic and/or international public opinion in Western Europe could have major political and national security costs to the administration. (Boyle 1990:32;Gardner 2006:79-80). Accordingly, such meetings usually required months of intense preparations by all involved. Agreeing to hold one was considered quite a significant and costly act by the U.S.¹⁶⁹

Not surprisingly, the Eisenhower administration had little desire to hold such a meeting with what it saw as a devious opponent who neither had any desire to negotiate honestly nor showed any real flexibility in its positions.¹⁷⁰ This position was further fortified by mid-March 1953 (when, following Stalin's death, this issue began to be seriously raised) by the fear that agreeing to such a conference might also undermine Western unity and perhaps even the political

¹⁶⁹ The opposite opinion, held by some in the administration in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death, that such a four power meeting could be a useful propaganda tool for the U.S. (rather than a costly risk to be avoided) given the USSR's temporary weakness b/c of the former's death, was rejected after a discussion by both Eisenhower and Dulles in early March 1953 see 136th NSC meeting March 11,1953 DDRS. For the major effort involved on the side of the U.S. in preparing for such a meeting see FRUS 1952-1954 8:1112.

¹⁷⁰ (Boyle 1990:32);139th NSC meeting April 8, 1953 DDRS. The Administration's view of the Soviets changed little after agreeing to a four power conference. See Eisenhower's comments in FRUS 1952-1954 5:1761. By late April 1953 it was willing, in private, to consider such a meeting but only on the condition that it was clearly limited in advance to a relatively minor set of issues-an idea which went nowhere (141st NSC meeting April 29,1953 DDRS).

positions of the various pro-American regimes in Western Europe.¹⁷¹ As a result, the Eisenhower Administration did all in its power to prevent such a meeting from occurring. For example, when Winston Churchill, during his second term as prime minister, repeatedly proposed such a major power meeting in the winter and spring of 1953, first in private conversations and then in public announcements, the U.S. immediately rejected his proposal. Indeed, the initial American reason for proposing a meeting between the U.S., Britain and France in the early summer (eventually the tripartite foreign ministers meeting of July 1953 noted below) was in order to prevent the British from doing any further acts that would make such a U.S.-Soviet conference with a significant agenda impossible to prevent (Larres 2006:144).¹⁷² The fact that Adenauer at the time had little desire for such a conference (which was quite likely to focus on Germany), reinforced an already staunch U.S. opposition to this idea (Schwartz 1995(2):54).

As a result, despite British desire for such a meeting, the U.S. continued to oppose the idea. The eruption of the East German uprising in mid-June 1953 and the use of Soviet troops to repress the demonstrations (see later description) initially appeared to the Eisenhower administration to further justify its opposition. In Eisenhower's words, the uprising gave the U.S. "the strongest possible argument" against conducting such four power talks any time soon.¹⁷³ Indeed, one of the objectives listed in the American delegation's briefing book, completed a day

¹⁷¹ 136th NSC meeting March 11,1953 DDRS.

¹⁷² The original meeting was planned for mid-June 1953 but was then delayed to July and changed to a meeting at the foreign ministers level due to the stroke suffered by Churchill in early June.

¹⁷³ FRUS 1952-1954 7(2):1589

before the tripartite meeting started on July 10, was achieving an agreement with the French and British not to hold such a conference any time soon.¹⁷⁴

This American position then dramatically changed because of Adenauer's last moment request. The holding of a four power conference to discuss, and perhaps achieve, German reunification was a major and longstanding SPD demand. Prior to the uprising Adenauer and the CDU publicly supported such a conference in principle but only under very narrow and special circumstances. In private, they were completely opposed to such a conference being held any time soon.¹⁷⁵

Then on June 16, 1953, the East German uprising began (see description in the food aid section). The news of the massive revolt of fellow Germans against the East German regime turned yet again the issue of German reunification into a burning issue for the West German public. It accordingly greatly increased public pressures within West Germany for the most plausible route in 1953 for achieving this goal- a four power conference in which the issue of German reunification would be seriously discussed by the U.S. and the Soviets.¹⁷⁶ Likewise the SPD which, in the search for a good election issue against Adenauer and the CDU, had already prior to the revolt been making more insistent demands for such a conference, raised the heat on Adenauer once the uprising began for not doing more to get such a conference under way. The SPD accordingly described the post uprising situation as a rare window of opportunity for such a

¹⁷⁴ FRUS 1952-1954 5:1604 see also the planned draft communiqué FRUS 1952-1954 5:1601-1602

¹⁷⁵ Bonn dispatch 3877 June 4, 1953; Bonn 5280 June 10, 1953; Bonn 5321 June 13, 1953 all three in 762a.00 box 3862 RG59 NARA

¹⁷⁶ Bonn 5485 June 26 in 762a.00 box 3862 RG59 NARA

conference on German reunification which must not be missed and attacked Adenauer for not caring and doing enough about German reunification.¹⁷⁷

Adenauer accordingly, in the days after the uprising, began to declare in public his strong support for such a four power conference and he ostensibly started to make serious efforts to get such a conference to occur. However, in private he continued to staunchly oppose a four power conference, even requesting at one point from the U.S. to disregard a letter that he had sent a few days after the uprising started in support of such a conference, a letter which he claimed was sent only for 'public consumption' purposes.¹⁷⁸

Then in the last few days prior to the tripartite meeting, Adenauer abruptly changed his mind. In an attempt to neutralize the SPD's demand for a conference and their attacks on him, Adenauer decided to request from the U.S. (and France and Britain) to agree to a four power conference on Germany during the tripartite meeting and, after its conclusion, to make a formal public offer to the Soviets to hold one. This was on the condition that this conference would only start after the elections. He then sent a secret messenger (a diplomat and personal aide on foreign affairs named Blankenhorn) to Washington D.C. where the tripartite meeting had just begun that very day to convey his request as well as a letter. As Blankenhorn described it, Adenauer's request of the U.S. and his sudden change of mind on this topic "was a tactical move designed to improve his position in the election campaign".¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Bonn 5280 June 10; Bonn dispatch 4222 June 25 both in 762a.00 box 3862 RG59 NARA; Bonn 31 priority July 1 in 762a.00 box 3863 RG59 NARA

¹⁷⁸ Bonn 5445 June 24, 1953 in 762a.00 box 3862; FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1587 for the letter see 7(2):1591

¹⁷⁹ FRUS 1952-1954 5(2): 1606-1607

Although the U.S., as well as France and Britain, were quite annoyed at Adenauer's 'crashing' of the meeting, the U.S. decided to agree to Adenauer's request in order to help him in the election. Dulles then convinced France and Britain to agree as well, even handing out during the meeting copies of Adenauer's letters requesting this aid to help in this effort.¹⁸⁰ The U.S., with British assistance, then even permitted Adenauer to go over the new draft communiqué on Germany and the agreement to a four power conference and the note to the Soviets formally requesting this conference and amend it so as to fit his request and his electoral needs.¹⁸¹

As hoped for by Adenauer, this request, and the subsequent well publicized revelation of his part in achieving it, accomplished its electoral goal. It neutralized this potent election issue and left the SPD without its main positive foreign policy demand.¹⁸² As promised by the U.S., the four power conference with the USSR was eventually held after the German elections in Berlin in January- February 1954. This conference failed to achieve any significant progress on German reunification or on other issues in dispute between the two superpowers.

3.2.5 Threatening “disastrous effects” if Adenauer wasn’t reelected

A fifth significant way in which the U.S aided Adenauer's reelection was achieved by Dulles publicly threatening in an American press conference which took place two days before the elections of “disastrous effects” for Germany if Adenauer wasn't reelected. This threat of

¹⁸⁰ FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1616-1617; FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1628; For Dulles handing out of Adenauer's letter during the meeting see State 197 July 11 396.1wa box 1474 RG59 NARA

¹⁸¹ FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1672, FRUS 1952-1954 5(2):1691

¹⁸² See for example FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):487-488

punitive U.S. actions echoed throughout Germany, becoming front page news in West Germany and the main issue of the election campaign in its final days, with the SPD strongly denouncing it and the CDU supportive of it.¹⁸³ As the administration knew quite well, making such a public threat was quite risky and put U.S. credibility on the line.¹⁸⁴

I was unable to find the direct request by Adenauer for this threat. Furthermore, some historians who note this statement by Dulles, which came in a response to a reporters question, even claim that it was an uncoordinated and unplanned gaffe by Dulles (see for example (Schwartz 1995(2):79)). However, the lack of the direct request note is not very surprising given Adenauer's penchant on sensitive issues (as seen in multiple occasions here) to bypass regular diplomatic channels in communicating with the U.S. and instead to use various backchannels utilizing multiple methods and people (such as through Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles brother and head of the CIA).¹⁸⁵ Such communication methods often leave little documentary record. Nevertheless, there is strong indirect evidence that this threat was intentional and done at Adenauer's request.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³“Dulles Pins Blame on Soviet Policies”, NYT September 4,1953;“Abroad” NYT Sept 7,1953

¹⁸⁴ As Nixon colorfully described it in a pre-election telephone conversation with Dulles on the latter's threat, “all our money” was now put on Adenauer. Conversation with Nixon, September 5,1953 in Dulles papers, Dulles Chronological series, box 5 DDEL

¹⁸⁵ For repeated complaints throughout 1953 within the administration about Adenauer's excessive use of such methods see telephone conversations of Dulles with John McCloy, Allen Dulles and Eisenhower in March 27, 1953, Dulles Chronological series box 4; November 19,1953 in telephone call series Tele memoranda (exp.WH) Nov.-Dec. 53(2) box 2;November 20, 1953 Telephone call series, WH telephone conversations May-Dec. 53(1) box 10 respectively all Dulles papers, DDEL. One should also note that Dulles was for much of the two weeks preceding the abovementioned press conference on vacation (and thus outside of the State Department) as was Eisenhower, which means that such a backchannel message was even less likely to be preserved than usual.

¹⁸⁶ See (Ninkovich 1988:102) for a similar argument

Firstly, from the telcoms and memos of Dulles' conversation's on this topic with Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon in the following days, it is clear that this threat was done in accordance with the intentions of Eisenhower on this matter. Likewise, in his conversation with Nixon on this topic, Dulles seems to be briefly referring to a favorable previous exchange of messages which he had with Adenauer on this issue.¹⁸⁷

Secondly, Dulles frequently used such calculated diplomatic 'indiscretions' in an intentional manner, sometimes for non-electoral purposes as well. Some examples include the the Yoshida letter in 1952 (when he was a special envoy under Truman) and again in 1954, a few months after this West German election, when he publicly warned the French of an "agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. policy towards Europe if the French parliament refused to confirm the EDC (Hoopes 1973:112-113,189).¹⁸⁸

Thirdly, Adenauer was quite pleased with Dulles' statement which he saw as a useful boost. Indeed after Dulles made his statement, Adenauer a private note thanking him for this statement. This note was sent a day *before* the voting began and, of course, two days before the election results were known.¹⁸⁹ Publicly, Adenauer even quoted Dulles' statement as part of a

¹⁸⁷ Memo to the Secretary of State September 8,1953 Dulles papers White House Correspondence 53(2) Dulles Memorandum Series Box 1;"Conversation with Vice President Nixon" September 5,1953 Dulles papers, Dulles Chronological series box 5 all DDEL. Indeed Conant also believed at the time that Adenauer and Dulles coordinated on the issuing of this statement behind his back. Scrapbook entry September 6,1953 box 35 Conant Papers, Pusey Library, Harvard.

¹⁸⁸ For the way in which Eisenhower admitted in private conversations his part in this 'unplanned' statement by Dulles towards the French see supplementary notes, "Legislative Leadership Meeting" December 18,1953 in Staff notes January-December 1953 Eisenhower Papers Whitman Files DDE diary box4 DDEL. For the way in which the State Department initially planned to use this method, an answer to an 'unexpected' question during a press conference, for its overt intervention in the April 1953 Japanese elections see FRUS 1952-1954 14(2): 1405, 1409-1411.

¹⁸⁹ Bonn 937 September 4,1953;Bonn 947 September 5,1953 both 762a.00/RG59/NARA

speech he made in one of the last preelection campaign rallies.¹⁹⁰ Despite the complacency of Conant and the rest of the American diplomatic corps in Bonn who believed by late August 1953 that the CDU's victory was all but certain,¹⁹¹ Adenauer needed the extra help. In the days preceding Dulles' statement the race between the SPD and the CDU had tightened considerably after a significant gap opened in favor of the CDU during the summer of 1953. The last pre-threat election poll showed the SPD coming within 1 point of the CDU and Adenauer's personal approval rating dropped by 6 points (Schwartz 1995(2):78).¹⁹²

Furthermore, in the run up to the elections, Adenauer, both before and after Dulles' statement, showed no fear that over-identification with the U.S. might lead to a domestic backlash against him, although many in the State Department, the High Commission, and at one point in late July even Dulles, showed such fears. Instead, Adenauer believed (as he described to Conant) that the West German public were either so grateful for past U.S. actions or so certain of their dependence on it for their future security that the reverse would be the case. As a result, in the months preceding the threat Adenauer looked, among other things, for every possible opportunity to demonstrate to the German public the friendliness of the U.S. government towards him.¹⁹³ Indeed, Dulles' statement fit perfectly within the line promoted by the CDUs election campaign in which Adenauer (in Conant's words) "Virtually ran on an American ticket".¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ "Dulles Pins blame on Soviet policies" NYT September 4,1953

¹⁹¹ FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):531

¹⁹² This poll was conducted by Adenauer's polling company during the campaign.

¹⁹³ FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):495-496;FRUS 1952-1954 7(1):499-500;Bonn 937 September 4,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA. Letter Conant to Eisenhower September 8,1953 Conant, Dr James(2), Eisenhower Papers (Ann Whitman Files) administrative series box 10 DDEL

¹⁹⁴ FRUS 1952-1954 6:672

Following all the previously described U.S. acts in Adenauer's favor, the CDU and Adenauer won a decisive victory in the September 1953 Bundestag elections. The CDU greatly increased its vote share to 45.2%, while the SPD's vote share slightly dropped (28.8%), thus enabling Adenauer to remain in the Chancellorship.¹⁹⁵

3.3 Second Case study: the U.S. and the 1967 Greek elections

3.3.1 U.S. interest in Greece in the 1960s

Unlike in the days of the Truman Doctrine of the late 1940s, when the Greek government was in the midst of a difficult civil war against a communist dominated insurgency, Greece was not a burning, daily concern to U.S. decision-makers during the sixties. Nevertheless, the U.S. government still saw itself as having very important interests in Greece throughout this period and kept its watch over events there. Firstly, Greece occupied an important position both strategically and in the U.S Cold War alliance network. Greece was a member of NATO, the United States' major military Alliance during (and after) the Cold War, and played an important role in maintaining its cohesion as well as providing important military facilities (see below). It

¹⁹⁵ See chapter 7 for an attempt to estimate the effect of the U.S. intervention in this case. The U.S., as well as many West Germans, mistakenly saw the Soviet note of August 15, 1953 (which was actually done in order to stabilize the E. German regime after the June 1953 uprising (Harrison 2002)) as a Soviet attempt to intervene against Adenauer. However, as described here, the decision to intervene and many of the particular acts done for that purpose came long before this supposed Soviet intervention had occurred. Likewise, both the SPD and the CDU immediately rejected this note, and it didn't become an issue in their campaigns. Furthermore, as both the CIA and the U.S. High Commissioner reported, this note seemed to have no effect whatsoever on German opinion or on the course of the election, an assessment shared also in German political circles (CIA telegram to director August 20, 1953 CIA telegrams 5-18(3), WH office NSC staff papers registry series box 4 DDEL; Bonn Dispatch 691 August 20, 1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA). Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that this misperception of the Soviet intentions in issuing this note had any effect on Dulles' later decision to make the public threat etc.

likewise occupied an important strategic location on NATO's southern flank, limiting Soviet access to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa.¹⁹⁶

Secondly, the U.S. had major facilities in Greece whose continued and unhindered activities was considered vital to U.S. national security. For example, the U.S. military bases in Greece (with nearly 7000 U.S. personnel by late 1965) were of primary importance in serving the U.S. Sixth Fleet in particular and U.S. force projection capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in general. These were both areas where the U.S. saw (and still sees) such capabilities as very important to its security.¹⁹⁷ Likewise, thanks to its unique position during that period as the only Balkan state which was also a NATO member, it had a large CIA station which had a major role in CIA intelligence gathering and covert espionage activities throughout the Balkans (Miller 2009:73). It also had important overt VOA relay stations for open propaganda activities by USIA in Eastern Europe.

The number and importance of these U.S. (and NATO) facilities were increasing throughout this period. For example, during the first four years of the LBJ Administration, the U.S. completed the construction of two important communications facilities, one of which solved a major communications problem with the U.S. Sixth Fleet while on missions in the Eastern

¹⁹⁶ John Owen OH,ADST;Memorandum December 1,1965 Memorandums NEA/GRK Greece 65,NEA/GRK 1963-1966/lot/RG59/NARA. Memorandum December 1, 1965 Memorandums NEA/GRK Greece 65, Records relating to Greece 63-66 lot box 2 RG59 NARA. For the fragile condition of NATO in the mid 1960s in the eyes of American and European contemporaries following the withdrawal of France from the military component of NATO in early 1966, a situation which made any potential anti-NATO acts by any of the other NATO members all the more worrisome to the U.S. see Schwartz (2003:96-97,105,147,229)

¹⁹⁷ Memorandum to the President July 22,1967 Greece memos & misc (1of 2) vol.2 1.66-7.67 Country File Greece box 126 in the LBJ Presidential Library in Austin, Texas (hence LBJL); Memorandum December 1,1965 memorandum NEA/GRK Greece 65, NEA/GRK 1964-1966;Suggested talking Points to the Secretary September 1,1965 memoranda S/S Greece, NEA/GRK 1964-1966 both lot/RG59/NARA.

Mediterranean, and was in the process of trying to expand a third communications facility in Marathon for CIA purposes.¹⁹⁸

Thirdly, the U.S. saw a cooperative Greece as an essential component (through its influence over the Greek Cypriots etc.) in achieving favorable results in the Cyprus peace process and preventing a conflagration from erupting. This issue was considered quite important to the U.S. Following a low level civil war within Cyprus between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots which almost ignited into a regional war in early 1964, LBJ invested significant amounts of time and effort throughout 1964 to resolve this conflict (Miller 2009:chp.4). After this attempt failed in late 1964, the U.S. continued with private, behind the scenes encouragement of secret negotiations between the Greek and Turkish governments in the hopes of reviving the peace process and resolving this incendiary dispute.¹⁹⁹

3.3.2 The U.S. Embassy's changing views of Andreas Papandreou and the proposal to intervene

Initially most American officials both in Athens and in the US saw little reason to worry when the Center Union party, a moderate Center-left party headed by a staunch anti-communist named George Papandreou, came to power in Greece following its electoral victories in 1963 and

¹⁹⁸ A-1010 March 20, 1964 Greece cables vol.1 12.63-12.65 Country File Greece box 126 LBJL;memo "Naval communication facility" April 22,1966 memoranda NEA/GRK,NEA/GRK1964-1966/lot/RG59/NARA

¹⁹⁹ FRUS 1964-1968 16:494-496,525-526. In late 1967, a few months after the decision not to intervene in the previously noted elections was made, the LBJ administration was also deeply involved in (temporarily successful) efforts to prevent another crisis in Cyprus from erupting into a Greek-Turkish conflagration.

1964.²⁰⁰ They were also quite pleased that Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou's son, decided to enter Greek politics on his father's side in early 1964. Indeed, Andreas Papandreou (hereafter Andreas to prevent confusion) was initially seen by the U.S. as a "positive" influence on his father.²⁰¹ During much of 1964, Andreas was also seen by U.S. officials as providing much needed aid in countering the increasing anti-American tide within the Greek public.²⁰²

These American views of both the Center Union being in power (hence referred by its Greek acronym EK) and the Papandreous in general changed, however, when Andreas Papandreou, following a humiliating failure in his first entry into politics, decided to radically remake his political persona.

Andreas' initial foray into electoral politics didn't go well. First elected to the Greek parliament in a safe district as part of the EK's February 1964 election victory, he immediately joined his father's cabinet, first as a Minister in the Prime Minister's office and then as the Alternate Minister of Economic Coordination. His quick rise at a relatively young age by the Greek political standards of that era (ten or more years younger than most cabinet ministers) as well as his father's obvious efforts to groom him as his eventual successor, raised the ire of fellow politicians at the EK who were themselves hoping to eventually succeed George. Likewise, as a former U.S. citizen who spent more than two decades in the U.S. (largely detached from the events within Greece) before returning to it in 1959 as the head of a U.S.

²⁰⁰ (Keeley 2010:xxiii).Indeed George Papandreou was considered so friendly to the West that the British, when liberating Greece in 1944, appointed him as the PM of the first interim, post-liberation Greek government (Rousseas 1967:76).

²⁰¹ A-1120 February 19,1964 memoranda box 1 NEA/GRK 1964-1966;A-915 January 20,1964 Pol2-1/RG59/NARA

²⁰²State 990 March 3,1964;Athens 1356 March 5,1964 both Pol7/RG59/NARA

funded economic research institute, Andreas was viewed with suspicion by the Greek public which was becoming increasingly anti-American in the mid-1960s. Accordingly, within a short time (with the behind-the-scenes encouragement of fellow EK politicians), he became widely seen as an alien imposter, a ‘parachutist’ into Greek politics, with persistent rumors about him being a CIA agent circulating within Greece.²⁰³ Then, eight months after his appointment, he was forced to quickly resign from his cabinet position in order to avoid being hit by a bribery scandal.²⁰⁴

In such a problematic political situation, Andreas made a calculated strategic decision to shift to strident anti-American positions on various foreign policy issues such as the Greek membership in NATO, the U.S military and other official presence in Greece and the issue of Cyprus.²⁰⁵ By becoming ‘more Catholic than the Pope’, he seemed to have hoped to conclusively prove to the Greek public that he was a true Greek patriot and not an American ‘stooge’.²⁰⁶

Likewise, such a foreign policy shift, combined with a change toward a more left wing ‘social justice’ agenda on domestic issues, was seen by Andreas as a shift which could provide major political dividends. Such a platform could appeal to a significant slice of Greek voters which had been largely neglected by other EK politicians- from the left of the EK as well as

²⁰³ Stern 1977:28;Keeley 2009:28; Daniel Brewster Oral History (hence OH) at the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History program website (hence ADST)

²⁰⁴ Miller 2009:118

²⁰⁵ Many Greeks felt betrayed and disappointed at what they perceived as the U.S. responsibility for blocking the Greek government in 1964 from achieving the long dreamed enosis (or unification) of the majority ethnically Greek Cyprus with Greece (Miller 2009:106,108).

²⁰⁶ Keeley 2010:28;Stern 1974:28

many voters of the United Democratic Left (hence EDA) the far left (defacto) ²⁰⁷ Greek Communist party. By ‘stealing’ much of the EDA’s foreign and domestic policy agenda while making it seem more achievable in the context of a major governing party like the EK, Andreas seemed to believe that he could create his own significant political power base, a base which would make an eventual succession to his father more likely.²⁰⁸

For example, already in the final weeks prior to his resignation Andreas began to publicly display more anti- American attitudes, sharply attacking the U.S. proposed settlement in Cyprus in an interview to a French Newspaper and claiming, among other things, that its membership in NATO had turned Greece into a “satellite” and that Greece needed to stop “taking orders”.²⁰⁹ A few days after his resignation from the cabinet, he tried to shift the blame for it as being supposedly due to heavy U.S. pressure on the PM, George Papandreou, secretly using a friendly Greek newspaper to spread these claims. The claims got such wide currency within Greece, thanks among other reasons to the initial refusal of George to deny them, that the U.S. Ambassador to Greece had to officially deny them, angering much of the U.S. embassy personnel in the process.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Following the Greek civil war, in which many of the insurgents (and losing side) were members of the Greek Communist party (KKE), the communist party was formally outlawed. However, many sympathizers of the communist party were nevertheless able to legally contest the elections under the banner of the EDA, a party which sprouted much of the communist party’s domestic and foreign policy platform(Rousseas1967:21).

²⁰⁸ Keeley 2010:29-30,51. For a US diplomatic dispatch (based on a still classified us intelligence report) describing these plans by Andreas A-854 April 22,1965 Pol12/RG59/NARA

²⁰⁹ See A-284 Oct 9,1964 pol12 box 2242 RG59 NARA for translations of parts of this interview. As one contemporary journalist noted, in the context of the mid-1960s, Andreas words in this interview could be understood “an an attempt to fly the kite of neutralism in Greek foreign policy”. David Holden”The Greek Colonels are part of an old tradition” *New York Times* May 31, 1970.

²¹⁰ See Athens 875 November 19,1964 FRUS 16:332-334. For Andreas all but admitting his culpability in spreading these claims see his discussion with an embassy official on December 18,1964 in A-928 May 13,1965 pol12 box 2242 RG59 NARA .

Andreas' new, vehement anti-American positions began to worry U.S. officials in Athens both in the Embassy and the CIA station by the start of 1965, with the decisive shift in their views occurring during the Greek political crisis of summer 1965.²¹¹ Following the dismissal of George Papandreou on July 15, 1965 by the King of Greece due to the latter's attempt to fire the Defense Minister and the non-partisan Chief of Staff of the Greek Military in order, among other reasons, to protect Andreas from possible prosecution in a military scandal known as ASPIDA, Greece descended into a period of political turbulence. The conservatives, who successfully pressured the King into doing this move, tried to get enough defectors from the EK to create a new government without the Papandreous which could survive a vote of confidence in parliament while the remaining EK parliamentary delegation, headed by George Papandreou, tried to create enough public pressure (via mass demonstrations etc.) to force the King to reinstitute him.²¹²

As this Greek political crisis progressed during the summer of 1965, American officials in Athens became increasingly convinced that the U.S. had to prevent the return of the Papandreous. While George Papandreou was still seen as 'acceptable', the problem lay with Andreas and his possible influence upon his father. Andreas was now seen as a "neutralist" whose "policies constitute [a] threat to [the] present U.S. position in Greece and U.S. policy objectives in Greece". With the defection of most of his political opponents within the Center

²¹¹ For the continuing significant level of uncertainty of the U.S. embassy in Athens in the first half of 1965 as to how much of a threat, if at all, Andreas posed to the U.S. prior to this crisis see A-928 May 13, 1965 pol12 box 2242 RG59 NARA. For the way in which both the embassy and the Greek desk saw the Papandreou Government in sufficiently favorable light as late as June 1965 to, for example, push for the maintenance of an aid program critical to a pet project of George Papandreou see Memo June 3, 1965 "title III school lunch program for Greece", memorandum NEA/GTI Greece 65, box 2 records relating to Greece 64-66 lot RG59 NARA

²¹² Miller 2009:120-123

Union, Andreas was now expected to dominate the party. Likewise, as George's senior advisor and number two, he was likely to push a new George Papandreu government in a neutralist direction, loosening its ties with NATO and greatly warming up Greece's relationship with the Soviet Union.²¹³ The Embassy and the CIA accordingly, in September 1965, jointly proposed a covert action program to be carried out by the CIA which, among other things, would destabilize the Center Union and weaken the Papandreu's position within it while, at the same time, helping the EK defectors (who quickly became known within Greece as the "apostates") and the Center Right, Conservative dominated, National Radical Union party (hence ERE) in their efforts to cobble together a majority.²¹⁴ This proposal was then rejected by the top echelons of the U.S. government (see later description).

The rejection of the proposed intervention proposal, however, didn't diminish the abovementioned fears of the U.S. Embassy, the CIA station and increasingly, the Greek Desk in State Department (headed in 1966 by a former senior member of the Embassy) of the Papandreu's possible return to power.²¹⁵ Indeed, the subsequent developments within Greece caused them to see such an option as even more threatening.

Firstly, by late 1966 and early 1967, Andreas' public rhetoric became more and more anti-American and the embassy now believed that, despite not being a communist himself, he

²¹³ Athens 369 September 5, 1965 Greece 1965 Cabinet Crisis, NSF files of Robert Komer box 21 LBJL. This version includes sections still sanitized in the FRUS version of this telegram; A-321 November 8, 1965 same location.

²¹⁴ Athens 369 September 5, 1965 Greece 1965 cabinet crisis, NSF files of Robert Komer, box 21 LBJL

²¹⁵ memorandum December 23, 1966 NEA/GRK1966, NEA/GRK 1964-1966/lot/RG59/NARA; Memorandum October 19, 1966 Pol15-1 Andreas Papandreu, NEA/GRK 1964-1966/lot/RG59/NARA. See also Stern (1977:36-37) for the CIA's view. The increasing fear of the Greek desk in the State Department of Andreas can be seen in the fact that from 1966 onwards a special "Andreas Papandreu" folder, solely dedicated to his recent utterances and activities, was being kept by the desk, a highly unusual treatment for someone who was formally just a common member of parliament and moreover of the opposition.

would become, if in power, completely dominated by the EDA.²¹⁶ For example, in a February 18, 1967 speech, Andreas accused the U.S. government, among other things, as being behind Greece's political ills and demanded the reduction of Greece's NATO Alliance obligations.²¹⁷ In another speech a week and a half later Andreas claimed that American foreign policy was in practice under the control of the Pentagon, the CIA and the U.S. business community and that the U.S. needs to undergo a major domestic shift in order to change its existing negative nature. He also accused the U.S. government of constantly interfering in Greece's internal affairs, relegating Greece to a Neo-Colonial status and trying (unsuccessfully) to impose on it a forced solution on the Cyprus issue. Andreas also hinted that the CIA was the real manager of Greece foreign and domestic policies and promised that an EK government would put a stop to this situation. Indeed, the latter speech even led the American embassy officials, who were in attendance, to walk out in anger due to what they perceived as its anti-American content.²¹⁸

Secondly, despite the hopes of Andreas' opponents, the EK seemed likely to win in the next election, now expected in May 1967. A third factor which increased the embassy's worries was George Papandreou's age and health. By early 1967, George was 80 years old and believed to be in failing health. In that situation, a victory of the EK in the polls and the return of George Papandreou to the Prime ministry was likely to lead, within the next government's term, to the death or retirement of George Papandreou and his replacement by Andreas.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ FRUS 1964-1968 16:541.

²¹⁷ For a translated version of this speech see A-444 February 18, 1967 pol 15-1/RG59/NARA

²¹⁸ Keeley 2010, 44-48

²¹⁹ FRUS 1964-1968 16:575; FRUS 1964-1968 16:541

In December 1966 the Greek government headed by the “Apostates”, which was eventually created (without U.S. aid) in late September 1965 after the previously noted political crisis, fell. It was replaced two weeks later by a service government which was expected to lead Greece to an election in May 1967. Accordingly, by the start of 1967 the U.S. Embassy as well as the CIA station in Athens decided to propose a covert intervention designed to prevent Andreas from gaining power as a result of an EK victory in the expected upcoming Greek elections.

3.3.3 The preferences of the Greek Conservatives

The U.S. embassy quickly discovered, however, that there was little desire for a U.S. electoral intervention on the side of the Greek Conservatives. The ERE could certainly have used such help. It had already lost twice in a row, in 1963 and 1964, to the EK in the latter case the EK getting an absolute majority of the vote (53%). Despite the previously noted dismissal of George Papandreou and the defection during the summer 1965 crisis of 49 EK MPs, the popularity of George Papandreou and the EK was undiminished. Indeed a secret CIA poll done in early 1967 had found that in the upcoming election the EK was likely to do even better than in 1964 and, from their own sense of the electorate’s preferences most Greek politicians believed that as well.²²⁰

Likewise, the conservative Greek politician had no moral compunctions against such interventions on the side of the U.S. For example, in the 1961 election the U.S. covertly

²²⁰ Stern 1974:35;A-456 February 27,1968 Pol112/RG59/NARA

intervened against the defacto communist EDA following a request for such help by the then ERE PM Karamanlis (Miller 2009: 77-78).²²¹ However, due to the nature of Greek politics, the Greek conservatives seemed to believe that they had at their disposal what they saw as better, more effective domestic tools than a U.S. electoral intervention to defeat the Papandreous. One group of conservative politicians within the ERE, as well as some of the advisors to the Greek King, thought that in response to the electoral threat posed by the Papandreous they should encourage the Greek military, much of its upper echelons deeply conservative and personally loyal to the King, to do some kind of a 'soft' or 'hard' coup. After a Turkish style 'resetting' of the political system following such a coup, the electoral chances of the conservatives would be much better.²²²

A second group of conservatives, headed by the leader of the ERE Kanellopoulos, preferred another domestic solution. In order to prevent the incumbents from abusing their office in order to assure their reelection, Greece had a political tradition of appointing non-partisan, apolitical service governments to run the country in the months preceding the elections (Keeley 2010:57). Kanellopoulos wanted to ignore this tradition and replace the non-partisan service government with a partisan ERE service government headed by himself. With all of the organs of the government at their disposal in the runup to the elections (and, if possible, a modification of the electoral law so as to favor the ERE), Kanellopoulos seems to have thought that the

²²¹ From the available evidence the CIA, with George Papandreou's consent, also gave then covert electoral aid to the EK (Miller 2009:78).

²²² FRUS 1964-1968 16: 528;Athens 4335 March 24,1967 Pol15 1.2.67/RG59/NARA

political landscape would be sufficiently tilted in the EREs favor to enable it to win the election.²²³

After the U.S. refused in private talks to passively countenance a coup, a temporary consensus seemed to have developed among the conservative politicians and they all decided to support Kanellopoulos' proposed option and contest the elections in that manner.²²⁴ However, if the EREs chances in the final days of the campaign (or during the counting of the votes) continued to be bleak the military would be nevertheless encouraged to do a coup.²²⁵

As a result, despite efforts by some American officials in this regard, there were no requests for or desire among any significant Greek conservative politician for a U.S. electoral intervention.²²⁶ Indeed the only people outside of the abovementioned U.S. government officials who seem to have desired such an intervention was a group of conservative, well connected Greek-Americans with significant social and/or commercial interests in the 'old country'.²²⁷

²²³ FRUS 1964-1968 16:569; Athens 4451 April 4,1967 pol15/RG59/NARA; memo April 8,1967 Pol14 elections NEA/GRK 1963-1974/lot/RG59/NARA. For example of the ways in which the power of the state could be used for that purpose in Greece see memo January 17,1967 in pol 14 elections records relating to Greece 63-74 box 7 RG59 NARA. Interestingly enough no evidence was found that the Greek publics increasing anti Americanism played a role in the ERE's lack of desire for such a U.S. electoral intervention - perhaps due to the fact that the ERE knew quite well that a overt electoral intervention was a possibility that they could utilize as well.

²²⁴ This partisan ERE service government was eventually created, as planned, in the beginning of April 1967.

²²⁵ FRUS 1964-1968 16:528,569.

²²⁶ For an unsuccessful attempt by supporters of such an electoral intervention in the State Department Greek Desk to recruit the former PM Karamanalis to run in the upcoming Greek elections (and by implication become the receiver of such electoral aid) see Keeley 2010:16;Letter Brewster to Rockwell March 6,1967 Pol12 ERE, NEA/GRK 1963-1974/lot/RG59/NARA;Interview with Robert Keeley11/28/2011. Likewise, after a thorough search in the relevant archives (the LBJ Library and NARA) I could not find any request for such us aid by a Greek politician in the months preceding the U.S. intervention proposal (or withdrawal sheets hinting of such requests that are still classified).

²²⁷ This group probably included, for example, Tom Pappas, a wealthy Greek-American businessmen who owned a network of gas stations in Greece (interview with Robert Keeley 11/28/2011). The lack of requests for support for such an American intervention among Greek politicians may have also been quite ironically due to the fact that one of Andreas' main public claims was that the ERE were U.S. stooges brought to power in the past largely thanks to CIA support. In such a situation, any later exposure of U.S. covert aid would have had especially high political costs

3.3.4 The majority U.S. view of Andreas and the rejection of the electoral intervention proposal

Furthermore, the Athens embassy's dark threat assessment as to the dangers of an EK election victory in general and of Andreas Papandreou in particular seems to have been the minority position even within the higher echelons of the LBJ administration. While agreeing that Andreas Papandreou was neither very friendly now to the U.S. nor their most preferred candidate for leading Greece, they nevertheless saw him as a leader with whom the U.S. could deal and live with on the major issues of relevance.

Within the State Department, the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) seems to have consistently disagreed with the Greek Desk as well as with the U.S. embassy in Athens as to the level of threat that Andreas posed to U.S. interests.²²⁸ A similar position was held also by some of the lower level officials in the U.S. embassy, some of whom viewed Andreas' ostensibly threatening behavior and rhetoric as being no more than cynical political moves to promote his political career.²²⁹ The highest echelons of the White House and the State Department, while often disliking Andreas on a personal level (partly from their experiences with him and his father during the 1964 Cyprus peace negotiations),²³⁰ shared this more benign view of Andreas as

to their political standing within Greece. See Athens 3894 February 17,1967 and Pol 15 1.2.67 box 2148 RG59 NARA

²²⁸ Letters Talbot to Spain February 10,1966 & Owen to Barnham May 6,1966 both Pol15-1Andreas Papandreou, NEA/GRK 1964-1966/lot/RG59/NARA.

²²⁹ August Valneti OH,ADST

²³⁰ See Stern 1977:26; Lucius Battle (Assistant secretary of state) OH in LBJ Library

well. For example, when the above-noted September 1965 CIA station and embassy proposal for a covert destabilization program against the Papandreous was brought for their approval in the 303 committee (the high level body then in charge of approving covert operations), the NSC staff as well as top officials in the state department were extremely skeptical of the Embassy (and CIA's) claims that Andreas was a grave threat to U.S. interests (see previous descriptions). From the limited evidence available on the proceedings of the 303 committee on this particular plan (only a brief summary of which has been declassified), they seemed to have disagreed with the embassy's threat assessment, rejecting the embassy and CIA station's proposal on the grounds that the available evidence from the embassy's own reporting didn't support their claims.²³¹

When the Embassy and the CIA station proposed in February 1967 a covert U.S. intervention in the May 1967 Greek elections against the Papandreous, this more benign view of Andreas Papandreou remained. When the proposal was brought up for debate in the 303 committee over two separate meetings in early March 1967, much of the debate centered over the level of threat that Andreas Papandreou posed to U.S. national security. NSC Advisor Walt Rostow as well as the representatives of the State Department sharply disagreed with the portrayal of Andreas by the Athens CIA station head Jack Maury as, among other things, having "percolating animosity" towards the U.S., claiming that he was greatly exaggerating the threat that Andreas posed to the U.S. and that if Andreas were to be elected, he would be likely to "settle down" and be someone with whom the U.S. could live with. However, given Maury's continued insistence as well as that of the Greek Desk in the State Department on the need for a

²³¹ FRUS 1964-1968 16:430. For the skeptical manner in which these proposals were received see September 11, 1965 memo Komer to Bundy Greece memos & misc. 12.63-12.65; State 260 September 9, 1965 Greece cables vol. 1 12/63-12/65 both NSF Country Files box 126, LBJL.

U.S. electoral intervention to stop Andreas, they decided to send the decision up to Secretary of State Dean Rusk for his final decision on this matter.²³²

Rusk seems to have agreed with those who didn't see Andreas as a significant threat. He was also (as was at least one member of the 303 committee) greatly troubled by the fact that the only ones who were willing to cooperate with the U.S. within Greece on an electoral intervention were the abovementioned group of Greek-Americans. As a result of these two factors, Rusk decided to reject this proposal and, with it, the possibility of any U.S. intervention of any kind in the expected May 1967 Greek elections.²³³

Following the U.S. decision to not intervene, a partisan ERE service government was eventually created, as planned by the Greek conservatives, in the beginning of April 1967. A few weeks later (April 22, 1967), a coup was done by a group of henceforth unknown Colonels in the

²³² FRUS 1964-1968 16:551-552,554-555; See also the secret letter to U.S. Ambassador in Athens Talbot on this decision reproduced in (Keeley 2010: 41-43). The representatives of the Defense Department were also opposed to such an intervention, probably for the same reasons as those described above. The administration thought that it could, if necessary, effectively exercise its leverage (via its military aid etc.) to moderate Andreas behavior see Q&A for the NEA advisors April 20, 1967 Pol15-1, NEA/GRK 1963-1974/lot/RG59/NARA. From that letter it is clear that the 'divided councils' in the State Department noted during the discussion refer to the previously noted Greek desk.

Interestingly enough Walt Rostow noted in this context former Venezuelan President Betancourt a leader who despite a radical left wing past became, once in power, one of Americas staunchest allies during the Kennedy administration helping it, for example, to stop an insurgency with significant communist components in Venezuela in the early 1960s. For the way that the U.S. nearly helped Betancourt in the 1958 elections see chapter 4.

²³³ "Minutes of the 303 committee meeting 13 March 1967" March 16, 1967 "Greek coup 1967" NSF intelligence files box 10 LBJL and the previously noted document in (Keeley 2010:41-43). Another factor noted at times as a major cause for this intervention being rejected was the disclosure in early 1967 of some of the CIAs covert funding to various civil society groups such as student organizations, disclosures which raised the risk of doing such a covert electoral intervention (see for example Iatrides 2003:92). However, as previously shown here, the U.S. government rejected a similar covert non electoral intervention proposal in September 1965- long before these disclosures came about. Furthermore, the supporters of covert intervention to counter these claims described during the meeting the various methods by which these risks would be unusually low (see previously noted minutes). Likewise, if the fear of exposure of CIA machinations was the main factor in stopping a covert electoral intervention one would have expected some serious discussion of an overt intervention being used instead, something which seems to have not been discussed after the rejection of this covert intervention proposal. Accordingly, while these increased fears of exposure were certainly a factor they could not have been the main reason or reasons why this proposed intervention was rejected.

Greek army (the ‘colonels’ coup) surprising both the various political groups within Greece as well as the U.S..²³⁴

3.4 Conclusions

As can be seen here, the archival evidence from the first two in-depth case studies seems to follow overall the theoretical expectations of our theory. In the first case, the 1953 West German elections, the SPD, because of the strong preferences of its leadership for German reunification as well as the hope to protect itself from attacks of being insufficiently nationalist decided to staunchly oppose the creation of the EDC- an organization seen by the Eisenhower administration as the best policy solution to their three main interests in regard of Germany. The SPD’s opposition, in combination with Adenauer’s decision to request U.S. electoral help because of his and the CDU’s weak political position, led the U.S. to agree to intervene in the elections in Adenauer’s favor. It then, in full cooperation with Adenauer and his election ‘shopping list’, assisted him in various costly ways during the campaign: from restarting a trade agreement, to setting up a commission to release German War Criminals, to spending 15 million dollars in a food aid program for East German to agreeing to call for a risky four power conference with the USSR, and finally to issuing public threats of severe consequences a few days before the elections if Adenauer failed to be reelected.

²³⁴ The U.S. expected the May 1967 Greek elections to occur as planned (see for example FRUS 1964-1968 16:611-612). Despite some Greek claims that the U.S. government was behind the coup or quietly encouraged it, the U.S. archival documents declassified over the past two decades have led to an academic consensus that the U.S. government had nothing to do with it (Klarevas 2006,471-508;Miller 2009,253-254). For a description of the surprised reaction of the then Director of the CIA, Richard Helms, to the news of this coup see (Weiner 2007:331).

In the second case, the 1967 Greek Elections, Andreas Papandreou, as part of a cynical political 'remake' designed to restart a faltering political career, adopted increasingly left-wing, anti-American positions on Greek membership in NATO and the U.S. bases (among other things). These anti-American positions, combined with the fear of his potential effects on his father (the leader of the EK), led the Athens embassy as well as the local CIA station to first recommend in September 1965 a destabilization operation against the Papandreous. It then, when a new election was in the offing recommended a covert electoral intervention designed to prevent Andreas and the EK from winning the elections. However there was little desire among Greek conservative politicians for such a U.S. intervention (despite some unsuccessful efforts by supporters of such an intervention within the U.S. embassy to find them) due to their belief that they had in this case better, more effective domestic tools to deal with their political problems. The American knowledge of this fact combined with the widespread belief within the higher echelons of the LBJ administration that Andreas wasn't a major threat to U.S. interests led the Administration to twice reject the embassy's recommendations, and not intervene in the expected elections.

In the next chapter, I investigate the cases in the two other cells: the 1965 Philippine Elections and the 1958 Venezuelan Elections.

Chapter 4: The Causes of Electoral Interventions (Prt.2)- the cases of Venezuela 1958 and Philippines 1965

Introduction

As described in chapter 1, I argue that electoral interventions usually occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first is that the Great Power perceives its interests as being endangered by a significant candidate/party within a democratic target. This candidate/party has different and inflexible preferences on important issues-i.e., the actor is either greatly constrained by his political base on these issues and/or ideologically committed to particular positions. The second is the existence of another significant domestic actor within the target who wants (or is willing) to be aided in this manner. When these two conditions are missing partisan electoral interventions will rarely if ever occur.

In two previous chapters I have begun to examine this argument. In the chapter 2 some general preliminary evidence from the full dataset supported some of the implications of this argument. In chapter 3, I did an in-depth investigation of two of the four case studies- the 1953 West German elections and the 1967 Greek elections. As can be seen from figure 4.1 these were the cases in which both conditions were missing or both were available. The findings in both cases supported the theoretical argument presented here with an intervention occurring in the West German case, no intervention occurring in the Greek case, and the two previously noted conditions playing a major role in the process which led to the American decision to intervene in the former and to the decision not to intervene in the latter.

Figure 4.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria (investigated cases in this chapter are shaded)²³⁵

Wants aid↓ / Implacable→	Yes	No
Yes	W. Germany 1953	Philippines 1965
No	Venezuela 1958	Greece 1967

However, these two case studies still left open the possibility that one of the concurrent conditions is superfluous. In other words, the fact that the two cases that were examined so far either included both conditions or were missing both of them makes one wonder whether, in situations in which only one of these conditions is present, we would see processes and outcomes that diverge from our theoretical predictions.

Accordingly, in this chapter I investigate two additional case studies- The 1965 Philippine Elections and the 1958 Venezuelan Election. As can be seen from figure 4.1 in each one of these cases only one of these conditions is present. In the 1965 Philippine Elections case only the second condition (desire of a domestic actor for electoral aid) is present while in the 1958 Venezuelan Elections case only first condition (the great power perceiving its interests as being seriously threatened by another domestic actor) is. These two cases are analyzed (with primary archival documents) using structured-focused comparison (George & Bennett 2005) checking, via process tracing and congruence, for the same set of observable implications in each process in which a would-be intervening country decides to intervene in an election or not (see chapter 3 for the observable implications).

²³⁵ For a description of the case selection method see the methodology section in chapter 1.

4.1 Third test case: The 1965 Philippine Elections

4.1.1 U.S. Interests in the Philippines in the 1960s

During the mid-1960s, as during much of the Cold War, the United States saw itself as having important interests in the Philippines. Firstly, the Philippine Islands were seen as occupying an important strategic location in Asia in two different ways. The first was by their location next to the major ocean approaches from Asia to the United States. The second was by enabling effective American power projection towards the Far East in general and Southeast Asia in particular. This American power projection capability was enabled through the existence of half a dozen major U.S. naval and air bases (and numerous smaller ones) in the Philippines and the relatively free hand the U.S. had in using them. As a result, if to give one example, these U.S. bases were seen as “indispensible” for the support of the escalating U.S. military operations in South Vietnam and its neighbors during this period.²³⁶

Not surprisingly, the control of the Philippines by a friendly government was defined in secret internal policy analyses during this period as an “irreducible minimum” for the U.S. strategic position in Asia and the Pacific.²³⁷

Secondly, given the unique history of the Philippines as the United States’ only significant former colonial possession, the success of the Philippines (as a democratic and economically

²³⁶ NPP draft November 1964 part I:2-3 Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966, pol1/box 3/lot/ Record Group 59 (hence RG59)/US National Archives in College Park, Maryland (hence NARA); military assistance reappraisal FY67-71 draft report June 1965 VI:10-11,22-24 NSF agency materials, box 20 Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library (hence LBJL)

²³⁷ NPP draft November 1964 part I:2-3 Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966, pol1/box 3/lot/RG59/NARA; military assistance reappraisal FY67-71 draft report June 1965 VI:10-11,NSF agency materials box 20 Johnson presidential library LBJL.

prosperous country) while maintaining a close allied relationship with the U.S. was seen as important for American prestige and influence throughout Asia.²³⁸

Thirdly, the U.S. needed a friendly, cooperative government in the Philippines also in order to get a significant Philippine military contribution for the Vietnam War.²³⁹ Such a contribution, while of limited direct military benefit, was nevertheless expected to be very important for U.S. goals in this conflict in three major ways. First, every further significant participation by a ‘free world’ country in the Vietnam war effort on the U.S. side was expected to increase its international legitimacy, an important need given that this war, from its very start, was quite controversial (although not as much as it would be by the late 1960s) (Colman and Widen 2009:486).

Second, more specifically, such participation from a South East Asian country such as the Philippines, one of those on the “line of dominos” which was believed to eventually fall if South Vietnam went communist, was expected to be especially valuable in providing credibility to the Johnson’s administration effort to legitimize the war as an effort to protect the future of Asia from communism both at home and abroad (Hess 2007:56; Logevall 1999:182). Likewise, such Asian troops would help reduce the negative image that a largely non-Asian, ‘White’ U.S. military force fighting versus indigenous Asian forces would be expected to create by the mid-1960s (Colman and Widen 2009:486,503).

²³⁸ NPP draft November 1964 part II: 2-3, part I:1-2, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966, poll/box 3/lot/RG59/NARA

²³⁹ Interestingly enough, this Philippine troop contribution idea seems to have begun with such a secret offer by Philippine president Macapagal in September 1964 rather than a U.S. initiative in this regard vis-a-vis the Philippines (Foreign Relation of the United States (hence frus) 1964-1968 26:656-657).

Third, significant support from a fellow South East Asian country like the Philippines would be especially valuable in raising the morale and willingness to fight among the South Vietnamese population which, by the mid-1960s, were already quite weary after two decades of almost non-stop warfare (Logevall 1999:183;).²⁴⁰

Accordingly, and given the increasing U.S. interest and involvement in this region during this period (during this Philippine election year, 1965, the U.S. began the major escalation of its combat involvement in Vietnam), the importance of the Philippines to the U.S. was, if anything just increasing.

4.1.2 The PPP's difficulties and the decision to request U.S. aid

In 1964, increasingly disappointed by their political marginalization under the Macapagal administration and its failure (in their view) to promote its promised reform agenda, two Philippine senators, Raul Manglapus and Manuel Manahan, together with a small cohort of likeminded reformists quit the reigning Liberal party. Manglapus and Manahan then decided to run under their reconstituted third party (the Party of Philippine Progress- hence PPP) to the presidency and vice presidency as well as present a slate for the Philippine Senate (Joaquin 1990:157-161;Pinckney 1971:134-135).

Success in this endeavor was, given the Philippine political context of this era, a quite remote prospect. The Philippines during this period had a two party system. While party loyalties

²⁴⁰ State 29 July 6,1965 Pol 27-3/box 3015/Central Files 1964-1966 (hence CF)/RG59/NARA; Frus 1964-1968 26:656-657

weren't very strong, several features of the political system and of Philippine society made it extremely difficult for a third party such as the PPP to win an election.

Firstly, the Philippines had, probably due to American influences, an electoral system very similar in many of its features to that of the U.S. (i.e. one round plurality for the election of the president with FPTP for Congress etc.). This kind of electoral system isn't very conducive for third party victories (Wurfel 1988:94). This anti-third party institutional feature was further buttressed by various Philippine election laws and regulations. For example, in the local election boards (responsible for the actual counting of the votes etc.) only members of the two largest parties in the previous election were legally permitted to have representatives. That, in turn, enabled the representatives of two main parties to collude, when necessary, in various "shenanigans" to reduce a third party's vote share (Pinckney 1971:99-103).²⁴¹

Secondly, and more importantly, victory in a nationwide election in the Philippines, in other words in the presidential, vice presidential or senate contests (Philippine senators were elected at large), required having a nationwide 'machine' or patronage networks throughout the country in order to get out the vote and get the voters to vote in the "right" way. The local politicians, who controlled the various patronage networks, as well as many of their clients, were primarily interested in the various material benefits bestowed by those in control of the government machinery. As a result, a candidate/party which couldn't provide this patronage through the power of incumbency, or through the provision of large amounts of preelection funding (and/or past electoral record) make a credible case for having a good chance of being

²⁴¹ For the way that members of the leading parties openly admitted in private conversations that such "discrimination" against the PPP by the observers of the major parties is likely to occur in this election see, for example, a-1053 June 17, 1965 in Pol political affairs and relations/box 2578/CF/RG59/NARA

victorious and providing this patronage in the future, had a very limited ability to gather enough votes in order to have a plausible chance of victory (Lande 1964: 86-87; Wurfel:83,85-87,94-96).

Thirdly, due to various sociological reasons, Philippine politics at the local level was traditionally divided in a strong bifactional manner with only two major rival factions competing with each other for the various local offices. That, in turn, left very limited political space for politicians (or parties) trying to build grassroots support but operating outside of the two major parties. (Lande 1964: 86).

Not surprisingly, the record of third party runs in national level Philippine elections was quite dismal. The record of third party runs by reformist groups (such as the PPP) was, if anything, no exception to the rule with not a single independent victory in a run for any national level office (president, vice president, senator) since such parties (and candidates) began their efforts in the aftermath of Philippine independence in 1946 (Wurfel 1988:96;Pinckney 1971).

The leading members of the PPP knew these facts quite well from their own personal political experiences. Manahan, after a failed but respectable third place showing (20.9%) in the 1957 presidential election under a similar reformist third party run (also named the PPP), was not even able, despite widespread name recognition, to win a senate seat under the same party's ticket (now renamed the "Grand Alliance")²⁴² in the 1959 midterms. Manglapus suffered a similar fate when he ran for a senate seat under that ticket in 1957 and again in 1959. Both were able to win their senate seats in 1961 only after the PPP temporarily joined the Liberal party and its patronage networks in the hope that this would finally enable them to win a political office

²⁴² One should note that the Grand Alliance's failure in the 1959 midterms seems to have occurred despite the fact that the CIA intervened in favor of its senate ticket with \$200,000 in covert election funds (1.1 million in 2005 dollars) among other things, a fact that seems to have been known at least to Manahan, if not to Manglapus as well (Smith 1975:299-300,315).

from which they could advance their reform agenda (Joaquin 1990:159-160; Pinckney 1971:133-134).²⁴³

Furthermore, over the following months, the factors which Manglapus and Manahan seemed to have believed that would give them a decent chance to mitigate these expected difficulties failed to materialize. For example, despite his secret promises to that effect before they quit the Liberal Party, the sitting Vice President, Emmanuel Paleaz (who had a considerable patronage network and political following) decided not to join the PPP or support their candidacies (Joaquin 1990:160). Likewise, they were largely unsuccessful in raising campaign funds from various private sources (such as from U.S. firms active in the Philippines).²⁴⁴

Finally, while the PPP was able to receive support from some elements in the Philippine Catholic church Hierarchy, the Philippine church had, during this period, very limited ability to affect the average voters behavior or vote choice.²⁴⁵ Even worse, other elements of the Philippine Church openly supported Macapagal (Carlos & Banoloi 1996:108-109).

As a result, the leadership of the PPP decided to request U.S. assistance in the upcoming election for the Presidential and Vice Presidential campaign as well as for the building of the renewed party in March 1965. Admitting that their electoral chances at present weren't very good, they nevertheless justified a U.S. electoral intervention in their favor (as its "true friends")

²⁴³ As part of the pack leading to unification of the PPP with the Liberal party before the 1961 elections, the united party's platform was amended to include much of the PPP reform planks on various issues and Macapagal promised to promote these reforms if elected (Pinckney 1971:130-131,135).

²⁴⁴ Memcom October 13,1964 Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966, Pol2/box 3/lot/RG59/NARA; A-52 July 20,1965 Pol 12/box 2585/ CF/RG59/NARA

²⁴⁵ Memcom March 10, 1965 Pol Political affairs and relations Phil-U.S/box 2589/CF/RG59/NARA; a-358 November 3,1965 pol 13-6/box 2586/RG59/NARA; a-810 (election report 5) October 28,1965 Pol 19/box 2588/CF/RG59/NARA (DDRS); a-182 September 11, 1964 in Pol 14/box 2586/ CF/RG59/NARA

as being necessary in order to counter the increasingly negative effects of the “enemies” of the United States (defined as the two major parties and their presidential candidates) on the Philippines domestic situation. The continued control by the leaders of either party would, they argued, eventually lead to disastrous effects on U.S. interests in the Philippines akin to those it was then seen by them as facing in South Vietnam and perhaps even eventually requiring a similar, costly military intervention on the U.S. side.²⁴⁶

4.1.3 U.S. threat assessment as to the Philippines and the rejection of the intervention request

However, the U.S. government felt no serious need or desire to intervene in these elections. The Johnson administration had no aversion to electoral interventions, intervening in this manner at least ten times during the five years in which it was in power.²⁴⁷ Nor did the U.S. show any compunctions in the past about intervening in Philippine elections. For example, in 1953 fearing that the incumbent (Quirino) extremely corrupt ways and overall incompetence (and repeated refusal to reform) was, Batista style, pushing the Philippines into the hands of a strong communist inspired insurgency raging then in the Philippines (the Huks), it covertly intervened in the presidential election against Quirino. This intervention was done after the U.S. was able to secure the cooperation of a candidate (Magsaysay) who was seen as being both more honest and more capable of defeating the Huks (Smith 1975:106-107). Four years later, after

²⁴⁶ Memcom March 10, 1965 Pol Political Affairs and Relations Phil-U.S./box 2589/RG59/NARA

²⁴⁷ Authors dataset

President Magsaysay died in a plane crash, the United States covertly intervened in the presidential elections in order to prevent the election of a candidate, Claro Recto, that it saw as having dangerous nationalist, Anti-American tendencies (Smith 1975: 254-255).

However by the mid-1960s, thanks to the efforts of Magsaysay and others, the Huk insurgency was long vanquished for all practical purposes with the Huk guerrilla forces down to a minor, irrelevant remnant. No other major internal threats took its place.²⁴⁸ Indeed, the Philippines was seen by the LBJ administration as having one of the more stable and democratic regimes in Asia, a relative “bright spot” in an otherwise troubled region.²⁴⁹ While there were some longer term American worries about the direction in which the Philippines was heading, neither of the two main presidential candidates was seen, if (re)elected, as jeopardizing the chances of future political/economic reforms or bringing about the (re)ignition of a communist insurgency.²⁵⁰

Nor were the two other candidates seen as having policy positions and/or preferences which would threaten U.S. interests. As for the incumbent, President Diosdado Macapagal, the United States government saw him in a quite favorable manner by 1965. The relations between the U.S. and Macapagal were quite rocky at the start of Macapagal’s term with the two sides getting into multiple public disputes over compensation for WW2 Pilipino war claims as well as over the best ways to deal with Indonesian president Sukarno (among other issues). However,

²⁴⁸ Frus 1964-1968 26:713-714

²⁴⁹ Letter, Usher to Service June 2,1964 Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966 ,pol political relations U.S./box 5/lot/RG59/NARA

²⁵⁰ Letter Usher to Service June 2,1964 (1964) Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966 ,pol political relations U.S./box5/lot/RG59/NARA; A-67 July 31,1964 Pol 6/box 2581/CF/RG59 /NARA; CIA intelligence memorandum oci 2343/65 October 28,1965 box 278, NSF country files Philippines LBJL;

the two sides were able to resolve their disagreements on these issues during 1963 and 1964. With their resolution, the bilateral relations improved and with it the U.S. view of Macapagal. Accordingly, by 1965 he was seen by the LBJ administration as a pro-American leader and a reliable and cooperative ally.²⁵¹

The other major presidential candidate, Senate President Ferdinand Marcos, was also seen by the U.S. government in a favorable manner although somewhat less than Macapagal. Marcos's somewhat inscrutable and slippery character led some American diplomatic and CIA personnel to have more reservations about his plans, if victorious, than about Macapagal's.²⁵² Likewise, the fact that Marcos was running on the Nationalist party presidential ticket, a party which despite its overall pro-American orientation had, by the mid-1960s, some of the more nationalistic elements in Philippine politics (which, in turn, could exert some influence on his future administration), led the LBJ administration to believe that cooperation with Marcos may become somewhat more difficult than with Macapagal.²⁵³

Nevertheless, Marcos was seen overall by the LBJ administration as a friendly, "solidly Pro-U.S." candidate who would, if elected, maintain the Philippines pro-western orientation.²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ For a description of the controversies and the later improvement in relations see A-1011 June 8, 1965 in Pol 1 /box 2578/ CF/RG59/NARA; Glueck 1993:273-275,294-296; Glueck 1988:135-136,145-146. For the U.S. view of Macapagal by 1965 see Frus 1964-1968 26:651, 699; a-576 December 21, 1965 pol14/box 2586/CF/RG59/NARA

²⁵² Frus 1964-1968 26:696. For the CIA's view of Marcos see (Smith 1975: 311; Richardson 2005:136)

²⁵³ Frus 1964-1968 26:695; For a description of some of those elements see a-779 April 8, 1965 Pol 12/box 2585/ CF/RG59/NARA). One should note that even most of the demands of many of those elements were seen as ones with which the U.S. could probably accommodate. For one example in which the U.S. gave the Philippines a preemptive concession on one of their planned nationalist party election planks see Manila 1601 March 3, 1965 ft4/box 1028/RG59/NARA

²⁵⁴ A-67 July 31, 1964, Pol 6/box 2581/CF/RG59/NARA; a-779 April 8, 1965 pol 12/box 2585/ CF/RG59/NARA; CIA intelligence memorandum oci 2343/65 October 28 1965 box 278 NSF country files Philippines LBJL; Memorandum to the President November 12, 1965 box 19, NSF files of McGeorge Bundy LBJL; Frus 1964-1968 26:694-699.

Accordingly, cooperation with Marcos on various issues important for the U.S. was expected to be quite feasible. For example, although in public Marcos at times opposed a Philippine troop commitment to Vietnam, from private discussions with him and his close associates (in which they were more open to such a commitment) U.S. officials believed (correctly in retrospect) that they could eventually convince Marcos, if he became president, to agree to a significant Philippine troop commitment.²⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, the LBJ administration expected these elections to result in a friendly and cooperative pro-American government, irregardless of which of these candidates wins.²⁵⁶

Given these factors, it seems that even the CIA saw little pressing need for an electoral intervention in favor of the PPP and its presidential candidate. Nevertheless, given their request it decided to recommend the provision of personal electoral aid (largely covert campaigning funds) to both Manglapus and Manahan in the upcoming election campaign. Such covert aid was recommended by the CIA in order to keep such reformist politicians within the Philippine political system after the elections and their expected defeat. The CIA seems to have hoped that their continued presence in Philippine politics would provide a future nucleus for a moderate

²⁵⁵ Memorandum of conversation with Romualdez May 24, 1965 in (1965) Philippine aid to South Vietnam/box 6/lot/RG59/NARA Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records Relating to the Philippines 1964-1966; State 29 July 6, 1965 in pol 27-3/ box 3015/ CF/RG59/NARA; Frus 1964-1968 26:695. The U.S embassy also received private assurances by Marcos that some of the abovenoted elements in the Nationalist party, such as the Nationalist party's Vice Presidential candidate Lopez (nominated and elected separately from the presidential candidate under the Philippine presidential system) would not be put in foreign policy related positions if victorious. A-363 November 5, 1965 Pol14/ box 2586/ CF/RG59/NARA,

²⁵⁶ CIA intelligence memorandum oci 2343/65 October 28, 1965 box 278, NSF country files Philippines LBJL (pg 1,6); Manila 866 November 8, 1965 Pol 14/box 2586/ CF/RG59/NARA

democratic reform movement, a movement that would help push for reforms of the various long-term socioeconomic ills plaguing the Philippines.²⁵⁷

However, when this proposal was brought up for debate in two different meetings of the 303 committee in September 1965 it was rejected in full. From the available parts of the discussions of the 303 committee on this question, this proposal seems to have been rejected because, agreeing with the CIA, the members of the 303 committee perceived no serious threats to U.S. interests in these elections.²⁵⁸

As a result, the United States didn't intervene in the November 1965 Philippine elections in any covert or overt manner²⁵⁹. In these elections Marcos defeated Macapagal 51.9% to 42.9%, starting two decades of the Marcos presidency, first as a democratic leader and then (after a fraudulent election victory in 1969 and the imposition of martial law in 1972) as a dictator.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ Frus 1964-1968 26:685-686. For a description of those ills from the U.S. view see Frus 1964-1968 26:707-708. This proposal seems to have included also electoral aid for two reformist senate candidates in the Liberal and Nationalist parties. The names of the Philippine requestors of this U.S. electoral aid are sanitized in this document. However, from the details nevertheless given about who the requestors are and the general political situation in the Philippines in the year preceding the elections, it is clear that they are referring here to the PPP's request for electoral intervention found and noted by the author (see ft x)

²⁵⁸ Frus 1964-1968 26:686.

²⁵⁹ See the CIA memorandum in (Frus 1964-1968 26:688); Manila 866 November 8, 1965 pol 14/box 2586/CF/RG59/NARA; Memorandum to the President November 12, 1965 box 19 NSF files of McGeorge Bundy LBJL. For examples of U.S. subsequent efforts not to intervene, even in an inadvertent manner, in this election see (Frus 1964-1968 26:686-687). A few months beforehand the Johnson administration seems to have also rejected a proposal coming from a member of the NSC (Chester Cooper) to intervene in favor of Macapagal as part of a quid pro quo meant to speed up the process of Philippine congressional approval of the sending of troops to Vietnam (Frus 1964-1968 26:672-675)- probably for the same reasons as those described here.

²⁶⁰ In contrast to claims by some authors, largely based, it seems, on second-hand rumors as well as the rather slim reed that some of Marcos campaign personnel probably worked with the CIA in its electoral intervention in favor of Magsaysay back in 1953 (Hamilton-Paterson 1998:198-199), I have found no evidence whatsoever of any U.S. electoral aid for Marcos during this election or of such a request ever being made by Marcos. Any American preference and/or decision to support Marcos (as some claim when, for example, Marcos decided to impose martial law in 1972 (Wurfel 1988:20-21; Hamilton-Paterson 1998:294-295)), was a much later development.

Both Manglapus and Manhanan ended in poor third places in the presidential and vice presidential contests, with 5.2% and 3.4% of the vote respectively. As the CIA expected, these two candidates, following their heavy defeats, decided to retire from electoral politics in the late 1960s when their senate terms expired.²⁶¹

4.2 Fourth test case- The 1958 Venezuelan Elections

4.2.1 U.S. interest in Venezuela in the late 1950s

During the first part of the Cold war the United States saw itself as having multiple important interests in Venezuela. Firstly, Venezuela's natural resources, but especially oil, were seen as "essential" to U.S. national security and economy. For example, Venezuela's role as an oil producer was far more important in the 1950s than it is nowadays, being then the world's biggest oil exporter and second largest oil producer (after the U.S.)- or in a position similar to that of Saudi Arabia nowadays in the oil market. The U.S. was during this period Venezuela's chief client, with about two thirds of all U.S. oil imports coming from Venezuela. Most of this oil was being produced by U.S. companies.²⁶² Furthermore, the Eisenhower Administration even hoped during this period that Venezuelan oil production would become sufficient large to reduce

²⁶¹ Manglapus eventually returned to electoral politics in the late 1980s after the fall of Marcos, first as a senator and then as Curzon Aquino's foreign minister.

²⁶² n.d. "Mutual Security program Fiscal year 1958 estimates for Latin America" in WH central files, confidential files box 97 Eisenhower Library (hence EL); VP Nixon South American trip, brief on Venezuela may 58 economic situation-petroleum in Maurice Bernbaum office files 1954-1959 box 23/lot /RG59/NARA; (Rabe 1982:158). The U.S. still imported only 16% of its oil needs in 1958. Nevertheless, given the high share of Venezuelan imports that meant that a tenth of all oil U.S. demand was supplied by Venezuela (see data in Rabe 1982:198)- an amount quite sufficient to cause significant economic pain to the U.S. if it was suddenly cut off, etc.

Western European dependence on the Middle Eastern oil with its already volatile regional politics.²⁶³ As a result, Venezuela's importance as a reliable oil producer both in peacetime (and possible wartime) was quite high to the Eisenhower administration.²⁶⁴

Secondly, Venezuela was seen as very important economically to the U.S. with Venezuela for, among other things, being a major market for U.S. exports as well as the second highest target of U.S. FDI (after Canada) in the late 1950s.²⁶⁵

Thirdly, Venezuela, with its rapid (oil fueled) economic growth during the 1950s, was seen by the Administration as important as a public showcase of the benefits of capitalism and private enterprise in Latin America, an example repeatedly used by Eisenhower as part of its ideological campaign in the Cold War in general and its efforts to help Latin American countries mainly through the encouragement of foreign investment and private enterprise.²⁶⁶ "Losing" such a prominent example of how capitalism could help the world would naturally have been quite problematic to U.S. foreign policy during this period.

Finally, Venezuela had geostrategic importance in two major ways. First, it was located in an important strategic position in which it dominated the southern Caribbean and the approaches

²⁶³ Memo February 24, 1958 "Oil Imports Progress" Records of Roy Rubottom, subject files 1957-1959, 1958 Petroleum folder, box 8/lot/RG59/NARA

²⁶⁴ (Rabe 1982:120-121). See also, for example, memo November 12, 58 " 'Political' vs. 'Military' Justifications for U.S. Grant Military Aid" in Maurice Bernbaum office files 1954-1959, ARA deputy miscellaneous/box 25/lot/RG59/NARA where Venezuela is discussed in Saudi Arabian like terms.

²⁶⁵ n.d. "Mutual Security program Fiscal year 1958 estimates for Latin America" in WH central files, confidential files box 97 EL;(Rabe 1982: 128)

²⁶⁶ n.d. "Mutual Security program Fiscal year 1958 estimates for Latin America" in WH central files, confidential files box 97 EL;(Rabe 1982:130;Rabe 1988:92-94)

to the Panama Canal, the United States most important strategic installation in the region.²⁶⁷ Second, as a country in the American “back yard”, any situation in which Venezuela came under communist domination or influence was seen as especially threatening to U.S. interests (Rabe 1988: 30-31, 39-40).

4.2.2 The increasing U.S. threat perception as to Venezuela part 1- the PCV

During the eight years of the Perez Jimenez military dictatorship, the U.S. had little to no concerns as to Venezuela. The relations between the U.S. government and Perez Jimenez were, despite a few minor tensions, quite good and it was seen by the Eisenhower administration as a friendly government under which U.S. interests were maintained.²⁶⁸ Likewise, the possibility of a communist takeover was seen as very low with the Venezuelan Communist party (hence the PCV) outlawed and believed to be quite weak.²⁶⁹ Indeed, in early January 1958, three weeks before Perez Jimenez’s downfall, the U.S. was planning to cancel a planned internal security program for Venezuela because, among other reasons, Venezuela was believed to be facing “no real communist threat”.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ n.d. “Mutual Security program Fiscal year 1958 estimates for Latin America” in WH central files, confidential files box 97 EL; (Rabe 1988:35)

²⁶⁸ See for example Frus 1955-1957 7:1138-1139

²⁶⁹ “1290d draft paper on Venezuela” April 30, 1956 in Wh office, NSC staff papers, OCB central files series, box 57 EL

²⁷⁰ Memo January 2, 1958 Richards to Hoyt in Internal Security Venezuela 1958/box 7/lot/RG59/NARA records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958;

The wave of public protests and general strikes which brought down Perez Jimenez on January 23, 1958 came largely as a surprise to U.S government which, as late as December 1957, still saw the Jimenez regime as very stable.²⁷¹ Nevertheless, the coming to power of a new regime, a transitional military junta headed by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, didn't initially bring about a significant increase in U.S. worries about Venezuela. The new transitional regime (and its leader) were seen as moderately conservative, friendly to the U.S. and protective of U.S. interests and the Eisenhower Administration was quite happy about its democratic transition plans.²⁷² Likewise, although the decision by the transitional government to permit in practice the PCV to openly operate within Venezuela (due to its role in the abovenoted demonstrations against Jimenez) was of concern to the Eisenhower Administration, the PCV and its activities were nevertheless still seen as a quite secondary problem for the U.S..²⁷³

This U.S. view of Venezuela, the temporary junta, and the PCV began to change as a result of Vice President Nixon's visit to Caracas in May 1958. This visit was the final leg of a Latin American goodwill trip in which Nixon and his entourage were subject to an increasing number

²⁷¹ Indeed only a day before Jimenez's overthrow did the CIA inform the Eisenhower Administration that this was likely to happen. Discussion at the 352nd NSC meeting, January 22, 1958 Eisenhower Papers, NSC series box 9 EL

²⁷² Memo January 28, 1958 in Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-1; February 25, 1958 briefing memo "Political Situation: Venezuela", , subject files Records of Roy Rubottom, subject files 1957-1959 1958 Venezuela folder/box 10/lot/RG59/NARA .See also the biographical sketches in Vice President Nixon South American trip, briefs on Venezuela May 1958 "Venezuelan Government officials and other prominent persons" in Maurice Bernbaum office files 1954-1959, folder briefing papers for Vice President South American tour, box 23/lot/RG59/NARA.

²⁷³ For example, in the briefing papers to Nixon for his May 1958 visit to Venezuela, getting the Venezuelan government to deal more forcefully with the PCV threat is listed as the last of five of U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis Venezuela (behind, if to give one example, various economic objectives such as preventing Venezuelan efforts to broaden Venezuela's economic base through increasing Venezuelan tariffs on American goods). Likewise, the topic of Venezuelan communism is noted as one which isn't even a scheduled part of Nixon's talks with leaders of the Junta during his visit but rather one for him to raise at his discretion. See Vice President Nixon South American trip, briefs on Venezuela May 1958 "U.S policy towards Venezuela" (April 9, 1958) and "The Communist threat" both briefs in Maurice Bernbaum office files 1954-1959, folder briefing papers for Vice President South American tour, box 23/lot/RG59/NARA.

of anti-American demonstrations and various hostile acts by local civilians as the trip progressed through the various Latin American capitals. In Venezuela however the reaction to Nixon's arrival was hostile in an unprecedented manner till that point in time.

As soon as the Vice President's plane landed in Caracas, Nixon was greeted by hundreds of angry demonstrators which, during the landing ceremony organized by the Venezuelan government, threw garbage at and spat on him and his entourage. Then, while the delegation's motorcade made its way to Caracas in order to lay a wreath on Bolivar's tomb, the motorcade was stopped by a large angry mob in downtown Caracas which was organized by PCV activists in order to demonstrate against Nixon's visit. However, the PCV activists quickly lost control of the angry, agitated mob which then, unhindered by the Venezuelan police which were supposed to protect the convoy, attacked Nixon's limousine with rocks and pipes, broke the windows and nearly overturned the car while yelling *Muera Nixon* ("Death to Nixon"). Only the timely arrival of some Venezuelan military units enabled Nixon and his entourage to escape with their lives. Then, with anti-American riots continuing in Caracas for the whole night, Nixon canceled all of his planned events and hunkered down in the U.S. embassy until he flew out the next day.²⁷⁴

Shocked and concerned by the levels of public hostility expressed towards Nixon throughout Latin America, and by the ability of the local Communist activists to organize such protests and exploit this hostility, the Eisenhower Administration began to put significant efforts

²⁷⁴ (Zanisher & Weis 1989: 170-183; Nixon 1962:217-220). For the U.S. government (probably accurate) conclusions about the PCVs role in organizing these demonstrations (and the later public admission by the PCV of its role in them) see DRA report June 19, 1958 records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958 folder Nixon trip followup/box8/lot/RG59/NARA; Memo October 5, 1958 "Recent communist activities in Venezuela" in box 3036/731.001-8-1055/Central files 1955-1959 (Hence CF)/RG59/NARA. An indication of how little the Eisenhower Administration was concerned, prior to these events, about developments in Venezuela can be seen in the fact that Nixon initially asked for his visit in Caracas to have a car with an open roof. Only the strong protests of the embassy seem to have led Nixon to accept a car with a closed roof (McPherson 2003:28), a change that probably saved his life.

into finding the underlying causes of this hostility as well as devising ways to combat this problem in general and local communist agitation in particular.²⁷⁵ While the Eisenhower Administration's concerns as to the vulnerability of most Latin American countries to communism quickly receded in the subsequent weeks and months,²⁷⁶ its worries as to Venezuela just increased.

These new American anxieties about Venezuela came from two main sources. Firstly, despite U.S. hopes that the events transpiring during Nixon's visit to Venezuela would lead to prompt action by the Venezuelan government against the PCV in general and the communist activists responsible for organizing them in particular, very little was done by the transitional junta to either investigate the causes of these demonstrations or to crack down the PCV besides the arrest of a few of the protestors.²⁷⁷ Indeed, nine days after Nixon's visit in Venezuela ended, the transitional Junta formally legalized the PCV.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, Larrazabal, during a press conference he held on June 19, 1958, even openly dismissed the claim that the PCV posed in any way or manner a threat to Venezuela or to the U.S..²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Memo "thoughts for meeting with Governor Herter and others" May 17,1958; Memo "some thoughts on the evaluation of the Nixon trip" May 14,1958 both in 1958 Nixon trip to South America, box7/lot/RG59/NARA Records of Roy Rubottom, subject files 1957-1959; Discussion at the 366th NSF meeting May 23, 1958 Eisenhower Papers, NSC series box 10 EL

²⁷⁶ See for example Memo for the OCB Planning board July 15, 1958 in NSC 1958, box 7/lot/RG59/NARA Records of Roy Rubottom, subject files 1957-1959; Telephone conversation Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles June 19, 1958 in box 8, Dulles papers, telephone calls series, EL. As Rabe notes, only after Castro came to power in Cuba in the following year (1959) and began to move in a more Communist direction, did the Eisenhower Administration start to seriously worry about the possibility of a communist takeover in most Latin American countries (1988:113-115).

²⁷⁷ DRA report June 19,1958 records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958 folder Nixon trip followup/lot/RG59/NARA; Discussion at the 366th NSF meeting May 23, 1958 Eisenhower Papers, NSC series box 10 EL; Memo "Notes" August 14,1958 in Venezuela 1958/box 8/lot/RG59/NARA records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958;

²⁷⁸ CIA Central Intelligence Bulletin June 23,1958 in CREST

²⁷⁹ Caracas telegram 857 June 20,58 731.001-8-1055/box 3036/CF/RG59/NARA

At the same time the Eisenhower Administration was receiving indications from various reliable sources of increasing communist influence in the Venezuelan press, Universities, and labor unions- three components of civil society that were seen by the U.S. as being frequently utilized by communist revolutionaries in order to take over countries around the world. Even more worryingly, in the Administrations view, there was increasing evidence of the PCVs successful infiltration into the transitory government where communist sympathizers were believed to occupy major positions within the cabinet.²⁸⁰

As a result, anxiety about the developments within Venezuela became widespread within the Administration during the summer of 1958. For example, in a secret speech at the National War College on August 25,1958, the acting Secretary of State Christian Herter described the Eisenhower administration as having “considerable apprehension” about the “very serious situation” in Venezuela because of the abovenoted reasons.²⁸¹ Subsequent political developments in Venezuela, such as the failure of another military coup attempt in September 1958, were seen by the U.S. as further increasing PCV influence.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ Memo “Communist position in Venezuela” July 2,1958 731.001-8-1055/box 3036/CF/ RG59/NARA; memo July 10, 1958 “suggested embassy program for action on communist threat in Venezuela”; memo August 4,1958 “recent communist advances in Venezuela” all in 731.001-8-1055/box 3036/ CF/RG59/NARA; Memo “Notes” August 14,1958 records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958 Venezuela 1958/box 8/lot/RG59/NARA; CIA current Intelligence Weekly Summary 24 July 1958 in CREST. At one NSC meeting in July 1958 CIA director Alan Dulles even described the Venezuelan government as “Communist Infiltrated”. Discussion at the 371st NSC meeting July 3,1958 Eisenhower Papers, NSC series box 10 EL; see also Berle diary file July 9, 1958 in 1958 diary Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library.

²⁸¹ Transcript of Herter’s speech at the National War College August 25, 1958 box 15, Herter papers, EL; For other examples see letter Rubottom to Sparks August 15,1958 and letter Bernbaum to Sparks August 4,1958 both in folder 350.21 communism Box 106 embassy files, Caracas /RG84/NARA

²⁸² See for example memo September 16, 1958 “significance of aborted military revolt in Venezuela” in records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958, 1958 Venezuela folder/box 8/lot/RG59/NARA

Indeed, this situation was so concerning to the Eisenhower Administration that it decided, at some point during the summer of 1958, to launch various covert and overt U.S. activities (through multiple U.S. government agencies) designed to improve the image of the U.S. within Venezuela and to reduce communist influence within Venezuelan Universities and trade unions.²⁸³

Nevertheless, these concerns (and actions) by the Eisenhower Administration about the situation of Venezuela didn't extend at that point to the electoral sphere. This was due to two main reasons. First, although the PCV showed worrisome signs of quick growth in party membership and overall public support within Venezuela, it was still believed to be far too small, in electoral terms, to have any chance of seriously contesting an executive election in the near future.²⁸⁴

Second, the initial democratic transition plan agreed upon (at least in public) by all of the main political parties (AD, COPEI, URD) after the ouster of Jimenez called for the selection of a single joint presidential candidate in the first post-Jimenez elections. As a result, much of Venezuelan politics during 1958 (and into the early fall of that year) was consumed with negotiations between these three parties (with the exclusion of the PCV) over the exact identity of this "unity" candidate and various power sharing formulas (Alexander 1982:418-423). The Eisenhower Administration seemed to have believed that any candidate agreed upon by these three parties (all three seen as having largely friendly attitudes towards the U.S.) would, after

²⁸³ Memo November 12, 1958 "Lines of action in Venezuela" records of the special assistant on Communism subject files, Anti communist campaign task force 1958/Box 1/lot/RG59/NARA; memcom November 5, 1958, in 92 memoranda file, box 3 lot/RG59/NARA records relating to Venezuela 1948-1963

²⁸⁴ Memo "Communist position in Venezuela" July 2, 1958 731.001-8-1055/box 3036/CF/RG59/NARA; CIA current Intelligence Weekly Summary July 24, 1958 in CREST; NIE 89-58 "The Venezuelan Situation and Prospects" September 9, 1958 in Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-13.

easily winning the elections, be unlikely to be one who would endanger U.S. interests in Venezuela, or, once firmly established, continue giving the PCV a free hand.²⁸⁵

4.2.3 The increasing U.S. threat perception as to Venezuela part 2 & the U.S. electoral aid offer to Betancourt

However, new unexpected turns of events in Venezuela during October and November of 1958 led to an extension of the administrations concerns about the increasingly threatening situation in Venezuela to the one of the major candidates contesting the 1958 Venezuelan presidential race (Larrazabal). That, in turn, led the Eisenhower Administration to seriously consider an intervention in those elections on the side of one of his competitors, Romulo Betancourt.

During October 1958 the above noted unity candidate plan by the three main parties finally collapsed and all three parties decided to run separate candidates, making the expected presidential race (now set to December 7, 1958) into a competitive one.²⁸⁶ Then Larrazabal, after agreeing to contest the elections as the Presidential candidate of the URD party, decided to also

²⁸⁵ February 25, 1958 briefing memo "Political Situation: Venezuela" Records of Roy Rubottom, subject files 1957-1959, 1958 Venezuela folder/box 10/lot/RG59/NARA; NIE 89-58 "The Venezuelan Situation and Prospects" September 9, 1958 in Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-13; For the way in which the U.S. was, as late as October 1958, so unconcerned by the upcoming election results that it was canceling some planned activities in Venezuela in order to avoid even the possibility of the U.S. being inadvertently pulled into the election campaign and alienating any of the sides contesting them see letter Sparks to Bernbaum October 1, 1958 box 102 Embassy files, Caracas RG84/NARA; Memo November 12, 1958 "Lines of action in Venezuela" records of the special assistant on Communism subject files, anti communist campaign task force 1958/Box 1/lot/RG59/NARA

²⁸⁶ (Alexander 1982: 423,426). The fact that the unity candidate plan was dead wasn't fully clear to the U.S. government until at least late October and the signing of the Funto Pijo pact between three main parties. tel G-53 October 15, 1958; memcom October 25, 1958 "Pre-election activities in Venezuela"; Caracas tel 229 November 1, 1958 all in 731.00-10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA.

formally accept the endorsement of the PCV. Larrazabal, as part of accepting this endorsement, seems to have also received (as the CIA discovered sometime in mid-November) some covert Soviet funding for his campaign.²⁸⁷

This decision by Larrazabal completed the ongoing shift in the Eisenhower's Administrations view of him. In the months following VP Nixon's visit to Venezuela, the Eisenhower Administration was developing an increasingly negative opinion about Larrazabal over what they saw as the failure of the transitional Junta that he headed to deal in any serious manner with the increasing threat posed by the PCV and his rather naïve view of the threat that the U.S. believed that they posed (see some previous examples).²⁸⁸

Larrazabal's decision to accept PCV (and through them Soviet) endorsement and aid seems to have fully convinced the Eisenhower administration that he would be an unacceptable candidate to the U.S.. Larrazabal's unacceptability was due to the administrations belief that Larrazabal's excessively friendly and/or staunchly naive position towards the PCV (and the Soviets) if he stayed in power, as conclusively shown in this decision, would make any significant cooperation with the U.S. on this issue very difficult (if not impossible) and quickly

²⁸⁷ Berle diary file November 24, 1958 in 1958 diary, Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library. Berle's source was his close friend, the head of the CIA's Latin American division at the time J.C. King. See also "Updating supplement major developments in Latin America since the issuance of the OCB special report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1) dated November 26, 1958" December 22, 1958 in Who OSANA records, NSC series briefing notes subseries, box 12 EL. The CIA's intelligence seems to have been quite reliable in this particular case. The available evidence from the Soviet archives indicates a one time transfer by the CPSU (one of the bodies used by the Soviets at times to finance such covert interventions among other things) of an additional \$100,000 dollars (about \$550,000 in 2005 dollars) in covert funding to the PCV for that year (Riva 1999:50), at least some of which was probably used to help Larrazabal's election campaign as well as that of the PCV.

²⁸⁸ "Communist position in Venezuela" July 2, 1958 731.001-8-1055/box 3036/CF/RG59/NARA; NIE 89-58 "The Venezuelan Situation and Prospects" September 9, 1958 Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-13; letter Sparks to Rubottom August 28, 1958 731.00-8-158/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA; see also (Nixon 1962:222); CIA Intelligence Study "Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Venezuelan Communist Party 1958-mid 1965" December 6, 1965 CREST.

open Venezuela to communist domination and takeover through its (supposedly) favorite infiltration techniques.²⁸⁹

Accordingly, the Eisenhower Administration decided to offer electoral aid to the other main candidate in this race, Romulo Betancourt. For this purpose they seem to have requested Adolf Berle, a former FDR advisor and Assistant secretary of State in the 1940s and a close friend of Betancourt, to serve as a trusted intermediary for this electoral aid offer.²⁹⁰

4.2.4 Betancourt's political position and the rejection of the electoral intervention proposal

Betancourt however decided to reject this American electoral aid offer.²⁹¹ Betancourt's decision to reject this American offer seems to have been the result of the strength of the party which he

²⁸⁹ The Eisenhower administration seems to have believed that in the most likely scenario of a Larrazabal victory, a narrow win over Betancourt, Larrazabal would probably appoint members of the PCV (or public figures approved by the PCV) to important cabinet positions. Larrazabal would then, given his domestic political needs and general attitude towards them, be loath to do anything to keep the PCV under check. That, in turn, would open Venezuela to being slowly taken over by the PCV in a manner similar to what the Administration thought had occurred under Arbenz in Guatemala (prior to his removal by a U.S. orchestrated coup). Indeed, some members of the administration were increasingly worried about such a 'Guatemalan' scenario even before Larrazabal made the decision to accept the PCV's endorsement. Memo "Venezuela Guidelines" November 19, 1958 in folder 63 parties and elections box 3/lot/RG59/NARA Records relating to Venezuela 1948-1963; Memo November 21, 1958 Herter to Straus Herter papers Chronological files box 6 EL; Memo December 4, 1958 "The Venezuelan election: close contest expected" in Venezuela 1958/box 8/lot/RG59/NARA records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958; CIA Current intelligence Weekly Summary November 26, 1958 CREST. For increasing fears of Venezuela becoming "Another Guatemala" even prior to Larrazabal's decision see, for example, Memo "Notes" August 14, 1958 in Venezuela 1958 /box 8/lot /RG59/NARA records of the special assistant on Communism office files 1956-1958. One of Larrazabal's own cabinet ministers admitted, in a private conversation with State Department officials in November 1958, that Larrazabal was "a naive person" on these issues, an admission that probably just made the Administration even more apprehensive about him. Memcom with Maybore November 25, 1958 box 102 Embassy files, Caracas RG 84/NARA.

²⁹⁰ Berle diaryfile November 24, 1958 in 1958 diary, Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library. Berle seems to have become, long before the Eisenhower Administration thought of intervening in this election, an important informal channel of communication of the Administration with Betancourt when the latter returned to Venezuela in early 1958 from his Puerto Rican exile and resumed his activity in Venezuelan politics. See, for example, Memo July 21, 1958 conversation with Adolf Berle box 3036/731.001-8-1055/CF/RG59/NARA; Berle diary files July 9, 1958 & October 24, 1958 both in 1958 diary, Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library.

²⁹¹ Letter Betancourt to Berle December 6, 1958 in 1958 diary, Box 219, Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library.

founded and led- the Accion Democratica (AD). AD was the first of its kind party in Venezuela, a mass party which had developed widespread grassroots support. Using that support (as well as a successful military coup in its favor in 1945), Betancourt and the AD took over the country in late 1945 and delivered on some of their socio-economic promises over the next three years. As a result of both factors, the AD was able to consolidate a mass public following within Venezuelan society, winning more than 70% of the votes in three overall fair nationwide elections conducted between 1946 and 1948, including one for the Presidency (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 41-43;Martz 1966:72-78).

Although the AD suffered under the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, during which it was banned and many members of the party who didn't leave to exile were heavily persecuted, it nevertheless was largely able to maintain its party organization and political strength within Venezuela over that decade. Indeed, when Perez Jimenez called an election in 1952 to legitimize his rule he banned the AD from participation given its expected strength. When the AD decided to clandestinely support the URD, that was sufficient to lead the URD (which beforehand was getting less than 5%), despite heavy restrictions on URD campaigning and large scale government harassment, to an overwhelming victory over Jimenezes 'government' party (the FEI) (63% to 21% according to one later estimate), forcing Perez Jimenez to stop the counting in the middle and issue "corrected" returns a few weeks later (Martz 1966: 146,327-329).²⁹²

As a result, when the Perez Jimenez regime fell in early 1958, Betancourt and AD leadership quickly rebuilt the party organization and membership and reclaimed the AD's dominant political position in Venezuelan politics. Indeed, in private conversations before the

²⁹² For this vote share estimate see (Nohlen 2005(2):568).

attempt for find a unity candidate collapsed & the election campaign began, there was a general agreement among Venezuelan politicians as to AD's continued political dominance, including those politicians (like Rafael Caldera, the then leader of COPEI) who were among AD's (and Betancourt's) harshest political opponents.²⁹³

The only thing that could still have stopped the AD (& Betancourt) from a decisive election victory and coming to power in the first post-transition months was the Venezuelan army. As previously noted, the Venezuelan army had removed the first freely elected AD government in late 1948. Despite the overthrow of Jimenez in January 1958 the army still included some senior, far right, officers which detested the AD (seeing it as little better if not worse then the Communists) who were widely believed to be willing and able to do a coup if a member of the AD and/or Betancourt won the election. Indeed, the initial willingness of Betancourt to agree, at least in theory, to the idea of the unity candidate (rather than posing its own candidacy) was probably because of his fear of such a coup occurring if he dared to propose his candidacy.²⁹⁴

However, two failed coup attempts in July and early September 1958, attempts which failed largely because of cross-party civilian opposition to the return of a military dictatorship, weakened the military's political position and therefore its ability to meddle in Venezuelan politics. More importantly, as a result of the coups, most of the senior military officers which

²⁹³ For a few examples of such admissions see Caracas dispatch 610 February 24, 1958 in 731.00-2-358/box 3032/CF/RG59/NARA; Caracas dispatch 913 June 6, 1958 in 731.00-5-558/box 3032/CF/RG59/NARA; NIE 89-58 "The Venezuelan Situation and Prospects" September 9, 1958 in Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-13;

²⁹⁴ Caracas dispatch 24 July 8, 1958 731.00-6-1758/box 3032/CF/RG59/NARA; NIE 89-58 "The Venezuelan Situation and Prospects" September 9, 1958 in Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-13; Caracas dispatch 364 November 6, 1958 in 731.00-10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA. For some examples of the views of the military officers see Caracas dispatch 95 July 28, 1958 731.00-6-1758/box 3032/CF/RG59/NARA. For Betancourt's (private) desire to be a candidate in these elections see his conversation with Adolf Berle in Berle diary file January 31, 1958 in 1958 diary, Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library.

opposed the AD and Betancourt (and who participated in both coup attempts) were exiled by the transitional Junta and lost all of their influence over the military. With their removal, the remaining military hierarchy had a friendlier attitude towards the AD. As a result, Betancourt seems to have become certain by late September 1958 that the Venezuelan military would not do a coup in the case that he won or it looked like he was about to win the presidential elections (Alexander 1982:424).²⁹⁵

As a result, when Betancourt openly announced his candidacy for the presidency in the middle of October 1958, he seems to have been very certain of his chances of winning the presidency (Alexander 1982:426).²⁹⁶ Likewise, unlike the Eisenhower Administration, Betancourt seemed to have had very little worries about Larrazabal's candidacy and his subsequent reception of the PCV's endorsement, seeing Larrazabal as a political neophyte with little real chances of beating him.²⁹⁷ Indeed Betancourt, when rejecting this American aid offer, indirectly noted his good chances of winning this election as the reason for rejecting this offer.²⁹⁸

As a result of Betancourt's rejection of this electoral intervention offer, the Eisenhower Administration seems to have decided to largely drop this attempt to intervene in the Venezuelan Presidential election.²⁹⁹ Two weeks later Betancourt nevertheless won the Venezuelan

²⁹⁵ See also Caracas Dispatch 364 November 6, 1958 in 731.00-10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA; Caracas dispatch 311, October 13, 1958 in 731.00-10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA

²⁹⁶ See also Caracas dispatch 311, October 13, 1958 in 731.00-10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA;

²⁹⁷ Caracas dispatch 311 October 13, 1958 in 731.00/10-358/box 3033/CF/RG59/NARA; Caracas dispatch 490 December 16, 1958 Frus 1958-1960 microfiche supplement 5:VE-15.

²⁹⁸ As Betancourt described it in his rejection of this offer, given that he (Betancourt), once elected, would never let the PCV in his government, the U.S. has "no rational reason" to worry about them. Letter Betancourt to Berle December 6, 1958 in 1958 diary Box 219 Adolph Berle papers, FDR Library.

²⁹⁹ Memo "Venezuelan Elections" December 1, 1958 in records relating to Venezuela 1948-1963 folder 63 parties and elections/box 3/lot/RG59/NARA; Memo December 15, 1958 box 105 embassy files Caracas RG 84/NARA. The

presidency in a landslide with 49.9% to Larrazabal's 35%.³⁰⁰ Betancourt's election to the Presidency inaugurated a forty year period of democratic politics in Venezuela, not interrupted (despite the eruption of a short lived communist insurgency in the early 1960s) until the coming to power of Hugo Chavez in December 1998.

4.3 Summary and Conclusions

As could be seen here, the documentary evidence from the second set of two in-depth case studies seems to also follow overall the theoretical expectations of our theory. In the first case, the 1965 Philippine Elections, the weak political position of the PPP and its presidential candidate Raul Manglapus, led them to secretly request the United States government for electoral aid in this election. However, the United States government also saw the other two main candidates in the presidential race, Diosado Macapagal and Ferdinand Marcos, as overall friendly candidates who, if elected (or reelected) to the Presidency, would cooperate on issues of importance to it (such as getting a Philippine troop commitment for the Vietnam War). As a result, the U.S. government, seeing no good reason to intervene, decided to reject the PPP electoral intervention request and didn't intervene in any way or manner in this election.

Eisenhower administration did secretly decide to delay the formal announcement of new restrictions on the importation of foreign oil (which included also Venezuelan oil) into the U.S. until after the conclusion of the elections, an announcement which it feared could help the PCVs (& Larrazabal's) chances if made right before the elections (Memo November 21, 1958 Herter to Straus Herter papers, Chronological files, box 6 EL). However, given that this oil restriction policy was announced & enacted unmodified by the Administration shortly afterwards, and that for various operational and bureaucratic reasons, the Eisenhower Administration didn't anyway plan for these restrictions to come into force in practice until after the Venezuelan elections was long concluded (this enactment plan being in place long before the Eisenhower Administration began to worry about the upcoming Venezuelan elections), this delay is best described as a minor, completely costless act on its side. Memo November 6, 1958 "meeting of the special committee to investigate crude oil imports" in 411.006/11-158/box 1714/CF/RG59/NARA; Frus 1958-1960 supplement 5:VE-21 Editorial note.

³⁰⁰ A third candidate Rafael Caldera, the leader of COPEI, received 16%

In the second case, the 1958 Venezuelan elections, the Eisenhower Administration became increasingly concerned, following the violent attack of an angry communist agitated mob on Vice President Nixon motorcade during his visit to Caracas in May 1958, by the growing strength and influence of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) which began to operate freely in Venezuela after the fall of the Jimenez dictatorship in the beginning of that year. It also became concerned by the unwillingness of the transitional junta, under Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, to do much in order to keep the PCV in check in the following months.

These increasing American concerns spilled over into the electoral sphere when Larrazabal decided to run in the presidential elections and then chose to accept the endorsement of the PCV (and covert Soviet funding). That, in turn, led the United States, concerned about Larrazabal's attitude towards the PCV, as revealed in making the above decision, and his expected unwillingness, as a result, to cooperate with it in suppressing PCV activities (& prevent a possible future communist takeover attempt) if he wins the elections, to offer his main opponent in these elections, Romulo Betancourt, to intervene in these elections in his favor. However, Betancourt, who was quite confident of his chances of winning the presidential election due to the political and organizational strength of his party, the AD, chose to reject this American offer. That, in turn, led the Eisenhower Administration to "sit out" this election and not significantly intervene in it.

The results in this and the previous case study chapter demonstrate the utility and strength of the theoretical framework proposed here for explaining the causes of Great power electoral interventions. They also have further implications as to some claims and/or arguments made about such interventions in the literature and/or public discourse.

First, a high level of strategic importance of the country in question (in the eyes of a would-be intervener) is far from sufficient to lead a great power to intervene in this manner in its electoral processes.³⁰¹ All four countries were perceived by the U.S. government, at the time of their relevant elections, as countries in which the U.S. had important interests, the “loss” of any one of them during the period in question likely to have been seen as a major setback to the United States. Nevertheless, that fact didn’t suffice to lead American decision-makers to intervene in three of the four elections investigated here. That, in turn, indicates that being the target of an electoral intervention is not some nearly automatic result of being a “country of interest” to a great power while having relatively competitive elections. Instead, the way in which the various major political actors in the target are perceived by the great power and the willingness of one or more of them to accept (or request) such aid are far more important factors in leading (or not leading) to such interventions.

Second, these cases provide no significant evidence for claims that electoral interventions are the result of bureaucratic inertia or become, after done once in a particular country to deal with a particular problem, an ingrained “Standard Operation Procedure” by the intervener for dealing with any new issue which arises with that country.³⁰² Two of our cases (Greece 1967 and Philippines 1965) had experienced U.S. electoral interventions in past national level elections. This past intervention record may have indeed been a secondary factor in increasing the chances that a domestic actor in the target in deep political trouble would think of the

³⁰¹ This is one of the conditions for such interventions according to Weinberg (2011:94-97)

³⁰² This is an accusation made at times against CIA/covert U.S. interventions of various types (including electoral ones). For one recent example see (Prados 2006:381). Given that 44% of electoral interventions are repeat interventions (see chapter 2) the possibility that this was indeed the case couldn’t be dismissed out of hand without further investigation.

possibility of requesting electoral aid from the U.S. as a way to resolve its political difficulties (Philippines), or for some members of the local U.S. embassy & CIA station to propose this option when encountering what they saw as an increasingly threatening domestic actor in the target (Greece).

Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that their past electoral intervention record in a particular country isn't usually a significant consideration for decision-makers when deciding, when such proposals arrive at their desk, whether to intervene or not in an upcoming election there. Indeed, the fact that the U.S. had electorally intervened in the past in the Philippine and Greek cases seems, from the available documentary evidence, to have had little 'pull' or effect on the relevant American decision-makers calculus, rejecting in both of these cases proposals to intervene in this manner.

Instead, the available evidence seems to indicate that the decision-making process on whether to intervene or not in a particular election in a given country is usually a discrete, separate new decision by the relevant decision-makers for each election in question, the decision largely based on the existing conditions in the target in the months prior to that election and requests for aid (and/or lack of desire for it) from political elements within it. Past conditions in potential electoral intervention targets, or whether previous interventions of this kind were done in the country in question, seem to usually play a very small to no role in the making of the intervention (or non-intervention) decision.³⁰³

As for the argument that the electoral intervention of other hostile powers can be a cause for ones own intervention (see for example Corstange & Marinov 2012:4), no evidence had been

³⁰³ The nature of national level elections in most democracies, i.e. discrete events temporally separated from one another by a few years rather than an ongoing, continuous process (like say most civil wars) may be a factor in that.

found in these cases to support it. In the German case (where the U.S. intervened) there were indeed some (misplaced) fears of such a Soviet intervention occurring. However, the available evidence indicates that they were quite secondary in comparison to the factors noted here. Likewise, the fact that the U.S. discovered a Soviet electoral intervention in the Venezuelan case in favor of Larrazabal wasn't sufficient to lead the U.S. to intervene as well in favor of Betancourt when other factors that my argument emphasizes (such as the willingness of the domestic actor to accept such aid) were lacking. These results provide further, in-depth contextual evidence for the finding in the dataset overview chapter that double electoral interventions (the U.S. on one side, the USSR/Russia on another) have been relatively rare occurrences even during the Cold War era.

Another argument for which no evidence of significant effects were found was for the effect of the potential target being a new/fragile democracy (Corstange & Marinov 2012:4). As for the West German case, while Germany during this period was certainly still a new, (albeit quickly maturing) democracy, there is no evidence that this was a significant factor leading to the U.S. intervention. As noted in the previous case study chapter, in case of a CDU defeat, the likely winners the SPD had impeccable, widely known democratic (and anti-communist) credentials and were thus highly unlikely to destroy German democracy or prevent the CDU from freely contesting the next elections.³⁰⁴ Adenauer's desire for an American intervention in his behalf was due to his fear for his and the CDUs political survival, not for the future of West German democracy.

³⁰⁴ Indeed even Adenauer himself in private talks, when not talking to U.S. officials (to whom one of his favorite tactics was presenting the SPD as a dangerous bogeyman), admitted in 1953 that the SPD were becoming more moderate. See for example Ottawa 1071 April 21, 1953 762a.13/RG59/NARA

Likewise, in the Venezuelan case the fact that these elections were going to be a “founding election” after a decade long dictatorship had little to do with the reasons why the U.S. government seriously considered an intervention in them. Nor, for that matter, was the all too likely possibility of a Larrazabal cabinet with significant Communist presence after a Larrazabal Victory (and a possibility of a later communist takeover) sufficient to push Betancourt to accept the U.S. electoral aid offer. Indeed, this factor seemed to have little effect on the decision whether to intervene or not in either in the Philippine case (where the U.S. refused to support a democratic minded reform candidate), or in the Greek case.

These results from the in-depth study of these four cases, combined with the null statistical finding for the level of democracy as a predictor of such interventions in the dataset overview chapter, seem to indicate that the level of democracy of the target seems (when low) to have little effect on the decision whether to intervene or not in this manner. In other words, when it comes to partisan electoral interventions, the newness (or fragility) of the democratic system in the target neither presents an unusually tempting opening for the promotion of the interveners interests (Corstange & Marinov 2012:4), nor does it seem to encourage electoral intervention requests by domestic actor and/or create greater willingness on their side to accept such great power intervention offers on their behalf.

In the next chapter a new important issue will begin to be examined- the effects of electoral interventions on the targets election results.

Chapter 5: The Effects of Electoral Interventions on Election Results – the Large N Statistical Analysis

“In the midst of these pleasing ideas we should be unfaithful to ourselves if we should ever lose sight of the danger to our liberties if anything partial or extraneous should infect the purity of our free, fair, virtuous, and independent elections...If that solitary suffrage can be obtained by foreign nations by flattery or menaces, by fraud or violence, by terror, intrigue, or venality, the Government may not be the choice of the American people, but of foreign nations...and candid men will acknowledge that in such cases choice would have little advantage to boast of over lot or chance.”

John Adams, Inaugural Address March 4, 1797³⁰⁵

Introduction

President John Adams was probably among the first leaders, but by no means the last, who had a good reason to warn his own country about the possibility of a foreign intervention in its elections. Partisan electoral interventions are a quite common phenomenon. In a previous chapter (chp.2) in which the overview of my newly constructed dataset of U.S. and USSR/Russian interventions between 1946 and 2000 was presented, I have found that partisan electoral interventions have occurred in approximately one of every nine competitive national level executive elections during this period and done in sixty different independent countries hailing from all world regions. They were also far more frequently done by the great powers during this period than other forms of intervention such as foreign imposed regime change (FIRC), a

³⁰⁵Online by Gerhard Peters and John Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25802>.

category that includes military invasions as well as significant covert coups, or significant military interventions (i.e. including the deployment of 500 or more troops etc.).

Nevertheless, the ubiquity of great power electoral interventions may not necessarily indicate, in and of itself, that they are of any significant “real life” importance. For that purpose, this chapter will try to examine one important, basic criteria determining whether electoral interventions “matter”. In other words, whether as John Adams warns in the above quote, electoral interventions are truly able to significantly affect the election results in the targeted country.

This investigation will also be of value in two other major ways. Firstly, one usually assumes, *prima facie*, that policymakers choose a particular policy tool given that it is, in most cases, quite effective in its main purpose. Finding out whether this is indeed the case will enable us to see how accurate our underlying presumption is. Secondly, this examination will also provide some further indirect evidence as to the strength of my argument about the causes of such interventions. As was described in the theory chapter, the first three hypotheses on the effects of electoral interventions (H4-H6 see brief description below) are directly derived from the model of the causes of such intervention (H1-H3). Accordingly, the findings on these three hypotheses may buttress or may weaken any conclusions noted in previous chapters

In chapters 3 and 4 I investigated the first three hypotheses in regard to the causes of electoral interventions (H1-H3). Five major hypotheses about the effectiveness of electoral interventions will be examined in this chapter (see their full description in chapter 1). Briefly stated, my first hypothesis as to the effects of electoral interventions (H4) is that electoral interventions will overall increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate/party. My second hypothesis (H5) is that overt public interventions are more beneficial to the aided candidate/party

than covert interventions. The third hypothesis (H6) is that electoral interventions will be less helpful to the aided party/candidate in founding elections than in later elections. Finally, the fourth and fifth hypotheses (H7-H8) have contrary predictions as to the effects of electoral interventions in favor of challengers vs. those in favor of incumbents, with the fourth hypothesis expecting challengers to benefit more from such interventions while the fifth hypothesis expecting incumbents to benefit more.

This chapter will be divided into four main parts. In the first section (starts the next page) the method by which the abovenoted five hypotheses are operationalized and tested (as well as the required controls) is described. In the second section these hypotheses are tested using a new dataset of U.S. and Russian/Soviet interventions and the results described. In the third section results of diagnostics done on the results of these five hypotheses are described and further statistical findings are noted and explained. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the findings and notes their implications.

5.1 Variables and definitions

In order to investigate my five hypotheses about the effects of electoral interventions (H4-H8), a plausible model of the factors which affect voting, of the type frequently used in the economic voting literature for cross-national studies, is required. Accordingly, I use the approach recently employed by two major scholars in this subfield, Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels (2007), and then add the relevant electoral intervention variables (and other robustness checks). As a

further check I also employ (with two exceptions)³⁰⁶ a second cross-national economic voting model, that of Mark Kayser and Michael Peress (2012), with the inclusion of the electoral intervention variables.³⁰⁷

Besides the inclusion of the variables specified for each of these economic voting models, I also add, for further robustness checks, relevant control variables such as for various kinds national security/foreign policy factors (Civil Wars, Interstate Wars, and major foreign policy crises), the level of democracy in the target (polity scale) and the time period involved (Cold War era or later) (see further description of these various control variables in appendix 5.1 at the end of this chapter following the regression tables).

For both of these approaches, I will use OLS with PCSE (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) (Beck and Katz 1995). This is the technique commonly used in similar cross national studies of the economic vote (Wilkin et al 1997;Samuels 2004; Benton 2005) as well as the two above noted replicated papers. It is also the best technique to use when the dependent variable (as in this study) is incumbent vote share, a variable which usually exhibits an approximately normal distribution and, due to its bounded nature, has few influential outliers.

An outside partisan intervention in an election will only be invited by a domestic actor and/or seriously considered by a foreign power if there is some plausible prospect of success in this endeavor. I therefore begin by compiling the universe of cases- a list of national level

³⁰⁶The first variable used by KP but excluded here, unemployment, is unfortunately not available for many countries. Furthermore the differences in the measurement of unemployment in general and the reliability of this measurement in non-OECD countries in particular make it a problematic tool for cross-national comparisons (see Hellwig and Samuels 2007:303). Indeed even in the models of Kayser and Paress local unemployment has no significant effects in eight of the nine models tested. The second missing variable, coalition size, is unfortunately either unavailable, irrelevant or inapplicable concept as to many of the presidential and semi-presidential systems included in our dataset.

³⁰⁷ The author wishes to thank Michael Peress for the kind aid provided in replicating this model.

competitive elections in which an electoral intervention could potentially occur.³⁰⁸ I define an intervenable/competitive election as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the 2010 DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) executive electoral competitiveness index (Beck et.al 2001) with a small modification. For an election to get that score, multiple parties (in parliamentary systems) won seats in the election and the largest party received less than 75% of the vote, or, in presidential or semi- presidential systems, multiple candidates ran and the winning candidate won less than 75% of the votes.³⁰⁹ Although rarely used in IR, this is a frequently used measure in Comparative Politics (for examples see Brownlee 2009; He 2007; Triesman 2007).

Following this criterion and extending the coverage of this index back to 1946 using Nohlen's data on elections (see description below), 937 national level executive elections with a population of above 100,000 have been found.³¹⁰ These elections come from 148 different countries. Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Greece and Japan have the most competitive

³⁰⁸ Such elections can occur of course even in many regimes which are far from being democracies if not largely authoritarian such as the Philippines under Marcos (after the imposition of martial law), Yugoslavia under Milosevic or Argentina under Peron. As a result, even elections in such "Competitive Authoritarian" regimes, so long as they are expected to be overall competitive (even if the playing field is significantly tilted in favor of one of the sides), can be and often are tempting targets for interveners. Accordingly, no criteria for the country's level of democracy, beyond the election's competitiveness, are used in order to exclude or include particular elections.

³⁰⁹ For further explanation of the reasons for choosing the DPI measure see appendix 5.1. Elections to Constitutional assemblies if one of their explicit purposes is to select an executive are included as are partial/ supplementary elections in parliamentary systems so on the number of seats contested in them is at least 10% of the total (i.e. usually enough to potentially affect the parliamentary majority of the executive).

³¹⁰ Besides avoiding missing data problems as to DPI data (which uses this threshold), the 100,000 population criteria also make theoretical sense as the lower bound of country size which is of any plausible interest to the great powers and therefore belongs to the universe of cases (i.e. plausible targets for an electoral intervention). The historical record indicates that during the period of this dataset the positions and developments in relatively small countries above this population threshold such as Iceland (132,000-280,000) Luxemburg (284,000-433,000) and Grenada (110,000) were of significant interest to the great powers at times. For example, the first two countries were (and are) full members of NATO, Iceland also had a major U.S. base during the Cold War era (and was heavily wooed by the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s) and Grenada was the target of a U.S. military invasion in 1983. One is hard pressed to find any comparable great power interest in the micro states (such as Nauru, Palau etc.) with smaller populations than that. Indeed some IR datasets (such as those by COW) use an even higher threshold-500,000.

elections in this dataset (between 22 and 18) while another 23 countries have only one competitive election. Because of missing data (most of which is non-imputable),³¹¹ the number of elections (and countries) on which the statistical analysis can be done is somewhat smaller in practice.

The dependent variable in all of the models estimated here, as is common in models of economic voting (including in the two approaches adopted here), is the vote share of the incumbent's party (in parliamentary systems) or presidential candidate (in presidential and semi-presidential systems with direct elections).³¹² Nearly all of this data came from the edited volumes by Dieter Nohlen and colleagues (1999,2001,2005,2010) on elections around the world. These scholars, over the course of the last two decades, have painstakingly assembled data on national level election results from all independent states going back from (at least) 1946 to the present. The data on election results in different countries is standardized into one common format, making it an ideal source for cross-national comparisons. For the small number of election results missing from these volumes (usually those occurring right before or after the publication of these volumes) I used other reliable sources such as the African elections

³¹¹ If to give two examples, in some of these elections the incumbent was either completely neutral (caretaker or otherwise) or its identity was unclear making it impossible to define what was the incumbent vote share in those election (my independent variable). The previous vote variable was of course unavailable for the first executive level elections ever to occur in a particular country. For these and most other missing data in my dataset, it is logically impossible for the data in these cases to exist in reality. Accordingly, this data is non-imputable via data imputation programs such as Amelia or other methods.

³¹² Besides its ubiquitous use in the cross-national economic voting literature in order to investigate the effects of various factors on election results, incumbent voter share was chosen as the dependent variable for this analysis for three other reasons. First, it is widely recognized, as a result, as a valid tool for such purposes. Furthermore, any findings discovered while utilizing it would be harder to contest with claims that this particular independent variable was used just because it happened to provide the "right" results. It also makes it easier to compare the findings on the variables emphasized by the economic voting literature (economic growth etc.) to the findings on my variables of interest.

database³¹³ and the reports on election results by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.³¹⁴ All of this data for the relevant elections was entered manually by the author from these non-digital sources and then rechecked twice.³¹⁵

In this and other variables where this distinction is used, an incumbent is defined as the party and/or candidate which held the highest elected executive position (President in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems, Prime Minister in parliamentary systems) in the period preceding the elections and/or received the endorsement or backing of the holder of the highest executive position during that period.³¹⁶ A challenger is a party and/or candidate which does not fall under these criteria.

The main independent variables, partisan electoral interventions and, in subsequent models, various subtypes of such interventions, are taken from a new dataset constructed by the author of all such interventions between January 1, 1946 and December 31, 2000 which were done by the US and the USSR/Russia. An electoral intervention is defined as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe

³¹³ <http://africanelections.tripod.com/>

³¹⁴ <http://www.ipu.org>

³¹⁵ For a small number of parliamentary systems in which vote share was repeatedly missing, seat share was used instead. Cases in which the elections were clearly competitive but the elections were invalidated before the results became fully available and/or the data sources indicate that election fraud was so massive so as to make the results completely unreliable were excluded from the dataset.

³¹⁶ In countries in which it is common to install a neutral non-partisan caretaker government in the runup to the elections (like Greece or Bangladesh since 1996), I code the party of the last pre-caretaker executive as the incumbent. As some researchers on the economic vote have noted, while voters can also hold (in multiparty parliamentary systems etc.) other coalition partners accountable for the executives performance, the evidence seem to show that, in most cases, the party/candidate which holds the top executive position prior to the election receives nearly all of the credit and/or blame for the executives performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008:59).

will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country. (see chapter 1 for further description of dataset construction).


To be coded as a covert intervention all of the significant acts done in order to help a particular party/candidate must have been either a secret and/or that the connection between those acts and the election was not known to the average voter in the target at least until after the election day (if they ever become known).³¹⁷ To be coded as an overt intervention at least some of the significant acts done in order to aid a particular candidate/party must have been known by the average voter in the target to have been done in order to help or hinder a particular candidate/party in the elections. Following these definitions, 117 American and Soviet/Russian interventions have been found during this period (see dataset description in figure 5.1).

To investigate my first hypothesis on effectiveness I include in the first set of models an electoral intervention variable (*Electoral Intervention*). In order to model the fact that electoral interventions can be done in order to help or to harm the incumbent³¹⁸ this variable is constructed as trichotomous, coded as 1 if an intervention is for the incumbent, -1 if it is for a challenger, and

³¹⁷ To examine whether a certain known intervention was overt I examined preelection mass media descriptions of these acts (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these acts are described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that the average voter knew about this intervention. Given that overt interventions are designed to affect public opinion in the target there was rarely any ambiguity in this regard in practice as to the main components of these interventions.

³¹⁸ As can be seen in chapter 1 in H4-H6, I do not expect any differences in the effects of electoral interventions based upon whether the intervention is for the incumbent or for the challenger. Accordingly a trichotomous intervention variable closely approximates my theoretical arguments for these three hypotheses. See the section of the results for H7 & H8 for the findings when this theoretical assumption is relaxed and further examined.

0 when no intervention occurs.³¹⁹ If this hypothesis is correct, I would expect the effect of this variable to be positive and significant.



In order to test the second hypothesis I include in the second set of models (instead of a single intervention variable) two trichotomous variables, one of overt interventions (*Overt Int.*) and one of covert interventions (*Covert Int.*) following my coding of my electoral intervention dataset. If this hypothesis is correct, then I would expect the effect of the overt interventions variable to be positive and significant as well as larger in substantive terms than the effect of the covert intervention variable. Given that some interventions include both significant covert and

³¹⁹ Given that in cases of double interventions (the Soviets helping one side the U.S. another) there are effects in both directions I exclude these interventions as well (except in the models for hypotheses 4 and 5). As noted in chapter 2 such interventions are quite uncommon in practice. Also excluded are cases in which the identity of the incumbent is unclear.

overt components (say a public threat/ promise as well as covert campaign aid),³²⁰ I also include a control variable (*Covert & Overt*) for such cases.

In order to investigate the third hypothesis I create in the third set of models an interaction (*Int*Founding Election*) between a founding election dummy (*Founding Election*) and the electoral intervention variable from the first hypothesis.³²¹ In order to prevent possible bias, together with the interaction I also include its two abovenoted main effects. All three variables are then included in the third set of models. If hypothesis six is correct, then the interaction term should be negative and significant.

One should note here that I code founding elections here somewhat differently than some other scholars do (see for example O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).³²² The theoretical logic behind this hypothesis is that the quality of information which the aided candidate/party can provide to the intervener about the target country's preferences etc., information usually acquired through the aided candidate/party previous electoral experience, has a major effect on how effective the intervention is. Accordingly, in order to be coded as a founding election, in the previous six years there had to be no competitive, national level executive election in that country. The six year time range was chosen because it is the longest gap that modern

³²⁰ Ten of the overt interventions (23.8% of all overt interventions) in the dataset fall into this category

³²¹ The incumbent in such elections was coded, in manner similar to my coding incumbency in democratic regimes, as either the effective (unelected) leader/ member of the leadership group of that country (if running in the elections) or whichever party/candidate was endorsed/supported by the current effective leadership. In order to enable this interaction the founding election dummy is constructed as 1 for non-founding elections and 2 for founding elections. An alternate way of creating the interaction- having the founding election dummy as 0 for non-founding and 1 for founding and turning the trichotomous election variable into a 1 to 3 scale (each respectively of the original -1, 0 and 1 scale) had no effect on the subsequent substantive results.

³²² These scholars define a founding election as the first competitive multiparty election following a period of authoritarian rule (regardless of its length).

democracies (with one past exception) permit between executive national level elections.³²³ For longer periods, the information available to the local politicians from a previous competitive election is expected to degrade to the point of being of little value.

For periods shorter than six years, the information about how to effectively campaign in their country or the preferences of the electorate is unlikely to vanish from the minds of the local politicians simply because there was a short, non-constitutional “interruption”. Indeed, when such a relatively short interruption ends the subsequent election usually has the same pre-interruption politicians and parties reentering politics and contesting the elections. Likewise, the fact that the previous competitive national level election was done prior to independence (or under foreign military occupation) should not usually reduce the value of the knowledge acquired from it for the participating politicians for the purposes of campaigning.

Accordingly, except in cases in which the data indicated that all or most of the pre-interruption politicians (and parties) were exiled, executed and/or banned from running in the post-interruption elections (as was the case of Turkey in the 1981 elections or in Argentina in the 1963 elections), I don’t code the second of two competitive elections with less than a six year gap as a founding election even if there was a successful coup (or autocoup) in the interim or the first of these competitive elections was done prior to independence.

To investigate the fourth and fifth hypotheses, I include (instead of a single intervention variable) two dummy variables, one for the interventions done for the purpose of aiding the

³²³ Some fully democratic countries with presidential systems (post-1987 South Korea, Chile before 1973 and after 1989) have an executive election only once every six years. Likewise, some parliamentary systems have a maximum term of five years (the U.K). In practice, while coding this variable for countries which suffered from non-constitutional interruptions etc., there were no more than three or four cases in which the coding would have differed if a four year range was chosen instead. For the one past exception to this rule in modern democracies, France between 1958 and 2002, I code the relevant presidential elections as non-founding.

incumbent (*Int. for Incumbent*) and one for interventions done for the purpose of helping a challenger (*Int. for Challenger*).

Given that successful interventions in favor of a challenger would reduce an incumbents vote share and vice versa, if the seventh hypothesis is correct I would expect the absolute substantive effect of the challenger aid variable to be significantly larger than that of the incumbent aid variable. If the eighth hypothesis is correct I would expect the opposite to be the case. Due to the fact, as was noted in chapter 2, that seven elections had interventions on both sides (one by the U.S. and one by Russia/USSR)³²⁴ I include a dummy variable (named *Double int.*) for these cases.

5.2 Results

Tables 5.2 to 5.4 present the statistical results for the first hypothesis about the beneficial effects of such interventions on the aided side (For improved readability all regression tables henceforth noted are at the end of the chapter). As can be seen from Model 1 in Table 5.2, I am able to replicate Hellwigs and Samuels (henceforth HS) main result- that the interaction of economic growth and trade openness significantly reduces the incumbent's vote share. However, under some robustness checks such as fixed effects (Model 2) (not done in the HS paper) and fraud limit (Model 4), this result becomes insignificant.³²⁵ This also occurs in many subsequent models where the electoral intervention variables are included as well.

³²⁴ Given that the intervention variable is disaggregated, in order to test H7 & H8, into two separate variables the double interventions can now be included in the analysis.

³²⁵ In a "clean" replication (without the electoral intervention variable) of HS (see appendix 5.2), this interaction becomes insignificant under fixed effects as well, albeit, at a lower level of insignificance.

In model 1, I also include the electoral intervention variable. The effect is in the predicted positive direction and has significant effects both statistically and substantively. A Wald test also indicates (at the 0.01 level) that it significantly increases overall model fit. On average, an electoral intervention in favor of one of the sides contesting the election will increase its vote share by about 3%. That is quite a significant effect. For example, such a swing in the vote share from the winner to the loser in the fourteen U.S. presidential elections occurring since 1960 would have been sufficient to change the identity of the winner in seven of these elections.³²⁶ Its effects also stack up quite well in comparison to another well known major effect on election results- the state of the economy. As can be seen in Model 3 (where the interactions of the economic growth variable with two other variables are excluded), a 1% increase in the real GDP per capita would increase incumbent vote share by about 0.4%. To illustrate its effects, had Carter in 1980 run for reelection with the economy which Reagan had in 1984 (+6.6%) rather than the economy he actually had in 1980 (-1.9%), our model would have predicted Carter's vote share to have increased by about 3.4%.(see section 2.1 for illustration of the effects of interventions in specific cases).

The following models include a battery of various robustness checks. As can be seen in Models 2 and 4, my results hold under country fixed effects as well as when elections in which evidence exists that significant election fraud had occurred are excluded from the dataset. In model 5, I include a control for whether the intervention in a particular case is a repeat intervention. This control is neither significant nor has any effects on my result.

³²⁶ Assuming, of course, a similar shift in the relevant 'swing states' and, accordingly, the electoral college.

In Model 6 (Table 5.3), I include controls for three other foreign policy/national security variables: the existence or eruption of a civil war, an interstate war or an international crisis involving that country prior to the election. As can be seen in this model, the inclusion of these three factors does not affect the results. Interestingly enough the control for interstate war has a substantive positive effect on incumbent vote share (+4.4%) albeit only at the 0.1 significance level. While this latter result loses its significance in some specifications (not shown here), it is nevertheless worthy of further study- especially given that there are only 28 cases of countries engaged in an interstate war prior to an election in my dataset.³²⁷

In Models 7 and 8, I check for the possible effects of the level of democracy of the target on the effectiveness of the intervention. A logged combined polity control variable does have a significant and substantive effect (Model 7) with every one unit increase in the logged polity scale (now ranging from 0 to 3) decreasing incumbent vote share by 4.6%. This result is to be expected given that some of the elections in countries with the lower polity scores are occurring in “electorally authoritarian” regimes where the incumbents usually enjoy far more advantages over their challengers than in fully democratic regimes. However, an interaction between the polity variable and my intervention variable is insignificant (Model 8).

In Model 9, I check for the effects of time period. A dummy variable for the Cold War period does not have a significant and substantive effect and an interaction between this variable and the electoral intervention variable (not shown) is not significant. Similar non-significant results are found when the time trend variable in Kayser and Peress’s models is included (see

³²⁷ This result may perhaps be preliminary evidence of the “rally effect” following such wars also affecting an upcoming election in that country. Likewise in a different robustness check (not shown here) I checked an alternative foreign policy effects measure- sanctions. No significant effects were found for this measure as well

next paragraph and Table 5.4) or an interaction between this variable and the electoral intervention is added as well (see appendix 5.2). These results indicate that, at least as to the post-WW2 era, there is no significant relationship between the time period in which the intervention occurred and the effectiveness of the intervention.

In Model 10, I check for the effects of international election observers. This variable has no significant effects.³²⁸ In Model 11, I check for the effects of clarity of responsibility- the extent to which the pre-election political and institutional context increases or reduces the perceived responsibility of the incumbent for her administration's recent performance. This factor is believed by some scholars in Comparative Politics to affect the willingness of voters to reward or punish the incumbent for her performance (Powell and Whitten 1993:400-401,410). The interaction between clarity of responsibility and our intervention variable is statistically insignificant indicating that this factor has no significant effects on the effects of electoral interventions.

Finally, in table 5.4, I attempt to replicate Kayser and Peress (2012) (henceforth KP) new study on the cross-national economic vote and then include the electoral intervention variable. This is done in order to make sure that my finding of a positive, significant and substantive effect for electoral interventions was not the result of an unusually well fitting economic voting model.. As can be seen in Table 5.4, I am able to replicate KP's main result- that once one controls for the tendency of the public to compare (or benchmark) the economic performance of their country to that in other relevant countries (or global growth) the effects of the local economic

³²⁸ Similar results are found when, in an alternate specification, I include only Western based international monitors. In Table 3.2 Model 9 this control is significant and in the opposite direction but this result is not robust as well (see appendix 5.2). The sending of election observers is also, of course, one of the major non-partisan methods by which democracy is promoted- so this factor (together with the robustness checks for period etc.) should also capture any separate effect, if any, such efforts have on election results if done in conjunction with a partisan intervention.

performance on the incumbent's vote share will consistently be affected by the performance of the local economy. Indeed in the various robustness tests conducted for the electoral intervention hypotheses, this result by KP was found to be far more robust to alternate specifications than HS's main result (the economic growth and trade share interaction).³²⁹

As for the argument presented here, my trichotomous electoral intervention variable (Models 12-15) continues to have significant effects both statistically and substantively. A Wald test indicates here as well (at the 0.01 level) that the electoral intervention variable significantly increases model fit.³³⁰

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 presents my results as for the second hypothesis on the differing effects of covert and overt electoral interventions. As can be seen from Model 1 in Table 5.5, the results support hypothesis 2 with overt interventions on average increasing vote share by 3% more than covert interventions do- a major substantive difference in the effects of each subtype.³³¹

Models 2 to 10 in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 include a battery of robustness checks for this result, similar to those done for hypothesis 1. These models show essentially the same results as to the

³²⁹ In the various robustness tests conducted for the electoral intervention hypotheses, this result by KP was found to be quite robust to alternate specifications, although it also, in some subsequent robustness checks, becomes insignificant.

³³⁰ The inclusion of various additional control variables shown in tables 1.1 and 1.2 in KP's model leads to similar results as in the HS model and are accordingly not shown here (see appendix 5.2). In a further robustness check I also disaggregated the Electoral intervention variable by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions. The results for the disaggregated Russian and American electoral intervention variables are essentially the same as for the aggregated variable although the results for the Russian interventions aren't significant in many models. This is probably due to the relatively small number of Russian interventions which aren't dropped due to missing data on some covariates (22). Other robustness checks using HS and KP's models utilizing, for example, other controls (such as such as for the targets relative power (cinc)) showed no significant effects (see appendix 5.2 for these additional results).

³³¹ Some may wonder whether the differences found in effectiveness between covert and overt interventions in favor of the latter are simply due to the cases in which the covert interventions were exposed prior to the election and the resulting political 'fallout'. However in further robustness checks (see appendix 5.2) in which the small number of covert interventions in which this occurred this had little effect on the results.


effectiveness of covert and overt intervention variables as model 1.³³² Likewise, unlike covert interventions, the effect of overt interventions is consistently significant under various models and robustness checks.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the models which evaluate the third hypothesis, that electoral interventions will be less beneficial to the aided party/candidate in founding elections than in later elections. As previously noted, in order to enable such a comparison I include, besides the electoral intervention variable, a dummy variable for founding elections and an interaction term between them and exclude the control variable for previous vote share.

In results which support this hypothesis, the interaction variable between my intervention variable and a measure of founding elections is both negative and statistically significant. A joint Wald test also indicates (at the 0.01 level) that this interaction significantly increases overall model fit. Because such interactions are not easy to interpret, to estimate the substantive differences between the effects of electoral Interventions in both situations, I generate the predicted absolute mean effect of electoral interventions in founding vs. non founding elections in Model 1 Table 5.7 (the benchmark for this hypothesis).

As can be seen in figure 1, while interventions in non-founding elections usually benefit the aided side increasing its predicted mean vote share by 3.2% on average, this is not the case in founding elections. In founding elections, the interventions appear to usually *harm* the aided side, reducing its predicted mean vote share by 6.7% on average. These are quite significant

³³² As can be seen in appendix 5.2, the result of the interactions of the Cold War, time trend, and clarity of responsibility variables with the covert and overt intervention variables, are similar (and eventually insignificant) as in the case of the interaction reported as to hypothesis 1. The same case is with a disaggregation of the covert and overt intervention variables by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions.



substantive differences in the effects of interventions in founding versus non-founding elections which I further discuss in the conclusions and investigate (as particular cases of such interventions in founding elections) in chapter 7.

Then in Models 2-12 in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, I conduct a battery of robustness checks for this result similar to those done for the previous two hypotheses. The results show the interaction between founding elections and electoral interventions essentially retains the same direction, statistical significance and effect as in Model 1 of Table 5.7.³³³

³³³ An alternative interaction between the electoral intervention variable and a logged electoral experience variable (not shown) shows similar results with aided candidates/parties benefiting more from such interventions as their (and their country's) experience with competitive elections increases. Unfortunately, this interaction is significant only at the 0.1 level and the results were not robust under certain alternative model with specifications (such as for fixed effects and/or fraud in the KP models)- probably due to the fact that the number of interventions at many levels of electoral experience was relatively small. As a further robustness check, these two interaction variables were interacted with various third potential 'moderator' variables (polity, time, Cold War etc.) in manner similar to

Table 5.9 shows the results as for the fourth and fifth hypotheses. The evidence overall seems to indicate that the fourth hypothesis, which argues that challengers will benefit more than incumbents from an electoral intervention in their favor, has somewhat more evidence on its side than the fifth hypothesis (which argues the opposite). Unfortunately, this result is not robust. Under some plausible alternative specifications, such as models 3, 5, and 6 in which elections in which evidence exists that significant fraud had occurred are excluded, the variable for interventions in favor of the challengers has the same substantive strength as that of the variable for interventions in favor of the incumbents. This variable also becomes statistically insignificant in Model 6. As a result, given the present evidence available, I am forced to reject both hypotheses.

The results of three other control variables used in models for the different hypotheses are also of interest. The first such variable is whether a given election is a direct presidential election in which the incumbent is running for reelection (or *reelection*). As can be seen from Tables 5.2 through 5.9, this variable has a substantial and significant positive effect increasing the incumbent's vote share by approximately 8% on average. This result confirms a similar result found by HS as well as Cheibub and Przeworski's argument (1999:234-235) about the strong incumbency advantage that presidents running for reelection usually have.

The second variable of interest is the interaction between presidential elections and growth rate. In confirmation of HS results, this interaction is not statistically significant in any of the models where it is included. The third interesting result is the logged level of GDP per capita income in the election year. Although in the predicted direction by HS, this measure is (unlike in

hypotheses 1 and 2 in order to see whether they have any effect upon this interaction. No significant effects were found (see appendix 5.2).

HS) not statistically significant in most models examined here, perhaps due to the longer time period of my dataset versus that of HS (which only starts at 1975).

5.2.1 Estimated Effects in Particular Election Cases

Of course a question may be raised as to how much the estimated electoral intervention effects found here apply in practice as to specific elections in which such an intervention had actually been done. Accordingly, in order to illustrate some of the “real life” effects of electoral interventions, Table 5.1 gives the estimated effects on election results in six cases of intervened elections, all of these elections (and their results) widely considered to be important turning points in retrospect in these nations’ history.

As can be seen in Table 5.1 in most cases (in non-founding elections), the electoral intervention had an important and decisive effect on the outcome in the “desired” direction. In the 1972 West German parliamentary elections, for example, my model estimates that the Soviet intervention in favor of Willie Brandt and the SPD was an important factor in its winning a narrow 5 seat margin (in a 496 seat lower house or Bundestag) over its main rival Rainer Barzel and the CDU (230 to 225).³³⁴ Without the increase in vote share due to this intervention, and given West Germany’s Electoral system, I estimate that the SPD would have narrowly lost the

³³⁴ Shift estimated given Germany’s electoral system (and assuming a uniform shift in the PR component) and that most votes shifted from the SPD to the CDU the two major parties. The seats of West Berlin representatives whose status (and ability to be full voting members in the Bundestag) was one of the hotly contested issues in this election are excluded but their inclusion would not significantly affect this estimate.

election to the CDU, 216 to 236, probably leading to Willie Brandt's loss of the chancellorship.³³⁵

Table 5.1: Estimated effects of the electoral intervention on election results- selected real intervention cases (interventions in favor of challengers in bold)

Election	Aided side	Intervener	Actual incumbent vote share	Estimated incumbent vote share w/out the intervention	Did the intervention have the desired (& decisive) effect?
W. Germany Nov. 1972	Incumbent	USSR	45.8	43.6	Yes
India Aug. 1977	Incumbent	USSR	34.5	32.3	No
Israel June 1992	Challenger	U.S.	24.9	30.3	Yes
Yugoslavia/ Serbia September 2000	Challenger	U.S.	38.2	43.4	Yes
<i>Founding Elections</i>					
Argentina Feb. 1946	Challenger	U.S.	53.7	47.2	No (reverse)
Yugoslavia/ Serbia Dec. 1992	Challenger	U.S.	53.2	47.2	No (reverse)

Note: Table created by deducting from the true election results the predicted electoral intervention effects in that election. The predicted intervention effect was estimated by generating the predicted vote share from our model for that election and then recoding that case as a non-intervention on the intervention variable, generating a second prediction and deducting this result from the first prediction. The predicted results of Hypotheses 2 and 3 were used for estimating the effects in cases of founding and non-founding elections respectively. The 1992 Yugoslav election was technically only for Serbia (the dominant member in what became by this point a two member federation with tiny Montenegro). Given Peron's role in the Argentinean military regime by mid-1945 (to the point that his temporary removal from office in October 1945 was widely seen as a full scale coup), and the intermittent support that he received from the regime after he formally resigned from the junta in the runup to this election, Peron was defined as the incumbent in the 1946 Argentinean election (see also chp.7). The result here is his vote share in the presidential elections.

³³⁵ Given the nature of coalition forming in parliamentary systems (and West German election laws) it is of course theoretically possible that the SPD's main coalition partner, the FDP, would have nevertheless agreed to recreate their preelection coalition. However, such defeats usually lead to the largest party gaining power. Indeed, it is instructive that the most recent exception to the largest party gaining power norm in German politics, the 1969 West German elections, came only after the CDU lost some votes and the SPD made significant electoral gains.

Likewise, the American intervention against the incumbent, PM Yitzhak Shamir, in the 1992 Israeli parliamentary elections is estimated, according to my model, to have cost Shamir's right wing Likud party the amount of votes equivalent to about five or six seats in the 120 seat Israeli parliament (the Knesset)³³⁶. Given that in this election, the left wing opposition parties won a narrow, 1 seat absolute majority in the Knesset for the first time since the 1973 elections, this intervention was likely an important factor in enabling the coming to power of Yitzhak Rabin following this election as the head of a center-left coalition.

Of course, like any other domestic or international factor known to affect elections, an electoral intervention in one's favor does not always guarantee success to its intended beneficiary. In the 1977 Indian parliamentary elections, the covert Soviet intervention in favor of Indira Gandhi and the Congress party is estimated by my model to have done little to prevent, or to even much soften, the crushing blow that it had suffered from the Janata party. In this defeat, which led the Congress party to lose power for the first time since India's independence, the Soviet intervention is estimated to have assisted the Congress party in keeping only eleven or so seats³³⁷ from being lost to the Janata party and/or other parties. This is a number too small to have any serious effect on the election results given that the Congress party lost more than a 150 seats in this election and the Janata party won 295 seats and a solid, 24 seat absolute majority in the 542 seat lower house (the Lok Sabha).

³³⁶ Seat share change given this shift in vote share estimated based on the Israeli election law in force during 1992. Israel had (and has) a single district PR system.

³³⁷ Estimated using the SMD district level results in the 1977 statistical report of the Indian electoral commission on this election and assuming a uniform swing in all districts. Many districts had more than two significant candidates (and 18 parties won seats in the Lok Sabha in this election) so no estimate of where the votes could have otherwise gone (besides being lost to the Congress party candidates) could be plausibly made in this particular case.

In contrast, the American intervention against Slobodan Milosevic in the 2000 Yugoslav election is estimated by my model to have been decisive in bringing about his final downfall. Without this U.S. intervention my model predicts that Slobodan Milosevic would have run neck to neck with his main rival, Vojislav Kostunica (43.4% to 46.5%).³³⁸ If the first round of the Yugoslav elections had concluded in this inconclusive manner, rather than in an outright Kostunica victory (51.7%), Milosevic would probably have been able, as he did in the past, to “steal” the elections without bringing about the massive wave of demonstrations which eventually forced him to acknowledge his defeat and resign from the presidency.

In the two founding elections, the effects were also quite significant and decisive, but **not** in the direction desired by the intervener. In the 1946 Argentinean election, my model estimates that the overt American intervention against Juan Peron (the publication of the Blue Book- see further description in chp.7) backfired badly, enabling Peron to win this election with a comfortable, absolute majority of the vote (53.7%) rather than a narrow loss to the other presidential candidate Jose Tamborini (47.2 to 50.1%).³³⁹ Likewise, the U.S. intervention against Milosevic in the 1992 elections is estimated to have helped rather than hindered Milosevic, the resultant backlash probably enabling him to get an outright absolute majority in

³³⁸ Assuming that most of the votes which Milosevic lost went to Kostunica, a reasonable assumption given that Kostunica was the only other major candidate as well as the main beneficiary of the U.S. electoral intervention

³³⁹ Assuming an equal swing in the Argentinean electoral college. Juan Peron and his party, for one, seem to have been quite certain that this overt American attempt to prevent Peron’s election to the Presidency in the 1946 elections was very helpful to Peron’s success in it. As a result, when a Peronist candidate (and then Peron himself) ran again for the presidency in 1973 (after an 18 year ban on their activity) they attempted to run yet again against an alleged U.S. intervention designed to prevent Peron’s return to power. The Peronists even tried to reuse some of the anti-U.S. posters used during 1946 election campaign for this purpose. The U.S. government, which after observing Peron for a whole decade in power in the late 1940s and early 1950s stopped seeing him as a threat, didn’t in this case intervene in the wanted manner, frustrating Peronist plans for a “re-enactment”. See “Peronists Favor Economic Shift From U.S. to Europe” Washington Post, March 15, 1973

the first round rather than being forced into a second round in which, facing a single opposition candidate (Milan Panic), he may have lost the elections and eventually forced to accept the results.³⁴⁰

5.3 The effectiveness of different tools of Electoral Intervention

Given the finding here about the overall effectiveness of electoral interventions, it would also be of interest to examine whether there are any significant differences in the effectiveness of specific aid provided and/or its magnitude. Accordingly, I also tried to disaggregate the electoral intervention variable to other subtypes than those tested through my five hypotheses. For example, I tried to disaggregate by subtypes of electoral aid (dirty tricks, threats and promises, campaign funding etc.). Unfortunately, when entering the various subcategories as multiple trichotomous variables into the HS and KP models (not shown), I was unable to find results of any significance or value.

This null result was probably due to two reasons. Firstly, the number of interventions in some of these sub-categories was quite small in practice (n of 15 to 25). For example there are only 14 known cases of various dirty tricks being used by the intervener against an ‘unwanted’ candidate/party and 25 cases of public threats and/or promises made by the intervener in my dataset etc. Secondly, in quite a few intervention cases the intervener is known to have used more than one technique in the same intervention. This in turn, created significant correlations

³⁴⁰ Prior to the elections it was widely believed that a failure of Milosevic to win decisively in the first round would “break the spell” and lead to his defeat in the second round. See for example “Serbian Vote Crucial to Balkan Fate: Accusations of Rigging Surround Close Contest”, *Washington Post* December 20, 1992. Some election observer reports had claimed that although Milosevic probably got a clear victory over his main opponent Panic, this victory was further “enhanced” with the aid of various shenanigans (see, for example, “Conflict in the Balkans; Serb Nationalist Claims a Victory; Rival Cries Foul” *NYT* December 22, 1992). If that was indeed the case, then the U.S. intervention may have, inadvertently, even prevented a Panic victory over Milosevic in the first round.

between these variables which further reduced the variation available for the statistical model.³⁴¹ For example in 58% of the cases in which dirty tricks are known to have been used against an ‘unwanted’ candidate/party, they were used in conjunction with secret campaign funding to the candidate/party preferred by the intervener.

As an alternative, I tried disaggregating my dataset of electoral interventions into two subtypes. The first subtype (*Campaign aid*) are acts which directly aid the campaign conducted by the preferred candidate/party (campaign funding, technical support, dirty tricks etc.). The second are acts (*Condition aid*) which affect the underlying conditions in which the election is occurring (foreign aid, threats and promises, other types of concessions etc.).³⁴² A further control is for acts which include both subtypes (*Campaign and Condition aid*). As can be seen in Table 5.10, the evidence seems to indicate that electoral interventions which affect the underlying conditions have somewhat stronger substantive effects than those which directly help the

³⁴¹ Another option which was suggested to the author for differentiating between electoral interventions, rescaling the interventions by the cost to the intervener and/or by the benefit to the target which is standardized across targets (i.e. its GDP), is unfortunately infeasible at present. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, some subtypes of interventions cannot be easily quantified in monetary terms such as openly threatening severe consequences if the right candidate is not elected or agreeing to release war criminals- two of the ways by which the U.S. aided Adenauer in the 1953 W. German elections case described in chapter 3. Secondly, and more importantly, the data on the exact amounts of covert campaign funding provided in many cases of U.S. and Soviet interventions is missing or still classified. Likewise, from the testimonies of CIA agents who were part of some of these interventions it seems that the official sums approved for the operation, even when available, may not be an accurate measure of the actual amounts provided to the target in some cases given the use of various methods (such as converting the covert funding to the local currency in the black market using an unusually favorable exchange rate) in order to increase the funds available for this purpose (see for example Smith 1975:211,316). Furthermore, as various recent studies indicated as to a partly related domestic phenomenon (the relationship between pork “brought home” and congressional vote share), exact dollar amounts of such pork, even when fully available, fail to usually capture the true effect on subsequent vote share unless one accounts for the manner in which it influences in practice the voters (Grimmer et.al 2012:717).

³⁴² I thank Prof. Mike Thies for the idea of doing such a categorization (from feedback given on a different chapter at Cal APSA). A small number of intervention methods that could not be easily categorized into either subtype were excluded.

campaign, the latter increasing vote share by around 1.5% to 2% depending on the model. Likewise, the effects of electoral interventions which affect the underlying conditions are consistently significant under various models and robustness checks.

Given that the second subtype includes acts which are usually considered more costly than those included in the first subtype, these results provide some, albeit very rough, support to the intuitive logic that, all else being equal, the more resources are invested in the preferred candidate/party, the more helpful such support would usually be.

5.4 Diagnostics

Of course, in order to feel higher certainty in any results one needs to look further “under the hood”. As for a potential problem, such as multicollinearity, the VIF statistic (Variance Inflation Factor) indicates little multicollinearity between the independent variable. The average VIF in the main models for all five hypotheses is 2.39. As for specific variables, with the exception of the interaction terms, which by construction are multicollinear with at least two other variables, none of the variables entered into the models show much colinearity and neither have a VIF score above 10 (usually seen as the threshold for harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy 2003:213)).³⁴³

The residual plots do show a slight heteroskedasticity in many of my models. However, the robust standard errors used in all of our models already corrects for this possibility. Likewise, with the exception of the models with the non-robust results for hypothesis 4 and 5, no

³⁴³ VIFs estimated using the stata add-on program Collin www.ats.ucla.edu

influential cases (or outliers) have been found which affect in any significant manner our results- a possible concern in a linear model of this kind.

A final concern is as to the possibility of selection bias with regard to the Electoral Intervention variables. Although my data collection strategy (excluding the most recent past, data collection on the two great powers on which our data is most likely to be complete etc.), was carefully designed to prevent missing cases of such interventions and selection bias, it is nevertheless possible that some American and Soviet/Russian electoral interventions have been missed. However in this case, in which the great power intervention variable is an explanatory/independent variable, this bias is unlikely to be problematic. Technically speaking such a situation, in which some cases of treatment (intervention) were mistakenly analyzed as part of the no-treatment/control group (non-intervention), would just blur the differences between the two groups, thus reducing the chances of finding any significant result of the treatment in either direction (in the substantive and statistical senses). Accordingly, any possible bias due to missing data in my main explanatory variable in this context would have the effect of understating my results (and militating against any significant effects whatsoever) rather than overstating them.³⁴⁴

To further check for the effects of any covert electoral interventions which my data collection process may have failed to detect, I simulated these possible effects by dropping up to about 5% of all known cases of covert interventions in my electoral interventions dataset

³⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, there is as a result no statistical method that I know of to correct for such a bias. The Heckman selection model deals with selection bias only as to the outcome/explained variable- situations where a selection bias can have far more pernicious effects.

(examining all possible combinations of such “missed” covert interventions).³⁴⁵ I then re-estimated my main models for each hypothesis without them, summing and averaging the results across all possible combinations of “missing” interventions. While, as expected, the standard error for my main explanatory variable(s) became a bit larger on average, the results in each one of them, for each of the hypotheses, remained otherwise the same.

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion.

The results found here indicate that John Adams was quite justified in his worries about the likely effects of foreign electoral interventions on the targeted elections results. Three of the five hypothesis tested here were overall supported. Overall, electoral interventions seem to substantively benefit the aided candidate/ party (hypothesis 1). Of the two main subtypes of electoral interventions overt interventions are significantly more effective than covert intervention in both the substantive and statistical sense (hypothesis 2). However no significant robust differences have been found between interventions in favor of challengers versus incumbents (rejecting hypotheses 4 and 5). Likewise, interventions done in founding elections, unlike in later elections, do little to benefit and usually harm the aided candidate/party (hypothesis 3). Finally some rough, tentative indirect evidence does exist that the overall magnitude of such interventions matters although the data currently available is insufficient so as to sort out which are the exact “best tools” for this purpose.

³⁴⁵ See Appendix 5.2 for the summary results. To estimate the effects of possibly missing covert interventions approximately 60,000 versions of each model were simulated and then averaged. Simulating the “missingness” of a higher percentage of covert interventions would have required the estimate of a million or more versions of each model. That would have been both computationally prohibitive using conventional computing resources as well as probably larger than the likely amount of missing cases of this type, if indeed any have actually been missed.

These results indicate that electoral interventions, with some exceptions, seem to be an effective foreign policy tool benefiting those they are designed to help. Given the average effect found here (of about 3% in vote share), an electoral intervention won't always, of course, suffice to assure a victory in the polls for the aided side. However, as shown in some examples in Table 6, under many commonly occurring situations at national level elections, a partisan electoral intervention can be the factor that determines whether it wins or loses the election. The evidence found here, showing little significant change (since at least 1946) in the effectiveness of electoral interventions over time or by the level of the targets democracy indicates that this tool is likely to continue being an effective way for great powers to intervene in the affairs of other countries with “competitive authoritarian”, partial, or fully democratic regimes in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, the significant substantive effect of overt interventions found here indicates that the conventional wisdom, which sees overt partisan foreign interventions as doomed to failure, requires some revisions. In some situations, such overt interventions can indeed “convince” the public of another country to vote in the manner preferred by the great power. This result also provides further support for the finding of Corstrange and Marnov (2012) of no popular backlash effect in their survey experiment of such an overt intervention.

Those things said, these results also indicate, quite ironically, that the “model scenario” for electoral interventions, the one deemed by many as the most morally acceptable for such interventions by the U.S.³⁴⁶, that is helping inexperienced yet well intentioned pro-democracy parties facing long odds in a competitive election either against an entrenched competitive

³⁴⁶ For examples see (Carothers 1996:102-103).

authoritarian regime or strong and more authoritarian forces within their society, are also the ones least likely to actually benefit in practice from such help.

To give a recent illustration: after the fall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011 some American pundits, former diplomats, and experts in the U.S. foreign policy community called on the Obama administration to intervene in the upcoming Egyptian presidential elections (and elsewhere in the Middle East) in favor of the liberal groups (Takeyh 2011; Krauthammer 2011; Satloff 2012; see also quotes in Carothers 2011). The available evidence thus far seems to indicate that in this case, the Obama administration eventually concluded that the main faction of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood (the most likely to win a fair election) could be an acceptable option to U.S. interests. As a result, it seems that the Obama administration decided to reject these calls and did not significantly intervene in favor of any side in the Egyptian Presidential elections of May 2012, which were the first fully fair and competitive national level executive elections in Egypt.³⁴⁷

However, the statistical evidence found here indicates that had the Obama administration, in a hypothetical alternate universe, listened to these calls³⁴⁸ and decided to intervene in favor of the Egyptian liberals in the May 2012 Egyptian presidential election, it would have been unable

³⁴⁷ See for example “Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy” *NYT* January 3, 2012; “State Department training Islamic Political Parties in Egypt” *The Cable* (Foreign Policy Blog), November 3, 2011; Satloff 2012

³⁴⁸ Given how recent these events are, it is of course quite possible that a U.S. covert intervention for the more liberal forces did occur in this presidential election but still remains unexposed. For example, according to Stephan McInerney, the head of one Washington D.C. think tank (as well as some anonymous sources quoted in this article) at least prior to the parliamentary elections of late 2011, the impartial technical aid provided by the U.S. to Egypt for the conduct of the elections was in practice funneled to the liberal parties (“Building on Sand” Campaigns and Elections Oct 22, 2011). If true, such aid may have continued into the presidential campaign as well despite a crackdown on western NGOs by the transitional regime in early 2012. However, given the results of the Egyptian presidential elections, in which the liberal candidates were unable to reach even the second election round, such a failed intervention would have provided just more evidence to the example given here.

to help them in an effective manner. Indeed, it would have probably harmed their chances rather than benefitting them. Like other kinds of interventions, it seems that electoral interventions are better in promoting *Realpolitik* goals than idealistic ones.

Finally, these results provide some indirect support for our model of the causes of electoral interventions. The three hypotheses about the effects of electoral interventions which received statistical support here were also “observable implications” developed from the author’s model of the causes of electoral interventions. For example, the underlying logic of the third hypothesis is derived from the author’s argument that cooperation between the intervener and the aided side is usually a prerequisite for a such an intervention to occur given the intervener’s need for the private information available to the aided side on the preferences of the electorate and the best ways to campaign in the target etc in order to succeed in it. Accordingly, besides supporting the main arguments provided here for the effects of electoral interventions, these results also provide some indirect statistical evidence for the argument presented in the first part of this study.

In the following two chapters I will examine some specific cases of electoral interventions and attempt to determine whether the patterns we see at the aggregate level fit the evidence available in the particular election/local level.

Table 5.2 Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects in HS Model

	(1) & Electoral Int.	(2) Fixed effects	(3) No interactions	(4) Fraud limit	(5) & repeat E.Int
Electoral Intervention	3.190** (1.226)	2.976* (1.307)	3.280** (1.218)	3.115* (1.228)	3.194** (1.231)
Previous vote	0.368** (0.0509)	0.373** (0.0558)	0.368** (0.0503)	0.389** (0.0552)	0.367** (0.0512)
Growth	0.564** (0.106)	0.523** (0.102)	0.391** (0.0685)	0.525** (0.142)	0.565** (0.107)
Trade Openness	0.315 (1.384)	-2.073 (2.176)	-0.829 (1.273)	0.945 (1.592)	0.302 (1.383)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.291* (0.134)	-0.183 (0.122)		-0.257 (0.171)	-0.291* (0.135)
Presidential Election	-1.737 (1.964)	-5.509 (3.370)	-1.661 (1.954)	-2.925 (2.135)	-1.679 (1.988)
Growth* Pres. Election	0.0367 (0.164)	0.156 (0.184)		0.0495 (0.200)	0.0351 (0.165)
Re-election	8.315** (1.662)	8.732** (1.813)	8.316** (1.700)	8.723** (1.890)	8.267** (1.670)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.30** (1.929)	-13.40** (2.238)	-14.22** (1.916)	-13.24** (2.128)	-14.37** (1.917)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.935 (0.722)	1.239 (1.135)	0.916 (0.730)	0.653 (0.810)	0.981 (0.744)
Africa	2.881 (3.170)	‡	2.920 (3.200)	0.139 (3.626)	3.027 (3.207)
Asia	-3.178 (2.030)	‡	-3.032 (2.025)	-4.437+ (2.397)	-3.124 (2.036)
Central & E.Europe	-4.710* (1.903)	‡	-4.715* (1.900)	-6.211** (2.133)	-4.668* (1.916)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.608 (1.478)	‡	-1.534 (1.488)	-1.659 (1.663)	-1.559 (1.476)
Repeat Int.					0.971 (2.273)
Constant	28.85** (7.493)	26.42** (10.08)	29.52** (7.569)	29.51** (8.110)	28.48** (7.657)
Elections (N)	698	698	698	634	698
Countries	121	121	121	113	121
R-sqr	0.548	0.521	0.544	0.525	0.549

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 5.3 Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (HS)

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	& FP controls	& Polity control	& interaction w/Polity	& Cold War control	& Elect. Observers	& interaction w/clarity
Electoral Intervention	3.052*	3.329**	5.732 ⁺	3.198**	3.192**	4.056*
	(1.204)	(1.225)	(3.237)	(1.227)	(1.226)	(1.682)
Int.*Polity			-0.868			
			(1.173)			
Int.*Clarity						-3.126
						(2.797)
Previous vote	0.374**	0.374**	0.375**	0.368**	0.368**	0.368**
	(0.0504)	(0.0499)	(0.0499)	(0.0512)	(0.0512)	(0.0582)
Growth	0.538**	0.580**	0.591**	0.563**	0.558**	0.579**
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.118)
Trade Openness	0.261	0.478	0.471	0.391	0.341	-0.235
	(1.333)	(1.323)	(1.321)	(1.420)	(1.402)	(1.413)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.262*	-0.322*	-0.343*	-0.291*	-0.282*	-0.235
	(0.130)	(0.134)	(0.145)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.146)
Presidential Election	-1.496	-1.668	-1.684	-1.694	-1.717	-1.637
	(1.991)	(1.910)	(1.906)	(1.986)	(1.980)	(1.991)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0232	-0.0377	-0.0374	0.0374	0.0437	-0.0527
	(0.160)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.176)
Re-election	7.877**	8.026**	7.996**	8.339**	8.298**	8.450**
	(1.693)	(1.663)	(1.661)	(1.666)	(1.657)	(1.613)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.29**	-14.10**	-14.07**	-14.23**	-14.34**	-12.83**
	(1.914)	(1.853)	(1.853)	(1.950)	(1.950)	(1.997)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.969	1.381*	1.410*	1.002	0.923	0.905
	(0.712)	(0.693)	(0.693)	(0.719)	(0.726)	(0.717)
Africa	3.211	1.492	1.574	3.123	2.815	1.825
	(3.204)	(3.018)	(3.006)	(3.198)	(3.165)	(3.208)
Asia	-2.828	-3.692 ⁺	-3.622 ⁺	-3.026	-3.226	-2.154
	(2.049)	(1.974)	(1.972)	(2.086)	(2.061)	(1.783)
Central & E.Europe	-4.638*	-5.682**	-5.642**	-4.530*	-4.746*	-4.928*
	(1.904)	(1.879)	(1.869)	(1.923)	(1.882)	(1.969)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.524	-2.147	-2.097	-1.508	-1.643	-1.471
	(1.480)	(1.408)	(1.406)	(1.458)	(1.579)	(1.565)
Civil War	-1.583					
	(1.742)					
Interstate War	4.398 ⁺					
	(2.551)					
Crisis	1.217					
	(1.045)					
Polity		-4.634**	-4.703**			
		(1.324)	(1.326)			
Cold War				0.227		
				(0.893)		
E.Observers					0.0377	
					(1.243)	
Clarity						1.690
						(1.303)
Constant	28.21**	37.79**	37.64**	27.91**	29.01**	27.20**
	(7.438)	(8.228)	(8.204)	(7.590)	(7.543)	(7.480)
Elections (N)	698	698	698	698	697	675

Countries	121	121	121	121	121	118
R-sqr	0.553	0.560	0.561	0.549	0.548	0.561

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.4 Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects (in KP)

	(12) Model 4 & E.Int	(13) Model 7 & E.Int	(14) Model 4 & E.Int & fraud limit	(15) Model 7 & E.Int & fraud limit
Electoral Intervention	3.413** (1.181)	2.958* (1.205)	3.252** (1.200)	2.859* (1.264)
Previous vote	0.394** (0.0527)	0.386** (0.0598)	0.409** (0.0582)	0.405** (0.0678)
Global Growth	0.620 (0.398)	0.592 (0.413)	0.479 (0.418)	0.558 (0.435)
Local Growth	0.147* (0.0724)	0.174* (0.0796)	0.129+ (0.0752)	0.147+ (0.0774)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.67** (2.037)	-13.92** (2.338)	-13.11** (2.272)	-11.99** (2.679)
Population (logged)	0.320 (0.307)	3.600 (3.366)	0.173 (0.321)	5.415 (3.573)
Year	0.00400 (0.0337)	-0.0513 (0.0471)	-0.00885 (0.0360)	-0.0761 (0.0490)
Constant	23.43 (67.50)	103.9 (76.39)	47.74 (71.79)	134.5+ (79.28)
Elections (N)	700	700	636	636
Countries	122	122	114	114
R-sqr	0.488	0.347	0.461	0.215

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.5 Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions & Various Controls (HS)

	(1) & Covert/ Overt Int.	(2) & Fixed effects	(3) & Fraud Limit	(4) & Repeat int. control	(5) & FP variables	(6) & Polity Control
Overt Int.	5.424* (2.277)	5.423* (2.410)	5.137* (2.363)	5.415* (2.214)	5.164* (2.261)	5.516* (2.290)
Covert Int.	2.255 (1.425)	1.921 (1.420)	2.184 (1.380)	2.299 (1.455)	2.189 (1.399)	2.404+ (1.406)
Covert & Overt	-10.13+ (6.102)	-13.35 (8.719)	-9.909 (6.172)	-10.58+ (6.247)	-9.790 (6.111)	-9.589 (5.952)
Previous vote	0.372** (0.0513)	0.373** (0.0562)	0.393** (0.0553)	0.370** (0.0519)	0.377** (0.0508)	0.377** (0.0503)
Growth	0.548** (0.108)	0.513** (0.104)	0.509** (0.146)	0.551** (0.109)	0.525** (0.106)	0.565** (0.108)
Trade Openness	0.120 (1.389)	-2.003 (2.192)	0.668 (1.571)	0.102 (1.386)	0.0825 (1.341)	0.284 (1.327)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.265* (0.135)	-0.165 (0.122)	-0.232 (0.172)	-0.266* (0.135)	-0.239+ (0.130)	-0.297* (0.135)
Presidential Election	-1.867 (1.988)	-5.317 (3.488)	-2.596 (2.104)	-1.779 (2.015)	-1.629 (2.011)	-1.788 (1.932)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.00840 (0.166)	0.111 (0.186)	0.0125 (0.200)	0.00443 (0.167)	-0.00434 (0.162)	-0.0633 (0.165)
Re-election	8.709** (1.605)	9.341** (1.746)	8.791** (1.777)	8.651** (1.607)	8.280** (1.638)	8.392** (1.606)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.32** (1.914)	-13.41** (2.226)	-13.32** (2.089)	-14.42** (1.914)	-14.30** (1.900)	-14.12** (1.835)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.796 (0.735)	0.938 (1.174)	0.565 (0.811)	0.860 (0.754)	0.835 (0.726)	1.248+ (0.704)
Africa	2.479 (3.205)	‡	-0.264 (3.645)	2.677 (3.237)	2.808 (3.243)	1.134 (3.053)
Asia	-3.250 (2.034)	‡	-4.400+ (2.356)	-3.161 (2.034)	-2.908 (2.057)	-3.755+ (1.972)
Central & E.Europe	-4.560* (1.968)	‡	-6.089** (2.208)	-4.493* (1.994)	-4.498* (1.971)	-5.526** (1.936)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.491 (1.497)	‡	-1.780 (1.665)	-1.415 (1.493)	-1.414 (1.496)	-2.036 (1.423)
Repeat Int.				1.467 (2.013)		
Civil War					-1.519 (1.800)	
Interstate War					4.277+ (2.607)	
Crisis					1.122 (1.045)	
Polity						-4.580** (1.301)
Constant	30.17** (7.593)	29.04** (10.46)	30.40** (8.086)	29.64** (7.721)	29.48** (7.557)	38.90** (8.287)
Elections (N)	698	698	637	698	698	698
Countries	121	121	113	121	121	121
R-sqr	0.549	0.526	0.526	0.550	0.554	0.561

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 5.6 Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions - Further Robustness Checks (HS & KP)

	(7) &interaction w/Polity (HS)	(8) & Cold War control (HS)	(9) KP Model 4 & E.Int	(10) KP Model 4 & E.Int & fraud limit	(11) KP Model 7 & E.Int	(12) KP Model 7 & E.Int & fraud limit
Overt Int.	14.38 (14.67)	5.422* (2.278)	5.507* (2.292)	5.243* (2.359)	5.181* (2.390)	5.168* (2.559)
Covert Int.	4.611 (2.889)	2.263 (1.428)	2.559* (1.293)	2.448+ (1.297)	2.024 (1.310)	1.905 (1.327)
Covert & Overt	-9.562 (6.104)	-10.13+ (6.142)	-9.953 (6.217)	-9.907 (6.314)	-11.66 (7.688)	-12.03 (7.939)
Previous vote	0.379** (0.0511)	0.371** (0.0516)	0.398** (0.0533)	0.412** (0.0590)	0.388** (0.0604)	0.407** (0.0685)
Growth	0.574** (0.113)	0.548** (0.108)				
Trade Openness	0.270 (1.331)	0.164 (1.433)				
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.314* (0.146)	-0.266* (0.134)				
Presidential Election	-1.840 (1.948)	-1.844 (2.012)				
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.0606 (0.166)	0.00894 (0.166)				
Re-election	8.347** (1.608)	8.724** (1.603)				
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.03** (1.875)	-14.27** (1.934)	-14.68** (2.015)	-13.15** (2.264)	-13.95** (2.347)	-12.07** (2.711)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.252+ (0.726)	0.836 (0.732)				
Africa	1.151 (3.083)	2.628 (3.243)				
Asia	-3.751+ (2.008)	-3.160 (2.086)				
Central & E.Europe	-5.474** (1.923)	-4.451* (1.971)				
L.America & Caribbean	-1.998 (1.423)	-1.428 (1.469)				
Overt Int.*Polity	-3.082 (5.294)					
Covert Int.*Polity	-0.817 (1.010)					
Polity	-4.722** (1.337)					
Cold War		0.135 (0.900)				
Global Growth			0.589 (0.397)	0.447 (0.418)	0.556 (0.413)	0.515 (0.435)
Local Growth			0.137+ (0.0768)	0.118 (0.0795)	0.164+ (0.0830)	0.133 (0.0807)
Population (logged)			0.336	0.187	3.942	5.622

			(0.312)	(0.327)	(3.411)	(3.583)
Year			-0.000456	-0.0129	-0.0617	-0.0849 ⁺
			(0.0339)	(0.0362)	(0.0480)	(0.0497)
Constant	39.11**	29.61**	32.21	55.81	121.7	150.3 ⁺
	(8.469)	(7.674)	(67.86)	(72.35)	(77.77)	(80.75)
Elections (N)	698	698	700	636	700	636
Countries	121	121	122	114	122	114
R-sqr	0.562	0.549	0.490	0.463	0.330	0.208

Table 5.7 Hypothesis 3: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding Elections & Various Controls (HS)

	(1) & Founding Election interaction	(2) & no HS interactions	(3) & Fixed effects	(4) & Fraud Limit	(5) & Repeat E.Int.	(6) & FP controls
Electoral Intervention	13.16** (4.244)	13.18** (4.163)	13.59** (4.664)	13.85** (4.323)	13.49** (4.236)	12.81** (4.250)
Int*Founding Election	-9.908** (3.652)	-9.797** (3.547)	-10.63* (4.147)	-10.59** (3.746)	-10.19** (3.621)	-9.729** (3.643)
Founding Election	3.059* (1.474)	2.952* (1.468)	3.460* (1.637)	2.387 (1.646)	3.137* (1.483)	3.019* (1.468)
Growth	0.539** (0.117)	0.287** (0.0684)	0.559** (0.123)	0.609** (0.133)	0.539** (0.115)	0.530** (0.113)
Trade Openness	1.087 (1.490)	0.215 (1.418)	0.956 (2.427)	1.856 (1.433)	1.080 (1.486)	1.177 (1.472)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.337* (0.150)		-0.344* (0.161)	-0.401* (0.173)	-0.335* (0.149)	-0.327* (0.146)
Presidential Election	2.068 (1.869)	2.114 (1.877)	-1.470 (3.822)	0.458 (2.201)	2.170 (1.872)	2.198 (1.859)
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.124 (0.142)		-0.0114 (0.160)	-0.0875 (0.181)	-0.123 (0.142)	-0.112 (0.140)
Re-election	7.810** (1.680)	7.958** (1.703)	9.067** (1.724)	8.422** (1.814)	7.702** (1.674)	7.472** (1.615)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.59** (1.729)	-22.65** (1.730)	-20.90** (2.208)	-21.07** (1.936)	-22.65** (1.709)	-22.62** (1.716)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.860 (0.722)	0.766 (0.723)	0.489 (1.272)	0.707 (0.788)	0.945 (0.740)	0.912 (0.716)
Africa	-0.392 (2.839)	-0.801 (2.837)	‡	-1.007 (3.214)	-0.123 (2.867)	0.104 (2.847)
Asia	-2.549 (1.941)	-2.536 (1.963)	‡	-3.599 (2.309)	-2.439 (1.932)	-2.340 (2.008)
Central & E.Europe	-4.136* (2.029)	-4.163* (2.011)	‡	-5.832** (2.091)	-4.065* (2.037)	-4.239* (1.982)
L.America & Caribbean	-2.666 (1.725)	-2.858 ⁺ (1.736)	‡	-1.962 (1.869)	-2.586 (1.723)	-2.516 (1.724)
Repeat Int.					2.822 (2.484)	
Civil War						-0.749 (1.387)
Interstate War						4.677 ⁺ (2.508)
Crisis						1.048 (1.175)
Constant	49.77**	51.38**	50.57**	49.88**	48.83**	49.13**

	(7.473)	(7.346)	(11.12)	(8.288)	(7.672)	(7.477)
Elections (N)	839	839	839	739	839	839
Countries	144	144	144	131	144	144
R-sqr	0.457	0.452	0.438	0.417	0.459	0.462

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$ ‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 5.8 Hypothesis 3: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding Elections & Further Robustness Checks (HS & KP)

	(7) & Polity Control (HS)	(8) & Cold War control (HS)	(9) & Elect. Observers	(10) KP Model 4 & Interaction	(11) KP Model 4 & Fraud limit	(12) & KP Model 7 (fixed effects)
Electoral Intervention	11.63** (4.220)	13.43** (4.228)	13.60** (4.247)	12.30** (3.782)	12.55** (4.140)	12.31** (4.485)
Int*Founding Election	-8.319* (3.650)	-10.14** (3.641)	-10.35** (3.655)	-8.948** (3.117)	-9.175** (3.471)	-9.281* (3.928)
Founding Election	1.717 (1.432)	2.881* (1.464)	2.990* (1.435)	3.845** (1.420)	2.543 (1.676)	2.764 (1.720)
Growth	0.541** (0.112)	0.529** (0.116)	0.519** (0.117)			
Trade Openness	1.087 (1.497)	1.661 (1.543)	1.210 (1.491)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.351* (0.146)	-0.339* (0.149)	-0.318* (0.151)			
Presidential Election	2.043 (1.713)	2.386 (1.877)	2.289 (1.878)			
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.139 (0.139)	-0.116 (0.142)	-0.119 (0.143)			
Re-election	6.698** (1.607)	7.977** (1.711)	8.264** (1.687)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.14** (1.651)	-21.92** (1.756)	-22.27** (1.720)	-22.55** (1.800)	-20.91** (2.048)	-20.38** (2.283)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.476* (0.730)	1.340+ (0.727)	0.854 (0.707)			
Africa	-1.183 (2.666)	1.557 (2.898)	0.773 (2.924)			
Asia	-3.359+ (1.889)	-1.291 (2.013)	-1.778 (1.995)			
Central & E.Europe	-5.102** (1.859)	-2.569 (2.108)	-2.530 (2.096)			
L.America & Caribbean	-3.421* (1.619)	-1.983 (1.713)	-1.717 (1.778)			
Polity	-5.964** (1.330)					
Cold War		2.034+ (1.073)				
E.Observers			-2.501* (1.145)			
Global Growth				0.555 (0.413)	0.488 (0.439)	0.454 (0.420)
Local Growth				0.0456 (0.0612)	0.0629 (0.0690)	0.0686 (0.0716)

Population (logged)				0.460	0.281	-2.449
				(0.355)	(0.368)	(3.302)
Year				-0.0165	-0.0264	-0.0133
				(0.0346)	(0.0368)	(0.0557)
Constant	62.51**	42.70**	49.48**	84.66	105.0	103.5
	(7.322)	(8.042)	(7.347)	(68.85)	(73.36)	(91.26)
Elections (N)	839	839	838	841	741	841
Countries	144	144	144	145	132	145
R-sqr	0.477	0.461	0.457	0.390	0.347	0.290

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.9 Hypotheses 4 & 5: Electoral Interventions for Challengers vs. Electoral Interventions for Incumbents- select models

	(1) HS Model 1& my variables	(2) & Fixed effects (HS)	(3) & Fraud limit (HS)	(4) KP model4	(5) & Fraud limit (KP4)	(6) & Fraud limit (KP7)
Int. for Challenger	-4.022* (1.873)	-4.114* (1.915)	-3.250+ (1.831)	-4.186* (1.777)	-3.365+ (1.766)	-2.882 (1.865)
Int. for Incumbent	2.266 (1.648)	1.637 (1.761)	3.006+ (1.737)	2.529 (1.766)	3.130+ (1.898)	2.898 (1.917)
Double int.	5.747+ (2.965)	6.487* (3.172)	4.536 (2.961)	4.676+ (2.809)	3.654 (2.876)	2.868 (3.112)
Previous vote	0.354** (0.0509)	0.355** (0.0556)	0.371** (0.0553)	0.380** (0.0527)	0.392** (0.0581)	0.383** (0.0674)
Growth	0.563** (0.101)	0.526** (0.0973)	0.526** (0.134)			
Trade Openness	0.291 (1.384)	-1.962 (2.202)	0.933 (1.583)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.284* (0.132)	-0.181 (0.120)	-0.255 (0.166)			
Presidential Election	-1.631 (1.956)	-5.354 (3.275)	-2.732 (2.135)			
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0131 (0.163)	0.121 (0.184)	0.0273 (0.197)			
Re-election	8.434** (1.673)	8.995** (1.806)	8.733** (1.911)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.57** (1.950)	-13.62** (2.262)	-13.61** (2.151)	-14.91** (2.065)	-13.48** (2.306)	-12.35** (2.720)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.872 (0.765)	1.051 (1.216)	0.671 (0.855)			
Africa	2.676 (3.273)	‡	0.219 (3.756)			
Asia	-3.275 (2.053)	‡	-4.408+ (2.423)			
Central & E.Europe	-4.643* (1.915)	‡	-6.166** (2.140)			
L.America & Caribbean	-1.582 (1.468)	‡	-1.584 (1.656)			
Global Growth				0.590 (0.409)	0.467 (0.431)	0.549 (0.449)
Local Growth				0.145* (0.0710)	0.126+ (0.0747)	0.142+ (0.0770)
Population (logged)				0.333 (0.310)	0.174 (0.322)	5.222 (3.523)
Year				-0.00151 (0.0359)	-0.0110 (0.0383)	-0.0757 (0.0506)
Constant	30.35** (7.758)	29.08** (10.72)	30.43** (8.380)	35.29 (71.73)	53.22 (76.21)	136.6 (84.03)
Elections (N)	705	705	641	707	643	643
Countries	121	121	113	122	114	114
R-sqr	0.543	0.518	0.518	0.483	0.456	0.218

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ ‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 5.10 Effects of different subtypes of Electoral Interventions: Interventions Which Aid the Campaign vs. Those which Affect Overall Conditions- select models

	(1) HS Model 1 & my variables	(2) & Fixed effects (HS)	(3) & Fraud limit (HS)	(4) KP model 4	(5) KP model 7	(6) & Polity Control (HS)
Campaign aid	2.194 (1.465)	1.738 (1.508)	2.065 (1.408)	2.652 ⁺ (1.392)	1.853 (1.510)	2.324 (1.463)
Condition aid	3.954 ⁺ (2.174)	4.302 ⁺ (2.199)	3.937 ⁺ (2.242)	4.057 ⁺ (2.093)	4.236* (2.084)	4.053 ⁺ (2.174)
Campaign & Condition aid	-3.489* (1.709)	-4.844* (2.173)	-3.315 ⁺ (1.958)	-4.818** (1.417)	-5.257** (1.507)	-3.510* (1.760)
Trade Openness	0.0427 (1.416)	-2.316 (2.208)	0.667 (1.619)			0.202 (1.351)
Previous vote	0.365** (0.0516)	0.368** (0.0567)	0.383** (0.0558)	0.391** (0.0533)	0.382** (0.0607)	0.371** (0.0504)
Growth	0.542** (0.109)	0.501** (0.105)	0.503** (0.149)			0.557** (0.110)
Growth*Trade	-0.264 ⁺ (0.136)	-0.158 (0.125)	-0.232 (0.175)			-0.294* (0.136)
Openness						
Presidential Election	-1.947 (1.991)	-5.751 ⁺ (3.397)	-3.094 (2.161)			-1.877 (1.934)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0313 (0.163)	0.146 (0.183)	0.0433 (0.199)			-0.0425 (0.163)
Re-election	8.572** (1.649)	9.137** (1.798)	8.977** (1.895)			8.281** (1.654)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.55** (1.929)	-13.59** (2.249)	-13.65** (2.139)	-14.87** (2.031)	-14.08** (2.350)	-14.34** (1.842)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.804 (0.743)	1.005 (1.181)	0.563 (0.825)			1.253 ⁺ (0.713)
Africa	2.603 (3.208)	‡	-0.112 (3.656)			1.217 (3.059)
Asia	-3.348 (2.048)	‡	-4.584 ⁺ (2.402)			-3.867 ⁺ (1.991)
Central & E.Europe	-4.435* (1.958)	‡	-5.976** (2.200)			-5.403** (1.908)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.468 (1.523)	‡	-1.546 (1.715)			-2.007 (1.456)
Global Growth				0.594 (0.401)	0.562 (0.416)	
Local Growth				0.151* (0.0718)	0.177* (0.0806)	
Population (logged)				0.335 (0.310)	3.685 (3.355)	
Year				-0.00332 (0.0338)	-0.0613 (0.0471)	
Polity						-4.646** (1.273)
Constant	30.64** (7.646)	29.11** (10.41)	31.21** (8.228)	38.36 (67.69)	123.6 (76.82)	39.57** (8.322)
Elections (N)	697	697	633	699	699	697
Countries	121	121	113	122	122	121
R-sqr	0.551	0.524	0.526	0.494	0.348	0.563

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ ‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11

Chapter 6: Single election level investigation of the effects of electoral interventions (prt.1)

“...If Adenauer wins a resounding election victory ...it will have been due in a large part to the [U.S.] food program”

C.D. Jackson, Presidential Assistant to President Eisenhower 1953-1954³⁴⁹

“...[The] undisguised [American] attempt to bring down the democratically elected government of Israel...contribut[ed] to the downfall of the [Likud] government led by Yitzhak Shamir”

Moshe Arens, number two on the Likud party slate in 1992 (and Secretary of Defense)³⁵⁰

Introduction

As can be seen in the above quotes, in both the 1953 West German elections and in the 1992 Israeli elections, decision-makers within the intervener and/or knowledgeable locals credited the U.S. intervention with having significant effects on the intervened election's results. In chapter 5, I began to empirically examine how seriously one should take these kinds of claims. In that chapter, I did a large-N study examining the effects of Electoral interventions in general, utilizing my dataset of 117 such interventions between 1946 and 2000. I found, in the aggregate, that electoral interventions are indeed quite effective in helping the preferred candidate/party (except in the cases of interventions in founding elections).

³⁴⁹ Letter, C.D. Jackson to Walter Bedell Smith August 18, 1953 in C.D. Jackson records 1953-1955, Box 6 DDEL

³⁵⁰ In (Arens 1995:9)

However, these aggregate large N results may be questioned by some readers. First, some may wonder whether the aggregate results from multiple elections are actually reflecting the true effects usually occurring at the single (intervened) election level. Indeed, a similar concern was raised by some scholars in the economic vote subfield as to the effects of the economy on election results in similar large N regressions to the one done in chapter 5 (Paldam 1991; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000:191).

Second, given that a few of my hypotheses as to the causes and effects of such intervention do note a selection process as to where and when such interventions may occur, some readers of this study may argue that the large-N results as to the effects are merely a result of a “cherry picking” or “choosing likely winners” process in which candidates/parties which are highly likely to win the elections anyway are those who are the most likely to receive such backing. In other words, the results that I find in chapter 5 aren’t really indicating that these interventions have any actual effects on the results- just that the great powers, like an experienced gambler at the horse races, do a pretty good job as to where they place their “bets”. The findings in the case studies as to the process leading (or not leading) to an electoral intervention (see chapters 3 and 4) do not indicate that the selection process that is occurring is of this nature. Indeed, “likely winners” seem to be quite unlikely to become the recipients of such aid.³⁵¹ Nevertheless, to further confirm that the results found in chapter 5 are not merely due to selection effects, a local/micro-level investigation of the effects in particular intervention cases can be of aid.

³⁵¹ See, for example, the 1958 Venezuelan case study in which one such likely winner (Romulo Betancourt) rejected such a U.S. offer

Unfortunately, a single election/ micro level investigation of the effects is quite hard to do in practice in most cases of electoral interventions. As noted in chapter 2, almost two thirds of such interventions (64.1%) are covert, making the investigation of their effects at the single election level all but impossible.³⁵² In many of the elections in which overt interventions had occurred no pre (or post) election surveys have been conducted or no surveys asking respondents questions related to the intervention in particular have been asked.³⁵³ Likewise, in many such cases there has been little scholarship about these interventions in general and/or in formats inaccessible to the author in particular. Nevertheless, after some effort, I have been able to find relevant data as to a few such cases of overt intervention.

Likewise, such a micro level examination of electoral interventions in non-founding elections will also serve as a useful examination of the mechanism predicted by my argument about the effectiveness of overt interventions. My theoretical logic as to overt electoral interventions would expect such interventions to be effective (in non-founding elections) because the public in the target knows about the statements and actions of the great power, understands them correctly and then at least some of the voters decide, as a result of this message, to vote in the way preferred by the intervener. In other words, if the argument here is correct I would expect that factors measuring voter knowledge of U.S. position and/or activities to be good predictors of their vote choice in the “preferred direction”. I would also expect to find evidence

³⁵² In a few cases the covert interventions were of course exposed prior to the elections. However in those cases (an intervention that seriously “malfunctioned”), the effect found is highly unlikely to be representative of the effects of covert interventions in general.

³⁵³ Even in countries where such interventions have been frequent, election surveys don’t ask many times respondents relevant questions about such interventions. For example, while the INES 1992 Israeli pre-election survey utilized here asked respondents about U.S.-Israel relations, no such question (or a similar one about U.S.-Israel relations) has been asked in the subsequent INES election survey (1996) where an overt U.S. intervention had occurred as well.

indicating that the particular issues which the interveners statements and/or actions affected (or threatened to affect) tended to be bigger “vote getters” for the preferred side then for the unwanted side (or at the minimum better vote getters then they were expected to be in the past).

In this chapter I will investigate the effects of such interventions in two cases of non-founding elections: the 1992 Israeli elections and the 1953 West German elections. In the case of the latter election I focus in this chapter on the effects that the various components of the American intervention had on the West German public rather then (as in chapter 3) on the process that led this intervention to occur and the way each of its components was decided upon and conducted. The next chapter will investigate the effects of electoral interventions in two cases of founding elections (U.S. 1796 and Argentina 1946).

6.1 The case of the 1992 Israeli Elections

6.1.1 Overview of the intervention:

From what is known at present, the intervention of the Bush senior administration in the June 1992 Israeli elections in favor of the Labor party and Yitzhak Rabin included two major components. The first was the final public rejection by U.S. President George H.W. Bush (hence Bush senior) on March 17, 1992 (three months before the elections) of the Israeli government request for ten billion dollars in loan guarantees. This rejection was preceded by an increasingly angry public spat on this issue in the preceding six months. These loan guarantees were requested by the Israeli government in order to help it absorb the large wave of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union (375,000 by 1992- or about 7% of Israel’s population in the early 1990s) that had begun to arrive en masse after Mikhail Gorbachev legalized Jewish immigration

from the USSR in 1989. The Bush senior administration publically made the future reception of these guarantees conditional on the complete freezing of the Israeli government of any further construction in Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (with the exception of houses already in construction) – a condition that it knew that a Likud government (during this period) could never accept.(Ben Zvi 2013:200,204; Ross 2004: 83-84; for details see Rubin 1995:196-197).³⁵⁴

The second main component were various acts that were designed to further strengthen the impression that the Israeli public had drawn from the argument over the loan guarantees that U.S- Israel relations were in a deep crisis in the months preceding the elections and were likely to worsen further (with various negative effects) if a right wing government headed by the Likud (& Shamir) remained in power. If to give three examples, in January 1992 the U.S. voted in the U.N. in favor of a resolution that “strongly condemns” the deportation of Palestinian terrorists- the harshest resolution of this kind that the U.S. ever supported till that point. Two months later the Bush senior administration leaked two classified reports accusing Israel of supposedly selling American weapon systems to various countries (including parts of American Patriot missiles to China)- an illegal act on Israel’s side if it were true (and, of course, a potential basis for future U.S. sanctions of various kinds on Israel). A subsequent U.S. investigation (the part done prior to the elections), only partially cleared Israel of this accusation (Rubin 1995:197). Then in mid-May 1992, one month before the Israeli elections, the then State Department spokeswoman, Margaret Tutweiler, announced that U.N. resolution 194 from December 1948

³⁵⁴ Indeed after the victory of Rabin in these elections, the Bush senior administration, in the final months before its defeat in the 1992 elections, agreed to give Rabin the full loan guarantees under far less restrictive conditions as to construction in the West Bank then it demanded of Shamir (just a significant reduction in the rate of construction- not a complete freeze of new construction) (Ben Zvi 2013:204).

(which guaranteed a right of return to Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war) was seen by the U.S. government as still relevant and valid to any peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians- an act seen as supportive of the PLOs claims in this regard (Steinberg 1995:194).

6.1.2 Analysis of effects- methodology

To analyze the effects of the U.S. intervention in this case I turned to a preelection Israeli survey which happened to have a suitable question. This survey, the 1992 Israeli National Election Study (INES), was designed by two of Israel's premiere Political Scientists, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir. This ANES style survey was carried out in the two weeks preceding the 1992 election (June 8-18th) by a reputable Israeli polling firm (Dahaf Research Institute) among a nationally representative sample of the adult Jewish population within the 1949 borders (1192 respondents).³⁵⁵

In order to check the effects of the U.S. intervention in this case I utilized one of the questions asked in this survey about U.S.-Israel relations (*US-IL Relations*). This question, one among a battery of questions about the two parties performance evaluations on various topics, asked the respondents to which of the two main parties, the Likud or the Labor party, was the

³⁵⁵ Of course this survey design excluded, as a result, the Israeli-Arab population (11.8% of the overall electorate in 1992 (Al-Haj 1995:144)), as well as the Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and members of the kibbutzim. However, given the nature of the U.S. intervention (one which wasn't designed to affect these groups vote choice), the nature of these groups and the way that vote choice was operationalized here (see later), the effects of this exclusion are expected to be minimal. The Israeli-Arab population (then and now) votes overwhelmingly for parties in the left bloc (mostly to the far left parties such as the former communist party- Hadash/DFPE). For example, about 78% of the Israeli-Arab voters voted for parties in the left bloc in the 1992 elections and only about 13.4% for parties in the right bloc (Al-Haj 1995:151). The Jewish settlers in the West Bank and members of the Kibbutzim were (and are) very reliable voters for the right and left bloc parties respectively. Accordingly, given the way that the vote choice was operationalized here (a dichotomous choice of vote for the left or right bloc) the exclusion of some "base" voters who were highly unlikely to shift their votes to the other party bloc (and who were not furthermore the targets of this U.S. intervention), should have little effect on the overall findings here.

characteristic “can maintain good relations with U.S” more suitable. The respondents could then choose whether this characteristic suited the labor party more, suited the Likud more or both were equally suited/neither. I then operationalized this question into a tricotomous measure with 1 for those who saw the labor party as better in this regard, -1 to those who saw the Likud as better in this regard and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same on this characteristic.

In the analysis that follows, I use this question as an indicator of the effect of knowledge about U.S. attitudes on vote choice. While this question isn’t a perfect proxy of the U.S. intervention in this case³⁵⁶ it nevertheless, given the characteristics of the intervention in this particular case, should capture enough of the possible effect of this overt U.S. Intervention to enable us to determine whether this intervention ‘mattered’ and at least the lower bound of its effect. If my hypotheses as to the effects of electoral interventions in general and overt interventions in particular (in non-founding elections) are correct, I would expect knowledge of the US position to significantly increase the probability of voting for the left bloc- the side that the U.S. was trying to aid in this election.

Following Shachar and Shamir (1995:Chp.2), I operationalized the vote choice facing the voters (or independent variable) as a dichotomous variable with 1 coding a vote for left bloc parties (including the Israeli Labor party- hence Labor) and 0 for right bloc parties (including the Likud)³⁵⁷.To analyze the resulting models I then use probit with robust standard errors.

³⁵⁶ If the author could have determined the questions included in the survey a question asking directly about the U.S. intervention and/or one of its components (such as the possibility of receiving the loan guarantees) would have been, of course, better.

³⁵⁷ Following Shachar and Shamir’s coding (1995:73), I exclude the small number of votes (around 5%) to parties which couldn’t clearly designated at the time as being in either bloc such as two of the religious parties (Shas and United Torah Judaism). See appendix 6.1 for the full listing of which parties were put in which bloc.

Given the extreme multiparty nature of Israeli politics (ten parties entered the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, after this elections- and at least other two parties were on the verge of entering), attempts to model vote choice between individual Israeli parties³⁵⁸ is simply beyond the abilities of the existing statistical techniques usually used for this purpose (multinomial logit or multinomial probit).³⁵⁹ This also is a good way substantively to model vote choice in the Israeli case given that many Israeli voters perceive their voting choice in this manner- i.e. as either voting for one of the left wing parties or for one of the right wing parties.

Of course, other variables besides the U.S. electoral intervention may have had significant effects on vote choice in this election. Accordingly, I use the general approach employed by Shachar and Shamir (1992:chp.2) to model the main factors affecting vote choice in this election to which my variable about voter knowledge of US attitudes is added.³⁶⁰ A detailed explanation of the operationalization of each variable is included in appendix 6.1- included here is just a brief description of each variable and its importance.

One variable included in the model is a question about the voters general performance evaluation of both parties on Security and Foreign Policy (*Sec. & FP Perform.*). This is widely believed to be the main factor usually determining vote choice in Israel and accordingly the results of many Israeli elections (Arian and Shamir 1999:268). A second variable is the voters past bloc vote in the 1988 election (*1988 bloc vote*)– the last parliamentary election before the one discussed here (i.e. party attachment). A third variable is the voters issue position on what is the best solution for dealing with the territories in the West Bank and Gaza that Israel had

³⁵⁸ As is at times done in the economic vote literature when survey data is used (Duch and Stevenson 2008:49-50)

³⁵⁹ The rule of thumb is that such techniques can usually deal with, at most, 4-5 major options/choices.

³⁶⁰ The author wishes to thank Michal Shamir for the kind aid provided in replicating this model.

captured during the 1967 war (*Territories issue*). This issue was (and is) the primary issue defining what is considered the left and the right in Israel. It is accordingly believed to exert a significant effect on vote choice (Shachar and Shamir 1995:57; Arian and Shamir 1999:268).

A fourth variable was the evaluation of both parties as to their level of corruption (*Corruption*)- one of the main issues raised by the various parties in this particular election following reports by the state comptroller, two months before election day, finding significant irregularities in the activities of some government ministries under the Likud government (Shachar and Shamir 1992:63).

A fifth variable is a question about the voters general performance evaluation of both parties in economic issues (*Econ. Perform.*). While this factor is usually seen as secondary in determining vote choice in Israel it nevertheless can have at times a significant effect as well (Arian and Shamir 1999:268). A sixth variable is a comparative PM candidate evaluation measure on various characteristics- Yitzchak Rabin (Labor and leader of the main opposition party) versus Yitzchak Shamir (Likud and incumbent PM).

Three other variables which are included are socio-demographic factors widely believed by scholars of Israeli politics to have significant effects on ones vote choice in Israel- age (*Age*), ones extent of (Jewish) religiosity (*Religiosity*) and their Jewish ethnic background (i.e. whether they are from a Sephardic background or an Ashkenazi one³⁶¹) (Schachar and Shamir 1995:59-60; Arian and Shamir 1999:268).

³⁶¹ Sephardic Jews are usually Jews who migrated to Israel from various Middle Eastern, Northern African and Asian countries; Ashkenazi Jews (the background from which the overwhelming majority of American Jews hail from) are usually Jews who migrated to Israel from Europe and/or the Americas.


I also include in some subsequent models, for robustness checks, further controls for other variables believed by other scholars to have significant effects on Israeli election results during this period such as questions concerning more specific performance evaluations (such as on advancing the peace process, ending the first Palestinian Intifada, absorbing Aliyah, dealing with unemployment etc.), other issues (preference for socialism vs. capitalism), other socio-demographic factors (income, gender) as well as factors seen by some scholars as being quite important in affecting vote choice in other western countries (such as ideology and post-material values). To enable easy comparison of the effects with that of my variable of interest, most of the above noted factors (with the exception of some of the socio-demographic controls such as age and ethnicity) were operationalized using a scale ranging from -1 to 1 as well.

6.1.3 Results

Tables 10.1 and 10.2 in appendix 6.1 include the full results. Figure 6.1 illustrates the substantive effects of the variables in the model 1 which were statistically significant in it as well as in other robustness checks.

Overall the other factors in the model are in the expected directions and magnitude and are largely in conformity with the results of Schachar and Shamir. An ROC test, used to determine the ability of logit and probit models to discriminate between those who chose the two outcomes (Hosmer et al. 2013:173-177), indicates that this model does an overall good job in doing this (area under the ROC curve 0.797).

Figure 1.1: 1992 Israeli Elections bloc vote choice
 Probit Estimates (0 Right 1 Left) sig. coefficients only



Note: All variables listed here (except for ethnic background and age) are scaled between -1 and 1 with the higher score denoting past vote for the left bloc, performance evaluation in favor of Labor, evaluation of Labor as corrupt and hawkish positions on the territories issue. The size of effect for age is for a 10 year increase in the respondent's age. The effect for ethnicity is the difference in the probability of voting for the left bloc when the respondent comes from a Sephardic background rather than an Ashkenazi (or non-Sephardic) one.

As my hypotheses as to the effects of such interventions would expect, the proxy factor for the U.S. intervention (*US-IL Relations*) and has significant effects both statistically and substantively.³⁶² On average, a shift by an Israeli voter from believing that both parties are equally good in maintaining Israel's relations with the U.S. to believing that the Labor party

³⁶²The inclusion of this variable increases the models ROC score vs. a version which excludes it. A Wald test also indicates (at the $p > 0.0001$) that this variable significantly increases overall model fit.

would perform better in this regard (a one unit shift) increases her the probability of voting for a left bloc party by about 2.8%. This is a medium sized yet significant effect substantively.

This effect also stacks up quite well compared to other important factors in this model. In comparison, the factor that has the most effect on increasing the probability of vote choice for the left bloc, the performance evaluation of security and foreign policy (*Performance Sec. & FP*) increases, in a similar 1 unit shift, the probability of voting for the left bloc by about 5.6%. A similar 1 unit shift towards a more hawkish position on the territories issue (*Territories issue*) reduces the probability of voting for the left bloc by 3.5%. Likewise, the economic vote (*Econ Perform.*) has a somewhat **smaller** effect than the intervention, with a similar one unit shift leading to only a 1.8% increase in the probability of voting for the left bloc.

This result is robust to the further inclusion of various additional control variables noted above such as (if to give a few examples) income, specific questions about ability to promote peace or post-materialist values and party ideology. Similar results are found when Logit, rather than Probit, is used in order to estimate this model (see appendix 6.1).

It is also clear from the responses to other questions in this survey that this finding is not some statistical fluke.³⁶³ For example, when respondents were asked about eight various “worse case” scenarios that Israel may face in the future and the ability of the country to cope with them, the **only** scenario which a majority of Israelis thought that Israel would be unable to cope with (51% to 49%) was a situation in which the U.S. government ceased to provide support to

³⁶³ One should also note that the crosstabs of the proxy factor show that the Labor party was seen in this regard (U.S.-IL relations) by most Israelis as being far better than the Likud (47% to 24%). While this question was unfortunately not asked in the previous (or subsequent) election surveys (preventing complete certainty in this regard), nevertheless the large gap in favor of the Labor party on this factor in 1992, as well as the overall similar warmth of relations with the U.S. that both Labor and Likud administrations usually achieved in the two decade before 1989, nevertheless probably indicates that many Israelis indeed “got the message” that the Bush Senior administration was trying to convey in this particular case.

Israel.³⁶⁴ Likewise, when asked in later follow up questions how much various issues affected their vote, 62% of those responding to this question said that the state of Israel's relations with the U.S. would affect their vote.³⁶⁵ These responses indicate that the respondents answer as to performance evaluation of the two parties on this measure probably reflected an underlying factor that at least some Israelis indeed took very seriously when casting their votes a few days later.

Likewise the pre-intervention trends as to the Labor party chances in the upcoming elections didn't seem to show any indication that it was about to win the upcoming elections. The opposite seemed to be true. The Labor party had lost already four elections in a row (1977, 1981, 1984, 1988) some under conditions which should have been quite favorable to an opposition party.³⁶⁶ While a Gallup like monthly/weekly tracking poll unfortunately didn't exist at the time in Israel, the various intermittent polls conducted by various Israeli polling organizations prior to the U.S. intervention showed a party highly likely to lose for the fifth time in a row. For example, one poll conducted by one of Israel's premiere pollsters (Hanoach Smith) in November 1991, before the U.S. intervention began in full force, found that if the Israeli election would have occurred then the labor party vote share would drop by nine and a half points to 22%. In contrast, the Likud would see its vote share increase by 1% and the right bloc overall would get 54% of the vote. Other polls conducted during this period found similar results

³⁶⁴ In comparison, 65% of Israelis thought that Israel could cope with a total Israeli-Arab war (i.e. with all other Arab states in the Middle East) and 87% with a significant increase in terrorist activity against Israelis.

³⁶⁵ This question came, of course, long after the performance evaluation question within this survey- so it couldn't have affected responses to it.

³⁶⁶ Before the 1984 elections, for example, Israel was stuck in an increasingly bloody stalemate in Lebanon (the first Lebanon war) as well as a full fledged economic crisis with yearly inflation rates reaching almost 400%.

(Mendilow 1992: 217). As one knowledgeable commentator noted in December 1991, “all the indications are that the image of labor is so besmattered with self seeking corruption and division, that the long suffering population will turn once again to the Shamir-led Likud”.³⁶⁷ Although the U.S. intervention in favor of the Labor party wasn’t the only thing that had changed in its favor in the following months,³⁶⁸ it is quite likely, given the results above that it was one of the important factors that helped lead to the turnaround in its fortunes.

6.1.4 Effects of the electoral intervention through other routes

Likewise, there is a good reason to believe that the U.S. intervention in favor of the Labor party & Rabin benefited them through other channels as well. One other channel by which the U.S. intervention probably affected the election results was by changing the opinion of parts of the Israeli public on the main issue on which elections were (and are) fought in Israel- the West Bank and Gaza territories issue. As some scholars have noted, based upon (among other things) intermittent polling data on the Israeli public preferences on this topic between 1990 and 1992, the spat over and finally the public refusal of the Bush senior administration to give the 10 billion loan guarantees seems to have shifted Israeli public position on this issue in a more dovish direction (Mendilow 1995:219;Fein 1995:170).

³⁶⁷ See also “Israel Politics goes Critical” *Guardian* December 30,1991

³⁶⁸ For example, in March 1992, three months before the elections, the more popular Yitzhak Rabin replaced Shimon Peres as the leader (and PM candidate) of the Labor party- although one must note that the control variable included in order to capture the differences on candidate evaluation between Rabin and Shamir in our statistical analysis becomes statistically insignificant under certain situations (see appendix 6.1).

The shift was especially pronounced among the new Jewish immigrants from Russia (hence Russian immigrants) which had begun arriving in Israel in large numbers once Gorbachev legalized Jewish immigration from the USSR in 1989. The Russian immigrants, already eligible to vote in these elections,³⁶⁹ were the biggest losers from the Bush senior administration's decision to withhold the 10 billion dollars loan guarantees, loans which were requested by the Israeli government, as noted, in order to help it deal with their influx into Israel. For example, while in June 1991, before the U.S. intervention began, 72% of Russian immigrants opposed the "land for peace" formula, that opposition dropped to 54% in January 1992 (after the public spat between the U.S. and Israel over the guarantees was in full force). It further dropped to 46% by May 1992, a month before the elections and two months after the Bush Senior administration finally denied the guarantees (Mendilow 1995:219; Fein 1992:168-170). This shift concurred with a shift in preferences among these immigrants towards left wing parties from 25% in June 1991 to 48% in May 1992 (Fein 1995:172). Indeed in the 1992 elections about half (47% to 50%) of the Russian immigrants are estimated to have voted for the Labor party in particular and between 58% to 63% to the left wing parties in general- an important factor in the victory of the Labor party (& the left bloc) (Fein 1995:173; Goldberg 1994:203).³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ According to Israeli law Jewish migrants who decide to settle in Israel receive automatic citizenship upon entry. Accordingly, Russian immigrants who have arrived at least three months before election day (when the official voting list for a given election is closed) were eligible to vote in these elections (Fein 1995:162).

³⁷⁰ Based on this data one Israeli pollster even claimed that "...one can state that the [1992] election outcome... resulted from the support given by Russian immigrants to the left bloc" (Fein 1995:173). One should note that given that many Russian immigrants came from a communist country (USSR) which discriminated against Russian Jews in various ways and even actively persecuted the more Zionist oriented among them, it was widely expected before 1992 (with some support in initial polls), that many of these immigrants would be quite resistant, if not downright hostile, to the Israeli left in general and a social democratic party such as the Israeli Labor party in particular (Reich et al. 1995:128). Likewise, the Russian immigrants voting patterns in this election were in contrast to the pattern usually observed among new immigrants- i.e. initially voting for the party in power when arriving at that country (Goldberg 1994:203).

Accordingly, it is clear that the U.S. intervention in the 1992 elections shifted Israeli voting patterns in favor of the Labor party also by making the territories issues an issue more favorable to the Labor party than it would have been otherwise.

A second additional channel by which the U.S. intervention affected the results in favor of the Labor party was by creating underlying conditions that increased the effectiveness of the Labor party campaign while reducing that of the Likud. Although usually hard to measure via conventional pre-election or exit polls, scholars increasingly see the quality and effectiveness of the different pre-election campaign strategies in given situations by the various contenders as having a significant effect on the final election results (see for example Vavreck 2009 esp. chp 3).³⁷¹

One of the main campaign lines of the Labor party during the 1992 elections was that the priorities of the Shamir government were misplaced and that the Israeli government should invest more resources in improving the conditions of poor Israelis living within Israel's 1949 borders rather than in the West Bank settlements— the latter blamed by it as being one reason for the lack of investment of the recent Likud governments in the former (Klein 1995: 214-216,222; Mendilow 1995:224-225). As one major election slogan of the Labor party succinctly summarized it, a Rabin led government would prioritize “Money to the [poor Israeli] neighborhoods- not to the [West Bank] settlements”.

It is agreed by observers of this election that the denial of the loan guarantees by the Bush senior administration (supposedly over the settlements issue) provided a significant boost to this Labor party campaign in two major ways. First, by providing evidence for the costs involved to

³⁷¹See the Introduction chapter for a description of the effects of such factors.

many Israelis from the continued prioritization of the West Bank settlements by the Shamir government-which the Labor party campaign made sure to note in many of its TV commercials. Second, by making the issue of the West Bank settlements more visible and hence more salient than it would have been otherwise (Goldberg 1994:144,171;Klein 1995:214-216,222). Furthermore, the American intervention also disrupted the Likud's main planned campaign line, by forcing it into a more hawkish line (and thus less in tune of the Israeli electorate) than it initially planned prior to the American intervention (Goldberg 1994:21,23,144;Mendilow 1995:218). By increasing the salience of some of the campaign messages of the Labor party while reducing those of the Likud, the U.S. intervention contributed in this way as well to the Labor party's (and Rabin's) victory.

6.2 The Case of the 1953 West German Elections

6.2.1 Overview of the intervention:

This section focuses on the effects that the various components of the American intervention in the 1953 West German Election had on the West German public and its vote choice in this election. As noted in the case study in chapter 3 the U.S. intervention in favor of Adenauer, following his request for U.S. aid in March 1953, included multiple components. Five of the major components of this intervention, all done between April and September 1953, will be analyzed here. The first was reviving the 1923 U.S.- German Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty, a treaty which was suspended as a result of WW2. The second was the establishment of mixed parole boards for the purpose of releasing German War criminals. The

third was supplying West Germany with 15 million dollars of food in order to enable Adenauer to give out food to East Germans civilians, following a revolt against the East German regime which began on June 17, 1953 (the June 17 uprising). The fourth was agreeing to a four power conference in which the topic of German reunification would be discussed. The fifth was an open threat by U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles of “disastrous effects” if Adenauer wasn’t reelected. In the next few sections I will attempt to estimate the effect of each sub-intervention separately and then attempt to provide, based on available survey summary results, a general estimate of this interventions overall effect on the election results.

Of course one must note that this American intervention was not the only factor benefiting the CDU and Adenauer in the 1953 elections. The CDU also, as will be later seen, benefited from the fact that the effects of what was later known as the German “economic miracle” finally began to be felt by the average West German voter by the late spring and summer of 1953 (Spicka 2007: 101-102,197). Likewise, the SPD made some serious errors during the election campaign such as deciding as a cost cutting measure to forgo the use of a polling firm. In contrast, the CDU avoided this and other errors and ran a better campaign (Friedel 2007:116, 122-123).³⁷² Nevertheless, will be seen in the subsequent sections, the U.S. intervention was an important factor in enabling the victory of the CDU in this election.

³⁷² It instead chose to get a regular subscription to summaries of the results of a few polls regularly conducted by one German polling firm (Emnid) for various media organs etc. (Spicka 2007:192)- leaving it with about as much polling data as an average reader of a newspaper who published that poll would have usually received.

6.2.2 Reviving the U.S.- German Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty

As noted, one significant way in which the U.S aided Adenauer's reelection chances was by reviving the 1923 U.S.- German Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty, a treaty which was suspended as a result of WW2.

I was unable to find any polling data or for that matter, any in-depth historical discussion of the exact direct effects of this treaty on the elections- perhaps because of the proximity of its formal signing ceremony to the start of the June 17 rebellion in East Germany (see later description). Accordingly, although the rather favorable press coverage that the revival of treaty had received ³⁷³ probably indicates that this treaty benefitted somewhat the CDU, no clear conclusions on its direct effects can be drawn.

6.2.3 Establishment of mixed parole boards in order to release German War Criminals

As noted in chapter 3, the demand that any German war criminals still imprisoned by the western allies be released received widespread traction in the German public in the early 1950s. The widespread public pressure for the release of German war criminals even endangered, at one point in 1952, Adenauer's government. Likewise, as noted, a survey conducted in October 1952 found that 63% of the West German population believed that those who were still imprisoned for war crimes in Allied jails were innocent.

³⁷³ Bonn 4025 dispatch, June 11,1953 762a.00/RG59/NARA

I was unable to find any polls asking about this particular (or related) topics in the run up to the election or immediately afterwards- perhaps due to the great international sensitivity of this issue.³⁷⁴ Nevertheless, there is strong evidence of the continued relevance of this concern to many German voters in 1953 as well. That may have, in turn, affected their vote choice in this election.

First, calls for the release of German war criminals continued to be made in multiple German veteran gatherings during 1953 to the widespread applause of their members. These veteran gatherings and organizations were widely believed to be of significant importance in affecting the votes of their members and sympathizers- a major factor in a country in which much of the male population fought in WW2.³⁷⁵

Second, the various parties seem to have put significant effort in the run up for the elections to attract voters who cared about this topic. Adenauer for example, besides his quiet pressure on the U.S. to create a parole commission for the war criminals, also made a highly publicized visit in late June 1953 to one of the biggest prisons (Werl) where many of these German war criminals were imprisoned. At Werl, Adenauer met some of the high profile prisoners and made sure to be seen as checking whether their conditions of imprisonment were satisfactory. He subsequently even conducted a special cabinet meeting in which his findings about their imprisonment conditions were reported to the cabinet (Schwartz 1995:75;Frei 2002:223). The Free Democratic Party, the third largest party in the Bundestag (and Adenauer's

³⁷⁴ For example, the leaking of a closely related yet misinterpreted U.S. government funded poll (on Nazi sentiments in the German population) led to a major scandal in early 1953 (Frei 2002:285-287).

³⁷⁵ See for example "Bonn Gets a Voice on War Criminals" NYT July 21,1953; Bonn 224 July 18,1953 "West German Political Weekly no 28" in box 3863 762a.00 RG59 NARA. A rough indication (given how WW2 ended) of the number of veterans in the West German population can be seen from a poll in September 1956 which found that 40% of the male population claiming to have been at one point POWs (Noelle and Neumann 1967:390).

main coalition partner), even tried to one up Adenauer in this regard. For example, the FDP offered former Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, a recently released war criminal, and a well known advocate for the release of the remaining war criminals, a place on its party list, an offer that he declined.³⁷⁶

Finally, the announcement of the creation of the parole commissions was favorably covered by the German media. An indication of how significant this American concession was perceived in West Germany can be seen in the fact that many German newspapers, following this announcement, stopped using the term “war criminals” (Kriegsverbrecher) to describe these convicts and began using the far more favorable term “war convicted” (Kriegsverurteilte) instead.³⁷⁷ It was also favorably received by many of the German organizations and activists pushing for the release of these war criminals. As one such organization noted, in a rather blunt manner, the problem of imprisoned German war criminals was now “ripe for a final solution” (Frei 2002:223).

Accordingly, one researcher on this topic concludes that, at the minimum, this particular intervention probably helped Adenauer (& the CDU) among German war veterans and former Nazis (Frei 2002:223-224). This was an important vote bloc that became larger in 1953 due to the enfranchisement of about 100,000 former Nazis following the expiration of some of the Western occupations denazification laws (Schwartz 1995:59;Pollock 1955:98) - and which could have nibbled on the CDU’s vote share from the right via votes to various far right parties.

³⁷⁶“Albert Kesselring”Der Spiegel 7.22.1953

³⁷⁷ See the review of German newspapers reactions in Bonn 319 July 23,1953 “West German Political Weekly no 22” in box 3863 762a.00 RG59 NARA

6.2.4 Creating a food aid program for East Germany

As noted in chapter 3, Adenauer, in the weeks following the June 17 revolt, was under growing West German public pressure to show (among other things) that he was ‘doing something’ to help fellow Germans in East Germany suffering from the Soviet and East German crackdown and was repeatedly attacked for his passivity in this regard. Adenauer was also under increasing SPD attacks that he didn’t really care about the East German population- a line of attack which seems to have begun to resonate among many West Germans before the food aid program started.³⁷⁸ This line of attack, given the wave of sympathy among the West German population towards the protesters, could have seriously harmed Adenauer’s electoral chances.³⁷⁹

The food aid seems to have been favorably received among the West German population and was useful for Adenauer in dealing with the public pressure and the related political attacks. As Adenauer had hoped, the initial food aid request and subsequent food distribution program received widespread, overwhelmingly favorable, coverage by the West German media, probably thanks to its “humanitarian”, relatively low key nature (Schwartz 1995:65).³⁸⁰ A poll done in late July 1953, a week after the food aid program had begun (and a few weeks after the initial West German and American request for provide food was rejected by the Soviets), had found that 89%

³⁷⁸ See for example (Kisatsky 2005:55);“Adenauer regime under fire for inaction on Riots in East” NYT June 29,1953; “Adenauer defeats bid for big 4 talk” NYT July 2, 1953

³⁷⁹ An indication of the widespread West German sympathy towards the protesters can be seen, for example, in the results of one poll showing that despite the obvious, well known fact that these protesters had no real chance of defeating the Soviet occupying troops (and the East German police) only 19% of west German respondents claimed that their protests were “in vain” (Noelle and Neumann 1967:480).

³⁸⁰ For a description of the initial German media coverage see also Bonn 202 July 13,1953 and Bonn 418 July 30,1953 both in box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA. The shift towards less favorable West German media coverage of this aid program noted by Inghimundarson(1996: 406) was largely a post election phenomenon.

of the West German respondents fully approved of the food aid program.³⁸¹ Likewise, the food aid program (together with the four power conference proposal) seems to have also convinced most West Germans that all that could be feasibly done by the west (and Adenauer) for their East German brethren was indeed being done, with only 13% of West German respondents believing otherwise.³⁸² Furthermore, the food aid plan seems to have helped Adenauer deflect SPD charges that he “didn’t care”, causing the subsequent (yet accurate) SPD accusations that it was done for selfish electoral purposes make the SPD, rather than Adenauer, look bad (Kisatsky 2005:54-55).

Not surprisingly, there is a consensus among historians that had studied this program that it indeed succeeded in helping Adenauer (and the CDU) in the 1953 elections (Inginmundarson 1996: 408; Ostermann 1996:75; Kisatsky 2005:54-55). That seems to have been Adenauer’s view as well. As one of his close advisors noted in a discussion with British diplomats a few weeks after the elections “Dr. Adenauer considers that the . . . [food] distribution scheme has achieved a most favorable political result” (Larres 1994: 348).

6.2.5 Agreeing to a Four Power conference with the Soviet Union

As noted in the case study, the June 17th revolt in East Germany turned yet again the issue of German reunification into a burning issue for the West German public. It accordingly greatly increased public pressures within West Germany for the most plausible route in 1953 for

³⁸¹ See a brief description of this survey in Bonn 550 August 6, 1953 in box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA

³⁸² Ibid

achieving this goal- a four power conference in which the issue of German reunification would be seriously discussed by the U.S. and the Soviets.

For example, when asked, in a poll conducted in July 1953, as to the most important question that the country should deal with, the issue of reunification was noted by 38% of the respondents- the most highly ranked on the list of options. This was also an increase of nearly 15% in its perceived importance over the preceding time this question was asked in July 1952. Not surprisingly, when asked in early July about their view of holding a four power conference (before the decision to hold it was made and publicized by the U.S.) no less than 75% of the West German public were in support (Noelle and Neumann 1967:464).

Accordingly, when Adenauer abruptly changed his mind, decided to advocate in practice a four power conference and convinced the Eisenhower administration to agree to eventually convene such a conference, he fulfilled a demand deeply desired by a significant segment of the West German population. That, in turn, enabled him to turn the tables on the SPD and make the CDU into the predominant advocate of German reunification in the eyes of most of the West German population.

This act was especially important in electoral terms given that, prior to this American intervention in its favor, the CDU and Adenauer were in a distinct disadvantage on this issue. Over much of the preceding four years the SPD constantly presented itself, among other things, as the champion of German reunification and repeatedly accused Adenauer (with some justice³⁸³) of not really caring about this issue (Handrieder 1967:129). This constant effort by the SPD made significant inroads, prior to this U.S. intervention, in achieving the preferred

³⁸³ For examples of Adenauer's clear lack of desire for German reunification when he discussed this topic in private during the 1940s and 1950s see (Trachtenberg 1999:131,231,277-278)

'branding' of each side in the mind of the West German public. For example, in an October 1951 poll only 36% of the respondents were completely certain that Adenauer was indeed interested in the reunification of Germany (Noelle and Neumann 1967:243). Likewise, in an April 1952 poll the SPD was seen by more respondents as being for the reunification of Germany (24%) than the CDU (19%). Similar results were found in other questions comparing Adenauer versus the then head of the SPD Schumacher (Noelle and Neumann 1956:314). The main method repeatedly proposed by the SPD (and others) to achieve reunification, a four power conference, was also polling quite well even prior to the revolt. For example, by early 1953, a plurality of the West German public (44% to 48% in various polls conducted in April 1953) thought that a four power conference on this topic would benefit West Germany (Hicog survey 193).

Not surprisingly, the SPD leadership decided in early 1953 (long before the revolt) to have the issue of German reunification as the centerpiece of its election campaign. As a result, convening a four power conference for this purpose was the major and most important foreign policy prescription in the SPDs pre-election platform, a platform otherwise largely lacking in specific foreign policy prescriptions (Drummond 1982:105). After the revolt began the SPD naturally tried to press its advantage even further and succeeded in embarrassing Adenauer in parliamentary debates on this topic in late June and early July.³⁸⁴ In contrast, Adenauer, given his abovenoted image as to reunification and the fact that he publically and repeatedly opposed a four power conference (except under highly implausible circumstances) until after the revolt was long under way,³⁸⁵ was likely to be far less successful on this potent issue.

³⁸⁴ For two examples see "Adenauer defeats bid for big 4 talk" NYT July 2, 1953;"Bonn House votes 2 rebuffs to Paris" NYT July 3, 1953

³⁸⁵ See the description on this particular U.S. act in the causes case study of Germany.

This American intervention, announced following the three power meeting in mid-July, dramatically changed the situation in Adenauer's favor. By being able to provide what seemed as a concrete achievement on the road towards German reunification- achieving an American (and Western) agreement to convene a four power conference, Adenauer was able to clearly prove, to significant parts of the West German public, his (supposed) true desire for prompt German reunification and disprove the SPD claims about him in this regard. That, in turn, turned this issue from a negative for the CDU into a positive, enabling the CDU to take from the SPD its dominance on this topic (Friedel 2007:129-130;Schwartz 1995:69). For example, a survey in August 1953 already found a 9% gap in favor of the CDU (30% to 21%) when respondents were asked whether a CDU led government or a SPD led government would be more likely to achieve reunification (Noelle and Neumann 1967:463). Likewise, by 'stealing' from the SPD its main positive foreign policy demand, Adenauer left the SPD little to campaign about on foreign policy issues beyond various nit picking arguments over the exact details of this conferences planned agenda or taking credit for Adenauer's shift- now on a topic on which the CDU was stronger (Friedel 2007: 130).

This shift in attitudes (due to the intervention) paid significant dividends in the ballot box for Adenauer and the CDU. When asked in a post-election exit poll on various factors or issues that affected their vote choice (see later description of this survey in section 3.7) 7% of the CDU voters (fifth most common reason) claimed that that foremost reason for their vote choice was because that the CDU was the best advocate for German reunification. In contrast, only 2% of the SPD voters made a similar claim. (Hicog survey 191).³⁸⁶ This was especially effective among

³⁸⁶ Another 15% claimed that this was the second most important factor in voting for the CDU- in contrast to only 8% on the SPD side.

one of the main groups seen as “swing voters” in this elections- the nine million refugees from East Germany and Germans expelled from the areas annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union east of the Oder-Neisse line after WW2 (Bretton 1955:55,142). Among this important swing group, 13% of those who voted for the CDU (the third most commonly stated reason) claimed that this was the most important reason why they voted for the CDU and Adenauer. Only 3% of the voters to the SPD from this group made a similar claim (Hicog survey 191).³⁸⁷

6.2.6 Threatening “disastrous effects” if Adenauer wasn’t reelected

The final act of U.S. intervention in this election was done with a statement by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in an American press conference which took place two days before the elections. As noted in the case study, Dulles publicly threatened in this statement “disastrous effects” for Germany if Adenauer wasn’t reelected. This threat echoed throughout Germany, becoming front page news in West Germany and the main issue of the election campaign in its final days, with the SPD strongly denouncing it and the CDU supportive of it.³⁸⁸

The exact effect of this threat by Dulles is not easy to find given its close proximity to the election date. Nevertheless there is strong evidence that it was of significant aid to Adenauer and the CDU. The last pre-threat (andpreelection) poll available showed the race tightening and a CDU vote share that was about seven percent lower then what it actually received in the election

³⁸⁷ Another 23% of the expellees and refugees claimed that this was the second most important factor in voting for the CDU- in contrast to only 11% on the SPD side

³⁸⁸“Dulles Pins blame on Soviet policies“ *NYT* September 4,1953;“Abroad” *NYT* September 7,1953

after the threat (Schwartz 1995:79). An ineffective or counterproductive threat would presumably not show such differences.

Likewise, one CDU politician estimated that this threat by Dulles swung a million voters into the CDU- or about one quarter of its margin of victory over the SPD (Kitzinger 1960:251). Many members of the SPD leadership, who even coined a special term, the “Dulles-Intervention”, for this particular pre-election threat, made similar claims (Bretton 1955:71). Furthermore, various contemporary German media sources agreed that this threat benefited the CDU at the expense of the SPD³⁸⁹ as did later historians who studied this particular act by Dulles (Hoopes 1973:175; Schwartz 1995 :79).

Finally, as will be described in further detail in section 3.7, the U.S. intervention overall was seen in a favorable manner by most of the West German public. This result would be highly unlikely to have occurred if this threat by Dulles, which seems to have been (not surprisingly) widely noticed by the German public³⁹⁰ (and was the final act of U.S. intervention in favor of Adenauer) was seen in a negative light. Indeed, the favorability of the U.S. intervention overall in this post election poll even increased compared to a preceding pre-threat poll in which this question was asked.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ See for example “Mit Legionärsgeist” *Der Spiegel* September 16,1953

³⁹⁰ Indeed when respondents were asked in a subsequent open question when did they notice the U.S. intervention and/or for examples of the U.S. intervention the most frequently noted example by the respondents was this threat by Dulles (Hicog Survey 191).

³⁹¹ When a question about the U.S. intervention was asked in late July 1953, among those who agreed that the U.S. gave such support to the CDU (and Adenauer) during the elections 36% saw it favorably, 36% unfavorably and the rest had no opinion.

6.2.7 Overall evaluation of the Interventions effect

Of course the question can be asked as to how much overall did all of these components help the Adenauer campaign overall. In order to make such an estimate, I located two post election exit surveys (conducted by a German polling firm (DIVO) which was secretly contracted by the U.S. government for this purpose) which were done in the weeks following the elections. While the underlying data is unfortunately not available³⁹² (preventing the use of statistics etc.), tables summarizing many of the results for the main questions (Hicog Survey 191) have nevertheless been found, enabling me to draw some general conclusions about this interventions overall effectiveness.

One of the questions in the second exit survey listed various reasons for voting for a particular party. It then asked the respondents to answer which of the reasons listed affected their vote choice for the CDU (and other parties) was the most important on this list and then the second and third most important reasons. Unfortunately, with the exception of the German reunification advocacy reason which I noted in section 3.5, the other factors which were part of the U.S. intervention (or in this question as to the intervention itself) were not listed among the reasons available for the respondents to choose from. Nevertheless, some of the most important reasons noted in this poll which led the respondents to vote for the CDU are indeed closely related to many components of this intervention. That, in turn, enables a basic ballpark estimate of the overall effect.

³⁹² Researchers who tried in the past to locate the underlying data for these polls by Hicog were told that it was either lost during the transportation of Hicog's archives to the U.S. in the late 1950s or was destroyed in a flood (Merritt 1980:11). I was also unable to find this data after a month long search that I conducted for it during summer 2013. I plan to do another, more in-depth search for it in the future.

In this poll the two top reasons noted by respondents for choosing the Christian Democrat Union, following the main Socio- demographic factor that defined it (i.e. being a Christian party),³⁹³ was (18% as first reason) the prestige, friends and respect that Adenauer acquired for Germany around the world, followed (16% as first reason) by Adenauer being a great leader (Hicog Survey 191).³⁹⁴ Both of these reasons why people voted for the CDU were clearly influenced by the U.S. intervention.

As for the reason to vote for the CDU due to Adenauer being a great leader, a view that few West Germans seemed to subscribe to (according to available polling data) prior to 1953,³⁹⁵ probably became so important in the voters minds as a result (at least in part) of Adenauer's foreign policy achievements during 1953, achievements which were due to the U.S. intervention noted here. In other words, a perception (and resultant vote choice) of Adenauer as a great leader probably had much to do with the fact that in the six months prior to the election Adenauer suddenly was able to present to the electorate with a series of important achievements such as (among other things) signing a significant trade agreement with the U.S., getting from the United States two things widely desired by many within West Germany (a four power conference and a procedure for the release of German war criminals), finding a way for West Germany to help the oppressed East German brethren etc..

³⁹³ 40% noted this as their top reason for voting the CDU.

³⁹⁴ In contrast, when asked a similar option about the leadership skills of the leader of the SPD, Ollenhauer, virtually no one (less than 1% overall) seems to have voted for the SPD due to this factor.

³⁹⁵ For example, when asked in an August 1952 poll about who are (or were) the greatest Germans, Adenauer was only listed by 3% of the respondents- or within the polls margin of error. It is instructive to note that when asked this question again two months after the elections in November 1953 (the start of his ascent, by the mid-1960s, to the greatest German ever in this survey), Adenauer was listed by almost three times as many people (9%)- ironically reaching the same share as Hitler did in that years poll (Noelle and Neumann 1967:241).

As for the other major reason for voting for the CDU (gaining friends and prestige for Germany) there is little reason to doubt that the U.S. intervention in his favor greatly contributed to this being such a major factor for voting for Adenauer and the CDU. The average German getting all of his news from the German media (without any access, of course, as we currently have to archival documents) would have received, thanks to the U.S. intervention in his favor, numerous significant examples of how Adenauer has found friends and increased Germany's prestige around the world.

If to describe the view available to the average West German voter in 1953, in April 1953 Adenauer made a visit to the U.S. (a first ever for a German chancellor), was received in an official ceremony and a very warm manner by President Eisenhower and other officials from the administration and returned from the talks with clear promises (as could be seen in the resulting communiqué)³⁹⁶ for various benefits for Germany (such as the trade agreement and the parole committee). As one could expect from a friend many of these promises were actually fulfilled afterwards.

A few months later, after the June 17 revolt erupted, the U.S., Britain, and France sent in response to Adenauer's telegrams, friendly letters showing their sympathy with West German anguish over events in East Germany. President Eisenhower even sent afterwards, on his own initiative, a letter endorsing the West German government's positions as for how German reunification should occur.³⁹⁷ The U.S. shortly afterwards upgraded the German representative in the U.S. (and its own representative Conant) to the rank of an Ambassador. Then, after a

³⁹⁶ "U.S. to help Arm Bonn When Europe Implements Act" *NYT* April 10, 1953.

³⁹⁷ (Hirsch-Weber and Schurtz 1957:130; Schwartz 1995:65). These were other significant components of the U.S. intervention which, in order not to overwhelm and bore the reader, weren't discussed in much depth here or previously.

personal letter from Adenauer to Eisenhower asking for U.S. help with feeding East Germans who are suffering under the brutal East German regime, President Eisenhower showed that U.S. friendship towards Germany wasn't limited to mere words but also included "real help" (to quote the report in one German newspaper) by kindly agreeing to offer American food to feed the East Germans. This food was then sent over the following weeks (Hirsch-Weber and Schurtz 1957:129).³⁹⁸ Shortly afterwards, following the request and efforts of two of Adenauer's messengers (whose role was widely reported afterwards in the German media)³⁹⁹ Germany was able to determine much of the agenda of the meeting of the three western great powers in Washington D.C. in July 1953- despite the fact that Germany wasn't actually invited to it. Their efforts also led the U.S., after consulting with Britain and France, to agree to a four power conference and to the setting up of parole committees for German war criminals.

In other words, many of the costly acts of intervention done by the U.S. also showed to many West German voters that the U.S. became, thanks to Adenauer, a friend of Germany.⁴⁰⁰ West Germany's friendship with the U.S. was especially important to the average German voter. For example, when asked prior to the start of the intervention in March 1953 with which country Germany should seek the closest possible cooperation, 83% (the most of all nine countries listed) noted the U.S. (Noelle & Neumann 1967:510 see also 550). This could be also seen in a related

³⁹⁸ Quote from one German newspaper (FAZ) in Bonn 418 in box 5263 862b.49 RG59 NARA. Other newspapers included headlines in response to this program such as "Americans Want to Help".

³⁹⁹ See for example "Ulbricht kannnichtdenken" *Der Spiegel* July 22,1953; "Die Stunde von Seoul" *Der Spiegel* July 22,1953 (both from a major West German magazine which was not very friendly to Adenauer).

⁴⁰⁰ As one scholar (and observer of this election) noted, the various abovenoted U.S. acts designed to help Adenauer's reelection "contribut[ed] further to the identification of the Adenauer regime with good German-American relations" (Bretton 1955:153). Indeed the abovenoted threat by Dulles can be seen in this context as helpful also by showing that voting for Adenauer would guarantee such good relations.

open answer question as to this factor in which many of the preserved responses noted Germany's relations with the U.S. in this regard.⁴⁰¹

Accordingly, if one assumes (quite conservatively) that half of the voters voting for the CDU due to the first reason (Adenauer gaining friends and prestige for Germany) as well as half of those voting for the CDU due to the second reason (Adenauer a great leader) can be attributed to the U.S. intervention in general on Adenauer's behalf, then 17% of the vote to the CDU can be indirectly attributed to the U.S. intervention.⁴⁰² If one includes also the direct effect of the one reason (CDU best advocate for German reunification) directly connected to one of the U.S. intervention acts (the four power conference) (see section 3.5), then almost a quarter (24%) of the votes to the CDU can be attributed to the U.S. intervention.

To give an idea of what effect this would have had on the CDUs vote share (and the election results), without these votes the CDU would have gotten only 34.4% in this election (rather than 45.2%) to the SPD's 28.8%. Given that the SPD was regularly receiving in multiple surveys conducted during 1952 and the start of 1953, (i.e. prior to the U.S. intervention against it), between 34% to 41% of the vote (Merritt 1980:16)⁴⁰³ and the CDU usually trailing it, it is quite likely that without the U.S. intervention many of these voters would have voted for the SPD instead and the CDU and Adenauer would had, nevertheless, lost the elections.

⁴⁰¹ (Hicog Survey 191). Four of the six responses related to the component "Adenauer's...prestige in the world" noted in some manner relations with the U.S. in this regard as a reason why they voted for the CDU in the first exit poll asking about this issue.

⁴⁰² Indeed, at least one of the open responses noted in the previous footnote notes the U.S. backing of Adenauer as something that indicates the U.S. friendship towards Germany in general.

⁴⁰³ Likewise a West German study in November 1952, based on an analysis the most recent Lander elections expected the SPD to get 36.2% of the vote in the upcoming elections-enough given the above estimate to lead to a narrow CDU defeat. See a description of this study in Bonn dispatch 1775 December 29,1952 762a.00. RG59 NARA

To further put the effect of this intervention in perspective according to this question only 11% of CDU voters (the fourth most important reason) noted the economic achievements of the CDU as the most important reason why they had voted for it (Hicog Survey 191). Accordingly, the economic vote in this election largely made a strong showing for the CDU even stronger, increasing the CDU's overall vote share from 39.2% to 45.2%.

Further confirmation of the positive overall effect of the intervention can be seen in a later question which asked respondents directly about the overall U.S. intervention for the CDU. Among those who agreed that the U.S. gave such support to the CDU (and Adenauer) during the elections, the majority (53%) saw it favorably while only 34% didn't (Hicog Survey 191).⁴⁰⁴ The favorable manner that the U.S. intervention was received by most of the West German public, despite repeated and loud denunciations of U.S. meddling in general and many of these acts in particular by the SPD,⁴⁰⁵ further indicates that the U.S. intervention probably worked overall as it was intended. This was also the opinion of many historians which had studied this particular period in Germany's history in depth (Trachtenberg 1999:134; Kisatsky 2005:55; Schwartz 1995:69,79).

6.3 Conclusions

As could be seen from this single election/ micro level analysis in two intervened (non-founding) elections, the interventions were indeed found, as the first hypothesis (and the results

⁴⁰⁴ Percentages calculated from the provided table

⁴⁰⁵ See for example Bonn dispatch 159 762a.00 box 3863RG59 NARA for a translated version of one of the articles (in the SPD's party newspaper) denouncing the U.S. intervention in favor of Adenauer. See also (Drummond 1982:106; Schwartz 1995:79)

of the large-N study) would expect, to have a significant effect in the predicted direction. In the 1992 Israeli elections the results of the statistical analysis indicate that this factor increased the probability of voting for the left wing bloc (the one supported in this intervention) by at least 2.8%- a medium size effect which stacks up quite well in comparison to important factors which determined vote choice in this election. Analysis of other ways by which this intervention may have effected the election (through, for example, shifting parts of the Israeli public's views in a more dovish direction on the Issue of the territories) indicates that the full effect of the intervention may have even been larger than that. This evidence is largely in accordance with the findings in chapter 5 as to this election (see section 5.2.1).⁴⁰⁶ In that section, based upon the predicted results derived from the aggregate large-N statistical analysis, I estimated the effects of the intervention in this case to have been large enough to have probably enabled the coming to power, as a result of this election, of Yitzhak Rabin as the head of a center-left coalition. The analysis here, using local level survey data from this election, further buttresses this conclusion.

In the case of the 1953 West German election clear evidence has also been found for significant direct effects of at least four of the five major components of the U.S. intervention in favor of Adenauer and the CDU. For example, one of these components- agreeing to hold a four power conference, probably contributed about seven percent of the overall CDU vote in this election. When one also includes parts of the major vote choice reasons in a post election poll which capture indirectly some of the effects of this intervention on increased vote choice for the CDU (such as, for example, the view of Adenauer as a great leader) the intervention is estimated

⁴⁰⁶ Given the different statistical methods used (OLS in the large N study in chapter 5, probit here) the different independent variables (incumbent party vote share vs. left/right bloc) and the different ways used to interpret the results of each method, the absolute magnitude of these effects via each aren't directly comparable. Nevertheless, both methods indicate an effect large enough to have significantly affected this election's outcome in the direction that this intervention was supposed to have (i.e. a Rabin and a Labor party/ left wing bloc victory).

to have contributed around 24% of the CDU's vote share in this election. This result, in turn, indicates that the U.S. intervention played an important role in the victory of Adenauer and the CDU. Without the American intervention my estimate here indicates that this election would have been far closer and, given the SPD's vote share in various pre-intervention surveys, there is a good chance that the SPD, rather than the CDU, would have won them.

These results accordingly support the findings of the aggregate large-N statistical analysis in chapter 5. The congruence overall between what the first hypothesis predicts that will occur and what is actually found both in the large N and the single election levels should start to put to rest possible ecological inference concerns as to whether the aggregate results in chapter 5 accurately reflect what is actually occurring at the single election level. Likewise, the findings here provide no evidence for a "cherry picking" selection mechanism driving the findings of significant effects of such interventions. Using, where available, the same types of data used by scholars in the economic voting literature to determine what were the main factors that led to the results of a particular election (pre/post election surveys etc.), evidence of the electoral interventions having a significant independent effect on the results in the preferred direction have been clearly found in both cases. A "cherry picking" explanation for the large-N results would not predict such findings. In contrast, these results support my first hypothesis that posits that such interventions will usually have significant beneficial electoral effects for the aided side.

These results (especially the 1992 Israeli election) also provide support for the mechanism proposed here as to how overt interventions may affect vote choice (in non-founding elections), indicating that voters in the target usually pay attention to the overt interventions, change their opinions on the relevant issues accordingly, and at least some of them do change, as a result, their voting choices as well. Furthermore, while my second hypothesis as to the effects

(overt more effective than covert) can't be fully examined at this level of analysis, these results do at least indicate that overt interventions aren't useless and/or counterproductive (in non-founding elections) in shifting election results for the preferred side.

In the following chapter an investigation at the single election level of the effects of the third hypothesis as to the effects in founding elections will be done as well.

Chapter 7: Single election level investigation of the effects of electoral interventions (prt.2)

“God, protect me from my friends. I can take care of my enemies”

Voltaire

Introduction

This chapter continues the micro level analysis begun in chapter 6- this time focusing on electoral interventions in founding elections. In that chapter, I conducted a single election/micro level analysis in two intervened elections- the 1992 Israeli elections and the 1953 West German elections. These cases were analyzed in order to check for possible critiques which the aggregate large N statistical analysis was potentially open to. In other words, whether these large N results are actually reflecting the true effects occurring at the single (intervened) election level and/or whether they merely reflect a selection process by which the intervener only intervenes for “sure winners” rather than the actual effects by the intervention on the election results. The electoral interventions in these two cases were indeed found, as the first hypothesis (and the results of the large N study) would expect, to have a significant effect in the predicted direction, increasing the vote share of the preferred candidate/party thus refuting these critiques.

However, both of the cases examined in chapter 6 were cases of interventions in non-founding elections. Nevertheless, one of my major hypotheses (hypothesis 3) has very different predications as to founding elections, expecting interventions in such elections to bring little benefit and usually harm the side that the intervener is trying to aid. This hypothesis was supported in the large N, aggregate analysis (see chapter 5)- but naturally it couldn't be

examined at the single election level using cases in which the intervention was in a non-founding election. Accordingly, the analysis in the preceding chapter still leaves open the question as to the exact micro level effects of the electoral interventions in such elections.

Likewise, a micro level examination of electoral interventions in founding elections will also serve as a useful plausibility probe, enabling us to check whether some of the expected processes that lead to the low effectiveness of interventions occurring in such elections are indeed occurring in practice in at least some of these cases.

My theoretical logic as to interventions in founding elections expects them to be less effective, if not counterproductive, because the information provided by the inexperienced client to the great power, on which the great power depends in order to know how to effectively intervene on its behalf, is of very low quality. In other words, I would expect one of two situations to usually bring about this effect. The first is that the client in interventions occurring in founding elections will propose methods of intervention on its behalf to the great power which are ineffective or counterproductive in that particular election's circumstances. The second is that the client, when consulted as to a possibly problematic method of intervention thought up or proposed by the intervener, will fail to warn the intervener of the possible problems that its use in this election may bring about, thus encouraging the intervener to utilize it.

As noted in chapter 6, a single election/micro level investigation of the effects is quite hard to do in practice in most cases of electoral interventions due to the various limitations on the amounts of data available for many of these cases. Nevertheless, after some effort, I have been able to find relevant data as to a few such cases of interventions in founding elections. In this chapter I will investigate the effects of such interventions in two cases of founding elections. The first is the 1796 U.S. presidential elections- which given that George Washington ran unopposed

in 1789 and 1792 was in practice the first competitive presidential elections in American history (Pasley 2013). The second is the 1946 Argentinean presidential elections- the first competitive presidential election in Argentina in at least nine years.⁴⁰⁷

7.1 The case of the 1796 U.S. Election

7.1.1 Historical Introduction

The English novelist L.P. Hartley famously claimed at the beginning of one of his novels that “the past is a foreign country: they do things differently there”. When one attempts to assess the effects of an electoral intervention in an 18th century U.S. Presidential election, keeping in mind some of the very important differences between American politics and the U.S. geopolitical situation in the late 18th century and the present is indeed quite important for understanding the analysis presented here.

The first important difference to note was that the U.S. in the 1790s was in a very different geopolitical situation then it is today or even that it came to occupy a few decades later. During that decade, the United States, although already quite large in nominal geographic terms, and of increasing economic/strategic importance to the great powers due to the Napoleonic

⁴⁰⁷ The last presidential election in Argentina prior to February 1946 had occurred in September 1937. A military coup had overthrown the vice president which was elected in 1937 and established a new military regime in June 1943. Many scholars studying this era don't see the 1931 and 1937 Argentinean presidential elections as truly competitive due to the extremely high levels of election fraud, the banning of many significant potential presidential candidates, and other shenanigans (see for example Potash 1969:71-74,98,104,106). If one accepts this position, then the 1946 elections were the first truly competitive presidential elections in Argentina since 1928.

wars⁴⁰⁸, was still a relatively weak country. The U.S. had then a relatively small population (even by that era's smaller population standards) of approximately four million, the vast majority of whom were still living on or near the Atlantic coast.⁴⁰⁹

By 1796, the U.S. was composed of only sixteen member states with newest state, Tennessee, having just joined earlier that year. The Federal government still had virtually no navy and a rather small standing army, numbering about 5000 officers and soldiers. In comparison, the army forces fighting an average battle in Europe in the 1790s regularly numbered ten times and more as many troops on both sides.⁴¹⁰ Likewise, the U.S. economy was still very highly dependent on trade in general and trade with the various European countries in particular. For example, the value of all U.S. exports in 1796, 67 million dollars (nearly all to Europe), was more than ten times the size of the federal government's budget for that year (5.9 million).⁴¹¹ Due to the United States economic and military situation described above, any threat by a significant European great power to commence hostilities against the U.S. or to disrupt American foreign trade with Europe was a quite credible, costly possibility to the average American and was accordingly taken quite seriously by contemporaries.

Secondly, although the current U.S. constitution was already in effect, there were major differences in the process by which the president was chosen in practice. For example, there was

⁴⁰⁸ For example, the U.S. was one of the few reliable exporters of agricultural goods during a period in which the Napoleonic wars increasingly disrupted much of the intra-European trade, leading even the strongest great powers such as France or Britain to suffer at times from significant food shortages.

⁴⁰⁹ U.S. Census Bureau at www.census.gov

⁴¹⁰ For example, in one run of the mill battle during the Napoleonic wars, the battle of Tourcoing (May 18, 1794) between France and combined forces of Britain and Austria, there were about 70,000 soldiers fighting on the French side and 74,000 troops fighting on the British and Austrian side.

⁴¹¹ For U.S. exports in 1796 see (North 1960: 577). For the 1796 Federal budget see http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/breakdown_1796USmt_15ms5n

significant variation in the ways that the different states chose their presidential electors. In eight states, all of the presidential electors were indirectly chosen by the state legislature, in a manner similar to the way in which senators were chosen prior to the seventeenth amendment. In the other eight states in which part or all of the electors were chosen by the general electorate,⁴¹² there was a variety of methods by which the electors were chosen by the public instead of the nearly uniform “winner take all” method which became the norm a few decades later. Likewise, there was no common “election day”. Instead, in a manner similar to the way that the selection of convention delegates is done in the presidential primaries nowadays, each state had a different date for choosing its presidential electors. These state election days were spread across the last months of 1796, with the earliest states choosing the presidential electors in the last days of October and the latest ones choosing them in the first week of December, usually without clear knowledge of what were the actual election results in the other states that preceded it (Pasley 2013: 346).

Thirdly, the presidential electors did not yet become (as they largely are nowadays) a mere accounting unit designating the relative electoral importance of different states. While usually pledged to vote to a particular candidate and/or presidential ticket the electors were not (and to this day are still not) legally obligated to vote according to their pledge, and the custom of always voting to the pledged candidate(s) was far less developed then it quickly became afterwards. Furthermore, in the states in which the electors were directly chosen by the public, the candidates of the two parties for presidential electors were usually actively campaigning for this temporary job in their “districts” or states (see for examples Pasley 2013:328-345)- in a

⁴¹² The electorate in this era was usually composed, of course, only of free male adults with a designated minimum amount of property.

manner not too different than the way (in modern parliamentary systems) that candidates for MPs from the major parties run in national elections with the promise (explicit or implicit from their party designation) of voting for a particular person as the PM in the first session of parliament.

Fourthly, as was the case prior to the twelfth amendment (1804), the votes that the electors casted for the president and vice president were not differentiated. Accordingly, whichever candidate (whether presidential or vice presidential) received the highest number of Electoral College votes would become the president with the runner up (regardless of his affiliation with the first place winner) becoming the vice president. As a result, although the two parties had clearly designated presidential (and vice presidential) candidates in 1796, the electoral system (combined with the abovenoted nature of electors at the time) was open to abuse via behind the scenes manipulation by politicians who were not satisfied, for one reason or another with their party's presidential candidate and preferred the vice presidential candidate instead (Sharp 1993:146).

Fifthly, the party system was composed of two different parties- the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans (Pasley 2013:7).⁴¹³ By the mid-1790s, most of the "Founding Fathers" that were still alive and/or active in politics were members of one or the other party. For example, George Washington (in his second term), John Adams and Alexander Hamilton were members of the Federalist party, while Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and James Monroe were members of the Democratic-Republicans.

⁴¹³The Democrat-Republicans are usually seen as the predecessors of the modern Democratic party (Pasley 2013:7).

Finally, due to the political norms and classical Republican ideology deeply held by most of the public (and elites) during this era, the presidential (and vice presidential) candidates did not actively campaign or even manage the overall campaign behind the scenes. The campaigning was usually done in practice by the candidates to electors themselves as well as by various lower level politicians whose names, unlike those of the Founding Fathers, are not household names nowadays (Sharp 1993:138).

7.1.2 Overview of the French Intervention

In the 1796 U.S. Presidential elections, the French government, via its minister to the U.S. Pierre Adet, intervened in favor of Thomas Jefferson, the presidential candidate of the Democratic-Republican party (hence DR). This was done in order to prevent the election of the Federalist presidential candidate John Adams which the French government then feared would lead to the continuation of what it perceived as the pro-British foreign policies of the Washington administration. The French government thought that the Washington administration, for all practical purposes, effectively negated the 1778 U.S.-French Alliance treaty by signing the Jay treaty with Britain in August 1795 as well as other supposedly anti-French acts on its side (Deconde 1958).

The French intervention included three major components. The first was a diplomatic message to the U.S. government which enclosed a decree by the French government, both of which were “leaked” to a partisan DR newspaper (the Philadelphia Aurora) in late October. This decree ordered that American merchant ships carrying goods to other countries were henceforth to lose their neutral status in the eyes of the French navy so on that the U.S. government

continued its present policies which (in French eyes) effectively permitted the British government to do the same. In practice, that meant that U.S. merchant ships carrying goods to Europe (or other destinations) that were intercepted by the French Navy (or French privateers) could henceforth be boarded, searched and have their goods confiscated, usually without receiving any compensation. The decree (and the accompanied diplomatic message) also warned that if the U.S. government continued its current foreign policies, as a Federalist administration under John Adams obviously planned to do, it would “Cross the Line of Neutrality” vis-a-vis France and instead “become its enemy” (Pasley 2013:367).

The second measure (quickly dubbed the “Cockade Proclamation”) published a few days later was a declaration by Adet, supposedly directed at French nationals. It required French nationals to wear on their hats a circular cockade with the French national colors (red, white and blue) in order to receive French government protection. This proclamation implied, in an era prior to the secret ballot in which voting was usually done in the open, that American citizens who openly showed that they were friends of France could expect to be exempted from the various sanctions that the French government was planning to impose on the U.S. (Ibid, 368).

The third measure, published ten days later, seems to have been focused mainly on “flipping” Federalist electors into voting nevertheless for Jefferson when the Electoral College convened in their state after the election. In this message Adet declared that, due to the approval of the U.S.-British treaty earlier that year (the Jay treaty) by the Washington (Federalist) administration, the French government had decided to suspend his mission and call him back home- one of the final steps in 18th century diplomatic practice prior to a declaration of war. It however promised that an armed conflict could be nevertheless prevented if Americans “let your

Government return to itself” -i.e. voted for opponents of this treaty- Jefferson and the Democratic-Republican ticket (Pasley 2013:368-370; Deconde 1958:474-475).⁴¹⁴

7.1.3 The effects part. 1- Pennsylvania

The evidence indicates that, following the advice that the French Ambassador received from some of the Republican-Democratic officials who were in charge of their party’s presidential campaign, Adet’s first two notes were primarily focused on winning the general election for Jefferson by handing Pennsylvania to the DR ticket. As many of the DR officials seemed to have believed prior to the election, Pennsylvania was the main “swing state” with which they needed to be concerned. If they were able to somehow put its fifteen electoral votes in Jefferson’s column then, as one of the senior DR campaign managers in this election (John Beckley) described it, “the election is safe” for Jefferson (Kurtz 1957:177-178). They were especially hoping, it seems, to affect through such French overt measures the mercantile elite of Philadelphia, many of whom were devout Quakers, by filling them with “fear” (Pasley 2013:373).

Adet’s overt threats seemed to have a major effect (in the direction preferred by the French and the DR) within the Philadelphia area. As multiple observers present in Philadelphia during election time had noted many well off Quakers, then usually staunch Federalist voters, suddenly changed in this election their voting patterns, voting for Democratic-Republican

⁴¹⁴ Although some Federalists accused the French government of also providing the DR with covert campaign funding, there is little to no evidence that such funding was given in practice (Pasley 2013:374). Indeed one of Adet’s main complaints, when he returned to France and tried to excuse his failure, was that he did not get from the French government sufficient funds for various “covert action” purposes (Elkins and McKittrick 1993:566).

electors instead. As one observer described it, many Quakers explained to him the shift in their choice as being because “THE ELECTION OF MR. JEFFERSON WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT A RUPTURE WITH FRANCE!!!” (uppercase use, punctuation as in the original).⁴¹⁵ Indeed, following Adet’s cockade proclamation, many Philadelphian voters even went to the polling places with a French cockade on their hat. Likewise, if one is to believe one contemporary’s claims, the cockade proclamation may have even been used by DR partisans as a “filtering” mechanism in a few polling places in Philadelphia, with DR party activists forcibly preventing would be voters not wearing a French cockade on their hat from even approaching the polling stations.⁴¹⁶

When the counting of the votes was completed, 14 of the 15 presidential Electoral College candidates chosen from Pennsylvania were DR who, a few weeks later, casted their votes for Jefferson. This was significantly more than one would have expected in Pennsylvania given the electoral system used in this state for choosing the electors and the two parties record prior to the French intervention. In 1796 Pennsylvania used for the purpose of selecting its presidential electors a single statewide ticket in which the fifteen candidates who got individually the highest number of votes were chosen. Given the most recent election results, the Federalists had a good reason to expect to capture a significantly larger number of the electoral votes in this state. If one uses as a yardstick the vote counts gained by the Federalist and Democratic-

⁴¹⁵ Oliver Wolcott jr. to Oliver Wolcott Sen. November 27,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]:401);Smith to Izard November 8,1796 in (Philips 1909: 784).

⁴¹⁶ Smith to Izard November 8, 1796 in (Philips 1909:785). Even within Pennsylvania, outside of the greater Philadelphia area, a wave of sudden support for Jefferson wasn’t observed. As one DR congressman who was campaigning for Jefferson in Western Pennsylvania (a DR stronghold) in the run up to the elections had noted, the turnout among DR voters in this region was significantly lower in his area than he had expected. Albert Gallatin to his wife November 9,1796 in (Adams 1880:177).

Republican congressional candidates in the election for the House of Representatives which occurred in early October 1796 (a few weeks before the presidential election and the French intervention) one would have expected the Federalists to get six of the electoral votes in this state.⁴¹⁷

Likewise, in modern studies of the city of Philadelphia vote returns in the 1796 Presidential elections, seem to show a shift in the voting patterns in Philadelphia in congruence with abovenoted “frightened Quakers” phenomenon described by contemporary observers in this election (Pasley 2013:372-373). Of course, other factors had benefitted the democratic-republicans in Pennsylvania as well such as the creation by Republican Democratic officials in the pre-election months of a well oiled party organization in this state which, among other things, distributed large amounts of campaigning materials as well as nearly fifty thousand filled out paper ballots (or more then double the number of Pennsylvanian voters who actually turned out to vote) (Elkins & McKitrick 1993: 520-521). Nevertheless, the belief of many contemporaries that this unexpectedly large Democratic- Republican victory would not have occurred “without the publication of Mr. Adet’s note” is probably justified, and helped the DR gain five additional electoral college votes in Pennsylvania that they wouldn’t have otherwise.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ Estimated using the voting totals for each candidate in the October 1796 house of representatives election available at “A New Nation Votes” project, Tufts University accessed December 21,2013. <http://elections.lib.tufts.edu/>. To make that the results of all of candidates are comparable, I excluded from this estimate a candidate who ran unopposed in his district as well as those competing in another, unusual electoral district.

⁴¹⁸ Oliver Wolcott jr. to Oliver Wolcott Sen. November 19,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]:396). For similar conclusions see (Elkins & McKitrick 1993: 521).

7.1.4 The effects part. 2- the rest of the U.S.

However, outside of Pennsylvania, where Quakers did not form a significant segment of the American electorate, the reaction of the electorate to the French Intervention was very different and quite negative for the DR ticket. Across the U.S. the French intervention led to a wave of anger against France which harmed the DR ticket as well. As one newspaper noted in reaction to the notes “The [French and the DR newspaper the] Aurora threatens us with war if we elect John Adams president...will the real and independent Americans be so crouching as to have a president forced upon them by such daring maneuvers?” (Kurtz 1957:131). This newspaper was far from alone in expressing such sentiments. As one observer (from outside of Pennsylvania) noted, the French intervention “injured” the DR ticket because “I have not met a man who doesn’t condemn his [Adet’s] note.... the great mass of our fellow citizens consider it as the most insulting and offensive addresses that ever was made to a government or a people”⁴¹⁹. Another contemporary observer noted, based on letters that he was getting from acquaintances from various parts of the U.S., that the French intervention has “roused every part of it” in opposition.⁴²⁰ Indeed another publicist, writing from New England, claimed that since the French had made their threats “There is not an elector on this side of the Delaware [i.e. outside of the

⁴¹⁹ Troup To King January 28,1797 in (King 1895:135).

⁴²⁰ Boudinot to Bayard December 14,1796 in (Boudinot 1896:119-120); see also Stewart to Washington December 18,1796 The Founding Era Collection, Washington papers, founders early access *ibid*.

DR strongholds] that would not sooner be shot rather than vote for him [Jefferson]” (Deconde 1958:476).⁴²¹

Indeed, the Federalists quickly began to use Adet’s notes as campaigning material in their campaign, attacking it as an immoral “foreign influence” and a prime example of the warning that George Washington, the widely beloved outgoing president, gave in his Farewell Address, six weeks before the start of Adet’s intervention, against “the insidious wiles of foreign influence” (Deconde 1958: 477;Stewart 1969:278). The Federalists also claimed that this intervention conclusively proved that if Jefferson becomes president the U.S. would become a French satellite state (Stewart 1969:278).

In response, the DR were largely reduced in their campaigning to the rather unconvincing denials that the French, in doing these acts, were even intervening in the election, such claims even being made, rather ironically, by the DR party newspaper (the Philadelphia Aurora) which was the first to publish the three notes of the French ambassador (Perkins 1955:199-200;Stewart 1969:278).

One state where this backlash clearly began to affect the voting patterns was Maryland. In 1796 Maryland’s presidential electors were to be chosen directly by the public in ten special and separate election districts. This method of choosing presidential electors, and the relative balance of strength between the DR and Federalists in this state, led both sides to expect, prior to Adet’s intervention, that Maryland’s electoral votes would be divided equally between the DR and Federalist tickets.⁴²²

⁴²¹ For other examples see (Dawson 2000:39).

⁴²² See for example Oliver Wolcott jr. to Oliver Wolcott Sen. October 17,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]:387); Beckley to Irvine September 15,1796 in (Gawalt 1995:122).

The French intervention however seems to have led to a shift against France in general and the DR in particular within Maryland. Adet's notes led to a wave of public rage against France within Maryland. As a spokesmen for a group of Maryland farmers noted, although they did not desire to kill any Frenchmen in person, unless France changes its behavior "we must...appeal to our RIFLES" (Clark 1966:221). Likewise, multiple observers of Maryland politics noted that this intervention "irretrievably diminished" Marylanders previously favorable views towards France.⁴²³ Indeed, anger against the French intervention ran so high that the Maryland legislature in its next session, a few weeks after the election was concluded (but before the results were known), even adopted a highly unusual series of resolutions denouncing the French intervention (Renzulli 1972:183).

Federalist party campaigners in Maryland, who were already warning for a long time in their election propaganda about the dangers of voting for the DR and Jefferson because of the undue influence that the French government may have on them, quickly capitalized on this wave of anger against France, successfully using it to their presidential electors benefit. For example, Federalist propagandists in Maryland began to warn in the last days prior to the election that voting for the DR and Jefferson would bring to power a "president of experiments" under whom the United States would be under the risk of being "Polandized" (Pasley 2013: 396-397). The reference to Poland was meant to evoke among contemporaries the tragic story of Poland's elections for king (by an electorate which composed of all of the Polish nobility- or 6% of the population) which were notorious for being repeated targets for foreign interveners. These foreign interventions in Poland's politics were widely believed by contemporaries (together with other forms of foreign meddling) to have been a major cause behind Poland's dysfunctional

⁴²³ Key to McHenry November 28, 1796 in (Steiner 1979[1907]:202-203).

politics and final bloody partition in the preceding year (1795), an event which was widely reported in American newspapers (Pasley 2013:370-371). As a result, when the votes were counted in Maryland, the Federalists won almost twice the number of electoral votes then the DR did 6 to 3⁴²⁴ - or three more electoral votes for Adams over Jefferson than was expected prior to the French intervention.

In Massachusetts a similar pattern had occurred. In this state fourteen of the sixteen electoral votes were to be chosen directly by the public in fourteen separate election districts whose borders were, moreover, congruent with those of its fourteen congressional districts (Pasley 2013:341,346). As a result of this method of choosing electors, and despite the natural advantage that John Adams had in his home state (which was also dominated by the Federalists), the DR had a good chance of capturing some of its presidential electoral votes. For example, in the preceding House of Representatives elections (late 1794), the DR were able to capture four seats. Likewise, the governor of Massachusetts at the time, Sam Adams, was a DR who was extremely popular within Massachusetts, easily winning the gubernatorial election in the spring of 1796, despite strenuous Federalist efforts to defeat him, by a 20% margin over his Federalist opponent.⁴²⁵ Indeed, in order to capitalize on Sam Adam's popularity, the DR even made him one of their electoral college candidates in part of the city of Boston- his hometown and one of the DRs Massachusetts strongholds (Kurtz 1957:150).

The seriousness in which DR saw their chances of getting electoral college votes in Massachusetts (and New England in general) can also be seen by the fact that the Vice

⁴²⁴ The seventh elector which the Federalists won in Maryland voted for both Adams and Jefferson (thus effectively negating the effect of his vote)- the latter choice probably done in order to prevent Hamilton's backroom scheme of having Pinckney (the Federalist VP candidate) rather than Adams get the presidency rather than any sudden preference for Jefferson (Pasley 2013:395).

⁴²⁵ "A New Nation Votes" data *ibid.* For a similar view about the DR's prospects in this state see (Pasley 2013:341).

Presidential candidate of the DR, Aaron Burr, one of the few senior politician of his era who actively campaigned for political office, did a six week long electioneering tour throughout New England during September and October 1796 for this purpose, much of it in Massachusetts (Isenberg 2007:151).

However, as in Maryland, Adet's threats weren't well received by the voters. As some contemporary observers noted, following the French intervention Massachusetts became extremely hostile towards France, with common people regularly seen cursing the French in public.⁴²⁶ Indeed, John Adams who, Cincinnatus style, stayed at his Massachusetts home during the run up to the presidential election in Massachusetts, observed that Adet's intervention had the opposite effect then what the French had planned.⁴²⁷

As a result, the DR failed to get a single Electoral College vote out of Massachusetts. Even the DR's most popular presidential elector, Sam Adams, went down to a major defeat against a virtually unknown federalist opponent 55% to 45% (Pasley 2013:345). Other DR candidates fared even worse.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶(Bentley 1962[1907]:207). Despite longstanding hatred of France among some of the more partisan Massachusetts Federalists, as well much of the local clergy, this seems to not have been the case, before Adet's intervention, among most of Massachusetts public. Indeed, when Adet visited Boston in September 1796 he and France were still so highly esteemed within Massachusetts that when the DR held a special dinner in his honor, even some local Federalists chose to attend it (Pasley 2013:366).

⁴²⁷ John Adams to J.Q. Adams November 12, 1796 in The Founding Era Collection, Adams papers, founders early access at <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FGEA-print&mode=TOC> .Adams assumed this about the U.S. as a whole. However given that in the two weeks or so preceding this letter Adams seems (if one is to trust the quite voluminous Adams family papers from this period) to have received no information from other federalist activists about how the election was going outside of Massachusetts, something he only began to receive a few days later in mid-November when he left Massachusetts in order to open the congressional lame duck session. Accordingly, Adam's assessment of the effects of the French intervention at this point in time could have only come from observing its effects in Massachusetts.

⁴²⁸ For example, Sam Adams Lt. Governor, Moses Gil, was defeated by a 9 to 1 margin in his Electoral district ("A New Nation Votes" data ibid).

The effect on American politicians (and political elites) was no different. For example, there seems to be no evidence whatsoever that any of state legislatures, in any of the states in which they were charged of choosing the electors, changed their planned choice of electors so as to favor (or favor more) DR aligned ones as a result of the French intervention. Likewise, the other way by which Adet tried to influence the election results, by ‘flipping’ Federalists presidential electors into voting for Jefferson, failed as well, probably leading to the opposite result.

Prior to the French intervention the chances of achieving some electoral votes for the Democrat- Republican ticket from such “vote flipping” were seen as quite significant by both sides. For example, one of the major efforts of the DR campaign was focused on persuading federalist electors through various targeted campaigning and lobbying methods, especially those who hailed from states in which the electors were chosen by the legislature, to vote for the DR ticket instead. For example, in what was probably one of the first direct mailing campaigns in history, one of the main DR campaign functionaries, Tench Coxe, sent personal letters and campaigning materials to the house of each presidential elector (in many cases hand delivered by a personal courier) in seven different states (Freeman 2001:152). Likewise, one of Aaron Burrs close confidants had repeated, one on one, late into the night lobbying meetings with one of the Federalist electors from the State of New York in the hopes of getting him to flip his vote and vote for the Democrat-Republicans instead (Young 1967:551).⁴²⁹ Such efforts on the side of the DR probably had a good chance of success. As some Federalist leaders complained in their

⁴²⁹ Van Gaasbeek to Burr November 25, 1796 in (Kline 1983:274). For other examples see (Freeman 2001:153), Higginson to Hamilton December 9, 1796 in (Syrett 1974:438).

private communications, a few of the Federalist electors chosen by the state legislators (such as, in one case, two of the electors chosen by the Vermont legislature) were not completely reliable in this regard.⁴³⁰

However, no evidence exists that any Federalist presidential elector changed his vote (Malone 196:287).⁴³¹ Indeed, the evidence seems indicate that, if at all, the French intervention led to the closing of the ranks among Federalist presidential electors, discouraging them from such flipping (Pasley 2013: 375,379). As one Federalist congressman, probably reflecting the sentiments among many Federalist presidential electors noted shortly afterwards, the fact that the French were working “to the utmost in favor of his [Jefferson’s] election...would have been quite sufficient...[to] render him unfit for President of the United States” even “*had there been no other objection to him*” (my emphasis).⁴³²

Not surprisingly, most contemporary observers of the 1796 elections, both before and after the final results were known, quickly concluded that the French intervention harmed, overall, Jefferson’s electoral chances. In private conversations Federalist party leaders, after an initial panic attack by some of them when hearing about the election results in Pennsylvania, became quite certain that the French intervention is counterproductive overall and is working in

⁴³⁰ Oliver Wolcott Sen. to Oliver Wolcott Jr. November 28,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]:403). For another such example see (Pasler and Pasler 1975:77).

⁴³¹ One Federalist elector in Maryland voted for both Adams and Jefferson, the latter choice probably done in order to prevent Hamilton’s scheme of having Pinckney (the VP candidate) rather than Adams get the presidency (Pasley 2013: 395).

⁴³² Harper to constituents January 5,1797 in (Donnan 1915:25-26).For other similar examples of reactions by Federalist politicians and presidential electors see Smith to Izard November 3, 1796 in (Philips 1909:781); Oliver Wolcott jr. to Oliver Wolcott Sen. November 19,1796 & Oliver Wolcott Sen. to Oliver Wolcott jr. November 21, 1796 & December 12,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]: 397-398,409);Governor Johnson to Iredell December 25,1796 in (McRee 1858 2:483).

their favor.⁴³³ Indeed, one prominent Federalist publicist described the French Intervention as a “diplomatic blunderbuss” (the title of his pamphlet on this topic). This was a reference to an 18th century musket notorious for the difficulties its users had in using it in an effective manner (Corbett 1801:139-141).

Most members of the DR party agreed with that Federalist assessment of the interventions effects, at least in private. As James Madison complained in a private letter to Jefferson, the French Intervention was “working all the evil with which it is pregnant” with the Federalists making significant gains as a result of it. President Washington was hearing similar things from the private discussions he seemed to have been regularly holding with various members of the DR party and supporters of France with many of them “confess[ing] that, he [Adet] has been too precipitate; and thereby injured the cause he meant to espouse”.⁴³⁴

Indeed even Adet himself, by the time that the first two parts of the intervention were concluded, seems to have been receiving increasing complaints about the French electoral intervention and the way it was being executed from many of those DR members who seem to have requested it in the first place (O’Brian 1996:239). As Jefferson himself complained a few months after the election in a letter to a friend, the DR have had “a hard struggle indeed, overwhelmed by a cry as loud & imposing as if it were true, of being under French influence” (Bowmen 1974:271).

⁴³³ Hamilton to Washington November 4,1796 in (Syrett 1974:373)Fischer Ames to Oliver Wolcott November 14,1796 & to Christophe Gore December 3, 1796 in (Allen 1983:1202,1204); John Adams to Abigail Adams November 27, December 1 & December 12, 1796 all in The Founding Era Collection, Adams papers, founders early access *ibid*.

⁴³⁴ For other examples see Chauncey Goodrich to Oliver Wolcott Sen. December 17,1796 in (Gibbs 1971 [1846]:413);John Adams to Abigail Adams December 12,1796 The Founding Era Collection, Adams papers, founders early access *ibid*.

The French government eventually reached quite similar conclusions about the effects of its electoral intervention in this election. As one of its foremost experts on American affairs, a French diplomat who had served twelve years in various diplomatic postings within the U.S., had concluded in a detailed analysis of U.S.-French relations written in mid-1797, the Americans, “the freest people on earth”, chose a “friend of the aristocracy and hereditary nobility” (as John Adams was seen by the French) not because they “suddenly became friends of monarchy and inequality”. Instead, this was largely because of the “outrageous conduct” of the French diplomats in the U.S. prior to the 1796 presidential elections (Otto 1945[1797]:22-23).⁴³⁵ Many modern historians concur with these above judgments of contemporaries as to the interventions overall effects. As one of them had noted, the French intervention was, overall, the “kiss of death” for Thomas Jefferson in the 1796 elections ((Pasley 2013:375) see also (Deconde 1958: 476-477;Sharp 1993:152;Dawson 2000:38-39)).

As a result the DR lost the elections. John Adams became the second President of the United States. Thomas Jefferson, who was the runner up, received (with great reluctance) the vice presidency in which he served until 1800 (and the presidential election of that year), a position already seen as a completely powerless office which neither party cared much about holding.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁵ I thank Andre Commandon for his kind help in translating the relevant passages.

⁴³⁶ Even this Jefferson achievement seemed to have largely due a secret scheme by Alexander Hamilton to put the VP candidate of the Federalist party Pinckney as the president. The evidence indicates that this scheme was, as well foiled largely due to the backlash from the French intervention (see Pasley 2013:379-384). Nevertheless, had the need to foil it not existed (leading to an artificial “throwing away” of federalist electors votes which were supposed to be given to Pinckney) Jefferson would have probably ended in third place. For the very low regard the VP already had in this era see (Wilmerding 1953:17-20, 24-25, 27-28). John Adams already described the vice presidency in the early 1790s as “the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived” (ibid).

7.2 The case of the 1946 Argentinean Election

7.2.1 Overview of the American Electoral intervention

In the 1946 Argentinean presidential elections the U.S. government intervened in favor of the Presidential candidate Jose Tamborini, a candidate which was supported by a coalition of parties collectively known as the Democratic Union. This American intervention was done in order to prevent the election of the other major presidential candidate contesting these elections, Colonel Juan Domingo Peron. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations believed that Peron was a fascist who moreover dominated behind the scenes the military regime which had ruled Argentina since 1943. The U.S. government believed moreover that, although ostentatiously neutral during much of WW2, this military regime, thanks to Peron and other likeminded military officers, had in practice pro-axis proclivities (Macdonald 1980:376-380,384, 386-387,394).

With the Cold War yet to erupt, the Truman Administration in general, and key personnel shaping its Argentinean policies such as undersecretary of state (and former U.S ambassador to Argentina) Spruille Braden in particular, naturally saw the possibility of a leader believed to have fascist tendencies (and possible expansionist tendencies) continuing to exercise control over a major Latin American country as an extremely alarming, dangerous outcome to U.S. interests in Latin America (Macdonald 1980:376-380,384, 386-387,394).

The American intervention in this case had one major component- the publication of the U.S. government's "Blue Book" on Argentina ⁴³⁷ twelve days before the elections. The Blue

⁴³⁷ The formal full name of this U.S. government publication was "Consultations among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentinean Situation".

book provided a collection of documents found in captured German archives by the U.S. government , following a massive archival search for such incriminating materials conducted by U.S. government officials in the months preceding the elections, ⁴³⁸ which supposedly proved beyond doubt that Peron, and the Argentinean military regime that he dominated, were active collaborators with the Nazi Government and helped it advance its goals in Latin America during World War Two- an already morally despicable association and behavior by early 1946. Furthermore, the introduction to this book, written by U.S. government officials (which summarized the above documentary evidence), also warned that the U.S. government would not permit the existing Argentine regime, or persons affiliated in the past with this regime, to join the planned American Latin American alliance system⁴³⁹- a clear hint that military (and other possible sanctions) may be imposed on Argentina if Peron wins these elections (Frank 1980:99-104; Whitaker 1946:294).

The final American decision whether to intervene in these elections seems to have been made following a secret consultation between the U.S. government and senior leaders of the Democratic Union such as its vice presidential candidate Enrique Mosca in early February 1946. The minutes of this consultation indicate that the leaders of the Democratic Union fully supported an American intervention in their favor utilizing the main method proposed by the U.S. government- i.e. the publication of the Blue Book. Indeed, one of the Democratic Union's members may have even given to Braden (and the Truman administration) the initial idea of intervening in the 1946 elections in this particular manner (Potash 1980: 40-41).

⁴³⁸ U.S. government officials frantically sifted through at least four hundred tons of captured Nazi Documents between late 1945 and early 1946 in order to locate such incriminating material on Peron (Rawls 1976:435).

⁴³⁹ This was to eventually become in 1947 the Rio Pact.

The Democratic Union's advice stood in sharp contrast to the advice provided in that period (and eventually rejected) to the State Department by its local embassy personnel such as the U.S. Chargé in Buenos Aires John Cabot.⁴⁴⁰ Cabot, based upon his diplomatic experience, his observation (and his local sources) of the recent Argentinean political developments, as well as own personal estimation (from local sources etc.) of its likely effects on the electoral situation, was strongly opposed to the use of the Blue Book (which he described in one telegram as akin to an "Atomic Bomb"), for the purpose of intervening in the Argentinean elections, claiming that it would "court incalculable results". He instead recommended keeping the Blue Book in reserve for later possible American use in various possible non-electoral contingencies or purposes, such as a useful justification for breaking diplomatic relations with Argentina after the Presidential elections in case that Peron wins them.⁴⁴¹

7.2.2 Election campaign developments prior to the U.S. intervention

In an election in which public opinion polls weren't conducted and all voting occurred on a single day, shifts in public support from one candidate to another during the campaign cannot be determined with complete certainty. Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that in the weeks preceding the U.S. intervention things were not going well for Juan Peron's election campaign. Peron began the election campaign with a big boost from the failure of a mid-October

⁴⁴⁰ Following the appointment of Spruille Braden to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America in September 1945, the Truman administration left the position of U.S. Ambassador to Argentina vacant in the runup to the Argentinean elections. Cabot, as a result, became the defacto U.S. ambassador during those months (Cabot 1979:25).

⁴⁴¹ Cabot to Secretary of State February 8, 1946 in Frus 1946 11:201-202. See also (Cabot 1979:24-26).

1945 military coup against him. This coup attempt, after initially removing Peron from office, eventually failed nine days later. This was largely due to the mass protests of hundreds of thousands of Argentinean workers who came out (with the encouragement of labor unions which were friendly to Peron) en masse to the main square of Buenos Aires to demand Peron's reinstatement (Gambini 1999:chp 2).

However, despite its increasing strength and political importance, the pro-Peronist parts of the Argentinean working class, which became Peron's main political base by late 1945, were far too small in size during this era to guarantee an election victory for Peron.⁴⁴² As Election Day neared, Peron began to encounter major difficulties in his attempt to win these presidential elections.

One difficulty that Peron discovered, to his complete surprise, was with the incumbent military government that he had installed. Following the failure of the October 1945 coup, Peron, in order to concentrate on the election campaign, decided not to formally return to the various positions that he held beforehand in the military government.⁴⁴³ Instead he put in place an interim cabinet with military personnel that he believed to be friendly to him and to his election campaign.⁴⁴⁴ However, the incumbent military government refused to tilt the playing field in Peron's favor as much as Peron wanted it to. This was due to a combination of factors including (among other things) fears of international repercussions to Argentina if the vote wasn't widely

⁴⁴² As some scholars have noted, there were only half a million or so industrial workers in Argentina in 1946 out of a total electorate of about three million Argentineans- or only a third or so of the amount required for victory in a two candidate presidential election (Kenworthy 1973:24).

⁴⁴³ Prior to the October 1945 coup attempt Peron was the Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare, the Minister of War as well as the Vice President.

⁴⁴⁴ The official head of state, President (and General) Farrell was, to a large extent, a figurehead by this point in time.

seen as fair overall,⁴⁴⁵ as well as a feeling by many military officials of being honor bound to their public promises to enable a free and fair presidential election. As a result, although the interim military government did aid Peron's election campaign in various ways (such as in publishing decrees ordering businesses to provide various benefits to their workers-see later description), it nevertheless forced Peron to compete on a playing field far less tilted in his favor than he was planning to, with the military government even rejecting during the election campaign some of Peron's private requests for help in various ways (Potash 1980:15-18,22).⁴⁴⁶

Likewise, while the Democratic Union, which had the backing of the Argentinean economic elites, wasn't lacking in campaign funds,⁴⁴⁷ Peron was having significant difficulties raising sufficient campaign funding as the election campaign progressed. These shortages became so acute by early February that one of the main parties supporting Peron's candidacy, the Labor party, was forced to close several election teams in order to cut costs. Indeed, the funding situation became so bad in the final weeks of the campaign that Peron was requesting from his supporters during mass rallies to write Pro-Peron campaign slogans with chalk on public buildings throughout Argentina (Gambini 1999:70; Luna 1969:397,406-407).⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁵ For example, one important reason why the date of the election was moved up from April to February 1946 seems to have been in order to have the election before the next U.N session could reimpose sanctions on Argentina (Rawls 1976:388), a quite real possibility given that (as previously noted) Argentina's military dictatorship was widely perceived as having Nazi/Fascist sympathies and being quite friendly towards the Axis during WW2.

⁴⁴⁶ For one example see Frus 1946 11:198. The military government (or parts of it) also seemed to have permitted Peronist gangs to intermittently harass and in a few cases violently disrupt Democratic Union campaign events and candidates in the months preceding the elections (Blanksten 1953:67-69).

⁴⁴⁷ The Democratic Union also had the support of most of the privately owned press which, once the censorship was removed by the military in mid-1945, became quite hostile to Peron and to his continuation in power (Crassweller 1987: 178).

⁴⁴⁸ See also Frus 1946 11:197.

Nor was Juan Peron's (soon to be famous) wife and later co-ruler, Evita, yet able to help him much in the election campaign. A small time actress who married Peron just a few months beforehand, Evita still had very little knowledge or experience in politics in general or in giving political speeches in front of a large audience (the main form of campaigning in that era) in particular. Not surprisingly, she was of very little help to Juan Peron in the 1946 election campaign. Indeed, the only time that Evita tried her hand in active campaigning for Juan Peron in this election the results were quite disastrous. Given to do in early February 1946 a campaign speech instead of Juan Peron (who came down with a cold), in front of a female audience in one of Buenos Aires main stadiums, Evita was unable to keep it engaged and was eventually shouted down by parts of the audience who prevented her from finishing her speech. Indeed, some of the attendees became so angered by Evita that after she stopped speaking they began a mini-riot in the nearby streets and needed eventually to be dispersed by the local police with tear gas (Luna 1969:431;Ortiz 1997:140-141). When people in Argentina cried for Evita in early 1946, it was still for all of the wrong reasons.

The final difficulty that Peron increasingly faced prior to the American intervention was organizational. The Democratic Union front, which included most of Argentina's existing political parties and established political organizations, was able by mid-December 1945, despite the large diversity in party political positions, to agree on a common platform for the election as well as on a single presidential and vice presidential nominees (Blanksten 1953:66-67).

In contrast, Peron began the election campaign without any parties or party organizations willing to support his candidacy. He was eventually able to secure organizational support from two main sources. The first of these sources was a small faction of the Radical party (called the Radical "Renovating board" or "Collaborationists") that split off from the main body of the

Radical party (most of which had joined the Democratic Union front). The second was a newly constituted Argentinean Labor Party created by the union leaders who helped organize the demonstration that stopped the abovenoted anti-Peron coup in October 1945 (Blanksten 1953: 64-65; Luna 1969:396-398).

To Peron's misfortune these two separate parties (and later smaller joiners) did not get along very well with each other. This was due to a combination of two factors. The first were the various significant social and sociological differences between the leadership of these two parties. The second were the sharp disagreements between the Pro-Peron parties as to which of them will get to nominate Peron's vice presidential candidate as well as the division of the Peronist nominations in the concurrent elections to the various provincial governorships and the two houses of the Argentinean Congress. Indeed, by January 1946 the disagreements between these two pro-Peron parties over the various nominations became so heated that they descended into open brawls and even gun fights leading, in one such incident, to the death of one Peronist activist and the wounding of several others (Luna 1969:398, 420-423).

Although Peron invested much of his time in the weeks preceding the U.S. intervention in settling disputes between his various supporters over the nominations and other issues, severe internal disputes continued to convulse the Peronist camp. Indeed, in the days preceding the publication of the Blue Book, the Peron campaign was in full crisis mode due to a wave of resignations from the Peronist camp by activists and local politicians dissatisfied with Peron's decisions on the division of the various nominations. Likewise, in Buenos Aires province, for example, infighting between the Peronist parties became so severe that on February 10, or two weeks before the election date, there still wasn't an agreed upon list of Peronist nominees for this major Argentinean province- the equivalent of an Democratic or Republican party without

agreed upon nominees for various state and congressional positions in Florida or California by the first week of October of an election year (Luna 1969: 429-430).

As a result of these abovenoted difficulties, by the time that the intervention had occurred (early February 1946) there was an increasing belief among most knowledgeable Argentines that the chances of Tamborini and the Democratic Union to win the presidential elections were becoming quite favorable. Indeed, one Argentinean newspaper, based on reports from all across Argentina expected right before the U.S. intervention a strong electoral college victory ⁴⁴⁹ by Tamborini over Peron, 332 to 44 (Luna 1969:375;Whitaker 1954:146-148).⁴⁵⁰

7.2.3 The American intervention and its effects

According to all available sources, the publication of the Blue Book led to a sharp shift in the election campaign. The Blue Book became the front page news in all of the Argentinean media with the anti-Peronist media giving prominent, daily coverage to extracts and summaries from the Blue Book while the Peronist press countered by publishing various denials of the charges contained in it combined with attacks on the decision by the U.S. government to publish it. As one historian notes, given the widespread local media coverage given to the Blue Book in Argentina “it is difficult to conceive of a voting age person who had not heard of the Libro Azul [Blue Book] in one context or another” prior to election day (Potash 1980:42-43).

⁴⁴⁹ Argentina’s electoral system at the time was largely copied from the U.S. constitution with the various Argentinean provinces serving as the equivalents of U.S. states for this purpose.

⁴⁵⁰ See also Frus 1946 11:198,200.

The Blue Book then became for the remainder of the pre-election election the main campaign topic in both the Peronist and Democratic Union campaigns. The Democratic Union campaign initially came out in open support of the Blue Book declaring it to be irrefutable proof that Peron was unworthy of becoming the president of Argentina. Indeed, the head of the main body of the Radical party, the main party from which the Democratic Union was composed, even described the Blue Book in one campaign speech as a “friendly gesture” by the U.S. towards the people of Argentina. (Cueno 1982:115;Luna 1969: 378).

Peron, in contrast, immediately declared that the Blue Book was completely false as well as an immoral intervention by the U.S. government or more specifically the Assistant Secretary of State Spurrille Braden (a recent former Ambassador to Argentina- and a person who was well known in the Argentinean public) in the domestic affairs of Argentina. Peron accordingly claimed that the Blue Book was clear proof that the Democratic Union is merely a front for U.S. government’s evil machinations in Argentina, making any vote for the Democratic Union a vote for the American dominance of Argentina and its (supposed) lackeys among Argentina’s malevolent elites. As he described it in the crescendo of one of his speeches, immediately after the Blue Book was published, “Let those who vote on the Twenty-fourth for the Oligarchic-Communist alliance [the Democratic Union] know that they are simply voting for Mr. Braden. The question of the hour is this: Braden or Peron!” (Potash 1980:43; Luna 1969: 430-433).

The Peron campaign then used its remaining campaign funds in a massive production of handbills and wall posters with the slogan “Braden or Peron” which were widely distributed throughout Argentina. Two days before the ballots opened the Peron campaign added to these efforts a pamphlet symbolically called the “Blue and White Book” (the colors of the Argentinean flag) in which Peron claimed to have refuted the charges contained in the Blue Book and accused

the U.S. government of (supposedly) committing various horrendous crimes against Argentina (Potash 1980:43).

After an initial shock from the revelations in the Blue Book, which many Argentines seemed to have been unable or unwilling to believe,⁴⁵¹ the intervention seems to have led to a nationalist backlash within significant parts of the Argentine populace against Tamborini and the Democratic Union (Whitaker 1954:148). As one Argentinean admiral, from the (harshly anti Peronist) Argentinean navy later noted “the American intervention damaged my sensibilities just as [it] would have damaged those of the North American, the Indonesians, or the French if a foreigner took similar liberties against the rights and respect that free people deserve. I decided to support Colonel Peron. I would have supported any Argentine who adopted the position Peron did ” (Schoultz 1983:92). Likewise, when a Democratic Union activist questioned on the election day the people standing in line to vote about their vote intentions, one of them answered “Peron is not my cup of tea. But I will vote against Braden.” (Cueno 1982: 184).

These reactions seem to have been quite representative of the views of many Argentines. As the editor of one major, (anti-Peronist) Argentinean newspaper complained in a private conversation a few days before the elections, much of the Argentinean middle and lower classes seem to have taken far more seriously Peron’s claims that the Blue Book was an illegitimate American Intervention in Argentina’s internal affairs than the allegations made in the Blue Book about Peron (Guadagni 2008:149). Indeed, one historian later estimated that the intervention was especially counterproductive among first time voters from these classes,

⁴⁵¹ “What Argentina thinks of Uncle Sam” *NYT* March 31,1946; see also Frus 1946 11:209.

shifting many of them into Peron's column (Potash 1980:45-46). It may have also led some conservative voters to defect from the Democratic Union and vote for Peron instead.⁴⁵²

The American intervention seemed to have also helped Peron in his efforts in the days before the election to reinvigorate his fractious campaign organization. As some Peronist union leaders later testified, one of the main reasons that they had worked so hard for Peron was because they felt that "we were either [Argentine] nationalists or we were Americans. Braden or Peron. It was [not just] a slogan, but the reality of the moment...we said Peron yes Braden no" (Cueno 1982: 119).

Given the lack of exit polls, or other reliable yardsticks in this case, the magnitude of the Blue Books effect and how much this backlash exactly contributed to Peron's election victory cannot be determined with full certainty. Other factors, domestic in nature, probably also significantly contributed to Peron's victory in this election, such as a decree in December 1945 by the Argentinean Labor Ministry (then managed by a close Peron confidante). This decree required all local businesses to immediately increase all workers wages by 13% to 33% as well as mandating various additional worker benefits such as an annual bonus 13th salary, a decree widely seen in the Argentinean public as being largely due to Peron's work as the secretary of Labor prior to the October 1945 coup attempt (Whitaker 1954:149; Crassweller 1987:178).

Nevertheless, given the difficulties that Peron faced prior to the intervention, the use by Argentina at the time of an electoral college system for choosing presidents (in a manner similar to the U.S.) and the small margins by which Peron won some provinces, the U.S. intervention

⁴⁵² "Col. Peron's victory Certain" *The Times* (London) March 29, 1946. Some later scholarly ecological vote analyses (based on aggregate election returns) indeed show, in at least some outlying Argentinean provinces, a surprising pattern of conservative voting for Peron despite the rather left wing nature of his social-economic platform (Esteves 1980:358-360).

may well have been, unintentionally, the factor that tipped the scales in Peron's favor. As one historian estimated based on the election returns, a shift of only about 37,350 votes in five provinces from Peron to Tamborini (or about 1.3% of all of the votes cast) would have sufficed to give Tamborini a victory in the Argentinean electoral college (Potash 1980:45).

Not surprisingly, most contemporary observers concluded that the U.S. intervention significantly benefited rather than harmed Peron's electoral prospects (Herring 1946:302-304; Welles 1947:128-129; Whitaker 1954:147-149). This was also the view within the two campaigns. Peron himself, even prior to the conclusion of the elections, claimed that the U.S. intervention benefited his campaign. As he described it, if he gets two thirds of the popular vote in the election at least one third of it would be due to Braden (Luna 1969:434; Potash 1980:46). Indeed Peron seems to have been so convinced of the beneficial effects of the U.S. intervention against him on his electoral fortunes in 1946 that, 27 years later, when a Peronist candidate (and then Peron himself) were permitted by the military to run for the presidency for first time after his removal in a coup in 1955, they attempted to run yet again against a (this time non-existent) U.S. intervention designed to prevent Peron's return to power.⁴⁵³ Other close associates of Peron reached similar conclusions about the effects of the American intervention in the last days prior to the election (Guadagni 2008: 152-153).⁴⁵⁴ This view of the effects of the U.S. intervention seems to have been also widely shared by the rank and file of Peron's political coalition. For example, when some local Peronist activists were asked shortly after the election by an

⁴⁵³ The Peronists even tried to reuse the "Braden or Peron" slogan for this purpose. The U.S. government, which after observing Peron for a whole decade in power in the late 1940s and early 1950s stopped seeing him (and his party) as a threat, did not in this case intervene in the "desired" manner, frustrating Peronist plans for a "re-enactment". See "Peronists Favor Economic Shift From U.S. to Europe" *Washington Post*, March 15, 1973.

⁴⁵⁴ See for example the description of Juan Cooke views noted in this secret FBI report. For similar views by other senior Peronists see for example (Scenna 1974:89).

American journalist who had elected Peron they all answered in unison that it was “Braden” (Herring 1946:302; Cabot 1979:26).

In the days following the U.S. intervention, many leaders of the Democratic Union eventually reached a similar conclusion. As previously noted, in the first few days after the Blue Book came out the Democratic Union leadership saw it as extremely favorable to the Democratic Union both in private discussions as well as in their public pronouncements (Luna 1969:478).⁴⁵⁵ However, in the last few days prior to the election, their views about the effects of the U.S. intervention seemed to have shifted in private, with many members of the Democratic Union becoming increasingly worried in this regard.⁴⁵⁶ Indeed, the Democratic Union campaign seemed to have become so worried of the effectiveness of the “Braden or Peron” retort to the U.S. intervention that they even came out in the last few days prior to the election with a new counter slogan declaring “Tamborini or Hitler” (Scenna 1974: 90). After the election many officials in the Democratic Union campaign seemed to have agreed with Peron’s conclusion that the Blue Book was the main factor behind his victory in this election.⁴⁵⁷

In internal discussions after the Argentine elections, the American chargé as well as most members of the Truman administration seem to have also concluded that the American intervention harmed rather than helped Tamborini’s chances (Wood 1985: 121,242; Acheson 1969:187-190). This seems to have been also the view of the then British ambassador to Argentina David Kelly as well as that of the Latin American diplomats stationed in Argentina

⁴⁵⁵ See also Frus 1946 11:212

⁴⁵⁶ See also Frus 1946 11:219

⁴⁵⁷ “What Argentina thinks of Uncle Sam” *NYT* March 31,1946; “Peron Election Blow to U.S. in Latin America” *Chicago Tribune* March 20,1946;“Tamborini Admits Victory Hopes Dim” *NYT* March 16,1946

(Wood 1985:120; Escude 1982:253). As Kelly later described it, Peron was able to derive “an immense advantage” from the U.S. intervention against him (Kelly 1953:311). Many modern historians who discussed this election concur with these above judgments of contemporaries as to the interventions effect (Humphreys1982:201;Luna 1969; Potash 1980:44-46; Blanksten 1953:70;R.Wood 1979:207;Crassweller 1987: 179-180).⁴⁵⁸

As a result, Jose Tamboini lost the presidential election to Juan Peron 43.6% to 53.7% in the popular vote and 72 to 304 in the Electoral College.⁴⁵⁹ Juan Peron (and, until her death in 1952, Evita) ruled Argentina in an increasingly authoritarian fashion over the following decade until overthrown in a coup in 1955, bringing in the interim about numerous social and economic changes in Argentina.

7.3 Conclusions

As could be seen from these two cases of interventions in a founding election, their effects was indeed found to largely conform with the predictions of the third hypothesis (and the large N results) overall harming rather than helping the preferred side. In the 1796 American case, the French intervention was initially able to work as planned within Pennsylvania largely thanks to the existence of a significant voting bloc with unique preferences within the greater Philadelphia area, Quakers with pacifistic tendencies, a bloc which was unusually susceptible to full compliance with war related threats (as one component of the intervention was). The Quakers

⁴⁵⁸ The only exception that I could find (Frank 1980:109), merely claims that the intervention had no significant effect either way- a claim which is also in congruence with my third hypothesis here.

⁴⁵⁹ The remaining votes were blanks or for very minor parties.

resultant swing against the Federalists, probably helped shift about five of Pennsylvania's electoral votes into the DR column.

However, outside of Pennsylvania, the opposite effect had occurred within the U.S. with a wave of public rage against the French and the DR, upon which the Federalists have effectively capitalized, leading to the loss of at least 6-7 electoral college votes by the DR within some of the other states whose presidential election days came after that of Pennsylvania (such as Maryland and Massachusetts). The intervention also backfired among the presidential electors themselves, leading to the closing of the ranks among Federalist electors who all became unwilling to break their pledge and vote for Jefferson after the French government had openly endorsed his candidacy. As a result, the French intervention in Jefferson's favor probably hindered rather than helped him, thus contributing to Jefferson's and the DR tickets defeat in this election.

In the 1946 Argentinean case, the American intervention in favor of the Democratic Union and Tamborini seems to have led to a nationalist backlash against the Democratic Union within significant segments of the Argentinean public. The intervention also revitalized Peron's increasingly fractionalized and faltering campaign and enabled Peron to effectively tag the Democratic Union in the eyes of significant segments of the Argentinean public as an illegitimate stooge of the United States. While the available evidence is insufficient to determine whether the intervention was the factor that determined the election in Peron's favor, it is clear that it was a significant vote getter for Peron rather than Tamborini among some sectors of the Argentinean public such as first time voters from the lower and middle classes as well as from some conservatives. With only 37,000 or so strategically located votes separating Tamborini

from a victory in the Argentinean Electoral College, this intervention perhaps was enough in this case to bring about the very result that the U.S. was trying to prevent.

The results from these two cases provide further support for the findings of the aggregate large N statistical analysis in chapter 5 as to the effects in founding elections. The congruence overall between what the third hypothesis predicts that will occur and what is actually found both in the large N and the single (founding) election levels should to put to rest any remaining ecological inference concerns as to whether the aggregate results in chapter 5 accurately reflect what is actually occurring at the single election level. Likewise, the 1796 U.S. case indicates that the occurrence of a public backlash in founding elections due to a counterproductive electoral intervention is by no way a phenomenon limited only to the post-WW2 era or to non-western countries or to bumbling, ham-handed representatives of the U.S. government.

Finally, these cases also provide evidence for the theoretical logic behind the third hypothesis, clearly illustrating the clients inability, when competing in a national executive level election for the first time (or after a long non-democratic interregnum), to give the intervener useful advice on how to intervene in a manner favorable to it. In the Argentinean case the leaders of the Democratic Union, when consulted by the U.S. government in this regard, strongly supported the publication of the Blue Book prior to the election- an act that clearly harmed them electorally. Indeed, given that the U.S. Chargé in Buenos Aires, based upon his own local sources and estimation of its likely effects on the electoral situation, was strongly opposed to the publication of the Blue Book when notified about it by the State Department, the advice and feedback given by the Democratic Union was actually *inferior* to what the U.S. government may have been able to learn about meddling in this election via its own capabilities.

Likewise, from the available evidence about their advice, the officials in the DR party that advised the French Ambassador on how to intervene in their favor, a course of action largely adopted afterwards by Adet, seem to have recommended a method of intervention which was penny wise and pound stupid- French overt threats and sanctions that aided the DR ticket (as the DR hoped) in Pennsylvania but harmed it far more than any gains made there in subsequent elections in other states etc..

In the next chapter I will conclude with a general summary of the findings in this study as well as what implications can be derived from it to other subfields of IR as well as Comparative Politics.

Conclusions

“The stone which the builders had rejected has become the cornerstone”
(Psalms 118:24)

If this study was to be summarized in one sentence it would be that Great power electoral interventions are a common, significant and important phenomenon in Political Science. Either completely ignored by most IR scholars or usually receiving the same cursory attention that say most viewers of Shakespeare’s Hamlet give to Rosencranz and Guildenstern, this study attempted to show that partisan electoral interventions are worthy of significant scholarly attention in their own right and to begin to provide an explanation for why they occur and what their effects are. I accordingly developed and tested here new theoretical arguments as to the causes of electoral interventions as well as their effects on election results.

As for the causes of partisan electoral interventions, this study argues that electoral interventions are usually an *“inside job”*, occurring only if a significant domestic actor within the target wants, or is willing, to be aided in this manner by a Great Power. Without such an actor being available and accordingly willing and able to provide the would be intervener with its private information on how to win an election, the chances of an electoral intervention succeeding are very low, usually making such an intervention an infeasible option. Such interventions also usually require that the would-be intervener sees its interests as being severely endangered by another significant candidate/party within the target with very different and inflexible preferences on the relevant issues. Without such a situation occurring the costs that electoral interventions usually have for the intervener, as well as the fear of making a merely

unfriendly domestic actor into a full fledged enemy, will usually discourage the would-be intervener from intervening in this manner.

As for the effects of electoral interventions on election results, this study proposed five hypotheses most of which are derived from the above noted argument on the causes of such interventions. The first argument (H4) as to the effects, is that such interventions usually increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate. This is due to the fact that the underlying reasons why the great power usually desires to intervene in the election, and the would-be client agrees to accept this aid tends to cause interventions to occur in marginal elections. Great powers will avoid helping “lost causes” and candidates/parties who believe that they are quite likely to win will prefer not to take the outside aid with all of its possible attendant risks to them. In other words, electoral interventions tend to occur in situations where the extra resources provided by the great power can have a significant effect in the preferred direction. I also argue (H5), in contrast to a widespread viewpoint that holds that any *public* foreign intervention of any kind in domestic affairs is bound to fail, that *overt* electoral interventions are *more* effective than covert interventions. This is due to the fact that an overt intervention is usually more effective except in cases in which a public backlash is expected to such interventions- and the would-be client will usually make sure that the great power does not intervene in an overt manner in such cases.

My third major claim (H6) about the effects of electoral interventions this study is that interventions in founding elections are far *less* likely to help the side the Great Power is trying to help and, in such cases, they usually harm rather than help its chances. This is due to the fact that in founding elections the inexperienced client usually has very little high quality private information on the target public to provide the intervener- greatly increasing the chances that it will encourage the great power to intervene in the election in an ineffective and/or counter

productive manner. In two further hypothesis (H7 and H8), I derive competing expectations from related literatures as to effects of such interventions when a challenger is aided vs. when an incumbent is helped.

For the purpose of testing these arguments, I constructed and then utilized a new, original dataset of all such U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions between 1946 and 2000 and their various features. I also conducted an in-depth multi-archival research into cases of elections in which an electoral intervention was conducted or seriously considered by a Great Power.

When first looking at the overall patterns in my electoral intervention dataset (chapter 2) I found, among other things, that partisan electoral interventions are a quite common phenomenon, occurring in approximately *one of every nine* competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and 2000. Indeed, even in absolute numbers alone (117 cases) they are far more frequent than other, better known forms of interventions during this time period such as FIRC's or significant military interventions. Such interventions had occurred in every inhabited part of the world except Oceania and were frequently done by the great powers in every decade since (at least) the end of WW2. Turning to the two interveners, no difference in the frequency of electoral interventions was found between Democratic and Republican Presidents during this era, nor between the various Soviet/Russian leaders (with the special exception of Gorbachev). I likewise found that double interventions, situations in which the U.S. was backing one side while the Soviets (or Russia) were backing another side during the same election, are quite rare occurring in only 6.3% of all intervened elections (7.8% of Cold War interventions). Ironically, two of the most famous cases of intervened elections- the 1948 Italian elections and the 1970 Chilean elections, are among these exceptions.

Turning afterwards to test my arguments, this study found strong quantitative and qualitative evidence for them, both as for the arguments as to the causes of partisan electoral interventions as well as for most of the hypotheses as to the expected effects of such interventions on elections.

8.1 Results causes:

The explanation proposed in this study for the causes of partisan electoral intervention received strong support via three separate lines of evidence. The first was by measuring a proxy of one of the key conditions of this argument (the need for cooperation with a significant local domestic actor)—i.e. whether the supported candidate and/or party is a fragile victor or a blocked/weakening loser. Overall, out of the 114 intervention cases in my electoral interventions dataset in which enough data is available for this purpose, 76.3% of the receivers of such support (or in 87 of these cases) fit this criteria (see chapter 2). The second was the statistical tests of some of the arguments about the effects of electoral interventions. Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 were directly derived from the argument proposed here as to the causes of such interventions. The confirmation of these three hypotheses (see chapter 5 and section 1.3 here) provides indirect statistical evidence for this argument.

The third line of evidence was an in-depth analysis of four cases in which an electoral intervention was being seriously considered by the great power chosen out of my electoral interventions dataset (chapters 3 and 4). As can be seen in Figure 8.1, each of the four cases represented one of the four possible combinations that the two conditions that my argument

above posits (i.e. a domestic actor with very different/inflexible preferences and another actor willing to receive such assistance).

In the first case (cell 1), the 1953 West German elections, the SPD because of the strong preferences of its leadership for German reunification as well as the hope to protect itself from attacks of being insufficiently nationalist, decided to staunchly oppose the creation of the EDC- an organization seen by the Eisenhower administration as the best policy solution to its three main interests in regard of Germany. The SPD's opposition, in combination with Adenauer's decision to request U.S. electoral help because of his and the CDU's weak political position, led the U.S. to agree to intervene in the elections in Adenauer's favor. It then, in full cooperation with Adenauer and his election 'shopping list', assisted him in five major costly ways during the campaign.

Figure 8.1: Causes argument summary (H1-H3): theoretical predictions, case studies & results

Wants aid / Implacable →	Yes	No
Yes ↓	Theoretical prediction: E. Intervention occurs Case Study: W. Germany 1953 Argument supported: yes <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 0 auto;">1</div>	Theoretical prediction: no E. Intervention Case Study: Philippines 1965 Argument supported: yes <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 0 auto;">2</div>
No	Theoretical prediction: no E. Intervention Case Study: Venezuela 1958 Argument supported: yes <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 0 auto;">3</div>	Theoretical prediction: no E. Intervention Case Study: Greece 1967 Argument supported: yes <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 0 auto;">4</div>

In the second case (cell 2), the 1965 Philippine Elections, the weak political position of the PPP and its presidential candidate Raul Manglapus, led them to secretly request electoral aid from the United States government for this election. However, the United States government also saw the other two main candidates in the presidential race, Diosado Macapagal and Ferdinand Marcos, as overall friendly candidates who, if elected (or in the case of Macapagal, reelected) to the Presidency, would cooperate on issues of importance to it (such as getting a Philippine troop commitment for the Vietnam War). As a result, the LBJ administration, seeing no good reason to intervene, decided to reject the PPP electoral intervention request and didn't intervene in any way or manner in this election.

In the third case (cell 3), the 1958 Venezuelan elections, the Eisenhower Administration became increasingly concerned, following the violent attack of an angry, communist agitated mob on Vice President Nixon's motorcade during his visit to Caracas in May 1958, by the growing strength and influence of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) which began to operate freely in Venezuela after the fall of the Jimenez dictatorship in the beginning of that year. It also became concerned by the unwillingness of the transitional junta, under Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, to do much in order to keep the PCV in check in the following months.

These increasing American concerns spilled over into the electoral sphere when Larrazabal decided to run in the Presidential elections and then chose to accept the endorsement of the PCV (and covert Soviet funding). That, in turn, led the United States, concerned about Larrazabal's attitude towards the PCV, as revealed in making the above decision, and his expected unwillingness, as a result, to cooperate with it in suppressing PCV activities (and prevent a possible future communist takeover attempt) if he wins the elections, to offer his main opponent in these elections, Romulo Betancourt, to intervene in these elections in his favor.

However, Betancourt, who was quite confident of his chances of winning the presidential election due to the political and organizational strength of his party, the AD, chose to reject this American offer. That, in turn, led the Eisenhower Administration to “sit out” this election and not significantly intervene in it.

In the fourth case (cell 4), the 1967 Greek Elections, Andreas Papandreou, as part of a cynical political ‘remake’ designed to restart a faltering political career, adopted increasingly left-wing, anti-American positions on Greek membership in NATO and the U.S. bases in Greece (among other things). These anti-American positions, combined with the fear of his potential effects on his father (the leader of the EK), led the Athens embassy as well as the local CIA station to first recommend in September 1965 a destabilization operation against the Papandreous. It then, when a new election was in the wings, recommended a covert electoral intervention designed to prevent Andreas and the EK from winning the elections. However the lack of desire among Greek conservative politicians for such a U.S. intervention combined with the widespread belief within the higher echelons of the LBJ administration that Andreas was not a major threat to U.S. interests led the administration to twice reject the embassy’s recommendations, and not intervene in the expected elections.

In contrast, little evidence was found either in the case studies or in the overview chapter for some of the alternative explanations proposed in the past for why such interventions occur. For example, a high level of strategic importance of the country in question (in the eyes of a would-be intervener) is far from sufficient to lead a great power to intervene in this manner in its electoral processes.⁴⁶⁰ All four countries in which these case studies had occurred were perceived

⁴⁶⁰ This is one of the conditions for such interventions according to Weinberg (2011:94-97)

by the would-be intervener (the U.S.), at the time of their relevant elections, as countries in which it had quite important interests. Nevertheless, that fact didn't suffice to lead American decision-makers to intervene in three of the four elections investigated here.

As for the argument that the electoral intervention of other hostile powers can be a cause for one's own intervention (see for example Corstange & Marinov 2012:4), no evidence had been found in these case studies to support it. In the 1953 West German case there were indeed some (misplaced) fears of such a Soviet intervention occurring. However, the available evidence indicates that they were quite secondary factors in the American decision to intervene in comparison to the factors noted by my argument. Likewise, the fact that the U.S. discovered a Soviet electoral intervention in the 1958 Venezuelan case in favor of Larrazabal was not sufficient to lead the U.S. to intervene as well in favor of Betancourt when other factors that my argument emphasizes (such as the willingness of the domestic actor to accept such aid) were lacking. Indeed, as found in chapter 2, double interventions of his kind are relatively rare.

Likewise, in contrast to Corstange and Marinov's argument in this regard, no evidence was found that the fragility of the target's democratic institutions played a significant role in the decision to intervene or not. Indeed, even in a case where the intervener installed a new democratic regime just a few years beforehand (West Germany 1953), I could find no evidence that this was a significant factor leading to the U.S. electoral intervention either behind the desire of the U.S. to intervene or behind Adenauer's request for electoral assistance. Likewise, in the chapter 2 countries with polity 2 scores of 'full democracies' (six or above) were no less likely to be the targets of electoral interventions than countries with competitive elections who had lower scores.

Furthermore, in the two cases which experienced an electoral intervention in a previous election (Greece 1967 and Philippines 1965) that factor played, at best, a minor role. The fact that an electoral intervention had occurred in a past election may have increased somewhat the chances that the idea of doing such an intervention was raised when either some officials in the would be intervener perceived a threat (Greece) and/or an actor in the target was in major political trouble (Philippines). Nevertheless, the available evidence from the decision making process in both of these cases indicates that their past electoral intervention record in a particular country isn't usually a significant consideration for the interveners decision-makers when they decided whether to intervene or not in an upcoming election. Indeed in both cases such a proposal for an intervention was rejected nevertheless.

8.2 Results effects:

My proposed hypotheses as for effects of electoral interventions on election results were first investigated in two different methods, the findings supporting the first three hypotheses (H4-H6) and not in support of the other two hypotheses (H7 and H8). The first method these hypotheses were tested was via a large N statistical analysis utilizing the above noted dataset (chapter 5). The first hypothesis as to the effects (H4) was confirmed with Great Power electoral interventions found to be usually quite effective (with the special exception of cases of interventions in founding elections), increasing the vote share of the preferred candidate/party by about 3% on average - sufficient in many elections to determine the identity of the victorious candidate/party. The second hypothesis (H5) was confirmed as well with overt interventions found to be significantly more effective than covert intervention in both the substantive and

statistical sense. Overt interventions on average increase vote share by 3% more than covert interventions do and their effects are more statistically robust than those of covert interventions. The third hypothesis (H6) was confirmed as well with interventions done in founding elections, unlike in later elections, found to do little to benefit and usually harm the aided candidate/party, reducing the aided side vote share by 6.7% on average. However, no evidence was found as to any differences in the effectiveness of interventions helping incumbents vs. those aiding challengers (H7 and H8).

In order to make sure that the aggregate effects found in the large N statistical results are indeed reflecting what is usually happening “on the ground”, I also investigated the micro/single election level effects of electoral interventions in four cases in which such interventions had occurred and sufficient data was available to do such micro level analysis (Chapters 6 and 7). Two of these cases were in non-founding elections (West Germany 1953, Israel 1992) and two cases were in founding elections (U.S. 1796, Argentina 1946).

The evidence from the cases of intervention occurring in non-founding elections was in conformity with the first hypothesis and the large N findings. In the 1992 Israeli election case sufficient data was available to run a statistical analysis of the effects of the U.S. intervention in favor of Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor party. This analysis found, as was found in the large N results, that the effects of the U.S. intervention were probably large enough to have enabled the coming to power of Rabin as the head of a center-left coalition. In the 1953 West German elections case the five major ways in which the U.S. aided Konrad Adenauer in this election were estimated, based on the aggregated results of a post-election poll, to have contributed overall around 24% of the CDU’s vote share in this election. Given the condition of the CDU in

various pre-intervention surveys, the benefits accrued to the CDU from the U.S. intervention were a major factor in its victory in this election.

The findings from the two cases of interventions in founding elections were in conformity with the third hypothesis and the large N findings as to interventions such elections. In the 1796 U.S. election case, the overt French intervention in favor of Jefferson and the DR party clearly hindered Jefferson's candidacy. Although some gains were initially made by the DR ticket in Pennsylvania, as a result of the French intervention, among a highly unusual voting bloc (Quakers with pacifist tendencies in the greater Philadelphia area) these gains were eventually offset and more by the far greater losses to the DR elsewhere in the U.S. due to a wave of public anger against the French and the DR for the French meddling in the election in this manner.

Likewise in the case of the 1946 Argentinean election, the American intervention in favor of the Democratic Union and Tamborini seems to have led to a nationalist backlash against the Democratic Union within significant segments of the Argentinean public. It also revitalized Peron's increasingly fractionalized and faltering campaign and enabled Peron to effectively tag the Democratic Union in the eyes of significant segments of the Argentinean public as an illegitimate stooge of the United States. While the available evidence is insufficient to determine whether the intervention was the factor that determined the election in Peron's favor, it is clear that it was overall a significant vote getter for Peron rather than for Tamborini.

These results further buttress the large N findings in chapter 5. They also indicate, together with the case studies as to the process of intervention in these elections, that one possible critique of my interpretation of these large N findings (at least as to H4) is usually false. This critique would argue that my large N results are merely due to selection effects by which

the great power chooses where and when to intervene, these results just showing that great powers are, like experienced gamblers at the horseraces, very good in choosing “likely winners”- not that electoral interventions are actually able to “move the needle” for the preferred candidate/party.

As could be seen in chapters 3 and 4, the process by which the decision whether to intervene or not is usually made is very different than that expected by this potential critique, with the intervener usually trying to help candidates/parties in significant political trouble rather than “likely winners”. Likewise, as could be seen in the Venezuelan case, when the would be client (Betancourt) happened to be a “likely winner”, it was due to its own interests unwilling to accept such aid on its behalf when the Eisenhower administration secretly offered it, thus preventing an electoral intervention from occurring. The case studies as to the effects of electoral intervention, by showing clear evidence for the existence of independent effects of electoral interventions at the micro-level in multiple cases (which this critique would not expect), further helps to reject this “cherry picking” critique. In the electoral type of horseraces the great power can indeed “fix” the horserace so as to favor its preferred choice, at least in the cases in which the “jockey” has some prior experience in such horseraces.

8.3 Contributions

In addition to these empirical findings about the causes and effects of electoral interventions, this study provides several important contributions to other research agendas or subfields in Political Science.

One contribution is to our understanding of the democratic peace theory and its limits as well as to the future of international relations. The democratic intervener in my dataset, the United States, by no means limited its electoral interventions only to new democracies and/or “electoral authoritarian” regimes. Even according to very strict and conservative definitions of what a fully consolidated democracy is, at least seventeen cases of such American interventions had occurred in such regimes exist in my dataset. Examples include Great Britain in the late 1980s, Costa Rica in the mid-1960s and in the mid-1980s, Israel in the 1990s, Italy in the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Chile in the 1960s, Iceland in the mid-1950s etc.. Under more generous definitions of democratic consolidation this number would be even higher.⁴⁶¹ Likewise, from what is known about their activities in this regard, other democratic great powers have also been quite willing to electorally intervene in elections in other established democracies.⁴⁶² Such interventionist, coercive behavior would seem to stand in contradiction to what the Democratic Peace theory would usually expect about relations between established democracies.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ For this estimate I only counted countries as consolidated democracies if they appeared in multiple lists of democracies (Przeworski et.al, Polity 4, Doyle etc.) as full democracies and which moreover were widely seen as democracies at the time of the intervention by most contemporaries. To be on the (very) conservative side I also excluded interventions which occurred in the first three elections in the target since independence and/or since it’s most contemporary uninterrupted period of democracy had begun. If I say only use the polity scale to define consolidated democracy (i.e. polity scores of 9 or 10 in the target) then a third of all U.S. electoral interventions had occurred in such countries.

⁴⁶² Britain, for example, had intervened in the 1949 Icelandic elections as well as in the 1992 U.S. elections (Aldrich 2001:149) “Major says sorry for Tory help to Bush” *Guardian* November 21, 1992. More recently, Germany had intervened in the June 2012 Greek elections “Greek Elections: Angela Merkel Warns Country Cannot Negotiate Bailout” *Huffington Post* June 16,2012.

⁴⁶³As both critics and some proponents of the Democratic Peace have long agreed, even coercive/aggressive behavior between democracies which led to conflicts with far below 1000 battle-related deaths would be a problem for the Democratic Peace theory (citations in Elman 1997:193). Likewise, a recent review article on the Democratic Peace has noted that “explaining both negative and positive peace in interstate relations” between democracies has increasingly become the standard for theories attempting to explain this phenomenon (Ungerer 2012:25).

However, proponents of the Democratic Peace rarely discuss or even note partisan electoral interventions. The one rare exception to this rule, Charles Lipson, tries to excuse electoral interventions by democracies in other established democracies as being both extremely rare and usually due to fears by American policymakers in those cases that if the “unwanted” leaders/parties were elected (or remained in power) they would overthrow the targets democratic regime (Lipson 2003:136-137).⁴⁶⁴

It is indeed true that in some of these cases the partisan electoral interventions were meant to stop leaders and/or parties who, besides being perceived as a severe threat to U.S. interests, had (or were widely believed to have) authoritarian designs for their country if elected- such as the Italian Communist party during the early Cold War or Salvador Allende in Chile. However, in many of these interventions this was clearly not the case. Whatever ones opinion is about the preferred domestic and/or foreign policies of Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, Neil Kinnock of the UK, or Oscar Arias of Costa Rica (if to give examples of three such U.S. targets) neither they nor their parties were planning (nor widely believed to be planning) to turn their countries into

⁴⁶⁴ Another explanation could apply Russett ‘s argument as to U.S. covert coups during the Cold War to electoral interventions- i.e. that the covert nature of many of these electoral interventions actually is actually a point in favor of the Democratic Peace (1993:120-124). In other words, democratic governments are so constrained from meddling in countries widely perceived as democratic by the would be interveners publics due to institutional safeguards and the expected moral opprobrium for doing such acts that only in covert actions, in which democratic constraints are relatively weak and/or the “dirty deeds” could be hidden from the interveners public, is it possible to do acts that (partly) violate the Democratic Peace.

However, at least six of the abovenoted U.S. interventions were fully overt- a number of overt interventions in such situations that one would not expect if the institutional restraints or normative were indeed having such an effect. Furthermore, as I described in a discussion of Weinberg’s argument (see the introduction), such interventions are regularly proposed in the elite U.S. media towards various countries without bringing about adverse public reactions. Indeed, in the case of the 1970 Chilean election Nixon was even worried in its immediate aftermath that he may be attacked by the Democrats during his 1972 reelection campaign *for not intervening enough* prior to the Chilean election to prevent Allende’s victory at the polls (Grow 2008:110) - not exactly what one would expect if such interventions were seen as so reprehensible by the U.S. public towards fellow democracies that they had to always be kept under covers.

dictatorships if elected, or reelected, to office. Likewise, in the context of International Relations phenomena, the existence of at least seventeen interventions of this kind is far from being a rare occurrence or exceptional anomalies that “prove the rule”. Indeed, the number of U.S. electoral interventions in established democracies since 1946 (17) is higher than the number of interstate wars that have erupted around the world since 1980 (14).⁴⁶⁵

Accordingly, the findings of this study about the frequency of partisan electoral interventions by established democracies against other democracies indicate that the explanatory purview of the Democratic Peace theory has to exclude non-violent activities. Whatever is the exact reason (or reasons) that prevents democracies from usually using violence towards other democracies seems to have very little effect on their ability or willingness to use various non-violent forms of coercion.⁴⁶⁶ In other words, democracies may be quite unwilling to fight each other- but they are more than willing to make sure that their opponent in the helm of another democratic country loses her job (or fails to gain office in the first place).

It likewise gives us a better idea of the future of international relations if most or the entire world ever becomes fully democratic. Assuming that the Democratic Peace isn't due to some kind of transitory, ephemeral factor⁴⁶⁷ a fully democratic world would probably be one in which the scourge of interstate war would largely become a thing of the past. Nevertheless, my research here as to electoral interventions indicates that it would probably not be a world free of meddling or of attempts by stronger states to coerce weaker states to do their bidding. In other words, a world composed largely or only of democracies would be one in which international

⁴⁶⁵ Number of interstate wars estimated using the COW interstate war dataset (version 4.0)

⁴⁶⁶ For similar findings as to economic sanctions see (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008)

⁴⁶⁷ For such claims see (Rosato 2003;Gartzke and Weisiger 2013).

politics would be conducted with far less bloodshed and violence- but no age of Aquarius will suddenly dawn.⁴⁶⁸

A second contribution is by providing systematic evidence for “leader effects” in an uninvestigated direction - the way in which the characteristics of particular leaders (or would be leaders) affect the behavior of other countries towards them in peaceful interactions. The question of what effects do the characteristics of leaders have on their countries domestic and international policies is becoming a burgeoning research agenda within IR (for some examples see (Chiozza and Choi 2003;Croco 2011; Horowitz & Stam 2012;Brown 2012;Colgan 2013;Fisunoglu 2013;Prorok 2013)). However, this research is largely monadic- focusing on the effects of leaders on their own countries’ actions while ignoring the effects that different types of leaders etc. may have on the actions of other countries towards them. Given the heated debate in other IR subfields as to whether such monadic effects necessarily spillover into the dyadic (or K- adic) sphere (such as over the existence of state reputations of various types (Mercer 1996: Danilovic 2001;Sartori 2002 ;Press 2005)), this is an important issue to investigate and address as to the “leaders effects” literature. Some recent research on leader effects has found some indications that the characteristics of leaders can indeed affect the behavior of other countries towards them (Potter 2007; Bak & Palmer 2010)- but only in cases in which the use of force is seriously contemplated.

This study provides, for the first time, clear systematic evidence that the characteristics of leaders (and would-be leaders) can significantly affect other countries policies towards their country also in non-violent interactions. If to give two examples, as could be seen in the West

⁴⁶⁸ For a similar prediction, which does not discuss electoral interventions, see (Harrison and Mitchell 2013)

German case, the American perception of the SPD's leaders, first Schumacher and then Ollenhauer, as having inflexible preferences on the EDC was an important reason why it agreed to Adenauer's request to aid it in that election. Likewise, as could be seen in the Philippine case, the American perception of neither incumbent Philippine president Macapagal nor his main challenger Ferdinand Marcos as having policy positions and/or preferences which would threaten U.S. interests in the Philippines in the mid-1960s was an important factor in leading the LBJ administration to reject the request by the PPP for electoral aid in the 1965 Philippine elections.⁴⁶⁹ These results accordingly indicate that the purview of "leader effects" is wider than has been known until now. They also indicate that focusing on the effects of leader characteristics on other countries behavior towards them could be a highly productive venue of future research for researchers on this topic.

A third contribution is the identification of a possible precondition for the occurrence of an important, heavily studied anomaly- the use by the U.S. government of covert coups in order to remove leaders in democratic or partly democratic political systems.⁴⁷⁰ This, in turn, shows a possible yet ironic upside of electoral interventions.

Scholars who have studied this topic have usually noted seven particular cases as covert coups occurring in relatively democratic countries: Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Indonesia 1957, British Guyana in the early 1960s, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, and Nicaragua from 1984 (Forsythe

⁴⁶⁹ As scholars in the literature on reputation have noted this is usually where effects of this kind have been the hardest to find (Press 2005:137-138 esp. ft 8).

⁴⁷⁰ Although only the U.S. is discussed in this section it is clear that it is far from being the only democratic great power to seriously consider such operations against other democracies. For example, according to recently released archival documents, before the 1976 Italian elections the British government (in possible conjunction with other Western European countries) was seriously considering to covertly encourage a military coup in Italy if the Communist party had won these elections. "Britain joined plot to overthrow a Communist Italian government" *The Times (London)* January 14, 2008.

1992;Rosato 2003:590).⁴⁷¹ Although much ink has been spilled in debates about the causes of these covert coups, the possible role of electoral interventions or its lack thereof seems to have been largely ignored. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that of above list of seven or so such cases, five of these cases were preceded either by unsuccessful electoral interventions or the covert operation (British Guyana) was itself in practice part of such an electoral intervention (albeit one occurring in a colony of another country which was yet to receive its independence).⁴⁷² In the two other cases (Nicaragua after 1984, Guatemala 1954), the option of electoral intervention was clearly not seen as available for various reasons by the U.S..⁴⁷³ If one accepts as U.S. covert coups in democracies only the three cases (Chile 1973, Brazil 1964, Guatemala 1954) that even some proponents of the democratic peace do not reject out of hand as being democratic (Kinsella 2005:455), this pattern is even clearer.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷¹ Rosato also includes (admitting that it is a questionable case) the 1961 resignation of President Quadros of Brazil.

⁴⁷² The cases of U.S. covert coups in Chile 1973, Brazil 1964, Indonesia 1957 and Iran 1953 were all preceded by failed electoral interventions (in the latter case a failed British intervention- who also cooperated with the U.S. in the subsequent covert coup). As Rosato himself noted, the 1961 Brazilian case is questionable and most historians agree nowadays that the sudden resignation of President Quadros had nothing to do with the U.S. (Smith 2010:153-154; Crandel 2011:95-97) .

⁴⁷³ In the case of Guatemala, the U.S. government initially perceived Arbenz, when he ran for the presidency in 1950, as an unprincipled opportunist who posed no threat to it- and accordingly it did not do anything to prevent his election (Glejeses 1991:125-127). When the U.S. government later changed its mind and began to perceive him as a serious threat it was “too late” for an electoral intervention. Due to the existence of presidential term limits, the option of electoral intervention was unavailable to American decision-makers which knew that, if they were correct about Arbenz’s intentions, he would not permit his term to ever “expire” or run in extra-constitutional elections whose competitiveness would greatly be in doubt. A similar situation (albeit one following a failed electoral intervention as well) seemed to have existed also in the cases of Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973 (for Chile see for example Frus 1969-76 ev10: document 42). In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas waited five years until they bothered to conduct a national level election in 1984- long after the U.S. covert operations were already in full force. The Reagan administration was probably quite correct in its belief that this election was not competitive in practice given that senior Sandinista leaders were secretly boasting to foreign visitors that they have turned all of the other political parties in Nicaragua into mere facades (Grow 2008:116).

⁴⁷⁴ See preceding footnote

Such a correlation cannot, of course, conclusively prove causation in a conclusive manner until further research on this topic is conducted. Nevertheless, the striking tendency of such covert coups to be in situations in which an electoral intervention had failed and/or believed to be unavailable may be an indication that electoral interventions play an important yet unacknowledged role in the decision-making process that leads to such coups. One may posit that, given the relatively higher costs of such covert coups, such attempts by democratic great powers to use violence towards leaders in relatively democratic systems usually occurs only after the option of an electoral intervention is seen as exhausted and/or unavailable. In other words, the failure or unavailability of an electoral intervention may be one necessary (but by no means sufficient) condition before a democratic country decides to conduct covert violent operations against the leaders of another democratic country. Indeed there is some evidence from a few cases of successful electoral interventions that, had they failed, the intervener (or other democratic great powers), was seriously considering covert coup style activities if the ‘unwanted’ side was elected and was as bad as it believed it to be to its interests.⁴⁷⁵

The results of this study, that show that electoral interventions are capable of influencing election results in a significant manner, may strike some people hailing from democratic countries as clear evidence that the openness of the political process in their country creates a dangerous vulnerability, enabling foreign powers to affect their domestic politics in an

⁴⁷⁵ For example, from what we know today, had the U.S. intervention in the 1948 Italian elections failed, and the Communists had come to power via a victory at the polls, the Truman administration was planning to conduct a Nicaragua-style operation against it (NSC 3/1 March 8, 1948 FRUS 1948 3:777,779). Likewise, the JFK administration, prior to the 1964 Chilean election, was seriously contemplating various covert activities (similar to those done by the Nixon administration after the 1970 elections) if Allende had won the 1964 Chilean elections (see for example Memorandum of conversation, May 21, 1963 NSF Files box 215 JFKL). See also case of Britain in the 1976 Italian elections noted in ft 13 if the U.S. electoral intervention in favor of the Italian Christian Democrats had failed to prevent the coming to power of the Italian Communist party.

illegitimate manner.⁴⁷⁶ However, given the abovenoted clear willingness at times even of democratic great powers, if the threat posed by the leader of another country is perceived as severe enough and cannot be ameliorated via other means, to covertly use violent means against democratic or partly democratic countries another conclusion presents itself; namely that the permeability of the electoral institutions of democracies to outside pressures may protect (and have protected) many democratic countries (and their populations) from far worse fates.

Outside of International Relations, this study also contributes to Comparative Politics by illustrating the potential importance of international factors in the explanation of some domestic political phenomena hence seen as largely unrelated to such factors. The research conducted here has shown the importance of an international factor, a foreign partisan intervention by a great power, on one of the most heavily studied topics in comparative politics— what significantly affects (or does not affect) national-level election results. While there has been increasing recognition of the potential importance of international factors in a few subfields of Comparative Politics, such as the causes of democratization and democratic survival (see for example Whitehead 1995; Geddes 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Boix 2011; Bunce & Wholchik 2012) or Political Economy (Rogowski 1989; Garrett 2001; Simmons and Elkins 2004), much of Comparative Politics has ignored international factors in their research on the causes of various domestic political phenomena. In the rare cases that international factors are studied in Comparative Politics outside of the abovenoted fields they usually tend to focus only on factors related to the economy such as, in the literature on elections and campaigns, the effects of trade

⁴⁷⁶ Likewise, Authoritarian and semi-Authoritarian leaders, of course, have long worried of such meddling if they

openness (Hellwig and Samuels 2007), or comparative economic growth (Kaysar and Peress 2012).⁴⁷⁷

It has become increasingly clear among International Relations scholars over the past two decades that in order to explain many types of state behavior in the international sphere one needs many times to have a better understanding of the institutional structures and the domestic politics of the countries in question. Comparativists may need to start to learn more about International Relations (in general or of the country in interest), in order to better understand various domestic political phenomena such as national level election results.

At the minimum these results should lead Comparativists to pay closer attention to potentially relevant international factors when designing their data collection instruments. In order to investigate various domestic phenomena, scholars in Comparative Politics frequently gather data of types that cannot be easily replicated at a later point in time (such as surveys, interviews etc.). Making sure in such cases that the data gathering efforts also include questions on potentially relevant international factors must become the standard in Comparative Politics- in the same way that nowadays including various questions about say economic well being is the rule rather than the unusual exception. Ignoring international factors, as is unfortunately all too many times the case at present (as the authors search for useful micro/country-level data can testify), may lead Comparativists to miss important factors shaping the behavior of the relevant public(s) on an issue of interest- and the lack of relevant data may make it very hard or impossible for future scholars on this topic to notice or correct this initial oversight.

⁴⁷⁷ Such factors do get noted from time to time by some area experts especially in countries or regions highly penetrated by a great power or powers (such as Central America) (see for example (Seligson & Booth 1995)). However, these insights frequently fail to translate into being included as an explanatory variable in many subsequent large-N and other analyses.

8.3 Venues for Further Inquiry

As a new, rarely studied, topic many venues for further scholarly inquiry on partisan electoral interventions still remain wide open. In this section some of the wider and longer term effects of electoral interventions which seem the most worthy of scholarly investigation, given the results found here, will be described.

The first is the extent to which the intervener gains from a successful intervention beyond putting the “right” person/party in power (and/or preventing the “wrong” person/party from gaining it). For example, from the in-depth research on the causes of partisan electoral interventions here, it is clear that some cases of electoral interventions include an open or implicit quid pro quo between the two sides with the aided candidate/party’s commitment to attempt to implement certain domestic and/or international policies if/when it gains or retains power after the elections. For example, in the 1953 West German case, Adenauer clearly committed himself, if reelected, to have the EDC treaty ratified by the Bundestag (Granieri 1996). Five years beforehand the American intervention for the Christian Democrats in the 1948 Italian elections was part of a similar deal by which the Christian Democrats were supposed to enact, if reelected, economic policies which the U.S. believed that would, over the longer term, undercut support for the Italian Communist party (Miller 1983:38-39,44).

Accordingly, when the intervention has succeeded in bringing to or keeping a particular candidate/party in power, another question naturally presents itself- i.e. whether electoral interventions are effective (for the intervener) in terms of policy effectiveness. In other words, how much does the supported party/candidate, if it gains or retains power, actually tries to keep

its promises and implement the particular domestic or international policies which the intervener wanted.

In a related, more general aspect of this policy effectiveness question, whether successful electoral interventions leads to behavior on the side on the target which benefits the intervener during the period in which the aided candidate/party is in power. For example, is trade between the two countries likely to increase and/or are the terms of trade unusually beneficial the intervener when the aided candidate/party is in power after an electoral intervention? Recent research on this question as to another related form of intervention (FIRCs) has found very mixed results, with one study finding significant trading benefits to the intervener (Berger et.al 2013) while another, focused only on U.S. forcible regime changes in Latin American cases, has found the opposite effects (Zachery, Deloughery & Downes 2013).

The second aspect is the effects of such interventions on the target. A Great Power electoral intervention attempts to influence one of the key institutions in a democracy- the national level elections and the process by which the executive is peacefully replaced or retained. As a result, such interventions may have major long term effects on the target. For example, are countries whose elections have been intervened in this manner more likely to collapse into authoritarianism or is the reverse usually the case? Likewise, do such interventions when overt (or covert interventions which have been unintentionally exposed) encourage various kinds of extra-parliamentary opposition (i.e. mass protests, civil wars) by the side who lost the election now with irrefutable, direct proof that “the system is fixed” against them or do they limit their responses to the electoral sphere? Furthermore, does the nature of the Great Power intervener (a democracy or an authoritarian power) in each case mediate the effect or not?

Having answers to these questions will increase our substantive understanding of the effects of international factors on the target. For example, it could provide a better idea as to the limits of outside pressures/inducements falling short of the coercive use of force on achieving policy change in democratic or semi-democratic targets and/or affecting its regime type.

Furthermore, in some of these cases the answers found as to electoral interventions may also shed light on other related forms of interventions. For example, in the case of trade benefits from an intervention a focus on a type of intervention which, when successful, usually does not have economic side effects separate from the change in power itself (i.e. war related destruction in the target etc.) would enable us to better disentangle the effects that outside regime change of all types may have on the target from the effects of fighting an interstate war (or coup related internal fighting) etc.

Appendix 1.1: Research on the Effectiveness of Electoral Interventions- An addition

In a new American Economic Review article Daniel Berger et.al (2013) try to measure the effect of successful U.S. covert operations during the Cold War to remove/maintain leaders (both covert coup/ maintenance and covert electoral interventions) on the subsequent trade relations between the two countries, finding that the imposed leaders increase their trade with the U.S. and do so in a manner unusually favorable to the U.S. economy. Unfortunately, although impressive statistically, the dataset that they had created and use for this purpose is badly constructed, missing quite a few cases of successful covert electoral interventions and miscoding many cases of covert coups. If to give one example, the authors code the 1967 Greek coup as a U.S. backed coup although most diplomatic historians, following the release of the relevant U.S. government archival documents over the past few years, now agree that the U.S. government had nothing to do with this particular coup (see for example Miller 2009).

Furthermore, the authors do not make any effort to check for possible differences between the effects of covert coups and covert electoral interventions- despite the fact that these are operations of a different magnitude and nature and therefore possibly differing effects. For example, covert coups often lead to a full blown violent 'regime change' while successful covert electoral interventions against the incumbent usually lead to peaceful transitions of power with the existing political institutions remaining intact. Due to these serious methodological flaws these results, although interesting, cannot be relied upon.

Appendix 1.2 Defining a partisan electoral intervention- further description

This appendix further discusses the logic under which certain types of acts were or were not coded as an electoral intervention as well as some clarifications on why electoral interventions were defined and operationalized in the manner chosen here. An electoral intervention is defined in this study as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country.

This definition excludes activities which are unintentional interventions- i.e. various acts by decision-makers in one country done with little to no regard to an upcoming elections in another country which may have, nevertheless, influenced those elections. Likewise excluded are acts done “automatically” by other countries bureaucracies etc. (say regulations on visa requirements, tariff definitions etc.) which coincidentally coincided with another countries election effecting it (unless of course significant evidence exists that decision makers manipulated such a usually automatic decision for this purpose).¹

In a world in which significant interconnections of various kinds exists (and long existed) between many countries, each with its own decision-makers and bureaucracy which create and execute policies on their own schedules with little regard to the scheduled events in the rest of the world, the number of significant unintentional interventions which may have occurred is

¹ Likewise, for a particular action to be coded as an electoral intervention at least part of the intervention had to occur within twelve months of the election date.

nearly endless and therefore of limited interest. Furthermore, the intention by the decision-makers in the intervener to intervene in a particular foreign event and/or through the use of a certain policy tool is a central component of the definition of intervention in virtually all studies of other types of interventions (interventions in civil war, FIRC, humanitarian interventions etc.) known to the author.²

This definition also exclude acts which were done at a given timing, form, etc. in order to use the possible window of opportunity that such an election in another country may have created (through distracting the decision-makers in that other country, etc.) but that weren't done in order to influence the results of those elections. For example, the 1956 Suez crisis (or Sinai War) was clearly timed by the three attacking countries (the U.K, Israel and France) to start in the run up to the 1956 U.S elections in order to lower the chances that the U.S will attempt to stop it (Kyle 2003:317,324-325). However, given that all of the available evidence suggests that none of the attacking countries launched this war in order to (directly or indirectly) affect the results of the 1956 U.S. election, this case wouldn't count as an electoral intervention- even if it may have (unintentionally) affected the final results.

Also excluded from being counted as an electoral intervention are the very rare cases, such as the U.S. in the 1984 Nicaraguan elections (Blum 2005:229) or Russia in the May 2014 Ukrainian election,³ in which the great power is trying to actively disrupt an election in another

² Some studies assume it to be such an obvious component of their intervention type of interest (i.e. the U.S. military wouldn't say invade another country and depose its leader unless ordered to do so by the president etc.) that they don't even note this issue and/or just use an off the shelf dataset of the intervention type of interest that uses, in some form, a component of decision-makers intent for coding this phenomenon.

³ Some observers of the recent events in Ukraine believe that this may have been one of the goals of Putin's intervention following the overthrow of Yanukovich in February 2014 "Ukraine Poised for Uncertain Elections" *Council on Foreign Relations* May 19,2014

country. In such cases the intervener is trying to harm the political system as a whole and/or deprive it of legitimacy- not to affect the election's results. In other words, these cases are more akin to acts of warfare against the target hatched at a convenient opportunity (with the election coincidentally found to be creating such a moment) rather than attempts to manipulate the identity of those in power using the elections as a tool for that purpose.

Likewise, to be coded as an intervention under this definition there also had to be some kind of concrete action on the side of the would be intervener in regard to the election in question beyond what was already planned anyway due to other, unrelated reasons.⁴ Defining 'doing nothing' as to a particular election as intervention on the side of the great power would lead, among other things, to rather ludicrous coding decisions. For example, it could lead to a coding of every election in which a somewhat unfriendly candidate to a particular great power ran but the great power did not intervene against it as the great power basically intervening in its favor.

This definition also excludes intervention conducted only in the immediate aftermath of an election (disputed or not) in another country. Post-election interventions, instead of trying to affect the decision by the electorate at the ballot box (as in electoral intervention) attempt to manipulate the post-election situation resulting from this decision by the voters (and/or efforts by the incumbent to negate the voters decision). Accordingly, post -election interventions by a great power are an altogether different phenomena than the one discussed here. For example, they are (unlike electoral interventions) quite frequently an impromptu, unplanned activity by the great power, the result of an unexpected instability in another country due to post-election protests,

⁴ If the intervener had a wider foreign policy agenda in regard to that country (i.e. besides removing/maintaining a given leader/party) it had to be doing some additional activities beyond those already enacted or already planned to be enacted under this general policy etc..

‘surprise’ election results etc.⁵ As a result of these theoretical and empirical differences such interventions are excluded.

Some may wonder whether purely neutral tools couldn’t be also used, on their own, for blatant partisan purposes. In other words, in theory an intervener may be able to use in some situations only a seemingly fully neutral intervention as a way to get rid of an ‘undesired’ leader. For example, an intervener could pressure an unpopular authoritarian or a quasi-authoritarian incumbent to hold a competitive election (where none were being held before) or send election observers to an upcoming election (in countries with serious past record of election fraud) so as to reduce her ability to commit fraud. Enabling the opposition to compete and/or leveling the playing field only through such neutral measures could accordingly be sufficient to enable the opposition to remove the unwanted unpopular leader without any need for any ‘partisan’ measures on the side of the intervener.

In practice, however, when states do such neutral acts, affecting who is in power in another country in the short/medium term isn’t one of their goals. For example, in the famous case of the Philippines in 1986 the evidence indicates, some later claims notwithstanding, that the U.S., in quietly pressuring Marcos to conduct a free election, had no desire to see Ferdinand Marcos lose power as a result. Indeed, Reagan liked Marcos and seemed to have thought that Marcos would win such a competitive election. That would, in turn, strengthen the Marcos

⁵ Of course in a few cases a post-election intervention followed a (pre-election) electoral intervention by the same great power -such as Nixon’s infamous track 1 and track 2 efforts in the immediate aftermath of the 1970 Chilean election and the failed U.S. attempt to prevent Allende’s victory in this election (Gustafson 2007). However, that fact doesn’t mean that post-electoral intervention are the same theoretical phenomena as a partisan electoral intervention- in the same manner that the fact say that state building operations sometimes follow a regime change operation by the same great power does not mean that the these two types of interventions are identical in their nature.

regime's overall legitimacy while reducing domestic criticism within the U.S. as to the Reagan administration's foreign policy towards the Philippines. The Reagan administration's shift to trying to force Marcos to surrender power came only in the post-election period and was largely due to the (entirely domestic in nature) post-election mass street demonstrations (Bonner 1987)- a very different phenomenon than that which is studied here.⁶ Research on other cases where the U.S. and other democratic countries pressured incumbents in both the pre and post-cold war era to hold competitive (or more competitive) elections have likewise found little to no evidence of such partisan motives being involved (Brown 2001; Brown 2005; Kim & Biak 2011: chp 2)). Likewise, most research on election observation notes the usually neutral goals of the providers of election observation (Hyde 2011).⁷

Furthermore, while collecting the data for this dataset of electoral interventions, it became clear that when states do want to remove a particular leader/party from power they don't seem, in practice, to limit themselves to using such usually neutral means. In other words, a more 'level playing field' isn't seen as sufficient to reliably guarantee the "preferred" results for the preferred side. Indeed, in the few cases in which an intervener also used, for example, election observation for this purpose (such as in the 1953 Philippine elections or the 1998 Slovakian election) this 'neutral' measure was only one component of an intervention which included also multiple clearly partisan measures (covert funding to the preferred side etc.) as well (authors dataset).

⁶ The call by this post-election stage by the U.S. government for a new election ? was of course proforma in nature

⁷ Likewise the exact ability, if any, of election monitoring to reduce election fraud is still a highly debated within the academic literature on this topic (Kelly 2008: 222-223,249; Hyde 2011:chp4)

Besides the type of intervention defined here, another type of partisan electoral interventions is conceivable- an intervention of this type which involves largely costless activities. Nevertheless, such activities aren't coded here as an intervention (unless costly activities have occurred in this case as well). This is due to a few reasons. First, requiring that the partisan intervention have a cost to the intervener better enables us to capture the phenomenon commonly referred to when partisan electoral interventions are publically discussed, proposed and/or denounced. For example, the cases usually discussed in this regard (such as Italy 1948 or Chile 1970) all involved significant costs. Likewise, most interventions discussed in the scholarly literature (from training and sending arms to a friendly proxy to bombing or invading another country to imposing economic sanctions) involve some kind of cost to the intervener as well.

Secondly, in interventions of the costless types it is frequently far harder to determine the true intent of the intervener behind the act. For example, the other NATO members agreed to do their annual conference in Germany a few months before the 2009 German election- a costless act which perhaps aided Merkel a bit by providing her with countless photoup opportunities with other friendly world leaders. However in this case the reasons for the U.S. and other NATO members agreement to let Germany host this meeting at this date was unclear. The U.S., for example, may have done so to aid Merkel reelection chances- but it may have been instead largely due to difficulties with all other possible alternative dates for President Obama, a desire to be as polite as possible towards the leader of another important country and/or avoid what may be seen as an severe insult to Merkel (or even a sign to her that it desired her defeat) if the U.S.

refused to attend this conference or demanded another location or date. Indeed, in such costless activities the ‘intervener’ may itself not be fully sure in this regard in many cases.⁸

Thirdly, costless acts may also follow different dynamics than costly acts. If that is the case then constructing a dataset which includes both types, or analyzing costly and costless acts together would be like mixing apples with oranges, reducing our ability to better understand this phenomenon or its effects.

Finally, in the process of coding of any phenomenon of interest a line has to be drawn between activities which ‘count’ and activities which ‘don’t count’. Including cost as part of the definition of a partisan electoral intervention enables this phenomena to be clearly coded in this case.

⁸ In technical terms in costless acts “pooling equilibrium” as to the reasons for a certain behavior are more likely to exist than in costly ones.

Appendix 1.3: Definition Operationalization and description of Dataset Construction

1.3.1 Operationalization

As noted in the main text, an electoral intervention is defined as a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner which they believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener(s) or the intervened country.

For the purpose of constructing the dataset, I operationalized such interventions as follows: in order to be coded as an electoral intervention, the acts done by the intervener need to get a ‘yes’ answer to two questions: 1. Was the act *intentionally* done in order to help or hurt one of the sides contesting the election for the executive? 2. Did the act clearly carry significant costs which were either (a) immediate (cost of subsidizing the preferred candidate’s campaign/a covert intervention) and/or (b) longer-term/potential (loss of prestige/credibility if a public intervention fails and/or long-term damage to the relations once act is done or exposed).⁹ Each case which is found to fit to these criteria is then coded as to other relevant aspects (covert/overt, intervener, party/candidate supported, etc.).

For an example of the way the operationalization was applied in practice, in the case of the 1969 Thai elections, the evidence from U.S. primary documents indicated that the U.S. gave

⁹ For the way that public acts of this type, like other kinds of coercive diplomacy, can have significant reputational costs if they fail and/or the intervener is caught bluffing, see George (1991) and Sartori (2005). For some of the ways that damage to the relations between two states can be costly to an intervener even if immediate military retaliation/war is not feasible for the target, see (Trager 2010).

millions of dollars¹⁰ in covert party funding to the UTPT party prior to the elections (i.e. a costly act). According to the records of the U.S. government body which made the decision on approving this covert funding (the 303 committee), this funding was provided by the U.S. government in order to improve the UTPT’s electoral chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections (i.e. partisan and intentional).¹¹ Given that this particular act fits all of the criteria noted above, it was coded as a case of a U.S. electoral intervention in the 1969 Thai elections. Other examples of acts which would fit these criteria are listed in the left column of table 1.1. Acts of a great power which don’t fit one (or more) of these criteria are listed in the right column of table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Examples of Activities Coded or Excluded as Partisan Electoral Interventions

GP activities coded as interventions	Excluded great power activities
<p>“Symbolic” military exercises by the intervener before an election</p> <p>Covert provision of campaign funds to the favored side either directly (to candidate/party coffers) or indirectly (secret agents buying votes etc.)</p> <p>Training locals (of the preferred side only) in advanced campaigning and get out the vote (GOTV) techniques</p> <p>Covert dissemination of scandalous exposes/disinformation on rival candidates</p>	<p>Invitation of preferred candidate to international conferences, IOs, a visit to another country (unless includes concrete concessions/promises, etc. as well)</p> <p>Photo-ops/meetings of candidate with world leaders/official representatives of the intervener with no concrete results otherwise</p> <p>Provision of foreign aid of various types in order to enable the holding of free elections and/or improve their quality (without subsequent attempts to affect the results)</p> <p>Generic/neutral statements of support for the proper</p>

¹⁰ Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 “Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee” February 7,1969.The exact sum has not yet been declassified but based on the context it was clearly significant.

¹¹ Frus 1969-1976 20: document 3 “Memorandum prepared for the 303 committee” February 7,1969

<p>Efforts to covertly physically harm/destroy the ‘unwanted’ party/candidates HQ, campaigning materials or their candidates contesting the election</p> <p>Public & specific threats or promises by an official representative of intervening country</p> <p>Creation (for the preferred side only) of campaigning materials/ sending campaigning experts to provide on-the-spot aid</p> <p>Sudden new provision of foreign aid or a significant increase in existing aid</p> <p>Withdrawal of part or whole of aid, preferred trading conditions, loan guarantees, etc.</p>	<p>conduct of the electoral process (with no endorsements of a particular candidate/side)</p> <p>Secret/open refusal of leader/officials of the intervener to publicly meet with a candidate or his/her representatives</p> <p>Positive/negative things said about a candidate/party by the intervener before an election with no concrete threats/promises</p> <p>Leaks to the press of reports of disagreements between the intervener and the target, etc.</p> <p>“Regular” election monitoring</p>
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A few further notes on the operationalization (see also appendix 1.2)

1. Acts done by private citizens of a great power on their own volition, such as American campaign consultants hired for pay by a candidate/party in another country to give it campaigning advice etc., were excluded.
2. Electoral interventions done by non-state actors (NGOs, transnational terrorist groups, IOs, global media conglomerates etc.) were usually excluded as well. The main exception is if such non-state actors are directly controlled by an intervening great power (via funding etc.) or clear evidence exists that their intervention was done on the request of, or due to the pressures upon by, such an intervening state.

Accordingly, for example, the IRI and NDI are NGOs who get virtually all of their funding via the U.S. government (via the NED) as well as frequently following

secret directives from it in regard to many of their operations (see for example Smith 2013). Accordingly acts by these NGOs which would otherwise fit the definition of a partisan electoral intervention are coded here as U.S. interventions- unless the acts in question are fully and openly repudiated by U.S. government officials prior to the elections (in a manner similar to point 3 below). In contrast, similar activities done by the Soros foundation, which (Russian and Syrian conspiracy theories aside) gets virtually all of its funding and directives from private individuals (George Soros etc.), are not coded as electoral interventions.

3. The few cases in which an act that would usually be coded as an overt electoral intervention (say a threat to cut off aid by the U.S. ambassador) which were later (but prior to election day) fully repudiated by a higher level official of the great power were excluded. In such cases the act in question is usually completely unintended by the top decision-makers in the great power- so it fails of course the first criteria.
4. Acts which would have usually been coded as an electoral intervention but the evidence available about them indicates that they were, in practice, acts of outright coercion by the aided side towards the 'intervener' were excluded. Examples of acts which lead to the exclusion of such cases include, for example, outright threats by the local leader not to let the great power use bases that it has in its country or to immediately leave an alliance if the great power doesn't help the local leader. The few rare situations where acts of this type had occurred are, in reality, cases of successful coercion on the side of a government/faction in the target rather than an intervention by the great power in the domestic politics of that country.

5. At least some of the acts in question had to occur within twelve months of the expected election day in the target in order for them to be counted as an intervention. Earlier acts are assumed to have other goals (generic country/regime support etc.) and/or that the intervener changed his mind in this regard.¹²
6. Planned electoral interventions that never occurred in practice because that the would be intervened election did not eventually occur for various reasons (a domestic coup etc.) were excluded.

1.3.2 The dataset construction process

The dataset of U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions was constructed by the author over the course of a whole year of work during parts of 2011 and 2012. The method for collecting this data depended on its type (covert or overt) as well as whether it is a Soviet/Russian or an American intervention.

For each intervener the data collection began by generating a list of candidate electoral intervention cases. For **American electoral interventions** I used as a starting point two sources. The first was a list of such interventions constructed for a critique of post-WW2 U.S. foreign policy by Blum (2005:Chp 18). The second was CIAbase, a reference dataset of alleged CIA activities (all entries listed under the key word “elections”), created in the mid to late 1990s by Ralph McGehee, a former CIA employee. The relevant part of this dataset was kindly provided

¹² Likewise in some cases parties received regular yearly funding (or subsidies) to enable various regular (non-electoral) day to day party operations etc.. Such funding, if occurring as usual on an election year, wasn't counted as

to the author by the holder of McGehee's papers and research John Judge. These two lists, although quite useful as a starting point, were nevertheless constructed by non-academics with clear policy biases who, in some cases, utilized sources which were of dubious reliability or somewhat outdated. Accordingly each candidate case which fits the operationalization above of electoral interventions which was generated from these two sources was carefully cross-checked with more reliable and up to date sources.

I then added to this initial list of electoral interventions other possible cases noted in reliable secondary sources each carefully cross-checked. The main types included:

1. Various formal Congressional investigations of CIA activities such as the Pike and Church Committees' Reports.
2. Declassified internal secret CIA histories (See for example Darling 1953; Jackson 1973; Montague [1971] 1992).
3. Reliable histories of the CIA and of U.S. covert operations in particular as well as diplomatic histories on U.S. side of the Cold War in general (see for example Rabe 2005; Gustafson 2007; Weiner 2007).
4. Academic research in intelligence studies on U.S. covert activities (see for example Treverton 1987; Johnson 1989; Prados 2006; Daugherty 2004).
5. Memoirs by former CIA officials in particular and U.S. government officials in general. (see for example Gates 1996; Smith 1996; Clarridge 1997; Ross 2004).

an electoral intervention unless clear evidence existed that at least part of the funding of that year (usually involving an increase in funding) was given by the great power in order to explicitly aid the party in the upcoming elections.

6. Histories or academic research on the various U.S. democracy promotion activities in particular since the end of ww2 as well as on “electoral authoritarianism” (see for example Lowenthal 1991; Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

Finally, as a supplement and a check on this list’s inclusiveness, I conducted a keyword search of all of the State Department’s FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) volumes which cover the years since 1946 which were made publically available by December 31,2011. The online searchable versions of the FRUS volumes were available through website of the Office of the Historian in the State Department¹³ and (for the older volumes) the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections.¹⁴

For the **Soviet/Russian interventions** (especially the covert), the primary source for cases of electoral intervention was the Mitrokhin Archive. This is a remarkable, relatively complete, archive composed of summaries describing Soviet covert interventions and secret activities of various kinds (including Electoral interventions) during most of the twentieth century. It was created by a disgruntled KGB archivist named Mitrokhin over the course of twelve years and then smuggled to the West after the end of the Cold War (Andrew & Mitrokhin 1999,2006:Introduction). This source was then supplemented by other sources which were the

¹³ <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>

¹⁴ <http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS> . A small number of FRUS volumes which were originally published in microfiche format were not available online during the period of the data collection. Those volumes instead were selectively checked by the author focusing only on reading the documents created within 12 months of a competitive election in a particular country noted in these volumes (as listed by the DPI measure- see description of the creation of competitive elections list).

result of the plethora of new information on Soviet activities which became available following the end of the cold war.

One important supplementary source for candidate electoral intervention cases was that of Riva (1999)¹⁵ which constructed, based upon the primary archival soviet sources which became available after the end of the cold war, a small dataset of the covert financial support provided by the Soviet Communist Party (the CPSU) to some likeminded parties around the world during the Cold War, funding which in some cases was provided in order to intervene in an upcoming election in the target. Pavel Stolisov was also kind enough to carefully search through his collection of archival documents on Soviet high level decision-making (smuggled by him to the west from the Gorbachev Library) and send to the author select documents which were of relevance. Also of use was the set of soviet government documents secretly scanned during the early 1990s and then made available on the internet by Soviet dissident Valdimir Bukovsky.¹⁶ For the Post Cold War era cases I utilized the existing research on Russian foreign policy and Russian activities during the 1990s (for examples Hill & Jewett 1994; Henderson 2002; Bugajski 2004) which was then carefully crossed-checked.

Other types of useful sources included:

1. Memoirs of former KGB agents and defectors to the west (for examples see Andrew and Gordievsky 1990; Levchenko 1988; Womack 1998).
2. Histories of the Cold War from (among other things) the Russian side as well as Russian activities during the cold war as to particular countries using the very selective and partial

¹⁵ I thank Renata Redford for her assistance with this Italian language source.

access sometimes granted to scholars to other Soviet archives during the 1990s (see for example Westad 2005; Zubok 2007; Haslam 2011).

3. CWIHP bulletins. These bulletins publish newly available primary sources coming from Soviet (and E. European) archives.¹⁷ Also useful was the collection of research papers based on these sources at the above website.
4. A keyword search of the three main historical journals which are the most likely to publish new research of relevance to this dataset coming from the Soviet archives- the Journal of Cold War Studies (1998-2010), the Journal of Cold War History (2000-2010) and Diplomatic History (1991-2010).

In order to find additional candidate cases of overt electoral interventions by both powers, I used, as is common for the collection of overt acts, numerous keyword searches with the relevant terms in three online newspaper archives which cover the entire period (1946 to 2000): The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Guardian (UK) (with its weekly companion paper the Observer). The archives of the first two newspapers were available at the Proquest historical newspapers.¹⁸ The archive of The Guardian and Observer was available at the Guardian website.¹⁹ Overt interventions, to be effective, must be known to the target public prior to the election. As a result, they usually receive significant journalistic coverage and are unlikely to be missed.²⁰ As a further check in this regard, one of the newspaper archives which was

¹⁶ Available at <http://bukovsky-archives.net/>. I thank Lev Uchitel for his assistance with Russian language sources.

¹⁷ <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/cwihip-bulletin>

¹⁸ <http://www.proquest.com/products-services/pq-hist-news.html>

¹⁹ <http://www.theguardian.com/info/2012/jul/25/digital-archive-notice>

²⁰ For the definitions of covert and overt interventions see chp.2

utilized for this purpose was from outside of the U.S. (The Guardian & Observer) in order to protect the search results from a possible U.S. centric bias which American newspapers are sometimes claimed to have.

Once the list of candidate intervention cases was completed I began to carefully cross-check the evidence for each one of them. In many cases the coding decision (especially for the overt interventions) based on the operationalization in section 1.4.1 was very clear cut. Where evidence was nevertheless missing for a particular candidate intervention case and/or particular features of it, further data was collected utilizing the types of sources noted above as well as scholarly/historical descriptions of the elections/country in question, the Declassified Documents Reference System website (DDRS)²¹ and (for overt interventions) Lexis-Nexis and Keesing's.²² Wrong or spurious public accusations of the U.S. or the USSR/ Russia for conducting electoral interventions which they did not actually do in practice were not an uncommon phenomena during the period covered by the dataset. Accordingly for a particular candidate case to be eventually included in the dataset the evidence for an electoral intervention occurring had to be quite reliable. For example, for a particular candidate case of a *covert* intervention to be included in the dataset evidence from at least one of the following sources was required:

1. An official admission of the intervener in question that it meddled in that particular election (via a statement, government/congressional report etc.).
2. Primary archival governmental documents and/or reliable secondary research based on these sources.

²¹ <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS>

²² www.keesings.com

3. The testimony of a reliable former official (in the intervener and/or target side) which was a participant in the decision-making or the execution of this intervention and/or was a witness to these activities in person (a former government official, CIA/KGB agent etc.).²³
4. An account of such interventions by journalists known for having good government sources in the intervener and high-quality reporting (such as Bob Woodward).

Any candidate intervention cases for which doubts still existed as to their coding (or evidence either way was still insufficient) were further checked by consulting the relevant primary documents in U.S. archives over the course of two extended research trips to the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. For that purpose I examined the diplomatic documents related to the country and period in question and, where relevant, also the CIA's Crest system terminal as to potentially useful declassified CIA documents (at the time available only in this location). In such cases I also consulted (especially for such Soviet/Russian cases) with experts on the relevant country/intervener.²⁴

A few final additional precautionary searches for possible cases of electoral intervention were then done as well. For example, in the research conducted on other types of external

²³ Or of course academic/reliable secondary research based, among other things, upon interviews with such officials. CIA evidence in regard to such covert activities by the KGB wasn't sufficient for coding a Soviet intervention unless some evidence was also available from reliable Russian/Soviet sources of such a Soviet/Russian intervention indeed occurring. In a very small number of cases the former government officials in question were in a position high enough to read the (still classified) official government documents in regard to electoral interventions in which they had neither participated in or directly observed. That was deemed as acceptable evidence as well if their account of this particular file contents has been widely accepted as reliable by other reputable scholars which discussed this case.

²⁴ Special thanks in this regard (as to particular unclear cases) is due to Krishna Kumar, Wolfgang Mueller, Jan Willem Stutje, Marc Trachtenberg, Daniel Triesman, Odd Westad and former U.S. Ambassador Avis Bohlen.

interventions scholars frequently claim that an intervention by one power frequently leads to an intervention by other (frequently rival) powers. Accordingly in every case in which a U.S. or Soviet intervention was confirmed I made a special effort to check as to the activities of the other great power in regard to that election.

Likewise, elections in countries which were past/subsequent targets of other non-electoral interventions by the U.S. or the USSR/Russian (such as Guatemala, S. Korea, Iran, S. Vietnam etc.) received special and careful attention. Similar attention was also given to other elections in countries in which an electoral intervention was found in the initial list of cases. For example, following clear evidence of electoral interventions in some of their elections, I eventually examined each one of the competitive elections conducted in the Philippines and in West Germany/Germany during the period covered by the dataset.²⁵

As for coding particular features of a confirmed intervention, to examine whether a certain known intervention was overt, I examined the preelection mass media descriptions of these acts (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these acts are described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that the average voter knew about this intervention. Given that overt interventions are designed to affect public opinion in the target there was rarely any ambiguity in this regard in practice as

²⁵ At an advanced stage of the construction of this dataset two measures from NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012) for two types of overt foreign interventions in elections (public threats/promises and aid cutoffs) were brought to my attention. These two measures, unlike the dataset created here, are a mixture of neutral and partisan (overt only) preelection foreign interventions, activities by foreign powers which happened to coincide with a preelection period in the target, as well as of various kinds of post-election meddling. Even in regard to overt interventions many cases are missing given this criteria. These NELDA measures are, accordingly, far less useful for investigating partisan electoral interventions than the dataset created here and may lead to highly biased results. Nevertheless, given the potential relevance of some of the cases noted by these measures, I had also carefully examined and cross checked all of the cases noted by it. Happily all of the cases of partisan electoral interventions

to the main components of these interventions. The identification of the electoral intervention as being on the side of the incumbent or the challenger or in a founding or later election was done using the DPI data coding for those supported actors or elections.²⁶

Some interventions included both a covert and an overt component. To code such cases, I carefully examined all overt interventions with more than one known component. In those cases I examined preelection mass media descriptions of these additional components (and/or reliable secondary sources describing these reactions). If these additional acts are not described by the media as being part of such a foreign electoral intervention then it is assumed that those components were not known (or meant to be known) to the targets public. As an additional check, I also examined in this regard, where available, any archival or secondary sources as to the way these additional components were designed to executed by the intervener and/or the domestic actor. In practice, I found that if one of the components of an intervention is clearly overt that usually leads the media (and the targets public etc.) to very carefully examine all other recent preelection acts by the relevant great power for evidence of any other acts designed to help one of the sides contesting that election. Accordingly, when the intervener (and/or the local actor) want to keep a certain component of the otherwise overt intervention a secret from the target's general public they make sure to do it in an obviously covert manner (utilizing the interveners intelligence agencies etc.) leaving little ambiguity in this regard.

noted by these two NELDA measures that would fit under my operationalization for inclusion were also already included in the dataset.

²⁶ The coding for chapter 2 of whether the aided candidate party is a fragile victor or a blocked loser utilized the sources also used for the coding of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions. When those didn't suffice historical research on that era or comparative politics scholarship on the politics of that country was used as well.

Appendix 5.1 Description and operationalization of the control variables for chp.5

1a. Control Variables

As previously noted, in order to assess the impact of electoral interventions we also need a plausible set of control variables for other factors noted in the economic voting literature as having effects on the election results. The first set of controls are variables used as dependent variables in the Hellwig and Samuels (2007) model (henceforth HS) which I then try to replicate here. Given that my time frame is longer than that of HS and the number of countries included is larger, in order to replicate their model I usually needed to use other reliable data sources with better data coverage.

The first variable is the previous vote share of the incumbent (*Previous vote*). This variable is included in order to control for past election outcomes. For this purpose, I use the same data sources and coding as for the incumbent vote share (see description).

The second variable is the real GDP per capita growth rate (*Growth*). This variable is HS's variable for the effect of the "economic vote" and one frequently used in cross-national research on this topic. Following HS, I use the previous year's growth rate for elections occurring during the first six months of the election year and the same year's economic growth rate for elections occurring during the second half of the election year. The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et.al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The third variable is trade as a percentage of GDP in constant terms (*Trade Openness*). This variable is included as an indicator of the effects of economic globalization and used in the subsequent interaction term (see further description for the following interaction variable). The data for this variable is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (Openk) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I calculate this variable using Maddison's above-noted GDP data (Maddison 2003) and the Barbieri /COW trade dataset version 3 (Barbieri et al 2009) both adjusted to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

The fourth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and trade as a percentage of GDP (*Growth * Trade Openness*). HS argue that economic globalization reduces the effect of the "economic vote" and accordingly reduces the executive's accountability to the voters. This interaction replicates one of the main ways by which they try to test this argument, measuring the effects of economic globalization on political accountability.

The fifth variable is a dummy variable measuring whether a particular election is a presidential election (1) or not (0) (*Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible differences in vote share between presidential and parliamentary systems as well as a component of an interaction with growth rate (see next description). To code this variable the data was taken from a DPI measure (System) (Beck et.al 2001) and carefully rechecked. For pre-1975 coding I use Nohlen and Colleagues (1999,2001,2005,2010).

The sixth variable is an interaction between the economic growth rate and presidential elections variables (*Growth \times Presidential Election*). This variable is included in order to control for possible differences in the ways voters hold presidents accountable vs. prime ministers.

The seventh variable is whether a president is running for reelection in a presidential or Semi-Presidential system (*Re-election*) with 1 as yes and 0 as no. This variable is included in order to control for the incumbency advantage that sitting presidents usually have. To code this measure I use Nohlen and colleagues (1999,2001,2005,2010) data on elections.

The eighth variable is the effective number of parties or candidates contesting the election (*Effective num. of Parties*). This variable is included in order to control for the differences between political systems as well as possible reduced volatility in the incumbents vote in more fragmented party systems. Ignoring this factor may accordingly lead to a misestimate of the effect of other substantive factors on the incumbents vote share. Accordingly, in parliamentary systems, as well as Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems in which the president is elected by Parliament (such as Post-Apartheid South Africa), I use the effective number of parties while in Presidential and Semi-Presidential systems with direct presidential elections, I use the effective number of presidential candidates.

For most of this data I use Golder's (2005) effective number of parties measure (ENPP) and effective number of presidential candidates measure (ENPRES) obtained via the Quality of Government (QOG) dataset. Data that is missing in Golder's dataset (yet available) is usually calculated using data on election results from Nohlen and colleagues (1999,2001, 2005,2010). This variable is then logged.

The ninth variable is the (logged) GDP per capita in thousands of 2005 constant U.S dollars (*GDP Per Capita Level*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible effects that a country's overall wealth may have on the vote share that incumbents usually get in

elections. The real GDP data is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars-rgdpl) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP per capita data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars.

Four other variables are regional dummies (*Africa, Asia, Central and E.Europe, L. America and Caribbean*) with the advanced industrial democracies (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand etc.) excluded and serving as a baseline.

For the models replicating Kayser and Peress (2012) models (henceforth KP) four additional control variables are included. The first variable is the real median global growth rate (*Global Growth*). This variable is included as part of KP's main argument that voters compare (or benchmark) the economic performance of their country to that in other relevant countries. Following KP, to calculate this variable for every year I take the median growth rate of the growth rates of all independent countries for whom data is available for that particular year.²⁷The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World tables version 7.1 (real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars. Given that KP don't expect this variable to have independent direct effects on the incumbent vote share, it is not expected to be significant.

²⁷ KP also uses two other global growth benchmarks (average of growth rates of trading partners or by principal components). Unfortunately these two measures, which create a separate global growth rate for different countries which have an election in the same year, require data many times missing for countries outside the OECD (KPs dataset) and very complex and time consuming calculations. Accordingly, these two measures could not replicated here.

The second variable is the real local economic growth rate (*Local Growth*). This variable is included as part of KP's main argument. KP argue that once one takes into account the benchmark of global growth used by voters when evaluating the local incumbent's performance, the effects of the local economic performance on the incumbent's vote share will consistently and significantly be in the expected direction. Following KP, to calculate this variable for every observation I take the overall growth rate for that country and deduct from it the median global growth rate (see previous description) for that year. The real GDP data used to calculate growth rates is largely taken from Penn World Tables version 7.1 (real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (rgdpl)) (Heston et al 2012). For most of the missing data, mostly from the late 1940s, I use Maddison's real GDP data (Maddison 2003) after adjusting it to 2005 constant U.S. dollars. Following KP, I expect this variable to have a positive and significant effect.

The third variable is a logged variable of population size (*Population*). This variable is included in order to control for the possible difficulties a larger population may create to opposition parties efforts to gather votes, thus benefiting the incumbents. This variable is taken from (Maddison 2003) via QOG.

The fourth variable is for a time trend (*Year*). This variable is included in order to control for possible time trends in the election data. For this purpose I use the election year variable used in order to define each case in the dataset.

1b. Controls for further robustness checks

Beyond these controls “inherited” from the work of HS & KP, I add in some models the following variables for additional robustness checks.

The first three variables are for the effects of various significant national security/foreign policy factors- being a participant in an interstate war, civil war, or an international crises²⁸. While the effects of such foreign policy/national security factors are usually ignored in the economic voting literature they can nevertheless have significant influence on the election results as well.²⁹

The first is a dummy variable (*Interstate War*) for whether the country fought an interstate war (0 no 1 yes) during the election year taken from the Correlates of War (COW) interstate war dataset version 4 (Sarkees and Wayman 2007). The second is a dummy variable (*Civil War*) for whether there was a civil war (0 no 1 yes) occurring during the election year taken from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) article. For that purpose I use the measure of Fearon and Laitin (Empwar) which includes civil wars which at times are also referred to as extrastate/colonial wars. The third is a dummy (*Crisis*) for whether that country experienced a significant foreign policy crisis during the election year taken from the International Crisis

²⁸ Unfortunately another possible national security variable of this kind, terrorism, could not be included. This is due to two main reasons. The first is that all existing datasets on terrorism go back to no earlier than 1970 or 1968 (depending on the subtype). Accordingly, in order to control for this variable I would have to exclude nearly a third of my data- a bias causing effect in and of itself. Even worse, for a cross-national dataset such as this one, it is unclear what exact variables should be included for this purpose given that there are multiple plausible options for different countries: the number of attacks, the number of casualties, the number of high casualty attacks, a weighed version of either of these three by population or country size etc.

²⁹ For the admission in this regard of some experts on the economic vote see (Duch and Stevenson 2008:86)

Behavior dataset version 10 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). In all three variables wars or crises which erupted during the election year but only after the conclusion of the elections were excluded.

Of course, the exact effect of a particular civil or interstate war or crisis on an election is probably mediated by numerous factors which could not be included here such as the culpability of the leader in power for the conflict (Croco 2011) or whether the relevant Foreign Policy/National Security factor is perceived as a success or a failure on the side of the incumbent. For example, many scholars agree that the Iranian Hostage Crisis was an important factor in Carter's defeat in the 1980 U.S. Presidential elections (Healy 2011:17-21). Nevertheless, had the U.S. hostage rescue mission in April 1980 succeeded rather than failed, this crisis would have probably rebounded in Carter's favor rather than harming him. Accordingly, I have no prediction on the exact effect or significance of any of these variables- I only include them here in order to control for any related variance in the election results.

The fourth control variable is a dummy variable for a repeat electoral intervention (*Repeat Intervention*). In other words, cases in which the same intervener had intervened in the previous national level executive election as well. Given that 43% of the interventions in our data are repeat interventions (see overview chapter), the experience of the intervener in intervening in this manner in that country in the past (or a weakness of the aided candidate/party so severe as to require a second consecutive intervention) may have an effect on how effective its current intervention is.

The fifth control variable, used here as a restriction, is whether there was significant election fraud. Significant election fraud (such as the stuffing of ballot boxes with fake votes,

voters voting “early and often” etc.) may lead the reported election results to differ from what the electorates actual preferences were in practice. Such “measurement error” on the independent variable in such cases in favor of the incumbent (the usual beneficiary of election fraud) may, in turn, affect the reliability of our results. As a precautionary measure, some cases of competitive elections in which the sources used to code the incumbent vote share data indicated that the available election results are so blatantly or massively fraudulent as to have little to no relationship with the probable true results are already excluded from the dataset. Nevertheless, less severe yet significant fraud may have nevertheless occurred that was sufficient to bias our results.

I accordingly constructed a dummy variable for cases (1 yes, 0 no) in which there is credible evidence that serious election fraud had occurred. As a baseline, I took a measure from the Nelda dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2010) Nelda11 which codes (as yes) all elections in which preelection fears of fraud by domestic actors and/or international observers were known to have existed.³⁰ To these cases I added a similar measure from the DPI dataset (Fraud) (Beck et al 2001) which codes post-election accusations of fraud as well as evidence of significant fraud. Then elections in which Western election observers were available and reported fraud and/or such observers were denied entry (or refused to come) (Nelda 46 to 49) were coded as cases of significant fraud (1). Elections in which such fears or accusations existed but Western election observers were present and didn’t report fraud were coded as 0.

³⁰ For elections missing from the Nelda dataset I used the DPI fraud measure for any reports or accusations of election fraud and then double checked them in the same manner as described above in cases of Nelda 11 in which no Western election observers were present as to whether such accusations were justified. An additional small number of cases were coded as experiencing such fraud based on secondary sources collected for the construction of the electoral intervention dataset.

For each one of the remaining possible cases of fraud, i.e. fears or accusations of fraud existed but no western election observers were present, I double checked via various secondary sources from academic articles and monographs about the relevant election (where available) to historical newspaper archives available via Lexis-Nexis and Proquest, to determine whether these fears or accusations of election fraud were justified. If the available evidence justified these claims, I coded the cases as 1 and 0 otherwise. To be on the safe side, the few cases in which no clear evidence could be found either way as to these fears or accusations of fraud were coded as 1 as well.

The sixth control variable is for the Cold War period (*Cold War*). The end of the Cold War was an important watershed event which led to major changes in the international system (such as the transition from bipolarity to U.S. hegemony). Such changes may have also affected the effectiveness of electoral interventions. Accordingly, I include in some models a dummy variable for the Cold War era coded as 1 for years prior to 1989 and 0 afterwards.

The seventh control variable is for the level of democracy in the target (*Polity*). The level of democracy in a particular country is, of course, widely believed in both International Relations and Comparative Politics to have major effects on numerous aspects of a given country's foreign and domestic policies. Even given our universe of cases which only includes countries with competitive elections, it is nevertheless possible that the level of democracy will also affect how effective electoral interventions are as well. For example, the level of democracy in the target may perhaps affect what means can be used to sway the elections in favor of the preferred candidate, i.e. from how feasible is a covert intervention given the domestic media environment to how receptive is the public in the target to overt foreign interventions in its elections.

Accordingly, I include in some models a logged version of the Combined Polity 4 Scale (Marshall and Keith 2002).³¹

The eighth control variable is for the presence of international election observers in the relevant country during the preelection period (*Election Observers*). Some scholars who study international election observation argue that the presence of international election observers, at least in some cases of observed elections, encourages local election officials to follow more carefully the letter of the election laws and discourages the use of various “shenanigans” by the various sides contesting the elections (Hyde 2011). Increasing the quality of the competitive elections may, in turn, affect its outcome in some cases. For this purpose I took a measure from the Nelda dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2010) Nelda coded as 1 if international election observers were present and 0 otherwise.³²

The ninth control is an interaction between a measure of “clarity of responsibility” and the electoral intervention measure. According to some scholars of economic voting (Powell & Whitten 1993), the extent to which voters hold the incumbent accountable for its performance varies depending upon how the preelection political and institutional context in a given country leads them to believe that it “deserves” to be punished or rewarded for it. These diverging levels of willingness to hold the incumbent accountable for its economic performance etc. may similarly lead to a divergence in how effective electoral interventions are. Following Hellwig and

³¹ This variable was rescaled from the original -10 to 10 scale to a 0.01-20 range in order to enable logging and the interaction described in table 1.1 model 8

³² For elections missing from the Nelda dataset I used Kelly’s (2010) three new datasets on election observation. An additional small number of cases for which data was still missing were coded based on descriptions of these elections in historical newspaper archives (available at Proquest, Keesing and other reliable secondary sources about these elections).

Samuels (2007) I create a measure of clarity of responsibility (*Clarity*) coded as 1 if a single party controls both the executive and has a majority in the legislature prior to the election and 0 otherwise and then interact it with my intervention variable.³³

³³ In countries in which there is an influential and elected upper house (as in the U.S.), a majority in both houses was required in order to be coded as 1.

Appendix 5.2 Tables with additional results and robustness checks for Chp.5

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1. Robustness checks for hypothesis 1-3

Enclosed in this section are some of the robustness checks done for hypothesis (tables 1.1-1.3) which could not be shown in the chapter for hypothesis 2 and 3 due to a desire not to overwhelm the reader with robustness checks. Also enclosed are robustness checks for the KP models in hypothesis 1 similar to those done for the HS models.

1.1 Robustness checks for hypothesis 1 (done in KP models)

Table 1.1 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & FP	(2) Model 7 & fp	(3) Model 4 & Polity control	(4) Model 7 & Polity control	(5) Model 4& interaction w/Polity	(6) Model 7& interactio n w/Polity
Electoral Intervention E. Int.*Polity	3.330** (1.190)	2.897* (1.216)	3.562** (1.196)	3.064* (1.213)	5.690 (3.735) -0.769 (1.331)	4.288 (3.390) -0.441 (1.195)
Previous vote	0.399** (0.0518)	0.390** (0.0587)	0.397** (0.0515)	0.392** (0.0588)	0.398** (0.0515)	0.392** (0.0588)
Global Growth	0.621 (0.395)	0.582 (0.411)	0.605 (0.397)	0.659 (0.415)	0.602 (0.398)	0.658 (0.415)
Local Growth	0.123 (0.0811)	0.156 ⁺ (0.0859)	0.147* (0.0695)	0.172* (0.0753)	0.149* (0.0697)	0.173* (0.0755)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.85** (1.995)	-14.08** (2.283)	-14.33** (2.018)	-13.67** (2.312)	-14.30** (2.015)	-13.66** (2.311)
Population (logged)	0.483 (0.327)	4.636 (3.388)	0.284 (0.304)	4.433 (3.363)	0.289 (0.306)	4.420 (3.362)
Year	0.0132 (0.0340)	-0.0530 (0.0459)	0.0192 (0.0347)	-0.0375 (0.0491)	0.0190 (0.0347)	-0.0373 (0.0491)
Civil War	-3.350 ⁺ (1.751)	-4.172 ⁺ (2.278)				
Interstate War	4.727 (3.157)	4.537 (3.314)				
Crisis	1.932 ⁺ (1.044)	1.642 (1.090)				
Polity			-4.595** (1.228)	-5.021** (1.605)	-4.644** (1.233)	-5.056** (1.610)
Constant	3.834 (68.27)	98.35 (74.73)	5.697 (69.36)	82.67 (80.39)	6.226 (69.31)	82.57 (80.33)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122	122	122
R-sqr	0.501	0.307	0.487	0.302	0.487	0.303

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.2 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & cold war	(2) Model 7 & cold war	(3) Model 4 & E.Observers	(4) Model 7 & E.Observers	(5) Model 4& interaction w/clarity	(6) Model 7& interaction w/clarity
Electoral Intervention Int.*Clarity	3.403** (1.179)	3.003* (1.203)	3.408** (1.184)	2.942* (1.207)	3.794* (1.745) -1.583 (2.745)	3.423+ (1.835) -1.979 (2.731)
Previous vote	0.394** (0.0527)	0.389** (0.0595)	0.393** (0.0531)	0.385** (0.0601)	0.398** (0.0577)	0.393** (0.0665)
Global Growth	0.634+ (0.331)	0.712+ (0.380)	0.616 (0.393)	0.594 (0.409)	0.598 (0.389)	0.608 (0.402)
Local Growth	0.147* (0.0725)	0.164* (0.0816)	0.147* (0.0727)	0.174* (0.0792)	0.139+ (0.0750)	0.173* (0.0807)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.76** (2.093)	-14.14** (2.377)	-14.73** (2.063)	-14.04** (2.383)	-13.28** (2.154)	-12.69** (2.392)
Population (logged)	0.312 (0.309)	1.107 (2.434)	0.317 (0.309)	3.395 (3.294)	0.298 (0.310)	4.170 (3.414)
Cold War	-0.351 (0.927)	-0.148 (0.933)				
Year			0.00130 (0.0325)	-0.0503 (0.0475)	-0.00518 (0.0338)	-0.0549 (0.0475)
E.Observers			0.445 (1.320)	0.708 (1.888)		
Clarity					1.104 (1.209)	1.092 (1.266)
Constant	31.66** (4.341)	24.29 (22.51)	28.77 (65.25)	103.8 (76.53)	39.91 (67.75)	104.0 (77.05)
Elections (N)	700	700	699	699	677	677
Countries	122	122	122	122	119	119
R-sqr	0.487	0.478	0.486	0.360	0.497	0.318

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.3 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- repeat intervention control (KP)

	(1) Model 4& repeat E.Int	(2) Model 7 & repeat E.Int
Electoral Intervention	3.418 ^{**} (1.187)	2.968 [*] (1.211)
Previous vote	0.394 ^{**} (0.0528)	0.386 ^{**} (0.0600)
Global Growth	0.625 (0.401)	0.596 (0.416)
Local Growth	0.147 [*] (0.0714)	0.174 [*] (0.0795)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.73 ^{**} (2.019)	-13.99 ^{**} (2.337)
Population (logged)	0.317 (0.309)	3.487 (3.355)
Year	0.00533 (0.0349)	-0.0482 (0.0488)
Repeat Int.	0.695 (2.654)	0.735 (2.508)
Constant	20.86 (69.78)	98.98 (79.85)
Elections (N)	700	700
Countries	122	122
R-sqr	0.488	0.355

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$

1.2 Hypothesis 2 Robustness checks

Table 2.1 Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks (HS)

	(1) & Repeat int. control	(2) & FP variables	(3) & Polity Control	(4) &interaction w/Polity	(5) & Cold War control
Overt Int.	5.415 [*] (2.214)	5.164 [*] (2.261)	5.516 [*] (2.290)	14.38 (14.67)	5.422 [*] (2.278)
Covert Int.	2.299 (1.455)	2.189 (1.399)	2.404 ⁺ (1.406)	4.611 (2.889)	2.263 (1.428)
Overt Int.*Polity				-3.082 (5.294)	
Covert Int.*Polity				-0.817 (1.010)	
Previous vote	0.370 ^{**} (0.0519)	0.377 ^{**} (0.0508)	0.377 ^{**} (0.0503)	0.379 ^{**} (0.0511)	0.371 ^{**} (0.0516)
Growth	0.551 ^{**} (0.109)	0.525 ^{**} (0.106)	0.565 ^{**} (0.108)	0.574 ^{**} (0.113)	0.548 ^{**} (0.108)
Covert & Overt	-10.58 ⁺ (6.247)	-9.790 (6.111)	-9.589 (5.952)	-9.562 (6.104)	-10.13 ⁺ (6.142)
Trade Openness	0.102 (1.386)	0.0825 (1.341)	0.284 (1.327)	0.270 (1.331)	0.164 (1.433)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.266 [*] (0.135)	-0.239 ⁺ (0.130)	-0.297 [*] (0.135)	-0.314 [*] (0.146)	-0.266 [*] (0.134)
Presidential Election	-1.779 (2.015)	-1.629 (2.011)	-1.788 (1.932)	-1.840 (1.948)	-1.844 (2.012)
Growth*Pres. Election	0.00443 (0.167)	-0.00434 (0.162)	-0.0633 (0.165)	-0.0606 (0.166)	0.00894 (0.166)
Re-election	8.651 ^{**} (1.607)	8.280 ^{**} (1.638)	8.392 ^{**} (1.606)	8.347 ^{**} (1.608)	8.724 ^{**} (1.603)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.42 ^{**} (1.914)	-14.30 ^{**} (1.900)	-14.12 ^{**} (1.835)	-14.03 ^{**} (1.875)	-14.27 ^{**} (1.934)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.860 (0.754)	0.835 (0.726)	1.248 ⁺ (0.704)	1.252 ⁺ (0.726)	0.836 (0.732)
Africa	2.677 (3.237)	2.808 (3.243)	1.134 (3.053)	1.151 (3.083)	2.628 (3.243)
Asia	-3.161 (2.034)	-2.908 (2.057)	-3.755 ⁺ (1.972)	-3.751 ⁺ (2.008)	-3.160 (2.086)
Central & E.Europe	-4.493 [*] (1.994)	-4.498 [*] (1.971)	-5.526 ^{**} (1.936)	-5.474 ^{**} (1.923)	-4.451 [*] (1.971)
L.America & Caribbean	-1.415 (1.493)	-1.414 (1.496)	-2.036 (1.423)	-1.998 (1.423)	-1.428 (1.469)
Repeat Int.	1.467 (2.013)				
Civil War		-1.519 (1.800)			
Interstate War		4.277 (2.607)			
Crisis		1.122 (1.045)			
Polity			-4.580 ^{**} (1.301)	-4.722 ^{**} (1.337)	
Cold War					0.135 (0.900)
Constant	29.64 ^{**} (7.721)	29.48 ^{**} (7.557)	38.90 ^{**} (8.287)	39.11 ^{**} (8.469)	29.61 ^{**} (7.674)
Elections (N)	698	698	698	698	698
Countries	121	121	121	121	121

R-sqr	0.550	0.554	0.561	0.562	0.549
Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$					

Table 2.2 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Clarity of responsibility & polity interaction

	(1) HS & interaction w/clarity	(2) KP4 & interaction w/clarity	(3) KP7 & interaction w/clarity	(4) HS & interaction w/Polity	(5) KP 4& interaction w/Polity	(6) KP 7 & interaction w/Polity
Overt Int.	6.456* (3.055)	5.765* (3.137)	5.350 (3.293)	14.38 (14.67)	23.95* (13.15)	20.41 (17.03)
Covert Int.	2.798 (1.835)	2.973 (1.874)	2.498 (1.951)	4.611 (2.889)	4.255 (2.824)	2.971 (2.557)
Clarity *Overt Int.	-4.202 (4.147)	-0.588 (4.408)	-0.795 (4.253)			
Clarity* Covert Int.	-1.459 (2.922)	-1.107 (2.613)	-1.493 (2.640)			
Polity* Overt Int.				-3.082 (5.294)	-6.355 (4.810)	-5.239 (6.030)
Polity* Covert Int.				-0.817 (1.010)	-0.572 (0.984)	-0.306 (0.879)
Previous vote	0.369** (0.0595)	0.402** (0.0587)	0.396** (0.0674)	0.379** (0.0511)	0.404** (0.0527)	0.396** (0.0599)
Growth	0.573** (0.120)			0.574** (0.113)		
Covert & Overt	-9.993 (7.468)	-10.88 (7.989)	-11.86 (9.458)	-9.562 (6.104)	-9.706 (6.461)	-11.32 (7.904)
Trade Openness	-0.390 (1.424)			0.270 (1.331)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.222 (0.146)			-0.314* (0.146)		
Presidential Election	-1.711 (2.027)			-1.840 (1.948)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.0580 (0.182)			-0.0606 (0.166)		
Re-election	8.585** (1.562)			8.347** (1.608)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-12.94** (1.978)	-13.26** (2.129)	-12.67** (2.426)	-14.03** (1.875)	-14.14** (2.023)	-13.54** (2.364)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.799 (0.728)			1.252* (0.726)		
Africa	1.589 (3.228)			1.151 (3.083)		
Asia	-2.087 (1.802)			-3.751* (2.008)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.707* (2.048)			-5.474** (1.923)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.505 (1.596)			-1.998 (1.423)		
Clarity	1.632 (1.274)	1.026 (1.180)	0.988 (1.228)			
Global Growth		0.574 (0.388)	0.582 (0.401)		0.570 (0.399)	0.622 (0.416)
Local Growth		0.131 (0.0798)	0.165* (0.0842)		0.141* (0.0737)	0.166* (0.0781)
Population (logged)		0.321 (0.312)	4.638 (3.461)		0.297 (0.309)	5.061 (3.341)
Year		-0.0100 (0.0338)	-0.0668 (0.0479)		0.0128 (0.0351)	-0.0535 (0.0490)
Polity				-4.722** (1.337)	-4.824** (1.233)	-5.210** (1.584)
Constant	28.38** (7.573)	49.36 (67.72)	123.4 (77.26)	39.11** (8.469)	18.76 (70.16)	109.2 (80.35)
Elections (N)	675	677	677	698	700	700

Countries	118	119	119	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.562	0.500	0.293	0.562	0.491	0.272

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$

Table 2.3 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- International election observers

	(1) HS	(2) Model KP 4	(3) Model KP 7
Overt Int.	5.436 [*] (2.279)	5.532 [*] (2.297)	5.184 [*] (2.392)
Covert Int.	2.248 (1.426)	2.538 [*] (1.295)	1.993 (1.313)
Previous vote	0.371 ^{**} (0.0515)	0.396 ^{**} (0.0537)	0.387 ^{**} (0.0607)
Growth	0.543 ^{**} (0.107)		
Covert & Overt	-10.11 ⁺ (6.101)	-10.06 (6.220)	-11.68 (7.679)
Trade Openness	0.144 (1.405)		
Growth*Trade	-0.256 ⁺ (0.134)		
Openness			
Presidential Election	-1.850 (2.003)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0154 (0.166)		
Re-election	8.687 ^{**} (1.595)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.36 ^{**} (1.936)	-14.74 ^{**} (2.042)	-14.07 ^{**} (2.392)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.783 (0.739)		
Africa	2.402 (3.208)		
Asia	-3.307 (2.069)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.612 [*] (1.942)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.537 (1.605)		
E.Observers	0.0633 (1.252)	0.616 (1.327)	0.769 (1.878)
Global Growth		0.581 (0.392)	0.558 (0.408)
Local Growth		0.137 ⁺ (0.0772)	0.163 ⁺ (0.0827)
Population (logged)		0.332 (0.313)	3.717 (3.335)
Year		-0.00431 (0.0325)	-0.0607 (0.0484)
Constant	30.34 ^{**} (7.641)	39.81 (65.37)	121.7 (77.94)

Elections (N)	697	699	699
Countries	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.489	0.344

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 2.4 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks (KP)

	(1) Model 4 & repeat E.Int	(2) Model 7 & repeat E.Int	(3) Model 4 & FP	(4) Model 7 & FP	(5) Model 4 & Polity control	(6) Model 7 & Polity control
Overt Int.	5.502* (2.254)	5.181* (2.346)	5.249* (2.316)	4.857* (2.422)	5.640* (2.336)	5.244* (2.412)
Covert Int.	2.597* (1.308)	2.073 (1.321)	2.568* (1.310)	2.129 (1.335)	2.706* (1.280)	2.143 ⁺ (1.289)
Previous vote	0.397** (0.0536)	0.387** (0.0609)	0.402** (0.0524)	0.392** (0.0593)	0.401** (0.0521)	0.394** (0.0594)
Global Growth	0.596 (0.400)	0.561 (0.415)	0.591 (0.396)	0.547 (0.411)	0.576 (0.397)	0.623 (0.415)
Local Growth	0.137 ⁺ (0.0755)	0.163 ⁺ (0.0826)	0.114 (0.0850)	0.147 (0.0887)	0.137 ⁺ (0.0738)	0.162* (0.0785)
Covert & Overt	-10.34 (6.397)	-12.07 (7.866)	-9.528 (6.197)	-11.38 (7.772)	-9.732 (6.155)	-11.39 (7.653)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.77** (2.010)	-14.06** (2.353)	-14.84** (1.976)	-14.07** (2.289)	-14.34** (1.992)	-13.70** (2.319)
Population (logged)	0.331 (0.313)	3.741 (3.389)	0.494 (0.333)	4.918 (3.432)	0.300 (0.308)	4.758 (3.380)
Year	0.00173 (0.0349)	-0.0566 (0.0493)	0.00874 (0.0342)	-0.0627 (0.0471)	0.0150 (0.0348)	-0.0479 (0.0496)
Repeat Int.	1.232 (2.357)	1.297 (2.202)				
Civil War			-3.246 ⁺ (1.782)	-4.079 ⁺ (2.301)		
Interstate War			4.632 (3.200)	4.428 (3.364)		
Crisis			1.888 ⁺ (1.053)	1.618 (1.100)		
Polity					-4.584** (1.214)	-4.954** (1.572)
Constant	27.99 (69.78)	113.4 (80.52)	12.73 (68.74)	115.3 (76.60)	13.90 (69.64)	100.3 (81.14)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122	122	122

R-sqr	0.491	0.342	0.503	0.294	0.490	0.287
Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$						

Table 2.5 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions- Further Robustness Checks

	(1) Model 4& interaction w/Polity	(2) Model 7& interaction w/Polity	(3) Model 4 & Cold War control	(4) Model 7 & Cold War control
Overt Int.	23.95 ⁺ (13.15)	20.41 (17.03)	5.512* (2.297)	5.092* (2.387)
Covert Int.	4.255 (2.824)	2.971 (2.557)	2.547* (1.285)	2.153 (1.300)
Overt Int.*Polity	-6.355 (4.810)	-5.239 (6.030)		
Covert Int.*Polity	-0.572 (0.984)	-0.306 (0.879)		
Previous vote	0.404** (0.0527)	0.396** (0.0599)	0.397** (0.0533)	0.391** (0.0600)
Global Growth	0.570 (0.399)	0.622 (0.416)	0.631 ⁺ (0.332)	0.699 ⁺ (0.380)
Local Growth	0.141 ⁺ (0.0737)	0.166* (0.0781)	0.137 ⁺ (0.0767)	0.152 ⁺ (0.0856)
Covert & Overt	-9.706 (6.461)	-11.32 (7.904)	-9.937 (6.263)	-11.20 (7.839)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.14** (2.023)	-13.54** (2.364)	-14.80** (2.067)	-14.19** (2.374)
Population (logged)	0.297 (0.309)	5.061 (3.341)	0.319 (0.314)	0.988 (2.447)
Year	0.0128 (0.0351)	-0.0535 (0.0490)		
Polity	-4.824** (1.233)	-5.210** (1.584)		
Cold War			-0.344 (0.929)	-0.133 (0.928)
Constant	18.76 (70.16)	109.2 (80.35)	31.60** (4.362)	25.41 (22.53)
Elections (N)	700	700	700	700
Countries	122	122	122	122
R-sqr	0.491	0.272	0.490	0.483

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

1.3 hypothesis 3 Robustness checks

Table 3.1 Appendix Investigation of the 3rd Hypothesis: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding elections & Further Robustness Checks (HS)

	(1) & Repeat E.Int.	(2) & FP controls	(3) & Polity Control	(4) & Cold War control	(5) & Elect. Observers
Electoral Intervention	13.49** (4.236)	12.81** (4.250)	11.63** (4.220)	13.43** (4.228)	13.60** (4.247)
Int*Founding Election	-10.19** (3.621)	-9.729** (3.643)	-8.319* (3.650)	-10.14** (3.641)	-10.35** (3.655)
Founding Election	3.137* (1.483)	3.019* (1.468)	1.717 (1.432)	2.881* (1.464)	2.990* (1.435)
Growth	0.539** (0.115)	0.530** (0.113)	0.541** (0.112)	0.529** (0.116)	0.519** (0.117)
Trade Openness	1.080 (1.486)	1.177 (1.472)	1.087 (1.497)	1.661 (1.543)	1.210 (1.491)
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.335* (0.149)	-0.327* (0.146)	-0.351* (0.146)	-0.339* (0.149)	-0.318* (0.151)
Presidential Election	2.170 (1.872)	2.198 (1.859)	2.043 (1.713)	2.386 (1.877)	2.289 (1.878)
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.123 (0.142)	-0.112 (0.140)	-0.139 (0.139)	-0.116 (0.142)	-0.119 (0.143)
Re-election	7.702** (1.674)	7.472** (1.615)	6.698** (1.607)	7.977** (1.711)	8.264** (1.687)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.65** (1.709)	-22.62** (1.716)	-22.14** (1.651)	-21.92** (1.756)	-22.27** (1.720)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.945 (0.740)	0.912 (0.716)	1.476* (0.730)	1.340* (0.727)	0.854 (0.707)
Africa	-0.123 (2.867)	0.104 (2.847)	-1.183 (2.666)	1.557 (2.898)	0.773 (2.924)
Asia	-2.439 (1.932)	-2.340 (2.008)	-3.359+ (1.889)	-1.291 (2.013)	-1.778 (1.995)
Central & E.Europe	-4.065* (2.037)	-4.239* (1.982)	-5.102** (1.859)	-2.569 (2.108)	-2.530 (2.096)
L.America & Caribbean	-2.586 (1.723)	-2.516 (1.724)	-3.421* (1.619)	-1.983 (1.713)	-1.717 (1.778)
Repeat Int.	2.822 (2.484)				
Civil War		-0.749 (1.387)			
Interstate War		4.677+ (2.508)			
Crisis		1.048 (1.175)			
Polity			-5.964** (1.330)		
Cold War				2.034+ (1.073)	
E.Observers					-2.501* (1.145)
Constant	48.83** (7.672)	49.13** (7.477)	62.51** (7.322)	42.70** (8.042)	49.48** (7.347)
Elections (N)	839	839	839	839	838
Countries	144	144	144	144	144

R-sqr	0.459	0.462	0.477	0.461	0.457
Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$					

Table 3.2 appendix Investigation of the 3rd Hypothesis: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding elections- triple polity interactions

	(1) HS& interaction w/Polity	(2) HS&F.Effects& interaction w/Polity	(3) Model KP 4 & interaction w/Polity	(4) Model KP 7 & interaction w/Polity
Electoral Intervention	12.29 [*] (5.132)	12.71 [*] (5.503)	11.65 ^{**} (4.227)	11.85 [*] (4.867)
Int*Founding Election	-5.118 (4.690)	-7.120 (5.972)	-0.121 (4.648)	-0.507 (5.822)
Founding Election	3.285 (6.884)	-1.692 (7.896)	8.977 (7.301)	1.289 (8.144)
E.Int.*Polity* Founding Election	-1.519 (2.039)	-1.372 (2.265)	-3.537 ⁺ (1.906)	-3.931 ⁺ (2.266)
Growth	0.539 ^{**} (0.116)	0.553 ^{**} (0.124)		
Trade Openness	1.072 (1.469)	0.970 (2.626)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.345 [*] (0.154)	-0.347 [*] (0.170)		
Presidential Election	2.126 (1.667)	-0.778 (3.645)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.149 (0.140)	-0.0567 (0.164)		
Re-election	6.566 ^{**} (1.587)	7.967 ^{**} (1.660)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.18 ^{**} (1.651)	-20.20 ^{**} (2.179)	-21.90 ^{**} (1.741)	-19.63 ^{**} (2.219)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.477 [*] (0.718)	0.940 (1.370)		
Africa	-1.162 (2.677)	‡		
Asia	-3.336 ⁺ (1.922)	‡		
Central & E.Europe	-5.035 ^{**} (1.908)	‡		
L.America & Caribbean	-3.472 [*] (1.618)	‡		
Polity	-5.230 (3.744)	-7.113 (4.339)	-2.567 (3.802)	-6.075 (4.340)
E.Int.*Polity	0.161 (0.698)	0.476 (0.731)	0.696 (0.499)	1.034 ⁺ (0.488)
Polity* Founding Election	-0.623 (2.795)	1.722 (3.165)	-2.821 (2.921)	0.277 (3.208)
Global Growth			0.580 (0.406)	0.524 (0.418)
Local Growth			0.0664 (0.0573)	0.0661 (0.0685)
Population (logged)			0.440 (0.334)	-1.362 (3.301)
Year			0.00129 (0.0363)	-0.00434 (0.0551)

Constant	60.68** (11.36)	66.07** (14.51)	58.42 (73.81)	92.75 (93.62)
Elections (N)	839	839	841	841
Countries	144	144	145	145
R-sqr	0.477	0.454	0.410	0.362

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 3.3 appendix Investigation of the 3rd Hypothesis: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding elections & Further Robustness Checks (KP)

	(1) Model 4& repeat E.Int	(2) Model 7& repeat E.Int	(3) Model 4& FP	(4) Model 7& FP	(5) Model 4 & Polity control	(6) Model 7 & Polity control
Electoral Intervention	12.59** (3.727)	12.80** (4.383)	12.19** (3.900)	12.57** (4.621)	11.09** (3.881)	11.37* (4.537)
Int*Founding Election	-9.197** (3.028)	-9.691* (3.803)	-8.949** (3.184)	-9.632* (4.003)	-7.657* (3.228)	-8.281* (4.032)
Founding Election	3.902** (1.424)	2.796 (1.721)	3.852** (1.400)	2.804 (1.701)	1.883 (1.428)	1.859 (1.665)
Global Growth	0.563 (0.415)	0.460 (0.421)	0.584 (0.411)	0.474 (0.417)	0.527 (0.402)	0.478 (0.412)
Local Growth	0.0462 (0.0611)	0.0687 (0.0714)	0.0461 (0.0627)	0.0742 (0.0740)	0.0646 (0.0578)	0.0695 (0.0677)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.62** (1.782)	-20.46** (2.264)	-22.66** (1.760)	-20.24** (2.212)	-21.90** (1.766)	-19.82** (2.222)
Population (logged)	0.447 (0.355)	-2.790 (3.289)	0.551 (0.368)	-1.610 (3.301)	0.430 (0.337)	-1.293 (3.300)
Year	-0.0133 (0.0355)	-0.00498 (0.0578)	-0.00724 (0.0352)	-0.0139 (0.0544)	0.00303 (0.0369)	-0.00360 (0.0561)
Repeat Int.	2.379 (2.883)	2.473 (3.043)				
Civil War			-2.187 (1.664)	-3.493 (2.132)		
Interstate War			5.030 ⁺ (2.765)	5.135 (3.205)		
Crisis			1.082 (1.180)	0.638 (1.267)		
Polity					-6.262** (1.262)	-5.465** (1.650)
Constant	78.40 (70.68)	90.02 (95.43)	65.64 (70.22)	97.29 (89.68)	64.74 (72.29)	89.54 (93.12)
Elections (N)	841	841	841	841	841	841
Countries	145	145	145	145	145	145
R-sqr	0.391	0.275	0.398	0.332	0.405	0.366

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.4 appendix Investigation of the 3rd Hypothesis: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding elections & Further Robustness Checks (KP)

	(1) Model 4& Cold War control	(2) Model 7 & Cold War control	(3) Model 4 & Elect. Observers	(4) Model 7 & Elect. Observers	(5) KP Model 4 & Fraud limit
Electoral Intervention	12.35** (3.795)	12.38** (4.461)	12.47** (3.844)	12.84** (4.647)	12.55** (4.140)
Int*Founding Election	-8.981** (3.135)	-9.325* (3.926)	-9.115** (3.182)	-9.758* (4.097)	-9.175** (3.471)
Founding Election	3.869** (1.432)	2.724 (1.734)	3.961** (1.414)	2.764 (1.693)	2.543 (1.676)
Global Growth	0.607 ⁺ (0.368)	0.471 (0.412)	0.582 (0.408)	0.484 (0.420)	0.488 (0.439)
Local Growth	0.0456 (0.0610)	0.0693 (0.0705)	0.0472 (0.0604)	0.0798 (0.0683)	0.0629 (0.0690)
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.47** (1.857)	-20.23** (2.378)	-22.53** (1.802)	-20.29** (2.318)	-20.91** (2.048)
Population (logged) Cold War	0.448 (0.352)	-2.488 (2.126)	0.465 (0.360)	-0.786 (3.303)	0.281 (0.368)
Year			-0.00661 (0.0356)	-0.0213 (0.0548)	-0.0264 (0.0368)
E.Observers			-1.078 (1.268)	-2.734 (1.737)	
Constant	51.54** (4.081)	76.99** (19.80)	65.25 (70.79)	105.1 (90.43)	105.0 (73.36)
Elections (N)	841	841	840	840	741
Countries	145	145	145	145	132
R-sqr	0.390	0.288	0.391	0.364	0.347

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

2. “Clean” replications of the HS and KP models

These are the “clean” (i.e. without the electoral intervention variables) replications that were referred to in pg 13 (ft 40) in the main text.

Table 4.1 appendix clean replication HS & KP models

	(1) HS original	(2) HS original & fixed effects	(3) KP model 4	(4) KP model 7
Previous vote	0.345** (0.0512)	0.343** (0.0563)	0.371** (0.0528)	0.358** (0.0601)
Growth	0.600** (0.100)	0.557** (0.0952)		
Trade Openness	0.310 (1.375)	-1.840 (2.189)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.309 ⁺ (0.136)	-0.202 (0.122)		
Presidential Election	-1.465 (2.012)	-4.897 (3.590)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.0163 (0.162)	0.0916 (0.186)		
Re-election	8.107** (1.672)	8.577** (1.823)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-15.01** (1.919)	-14.19** (2.227)	-15.36** (2.033)	-14.69** (2.346)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.729 (0.699)	0.928 (1.087)		
Africa	2.420 (3.078)	‡		
Asia	-3.326 ⁺ (2.002)	‡		
Central & E.Europe	-5.145** (1.949)	‡		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.891 (1.484)	‡		
Global Growth			0.642 (0.402)	0.614 (0.416)
Local Growth			0.151* (0.0647)	0.179* (0.0718)
Population (logged)			0.334 (0.313)	3.959 (3.238)
Year			-0.00148 (0.0338)	-0.0585 (0.0470)
Constant	32.57** (7.254)	31.02** (9.677)	35.84 (67.56)	117.0 (77.32)
Elections (N)	707	707	709	709
Countries	121	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.535	0.511	0.473	0.314

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

3. Interactions w/ various temporal controls

These are the interactions between the electoral intervention variable(s) and the time trend and/or cold war variable that were referred to in pg 15 in the main text. As noted, the lack of any significant/robust findings in the models here (& in the paper) indicate that, at least as to the post-WW2 era, there is no significant relationship between the time period in which the intervention occurred and the effectiveness of the intervention.

Table 5.1 appendix Time trend interactions w/electoral Int. (hypotheses 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model4 H2 & fraud
Electoral Intervention	4.949*	4.567*	4.784*			
E.Int *Year	-0.0647 (0.0673)	-0.0436 (0.0701)	-0.0696 (0.0826)			
Overt Int.				5.095 (3.415)	4.393 (3.852)	3.500 (4.039)
Covert Int.				8.512** (3.060)	8.537** (2.955)	7.446* (2.950)
Overt Int. *Year				0.0156 (0.105)	0.0440 (0.115)	0.0665 (0.116)
Covert Int. *Year				-0.233+ (0.120)	-0.226+ (0.123)	-0.187 (0.117)
Previous vote	0.365** (0.0514)	0.395** (0.0525)	0.387** (0.0595)	0.363** (0.0530)	0.392** (0.0546)	0.406** (0.0605)
Growth	0.543** (0.110)			0.522** (0.113)		
Trade Openness	0.835 (1.362)			0.659 (1.383)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.283* (0.135)			-0.252+ (0.135)		
Presidential Election	-1.299 (2.017)			-1.451 (2.063)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0367 (0.162)			0.0131 (0.167)		
Re-election	8.514** (1.672)			8.951** (1.611)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-13.96** (1.920)	-14.67** (2.034)	-13.89** (2.334)	-14.11** (1.888)	-14.85** (2.000)	-13.37** (2.250)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.782* (0.800)			1.631* (0.814)		
Africa	5.221 (3.496)			4.879 (3.539)		
Asia	-1.568 (2.340)			-1.607 (2.354)		
Central & E.Europe	-3.548+ (2.015)			-3.551+ (2.079)		
L.America & Caribbean	-0.687 (1.578)			-0.546 (1.597)		
Year	-0.0480	0.00420	-0.0504	-0.0490	-0.00154	-0.0132

	(0.0346)	(0.0336)	(0.0469)	(0.0349)	(0.0343)	(0.0380)
Global Growth		0.630	0.605		0.584	0.438
		(0.399)	(0.414)		(0.404)	(0.430)
Local Growth		0.143 ⁺	0.167 [*]		0.141 [*]	0.125 ⁺
		(0.0737)	(0.0811)		(0.0712)	(0.0726)
Population (logged)		0.327	3.561		0.318	0.158
		(0.309)	(3.376)		(0.313)	(0.331)
Covert & Overt				-9.616	-9.180	-9.253
				(5.967)	(6.112)	(6.444)
Repeat Int.						0.845
						(2.356)
Constant	21.60 ^{**}	31.05 ^{**}	4.334	23.39 ^{**}	31.88 ^{**}	31.39 ^{**}
	(7.773)	(4.655)	(28.89)	(7.921)	(4.781)	(5.029)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	636
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	114
R-sqr	0.552	0.488	0.350	0.554	0.492	0.465

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$

Table 5.2 appendix Triple Time trend interactions w/electoral Int. (hypo 3)

	(1) HS	(2) KP 4	(3) KP 7
Electoral Intervention	6.353	4.709	1.981
	(6.445)	(5.971)	(7.100)
Int*Founding Election	-3.908	-2.509	-0.255
	(5.684)	(5.236)	(6.346)
Founding Election	5.784 ⁺	4.063	4.941
	(3.012)	(3.456)	(4.025)
E.int.*Year* F.Elect.	-0.229	-0.220	-0.338
	(0.178)	(0.164)	(0.219)
Growth	0.482 ^{**}		
	(0.127)		
Trade Openness	1.722		
	(1.456)		
Growth*Trade	-0.285 ⁺		
Openness	(0.155)		
Presidential Election	3.174 ⁺		
	(1.847)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.126		
	(0.142)		
Re-election	8.019 ^{**}		
	(1.717)		
Effective num. of	-21.70 ^{**}	-22.52 ^{**}	-20.35 ^{**}
Parties (logged)	(1.752)	(1.807)	(2.292)
GDP Per Capita	2.404 ^{**}		
(logged)	(0.760)		
Africa	4.662		
	(2.980)		
Asia	0.528		
	(2.070)		
Central & E.Europe	-1.526		
	(2.106)		

L.America & Caribbean	-1.201 (1.768)		
Year	0.00617 (0.0888)	-0.00137 (0.0946)	0.0641 (0.0969)
Year* E.Int.	0.261 (0.209)	0.263 (0.196)	0.388 (0.248)
Year*F.Election	-0.0989 (0.0789)	-0.0125 (0.0901)	-0.0812 (0.107)
Global Growth		0.571 (0.427)	0.421 (0.434)
Local Growth		0.0495 (0.0628)	0.0731 (0.0742)
Population (logged)		0.445 (0.359)	-1.731 (3.560)
Constant	33.66** (8.246)	52.40** (5.257)	69.42* (32.14)
Elections (N)	839	841	841
Countries	144	145	145
R-sqr	0.465	0.390	0.325

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.3 appendix Cold War interaction w/electoral Int. (hypo 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model7 H2
Electoral Intervention	4.981* (2.496)	5.557* (2.714)	3.813 (3.267)			
E.Int* Cold War	-2.185 (2.778)	-2.631 (3.015)	-0.973 (3.541)			
Overt Int.				7.210* (3.511)	7.463* (3.506)	6.612 (4.509)
Covert Int.				0.0714 (5.422)	0.818 (6.242)	-2.523 (5.639)
Overt Int.* Cold War				-2.662 (4.734)	-2.919 (5.057)	-2.171 (5.909)
Covert Int.* Cold War				2.399 (5.605)	1.896 (6.389)	5.095 (5.796)
Previous vote	0.368** (0.0516)	0.394** (0.0531)	0.389** (0.0598)	0.367** (0.0529)	0.393** (0.0544)	0.383** (0.0620)
Growth	0.556** (0.108)			0.545** (0.110)		
Trade Openness	0.292 (1.430)			0.133 (1.442)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.278* (0.135)			-0.261* (0.134)		
Presidential Election	-1.764 (2.001)			-1.812 (2.004)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0384 (0.167)			0.00983 (0.169)		
Re-election	8.364** (1.674)			8.751** (1.615)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.25** (1.956)	-14.78** (2.098)	-14.15** (2.380)	-14.38** (1.943)	-14.90** (2.079)	-14.32** (2.388)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.970 (0.726)			0.814 (0.742)		
Africa	3.051 (3.216)			2.590 (3.264)		
Asia	-3.080			-3.194		

Central & E.Europe	(2.093) -4.425*			(2.100) -4.561*		
L.America & Caribbean	(1.934) -1.497 (1.462)			(1.971) -1.425 (1.473)		
Cold War	0.177 (0.901)	-0.540 (1.027)	-0.153 (0.935)	0.130 (0.901)	-0.341 (0.928)	-0.150 (0.938)
Global Growth		0.578 (0.406)	0.705+ (0.383)		0.625+ (0.336)	0.698+ (0.385)
Local Growth		0.148* (0.0724)	0.165* (0.0813)		0.142+ (0.0728)	0.156+ (0.0813)
Population (logged)		0.307 (0.305)	1.098 (2.433)		0.299 (0.316)	0.849 (2.454)
Year		-0.00896 (0.0389)				
Covert & Overt				-9.595 (6.362)	-9.285 (6.502)	-10.65 (7.990)
Constant	28.32** (7.683)	49.82 (78.48)	24.41 (22.50)	30.11** (7.847)	32.07** (4.474)	27.11 (22.64)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.488	0.479	0.549	0.490	0.485

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.4 appendix Cold War triple interaction w/electoral Int. (hypo 3)

	(1) HS	(2) KP 4	(3) KP 7	(4) KP 4 & FP
Electoral Intervention	26.26** (6.518)	23.92** (6.363)	29.95** (8.934)	22.81** (6.544)
Int*Founding Election	-20.90** (5.558)	-17.85** (5.171)	-24.62** (8.067)	-16.94** (5.271)
Founding Election	-1.445 (2.173)	0.880 (2.162)	-4.073 (2.835)	0.910 (2.158)
E.Int* CW* F.Elections	14.62* (6.975)	11.92+ (6.359)	18.61* (9.008)	10.50 (6.461)
Growth	0.526** (0.118)			
Trade Openness	1.438 (1.492)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.327* (0.150)			
Presidential Election	2.599 (1.858)			
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.120 (0.139)			
Re-election	8.004** (1.671)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-21.84** (1.714)	-22.41** (1.840)	-20.08** (2.306)	-22.48** (1.807)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.310+ (0.741)			
Africa	2.445 (2.897)			
Asia	-1.534 (2.037)			
Central & E.Europe	-2.201 (2.216)			

L.America & Caribbean	-2.363 (1.714)			
Cold War	-5.102 ⁺ (3.006)	-4.475 (3.119)	-8.853* (3.580)	-4.538 (3.142)
E.Int *CW	-17.09* (8.162)	-15.16 ⁺ (7.745)	-21.33* (10.07)	-13.64 ⁺ (7.849)
CW* F.Elections	6.338* (2.709)	4.469 (2.859)	9.012** (3.361)	4.418 (2.885)
Global Growth		0.529 (0.372)	0.344 (0.419)	0.514 (0.368)
Local Growth		0.0407 (0.0627)	0.0702 (0.0727)	0.0410 (0.0636)
Population (logged)		0.428 (0.358)	-2.195 (2.041)	0.522 (0.376)
Civil War				-2.005 (1.677)
Interstate War				4.843* (2.785)
Crisis				0.976 (1.190)
Constant	47.90** (8.414)	55.48** (4.404)	82.03** (19.16)	54.91** (4.395)
Elections (N)	839	841	841	841
Countries	144	145	145	145
R-sqr	0.466	0.391	0.298	0.399

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

4. Disaggregation by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions

Some may wonder whether the patterns found in the paper are indeed what one finds as to each intervener interventions given the significant differences between the U.S. and the USSR/Russia on many aspects. Accordingly, I reran my models with disaggregated the Electoral intervention variable by U.S. and Soviet/Russian interventions. As can be seen in the models below, the results for the disaggregated Russian and American electoral intervention variables are essentially the same as for the aggregated variable (or variables) although the results for the Russian interventions aren't significant in many models. This is probably due to the relatively small number of Russian interventions (as low as 22 cases in some models) which aren't dropped due to missing data on some covariates etc..

Table 6.1 appendix Investigation of the 1st Hypothesis: Electoral Interventions Effects- separate U.S. & Russia variables

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

	HS	HS & fraud	HS & fixed effects	Model KP4	KP4 & fraud	Model KP7
US electoral Int.	3.111** (1.106)	3.003** (1.013)	2.890* (1.264)	3.487** (1.040)	3.259** (1.004)	2.913** (1.054)
Rus. electoral Int.	3.324 (2.822)	3.313 (2.946)	3.112 (2.777)	3.279 (2.892)	3.231 (3.034)	3.034 (2.840)
Previous vote	0.368** (0.0510)	0.389** (0.0555)	0.373** (0.0560)	0.394** (0.0527)	0.409** (0.0584)	0.386** (0.0599)
Growth	0.564** (0.104)	0.526** (0.140)	0.524** (0.100)			
Trade Openness	0.309 (1.387)	0.943 (1.596)	-2.065 (2.178)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.290* (0.134)	-0.258 (0.170)	-0.184 (0.121)			
Presidential Election	-1.740 (1.969)	-2.919 (2.143)	-5.481 (3.369)			
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0361 (0.165)	0.0485 (0.201)	0.156 (0.185)			
Re-election	8.317** (1.662)	8.721** (1.884)	8.730** (1.809)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.30** (1.931)	-13.24** (2.129)	-13.40** (2.240)	-14.67** (2.044)	-13.11** (2.272)	-13.92** (2.341)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.930 (0.726)	0.647 (0.811)	1.227 (1.142)			
Africa	2.877 (3.196)	0.122 (3.646)	‡			
Asia	-3.192 (2.039)	-4.457+ (2.403)	‡			
Central & E.Europe	-4.709* (1.902)	-6.217** (2.129)	‡			
L.America & Caribbean	-1.611 (1.481)	-1.675 (1.665)	‡			
Global Growth				0.620 (0.398)	0.479 (0.419)	0.592 (0.413)
Local Growth				0.146* (0.0723)	0.129+ (0.0750)	0.174* (0.0795)
Population (logged)				0.320 (0.307)	0.173 (0.320)	3.604 (3.376)
Year				0.00420 (0.0342)	-0.00877 (0.0362)	-0.0514 (0.0480)
Constant	28.89** (7.534)	29.59** (8.133)	26.52* (10.16)	23.04 (68.40)	47.58 (72.38)	104.2 (78.09)
Elections (N)	698	634	698	700	636	700
Countries	121	113	121	122	114	122
R-sqr	0.548	0.524	0.521	0.488	0.461	0.347

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 6.2 appendix Investigation of the 2nd Hypothesis: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions - separate U.S. & Russia variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	HS	HS & fraud	HS & fixed	Model KP4	KP4 & fraud	Model KP7

	effects					
US overt Int.	4.645*	4.603*	4.643*	4.534*	4.617**	4.610*
	(1.915)	(1.836)	(2.180)	(1.800)	(1.667)	(1.858)
US covert Int.	2.577	2.513	2.224	3.179 ⁺	2.788 ⁺	2.025
	(1.824)	(1.734)	(1.855)	(1.627)	(1.664)	(1.656)
Rus overt Int.	6.506	6.070	6.437	6.849	6.186	5.925
	(4.634)	(4.999)	(4.703)	(4.794)	(5.185)	(5.203)
Rus covert Int.	0.462	0.781	0.278	0.0175	0.449	0.388
	(2.458)	(2.420)	(2.220)	(2.200)	(2.275)	(2.251)
Covert & Overt	-9.665	-9.643	-12.77	-9.250	-9.451	-11.59
	(5.889)	(5.932)	(8.518)	(5.968)	(6.062)	(7.677)
Previous vote	0.372**	0.391**	0.373**	0.398**	0.411**	0.406**
	(0.0516)	(0.0560)	(0.0566)	(0.0537)	(0.0594)	(0.0690)
Growth	0.548**	0.508**	0.512**			
	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.103)			
Trade Openness	0.0912	0.736	-2.023			
	(1.412)	(1.628)	(2.242)			
Growth*Trade	-0.255 ⁺	-0.221	-0.156			
Openness	(0.136)	(0.174)	(0.123)			
Presidential Election	-1.890	-3.067	-5.394			
	(2.005)	(2.178)	(3.527)			
Growth*Pres.	-0.00436	0.00898	0.0995			
Election	(0.171)	(0.207)	(0.190)			
Re-election	8.681**	9.130**	9.313**			
	(1.616)	(1.836)	(1.763)			
Effective num. of	-14.30**	-13.30**	-13.40**	-14.64**	-13.15**	-12.10**
Parties (logged)	(1.908)	(2.114)	(2.212)	(2.026)	(2.256)	(2.688)
GDP Per Capita	0.750	0.478	0.873			
(logged)	(0.747)	(0.834)	(1.204)			
Africa	2.407	-0.387	‡			
	(3.248)	(3.699)				
Asia	-3.340	-4.634 ⁺	‡			
	(2.057)	(2.414)				
Central & E.Europe	-4.500*	-6.056**	‡			
	(1.989)	(2.233)				
L.America &	-1.540	-1.616	‡			
Caribbean	(1.517)	(1.691)				
Global Growth				0.577	0.438	0.509
				(0.398)	(0.418)	(0.434)
Local Growth				0.137 ⁺	0.118	0.135 ⁺
				(0.0744)	(0.0779)	(0.0802)
Population				0.339	0.184	5.658
(logged)				(0.312)	(0.328)	(3.597)
Year				-0.00235	-0.0140	-0.0866 ⁺
				(0.0347)	(0.0369)	(0.0503)
Constant	30.60**	31.29**	29.64**	35.95	58.10	153.3 ⁺
	(7.687)	(8.288)	(10.71)	(69.44)	(73.62)	(82.05)
Elections (N)	698	634	698	700	636	636
Countries	121	113	121	122	114	114
R-sqr	0.549	0.524	0.526	0.491	0.463	0.206

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

Table 6.3 appendix Investigation of the 3rd hypothesis: effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding Elections - separate U.S. & Russia variables

	(1) HS	(2) HS & fraud	(3) HS & fixed effects	(4) Model KP4	(5) KP4 & fraud	(6) Model KP7
US electoral Int.	13.48** (4.632)	12.10* (4.852)	14.61** (5.207)	12.82** (4.305)	11.81* (4.781)	13.47* (5.207)
Rus. electoral Int.	13.14 (9.400)	22.30** (6.062)	11.19 (9.570)	11.92+ (7.016)	16.91** (5.996)	9.635 (7.319)
US Int.*Founding Election	-9.770* (3.972)	-8.482* (4.299)	-11.24* (4.662)	-8.960* (3.644)	-8.051+ (4.118)	-9.951* (4.634)
Rus Int.*Founding Election	-10.71 (8.198)	-19.55** (3.679)	-8.969 (8.530)	-9.507+ (5.274)	-14.20** (3.515)	-7.509 (5.910)
Founding Election	3.078* (1.464)	2.426 (1.645)	3.456* (1.635)	3.890** (1.423)	2.594 (1.699)	2.764 (1.716)
Growth	0.535** (0.118)	0.626** (0.137)	0.557** (0.121)			
Trade Openness	1.127 (1.480)	2.049 (1.428)	0.928 (2.436)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.338* (0.152)	-0.424* (0.176)	-0.343* (0.161)			
Presidential Election	2.128 (1.842)	0.509 (2.163)	-1.481 (3.878)			
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.127 (0.144)	-0.116 (0.182)	-0.00839 (0.160)			
Re-election	7.787** (1.713)	8.637** (1.815)	9.041** (1.781)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.65** (1.716)	-21.11** (1.915)	-20.88** (2.202)	-22.61** (1.808)	-20.90** (2.046)	-20.37** (2.287)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.895 (0.709)	0.712 (0.770)	0.528 (1.269)			
Africa	-0.323 (2.800)	-1.104 (3.204)	‡			
Asia	-2.509 (1.917)	-3.688 (2.295)	‡			
Central & E.Europe	-4.103* (2.039)	-5.579** (2.050)	‡			
L.America & Caribbean	-2.669 (1.711)	-1.917 (1.852)	‡			
Global Growth				0.560 (0.415)	0.483 (0.438)	0.458 (0.421)
Local Growth				0.0439 (0.0611)	0.0618 (0.0680)	0.0677 (0.0727)
Population (logged)				0.459 (0.353)	0.273 (0.367)	-2.460 (3.323)
Year				-0.0144 (0.0349)	-0.0254 (0.0369)	-0.0118 (0.0565)
Constant	49.46** (7.336)	49.68** (8.084)	50.23** (11.07)	80.56 (69.39)	103.1 (73.49)	100.5 (92.61)
Elections (N)	839	739	839	841	741	841
Countries	144	131	144	145	132	145
R-sqr	0.458	0.420	0.439	0.390	0.348	0.290

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

5. Additional robustness checks

5a. Economic Sanctions

In the following tables I examined another foreign policy measure- whether significant economic sanctions were in effect on that country during election day. This is a foreign policy factor which may also potentially have, through its effects on the domestic economy etc., significant effects on election results in the affected countries³⁴. No significant effects were found for this measure.

Table 7.1 appendix Further Robustness Checks- economic sanctions (hypo 1&2)

	(1) HS H1	(2) KP model4 H1	(3) KP model7 H1	(4) HS H2	(5) KP model4 H2	(6) KP model7 H2
Electoral Intervention	3.210** (1.235)	3.431** (1.189)	2.984* (1.216)			
Overt Int.				5.505* (2.292)	5.585* (2.313)	5.252* (2.393)
Covert Int.				2.258 (1.445)	2.563+ (1.314)	2.047 (1.351)
Previous vote	0.369** (0.0509)	0.395** (0.0527)	0.388** (0.0595)	0.373** (0.0513)	0.399** (0.0534)	0.391** (0.0601)
Growth	0.564** (0.105)			0.549** (0.107)		
Trade Openness	0.377 (1.390)			0.204 (1.392)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.291* (0.133)			-0.265* (0.133)		
Presidential Election	-1.705 (1.973)			-1.824 (2.000)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0335 (0.163)			0.00341 (0.165)		
Re-election	8.298** (1.659)			8.694** (1.596)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.35** (1.930)	-14.70** (2.042)	-13.92** (2.329)	-14.38** (1.915)	-14.71** (2.020)	-13.95** (2.335)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.930 (0.724)			0.786 (0.738)		
Africa	2.808 (3.183)			2.365 (3.221)		
Asia	-3.256 (2.030)			-3.357+ (2.038)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.877** (1.889)			-4.786* (1.942)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.666 (1.487)			-1.571 (1.507)		
Sanctions	0.828 (1.724)	0.674 (1.952)	1.502 (2.378)	1.125 (1.734)	1.033 (1.990)	1.868 (2.405)
Global Growth		0.625 (0.400)	0.607 (0.419)		0.595 (0.400)	0.574 (0.419)
Local Growth		0.146* (0.0730)	0.172* (0.0798)		0.135+ (0.0778)	0.160+ (0.0833)

³⁴ For the use of sanctions as a tool of regime change see for example (Marinov 2005)

Population (logged)		0.310	3.324		0.321	3.605
		(0.309)	(3.439)		(0.315)	(3.488)
Year		0.00360	-0.0480		-0.00116	-0.0578
		(0.0336)	(0.0479)		(0.0337)	(0.0488)
Covert & Overt				-10.35 ⁺		-12.00
				(6.167)	(6.288)	(7.835)
Constant	28.83 ^{**}	24.23	99.54	30.18 ^{**}	33.61	116.7
	(7.507)	(67.29)	(77.22)	(7.609)	(67.57)	(78.58)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.488	0.363	0.550	0.491	0.349

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7.2 appendix Further Robustness Checks- economic sanctions (hypo 3)

	(1) HS	(2) KP model 4	(3) KP model 7
Electoral Intervention	13.24 ^{**} (4.221)	12.42 ^{**} (3.781)	12.42 ^{**} (4.464)
Int*Founding Election	-10.02 ^{**} (3.625)	-9.115 ^{**} (3.125)	-9.424 [*] (3.912)
Founding Election	3.078 [*] (1.470)	3.885 ^{**} (1.417)	2.809 (1.724)
Growth	0.538 ^{**} (0.117)		
Trade Openness	1.046 (1.465)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.337 [*] (0.150)		
Presidential Election	2.031 (1.862)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.122 (0.142)		
Re-election	7.839 ^{**} (1.672)		
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.56 ^{**} (1.734)	-22.53 ^{**} (1.806)	-20.40 ^{**} (2.283)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.868 (0.723)		
Africa	-0.343 (2.856)		
Asia	-2.489 (1.950)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.037 [*] (2.057)		
L.America & Caribbean	-2.620 (1.725)		
Sanctions	-0.482 (1.510)	-0.833 (1.612)	-0.905 (1.914)
Global Growth		0.552 (0.415)	0.447 (0.424)
Local Growth		0.0464 (0.0613)	0.0700 (0.0718)
Population (logged)		0.480 (0.358)	-2.241 (3.343)
Year		-0.0154 (0.0342)	-0.0151 (0.0565)
Constant	49.69 ^{**} (7.480)	82.46 (67.97)	105.3 (92.13)

Elections (N)	839	841	841
Countries	144	145	145
R-sqr	0.456	0.389	0.301

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

5b. Western election observers

Some scholars who study international election observation argue that at least some of the non western election observers missions (such as from the African Union, the Arab League etc.) are unusually lenient when it comes to election irregularities in the election that they are observing. Indeed, in some cases such observer mission may exist merely as a “fig leaf” designed to provide a modicum of legitimacy to a “stolen” election (Hyde 2011:169-174). Accordingly, when only non-western observers are present prior to a particular election the effect of the election observers may be very different, diluting the measured effect that such observer missions may usually have. I accordingly, as a further robustness check, included in the following models a measure counting as observed elections only those which were observed (also) by at least one western observer mission. As can be seen in the following tables the results are nevertheless similar to those found for International observers.

Table 7.3 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Western election observers (hypo 1& 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	HS H1	KP model4 H1	KP model7 H1	HS H2	KP model4 H2	KP model7 H2
Electoral	3.196**	3.409**	2.953*			
Intervention	(1.226)	(1.183)	(1.209)			
Overt Int.				5.436*	5.502*	5.183*
				(2.278)	(2.292)	(2.392)
Covert Int.				2.256	2.551*	2.013
				(1.428)	(1.295)	(1.314)
Previous vote	0.368**	0.393**	0.385**	0.371**	0.397**	0.387**
	(0.0512)	(0.0531)	(0.0602)	(0.0515)	(0.0537)	(0.0608)
Growth	0.558**			0.542**		
	(0.106)			(0.108)		
Trade Openness	0.349			0.153		
	(1.397)			(1.402)		
Growth*Trade	-0.282*			-0.256 ⁺		
Openness	(0.134)			(0.135)		
Presidential	-1.694			-1.823		

Election	(1.989)			(2.013)		
Growth*Pres.	0.0436			0.0155		
Election	(0.164)			(0.167)		
Re-election	8.332**			8.730**		
	(1.667)			(1.604)		
Effective num. of	-14.32**	-14.70**	-14.00**	-14.33**	-14.72**	-14.03**
Parties (logged)	(1.935)	(2.063)	(2.387)	(1.919)	(2.042)	(2.396)
GDP Per Capita	0.919			0.780		
(logged)	(0.728)			(0.740)		
Africa	2.864			2.472		
	(3.172)			(3.212)		
Asia	-3.169			-3.234		
	(2.077)			(2.084)		
Central &	-4.621*			-4.454*		
E.Europe	(1.857)			(1.920)		
L.America &	-1.570			-1.442		
Caribbean	(1.537)			(1.558)		
Western Obs.	-0.166	-0.195	-0.0266	-0.191	-0.0569	-0.0228
	(1.196)	(1.333)	(1.902)	(1.191)	(1.338)	(1.890)
Global Growth		0.627	0.599		0.595	0.563
		(0.396)	(0.414)		(0.395)	(0.414)
Local Growth		0.148*	0.176*		0.138 ⁺	0.165*
		(0.0723)	(0.0789)		(0.0768)	(0.0823)
Population		0.322	3.669		0.337	4.011
(logged)		(0.310)	(3.365)		(0.315)	(3.406)
Year		0.00520	-0.0515		0.000107	-0.0619
		(0.0336)	(0.0475)		(0.0338)	(0.0484)
Covert & Overt				-10.11 ⁺	-9.938	-11.64
				(6.097)	(6.229)	(7.683)
Constant	29.02**	21.14	103.8	30.33**	31.18	121.6
	(7.567)	(67.42)	(76.84)	(7.666)	(67.69)	(78.21)
Elections (N)	697	699	699	697	699	699
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.548	0.488	0.344	0.549	0.490	0.326

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7.4 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Western election observers (hypo 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	HS	KP model 4	KP model 7
Electoral Intervention	13.56**	12.54**	12.88**

	(4.244)	(3.854)	(4.649)
Int*Founding Election	-10.28**	-9.174**	-9.751*
	(3.648)	(3.192)	(4.094)
Founding Election	3.056*	4.019**	2.906 ⁺
	(1.439)	(1.414)	(1.693)
Growth	0.522**		
	(0.119)		
Trade Openness	1.071		
	(1.506)		
Growth*Trade	-0.319*		
Openness	(0.152)		
Presidential Election	2.271		
	(1.875)		
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.119		
	(0.144)		
Re-election	8.124**		
	(1.695)		
Effective num. of	-22.26**	-22.44**	-20.11**
Parties (logged)	(1.728)	(1.807)	(2.321)
GDP Per Capita	0.819		
(logged)	(0.712)		
Africa	0.321		
	(2.885)		
Asia	-1.955		
	(2.017)		
Central & E.Europe	-2.622		
	(2.083)		
L.America &	-1.896		
Caribbean	(1.786)		
Western Obs.	-2.393*	-1.582	-3.285 ⁺
	(1.218)	(1.338)	(1.833)
Global Growth		0.583	0.474
		(0.412)	(0.423)
Local Growth		0.0473	0.0795
		(0.0598)	(0.0675)
Population (logged)		0.487	-0.742
		(0.364)	(3.300)
Year		-0.00510	-0.0229
		(0.0358)	(0.0547)
Constant	49.81**	62.00	107.7
	(7.386)	(71.27)	(90.43)
Elections (N)	838	840	840
Countries	144	145	145
R-sqr	0.456	0.391	0.364

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

5c. Cinc

Some may argue that the stronger a country is in relative terms the harder it may be for the intervener to meddle in its elections in an effective manner. As the target becomes stronger in relative terms, threats of various kinds may seem less threatening and/or the concessions /promises that the great power needs offer in order to sway the electorate may not be as impressive (or felt as necessary) as they may seem to citizens of a smaller country. Likewise, country strength is many times correlated with multiple factors (geographical size, widespread ownership of T.V.s/electronic media, wealth etc.) that usually increase the costs of election campaigns and therefore of the magnitude covert electoral funding which the intervener needs to give the side it aids to be effective. Indeed, in extremis, it may be impossible for the great power to covertly provide enough resources for the preferred side without running a very high risk of getting caught. I accordingly, as a further robustness check, included in the following models a logged Cinc measure as a control and then interacted it with the electoral intervention variables. No significant effects were found for this measure.

Table 7.5 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Cinc as control & interaction w/E.Int (hypo 1)

	(1) HS& Cinc	(2) Model Kp4 & Cinc	(3) Model Kp7 & Cinc	(4) HS& interaction w/Cinc	(5) Model Kp4 & interaction w/Cinc	(6) Model Kp7 & interaction w/Cinc
Electoral Intervention Cinc *E.Int.	3.075* (1.202)	3.446** (1.181)	3.048* (1.203)	0.378 (2.585) -0.483 (0.505)	-0.770 (2.420) -0.755 (0.481)	-1.323 (2.450) -0.790 (0.495)
Previous vote	0.370** (0.0508)	0.394** (0.0528)	0.385** (0.0599)	0.369** (0.0509)	0.394** (0.0529)	0.386** (0.0598)
Growth	0.557** (0.105)			0.559** (0.105)		
Trade Openness	1.259 (1.378)			1.284 (1.381)		
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.292* (0.134)			-0.301* (0.133)		
Presidential Election	-2.165 (2.085)			-2.121 (2.111)		
Growth*Pres. Election	0.0456 (0.165)			0.0337 (0.166)		
Re-election	8.389** (1.687)			8.359** (1.704)		

Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-14.36** (1.943)	-14.79** (2.034)	-13.91** (2.345)	-14.36** (1.955)	-14.78** (2.048)	-13.91** (2.366)
Africa	1.394 (2.835)			1.413 (2.847)		
Asia	-4.592** (1.545)			-4.598** (1.556)		
Central & E.Europe	-5.334** (1.847)			-5.211** (1.885)		
L.America & Caribbean	-1.670 (1.683)			-1.638 (1.687)		
Cinc (logged)	0.375 (0.279)	0.640 (0.569)	1.569 (1.384)	1.353 (1.020)	2.143 ⁺ (1.120)	3.083 ⁺ (1.619)
Global Growth		0.611 (0.398)	0.567 (0.413)		0.617 (0.400)	0.576 (0.415)
Local Growth		0.145* (0.0730)	0.175* (0.0811)		0.141 ⁺ (0.0742)	0.171* (0.0825)
Population (logged)		-0.406 (0.717)	1.976 (3.509)		-0.375 (0.726)	2.139 (3.545)
Year		0.0124 (0.0353)	-0.0361 (0.0481)		0.0136 (0.0360)	-0.0370 (0.0487)
Constant	39.59** (4.054)	17.56 (68.08)	98.41 (75.77)	39.65** (4.063)	15.01 (69.23)	98.31 (76.61)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.549	0.494	0.338	0.548	0.495	0.335

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7.6 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Cinc as control & interaction (hypo 2)

	(1) HS& Cinc	(2) Model Kp4 & Cinc	(3) Model Kp7 & Cinc	(4) HS& interaction w/Cinc	(5) Model Kp4 & interaction w/Cinc	(6) Model Kp7 & interaction w/Cinc
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Overt Int.	5.380*	5.569*	5.334*	3.043	2.091	2.320
	(2.268)	(2.295)	(2.397)	(4.573)	(4.672)	(4.611)
Covert Int.	2.157	2.568*	2.066	0.507	-1.003	-1.791
	(1.408)	(1.289)	(1.301)	(3.838)	(3.601)	(3.559)
Overt Int.* Cinc				-0.425	-0.633	-0.554
				(0.888)	(0.935)	(0.959)
Covert Int.* Cinc				-0.288	-0.622	-0.678
				(0.675)	(0.630)	(0.626)
Covert & Overt	-10.69 ⁺	-9.930	-11.57	-10.15	-9.026	-10.61
	(6.005)	(6.287)	(7.874)	(6.446)	(6.923)	(8.184)
Previous vote	0.373**	0.397**	0.387**	0.372**	0.397**	0.387**
	(0.0512)	(0.0534)	(0.0605)	(0.0516)	(0.0537)	(0.0608)
Growth	0.543**			0.543**		
	(0.107)			(0.110)		
Trade Openness	0.987			0.992		
	(1.385)			(1.394)		
Growth*Trade	-0.267*			-0.271*		
	(0.134)			(0.137)		
Openness						
Presidential	-2.325			-2.288		
Election	(2.106)			(2.135)		
Growth*Pres.	0.0140			0.00707		
Election	(0.167)			(0.168)		
Re-election	8.832**			8.803**		
	(1.622)			(1.661)		
Effective num. of	-14.38**	-14.80**	-13.94**	-14.39**	-14.81**	-13.97**
Parties (logged)	(1.925)	(2.013)	(2.353)	(1.938)	(2.025)	(2.379)
Africa	1.344			1.372		
	(2.860)			(2.873)		
Asia	-4.390**			-4.414**		
	(1.558)			(1.568)		
Central &	-5.044**			-4.941*		
E.Europe	(1.920)			(1.967)		
L.America &	-1.360			-1.338		
Caribbean	(1.696)			(1.712)		
Cinc (logged)	0.387	0.636	1.564	1.821	3.145	4.003
	(0.281)	(0.579)	(1.425)	(2.060)	(2.233)	(2.544)
Global Growth		0.580	0.531		0.589	0.543
		(0.398)	(0.412)		(0.401)	(0.417)
Local Growth		0.135 ⁺	0.165 ⁺		0.132 ⁺	0.162 ⁺
		(0.0775)	(0.0846)		(0.0788)	(0.0858)
Population		-0.386	2.334		-0.366	2.439
(logged)		(0.730)	(3.572)		(0.735)	(3.606)
Year		0.00791	-0.0466		0.00930	-0.0467
		(0.0357)	(0.0495)		(0.0361)	(0.0500)
Constant	39.69**	26.43	116.3	39.76**	23.50	115.2
	(4.064)	(68.54)	(77.38)	(4.089)	(69.28)	(77.88)
Elections (N)	698	700	700	698	700	700
Countries	121	122	122	121	122	122
R-sqr	0.550	0.496	0.320	0.549	0.497	0.317

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7.7 appendix Further Robustness Checks- Cinc as control & triple interaction (hypo 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	HS& Cinc	Model Kp4 &	Model	HS&	Model Kp4 &	Model Kp7 &

		Cinc	Kp7 & Cinc	interaction w/Cinc	interaction w/Cinc	interaction w/Cinc
Electoral	13.16**	12.31**	12.36**	21.96	23.12	26.48
Intervention	(4.220)	(3.783)	(4.490)	(24.09)	(22.29)	(28.58)
Int*Founding	-10.02**	-8.921**	-9.313*	-22.50	-24.31	-28.44
Election	(3.656)	(3.122)	(3.932)	(23.45)	(21.60)	(28.10)
Founding Election	2.882*	3.941**	2.761	6.897	2.796	3.179
	(1.464)	(1.435)	(1.724)	(5.754)	(5.965)	(6.862)
E.Int*Cinc*				-2.117	-2.597	-3.228
Founding Election				(3.947)	(3.797)	(4.946)
Growth	0.535**			0.537**		
	(0.116)			(0.116)		
Trade Openness	2.139			2.115		
	(1.470)			(1.485)		
Growth*Trade	-0.337*			-0.344*		
Openness	(0.149)			(0.148)		
Presidential Election	1.518			1.415		
	(2.010)			(2.031)		
Growth*Pres.	-0.116			-0.122		
Election	(0.143)			(0.142)		
Re-election	7.948**			8.006**		
	(1.644)			(1.674)		
Effective num. of	-22.71**	-22.67**	-20.37**	-22.61**	-22.56**	-20.27**
Parties (logged)	(1.729)	(1.784)	(2.287)	(1.736)	(1.792)	(2.303)
Africa	-1.178			-0.860		
	(2.501)			(2.487)		
Asia	-3.756*			-3.890*		
	(1.495)			(1.513)		
Central & E.Europe	-4.587*			-4.515*		
	(1.941)			(1.987)		
L.America &	-2.267			-2.265		
Caribbean	(1.843)			(1.832)		
Cinc (logged)	0.553 ⁺	0.604	0.285	-3.060	-2.812	-4.562
	(0.296)	(0.602)	(1.611)	(8.291)	(8.111)	(10.52)
Global Growth		0.546	0.450		0.538	0.439
		(0.413)	(0.424)		(0.417)	(0.428)
Local Growth		0.0440	0.0686		0.0402	0.0640
		(0.0614)	(0.0717)		(0.0620)	(0.0727)
Population (logged)		-0.226	-2.761		-0.178	-2.468
		(0.786)	(3.541)		(0.789)	(3.529)
Year		-0.00824	-0.0105		-0.00711	-0.0126
		(0.0359)	(0.0555)		(0.0368)	(0.0563)
Cinc*E.Int				1.476	1.796	2.347
				(4.078)	(3.951)	(5.062)
Cinc* Founding				0.594	-0.167	0.0621
Election				(0.801)	(0.808)	(0.923)
Constant	61.07**	78.54	102.5	56.55**	76.99	103.0
	(3.074)	(69.27)	(90.43)	(6.599)	(70.26)	(91.00)
Elections (N)	839	841	841	839	841	841
Countries	144	145	145	144	145	145
R-sqr	0.458	0.394	0.292	0.458	0.395	0.302

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

6. Robustness check (Hypothesis 2)- Exposed covert interventions

Some may wonder, given the results found in the article as to the second hypothesis, whether the differences found in the effectiveness between covert and overt interventions in favor of the latter are simply due to the cases in which the covert interventions were exposed prior to the election and the resulting political ‘fallout’ . In order to investigate that possibility, I excluded in the table below the small number of cases of U.S. or Soviet/ Russian covert interventions for which clear evidence about this activity was found and became well known to the public of the intervener prior to election day³⁵. As can be seen from this table this had little effect on the results. The absolute substantive difference between covert and overt interventions remains unchanged and the variable for covert interventions becomes in some models, as in some models in the article, insignificant nevertheless.

Table 8.1 appendix Further Robustness Check for hypo 2- exposed covert intervention control

	(1) HS	(2) HS& fraud	(3) HS & Fixed effects	(4) KP 4	(5) KP 4 & fraud	(6) KP 7
Overt Int.	5.478* (2.283)	5.250* (2.354)	5.454* (2.416)	5.549* (2.302)	5.295* (2.369)	5.215* (2.399)
Covert Int.	2.023 (1.322)	2.069 (1.258)	1.676 (1.341)	2.124+ (1.165)	1.991+ (1.157)	1.642 (1.216)
Covert & Overt	-10.23+ (6.086)	-10.08 (6.157)	-13.50 (8.684)	-10.09 (6.217)	-10.07 (6.321)	-11.81 (7.671)
Previous vote	0.362** (0.0530)	0.384** (0.0581)	0.359** (0.0584)	0.390** (0.0547)	0.407** (0.0610)	0.375** (0.0624)
Growth	0.532** (0.108)	0.489** (0.147)	0.505** (0.104)			
Trade Openness	-0.105 (1.389)	0.513 (1.597)	-2.199 (2.197)			
Growth*Trade Openness	-0.247+ (0.134)	-0.212 (0.172)	-0.157 (0.121)			
Presidential Election	-1.820 (1.995)	-3.027 (2.172)	-5.082 (3.487)			

³⁵ For example of one such exposed covert operation, in the 1989 Panamanian election, Panamanian strongman, Manuel Noriega, caught a some of the CIA operatives red handed while aiding the Panamanian opposition & and they and their equipment were shown on Panamanian TV a few weeks before the elections.

Growth*Pres.	-0.00351	0.0170	0.0843			
Election	(0.165)	(0.201)	(0.185)			
Re-election	8.610**	9.023**	9.345**			
	(1.607)	(1.844)	(1.749)			
Effective num. of	-14.51**	-13.44**	-13.58**	-14.80**	-13.23**	-14.06**
Parties (logged)	(1.872)	(2.091)	(2.184)	(1.973)	(2.220)	(2.306)
GDP Per Capita	0.763	0.481	0.848			
(logged)	(0.730)	(0.819)	(1.169)			
Africa	2.691	-0.0483	‡			
	(3.096)	(3.546)				
Asia	-3.284	-4.558 ⁺	‡			
	(2.033)	(2.390)				
Central & E.Europe	-4.346*	-5.850**	‡			
	(1.900)	(2.142)				
L.America &	-1.337	-1.404	‡			
Caribbean	(1.501)	(1.677)				
Global Growth				0.482	0.331	0.470
				(0.417)	(0.439)	(0.432)
Local Growth				0.128 ⁺	0.109	0.157 ⁺
				(0.0756)	(0.0783)	(0.0821)
Population (logged)				0.335	0.186	3.981
				(0.310)	(0.323)	(3.396)
Year				-0.00709	-0.0201	-0.0696
				(0.0346)	(0.0370)	(0.0487)
Constant	31.24**	31.86**	30.81**	46.36	70.87	138.1 ⁺
	(7.646)	(8.261)	(10.46)	(69.50)	(74.10)	(79.60)
Elections (N)	695	631	695	697	633	697
Countries	121	113	121	122	114	122
R-sqr	0.551	0.526	0.528	0.493	0.467	0.325

Standard errors in parentheses ⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

7. Robustness check (Hypothesis 3) alternative target electoral experience measure

Some may wonder whether, if the interaction was done with a graded electoral experience

measure (i.e. one in which I permit electoral experience to increase as the number of consecutive competitive elections in the target increases rather than founding/ non-founding coding) similar results would have been found as with the dichotomous measure. Accordingly, in the following models, I interacted the electoral intervention variable with a such a graded electoral experience measure (see the previous section for a description of its construction). The results found are similar i.e. with aided candidates/parties benefiting more from such interventions as their (and their country's) experience with competitive elections increases. However this result (unlike for the dictomous measure) is marginally significant (only at the 0.1 level) and loses its insignificant under some subsequent robustness checks.

Table 9.1 appendix Alternate experience election interaction (logged experience variable) (hypo 3)

	(1) HS	(2) HS& fraud	(3) HS & Fixed effects	(4) KP 4	(5) KP 4 & fraud	(6) KP 7
Electoral Intervention	-2.300 (2.551)	-2.349 (2.635)	-2.960 (2.897)	-1.343 (2.085)	-1.034 (2.242)	-2.170 (2.684)
Electoral experience (logged)	-2.064** (0.677)	-1.840** (0.713)	-2.947** (0.832)	-1.352* (0.636)	-0.629 (0.707)	-0.647 (0.979)
E.Int.*E. Experience	2.907+ (1.587)	2.885+ (1.624)	3.204+ (1.719)	2.389+ (1.370)	2.189 (1.436)	2.767+ (1.643)
Growth	0.529** (0.116)	0.590** (0.136)	0.559** (0.121)			
Trade Openness	1.180 (1.512)	1.999 (1.443)	1.679 (2.427)			
Growth*Trade	-0.327* (0.151)	-0.392* (0.179)	-0.355* (0.164)			
Openness						
Presidential Election	2.156 (1.826)	0.483 (2.160)	-1.650 (3.623)			
Growth*Pres. Election	-0.133 (0.145)	-0.0583 (0.185)	-0.0159 (0.162)			
Re-election	7.984** (1.652)	8.366** (1.790)	9.613** (1.745)			
Effective num. of Parties (logged)	-22.27** (1.745)	-20.67** (1.983)	-20.55** (2.219)	-22.73** (1.845)	-20.98** (2.086)	-20.58** (2.315)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	1.780* (0.766)	1.554+ (0.850)	2.712* (1.332)			
Africa	0.301 (2.808)	-0.336 (3.173)	‡			

Asia	-2.078 (1.988)	-3.262 (2.361)	‡			
Central & E.Europe	-5.390** (2.074)	-7.122** (2.144)	‡			
L.America & Caribbean	-2.996+ (1.722)	-2.347 (1.863)	‡			
Global Growth				0.460 (0.414)	0.452 (0.436)	0.364 (0.420)
Local Growth				0.0491 (0.0589)	0.0677 (0.0674)	0.0692 (0.0679)
Population (logged)				0.525 (0.361)	0.315 (0.374)	-2.936 (3.159)
Year				0.00128 (0.0376)	-0.0180 (0.0409)	0.000655 (0.0584)
Constant	47.63** (7.143)	47.27** (8.074)	38.47** (11.03)	55.68 (74.40)	91.98 (81.02)	84.88 (103.6)
Elections (N)	839	739	839	841	741	841
Countries	144	131	144	145	132	145
R-sqr	0.451	0.410	0.421	0.377	0.338	0.255

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

‡ Country invariant variables dropped by Stata 11 when calculating country fixed effects

8. Simulation-summary results

As noted in the main text (pg. 19), in order to check for possible effects of selection bias due to

possible covert interventions during the period in question which are still secret I conducted a simulation of their possible effects. This simulation was done by dropping up to about 5% of all known cases of covert interventions in my electoral interventions dataset (examining all possible combinations of such “missed” covert interventions) re-estimating my main models for each hypothesis without them and then averaging the results across all possible combinations of “missing” interventions. Approximately 120,000 versions of each model were simulated and then averaged for this purpose for each hypothesis (about 60,000 for the HS model and 60,000 for the KP model)³⁶. In each of the following tables the simulated averaged results for the main variable of interest for each of the three hypotheses is shown. While, as expected, the standard error for my main explanatory variable(s) became a bit larger on average, the results in each one of them, for each of the hypotheses, remained otherwise the same.

Simulations- Hypothesis 1³⁷

	(1) HS	(2) KP
Electoral Intervention (2 drop 2485 models)	3.208 ^{**} (1.241)	3.429 ^{**} (1.198)
Electoral Intervention (3 drop 57155 models)	3.218 [*] (1.248)	3.437 ^{**} (1.21)

Note: The electoral intervention variable, in the two drop simulation (HS model) is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in all of the 2485 models run. The electoral intervention variable, in the three drop simulation (HS model), is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in the 57,155 models run with one exception (which is significant at 0.0508). In the KP model the electoral intervention variable is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) under both the two drop and three drop simulations (all 60,000 or so models run).

Simulations- Hypothesis 2³⁸

³⁶ Simulating the “missingness” of a higher percentage of covert interventions would have required the estimate of a million or more versions of each model. That would have been both computationally prohibitive using conventional computing resources as well as probably larger than the likely amount of missing cases of this type, if indeed any have actually been missed.

³⁷ The models simulated are model 1 in table 1.1 (HS) and model 12 in table 1.3 (KP).

³⁸ The models simulated are model 1 (HS) & 4 (KP) in table 2.1.

	(1) HS	(2) KP
Overt Int. (2 drop 2485 models)	5.432* (2.277)	5.512* (2.292)
Covert Int. (2 drop 2485 models)	2.254 (1.444)	2.557+ (1.314)
Overt Int. (3 drop 57155 models)	5.435* (2.277)	5.515* (2.292)
Covert Int. (3 drop 57155 models)	2.253 (1.454)	2.556+ (1.326)

Note: The overt electoral intervention variable is, not surprisingly, significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in all the HS and KP simulations. However in most of the simulated models the covert intervention variable isn't significant. For example in the three drop simulation of the HS model the covert intervention variable is significant at the 0.05 level in only 3.6% (2063) of the 57,155 models and in only 21.6% (12,357) of the models is it significant even at the 0.1 level.

Simulations- Hypothesis 3³⁹

	(1) HS	(2) KP
E.Int*Founding Election (2 drop 2485 models)	-10.00** (3.679)	-9.024** (3.137)
E.Int*Founding Election (3 drop 57155 models)	-10.04** (3.693)	-9.064** (3.149)

Note: The electoral intervention interaction, in the two drop simulation (HS model) is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in all of the 2485 models run. The electoral intervention interaction, in the three drop simulation (HS model), is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) in the 57,155 models run with two exception (which are significant at 0.055). In the KP model the electoral intervention variable is significant at the 0.05 level (or lower) under both the two drop and three drop simulations (all 60,000 or so models run).

Appendix 5.3: Defining an intervenable/competitive election- further description

As noted in the main text, I define an intervenable/competitive election, or the universe of

³⁹ The models simulated are model 1 (HS) & (KP) in table 3.1.

cases in which electoral interventions can potentially occur, as one that receives 7 out of 7 on the 2010 DPI's (Database of Political Institutions) executive electoral competitiveness index (Beck et.al 2001) with a small modification. For an election to get that score, multiple parties (in parliamentary systems) won seats in the election and the largest party received less than 75% of the vote, or, in presidential or semi-presidential systems, multiple candidates ran and the winning candidate won less than 75% of the vote. Although rarely used in IR, this is a frequently used measure in Comparative Politics (for examples see Brownlee 2009; He 2007; Triesman 2007).

As with other important concepts, other definitions (or operationalizations) of competitive elections exist of course in the comparative politics literature besides that of the DPI. These alternative definitions may have significant utility in investigating other important phenomenon (for studies in comparative politics on other phenomenon which use different criteria for electoral competitiveness see for example Rosseler and Howard 2009:110-111; Gandhi and Reuter 2013:146-147). The definition used here was chosen, besides its widespread use, due to the fact that it was judged by the author to be as close an approximation as possible of the information available to a would be intervener about the competitiveness of an upcoming election in a would-be target. The DPI's criteria was also seen by the author, based upon his research on this topic, as coming the closest among existing measures to reflecting the process and major criteria by which decision-makers in the would-be intervener usually judges whether an election is intervenable or not.

To give one illustrative example, the DPI's criteria do not exclude relatively competitive elections just because they happened to occur in a regime which is categorized as less (or even far less) than fully democratic or "competitive authoritarian" regimes- such as the Philippines

under Marcos (after the imposition of martial law) or Yugoslavia under Milosevic. From the case studies, as well as an analysis of the preliminary list of cases of interventions with which the data collection process began, it became clear to the author that relatively competitive elections, even in such regimes (and even if the playing field is significantly tilted in favor of one of the sides), can be and often are tempting targets for interveners. Accordingly, the DPI's lack of a regime criteria in its definition of what is a competitive election approximates quite well the lack of such an excluding criteria by the decision-makers in the would-be intervener.

Of course, it is possible in theory that an intervened election became competitive only because of the partisan intervention. However given that, with four exceptions, the incumbent vote share in all of the intervened elections is 10% or more below the 75% cutoff (or a much larger margin than any of the effects by an electoral intervention found in this study on the results) this is highly unlikely to have been usually the case. Likewise, in the very few cases in which such an intervention had occurred in a non-competitive election (according to the DPI's definition), the non-competitiveness of the election was usually due to a last moment, unexpected shift in its competitiveness (such as a last moment mass boycott of the election by the opposition parties/candidates etc.).⁴⁰

Appendix 6.1: Analysis of the 1992 Israeli election survey: regression models, description of variables, and robustness checks

⁴⁰ Four cases of partisan electoral interventions had occurred in elections which weren't competitive following this criteria (Bolivia 1964, Chile 1988, South Vietnam 1961 and 1971) usually due to last moment boycotts of the elections by one of the major sides which were widely expected to contest them or (in the Chilean case) a rare example of a relatively competitive plebiscite.

6.1 Dependent variable a dichotomous variable with 1 coding a vote for left bloc parties (including the Labor party) and 0 for right bloc parties (including the Likud)⁴¹. Following Shachar and Shamir's coding (1995:73), parties which are coded as belonging to the left bloc were the Labor party, Metertz, Hadash (DFPE), Progressive list for Peace (PLP) and the Democratic Arab party. Parties which were coded as belonging to the right wing bloc include the Likud, Tzomet, Moledet, Tehiya and the Mafdal/National Religious party. The small number of votes (around 5%) to parties which couldn't be clearly designated at the time as being in either bloc such as the ultra orthodox religious parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism etc.), the Moda'i splinter party (new liberal party) and other minor one issue parties (Russian immigrant parties etc.) were excluded.

6.2 Independent variables and Controls

6.2.1 Variables in main model (see table 9 model 1 and other models): For this purpose I largely adopted the model used by Shachar and Shamir (1995: chp.2) with a few modifications. First, in order to create the performance evaluations on the security and foreign policy performance evaluations Shachar and Shamir created scales composed of questions on general evaluations of security and foreign policy performance as well as questions asking for evaluations of more specifically related questions/items as to each factor. The same thing was done as to the performance evaluations on the economic issues.

However using factor analysis (both the Scree plots as well as the Kaiser criteria) I determined that in order to capture these factors constructing these two scales were unnecessary-

⁴¹ Following Shachar and Shamir's coding (1995:73).

the two general evaluation items were all that were necessary in order to fully capture them (both the security & fp and the economic measures)⁴². Accordingly, for each measure I only included the general evaluation. As part of later robustness checks, the other questions used in order to construct these scales were added as separate controls. However, I found that they didn't affect the results found as to my variable of interest.

Likewise, Shachar and Shamir excluded from their final model various socio-demographic variables claiming that none of these factors were significant in a full preliminary model. However, in my attempt to replicate their model I found that some of these variables (age, ethnicity, and in some models, religiosity) were indeed significant. Furthermore, given what we know about the substantive importance of each of these three factors included in my model to vote choice by Israelis then and now (see later description), excluding these factors would create a flawed vote choice model which may lead to incorrect inferences.

The response rate to the questions included in the main model and controls was very high- 95% to 97% and above in the various questions. For example, on the question on U.S.-Israel relations, which is used to create the independent variable of interest, the response rate was 97.8%. Indeed most of the respondents which were dropped from the statistical models were excluded because of their responses on the dependent variable (vote choice). Given that this survey was done before the elections about 8.3% of the respondents still haven't made a choice. Another 8% or so were excluded b/c of deciding not to vote in this election and/or for parties which can't be fit into either the right or left wing bloc (see main text). Due to the non-imputable

⁴² The question of interest here, the U.S.-II relations was initially part of the Security and FP scale. Naturally it wasn't included in this analysis and is entered separately in the model.

nature for most of the missing data (and the high rates of response for most questions which are used to create the independent variables) I decided not to use multiple imputation in this case.

6.2.2 Specific variables (components of the base model and later robustness checks):

General performance evaluation on Security and Foreign Policy: This measure used a question asking respondents “who will take better care of the country’s foreign affairs and security problems - the Labor team or the Likud team?”. The respondents could then choose whether the Labor team will do better, the Likud team will do better or both were equally good/neither. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw the Labor party team as better, -1 to those who saw the Likud party team as better and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Past bloc vote in the 1988 election: the last parliamentary election before the one discussed here (i.e. party attachment). Respondents were asked to list the party to which they voted for and their responses were categorized in a similar manner as in the dichotomous variable. The one significant party that ran in 1988 but not in 1992 (Meimad) was coded as part of the left bloc. Likewise the three parties from which Meretz was created in 1992 (Ratz, Mapam, Shinuie) were also coded as part of the left bloc.

Following Shachar and Shamir’s operationalization (1995:74), This measure was operationalized as trichotomous with 1 for those who voted for the left bloc, -1 for those who voted for the right bloc and those who didn’t vote in the previous election for one reason or another coded as 0. This operationalization was done, as in the case of Shachar and Shamir, in order to enable the inclusion of the very large number of voters for whom this was the first time

that they have ever voted (either b/c of age and/or very recent immigration to Israel from the former USSR etc.)- 19.8% of those surveyed in the sample and 19% of the general electorate in 1992 (Diskin 1993:3).

Territories Issue:Following Shachar and Shamir's operationalization (1995:74) this scale was created out of two questions. The first question asked the respondent to choose between "three proposals for long-term settlement for the problem of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip". They were then able too choose between the return of most of Judea, Samariaand the Gaze Strip in return to a peace settlement, the Annexation of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip or the Status quo (as of 1992- which was of course prior to the 1993 Oslo agreement etc.). Those who preferred the status quo were asked, in the next question, to choose between he first two options. This created a five point scale (the middle option were those who refused to choose even in the second question).This scale was then transformed into a -1 to 1 range, with 1 being those who immediately chose annexation and -1 those who immediately chose the return of the territories in return for a peace agreement.

Corruption:The respondents were asked to which party the description "A party with significant corruption" fit. They could then choose whether this characteristicsuitedthe Labor party more,suitedthe Likud more or both were equally suited or suited neither party. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw the Labor party as more corrupt,-1 to those who saw the Likud as more corrupt and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to corruption.

General performance evaluation on economic policy: This measure used a questionasking respondents "Who do you think will take better care of the country's economic

problems -the Labor team or the Likud team?” They could then choose whether the Labor team will do better, the Likud team do better or both were equally good / neither. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw the Labor party team as better,-1 to those who saw the Likud party team as better and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Candidate evaluation: Following Shachar and Shamir’s operationalization (1995:71), this scale was created out of a set of eight characteristics on which respondents were asked to state “if it best describes Yitzhak Shamir or Yitzhak Rabin”. These eight characteristics were leadership abilities, strong, decisive, places benefit of the country before party, has initiative, good negotiator, and able to stand stressful situations. The respondents then could choose between responding that this fits Shamir more, fits Rabin more or fits both/neither. Each characteristic was then rescaled into a -1 to 1 range with 1 being fitting Shamir more and -1 fitting Rabin more and 0 fitting neither one. Then the average of these eight characteristics was then taken for each respondent.

Religiosity: This control was measured using a four point subjective scale in which respondents were asked to report the extent to which they keep the Jewish religious tradition (observe them thoroughly, to a great extent, to a small extent, not at all/secular). This scale was then turned into a four point scale ranging from 1 (thoroughly observe) to 4 (not at all/secular).

Age: Exact year as provided by the respondent.

Ethnicity: This control was measured, as in most is Israeli studies on this topic (Shachar and Shamir 1995:73), by asking the respondent the country from which s/he and/or his/her father came from. Respondents who noted their (or their fathers) country of origin as being in the Middle East (except Israel) North Africa or Asia were coded as Sephardic (or 1), and the rest as 0.

6.3 Other Controls/ Robustness checks

Income (see table 9.1, model 2): while the relationship between income and vote choice has been found in the Israeli case during this era to be quite weak (Shachar and Shamir 1995:60), the finding of strong relationships of this kind in other countries (Gelman et al. 2007) makes this nevertheless a useful robustness check. This control was measured using a five point subjective scale in which they were given the then average monthly expenditure (4300 NIS) for an Israeli household and asked whether their own expenditure was significantly below average, somewhat below average, average, somewhat above average or significantly above average. This scale was then transformed into a -1 to 1 range with 1 being significantly above average and -1 significantly below average.

Absorbs Aliyah (see table 9.1, model 3): Performance evaluation on the ability to absorb the Jews immigrating to Israel was, given the big influx of immigration from the former USSR and Ethiopia over the previous three years, a hotly discussed topic during this Israeli election campaign (see for examples Goldberg 1994:165-166,168). Also, as a factor directly related to one of the ways that the U.S. intervened in this election (the 10 billion dollars in loan guarantees), it is important to make sure that our finding isn't just capturing concern as to this

issue in particular rather than a more general influence of the U.S. intervention. The respondents were asked to which party the description “A party that will know how to absorb immigration” best applied. They could then choose whether this characteristic suited the Labor party more, suited the Likud more or both were equally suited or suited neither party. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw it as more suitable to the Labor party, -1 to those who saw it as more suitable to the Likud and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Post-material values (see table 9.1, model 4): This measure, made famous by Inglehart (2006) as a representative of a major, general shift in western values over the past forty years, was used by Duch and Stevenson (2008:90-92) as a control in their cross national estimates of the economic vote in various election surveys in western countries between 1979 and 2001. They have found that shift on such values in either direction to predict on average a change of about 4% in the vote share. The original Inglehart items were unfortunately not asked in this survey. Instead, I use a question which measures some of these values, a value which is found to be very highly correlated with Inglehart’s own measure- preferences about the environment (see Inglehart 2006:139). This question asked respondents (as one of a battery of such questions on various issues/institutions) whether “in your opinion, should the state spend more money, less money or to the same extent it spends now” on preserving nature and protecting the environment. The respondents could then choose between spending more, spending less, or leaving the amount of spending as is. This scale was then transformed into a -1 to 1 range with 1 being spend more and -1 spend less.

Brings peace (see table 9.1, model 5): Performance evaluation on the ability to bring long lasting peace between Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel's neighbors was then (as now), an important factor in determining some voters vote choice as well as one hotly discussed during Israeli election campaigns. The respondents were asked to which party the description "A party that can achieve a true peace with the Arabs" best applied. They could then choose whether this characteristic suited the Labor party more, suited the Likud more or both were equally suited or suited neither party. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw it as more suitable to the Labor party, -1 to those who saw it as more suitable to the Likud and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Ends intifada (see table 9.2, model 6): Performance evaluation on the ability to end the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) and the failure of the Likud government to do so is believed by some researchers to have been an important fact that led to the defeat of the Likud in this election (Arian and Shamir 1995:40). The respondents were asked to which party the description "A party that will return tranquility and order to the territories" best applied. They could then choose whether this characteristic suited the Labor party more, suited the Likud more or both were equally suited or suited neither party. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw it as more suitable to the Labor party, -1 to those who saw it as more suitable to the Likud and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Unemployment (see table 9.2, model 7): Performance evaluation on the ability to reduce unemployment is an important additional control to the general question on economic performance. This is due to the potentially high salience that unemployment may have in Israel

when judging a governments economic performance- unemployment figures (unlike those of quarterly/yearly GDP growth) are frequently noted and highlighted in the Israeli media. The respondents were asked to which party the description “A party that will know how to decrease unemployment” best applied. They could then choose whether this characteristicsuitedthe Labor party more,suitedthe Likud more or both were equally suited or suited neither party. I then operationalized this question into a trichotomous measure with 1 for those who saw it as more suitable to the Labor party, -1 to those who saw it as more suitable to the Likud, and 0 for those who saw both parties as being the same as to this factor.

Economic issues (see table 9.2, model 8): The question as to which economic system is best for the Jewish state, socialism or capitalism, used to be a secondary yet important issue differentiating Zionist parties during much of the 20th century with the Israeli Zionist left (including the Labor party) also being strong supporters of socialist and social-democratic policies while the Zionist right (including the parties that eventually created the Likud) supportive of more capitalist policies. While, by the early 1990s, this issue is usually believed to have lost much of its salience in Israel due to various local and international developments, this is nevertheless a useful robustness check. Respondents were asked “As to the country’s economic structure, do you support a more socialist approach or a more capitalist one?”. They then could choose between absolutely capitalist, more capitalist than socialist, more socialist than capitalist or absolutely socialist.This scale was then turned into a four point scale ranging from 1 (absolutely capitalist) to 4 (absolutely socialist).

Political ideology (see table 9.2, model 9): This factor was used by Duch and Stevenson (2008:87-90) as a control in their cross national estimate of the economic vote in various election

surveys in western countries between 1979 and 2001. They have found that shift on such values in either direction to predict on average a change of about 4% in the vote share. This is also a factor widely seen in the literature on voting in the western world as having one of the strongest predictive effects on vote choice (ibid.:87). Accordingly this is a useful further robustness check.⁴³ Respondents were asked “With which political tendency do you identify”. They could choose between left, moderate left, center, moderate right, right. A small number of other responses which don’t fit on this scale were dropped. This scale was then transformed into a -1 to 1 range with 1 being those who defined themselves as being on the right and -1 those defined themselves on the left.

Gender (see table 9.2, model 10): As in the case of income, while the relationship between gender and vote choice has been found in the Israeli case during this era to be quite weak (Shachar and Shamir 1995:60), the finding of strong relationships of this kind in other countries (Channey et.al 1998) makes this nevertheless a useful robustness check. 0 is female and 1 male.

Logit (see table 9.2, model 11): In order to make sure that the results were not model dependent, I ran the main model (model 1) using Logit instead of Probit. The results were essentially the same both in the statistical and substantive sense. Running the other robustness checks in Logit (not shown) gave essentially the same results as well.

Table 9.1 appendix: 1992 Israeli election survey- base model & robustness checks (prt.1)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Base Model	& Income	& Aliyah	& Post Material	& Brings Peace

⁴³The measure used by Duch and Stevenson usually had 10 units-rather than five as in the one used here. However this is unlikely, given the dichotomous nature of our independent variable, to matter much in this case.

U.S. IL relations	0.386** (0.0740)	0.389** (0.0712)	0.281* (0.0971)	0.377** (0.0695)	0.213* (0.0816)
Performance Sec. & FP	0.787** (0.0602)	0.808** (0.0543)	0.778** (0.0585)	0.808** (0.0569)	0.697** (0.0542)
1988 bloc vote	0.761** (0.0673)	0.741** (0.0689)	0.736** (0.0721)	0.748** (0.0663)	0.738** (0.0719)
Territories issue	-0.491** (0.107)	-0.490** (0.108)	-0.499** (0.108)	-0.485** (0.105)	-0.483** (0.111)
Corruption	-0.384** (0.105)	-0.393** (0.114)	-0.368** (0.108)	-0.378** (0.120)	-0.399** (0.120)
Performance Econ.	0.246** (0.0746)	0.236* (0.0819)	0.214** (0.0584)	0.240** (0.0796)	0.273** (0.0761)
Candidate evaluation	-0.701** (0.205)	-0.683** (0.206)	-0.590** (0.187)	-0.718** (0.197)	-0.535* (0.212)
Ethnic background	-0.303* (0.124)	-0.305* (0.124)	-0.297* (0.116)	-0.241+ (0.133)	-0.212+ (0.114)
Age	0.0206** (0.00382)	0.0216** (0.00430)	0.0207** (0.00395)	0.0211** (0.00394)	0.0218** (0.00404)
Religiosity	0.368* (0.134)	0.368* (0.133)	0.329* (0.131)	0.348* (0.153)	0.327+ (0.160)
Income		0.0857 (0.0948)			
Absorbs Aliyah			0.284+ (0.151)		
Post-Material values				0.300 (0.193)	
Brings peace					0.512** (0.161)
Constant	-1.979** (0.469)	-2.024** (0.456)	-1.853** (0.468)	-2.013** (0.494)	-1.883** (0.563)
Respondents	879	856	871	869	876

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 9.2 appendix: 1992 Israeli election survey- further robustness checks

	(6) & Intifada	(7) & Unemployment	(8) & Econ. Iss.	(9) & Ideology	(10) & Gender	(11) In Logit
U.S. IL relations	0.231* (0.0826)	0.269** (0.0728)	0.384** (0.0768)	0.306** (0.100)	0.392** (0.0661)	0.886** (0.154)
Performance Sec. & FP	0.715** (0.0878)	0.789** (0.0642)	0.793** (0.0716)	0.617** (0.0675)	0.784** (0.0623)	1.487** (0.140)
1988 bloc vote	0.755** (0.0851)	0.756** (0.0657)	0.746** (0.0668)	0.615** (0.128)	0.752** (0.0663)	1.395** (0.128)
Territories issue	-0.480** (0.0995)	-0.497** (0.118)	-0.499** (0.0973)	-0.392** (0.0941)	-0.494** (0.110)	-0.981** (0.227)
Corruption	-0.444** (0.143)	-0.358** (0.116)	-0.392** (0.0965)	-0.794** (0.205)	-0.387** (0.110)	-0.696** (0.203)

Performance Econ.	0.280** (0.0731)	0.171* (0.0779)	0.254** (0.0630)	0.366** (0.122)	0.247** (0.0760)	0.422* (0.157)
Candidate evaluation	-0.403 (0.233)	-0.622** (0.189)	-0.680** (0.211)	-0.244 (0.186)	-0.709** (0.198)	-1.402** (0.407)
Ethnic background	-0.288* (0.119)	-0.283* (0.128)	-0.288* (0.126)	-0.299+ (0.156)	-0.313* (0.141)	-0.573+ (0.274)
Age	0.0184** (0.00442)	0.0198** (0.00405)	0.0209** (0.00358)	0.0233** (0.00296)	0.0208** (0.00398)	0.0371** (0.00920)
Religiosity	0.345* (0.142)	0.341* (0.143)	0.386** (0.126)	0.273 (0.156)	0.372* (0.137)	0.740* (0.287)
Ends intifada	0.595* (0.204)					
Unemployment		0.327* (0.114)				
Economic issues			0.101 (0.120)			
Political ideology				-1.779** (0.0958)		
Gender					-0.0848 (0.208)	
Constant	-2.953** (0.733)	-1.904** (0.495)	-2.281** (0.413)	-1.602** (0.523)	-1.865** (0.439)	-3.878** (1.120)
Respondents	876	871	855	835	876	879

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

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