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**Immigrants' Identities and Host-Country Participation: The Role of Linked Fate**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Michael Nicholson

Committee in charge:

Professor Kaare Strøm, Chair  
Professor Marisa Abrajano  
Professor David FitzGerald  
Professor Christina Schneider  
Professor Tom Wong

2018

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The dissertation of Michael Nicholson is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Chair

University of California San Diego

2018

DEDICATION

To my father, David Nicholson.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

**Immigrants' Identities and Host-Country Participation: The Role of Linked Fate**

by

Michael Nicholson

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California San Diego, 2018

Professor Kaare Strøm, Chair

While much of our attention has focused on the demographic changes that attend immigration, less attention has been paid to how immigration is affecting the politics of host societies. This dissertation examines why immigrants participate in their host countries' politics at different rates even when they face common institutional and linguistic barriers. While non-naturalized immigrants are often barred from voting and standing for office, they sometimes participate in less conventional ways. They may, for example, volunteer, sign petitions, and participate in boycotts and protests. Their participation rates in such activities, however, vary dramatically across countries, regions, and even within immigrant cohorts. Even after accounting for diversity in their socioeconomic backgrounds and the integration contexts in which they reside, immigrants must often overcome substantial linguistic and logistical challenges in order to participate in these activities, particularly

in the years immediately following their arrival. Likewise, even when immigrants are interested in host-country politics, the high cost of participation might encourage them to "pass the buck" to earlier arrivals, immigrant leaders, or natives possessing superior knowledge and resources. Indeed, it remains unclear to date why some immigrants integrate into their host countries' politics more fully than others despite these constraints.

Scholars have proposed a number of theories addressing variation in immigrants' host country political participation, emphasizing factors such as host countries' integration policies, the density of immigrants' social networks, and immigrants' political socialization. To date, however, substantial differences across immigrants remain unexplained even upon accounting for these factors.

This dissertation examines the covariates of immigrants' host-country participation. I argue that, all else equal, immigrants perceiving linked fate—a sense that their life chances are tied to those of others—are more likely than others to participate in their host countries' politics. Specifically, I extend and generalize U.S. theories of linked fate to immigrants in Europe, arguing that linked fate can enhance such individuals' political efficacy—their belief that they can have an impact on politics, either individually or through their groups—and facilitate their mobilization.

To test these hypotheses, I conducted an original survey of 613 first-generation immigrants from Italy and Turkey in three Swiss cantons with significantly different integration policies. I find that individuals perceiving linked fate with other immigrants on the basis of their foreign origins may be more likely than others to engage in Swiss politics. Likewise, Sunni Muslims perceiving linked fate with other Muslims may participate in politics more often than other Sunnis. In addition, I find preliminary evidence that linked fate increases political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of in-group mobilization and enhancing their sense of internal efficacy—the sense that they understand how to participate in politics.

To my knowledge, this dissertation represents the first comparative analysis of the relationship between immigrants' linked fate and host-country political behavior in continental Europe. My findings challenge the predominant hypothesis that immigrants identifying with minority ethnic

or religious groups participate in host-country politics to improve their self-esteem. They are also robust to variations in immigrants' origins, socioeconomic characteristics, and the integration contexts in which they reside. Ultimately, this dissertation suggests that the linked fate concept may provide important insight into how immigrants' identities shape their political incorporation.

# **Chapter 1**

## **Immigrants' Political Participation in Europe: The Role of Linked Fate**

### **1.1 The Importance of Studying Immigrants' Political Participation in Europe**

In recent years, terrorist incidents across Europe and recurring violent unrest in immigrant neighborhoods in cities such as Brussels, Paris and Stockholm have engendered widespread concern that immigrants—and Muslim immigrants in particular—are not committed to democratic values (Fish 2002; Huntington 1996). Likewise, immigrants' low rates of participation in politics relative to natives across Europe have given rise to broad concerns about whether they are integrating into Europe's civic and political fabric (Pettinicchio and de Vries 2017). In the 2014 European Social Survey, respondents across 21 countries expressed broad concerns about immigrants introducing foreign values into Europe, including non-democratic values, with 43.3 percent expressing that their countries would be better off if “almost everyone shared customs and traditions” (European Social Survey Round 7 2014). Across Europe, these anxieties have boosted support for right-wing populist parties such as the France's Front National, Germany's AfD, Switzerland's UDC/SVP, and The Netherlands' Party for Freedom, among others. These debates are highly salient in light of European

immigration and integration trends. The last several decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in immigration to many countries. Sweden and Germany now have higher foreign-born population shares than the United States, at 16.8 and 14.7 respectively relative to the U.S.'s 14.6 percent (OECD 2018).<sup>1</sup> In countries such as Spain and Italy, which experienced net emigration in the years following World War 2, immigrants now constitute 12.6 and 9.7 percent of the population (OECD 2018). Many of these immigrants are Muslim. As of 2015, Muslims constitute 4.9 percent of Europe's population (Lipka 2017).

Looking to the future, it is likely that the foreign-born share of Europe's population will continue to rise. Europe's aging population creates structural demand for foreign labor, while ongoing conflict and political unrest in many parts of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa "pushes" many to seek better lives abroad.

In light of these trends, integrating immigrant populations into the political life of their European host countries is vital to the continued robustness of democratic institutions (Ginsberg 1982). As Mansbridge would argue, it is necessary that immigrants feel included in order to establish overall democratic legitimacy (1999). Political participation provides immigrants with a structured way to air their grievances and advocate for their own economic and political equality. If immigrants feel voiceless and powerless to improve their lot in their countries of residence, they may riot or radicalize, potentially undermining social stability (Hammar 1985; Shuck and Smith 1985).

Data on immigrants' political integration in Europe suggests that many immigrants remain relatively detached from the politics of their host countries. In many countries, only a small fraction of eligible immigrants naturalize, rendering most unable to vote in national and most local elections (EUROSTAT 2017). While many non-naturalized immigrants are barred from voting and standing for office, however, they may participate through other means. They may, for example, volunteer for parties or campaigns, sign petitions, and participate in boycotts and demonstrations.

---

<sup>1</sup>Foreign-born shares include all individuals born outside of their current country of residence, regardless of their legal status in that country.

That said, non-naturalized immigrants also participate in non-electoral forms of politics—petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, etc.—at a substantially lower rate than natives (Pettinicchio and de Vries 2017). This is an alarming pattern. Immigrants’ non-electoral participation is highly important, not only because it is an indicator of their broader political incorporation but also because it might encourage continued political integration (Alba and Foner 2015). Indeed, participation in these forms of activities may correlate with voting and organizational membership over the long term (Giugni and Grasso 2016). Such forms of participation can also increase immigrants’ political efficacy, their sense that they and other immigrants can influence politics, lowering their perceived costs of future engagement (Iyengar 1980; Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Wallace, Zepeda-Millan and Jones-Correa 2014).

Even if immigrants participate less in such activities than natives across Europe on average, their participation rates vary substantially. Indeed, some immigrant groups participate more often than others despite similar socioeconomic characteristics and despite facing similar policy constraints. In Switzerland, for example, immigrants from Turkey participate at higher rates than those from the Balkans despite similar education and income levels (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). It is well-documented, also, that immigrants from Turkey participate at higher rates than other migrants in numerous countries, including Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, and The Netherlands (Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Stromblad, Myrberg and Bengtsson 2011; Togeby 1999). In France, however, migrants from North Africa participate at a higher rate than Turkish-born migrants (Tiberj and Simon 2012; Yalaz 2015).

This dissertation asks why immigrants participate non-electorally at different rates even when they often face common institutional and linguistic barriers. As many immigrants, and new arrivals in particular, must overcome severe logistical, bureaucratic, and linguistic challenges in order to participate in their host countries’ politics, it is unclear why some engage more readily than others. Indeed, one might expect that even immigrants interested in host-country politics might free-ride, leaving participation to earlier arrivals, immigrant leaders, or natives who possess superior knowledge and resources (Olson 1965). Such free-riding may be especially likely when immigrants

believe that their individual participation will not change policy outcomes.

Scholars have proposed a number of theories addressing such variation, emphasizing factors such as host countries' integration policies, the density of immigrants' social networks, and immigrants' political socialization (Black 1987; Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales and Giugni 2011). In particular, many scholars have emphasized that policies granting immigrants local voting rights, and relatively liberal naturalization policies, can legitimize immigrants' political claims and spur their political participation (Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). To date, however, significant differences in political participation across immigrants remain unexplained even upon accounting for these factors (González-Ferrer 2011; Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Ruedin 2018). To better understand the determinants of immigrants' participation, scholars are thus increasingly analyzing whether immigrants' ethnic and religious identities shape their political behavior (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018; Simon 2011). While some have argued that such identification provides immigrants with resources through social networks, others have stressed that some identities, particularly identification as Muslim, lower immigrants' host-country participation (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018). Correspondingly, empirical tests of the relationship between identification and participation have, to date, yielded inconsistent results.

Further, to date, this literature has not explicitly tested the mechanisms ostensibly linking social identities (e.g., ethnic and religious identities) and participation.<sup>2</sup> Instead, this literature largely assumes that immigrants participate in their host countries' politics when they perceive that such activities will enhance their groups' status and, as a consequence, strengthen their self-esteem (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018). This approach, however, does not take into account the linguistic and logistical obstacles inherent to immigrants' political participation. Immigrants may lack social networks knowledgeable about the politics in their

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<sup>2</sup>I define social identity as the portion of individuals' self-concept derived from their perceived membership in a specific social group (Tajfel and Turner 1986)

countries of residence. Indeed, gathering political information may be difficult. Fundamentally, then, the mechanisms linking immigrants' identity to political participation remain unclear.

In this dissertation, I seek to rectify this gap in the literature. I propose that, all else equal, immigrants perceiving linked fate— a sense that their life chances are tied to those of others—are more likely than others to participate in their host countries' politics. Specifically, I extend and generalize U.S. theories of linked fate to immigrants in Europe, arguing that linked fate can enhance such individuals' political efficacy—their belief that they can have an impact on politics, either individually or through their groups (Dawson 1994). Additionally, linked fate can facilitate immigrants' mobilization by other immigrants, even when they possess limited political knowledge and resources. Consequently, linked fate lowers the informational and logistical costs of participation. Finally, I argue that linked fate's effect on political engagement is strongest when immigrants accord emotional weight to their identities. This emotional dimension of identification, which I denote here as 'affective commitment,' cultivates a sense of obligation to one's group that can militate against free-riding.

As a preliminary test gauging whether linked fate might spur immigrants' political participation in Europe, I undertook extensive research in Switzerland. This consisted of an original, multilingual survey of 613 first-generation immigrants from Italy and Turkey, 25 interviews with immigrant leaders and integration policy officials, and four immigrant focus groups including a total of 40 individuals. Switzerland, described by the sociologist Sandro Cattacin as "Europe in Miniature," constitutes an excellent setting for this research (Cattacin 1996). Its unique federal system grants its 26 cantons broad latitude in designing and implementing integration policies and, to a degree, procedures for naturalization. I conducted my survey in three Swiss cantons that differ substantially with respect to their citizenship policies and the political opportunities they afford to immigrants—Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. Neuchâtel is among Switzerland's most open cantons and possesses integration policies that are roughly similar to historical policies in Sweden and The Netherlands. Immigrants in Aargau, on the other hand, face very stringent naturalization requirements, akin to those of Germany, and possess virtually no political rights or representation



in local government. Bern's policies lie in the middle, with fewer barriers to naturalization and political participation than Aargau but greater barriers than Neuchâtel.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I define political participation as the actions that individuals undertake to articulate political claims. Political participation encompasses not only voting, but also any form of non-electoral participation that is legal in receiving countries, including, but not limited to, petitioning, boycotting, protesting, contacting politicians, volunteering for political organizations, or attending political events and meetings. Since many immigrants in Switzerland, and in Europe more broadly, lack host-country citizenship and cannot vote, this analysis emphasizes non-electoral participation—political behaviors such as peaceful protests, boycotts, petitions, attendance at civic meetings, contacting politicians, and volunteering.

Upon analyzing my survey data, I find strong evidence that linked fate correlates positively with individuals' likelihood of participating in these activities. In particular, individuals perceiving broad-based linked fate with other immigrants on the basis of their foreign origins may be more likely than others to engage in Swiss politics. Likewise, Sunni Muslims perceiving linked fate with other Muslims may participate in politics more often than others. In addition, I find preliminary evidence that linked fate increases political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization by other immigrants and enhancing their sense of internal efficacy—the sense that they understand how to participate in politics. Finally, I find that Muslim immigrants' sense of linked fate with other Muslims has a stronger correlation with their participation than their broad sense of linked fate with other immigrants. This is consistent with my argument that linked fate may be particularly effective at overcoming free-riding when it is based on emotional, or “affective,” identities.

Importantly, these findings hold upon accounting for covariates of participation highlighted in the existing literature. Specifically, they are robust to differences in the strengths of immigrants' identities, their socioeconomic characteristics, their participation in civic organizations, and the integration contexts in which they reside. Indeed, my analysis finds that restrictive integration contexts often militate against participation, but also that linked fate correlates positively with

participation despite restrictive policies.

These results thus provide evidence that immigrants' identities, through linked fate, may spur their host-country political incorporation. I find preliminary evidence that linked fate may encourage intra-group mobilization among immigrants. Further, linked fate may strengthen immigrants' sense of internal efficacy, their confidence that they can effectively participate in politics. Critically, my results present little evidence that immigrants possessing linked fate participate in host-country politics in order to enhance their self-esteem or to avoid sanctions from other group members. By implication, the concept of linked fate represents a contribution to the literature that extends beyond existing work on collective identification.

## **1.2 Plan of the Dissertation**

The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I borrow from the U.S. race politics literature to advance a theory explaining how linked fate might inspire immigrants' political participation. First, I survey the extant literature on immigrants' political participation. In particular, I emphasize that existing works relating immigrants' identities and political participation do not explain how identities shape participation when immigrants face linguistic and logistical barriers, making it difficult to acquire political information.

Next, I propose that linked fate provides individuals with important psychological resources that change their perceived costs and benefits of political participation. Consistent with the U.S. race politics literature, I define linked fate as the degree to which individuals perceive that their life chances are tied to their ethnic, religious, or social groups (Dawson 1994). I argue that linked fate influences individuals' likelihood of political participation in two principal ways.

First, immigrants perceiving linked fate conflate their personal interests with the interests of their broader social groups (e.g., co-ethnics, co-religionists, or other immigrants more broadly). When individuals perceive shared interests with other group members, they become particularly susceptible to mobilization within their social networks. Put simply, such immigrants may be

less likely to expect disagreement among members of their group, leading them to discuss their political ideas and views more readily in group settings than others. As perceptions of shared interest intensify, individuals may discuss politics with other group members more readily and learn about opportunities for participation. All else equal, this can increase immigrants' likelihood of participation.

Second, linked fate may also boost immigrants' sense of political efficacy (Chong and Rogers 2005; Shingles 1981). Efficacy refers to individuals' beliefs that they can have an impact on politics, either individually or through their groups. Again, linked fate can facilitate intra-group discussion and exchange, which can create new opportunities for coordination and thus enhance individuals' perceptions of their group's collective efficacy (Drury and Reicher 1999; Ellemers, Kortakaas and Ouwerkerk 1999). Put differently, it fosters intra-group consensus and mutual support, strengthening individuals' perceptions that their group can effect political change (Drury and Reicher 1999). Such discussions may also help immigrants to understand host country political processes. Likewise, when individuals that perceive that those close to them or valued by them support their behaviors, their confidence in their ability to perform those behaviors often increases (Ajzen 1988, 1991). Broadly, then, linked fate may also enhance immigrants' perceived internal efficacy, individuals' confidence in their ability to understand politics and act politically.

Next, linked fate may be more likely to lead to political action when it is based on identities to which immigrants are emotionally attached (Campbell et al. 1960). Such attachments can foster a sense of obligation to other group members and militate against free-riding. As such, religious and ethnic identities may be more likely to spur political engagement than pan-ethnic or racial identities or identities based on legal status alone. Emotional attachments may also enhance the credibility of in-group mobilizers, rendering them more persuasive (Deshpande and Stayman 1994). Consequently, linked fate combined with affective attachment may yield higher participation than perceptions of linked fate alone.

I also describe how linked fate takes root among immigrants, with an eye towards selecting appropriate cases for research. In brief, to perceive linked fate, immigrants must perceive that

they are members of a distinct social group, regardless of their degree of emotional attachment to that group. They must also perceive that group membership cannot be changed without incurring significant costs. Second, they must perceive that their group memberships constitute obstacles to achieving parity with the native-born majority. I emphasize that these perceptions may be strongest in polities with strict integration policies or which afford immigrants few political rights. Finally, they must consider their group memberships relevant to current debates over the distribution of resources and rights in their host countries. This is particularly likely in areas where radical right parties are strong or have recently gained traction. If these conditions are met, individuals often come to perceive that their personal interests and upward mobility are tied to those of the group as a whole. When this occurs, they can be said to possess linked fate.

In Chapter 3, I explain why Switzerland presents an excellent context for testing the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2. First, I briefly summarize the history of immigration to Switzerland, emphasizing that immigration has long been at the center of Swiss political debates. I will also briefly survey Switzerland's current immigration trends and policies, emphasizing that debates over naturalization policies and immigrants' political rights are ongoing.

Second, I briefly discuss patterns of immigrants' political participation in Switzerland. In brief, existing findings suggest that immigrants' political participation varies significantly by their origin country and that inter-group differences do not disappear upon controlling for their socioeconomic characteristics, civic integration and networks, and socialization (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Ruedin 2018). Such variation, I argue, is conducive to rigorous analysis.

Third, I discuss my selection of Italian and Turkish-born immigrants as my key cases. These are both among Switzerland's largest immigrant groups and are dispersed across many cantons. While the salience of Italian immigration has declined over time, however, the salience of immigration from Muslim countries, including Turkey, has increased. These differences may lead to differences in these groups' political participation.

Finally, I discuss my selection of the three cantons in this study, Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. These cantons have pursued substantially different approaches to immigrants' political incorporation.

These cases will thus allow me to gauge whether any relationship between immigrants' linked fate and participation is robust to integration contexts.

In Chapter 4, I describe the empirical strategy I use to test my hypotheses. I begin by describing the population I intended to target through my survey. I then describe my survey methodology and discuss how I operationalized political participation and linked fate. I also assess the construct validity of these operationalizations, gauging whether responses may have been subject to acquiescence bias or social desirability bias. I conclude that neither of these biases constitute a threat to this study's validity.

Finally, I address several possible limitations of my survey methodology. Specifically, I consider whether the sampling locations might have biased the rate of political participation and degree of linked fate expressed by participants relative to their true values in the population. Upon examining the variation in responses across sampling locations and comparing the social and demographic characteristics of the sample to overall population averages, I conclude that any such biases are likely too small to compromise the validity of my results.

Over the following two chapters, I test my theory using my survey data. Specifically, I assess whether linked fate contributes to our understanding of immigrants' political participation upon accounting for differences in their demographic characteristics and the integration contexts in which they reside. My dependent variable is a dichotomous index of political participation that reflects whether immigrants participated in one of eight forms of non-electoral participation in the past year: petitions, boycotts, volunteering, attendance at informational meetings, attendance at public hearings, donations, or contacting politicians. These items are frequently used in surveys such as the American National Election Study, the Swiss MOSAICH survey, and the European Social Survey to measure political participation. They have been found to capture the latent construct

of participation across diverse political contexts Goroshit (2016).<sup>3</sup>

In Chapter 5, I concentrate on pan-immigrant linked fate, individuals' sense that they are politically and economically connected to other immigrants, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. This chapter is divided into several sections. First, I briefly review existing theories of immigrant participation, with an eye towards building a model to estimate its correlation with linked fate. I also provide descriptive statistics of participation as well as the key independent variables in this study.

Next, I estimate several regression models and find that pan-immigrant linked fate positively and significantly correlates with political participation. This effect is substantively large and robust to diverse model specifications. Further, my findings hold across all cantons and immigrant groups, suggesting that linked fate's positive relationship with political incorporation is robust to differences in integration policy contexts. Likewise, although I find a positive correlation between membership in ethnic organizations and political participation, the effect of linked fate is robust to membership in associations.

Finally, I analyze the mechanisms linking linked fate and participation through path analysis. I find evidence that linked fate may increase individuals' likelihood of mobilization by other group members, increasing political participation. Moreover, I find that linked fate may increase internal efficacy – immigrants' sense that they understand how to participate in politics. I also gauge whether linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for individuals' degree of identification with other immigrants. Ultimately, I find little evidence that immigrants participate in order to raise their self-esteem or to avoid in-group sanctions. This suggests that the concept of linked fate offers theoretical purchase beyond existing accounts linking identity and participation.

In Chapter 6, I test my theoretical framework again with respect to immigrants' ethnic and

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<sup>3</sup>Given that these forms of participation require distinct resources and are not perfectly substitutable, I use a dichotomous index rather than an additive index as my key independent variable. In the Chapter 5 and 6 appendices, I repeat my analyses with additive indexes for robustness.

religious identities. First, I examine whether ethnic group linked fate—a sense of politicized connection with members of one’s own ethnic group—correlates with political participation probabilities among Italians, Kurds, and Turks in the sample. Strikingly, I find little evidence of a significant relationship along that vein.

Second, I examine whether religious linked fate correlates with political participation among self-identified Sunni Muslims. I focus on Sunnism because the lion’s share of Muslim immigrants in both Switzerland, and Europe more broadly, identify as Sunni.<sup>4</sup> I find strong evidence that Sunni Muslim immigrants’ probability of participation correlates significantly and positively with their perceptions of linked fate, even after accounting for differences in their socioeconomic characteristics and the integration contexts in which they reside. This finding implies that Muslim linked fate may be an important covariate of Muslim immigrants’ political participation. Further, I find tentative evidence that Muslim linked fate may increase individuals’ likelihood of mobilization by other Muslims.

Importantly, I find that Sunni Muslim immigrants residing in restrictive immigration contexts participate less than others, on average. I also find that organizational membership correlates positively with participation among Muslims. Strikingly, linked fate has a positively correlation that holds even after accounting for these covariates.

I also consider whether Muslims perceiving linked fate participate in politics in order to boost their self-esteem. To determine whether this may be the case, I gauge whether linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for Muslims’ degree of religious identification and participation in religious organizations. If Muslims participate to boost their self-esteem, one might expect such correlations to be statistically significant. This is not the case, however, suggesting that self-esteem likely does not underscore the link between Muslim linked fate and participation. Furthermore, I find little evidence that Muslim identification facilitates Muslim immigrants’ political

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<sup>4</sup>Throughout this dissertation, allusions to Muslims refer to Sunni Muslims unless otherwise indicated.

participation by increasing the threat of in-group sanctions.

I conclude by comparing my findings with respect to pan-immigrant and Muslim linked fate. My results suggest that Muslim linked fate may correlate more strongly with participation than pan-immigrant linked fate. This is consistent with the notion that linked fate may be more likely to spur participation when it is rooted in affective (emotional) identities. Indeed, Muslims' perceived ties to other Muslims has deep cultural and religious origins. Conversely, immigrants often perceive few connections with other immigrants beyond their shared experiences of having to adjust to a new society.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the significance of my findings for scholars' and policymakers' understanding of immigrant political participation in Europe. While this study is preliminary and based on a relatively small sample, the robustness of these conclusions suggest that further work examining linked fate among immigrant populations in Europe—and Muslim immigrant populations in particular—will be fruitful. I emphasize that, while Switzerland's steep naturalization requirements and emphasis on direct democracy set it apart from other European countries, Swiss immigration and integration policies are consistent with those adopted elsewhere in Europe. Furthermore, Switzerland's shift from policies emphasizing guestworker admissions to those emphasizing refugee and asylum seekers parallel shifts seen in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. In conclusion, then, my results indicate that further research on immigrants' linked fate and participation in Europe is warranted.



## **Chapter 2**

# **Linked Fate and Political Participation among Immigrants**

This chapter examines immigrants' patterns of non-electoral political participation, including petitions, boycotts, volunteering, and protests. Specifically, I ask why immigrants participate in these activities at different rates even when they often face common institutional, economic, and linguistic barriers. Indeed, many immigrants, and new arrivals in particular, lack the necessary linguistic skills and institutional knowledge to navigate their host countries' politics. Further, they are generally barred from voting and running for office prior to naturalization. As many immigrants must overcome substantial challenges in order to participate in their host countries' politics, one might expect that immigrants interested in politics would free-ride, leaving participation to settled immigrants, immigrant leaders, or natives who possess superior knowledge and resources (Olson 1965). This may be especially likely if immigrants perceive that their individual participation will not influence policy outcomes. Even so, existing studies suggest that immigrants' average non-electoral participation varies dramatically across countries, subnational units, and even within immigrant groups (Dancygier 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005).

Scholars have proposed a number of theories addressing such variation, emphasizing factors such as the density of immigrants' social networks, immigrants' political socialization, and host

countries' integration policies (Black 1987; Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales and Giugni 2011). Empirical tests to date, however, suggest that significant differences in political participation across immigrants remains unexplained even upon accounting for these factors (González-Ferrer 2011; Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Ruedin 2018).

To better understand the determinants of immigrants' participation, scholars of immigrant integration are increasingly analyzing whether immigrants' collective identities shape their political behavior (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Simon 2011). Much of this literature draws heavily from social identity theory. It assumes that immigrants participate in their host countries' politics when they perceive that such activities will enhance their groups' status and, as a consequence, strengthen their self-esteem (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018). To date, however, it has stopped short of analyzing whether and how identities might alter immigrants' perceptions of the cost and benefits of participation.

In this chapter, I seek to rectify this gap in the literature. I argue that, all else equal, immigrants perceiving linked fate—a sense that their life chances are tied to those of others—participate at a higher rate than others in host country politics. Specifically, I extend and generalize U.S. theories of linked fate to immigrants in Europe, arguing that linked fate can enhance such individuals' political efficacy—their belief that they can have an impact on politics, either individually or through their ethnic, religious, and other groups—and facilitate their mobilization even when they face severe informational and linguistic constraints. I also argue that the substantive effect of linked fate on political engagement will be strongest when immigrants attach emotional weight to their identities. This emotional dimension of identification, known as 'affective commitment,' cultivates a sense of obligation to one's group that can disincentivize free-riding.

For the purpose of this chapter, I define immigrant political incorporation as the extent to which immigrants engage host country political institutions and policymakers in order to articulate

political claims.<sup>1</sup> These claims must either respond to the actions or political positions of local or national host country governments, or propose a course of action or policy for these governments to pursue. Importantly, under this definition, lobbying a host country to place pressure on the government of one's home country would qualify as political incorporation as it signals engagement with host country policymakers and political institutions.

I define political participation as the actions that individuals undertake to articulate such claims. Political participation encompasses not only voting, but also any form of non-electoral participation that is legal in receiving countries, including, but not limited to, petitioning, boycotting, protesting, contacting politicians, volunteering for political organizations, or attending political events and meetings.

The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will summarize exist work in this area, emphasizing the burgeoning literature relating immigrants' political participation to their collective identities. Next, I define linked fate and lay out an individual-level theory describing the conditions under which it may alter immigrants' propensity to participate. Third, I explain how immigrants may develop a sense of linked fate, providing a schema that will enable me to select cases for my empirical research.

## **2.1 Explaining Immigrant Political Participation in Europe**

The last several decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in immigration to Europe. Countries such as Sweden and Germany now have higher foreign-born population shares than the United States, at 16.8 and 14.7 respectively relative to the U.S.'s 14.6 percent (OECD 2018).<sup>2</sup> In countries such as Spain and Italy, which experienced net emigration in the years following World


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<sup>1</sup>I also use the term 'political integration' to refer to the same concept.

<sup>2</sup>Foreign-born shares include all individuals born outside of their current country of residence, regardless of their legal status in that country.

War 2, immigrants now constitute 12.6 and 9.7 percent of the population (OECD 2018). Looking to the future, it is likely that the foreign-born share of Europe’s population will continue to increase.

Alarminglly, research on immigrants’ political integration in Europe suggests that many immigrants remain relatively detached from the politics of their host countries. In particular, non-citizen immigrants participate in non-electoral forms of politics—petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, etc.—at a substantially lower rate than natives. This participation gap is visible in Figure 2.1 below, which plots natives’ and immigrants’ rates of participation in these activities using pooled data from the first six waves of the European Social Survey, conducted from 2002 to 2012 (Pettinicchio and de Vries 2017).<sup>3</sup>



**Figure 2.1:** Non-Citizen Immigrants Participate Less Than Natives Across Europe. **Source:** (Pettinicchio and de Vries 2017)

<sup>3</sup>The European Social Survey overrepresents intra-European immigrants. Non-European migrants tend to respond to surveys such as the ESS at relatively low rates, leading to undercoverage. Correspondingly, these findings should not be assumed to generalize to non-European immigrants

Even if immigrants participate less in such activities than natives across Europe on average, their participation rates vary substantially across origin groups and contexts. Indeed, some immigrant groups participate more often than others despite possessing similar socioeconomic characteristics and facing similar policy constraints. In Switzerland, for example, immigrants from Turkey participate at higher rates than those from the Balkans despite similar education and income levels (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). In France, surveys suggest that individuals of North African immigrant origin register to vote at a higher rate than those of Turkish origin, and demonstrate greater interest in French politics (Tiberj and Simon 2012). In the United Kingdom, South Asian immigrants vote at a much higher rate than immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa (Cutts et al. 2007; Dancygier 2013; Saggar 2000)

To understand why immigrants in Europe participate less than natives in such activities on average, it is first important to understand why immigrants themselves participate at different rates. To this end, scholars have proposed a number of theories addressing differences in immigrants' participation rates. In particular, many existing works emphasize states' integration and citizenship policies and the role of immigrant organizational networks. Here, I will discuss each of these approaches in turn.

To date, the notion that immigrant political incorporation is conditioned by host country "opportunity structures" —political and cultural institutions, particularly those governing integration and citizenship—represents the predominant theory of immigrants' political integration in Europe (Alba and Foner 2015). This theoretical approach assumes that collective action is shaped by the opportunities and constraints inherent in the political environment where it takes root (Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1994). In perhaps the best-known recent contribution to this literature, Koopmans et al. find that states' conceptions of citizenship (i.e., whether citizenship law emphasizes ethnic or civic belonging), naturalization policies, and cultural policies shape immigrants' patterns of political engagement across five European countries (2005). In particular, policies granting immigrants local voting rights, and relatively liberal naturalization policies, legitimize immigrants' political claims insofar as immigrants are officially regarded as future "members" of society (Giugni

and Passy 2004). Correspondingly, such policies may spur immigrants' political incorporation.

Although the political opportunity structure approach remains an important paradigm for integration research, it is not without its critics (Entzinger 2000; Freeman 2004). Alba and Foner, for example, have noted that little empirical work analyzes how political opportunity structures shape immigrants' sense of belonging and condition their ability to mobilize (Alba and Foner 2015). Further, existing theories do not specify the conditions under which immigrants mobilize when opportunities for engagement exist (Yalaz 2015). Why, for example, do ethnic groups participate differentially in countries such as The Netherlands and Denmark where immigrants enjoy local voting rights, even when they possess similar social and demographic backgrounds? Conversely, why do some groups, such as Turkish-born migrants, participate at higher rate than others in states with relatively limited opportunity structures such as Germany and Switzerland?

With these questions in mind, some scholars have posited that differences in the density of immigrants' social networks underlie differences in participation—even among those residing in similar institutional contexts (Berger, Galonska and Koopmans 2004; Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn 2007). This body of literature builds upon Putnam's seminal work linking political participation with social capital (Putnam 2000). Most notably, Fennema and Tillie, argue that Turks residing in Amsterdam are more likely to participate in electoral politics than Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean immigrants due to their stronger ethnic organizational networks (Fenemma and Tillie 1999). To date, however, research examining the relationship between organizational involvement and political engagement has yielded mixed results. Studies from Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark, among others, find little to no correlation between organizational participation and voter turnout (Jacobs, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2004; Stromblad, Myrberg and Bengtsson 2011; Togeby 2004). Further, even if organizational involvement catalyzes immigrants' participation, their decisions to join and participate in organizations, or even start new organizations, are endogenous to their underlying identities and interests.

Additionally, a number of scholars have noted that immigrants' origin country political socialization might condition their host country political incorporation. Immigrants' home country

experiences can facilitate the development of political interests, ultimately heightening their degree of psychological involvement with politics and predisposing them to seek further political information. Further, pre-immigration experiences may help immigrants to understand when their personal interests are served by political involvement, facilitating their political incorporation into receiving countries (Black 1987). More specifically, numerous scholars have stressed that immigrants socialized in democracies may be more inclined towards host country political involvement than those from repressive regimes (Black 1987; Portes and Rumbaut 1992). Such immigrants may lack trust in, or familiarity with, democratic institutions, militating against involvement.

Empirical tests of these hypotheses, however, have not produced conclusive results. On the one hand, some studies find that immigrants from democratic countries may participate at higher rates than others. Andre et al., for example, find that immigrants across Europe may be most likely to vote when they come from Christian and/or democratic countries (2009). Similarly, Portes and Rumbaut find that non-democratic socialization dampens participation (1992). Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, however, have found no correlation between immigrants' homeland political socialization and their host-country incorporation (2001). Indeed, some studies suggest that immigrants socialized in Communist regimes, and political refugees in particular, may be more likely to participate than those coming from democratic regimes (Black 1987; Greeley 1974; Portes and Mozo 1985). Together, these studies suggest that pre-immigration socialization shapes individuals' political engagement, although the direction and magnitude of this effect cannot be discerned from extant research.

A number of scholars have also argued that immigrants' groups-level political incorporation is catalyzed by direct party outreach. Erie, for example, argues that party machines along the Eastern Seaboard catalyzed participation among Irish immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1988). Correspondingly, Harles noted that, on the 19th century U.S. Eastern Seaboard, party officials processed immigrant voters and escorted them to the ballot box on election day (1993). Recent studies, however, cast doubt that party mobilization drives immigrants' participation patterns in modern-day Europe. Indeed, many scholars allege that mainstream parties have ignored

immigrants in some contexts, notably the U.K. and Switzerland (Heath et al. 2013; Ireland 1994). In many cases, parties may be reluctant to take on migrant issues out of fear of alienating mainstream voters (Maxwell 2010). Perhaps more importantly, however, parties may have few incentives to incentive migrants when naturalization requirements are steep and citizenship acquisition rates are low, as is the case in Germany, Switzerland, and many other European countries. Party-based theories may also stop short of explaining the political participation of relatively small, electorally unimportant immigrant groups, particularly where electoral systems provide limited incentives for policymakers to promote collective mobilization. Chilean asylees in Sweden, for example, vote at higher rates than others despite their relatively small numbers (Myrberg and Rogstad 2011).

Increasingly, scholars are examining the individual-level microfoundations of immigrants' participation in Europe by analyzing how their ethnic and religious identities shape their political behavior (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Just, Sandovici and Listhaug 2014; Klandermans, der Toorn and van Stekelenburg 2008; Simon 2011). While some scholars have argued that such identification provides immigrants with resources through social networks, others have argued that some identities, particularly identification as Muslim, lower immigrants' interest in host-country participation (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018). Correspondingly, empirical tests of the relationship between identification and participation have, to date, yielded inconsistent results. While some have found that immigrants' identification with their homelands and ethnic groups correlates negatively with host-country participation, others demonstrate that homeland and ethnic identification can boost political interest, voting, and non-electoral participation, particularly when immigrants also identify with their country of residence (Fleischmann, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2013; Klandermans, der Toorn and van Stekelenburg 2008; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018; Simon, Reichert and Grabow 2013; Simon and Grabow 2010). Likewise, while some have found a positive relationship between Muslim identification and political participation—particularly in the face of discrimination—others have found that self-identified Muslims engage less in politics than others (Fleischmann, Phalet and Swyngedouw 2013; Just, Sandovici and Listhaug 2014). Broadly, the relationship between immigrants' attachment to their



ethnic and religious identities and political engagement in Europe remains unclear.

To date, the existing literature on immigration has not explicitly tested the mechanisms ostensibly linking social identities (e.g., ethnic and religious identities) and participation.<sup>4</sup> Instead, consistently with social identity theory, individuals are assumed to engage in politics when they perceive that political activities will enhance their groups' position in society (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Kranendonk, Vermeulen and van Heelsum 2018; Simon 2011; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1987). As social identity theory posits that individuals derive self-esteem—their sense of self-worth—from group memberships, improving their groups' position in society will increase individual self-esteem. Correspondingly, immigrants' social identities are assumed to increase their political participation when they believe that doing so will strengthen their groups' social position.

Individuals may also participate when they feel that abstention will invite their stigmatization by other group members. The social psychology literature on identity suggests that individuals conform to group expectations in order to avoid violating group norms and avoid punishment from group members (Abrams 1990; Bem 1972; Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens 1988; Stryker 1980; White et al. 2006). This would suggest that immigrants participate in order to secure their reputations within their groups. If they do not participate, by this account, they may incur reputational costs.

Finally, some scholars argue that individuals participate in politics simply to reaffirm or express their social identities (Brennan and Hamlin 1998; Schuessler 2000). By this account, social identification directly increases the value that individuals accord to participation. Individuals participate to express their identities rather than improve their in-group reputation or their self-esteem.

Broadly, the bulk of existing accounts emphasize that collective identities can foster the development of homogeneous preferences through self-stereotyping, facilitating immigrants' political participation (Fischer-Neumann 2014; Simon 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Tajfel 1981).

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<sup>4</sup>I define social identity as the portion of individuals' self-concept derived from their perceived membership in a specific social group (Turner et al. 1987).

Put differently, individuals tend to stereotype the interests and preferences of their membership groups. Further, social identification can facilitate ‘depersonalization’—when individuals come to think of themselves and others in terms of group identities. “Your” and “my” experiences thus transform into “our” experiences, potentially shaping individuals’ political preferences and behaviors (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Depersonalization also anchors individuals’ self-esteem to the social position of their group relative to others in society. As such, individuals may engage in political action to improve their self-esteem by attempting to improve their groups’ status.

If we accept these theoretical assumptions, we might expect political participation to be highest among immigrants who strongly identify with their groups as well as those who perceive group relative deprivation—the sense that one’s group is unjustly worse off than other groups. Dominant approaches would imply that immigrants perceiving such relative deprivation would seek to improve the status of their group, and thereby improve their self-esteem, through political participation. Existing studies, however, suggest that perceptions of group relative deprivation and identity strength alone do not correlate, or correlate negatively, with voter participation and, therefore, may not explain inter-group differences in participation rates (Asingo 2018; Heath et al. 2013; Sanders et al. 2005). As a consequence, it is as yet unclear whether self-esteem considerations strongly influence immigrants’ political behavior.

Perhaps most critically, the extant literature linking immigrants’ identification to participation does not address potential linguistic and logistical obstacles to immigrants’ political participation. Immigrants, and newly-arrived immigrants in particular, may lack social networks knowledgeable about the politics in their countries of residence. As a consequence, gathering information on politics—both substantive information about policies and parties’ platforms and practical information about how to vote, attain official permission for demonstrations, etc.—may be challenging. All else equal, immigrants interested in politics may be inclined to free ride off the efforts of group members who have lived abroad longer, immigrant group leaders, or natives with similar political beliefs.

It remains, as yet, unclear whether social identification itself can spur participation when

the costs of gathering information about host-country politics is steep. If this were the case, one might expect to see similar average rates of participation among low-status groups facing similar linguistic and cultural constraints. In practice, however, such groups often participate at strikingly different rates. In The Netherlands, for example, immigrants from Turkey vote and run for office at a higher rate than Moroccans despite facing similar linguistic and cultural barriers to participation (Fenemma and Tillie 1999).

Additionally, in countries such as Switzerland and Germany, a combination of strict historical integration policies and immigrant mobilization by origin countries such as Turkey and Italy encouraged immigrants to devote their resources to diasporic involvement in their homelands rather than to their host countries' politics (Koopmans et al. 2005; Laurence 2012). In such cases, immigrants may seek to enhance their position within their ethnic or religious groups through transnational engagement. Despite facing group pressure to participate in the politics of their homelands, however, many immigrants also participate in their host countries' politics. Self-esteem-based theories likely do not sufficiently explain variation in immigrants' participation in host-country politics.

Looking beyond theories emphasizing self-esteem, numerous scholars have also argued that adherence to group identities can increase social trust, facilitating political engagement (Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Robinson 2016; Rothstein 2000; Stolle 2001). Such enhanced trust can create good will among immigrants and facilitate interaction among minority group members (Fenemma and Tillie 1999). Trust facilitates norms of reciprocity, facilitating collective action (Putnam 2000). Even if higher trust leads individuals to interact with other group members more readily, however, it is not theoretically clear how social trust might facilitate immigrants' political incorporation, particularly when they face significant linguistic and logistical barriers. Moreover, social trust can decrease perceptions of grievances by increasing individuals' optimism, potentially decreasing their reasons to participate (Helliwell, Huang and Wang 2018).

Furthermore, some scholars of economic development have proposed that ethnic identification can spur collective action by facilitating sanctioning of members that refuse to cooperate

(Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Namely, shared ethnicity enhances individuals' ability to punish defectors through their social networks, and defection can imply reputational costs. In particular, ethnic or religious leaders may punish those who do not comply with group norms. Once again, however, it is unclear whether social sanctioning is sufficient to inspire host-country participation among immigrants facing linguistic and logistical barriers. Furthermore, in many cases, sanctioning may be reserved for immigrants who do not participate in their homelands' politics rather than those who do not engage with their host countries. This may be particularly likely when immigrant leaders and organizations do not feel that they can influence their host countries' politics or when immigrants plan to return home in the future.

Broadly speaking, most existing accounts have largely assumed that social identification drives individuals to participate in order to raise the status of their membership groups and, consequently, their own self-esteem. Others suggest that individuals participate when failing to do so might invite sanctions from other group members. Generally, however, these approaches do not consider that the costs of participation for immigrants are often steep. Immigrants, particularly newly-arrived ones, may lack social networks and linguistic skills necessary to gather information on host country politics. Those interested in host-country politics might thus be tempted to free ride on the actions of immigrant and native activists, particularly when they perceive that their participation will do little to change policies. Further, many immigrant communities emphasize homeland participation over host-country participation, meaning that immigrants who do not participate in the latter may face minimal reputational costs. Ultimately, then, it is unclear from the existing literature whether and how social identification could increase immigrants' participation in light of the steep costs they often face.

In this dissertation, I argue that social identification, in the form of linked fate, can provide individuals with important psychological resources that change their perceived costs and benefits of political participation. Identification can thus increase immigrants' participation even when they possess limited social networks and information about host-country politics.

Herein, I draw from the U.S. race politics literature on "linked fate" to explain why social

identification may spur political participation among immigrants (Dawson 1994). “Linked fate” is most often defined as the degree to which individuals perceive that their life chances are tied to their ethnic, religious, or social groups (Dawson 1994). That theory posits that, for African-Americans, race provides a heuristic, or informational shortcut, through which they can rationally assess the costs and benefits of prospective electoral choices as well as their prospective political behaviors. Racial identification cultivates a sense of community and helps individuals understand how policies affect them as individuals, lowering the informational costs of political participation.

In the remainder of this chapter, I extend this theoretical framework to immigrants in Europe. I argue that sentiments of linked fate may encourage their mobilization by other members of their ethnic or religious groups, or other immigrants more broadly, increasing their political participation. Further, all else equal, linked fate might increase their sense of efficacy, their belief that they can influence political outcomes. Insofar as linked fate increases immigrants’ likelihood of mobilization and strengthens their perceptions of efficacy, it might spur political participation even when immigrants face significant barriers. Such effects may be particularly strong when immigrants attach emotional weight to their identities, fostering a sense of community and mutual responsibility that disincentivizes free-riding.

## **2.2 Defining Linked Fate**

The concept of linked fate, first developed by Michael Dawson to explain why African-Americans engage in politics at high rates despite their relatively weak socioeconomic position, is near-paradigmatic in the U.S. race politics literature. In his works, Dawson argues that African-Americans’ unique and difficult history of institutional discrimination in the United States has perpetuated a shared understanding that their relative socioeconomic position is inextricably linked to their race. Hence, African-Americans often evaluate policy developments through a group lens: policy developments affecting the welfare of the group as a whole are believed to influence individual life chances (Dawson 1994; Lee 2008). By this account, race provides a heuristic, or informational

shortcut, through which African-Americans assess the costs and benefits of prospective electoral choices as well as their own political behaviors. Put differently, racial identification helps them filter through political information and understand how policies affect their own life. Linked fate, forged by shared experiences of discrimination, leads Black individuals to imagine the interests of African-Americans as a collective as their own political interests. Cues from actors such as the African-American church and the NAACP<sup>5</sup> both reinforce and activate sentiments of linked fate, motivating political action. Linked fate ultimately lowers the cost of gathering information about politics. As such, it has led to relatively high levels of participation among African-Americans, even when they are socioeconomically disadvantaged.

It is important to stress that, in Dawson's theoretical framework, "linked fate" does not refer to empathy towards members of your own group, but rather to the sense that political events shaping the welfare or rights of other members of your social group - even members you do not know personally - also affect your welfare or rights.

Looking beyond African-American linked fate, recent work suggests that linked fate may underscore the engagement of racialized immigrant-origin minorities in the U.S., notably Asian-Americans and Latino-Americans (Junn and Masuoka 2008; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Masuoka 2008; Sánchez and Masuoka 2010; Stokes 2003). García-Ríos and Barreto find that linked fate rooted in shared immigration experiences can spur Latino political participation (2016). Barreto et al. also find that linked fate can increase political participation among Muslim-Americans (2008).

For the remainder of this chapter, I argue that linked fate may facilitate political interest and participation among some immigrant groups in Europe through a process similar to the one outlined by Dawson. Immigrants may develop a sense that their lives are connected to other immigrants or members of their ethnic and religious groups. Indeed, such a sense of connection may be particularly likely where immigrants experience targeted institutional discrimination, such as prohibitions on

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<sup>5</sup>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

building mosques or minarets and bans on Islamic clothing. Under such circumstances, their immigrant status, ethnicity, or religion may serve as a cognitive filter for political information, helping them to understanding how politics and policies affect their own lives. Consequently, their identities lower the costs of political participation. That said, it is critical to distinguish my conceptualization of linked fate to that frequently employed in the U.S. politics literature.

To date, that literature has largely assumed that linked fate is synonymous with emotional attachment (or, in social psychology parlance, an affective commitment) to one's membership group (typically, in the U.S. literature, one's racial or pan-ethnic group) (Bowler and Segura 2011; Gay, Hochschild and White 2016).<sup>6</sup> Fundamentally, the racial heuristic is underscored by an emotional commitment to members of one's racial group. Such affective commitment is frequently perceived as necessary for linked fate to mobilize individuals (Bowler and Segura 2011; Chong 1991; Dawson 1994; McKenzie 2004). Likewise, existing theory does not explicitly address how variation in the salience of particular identities to individuals may influence the development of linked fate attached to those identities (Bedolla 2005). Broadly speaking, the broader salience of racial identities is assumed.

My argument builds upon previous accounts, emphasizing instead that, if individuals perceive certain identities as salient, identification may motivate political behavior even when individuals demonstrate limited attachment or loyalty to others who share that identity. I also argue that both "cognitive" and "affective" identities can lead individuals to stereotype the interests of other in-group members and develop a sense of group-level shared interests (Spears, Doosje and Ellemers 1997; Tajfel et al. 1971). Cognitive identification occurs when individuals understand that they are part of some externally-defined group, regardless of whether they choose to identify with it. For example, an immigrant may cognitively identify as unauthorized or undocumented even if he or she accords little emotional weight to that identity. An unauthorized immigrant from Latin America

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<sup>6</sup>See Gay et al. 2016 for an overview and discussion of the assumptions and scope of this literature

may identify on a superficial level with undocumented immigrants from Asia, but may feel a deeper sense of connection to others from Latin America who share more common experiences. Cognitive identification need not imply an emotional connection or attachments to other group members. Affective identification, on the other hand, occurs when individuals actively choose to identify with a given group and accord emotional weight to their group membership. Affective identifications imply a sense of belonging to a community with a distinctive culture, history, or belief system.

By implication, as I will argue in subsequent sections, both affective identities and cognitive identities—identities that shape individuals’ self-concept yet carry little emotional weight, such as legal status—might inspire participation when immigrants perceive that these identities limit their membership rights and are politically salient.

Along this same vein, my conceptualization of linked fate also diverges from earlier theories of group consciousness that preceded linked fate theory (Lee 2008; Miller et al. 1981). These theories posited that group consciousness can spur political engagement when individuals are dissatisfied with their groups’ social position and when they favor other group members, deeming them more trustworthy or cooperative than out-groups (Brewer and Silver 1978; Rubin and Hewstone 1998). My conceptualization does not require individuals to favor their groups in this manner in order for political action to occur. Once again, identification can foster an awareness of shared interests regardless of individuals’ emotional attachment to their identities.

Importantly, while linked fate may be correlated with perceptions of discrimination and relative deprivation, these concepts are not identical. Linked fate refers to the ‘depersonalization’ of the self and the fusion of self-interest with the interest of one’s identity group or groups. It implies a sense of political community—an “imagined community” of members who perceive that they are politically and socially connected even if they do not know each other personally.

Nor is linked fate simply a filter through which perceptions of discrimination affect political participation. Indeed, as Dawson suggests, past experiences and group narratives can shape perceptions of linked fate (Dawson 1994). Along this vein, also, Rothstein, Aleinikoff, Rumbaut, and others have suggested that collective memories form the basis of group solidarity and group



interests (Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998; Rothstein 2000). As a consequence, the linked fate concept possesses significant analytical value for research on political participation. Substantively, it is valuable for understanding how perceptions about identity shape political mobilization. Moreover, unlike phenomena such as collective memory and socialization, it is measurable through surveys, requiring minimal customization to fit individuals' and groups' diverse experiences and facilitating inter-group comparisons. Indeed, as I will discuss later, cognitive interviews and focus groups held in Switzerland prior to my survey's launch revealed that immigrants from many different cohorts and backgrounds understood my linked fate items similarly.

To close, I make no presumptions that the above prerequisites are independent of one another—rather, it is likely that perceptions of inequality and the broader societal salience of minority identities reinforce one another in a feedback loop. Identification with a social group, for example, need not precede perceptions of relative deprivation for linked fate to influence political participation. Indeed, perceived discrimination based on group membership can threaten individuals' self-esteem, sometimes prompting them to identify more strongly with marginalized groups. Researching second-generation immigrants in the U.S., Aleinikoff and Rumbaut observe that individuals' experiences, expectations, and perceptions of racial or ethnic discrimination can increase their adherence to their minority identities (Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998). In a European context, similar arguments have been made to describe the behavior of Muslims. Saggar, for example, argues that Muslims' perceptions of stigmatization foster their adherence to a single Muslim identity, regardless of their specific national origins or the form of Islam to which they adhere (Saggar 2009). Even if identification is 'reactive' in this manner, however, individuals perceiving identity-based grievances may conflate their personal interests with group interests. For linked fate to influence political participation, I hold, it is only necessary that individuals believe that their identities imply social disadvantage.

I should also stress that individuals' perceptions of linked fate may be bound to specific geographies and territories. While linked fate is generally thought of as a national phenomenon, meaning that African-Americans, for example, perceive linked fate with other African-Americans in

the U.S., immigrants may also perceive linked fate with other group members at a city, cantonal, or provincial level. The geographical scope of linked fate sentiments depends on immigrants' beliefs about where group identities condition their rights relative to the majority and their perceptions of the salience of their identities in their various jurisdictions of residence. City-level anti-immigrant ordinances may inspire linked fate with other immigrant residences in that city, while country-level ordinances may inspire linked fate at the national level. For simplicity and consistency with the existing literature on immigrants' identities, this chapter considers national-level dynamics only.

## **2.3 Linked Fate and Political Participation**

In this section, I argue that linked fate may facilitate immigrants' participation in three distinct ways. First, those perceiving linked fate may be particularly susceptible to mobilization by their peers. Second, linked fate heightens individuals' sense of political efficacy—both internal efficacy, their sense that they understand politics well enough to participate, and external efficacy, the sense that their group can have a palpable impact on politics. Third, linked fate can cultivate a sense of obligation to one's membership group, particularly when it is based on an 'affective' identity to which immigrants accord emotional weight.

Prior to discussing how linked fate may shape individuals' political behavior, it is important to address when and why individuals decide to engage in politics in the first place. To begin, I hold that individuals' decisions to participate are fundamentally guided by cost-benefit analyses. Consistent with Edlin et al., I assume that, as the perceived benefits of a political outcome to oneself and others rise relative to costs, and as an individual's perceived probability of attaining the desired outcome increases, then individuals will be more likely to engage in politics (2007). I also assume that attitudes such as group affect can shape individuals' perceptions of the benefits of participation and thereby influence individuals' likelihood of political engagement.

Political participation as a costly process—individuals are less likely to participate in politics when doing so requires substantial investments of time and energy (Downs 1957). Many forms

of participation require an understanding of the issues at stake and the policies and candidates proposed. To participate in public meetings, demonstrations, or votes, individuals must also know where these events take place. To plan public meetings, strikes, demonstrations, or even launch petitions, individuals may need to understand how to reserve space and acquire official permissions.

Acquiring such information may present a challenge to many immigrants. Immigrants, particularly relatively new arrivals, often possess limited skills in their host countries' language(s). They often work long hours at demanding jobs. They may lack social networks knowledgeable about the politics in their countries of residence. As such, gathering information on politics—both substantive information about policies and parties' platforms and practical information about how to vote, attain official permission for demonstrations, etc.—may be challenging.

Given these challenges, even immigrants interested in host-country politics may be likely to free ride, particularly if they perceive that others with similar preferences—either immigrants or natives—possess greater resources in the form of linguistic skills or logistical knowledge and are able to participate more ably.

Immigrants may be particularly unlikely to participate when they perceive that their individual participation will have little impact on policies. When immigrants have group-specific political preferences, such as supporting rules for family reunification or, in the case of Muslim immigrants, the introduction of a policy providing for halal foods in schools, they may be disinclined to mobilize. Immigrants generally constitute a small share of their host countries' populations and, when they do not expect that their positions will be supported by native-born citizens, they may feel pessimistic about their chance to bring about political change. In such cases, individuals may be particularly likely to free ride on the efforts of immigrant leaders and allies with greater resource endowments. In some cases, immigrants may even fear that political activities will invite marginalization by natives. Sunni Muslims, for example, may be reluctant to organize and visibly engage in politics if they fear that such political participation will generate backlash.

Linked fate, I argue, may increase immigrants' likelihood of participation, all else equal, by facilitating the acquisition of political knowledge—decreasing the costs inherent in seeking

out information in foreign languages and unfamiliar news sources—and by enhancing individuals’ political efficacy.

Recall that linked fate takes root when individuals come to think of the interests of their social group as their own. When individuals perceive linked interests with other group members, they will be more likely to participate in collective action (Klandermans 2014). These shared interests may either be issue specific (concerning, for example, immigration policies) or take the form of broad ideologies (such as support for socialist causes).

Immigrants perceiving shared interests may be particularly susceptible to mobilization within their social networks. Put simply, individuals perceiving shared interests may be less likely to expect disagreement or conflict among members of their group, leading them to discuss their political ideas and views more readily than others in group settings. Such perceptions of social support are necessary to transcend fear of in-group sanctions—otherwise, individuals may be reluctant to discuss controversial topics out of fear of stigmatization (Bandura 1977; Reicher, Levine and Gordijn 1998). Shared interests thus create “safe spaces” for the exchange of political ideas and information, ultimately facilitating immigrants’ mobilization by other group members (Drury and Reicher 1999; Huckfeldt and Kohlfeld 1989). Simply put, as perceptions of shared interest intensify, individuals may discuss politics with other group members more readily and learn about opportunities for participation. This need not occur within the context of a formal organization or association, but may also occur through informal conversations and interactions.

Linked fate may also spur participation through psychological processes not captured by cost-benefit approaches such as that of Edlin et al. When shared interests are perceived, group membership may function as a cognitive filter, cueing other members’ messages as relatively important. Hence, other group members’ efforts at mobilization may be more persuasive. Finally, as individuals tend to adopt behaviors that they perceive as positively reinforced, perceptions of shared interests may encourage political action on behalf of one’s group (Huckfeldt and Kohlfeld 1989; Mansbridge 1999). When they perceive that participation is positively reinforced within their groups, they might be willing to mobilize despite concerns about native backlash.

Second, linked fate may also boost individuals' sense of political efficacy—both internal and external (Chong and Rogers 2005; Shingles 1981). Efficacy refers to individuals' beliefs that they can have an impact on politics, either individually or through their groups. Research from political science and social psychology characterizes efficacy as a psychological resource that enables individuals to overcome the costs of participation (Easton and Dennis 1967; Lane 1959; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Verba and Nie 1972).

I will first consider how it might alter individuals' sense of collective external efficacy—the sense that their group can have a collective impact on politics. Broadly, the social psychology literature suggests that linked fate can “empower relatively powerless individuals” by raising their collective efficacy (Drury and Reicher 1999; Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008). More specifically, linked fate facilitates discussion and intra-group exchange, which can create new opportunities for coordination and thus enhance individuals' perceptions of their group's collective efficacy (Drury and Reicher 1999; Ellemers, Kortakaas and Ouwerkerk 1999). Put differently, linked fate can foster intra-group consensus and mutual support, strengthening individuals' perceptions that their group can effect political change (Drury and Reicher 1999). Furthermore, through such interactions, individuals learn about the political interests and attitudes of other group members. Individuals who see their interests linked to the group as a whole will evaluate the potential benefits of their individual participation with reference to their expectations that other group members will mobilize.

Linked fate may also enhance individuals' perceived internal efficacy, individuals' confidence in their ability to understand politics and act politically (Shingles 1981). Again, such sentiments may facilitate individuals' engagement with their social groups. Insofar as perceptions of shared interest facilitate political discussions, individuals grow increasingly likely to hear of political developments affecting their communities. As such, they may gradually develop a deeper understanding of host country political processes. Likewise, when individuals that perceive that those close to them or valued by them support their behaviors, their confidence in their ability to perform those behaviors often increases (Ajzen 1988, 1991). An immigrant who does not see

himself as the “type” of person to participate in a protest, for example, may be more likely to march if his friends support the cause. Interactions with other group members frequently also impart the notion that every individual can contribute to the cause at hand (Schwartz and Paul 1992). Indeed, social movement leaders often seek to recruit members by stressing that everyone can make a difference. Hence, immigrants’ internal efficacy might rise with increased in-group interaction pertaining to politics. Importantly, sentiments of internal efficacy connected to linked fate need not be a product of recent interactions, but instead may be forged throughout individuals’ lives. That is, I expect linked fate’s effect on internal efficacy to be enduring rather than transient.

To summarize, I advance three key hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1** *All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants’ likelihood of political participation.*

**Hypothesis 2** *All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants’ probability of mobilization by other immigrants or members of their ethnic, religious, and other identity groups.*

**Hypothesis 3** *All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants’ sense of internal and external efficacy.*

It is important to clarify that, in order for linked fate to encourage political involvement, it need not drive individuals to expand their social networks and meet new people within their religious and ethnic, etc., groups. It must instead simply facilitate political discussions and exchange within individuals’ networks. That said, individuals’ networks may expand as they engage more with their social groups and come into contact with more people that share their identities. As individuals’ network size increases, they may be exposed to ever-increasing possibilities for mobilization and new sources of political information, magnifying linked fate’s effect on participation.

It is important, also, to reiterate that individuals may perceived shared interests with other group members along one or many issue areas, or indeed simply perceive a broad, shared ideological

or party orientation. As the scope and diversity of perceived shared interests increase, I anticipate that the depth and frequency of inter-group interactions may also increase, creating additional possibilities for mobilization. That said, linked fate may increase political participation even when perceptions of shared interests are limited to very specific issue areas such as immigration. As long as immigrants anticipate that their opinions and ideas will be supported by other group members, I expect linked fate to correlate positively with participation.

Along the same vein, it is important to clarify that such political activity need not relate directly to immigration or integration. It also need not be group-specific (e.g., a policy affecting only immigrants from Muslim countries). As long as linked fate increases individuals' interactions with their groups, exposing them to new political information and additional possibilities for mobilization, I expect that it might inspire participation across diverse policy domains. An immigrant perceiving linked fate, for example, may learn about new referendums on environmental policy after attending a discussion group or meeting on immigrants' rights.

Finally, I expect that linked fate will increase immigrants' likelihood of participation regardless of the integration context in which they reside. When immigrants do not perceive that they possess political influence, as might be the case where immigrants possess few political rights, they may be relatively disinclined to participate (Koopmans et al. 2005) That is, fewer immigrants may be inclined to participate where they lack formal political rights. That said, all else equal, linked fate will still correlate positively with participation for those that possess it. Indeed, as long as immigrants are permitted to interact with other group members, linked fate may facilitate political discussion and mobilization, potentially spurring political participation. Indeed, when immigrants reside in contexts where they enjoy few political rights and no clear path to naturalization (e.g., the Swiss cantons of Aargau and Bern), they might possess more severe grievances, motivating political discussion and informational exchange.

That said, some integration policies may affect the size of the effect of linked fate on participation. Importantly, host governments vary in the degree to which they fund immigrant organizations. Funding dictates the number and scale of activities and meetings that immigrant

groups can organize. Correspondingly, funding may affect the frequency and depth of interactions between immigrants. When organizations receive less funding, immigrants have fewer opportunities to exchange political information with others and fewer funds to plan political events. Under such circumstances, even the participation of immigrants possessing a relatively high degree of linked fate may be constrained. Some governments also sponsor language and integration classes and discussion groups that provide immigrants with regular opportunities to interact. In such contexts, immigrants possessing linked fate will have ample opportunities to discuss politics and share political information, facilitating participation. Further, linked fate may be particularly likely to spur political participation when governments subsidize or organize political or anti-racism discussion groups for immigrants, encouraging them to interact. Such events are infrequent, however, and likely have only a weak effect since immigrants must elect to attend political and anti-racism discussion groups.

The effect of linked fate on political participation may also be influenced by the political culture of the communities in which immigrants reside. In many European countries, cities and towns vary with respect to how often they hold public roundtables, public meetings, and popular referenda. Furthermore, local political parties may be more active and organized in certain locations than in others. In communities with active local parties, and in communities where local governments frequently organize roundtables, meetings, and referenda, there are more opportunities to get involved in politics. This might increase the likelihood that individuals possessing linked fate will be mobilized by other group members. In locales where there are fewer opportunities to participate, their likelihood of mobilization by community members will likely be lower, all else equal. Put differently, I expect that linked fate will raise immigrants' probability of participation on net regardless of the political culture of their communities of residence. The magnitude of this increase, however, may be smaller when there are fewer local opportunities for participation in the first place.

Differences in immigrants' home-country socialization may shape their propensity to address their grievances through political action. Immigrants' home country experiences can shape their



degree of psychological involvement with politics and, in some cases, predispose them to seek further political information. Such experiences may also help immigrants to understand when their personal interests are served by political involvement, facilitating their political incorporation into receiving countries (Black 1987). With this in mind, I hold that immigrants who are particularly predisposed to address grievances through political action may be particularly likely to seek political information and discuss politics when they perceive linked fate.

Prior to testing the mechanisms through which linked fate may influence participation, then, I advance two further hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 4** *All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on individuals' likelihood of participation in politics that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.*

**Hypothesis 5** *All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on individuals' likelihood of participation in politics that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.*

Importantly, I do not expect that cleavages within immigrant communities will necessarily constrain linked fate's effect on participation. Some immigrant communities, such as Turkish-born communities in Switzerland and Germany, encompass people of diverse ethnicities, religious beliefs, and political ideologies. Often, immigrant organizations and networks in host countries form around such cleavages, mirroring the diversity of sending countries. Individuals' religious and ethnic identities, as well as political ideologies, may determine who they interact with. Kurdish immigrants in Switzerland, for example, may interact most often with Kurds. Turkish nationalists may likewise interact most frequently with other Turkish nationalists. Even among such divided immigrant communities, however, I expect that linked fate will spur participation. Even if linked fate does not increase the size of individuals' social networks, it may increase interactions and facilitate the exchange of political information within networks, leading to greater political participation. A Kurd perceiving linked fate on the basis of her Muslim faith, for example, may broach this issue with

Kurdish friends and colleagues more readily than others even if she does not directly engage with ethnically Turkish Muslims. On net, I expect linked fate to facilitate interaction within individuals' networks, fostering participation even when larger immigrant communities are highly divided.

The above hypotheses reflect my expectation that linked fate increases individual immigrants' likelihood of political participation. Even if linked fate increases their probability of mobilization by other group members and their sense of efficacy, however, they might still be tempted to free-ride off of the actions of others. Particularly when they possess relatively limited knowledge of their host country's political context and limited capacity in the local language, immigrants might be reluctant to participate even when they possess linked fate. This reluctance may be magnified if immigrants do not believe that participating in a specific action will enhance their group's economic or political position in society.

Under such circumstances, how might linked fate, then, militate against free riding among those interested in participating? The social psychology literature suggests that individual interactions between group members can facilitate a sense of obligation to the greater group which militates against free-riding (Chong 1991; Gamson 1975; Schwartz and Paul 1992). Insofar as linked fate facilitates open interaction and political discussion among group members, it may increase a sense of obligation to one's community as a whole. Furthermore, such interactions can strengthen individuals' capacity to understand how the experiences and political actions of individuals in his or her network fit into broader regional, national, or global movements (Schwartz and Paul 1992). A sense of meeting obligations towards one group or participating in a larger cause can increase individuals' self-esteem, increasing their likelihood of participation. For example, an individual considering signing a local referendum related to water pollution may be more likely to do so if she learns that that referendum is part of a nationwide effort to promote clean water. The sense of contributing to a broader movement, rather than simply a local issue, may boost her self-image.

Much of the existing comparative politics literature, once again, emphasizes in-group sanctioning as a critical means through which group leaders can encourage cooperation (participation) and punish defection. By this account, individuals would participate if they feared retribution

from other group members. Perhaps they might be concerned that their reputations within their communities would suffer if they abstain from participation. Once again, however, it is unclear whether the fear of sanctioning is enough to drive immigrants to participate. Again, given informational and linguistic barriers as well as long working hours, the costs of participation may outweigh the reputational costs of non-participation. Furthermore, many immigrant groups place a greater emphasis on diasporic or transnational participation rather than host-country participation (Koopmans et al. 2005). Particularly in communities where host-country participation is infrequent, the reputational costs of non-participation might be limited.


Finally, linked fate may be more likely to lead to political action when individuals perceive deep-seated group loyalty than when they perceive little connection other than some externally-imposed status (such as refugee status or immigration status) (Campbell et al. 1960). Deep-seated loyalty can foster a sense of community and obligation and militate against free-riding. As such, religious and ethnic identities may be more likely to spur political engagement than pan-ethnic or racial identities or identities based solely on legal status. For example, a Malian Muslim immigrant in France may feel emotionally more attached to her Muslim identity and her Malian identity than she would with her African identity, her identity as a black woman, or her identity as an immigrant. Ultimately, individuals who are attached to their identity groups may gain greater utility from political actions on behalf of group interests than others. That is, all else equal, group affect might increase individuals' perceived benefits of participation. Additionally, emotional attachments may enhance the credibility of in-group mobilizers, rendering them more persuasive (Deshpande and Stayman 1994). Consequently, linked fate combined with affective attachment may yield higher participation than a perception of linked fate alone. To that effect, I advance a final hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 6** *Linked fate's effect on participation will be greatest when it is based on affective identities that foster a sense of emotional connection with other group members.*

Before concluding, it is necessary to gauge whether the linked fate concept is analytically distinct from existing explanations linking identity and political participation—namely, the idea that group identification spurs participation by increasing individuals' social trust. Like linked fate,

social trust might increase interactions between group members, potentially increasing individuals' probability of mobilization by other group members (Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Rothstein 2000; Stolle 2001). That said, social trust refers to a belief in the integrity and reliability of others and need not imply shared political interests or views. Correspondingly, social trust may not enhance individuals' sense that their ideas and opinions will be supported and may not facilitate political discussion as effectively as linked fate. Furthermore, social trust can enhance individuals' optimism and decrease their perceptions of collective grievances (Helliwell, Huang and Wang 2018). For this reason, linked fate constitutes a conceptually distinct addition to the extant literature.

To summarize, linked fate may enhance immigrants' participation insofar as it enhances their collective external and internal efficacy and promotes their mobilization. External efficacy raises individuals' overall perceptions that their group could bring about political change while internal efficacy decreases the costs inherent in participation by facilitating immigrants' access to political information. Linked fate may also promote a sense of obligation to the group and lead individuals to imagine themselves as part of a larger movement, enhancing the individual benefits of participation and discouraging free-riding. This theory is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below.



**Figure 2.2:** How Linked Fate Influences Individuals' Probability of Participation

**Table 2.1:** Summary of Hypotheses

	<b>Hypothesis</b>
<b>H1</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants' likelihood of non-electoral participation.</i>
<b>H2</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization by other group members or supporters.</i>
<b>H3</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' sense of internal and external efficacy.</i>
<b>H4</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.</i>
<b>H5</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.</i>
<b>H6</b>	<i>Linked fate's effect on participation will be greatest when it is based on affective identities that foster a sense of emotional connection with other group members.</i>

## 2.4 Prerequisites of Linked Fate

In subsequent chapters, I will discuss my case selection, arguing that linked fate may help explain patterns of participation among Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants in Switzerland. I will also propose variables that may spur both linked fate and political participation among immigrants, complicating attempts to empirically measure the influence of linked fate on participation. Before proceeding, then, it is necessary that I briefly survey several key psychological and social prerequisites for the development of linked fate. Here, I extend key assumptions from U.S. linked fate literature to immigrants in Europe.

Immigrants may develop linked fate perceptions if four necessary conditions hold. Each of these conditions is necessary, but no single one is sufficient, for linked fate to become manifest. First, immigrants must perceive that they are members of a distinct social group, be it ethnic, religious, based on immigration status, etc. Membership in this group must be immutable or difficult to change given individuals' short term resource endowments. That is, individuals must perceive that they cannot change their group membership, either because it is fixed or because doing so will invite sanctions from friends and family. Even though a Muslim could theoretically convert, for example, he or she might risk alienation from friends and family if he or she does so. Indeed, if identity is mutable, individuals could simply leave their groups when membership limits their rights or opportunities. Importantly, by definition, visible minorities cannot change or hide their minority status, making them particularly likely to perceive linked fate, all else equal.

To possess linked fate, immigrants need not feel emotionally attached to their membership groups. They must simply be cognitively aware of their categorization. That is, both cognitive and affective identities can serve as the basis for linked fate. Put more concretely, an individual may perceive linked fate on the basis of ethnic or religious identities. Such identities are often valued insofar as they provide a personal sense of belonging and heritage. That said, more legalistic identities such as non-citizenship or non-European Union citizenship may also serve as the basis of linked fate even if immigrants attach little emotional value to them. Such identities often serve as the basis for institutional discrimination and may foster a sense of political connection between

individuals that share them.

Second, immigrants must perceive that one or more of their group memberships constitutes an obstacle to achieving economic, social, or political parity with the majority in their host country. They must also hold any perceived lack of equality with natives implied by their group membership to be fundamentally detrimental to their personal interests. Put differently, they must perceive that their group memberships shape their personal life chances. This perceived lack of equality provides immigrants with a reason to seek redress and is thus a necessary prerequisite for the politicization of their identities.

In addition, they must not perceive that this lack of equality is fleeting or temporary, but rather that it will persist indefinitely in the absence of social or political change. For example, an immigrant who perceives discrimination on the basis of foreign citizenship, but expects to naturalize or gain eligibility to do so shortly thereafter, may not perceive linked fate. An immigrant who perceives that he or she may not be able to meet a host country's citizenship requirements in the long run, on the other hand, may perceive linked fate on the basis of his or her foreign citizenship.

Importantly, immigrants' linked fate need not be rooted in explicit perceptions of discrimination, but may be anchored in a sense that their language, culture, or religion, or immigration status precludes them from being full members of their country of residence, able to enjoy the same rights and legal protections guaranteed to citizens. Such perceptions may be particularly acute in closed integration contexts where non-citizens have relatively few political rights, relatively few religious rights, and/or no clear path to naturalization. When, for example, states lack consultative mechanisms and/or councils through which non-citizens can voice their policy opinions, when non-citizens lack the right to vote or launch official petitions, and when immigrant religious minorities lack protection and/or subsidies offered to adherents of the state religion, feelings of relative deprivation may intensify. Targeted institutional discrimination such as minaret and mosque bans and the prohibition of the Islamic veil may lead individuals to feel especially marginalized, creating conditions that foster linked fate. Importantly, this criterion is looser than the criterion frequently employed by many linked fate scholars, for whom explicit perceived discrimination is a prerequisite

for linked fate.

Importantly, Yalaz has argued that immigrants evaluate their social position relative to other immigrants rather than relative to natives (2015). I contend, however, that in most circumstances immigrants are ultimately concerned with their position relative to the native majority (Melfer and Muffels 2012). Immigrants may compare their status with that of other immigrant groups in order to assess their position relative to natives. This may be particularly likely when immigrant groups live in close proximity to one another or when they have relatively few connections to natives. Comparing themselves to members of other immigrant groups may thus facilitate their understanding of their position relative to natives. That said, many immigrants have more information about natives than immigrants of other ethnicities and religions, particularly when other groups are relatively small. Further, migrants who have resided abroad for a long time may be particularly prone to compare themselves to natives and distinguish themselves from newer immigrant cohorts (Melfer and Muffels 2012; Stark 2006). Indeed, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, Italian and Turkish former guestworkers in Switzerland often emphasize their contributions to Switzerland and differentiate themselves from newer immigrant cohorts such as Syrians and Eritreans.

It is critical to note that the existing literature in social psychology suggests that individual immigrants' perceptions of what constitutes an obstacle to parity with natives vary significantly. Indeed, it suggests that the psychological processes of integration vary significantly across immigrants, even among individuals who have the same cultural origins and live in the same integration contexts (Nauck 2008). The degree to which immigrants perceive linked fate may be shaped by their background and socialization prior to migration, their reasons for migrating, and their degree of attachment to their culture and language. Importantly, many migrants choose to relocate abroad knowing that doing so will entail cultural and linguistic adjustments and the relinquishment of political rights they enjoyed at home (Berry et al. 1987; Sam and Berry 2010). Further, individuals place variable importance on the maintenance of their own cultural and religious traditions (Berry 1974, 1980; Berry et al. 1987). While some immigrants' experiences may lead them to perceive inequality with natives, then, others may see relatively few barriers to achieving equality. For this



reason, I expect that the strength of immigrants' perceptions of linked fate will vary. Indeed, one should not presume that all immigrants, or all immigrants belonging to a specific ethnic group or religion, will perceive it at all.

Third, immigrants must also evaluate their social position relative to others in the host country rather than relative to those in their homelands. This is most likely to occur when immigrants cannot, or do not intend to, return to their homelands in the short run. Political immigrants, for example, may not be able to return home and thus may be particularly likely to feel invested in their host countries. Those who have permanent employment or family in their host countries may also find it difficult to uproot themselves. Immigrants on short-term contracts or temporary visas, on the other hand, may feel less vested in their host countries. Such immigrants may not place much importance on achieving broad parity of rights with native populations, as they eventually plan to return home.

Finally, immigrants meeting these conditions will be particularly likely to develop linked fate when they perceive that their group memberships are salient points of political contestation in their countries or regions of residence. Put differently, they must believe that their social position and that of others who share the same identity is subject to public contestation. A Muslim immigrant in a country debating the admission of Syrian Muslim refugees, for example, may thus be more likely to perceive linked fate than a Sikh immigrant from India. When social memberships are salient, immigrants' individual senses of grievance transform into a collective sense of grievance. They come to believe that their identity is pertinent to their own life experiences, but more broadly that the rights of all possessing that identity are publicly contested.

Critically, immigrants' *perceptions* that their identities are salient are more important to linked fate than the objective political salience of the same identities. Such perceptions may take root in the event of ongoing public debates or polarization over the distribution of membership rights or group rights to specific social groups (e.g., non-citizens or Muslims). When debates about specific groups' rights are at the center of politics, immigrants often develop a sense that they share political interests with other members of their group, particularly if other group members have broadcast their policy positions in the media, in public forums, and other venues. Put simply, they may develop

stereotypes of other group members' ideologies and policy preferences, engendering perceptions of shared interests (e.g., assuming that ethnic minorities are more likely to be pro-immigration).

Importantly, minority social movements can increase the salience of group membership. In the U.S., organizations such as the NAACP and African-American leaders such as Jesse Jackson enhanced the societal salience of Black identity by advocating for civil rights in the public arena. Across Europe, Muslim organizations (e.g., Muslim Council of Britain) have become advocates for Muslim group rights and publicized the stigmatization faced by many Muslims (Saggar 2009). Broadly, minority organizations and political entrepreneurs express grievances and seek redress in public forums, potentially facilitating the development of linked fate.

It is also important to stress that group membership may be most salient when members of a minority group are visibly distinct from the majority, either because of their race or skin color or because of distinctive clothing, hairstyles, or other accoutrements. Koopmans, Statham, Kastoryano and others have stressed, for example, that Muslims' visibility has fueled public debates about Muslims' potential for integration in Europe (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Kastoryano argued that visible distinctions thrust negotiations about societal membership and identity into the public space (Kastoryano 2002). That is, visible distinctions between members of a minority group and the majority may intensify public debate over integration. Insofar as visibility also increases immigrants' perceptions that their identities are salient, racial minorities or visible religious minorities (e.g., Sikhs, Muslims who wear traditional dress) may perceive greater linked fate than less visible minorities.

Additionally, it is important to stress that immigrants may perceive that their group memberships create obstacles to parity with natives even when they do not perceive that such perceptions are shared by others. In contexts where immigrants' identities are not salient, and where immigrants have little incentive to air their grievances in public forums, individuals may not perceive that other immigrants living in different neighborhoods and cities, working different jobs, and interacting with different people possess parallel grievances. Under such circumstances, linked fate may not become manifest even when individuals possess significant grievances. Indeed, political salience is

necessary to create a sense of shared grievances. A sense of shared grievances is necessary to create linked fate between individuals and others in their social groups.

If these conditions are met, sentiments of linked fate may be crystallized through interactions with other group members—either formally through organizational involvement or informally through interactions with co-workers, friends, acquaintances, and family, as well as consumption of immigrant media. Such interactions lead individuals to believe that they share broad grievances with fellow group members (Dawson 1994).

When such sentiments materialize, immigrants may conflate their political interests with those of their groups. Such crystallization represents a necessary and sufficient condition for the linked fate. This conflation can be either tied to specific issue domains, such as immigration policy, or a broader ideological orientation, such as socialism. That is, individuals may come to perceive that their personal interests and upward mobility are tied to the interests and progress made by their group as a whole. Given that political information is costly to attain, group identities come to serve as a heuristic through which immigrants assess the cost and benefits of political developments (Dawson 1994).

## **2.5 Conclusion**

To conclude, I expect that linked fate increases individuals' probability of participation in politics by increasing their likelihood of mobilization by other group members and increasing their degree of efficacy—the sense that they can influence politics. I also expect that the effect of linked fate on participation will be strongest when linked fate is rooted in an emotional connection to one's membership group, inspiring a sense of responsibility and mutual obligation. In the chapters that follow, I will test these hypotheses among Italian and Turkish-born immigrants in Switzerland.

## **Chapter 3**

# **Immigration to Switzerland from Italy and Turkey in Context**

In this chapter, I will explain why Switzerland presents a suitable context for testing the hypotheses in Chapter 2. This chapter is divided into several sections. First, I will briefly summarize the history of immigration to Switzerland, emphasizing that immigration has long been at the center of Swiss political debates. I will also briefly survey Switzerland's current immigration trends and policies.

Second, I will briefly survey existing data on immigrants' political participation in Switzerland. In brief, existing findings suggest that immigrants' political participation varies significantly by their origin country and that inter-group differences do not disappear upon controlling for their socioeconomic characteristics, civic integration and networks, and socialization (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Ruedin 2018).

Third, I will discuss my selection of Italian and Turkish-born immigrants as my key cases in reference to their immigration histories in Switzerland. These are both among Switzerland's largest and most-dispersed immigrant groups. While the salience of Italian immigration has declined over time, however, the salience of immigration from Muslim countries, including Turkey, increased. Likewise, many Turks continue to report relative deprivation on the basis of their Muslim

background. These differences may lead to differences in these groups' political participation.

Next, I will describe the integration and citizenship policies the three cantons in this study, Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. These cantons have pursued significantly different approaches to immigrants' political integration, enabling me to gauge whether linked fate influences participation after accounting for such differences.

Finally, I apply the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 to the Swiss case. I highlight key dimensions of identity along which immigrants to Switzerland might perceive linked fate.

### **3.1 Immigration to Switzerland**

In this section, I provide a brief overview of Switzerland's immigration history. Immigration has long been salient to Swiss politics and remains salient to this day. Likewise, throughout Swiss history, opposition to immigration has periodically spurred the introduction of popular initiatives meant to reduce admissions and limit immigrants' political rights. Over time, the focus of immigration debates has gradually shifted from the immigration of Italian immigrants to the admission of immigrants more generally. Current integration discourse also centers on the integration of Muslim immigrants and their descendants rather than the integration of Italians.

Switzerland's history as a modern country of immigration starts in the late 19th century, when thousands of Italian guestworkers were recruited to build Switzerland's railroad network and to work in factories. Italian guestworkers, predominantly male, lived apart from the Swiss in immigrant "shantytowns" outside of villages and cities. In general, they were not permitted to bring their families to Switzerland. Around the same time, many German and French nationals settled in Switzerland, where they worked as craftsmen. By the onset of World War 1 in 1914, 14.7 percent of the population of Switzerland was comprised of foreigners, mostly from adjacent countries (Efionayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005).

In the wake of World War 2, Switzerland's economy boomed, spurring demand for foreign

labor to build its industrial base. To this end, Switzerland signed agreements with Italy and, subsequently, Spain to recruit guestworkers. They worked mostly in construction, but also in the textile and machinery sectors. guestworkers were entitled to stay in Switzerland for one year, but high labor demand meant that contracts were frequently extended.

Initially, Switzerland's government envisaged that guestworkers would return home. Correspondingly, it imposed strict rules limiting family reunification and increased the residence period for obtaining permanent residence from 5 to 10 years. Immigrants had virtually no access to Swiss social welfare or social services during this period and their children had little access to schooling. Italian Catholic Missions and, to a lesser extent, Spanish Catholic Missions, stepped in to offer basic integration courses and counseling for immigrants as well as schooling for their children.

Over time, both the Italian government and largely-Italian immigrant workers' unions pressured the Swiss government to relax these restrictions. By the 1960s, family reunification laws were loosened. Around this time, also, the Swiss government began to pursue guestworkers from more distant countries, assuming that greater physical and cultural distances would dissuade workers from remaining in Switzerland over the long term (Tezgören 2008). To this end, companies began to recruit guestworkers from Turkey, the Balkans, and Portugal. Typically, companies paid for workers' transportation to Switzerland and housed them in company barracks. If they did not pass periodic health inspections, companies also paid for their deportation.

Following the oil crisis in 1973, also, many workers were laid off and left Switzerland (Efionayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005). As the economy recovered, however, guestworker inflows—particularly inflows from Turkey and Portugal—accelerated.

Guestworker inflows were not always well-received by the Swiss public and Swiss politicians. By the late 1960s, anti-immigrant political movements critical of Switzerland's so-called "*Überfremdung*" or "Over-Foreignization" had become a powerful force in Swiss politics. The Schwarzenbach Initiative, a 1970 popular referendum championed by James Schwarzenbach, called for a strict tightening of guestworker admissions. Specifically, Schwarzenbach called for a 10 percent reduction in Switzerland's foreign population (to 20,000 per year, with an overall cap of

600,000) and to limit cantonal intake to 12 percent of the overall foreign born population from 1970 to 1978 (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). He emphasized “Swiss uniqueness,” arguing that immigrants, and particularly immigrants from Italy, threatened Swiss culture and Swiss democracy. He is famous for intimating that the Swiss are “no longer the masters of their own house” (Maiolino 2011).

Narrowly rejected by the Swiss public (54 percent), this initiative was the first in a series of initiatives (in 1974 and 1978) designed to curb immigration into Switzerland, almost all of which were defeated. Schwarzenbach’s anti-immigrant push had an enduring effect on Swiss politics throughout the late 20th century, galvanizing not only opponents of immigration but also burgeoning immigrant movements seeking to secure immigrants’ rights (Maiolino 2011).

By the late 1970s, facing continued pressure from the left and from immigrant organizations, the Swiss government instituted reforms enabling seasonal workers to transform their temporary work permits into permanent residency. This reform also permitted guestworkers to bring their families. These reforms paved the way for the eventual abolition of Switzerland’s seasonal worker programs—indeed, seasonal permits have not been issued since 2002.

In the 1970s, also, asylum seeker inflows into Switzerland began to rise. In the mid- and late-1970s, the Swiss government offered asylum to political refugees from Turkey, Chile, and Eastern Europe, among other places, as well as 8,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian “boat people” (Efionayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005). Many of these refugees were university-educated professionals. In 1981, Switzerland established its first formal asylum policy which defined the rules of refugee status determination and granted cantons significant latitude over refugee integration. As guestworker inflows dwindled throughout the 1980s, asylum seeker inflows accelerated. Over this period, thousands of asylum seekers entered Switzerland, particularly ethnic Kurds from eastern Turkey and Tamils from Sri Lanka. Although some of these refugees were highly-skilled professionals, many others were less-educated. In the 1990s, wars in the Balkans prompted substantial inflows of asylum seekers from Bosnia and Kosovo, some of whom had family ties in Switzerland due to earlier guestworker programs.

Over this period, rising asylum seeker inflows prompted growing concern from the Swiss

public, particularly in the context of rising unemployment rates in many cantons (Efionayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005). In response, the Swiss government passed a new asylum law in 1999 that made it more difficult for those who entered Switzerland illegally to gain permanent residency. Effectively, this policy required that many asylum seekers (40,000-60,000) from Bosnia and Kosovo return home after conflicts ended in those countries in 1995 and 1999, respectively (Efionayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005).

These developments defined the demographics of Switzerland's immigrant population today. Currently, Swiss immigration policy emphasizes highly-skilled migration and refugees. In recent years, the bulk of non-European immigrants arrived from Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Syria, although their numbers remain small relative to groups that arrived earlier. Likewise, Switzerland's intake of refugees, in proportion to its population, is small compared to that of many other European countries, particularly Germany and Sweden.

Over the last several decades, then immigrant inflows from neighboring European countries have largely been supplanted by inflows from Muslim countries. Likewise, Swiss immigration policy now makes it relatively easy for European Union citizens with work contracts to gain residency in Switzerland. At the same time, many second- and third-generation immigrants from Turkey, the Balkans, and further afield, identify as Muslim. Like elsewhere in Europe, this has prompted considerable public debate over the integration of Muslim populations and, more generally, their place in Swiss society. What were once debates over the "integrability" of Italians and Spaniards have transformed into debates over the integrability of Muslims (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016; Maiolino 2011). Furthermore, in the past, many policymakers sought to limit immigration from Turkey out of fear that many asylum seekers' claims were illegitimate. As asylum claims from Turkey have dropped off, and as Switzerland's asylum policies have tightened, Turkish migration has lost salience.

Indeed, many recent popular initiatives and votes related to immigrants' integration concern Muslims more broadly. At the cantonal level, right-wing parties, particularly the Swiss Peoples' Party, have spearheaded initiatives to ban the full face veil in public. To date, full-face veils have



been banned in the cantons of Ticino and St. Gallen. In 2009, also, Swiss citizens voted to ban the construction of minarets, prompting an outcry among practicing Muslims. More recently, Muslims' push for single-sex physical education classes and the construction of Muslim cemeteries—exempt from Swiss burial laws—have fomented new debates. These questions are largely unresolved, and Muslim immigration and integration remain highly salient to Swiss politics.

### **3.2 Migration to Switzerland: Trends and Policies in 2016**

In this section, I will briefly profile Switzerland's foreign-born population in 2016. I will also summarize Switzerland's current immigration and integration policies. I will emphasize that immigration, and particularly legal immigration, remains highly salient to Swiss politics. Furthermore, Swiss naturalization and integration policies, particularly as pertaining to Muslims, are intensely debated and continuously evolving. The frequency of referenda and policy initiatives in these areas may foster the development of linked fate if immigrants perceive that their political and cultural rights as minorities are subject to public contestation.

Switzerland has one of the highest foreign-born population shares in Europe. Approximately 29 percent of Switzerland's legally-resident population, almost 2.5 million people, was foreign-born in 2016. In 2016, the top 10 source countries of immigrants were Germany, Italy, Portugal, France, Kosovo, Turkey, Spain, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, and Austria. The top 10 non-Western European sending countries were Kosovo, Turkey, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, the United States, and Poland (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*).

In recent years, Switzerland has prioritized the admission of educated professionals. As such, educational attainment among Western European and non-European immigrants, on average, is higher than that of native-born Swiss citizens. In 2014, 38.4 percent of Western European-born immigrants and 41.5 percent of non-European immigrants had completed at least tertiary education, as compared to 29.4 percent of Swiss-born Swiss citizens and about 15.9 percent of foreign citizens born in Switzerland. Moreover, 33 percent of naturalized Swiss citizens have completed tertiary

education or higher. Only Eastern and Southeastern Europeans (namely, immigrants from the Balkans and Turkey) were less educated than native-born Swiss citizens, with only about 14 percent completing tertiary education (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*b*). Highly-educated immigrants were particularly concentrated in the Zürich region.

Accordingly, many foreign-born citizens are highly concentrated in white-collar industries. In 2016, 53 percent of the foreign-born worked as executives, academics, technicians, and office workers. Another 18 percent worked in the service sector (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*a*). Although many Eastern and Southeastern Europeans and non-Europeans worked in such professions as well, they were more likely than Western European immigrants to work in the service sector, manufacturing, and as tradespersons. These immigrants play a particularly important role in Switzerland's hospitality, restaurant, and construction industries (Efonayi, Niederberger and Wanner 2005).

Muslims constituted 5.2 percent of the population, or 362,973 individuals, in 2016. The majority of these are foreign-born (58 percent are non-citizens) and about 73 percent of non-naturalized foreign-born Muslims are from Europe, particularly the Balkans (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*c*). Like most Muslim immigrants in Europe, a majority adhere to Sunnism.

The bulk of immigrants in Switzerland and in the three study cantons are authorized. A recent study by University of Neuchâtel researchers estimates that 76,000 individuals, or 3 percent of Switzerland's foreign-born population, were unauthorized in 2015 (Morlok et al. 2018). Most of these were relatively recent immigrants from Latin America or the Balkans who overstayed tourist visas or whose asylum requests were rejected. According to this study, also, 2000 and 3000 unauthorized immigrants lived in Aargau and Bern, respectively.

### **3.2.1 Admissions Requirements as of 2016**

Switzerland's current immigration policies emphasize the admission of E.U. citizens and highly-skilled non-E.U. workers. Since the conclusion of a bilateral agreement between Switzerland and the E.U. in 2002, E.U. citizens with a work contract are permitted to legally live and work

in Switzerland. Initial permits are valid for 5 years and renewable, provided that they have an employment contract or the financial means to otherwise support themselves. These permits also allow workers to bring partners and children to Switzerland. After 5 years, E.U. citizens become eligible for permanent residency. These policies have encouraged migration from the E.U. into Switzerland. In 2014, voters approved a referendum imposing quotas on E.U. migration, but these have not yet been enacted.

Non-E.U. citizens are subject to stricter requirements. Employers must apply for authorization to hire foreign workers through canton. Cantons are permitted to issue authorizations only if the federal government agrees that the applicant possesses skills in high demand and if no similarly-qualified domestic or E.U. worker can be found. In effect, most permits are offered to executives, specialists, and other highly-qualified workers. Permits are initially valid for one year. Renewals are unlimited, and workers can apply for permanent residence after 10 years. Changing jobs or moving cantons requires approval from cantonal labor market authorities.

### **3.2.2 Naturalization Policies as of 2016**

As of 2016, immigrants can apply for naturalization after 12 years (years spent in Switzerland between 10 and 20 years of age count doubly). Naturalization proceeds in three stages. First, municipalities must approve individuals' applications. Next, applications are forwarded to cantonal authorities who, upon a positive adjudication, forward them to the Federal Office of Migration. Under Swiss naturalization law, cantons enjoy significant leeway to determine whether immigrants are integrated into Swiss life, are familiar with Swiss customs, and comply with Swiss laws. Although the Federal Office of Migration establishes general guidelines, cantons and municipalities determine specific thresholds for integration, as measured through language and civics exams. Generally, in order to naturalize, immigrants must demonstrate financial self-sufficiency, pay any back taxes owed, have a clean criminal record, and demonstrate some ability in a Swiss language (typically at a B1 proficiency level at a minimum). Immigrants on welfare are barred from naturalization. Cantons and municipalities frequently impose residence requirements beyond the

universal 12 year requirement.

In recent years, Switzerland's decentralized naturalization laws have come under fire. Until 2003, some municipalities voted on naturalization applications at town hall meetings. Likewise, some municipalities have been criticized for including questions that are insensitive to immigrants' religion and race (Hunziker 2015). These criticisms have spurred efforts to establish stricter standards for naturalization, both at the cantonal level and at the federal level. Public votes on naturalization have been outlawed, and cantons such as Aargau have taken steps to standardize municipal naturalization tests. In early 2018, also, a new federal naturalization law went into effect, lowering the residency requirement from 12 to 10 years.

Swiss citizenship is conferred by blood, meaning that second-generation immigrants born on Swiss soil are not automatically granted Swiss citizenship. In fact, only after a 2017 referendum were third-generation immigrants granted Swiss citizenship at birth. Switzerland's naturalization requirements are steep for many immigrants, and naturalization fees are high. Even though many immigrants—about 45 percent—have resided in Switzerland long enough to naturalize, only about 32 percent of foreign-born residents possess Swiss citizenship (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017a).

### **3.2.3 Integration Policies as of 2016**

Broadly, Swiss integration policy is grounded in the belief that the onus of naturalization befalls individuals. Consistent with Germany's historical integration policies, Switzerland emphasizes linguistic and cultural integration and "assimilation" into mainstream Swiss culture (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Koopmans et al. 2005). Accordingly, Swiss integration policy diverges from historical policies in countries such as The Netherlands and Sweden, where policies foster cultural plurality among immigrants. Swiss integration policies are still managed largely by cantons and municipalities, however, and cantonal approaches to integration vary substantially (Manatschal 2013; Wichmann et al. 2011). While the federal government sponsors occasional integration initiatives—notably, anti-racism and anti-discrimination initiatives—cantons and municipalities manage

integration at the grass roots level. As such, Swiss cantons have adopted a wide array of integration policies. Some cantons subsidize language and civics courses for new arrivals and offer extensive orientations to introduce immigrants to Swiss cultures, while others take minimal action. Some cantons also meet new immigrants to lay out concrete checklists—integration contracts—required to achieve permanent residence and, ultimately, naturalize. Immigrants in such cantons periodically meet with integration officials and receive warnings if they are in danger of not meeting integration conditions.

Swiss federalism also grants cantons significant latitude to regulate immigrants' political and civic integration. While some cantons allow immigrants to vote in local elections and run for local office, others accord immigrants few political rights. The cantons of Neuchâtel and Jura allow immigrants to vote and run for office at the local and cantonal levels, and the cantons of Fribourg, Vaud, and Geneva, and some municipalities in Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Basel-Stadt, and Graubünden allow immigrants to vote and run for office at the local level. In some cantons, notably Bern, Basel-Stadt, Luzern, and Zürich, referenda introducing local voting rights have been rejected. Certain municipalities in Bern and Luzern permit immigrants to launch "*Ausländermotion*"—motions that will be considered by local parliaments if they receive enough signatures. Further, some cantons sponsor immigration councils that are formally consulted on matters of integration and immigration policy. It is likely that the coming decade will see new referenda on non-citizens' right to vote locally and launch motions and petition. Indeed, as of early 2018, the Swiss Green party proposed a referendum in Canton Solothurn, and it is likely that it will follow suit in other cantons (Karpf 2018).

Cantons also vary in the degree to which they incorporate immigrants into their civic life. Most cantons have an application system through which immigrant organizations can apply for public money to organize events. Such events are typically required to promote intercultural understanding or immigrants' integration, and cantonal authorities possess diverging views about what kinds of projects are eligible for funding. Cantons such as Neuchâtel have partnered with immigrant organizations to a greater degree than cantons such as Bern and Aargau.

Broadly speaking, Switzerland lacks federal policies explicitly addressing the religious and cultural practices of immigrant-origin minorities. Generally speaking, the regulation of religious institutions and religious education fall within the purview of cantonal and local authorities. While some cantons are officially secular, as in France, other cantons have official, state-recognized and financed churches as in Germany (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). As of 2016, no cantons had officially recognize Sunni Islam as a minority religion and policies governing Muslim practices remain scarce. Unlike in France and Belgium, for example, there is as yet no federal law expressly prohibiting Muslim women from wearing burqas or headscarves. Only the cantons of St. Gallen and Ticino formally ban wearing the full-face veil. A number of cantonal parliaments, including those of Bern and Basel-Stadt, have rejected proposed burqa bans, and the Swiss federal government rejected a proposed nationwide ban launched by the Canton of Aargau. Several municipalities have attempted to ban headscarves in schools, but these attempts, to date, have been overturned by federal courts. Importantly, secularist policies in cantons such as Geneva and Neuchâtel effectively ban headscarves in schools, but, as yet, no explicit bans have been implemented and no legal challenges have been initiated. Educational policies are also regulated by cantons, but to date no cantons have publicly funded Muslim schools or Islamic education within mainstream public schools. Furthermore, halal foods are not yet offered in public schools. Several cantons have permitted the construction of Islamic sections in cemeteries, but, as of 2016, no Swiss authority has exempted Muslims from regulations governing burials. Swiss policies currently require that the deceased be cremated, a practice with which many Muslims disagree.

### **3.2.4 Interim Conclusions**

Broadly speaking, Swiss naturalization and integration policies are dynamic. They have been the subject of numerous recent referenda and thus are perennially salient in Swiss politics. Naturalization policies, non-citizens' rights to participate in local and cantonal elections, and the cultural rights of Muslims are continuously debated at the federal, cantonal, and local levels.

These policies may shape immigrants' political participation through several avenues. First,

immigrants residing in cantons with strict naturalization rules and laws barring non-citizen political participation may abstain from participation if they perceive engagement to be futile. Further, strict rules might limit parties efforts to mobilize migrants as they are not viewed as potential constituents.

Such policies may also stimulate the development of linked fate if immigrants believe they constitute unfair obstacles to achieving parity with natives. Again, immigrants residing in cantons where they possess few political rights may feel unfairly shut out from Swiss politics, particularly when they have resided in Switzerland for many years. In the wake of the minaret ban and several successful initiatives to ban full-face veils, Muslim immigrants may also perceive that they are barred from enjoying the same freedom of religion that is guaranteed to non-Muslims by Swiss law. Further, non-European Union immigrants may perceive that admissions policies unfairly favor immigrants from countries such as Italy, Spain, and France.

### **3.3 Immigrant Political Participation in Switzerland**

To date, relatively little data exists on immigrants' political participation in Switzerland. Existing studies also tend to focus on immigrants' participation in local elections rather than their non-electoral participation (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Giugni 2010). On the whole, these studies suggest both that immigrants vote, on average, at a lower rate than natives and that their participation rates vary significantly according to their countries of origin (Freeman 2004; Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Giugni 2010; Ruedin 2018). Furthermore, a recent study found that immigrants from distinct countries of origin vote at different rates even after controlling for individuals' socioeconomic status, social networks, family socialization, and cantonal integration policies (Ruedin 2018). A survey of Muslim immigrants also noted significant differences in non-electoral participation across origin groups (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015).

Broadly speaking, these findings suggest that there is significant diversity in immigrants' participation rates in Switzerland, all else equal. They parallel findings from many other European countries and cities, including studies in Sweden, Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and

The Netherlands (Bevelander and Pendakur 2011; Bhatti and Hansen 2010; Méndez-Lago and Pérez-Nievas 2011; Richards and Marshall 2003; Sanders et al. 2005; Togeby 1999; Van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn 2007). Consequently, Switzerland represents an ideal context for testing whether linked fate influences immigrants' political participation.

The bulk of studies on immigrants' political participation in Switzerland analyze turnout in elections in those cantons where non-citizens are permitted to vote. Generally, these results suggest that non-citizens' participation rates are significantly lower than those of citizens. A recent study of the 2015 municipal elections in the canton of Geneva suggests that 42 percent of Swiss citizens voted, as compared to 38 percent of all eligible voters. Non-Western, non-naturalized immigrants were significantly less likely than Swiss citizens to vote (Ruedin 2018). An older study from Geneva's 2007 municipal elections found that non-naturalized immigrants' turnout was 10 to 15 percent lower than that of Swiss citizens (Giugni 2010). Finally, a study of the 2006 communal elections in the canton of Vaud found that 26.9 percent of non-naturalized immigrants voted, as compared to 43.7 percent of Swiss nationals (Giugni 2010).

To my knowledge, only one study has explicitly examined the political behavior of immigrants beyond voting. Leveraging a survey of immigrants from Muslim countries in Switzerland, its authors found that immigrants from the Balkans, North Africa, and Turkey were less likely than Swiss citizens to protest, contact politicians, volunteer for political parties and campaigns, and donate money for political causes (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015).

While relatively few studies examine patterns of political engagement across immigrants, those that do suggest that participation rates vary by origin country. The 2015 study of Geneva's municipal elections also suggests that immigrant groups participated at different average rates (Ruedin 2018). While French and Italian citizens voted at rates of 38 and 34 percent, respectively, only 22 percent of Spanish citizens and 17 percent of Portuguese citizens voted (Ruedin 2018).<sup>1</sup>


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<sup>1</sup>Non-Western-European immigrant groups are not disaggregated in this study.



Strikingly, these differences persisted upon controlling for immigrants’ socioeconomic backgrounds, participation in community organizations, and family socialization. With respect to participation in non-electoral activities, the same survey of immigrants from Muslim countries in Switzerland found that Balkan immigrants participated less than North African immigrants on average, who in turn participated less than Turks (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). These participation rates are depicted in Figure 3.1.

Broadly speaking, these results suggest that there is significant variation in immigrants’ political participation in Switzerland and that such differences may not be easily explicable using existing theories. This variation makes Switzerland a viable case for testing the hypotheses laid out in the last chapter.



**Figure 3.1:** Non-Electoral Participation by Immigrant Groups, Muslim Immigrants Only **Source:** (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015)

### 3.4 Immigration from Turkey and Italy

In this section, I will briefly survey the history immigrant groups at the core of this study: Italian and Turkish-born immigrants. I will argue that these groups constitute excellent cases for several reasons. First, both groups are large in absolute numbers and well-dispersed throughout

Switzerland, including the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. Second, many immigrants from both Turkey and Italy arrived in Switzerland as guestworkers recruited under relatively uniform admissions standards. Third, both groups have, at times, been highly salient to Swiss debates over immigration and subject to discriminatory legislation. Fourth, both groups are well-organized within Switzerland, possessing dense networks of social, religious, and political organizations. Both groups have historically been very active in unions. Finally, both groups have relatively low naturalization rates, potentially suggesting similar levels of social and civic integration. As of 2016, about 24 percent of Italian immigrants and about 34 percent of Turks were naturalized (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*).

Despite these similarities, however, these groups differ in several important ways. First, immigrants from Italy and Turkey had different socializing experiences before migrating to Switzerland. In particular, ethnic and religious minorities from Turkey (e.g., Kurds and Alevis) whose identities were highly politicized in that country may be more interested in politics than Sunni Muslim Turks or Italians. Many Kurds in Switzerland are political asylees and may be predisposed to address their grievances through politics. That said, I expect that ethnic Turks and ethnic Italians will have similar attitudes towards political participation, on average. Indeed, over the last 50 years or so, Turkey and Italy have both possessed highly fractionalized party systems, frequent leadership turnover, and occasional political violence.

Furthermore, Turkish-born immigrants may be more likely to perceive linked fate than Italians. Over the past several decades, the political salience of Italian immigration has waned as migration from the Balkans, Turkey, and elsewhere has grown as a share of inflows. Consequently, debates about the admission and integration of Italian immigrants have been overtaken by concerns about the integration of immigrants from Muslim countries, including immigrants from Turkey. Given the continued salience of Muslim integration, I expect that relative to Italians, some immigrants from Turkey will feel particularly targeted by recent policy initiatives and right-wing discourse directed at immigrants and Muslims. As a consequence, I expect immigrants from Turkey to possess a higher degree of pan-immigrant and religious linked fate than Italians.

It is important to note that, while Italian is an official language in the cantons of Ticino and Grubunden, it is neither official nor widely-spoken in any of the cantons in this study. Although Italians might have greater access to federal-level political information than Turkish-born immigrants, I expect that both groups face substantial linguistic and logistical barriers to participation in the cantons in this study.

### **3.4.1 An Overview of Italian Immigration to Switzerland**

Italians have a long history of immigration to Switzerland and represent Switzerland's second-largest immigrant group, with a 2016 population of 267,308, or 10.9 percent of the foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). Italian immigrant communities come from all over Italy and can be found in virtually every Swiss canton (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*).

The first Italian immigrants in Switzerland arrived during the late 1800s as political refugees and anarchists fleeing from Italy's wars of unification. Further, a construction and industrial boom in Zürich around the same period drew thousands of immigrants from northern Italy. These immigrants mostly worked in construction. Italian neighborhoods formed on the periphery of cities such as Zürich and Bern.

This first immigration wave was followed by subsequent waves of refugees fleeing World War 2 and, ultimately, guestworkers. During the War, many Communists and Anti-Fascists sought refuge in Switzerland. Following the war, immigrants from impoverished regions of southern Italy sought work in Switzerland and Germany, which were experiencing a post-war economic boom. Guestworkers recruited many of these immigrants directly in the southern states of Calabria, Puglia, and Sicily. From 1958 to 1964, bolstered by inflows from Italy, Switzerland's foreign worker population nearly doubled in size (Maiolino 2011). By 1975, more than 500,000 Italians lived in Switzerland (St. Gallen Historisches und Völkerkundemuseum 2016).

Hoping to incentivize workers' return to their homelands, Swiss authorities also took little action to promote these workers' integration into Swiss society. They received no language or

cultural training or orientation and had little access to social support or social insurance.

In the early 20th century through the 1970s, Italians faced significant discrimination in Switzerland. They frequently lived in workers' barracks outside of city and town centers and were frequently prohibited from going into cities, particularly to bars and restaurants. Some of these barracks were quite large, housing up to 160,000 people (St. Gallen Historisches und Völkerkundemuseum 2016). Those who lived outside of barracks faced significant housing discrimination. They were also barred from sitting down on trains. As Italian immigration grew, also, anti-immigrant sentiment increased, culminating in race riots in Bern and Zürich and periodic attacks on Italian-owned businesses.

Italians also frequently faced severe working conditions. This prompted political backlash from Italian organizations. On 30 August 1965, 600 guestworkers (mostly Italians) building a dam wall in Mattmark, an Alpine town in the Canton of Valais/Wallis, died when an ice floe fell on their encampment. Immigrant organizations criticized the Swiss government for not having established avalanche warning systems and for not requiring higher-quality housing for immigrant workers. The murders of several Italian immigrants in the Zürich area in the late 1960s and early 1970s also prompted an outcry. In particular, in 1971, the murderer of Alfredo Zardini, a young Italian immigrant, received an 18-month jail term. Likewise, the murderer of Attilio Tonola, another immigrant, also received a minimal jail term in 1969. Italian organizations called for longer jail terms and official recognition of these murders as hate crimes (Maiolino 2011).

Given the difficulty of finding places to meet, Italians initially met in train stations (so-called "Sunday meetings") to exchange information about work, lodging, and political developments affecting their communities. Labor unions began to recruit Italian workers at these meetings, which soon became important venues for intra-group mobilization (Maiolino 2011).

Over time, these unions came to play a large role in articulating the demands of Italian communities to Italian and Swiss officials. They also played an important role in fostering a sense of group consciousness among Italian guestworkers. In the 1970s, the oil crisis prompted layoffs of guestworkers in many factories. In response, immigrants (and Italian immigrants in

particular) organized a series of strikes—most famously, a 1976 strike at the Bulova watch company in Neuchâtel. Unions, recognizing the importance of growing their ranks, courted immigrants during this period. By the early 1980s, almost 30 percent of immigrants belonged to trade unions.

Italian Catholic missions also became important community centers, providing immigrants with valuable social services and advocating for immigrants' rights. By 1970, 101 Catholic missions had opened across Switzerland (St. Gallen Historisches und Völkerkundemuseum 2016). These missions organized social events and parties, published bulletins and newsletters in Italian, and provided day cares and schooling for guestworkers' children. They also served as an important voice for Italian immigrants in Switzerland, advocating for workers' rights and publicly challenging critics claiming that Italians were Communist agents.

Regional and hometown associations also played a central role in the Italian community throughout the 1960s and 1970s. These organizations organized regular social events and sports leagues. They also organized fundraisers to promote regional economic development in Italy. Over time, however, these organizations gave way to pan-Italian social organizations focusing on hobbies such as cycling, soccer, and bocce (St. Gallen Historisches und Völkerkundemuseum 2016).

Importantly, the FCLIS (Federation of Free Italian Colonies), founded in Italy in 1943 by opponents of Fascism, came to serve as Italian immigrants' political voice. It is often credited with creating group consciousness among Italians and immigrants more broadly (Maiolino 2011). Working together with Swiss unions and the Swiss Social Democrats, this organization pressured the Swiss government to improve immigrants' working and living conditions, strengthen immigrants' access to social benefits, ease citizenship requirements, and improve the representation of immigrants in the Swiss government. It also fought against negative portrayals of Italian immigrants in the Swiss media and, more generally, sought to call attention to the marginalized status of Italians (Maiolino 2011). Furthermore, it pressured the Italian government to lobby the Swiss authorities on behalf of Italian workers. Its activities not only consisted of direct political actions. Indeed, it organized research commissions, conferences, and seminars including representatives of both Swiss and Italian organizations in order to advance its goals (Maiolino 2011). Individual *Colonie*

*Libere* clubs also provided social support to recently-arrived immigrants and organized dinners and movie nights to foster community. By the beginning of the 1970s, FCLIS had grown into an important organization, with 30,000 members in 120 clubs across Switzerland (St. Gallen Historisches und Völkerkundemuseum 2016). It also published an Italian-language newsletter, “*Emigrazione*,” covering news in Italy and Switzerland for immigrants.

As Swiss authorities assumed that guestworkers would eventually return home, they made little effort to educate Italian children. In response, the *Colonie Libere Italiane* lobbied the Swiss government to integrate Italian children into mainstream public schools. Further, Italian organizations, particularly parents’ associations, organized Italian language and culture courses, cultural trips, and sports leagues for children.

In the 1970s, Schwarzenbach’s popular initiative spurred the mobilization of Italian immigrant organizations. Schwarzenbach’s rhetoric singled out Italian immigrants, emphasizing their “incompatibility” with Swiss culture and alleging that Italian workers were introducing Communism to Switzerland (Maiolino 2011). FCLIS led the charge against the Schwarzenbach Initiative, launching campaigns to mobilize Swiss citizens and pressuring the Italian government to condemn the referendum. In 1969, it spearheaded a large conference in Luzern bringing together representatives from all segments of the Italian community, which led to a meeting between Swiss and Italian officials in Rome. Through its opposition, the FCLIS became an important advocate for immigrants’ rights in Switzerland.

Its advocacy continued throughout the 70s and 80s. In 1979, together with Spanish organizations, it launched an unsuccessful campaign to institute local and cantonal voting rights for non-citizens. In 1981, it became an important advocate for the “Togetherness Initiative,” a law that would have eliminated seasonal workers, permitted contract workers to change employers, facilitated family reunification, and granted foreign workers access to social security. Although this referendum failed, it set the stage for reductions in permanent residency requirements in 1982 and the eventual elimination of seasonal worker contracts in the early 2000s.

These organizations remain active in Swiss politics to this day, lobbying against referenda

that would tighten immigration policies and in favor of expanding immigrants' political rights. Some Italian organizations also have sponsored petitions and referenda in recent years calling for greater environmental protections. In 2016, Italian organizations were organizing public forums pertaining to a new taxation treaty affecting Italians living in Switzerland who retained or inherited property in Italy.

Italian immigration to Switzerland was greatly impacted by the oil crisis of the 1970s. As oil prices skyrocketed, Swiss employers let go of over 340,000 workers. As a result, 250,000 workers, including many Italians, left Switzerland (Maiolino 2011). Over time, also, increased living standards in Italy led to a decline in emigration as Swiss employers sought workers that would work for lower wages (Maiolino 2011).

In recent years, Italian migration to Switzerland has largely been limited to a trickle of professionals and family reunification migrants. A slight uptick occurred in the wake of the Great Recession in 2007-2009 as youth unemployment rose, particularly in southern Italy. As more and more Italians have either retired or gained upward mobility, other national origin groups have grown as a share of Switzerland's less-skilled labor force.

Currently, the economic position of Italians in Switzerland is weaker than the Swiss average but higher than that of more recent, predominantly-Muslim immigrant cohorts. From 2013 to 2015, the rate of unemployment among Italians of working age was about 6.5 percent. In comparison, Switzerland's average unemployment rate was about 3 percent (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018e).<sup>2</sup> Further, across Switzerland, 18.4 percent of Italian immigrants were highly-educated (a tertiary education) in 2016. By comparison, 32.4 percent of the Swiss population without migration background had received a tertiary education (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018c). Second and third-generation Italian-immigrants have experienced significant upward mobility, with labor market outcomes similar to those of Swiss without a migration background (Maiolino 2011).

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<sup>2</sup>Note: Italian numbers do not account for individuals who have voluntarily left the labor force and therefore the true unemployment rate is likely lower than 6 percent.

As Italian inflows have dwindled—and indeed as inflows of other, predominantly-Muslim groups accelerated in their stead—the image of Italians in Switzerland has improved (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015; Maiolino 2011). Over time, right-wing parties have switched their emphasis to Muslim groups, which are perceived as a more significant cultural threat. Broadly speaking, the salience of *Italianità*, or Italian identity, has declined over time as Muslim groups have ignited broader debates about immigration and integration.

That said, debates over immigrants' political rights and over Switzerland's naturalization laws continue reinforce the salience of non-citizenship in Switzerland. Indeed, many of the demands advanced by Italian organizations throughout the 1970s and 1980s—demands for non-citizen voting rights and greater non-citizen representation in the Swiss government—have not yet been realized at the federal level. Further, the 2014 referendum threatens to impose quotas on E.U. immigration, which affects some Italians' ability to bring their families to Switzerland.

### **3.4.2 Immigration from Turkey**

#### **A Snapshot**

Immigration to Switzerland from Turkey is more recent than Italian immigration, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, Switzerland's Turkish-born population remains smaller than its Italian population. That said, Turkish-born immigrants constitute the second-largest non-Western European immigrant group in Switzerland, at 79,230 people in 2016, and the second largest predominantly-Muslim group, after Kosovars (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). Turks also constitute about 37 percent of Muslims in Switzerland (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*d*). A plurality identify as Sunni.

It is estimated that 40 percent of Turkish-born immigrants to Switzerland identify as Kurdish (Haab et al. 2010). Turkish-born immigrants are especially concentrated in the cantons Basel-Stadt, Aargau, Solothurn, and Zürich, but immigrant communities exist throughout Switzerland. Kurdish immigrants, many of whom arrived in Switzerland as asylum seekers, are estimated to outnumber Turks in much of the country's west, including the cantons of Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Bern,



Fribourg, and Neuchâtel.

Although overall inflows from Turkey to Switzerland have been relatively small in absolute terms, Turkish immigration was salient to Swiss politics for much of the late 20th century. Turks constituted the first large group of Muslims immigrants to Switzerland and, throughout much of Switzerland's recent history, Turkey was Switzerland's largest source of unauthorized migrants. As a result, Turkish immigration was at the center of political and media debates over immigration throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Tezgören 2008). Since then, the salience of immigration has decreased. As more and more migrants have arrived from other Muslim countries, debates have instead increasingly focused on the integration of Muslim immigrants more generally.

The bulk of immigrants from Turkey to Switzerland arrived between 1961 and 1964. The Swiss authorities assumed that workers from geographically and culturally distant countries such as Turkey and the Balkans would be less likely to bring family members and more likely than Italians to return home after their contracts ended. Further, the Turkish government actively sought to promote development through foreign workers' remittances (Tezgören 2011). As such, recruiters were given a green light to hire Turkish workers under the same criteria under which Italian workers had previously been hired. Further, Swiss authorities feared that Italian workers, then the majority of the country's foreign-born workforce, were promoting Communism in Switzerland (Çalışlar 2011; Maiolino 2011). Recruiters worked directly with Turkish labor federations to recruit experienced workers from Turkish companies, mostly in rural regions of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish and Kurdish workers in Switzerland could nominate other colleagues for consideration. The bulk of Turkish-born immigrants were recruited to work in the German-speaking cantons of Basel, Solothurn, Aargau, and Zürich, which even now host the largest Turkish and Kurdish communities in Switzerland. They worked mostly in textiles, woodworking, and watchmaking.

From 1964 to 1974, Turkish migration increased 20 percent per year (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). By the early 1970s, Turkish guestworkers began to bring their spouses and children to Switzerland, facilitating the development of Turkish immigrant communities. In 1964, a new law forbade employers from hiring Turkish workers on a seasonal basis. As a result, many employers

hired Turkish and Kurdish workers arriving with tourist visas. This catalyzed undocumented immigration from Turkey (Tezgören 2011). By 1970, about half of all unauthorized immigrants in Switzerland's agricultural industry were Turkish (Tezgören 2011). At the time, Turkey constituted the largest source of undocumented migrants to Switzerland (Tezgören 2008).

In response to rising undocumented inflows from Turkey, the Swiss government authorized its border police to actively patrol the borders and restrict migration from Turkey and the Balkans in 1961. Many Turks were consequently detained and, eventually, turned away from Switzerland at its borders. Increasingly, Swiss politicians and the Swiss media began to refer to the "Turkish Problem," increasing the salience of Turkish immigration (Tezgören 2008). The harsh rhetoric and tactics utilized by the border police towards Turkish migrants invited criticism from both Turkish guestworkers and media outlets in Turkey (Tezgören 2011).

At the same time, Turkish guestworkers increasingly criticized the Swiss governments' failure to provide them with adequate social insurance. Turkish organizations thus lobbied the Turkish government to pressure Switzerland both to provide more benefits to workers and to cease the detention of Turkish immigrants at its borders.

Until the 1990s, it was illegal to belong to a Communist party in Turkey (Kaya and Baglioni 2008). For this reason, many Turks sought asylum in Switzerland, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. Left-wing political activists and students also sought asylum in large number's following Turkey's 1980 military coup.

During the 1960s, Turkish and Kurdish organizations largely functioned as social and cultural clubs. Prayer rooms (often set up in workers' barracks) became spaces where immigrants could socialize and discuss conditions in their homelands. Gradually, as Turkish workers brought their families to Switzerland, immigrants founded an array of organizations, including sports clubs, hobby clubs, and parent and school organizations, to support integration and foster camaraderie. Early Muslim organizations sought to promote interreligious dialogue, intercultural contact, and religion classes for Turkish youth. Furthermore, Turkish immigrants were often active in labor unions, sometimes working closely with Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Balkan immigrants to

advocate for workers' rights. Some small organizations, such as *Türkgücü* ("Turkish Strength") also formed to promote the integration of guestworkers. In 1969, a radio show in Turkish, *Hoşgeldiniz* ("Welcome") was launched, addressing themes such as immigration and family reunification policies, religion, schooling, and financial management (Tezgören 2008).

Immigration from Turkey entered a second phase in 1980, when guestworker inflows were superseded by quickly-rising inflows of asylum seekers. From 1980 to 1993, 50,000 Turkish asylum seekers sought refuge in Switzerland—mostly ethnic Kurds fleeing violence in eastern Turkey. Although most were not granted asylum, most arrivals were eventually granted humanitarian visas or residence permits. By 1993, the Turkish-born population in Switzerland reached 75,612 (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995).

This inflow of asylum seekers, combined with continued unauthorized immigration from Turkey—mainly through visa overstays—prompted a backlash against Turkish immigration in the 1980s. Some Swiss politicians accused Turkish-born immigrants of engaging in drug smuggling. Further, many Swiss officials grew increasingly worried that Turkish workers would introduce religious extremism to Switzerland. The opening of several Qu'ranic schools in Switzerland reinforced this fear of Islamic extremism. Prominent members of the border policies expressed a fear that Turks would refuse to integrate, forming 'states within the Swiss state' (Tezgören 2011). The Canton of Aargau was particularly vocal, calling for strict asylum laws and refusing to accept asylum seekers from Turkey (Tezgören 2008). Ultimately, new visa requirements were instituted for Turkish citizens. Further, to curb against religious extremism, in 1984 Swiss authorities created a new visa to facilitate the immigration of Turkish government-sponsored imams (Tezgören 2008).

These developments fostered a sense of relative deprivation among Turkish-born immigrants, many of whom perceived the tightening of visa rules as a xenophobic act (Tezgören 2008). Although some organizations lobbied against these policies, Turkish and Kurdish organizations never reached the level of cooperation attained by their Italian counterparts. Immigrant organizations developed around cleavages borne of Turkish politics and thus remain divided with respect to religion, ethnicity, and ideology. Turkish and Kurdish organizations have thus historically turned much of their attention

to political developments in Turkey, although some, particularly Kurdish organizations, have played an active role in Swiss politics as well. Most famously, Kurdish organizations led a protest against a 1988 initiative that would have cut the foreign population to 300,000 and imposed strict refugee quotas.

By the mid-1990s, immigration from Turkey declined in salience as refugee flows from Bosnia, Kosovo, and other Balkan countries accelerated. Soon, Balkan refugees would outnumber Turks and Kurds and overtake Turkish-born immigrants as the largest Muslim community in Switzerland. As refugee flows into Switzerland from other Muslim countries such as Iraq and Syria have picked up, Swiss debates over immigration have come to focus on Muslims in general rather than Turks and Kurds. Broadly, recent public debates in Switzerland have emphasized threats posed by Muslim immigrants in general rather than threats posed by specific groups (Feddersen 2013; Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). Indeed, increasingly, Turks are frequently seen as a lesser threat than new arrivals from elsewhere in the Muslim World (Tezgören 2008).

### **Turkish-Born Communities Today**

Today, immigrants from Turkey represent only a small share of flows to Switzerland. The bulk of new arrivals are either relatives of previous immigrants or students and professionals. Currently, most first-generation Turkish-born immigrants work in hospitality, textile manufacturing, construction, machinery, and metalwork. In addition, many Turkish-born immigrants run small businesses such as grocery stores, restaurants, travel agencies, and auto repair shops—particularly in German-speaking cantons. Many Kurdish immigrants also work as social workers, particularly in the area of immigrant integration (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995).

Broadly speaking, Turkish-born immigrants in Switzerland earn lower salaries and experience higher unemployment than the native-born (Strijbis 2011). On average, about 14 percent of the working age Turkish population was unemployed from 2013-2015 (although some of these individuals may not be in the labor force), as compared to 3 percent of native-born Swiss (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*e*). Over the same period, the bulk of Turkish-born immigrants

were less-educated than the Swiss average—only about 13.5 percent have a tertiary education overall, as compared to 32.4 percent of native born Swiss (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018c). That said, many political asylees hold degrees from Turkish universities and were professionals in Turkey.

The Turkish-born population remains highly divided, and organizations in Switzerland represent a plethora of Turkish political and religious interests. Over 200 Turkish and Kurdish immigrant organizations currently exist in Switzerland (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). Turkish nationalist and secularist organizations exist alongside revolutionary socialist movements. Religious communities sponsored by Turkey's state religious board exist alongside communities opposed by the Turkish state, such as the Gülenist movement and smaller movements that oppose Turkey's secular state. Typically, unlike Italian immigrants' hometown organizations, these organizations include members from many parts of Turkey. These organizations are often linked to larger Turkish diaspora movements, generally headquartered in Germany, and frequently interact with movements within Turkey itself.

Around 30 to 40 percent of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants identify as Alevi, a religion that combines elements of Shi'i Islam with Anatolian folk traditions (Haab et al. 2010). Unlike Sunni Muslims, Alevi do not attend mosques and Alevi women do not typically wear headscarves. Instead, Alevi pray in mixed-gender prayer houses known as *cemevleri*. As of 2008, the most recent data available, about 4,000 immigrants belong to 15 or so Alevi organizations across Switzerland, particularly in Basel, Aargau, and Zürich (Haab et al. 2010). These Alevi organizations are aligned with the Confederation of Alevite Communities in Europe, based in Germany. These organizations regularly organize prayer services, dinners, and folk concerts. They also offer music, language, and computer classes for their members. Many Alevi organizations include both Turkish and Kurdish Alevi. These organizations also hold politician debates and events related to both Swiss and Turkish politics.

Many ethnic minorities from Turkey have formed their own organizations in Switzerland—particularly Kurds. Switzerland's Kurdish umbrella organization, FEKAR, is part of a

European umbrella organization known as KON-KURD. Its constituent clubs frequently engage with both Turkish and Swiss politics (Ideli 2011). In particular, they seek to promote awareness of Kurdish issues and pressure the Swiss and other European governments to condemn Turkey for its actions against the Kurds (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). They also actively lobby the Swiss government to liberalize asylum laws and extend the right to vote to non-citizens. Currently, Kurdish organizations are pressuring the Swiss government to accept more Syrian refugees and condemn Turkey's actions in northern Syria. Further, at a grassroots level, Turkish Kurdish organizations are providing social support for Syrian Kurdish refugees in many Swiss cities.

### **Lived Experiences**

Turkish-born immigrants, like other immigrants from Muslim countries in Switzerland, report facing significant discrimination in Switzerland. A 2015 survey of Muslim immigrants reveals that one-third of Turks, and 50 percent of women wearing headscarves, perceived discrimination on the basis of their appearance (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). They recounted experiencing discrimination at school, work, and on public transit in particular. A 2017 study by GFS Bern, a polling firm, finds that 46 percent of Muslims perceived discrimination while searching for jobs, including many who do not wear headscarves or beards (Golder et al. 2018).

Recent events have also increased many Turks' sense of discrimination. Most notoriously, in 2009, a popular referendum banned the construction of minarets in Switzerland. In 2005, members of a Turkish mosque, operating in an empty factory in the town of Wangen bei Olten, published an announcement in a local newspaper indicating their intention to build a minaret. This announcement caused a stir among townspeople, who petitioned that the town assembly convene to review the mosque's request. After local and federal courts upheld the right of the Turkish community to build a minaret, several right-wing political parties banded together to launch a national popular referendum against the construction of minarets. The ban was approved in November 2009, with 57.5 percent voting in favor (Cummings-Bruce 2009).

In the wake of the minaret ban, many Turks feel that the Swiss government has not done

enough to accommodate Islamic religious practices. In particular, a 2015 survey suggests that most Turks believe the government should strike down the minaret ban (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). Further, most Turks favor exempting Muslims from Swiss burial laws, which currently require that the deceased be cremated (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015).

Broadly speaking, many Turkish immigrants appear to perceive relative deprivation based on their Muslim faith or simply the fact that they emigrated from a predominantly-Muslim country. Further, since the 1980s, Swiss politicians and media have rarely discussed Turkish and Kurdish immigration explicitly, and no policies or initiatives have explicitly targeted immigration from Turkey. Instead, policy debates increasingly refer to Muslims in the abstract, and initiatives pertaining to Muslims' integration are currently on the docket or planned in a number of cantons and municipalities.

### **3.4.3 Interim Conclusion**

Italian- and Turkish-born immigrants represent suitable cases for testing my hypotheses. On the one hand, these groups are similar in several important ways (Table 3.1). First, they are among Switzerland's largest immigrant groups and are dispersed throughout Swiss cantons. Second, many Italian, Turks, and Kurds initially came to Switzerland as guestworkers or as guestworkers' families under common admissions criteria. Third, both groups were highly salient in past debates over immigration and were the targets of discriminatory legislation. Fourth, they both have relatively low naturalization rates. Finally, although Italian organizations are more unified than their Turkish counterparts, both immigrant groups possess strong networks of political, social, and religious organizations in Switzerland, organizations that have, at times, mobilized against exclusionary initiatives.

That said, these groups possess different histories (Table 3.1). First, immigrants from Italy and Turkey may have had different socializing experiences before migrating to Switzerland. While many Turks and Italians arrived in Switzerland as guestworkers, other immigrants from Turkey, notably Kurds, arrived in Switzerland as political refugees. Such immigrants may be particularly interested

in politics or embrace politics as a means of resolving their grievances.

Second, I expect that Italian and Turkish-born immigrants possess differing degrees of linked fate. Over time, Italian immigration has become less and less salient. As Italy's living standards increased, immigration flows to Switzerland slowed. At the same time, however, immigration from Muslim countries increased, instigating new debates over the integration of Muslim populations and new initiatives designed to ban minarets, full-face veils, and other hallmarks of Islam. As suggested by the survey results above, many Turkish-born immigrants perceive relative deprivation on the basis of their religious beliefs (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015).

Likewise, I expect that public discourse concerning family reunification migration and asylum affects Turkish-born migrants to a greater degree than Italian-migrants, perhaps engendering a higher degree of pan-immigrant linked fate. On average, Turkish migrants are younger than Italian migrants and may possess more family in Turkey. As many are political asylees, they may also have difficulties returning to Turkey to visit family members. In the wake of Turkey's 2016 coup attempt, in particular, and given increased political and inter-ethnic tensions in Turkey, immigrants from Turkey may perceive Switzerland's asylum policies as unnecessarily restrictive. In particular, recent referenda have barred asylum for defectors and conscientious objectors from foreign militaries and facilitated deportations of asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected. Such policies might disproportionately affect asylum seekers from Turkey, where military service is required of all men. As a consequences, I expect that Turkish-born immigrants may possess higher pan-immigrant linked fate than Italians as well.

Finally, although information on referenda and local political issues are only available in French and German in this study's key cantons, Italian is one of Switzerland's official languages and information about national politics in Italian is widely available. Furthermore, Italian-language newspapers and TV programs are available in all cantons. Turkish language materials, in contrast, are limited to one or two nationally-syndicated publications. The relative availability of Italian-language material might facilitate Italians' access to political information relative to that of Turks. That said, information about local and cantonal politics is typically in German or French, and many



political events not organized by immigrant associations (e.g., rallies and informational meetings) require some knowledge of either French or German. Further, any informational advantages possessed by Italians likely dissipate somewhat over time as both groups learn local languages.

**Table 3.1:** Immigrants from Italy and Turkey Compared

	<b>Turkish-Born Immigrants</b>	<b>Italian Immigrants</b>
<b>Population Size</b>	79,230	267,308
<b>Dispersion</b>	All over Switzerland, particularly in German-speaking areas around Basel and Zuerich	All over Switzerland
<b>Arrival Mode</b>	Mix of guestworkers and asylum seekers	Predominantly guestworkers
<b>Number of Associations</b>	High	High
<b>Naturalization Rates</b>	34 percent	24 Percent
<b>National news sources in native language</b>	Few	Many
<b>Likely Level of Linked Fate</b>	High	Low

### 3.5 Cantonal Immigration Policies

As I emphasized above, Switzerland’s management of immigration is highly decentralized. While immigrants are admitted to Switzerland on the basis of federal policies, cantonal integration and citizenship policies vary significantly across cantons. This high degree of subnational variation enables me to study immigrants’ political participation across cantons —and thereby gauge whether linked fate has an influence on immigrants’ political participation that extends beyond the effects of cantonal opportunity structures.

In this section, I will describe the integration policies pursued by the three cantons in this study. Neuchâtel, the most open of the study cantons, permits immigrants to vote in local

and cantonal elections and hold office, and as of May 2016 required no formal naturalization test. Indexes compiled by Switzerland's National Center of Competency for Migration ranked Neuchâtel's naturalization policies the most inclusive of Switzerland's 27 cantons (NCCR 2018).<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, its cantonal government sponsors pan-immigrant organizations and discussion groups, fostering interactions between immigrants of diverse backgrounds. Immigrants in Aargau, on the other hand, face very stringent naturalization requirements and possess virtually no political rights or representation in local government. Indeed, NCCR's index ranks Aargau's naturalization rules as the least inclusive of Switzerland's cantons (NCCR 2018). Bern's policies lie in the middle, with fewer barriers to naturalization and political participation than Aargau but greater barriers than Neuchâtel. Its citizenship policies are ranked the 16th most exclusionary of Switzerland's 27 cantons.


These cantons all have high Italian and Turkish-born populations relative to their overall foreign-born populations. Italian immigrants constitute the second-largest foreign-born grouping in Aargau and Bern, at 9.5 and 7.5 percent of the foreign-born population, and the third largest in Neuchâtel at 11.2 percent of the foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). Turkish-born immigrants constitute the second largest non-Western-European immigrant group in Aargau and Bern at 5.3 and 3.5 percent of the total foreign-born population, respectively, and the largest such group in Neuchâtel, at 2.4 percent of the total foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). By analyzing the relationship between linked fate and participation among these groups across all three cantons, I will be able to gauge whether any findings are robust to variation in naturalization and political integration policies. For this reason, Switzerland constitutes a powerful case, allowing me to test my hypotheses in a robust manner.

Importantly, also, in order to achieve long-term residence permits and, ultimately, naturalize, immigrants must reside in a given municipality for a fixed period of time. As a result, relatively few

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<sup>3</sup>These indexes also include dual nationality policies and policies regarding expatriate political participation

immigrants move within Switzerland prior to naturalization. Language barriers and differences in local dialects also militate against cross-canton migration. This limits bias that might otherwise arise if immigrants could self-select into cantons with relatively liberal integration policies.



**Figure 3.2:** Map of the Three Study Cantons

To begin, Neuchâtel is the most inclusive of the three cantons in this study. There, all immigrants with a long-term “C” residence permit can fully participate in political life at the municipal level. This includes running for local office, voting in all local elections, and proposing local initiatives. Indeed, the Neuchâtelois government is increasingly interested in promoting immigrants’ political integration (Mutlu 2015). In recent years, it has sponsored discussion groups and awareness campaigns among immigrants and translated campaign materials into immigrant languages.

After five years of residence, immigrants are also permitted to participate in cantonal politics and vote for Neuchâtel’s representation in the federal Council of States—a federal body representing

cantonal interests. In order to naturalize, immigrants must have lived in Switzerland for 12 years and in the canton for 3. Unlike many other cantons, there is no formal naturalization test and no knowledge of civics or history is required. Instead, candidates must often pass a 15-20-minute interview to assess whether or not they meet the required A2 (high beginner) level of spoken French. The canton also subsidizes optional French-language courses through the A2 level, and a certificate of successful course completion can be furnished in lieu of a pre-naturalization interview. Candidates for naturalization must also pay national and cantonal fees that amount to between 500 and 1,370 CHF (Swiss francs) per person depending on whether applicants apply as minors, adults, or as family units (Mutlu 2015). Consistent with its relatively liberal naturalization policies, Neuchâtel's naturalization rate is the highest of the three cantons in this study, at 35.4 percent (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017b).

Neuchâtel's approach to integration, according to the mission statement of its "Ministry of Multicultural Cohesion," is based on a belief in mutual adaptation. That is, both immigrants and their host communities must adjust to one another without seeking to suppress one another's cultures. Each new arrival to the canton receives a personalized welcome letter and an invitation to a welcome ceremony where they learn about local life. Since 1990, the government has organized a working group on integration—an official consultative commission for the cantonal parliament. One-third of its members are immigrants, generally selected by immigrant groups themselves. Within this body, there are several subgroups, including a committee tasked with encouraging migrants' participation in local civic life and an interfaith committee to promote dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. Furthermore, the canton sponsors sensitivity training for government officials. Neuchâtel also supports a pan-immigrant interest group called FENECCI, which organizes discussions and meetings related to Swiss politics and policies for immigrants of all backgrounds (Mutlu 2015).

Aargau's approach, on the other hand, is much more exclusionary. Per a referendum passed almost 20 years ago, non-citizens are banned from local and cantonal electoral participation across the canton. Unlike Neuchâtel, also, Aargau possesses no consultative councils with fixed immigrant representation. Instead, Aargau's *Migrantenkommission* consists of 10-12 government

representatives that meet irregularly to discuss integration. Migrants themselves are invited to participate on an irregular basis at the *Kommission's* behest (Hunziker 2015).

Aargau's policies vis-à-vis residence and citizenship also differ substantively from those of Neuchâtel. Upon arrival to Aargau, all non-E.U. immigrants that are not family migrants must sit for an initial interview. Each migrant then effectively enters into a binding agreement, or contract, with local officials and must fulfill specified conditions in order to acquire permanent residency (i.e., to attain a "B" or "C" permit). In order to naturalize, immigrants in Aargau must have resided 12 years in Switzerland, 5 years in the canton, and 3 in their current municipality of residence. They must pay between 750 and 1,500 CHF in fees to their municipalities and a further 750 CHF to the canton—often more than double the fees in Neuchâtel. They must also demonstrate a low-intermediate knowledge of spoken German, a high-beginner knowledge of written German (A2), and pass a written test covering civics and local history and geography. Although a canton-wide requirement, municipalities design and implement tests themselves, some of which are administered in local dialect. While the canton has established guidelines for the tests' content, effectively banning controversial questions asked locally in recent years about religious practices and allegiance to Swiss sports teams, municipalities have the final say. Notably, individuals must also pay a fee to sit for the test (Hunziker 2015). Municipalities can also require that applicants provide letters of recommendation from Swiss citizens. Perhaps as a consequence, Aargau's naturalization rate is the lowest of the three cantons in this study, at 30.5 percent of foreign-born residents (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017b).

Bern's policies lie between Aargau's and Neuchâtel's in their inclusiveness. In 2010, Bernese citizens rejected a proposal that would have granted immigrants the right to vote locally. Opposition to this proposal was strongest in rural parts of the canton, and a majority of voters in Bern city, the canton's largest municipality—and many voters in the cities of Biel-Bienne and Moutier—voted in its favor. In light of the rejection of canton-wide local voting for non-citizens, activists in the cities of Bern, Biel-Bienne, Thun, and Langenthal have called for the institution of *Ausländermotionen*, or "foreigner motions," which would enable non-citizens to propose motions to be considered

by municipal governments provided that they meet a threshold of 200 signatures (Bisaz 2016). In 2015, voters in the city of Bern voted overwhelmingly to institute such motions. This was undertaken in late 2016—after my survey’s conclusion—when the municipal government rejected a formal complaint launched by the Swiss People’s Party. A similar policy was enacted in the town of Burgdorf seven years ago. Broadly speaking, immigrants currently possess few political rights in Canton Bern, but an active debate about extending their rights persists throughout the canton—particularly in urban areas (Bisaz 2016).

Like Aargau, Bern possesses a cantonal integration commission that meets infrequently. Unlike in Aargau, however, migrant representatives participate in this council on an official basis alongside representatives of the Grand Council, the canton, and individual municipalities. Unlike in Neuchâtel, where representatives are chosen by immigrant organizations, immigrant representatives in Bern largely appointed by the local government (*Regierungsrat*). The city of Biel also organizes a municipal foreigners’ council.

The stringency of Bern’s residence and naturalization requirements falls between that of Neuchâtel and Aargau’s. As in Aargau, new arrivals in Bern from third countries (non-family migrants) must sit for an initial interview. Immigrant officials then determine whether or not an individual is likely to have difficulty integrating, and problematic cases are obligated to sign integration contracts and possibly sit for further consultations. In order to attain permanent residency (i.e., acquire a “B” or “C” permit), migrants must meet the conditions set forth in these contracts.

To naturalize, immigrants must have resided for 2 uninterrupted years in both the canton and in the town through which they are applying. This requirement is considerably less stringent than that of Aargau. They must also pass a 90 minute test, in French or German, covering geography, history, politics, health, work, and civics. Municipalities can add questions to this test and also require that applicants for naturalization furnish letters of recommendation. As in Aargau, candidates for naturalization must demonstrate a low-intermediate spoken proficiency in a cantonal language (B1, French or German) and a high-beginning written proficiency (A2). They must also pay cantonal and national fees that are comparable to those in Neuchâtel. Unlike in Neuchâtel, however, candidates

must pay an additional fee in order to take the naturalization test (Cardinale and Belli 2015; Helfer 2015). About 34 percent of Bern's foreign-born residents are naturalized, fewer than Neuchâtel but more than Aargau (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*).

It is important to note that, despite these differences in integration and naturalization policies, these cantons possess similar electoral institutions and party systems. Each canton in the study elects its executives directly through a personal, two-round, majoritarian voting system. Cantonal parliaments are elected under party-list proportional representation rules. Since few immigrants in Switzerland naturalize, however, politicians' incentives to mobilize immigrants are ultimately limited to local and cantonal elections in the handful of cantons where immigrants enjoy local voting rights (in this case, Neuchâtel).

Furthermore, most cantonal and local politicians belong to one of Switzerland's major federal parties.<sup>4</sup> Although the institutional strength of these parties varies, the parties themselves and their broader agendas vary little across the three cantons in this study.

Ultimately, then, these cases should enable me to gauge whether linked fate and participation are correlated without worrying about whether any observed effect is simply an artifact of differences in local electoral systems or in parties' incentives to mobilize immigrant groups across distinct polities. Insofar as context influences immigrants' political participation, any effect will result from differences in cantons' integration and citizenship policies rather than differences in electoral and party institutions.

To conclude, the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel thus possess substantially different political opportunity structures and citizenship policies. As such, the Swiss case presents an opportunity to test my hypothesis in a variety of integration contexts, allowing me to estimate the degree to which linked fate affect individuals' political engagement, notwithstanding contextual differences. Essentially, testing my hypotheses across diverse set of contexts will enable me to

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<sup>4</sup>The Liberals (FDP), the Social Democratic Party, the Swiss Peoples' Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Conservative Democratic Party.

gauge the degree to which my results may be generalizable across policy contexts.

**Table 3.2:** Key Policy Differences across Cantons

	<b>Neuchâtel</b>	<b>Bern</b>	<b>Aargau</b>
<b>Non-Citizen Voting Rights</b>	Yes	No	No
<b>Non-Citizens Can Launch Non-Binding Motions</b>	Yes	Some municipalities	No
<b>Written Citizenship Examination</b>	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Non-Citizens can run for local office</b>	Yes	No	No
<b>Spoken Language Requirement</b>	A2	B1	A2
<b>Written Language Requirement</b>	None	A2	A2
<b>Naturalization Fee</b>	500 - 1370 CHF	550-1650 CHF	1500 - 2250 CHF
<b>Formal Consultative Body Comprised of Immigrants</b>	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Immigrants Elected to Consultative Body</b>	Yes	No	No
<b>Integration Contracts</b>	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Required Cantonal Residency Period before Naturalization</b>	3 years	2 Years	5 Years
<b>Percent of FB Population Naturalized</b>	35.4	34.2	30.5
<b>Percent of FB Residents Meeting Residence Requirement</b>	47.2	47.5	51.9

### 3.6 Applying Theory to the Swiss Case

Prior to testing the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2, also, it is necessary to identify which group identifications may serve as the basis for linked fate among immigrants in Switzerland. In this section, I consider three identities that feature heavily in academic and policy debates over immigration: broad identification as an immigrant or foreigner, ethnic or racial identification, and Sunni Muslim identification (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016; Koopmans et al. 2005). I expect that linked fate perceived on the basis of immigrant status (pan-immigrant linked fate)—that is, a sense of commonality stemming from perceptions of shared challenges faced by all foreigners— and on the



basis of Muslim identity (Muslim linked fate) will be particularly widespread among first-generation immigrants in Switzerland, relative to ethnic and racial linked fate. While immigrants may perceive relative deprivation with respect to each of these identity dimensions, I argue that pan-immigrant identities and Muslim identities are more salient than ethnic and racial identities in contemporary Switzerland.

To begin, pan-immigrant linked fate may take root when immigrants perceive that the very fact of their “foreignness” weakens their social position in their countries of residence. They may perceive that traits linked to their immigrant status (e.g., their relative lack of knowledge of official languages or unfamiliarity with host country institutions) preclude them from full membership in their country of residence, rendering them unable to enjoy the same rights and legal protections guaranteed to citizens. Non-citizens may also feel marginalized due to their lack of a political voice. This may be especially likely when they perceive that they are integrated into their host societies but cannot naturalize, either due to financial obstacles or to strict tenure requirements. More generally, pan-immigrant linked fate may arise when immigrants perceive that they are treated as an outsider based on their legal status, either as non-citizens or as naturalized foreign-born citizens.

I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate might be common in Switzerland. First, naturalization requirements are steep, and even immigrants who have resided in Switzerland for many years may not qualify or be able to afford fees. Furthermore, non-citizens possess few political rights in Switzerland, and can only vote and run for office in local elections in several cantons. As such, I expect that many immigrants perceive relative deprivation based on their status as foreigners.

Moreover, immigration is highly salient and the rights of immigrants are frequently the subject of political debates and initiatives. In recent years, there have been a great many proposed initiatives and referenda concerning non-citizens in Switzerland. In February 2017, Swiss voters approved a referendum easing citizenship procedures for third-generation immigrants (the grandchildren of immigrants). In February 2016, Swiss voters rejected a referendum that would have expanded the list of criminal offenses warranting deportation. Debates over non-citizens’ political rights continue across many cantons, and, in recent years, popular referendums have rejected

extending the franchise to non-citizens in the cantons of Bern and Basel-City. These and other initiatives have intensified public debates about the meaning of Swiss citizenship and the rights of permanent residents.

As a result, immigrant status—and non-citizenship in particular—remains highly salient in Swiss political debates. Indeed, analyzing over 1000 references to integration in Swiss media between 1995 and 2009, Berkhout and Ruedin found that that 23 percent of claims referred generally to non-citizens (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016). This heightened salience may lead immigrants to perceive that the difficulties they have faced on the basis of their immigrant status may be shared broadly with other immigrants. Essentially, in such contexts, the shared experience of being regarded as an outsider based on one's legal status may foster a sense of linked fate.

It is important to stress, however, that immigrant status is a cognitive rather than affective status. That is, I do not expect that immigrants perceive an emotional connection on the basis of their legal status alone. For this reason, I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate may not correlate as strongly with political participation as pan-Muslim and ethnic linked fate, as these identities are often affective and imply a stronger emotional connection. Pan-immigrant linked fate may not be as effective at cultivating a sense of obligation to one's group and therefore may not solve free rider problems as ethnic- and religious linked fate.

Second, immigrants who identify as Muslim may also perceive linked fate with other Muslims, regardless of their immigrant status. Muslim linked fate is likely to exist in Switzerland for two principal reasons. First, Muslims in Switzerland report significant levels of discrimination (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). Second, the integration of Muslims is highly salient to contemporary Swiss politics. As most Muslims in Switzerland adhere to Sunnism, I focus on Sunni Muslim identification.

Existing studies suggest that Muslims in Switzerland perceive significant relative deprivation on the basis of their religious beliefs. As I noted above, a 2017 survey of immigrants from Turkey found that 46 percent perceived discrimination while searching for jobs (Golder et al. 2018). Likewise, a 2015 study of Swiss Muslims found that over one third of Turks reported discrimination

on the basis of their appearance, particularly in school, at work, and on public transit. Further, ongoing controversies over Islamic clothing, the construction of minarets, and Islamic burial practices, among others, have led many to perceive that the state has denied them freedom of religion—in Switzerland and in Europe more broadly (Ramadan 2004).

Importantly, also, Muslim identification remains highly salient in contemporary Swiss politics. As discussed above, Swiss citizens voted to ban the construction of minarets in 2009. At the cantonal level, right-wing parties, particularly the Swiss Peoples' Party, have led initiatives to ban the full face veil (the burqa and niqab) in public spaces. To date, veils have been banned in the cantons of Ticino and St. Gallen, and referenda are pending in several other cantons. More recently, Muslims' push for single-sex physical education classes and the construction of Muslim cemeteries—exempt from Swiss burial laws—have engendered new debates. Importantly, the salience of Islam and Muslim integration is likely enhanced by the visibility of Islamic practices (Kastoryano 2005; Statham and Tillie 2016). Headscarves and other Islamic garments, minarets, and calls to prayer serve as visible reminders of the presence of Islam in European societies and reinforce perceptions of difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, increasing the broader social salience of Islamic identities (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005).

It is important to note that Muslims often possess a strong collective Muslim identity regardless of their ethnic and national origins and their denomination within Islam (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Safran 1986; Saggar 2009). Scholars have emphasized that the development of a collective Muslim identity has been facilitated by Islamic tenets, particularly the principle of “ummah,” the notion that Muslims throughout the world are connected by common beliefs, regardless of their specific ethnicity or language (Jamal 2005; Saggar 2009). For Muslims residing in non-Muslim societies, the concept of ummah encourages solidarity and connections between Muslims (Barreto, Masuoka and Sánchez 2008; Saggar 2009). Indeed, Barreto et al. argue that perceptions of “ummah” among Muslims in the U.S. have propagated sentiments of linked fate. Muslim linked fate is likely also undergirded by the use of Arabic as a shared religious and ceremonial language and certain practices common to all denominations, such as daily prayers,

required almsgiving (*zakat*), and a mandatory pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) (Saggar 2009). These religious practices also encouraged iterated contact between Muslims, creating possibilities for Muslims to share their grievances and identify common interests. Furthermore, they foster a sense of community rooted in a psychological sense of belonging. As such, Muslim linked fate constitutes an affective identity. Consistently with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, Muslim linked fate may thus be particularly effective at spurring participation.

Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between immigrants' pan-Muslim identification and identification with specific Muslim communities. In Switzerland, as in many other European countries, Muslim immigrants tend to belong to ethno-religious communities. Turkish Sunni Muslims, for example, might attend separate mosques than Moroccan Sunni Muslims and Iranian Shi'i Muslims. Mosques frequently function not only as places of worship, but as community centers for immigrants. Turkish mosques frequently follow Turkish architectural practices, hire Turkish imams that possess religious and political views consistent with those of the congregation, and organize events and courses focused on Turkish culture and politics. The same is true in many cases for North African mosques, particularly Moroccan and Algerian mosques (Laurence 2012). This diversity can limit interactions between Muslims of different ethnic background and exacerbate perceptions of differences across Muslim communities. Turkish Muslim communities, in particular, are divided with respect to their beliefs about the role that Islam should play in civil law in Turkey.

That said, controversies over Islam in European contexts, including Switzerland, frequently emphasize practices that are common to nearly all large Muslim immigrant groups. Indeed, debates such as those over whether teachers should be permitted to wear headscarves, whether Muslims should be exempt from burial laws, whether halal foods should be provided in public schools, and whether traditional Eid animal sacrifices should be permitted cut across most religious Muslim communities, regardless of their specific national origins or religious beliefs. Consequently, I expect that pan-Muslim linked fate may still be relatively common among Muslim communities and may have a tangible impact on their political behaviors.

Finally, I expect that linked fate perceived along ethnic group lines will be limited in

Switzerland. According to the framework above, immigrants might develop linked fate with co-ethnics when they perceive that traits linked to their ethnic group (their native language, culture, traditions, names, or physical features) limit their access to full membership rights in their host countries. As is the case for pan-immigrant linked fate, some immigrants may perceive that their specific ethnic background invites discrimination, impeding their ability to earn a stable living, integrate socially, and make political claims. A South Asian immigrant, for example, may perceive that South Asian names and accents induce unfair treatment or discrimination.

That said, current Swiss debates over immigrant integration center on the obligations of the state towards non-citizens as well as the cultural rights of Muslim residents. Indeed, Berkhout and Ruedin found that only 1 percent of claims mentioned ethnic or racial identities while 14 percent dealt with religion and 23 percent referenced non-citizens more broadly (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016). Although, for example, the rights of Italians in Switzerland was once central to Swiss debates over integration, debates over immigrants' rights have broadened as Switzerland's immigrant population has diversified (Maiolino 2011). While the integration of specific immigrant groups may be politically salient in local areas where such groups are concentrated (e.g., many small, Alpine towns have relatively large Portuguese communities), national debates focus on the integration of immigrants more generally and Muslims in particular (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016). As such, I expect that the salience of ethnic and racial identities across Switzerland will be limited, militating against ethnic and racial linked fate. As a sideline, I should also stress that immigrants may perceive linked fate along one or several identity dimensions, be it ethnic, religious, or based on a broader identity as an immigrant. Perceptions of linked fate along one identity dimension do not preclude its existence along other dimensions. It is also not my intention to argue that these dimensions are the only potentially salient bases for linked fate in Europe—indeed, further research might explore yet additional dimensions.

### 3.7 Synthesis

Switzerland presents a suitable context for testing the hypotheses I advanced in the previous chapter. As across much of Europe, debates about immigration and multiculturalism have played a prominent role in Swiss politics over the last several decades. Unlike in much of Europe, however, Switzerland's management of immigration is highly decentralized. While immigrants are admitted to Switzerland on the basis of federal policies, cantonal integration and citizenship policies vary significantly across cantons. This high degree of subnational variation enables me to study immigrants' engagement across cantons—and thereby gauge whether linked fate has an influence on immigrants' political participation that extends beyond the effects of cantonal opportunity structures. In particular, the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel have pursued markedly different approaches to immigrants' integration. Broadly, Neuchâtel has pioneered the extension political rights to non-citizens and adopted relatively liberal naturalization policies. Aargau, on the other hand, grants non-citizens few political rights and possesses one of the strictest naturalization policies in Switzerland. Bern falls between the two, granting immigrants limited political rights. By studying the relationship between linked fate and participation in these three cantons, I will be able to gauge whether any effect of linked fate on participation is simply a function of the openness or closure of local integration contexts.

Immigrants from Turkey and Italy also constitute suitable groups for my analysis. For one, these groups constitute a significant share of the foreign-born population in each of the three study cantons. Further, Turkish-born and Italian guestworkers were admitted to Switzerland according to similar criteria. As such, the Swiss case enables me to control for factors related to the circumstances of specific groups' admission and settlement in Switzerland that might underlie any observed correlation between linked fate and participation. Importantly, also, immigration from both Italy and Turkey admission were highly salient in the post-World War II era and both groups were subject to discriminatory federal legislation. Over time, however, Italian immigration has decreased in salience while political debates over the admission and integration of immigrants from Muslim countries have intensified. As a consequence, I expect that Turkish-born immigrants

may possess stronger feelings of linked fate due to the persistent salience of Muslim immigration and integration in Swiss political debates. By comparing immigrants from Italy and Turkey, also, I can gauge whether the theory I advanced in the previous chapter is applicable both to European Christian immigrants and non-European, non-Christian immigrants. If I find a correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation for both groups, I can confidently claim that this correlation is not simply an artifact of the socialization of Muslim (or non-Muslim) immigrants. Rather, such a result would suggest that similar processes may link identification and mobilization for diverse groups, regardless of their origin and religious background.

To conclude, studying Italian and Turkish-born immigrants in the Swiss cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel permits a robust test of the hypotheses I advanced in the previous chapter. By examining different groups, I can gauge whether any such correlation is simply an artifact of group-level socialization processes. By exploiting subnational variation in Switzerland, I can determine whether any observed correlation between linked fate and participation is simply an artifact of diverse integration contexts. This will permit me to gauge with confidence whether, all else equal, linked fate has an impact on immigrants' political participation.

# **Chapter 4**

## **Surveying Italian and Turkish-born Immigrants in Switzerland**

In previous chapters, I hypothesized that linked fate increases immigrants' likelihood of political participation by increasing their political efficacy and their probability of in-group mobilization. In this chapter, I will describe the empirical strategy I use to test my hypotheses on Italian and Turkish-born immigrants in Switzerland. I will begin by describing the population I intended to target through this survey. I will then describe my survey methodology and discuss how I operationalized political participation and linked fate. Finally, I address several possible limitations of my survey methodology.

### **4.1 The Target Population**

From February 8 to June 3, 2016, I conducted a survey of 613 first-generation immigrants born in Turkey and Italy residing in the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. To make any results as generalizable as possible and ensure that they are not simply an artifact of sampling methods, I attempted to sample a broad cross-section of these populations that reflects the underlying population. In particular, I hoped to achieve a sample of Turkish-born immigrants reflecting major ethnic and religious cleavages in that community. In the absence of a cross-cutting sample, it would



be difficult to gauge whether any observed results are simply an artifact of specific groups' political socialization in Turkey and in Switzerland.

I will thus begin by briefly describing the demographic and social characteristics of immigrants from Turkey and Italy in Switzerland using data from Swiss population registries. Understanding the target population is critical to designing a survey that is as representative as possible. The figures I employ in this section will enable me to discuss how I designed my survey to minimize sample bias insofar as possible given logistical constraints.

Italians have a long history of immigration to Switzerland, starting in the late 1800s, and represent Switzerland's second-largest immigrant group, with a 2016 population of 267,308, or 10.9 percent of the foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). They constitute the second-largest foreign-born grouping in Aargau and Bern, at 9.5 (16,524) and 7.5 (14,677) percent of the foreign-born population, and the third largest in Neuchâtel at 11.2 (6,113) percent of the foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). The average age of first-generation Italian immigrants in these cantons was 56.4 years old in 2015, and 42.7 percent of the population was female. Across the three cantons, 24.1 percent of Italians were naturalized Swiss citizens (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*).

Currently, the economic position of Italians in Switzerland is weaker than the Swiss average but higher than that of more recent, predominantly-Muslim immigrant cohorts. From 2013 to 2015, the rate of unemployment among Italians of working age was about 6.5 percent. In comparison, Switzerland's average unemployment rate was about 3 percent (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*e*).<sup>1</sup> Italians' 2016 unemployment rates in the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel were 4.8 percent, 5.3 percent, and 8.4 percent respectively (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*e*). Further, across Switzerland, 18.4 percent of Italian immigrants were highly-educated (a tertiary education) in 2016. In Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel, 11.1, 12.2, and 15.6 of Italian immigrants

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<sup>1</sup>Note: Italian numbers do not account for individuals who have voluntarily left the labor force and therefore the true unemployment rate is likely lower than 6 percent.

were highly-educated, relatively speaking (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018c).

Immigration to Switzerland from Turkey is more recent than Italian immigration, with the bulk of immigrants in Turkey arriving after 1960. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Switzerland's Turkish-born population remains smaller than its Italian population. At the cantonal level, Turkish-born immigrants constitute the second largest non-Western-European immigrant group in Aargau and Bern at 5.3 (9,061) and 3.5 (6,950) percent of the total foreign-born population, respectively, and the largest such group in Neuchâtel, at 2.4 (1,270) percent of the total foreign-born population (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017b). The average age of Turkish born immigrants in these cantons was 44 in 2015, and 47 percent of them were female. About 34.2 percent of Turkish-born immigrants across the three cantons were naturalized Swiss citizens (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017b). Most in Neuchâtel and Bern come from Çorum and Amasya in central Turkey and Maraş and Adiyaman in the East, with smaller populations from Denizli and Antalya along Turkey's Mediterranean coast. Most immigrants in Aargau come from these regions as well as cities along the Black Sea in northern Turkey. It is estimated that 40 percent of Turkish-born immigrants to Switzerland identify as Kurdish (Haab et al. 2010).

Broadly speaking, Turkish-born immigrants in Switzerland earn lower salaries and experience higher unemployment than the native-born (Strijbis 2011). On average, about 14 percent of the working age Turkish population was unemployed from 2013-2015 (although some of these individuals may not be in the labor force) (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018e). Over the same period, the bulk of Turkish-born immigrants were less-educated than the Swiss average—only about 13.5 percent have a tertiary education overall, as compared to 32.4 percent of native born Swiss (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018c).

As I suggested above, the Turkish-born population is highly fractionalized, and organizations in Switzerland represent a plethora of Turkish political and religious interests. When sampling populations from Turkey, it is critical to be conscious of such divisions, as distinct groups' attitudes towards political participation and experiences of political socialization vary significantly. A sample that over-represents certain populations within the Turkish-born community could produce results

that ultimately only apply to those populations. To maximize the generalizability of this survey, then, it is important to sample in a way that incorporates diverse subpopulations within the Turkish community.

Over 200 Turkish and Kurdish immigrant organizations currently exist in Switzerland (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). Ideli estimates that about 40 percent of Turkish immigrants actively participate in these organizations as of 2010 (Ideli 2011). Typically, unlike Italian immigrants' hometown organizations, these organizations include members from many parts of Turkey. These organizations are often linked to larger Turkish diaspora movements, generally headquartered in Germany, and frequently interact with movements within Turkey itself. For a more detailed discussion of these groups, see this chapter's appendix.

In conclusion, it is critical to achieve a sample as representative as possible in order to minimize the possibility that any correlation between linked fate and political participation is simply an artifact of oversampling specific groups. In particular, Turkish-born immigrant groups in Switzerland come from a variety of ethnic, religious, and ideological backgrounds and possess unique socialization experiences. It is thus vital to sample in a manner that includes members of most key groups.

## **4.2 Sampling Method**

Accurately surveying Turkish- and Italian-born populations in Switzerland represents a challenge to survey researchers for a number of reasons. Currently, there are no pre-existing sample frames covering these populations. Further, both of these communities include many aged and less-educated individuals who do not feel comfortable using the internet or tablets for surveys. This necessitated surveying through personal interviews.

Second, many randomized sampling techniques would not be sufficient to achieve large samples from these populations. Randomized door-to-door surveying would be particularly difficult as there are few established Turkish, Kurdish, or Italian neighborhoods. These groups live among

Swiss-born and other foreign-born individuals. Consequently, it would be expensive to achieve a sample size sufficient for analysis through random door-to-door sampling. Likewise, random-digit dialing is impractical for these populations. For one, cell phone directories are not available in Switzerland, meaning that random-digit dialing would only cover individuals with landlines. Such individuals may not be representative of the entire population. Perhaps more critically, onomastic techniques used to identify minorities for random-digit-dialing surveys would not work very well in this case, as many second- and third-generation immigrants are also likely to have Italian and Turkish names. Furthermore, many native-Swiss individuals, particularly those from the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino, possess Italian surnames. Finally, both of these techniques might yield unrepresentative samples if heads-of-household are more likely to answer the telephone or front door. In particular, if household heads are male, women might end up underrepresented. Notably, also, many members of Turkish ethnic and religious minorities are reluctant to speak with outsiders, particularly those who arrived in Switzerland as political asylees. I thus expect that random-digit-dialing and door-to-door surveys would yield a very low response rate from important segments of the Turkish-born population.

At the same time, given the fractionalized nature of Turkish-born communities in Switzerland, techniques such as snowball sampling and respondent-driven sampling, which relies on individuals recruiting their friends through social networks, would also be ineffective. Preliminary interviews suggest that communication between members of different ethnic, religious, and political sects can be infrequent.

With these limitations in mind, then, the survey was conducted through venue- and event-based sampling. This technique is frequently used by health researchers studying hidden populations such as HIV-patients and the LGBT community (Ott et al. 2018; Rao et al. 2017; Rothblum 2007). It has also been used to survey immigrants from Turkey in Switzerland as well as Muslim immigrants in the United States (Barreto, Masuoka and Sánchez 2008; Ideli, Suter-Reich and Kieser 2011).

To participate in the survey, individuals were required to have been born in Italy or Turkey and over 18 years of age. I administered the survey in conjunction with a professional polling firm

and a team of interviewers consisting of four professionally-trained interviewers (two in Turkish, two in Italian) and 11 graduate student interviewers. I hired those 11 interviewers on a competitive basis from Swiss universities and personally trained them. In addition, I conducted 35 interviews personally—33 of which were in Italian. All the Turkish-speaking interviewers were native-speakers born in Turkey. All but two of these interviewers were also bilingual in German or French and several were capable of explaining the interview questions in several Kurdish dialects. All but two of the Italian interviewers were native speakers and all were bilingual in either German or French

With the help of my interviewers, I secured permission at 84 venues prior to sampling. Aside from restaurants and markets, many immigrant venues and events are closed to the public, making it difficult to randomly sample immigrant venues. Moreover, most immigrant venues in Switzerland are unlisted in public directories. Turkish and Kurdish immigrant venues and events, in particular, frequently cater to individuals of specific ethnicities, religious beliefs, and political views. Given inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions within Turkey as well as broader Muslim concerns about visibility in Switzerland, venues are often “hidden” in nondescript buildings in industrial areas outside of city centers. Consequently, finding out when and where immigrants from particular groups congregate is difficult. Access typically requires connections to community gatekeepers. With significant effort, my enumerators and I worked extensively to locate and contact a range of venues across the study cantons. To that end, I met and telephoned with many immigrant community leaders over the first several months of the study to explain my research and build trust.

I ultimately requested permission to conduct the survey at approximately 92 venues and events that represent a significant segment of the universe of Turkish, Kurdish, and Italian venues in the study cantons. We received permission from 84 venues and were explicitly denied permission by approximately 8 (including several restaurants, two small Turkish markets, two events sanctioned by the Turkish government, and a continuing education center for elderly immigrants), although several others never responded to e-mail and phone requests. A number of Turkish and Kurdish venues asked to review the survey in advance and some of these venues returned completed written surveys to me prior to sampling events (6 total surveys were collected in this manner).

Ultimately, surveys were conducted at 68 unique venues spread out across 14 municipalities in the 3 cantons. These venues were chosen non-randomly on the basis of practicality, interviewers' schedules, and the ease of reaching the target populations with diverse backgrounds. They included many restaurants, bars, markets, events sponsored by cultural associations, the Italian Embassy and several Embassy-sponsored events, and events at places of worship. Specifically, I administered the survey at 3 *Diyanet*-sponsored mosques, one large *Milli Görüş* mosque, and one large VIKZ-affiliated congregation as well as at 3 Alevi *cemevleri* and 6 Italian Catholic missions.<sup>2</sup> I also surveyed at several locations affiliated with the *Cemaat* movement. My interviewers and I conducted surveys at religious venues mostly during social events and festivals (particularly charity picnics at mosques), ensuring a degree of diversity in the religiosity of respondents. Importantly, reduce bias that might arise if individuals select into venues based both on their strength of identities and a predisposition toward politics, I attempted to minimize sampling at politicized ethnic venues (i.e., Turkish- or Italian-organized meetings related explicitly to Swiss politics). Just over 30 respondents were sampled at ethnic events related to Swiss politics. A table of responses by venue type follows.

**Table 4.1:** Responses by Venue Type

Venue Type	Number of Responses
Ethnic social events and organizations	263
Church and mosque sponsored events	201
Embassy and consular events	54
Ethnic political events	38
Restaurants and bars	25
Ethnic grocery stores	20
Miscellaneous	4

At each venue, interviewers randomly approached potential respondents and requested their participation in the survey. On average, nine surveys were conducted per venue. Given the high

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<sup>2</sup>See the appendix for further discussions of these affiliations.

degree of sensitivity of identity politics among Turkish-born populations, I made an effort to send interviewers of Kurdish origin to Kurdish venues, Sunni Muslim interviewers to Sunni venues, and Alevi interviewers to Alevi venues whenever possible. Additionally, to minimize bias based on gender, all interviews with Sunni Muslim women were conducted by female interviewers.

Through venue-based sampling, I was able to ensure that a diverse grouping of immigrants from Turkey, representing most major subpopulations in Switzerland, were invited to participate in the survey. Likewise, respondents were aware that my surveying was approved by community leaders and thus may have been more likely to respond than would have been the case had I utilized other survey methods. Often, community leaders or venue owners introduced the survey, in general terms, and the research team. These factors contributed to an ultimate response rate of approximately 54 percent.

### 4.3 Survey Mode

The survey was professionally translated into Italian, Turkish, French, and German and reviewed by native speakers. Respondents could choose to take the survey in any of these languages and also via a face-to-face interview, online, or a pen and paper questionnaire. The majority of surveys were conducted via face-to-face interviews in immigrants' native languages (See Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the assistance of tablets using built-in-filters, minimizing human error and discrepancies across interviewers. Interviews lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.

**Table 4.2:** Surveys Completed, by Mode

Mode of Interview	Number	Percent
Tablet (Face to Face)	511	83.4
Paper	85	13.9
Online	17	2.8

The pilot phase of the survey suggested that online and mail-in paper survey response rates would be extremely low (less than 10 percent) and thus I decided to emphasize face-to-face surveying

**Table 4.3:** Surveys Completed, by Language

Language of Interview	Number	Percent
Turkish	306	49.9
Italian	295	48.1
German	10	1.6
Kurmanji Kurdish	2	0.3

when possible. Upon randomly approaching potential respondents at each venue, interviewers first asked individuals if they would be willing to participate in a face-to-face interview. If the respondent was interested but did not have time, the interviewers distributed paper surveys with self-addressed stamped envelopes or cards with a link to take the survey online. In some cases, also, venue leaders requested that we distribute paper surveys instead of conducting face-to-face interviews. In subsequent analyses, I controlled for use of paper surveys to reduce bias in respondents' answers resulting from the survey mode.

## 4.4 Question Order Randomization

One key purpose of this dissertation is to gauge, as accurately as possible, whether immigrants in my sample perceive linked fate and whether such perceptions influence their political participation. In order to do so, it is important to consider that the ordering of questions in my survey may bias immigrants' responses. Immigrants may be particularly likely to report ethnic linked fate, for example, if they are asked about the strength of their ethnic identities immediately before answering linked fate questions. Furthermore, asking immigrants about political participation may prime them to think about their status or about immigrants' political rights in Switzerland, potentially altering their responses to linked fate questions.

In order to minimize potential biases arising from question order, I randomized question blocks. More specifically, participation questions and organizational involvement questions were randomly asked before or after linked fate questions. Likewise, the order of ethnic, religious, and pan-immigrant linked fate questions and questions on the strength of religious and ethnic identities



were randomly varied so as not to prime respondents to think about specific identities in a way that might “inflate” linked fate perceptions.

To avoid repetitive questions, also, several questions about group and pan-immigrant linked fate (Q3 and Q4) were randomly assigned—half of respondents received questions about ethnic linked fate and half received questions about pan-immigrant linked fate. Repeatedly asking similar questions about linked fate might either decrease response rates or lead respondents to report similar levels of ethnic and immigrant linked fate even when differences exist.

## **4.5 Operationalizations**

### **4.5.1 Political Participation**

Prior to testing the hypotheses I developed in Chapter 2, it is necessary to describe how I operationalized political participation and linked fate in my survey. Importantly, as the bulk of immigrants in Switzerland are not naturalized, I focus on non-electoral forms of participation such as volunteering, contacting politicians, attending political meetings, and participating in petitions, boycotts, and protests. Such participation is highly important, not only because it is an indicator of immigrants’ broader political incorporation but also because it might encourage continued political integration (Alba and Foner 2015). Indeed, participation in these forms of activities has been found to correlate with voting and organizational membership (Giugni and Grasso 2016). Such forms of participation can increase immigrants’ political efficacy, their sense that they and other immigrants can influence politics, lowering their perceived costs of future engagement (Iyengar 1980; Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Wallace, Zepeda-Millan and Jones-Correa 2014). Further, participation can strengthen individuals’ long-term interest in politics (Marwell, Aiken and Demerath 1987; McAdam 1989).

To measure host-country political participation, then, I define participation according to the question below. I drew the list of political activities here from the political participation questions on the European Social Survey and Switzerland’s MOSAICH survey (Stähli et al. 2015). Similar

questions are used by many large surveys, including the American National Election Study, to measure non-electoral participation. Goroshit's analysis of these questions suggests that they can accurately capture the latent construct of participation across diverse groups and contexts (Goroshit 2016). To assess whether these items provide a reasonable means of gauging immigrants' broader participation, I conduct a factor analysis of my survey data. The analysis suggests the presence of one latent factor. Strikingly, each of the 8 items loads heavily onto that factor. With the exception of boycotts (0.33), each correlation reaches 0.5 or above. Furthermore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test suggests that the sample size is adequate for gauging the data's factor structure. These items thus broadly appear to proxy political participation more generally. Importantly, also, the fact that factor analysis yields only one factor implies that it may not be ideal to subdivide the 8 items into subindexes. That is, there is no clear evidence that certain modes of participation group together more than others.

**1. There are many different forms of political participation other than voting. Below, you will see a list of several common ways that people participate in Swiss politics. Please read the list and indicate which of these actions you have performed within the last 12 months. Please select as many as applicable:**

- Sign a petition related to political issues in Switzerland
- Sign a petition related to political issues in Switzerland
- Boycott or deliberately purchase certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons
- Volunteer for a political campaign or organization concerned with politics in Switzerland
- Participate in a demonstration related to politics in Switzerland
- Attended a public hearing or discussion related to a proposed policy ( *Vernehmlassung* or *Gemeindeversammlung*)
- Attended an informational meeting about a party, candidate, or proposed policy, or about opportunities for political participation

- Contact or attempt to contact a Swiss politician or political party
- Make a donation or raise money for a political activity related to Switzerland

My theory concerns the effect of linked fate on individuals' probability of participation. With that in mind, I create a dichotomous 'dummy' variable reflecting whether or not individuals have participated in host country politics within the last 12 months. Here, all respondents who participated in at least one activity below are coded as having participated and assigned a value of "1." Those who did not participate in any activities are assigned a value of "0." This coding scheme facilitates the interpretation of regression results—coefficients on independent variables can be interpreted as changes in the log odds of participation.

I also create 8 dummy variables representing each political action described above. In subsequent chapters, I complement analysis of the dichotomous index described above with analysis of each of these 8 dummy variables. This approach permits me to analysis the drivers both of individuals' general likelihood of participation as well as their likelihood of undertaking specific activities.

For robustness, I also constructed an additive index reflecting how many forms of political participation each respondent undertook in the previous year. Such an index, however, makes coefficients substantively difficult to interpret (Goroshit 2016). To measure the effects of linked fate and other variables on participation using an additive index, each component of the index would have to be perfectly substitutable. Substantively, in this study, individuals' participation in each activity would have to be determined by the same variables. The differential factor loadings of each item onto the latent factor above indicate that this is not the case. Consequently, correlations with an additive index would be substantively difficult to interpret. Concretely, in this analysis, an additive index would treat an immigrant who participates in a demonstration and signs a petition as less politicized than an immigrant signing a petition, making a donation, and attending an informational meeting.

To create indexes using items that are not substitutable, it is common for analysts to weight responses by their frequency in the population when data is available. Unfortunately, however, to

my knowledge no data estimates immigrants' participation in all 8 actions in the study cantons or Switzerland more generally. Consequently, data constraints limit my ability to construct a straightforwardly interpretable additive index. With these caveats in mind, I will report results using additive indexes in the appendices of Chapters 5 and 6.

Important, also, it is possible to collapse the data into a single unidimensional index using factor analysis. This approach, however, would render the substantive effects of covariates on participation impossible to measure. Such an index would only permit me to estimate whether a general correlation exists between participation and linked fate. For this reason, I focus my analysis on the dichotomous index described above.

#### **4.5.2 Linked Fate**

Second, I will describe my operationalizations of linked fate—the key independent variables in this analysis. First, I measured pan-immigrant linked fate through Q2, Q3, and Q4 below. Through these items, I sought to capture the extent to which individuals perceive linked fate with other immigrants, regardless of their ethnicity. I use exploratory factor analysis to create an index based on these questions, and standardized values for ease of interpretation.

These questions correspond to the conceptualization of linked fate in the U.S. politics literature, which holds that individuals develop a sense of shared interests when they perceive that political developments affecting their social groups also affect them personally (Dawson 1994). To this end, I designed Q2 to capture the degree to which immigrants perceive that others share political orientations or beliefs based on their immigrant status alone. I also included two questions that are based on standard American linked fate questions (as asked in the American National Election Study 2016). Q3 was designed to capture the degree to which the political successes of other immigrants in Switzerland is reflected in individuals' personal level of optimism about their future. Q4 is designed to gauge the degree to which respondents perceive that their economic well-being is tied to that of other immigrants. To militate against misinterpretation, Q3 and Q4 refer to situations that parallel actual developments in other cantons in Switzerland. Importantly, immigrants in the

sample do not live in the cantons referenced in these questions, and these policy developments would be unlikely to directly affect them and their families. As such, these questions seek to capture the degree to which individuals perceive that their life chances are tied to the well-being of other immigrants more generally.

**2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more immigrants were in office across Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

**3. In 2015, Swiss citizens in Basel-Stadt elected an immigrant to the Nationalrat. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *When immigrants assume positions of power in Switzerland, I feel more optimistic about my chances for a successful life here.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

**4. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Zürich issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer immigrants. To what extent do you agree or**

**disagree with the following statement: *When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

Next, I used factor analysis to create an index representing a latent variable correlated with each of these questions. Per the American linked fate literature, I assumed that, when individuals perceive that their life chances are tied to developments affecting their social groups, they come to conflate collective group interests with their personal interests (Dawson 1994). As a consequence, if factor analysis suggests that a latent variable underlies these three questions, it is likely that this variable will capture a shared politicized identity consistent with linked fate. Any correlation between Q2 and Q3 might suggest that individuals feel politically connected to their membership groups, and an additional correlation with Q1 would suggest that this sense of connection is accompanied by a sense of shared political interest with other group members. Correspondingly, a latent variable correlated with all three questions is likely to represent the degree to which individuals perceiving political connections with other group members have developed shared interests due to these connections. I thus hold that such a latent variable broadly captures linked fate as conceptualized by (Dawson 1994).

Exploratory factor analysis suggests one common factor across these three questions (Eigenvalue  $>1$ ). Factor analysis suggests that each of the three questions correlates strongly with this latent factor—Q3 has the highest loading at 0.79, followed by Q2 at 0.69 and Q4 at 0.65. These results suggest that individuals perceiving that developments affecting immigrants broadly affect them personally often perceive shared interests with other immigrants.

Factor analysis typically requires a large sample size to effectively capture latent constructs. To gauge whether factor analysis is valid given my relatively small sample size, I conduct Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test. If the sample size is adequate, we want a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value of 0.6 or higher. In this case, the test yields a value of 0.58, which suggests that the sample size is borderline but likely adequate for a preliminary study. Furthermore, Bartlett's test of Sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that correlation matrix between these three questions represents an identity matrix. Given these results, it is reasonable to assume the presence of an underlying factor correlated with the three questions, with the caveat that this factor's estimation would be more accurate with a larger sample size. Broadly, then, these results suggest the presence of a latent variable measuring the degree to which individuals perceive shared interests rooted in a sense of politicized connection to other immigrants. To borrow terminology from Dawson, the resulting index measures the degree to which immigrants use their collective identities as a 'heuristic' to interpret the political world (1994).

I also constructed similar linked fate indexes for linked fate perceived with members of respondents' own self-declared ethnic groups (Q5, Q6, Q7). At the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked whether they identify as Italian, uniquely Kurdish, uniquely Turkish, both Turkish and Kurdish, or with another ethnic group. Respondents could indicate other identities or decline to answer entirely. Each respondent received a set of ethnic linked fate questions referring specifically to their declared identity.

I used factor analysis to create separate indexes of linked fate for each ethnic group using questions roughly the same as those above asked with reference to all immigrants. Once again, factor analysis suggests the presence of a latent variable with strong correlations with each of these questions (greater than 0.78). In this case, however, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin tests reveal that the sample may be too small for factor analysis, with a test statistic of 0.5 for each group. Again, I will proceed with the caveat that a larger sample size would lead to more accurate results.

Next, I combined the unstandardized factor analysis scores for both groups to create a

unified index of ethnic linked fate.<sup>3</sup> Note that I did not include a question here about elected officials from the same ethnic group out of concern that respondents' answers might be influenced by their opinions of specific candidates (given that relatively few immigrants hold political office in Switzerland). Given the differences in underlying questions, the immigrant and co-ethnic linked fate indexes cannot be compared directly, although the underlying questions are quite similar.

For robustness, also, I calculate similar indexes using a method known as item-response theory (IRT). IRT is similar to factor analysis in that it is used to exam whether items correlate with a common latent variable. While factor analysis computes factor loadings based on correlation matrices, however, IRT employs an algorithm that estimates the conditional probability of an outcome conditional on a latent variable. In subsequent sections, I will conduct analyses both with factor analysis and IRT-derived scores to gauge whether my results are robust to different methods of index construction.

**5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more [ITALIANS/KURDS/TURKS] were in office across Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

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<sup>3</sup>Again, exploratory factor analysis yielded only one factor for each group with an eigenvalue greater than one. Importantly, also, the unstandardized means of group linked fate among both Italians and the Turkish-born are equal to zero, permitting the group-level indexes to be combined.



**6. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Ticino issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer people from [ITALY]. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

**7. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Basel issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer people from [Turkey] and other Muslim countries. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

Finally, I also included a question designed to measure shared interests among self-declared Sunni Muslims. Given the dearth of practicing Muslim politicians in Switzerland, pre-tests during my focus groups suggested that questions phrased similarly to Q3 and Q4 above would confuse respondents. Furthermore, there have been few instances of explicit, publicized discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland—economic and job discrimination occurs, but it is typically at

the individual level, and it is unclear whether it is precipitated by religion, race, nationality, or a combination of these factors. Consequently, I was concerned that, when asked about whether what happens to other Muslims affects their economic prospects, respondents might think about certain individuals or nationalities that they had heard faced acute discrimination. I was concerned that the substance of individuals' answers would vary based on their subjective point of reference (e.g. a respondent might know Muslims that have been discriminated against, but they may be African and the respondent might attribute their discrimination to their skin color rather than Islam). Further, there is no clear, public instance of collective job market discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland that would permit me to prime respondents to imagine discrimination based solely on religion. Focus groups and interviews suggested that priming unrealistic scenarios decreases respondents' willingness to participate in the survey and contribute thoughtful answers.

Finally, I wanted to ask Sunni Muslims and Alevis (members of a minority religious sect loosely tied to Shi'a Islam who constitute almost a third of my Turkish-born sample) identical questions. Given a general lack of familiarity with Alevism in the West, questions about economic discrimination on the basis of Alevi beliefs and practices would have been met with confusion and skepticism. Further, prior to completing the survey, I had little sense of the relative numbers of Sunni Muslims and Alevis in the three study cantons (no official statistics are available). For these reasons, I sought to approximate religious linked fate by inquiring solely about shared interests based on religion. My question concerning Muslim shared interests can be found below (Q8).

**8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more people sharing my religious beliefs were in office across Switzerland.***

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree

- Strongly Disagree
- Don't know / Not sure.

### **Pre-testing and Construct Validity**

It is important to note that these operationalizations of linked fate differ substantially from those typically employed in American surveys. The 2012 American National Election Study measures linked fate with the following question (American National Election Survey 2014):

*“Do you think what happens to [R’s RACE/ETHNICITY] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?”*

This question was designed to gauge whether individuals feel a broad sense of individual connection with their broader racial or ethnic groups. Ultimately, several rounds of testing suggested that immigrants in Switzerland had trouble understanding this question. It was thus necessary to develop alternative wordings measuring the same concept.

In 2014, I proposed that this question be added to Switzerland’s nationally-representative MOSAICH survey, administered by the Swiss Centre for Excellence in the Social Sciences (FORS) at the University of Lausanne. Prior to finalizing the survey, colleagues at FORS conducted extensive cognitive testing to gauge how immigrants understand the question. They conducted 27 interviews lasting between 50 and 120 minutes. All interviews were conducted in French in the city of Lausanne. The interviewees ranged in age from 18 to 67 and represented many nationalities: Morocco, South Africa, Congo, Romania, United Kingdom, France, Croatia, Tunisia, and Portugal.

The cognitive interviews revealed that respondents interpreted this question highly inconsistently. In particular, when this question was posed in French, respondents often interpreted this question as asking whether or not they empathize with people belonging to their ethnic groups rather than whether they perceive linked fate or shared interests with them. That is, many respondents answered the questions indicating that they feel sad if bad things happen to other people. When asked about Muslim linked fate, for example, a Tunisian man mentioned that he was upset by the difficulties Syrian Muslims were facing in Europe, but indicated no further sense of connection to

them. Ultimately, five variants of this question were posed to the interviewees, and the results were similar for each variant. Alarming, also, those immigrants predisposed to perceive linked fate may be particularly likely to interpret the question as one about shared interests rather than empathy. As such, it does not appear that the American linked fate question reliably measures linked fate among immigrants in Switzerland.

When I further tested these questions in focus groups—in French, German, and Italian—and in interviews with some of my immigrant contacts, many (both from Turkey and Italy) had trouble understanding them. Broadly, the ambiguity in the American question stems from the term “what happens.” Respondents were unsure what kinds of events or phenomena that question was getting at. Further, as in the cognitive interviews, respondents had trouble understand the meaning of “have something to do with what happens in your life.” Broadly, respondents did not understand whether I was asking if they were upset or emotionally moved by what happened to others.

With these concerns in mind, I developed a new battery of questions asking more explicitly about individuals’ sense of connection and shared interests with other members of their groups. Questions 3 and 4 are essentially reformulations of the U.S. linked fate questions. Rather than referring to “what happens,” however, I refer explicitly to political and economic developments and present some general examples of hypothetical, yet realistic, scenarios in Switzerland that might evoke sentiments of linked fate. Further, in order to approximate respondents’ perceived connections with their social groups, I asked how such developments affect their “life chances”—a concept that translates well into French, German, Italian and Turkish.

Several scholars have argued that the standard American linked fate question does not represent the heuristic calculation hypothesized by Dawson (Gay, Hochschild and White 2016). Along this vein, the standard question does not explicitly measure whether individuals perceiving political connections with their social group conflate their personal interests with group interests. To better approximate whether immigrants perceived shared interests with other members of their social groups, I developed Q2 (and Q5, its homologue referring to members of the same ethnic group).

I designed this question to capture the degree to which immigrants perceive that others share political orientations or beliefs based on their immigrant status alone. I tested this question on 30 immigrants in focus groups, in which respondents consistently interpreted it as a question about shared political interests. As such, anecdotal evidence suggests that this question is consistent with the linked fate concept as theorized by Dawson—namely, that sentiments of linked fate underlie perceptions of shared group interest. Importantly, my experiences with focus groups suggested that venue-based sampling would have complicated any attempts to *directly* ask respondents whether they shared interests with other group members. My focus groups suggested that, when questions are formulated in this manner, immigrants tend to think about how much they agree with their friends and family members, particularly those present at that venue, rather than think abstractly in terms of group interests. To prime them to think more generally about group-level shared interests, I developed a question referring to hypothetical immigrant politicians—about which respondents know nothing other than their immigrant status, nationality, or religion. Given my sampling method, this question likely approximates the underlying degree of collective shared interest better than a more direct question would.

### **Construct Validity Considerations**

Before proceeding to test the theories advanced in previous chapters, it is also necessary to address several threats to the validity of these operationalizations of linked fate. First, my usage of agree and disagree items to measure linked fate may create acquiescence bias. Acquiescence bias refers to individuals' tendency to answer survey questions affirmatively regardless of their content, particularly when they are asked to agree or disagree with a given statement (Danner, Aichholzer and Rammstedt 2015; Messick 1967). Given the limited time available to survey respondents, asking respondents to choose question-specific responses rather than to indicate agreement or disagreement was not feasible. As such, the high degree of linked fate expressed by many respondents, as depicted in the previous section's histograms, may result from acquiescence bias.

To address this possibility, in subsequent sections, I will employ a process from psycho-

metrics (empirical psychology) called ‘ipsatization’ to correct for acquiescence bias. Ipsatization standardizes responses to agree-disagree questions within individuals, correcting to individuals’ tendency to agree with all questions presented.

Second, it is important to note that some interviews were conducted in venues where respondents’ friends and family members could hear their responses to questions. This could bias survey responses if respondents’ answers were affected by their expectations of their friends and families’ reactions (social desirability bias). I attempted to minimize social desirability bias by having my interviewers explain the purpose of my research clearly to would-be participants, by briefly presenting my research to respondents, or by having the venue leader introduce my research. Further, I tried to send interviewers from the same ethnic and religious background as respondents, when possible, in order to maximize respondents’ comfort level.

Questions about political participation might be particularly prone to social desirability bias if individuals feel embarrassed by their lack of participation. I attempted to minimize bias by asking respondents to talk about their political behavior over the last 12 months rather than their political intentions or interests. However, given that respondents on the whole expressed low interest in Swiss politics, I do not expect that social desirability created bias in this case.

To formally gauge whether social desirability bias might skew the measurement of political participation and linked fate, I compare the responses of individuals taking the paper version of the survey to individuals taking the survey via a face-to-face interview. Given that the bulk of individuals opting for the paper version were Italians, I limited this analysis to Italians (57 of 300 Italians used a paper survey). To this effect, I estimate a model regressing individuals’ probability of participation on their survey mode, all else equal. The results, displayed in Figure A1 in the appendix, suggest that social desirability may not be affecting respondents’ answers in this survey. Indeed, individuals who answered paper surveys were, all else equal, more likely to report participating in Swiss politics than others, all else equal.

Third, given that I conducted the survey in both Italian and Turkish, it is important to gauge whether the questions are measuring the same concepts in these languages. In particular, I am

concerned that the substantive meaning of the latent variable measuring linked fate may vary for Turkish-born and Italian-born immigrants.

To determine whether this might be the case, I conducted multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) on all pan-ethnic linked fate questions for both groups. This technique is commonly employed to measure potential differences in the meaning of questions across languages (Pérez 2011).

Strikingly, MGCFA suggests that the pan-immigrant linked fate questions possess a statistically significant common factor among Turkish-born respondents but not among Italian-born respondents. More concretely, this means that while all component questions significantly correlated with a latent factor among Turkish-born immigrants, the same correlations reached a significance level just shy of 90 percent for Italians. Further, comparing the measures of model fit produced by multigroup factor analysis with those produced by factor analysis treating all respondents as a single group suggests that factor analysis yields better results upon accounting for inter-group variation. In short, this suggests that, on average, there is a latent construct underlying pan-immigrant linked fate questions for the entire sample. These findings, however, may suggest that questions do not produce a valid scale of linked fate among Italians to the same degree that they do for the Turkish-born.

It is unclear to me that this discrepancy stems from language. I expect that this difference may stem in part from the relatively high number of retired respondents among the Italian sample. Some Italian respondents expressed that they no longer worry about economic threats to immigrants such as those implied by the above questions given that they are retired and that their children and grandchildren face relatively few labor market obstacles in Switzerland. Indeed, in focus groups and interviews, many more Italians expressed frustration about their lack of voting rights and representation in Swiss politics than about their economic status. The inter-group difference picked up by MGCFA may thus be picking up a relative sense of economic independence among Italians.

All that said, the questions fall just short of 90 percent significance among Italians with a relatively small sample size. This small sample size also makes it difficult to estimate separate linked fate indexes for each group. For this analysis, then, I will proceed with the linked fate index

produced without taking differences between Turkish-born and Italian respondents into account, with the caveat that this index may over- or under-represent linked fate among some Italians. To gauge whether the MGCFA results produce biased overall results, it would be necessary to recruit a larger sample of Italians.

Next, one might argue that these questions capture respondents' collective or individual orientation rather than linked fate. That is, respondents who have individualistic personalities may be more likely to answer these questions negatively than more collectively-oriented respondents. To test this possibility, I regress each linked fate index on a question proxying individualism. More specifically, I ask immigrants the degree to which they agree or disagree with the notion that those who fail to get ahead in Switzerland have only themselves to blame. The regression results suggest that neither the pan-immigrant linked fate index, the group linked fate index, nor the Muslim shared interest question have a statistically significant correlation with respondents' degree of individualism. Furthermore, when I standardize both pan-immigrant linked fate and ethnic group linked fate within individuals to correct for acquiescence bias (ipsatization), the resulting measures correlate at 0.6. If these measures capture individuals' disposition to think in collective terms, I might expect a higher correlation between linked fate measurements after accounting for acquiescence bias. Rather than simply proxying collective or individual personalities, then, I hold that my operationalizations capture respondents' sense that their life chances in Switzerland are tied to those of their membership groups.

One might argue that Q2, Q5 and Q8 capture a general preference for descriptive representation rather than shared group interests. Recall, however, that my indexes of pan-immigrant linked fate and ethnic group linked fate were developed through factor analysis. Factor analysis isolated a latent variable that is correlated both with these items and immigrants' sense that economic and political developments affecting others affect their own lives. For this reason, the index is not simply measuring individuals' preferences for descriptive representation. Even if the index does proxy such attitudes to a degree, it likely captures preferences born of a sense of connection to other immigrants and/or ethnic group members. Further, the existing literature suggests that linked fate is often highly



correlated to preferences for descriptive representation (Schildkraut 2015, 2016). For these reasons, I hold that these indexes capture linked fate to a reasonable degree of accuracy.

Finally, it is necessary to gauge whether these indexes proxy respondents' sense of relative deprivation rather than capturing linked fate. Three logit regressions of all three linked fate measures (pan-immigrant, ethnic, and pan-Muslim) on appropriate measures of political and economic relative deprivation suggest that linked fate and relative deprivation are significantly correlated, all else equal, albeit not very strongly (less than 0.4 ; see Appendix Figure A2 for further details). It is vital, however, to verify that any observed relationship between linked fate and political participation is not simply an artifact of relative deprivation. In subsequent chapters, I will examine how that relationship changes, if at all, upon controlling for different forms of relative deprivation.

## **4.6 Limits to Generalizability**

Given the challenges discussed above, venue-based sampling was the most cost-efficient method to recruit a sample size large enough for inference. That said, this method of sample selection is not without its challenges. Indeed, this survey may not capture the attitudes and beliefs of those individuals who did not attend those venues. Such individuals may possess different attitudes and ideas than those who were present at the sampling venues. As such, it would be remiss to claim that the results I will present below are generalizable beyond the sample itself. Notably, it is estimated that about 40 percent of Turkish-born immigrants in Switzerland belong to an organization. Assuming that this number is similar in the sample cantons and among Italian immigrants, this survey is likely at most generalizable to 40 percent of the target population (Ideli 2011).

First, the survey respondents may possess a higher average degree of linked fate than the overall population. To reiterate, 43 percent of respondents were recruited at ethnic-group specific venues and 33 percent were recruited at religious venues. It is possible that immigrants attending ethnic venues may identify more strongly with their ethnic group than others, and that those

attending religious venues may identify more strongly with their religion than others. Indeed, ethnic identifications were quite high on average across the survey, with 95 percent of Italians, 91 percent of those uniquely identifying as Turks, and 97 percent of those uniquely identifying as Kurds stating that their ethnicity is important to their self-definition (although some individuals held ethnicity to be more important than others). I also attempted to recruit both religious and non-religious Muslims by recruiting at mosque-organized charity events (which attracted crowds beyond regular mosque attendees) and Turkish cultural association picnics, but ultimately 87 percent of self-identified Muslim participants identified as religious (although only 33 percent identified as ‘very religious’). As such, my estimates of ethnic and religious linked fate may be inflated relative to their average population values.

Continuing, it is important to stress as well that estimates of this correlation may not approximate the population correlation if respondents’ attendance at sampling venues correlates both with individuals’ degree of linked fate and political participation. It is plausible that immigrants who are particularly interested in politics or possess high levels of linked fate are predisposed to frequent ethnic and immigrant venues. That said, most venues included in this survey were social or bureaucratic rather than political in nature, and it is not clear that self-selection into venues would be driven by politicization as well as the strength of individual identities. To reduce bias that might arise if individuals select into venues based both on their strength of identities and a predisposition toward politics, I attempted to minimize sampling at meetings and events related explicitly to Swiss politics—fewer than 40 respondents were ultimately sampled at such events. As such, I expect that the main difference between sampled and unsampled populations should be their levels of linked fate and participation.

To gauge whether the nature of sampling venues may have biased responses, I regressed the political participation dummy variable described above on dummies representing broad venue categories. The reference category includes respondents who took the survey online. The results are visible in Table 4.4 below. Likewise, I regressed each form of linked fate on the same categories. These results are visible in Table 4.5.

**Table 4.4:** Does Participation Correlate with Venue Types?

VARIABLES	Probability of Participation
Restaurants	0.325 (1.064)
Markets	0.847 (1.113)
Religious Venues	-0.131 (1.010)
Ethnic Orgs., Social	0.0770 (1.008)
Ethnic Orgs, Political	3.611** (1.424)
Bureaucratic Venues	0.288 (1.036)
Constant	-0 (1)
Observations	608

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Combined, these results suggest that the nature of the venues where this survey was conducted are unlikely to bias any measured correlation between linked fate and participation. For the most part, the nature of venues significantly correlates neither with individuals' probability of participation nor with their degree of linked fate. Only the 38 individuals sampled at ethnic political organizations were slightly more likely than others to participate in politics, but sampling at such venues does not significantly correlate with linked fate.

To understand other potential sources of bias in the survey, I compare the characteristics of my sample with the average characteristics of the underlying populations across the three sample cantons as measured by Swiss registry data. This analysis suggests that the sample population differs from the underlying Turkish- and Italian-born population across the three cantons in several important ways.

First, and most importantly, the sample includes a high proportion of naturalized Swiss citizens relative to the population. Across the three cantons, registry data suggests that 24.1 of Italian-

**Table 4.5:** Does Venue Type Correlate with Linked Fate?

VARIABLES	Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	Ethnic Group Linked Fate	Pan-Muslim Linked Fate
Markets	-0.621 (1.059)	0.578 (1.062)	-1.00 (1.195)
Religious Venues	-1.267 (1.007)	0.285 (1.007)	0.315 (1.046)
Ethnic Orgs., Social	-1.166 (1.005)	0.140 (1.007)	-0.371 (1.064)
Ethnic Orgs., Political	-0.644 (1.067)	0.513 (1.026)	-0.667 (1.195)
Bureaucratic Venues (e.g., Embassies)	-1.463 (1.067)	0.233 (1.019)	
Restaurants	-1.384 (1.043)	0.578 (1.062)	-1.00 (1.106)
Constant	1.190 (0.998)	-0.261 (1.002)	4*** (1.035)
Observations	168	269	152
R-squared	0.044	0.017	0.103

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

born individuals and 34.2 percent of Turkish-born individuals have naturalized (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2017*b*). In the sample, about 34 percent of Italian survey respondents and 38.5 percent of respondents from Turkey have naturalized. As naturalization can boost immigrants' political participation, it is possible that the average rate of political participation among those surveyed exceeds the population average (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017).

Second, on the whole, the sample is likely older and more male than the actual population. If age or gender are correlated both with political participation and linked fate, then any measured correlation may be an artifact of the sample. The average age of first-generation Italian immigrants in Bern, Neuchâtel, and Aargau was 56.4 in 2015, as compared to 63 years old in my sample. Furthermore, women constitute 42.7 percent of the Italian immigrant population and only 37 percent of my sample. The average age of Turkish-born immigrants, on the other hand, is about 44 both in the population and in the sample. While 47 percent of the Turkish-born population was female in 2015, however, only 32 percent of Turkish-born respondents were women. As such, young Italians and women (particularly Turkish women) may be underrepresented in the survey.

Finally, the sample is slightly better-educated and employed at a higher rate than the overall population. I estimate that 22 percent of both Turkish-born and Italian immigrants in the sample possess a tertiary education.<sup>4</sup> Among the population, only 18.4 percent of Italians and 13.5 percent of Turkish-born immigrants have attained this educational level (Swiss Statistical Office, Neuchatel 2018*c*). Further, I estimate that around 14 percent of the working-age Turkish-born population and 6.5 percent of the Italian population is unemployed, relative to 11.8 percent and 3 percent, respectively, in my sample. The existing literature suggests that education may be positively correlated with linked fate. If this is the case, my survey respondents may possess a higher degree of linked fate than the population average (Sánchez and Masuoka 2010).

It is possible that my sample may deviate from the population in other important ways. For

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<sup>4</sup>I assume that all individuals with 14 or more years of education have attained a tertiary degree or certification.

example, Kurds or Alevi may be underrepresented relative to their population levels. Unfortunately, however, no precise data on the ethnic and religious identification of Turkish-born immigrants is available at the Swiss local level. That said, Kurds and Alevi are overrepresented in my Bern and Neuchâtel samples and underrepresented in my Aargau sample. The share of Kurds in the sample in particular, at 32 percent, is realistic considering that Kurds are estimated to constitute 30-40 percent of the Swiss population more generally.

To gauge whether any of these deviations from population averages might influence my estimation of the correlation between linked fate and participation, I estimate several regression models. First, I regress a dummy variable representing an individual's probability of participation on their age, gender, educational attainment, naturalization status, and employment status. I then repeat this regression using pan-immigrant linked fate, ethnic group linked fate, and Muslim linked fate, respectively, as dependent variables. The results are visible in tables 4.6 and 4.7 below.<sup>5</sup>

These results from the political participation regression in Figure 4.6 suggest that age, Swiss citizenship, educational attainment, and unemployment correlate significantly and positively with political participation. Strikingly, the results also suggest that women in the sample may participate less than men. The results displayed in Figure 4.7 suggests that women also may perceive a higher degree of both pan-immigrant linked fate and ethnic linked fate than men. No other variables show a significant correlation.

Broadly, these results suggest that this survey's lack of female respondents relative to the female share of the population might limit the generalizability of results. In particular, it is possible that gender affects both linked fate and participation, and that increasing the number of female respondents in the sample would change the observed relationship between these variables. In the next chapter, I will thus apply post-stratification weights to the survey data as an attempt to correct for such potential biases.

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<sup>5</sup>Hosmer-Lemeshow tests of the model in table 4.6 suggests a low model fit

**Table 4.6:** Correlates of Political Participation in the Sample

VARIABLES	Probability of Participation
Age	0.0130** (0.00576)
Female	-0.539*** (0.180)
Educational Attainment	0.0946*** (0.0205)
Swiss Citizenship	0.685*** (0.182)
Unemployed	0.634* (0.336)
Constant	-1.548*** (0.452)
Observations	600
R2	0.0655

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4.7:** Correlates of Linked Fate in the Sample

	Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	Ethnic Group Linked Fate	Pan-Muslim Linked Fate
VARIABLES			
Age	-0.00203 (0.00526)	0.000929 (0.00438)	-0.00188 (0.0135)
Female	0.404** (0.173)	0.247* (0.135)	0.350 (0.274)
Educational Attainment	0.00145 (0.0159)	0.00246 (0.0129)	-0.00117 (0.0331)
Swiss Citizenship	0.138 (0.169)	-0.114 (0.129)	0.108 (0.284)
Unemployed	0.369 (0.336)	0.340 (0.228)	-0.265 (0.453)
Constant	-0.104 (0.387)	-0.150 (0.317)	3.910*** (0.803)
Observations	162	258	153
R-squared	0.046	0.026	0.017

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



To conclude, venue-based sampling likely biased survey responses to a degree. That said, venue-based sampling permitted me to cost-effectively recruit a sample large and diverse enough to permit analysis. Given the high levels of suspicion my staff and I faced in Turkish and Kurdish contexts, it is unclear whether random-digit dialing or even a door-to-door survey would have yielded a response rate that permits meaningful analysis. Indeed, having the approval of venue leaders and community leaders greatly facilitated response. In their absence, many of the individuals in my sample likely would have been too suspicious to participate in this survey.

## **4.7 Appendix**

### **4.7.1 Diversity within the Turkish-Born Community**

Over 200 Turkish and Kurdish immigrant organizations currently exist in Switzerland (Mutlu 2000). Here, I will briefly summarize several key organizations and cleavages in the Turkish-Swiss community. My survey includes substantial samples from each of these groups. First, the *Türkische Gemeinschaft Schweiz* (TGS), sanctioned by the Turkish government, is one of the most important Turkish organizations in Switzerland. It works with the Swiss government and Swiss organizations to promote awareness of Turkish culture and traditions. Notably, it organizes major on Turkish holidays, including Youth and Sports Day, the celebration of the founding of the Turkish republic, and Atatürk's birthday.

This organization also works very closely with Turkish schools. These schools, financially-supported by the Turkish government, also play an important role in immigrant communities in Switzerland. Turkish schools provide voluntary Turkish language and cultural education to second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants across Switzerland. Teachers are hired in Turkey and are sent to Switzerland on four-year teaching contracts. At any given time, about 45 government-sponsored teachers are present in Switzerland. In conjunction with Turkish parents' organization, Turkish schools host many cultural and sporting events. Primarily concerned with Turkish politics and culture, the TGS organizes few events that explicitly concern Swiss politics.

It is also important to briefly describe the main Turkish and Kurdish religious organizations in Switzerland. These organizations possess distinct perspectives relating to how Muslims should comport themselves in non-Muslim countries. While the bulk of Turkish-born immigrants, some 75 percent, self-identify as Muslim, practicing Sunni Muslims constitute a minority of their population (Haab et al. 2010). Indeed, a 2015 survey suggests that only 26 percent of Turkish immigrants in Switzerland visit mosques one or more times a week and only one third of Turks pray multiple times a day (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). Nonetheless, mosques play an important role in Turkish-born communities. They not only provide religious instruction, but frequently organize breakfasts, dinners, picnics, and other social events. As such, they are important to the socialization of Turkish-born immigrants.

Sunni Turkish mosques in Switzerland frequently belong to one of several umbrella organizations that espouse differential views relating to the role of Islam in the state. On the one hand, the Turkish-Islamic Foundation (*Diyanet*) comprises a network of mosques sanctioned by the Turkish government. These mosques are served by imams who are trained in Turkey and assigned by the government to work in expatriate communities. Broadly, these communities support a strict separation between religion and the state in accordance with the Turkish Republican constitution. On the other, many mosques are linked to Islamist movements such as *Milli Görüş*, which emphasize the rejection of Western secular values and call for greater integration of religion and state in Turkey. Still other mosques are linked to Fethullah Gülen's Islamist movement *Cemaat*, a moderate movement emphasizing interfaith communication that Turkey's current ruling party, the AKP, alleges orchestrated a failed coup attempt in 2016. Finally, some mosques are affiliated with the VIKZ umbrella (*Verband Islamische Kulturzentrum*), based in Germany. These mosques are linked to a Turkish Sufi movement and adhere to a mystical form of Islam, placing less emphasis on political Islam than, for example, *Milli Görüş*. Given that each of these organizations possesses distinct positions about the role of Islam in the state and the ideal behavior of Muslims abroad, survey sampling should include respondents falling under each of these umbrellas in order to maximize generalizability. There is no official data recording how many individuals in Switzerland fall under

each umbrella, although a plurality of Swiss mosques fall under the *Diyamet* umbrella.

Around 30 to 40 percent of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants identify as Alevis, a religion that combines elements of Shi'i Islam with Anatolian folk traditions. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Alevis do not attend mosques and Alevi women do not typically wear headscarves. Instead, Alevis pray in mixed-gender prayer houses known as *cemevleri*. As of 2008, the most recent data available, about 4,000 immigrants belong to 15 or so Alevi organizations across Switzerland, particularly in Basel, Aargau, and Zürich (Haab et al. 2010). These Alevi organizations are aligned with the Confederation of Alevite Communities in Europe, based in Germany. These organizations regularly organize prayer services, dinners, and folk concerts. They also offer music, language, and computer classes for their members. Many Alevi organizations include both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. These organizations also hold politician debates and events related to both Swiss and Turkish politics. Given that Alevis neither attend mosques nor wear headscarves, their socialization in Switzerland may be different from that of Sunni Muslims.

Many ethnic minorities from Turkey have formed their own organizations in Switzerland—particularly Kurds. Switzerland's Kurdish umbrella organization, FEKAR, is part of a European umbrella organization known as KON-KURD. Its constituent clubs frequently engage with both Turkish and Swiss politics. In particular, they seek to promote awareness of Kurdish issues and pressure the Swiss and other European governments to condemn Turkey for its actions against the Kurds (Mutlu and Tschannen 1995). They also actively lobby the Swiss government to liberalize asylum laws and extend the right to vote to non-citizens. Currently, Kurdish organizations are pressuring the Swiss government to accept more Syrian refugees and condemn Turkey's actions in northern Syria. Further, at a grassroots level, Turkish-Kurdish organizations are providing social support for Syrian Kurdish refugees in many Swiss cities. Many Kurds arrived in Switzerland as political asylees and were active in political organizations in Turkey. As such, their pre-immigration socialization is distinct from that of other groups.

#### **4.7.2 Survey Questions**

1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

*My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more immigrants were in office across Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

2. In 2015, Swiss citizens in Basel-Stadt elected an immigrant to the Nationalrat. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*When immigrants assume positions of power in Switzerland, I feel more optimistic about my chances for a successful life here.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

3. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Zürich issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer immigrants. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree

- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

*My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more [ITALIANS/KURDS/TURKS] were in office across Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

5. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Ticino issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer people from [ITALY]. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

6. Imagine the following scenario: A SVP / UDP leader in Basel issues a statement encouraging employers to hire fewer people from [Turkey] and other Muslim countries. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*When I hear news like this, I become concerned about my chances for a successful life in Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree

- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

*My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more people sharing my religious beliefs were in office across Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

8. There are many different forms of political participation other than voting. Below, you will see a list of several common ways that people participate in Swiss politics. Please read the list and indicate which of these actions you have performed within the last 12 months. Please select as many as applicable:

- Sign a petition related to political issues in Switzerland
- Boycott or deliberately purchase certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons
- Volunteer for a political campaign or organization concerned with politics in Switzerland
- Participate in a demonstration related to politics in Switzerland
- Attended a public hearing or discussion related to a proposed policy (Vernehmlassung or Gemeindeversammlung)
- Attended an informational meeting about a party, candidate, or proposed policy, or about opportunities for political participation
- Contact or attempt to contact a Swiss politician or political party

- Make a donation or raise money for a political activity related to Switzerland

9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*Immigrants can have an impact on politics in Switzerland.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

*I feel I have a pretty good understanding of Swiss politics.*

- Strongly Agree
- Somewhat Agree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Don't Know / Not Sure

### 4.7.3 Coding Schemes

The control variables were coded as follows:

- *SwissCitizen* takes on a value of 1 if an individual is a Swiss citizen and a value of 0 if he or she possess only Italian or Turkish citizenship.
- *YearsinSwitzerland* is a count variable representing the self-reported number years and individual has resided in Switzerland, cumulatively (not including periods away from Switzerland).
- *Age* represents individuals' age in years.
- *Education* represents the number of years of formal education an individual has undertaken.
- *KurdOnly* is coded 1 if an individual identifies only as Kurdish and 0 otherwise.
- *TurkOnly* is coded 1 if an individual identifies only as Turkish and 0 otherwise.
- *TurkOther* is coded 1 if an individual identifies as both Turkish and Kurdish, Turkish and Rum (Turkish of Greek descent), Turkish and Çerkez (Circassian), or Turkish and Laz (Turkish of Caucasian descent). It is coded 0 otherwise.
- *SunniMuslim* is coded 1 if an individual identifies as Sunni Muslim and 0 otherwise.
- *Unemployed* is coded 1 if an individual is unemployed and 0 otherwise. Retired individuals and students were not coded as unemployed.
- *Female* is coded 1 if a respondent identifies as female and 0 otherwise.
- *UnionMember* is coded 1 if the respondent is currently a member of a union and 0 otherwise.
- *EthnicCulturalOrg* is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of a cultural association comprised mostly of members of his or her own ethnic group (and 0 otherwise).
- *EthnicPoliticalOrg* is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of a political organization comprised mostly of members of his or her own ethnic group (and 0 otherwise).



- *MulticulturalOrg* is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of a cultural association comprised of members of diverse ethnic groups (and 0 otherwise).
- *MulticulturalAdvocacy* is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of a political organization comprised of members of diverse ethnic groups (and 0 otherwise).
- *ReligiousOrg* is coded 1 if the respondent belongs to a church, mosque, Alevi *cemevi*, or other religious organization (and 0 otherwise).
- *SurveyMode* is coded 1 if the respondent answered the survey on paper rather than on a tablet or online.
- *BERN* is coded 1 if the respondent resides in the Canton of Bern and 0 otherwise.
- *AARGAU* is coded 1 if the respondent resides in the Canton of Aargau and 0 otherwise.

#### 4.7.4 Appendix Tables

Table 4.9 below shows the correlates of pan-immigrant linked fate, ethnic group linked fate, and Sunni Muslim linked fate.<sup>6</sup> All else equal, pan-immigrant linked fate is significantly correlated with beliefs that immigrants are underrepresented in politics but not with the belief that immigrants are worse off than natives. Ethnic group linked fate is also positively correlated with perceptions that one's group is worse off than natives. Finally, Sunni Muslim linked fate is positively correlated with perceptions that Muslims face greater obstacles to getting ahead in Switzerland than non-Muslims.

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<sup>6</sup>The low sample sizes in Table 4.9 reflect randomized assignment of relative deprivation questions.

**Table 4.8:** Paper Survey Respondents More Likely to Participate, Suggesting Low Social Desirability Bias

VARIABLES	(1) Probability of Participation
Paper Survey	0.831*** (0.249)
Swiss Citizenship	0.429 (0.271)
Years in Switzerland	0.0140 (0.0185)
Female	-0.675** (0.272)
Unemployed	0.441 (0.708)
Educational Attainment	0.0779** (0.0347)
Age	-0.00307 (0.0125)
Canton of Aargau	-0.293 (0.294)
Canton of Bern	-0.502 (0.361)
Constant	-0.781 (0.931)
Observations	284
Robust standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

**Table 4.9:** Limited Correlations between Linked Fate and Relative Deprivation, All Else Equal

VARIABLES	Pan- Immigrant Linked Fate	Ethnic Group Linked Fate	Sunni Muslim Linked Fate
Immigrants are Politically Underrepresented	0.294*** (0.0947)		
Immigrants are Economically Worse Off	-0.00172 (0.0843)		
Age	-0.0115* (0.00626)	-0.000758 (0.00998)	-0.0286 (0.0199)
Swiss Citizenship	-0.168 (0.328)	-0.227 (0.216)	0.0943 (0.119)
Canton of Bern	-1.256*** (0.362)	-0.134 (0.241)	2.644*** (0.492)
Educational Attainment (Years)	-0.00988 (0.0197)	0.00692 (0.0208)	-0.0876*** (0.0258)
Canton of Aargau	-0.995*** (0.319)	-0.327 (0.221)	0.633** (0.282)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	1.606*** (0.478)	-0.382 (0.457)	-0.180 (0.502)
Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	1.201** (0.447)	0.00575 (0.606)	-0.467 (0.394)
Identities as Kurdish and Turkish	0.968*** (0.343)	0.595 (0.486)	
Sunni Muslim	-0.0465 (0.786)	-0.454 (0.408)	
Unemployed	0.374* (0.185)	0.412** (0.183)	-0.716 (0.435)
Female	0.661*** (0.227)	0.278** (0.127)	0.182 (0.463)
Union Member	0.0225 (0.308)	-0.159 (0.144)	0.344 (0.334)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Association	0.0809	-0.141	-0.0832

**Table 4.9:** Limited Correlations between Linked Fate and Relative Deprivation, All Else Equal, Contd.

	(0.240)	(0.188)	(0.430)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Association	0.262	0.176	-0.123
	(0.249)	(0.289)	(0.251)
Member, Multi-Ethnic Cultural Association	-0.485*	-0.535	1.529**
	(0.237)	(0.369)	(0.664)
Member, Multi-Ethnic Political Association	0.622*	0.477*	-0.181
	(0.328)	(0.262)	(0.260)
Member, Religious Association	0.118	0.161	0.0702
	(0.363)	(0.189)	(0.292)
Ethnic group members economically worse off		0.191**	
		(0.0761)	
Years in Switzerland		0.00325	-0.00421
		(0.0115)	(0.0172)
		(0.514)	(0.517)
Muslims face more obstacles than Non-Muslims			0.326**
			(0.111)
Constant	-0.960	-0.464	2.032**
	(0.859)	(0.979)	(0.911)
Observations	71	124	61
R-squared	0.666	0.296	0.558

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Chapter 5**

# **Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate and Political Participation**

### **5.1 Introduction**

In Chapter 2, I argued that linked fate might increase immigrants' likelihood of political participation in their host countries by increasing their efficacy and spurring their mobilization by other members of their social groups. Further, while I expected this positive relationship to hold across both liberal and closed integration policy contexts, I hypothesized that linked fate will have a stronger effect on participation in polities that promote interactions between immigrants and provide frequent opportunities for political participation. Finally, I argued that linked fate might correlate most strongly with individuals' likelihood of participation when individuals perceive a sense of emotional attachment to their groups, inspiring a sense of mutual responsibility and obligation.

Over the next two chapters, I test these hypotheses among Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants in Switzerland. Specifically, I assess whether linked fate contributes to our understanding of immigrants' non-electoral political participation—namely, their participation in petitions, protests, boycotts, and volunteer activities—upon accounting for differences in their demographic characteristics and the integration contexts in which they reside. Most importantly, I examine whether

immigrants' probability of participation correlates with linked fate upon controlling for the strength of their identities. By doing so, I gauge whether linked fate adds purchase to the existing literature, which to date stresses that identification leads immigrants to participate in politics in order to increase their self-esteem. I consider three forms of linked fate—pan-immigrant linked fate, ethnic group linked fate, and linked fate among Muslim immigrants.

In this chapter, I concentrate on pan-immigrant linked fate, individuals' sense that they are politically and economically connected to other immigrants. This chapter is divided into three sections. First, I briefly review existing theories of immigrant participation, with an eye towards building a model to estimate its correlation with linked fate. I also provide descriptive statistics of participation as well as the key independent and control variables in this study. Next, I estimate several regression models and find that pan-immigrant linked fate positively and significantly correlates with political participation. These findings hold across all cantons and immigrant groups, suggesting that linked fate's positive relationship with political incorporation is robust to differences in integration policy context. Finally, I analyze the mechanisms connecting linked fate and participation. I find evidence that linked fate may increase individuals' likelihood of mobilization by other group members, increasing political participation. I also find that linked fate may increase internal efficacy – immigrants' sense that they understand how to participate in politics.

Furthermore, I consider whether linked fate may explain immigrants' political participation to a greater degree than many existing accounts relating immigrants' group identification to political participation in Europe—namely, accounts emphasizing self-esteem. More specifically, I gauge whether linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for individuals' degree of identification with other immigrants. My results are robust to this specification, suggesting that the concept of linked fate contributes to existing accounts linking identity and participation. Additionally, I find little evidence that group identification facilitates immigrants' political participation by increasing the threat of in-group sanctions.

## 5.1.1 Potential Covariates of Participation

### Overview

Over the next two chapters, my principal goal is to assess whether the concept of linked fate furthers our understanding of immigrants' decisions to participate in politics. Specifically, I will test the hypotheses in Table 5.1 below.

**Table 5.1:** Summary of Hypotheses

	<b>Hypothesis</b>
<b>H1</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants' likelihood of non-electoral participation.</i>
<b>H2</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization by other group members or supporters.</i>
<b>H3</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' sense of internal and external efficacy.</i>
<b>H4</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.</i>
<b>H5</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.</i>
<b>H6</b>	<i>Linked fate's effect on participation will be greatest when it is based on affective identities that foster a sense of emotional connection with other group members.</i>

To determine whether the linked fate concept contributes to our understanding of immigrants' political participation, it is important to examine whether any correlation between these variable is observable after accounting for factors such as immigrants' demographic characteristics, involvement in civic organizations, and local integration policies. In order to estimate the strength and direction of any correlation in as unbiased a manner as possible, also, it is critical to account

for factors that might influence both individuals' perceptions of linked fate and probability of participation. Without accounting for such variables, any observed correlation between linked fate and participation may be an artifact of omitted variables. Put differently, controlling for confounds will lead to a less biased estimation of the direction and strength of any observed correlation.

In this section, I will briefly survey potential covariates of individuals' probability of participation and linked fate, with an eye towards building a model permitting an accurate estimation of any relationship between these variables. In order to assess whether linked fate strengthens our understanding of immigrants' political participation, such model should include other potential covariates. In particular, it is necessary to control for individuals' memberships in civic organizations, their tenure in Switzerland, their naturalization status, their educational attainment, their pre-immigration socialization experiences, and differences in the integration policy contexts in which they reside. Importantly, many of these variables may also be associated with individuals' degree of linked fate. Their inclusion will thus decrease bias when I estimate the correlation between participation and linked fate.

I will now discuss potential controls in turn. First, membership in civic organizations, and especially in immigrant organizations, may increase individuals' understanding of how to participate in politics, or increase their social trust, spurring political engagement (Berger, Galonska and Koopmans 2004; Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn 2007; Verba and Nie 1972; Wong 2006). When modeling the correlation between participation and linked fate, it is thus critical to control for organizational membership. This will allow me to gauge whether any observed correlation is robust to differences in individuals' participation in civic organizations. Importantly, also, such memberships may foster the development of linked fate by exposing individuals to the political ideas and concerns of other group members (Barreto, Masuoka and Sánchez 2008; Dawson 1994). In order to determine whether any observed correlation between participation and linked fate is simply an artifact of such memberships, then, it is necessary to control for them.

Second, as immigrants spend more time in their host countries, they might also learn how



to effectively participate in local politics (González-Ferrer 2011; Jones-Correa 2001; Messina and Lahav 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Tam Cho 1999; Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1989). Further, over time, immigrants may become more aware of their social position relative to that of natives, increasing their linked fate. Accordingly, controlling for time in country will permit me to gauge whether any observed correlation between participation and linked fate is simply an artifact of immigrants' integration into Swiss society over time. Along a similar vein, older immigrants may have arrived earlier, developed a greater sense of linked fate, and learned how to participate in local politics (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). For these reasons, it is also important to control for age and time spent in Switzerland.

Third, naturalized immigrants participate more in politics than non-naturalized immigrants (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017). Namely, citizenship enfranchises immigrants and gives them incentives to voice their grievances (Bevelander and Spang 2014; Bevelander and Pendakur 2011; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015; Just and Anderson 2012). Naturalization may also increase immigrants' sense of belonging, leading to greater civic engagement and interaction with natives which could boost their political engagement (Aptekar 2015; Bauböck et al. 2013; Bevelander 2011; Kesler and Demireva 2011). Insofar as naturalization grants immigrants the right to vote and run for office, naturalized immigrants may possess fewer grievances than long-term residents who possess limited political rights, perhaps lowering their linked fate. This might be particularly likely in Switzerland, where naturalization requirements are strict and where many issues of concern to immigrants, such as family reunification policies and second- and third-generation immigrants' rights to birthright citizenship, are subject to popular referenda. Controlling for naturalization at the individual level, then, will enable me to gauge whether any correlation between linked fate and participation is an artifact of individuals' naturalization status.

Next, individuals' educational attainment may influence their level of political engagement. Educated immigrants may possess a superior understanding of politics to others, catalyzing their political engagement (Jones-Correa 1998; Portes and Bach 1985; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). High-skilled, highly-educated

immigrants may possess fewer economic grievances than others, perhaps limiting their linked fate perceptions (Berry and Blondel 1982). Alternatively, they may also have a greater understanding of how policies influence their social groups, leading to a positive correlation between education and linked fate (Sánchez and Masuoka 2010). Controlling for respondents' educational attainment will thus lead to less biased model estimates.

Moreover, immigrants' political socialization prior to immigration may influence both their political participation and linked fate. Indeed, beliefs and attitudes developed in immigrants' homelands can carry over their host countries upon immigrating (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Immigrants' home country experiences can facilitate the development of political interests, heightening their degree of psychological involvement with politics and predisposing them to seek further political information. Host country socialization, further, may help immigrants to understand when their personal interests are served by political involvement, facilitating their political incorporation into receiving countries (Black 1987). Kurdish immigrants' political experiences in Turkey, for example, may condition their broader attitudes about the effectiveness and importance of political participation in Switzerland. Indeed, one interviewee, a Kurdish lawyer in Neuchâtel, noted that many Kurds have been conditioned by their experiences in Turkey to believe in the "power of the vote."

Immigrants who perceived linked fate vis-à-vis the politics of their homelands—notably, individuals who were religious and ethnic minorities at home—may also be particularly likely to perceive linked fate upon immigrating. In particular, migrants who experienced relative deprivation in their homelands may be particularly cognizant of, or sensitive to, discriminatory treatment in their countries of immigration (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). In this study, it is possible that Kurds could possess greater linked fate than other groups given the struggles they faced in Turkey. In the analysis that follows, I will thus assume that individuals' ethnic groups proxy their group-level pre-immigration socialization experiences. My analyses will thus include a set of dummy variables reflecting individuals' ethnic identification. Including these will enable me to assess whether any correlation between linked fate and participation results directly from individuals' group-level socialization processes.

Individuals' socializing experiences may also condition whether linked fate leads them to engage in politics. Again, their homeland experiences may affect their sense of when their political involvement advances their personal interests. Immigrants that are predisposed to address grievances through political action may be particularly likely to seek political information and discuss politics when they perceive linked fate. To this effect, I will consider whether group socialization and linked fate have an interactive effect on individuals' political participation. More concretely, I will estimate a model including an interaction between linked fate and dummy variables representing individuals' ethnic identity.

It is also important to note that acquiring political information may be easier for Italian-born immigrants than for Turkish-born immigrants. While most political information in Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel is only available in German and French, Italian immigrants might have access to TV programming and newspapers from Ticino, Switzerland's Italian-speaking canton. While these sources possess little information about how to participate in politics outside of Ticino (i.e. most information about local political meetings and events is in local languages), they might inform immigrants of political developments at the Swiss federal level. Relatively speaking, immigrants from Turkey have access to few Turkish-language sources covering Swiss politics, although several Turkish-language newsletters exist. Broadly, the costs of accessing information about Swiss politics might be higher for Turkish-born immigrants than for Italian-born immigrants. Correspondingly, it is important to control for ethnicity since ethnicity might influence individuals' likelihood of participation directly by conditioning their access to information about Swiss politics.

Finally, integration policy contexts may shape both immigrants' opportunities to engage in politics and their perceptions of linked fate (Koopmans et al. 2005). Policies granting immigrants local voting rights, and relatively relaxed naturalization policies, confer legitimacy upon immigrants' political claims insofar as immigrants are officially regarded as potential voters and "members" of society. They might participate more in non-electoral politics than others, in part because political parties and organizations have greater incentives to mobilize them (Erie 1988; Harles 1993). Furthermore, immigrants living in polities with relatively liberal integration and naturalization

policies may perceive fewer grievances than others, potentially leading to lower linked fate (Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). Put more concretely, in Aargau, the most restrictive canton in my sample, immigrants may possess more grievances than residents of liberal cantons like Neuchâtel. At the same time, many lack the right to voice their grievances formally in the political arena. As a result, in order to estimate the correlation between linked fate and participation as accurately as possible, accounting for differences in integration context is vital.

Integration policies may condition the effects of individuals' linked fate on participation. Some polities, such as the Canton of Neuchâtel, provide immigrant organizations with ample funding and sponsor integration classes and discussion groups providing immigrants with regular opportunities to meet and socialize. Some governments also subsidize or organize political or anti-racism discussion groups for immigrants, encouraging them to interact. In such polities, immigrants possessing linked fate will have opportunities to share political information. Such policies may thus spur the political engagement of immigrants perceiving linked fate. In the Swiss case, I thus expect that linked fate may increase political participation more frequently in Neuchâtel than in Aargau and Bern, where immigrants have fewer officially-sanctioned opportunities to discuss politics. With this in mind, my model will include an interaction term, enabling me to gauge whether any correlation between participation and linked fate is conditioned by cantonal policies.

Importantly, the literature also suggests that residence in ethnic neighborhoods may be an important confound. Ethnic or immigrant neighborhoods frequently host immigrant cultural associations, restaurants, and even media outlets. Immigrants' residential concentration may increase the frequency of individuals' interactions with other group members and facilitate the flow of political information within immigrant communities (Demo and Hughes 1990; Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Sánchez and Morin 2011). As a result, residence in ethnic neighborhoods may increase immigrants' perceptions of relative deprivation, inspiring linked fate (Maxwell 2010). At the same time, geographic concentration may facilitate immigrants' political participation by enhancing their access to information about host country politics.

Importantly, however, few ethnic neighborhoods exist in Switzerland. Turks and Kurds are

clustered in certain regions of Switzerland, but within those regions they do not frequently live in highly concentrated ethnic neighborhoods such as Kreuzberg in Berlin. Italians are scattered throughout Switzerland and reside in a diverse array of communities. When ethnic neighborhoods exist, they tend to be “immigrant neighborhoods” inhabited by residents of highly diverse backgrounds, including many Swiss people (Wilpert and Gitmez 1987). For example, as of 2006, the Bümpliz neighborhood of Bern, where many of Bern’s immigrants live and the most immigrant-heavy neighborhood in this study, was roughly 30 percent foreign-born (including individuals from the Balkans, Portugal, Turkey, Africa, and Asia) and 70 percent Swiss-born (Statistics Bern 2008). For this reason, it is not necessary that I explicitly account for residence in ethnic neighborhoods in subsequent analyses, although I will do so as a robustness check.

Finally, the ethnicity and religion of my interviewers may have biased participants’ responses, particularly among the Turkish-born sample. Co-ethnicity and co-religiosity between interviewers and interviewees may bias responses to questions about ethnic identification, ethnic relative deprivation, and linked fate, particularly when their shared identity is politically salient (Adida et al. 2016). Respondents interviewed by non-co-ethnics or non-co-religionists may be more likely than others to give socially desirable responses. Further, they might be more suspicious and more reluctant to answer controversial questions. To limit potential bias arising from the ethnicity and religious affiliation of my interviewers, then, it is vital to control for interviewer effects in my models.

## **Results from Interviews and Focus Groups**

Prior to conducting my survey, I asked immigrants about their political participation through 25 semi-structured interviews and four focus groups.<sup>1</sup> Participants were volunteers recruited with

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<sup>1</sup>Focus groups consisted of about 10 participants each. I held focus groups in November 2015, two comprising Italian immigrants and 2 comprising immigrants from Turkey in the cantons of Neuchâtel and Bern. Participants were compensated.

the assistance of local integration offices and the University of Neuchâtel. These meetings provided further insight into immigrants' reasons for participation, or for abstention from participation, in Swiss politics.

Immigrants provided a number of reasons for non-participation. First, some immigrants mentioned that they found the Swiss political system to be confusing and difficult to understand. Some immigrants in Bern and Aargau also stressed that they had a difficult time following political news and debates in German. The experiences of one Turkish-born woman highlight some challenges that many immigrants face:

*“I became interested in politics when I realized that I wanted to have a political presence here and not just work. This implied acquiring information about Switzerland and making contacts with Swiss organizations and associations, which takes a long time to achieve.”* –Fatma (from Kaya and Baglioni, 2008).

Broadly, these claims are consistent with existing findings that political participation may increase as immigrants spend more time in their host countries. Second, a number of individuals from both countries expressed that they would like to participate more but feel like their participation does not matter as they cannot vote in Switzerland. Several also said that they do not pay much attention to Swiss politics as they feel like they are shut out. Such sentiments were particularly widespread among participants in my focus groups in Bern and among individuals I surveyed in Aargau. This was not surprising, given that these cantons offer immigrants relatively few political rights. This finding is consistent with the notion that closed political opportunity structures may militate against immigrants' participation.

Third, a number of interviews with Turkish-born immigrants suggested that, although many Muslims have strong opinion on issues concerning Islam in Switzerland, many are reluctant to engage directly in politics. One man, a small business owner in his 50s, noted that friends and colleagues were afraid to participate as they perceived that doing so would make them seem “too extreme” and invite disfavor from the local communities. Further, despite disagreeing with the minaret ban, some moderate Muslims and members of Turkish state-sponsored mosques were concerned that openly protesting against the ban would lead others to associate them with conservative

mosques or movements that support a greater fusion of religion and the state, particularly in Turkey. Consequently, fears of stigmatization, both from Swiss people and within their own immigrant religious communities, may deter Muslim immigrants from engaging with Swiss politics even when they desire to do so. It is thus possible that non-electoral participation may be lower among Muslims than non-Muslims on average. Thus, it is important to control for Muslim identification while modeling the drivers of immigrant participation.

## **Discussion**

In my subsequent analysis of the relationship between linked fate and immigrants' participation in Swiss politics, then, it is critical that I include these variables as covariates. That is, to appropriately assess whether linked fate may have an effect on participation beyond that of variables discussed in the extant literature, it is important to control for as many potential confounds as possible. Further, by accounting for immigrants' organizational memberships, educational attainment, citizenship, integration context, ethnic identification, and time in Switzerland, I assure that any observed relationship is not simply an artifact of these variables.

It is important to note that this list of potential confounds is not exhaustive. Indeed, in this analysis, it may be necessary to omit confounds that are correlated both with linked fate and participation. Many psychological covariates of linked fate and political participation may be difficult, if not impossible to quantify. For example, past experiences and group narratives can shape perceptions of linked fate (Dawson 1994). Along this vein, also, Rothstein, Aleinikoff, Rumbaut, and others have suggested that collective memories form the basis of group solidarity and group interests (Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998; Rothstein 2000). Italian immigrants in Switzerland, for example, regularly organize popular lectures, documentary film screenings, and museum exhibitions highlighting the difficulties Italian immigrants faced in the past. Many Italian participants in my interviews and focus groups also stressed how Italians have been instrumental in securing rights for immigrants in Switzerland. Such narratives may be influential in shaping the attitudes of newer Italian immigrants and even second-generation Italians towards political engagement.

That said, collective memories and past socialization may also drive political participation through psychological avenues other than linked fate—perhaps by shaping individuals’ understanding of what constitutes persecution and when political action is an effective way to address grievances.

To achieve causal inference in this analysis, I would need to quantitatively account for all confounds. However, the complex interplay of personal experiences and psychological predispositions that underlie linked fate may be very difficult to capture in surveys such as the one employed here. Consequently, the results of my analysis should be thought of as suggestive rather than definitive.

## **5.2 Descriptive Statistics: Covariates of Participation**

I will now provide some basic statistics on the populations in my sample. In total, I conducted 613 surveys across the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. Thirty percent of surveys were conducted in Bern (181), 32 percent in Neuchâtel (196), and 38 percent in Aargau (236). In total, 313 respondents were born in Turkey and 300 born in Italy. About 100 individuals from each birth country were sampled in each canton.

On average, 35 percent of the sample consisted of women. The average age of the sample was 53.7 years old. Respondents, on average, completed about 10 years of schooling (partial completion of high school). About 8 percent of the sample was unemployed and seeking employment. About 44 percent of respondents identified as Catholic, 26 percent as Sunni Muslim, and 14 percent as Alevi.<sup>2</sup>

In the Italian sample, approximately 37 percent of respondents were female. Ninety-one percent of those surveyed identified as Roman Catholic. 22 individuals identified as non-religious,

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<sup>2</sup>Many venues were male-dominated, and a disproportionate number of women refused to take the survey. Furthermore, relatively few young people were present at many venues – particularly Italian venues. Although there are slightly more immigrant men than women in the population, the sample is not ultimately representative of underlying communities in terms of gender and age.



agnostic, or atheist. On average, respondents were 63 years old and possessed 10 years of education. Approximately 3 percent of the Italian sample was unemployed and seeking employment. About 54 percent of Italians sampled were retired (see Table 5.2). Many respondents were members of Italian cultural organizations but relatively few belonged to political organizations or multi-ethnic organizations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Italians sampled were from many different regions of Italy, but the far South (Sicily, Abruzzo) and the far north (Lombardy) are particularly well-represented.

**Table 5.2:** Descriptive Statistics, Italian-Born Sample

<b>Sample from Italy</b>	<b>Sample</b>
	<b>Percent (Standard Deviation)</b>
Roman Catholic	90.7
Female	37.3
Unemployment Rate	3
Naturalized Citizen (Percent)	34
Age	63 Years (15.6 Years)
Educational Attainment (Years)	10.1 Years (5.1 Years)
Median Year of Arrival in Switzerland	1968 (16.8 Years)
Member, Italian Cultural Org.	42.2
Member, Italian Political Org.	8.4
Member, Multiethnic Cultural Org.	7.7
Member, Multiethnic Political Org.	17.4
Member, Religious Org.	21.6

Of the Turkish-born sample, 32 percent were female. Thirty-two percent identified only as Kurdish and 42 percent identified uniquely as Turkish, with the remainder identifying as both, neither, or abstaining from response. About 50 percent of the Turkish-born sample identified as Sunni Muslim and 27 percent identified as Alevi. 58 respondents saw themselves as non-religious, agnostic, or atheist. On average, respondents were 44 years old and possessed 10 years of education. Almost 12 percent were unemployed and seeking employment, and about 1 percent were retired (See Table 5.3). Like Italians, many immigrants from Turkey belonged to Turkish or Kurdish organizations but few belonged to multi-ethnic organizations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of Turkish-born migrants in the sample originated in the Turkish cities of Kahramanmaraş,

Tunceli/Dersim, Bayburt, Antalya, and Çorum.


**Table 5.3:** Descriptive Statistics, Turkish-Born Sample

<b>Sample from Turkey</b>	<b>Sample</b>
	<b>Percent (Standard Deviation)</b>
Summi Muslim	50
Kurdish	32.4
Alevi	26.8
Female	31.8
Unemployment Rate	11.8
Naturalized Citizen (Percent)	38.5
Age	44.8 Years (10.5 Years)
Educational Attainment (Years)	10.3 Years (4.5 Years)
Median Year of Arrival in Switzerland	1995 (10.7 Years)
Member, Ethnic Cultural Org.	49.8
Member, Ethnic Political Org.	18.5
Member, Multiethnic Cultural Org.	8
Member, Multiethnic Political Org.	16.3
Member, Religious Org.	30.3

### **5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics: Political Participation across the Sample**

Before proceeding, it is necessary to reiterate how I operationalize political participation in this analysis as well as provide an overview of participation patterns in my sample. This dissertation focuses on immigrants' non-voting participation, namely, signing petitions, participation in boycotts, participating in demonstrations, political volunteering, attending public political meetings, contacting politicians, and donating to political causes.


Figure 5.1 below suggests a significant amount of diversity in the number of these items respondents have undertaken. The modal respondent has not participated in any of the above-listed activities, although many participate in one or two of them. Further, looking at specific immigrant groups, a higher proportion of Kurds seem to participate in more than 2 political activities with respect to Turks and Italians. Across the entire sample, relatively few individuals participated in more than 5 activities.



**Figure 5.1:** Political Participation (Count) by Group

As my hypotheses concern individuals’ probability of engaging in these activities, I create a dichotomous ‘dummy’ variable reflecting whether or not individuals have participated in host country politics within the last 12 months. Here, all respondents who participated in at least one of these activities are coded as having participated and assigned a value of “1.” Those who did not participate in any activities are assigned a value of “0.”

I also asked respondents to self-report their level of interest in Swiss politics. Forty-one percent of Italians, 29.7 percent of those identifying uniquely as Kurdish, and 21.2 percent of those identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish reported that they were very interested or quite interested in Swiss politics. In contrast, 42.4 percent of Italians, 30.4 percent of those identifying uniquely as Kurdish, and 44.8 percent of those identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish reported that they were not very interested or not at all interested in Swiss politics. This suggests that levels of interest in Swiss politics vary substantially across and within groups.



**Figure 5.2:** Interest in Swiss Politics

Interview and focus group participants also reported many reasons for participation in Swiss politics—both related and unrelated to immigration and integration policies. Some immigrants from both Italy and Turkey reported lobbying against referenda that would tighten immigration policies as well as advocating for the expansion immigrants’ political rights. Kurdish groups in Bern also organized information sessions and political meetings related to Switzerland’s asylum laws, particularly as pertaining to Syrian asylum seekers. A number of Kurdish immigrants also noted that they had lobbied the Swiss government to pressure Turkey on Kurdish issues.

Looking beyond participation related to immigration, some Italian immigrants in Neuchâtel reported signing petitions and referenda in recent years calling for greater environmental protections. Several Italian and Kurdish immigrants in Bern had attended public meetings concerning local zoning and construction rules. Several parents from both countries expressed that they participate because they are concerned about their children’s education. Finally, in La Chaux-de-Fonds, Neuchâtel, where non-citizens are permitted to run for local office, Turkish and Kurdish groups organized several question and answer sessions with Turkish and Kurdish candidates for local government positions.

One Turkish migrant in Neuchâtel expressed that “interest among immigrants is highest

when money is concerned.” Consistently with this remark, many immigrants I interacted with in 2016 reported participating in events related to Swiss tax laws. Italian organizations in all three study cantons organized numerous well-attended public forums pertaining to a new taxation treaty affecting Italians living in Switzerland who retained or inherited property in Italy. Likewise, immigrants from Turkey in Bern organized information sessions and discussion groups concerning Swiss tax policies as well as pensions for non-citizens. In a related manner, many immigrants from Turkey and Italy in La Chaux-de-Fonds, Neuchâtel, organized and attended public discussions related to a new European tax law, signed by Switzerland, that entered into effect in January 2017.

It is important to note, then, that this participation index reflects an array of substantive political concerns. Although some immigrants lobby actively to secure greater rights for immigrants, many more undertake activities related to issues that directly affect their families and their local communities.


## **5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate**

I will now examine respondents’ perceptions of pan-immigrant linked fate, the main independent variable in this study. In order to test whether linked fate correlates with political participation, it is vital both that a significant number of respondents perceive linked fate and that there is enough diversity in individuals’ responses to permit inference.

First, I will consider pan-immigrant linked fate.<sup>3</sup> Given that the linked fate index created above is standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, I will first create a histogram of responses and then discuss responses to the individual questions comprising the index. A histogram plotting the frequency of standardized responses is visible in Figure 5.3 below.

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<sup>3</sup>The linked fate index is standardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation at 1. To gauge how many immigrants perceive linked fate, it is thus more straightforward to look directly at responses to the questions used to calculate the linked fate indexes.



**Figure 5.3:** Histogram, Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

This graph suggests that many responses might be clustered at the highest measured level of linked fate. This could suggest acquiescence bias, meaning that individuals were likely to answer all linked fate questions affirmatively. I will address this possibility later in this chapter. That said, the index reflects significant diversity across individual responses.

Turning to the individual questions comprising the index, 68.7 percent of respondents perceive that immigrant status implies shared political interests. Further, 75.2 percent would be optimistic about their life chances with more immigrants in power in Switzerland. Finally, 74.6 percent worry about their life chances when immigrants are construed as economic threats. Broadly, these numbers suggest that perceptions of linked fate within the sample are likely common enough and diverse enough to permit analysis.

Looking at responses by origin groups, 62.6 percent of Italians, 77.3 percent of Kurds, and 72.3 percent of those identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish perceive that immigrant status implies shared political interests (either somewhat or strongly agreeing with Q2). Further, 73.7 percent of Italians in the study, 83.9 percent of Kurds, and 72.8 percent of those identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish would feel more optimistic about their life chances with more immigrants in power in Switzerland (Q3). About 63.3 percent of Italians, 93.9 percent of Kurds, and 80.4 percent of those identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish worry about their life

chances when immigrants are construed as economic threats (Q4). Broadly, these numbers suggest that Italians perceive a lesser degree of pan-immigrant linked fate than Turks, who themselves perceive a lesser degree of pan-immigrant linked fate than Kurds.

These numbers are not altogether surprising. During fieldwork, many Italian immigrants and some Turkish former guest-workers emphasized their distinctiveness from newer immigrants who came to Switzerland for social benefits. Many Italians in particular noted that they had led the movement fighting for workers' rights and fair treatment of immigrants, and that newer immigrants had reaped the rewards of their efforts. A number of Italians in Biel-Bienne, Bern, and La Chaux-de-Fonds also argued that new waves of non-European immigrants have very different religions and cultures that they do not understand or identify with (particularly Muslim immigrants). They argued broadly that "old" immigrants from Spain, Portugal, and Italy brought with them Christian values and European traditions while recent migrants are very "foreign."

Many former guestworkers also sought to distinguish themselves from recent waves of refugees and asylum seekers. Several Turkish men at a mosque in Wohlen, Switzerland, for example, insisted that they were not immigrants—they were "guestworkers." They argued that the term immigrant is derogatory because it suggests that they came to Switzerland to steal rather than to work. An Italian man in Biel-Bienne was similarly insistent, arguing that he had come as a guest worker and not for social welfare.

Kurdish respondents spoke little about other immigrants explicitly, but those that did expressed solidarity with new waves of immigrants, particularly asylum seekers and refugees from Syria and Iraq (many of whom are also Kurdish). Many Kurdish organizations in Bern and Neuchâtel professed solidarity with new asylum seekers and refugees, and during my multiple fieldwork sessions at the Kurdish community center in Bern I met several recently-arrived Syrian Kurds receiving integration advice from settled Kurds from Turkey.

Broadly, then, my survey suggests that some members of each ethnic group perceive pan-immigrant linked fate, although perceptions are strongest among Kurds and Turks who arrived in Switzerland as political asylees.

### 5.2.3 Conditional Probability of Political Participation at Different Levels of Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

Prior to modeling the correlation between individuals' likelihood of political participation and linked fate, I calculate the probability that individuals will participate in Swiss politics, as measured by the index above, at two distributions above and below mean levels of pan-immigrant linked fate. Table 5.4 below shows that the probability of participation rises as pan-immigrant linked fate increases. This suggests a positive and significant baseline correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and individuals' probability of participation. In subsequent sections, I will gauge whether a positive correlation is evident upon controlling for other potential covariates of participation.

**Table 5.4:** Conditional Probabilities, Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate and Political Participation

Standard Deviations	Political Participation	Standard Error	95 Percent Confidence Interval	
-2	0.43	0.09	0.26	0.60
-1	0.53	0.06	0.42	0.64
Mean	0.62	0.04	0.55	0.70
1	0.71	0.05	0.61	0.80
2	0.78	0.06	0.66	0.91

## 5.3 Results

### 5.3.1 Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

In the sections that follow, I will estimate a series of regression models to examine the relationship between linked fate and host-country political participation. To reiterate, I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate will correlate positively and significantly with immigrants' likelihood of participation, regardless of their ethnicity, associational memberships, or canton of residence.

I will begin by testing Hypothesis 1. Specifically, I examine whether individuals' degree of pan-immigrant linked fate correlates significantly with their probability of participating in any of the



non-electoral political behaviors described in the previous chapter. Again, my dependent variable is a dichotomous index representing whether immigrants participated in any of 8 non-electoral activities related to Swiss politics in the 12 months preceding the survey.

Any effort to measure the correlation between linked fate and participation may be biased if I do not control for the potential confounds listed above. With that in mind, I develop a baseline regression model that will enable me to gauge the robustness of this relationship to the addition of additional controls.

### The Baseline Model

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Probability of Participation} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{LinkedFate} + \beta_2 \text{SwissCitizen} \\
 & + \beta_3 \text{Years in Switzerland} + \beta_4 \text{Age} + \beta_5 \text{Education} + \beta_6 \text{Kurd Only} \\
 & + \beta_7 \text{Turk Only} + \beta_8 \text{Turkish Other} + \beta_9 \text{Sunni Muslim} \\
 & + \beta_{10} \text{Unemployed} + \beta_{11} \text{Female} + \beta_{12} \text{Union Member} \\
 & + \beta_{13} \text{Ethnic Cultural Org Member} + \beta_{14} \text{Ethnic Political Org Member} \\
 & + \beta_{15} \text{Multicultural Org Member} + \beta_{16} \text{Multicultural Advocacy} \\
 & + \beta_{17} \text{Religious Org Member} + \beta_{18} \text{Survey Mode} + \beta_{19} \text{Bern} \\
 & + \beta_{20} \text{Aargau} \\
 & + \beta_{21 \dots k} + \begin{pmatrix} i_1 \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \\ i_k \end{pmatrix} + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}$$

Where  $i_1 \dots i_k$  represents a column vector of interviewer dummy variables.

### Note

Importantly, unless otherwise noted, all models in this chapter and Chapter 6 include every control listed in this model, including dummy variables. Likewise, unless otherwise noted, Italians serve as the ethnic reference category and Neuchâtel serves as the reference canton in all regressions. Dummy variables are included for all interviewers; online respondents represent the reference

category. For the dummy variable indicating whether individuals completed the survey on paper or via tablet, the reference category includes those individuals who responded online. Additionally, all models in this dissertation cluster standard errors by survey venue unless otherwise noted.

### **Modeling the Relationship between Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate and Participation**

Employing a logistic regression model without any controls, I find that pan-immigrant linked fate is positively and significantly correlated with individuals' probability of participation (Table 5.5 Column 1). This is consistent with Table 5.4 above. This result is visible in the first column of Figure 5.4 below.

I next estimate three additional logistic regression models, setting the political participation dummy as the dependent variable.<sup>4</sup> All three models include canton fixed effects. The first of these 3 models, column 2 in Table 5.5, controls only for respondents' ethnicity, gender, and canton of residence. The second model, column 3 in Table 5.5, includes a full battery of control variables including citizenship status, years in Switzerland, age, religion, gender, education, and organizational membership (unions, immigrant organizations, multicultural organizations, immigrant and other political organizations). These variables reflect potential confounds, described above, that might bias estimation of the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation (my coding scheme is discussed in the Appendix of chapter 4).

The third model, column 4 in Table 5.5, includes all of these controls as well as a battery of interviewer dummy variables and a variable indicating those surveys completed on paper rather than using a tablet. In all three models, I cluster standard errors by venue to account for variation within sampling locales. This accounts for correlations in individual-level errors at each venue. I use Italians in the canton of Neuchâtel as a baseline for interpretation of dummy variables.

The results of these models suggest that the standardized pan-immigrant linked fate is

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<sup>4</sup>As a robustness check, I also estimate the models using an additive index of participation as a dependent variable. This is displayed in Table 1 in the Appendix.

**Table 5.5:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate Correlates Positively with Prob. of Participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	DV	DV	DV	DV
		Prob. of Participation	Prob. of Participation	Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.389** (0.161)	0.361* (0.191)	0.505** (0.199)	0.555** (0.225)
Educational Attainment (Years)			0.158** (0.0684)	0.0882 (0.111)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish		0.546 (0.536)	2.677** (1.205)	3.517 (2.401)
Sunni Muslim			-2.233** (0.966)	-1.239 (1.006)
Member, Union			1.498* (0.772)	0.588 (0.875)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.			1.957*** (0.620)	1.945*** (0.691)
Member, Religious Organization			1.278* (0.674)	1.304 (1.163)
Canton of Bern		-0.379 (0.626)	-1.294* (0.668)	-2.175* (1.133)
Constant	0.501*** (0.161)	0.761** (0.326)	-4.682* (2.533)	-2.838 (4.264)
Observations	171	171	128	115
Pseudo-R2	0.0266	0.0568	0.321	0.388
Canton Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Only statistically significant variables are displayed. Interviewer dummy variables not shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

positively and significantly correlated with individuals' probability of political participation. Without adding controls, the statistical power of a simple regression of participation on pan-immigrant linked fate is about 0.8, suggesting that the sample size is sufficient to detect significant effects. Further, this correlation is robust to the addition of demographic variables and canton and interviewer dummies. This suggests that the correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and political participation may not be simply an artifact of model specification.


Given my concern that the ethnicity of interviewers may bias results, I will focus on Model 3 for analysis. A comparison of Akaike Information Criteria for the three models also suggests that Model 3 may be a stronger predictor of population parameters than the other models.<sup>5</sup> To gauge whether the relationship between the log odds of participation and the independent variables is linear, I test for specification error using a 'link test.' Its results suggest that a logistic model is appropriate for this regression. Further, a Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test yields a chi-squared statistic of 0.7, suggesting that the model fits the data well.

Looking at the regression table above, it appears that the standardized linked fate index—measuring the degree to which respondents perceive linked fate with other immigrants regardless of their origins—has a positive correlation with political participation upon controlling for immigrants' demographic characteristics, group memberships, cantons of residence, and interviewer effects. This effect is significant at the 95 percent level. The results from the regression including canton effects suggest that a one standard deviation increase in linked fate increases an individual's odds of participating in Swiss politics by 74 percent, holding all other variables constant. Figure 5.9 below shows the predicted probabilities of political participation at levels of linked fate one and two standard deviations above and below the mean (all other variables are held constant at their means). There is little overlap between the 95 percent confidence intervals of prediction at lower and higher standard deviations of pan-immigrant linked fate, suggesting a positive correlation between linked

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<sup>5</sup>The Akaike Information Criterion is a statistic that is used to judge the relative quality and fit of models for a given sample. Model 3 minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion in this case.

fate and participation. These findings support Hypothesis 1 above.



**Figure 5.4:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate is Positively Correlated with Individuals' Probability of Participation

Interestingly, few control variables are significant in this regression. This is not altogether surprising due to small sample sizes, but the results as they stand lend little support to conventional accounts of host country participation. Education and unemployment are not significantly correlated with participation as resource models of political participation would predict. Furthermore, one might expect that participation would be higher among those who are rooted in Switzerland—citizens and long-term residents. The results, however, do not support this notion. Even upon removing pan-immigrant linked fate from the model, these variables remain statistically non-significant. It is plausible that this lack of significance stems from my inclusion of organizational membership regressors in the model. Indeed, if relatively educated and rooted individuals are more likely to participate in organizations, the effects of variables such as education, unemployment, and length of residence may be reflected in the coefficients relating participation and organizational membership.

Along this vein, the results are consistent with previous findings that organizational involvement positively correlates with political participation (e.g., Fenemma and Tillie 1999). The results suggest that, even after accounting for pan-immigrant linked fate, the odds of participation are higher among members of ethnic cultural organizations than among non-members. Members of such

organizations may be particularly prone to mobilization by co-ethnics, or, as Fennema and Tillie suggest, membership may promote social trust (1999). Notably, this correlation is substantively stronger than the correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation.

Interestingly, upon removing pan-immigrant linked fate from the model, the results suggest that union membership and membership in ethnic political organization (90 percent significance) may be positively correlated with political engagement. This finding suggests that pan-immigrant linked fate may moderate the effect of participation in unions and ethnic political associations on political engagement. This is a reasonable finding—many Swiss unions possess ethnically diverse memberships, and it is possible that union involvement could induce sentiments of pan-immigrant linked fate. Likewise, involvement in political organizations might expose individuals to concerns shared broadly within the immigrant community (e.g., immigrants' lack of voting rights in much of Switzerland).

Strikingly, also, the results suggest that, upon removing pan-immigrant linked fate from the model, Turks and Kurds may be more likely to participate in Swiss politics than Italians. This suggests that Turkish and Kurdish participation, in particular, may be undergirded by pan-immigrant linked fate. This result is consistent with my earlier finding that Turks and Kurds may be more likely than Italians to perceive pan-immigrant linked fate.

Finally, it is interesting to note that, after removing pan-immigrant linked fate from the model, residents of Aargau and Bern appear to participate less in politics than residents of Neuchâtel. In the latter, long-term immigrant residents possess the right to vote and run for office. This finding is thus consistent with the political opportunity structures literature—immigrants appear to be more politically engaged where they possess more political opportunities (and perhaps where immigrant leaders and parties have an incentive to mobilize them) Koopmans et al. (2005). Upon controlling for pan-immigrant linked fate, the correlation between residence in Aargau and political participation remains negative but loses statistical significance. This suggests that pan-immigrant linked fate may moderate the negative effect of closed political opportunity structures and strict integration policy on participation.

Given that my regression relating the linked fate index to political participation is based on relatively few observations, I am concerned that the estimated coefficients may be biased upward (Long 1997). Logit models employ maximum likelihood estimation, which may produce biased estimates with small sample sizes.<sup>6</sup> To address this possibility, I re-estimate the above model using a rare events logit model that penalizes maximum likelihood estimates for small sample sizes. The new result, which is still significant at the 95 percent level, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in pan-immigrant linked fate increases an individual's odds of participation by roughly 45 percent (see appendix Table 5.18).

I next look at the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and specific types of political engagement (Table 5.6).<sup>7</sup> I estimate a logistic regression model of each form of participation included in the index on the pan-immigrant linked fate index and the same battery of control variables as in the previous regressions. I drop interviewer dummy variables as many are collinear with the participation dummies. I find that pan-immigrant linked fate is positively correlated with three forms of political participation.

First, it correlates positively with individuals' attendance at public hearings and discussions. A one-standard deviation increase in immigrant linked fate more than doubles the odds of attending a public hearing or discussion (significant at the 95 percent level). Pan-immigrant linked fate is also positively correlated with attendance at informational meetings about politics and contacting politicians, although these correlations is only significant at the 90 percent level.<sup>8</sup>

Interestingly, pan-immigrant linked fate appears to be negatively and significantly correlated with donating money to political campaigns. Although I was not able to ask about respondents'

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<sup>6</sup>I also estimated all models in this chapter using ordinary least squares in lieu of logistic regression and the significance of results does not change.

<sup>7</sup>Only 20-30 individuals undertook each form of participation out of the 150 or so included in this regression. As such, these results should be treated with a grain of salt due to the small sample size. Nonetheless, they provide some more specific insight into the effects of pan-immigrant linked fate on political participation.

<sup>8</sup>Hosmer-Lemeshow tests suggest a good fit (p-values of above 0.7) for the models of petitioning, volunteering, informational meeting attendance, and donations. The models fit all other variables poorly. Further research will be necessary to gauge why this is the case.

income in the survey, the U.S. literature suggests that low-income individuals may be more likely to perceive linked fate than their wealthier counterparts (Sánchez and Masuoka 2010). If this is the case in Switzerland, then immigrants perceiving linked fate may have limited money to donate, resulting in this negative correlation.

Given that only 20 to 30 individuals undertook each form of participation out of the 150 or so included in these regression, maximum likelihood may lead to biased estimates here. To account for this possibility, I repeat these regressions using a Firth rare events logit model which penalizes maximum likelihood for small sample size. Again, pan-immigrant linked fate is correlated with attendance at public hearings and discussions and informational meetings, but these correlations are only significant at the 90 percent level. Importantly, Firth logit does not allow clustering standard errors and these results may be inaccurate.

These estimates may be biased if errors are correlated across different forms of participation. Indeed, it is possible that omitted variables may be driving individuals' participation in some forms of political behavior more than others. To account for this possibility, I re-estimate these models under a seemingly-unrelated regressions framework which accounts for cross-model correlation. Again, I omit interviewer dummy variables due to multicollinearity. This yields highly similar results. Pan-immigrant linked fate is positively correlated with attending informational meetings at the 95 percent level and contacting politicians at the 90 percent level.<sup>9</sup>

Ultimately, then, these results should be treated with a grain of salt due to the small sample size. Nonetheless, they provide more specific insight into the effects of pan-immigrant linked fate on political participation. Together, these results are highly suggestive that pan-immigrant linked fate is positively correlated with political participation. In particular, it seems to correlate highly with attendance at discussions and informational meetings about politics. This finding suggests, as hypothesized, that linked fate may drive individuals to seek out more information about Swiss

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<sup>9</sup>Unfortunately, STATA does not permit Hosmer-Lemeshow tests after Firth logit or seeming-unrelated regressions. It is thus difficult to estimate fit for these models



**Table 5.6: Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate is Positively Correlated with Political Meeting Attendance, Contacting Politicians**

VARIABLES	(DV 1) Petitions	(DV 2) Boycotts	(DV 3) Political Volunteering	(DV 4) Demonstrati on	(DV 5) Public Hearing or Discussion	(DV 6) Informationa l Meeting a politician	(DV 7) Contacting a politician	(DV 8) Political Donations
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, Index	0.0667 (0.270)	0.160 (0.308)	0.0464 (0.542)	0.329 (0.365)	0.931** (0.413)	0.738* (0.440)	0.546* (0.305)	-4.876** (2.404)
Swiss Citizenship	0.0185 (0.499)	1.659** (0.755)	-3.326** (1.620)	-3.075** (1.196)	-1.901*** (0.599)	-0.452 (0.946)	0.00751 (0.569)	1.087 (0.944)
Years in Switzerland	0.0505** (0.0239)	-0.0385 (0.0329)	-0.0950 (0.0837)	-0.0238 (0.0360)	0.0520* (0.0300)	-0.0340 (0.0296)	-0.0202 (0.0365)	0.288** (0.116)
Age (years)	-0.0382 (0.0298)	0.0291 (0.0370)	0.136*** (0.0523)	0.160*** (0.0614)	0.0167 (0.0341)	0.0797** (0.0341)	0.0362 (0.0541)	0.252 (0.175)
Canton of Bern	-1.647** (0.697)	-0.791 (0.952)	-0.579 (1.295)	-1.528 (0.933)	-2.218*** (0.858)	-1.309*** (0.474)	0.211 (0.604)	6.579* (3.453)
Educational Attainment (years)	0.0778* (0.0439)	0.0980* (0.0560)	0.0451 (0.132)	0.00817 (0.0700)	0.211*** (0.0787)	0.0568 (0.0622)	0.0538 (0.0828)	0.829* (0.433)
Canton of Aargau	-1.295* (0.673)	-0.301 (0.653)	-0.399 (1.614)	-3.652* (1.961)	-0.955 (0.759)	-0.863 (0.528)	-1.082 (0.809)	6.476 (4.616)
Uniquely Kurdish	0.0940 (0.895)	0.163 (1.009)	6.279** (2.977)	6.790*** (2.123)	2.048* (1.171)	1.525 (1.203)	0.271 (1.172)	
Uniquely Turkish	-0.165 (1.044)	0.537 (0.987)	5.448*** (1.866)	4.034*** (1.178)	2.184* (1.182)	0.355 (1.274)	0.404 (1.501)	6.881** (3.422)
Other, from Turkey	0.608 (1.038)	0.320 (0.895)	7.529*** (2.736)	5.757*** (1.357)	1.120 (1.068)	2.573** (1.106)	0.484 (1.528)	17.18** (7.752)

**Table 5.6: Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate is Positively Correlated with Political Meeting Attendance, Contacting Politicians, Contd.**

Identifies as Sunni Muslim	-1.875*** (0.654)	-0.503 (1.221)	-2.388* (1.406)	0.698 (1.288)	-2.952*** (1.047)	0.120 (0.876)	0.0453 (0.736)	-5.883* (3.385)
Unemployed	-0.362 (0.881)	2.140* (1.133)	(4.015)	-8.551** (4.015)	-0.917 (1.695)	-2.797 (1.712)	-1.496 (2.466)	
Female	-0.271 (0.539)	0.875 (0.734)	-2.209 (1.646)	3.146* (1.778)	-1.911** (0.821)	-1.309* (0.723)	-1.432 (1.015)	0.666 (1.585)
Member, Union	1.083* (0.569)	1.216 (0.971)	0.753 (1.387)	-0.295 (0.804)	-0.351 (0.708)	-0.0862 (0.548)	0.648 (0.580)	0.781 (2.322)
Member, Ethnic Cultural Association	0.426 (0.517)	1.255* (0.670)	-0.406 (1.678)	0.454 (1.000)	1.334** (0.636)	1.012** (0.501)	0.537 (0.680)	4.251* (2.312)
Member, Ethnic Political Association	1.121** (0.508)	0.426 (0.756)	3.506*** (1.184)	4.399*** (1.692)	1.364* (0.817)	1.504** (0.652)	1.286* (0.752)	4.548 (3.202)
Member, Multiethnic Cultural Association	1.070 (0.820)	-0.228 (1.097)	2.032 (1.305)	0.284 (1.544)	3.329** (1.640)	0.116 (0.905)	0.674 (0.860)	38.66*** (9.888)
Member, Multiethnic Political Association	-0.340 (0.609)	-1.719 (1.325)	3.314* (1.974)	2.734** (1.334)	-1.067 (1.449)	0.523 (0.782)	0.595 (0.828)	-35.34*** (9.962)
Member, Religious Organization	0.604 (0.466)	0.462 (1.069)	-0.701 (1.463)	-1.431 (0.993)	-1.172* (0.665)	-0.0642 (0.471)	-0.329 (0.981)	6.557* (3.465)
Constant	-0.857	-5.448**	-12.23**	-13.53***	-5.570**	-5.605***	-4.185	-58.72**

**Table 5.6:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate is Positively Correlated with Political Meeting Attendance, Contacting Politicians, Contd.

	(1.803)	(2.142)	(5.001)	(4.273)	(2.201)	(2.007)	(3.588)	(28.68)
Observations	127	127	118	127	127	127	127	100
Pseudo-R2	0.207	0.225	0.616	0.566	0.365	0.297	0.265	0.627
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Interviewer dummy variables omitted from regressions due to multicollinearity.

politics.

### **Group Socialization Effects**

As I suggested above, it is plausible that immigrants' home country experiences could alter the relationship between linked fate and participation. In particular, immigrants' past experiences can shape their degree of psychological involvement with politics and, in some cases, predispose them to seek further political information. Such experiences may also facilitate their participation by helping them to understand when their personal interests are served by political involvement (Black 1987).

It is important, then, to consider whether the above findings might simply be an artifact of the socializing experiences of the diverse ethnic groups in my sample. Given that many Kurds arrived in Switzerland as political asylees, I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate may have a particularly strong effect on Kurdish participation. That said, I do not expect that the effects above are entirely driven by Kurds.

To this effect, I repeat the above regressions including interaction terms between the pan-immigrant linked fate index and each ethnic group, respectively (Table 5.7). I include all controls listed in the baseline model above and clustered standard errors by venue. The results suggest that, all else equal, the effect of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation may be higher for Turks than for other groups (including Kurds), although this effect is only significant at the 90 percent level.

The left-hand side graph below plots the average marginal effect of pan-immigrant fate on participation for self-identified ethnic Turks and others. The plot suggests that the effect of pan-immigrant linked fate is likely non-zero for Turks, as 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimate lie above zero. For other groups, however, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimated marginal effect cross 0, indicating that the true marginal effect may be zero.

It is thus possible that the average effects may be driven by Turks. To gauge whether this is the case, I plot the contrast between average effects for Turks and non-Turks in the right-hand graph. Except for at the highest levels of pan-immigrant linked fate, the graph suggests that there may be

**Table 5.7:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate is Positively Correlated with Individuals' Probability of Participation


VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Identifies as Uniquely Turkish * Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	1.096* (0.587)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.814*** (0.683)
Observations	115
Pseudo-R2	0.41
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

no significant difference in effects for these groups. Indeed, at each other level of pan-immigrant linked fate, the 95 percent confidence interval crosses the zero threshold. This finding, although inconclusive, suggests that the effect of pan-immigrant linked fate on individuals' probability of participation is unlikely to be mediated by their ethnicity. That said, there are fewer than 50 individuals identifying as Turkish in this analysis, and additional data would be needed to attain a more conclusive result. Important, also, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates pool model fit. Further analysis is thus necessary.



**Figure 5.5:** Self-Identified Turks Likely Do Not Drive Marginal Effects

### Local Integration Policy Effects

As I stated in Hypothesis 4 in Chapter 2, it is also plausible that cantonal integration policies may affect the size of the effect of linked fate on participation. Importantly, host governments vary in the degree to which they fund and otherwise support immigrant organizations. Government support influences the number and scale of activities and meetings that immigrant groups can organize, potentially affecting the frequency and depth of interactions between immigrants. Immigrants with less funding may have fewer opportunities to exchange political information and plan political events. In such cases, even immigrants who possess a high degree of linked fate may be relatively unable to participate. Of the cantons in this study, Neuchâtel provides the most support to immigrant organizations, particularly pan-immigrant organizations, and sponsors a relatively high number of discussion groups and roundtables open to immigrants. I thus expect that the effect of linked fate on participation may be larger in Neuchâtel than in Bern and Aargau.

To gauge whether this is the case, I estimate another model including interactions between

the pan-immigrant linked fate index and the Neuchâtel and Bern canton dummies. Here, Aargau serves as the reference canton. Again, I include all controls listed in the baseline model above. The results below suggest that the coefficient of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation is statistically significant and positive in Neuchâtel and Bern. This is reasonable, as the cities of Neuchâtel and La Chaux-de-Fonds and the Bernese city of Biel-Bienne —where I conducted many surveys—actively sponsor immigrant discussion groups and possess councils comprised of immigrants. Strikingly, the values of the coefficient are about the same for both cantons, although its significance level is higher in Neuchâtel. In both cases, the coefficients are higher than in Aargau. Indeed, the results suggest that, for residents of Aargau, political participation decreases as linked fate increases.

**Table 5.8:** Local Integration Policies May Mediate Effect of Linked Fate

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Canton of Neuchâtel*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	2.046*** (0.763)
Canton of Bern*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	2.188** (0.939)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	4.354* (2.599)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	2.357*** (0.849)
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes
Constant	-5.161 (4.997)
Observations	115
Pseudo-R2	0.43


Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant variables displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The average marginal effect of pan-immigrant linked fate on individuals' probability of participation, by canton, is plotted in Figure 5.6 below. Strikingly, this plot suggests that the above

finding suggesting a positive, significant correlation between linked fate and participation may be driven by respondents in Neuchâtel and Bern. The average marginal effect negative in Aargau at each level of linked fate. Perhaps more importantly, however, the 95 percent confidence levels surrounding these estimates cross 0 for each level of linked fate, intimating that linked fate may not have a significant correlation with participation in Aargau.



**Figure 5.6:** Marginal Effects of Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate Higher in Neuchâtel and Bern

To investigate this further, I estimate an additional model examining whether this effect is moderated by ethnicity. The results are visible in Appendix Table 5.17. Interestingly, the results suggest that the negative correlation between the Aargau-linked fate interaction and participation is largely driven by Italian respondents. This is also visible in Appendix Figure 5.9, which shows that the marginal effect of pan-immigrant linked fate is positive for Turks in Aargau and negative for non-Turks—although they do not reach significance at the 95 percent level.

It is plausible that linked fate may positively correlate with participation among Turks in Aargau yet negatively among Italians. In Neuchâtel and parts of canton Bern (namely, Biel-Bienne where many Italians were sampled), much political communication and many political events are in French. The Italian language is closely related to French, and many Italians in Francophone regions speak some French. Many of the Italians I interviewed in Aargau, in contrast, do not speak



or read German at a high level. Linguistic difficulties may heighten some immigrants' sense of commonality with other immigrants while limiting their ability to participate in Swiss politics. Without larger sample sizes, however, it is not possible to effectively test this proposition.

Once again, also, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates pool model fit in this case. The model without interaction effects was a better fit. That said, to gauge whether interaction effects exist, more data and further analysis may be necessary.

### **The Moderating Effect of Politicized Locales**

In this section, I will test Hypothesis 5, my hypothesis that linked fate might have a greater effect on participation in polities that are highly politicized—namely, polities which regularly plan political events open to the public. I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate may correlate particularly strongly with participation in such polities, as immigrants have ample opportunities to mobilize.

To test Hypothesis 5, I employ data from an expert survey of Swiss municipalities conducted in 2017 (Ladner 2017). Municipal secretaries were asked both to rate the general level of political interest in their municipality and to note how often the municipality conducts opinion polls of its residents. I treat these variables as proxies for the political culture of municipalities at the time of my survey. Upon merging the expert survey data with data from my survey, I can analyze whether linked fate has a stronger effect on participation in municipalities that are politicized and encourage resident engagement. Note that my survey includes respondents in 14 municipalities, with most respondents concentrated in the largest municipalities in each canton. Due to small sample sizes in some municipalities, these results should again be considered suggestive rather than definitive.

To begin, I re-estimate the baseline model above, adding an interaction between respondents' degree of pan-immigrant linked fate and the reported level of political interest in their municipality of residence. Again, I include all controls from the baseline model, including interview dummies, and cluster standard errors by venue. As expected, the results, shown in Appendix Table 5.20, suggest a positive correlation between that interaction and participation. However, it is only significant at the 90 percent level. This suggests that linked fate may indeed have a stronger effect on participation in

”politicized” municipalities. Without a larger sample size, however, the significance of this effect remains unclear.

I next repeat the same regression, substituting the above interaction with an interaction between respondents’ pan-immigrant linked fate and municipalities’ usage of opinion polling. Again, this variable is meant to proxy whether municipalities promote residents’ engagement. In this case, I find a significant (at the 95 percent level) and positive correlation between the interaction term and participation. This suggests that the effect of linked fate on political participation may be highest in municipalities where local governments actively promote it.

Consistently with Hypothesis 5, then, these results suggest that local political cultures may moderate the effect of linked fate on political participation. Specifically, linked fate may have the strongest effect in municipalities that actively consult residents and encourage their participation.


### **5.3.2 Mechanisms**

In this section, I test hypotheses 2 and 3: namely, that linked fate increases immigrants’ political participation by increasing their probability of mobilization by other group members and enhancing their sense of political efficacy. I will test these hypotheses against the alternatives that linked fate increases participation by increasing immigrants’ self-esteem or by increasing immigrants’ fear of in-group sanctions. I expect to find that pan-immigrant linked fate increases immigrants’ participation by enhancing their efficacy and likelihood of in-group mobilization rather than their self-esteem.

To begin, I gauge whether linked fate increases political participation by increasing immigrants’ likelihood of mobilization by other immigrants (Hypothesis 2). Again, this may be the case if linked fate leads immigrants to interact more readily and discuss politics more frequently with others. To do so, I perform a structural path analysis, a type of structural equation model, modeling mobilization by other immigrants as a function of pan-immigrant linked fate (Figure 5.7). I operationalize mobilization using a dummy variable indicating whether individuals were encouraged to participate by co-ethnic friends, family members, associational members, or religious

leaders.<sup>10</sup> I also include all controls from the baseline model above.

The results suggest that linked fate may be positively correlated with an individual's likelihood of mobilization by other immigrants, although this correlation is only significant at the 90 percent level. It is important to note that the correlation between these variables does not imply that linked fate causes in-group mobilization and, ultimately, political participation. Indeed, these results could suggest reverse causality—political participation might inspire mobilization, creating linked fate. That said, the direct effect of linked fate on participation loses its significance upon accounting for mobilization. This suggests that linked fate may have an indirect effect on participation through mobilization, as hypothesized. This indirect effect is significant at the 90 percent level. It is also substantively small. Looking beyond mobilization, then, it is possible that other mechanisms may underscore the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation.



**Note: Controls omitted from diagram for simplicity.**


**Figure 5.7:** Linked Fate Indirectly Affects Participation through Mobilization

I next test Hypothesis 3. To do so, I assess whether the effect of linked fate on participation may be mediated by external collective efficacy, immigrants' sense that immigrants can collectively

<sup>10</sup>Questions about mobilization were only asked of respondents who reported participating in the 12 months leading up to the survey. For this reason, the dependent variable here reflects a count of acts of participation undertaken rather than a dummy indicating whether or not one participated. Importantly, I collapsed the participation count into 4 and 3 bins as a robustness check and the results of the path analysis held

effect political change. I perform a path analysis modeling external efficacy as a function of pan-immigrant linked fate. Path analysis suggests that external efficacy does not mediate linked fate's influence on participation—the path is not statistically significant.

Next, I analyze whether internal efficacy—individuals' sense that they possess the necessary knowledge and skills to participate in politics—may moderate the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and political participation. If this is the case, linked fate may strengthen immigrants' sense that they are personally capable of participating in politics, thus enhancing their participation. I perform a final path analysis, modeling internal efficacy as a function of linked fate (Figure 5.8). Consistent with Hypothesis 4 above, the result suggests that pan-immigrant linked fate may have an effect on participation through internal efficacy. Once again, however, this analysis suggests a correlation between linked fate and internal efficacy rather than causation. That said, the direct effect of linked fate on participation shrinks upon account for internal efficacy, suggesting that this effect is at least partially moderated by efficacy. This result is only statistically significant at the 90 percent level, but, given the small number of observations, it is plausible that future work will yield stronger correlations. Once again, also, additional work may be necessary to rule out the possibility of reverse causality—namely, that participation increases efficacy, increasing linked fate as individuals learn more about politics.



**Note: Controls omitted from diagram for simplicity.**

**Figure 5.8:** Linked Fate May Influence Participation through Internal Efficacy

Although further research is necessary, these models broadly suggest that linked fate may increase immigrants' participation by increasing their likelihood of in-group mobilization and by enhancing their sense that they can effectively participate in politics. To gauge whether these findings add to existing accounts relating collective identification to participation, however, it is necessary to consider alternative explanations. In particular, I will test whether self-esteem may moderate the relationship between linked fate and participation. Given that self-esteem does not alter immigrants' capacity to surmount the informational and logistical costs of participation, however, I do not expect that to be the case.

To test this expectation, I first estimate an additional model in order to gauge whether immigrants perceiving linked fate participate in order to increase their self-esteem or express loyalty to other immigrants. Specifically, I include an additional variable in the baseline regression model measuring the degree to which individuals self-identify as immigrants (*"Being an immigrant is an important part of who I am as a person."*). I also include all controls in the baseline model, including interviewer dummies, and cluster standard errors by venue. If immigrants' desire for self-esteem or to re-affirm their identity drives the relationship between identity and participation, I expect this variable to correlate directly with engagement. Further, in that case, I expect that the effect of the linked fate variable will decrease or lose significance. The results of this regression are in Table 5.9.<sup>11</sup>

Upon estimating this model, I find no statistically significant correlation between self-identification as an immigrant and political participation. Indeed, the pan-immigrant linked fate index remains significant at a 95 percent level. For robustness, I re-estimated the model with an interaction of pan-immigrant linked fate and self-identification as an immigrant. Again, this interaction term does not correlate significantly with political participation. Broadly, these results suggest that the link between pan-immigrant identity and participation may not be driven by self-

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<sup>11</sup>In this case, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates a good model fit.

**Table 5.9:** Pan-Immigrant LF Robust to Inclusion of Immigrant ID Strength

VARIABLES	(1) Dependent Variable: Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.602** (0.234)
Strength of Identification as Immigrant	-0.324 (0.251)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	2.131*** (0.691)
Canton of Bern	-2.046* (1.223)
Constant	-2.498 (4.311)
Observations	114
Pseudo-R2	0.402
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Interviewer dummies not shown. Only statistically significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

esteem. That is, those who identify strongly as immigrants may not simply participate in order to boost their self-esteem. Instead, if we believe the path analyses above, identification with other immigrants sometimes leads to linked fate, enhancing immigrants' efficacy and likelihood of in-group mobilization.

I next estimate the model without linked fate to gauge whether individuals' identification as immigrants and perceptions of relative deprivation correlate with participation in its absence. I also include an interaction term to gauge whether identification might correlate with participation most strongly among immigrants perceiving relative deprivation on the basis of their immigrant status. Neither identification, relative deprivation, nor the interaction of the two is significant. This result is noteworthy, as social identity theory would predict that immigrants perceiving marginalization might mobilize in order to enhance immigrants' social position as well as their individual self-esteem.

Second, I will examine whether linked fate might lead to increased participation by raising immigrants' fears of in-group sanctions. Rationalist approaches to immigrants' political behavior might stress that immigrants participate largely out of fear that their reputations will suffer if they do not. The threat of sanctions, however, is frequently assumed to influence behavior most profoundly among individuals that have not yet internalized group norms. Along this vein, Wenzel, for example, found that internalized norms moderate the effects of deterrence on behavior (2004). In the context of this dissertation, threats of sanction would presumably be most likely to change the behavior of individuals who would otherwise be disinclined to participate in Swiss politics. That is, individuals who gain utility from participation directly would be less swayed by threats from their in-groups. If linked fate increases individuals' fear that other immigrants will chastise them for non-participation, I would expect to see a negative interaction effect of political interest and linked fate on participation. Namely, all else equal, the effect of linked fate on participation should weaken as political interest increases.

To gauge whether this may be the case, I estimate another model with all controls. Specifically, I include an interaction term multiplying pan-immigrant linked fate by an index measuring individuals' self-expressed degree of interest in Swiss politics. The results from these two models

are plotted in Table 5.10 below.

**Table 5.10:** Marginal Effect is Stronger among Respondents with High Political Interest

(1)	
VARIABLES	Prob. of Participation
Level of Political Interest*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.364*
	(0.186)
Level of Political Interest	0.943***
	(0.235)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.836**
	(0.735)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	-1.621**
	(0.759)
Member, Multi-ethnic Cultural Org.	2.595**
	(1.178)
Canton of Bern	-2.201*
	(1.262)
Constant	-2.695
	(4.442)
Observations	114
Pseudo-R2	0.465
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables not shown. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

These results suggest that the interaction between political interest and pan-immigrant linked fate may be positively correlated with participation (although this correlation is only significant at the 90 percent level). This suggests that the effect of linked fate on participation may be strongest among respondents highly interested in Swiss politics. This finding provides evidence against the notion that linked fate spurs participation by increasing immigrants' fear of sanctions. Indeed, if this were the case, linked fate should have a stronger effect on the behavior of those who might not



otherwise participate. Instead, this analysis suggests that the effects of linked fate on participation rise with immigrants’ level of interest in Swiss politics.

To conclude, the results in this section suggest that the effects of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation may not derive from self-esteem concerns or a fear of sanctions. Indeed, including interactions between linked fate and identification as an immigrant—as well as political interest—yielded little support for these explanations. Although based on small sample sizes, the above path analyses offer preliminary evidence that linked fate may spur participation by increasing respondents’ likelihood of mobilization by other immigrants and enhancing their internal efficacy. These results thus tentatively support Hypotheses 2 and 3 above.

### 5.3.3 Tentative Conclusions

In summary, the analysis above provides evidence supporting hypotheses 1 through 5 from Chapter 2. For clarity, I reiterate these hypotheses and conclusions in Table 5.11 below.

**Table 5.11:** Summarizing the Findings

	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Significance Level</b>
<b>H1</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants’ likelihood of non-electoral participation.</i>	95
<b>H2</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants’ probability of mobilization by other group members or supporters.</i>	90
<b>H3</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants’ sense of internal and external efficacy.</i>	90
<b>H4</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.</i>	99
<b>H5</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.</i>	95

## 5.4 Anecdotal Evidence of Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

Prior to conducting my survey, I also asked immigrants questions about political participation and linked fate through interviews and focus groups. My conversations suggested that many immigrants perceive pan-immigrant linked fate. Consistently with the presence of linked fate, many participants noted that they feel discriminated against due to their status as foreigners and non-citizens. Further, some expressed a belief that the immigrant experience has engendered political commonalities across all immigrants, regardless of their background. Some expressed that these perceived common experiences inspired them to become politically active.

Note that all names in this section have been fictionalized in order to protect respondents' privacy.

To begin, many politically active immigrants expressed a broad sense of commonality with other immigrants, regardless of their origins. A Kurdish small business owner in Fribourg, a neighborhood association leader who also works with the municipal government on immigrant integration issues, said:

*"I noticed at the cantonal integration course that all of our questions are the same. Our experiences here are very close."* –Mehmet, Male, 55, Fribourg.<sup>12</sup>

This interviewee perceived similarity with other immigrants on the basis of their shared limited knowledge of Switzerland. Likewise, a Turkish graduate student working for the socialist party in the city of La Chaux-de-Fonds, and an active participant in a local immigrant political organization who organizes periodic political discussion groups, noted:

*"The problems facing an African, a Somalian, are the same as problems facing a Portuguese person."* –Cem, Male, 33, La Chaux-de-Fonds.

This quote suggests that perceptions of similarity sometimes derive from shared experiences rather than a shared racial or ethnic background.

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<sup>12</sup>I conduct several interviews in the Canton of Fribourg, a French-German bilingual, Catholic canton between Neuchâtel and Bern.

Many also stressed that immigrants on the whole are unfairly ‘otherized’ and treated as foreigners. They emphasized that policies affect all immigrants because of their lack of citizenship and foreign origins, regardless of their specific background. They also stressed that immigrant status is highly salient in Swiss policymaking and politics. A Kurdish man in Bern, a social worker by profession, noted that :

*“We are all unfairly labeled as foreigners. Where we are from is not important. Everyone is simply a “foreigner.” All debates and decisions are made about migrants in general. Of course laws made about migrants affect my life. . . automatically. . . These laws define what you can and cannot do.”* – Kerem, Male, 40 years old, Bern.

A Turkish man in Fribourg, a non-practicing Sunni Muslim who works as a liaison between the municipal government and immigrant parent associations, noted that he became involved in politics out of a sense of obligation to other Turks in Switzerland, but that feeling gradually developed into a broader sense of obligation to immigrants. He noted that immigrants face shared challenges of raising children in an unfamiliar environment. He also emphasized that the state does not effectively integrate immigrants, and that immigrants often feel stigmatized and alienated. Emphasizing these common challenges among immigrants regardless of ethnicity, he noted:

*“At first, initiatives were against Italians. Now they are against everyone.”*-Ekrem, Male, 45, Fribourg.

Along a similar vein, many immigrants stressed their perceptions that immigrants are unfairly denied political rights based on their citizenship status, even when they had spent many years in Switzerland. Those who had spent a lot of time in Switzerland perceived that they had earned a place in Swiss society and were particularly likely to perceive restrictions to immigrant voting and tight citizenship laws as unfair. A Kurdish social worker in Bern, a participant in an anti-racism organization and the leader of an immigrant mothers’ group, said:

*“Immigration is THE hot topic in Europe right now. There are debates over state support for the newest migrants. But only the Swiss can decide. We are immigrants, and no one asks us what we think. We have no voice.”* - Mine, Female, 34, Bern.

Similarly, a retired Italian man living in Bern stated:

*“Switzerland excludes foreigners. After 50 years, people can’t vote because they are foreign. It is ironic that Switzerland calls itself a defender of democracy. I have paid taxes for years and wanted to vote on a construction project in Ostermundigen, but I couldn’t...this has nothing to do with whether you’re Italian, Spanish, or Arab. It’s the same thing.” – Giacomo, 70, Bern.*

Even naturalized citizens expressed that they feel excluded in Switzerland due to their foreign origins. Most expressed concerns about discrimination in their day-to-day lives rather than explicit institutional discrimination. A Kurdish lawyer in Neuchâtel indicated:

*“If you’re from a non-E.U. country, no matter where you’re from, Switzerland feels exclusive. This happens even if you’re naturalized. You are treated with suspicion when you use a Swiss passport. Even in Geneva, where there are diplomats from all over the world, we feel excluded.” -Hasan, 37, Neuchâtel.*

The Kurdish social worker in Bern also expressed a sense that immigrants face economic barriers relative to natives, regardless of their naturalization status, stating:

*“Immigrants don’t have the same chances as natives in the workforce here.” – Mine, Female, 34, Bern.*

Broadly, a number of immigrants, particularly immigrants from Turkey, perceived that immigrants face social and employment discrimination. The Kurdish lawyer in Neuchâtel added that many immigrants with permanent residency fear that Swiss immigration policies could intensify, threatening their livelihoods further.

*“Many immigrants on “C” permits are afraid that the ‘hardening’ of immigration policies could destabilize their lives. They worry that they might be deported for owed taxes or using public benefits.” - Hasan, 37, Neuchâtel.*

Broadly, these anecdotes suggest that many immigrants in Switzerland perceive relative deprivation based on their ‘foreignness.’ Immigrants perceiving such relative deprivation often expressed solidarity or a sense of shared experiences with other immigrants, regardless of their backgrounds.

A number of participants also expressed beliefs that immigrants share broad political orientations. This is suggestive of the notion that perceptions of shared experiences and problems

can lead individuals to ‘stereotype’ the political beliefs of other group members. A Kurdish woman in Neuchâtel, an active member of the local socialist party, noted:

*“To have an immigrant elected to office... it’s someone who knows what it means to be a migrant, what our problems are. It doesn’t matter what country he or she is from... if he or she is Kurdish, Italian, whatever. It’s necessary that he or she knows what it’s like to be a migrant.”* – Gökçe, Female, 30s, Kurdish immigrant from Turkey.

Likewise, an Italian immigrant in Neuchâtel, a member of the city council active in both Italian and pan-immigrant organizations, noted that a sense of connection and obligation to other immigrants drives him to participate in politics. He speaks periodically to immigrant groups in Neuchâtel, encouraging them to participate more actively in local politics. He noted:

*“I think of the injustices I encountered when I arrived in Switzerland, and they still impact me... if you don’t defend your rights, they can be taken away. People still discriminate against the weaker groups. This is why I participate [in politics]. To improve the situation a bit.”* – Gregorio, 60s, Italian immigrant.

Broadly, anecdotes from my interviews and focus groups suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate may inspire participation among immigrants in Switzerland. Numerous immigrants expressed that their political rights and economic well-being are limited by their status as foreigners. A number also expressed a broad sense of connection to other foreigners based on shared experiences, and some suggested that this sense of connection inspired their political and civic engagement in their communities. Indeed, like Ekrem in Fribourg, some individuals were drawn to political activity after observing the challenges faced by immigrants.

## **5.5 Robustness Checks**

In this section, I will address the possibility that my model specifications above may yield spurious results.<sup>13</sup> First, the above results suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate correlates strongly

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<sup>13</sup>Unless otherwise noted, each robustness check includes all controls from the baseline model above as well as interviewer dummies. Further, all models cluster standard errors by venue.

with individuals' attendance at political meetings. It is possible that attending meetings could inspire linked fate, boosting political engagement rather than the other way around. To gauge whether reverse causality may be driving correlations between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation probabilities across the sample, then, I re-construct the political participation dummy variable leaving out attendance at political meetings. Upon re-estimating the baseline regression model, I find that pan-immigrant linked fate and participation are still positively correlated at the 90 percent level. Given the small sample size, and given that some immigrants may have been driven to attend political meetings out of a sense of linked fate, this result suggests that reverse causality is not fully responsible for this correlation. These results are visible in Table 5.12 below.

Second, it is possible that the index of pan-immigrant linked fate simply proxies individuals' perceptions of collective discrimination rather than a sense of political connection to other immigrants. To gauge whether this might be the case, I estimate the baseline model again, adding a variable measuring individuals' perceptions that immigrants are underrepresented in Switzerland. The results are displayed in Table 5.13 below.

The results suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate remains positively correlated with participation upon controlling for perceived under-representation, although this correlation is only significant at the 90 percent level. Although these variables are highly correlated, these findings suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate is likely not a direct artifact of perceived collective discrimination. This finding is also important insofar as it provides additional evidence that linked fate does not drive immigrants to participate simply to raise their self-esteem. Indeed, if individuals participate solely to enhance the social position of immigrants, I would expect the significant correlation to disappear upon controlling for relative deprivation.

It is also important to gauge whether pan-immigrant linked fate proxies respondents' interest in Swiss politics. Upon re-estimating the model above, I find that the effect of linked fate on participation holds after accounting for political interest. These results are visible in Column 2 of Table 5.13 above.

Next, I will analyze whether these findings are robust upon controlling for the concentration

**Table 5.12:** Results Hold (Although Drop in Significance) after Excluding Political Meeting Attendance

VARIABLES	(1) Probability of Participation (Omitting Participation in Political Meetings)
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.369* (0.199)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.153** (0.0691)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	2.635** (1.174)
Sunni Muslim	-1.771** (0.848)
Member, Union	1.434** (0.682)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.589*** (0.548)
Constant	-5.193** (2.606)
Observations	128
Pseudo-R2	0.297
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Dummies	No

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Nonsignificant variables omitted from table. Interview dummies omitted from regression due to multicollinearity.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5.13:** Correlation is Robust upon Accounting for Discrimination Perceptions, Political Interest

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.367* (0.206)	0.538** (0.241)
Perceived Under- representation (Political Discrimination)	0.438 (0.266)	
Level of Political Interest		0.543*** (0.199)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.120 (0.0766)	0.134* (0.0763)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	2.650* (1.493)	2.867** (1.361)
From Turkey, Neither Uniquely Kurdish or Turkish	1.174 (1.015)	1.888* (1.120)
Sunni Muslim	-2.034** (0.873)	-2.112** (0.924)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.942*** (0.669)	1.894*** (0.650)
Canton of Bern	-1.322* (0.710)	-1.203* (0.723)
Constant	-5.462 (3.326)	-5.714* (2.948)
Observations	115	125
Pseudo-R2	0.334	0.366
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Dummies	No	No

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables omitted from regressions. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.



of immigrants in respondents' municipalities of residence. Residence in ethnic neighborhoods may increase immigrants' perceptions of relative deprivation, inspiring linked fate (Maxwell 2010). At the same time, it may enhance immigrants' access to information about host country politics, spurring participation. For this reason, it may confound the relationship observed above. The results are displayed in Table 5.14 below. They suggest that the correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation is robust to differences in the concentration of immigrants across municipalities in the sample. The correlation remains positive and significant at the 95 percent level.

**Table 5.14:** Correlation Robust to Inclusion of Ethnic Concentration Variable

(1)	
VARIABLES	Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.581** (0.271)
Foreign Pop. Share of Municipality	-0.0847 (0.0991)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.864** (0.826)
Canton of Bern	-2.250** (1.108)
Constant	-1.418 (3.559)
Observations	112
Pseudo-R2	0.407
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables not shown. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Next, it is possible that the “agree/disagree” formulation of the questions comprising the

linked fate index may have induced acquiescence bias. That is, respondents might be likely to agree with all linked fate items even if they do not actually agree with the question. To account for such acquiescence bias, I employ a technique from psychology known as ipsatization. Ipsatization standardizes responses within individuals, removing acquiescence bias by re-centering responses around their mean. To remove acquiescence bias, I ipsatize all agree-disagree responses, generating new data that is standardized around individuals' mean response for all questions of that type. I then use ipsatized data to construct a new index of pan-immigrant linked fate. Finally, I re-estimate the baseline model above using ipsatized data rather than the unadjusted data. This model yields a positive correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation, although it is only significant at the 90 percent level. Given that ipsatization is rather conservative and assumes a high degree of acquiescence bias, the results below suggest that correlation holds upon accounting for acquiescence bias.

In previous chapters, I noted that the share of Turkish and Italian-born women and young Italians in my sample may be lower than in the actual population. To assess whether the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and political participation is likely to hold among the entire Turkish-born and Italian-born population, then, I compare the baseline results above to results from weighted, post-stratified regressions (See Table 5.16. Relative to the population, my sample has relatively few women and relatively few people under 40 years of age. Using registry data from the Swiss Statistical Office, I constructed post-stratification weights based on the gender, age distribution, and citizenship status of Italian-born and Turkish-born populations in each canton. I multiplied these by non-response weights calculated by national origin and canton (as I do not have nonresponse data by gender and age) to approximate the likelihood that a given individual was sampled from the entire population.

Interestingly, repeating the above regression of participation on pan-immigrant linked fate with weighted data does not produce significant results. Adding interactions between ethnic group and the linked fate index suggests pan-immigrant linked fate is significantly and positively correlated with participation among Turkish-born populations and negatively correlated among

**Table 5.15:** Results Hold Using Ipsatized Data, Suggesting Robustness to Acquiescence Bias

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate (ipsatized)	0.806* (0.453)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.214** (0.0966)
Kurd	2.859** (1.429)
Identifies as Sunni Muslim	-2.981** (1.373)
Member, Union	1.893** (0.893)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	2.001** (0.835)
Member, Multi- ethnic Cultural Org.	2.654* (1.436)
Member, Religious Organization	1.687* (0.964)
Constant	-5.666* (3.215)
Observations	115
Pseudo-R2	0.401
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	No

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables omitted from regression due to multicollinearity. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Italians. A triple interaction suggests that this negative effect among Italians is not conditional upon respondents' gender, suggesting that it may instead be driven by age.<sup>14</sup>

Broadly, this result suggests that the generalizability of linked fate to the entirely Italian population may be limited. In particular, my survey undercounts young Italians who may intend to return home after working in Switzerland for a few years. These individuals may possess a degree of linked fate but have limited interest in Swiss politics insofar as they do not feel invested in Switzerland.

Finally, it is necessary to consider possible shortcomings of the factor analysis used to produce the linked fate index. Factor analysis generally assumes a linear relationship between item responses. If responses to items are categorical, factor analysis may not calculate correct scores. Given that my questions are scaled from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” standard factor analysis may not be appropriate. When attempting to estimate a continuous latent variable from categorical or ordinal variables, Olsson and Pearson and Pearson have suggested implementing factor analysis based on polychoric correlations (Olsson 1979; Pearson and Pearson 1922). In case standard factor analysis miscalculates factor scores, I calculate a second index using polychoric factor analysis and re-estimate a logit regression model gauging the relationship between that index and participation. The results are quite similar to before—a one standard deviation increase in pan-immigrant linked fate raises the odds of participation by 73 percent (significant at the 95 percent level) (Appendix Table 5.21). As above, a rare events logit model penalizing maximum likelihood for a small sample size suggests that a one standard deviation increase in pan-immigrant linked fate, as measured by the polychoric index, increases the odds of participation by 44 percent (95 percent significance).

As an additional robustness check, I calculate one more index of pan-immigrant linked fate using item-response theory. Item-response theory represents another way that researchers combine

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<sup>14</sup>STATA does not permit Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for weighted logistic regressions. Consequently, the weighted model's goodness of fit is unclear.

**Table 5.16:** Results with Poststratification Weights

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	Prob. of Political Participation	Prob. of Political Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, Index	-0.0306 (0.387)	0.972 (0.708)
Italian		2.196 (2.916)
Italian* Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, Index		-1.347 (0.947)
Intention to Return Home		-2.591** (1.059)
Uniquely Kurdish	5.485 (4.766)	4.274* (2.435)
Other, from Turkey	5.321 (3.324)	5.511*** (1.948)
Member, Ethnic Cultural Association	2.363*** (0.885)	1.882*** (0.724)
Member, Ethnic Political Association	-1.492 (1.004)	-1.460* (0.869)
Constant	-0.651 (4.332)	-3.325 (4.796)
Observations	115	115
Pseudo-R2	0.525	0.571
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables not shown. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

question responses into indexes. Like factor analysis, item response theory is used to estimate latent variables underlying survey questions. The two methods are similar but vary in the details of their calculations. While factor analysis relies on covariance matrixes between items to estimate latent variables, IRT models the probability of selecting a given answer option as a function of a latent variable. Running the same regression using an index constructed with IRT instead of factor analysis again produces a coefficient of 0.55, but this time the result is not statistically significant. If I run the regression without including dummy variables for interviewers who performed fewer than 10 interviews, however, the results again suggest a statistically significant correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation (although only at the 90 percent level) (Appendix Table 5.22).

Finally, given that my models include over 20 regression parameters and just over 100 observations, I am concerned that they might be overfit. If this is the case, it might suggest that the model may not be generalizable to populations with different underlying characteristics. To gauge whether overfitting might be problematic, I employ k-fold cross-validation. This technique breaks down the sample into k subsamples then estimates model parameters for k-1 of the subsamples. It then assess how well those parameters predict the values of the outcome variable for the omitted subsample. In this case, k-fold cross-validation produces high root mean squared errors, suggesting that this model indeed may be overfit. This suggests that my findings may not be generalizable beyond this sample. Further research may be necessary to determine whether pan-immigrant linked fate and political population are positively correlated among other immigrant groups and in other contexts.

## **5.6 Interim Conclusion**

Taken together, these results suggest that sampled individuals' likelihood of political participation positively and significantly correlates with their perceptions of pan-immigrant linked fate. Further, this finding holds upon controlling for immigrants' demographic characteristics,

political socialization and ethnic origins, residence in areas with high immigrant concentrations, and involvement in civic associations. Consistent with the existing literature, my findings also suggest that membership in civic organizations might boost immigrants' political participation. Likewise, the results are consistent with previous findings that open opportunity structures might strengthen immigrants' political participation. That said, I find a positive correlation between linked fate and participation even after accounting for individuals' organizational memberships and the integration contexts in which they reside. My results thus suggest that the correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate on individuals' probability of participation is likely neither a straightforward artifact of contextual variables nor of the model specifications employed here. Indeed, they suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate may support political engagement even when immigrants lack formal participation rights.

Pan-immigrant linked fate also correlates significantly with participation upon controlling for respondents' perceptions of discrimination and levels of political interest. As such, linked fate is not simply proxying political interest or relative deprivation. Further, it is robust to a variety of model specifications. Correspondingly, pan-immigrant linked fate may be an important predictor of immigrants' political participation and constitutes an important addition to that literature.

Qualitative evidence from interviews and focus groups also supports Hypothesis 1. Broadly, many participants expressed a broad sense of political and economic linked fate with other immigrants on the basis of not being indigenous Swiss. Some also noted that not being Swiss affects peoples' life chances in Switzerland. These perceptions were strongest among individuals expressing strong political interest, and a number of participants suggested that a sense of commonality with other immigrants inspired them to participate in politics.

Finally, my findings imply that the effects of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation may not derive from self-esteem concerns or a fear of sanctions. Although based on small sample sizes, they offer preliminary evidence that linked fate may spur participation by increasing respondents' likelihood of mobilization by other immigrants and enhancing their internal efficacy, supporting hypotheses 2 and 3.

As a caveat, the validity of these results may be compromised if participation increases sentiments of linked fate rather than the other way around. Indeed, political participation, particularly participation in activities such as informational meetings, may foster individuals' sense that they are connected to group members. Ultimately, however, this is an observational study, and all findings represent correlations rather than causal effects.

That said, it is reasonable to suppose that the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation may be causal. First, path analysis suggests that pan-immigrant linked fate influences participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization. My results suggest that the effect of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation may work entirely through increasing individuals' probabilities of mobilization. If participation creates linked fate instead, we might expect to find a stronger direct correlation between these variables. Indeed, participation could increase linked fate even in the absence of in-group mobilization if it changes individuals' perceptions of their group's economic or political power vis-à-vis other groups. That is, an individual signing an unsuccessful petition related to immigrants' rights may develop linked fate insofar as these events remind him or her of their group's lack of voting rights.

Second, my results suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate may be positively correlated with contacting politicians. Unless politicians are other immigrants, which is uncommon in Switzerland given that non-citizens can only run for office in Neuchâtel, it is unlikely that such contact would spur pan-immigrant linked fate. Ultimately, however, further research is necessary in order to better understand the degree to which the correlations in the study reflect reverse causality.


Despite these potential limitations, these results suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate may be an important driver of immigrants' participation across a variety of contexts and groups. They also suggest that the pan-immigrant linked fate concept likely has analytical purchase beyond existing work emphasizing immigrants' affective attachments. As such, they bring to light a promising avenue for future research.



## 5.7 Appendix

Note: All models in this Appendix include all controls from the baseline model, including interviewer dummies, unless otherwise noted. Furthermore, standard errors are clustered by venue unless otherwise noted.

When I re-estimate the models above using an additive participation index rather than the dichotomous variable, I find a positive, but statistically insignificant, correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation. When I add interaction terms representing specific ethnic groups, it appears that pan-immigrant linked fate has a significant correlation with participation for Kurds and mixed Turkish-Kurdish respondents (at the 90 percent level). There is also a positive correlation among Turks, but this is not statistically significant. It is likely that a larger sample size would yield stronger effects. Broadly, these results suggest that the correlation between political participation and pan-immigrant linked fate may be strongest among immigrants from Turkey.



**Figure 5.9:** Italians May Drive Interaction Effects in Aargau

**Table 5.17:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate Leads to More Participation among Turkish-Born Immigrants (Additive Index)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	Dependent Variable: Additive Participation Index	Dependent Variable: Additive Participation Index
Pan-Immigrant Linked fate	0.0715 (0.103)	-0.0543 (0.130)
Uniquely Kurdish		0.729 (0.521)
Uniquely Kurdish*Pan-Immigrant Linked fate		0.533* (0.291)
Uniquely Turkish		0.825 (0.655)
Uniquely Turkish*Pan-Immigrant Linked fate		0.139 (0.218)
Other, from Turkey		1.038* (0.611)
Other, from Turkey*Pan-Immigrant Linked fate		0.119 (0.339)
Uniquely Turkish	0.940* (0.545)	
Other, from Turkey	1.052* (0.541)	
Uniquely Kurdish	0.915* (0.501)	
Member, Multicultural Association	1.124* (0.579)	1.191* (0.623)
Canton of Bern	-0.577* (0.288)	-0.586** (0.283)
Canton of Aargau	-0.794*** (0.240) (1.001)	-0.839*** (0.246) (1.085)
Observations	128	128
R-squared	0.483	0.500
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables not shown. Only significant variables displayed.

**Table 5.18:** Rare Events Logit, Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.370** (0.172)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.120** (0.0591)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	2.071** (1.042)
Sunni Muslim	-1.657** (0.836)
Unemployed	-0.144 (0.660)
Member, Union	1.153* (0.667)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.495*** (0.536)
Member, Religious Organization	1.023* (0.583)
Canton of Bern	-1.016* (0.577)
Constant	-3.525 (2.190)
Observations	128
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted from regression due to multicollinearity. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5.19:** Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, Triple-Interactions, Canton and Ethnic Group

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	0.989** (0.474)
Canton of Aargau*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	-4.736*** (1.779)
Canton of Aargau*Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	-12.63* (7.177)
Canton of Aargau*Identifies Uniquely as Turkish*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	3.618* (1.864)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	-109.5*** (13.04)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	108.7*** (13.78)
Canton of Aargau*Turkish-Born, Other Identification	151.6*** (26.42)
Canton of Aargau*Turkish-Born, Other Identification*Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	-76.79*** (9.980)
Female	1.250* (0.650)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	2.791** (1.332)
Constant	-4.676 (5.398)
Observations	112
Pseudo-R2	0.633
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5.20:** Stronger Correlation in Municipalities that Encourage Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate	-2.226 (1.557)	-0.852 (0.605)
Municipality uses Public Consultations / Polls		33.75*** (2.373)
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate* Municipality uses Public Consultations / Polls		1.828**
Political Interest in Municipality	0.485 (0.431)	
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate*Political Interest in Municipality	0.683* (0.370)	
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	4.600** (2.228)	8.998** (3.828)
Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	2.046 (1.994)	7.535*** (2.818)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	3.910 (2.448)	7.569*** (2.792)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.952** (0.771)	3.028* (1.635)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	-0.454 (0.861)	-3.021* (1.599)
Member, Multi-ethnic Cultural Org.	1.249 (1.033)	30.26*** (3.282)
Canton of Aargau	-0.976 (0.917)	28.75*** (2.697)
Canton of Bern	-2.116** (1.017)	-1.699 (1.738)
Constant	-7.198 (5.358)	-41.70*** (7.225)
Observations	112	112
Pseudo-R2	0.425	0.581
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table 5.21:** Polychoric Factor Analysis Yields the Same Results

VARIABLES	(1) Polychoric Political Participation, Dichotomous Index
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, Polychoric Index	0.553** (0.225)
Member, Ethnic Cultural Association	1.947*** (0.692)
Canton of Bern	-2.178* (1.133)
Constant	-2.837 (4.263)
Observations	115
Pseudo-R2	0.388
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant results displayed.

**Table 5.22:** Item Response Theory Based Index of Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate, IRT	0.513* (0.277)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.152** (0.0726)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	2.648** (1.300)
Sunni Muslim	-2.195** (0.968)
Member, Union	1.500** (0.746)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	2.037*** (0.648)
Member, Religious Organization	1.164* (1.098)
Canton of Bern	-1.119* (0.675)
Constant	-4.659* (2.644)
Observations	128
Pseudo-R2	0.322
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted from regression. Only significant variables shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Chapter 6**

# **Political Participation and Ethnic and Religious Group Linked Fate**

### **6.1 Introduction**

In Chapter 5, I argued that pan-immigrant linked fate correlates positively and significantly with Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants' probability of political participation across the three study cantons. To reiterate, I focused on immigrants' non-electoral political participation—namely, their participation in petitions, protests, boycotts, and volunteer activities. This correlation was robust to differences in immigrants' demographic characteristics and the integration contexts in which they reside, suggesting that pan-immigrant linked fate might have an effect on participation that extends beyond the scope of the extant literature. Furthermore, I found tentative evidence that pan-immigrant linked fate may increase individuals' probability of participation by increasing immigrants' likelihood of mobilization by other immigrants as well as by raising their internal efficacy. These findings were consistent with hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. These and other key hypotheses from Chapter 2 are summarized in Table 6.1 below.

In this chapter, I will again test these hypotheses, this time with reference to more narrowly-defined group identities. First, I examine whether ethnic group linked fate—a sense of politicized



**Table 6.1:** Summary of Hypotheses

	<b>Hypothesis</b>
<b>H1</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants' likelihood of non-electoral participation.</i>
<b>H2</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization by other group members or supporters.</i>
<b>H3</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' sense of internal and external efficacy.</i>
<b>H4</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.</i>
<b>H5</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.</i>
<b>H6</b>	<i>Linked fate's effect on participation will be greatest when it is based on affective identities that foster a sense of emotional connection with other group members.</i>

connection with members of one's own ethnic group—correlates with political participation probabilities among Italians, Kurds, and Turks. Ultimately, I find little evidence of a significant relationship along that vein. As I discussed above, given that specific ethnic identities are seldom salient in Swiss politics, this finding is not altogether surprising.

Second, I examine whether religious linked fate correlates with political participation among self-identified Sunni Muslims. I find strong evidence that Sunni Muslim immigrants' probability of participation correlates significantly and positively with their perceptions of linked fate, even after accounting for differences in their socioeconomic characteristics and the integration contexts in which they reside. This finding suggests that Sunni Muslim linked fate may be an important covariate of Muslim immigrants' political participation. It is also substantively important insofar as it suggests that Sunni Muslim identification is consistent with democratic participation, even in contexts where Muslims possess relatively few cultural and political rights. Further, I find tentative evidence that Muslim linked fate may increase individuals' likelihood of mobilization by other Muslims, although my results do not suggest that Muslim linked fate raises individuals' efficacy. These findings thus lend support to hypotheses 1 and 2.

I also consider whether Muslim linked fate may explain immigrants' political participation to a greater degree than existing accounts suggesting that members of marginalized groups participate in politics in order to strengthen their groups' relative positions and, ultimately, their self-esteem. Specifically, I gauge whether linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for Muslims' degree of religious identification and participation in religious organizations. I find that this is indeed the case, suggesting that self-esteem likely does not underscore the link between Muslim linked fate and participation. Furthermore, I find little evidence that Muslim identification facilitates Muslim immigrants' political participation by increasing the threat of in-group sanctions.


I conclude by comparing my findings pertaining to pan-immigrant, ethnic group, and Sunni Muslim linked fate. My results suggest that Sunni Muslim linked fate may correlate more strongly with individuals' likelihood of participation than pan-immigrant linked fate. This is consistent with the notion that linked fate may be more likely to spur participation when it is rooted in affective

(emotional) rather than cognitive, or legalistic, identities. Indeed, as I suggested earlier, Muslims' perceived connection to other Muslims has deep cultural and religious origins, while immigrants often perceive little connection with other immigrants beyond their shared status as foreigners. Correspondingly, my findings also support Hypothesis 6.

It is important to reiterate that each model in this chapter includes every control listed in this baseline model described in Chapter 5, including dummy variables. Likewise, unless otherwise noted, Italians serve as the ethnic reference category and Neuchâtel serves as the reference canton in all regressions. Additionally, all models in this dissertation cluster standard errors by survey venue unless otherwise noted.

## 6.2 Ethnic Group Linked Fate

I will first consider ethnic group linked fate. To begin, it is necessary to gauge whether respondents' perceptions of linked fate with their ethnic groups are dispersed enough to permit analysis of its relationship with political participation. To this effect, I plot a histogram of response frequencies of the standardized group linked fate index, as created by factor analysis, below.



**Figure 6.1:** Histogram, Ethnic Group Linked Fate

Overall, the distribution looks broadly similar to the distribution of the pan-immigrant linked

fate in the last chapter. Once again, responses are dispersed but there is a high concentration of responses at the higher-end of the linked fate scale, possibly suggesting acquiescence bias.

Analysis of the questions comprising the index suggests that 73.6 percent of respondents perceive shared interests on the basis of their national or ethnic origins. Further, 68.8 percent worry about their life chances when their co-ethnics are construed as a threat to Swiss jobs. Consistent with my expectations, fewer immigrants appear to perceive group linked fate than pan-immigrant linked fate.

At the group level, 67.4 percent of Italians sampled, 76.3 percent of Kurds, and 81.4 percent of respondents identifying as Turkish or mixed Turkish-Kurdish perceived shared interests on the basis of their national or ethnic origins. Further, 91.8 percent of Kurds and 79.7 percent of Turks and mixed Turks-Kurds worry about their life chances when their groups are construed as economic threats. In contrast, only 48.8 percent of Italians worried about their life chances when Italians are construed as a threat to Swiss jobs.

These results are somewhat surprising. Given that specific ethnic identities are not particularly salient in contemporary Swiss social debates relative to immigrant identities and Muslim identities, I would have expected fewer respondents to express ethnic group linked fate (Berkhout and Ruedin 2016). It is striking, however, that Italians expressed significantly lower degrees of ethnic linked fate than Turkish-born immigrants. This conforms with the idea that Italian identities have become less salient in Swiss politics over time and that polarization over Italian migration has given way to debates about the admission and integration of newer immigrant groups from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Maiolino 2011). In a focus group in Neuchâtel, some non-Sunni Muslim Kurds expressed concern that Swiss people cannot distinguish between different groups from the Middle East. Essentially, rising Islamophobia has led to unfocused discrimination against Middle Eastern groups regardless of their religious background. One man reported that he worries that he will face discrimination from employers if they see that his name is Middle Eastern. Given this context, and given relatively large Kurdish and Turkish populations in Switzerland, it is plausible that some Turks and Kurds may perceive their ethnic identities to be salient—perhaps inspiring

sentiments of ethnic linked fate.

Next, I calculate the probability that individuals will participate in politics at two distributions above and below mean levels of ethnic group linked fate. Table 6.2 below shows that the probability of participation rises slightly as ethnic group linked fate rises, although the confidence intervals suggest that this correlation may not be significant. Without further analysis, then, it is unclear whether ethnic group linked fate positively correlates with immigrants' probability of participation.

**Table 6.2:** Conditional Probabilities, Ethnic Group Linked Fate and Political Participation

Standard Deviations, Ethnic Group Linked Fate	Political Participation	Standard Error	95 Percent Confidence Interval	
-2	0.53	0.07	0.40	0.67
-1	0.58	0.04	0.49	0.66
Mean	0.62	0.03	0.56	0.67
1	0.65	0.04	0.57	0.73
2	0.69	0.06	0.57	0.81

### 6.2.1 No Significant Correlation between Ethnic Linked Fate and Participation

Using the baseline model I developed in Chapter 5, I will now examine the correlation between ethnic group linked fate and individuals' probability of participation. Here, I hope to gauge whether Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants perceiving linked fate with others from those countries are relatively likely to participate in politics. The ethnic linked fate index is constructed in the same manner as the pan-immigrant linked fate index. Political participation is measured using a dichotomous index that takes on a value of "1" if immigrants participated in non-electoral political activities in the 12 months prior to the survey.<sup>1</sup> I expect to find a positive and significant correlation between ethnic group linked fate and individuals' participation, although this correlation

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<sup>1</sup>The activities reflected in the index are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

may be weaker than observed in Chapter 5 given ethnic identities' lack of salience in contemporary Switzerland.

Like before, I estimate four logit models to gauge whether ethnic linked fate and participation are significantly correlated. The first model yields a simple correlation between ethnic group linked fate and participation without including any controls. The second model controls only for respondents' ethnicity, gender, and canton of residence. The third model includes a full battery of control variables, including citizenship status, years in Switzerland, age, religion, gender, education, and organizational membership ( unions, immigrant organizations, multicultural organizations, immigrant and other political organizations). Again, these variables reflect potential confounds, described above, that might bias estimation of the relationship between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation. The fourth model includes all of these controls as well as a battery of interviewer dummy variables and a variable indicating those surveys completed on paper rather than using a tablet. Again, in all four models, I cluster standard errors by venue. This accounts for correlations in individual-level errors at each venue. As before, I use Italians in the canton of Neuchâtel as a baseline for interpretation of dummy variables. The results are visible in Table 6.3 below.

The results of all four models above suggest that ethnic group linked fate is not correlated with political participation in the sample. The results also remain non-significant when I re-estimate the models using ordinary least squares and Firth rare events logit. The above models may be misspecified if the relationship between the binary dependent participation variable and the independent variables is not linear. To gauge whether this is the case, I test Models 3 and 4 for specification error using a 'link test.' Its results suggest that a logistic model is appropriate for this regression. Further, Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests suggest that the data fits the model well. I also examine the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each model and select model 4 for further analysis as it produces the smallest AIC.

Looking beyond ethnic linked fate, the results of this regression are quite interesting. First, relative to Italians, and all else equal, Turks and especially Kurds appear particularly likely to participate in Swiss politics (99 percent significance). This is consistent with findings in coun-

**Table 6.3:** No Significant Correlation between Ethnic Group Linked Fate and Prob. of Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation	(3) Prob. of Participation	(4) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate	0.168 (0.125)	0.0821 (0.0977)	0.156 (0.120)	0.116 (0.137)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish		1.384** (0.548)	1.590* (0.823)	6.963*** (1.820)
Identifies as Uniquely Turkish		-0.907*** (0.317)	0.534 (1.044)	4.385*** (1.418)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification		0.886 (0.574)	1.803* (1.096)	6.250*** (1.393)
Sunni Muslim			-1.637* (0.960)	-3.742*** (1.157)
Member, Union			1.605*** (0.353)	1.985*** (0.645)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.			0.746* (0.448)	1.205** (0.544)
Member, Religious Organization			0.149 (0.536)	1.323* (0.703)
Canton of Aargau		-0.977*** (0.286)	-1.089*** (0.344)	-1.444*** (0.475)
Canton of Bern		-0.832** (0.414)	-0.958* (0.524)	-0.375 (0.708)
Pencil and Paper Survey				2.214*** (0.531)
Constant	0.470*** (0.126)	1.167*** (0.281)	-0.829 (1.507)	-2.163 (1.784)
Observations	270	270	203	201
Pseudo-R2	0.00503	0.127	0.238	0.366
Canton Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

tries such as the Netherlands and Denmark suggesting that immigrants from Turkey are more politicized than many other immigrant groups (Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Togeby 1999). It is also not surprising that Kurds are quite active politically. Many Kurds in Switzerland were politically active in Turkey and arrived in Switzerland seeking asylum. Hence, their socialization in Turkey may have heightened their political interest relative to other groups. I suspect that the positive correlation between identification as Turkish and participation may be driven by Turkish religious minorities—namely Alevi (who constitute almost a third of the sample). Like Kurds, many Alevi perceive discrimination and persecution in Turkey, and their political socialization in Turkey may heighten their interest in Swiss politics. Indeed, adding a control variable accounting for Alevi identification both decreases the significance of Turkish ethnicity to 95 percent and decreases its substantive effect.

Second, the results suggest that self-identified Sunni Muslims may be less likely to participate in politics than non-Muslims, all else equal. It is possible that, relative to other religious groups, Muslims may feel alienated from Swiss society, decreasing their interest in Swiss politics.

Third, residents of Aargau may be less likely than others to participate in Swiss politics, all else equal (99 percent significance). This is consistent with the literature on political opportunity structures (e.g., Klandermans et al. 2005). Relative to Bern and especially Neuchâtel, the canton of Aargau has strict naturalization requirements and affords immigrants few opportunities for formal political participation. It is possible that the lack of opportunities for formal political membership in Aargau may limit immigrants' engagement.

Finally, membership in unions and ethnic organizations is positively correlated with political participation, all else equal (99 percent significance). Members of religious organizations may also be more likely to participate, but this effect is only significant at the 90 percent level. These findings are largely consistent with the literature linking civic involvement with political participation (Fenemma and Tillie 1999). Indeed, it is possible that organizational involvement enhances immigrants' knowledge of politics and social trust (Fenemma and Tillie 1999; Verba and Nie 1972). Organizational involvement may also have a direct effect on participation—indeed, several Italian



immigrants in La Chaux-de-Fonds, Neuchâtel, noted that the local priest drives elderly immigrants involved with church groups to polling stations, etc., to encourage their participation.

Next, I examine whether ethnic group linked fate correlates with individual modes of political participation, all else equal. I conduct logit regressions using individual forms of political behavior as dependent variables. I include all controls from the baseline model save interviewer dummies, which I omit due to multicollinearity. I also cluster standard errors by venue.

These regressions suggest that group linked fate is positively correlated with a number of political behaviors.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, it is positively correlated with volunteering for campaigns at the 95 percent level and with political donations at the 99 percent level. Furthermore, group linked fate may also positively correlate with participation in demonstrations, attending public hearings and discussions, and contacting politicians, although these relationships are only significant at the 90 percent level. Since logit coefficient estimates may be biased away from zero in the case of rare events, I re-estimate the models using rare events logit models as a robustness check. Upon running this model, the significance level of group linked fate's correlation with volunteering drops to 90 percent. Only political donations appear to have a highly significant and robust correlation with group linked fate.

It is possible that these estimates may be biased if errors are correlated across different forms of participation. To account for this possibility, I re-estimate these models under a seemingly-unrelated regressions framework accounting for correlation in errors across models. The results suggest that ethnic group linked fate is positively and significantly correlated with participation in demonstrations, at 95 percent, and with donations, at 90 percent.<sup>3</sup>

These results are somewhat surprising given that the index of ethnic linked fate does not

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<sup>2</sup>Hosmer-Lemeshow tests suggest that the baseline model fits well with respect to boycotts, demonstrations, contacting politicians, and attending informational meetings but poorly with respect to petitions, volunteering, and political donations. Further research may be necessary to gauge why this is the case. Importantly, it is possible that the correlations I find between ethnic linked fate and volunteering and donations may be driven by outliers.

<sup>3</sup>STATA unfortunately does not permit the calculation of goodness-of-fit indicators for Firth logistic regressions or seemingly-unrelated regressions

**Table 6.4:** Volunteering, Donations May Correlate with Ethnic Group Linked Fate

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Petitions	Boycotts	Political Volunteering	Demonstrations	Public Hearing or Discussion	Informational Meeting	Contact a Politician	Political Donations
Group Linked Fate, Index	0.0424 (0.197)	-0.0507 (0.196)	0.510** (0.243)	0.640* (0.356)	0.424* (0.241)	0.198 (0.222)	0.560* (0.316)	0.895*** (0.236)
Swiss Citizenship	0.390 (0.376)	0.701** (0.347)	-0.180 (0.666)	-0.779 (0.499)	-1.128** (0.511)	-0.444 (0.575)	0.0901 (0.794)	0.701 (0.650)
Years in Switzerland	0.0363* (0.0218)	0.0183 (0.0175)	0.0434 (0.0375)	-0.00137 (0.0312)	0.0326 (0.0337)	0.00457 (0.0278)	-0.0330 (0.0331)	0.0277 (0.0459)
Age	-0.00895 (0.0203)	-0.0457** (0.0203)	-0.0297 (0.0349)	0.0474 (0.0328)	-0.00464 (0.0349)	0.0107 (0.0287)	0.0537* (0.0292)	-0.0421 (0.0518)
Canton of Bern	-1.092** (0.472)	-0.472 (0.677)	-0.835 (0.643)	0.0125 (0.667)	-0.410 (0.632)	-1.491*** (0.575)	-0.360 (0.676)	0.245 (0.814)
Educational Attainment, Years	0.0369 (0.0342)	0.0401 (0.0284)	0.0916** (0.0443)	0.0916 (0.0558)	0.0938** (0.0451)	0.0592 (0.0486)	0.0636 (0.0428)	0.0819* (0.0474)
Canton of Aargau	-0.732** (0.356)	-0.239 (0.442)	-0.845 (0.664)	-0.547 (0.614)	-0.566 (0.537)	-1.049*** (0.368)	-2.297*** (0.551)	-2.306* (1.223)
Uniquely Kurdish	0.434 (0.595)	-1.001 (0.702)	2.679*** (0.939)	2.909*** (1.110)	1.089 (0.956)	1.261 (0.949)	2.757** (1.147)	-1.681 (1.506)
Uniquely Turkish	-1.098 (0.801)	-0.293 (0.959)	1.998* (1.125)	2.556*** (0.922)	0.553 (1.046)	-0.323 (0.975)	0.357 (1.445)	-3.635* (1.910)
Other, from Turkey	0.694 (0.661)	-0.274 (0.746)	1.699 (1.062)	2.020** (0.928)	1.041 (0.988)	1.993*** (0.739)	1.866* (1.034)	-2.038 (1.963)
Identify as Sunni Muslim	0.188 (0.763)	0.0753 (0.862)	-0.173 (0.674)	-0.885 (0.884)	-0.133 (0.795)	-0.0403 (0.697)	1.735** (0.692)	3.280*** (1.153)
Female	0.0243 (0.763)	-0.146 (0.862)	-1.047* (0.674)	-1.372*** (0.884)	0.217 (0.795)	-0.519 (0.697)	-1.438 (0.692)	-1.515* (1.153)

**Table 6.4:** Volunteering, Donations May Correlate with Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Contd.


Member, Member, Union	(0.473) 0.902**	(0.327) 1.194**	(0.621) 1.326***	(0.528) 1.110**	(0.428) 0.994**	(0.415) 0.893*	(0.941) 0.943	(0.828) 1.335**
Member, Ethnic Political Association	(0.390) 1.549**	(0.589) 1.289**	(0.506) 1.687**	(0.471) 2.043***	(0.392) 1.547***	(0.513) 1.707***	(0.593) 0.649	(0.643) 2.664***
Member, Multiethnic Cultural Association	(0.714) 1.725***	(0.566) -0.760	(0.663) 2.034***	(0.616) 1.636**	(0.354) 1.061*	(0.524) 0.302	(0.838) 1.597**	(0.946) 0.801
Member, Multiethnic Political Association	(0.567) -0.942	(0.601) 0.0336	(0.733) -0.295	(0.644) -0.596	(0.578) 0.479	(0.708) 1.506**	(0.731) 0.894	(0.604) -0.425
Member, Religious Organization	(0.654) -0.00479	(0.474) 0.224	(0.787) -0.517	(0.643) -1.028*	(0.507) -0.265	(0.638) -0.610*	(0.783) 0.0163	(0.709) -0.457
Constant	(0.380) -1.949* (1.067)	(0.539) -0.623 (1.051)	(0.622) -3.523* (1.850)	(0.582) -5.689*** (2.153)	(0.484) -3.339* (1.980)	(0.358) -2.748* (1.644)	(0.461) -5.989*** (2.029)	(0.600) -2.982 (2.531)
Observations	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232
Pseudo-R2	0.228	0.130	0.385	0.381	0.237	0.336	0.435	0.343
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted due to multicollinearity. Only statistically significant variables are displayed.

correlate significantly with the participation dummy. Repeating the regression of participation on group linked fate with group interactions (and including interviewer dummies and all controls from the baseline model) suggests that the positive correlation between donations, demonstrations, and group linked fate may be driven by Kurds (Table 6.5 below). Indeed, ethnic group linked fate correlates positively with political participation among Kurds—a result significant at the 90 percent level. No statistically significant relationship between these variables is observable for Italians or Turks. The marginal effects of ethnic group linked fate for self-identified Kurds and other groups are plotted in Figure 6.8. The 95 percent confidence intervals on the marginal effects rarely cross zero among Kurds, suggesting that linked fate is positively and significantly correlated with participation among that group. For other groups, however, the confidence intervals cross zero. Furthermore, average marginal effects are close to zero, indicating that linked fate may have a negligible correlation with participation. It thus appears that ethnic group linked fate may correlate with participation among Kurds but not among other groups.



**Figure 6.2:** Positive Correlation between Ethnic LF and Participation among Kurds

This result is reasonable. It is plausible that Kurds feel ethnic linked fate to a greater degree than others given that many arrived in Switzerland as asylum seekers. Many share histories of persecution prior to emigration. Strikingly, my survey data suggests that 90 percent of Kurds in the sample perceive that what happens to Kurds as a whole affects them personally—compared to

**Table 6.5:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate Positively Correlated with Kurdish Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate	0.156 (0.209)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	7.354*** (1.994)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish*Ethnic Group Linked Fate	1.038* (0.592)
Identifies as Uniquely Turkish	3.954*** (1.496)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	7.220*** (1.579)
Turkish Born, Other Identification*Ethnic Group Linked Fate	-2.716** (1.285)
Canton of Aargau	-1.601*** (0.510)
Sunni Muslim	-3.542*** (1.112)
Member, Union	1.864*** (0.612)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.235** (0.551)
Member, Religious Organization	1.397* (0.754)
Pencil and Paper Survey	2.259*** (0.564)
Constant	-1.824 (1.839)
Observations	201
Pseudo-R2	0.376
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant variables are displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

about 80 percent of Turks and less than half of Italians. Furthermore, at the time of the survey, Sibel Arslan, a Kurdish-origin politician from Basel had recently been elected to Switzerland's parliament. At least one Kurdish origin politician was also in local office in Bern at the time. Broadly speaking, it is possible that Kurds' socialization in Turkey, combined with campaigning by Kurdish-origin candidates at the time of the survey, underpins correlations between group linked fate and individual modes of participation.

I also examine the effects of interacting canton dummies with group linked fate. Interestingly, these interactions are not significantly correlated with political participation. This result is moderately surprising, as one might expect that group linked fate might influence participation when political opportunity structures are relatively open, as is the case in Neuchâtel. However, these results suggest that context does not necessarily moderate the effects of group linked fate on politics, at least in my sample (see Appendix, Table 6.18).

Finally, I run several robustness checks to assure that my finding that the ethnic linked fate index does not correlate significantly with participation is robust to diverse specifications. Unless otherwise noted, I include all controls from the baseline model in each robustness check and cluster standard errors by venue. First, I ipsatize responses to ethnic group linked fate questions, standardizing responses within individuals in order to correct for acquiescence bias. I then re-estimate the baseline model using an index of ethnic group linked fate based on ipsatized data. The results, visible in Appendix Table 6.19, suggest that no significant correlation exists between ethnic group linked fate and participation. Furthermore, I apply survey weights which correct for the relatively low numbers of women and young people in the sample. Here again, the relationship remains statistically non-significant (see Appendix Table 6.20). Third, I re-estimate the model using an index calculated via polychoric factor analysis, which takes into account the categorical nature of the survey questions. Once again, the results suggest no statistically significant correlation between the group linked fate index and participation (Appendix Table 6.21). Next, I use item-response theory (graded) to create another index of group linked fate. When I replace the index I constructed with factor analysis with this new IRT-based index, the results are once again statistically non-

significant (Appendix Table 6.22). Finally, as I did for pan-immigrant linked fate, I next test the stability of the model using k-fold cross-validation. Iterated attempts to fit the model to subsets of the survey sample produce large root mean squared errors. This suggests that this model may not be readily generalizable to immigrants outside of the immediate sample.

## **6.2.2 Anecdotal Evidence suggests that Ethnic Group Linked Fate is not Salient**

Anecdotes from interviews and focus groups suggested that, although some individuals perceive relative deprivation along group lines, ethnic identities are not currently salient in Swiss politics. Correspondingly, and consistently with my survey findings, anecdotal evidence does not suggest that ethnic linked fate encourages political participation. To reiterate, I use fictional names in this section to protect the anonymity of interviewees.

Accounts of ethnic relative deprivation were particularly common among Turkish-born participants. A number of participants noted that Turks face more institutional and societal discrimination than Western European immigrants with similar tenures in Switzerland. A Turkish man in Fribourg, for example, noted:

*“Italians, French people, etc. only need to wait 5 years for a permanent residence permit. We Turks need to wait 10 years. This is discrimination. . . the government still treats Turks like we are permanent foreigners.”* –Ekrem, Male, 45, Fribourg.

In general, however, immigrants from Turkey distinguished between the treatment of Western European and non-European migrants. They seldom referred to their specific origins in Turkey as source of discrimination.

Italian respondents, on the whole, did not perceive relative deprivation due to their origins. Most respondents mentioned that they had faced significant discrimination in the past, but Italians are now welcomed and respected. Indeed, one respondent exclaimed that "Everything has changed" relative to when he arrived in Switzerland. That said, several respondents expressed frustration that little political information is available in Italian.

*“Italian is a Swiss language, also. But it is not taught in schools, and it is difficult to participate in politics if you only speak Italian. If you speak a national language and you pay taxes, it is a sacrosanct right to have citizenship privileges.”* –Maria, 58, Bern.

The most explicit expressions of linked fate came from Kurdish respondents, although none reported explicit discrimination in Switzerland due to their Kurdish identity. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Kurds developed linked fate as a result of their experiences in Turkey. Several respondents also stressed that Kurdish identity implies a deep emotional bond.

*“If it’s your own people, you’re affected differently than, say, if something bad happens to a Frenchman. Because of cultural ties, you understand people. If something happens to Palestinians, I feel bad, but with other Kurds, there is a cultural tie. It doesn’t matter whether it’s Kurds in Syria or Kurds in Europe. . . it is a cultural and emotional connection.”* – Abdullah, Male, 70, Neuchâtel.

Ultimately, however, the bulk of respondents from both Turkey and Italy emphasized that their ethnic identities are rarely politically salient in contemporary Switzerland. To this effect, one older Italian man, a representative in Neuchâtel’s city council, remarked:

*“In the past, people were embarrassed to speak Italian in public. Today, that’s not the case. The reception is different. Everything has changed.”* – Giovanni, 70, Neuchâtel.

Likewise, a Turkish union leader in Aargau noted:

*“There is a hierarchy of bad immigrants. In the past, Italians were bad. In the 80s, it was the Turks. In the 90s, it was people from the Balkans. Now, the ‘least desired’ group is the Eritreans. It’s whoever is the biggest group at the time.”* –Şebnem, Female, 30s, Aargau.

A Kurdish woman in Bern also stated:

*“In the 1990s, asylum laws affected immigrants of certain immigrants more than others. They affected who [from families] could come. Currently, ethnicity is not important.”* – Dicle, 45, Bern.

Broadly, these anecdotes suggest that, although some individuals perceive a degree discrimination along ethnic lines, many immigrants no longer perceive that their ethnic identities are salient in Swiss politics. Instead, participants emphasized the salience of their immigration status and, when relevant, their origins in a Muslim country. This evidence is consistent with my finding that ethnic group linked fate has no significant correlation with political participation.




### 6.2.3 Interim Conclusion

Taken together, these results do not provide clear support for any of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 as applied to ethnic group linked fate. Instead, these results suggest that ethnic group linked fate may not significantly correlate with political participation among my target population.

## 6.3 Religious Linked Fate

### 6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Finally, I consider Sunni Muslim linked fate. As before, I first examine the distribution of religious linked fate perceptions across Sunni Muslim respondents. The histogram below shows a familiar pattern in that responses were dispersed but somewhat clustered toward the higher end of the linked fate scale.



**Figure 6.3:** Histogram, Sunni Muslim Linked Fate

Continuing, 77.1 percent of Sunni Muslims sampled perceived that Muslims share interests. For comparison, only 32.7 percent of Roman Catholics perceived shared interests. Among those who professed to be ‘very religious,’ 90.9 percent of Sunni Muslims and 54.1 percent of Roman Catholics expressed shared interests on the basis of religion. This is consistent with my expectation that Sunni Muslims would be likely to perceive linked fate given the high degree of salience of

Muslim identities in Swiss politics.

These figures conform to my expectations. Given that Swiss debates over integration tend to focus on Muslims and immigrants as a collective (*Ausländer*), I expected that many respondents would perceive linked fate along these dimensions. Indeed, a majority of respondents perceived pan-immigrant linked fate, and a majority of Sunni Muslim respondents experience linked fate with other Muslims.

I next calculate Muslim respondents' probability of participation at two distributions above and below mean levels of pan-immigrant linked fate. Table 6.6 below suggests that these individuals' probability of participation rises slightly as religious linked fate rises, although the confidence intervals suggest that this correlation may not be significant. Without further analysis, then, it is unclear whether Muslim linked fate significantly correlates with participation.

**Table 6.6:** Conditional Probabilities of Participation

Standard Deviations, Sunni Muslim Linked Fate	Political Participation	Standard Error	95 Percent Confidence Interval	
-2	0.36	0.11	0.14	0.58
-1	0.37	0.07	0.23	0.52
Mean	0.38	0.04	0.29	0.47
1	0.39	0.04	0.30	0.48
2	0.40	0.08	0.25	0.55

### **6.3.2 Muslim Linked Fate Correlates Positively and Significantly with Participation**

Next, I analyze the effect of religious linked fate on individuals' probability of participation for all respondents identifying as Sunni Muslim. As explained above, I measure immigrants' non-electoral political participation through a dichotomous index. I expect that Sunni Muslims possessing linked fate may participate more often than those who do not. Here, I test Hypothesis 1 with reference to Muslim linked fate. Like before, I estimate four models. The first model estimates

a simple correlation between individual Muslims' perceptions of religious linked fate and their likelihood of political participation. In the second model, I control only for respondents' ethnicity, gender, and canton of residence, setting self-identified Turks as the reference group. In the third model, I add education and civic participation. In the final model, I include interviewer dummy variables. The results from each of these models are displayed in Table 6.7 below.

The results from Model 1 suggest that Muslim linked fate does not significantly correlate with individuals' likelihood of participation before accounting for differences in immigrants demographic characteristics, cantons of residence, and membership in civic associations. Upon controlling for these factors in Model 3, however, this correlation becomes significant and positive. Further, it remains significant upon adding interviewer dummy variables in Model 4.

As before, the Akaike Information Criterion suggests that Model 3 may model population parameters most accurately. Further, the results suggest that interviewers' identification as Sunni Muslim may correlate with reported participation, as several interviewer dummy variables are significant. A link test suggests using a logistic model is appropriate, and a Hosmer-Lemeshow test suggests that the data fit the model well. For these reasons, I will proceed with analysis of Model 3. The results of that model suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Muslim linked fate roughly doubles immigrants' odds of participation (significant at the 99 percent level). The fact that Muslim linked fate only gains significance after controlling for organizational memberships suggest that linked fate may correlate with civic participation. That said, it is correlated with individuals' probability political participation after controlling for civic memberships.

These results are also displayed in Figure 6.4. This figure shows the predicted probabilities of political participation at one and two standard deviations of religious linked fate, above and below its mean, when all control variables in Model 4 are held constant at their means. The lack of overlap between the 95 percent confidence intervals on predicted probabilities of participation at relatively high and low levels of linked fate suggest a positive correlation between participation and linked fate.


**Table 6.7:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate Correlated with Prob. of Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation	(3) Prob. of Participation	(4) Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.0372 (0.182)	0.181 (0.177)	0.653*** (0.193)	0.740*** (0.252)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish		0.650 (0.687)	1.336* (0.776)	2.318*** (0.774)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification		0.649* (0.367)	0.517 (0.541)	0.593 (0.645)
Educational Attainment (Years)			0.0448 (0.0582)	0.0803* (0.0473)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.			0.661 (0.439)	1.083* (0.635)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.			1.850*** (0.707)	1.929** (0.750)
Member, Multi-ethnic Political Org.			1.347** (0.549)	1.029** (0.470)
Canton of Aargau		-0.821* (0.431)	-1.310*** (0.479)	-1.804*** (0.586)
Canton of Bern		-0.613 (0.710)	-1.686 (1.216)	-3.523*** (1.310)
Constant	-0.484** (0.190)	-0.0626 (0.395)	-1.992 (1.865)	-1.555 (2.260)
Observations	153	153	130	128
Pseudo-R2	0.000205	0.0452	0.200	0.274
Canton Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies not shown. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



**Figure 6.4:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate Positively and Significantly Correlated with Prob. of Participation

Looking at other covariates of participation, the results of this regression generally conform to expectations. Once again, respondents in Bern and Aargau appear to participate less than residents of Neuchâtel, all else equal. As Bern and Aargau possess relatively strict citizenship rules and grant immigrants few formal political rights, this finding is once again consistent with the literature on political opportunity structures. In addition, the results suggest that individuals identifying uniquely as Kurds may participate more, on average, than those identifying uniquely as Turks. As many Kurds moved to Switzerland for political reasons (while many Turks, in contrast, moved to Switzerland as guestworkers), it is likely that this result is driven by their socialization in Turkey. Importantly, however, Kurds only constitute a small share of the Muslim sample. Finally, membership in ethnic and pan-immigrant political organizations correlates positively with participation at the 95 percent level. The results also suggest a positive correlation between participation and membership in ethnic cultural associations, but this is only significant at the 90 percent level. Again, these results are consistent with the argument that membership in community organizations increases immigrants' political engagement (Fenemma and Tillie 1999). It is also worthwhile to note that Muslim women appear to participate less than Muslim men, but this result is not statistically significant.

Notably, the correlation between immigrants' participation and associational memberships,

and between immigrants' participation and cantons of residence, is stronger than that of Muslim linked fate. This suggests that extant approaches account for a substantial share of variation in immigrants' participation. That said, the fact that Muslim linked fate remains significant after accounting for these covariates may suggest an effect that extends beyond existing accounts.

For robustness, I again estimate a rare events logit regression of participation on Muslim linked fate, including all controls (except interviewer dummies due to multicollinearity). Again, I cluster standard errors by venue. The results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Muslim linked fate may increase individuals' odds of participation by 72 percent. An ordinary least squared regression also suggests that this correlation is positive and significant at the 99 percent level.

I next consider the individual modes of political participation that make up my index. Regressing each mode on Muslim linked fate and a battery of controls suggests that Muslim immigrants who perceive shared interests with other Muslims may be more likely than others to participate in boycotts (significant at the 99 percent level) and sign petitions (significant at the 90 percent level).<sup>4</sup> Here, I exclude interviewer dummies due to multicollinearity. Once again, I cluster standard errors by venue. When I estimate a rare events logit model to account for the small sample size and low frequency of specific modes of participation, I find that only the correlation between Muslim linked fate and boycott participation remains significant (at the 99 percent level). All other coefficients are positive (except donations), yet non-significant. The results are displayed in Table 6.8 below.

Again, it is possible that these estimates may be biased if errors correlate across participation modes. Accounting for this possibility, I re-estimate these models using a seemingly-unrelated regressions framework. In this specification, Muslim linked fate again only correlates positively and

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<sup>4</sup>Hosmer-Lemeshow tests for each model suggest good model fits for donations, volunteering, signing petitions, and participation in demonstrations, informational meetings, and public hearings. Given that the model fit for boycotts is poor, it is possible that the strong correlation between linked fate and boycotts may be driven by outliers. Further testing may be necessary to gauge the robustness of this finding.

**Table 6.8:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate Associated with Boycott Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Petitions	(2) Boycotts	(3) Political Volunteerin g	(4) Demonstrat ions	(5) Public Hearings or Discussions	(6) Informatio nal Meetings	(7) Contact a Politician	(8) Political Donations
Religious Linked Fate, Muslims	0.776* (0.431)	0.936*** (0.280)	0.299 (0.539)	0.464 (0.311)	0.367 (0.450)	0.318 (0.255)	0.657 (0.541)	-0.0126 (0.612)
Swiss Citizenship	1.880* (1.057)	1.213** (0.506)	1.482 (1.107)	0.391 (0.553)	0.455 (0.839)	1.198 (0.851)	1.653* (0.879)	0.520 (0.864)
Years in Switzerland	-0.0260 (0.0291)	0.0278 (0.0635)	0.125*** (0.0426)	-0.0139 (0.0519)	0.0316 (0.0742)	0.0795 (0.0527)	-0.0208 (0.0689)	0.0323 (0.0466)
Age	-0.0280 (0.0472)	-0.0305 (0.0702)	-0.153* (0.0820)	0.0582 (0.0515)	-0.0542 (0.113)	-0.105** (0.0461)	-0.0501 (0.0597)	-0.0280 (0.0817)
Uniquely Kurdish	1.377* (0.716)	-0.248 (0.526)	1.181 (1.842)	2.858** (1.119)	1.519 (1.073)	1.001 (0.909)	0.455 (0.981)	2.002 (1.620)
Other, from Turkey	2.112** (0.867)	-0.0744 (1.141)	-0.430 (1.391)	1.021 (1.312)	-0.0963 (1.126)	0.632** (0.302)	0.326 (0.843)	-0.315 (1.182)
Educational Attainment (years)	-0.0587 (0.108)	0.00238 (0.110)	0.129 (0.164)	-0.0314 (0.0917)	0.0860 (0.111)	-0.0310 (0.0935)	-0.169 (0.136)	0.136** (0.0685)
Female	-0.638 (0.941)	0.370 (0.400)	-0.731 (0.689)	-0.574 (0.951)	0.194 (0.965)	-2.702** (1.296)	-1.956** (0.997)	-0.0143 (0.818)
Member, Member, Union	2.557*** (0.844)	1.634*** (0.475)	2.231*** (0.410)	2.128*** (0.623)	1.881*** (0.635)	0.638 (0.899)	2.918*** (0.961)	0.638 (0.899)
Member, Ethnic Cultural	0.608 (0.608)	0.658 (0.658)	-0.125 (0.608)	0.718 (0.718)	-1.489 (1.489)	0.0806 (0.0806)	-0.792 (0.792)	0.0806 (0.0806)

**Table 6.8:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate Associated with Boycott Participation, Contd.

Association	(0.693)	(0.699)	(0.867)	(0.793)	(1.370)	(0.820)	(0.691)
Member, Ethnic Political Association	2.059***	2.317***	0.556	2.626***	1.043	1.361	0.865
Member, Religious Association	(0.582)	(0.562)	(0.650)	(0.901)	(0.636)	(1.028)	(0.920)
	0.337	-0.857	0.144	-1.899	1.287	-1.147**	-0.0950
Member, Multicultural Political Association	(0.843)	(0.835)	(0.805)	(1.196)	(1.093)	(0.498)	(0.782)
	0.410	-0.417	3.038***	3.176**	3.503***	1.371	2.409
Constant	(0.555)	(0.415)	(0.835)	(1.296)	(0.948)	(0.879)	(1.574)
	-2.633	-2.631	-2.572	-6.418**	-4.104	0.793	-4.429
	(2.008)	(1.926)	(5.558)	(2.831)	(3.030)	(1.475)	(3.407)
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	128	146
Pseudo-R2	0.338	0.218	0.356	0.511	0.373	0.276	0.101
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



significantly with boycott participation, at 95 percent.

### 6.3.3 Interaction Effects

I next consider whether the strength and significance of the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation is conditional on respondents' ethnic groups. Given that only 14 Kurds in the sample identified as Sunni Muslim (with most either identifying as secular or Alevi), however, it makes little sense to gauge whether the effects of Muslim linked fate are conditional upon ethnicity. Indeed, almost all Sunni Muslims in the sample identified as Turks. Indeed, analysis require a larger and more diverse sample of Muslims.

It is possible, however, that this correlation may be conditional on respondents' cantons of residence. Indeed, I expect that the effect of Muslim linked fate on participation may be highest in Neuchâtel, which sponsors periodic discussion groups related to multiculturalism and religious dialogue to a greater extent than Aargau and Bern. When I re-estimate the model including interactions between Muslim linked fate and cantonal dummies (again including all controls from the baseline model, including interviewer dummies), I find that the interaction between linked fate and the Aargau dummy variable is not significantly related to participation (see Table 6.9 below).<sup>5</sup> This suggests that the effect of Muslim linked fate on participation may not vary across Aargau and Neuchâtel. Correspondingly, this finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Importantly, only 15 respondents in Canton Bern identified as Sunni Muslim, limiting my ability to accurately gauge the correlation between linked fate and participation for respondents there.

This finding is surprising, as I expected that the relationship between Muslim linked fate and participation would be stronger in Neuchâtel than in Aargau. That said, this is an interesting finding insofar as it suggests that closed political opportunity structures and limited multiculturalism may not deter Muslims from political engagement when they perceive linked fate. This suggests that

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<sup>5</sup>A Hosmer-Lemeshow test also suggests that this model fits the data well

closed, non-multicultural contexts may not discourage Muslim political engagement when Muslims perceive a high degree of linked fate.

Importantly, Sunni Muslims were sampled in only four municipalities. For this reason, I cannot test whether the correlation is conditional upon municipal political institutions or cultures (Hypotheses 4 and 5). Similarly, to my knowledge, the Swiss government does not collect data on the share of Sunni Muslims in municipal populations. Correspondingly, I cannot gauge whether these results remain robust after controlling for Sunni Muslims' geographic concentration.

### **6.3.4 Mechanisms**

Next, I examine the mechanisms through which pan-Muslim linked fate may influence political participation. Again, I expect that pan-Muslim linked fate increases Muslim immigrants' participation by raising their likelihood of in-group mobilization and boosting their efficacy. To test these hypotheses, I first estimate a path analysis model (a form of structural equation model) examining whether pan-Muslim linked fate increases immigrants' participation by enhancing their probability of mobilization by other immigrants (Hypothesis 2).<sup>6</sup> I include all controls from the baseline model. Path analysis suggests that this may indeed be the case, implying that Muslim linked fate may have an indirect effect on participation through mobilization (significant at the 90 percent level) (Figure 6.5). It is important to reiterate that this analysis suggests a correlation rather than causation. That said, it is plausible that some of the effect of Muslim linked fate on participation stems from individuals' increased likelihood of mobilization. I thus cannot categorically confirm or reject Hypothesis 2, but this finding affirms its plausibility.

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<sup>6</sup>Data on mobilization was recorded only for immigrants who participated in politics within the last year. Consequently, the dependent variable here constitutes a one-to-eight count of individuals' acts of political participation. To check robustness, also, I divided individuals into 3 and 4 bins according to their frequency of participation. The results hold


**Table 6.9:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate's Effect Consistent across Cantons

(1)	
VARIABLES	Prob. of Participation
Canton of Aargau*Muslim Linked Fate	0.270 (0.462)
Canton of Aargau	-1.983*** (0.625)
Canton of Bern	-3.554*** (1.274)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.0813* (0.0452)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	2.283*** (0.781)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.086* (0.636)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	1.927*** (0.723)
Member, Multi-ethnic Political Org.	1.035** (0.455)
Member, Religious Organization	-0.320 (1.022)
Constant	-1.565 (2.245)
Observations	128
Pseudo-R2	0.274
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant variables displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Note: Controls omitted from diagram for simplicity.**

**Figure 6.5:** Sunni Muslim Linked Fate May Increase Participation by Increasing Prob. of Mobilization

I next test my hypothesis that linked fate inspires participation by enhancing individuals' sense of efficacy. Upon performing path analyses examining form of efficacy in turn, I conclude that neither external collective efficacy nor internal efficacy appears to mediate the relationship between Muslim linked fate and participation. Hence, this data does not lend support to Hypothesis 3.

Broadly, these results suggest that further research will be necessary in order to determine why Muslim linked fate correlates positively with participation. Indeed, the path analysis diagram above suggests that mobilization accounts for only part of the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation. Looking beyond these factors, it is plausible that Muslim participation may also be undergirded by a sense of responsibility to improve the lives of Muslims in Switzerland. Unfortunately, data limitations limit my ability to test this supposition at present.

Alternatively, it is possible that Muslims possessing linked fate participate in order to enhance their self-esteem. As identification as Muslim is stigmatized in Switzerland, individuals perceiving linked fate may be inspired to participate in order to raise their self-esteem by improving the social position of Muslims. If this is the case, I would expect that highly religious Muslims would participate more often. Likewise, I would expect that individuals participating in Muslim organizations might participate more often than others.

To assess whether this is the case, I estimate two additional models. The first includes

an interaction between Muslims' self-expressed religiosity and degree of linked fate. The second includes an interaction between Muslims' participation in religious organizations and degree of linked fate. Both models include all controls from the baseline model, including immigrant dummies. Both models also cluster standard errors by venues. The results are visible in Table 6.10 below.

Strikingly, neither interaction term correlates significantly with participation. Contrary to my expectations, it does not appear that more religious Muslims perceiving linked fate are more likely to participate than less-religious Muslims.

I also estimate the model including religiosity and participation in Muslim organizations as controls rather than interactions. Surprisingly, neither self-expressed religiosity nor participation in Muslim organizations correlates significantly with participation. Muslim linked fate also remains significant upon adding these controls.<sup>7</sup> These results are visible in Table 6.11 below.

Moreover, upon re-estimating this model among all Turkish-born respondents and controlling for Sunni Muslim and Alevi identification, I find no significant correlation between religious identification and participation.<sup>8</sup> Religious linked fate, however, remains significant across the entire Turkish-born sample. Broadly, these findings suggest that the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation may not stem from Muslims immigrants' desire to raise self-esteem or express loyalty to their co-religionists. Indeed, if this were the case, I would expect to see a direct correlation between identification and participation.<sup>9</sup>

I next estimate the model without linked fate to gauge whether individuals' religiosity or participation in religious organizations correlates with political participation, all else equal. Furthermore, I estimate two additional models interacting these two variables with Muslim relative deprivation (i.e., whether Muslims believe they have fewer opportunities than other groups). These

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<sup>7</sup>Hosmer-Lemeshow tests also indicate good fits for both models

<sup>8</sup>Ideally, I would include a variable measuring the strength of individuals' identification as Muslim here rather than a categorical identification variable. That said, I did not include this in the survey given the difficulty of asking questions both about this and about religiosity.

<sup>9</sup>Once again, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that this model fits the data well.

**Table 6.10:** No Interaction Effect of Linked Fate and Religiosity on Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.507 (0.792)	0.908** (0.364)
Muslim Linked Fate*Religiosity	0.0349 (0.236)	
Muslim Linked Fate*Member, Religious Organization		-0.474 (0.638)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	3.634*** (0.754)	2.471*** (0.719)
Unemployed	-1.689*** (0.623)	-1.284* (0.683)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.747*** (0.620)	1.144* (0.612)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	2.092*** (0.780)	1.943** (0.781)
Member, Multi-ethnic Political Org.	1.161* (0.594)	1.100** (0.448)
Canton of Aargau	-1.441** (0.595)	-1.821*** (0.611)
Canton of Bern	-4.595*** (0.973)	-3.521*** (1.363)
Constant	-2.072 (2.867)	-1.599 (2.177)
Observations	115	128
Pseudo-R2	0.311	0.276
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables omitted. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table 6.11:** Correlation Robust upon Controlling for Religiosity

(1)	
VARIABLES	Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.642** (0.324)
Religiosity	0.0892 (0.258)
Member, Religious Organization	-0.836 (0.946)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	3.701*** (1.015)
Unemployed	-1.699*** (0.611)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.746*** (0.615)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	2.110*** (0.778)
Member, Multi- ethnic Political Org.	1.159** (0.588)
Canton of Aargau	-1.448** (0.607)
Canton of Bern	-4.678*** (1.109)
Constant	-2.161 (2.663)
Observations	115
Pseudo-R2	0.311
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 6.12:** Correlation is Robust upon Accounting for Religious Identification

(1)	
VARIABLES	Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.393** (0.191)
Identifies as Sunni Muslim	-0.847 (0.865)
Identifies as Alevi	-0.277 (0.818)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	1.328*** (0.485)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	0.867* (0.478)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.0914** (0.0389)
Member, Union	1.415*** (0.481)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.011*** (0.390)
Member, Multi- ethnic Political Org.	1.284** (0.579)
Canton of Aargau	-1.090** (0.470)
Canton of Bern	-1.151* (0.619)
Constant	-0.983 (1.191)
Observations	221
Pseudo-R2	0.308
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



models yield only one significant result: religiosity is negatively and significantly correlated with political participation among those perceiving relative deprivation. Upon re-adding linked fate into the model, I find that the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation remains positive and significant (at the 90 percent) level even after including this interaction. This is interesting, as social identity theory would predict that strongly-identified Muslims perceiving relative deprivation might participate in order to enhance Muslims' social position and, ultimately, their individual self-esteem. My results instead imply that linked fate can motivate Muslims' participation, regardless of their level of religiosity. The linked fate concept may thus provide new insight into the mechanisms linking identification and participation.

Finally, it is important to consider whether Muslim linked fate may increase Muslims' participation by increasing their fear of in-group sanctions. Again, if this is the case, linked fate might have a weaker effect on participation as individuals' political participation increases. Namely, sanction threats should be most effective among those likely to gain less personal utility from political participation. To gauge whether this may be the case, I estimate two final models. First, I re-estimate the baseline model while controlling for variation in individuals' interest in Swiss politics. Second, I include an interaction term multiplying Muslim linked fate by an index measuring individuals' self-expressed degree of interest in Swiss politics. As above, I include all controls from the baseline model. The results from these two models are displayed in Table 6.13 below.

The results from the first model suggest that the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation remains significant upon accounting for respondents' political interest. The second model suggests that the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation may strengthen with individuals' political interest. This result implies that linked fate may not drive up participation by increasing Muslims' fear of sanctions. If that were the case, we might instead expect a negative interactive effect of political interest and linked fate on political participation.

**Table 6.13:** Correlation Stronger as Political Interest Rises

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.634** (0.275)	-0.480 (0.592)
Level of Political Interest	1.147*** (0.306)	0.784* (0.404)
Muslim Linked Fate*Level of Political Interest		0.510* (0.301)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	2.291*** (0.748)	2.527*** (0.826)
Unemployed	-1.247** (0.521)	-1.200** (0.527)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.088* (0.585)	0.978** (0.485)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	1.747*** (0.611)	1.931*** (0.638)
Canton of Aargau	-1.557*** (0.432)	-1.725*** (0.471)
Canton of Bern	-3.132** (1.228)	-4.423*** (1.417)
Constant	-2.405 (2.934)	-1.994 (2.813)
Observations	128	128
Pseudo-R2	0.359	0.368
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### 6.3.5 Robustness Checks

In this section, I will address potential model specification problems that might bias the results above. Unless otherwise noted, all models in this section include every control from the baseline model, including interviewer dummies. Likewise, standard errors are clustered by venue.

First, it is necessary to consider whether the Muslim linked fate index may simply proxy Muslim respondents' perceptions of discrimination. To gauge whether this is the case, I re-estimate the baseline model, including a variable indicating whether respondents believe Muslims face greater obstacles to success in Switzerland than non-Muslims. The results, displayed in Table 6.14 below, suggest that the correlation between Muslim linked fate and political participation remains significant after accounting for perceptions of discrimination. Notably, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates strong model fit.

Next, I apply nonresponse and poststratification weights to the regression to account for the lack of women in the sample relative to the population. I include all controls from the baseline model, including interviewer dummies, and cluster standard errors by venue. The weighted regression results, displayed in Table 6.14 below, suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Muslim linked fate nearly doubles individuals' odds of participation.<sup>10</sup> This result suggests that Muslim linked fate may be correlated with participation among the broader population of Muslims in Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. Interestingly, the interaction between gender and Muslim linked fate is significantly and positively correlated with participation in the weighted regression, suggesting that linked fate may have a particularly pronounced effect on women's participation. Perhaps controversies over headscarves in Switzerland have a particularly strong mobilizing effect on Sunni Muslim women—at least on Muslim women from Turkey.

As before, also, I apply k-fold cross-validation to assess the stability of my model—an

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<sup>10</sup>STATA does not permit the calculation of Hosmer-Lemeshow tests on weighted data. Corresponding, the weighted model's goodness of fit is uncertain.

**Table 6.14:** Correlation is Robust Upon Accounting for Relative Deprivation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	1.177** (0.460)
Muslims Face Unique Obstacles	0.322 (0.247)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	1.858* (1.126)
Canton of Aargau	-1.915** (0.895)
Constant	-6.110** (2.403)
Observations	93
Pseudo-R2	0.350
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummy variables omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 6.15:** Results with Poststratification Weights: Linked Fate May Have a Stronger Effect on Muslim Women's Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation	(2) Prob. of Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.676*** (0.200)	0.552*** (0.203)
Female*Muslim Linked Fate		0.346** (0.158)
Educational Attainment (Years)	0.101** (0.0510)	0.106** (0.0518)
Member, Ethnic Group Political Org.	2.260** (0.927)	2.211** (0.935)
Member, Multi-ethnic Political Org.	1.120* (0.587)	1.105* (0.605)
Canton of Aargau	-1.450** (0.604)	-1.403** (0.607)
Constant	-1.265 (1.892)	-1.188 (1.939)
Observations	128	128
Pseudo-R2	0.267	0.268
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

acute concern given the small sample size and relatively high number of parameters. Once again, k-fold cross validation yields high root mean squared errors, suggesting that my findings may not be broadly generalizable outside of my sample. Given the high degree of diversity even among Turkish Muslims in Switzerland (there are three major Turkish Islamic umbrella organizations), this is not very surprising.

Of course, it is even less clear whether these results might be generalizable to non-Turkish Muslim groups. Muslim immigrants adhere to a variety of branches of Islam and were socialized in a broad array of political systems, ranging from democratic to authoritarian. Perceptions of linked fate may correlate more weakly with participation among Muslim immigrants from dictatorships or failed states where they had few opportunities to develop civic skills (and may not have developed a sense that they can improve their situation through political engagement). Muslim linked fate may also be conditioned by the race and appearance of Muslim immigrants. Further, women from some groups do not wear headscarves (headscarves were common among women in my sample), whereas women from some countries and regions may wear veils that partially or fully covered their faces. That said, I expect that many immigrants that identify as Muslim would perceive at least some degree of linked fate given the recent rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric across Europe and North America. Nonetheless, scholars would do well to undertake further studies gauging the extent of, and political effects of, linked fate among other Muslim immigrant groups.

### **6.3.6 Anecdotal Evidence**

Although few participants in my focus groups and interviews identified as Sunni Muslim, the testimonies of those I spoke with are consistent with perceptions of linked fate.<sup>11</sup> Several participants also noted that, even though they do not actively practice Islam, it is part of their heritage and background and they are upset by the treatment of other Turks and Kurds that do.

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<sup>11</sup>Once again, all names here are fictional so as to protect the anonymity of interviewees

A non-practicing Sunni Muslim Turkish activist in her 30s, for example, noted that many young practicing Muslims she knows “felt marginalized” after the referendum banning minarets passed in 2009. Another interviewee highlighted that a number of her Muslim friends and colleagues perceive unfair treatment on the basis of their religion. She noted:

*“I know a woman who used to wear a headscarf. She worked in a nursing home. She was told she couldn’t keep working with her headscarf, so she took it off. She was told, ‘Either take it off or leave this job.’” - Yağmur, 42, Female, Bern.*

A Turkish man who identified as a non-religious Sunni Muslim and who works as a liaison between the municipal government and immigrant parent associations also remarked:

*“The minaret ban made Muslims conscious that their culture is not admissible here. They are made to feel like they need to change themselves. They can live their day to day lives as long as they don’t remind people that they are Muslim.” Ekrem, Male, 45, Fribourg.*

He also noted that he was bothered by the fact that adherence to Islam makes people “permanent foreigners” in the eyes of the Swiss government. Several Muslims I spoke with at a mosque in Wohlen, Aargau, also noted that many Swiss people think they are threatening and associate them with terrorism. One young second-generation Turk noted that men wearing skull caps (*taqiyah*) and beards are treated with suspicion in Switzerland, and ask why many non-Muslims “hate” Muslims. He noted that people who “look like terrorists” to Europeans make him think of his grandfather, father, and uncle. One of the leaders of the same mosque noted that he participates in politics in order to improve the image of Muslims in Switzerland.

Similarly, many respondents from Turkey, including those who did not identify as practicing Sunni Muslims, also experienced profound feelings of exclusion due to their Middle Eastern origins and expressed a sense of solidarity with other immigrants from Muslim countries. These quotes highlight the salience of Islam in contemporary Switzerland.

*“Kurds, Afghans, others who come from Muslim countries in the Middle East. It’s really hard for all of us. You get a feeling that you are very foreign.” – Ahmet, Male, 40s, Neuchâtel.*

*“At the beginning, people pre-judge me because of my appearance. They peg me as an extremist. They are surprised I speak fluent French.”- Cem, 33, Male, La Chaux-de-Fonds.*

*“There is a lot of prejudice, especially towards people coming from countries like ours. They think they know everything about us. They look down upon us and expect that we are uneducated and unskilled.” –Yağmur, 42, Female, Bern.*

*“I am a naturalized Swiss citizen and I still feel like a second-class citizen in my daily life. People assume we came here for economic reasons and judge us.” – Belgin, Female, 20s, Neuchâtel.*

These anecdotes neither explicitly demonstrate that Muslims perceive linked fate nor that such perceptions drive political involvement. That said, they are consistent with the presence of religious linked fate. Many Muslims, even if they do not practice, perceive discrimination on the basis of their Muslim origins and feel that their background influences how they are treated by the Swiss public and the Swiss government. Furthermore, these anecdotes suggest that Muslim identification is often affective. Even non-practicing Muslims feel a sense of attachment to Islam insofar as it represents their family’s origins and traditions.

### **6.3.7 Interim Conclusion**

Overall, these results suggest that Muslim linked fate may spur political participation among Sunni Muslim immigrants, consistently with Hypothesis 1. My findings suggest a strong positive correlation between these variables that is robust to differences in integration policy contexts. This has important implications, as it implies that linked fate may increase Muslims’ participation even when they lack few formal political or cultural rights. Importantly, I find little evidence that Muslims participate in order to raise their self-esteem or in order to avoid in-group sanctions. Instead, I find preliminary evidence that Muslim linked fate may increase individuals’ probability of in-group mobilization, potentially inspiring political engagement. That said, further research is necessary to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 definitively.

In summary, the analysis above provides preliminary evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 from Chapter 2. For clarity, I reiterate these hypotheses and conclusions in Table 6.16 below.



**Table 6.16:** Summary of Findings

	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Significance Level</b>
<b>H1</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate, regardless of the identity dimensions along which they are perceived, will be positively correlated with individual immigrants' likelihood of non-electoral participation.</i>	95
<b>H2</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization by other group members or supporters.</i>	95
<b>H3</b>	<i>All else equal, sentiments of linked fate influence political participation by increasing immigrants' sense of internal and external efficacy.</i>	Insignificant
<b>H4</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that actively promote interaction between immigrants by funding immigrant organizations and organizing discussion groups.</i>	Insignificant
<b>H5</b>	<i>All else equal, linked fate will have a greater effect on participation in polities that regularly plan public political events and possess active political party organizations.</i>	Insufficient Data

## **6.4 Synthesis and Conclusion**

### **6.4.1 Linked Fate and Affect**

In Chapter 2, I hypothesized that linked fate might have a particularly strong influence on individuals' likelihood of political participation when it is rooted in affective identities—identities to which individuals accord emotional value. I argued that, in such cases, linked fate cultivates a sense of group obligation and responsibility that can overcome free rider problems. I also hypothesized that linked fate based on religious identification, and Muslim identification in particular, might correlate more strongly with participation than pan-immigrant linked fate, all else equal.

Indeed, Muslim linked fate may be undergirded by the Islamic principle of “*ummah*,” the notion that Muslims throughout the world are connected by common beliefs, regardless of their specific ethnicity or language (Jamal 2005; Saggar 2009). Muslim identification may foster a sense of mutual commitment and obligation among members perceiving linked fate, facilitating participation. While Muslim identities often carry emotional weight, individuals' identification as immigrants or non-citizens is legal and procedural in nature and need not necessarily imply emotional attachments with other immigrants or non-citizens. While pan-immigrant linked fate may

increase individuals' probability of mobilization, then, it does not imply a sense of group obligation, and therefore may have a limited overall effect on participation.

The anecdotes above suggest that Sunni Muslims accord significant emotional weight to their religious identities, even when they do not practice Islam regularly. Interviewees who identified as Sunni Muslim considered Islam to be part of their story and their family history, critical to their self-definition. The importance of Islam to individuals is further evidenced by the fact that 49 percent of Sunni Muslims participated in religious organizations. For comparison, only 24 percent of immigrants in the overall sample participated in multi-ethnic cultural or political organizations encompassing immigrants of diverse nationalities. Correspondingly, many immigrants, particularly those who had been in Switzerland for many years, did not feel that they were foreign to Switzerland irrespective of their legal status. Indeed, many respondents expressed that the law defines them as "others" even though they feel that they belong in Switzerland.

Bringing together my results for pan-immigrant linked fate and Sunni Muslim linked fate above, it appears that Muslim linked fate has a more significantly and substantively stronger correlation with participation than pan-immigrant linked fate. That said, the results for these two models are based on distinct samples, as many individuals who were asked about pan-immigrant linked fate did not identify as Muslim. To better gauge the relative strength of the correlations between pan-immigrant linked fate and religious linked fate among Sunni Muslims, I estimate an additional model. Importantly, as I discussed in Chapter 4, the measures of Muslim linked fate and pan-immigrant are not directly comparable. For that reason, I proxy pan-immigrant linked fate here with an item gauging whether individuals perceive shared interests with other immigrants, regardless of their ethnicity or religion. I include all controls described in the baseline model, including interviewer dummies, and cluster standard errors by venue. The results are revealing (Table 6.17). Among Sunni Muslims, Muslim linked fate has a strong, positive correlation with political participation, all else equal. Pan-immigrant linked fate, on the other hand, has a positive but nonsignificant correlation. Broadly, these results lend support to Hypothesis 6.

**Table 6.17:** Muslim Linked Fate’s Effect Greater than Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate among Muslims

(1)	
VARIABLES	Probability of Political Participation
Muslim Linked Fate	0.0561** (0.0263)
Pan-Immigrant Linked Fate (Proxied)	0.0270 (0.0435)
Identifies as Uniquely Kurdish	0.321** (0.134)
Member, Ethnic Political Org.	0.273* (0.134)
Member, Multiethnic Political Org.	0.137* (0.0749)
Canton of Bern	-0.523*** (0.171)
Canton of Aargau	-0.301** (0.116)
Constant	0.317 (0.400)
Observations	128
R-squared	0.390
Cantonal Fixed Effects	Yes
Interviewer Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results shown.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## 6.4.2 Conclusion

In this chapter, I considered whether individuals' perceptions of linked fate with their ethnic and religious groups might inspire political participation. I find preliminary evidence that Muslim immigrants perceiving religious linked fate may engage in politics more readily than others. Consistently with the existing literature on immigrant political integration, I also find evidence that open political opportunity structures and membership in civic organizations may boost immigrants' political participation. Even after accounting for these factors, however, Muslims possessing linked fate appear more likely to participate in politics than others. My findings thus suggest that the concept of Muslim linked fate might further our understanding of Muslim immigrants' host-country political integration.

My findings also provide evidence that Muslim linked fate may inspire political participation by increasing Muslim immigrants' probability of mobilization by other group members. Although further research is necessary, my finding that Muslim linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for religious identification and religiosity suggests that the mechanisms linking identity and participation may not be rooted in self-esteem or group loyalty.

Furthermore, my results suggest that Muslim linked fate has a substantively stronger and more significant effect on participation than pan-immigrant linked fate. This is consistent with my hypothesis that linked fate's effect on participation is stronger when it is based on affective identification. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that Muslim identification is deeply tied to individuals' sense of their personal history and origins.

Strikingly, I find no significant correlation between ethnic group linked fate and participation. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that many immigrants from Turkey and Italy do not believe that their ethnic identities are salient to contemporary Swiss politics. Instead, interviewees emphasized the importance of immigrant status and broader Middle Eastern and Muslim origins to Swiss political debates. This null finding may result from the low salience of specific ethnicities in contemporary Switzerland.

That said, I would have expected there to be a positive relationship between ethnic linked

fate and participation among those who possess it. It is possible that there might be measurement errors compromising my results. In particular, as I suggested in Chapter 4, multi-group factor analysis suggests that Italian and Turkish-born respondents may have interpreted the questions differently. In particular, Italians might have interpreted ‘group linked fate’ questions, particularly my question about economic linked fate, as asking their sense of connection to so-called *frontalieri*, workers that live in Italy and commute to Switzerland daily. As the experiences of *frontalieri* differ from those of settled immigrants, such immigrants may perceive few commonalities and, consequently, less linked fate. If this is the case, group linked fate may not be properly measured among Italians, rendering my results difficult to interpret.

My linked fate measure also may be erroneous if Italian respondents answered questions affirmatively even when they do not perceive Italian identities to be salient in contemporary Switzerland. This might especially be the case among older immigrants who recall Italian activism in Switzerland in the 60s and 70s. It is possible that individuals socialized in those eras may have developed an enduring sense of linked fate, even if they believe Italian identities are no longer relevant in Swiss politics and see little need for Italian mobilization in the present. If this is the case, Italians’ perceptions of linked fate may not correlate clearly with political participation. Indeed, further testing might clarify whether Italians truly perceive ethnic group linked fate, and whether these perceptions correlate with participation.

Finally, the power of this analysis is also somewhat low due to the low sample size. As such, these results may not reflect the underlying relationship between group linked fate and participation within the population. Specifically, if the true effect size is small, I may be failing to reject the null hypothesis even if it is false. That is, small correlations between ethnic linked fate and participation may not be picked up by the model. Indeed, further research along this vein is necessary to determine whether ethnic linked fate correlates positively with participation in the broader population.

Once again, it is important to stress that the validity of these results may be compromised if participation increases sentiments of linked fate rather than the other way around. Indeed, it is plausible that some forms political participation may foster individuals’ sense that they are

connected to group members. Ultimately, however, this is an observational study, and all findings represent correlations rather than causal effects. As such, these findings only suggest that Muslim linked fate correlates positively with participation, not that it causes participation.

That said, it is likely that these findings are causal. When I examine correlations between Muslim linked fate and individual modes of participation, I find that it correlates positively and significantly with participating in boycotts and petitions. It is not immediately clear how participation in boycotts and petitions would increase sentiments of linked fate unless respondents were also inspired to do so through meetings or discussions with other group members. In that case, Muslim linked fate would also likely correlate with attendance at public debates or informational meetings. It is thus likely that, at least to some degree, Muslim linked fate causes participation. Ultimately, however, further research is necessary in order to better understand the degree to which the correlations in the study reflect reverse causality.

Broadly, the results from the present and last chapters suggest that linked fate may be an important driver of immigrants' participation across a variety of contexts and groups. They also suggest that the linked fate concept likely has analytical purchase beyond existing work emphasizing immigrants' affective attachments. As such, they bring to light a promising avenue for future research. Indeed, further research along this vein may lead to a more complete understanding of the drivers of immigrants' political participation.

## **6.5 Appendix Tables**

Note: All models in this Appendix include all controls from the baseline model, including interviewer dummies, unless otherwise noted. Furthermore, standard errors are clustered by venue unless otherwise noted.

**Table 6.18:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Cantonal Interactions

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate	0.131 (0.337)
Canton of Aargau	-1.462*** (0.473)
Canton of Aargau*Ethnic Group Linked Fate	-0.108 (0.421)
Canton of Bern	-0.364 (0.701)
Canton of Bern*Ethnic Group Linked Fate	0.0664 (0.394)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	7.065*** (1.746)
Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	4.430*** (1.371)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	6.341*** (1.350)
Sunni Muslim	-3.748*** (1.162)
Member, Union	1.999*** (0.656)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.204** (0.552)
Member, Religious Organization	1.315* (0.698)
Paper and Pencil Survey	2.219*** (0.540)
Constant	-2.162 (1.755)
Observations	201
Pseudo-R2	0.367
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

**Table 6.19:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Ipsatized Data

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Ipsatized	0.132 (0.155)
Member, Union	1.526*** (0.408)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	0.920* (0.543)
Canton of Aargau	-0.708** (0.339)
Canton of Bern	-0.331 (0.567)
Pencil and Paper Survey	1.533*** (0.485)
Constant	-0.428 (1.626)
Observations	191
Pseudo-R2	0.275
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table 6.20:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate Results using Poststratification Weights

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate	0.108 (0.178)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	8.330*** (2.454)
Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	7.152*** (2.075)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	8.298*** (1.833)
Sunni Muslim	-4.852*** (1.626)
Member, Union	3.161*** (0.895)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.708** (0.824)
Member, Religious Organization	1.962** (0.782)
Pencil and Paper Survey	1.890*** (0.690)
Canton of Aargau	-1.244** (0.629)
Constant	-4.083** (1.986)
Observations	201
Pseudo-R2	0.377
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table 6.21:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate with Polychoric Factor Analysis

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Polychoric	0.182
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	(0.209) 6.883***
Identifies as Uniquely Turkish	(1.857) 4.304***
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	(1.453) 6.169***
Sunni Muslim	(1.430) -3.743***
Member, Union	(1.155) 1.986***
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	(0.646) 1.203**
Member, Religious Organization	(0.543) 1.327*
Pencil and Paper Survey	(0.702) 2.208***
Canton of Aargau	(0.530) -1.448***
Constant	(0.473) -2.366 (1.766)
Observations	201
Pseudo-R2	0.366
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Interviewer dummies omitted. Only significant results displayed.

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table 6.22:** Ethnic Group Linked Fate, Item Response Theory Derived Index

VARIABLES	(1) Prob. of Participation
Ethnic Group Linked Fate, IRT	0.0534 (0.208)
Identifies Uniquely as Kurdish	6.972*** (1.839)
Identifies Uniquely as Turkish	4.314*** (1.464)
Turkish-Born, Other Identification	6.259*** (1.388)
Sunni Muslim	-3.712*** (1.140)
Member, Union	1.995*** (0.644)
Member, Ethnic Group Cultural Org.	1.220** (0.542)
Member, Religious Organization	1.334* (0.701)
Pencil and Paper Survey	2.243*** (0.529)
Canton of Aargau	-1.447*** (0.476)
Constant	-2.134 (1.787)
Observations	201
Pseudo-R2	0.365
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

# Chapter 7

## Immigrant Political Participation and Linked Fate: Reflections and Future Directions

### 7.1 Overview

This dissertation examined why immigrants participate in their host countries' politics at different rates even when participation is difficult and costly. While non-naturalized immigrants are often barred from voting and standing for office, they sometimes volunteer, sign petitions, and participate in boycotts and protests. Their rate of participation, however, varies significantly across polities and within immigrant groups (Dancygier 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005). As many immigrants, and new arrivals in particular, must overcome severe logistical, bureaucratic, and linguistic challenges in order to such activities, this variation is puzzling. Indeed, one might expect that immigrants might avoid participation altogether even when they are interested in host-country politics. Instead, they may pass the buck to those possessing superior knowledge and resources—namely, immigrant leaders, settled immigrants, and natives (Olson 1965).

My dissertation seeks to shed light on why some immigrants participate even when they

face high costs. Extending U.S. theories of linked fate to immigrants in Europe, I hypothesized that, all else equal, immigrants perceiving linked fate—a sense that their life chances are tied to those of others—are more likely than others to participate in their host countries' politics. I also proposed that linked fate enhances immigrants' political efficacy—their belief that they have an impact on politics, either individually or through their groups—and facilitates their mobilization, even when they possess limited political knowledge and resources. To test these hypotheses, I conducted an original, multilingual survey of 613 first-generation immigrants from Italy and Turkey in three Swiss cantons with diverse integration and naturalization policies. I also conducted 25 interviews with immigrant leaders and four focus groups comprised of nearly 40 immigrants.

In Chapter 5, I employed this original survey data to examine the relationship between immigrants' political participation and perceptions of pan-immigrant linked fate—their sense that they are politically and economically connected to other immigrants regardless of their ethnic or religious background. My results suggested that sampled individuals' likelihood of political participation positively and significantly correlates with their perceptions of pan-immigrant linked fate. Many of my findings were consistent with the existing literature on immigrant integration. Namely, I found evidence that membership in civic organizations and liberal integration contexts might facilitate immigrants' political integration. That said, pan-immigrant linked fate correlated significantly and positively with participation even after accounting for these factors. Further, my findings are robust to immigrants' demographic characteristics, political socialization, and residence in areas with high immigrant concentrations. Importantly, it also correlated significantly with participation upon controlling for respondents' discrimination perceptions and levels of political interest, implying that my findings are not simply an artifact of these covariates. Correspondingly, my results suggest that pan-immigrant linked fate may be an important predictor of immigrants' political participation and thereby represent an important addition to the literature on immigrants' integration.

I also analyzed the mechanisms linking pan-immigrant linked fate to participation. I found evidence that linked fate may increase individuals' likelihood of mobilization by other

immigrants, increasing political participation. Likewise, I found that linked fate may increase internal efficacy – immigrants’ sense that they understand how to participate in politics. Importantly, I also examined whether linked fate correlates with participation upon controlling for individuals’ degree of identification with other immigrants. I also tested whether this correlation holds upon controlling for immigrants’ perceptions of relative deprivation. My results are robust to the addition of these controls. Although preliminary, they challenge existing accounts suggesting that immigrants participate in host-country politics in order to improve their group’s status and, ultimately, their individual self-esteem.

In Chapter 6, I repeated Chapter 5’s analysis with respect to specific group identities. More specifically, I considered whether individuals’ perceptions of linked fate with their ethnic and religious groups might inspire political participation. I found preliminary evidence that Muslim immigrants perceiving religious linked fate may engage in politics more readily than others. Indeed, Muslim linked fate correlated positively and significantly with participation even upon controlling for Muslim immigrants’ socioeconomic characteristics and organizational memberships. Its effect on political participation was also robust to diverse integration contexts.

My findings also provided evidence that Muslim linked fate may inspire political participation by increasing Muslim immigrants’ probability of mobilization by other group members. Although further research is necessary, my finding that Muslim linked fate correlated with participation upon controlling for religious identification and religiosity suggests that the mechanisms linking identity and participation may not be rooted in self-esteem or group loyalty. Likewise, I found that this correlation remained robust upon controlling for Muslims’ sense of relative deprivation. Ultimately, then, Muslims may not participate simply to raise their self-esteem by strengthening their groups’ social position.

Finally, my results suggested that Muslim linked fate had a substantively stronger and more significant effect on participation than pan-immigrant linked fate. This is consistent with my argument that linked fate most strongly impacts participation when it is based on affective, rather than cognitive, identification.

Strikingly, I found no significant correlation between ethnic group linked fate and participation. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggested that many immigrants from Turkey and Italy do not believe that their ethnic identities are salient to contemporary Swiss politics. Instead, interviewees emphasized the importance of immigrant status and broader Middle Eastern and Muslim origins to Swiss political debates. This null finding may result from the low salience of specific ethnicities in contemporary Switzerland.

Broadly, these results suggest that linked fate may be an important driver of immigrants' participation across a variety of contexts and groups. In particular, they suggest that linked fate might inspire participation by increasing immigrants' likelihood of in-group mobilization. Correspondingly, the linked fate concept likely has analytical purchase beyond existing work emphasizing the connection between identification, participation, and self-esteem.

## **7.2 Discussion**

This dissertation suggests that the linked fate concept advances our understanding of immigrants' host-country political incorporation. My findings are robust to differences in integration contexts and immigrants' associational participation, suggesting that linked fate may have an important, hitherto unmeasured effect on immigrants' participation in Europe. This dissertation also offers preliminary evidence challenging existing works that draw from social identity theory to explain variation in immigrants' participation.

It is important to stress, however, that these findings are preliminary. Indeed, in order to categorically gauge whether linked fate causes political participation, rather than the reverse, further tests may be necessary. Likewise, further research might be necessary to gauge the external validity of these findings beyond the sample. That said, I expect that further research will reveal that linked fate impacts political participation causally, and that the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation is generalizable beyond Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants in Switzerland.

It is plausible that the validity of these results may be compromised if participation increases

sentiments of linked fate rather than the other way around. Political participation may foster individuals' sense that they are connected to group members, strengthening linked fate. That said, my results strongly suggest that linked fate may cause participation. First, path analysis suggests that pan-immigrant linked fate and Muslim linked fate may influence participation by increasing immigrants' probability of mobilization. My results suggest that the effect of pan-immigrant linked fate on participation may be indirect, through increasing individuals' probabilities of mobilization. If participation creates linked fate instead, we might expect to find a stronger direct correlation between these variables. Indeed, participation could increase linked fate even in the absence of in-group mobilization if it changes individuals' perceptions of their group's economic or political power vis-à-vis other groups. That is, individuals participating in an unsuccessful protest related to immigrants' rights may develop linked fate if these events remind them of their group's lack of voting rights. If participation caused linked fate, then, we might expect a direct correlation between these variables.

Second, these results may be driven by highly individual modes of participation that likely would not significantly alter immigrants' perceptions of linked fate. Indeed, pan-immigrant linked fate is positively correlated with contacting politicians. Unless politicians are other immigrants, which is uncommon in Switzerland given that non-citizens can only run for office in Neuchâtel (of the cantons in this study), it is unlikely that such contact would spur pan-immigrant linked fate. Likewise, Muslim linked fate correlates positively and significantly with participating in boycotts and petitions. It is not immediately clear how participation in boycotts and petitions would increase sentiments of linked fate unless respondents were mobilized through meetings or discussions with other group members. In that case, however, Muslim linked fate would also likely correlate with attendance at public debates or informational meetings.

It is thus likely that, at least to some degree, Muslim linked fate causes participation. In order to convincingly gauge the size and significance of linked fate's effects on participation, however, further research may be necessary. That said, these results suggest that linked fate likely has a causal impact on immigrants' participation.



The characteristics of my survey may also compromise the validity and generalizability of these results. First, the relatively small sample sizes limit the power of this analysis. The low statistical power of my models might limit their ability to capture the true strength and significance of linked fate's effects, particularly in the case of ethnic group linked fate. My analysis suggests that ethnic group linked fate may not correlate significantly with participation. If there is a correlation in the true population, given low power I may be failing to reject the null hypothesis even if it is false. In particular, small correlations between ethnic linked fate and participation may not be picked up by the model. Further, low statistical power may inflate the size and significance of effects. Given the low power of my analysis of Muslim linked fate, it is possible that its true correlation with participation is smaller and less significant than my analysis suggests. This is particularly likely if my study omits confounds that bias this correlation.

Once again, however, the robustness of the correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation gives cause for optimism. Indeed, this correlation remains significant upon estimating weighted models as well as rare events models that penalize logit estimates for low sample sizes. In order to more accurately estimate any effects of ethnic group and Muslim linked fate on participation, further research and larger samples may be necessary. That said, given my results, I expect that future research will reveal a strong correlation between Muslim linked fate and participation.

It is also important to note that my sample includes proportionally fewer women and young people—particularly young Italians—than exist in the population. As suggested by my weighted regressions in Chapter 5, young Italians might be less likely to possess pan-immigrant linked fate than their older counterparts. As a result, it is unclear whether these results are generalizable beyond the sample.

That said, these findings still imply a significant and positive correlation between linked fate and participation among many immigrants. In particular, both pan-immigrant linked fate and Muslim linked fate correlate with participation among the Turkish-born sample. Given that Turkish-born immigrants constitute large and important immigrant groups in many European countries, and constitute the largest Muslim immigrant group in countries such as Germany and Austria, this

finding is substantively important. Further, the fact that my results hold across diverse integration contexts within Switzerland suggest that the correlations between linked fate and participation in my sample are unlikely to be artifacts of cantonal integration policies. Further research may be indeed necessary to determine the exact conditions under which linked fate inspires participation. That said, these findings provide compelling initial evidence that the linked fate concept might improve scholarly understanding of immigrants' political participation patterns across diverse contexts and immigrant groups.

Finally, some might argue that the uniqueness of the Swiss context limits the generalizability of these findings to elsewhere in Europe. First, direct democratic procedures such as popular referenda are used extensively in Switzerland, particularly at the local level. Referenda related to immigrant integration, admissions, and naturalization occur with a frequency seldom observed elsewhere. Direct democracy might increase the salience of immigration relative to countries where immigration and naturalization policies are controlled by parties or bureaucratic institutions. This could engender stronger feelings of linked fate among immigrants than elsewhere in Europe. As referenda often concern non-citizens and Muslims, pan-immigrant linked fate and religious linked fate might be particularly strong. Furthermore, as I suggest in Chapter 2, direct democracy might create more opportunities for immigrants to get involved in politics. As a result, immigrants possessing linked fate may find more opportunities to mobilize.

Second, Switzerland's naturalization policies are quite strict relative to those of other European countries. pan-immigrant linked fate may be particularly strong in Switzerland relative to other European countries. This might lead immigrants to perceive that non-citizens are treated unfairly, potentially engendering pan-immigrant linked fate. This might be especially likely among immigrants who have resided in Switzerland for many years.

Indeed, I expect that pan-immigrant linked fate may be stronger, on average, in Switzerland than elsewhere. Cross-ethnic affinities may be slow to arise in contexts where ethnic groups compete directly for political power and economic resources (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Gay 2006). Since naturalization is difficult and expensive, the bulk of immigrants cannot vote or run for office in

national elections. Outside of a small number of cantons and municipalities, they cannot vote or run for office in cantonal elections. As such, there is little direct competition over political power. Likewise, the largest immigrant cohorts to Switzerland arrived in staggered waves—first Italians, then Iberians, then Turks, then Bosniaks and Kosovars. Such staggered migration likely prevented direct economic competition, limiting intergroup tensions. This might have fostered the development of pan-immigrant linked fate.

Importantly, also, Switzerland is a territorial state and Swiss citizens belong to numerous ethnic groups. Individuals' "Swissness" is defined less by their language or culture and more by family and hereditary ties to Switzerland (Gianni, Giugni and Michel 2015). The 'territorial' nature of Swiss citizenship thus might decrease the salience of immigrants' ethnic identities and increase the salience of their 'foreign-ness,' or their lack of hereditary ties to Swiss territory. The political salience of immigrants' specific ethnicities in Switzerland, then, might be lower than in other European countries, and the salience of general foreign-ness or non-citizenship might be higher. Corresponding, immigrants in Switzerland might possess greater pan-immigrant linked fate and less ethnic group linked fate than their counterparts elsewhere.

All of that said, it is likely that pan-immigrant linked fate exists beyond Switzerland. Indeed, Switzerland is not the only European country that possesses difficult naturalization laws. Data from MIPEX suggests that a number of other countries, including Austria, Denmark, Italy, and (recently) the United Kingdom, have similarly strict overall naturalization requirements for non-Europeans, including long residency periods, high language abilities, and steep fees (Huddleston et al. 2015). Further, with the exception of Denmark and parts of the United Kingdom, non-citizens (with the exception of E.U. citizens) cannot vote in the above-listed countries. Switzerland is also not the only European country where citizenship is territorially-defined. Indeed, a number of European countries, notably Belgium and the U.K., have historically defined citizenship in territorial rather than ethnic terms. As such, many implications of this study may be portable to other European countries.

Ultimately, however, the purpose of this study is not to predict what forms of linked fate exist

in which countries, but rather to propose that linked fate might influence immigrants' host-country political incorporation in Europe more generally. Indeed, even if immigrants outside of Switzerland are less likely to perceive pan-immigrant linked fate and, instead, perceive a high degree of ethnic linked fate, I expect my key hypotheses to hold. This study serves to demonstrate that linked fate might exist among immigrants in Europe and influence their political behaviors, regardless of the specific dimensions of identity on which it is based. Indeed, my purpose here is to highlight that the concept of linked fate may contribute to scholarly understanding of immigrants' political behavior and emphasize that further scholarship along this vein will likely be fruitful.

Finally, Switzerland was never a colonial power. Correspondingly, it is unclear whether my findings are generalizable to Commonwealth immigrants in Britain, for example, or immigrants from former colonies in France. Immigrants from former colonies might experience fewer barriers to participation if they speak their host countries' language fluently and are familiar with the political system. At the same time, their countries' colonial past might intensify their sense of deprivation relative to natives. These sentiments might be especially strong relative to those of self-selected labor migrants who selected into countries like Switzerland despite understanding that they would have limited political and economic rights there. Ultimately, then, colonial migrants might possess a stronger sense of linked fate than others. Given relatively low informational costs to participation, also, those possessing linked fate might be more likely to participate in politics.

If this is the case, however, my results from Switzerland are all the more striking. Indeed, in Switzerland, immigrants face relatively high informational costs to participation. Furthermore, many self-selected into Switzerland as guestworkers knowing that they would sacrifice their political rights. The fact that I found a strong, significant correlation between pan-immigrant linked fate and participation, and indeed Muslim linked fate and participation, in the Swiss case thus suggests that this correlation might be even stronger among former-colonial migrants in countries such as France and the U.K.

Broadly speaking, there are many reasons to expect that my findings would hold beyond Switzerland. Indeed, there are many parallels between Swiss immigration patterns and policy

responses to immigration and those of other countries—particularly Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Sweden.

As in those countries, immigration to Switzerland first brought guestworkers and later, asylum seekers. Many guestworkers were Turkish-born, particularly in Germany, which also experienced significant inflows of Italian workers. Guestworkers in Switzerland lived under similar conditions to guestworkers in Germany in particular. They often lived in company-provided barracks outside of town centers and had limited interactions with natives. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, guestworkers had few political or cultural rights in any of these countries, as European governments expect that they would eventually return home. Their rights to legally remain and to bring their families to Europe were granted gradually, often after significant public debates and sometimes after guestworker mobilization and strikes similar to those that occurred around the time of Schwarzenbach. Consequently, guestworkers' early political socialization across these countries was quite similar.

Swiss cantons have adopted a wide array of integration policies that reflect approaches seen elsewhere in Europe. Like Sweden and, historically, the Netherlands, some cantons, including Neuchâtel, subsidize language and civics courses for new arrivals and offer extensive orientations to introduce immigrants to Swiss cultures, while others take minimal action. Like France and The Netherlands, some cantons, such as Aargau, meet new immigrants to lay out concrete checklists—integration contracts—required to achieve permanent residence and, ultimately, naturalize. Immigrants periodically meet with integration officials and receive warnings if they are in danger of not meeting integration conditions.

Moreover, cantonal integration policies regarding non-naturalized immigrants' political rights reflect an array of European policy approaches. The cantons of Neuchâtel and Jura allow immigrants to vote and run for office at the local and cantonal levels, and the cantons of Fribourg, Vaud, and Geneva, and some municipalities in Appenzell Auserhoden Basel-Stadt, and Graubünden allow immigrants to vote and run for office at the local level. In some cantons, notably Bern, Basel-Stadt, Luzern, and Zürich, referenda introducing local voting rights have been rejected. These

policies reflect the diversity of approaches to immigrants' political incorporation across Europe more generally. While non-European Union, non-naturalized immigrants can vote in The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and Finland, efforts to institute these rights in France and Germany have failed.

Finally, Switzerland's approach to multiculturalism has many similarities with French and German approaches. Like German states, Swiss cantons establish their own policies with respect to immigrants' cultural and religious practices. While some cantons are officially secular, as in France, other cantons have official, state-financed churches as in Germany. As of 2016, no cantons had officially recognized Sunni Islam as a minority religion and policies governing Muslim practices remain scarce. The situation is comparable to that of Germany, where only a small number of states have officially recognized Islamic organizations. In contrast to Germany, France, and Belgium, however, there is currently no federal law expressly prohibiting Muslim women from wearing burqas or headscarves. Indeed, only the cantons of St. Gallen and Ticino formally ban wearing the full-face veil to date. Educational policies are also regulated by cantons, but to date no cantons public fund Muslim schools or Islamic education within mainstream public schools—much like in France. Similarly to Germany, several cantons permit the construction of Islamic sections in cemeteries, but, as of 2016, no Swiss jurisdiction exempts Muslims from laws governing burials.

Broadly speaking, Switzerland's responses to immigration bear much in common with those of France and especially Germany. Immigrants in France, Germany, and Switzerland face similar barriers to political participation. Likewise, these states are similarly restrictive with respect to Muslims' religious rights. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that immigrants in those countries possess linked fate, and that such immigrants are particularly likely to participate in French and German politics. In particular, given ongoing debates about Muslim integration across Europe, I expect that many Muslim immigrants in France and Germany possess Muslim linked fate. Even if the identities forming the basis of linked fate vary across these countries and Europe more generally, however, I expect that many immigrants possess some degree of linked fate. Further, I expect that such immigrants will be more likely to participate in their host countries' politics than

others.

### **7.3 Contributions**

To my knowledge, this dissertation constitutes the first empirical study of first-generation immigrants' linked fate in a continental European context, the first study to examine pan-immigrant linked fate in Europe, and one of few quantitative studies of political engagement among first-generation Muslim immigrants. It thus represents an important contribution to the existing literature on immigrant political participation for several reasons. Most critically, my findings suggest that the concept of linked fate might advance scholars' understanding of immigrants' participation patterns in Europe. Although preliminary, my results suggest that identification, through linked fate, might spur immigrants' host-country political incorporation by encouraging their mobilization by other immigrants. Further, I find tentative evidence that linked fate strengthens immigrants' sense of internal efficacy, their confidence that they can effectively participate in politics. Perhaps more importantly, I find little evidence that immigrants possessing linked fate participate in order to enhance their self-esteem or to avoid sanctions from other group members. By implication, the concept of linked fate represents a contribution to the literature that extends beyond existing work on collective identification.

Importantly, my focus groups and interviews suggest that many immigrants' participation in Swiss politics concerns issues unrelated to immigration—particularly fiscal policies, local construction plans, and environmental policies. My findings thus suggest that linked fate may not only spur participation related to immigrant issues, but may also inspire general participation by facilitating political discussion and enhancing individuals' access to political information. Given that many forms of political action mentioned do not concern the rights or status of immigrants or Muslims directly, my results further challenge the notion that immigrants participate in order to improve their groups' status and their own self-esteem. These results suggest that further research is necessary to unpack the relationship between group identification and participation. Moreover,

further research on linked fate will likely advance scholars' understanding of this relationship.

Second, my finding that pan-immigrant linked fate, a cognitive identity, has a weaker impact on political participation than Muslim linked fate (an affective identity) has important implications for future research relating identities and participation, particularly in the American context. In particular, this finding suggests that identification with umbrella ethnic categorizations such as Latino and Asian-American may have a relatively limited impact on participation compared to Muslim-American identification or identification with specific national origins, perhaps explaining inconsistent results from studies of linked fate and group consciousness among minorities in America. Future work might do well to gauge individuals' degree of affective commitment to such identities as well as whether and how affective commitment mediates the effect of identification on political incorporation.

Finally, my findings suggest that Muslim identification does not necessarily challenge, and indeed may encourage, immigrants' participation in democratic politics. Indeed, much existing literature suggests that Muslims who have experienced discrimination often distance themselves from society. Furthermore, such individuals might be inclined to express grievances through political violence rather than through democratic channels (Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje 2009; Vedder, van de Vijver and Liebkind 2006; Verkuyten 2008). Some have also argued that Muslims avoid host-country politics as participation signals engagement with non-believers (Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins 2004). In contrast, my findings suggest that Muslim identification, through linked fate, may increase Muslim immigrants' likelihood of political participation, all else equal. These results were robust to differences in immigrants' self-expressed religiosity. Importantly, among my sample, linked fate correlated most significantly with boycott and petition participation. Even of those sampled at *Milli Görüş* mosques, considered by many to be critical of Western values, almost a third noted participation in boycotts. Broadly, my findings highlight that immigrants' adherence to Islam need not undermine their political integration, even if they are religious or belong to conservative religious communities.



## 7.4 Directions for Future Work

This dissertation suggests that linked fate might constitute an important covariate of immigrants' political participation. My results are robust to immigrants' socioeconomic differences, immigrants' socialization, and differences in the integration contexts in which they reside. Further, I find that linked fate might strengthen political participation by increasing immigrants' likelihood of in-group mobilization. Notably, I find little evidence that immigrants possessing linked fate participate in order to boost their self-esteem. Overall, then, my results suggest that the concept of linked fate represents an important addition to the literature on immigrants' political participation. Indeed, further scholarship on linked fate might provide significant insight into the relationship between immigrants' identification and their patterns of political incorporation.

The results in this dissertation are meant to be suggestive, however, rather than definitive. Indeed, to better pinpoint the mechanisms connecting linked fate and immigrants' political incorporation, further research is needed. Additional surveys, perhaps with larger sample sizes, would enable scholars to estimate the relationship between linked fate and participation with greater accuracy. Repeating similar studies in other countries and among other immigrant populations, also, will establish the degree to which these results are generalizable. Given ongoing debates over Muslim integration in Europe, further research along non-Turkish and non-Kurdish Muslim populations might be particularly worthwhile. Indeed, it would be valuable to gauge how these results change among British and French Muslims with roots in former colonies. Likewise, it is possible that dark-skinned Muslims (e.g. African Muslims), may experience linked fate differently from the relatively-light Turks and Kurds in this study. Finally, my weighted findings suggest that linked fate might influence women's participation more than men's participation. Future research might consider whether linked fate's relationship with participation is gendered, and how gender influences immigrants' participation more generally.

Further research along this vein could have important implications for both academia and policy. Insofar as linked fate inspires host-country political participation among immigrants, further research might enable policymakers and activists to mobilize immigrants through messages priming

linked fate. Indeed, recent experimental work in the U.S. suggests that political appeals to Latino identity can increase voter turnout (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). Further research on linked fate in Europe might strengthen scholars' and policymakers' understanding of how to use identity-based appeals to mobilize immigrants.

Finally, while this dissertation only considers linked fate among first-generation immigrants, similar research on second-generation immigrants could be equally fruitful, if not more so. Indeed, linked fate might be particularly strong among second generation immigrants, particularly in countries such as Switzerland where they must apply to naturalize. Unlike many first-generation immigrants who consciously sacrifice political rights when they move abroad (refugees aside), second-generation immigrants may see themselves as full political members of their societies of birth, even when policies distinguish them from their peers without an immigrant background. They may thus be particularly likely to perceive relative deprivation and linked fate. That said, existing research suggests that some second-generation immigrants, particularly second-generation Muslims, feel politically alienated. Further research might thus consider whether and how linked fate increases second-generation immigrants' participation, with an eye towards decreasing their political alienation.

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