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Color, Bodily Capital, and Ethnoracial Division in the U.S. and Brazil

Author
Monk Jr., Ellis Prentis

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Color, Bodily Capital, and Ethnoracial Division in the U.S. and Brazil

By

Ellis P. Monk Jr.

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Committee in charge:

Professor Loïc Wacquant, Chair

Professor Mike Hout

Professor Evelyn Nakano Glenn

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Abstract
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This dissertation comprises the first two parts of the first comparative, mixed-methods study of the social and economic significance of skin tone and hair type as markers of ethnoracial division among black Americans in the U.S. and the Brazilian population as a whole. Using an extended concept of "bodily capital" to capture salient and consequential phenotypical properties, it combines a quantitative analysis of several nationally representative data sets in the U.S. and Brazil with 100 in-depth interviews (50 in each country) to show that: (1) skin tone is as powerful a basis of intraracial classification and stratification among African Americans as it is within the Brazilian population at-large and (2) skin tone and hair type are both powerful markers of social experience and widely perceived to determine differential treatment in intimate, commercial and public spheres alike. These findings are mined to contribute to current debates on the foundations and lived reality of ethnoracial inequality in the two Americas, colorism in global perspective, and theories of group formation.

Part I sets out the problematic I address both theoretically and empirically. I explain: (1) conceptual issues in the study of ethnoracial classification and inequality in the U.S. and Brazil respectively, as well as in comparative perspective over the past hundred years or more (centrally the conflation of folk notions and analytic concepts, particularly, the unreflexive borrowing of U.S. folk notions to understand both the U.S. *and* Brazil), by way of an intellectual history which focuses primarily on key figures' conceptions of "race" and "color" and understandings of ethnoracial inequality (using persons from the U.S. and Brazil) and (2) alternatives to these practices and the current "race relations" paradigm by way of an *epistemological break* with dominant scholarly practices rooted in the concept of *bodily capital* (e.g. phenotypic characteristics such as skin tone and hair, as forms of *symbolic capital*, cf. Bourdieu) and an analytic concept of *racial domination* (which includes a re-conceptualization/definition of "race" as a particular specie of social classification, cf. Bourdieu).

Using quantitative analysis of multiple nationally representative surveys, Part II of the dissertation: (1) demonstrates that skin tone continues to be a major factor of stratification among black Americans in the early 21st century despite recent arguments to the contrary; specifically, I find that skin tone has significant main effects of black Americans educational attainment, household incomes, occupational status, spouse's skin color, and spouse's educational attainment (i.e. spouse status), (2) finds that skin tone *is* a significant predictor of the frequency of perceived discrimination among black Americans (which current research has often hypothesized, but had difficulty demonstrating empirically), (3) shows that skin tone (among black Americans) is a significant predictor of social distance among black Americans (i.e. how "close" they feel to blacks as a "group" and how much they agree with negative stereotypes of blacks as a "group") and the probability that they are depressed or suffer from hypertension (even after controlling for their age and BMI, among other factors) – again, all of these findings are new to the literature, though previous research has hypothesized such relationships to exist, (4) reveals that *self-*

reported measures of skin tone (which previous research has explicitly referred to as "inferior" to interviewer-rated skin color measures) are actually stronger predictors of health outcomes than interviewer-rated measures of skin tone among black Americans and links this finding to the notion of "reflected appraisals," and *habitus*, (5) shows that the "race-color" categories (i.e. census categories, which rely on self-classification) used in research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil are *empirically* distinct from skin color, (6) reveals that skin color data, which researchers have lacked in Brazil despite making claims about "the significance of skin color in Brazil," is often a stronger predictor of basic stratification outcomes among Brazilians than the standard "race-color," census categories (which are *not* skin color or ancestral categories, but instead, are social categories which represent a mélange of phenotypic difference and socioeconomic status, whose usage is significantly affected by gender and region, among other factors), and (7) I find one exception to the strength of a skin color scale versus the "race-color" categories, which is household income, where I find that self-classified "race" is a stronger predictor. I view this as evidence of "whitening"/"darkening" where self-classifications of "race" *always already* take into account one's socioeconomic position, in accordance with the long-standing literature on ethnoracial classification in Brazil (again, the empirical finding is novel to the current literature due to the ironic lack of skin color data in Brazil). I conclude by discussing recent debates on the future(s) of the U.S. and Brazilian "racial orders."

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Introduction

Beyond "Race Relations": Towards a Comparative Sociology of Ethnoracial Division

In 1991, "Skin Tone Stratification in the Black Community," by Verna Keith and Cedric Herring was published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. The authors found, using a nationally representative survey of black Americans (conducted 1979-1980), that key stratification outcomes such as household income, educational attainment, and occupational status were *all* significantly associated with gradations of skin tone within the black population – even after controlling for individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and their parents' socioeconomic status. That is, while the vast majority of scholarship on "race relations" was busy documenting substantial gaps in educational attainment, household income, and labor market outcomes between blacks and whites as a whole (see Farley 1984; Massey and Eggers 1990; Massey 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Shapiro and Oliver 1995), Keith and Herring's (1991) study demonstrated that there was nearly as much socioeconomic inequality *within* the black population on the basis of skin tone, as there was between blacks and whites as a whole.

Given this, one may think that such an incredible finding, published in arguably the most prestigious journal in the discipline of Sociology, would have resulted in at least a slight shift in how scholars of "race relations" and stratification viewed and studied ethnoracial inequality. This, however, did not occur. Instead, in the first five years after its publication, Keith and Herring's (1991) article received 21 total citations[1] and 3 citations in top journals[2] (e.g. *American Sociological Review, Social Problems,* and *Annual Review of Sociology*).

Of the citations Keith and Herring's (1991) article received in the first five years after its publication, one was from Williams & Collins (1995: 367), writing four years after the article's publication in the *Annual Review of Sociology*, they point out that differences in skin tone among black Americans may be linked to differential exposure to "racial discrimination," and as a result, perhaps linked to certain health outcomes (e.g. hypertension) (a proposition I test quantitatively in Chapter 4). The other two citations, in the *American Sociological Review* and *Social Problems,* respectively, were both by the **same** author, Joane Nagel, who writes, "while blacks may make intra-racial distinctions based on ancestry or skin tone, the power of race as a socially defining status in U.S. society makes these internal differences rather unimportant in interracial settings in comparison to the fundamental black/white color boundary" (Nagel 1994: 152-176).

That gradations of skin tone among black Americans map onto considerable socioeconomic inequality is not, however, merely the consequence of "intra-racial distinctions" blacks Americans make among "themselves." To suggest this, is to ignore long-standing research which details how

[1] Citation data available from Google Scholar.

[2] This is in stark contrast to an article on the "concentration of poverty" among minorities (e.g. blacks and Hispanics) compared to whites, by Massey and Eggers (1990), also published in *American Journal of Sociology*, which in the first five years after its publication, received 94 total citations, 14 of which were in the top journals in Sociology (e.g. *American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Annual Review of Sociology, Social Forces,* and *Social Problems*) – including William Julius Wilson's (1991) *American Sociological Association* Presidential Address (published in *ASR*).

whites treat black Americans differently (i.e. better or worse) based on how light or dark-skinned the particular black American was (Reuter 1917; Powdermaker 1939; Frazier 1940, 1957; Williamson 1980; Davis 1991). In fact, the differential treatment of "blacks" according to the lightness or darkness of their skin, began in slavery where lighter-skinned "blacks" were usually individuals who had kinship ties with whites and thus, their skin color was thought to be an index of their "mixed ancestry" (i.e. lighter-skinned blacks were *less African* than other blacks and somehow superior to them because of this) (Frazier 1957; Russell et al. 1992). Furthermore, following the analysis of Keith and Herring (1991), when scholars study "racial disparities" between blacks and whites, some non-zero and possibly large quantity of this "interracial" inequality is due, not only to the stigma and historical consequences (lived out in the present) of being *marked* as "black," (or *marking* oneself as black, due to ancestry) but also, the difference between being *light-skinned*, *medium-toned*, or *dark-skinned* black (i.e. along a skin color continuum from light to dark). Consider, for example, that economists recently found that while black workers with medium and dark complexion earned 26.5 and 34.5 percent less than whites, respectively, the wage differential between whites and blacks with *light skin color* was *small and insignificant* (Goldsmith et al. 2007: 722).

Moreover, stating that these "internal differences" (i.e. skin color differences) were "rather unimportant" compared to "the power of race," begs the question: what does the author think "race" is? Is the "fundamental black/white" boundary the author speaks of really a "color" boundary? What this declaration, published in a top journal of Sociology, exemplifies, is one of the key issues that I discuss in Chapter 1 – "the continual barter between folk and analytic notions [and] the uncontrolled conflation of social and sociological understandings of 'race'" (Wacquant 1997: 222). That is, scholars (like Nagel) overlook that the black/white boundary is based on *ancestry*, according to the "one-drop rule," where any trace of known African ancestry is enough to relegate a person to the subordinate ethnoracial category "black" regardless of how "white" they appear (i.e. regardless of their "color") (Williamson 1980; Davis 1991). By adopting a folk notion, "the one-drop rule," as their analytic lens and relying upon popular discourse in their social science, researchers manage to simultaneously: (1) forget that blackness in the United States is determined by a rigid, ancestral dichotomy and (2) to use the notion "color" to refer to this *ancestral* dichotomy while they *dismiss the actual importance of skin color*. In so doing, so many researchers miss that they are simply conflating processes of ethnoracial classification in everyday life, which tend to rely on visual cues (e.g. skin tone, but also hair, and other facial features) in the *absence* of information about ancestry, with the actual nature of the black/white dichotomy, which is strictly concerned, obsessively, with any trace of *African blood*.

If it were only a single scholar who committed such an error, this would most likely not be worthy of discussion – but, the reality is that such errors (i.e. confusions and conflations) are an integral feature of the dominant, "race relations" paradigm (Massey & Denton 1993; Omi & Winant 1994; Shapiro and Thomas 1995; Conley 1999) which is, ironically, unsuited to the United States, where it was actually developed in the first place. Take, for example, how the fact of skin tone stratification among black Americans is handled in an otherwise excellent study on black-white disparities in wealth. In explaining why the study only focuses on blacks and whites, the author explains that: (1) what's true of Latinos "in terms of hindered life chances appears to be even more true for African Americans. Further, within the Hispanic population, wide variation exists in wealth and *other factors*" [emphasis mine] (Conley [1999] 2010: 40). Among the "other factors" the author highlights is skin tone, he writes, "skin color within the Hispanic population is a good predictor of where on the spectrum between blacks and whites an individual is likely to fall. In other words, the 'blacker' a Hispanic person looks, the more likely he or she is to resemble the African American

demographic profile; the 'whiter' a Hispanic person appears, the more he or she will resemble the demographic profile of European ethnic groups" (Conley [1999] 2010: 40). Strangely enough, the author includes a footnote at the end of this statement which leads to Keith and Herring's (1991) "Skin Tone Stratification in the Black Community" [emphasis added]. Keith and Herring's (1991) study is silent on the matter of skin tone stratification among "Hispanics" and certainly offers no suggestion that "the 'blacker' a Hispanic person looks, the more likely he or she is to resemble the African American demographic profile" and "the 'whiter' a Hispanic person appears, the more he or she will resemble the demographic profile of European ethnic groups" (see above). Furthermore, why the author refers to a study of skin tone stratification among *black Americans* to make a point about why they chose to *exclude* "Hispanics" from their study on black-white disparities in wealth, by perhaps implying that "other factors" such as skin tone are associated with inequality among "Hispanics" and make them somehow unique in comparison to blacks (if this is what the author is after, it is difficult to parse definitively), makes very little sense, especially considering the author cited a study on skin tone stratification among black Americans in the first place.

This author's confusion highlights, at the very least, how when U.S. scholars actually do consider the importance of skin color, they tend to view it as having something to do with "Hispanics," "Latinos," or Latin America – even, in this case, when they are *directly citing* studies about skin tone stratification among *black Americans*. Making such mistakes even more ironic is that many researchers often use the term "color" or even "skin color" (see, for example, Massey & Denton 1993: 20, 92, 148) interchangeably with "race," largely in reference to black Americans – all the while ignoring the actual consequences of *skin color* among black Americans. In other words, they conflate "race" in terms of a rigid, black-white dichotomy based on *ancestry* with ethnoracial classification in everyday life, which tends to rely on visual cues such as skin color, in the absence of information about ancestry. That is, academic discourse tends to simply mirror popular discourse.

Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that one of the very first citations of Keith and Herring's (1991) study on skin tone stratification among black Americans was by Thomas Skidmore (1993), a renowned historian of *Brazil*, in his article, "Bi-Racial U.S.A. vs. Multi-racial Brazil: Is the Contrast Still Valid?," published in the *Journal of Latin American Studies*. In it, Skidmore (1993: 378-379) cites Keith and Herring's (1991) study and argues that the U.S. is "ceasing to be a racially bi-polar society" due to the rise of the "Hispanic" and "multiracial" populations, and that the U.S. and Brazil are possibly "becoming closer" in terms of the significance of skin color (Skidmore 1993: 378-379). Skidmore (1993) explains that the typical contrast drawn between the U.S. and Brazil, is that in the U.S. there is a rigid, ancestry-based dichotomy between blacks and whites (i.e. bi-racial), whereas Brazil is a "multiracial" society typified by a *phenotypic continuum* of difference (primarily in terms of skin color, but also hair and facial features) (see, for example, Degler 1971 and Skidmore 1972, but also Telles 1992 and Patterson 2005).

Yes, in Brazil, phenotypic traits such as skin tone, hair texture and color, facial features (lip and nose shape and size), and eye color are crucial markers of ethnoracial difference (Harris 1970; Degler 1971; Bailey 2009). Brazilian ethnoracial categories are fuzzy, fluid, contextual, and ambiguous. Scholars report that Brazilians use myriad color labels to classify one another and themselves in everyday life (e.g. *moreno claro*, *tostada* (toasted), *corada* (ruddy), *castanha-clara* (clear, cashewlike), in addition to, since 1970, the five official census categories *preto* (black), *pardo* (brown), *branco* (white), *indigena* (indigenous), and *amarelo* (yellow, or Asian) (Telles 2009). Ancestry, in this system, is far less important than physical appearance as the basis for ethnoracial classification (Wagley [1959] 1965). Brazilian families include individuals of various ancestral mixtures, all across

the color continuum, classified and self-classified in a range of ethnoracial categories (e.g. *preto, pardo, branco, moreno, etc.*) (Harris 1970; Burdick 1998; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004). This is indeed different than ethnoracial classification in the U.S. (at least since the 1920s), which relegates any individual with any known trace of African ancestry to the subordinate ethnoracial category, "black." As a consequence of this, many individuals considered "black" in the U.S. would be considered "white" or "brown" in Brazil, and many individuals considered "white" or "brown" in Brazil would be considered "black" in the U.S. (Telles 2004).

Despite this key difference, however, evidence shows that skin color stratifies black Americans socioeconomically – just as is ostensibly the case in Brazil – even though this evidence has been mostly ignored or misunderstood by researchers of stratification and "race relations" (see above). As Skidmore (1993: 379) points out, perhaps the significance of skin color in the U.S. is "becoming" or has "always" been much closer to Brazil than scholars have previously acknowledged. Keith and Herring's (1991) study, in conjunction with previous research (see Frazier 1940, 1957, Bodenhorn 2006, and Bodenhorn & Ruebeck 2007), shows that skin color has mapped onto substantial differences in black Americans' life chances from slavery until at least 1980.

For all that has been written about "race in the U.S. and Brazil," studies that directly compare ethnoracial division, in the U.S. and Brazil are few in number (for exceptions, see Degler 1971 and Marx's 1998 comparative study of the U.S., Brazil, and South Africa). Instead, our literature is mostly characterized by truncated comparisons where scholars focus on a single case and then "extend" to another case (see Telles 2004 and Bailey 2009). Making matters more complicated for comparative research is that the "race relations" paradigm of the U.S., which is unsuited even for the United States, is blindly *exported*, as if the experiences, [folk] understandings, [folk] concepts, and [folk] categories of the United States are *universally* valid to understand ethnoracial division and inequality all over the world (Wacquant 1997). This has been particularly problematic as regards comparisons between the U.S. and Brazil specifically, where, as I explain in far more detail in Chapter 1, the experiences, concepts, and categories of the U.S. have had an overwhelming influence on how scholars study and understand Brazil. As Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] (2005: 185) explain, "[T]he intellectual current flows in one direction only: U.S. categories and problematics (starting with the dichotomous black-white division) travel south, but Brazilian experiences and counterpoints are rarely if ever repatriated north to question the peculiar ways in which the United States has constructed its 'race' question and how this construction has in turn been unthinkingly transcribed into the analytical apparatus of its national social science."

Given all of this, research which aims to compare the consequences of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil seems to be predestined for failure. How can scholars carry out *analytically sound* comparisons of these two cases (at the very heart of the sociology of "race relations"), in particular, when the dominant paradigm used to study one of the cases (the U.S.) is unsuited not only for itself, but also, for the study of the other case (Brazil)? In this dissertation, I endeavor to both provide (i.e. construct) the tools necessary for and actually carry out a truly *comparative sociology of ethnoracial division*. In this study, following Wacquant (1997: 230), I focus not on "racism" or even "colorism," but, instead, on two *elementary forms of racial domination*: categorization (which includes classification, prejudice, and stigma) and discrimination (differential treatment based on imputed group membership, though the very idea of 'group membership' varies between the U.S. and Brazil), both of which may yield substantial differences in the life chances of black Americans and Brazilians. In contrast to previous work, however, I focus on the significance of skin color (and hair) as a factor of

stratification and marker of ethnoracial difference in the U.S. (among black Americans[3]) and Brazil. That is, against the backdrop of the structural opposition between U.S. as descent-based system vs. Brazil as phenotype-based system of ethnoracial categorization, I examine whether skin color is as powerful a basis of intraracial classification among black Americans as it is within the Brazilian population at-large and the degree to which skin tone and hair type significantly affect individuals' life chances and operate as powerful markers of social experience which determine differential treatment in intimate, commercial, and public spheres alike. Such an exercise, not only contributes to the comparative sociology of ethnoracial division, but in so doing, makes a number of substantial contributions to current debates on the foundations and lived reality of ethnoracial inequality in the two Americas, "colorism" in global perspective, and theories of group formation.

This project combines the quantitative analysis of several nationally representative surveys of the U.S. and Brazil (Part II), with the examination of 100 in-depth interviews (50 in each country) in the U.S. and Brazil (Part III, forthcoming), all upon the foundation laid in this Introduction and the comparative-historical, intellectual history of U.S. and Brazil social science on ethnoracial division (Part I, Chapter 1). Ultimately, this dissertation clears a new path in our understanding of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil, both on their own terms, as well as in comparison to one another, and provides important lessons both for the study of ethnoracial division in general, as well as in comparative perspective.

In this Introduction, I provide the rationale for and a general overview of this project (previewing many of the core arguments I make in expanded form in Chapter 1), which includes needed historical background on the nature and study of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil, as well as the theoretical framework I construct and utilize to carry out this comparative analysis of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil. I begin though, with a brief discussion of the historical trajectory of "blackness" in the U.S. and the 'split' study of "race" and "colorism," over the past several decades (more detailed discussions can be found in Chapters 1 and 2).

The Peculiar History of "Blackness" and the Split Study of "Race" and "Colorism" in the United States

While the matter of who is "black" may seem to be fairly obvious to us in our daily lives in the United States, in many ways the definition of blackness is perfectly arbitrary. As Joel Williamson (1980) and F. James Davis (1991) expertly detail, the rule of strict hypo-descent, which maintains that any person with any trace of known African ancestry is considered "black," was not always in operation. It did not really become prevalent nationally until the 1920s (Davis 1991). Before this period, Americans (both socially as well as regards the State, via the U.S. census) made distinctions between Negroes and mulattos, quadroons, and octoroons – categories which denote distance from "pure African ancestry" (½, ¼, and 1/8th respectively).

In contrast to what is generally held by most of those inside and outside of the Academy alike, in their shared state of *anamnesis*, the U.S. conception of "race" was not *founded* on a clear dichotomy between "black" and "white;" no, as Fields (1993: 99) so ably explains, the primary distinction in

[3] Comparing the significance of skin color among black Americans to the Brazilian population as a whole may seem asymmetrical, but doing so is important given the differential weight given to ancestry for ethnoracial classification in the U.S. and Brazil. Remember, many individuals classified as "black" in the U.S. may be considered "white," "brown," or "black" in Brazil and many individuals classified as "white" or "brown" in Brazil may be considered "black" in the U.S. (Telles 2004).

America before the collapse of slavery was between *free* and *other persons* (i.e. slaves). It was not until the *collapse* of the institution of slavery that "racial" distinctions between "blacks" and "whites" overtook this primary distinction between *free* and *unfree* (Kolchin 1991; Fields 1993). In other words, the "one-drop rule" came about in the *collapse of slavery*, not simply *because* of slavery.

The inextricable linkage between the collapse of slavery and "racial ideology" in the U.S. (cf. Fields 1993), perhaps, explains why for so many in the U.S. "there is really one race, the Negro race" (Fields 1993: 97). That is, other persons are referred to using designations of geography, nationhood, or language (e.g. Asian, Hispanic and/or Latino) and persons of "European descent" are often not considered to be part of a "race," (Fields 1993) – rather, they are the *unmarked* ethnoracial category and as such, tend to be seen as the "default" ethnoracial category, against which all other "minorities" are compared. What seems banal and commonsensical for most residents of the U.S. is actually quite unique: "The United States is the only modern society to apply the 'one-drop rule' conjointly with the principle of hypo-descent, according to which the offspring of a mixed union find themselves automatically assigned to the group deemed inferior – here the erstwhile named 'Negroes'" (Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] 2005: 183).

Despite these historical (and contemporary) realities, researchers tend to rely upon commonsense understandings of "race" which maintain that "race" is a matter of "physiology alone" (Wacquant 1997: 224), based, at least in part, on the conflation of processes of ethnoracial classification *in everyday life*, which often rely upon the visual cues of skin hue, hair type, and facial features (in the absence of explicit information about *ancestry*), with the interrelated processes of ascription by others and self-classification into "race" categories on the basis of ancestry, which are reinforced and literally co-signed for by the massive reservoir of *symbolic power* held by the State (i.e. the *bureaucratic field*, which includes the U.S. Census Bureau and thus, the U.S. Census, among other agencies, which all utilize "race" categories in their administrative apparatuses and documentation). What this misses is that "race," is no more than a particular specie of a "historically constructed form of social classification which varies from one society to the next and from one historical conjuncture to another" (Wacquant 2008: 17n). While a fuller explication of the conceptual, methodological, and empirical fallout caused by these confusions is beyond the purview of this introductory chapter (for more on these issues, please see Chapter 1), a consequence of these confusions, at the very least, is that the actual significance of *skin color* among black Americans tends to receive less attention.

As I explain in much further detail in Chapter 1, scholarship on black Americans before the demise of Jim Crow, almost *always* discussed the significance of skin color for black Americans' life chances and interpersonal relationships (both *intra-* and *interracially*) (see, for example, Johnson 1934, Powdermaker 1939, Frazier 1940, 1957, Myrdal 1944, and Drake & Cayton 1945). W.E.B. Du Bois, for example, notes how lighter-skin tone afforded some blacks relatively prestigious jobs, in his landmark work of 1899, *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study*. E. Franklin Frazier conducted a study of black youth in the cities of Washington, D.C., and Louisville, Kentucky in 1940 and documents that, "Upper-class youth of dark complexion speak very frankly concerning color discrimination within the upper class. They are especially bitter because they feel that despite their family background and socio-economic status which should make them eligible for full participation in upper-class activities they are not completely accepted on account of their dark complexion" (Frazier 1940: 106-107). Within the black upper-class, the very lightest skin tones are preferred. This is slightly different than the black lower-class where more medium tones tend to be preferred, "[D]espite the fact that a fair or white complexion has considerable prestige in the Negro community" (Frazier 1940: 180-181). St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1945) dedicate several pages of their seminal

work, *Black Metropolis*, to phenotypic distinctions and biases among blacks in *Bronzeville* (Chicago). The authors detail the existence of "negro social clubs" with "unspoken" rules regarding how light skinned someone must be in order to join them (Drake and Cayton 1945: 497). They also note the high premium black men put on light skin and "good hair" in the marital market.

With the demise of Jim Crow and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, however, scholarly (and popular) concerns shifted towards examining the social problems suffered by black Americans striving for "racial equality" with whites. A key feature of his shift was the considerable attention given to the subjects of "social disorganization," urban poverty and family structure among black Americans. This was especially the case in the mid-to-late 1960s following release of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1965) report on the Negro family. Moynihan (1965:5-6) argued that "the Negro community is dividing between a stable middle-class group that is steadily growing stronger and more successful and an increasingly disorganized and disadvantaged lower-class group." Such concerns have characterized most of the research on "race relations" from the mid-1960s to the present-day. The significance of color among black Americans was never mentioned in the landmark study *The Declining Significance of Race* (Wilson 1978), even as it stressed rising socioeconomic differences *within* the black population. Other studies focused on answering the question of whether black Americans made significant socioeconomic progress after the Civil Rights Movement and were either "catching up with white Americans" or "falling behind them" (Farley 1984; but also see Glasgow 1981; Pinkney 1984; Massey & Eggers 1990, Massey & Denton 1993). With such an overwhelming focus on black life in terms of poverty and crime, however, even studies that moved to the micro-level, such as ethnographies and community studies, whose *strength* it is to richly detail the everyday lives of poor blacks in the U.S., also tended to ignore the significance of color within the black population (Stack 1971; Anderson 1978; for a review of studies of urban poverty, see Wilson & Aponte 1985).

While there is nothing inherently wrong with academic concerns changing over time given changing sociopolitical circumstances (in fact, this is to be expected), a casualty of this shift was paying attention to the significance of skin color among black Americans for their life chances and interpersonal relationships with other blacks, whites, and members of other ethnoracial populations. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this shift is the fact that, after the Civil Rights Movement (roughly 1955-1968), the study of the significance of skin color among black Americans splintered off into a sub-genre of the study of "race relations" currently referred to as "colorism," which is typically studied by psychologists and academics working in Ethnic Studies and/or Gender and Women's Studies departments (as opposed to Sociology, Economics, or Political Science departments where most research on "race relations" is conducted).

"Colorism" is generally defined as a discriminatory practice where lighter-skin tones are preferred over darker-skin tones (Russell et al. 1992; Hunter 2005; Keith 2009) *within* the black population (note how this widely accepted definition misses that "color" matters in intraracial *and* interracial interactions). Despite making the important move to analyze intraracial dynamics over against the dominant tendency to only analyze material and symbolic differences *between* putative "racial groups," this constellation of studies is not without flaws. First of all, the literature on colorism has been primarily focused on the experiences of black women and issues of beauty (Bond and Cash 1992; Golden 2005; Hunter 2005) (e.g., their interpersonal relationships and issues pertaining to their self-esteem). Evidence shows, however, that skin tone is a significant predictor of personal and family income net of education, occupation, parental socioeconomic status, region, urbanicity, and even marital status (Keith and Herring 1991: 772). Darker-skinned blacks are at a significant empirical disadvantage in comparison to lighter-skinned blacks and even medium-tone blacks. This material

disadvantage exists for *both* black men and women. Darker-skinned blacks have less income and are more likely to be unemployed (Johnson et al. 1998), in poverty (Bowman et al. 2004), have lower occupational prestige and wealth (Seltzer and Smith 1991), worse health outcomes such as high blood pressure (Harburg et al. 1978; Krieger et al. 1998). In fact, lighter-skinned blacks and mulattoes in the antebellum South commonly practiced homogamy (Reuter 1918; Gatewood 2000) which contributed to a substantial wealth gap between mulatto households and black households by the late 19th Century (Bodenhorn 2006). In sum, skin tone does not simply shape interpersonal relationships – it is a major factor of *stratification* within the black population.

Second, many "colorism" studies restrict the focus of their analysis to skin tone alone (Maddox and Gray 2002; Hunter 2005), even though, in addition to skin tone, similar to Brazil, other phenotypic traits such as eye color, hair texture and color, lip and nose shape and size are also markers of ethnoracial difference in the United States. Lawrence Otis Graham (1996), for example, dedicates an entire chapter of his autobiographical take on "life as a black man in a white world" to his decision to have plastic surgery on his nose to reduce its size and give it a more aquiline, stereotypically European appearance. The practice of processing and straightening one's hair with chemicals and hot combs has persisted among blacks for over a century. In fact, the first black millionaire was Madam C.J. Walker, who designed, marketed, and sold an entire line of hair products designed to help black men and women straighten their hair (Glenn 2009). The importance of eye color is the centerpiece of Toni Morrison's (1970) Nobel Prize winning novel, "The Bluest Eye."

Third, the "colorism" literature, much like the "race relations" literature, is myopically U.S.-centric. As historian John Hope Franklin (1968) observes in his edited volume *Color and Race*, skin color (among other phenotypic traits) has been an element of differentiation and inequality in societies throughout history and all over the world (e.g. South Africa, the Philippines, Colombia, and India, to name a few examples, for more on this see Glenn 2009). Given Brazil's reputation as *the* canonical case of a skin color continuum and "colorism," many scholars invoke Brazil in their analyses of "colorism" in the U.S. (see Hill 2002, Herring et al. 2004, Hunter 2005, 2007, Hall et al. 2008, Golash-Boza and Darity 2008, Glenn 2009), but the current literature lacks internationally comparative studies.

Perhaps more central than any of these issues individually, however, is that some researchers have expressed doubt about the continuing significance of skin color among black Americans. Some recent work, for example, argues that the social significance of skin tone within the black population has "subsided" (Pattillo 1999: 17) and its connection with class distinctions has *diminished significantly* (Lacy 2007: 30). The majority of the studies of skin tone stratification among black Americans have relied heavily on the National Survey of Black Americans 1979-1980 (see Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005; Hochschild and Weaver 2007; Keith 2009) and due to the lack of recently conducted, nationally-representative data sets with skin tone data, it has been extremely difficult to determine if skin tone remains a major factor of stratification among black Americans in the early 21st century.

Given this lacuna, some scholars caution that skin tone, which has mattered for so many generations for black Americans' life chances, may no longer significantly affect black Americans life chances in the present-day. Gullickson (2005), in his re-analysis of the NSBA 1979-1980, argues that the substantial skin tone-based socioeconomic stratification that persisted throughout the first half of the 20th century within the U.S. black population diminished significantly between 1950 and 1990. In Gullickson's view, the salience of blacks' skin tone for whites (whom he refers to as "white gatekeepers") was always less than that of blacks (whom he refers to as "black gatekeepers"), and with the increasing importance of "white gatekeepers," for whom skin tone was ostensibly less important

than "black gatekeepers," the significance of skin tone for black Americans' life chances diminished dramatically during and after the Civil Rights Movement – so much so, that according to Gullickson (2005: 169), "skin tone had virtually no effect on the educational outcomes of cohorts born after 1953." Moreover, Gullickson (2005) claims that the effect of skin tone on socioeconomic and occupational status among blacks had diminished almost completely by 1988.

Since the publication of this study, however, multiple researchers have pointed out potentially serious methodological flaws which cast doubt on the validity of Gullickson's findings (see Goldsmith et al. 2006 and Loury 2009). Even still, these re-analyses of Gullickson's study, however, still rely on the NSBA 1979-1980, consequently, it remains unclear if *skin tone stratification still persist for black Americans in the early 21st century*. In order to address this question, recently generated, nationally representative data is required. Fortunately, such data has recently become available and in Chapter 2 I address whether skin tone stratification persists in the early 21st century by quantitatively analyzing data from the recently conducted National Survey of American Life (2001-2003) which was designed by many of the same principal investigators responsible for the much relied upon National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980). In fact, the design of the present study, directly addresses *all three* of the "flaws" I highlight in this section: theoretically, empirically, and methodologically.

A Brief Overview of the Significance and the Study of "Race and/or Color" in Brazil

As was the case for the majority of modern Latin American nations, Brazil originated as a European colony (circa. 1500). Originally populated by hundreds of indigenous tribes, Portuguese settlers rapidly mixed with the indigenous population, giving rise to a large mixed-ancestry population (Amerindian-European). In fact, the Portuguese crown even encouraged miscegenation between Europeans and Indians, though never between Europeans and Africans or Europeans and mulattos (Telles 2004: 25). The Portuguese brought in Africans to serve as slave laborers to grow crops such as coffee and sugar, very early on in Brazil's history (as early as 1530). Brazil was a true slave society. The number of Africans imported to serve as slaves in Brazil outnumbers all other destinations during the transatlantic slave trade (Patterson 1982)[4].

Comparatively, there was a notable difference in the ratio of men to women in colonial Brazil and colonial U.S.A. In the case of Brazil, many single Portuguese men journeyed seeking adventure, and in many cases a 'second chance'[5]. By contrast, families eventually became the main settlers of the colonial U.S. (Degler 1971: 227-229). The scarcity of European women in Brazil ostensibly led to relatively higher levels of "miscegenation." These relatively higher levels of "miscegenation" in Brazil were coupled with what, Degler (1971) claims, was the relatively higher station American white women had relative to Portuguese women, which resulted in American white women being more able than Portuguese women to prevent their husbands from legitimately claiming their offspring with nonwhites. Consequently, Portuguese fathers of "mixed-race" children were able to legitimately claim

[4] When the slave trade ended in 1850 in Brazil, 3.6 million Africans had been imported as slaves (Telles 2004: 24).

[5] A common phrase used to characterize colonial Brazil is '*terra de bandidos*' (or, land of the bandits). This refers not only to the fact that most of the Portuguese settlers of colonial Brazil were male, but also that they tended to be impoverished, former criminals seeking a 'fresh start' in a new land. The phrase also captures the mystique of lawlessness associated with the colonial period in Brazil. This view of colonial Brazil as a lawless land, ruled by corrupt representatives of the Portuguese Crown and powerful bandits is a common theme easily recognized in the public imagination (books, film, and music) of colonial Brazil in the present day.

their offspring and pass their status onto them (Degler 1971). This key difference is, according to Degler (but also, see Toplin 1981), a major factor which helps explains differences in rates of manumission between Brazil and the U.S. (i.e. higher rates of manumission in Brazil) and ultimately, the differential weight given to ancestry vs. physical appearance for ethnoracial classification in the U.S. and Brazil – not the "harshness" or "mildness" of either countries' form of slavery[6] (contra the theory of Tannenbaum 1947, which was no more than a rehearsal of the views of Gilberto Freyre (1933), published in his immensely influential, though controversial work, *The Masters and the Slaves*).

A social hierarchy formed in Brazil where the few unmixed Europeans and the fairest-skinned, most "European appearing" *mestiços* dominated the highest ranks of society while indigenous and African people were at the bottom (Patterson 2005). Even still, free *mulatos* (and some *pretos*) served important economic functions as shopkeepers, craftsmen, and artisans – even during slavery. This is starkly different than in the U.S. where there were enough whites to perform much of these skilled tasks, and nonwhites were usually locked into compulsory labor of various forms (Degler 1971; Toplin 1981). As a consequence, free nonwhites (i.e. blacks and *mulattos*) in the U.S. found themselves in direct competition with whites for economic opportunities in post-Emancipation America. It is perhaps of little surprise then, post-Emancipation, that many states passed laws banning free nonwhites from entering altogether. Thus, not only was the population of free nonwhites larger in Brazil, these free nonwhites also served relatively prestigious economic functions, both during and after slavery, in contrast to free nonwhites and slaves in the U.S[7]. Such differences in the role of "African-descendants," in the Brazilian and U.S. labor markets during and after slavery, interacted with differences in political conditions and institutions, which were also key ingredients leading to the differential weights given to ancestry and physical appearance for ethnoracial division between the U.S. and Brazil (for more on this, see Degler 1971 and Toplin 1981).

As was the case in the United States, the Brazilian census has shifted in terms of its ethnoracial categories over the past two centuries. The first official, national, Brazilian census, conducted in 1872, used self-classification, except for slaves who were classified by their owners – the original categories were: white (*branco*), brown (*pardo*), and black (*preto*). The 1872 census also included a category for *caboclos*, which referred to individuals with European and Brazilian native ancestry (as did the 1890 census). While the first census explicitly included the *pardo* (brown) category, this category, in 1940, was created by simply adding up all individuals whom *interviewers* could not classify as "white," "black," or "yellow." This is different than the 1950 census where *pardo* was re-included as its own separate category, which explicitly included Brazilian natives (Araujo 1987). Moreover, some regionally-focused censuses included the category *negros* in their definitions of *mulatos* and *caboclos*

[6] Degler (1971) observes that Brazil had a considerably higher proportion of 'free Negroes' in the nineteenth century than the U.S. In 1817-18 in Brazil the number of slaves was about three times that of free Negroes and mulattos compared to the U.S. in 1860 (when the number of 'free Negroes' was at its maximum) where there was eight times as many slaves as 'free Negroes' (Degler 1971: 43).

[7] Another difference between Brazilian and U.S. slavery regards the sources of their slave populations. Where Brazil relied heavily on the external slave trade for its slave labor force all throughout its colonial period, the U.S. was unique in that its slave population successfully reproduced in large numbers and consequently, many U.S. colonies outlawed the external slave trade by 1807 (Degler 1971). The extent of the U.S. internal slave trade is unparalleled (Kolchin 1991).

(see, for example, the regional census of Sao Paulo 1907: 212). In the midst of various military dictatorships, however, the 1900, 1920, and 1970 censuses did not include any "race" categories.

Given the choice, evidence shows that the majority of Brazilians opt out of ethnoracial categories altogether in favor of simply selecting 'Brazilian' as their "racial" identity (Telles 2004; Bailey 2008). In everyday life, a mix of nonofficial "color categories" (cf. Harris 1970; Bailey 2009) and official census categories are used for the purpose of ethnoracial classification (Twine 1998; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004). As was explained earlier, physical appearance is central to these designations, especially as regards the usage of nonofficial "color categories." Sansone (2003), for example, finds that in addition to skin color, hair texture plays a large role in ethnoracial classification in everyday life. Those with relatively dark skin *and* kinky hair are almost always categorized as *negro*, while those with relatively dark skin and wavy hair may be categorized as *pardo* or even *branco* depending on their socioeconomic status (Sansone 2003). The *moreno* category is even more 'fuzzy' than the *pardo* category (Carvalho 2004). *Moreno* can be used to describe people while avoiding implying any sort of "racial" judgment (Harris 1993, 1995; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). The range of phenotypes lumped into the *moreno* category ranges from almost totally "white" in appearance to almost totally "black" in appearance (see Telles 2009: 16, for a comparison of how official categories and nonofficial, "color categories" correspond to various locations along the skin color continuum).

Perhaps clear evidence of Brazil's "racial ambiguity" (cf. Telles 2002) is the fact that one's "racial" status can shift depending on the region in which they live. At the very least, it is clear that as one moves northwestern from the southernmost state of Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul) the population of Brazil becomes much darker-skinned (Telles 2004). A person considered *pardo* (brown) in Salvador, Bahia (in the Northwest) may be considered *negro* in Curitiba, Parana. Similarly, a person considered *pardo* (brown) in Curitiba, Parana may be considered *branco* (white) in Salvador, Bahia. Brazil's "color continuum" is *relational*, with categorization depending on the particular phenotypic profiles most prevalent in each region. For example, the requirements of *whiteness* are certainly stricter in Rio Grande do Sul than they are in Sergipe (in the Northwest) (Pinho 2009, but also, see Chapter 4 for the first quantitative specification of such regional dynamics in Brazilian ethnoracial categorization).

Despite the multitude of Brazilian ethnoracial categories and their "fluidity" and "ambiguity," the fact remains that the darker one's skin is, the poorer life chances they can expect (Silva 1985; Skidmore 1993; Lovell and Wood 1998; Telles 2004; Telles 2009). Recognition of this fact, however, was not to be found in earlier works on "race and color" in Brazil, which tended to deny the significance of "race or color" for determining individuals' life chances (see Freyre 1933). The history of the study of ethnoracial division in Brazil can be broken down into at least three phases (see Telles 2004). In the first phase (1900-1950), Gilberto Freyre challenged the assumptions of many Brazilian and European elites alike, that Brazil would be consigned to second-class status on the world stage due to it being an undeniably "mixed-race" society (Skidmore 1971). Instead, Freyre (1993) praised the multitude of contributions of Africans and Amerindians in the creation of a truly "Brazilian" culture. As Hasenbalg (1985) astutely notes, however, Freyre also helped promote the notion that Brazil was a "racial democracy," that is, a nation mostly free of "racial animus" (especially in comparison to the United States). On this view, ethnoracial prejudice and discrimination were mostly absent due to the putatively unique, 'plastic' character of the Portuguese colonizers who were more 'liberal' than the colonizers of North America (ostensibly, as evinced by their widespread mixing with *indigenas* and

Africans alike). Brazil, according to the notion "racial democracy," was a land of inequality[8], to be sure, but class differences were far more important than "race or color" for determining one's life chances.

During this phase, both Brazilian and foreign researchers alike, focused their attention on the Brazilian Northeast. This phase is best characterized by the work of Donald Pierson (1942), who argued that class affected levels of education, types of occupation, and wealth far more so than anything having to do with "race or color." Foreign researchers, like Pierson, noted the fluidity of racial classification and the putatively benign relations between different races in Brazil, in sharp contrast to what obtained in the United States. With the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy" widely accepted by many social scientists all over the world, UNESCO devised a series of studies of "inter-racial relations" in Brazil, inspired by the horrors of Nazism and the fallout of World War II (Maio 2001). The rationale for this study was explained in a brief document titled, "The Race Question," drafted by Claude Levi-Strauss, Ashley Montagu, Gunnar Myrdal, and E. Franklin Frazier (among others):

> "Many inquiries have already been undertaken into interracial conflicts and the factors that produce them. The time has now come for us to consider the societies which have in large measure succeeded in resolving antagonisms by overriding racial differences. Thus, the General Conference of UNESCO in Florence recommended for the 1961 programme of the Organization a study of racial relations in Brazil. This great republic has a civilization which has been developed by the direct contribution of different races. And it suffers less than other nations from the effects of those prejudices which are at the root of so many vexations and cruel measures in countries of similar ethnic composition. We are as yet ill-informed about the factors which brought about such a favourable and, in many ways, exemplary situation... *We must learn from them exactly why and how social, psychological and economic factors have contributed in varying degrees to make possible the harmony which exists in Brazil. Then the results of their inquiries can be set for in publications in order to stimulate those who are still struggling elsewhere to introduce more peaceable and happier interracial relations*" [emphasis added]
>
> (UNESCO, "The Race Question": 4).

UNESCO's aim to learn lessons from Brazil's "harmonious" racial order had the unanticipated result, however, of raising serious doubts about the veracity of the idea that Brazil actually was a "racial democracy" (note: the first reports from these studies were collected in a volume titled "Race and Class in Rural Brazil," edited by Charles Wagley, published in 1952). In the main, while not in total agreement with one another, the first wave of UNESCO studies showed that while ethnoracial categorization in Brazil was indeed "ambiguous" and "fluid," especially in comparison to the U.S., there was relatively greater "race mixture" and "intermarriage" than in the U.S., and considerably less segregation along "racial" or "color" lines, it was not the case that Brazil was a land *totally free* of

[8] Thomas Skidmore (1985) quotes prominent Brazilian writer Vianna Moog (1972), who states, "If there are few dark-skinned Brazilians at the higher levels of society, it simply reflects past disadvantages – poverty and the lack of education which inevitably accompanied slavery". Another example of the notion, "racial democracy," at work can be found in Fontaine's (1985) quote of the president of the National Congress (1977), who declares: "In Brazil, access to society depends up on individual effort, intellectual ability, and merit. We have all inherited common attributes, and what we are building – socially, economically, and politically- proves the correctness of our rejection of the myths of racial superiority" (Skidmore 1985: 12).

ethnoracial stratification and discrimination (Harris 1952; Hutchinson 1952; Wagley 1952). Even still, while acknowledging the existence of "white aristocratic caste[s]" where membership is "closed to the Negro, the dark *mestiço*, and even those who have Negro ancestry or marked Negroid features," and a clear "preference for Caucasian physical features," Wagley (1952: 153-154) concludes that, "the expression of prejudice against the Negroes, the *mestiços* and people of Indian physical type is mainly manifested verbally and not in behaviour. *Other factors (wealth, occupation, education, etc.) are of greater importance in determining the actual patterns of inter-personal relations than race* [emphasis mine]... Brazil has avoided developing a caste society such as that of the United States, where the strict line between the Negro and the white has been such a costly drain upon the nation and the individual."

Such statements are somewhat different than those made by researchers' reports published just a few years after these initial studies. These reports were based on studies of the center and southeastern regions of Brazil. In contrast to the earlier studies of the Northeast, studies of the center and southeastern regions, in particular, where there was widespread European immigration, "emphasized racial discrimination and inequality, generally neglecting the issue of miscegenation" (Telles 2004: 21). The most influential of these studies was "Race Relations between Blacks and Whites in Sao Paulo," by Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes (1955). This study, in addition to another work stimulated by this earlier study, "Color and Social Mobility in Florianopolis," by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Octavio Ianni (1960), painted a different picture than the earlier UNESCO studies that were mostly ethnographic portraits of small Amazonian towns and rural Northeastern villages. Relying on both ethnographic and quantitative data, these studies argued that "negros" in Brazil were the victims of particularly pernicious "racial discrimination" in the labor market, given their competition with the descendants of European immigrants for jobs. Consequently, "negros" would find it very difficult to progress socially and economically given this direct competition with "whites" (i.e. the descendants of European immigrants) for jobs and economic opportunities in general (Bastide & Fernandes 1955; Cardoso & Ianni 1960). For these researchers, Brazil was not a "racial democracy," even though, they generally agreed with the other UNESCO researchers that "class was more important than race" for life chances. Even still, their conclusions were starkly different than the optimism generally shared by the authors of the first UNESCO studies (e.g. Hutchinson, Harris, and Wagley) that as "Brazilian society improved… people of darker skin color would join the middle ranks of society, given that there [were] no serious racial barriers to social and economic advance[ment]" (Wagley 1952: 154).

After a lull in the study of "race relations," in Brazil, brought on by military repression in the 1960s, 1970s, by the 1980s, armed with newly available, nationally representative data from the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE), scholar-activists such as Nelson Valle da Silva and Carlos Hasenbalg (who both completed their Ph.D.'s in the U.S. in the mid-to-late 1970s), inspired by the works of Bastide, Fernandes, Cardoso, and Ianni, also attacked the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy." I submit that this thinking marks the beginning of the third phase of studying "race in Brazil," where both Brazilian and North American scholars and activists viewed Brazil, more so than ever, through the lens of the U.S. (1980-Present).

A defining characteristic of this phase was the move towards conducting large-scale quantitative studies of racial inequality in housing, socioeconomic status, education, and crime similar to the studies of the black urban poor conducted in the U.S. These studies by Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva were directly modeled off of studies of 'black-white' socioeconomic inequality in the U.S. In fact, the title of Silva's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Michigan (1978) was "White-Nonwhite Income Differentials: Brazil-1960" an almost word-for-word copy of the title of the

book, *Black-White Income Differentials* (Masters 1975). Silva's findings were published in English in his seminal article, "Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil" (1985). Silva's aim, in this article, was to empirically test the influential 'mulatto escape hatch' theory proposed by Carl Degler (1971). In Degler's view, mulattos (i.e. those of the intermediate ethnoracial category *pardo*) suffered less discrimination than *pretos*; and consequently, mulattos enjoyed higher levels of educational, occupational, and economic attainment. As an alternative, Silva and members of the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (MNU) decided to *biracialize* Brazil by lumping together *pretos* and *pardos* into a single "negro" or "nonwhite" category. Silva writes, "[T]o consider Blacks and mulattos as composing a homogenous 'nonwhite' racial group does no violence to reality. Rather than being a mere simplification, the joint analysis of Blacks and mulattos constitutes a sensible approach to the analysis of discrimination in Brazil" (Silva 1985: 43). Silva (1985) claims that while there is socioeconomic inequality between *pardos* and *pretos*, the *primary* axis of socioeconomic inequality is between whites (*brancos*) and nonwhites[9] (i.e. *pretos* and *pardos*).

Quantitative studies, such as these, allowed for the first time, a precise, quantitative understanding of the association between ethnoracial categories and stratification outcomes in Brazil. They endeavored to show, once and for all, that the notion that Brazil was a "racial democracy" was a myth. Similar analyses have continued to be conducted by North American scholars to the present-day (see Telles 2004), which represent, on the view of this author, the third phase in the study of "race" in Brazil (1980-Present). This shift in focus towards quantitative analyses of ethnoracial inequality using national-level data, however, has had the effect of submerging the significance of Brazil's *gradational* system of ethnoracial classification based on physical appearance and accordingly, the *gradational* nature of inequality in Brazilian society. In particular, simply lumping *pretos* and *pardos* together into a "nonwhite" category in statistical analyses has led to the contention that there are no substantial *social* differences in "behavior" (ceteris paribus) between individuals classified by others or who tend to self-classify as *pardo* and *preto* in everyday life (Silva 1978, 1985; Hanchard 1994). That is, Silva conflates inequality as represented by his statistical models with the subjective experience of inequality and processes of ethnoracial classification in everyday life. Hasenbalg, at the very least, makes this distinction clear in an interview conducted decades after the initial studies (see Guimaraes 2006: 263).

Simply dividing the Brazilian population into "whites" and "nonwhites" (with the presumption of shared 'African lineage' held specifically by 'nonwhites' only, hence the notion *Afro-descendente*, which is often used interchangeably with the term "nonwhites," see Bailey 2008, 2009) makes Brazil, which has long been noted for its fluidity and its gradational "color" continuum, a facsimile of the U.S. (in terms of its "race relations" paradigm which views the U.S. simply as black or white). In other words, this practice is none other than the imposition of the United States's "one-drop rule" on a society where such thinking never developed and remains alien to their reality (Sansone 2003; Bailey 2009; Schwartzman 2008, 2009). Despite this confusion, the overwhelming influence of U.S.-led NGOs and foundations (both financially and intellectually) has aided in this oversimplification of Brazilian reality, co-signed, once again, by the considerable *symbolic power* wielded by the Brazilian state (Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] 2005). The use of the *negro* category by the Brazilian government has increased dramatically in the past few decades, as "Black Movement" activists have challenged the usage of the intermediate, *pardo* category by the IBGE (Brazilian Census Bureau) as devaluing "black identity" and promoted the usage of the *negro* category (see Loveman et al. 2012: 5),

[9] Hasenbalg (1985) reports similar findings and Telles (2009) reaches the same conclusion in his recent re-analysis of IBGE data from 1980-1990.

successfully lobbied for government campaigns instructing individuals to 'embrace their blackness' and not to 'whiten' or 'lighten' their ethnoracial self-classifications in the Census (here I refer to the Brazilian government campaign, "Don't Let Your Color Pass Into the White"), and the nation, inspired by such activism and the role of U.S.-led NGOs, experiments with its own versions of Affirmative Action programs (Nobles 2001; Bailey 2008, 2009; Loveman et al. 2012).

Contemporary research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil primarily focuses on the country's black-white continuum which scholars typically operationalize using the three major census categories: black (*preto*), white (*branco*), and brown (*pardo*), which 99% of the Brazilian population self-identifies as belonging to (though the use of the *negro* category, created by simply lumping *pretos* and *pardos* together is becoming increasingly common). These categories are typically referred to as "race-color" categories which are thought to capture a skin color continuum that ranges from individuals with very fair skin to individuals with very dark skin color (Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). As should be somewhat clear from the discussion above, *even* the standard "race-color" categories in the census are an *oversimplification* of Brazil's gradational system of ethnoracial classification. Yet, researchers claim that "race" as represented in by census categories is the "equivalent" of *cor* (Portuguese for *color*) (Telles 2004, 2009), which refers to Brazil's phenotypic continuum. The reality though, given that ethnoracial categorization into "race-color" categories is significantly affected by individuals' socioeconomic status, age, gender, and region, is that the census categories used in our literature on "race relations" in Brazil are *not* simply representative of Brazil's "color" continuum, particularly its continuum of skin color.

Once again, social science falls back on *folk notions* as their analytic concepts – that "race" and "color" are used interchangeably in everyday life and by the Brazilian government does not necessitate or even legitimate social scientists' use of these terms interchangeably in their research (Banton 2012). As ironic as it is, given that studies highlight the role of *physical appearance* in determining life chances (primarily skin tone) in Brazil, our literature on ethnoracial inequality relies upon census, "race-color" categories instead of actual data on *skin color*. In other words, for all that has been said about "the significance of skin color in Brazil," the reality is that we simply *do not know* the actual significance of *skin color*, because the data researchers use, "race-color" census categories, are affected by a range of *non-phenotypical* factors, which makes *skin color* only one of *many* factors which lead to individuals' categorization into these "race-color" categories in the first place (Guimaraes 2012). Moreover, with the inextricable relationship between socioeconomic status and ethnoracial categorization in Brazil, given processes of "whitening" and/or "darkening," in Brazil, the association between socioeconomic status and "race-color" categories may be *endogenous* (a point that one prominent scholar has recently admitted, see Telles 2012).

Furthermore, *even if* Brazilian "race-color," census categories (black, white, and brown), used by most scholars, *did* closely approximate Brazil's "color" continuum, scholarly practices over the past few decades, influenced by the folk experiences, categories, and understandings of the U.S. (blindly used as the *analytic lens* of the "race relations" and "racial formation" paradigms), simply lump together two of the three categories (black and brown) into a single category (with the puzzling assumption that blacks and browns, specifically, are *Afro-descendentes*, in a country where almost *anyone* can and often does claim *some* degree of African ancestry, see, for example, Harris 1952, 1970, Wagley 1952, but also, Telles 2004, Sue 2009, and Bailey 2009), resulting in the oversimplification of a categorical system that is *already* an oversimplification of the reality of ethnoracial categorization in everyday life.

In sum, as ironic as it is, research on Brazil, a country lauded for the primacy of physical

appearance in determining life chances, has proceeded *without* actual data on skin tone[10]. Thus, on the one hand, researchers in the U.S. conflate "race" and "color," at the same time that the actual study of skin color has been marginalized and split off from the dominant "race relations" paradigm in a sub-genre called "colorism;" and, on the other hand, researchers in Brazil conflate "race" and "color," all the while they explicitly claim to be studying the "significance of skin color," by using "race-color" categories (i.e. census data) which are not actually *skin color* categories (i.e. skin color data). In other words, in *each* case (though for slightly different reasons given differences in historical and national contexts), the categories most commonly used by researchers (e.g. census categories in both the U.S. and Brazil) do not refer strictly to *skin color*, despite a dominant, scholarly discourse which, in both cases, with an uncritical reliance upon *popular* discourse, refers to such categories as if they are indeed "color" (e.g. skin color). Such confusions, on the view of this author, necessitate the utilization of new and different analytic tools, principally *an analytic of racial domination* (cf. Wacquant 1997) and an extended conceptualization of *bodily capital* (cf. Wacquant 1995), which I discuss in the following section

The Relevance of Bodily Capital for the Comparative Study of Ethnoracial Division

Comparing *ethnoracial division* in the U.S. and Brazil, by focusing on the salience and significance of skin tone (and hair) as markers of ethnoracial division and inequality among black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole, would be considerably hindered if one were to follow the standard "race relations" paradigm with its myriad confusions resulting from its reliance upon (and exportation) of the experiences, [folk] categories, and [folk] concepts of the U.S. in lieu of the *construction of analytic concepts* needed to: (1) understand each case on its own terms and (2) compare each case as particular instances of *racial domination* (Wacquant 1997). As was the case in Wacquant's (2008: 165) *comparative sociology of advanced marginality*, which focused on the U.S. and France, this *comparative sociology of ethnoracial division* is a "systematic, empirically grounded, cross-national comparison" of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil which proceeds "according to a research design that (1): does not presuppose that the analytic apparatus forged on one continent should be transposed wholesale on to the other and (2) is sensitive to the fact that all 'national' conceptual tools have embedded within them specific social, political, and moral assumptions reflective of the particular history of classification struggles in each country."

Accordingly, one of the most obdurate epistemological obstacles to such a project is the very definition of "race" itself in mainstream Sociology. Consider, for example, the following: "race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race invokes biologically based human characteristics (so-called "phenotypes"), selection of these particular human features for racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process" (Omi & Winant 1994: 55). Or, take this more recent definition, for example, "Race involves the assumption that individuals can be divided into groups based on phenotype or genotype and that those groups have meaningful differences… Ethnicity refers to a subset of people whose members share common national, ancestral, cultural, immigration, or religious characteristics that distinguish them from other groups" (Burton and Bonilla-Silva et al. 2010: 440, for a similar definition see Cornell & Hartmann 1998). What both of these "definitions" miss (or

[10] Such data has been used to examine skin tone stratification among black Americans (Keith and Herring 1991 and Chapter 2 of this study), Mexican Americans (Murguia and Telles 1996), and more recently in Mexico (Villarreal 2010).

forget) is that the ethnoracial classification of U.S. blacks is not a matter of phenotype or genotype[11]. Individuals are classified as "black" according to the "one-drop rule" which means that ancestry, not phenotype (e.g. skin tone, hair texture, etc.) is the basis of the ethnoracial classification in the U.S. (though strictly so, only for "blacks"). These researchers conflate processes of ethnoracial classification *in everyday life*, which often rely upon the visual cues of skin hue, hair type, and facial features (in the absence of explicit information about *ancestry*) with self-classification (both census-level and in everyday life) and ascription by others when information about *ancestry* is known.

The latter definitions of "race" *and* "ethnicity" are none other than the *folk* understandings of "race" and "ethnicity" as they exist the U.S., where "race" is associated with African Americans, and "ethnicity" is associated with various immigrant populations (e.g. "Hispanics" or "Latinos," and Asian-Americans) (Loveman 1999). These definitions, however are unsuited, as ironic as it is, for the canonical case of "race," – black Americans, who are classified by their *ancestry* and not their phenotype, and fail to travel outside of the U.S. (e.g., Japan, Brazil, or elsewhere) (Wacquant 1997). As Miles (2003) explains, "If racism has been conceived in terms of the physical distinctiveness of its victims, academic and political developments throughout the 1990s have shown the poverty of this conceptualisation. It is impossible to describe how Bosnian Muslims are physically distinguishable from Bosnian Serbs, or Rwandan Hutus from Tutsis" (Miles 2003, 6)[12].

One of the problems with the standard of view of "race" as "physiology alone" (Wacquant 1997: 224) is that the *salience* of physical appearance for ethnoracial classification is *variable*. Charles Wagley [1959] (1965), in his seminal essay "On the Concept of Social Races in the Americas," sets out a useful guide to conceptualizing and comparing various strains of "race" throughout the Americas (and beyond). He writes, "Such terms as 'Negro', 'white', 'Indian', or 'mulatto' do not have genetic meanings… they may in one society be classifications based on real or imaginary physical characteristics; in another they may refer more to criteria of social status such as education, wealth, language, and even custom; while in still another they may indicate near or distant ancestry" (Wagley [1959] 1965: 531). Here, Wagley importantly breaks with the idea that "race" is no more than a socially constructed notion of physical difference.

Wagley observes three different bases of 'social races' in the Americas: ancestry, physical appearance, and sociocultural status. He proceeds to fit cases into each of these three types. In Wagley's estimation, the U.S. system is marked by a reliance on ancestry as its primary basis of 'social race.' He points to the institution of hypo-descent, described above, where just 'one-drop' of 'Negro blood' is enough to *legally* and socially label someone as "black." In this system, physical appearance, while important, is secondary to ancestry. One need only to look to the history of "black" leaders from Adam Clayton Powell and Walter White to A. Philip Randolph, Lena Horne, Diane Nash (of SNCC), Kathleen Cleaver (of the Black Panthers) and Colin Powell, who are all of mixed ancestry *and* nearly indistinguishable from whites phenotypically (e.g. skin tone, facial features, hair, etc.).

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[11] Genotype is not the same as ancestry – genotype implies that all blacks belong to some homogeneous genetic group, which is not the case. Furthermore, this commits the troubling error of equating "racial" difference with biological difference.

[12] In addition to these cases, one could also add the case of the Japanese *burakumin* (hamlet-people) who are physically and linguistically indistinguishable from other Japanese. Despite this, the *burakumin* have been the target of intense dehumanization and discrimination, particularly regarding 'intermarriage'. In the Edo Period (1603-1867), for example, government sanctioned discrimination and segregation created territorially stigmatized burakumin settlements, known as dōwa chiku (Hane 1982).

Wagley astutely notes how ancestry as the basis of 'social race' in the U.S., was critical in the maintenance (and creation) of a castelike separation between whites and blacks. This castelike separation enabled the development of a totally segregated society (in schools, the labor market, housing, public meeting places, etc. Remember though, that this occurred *after* the collapse of slavery, before then, blacks, especially in the South, lived and worked side-by-side with whites, particularly in the South, hence the "necessity" of Jim Crow to clearly separate black from white (see Woodward 1955 and McMillen 1990).

By contrast, as was explained earlier, physical appearance is the primary basis of 'social race' in Brazil (Wagley [1959] 1965, but also, Patterson 2005, who refers to Brazil as an instance of the "Latin American mode of Ethno-somatic stratification"). As Wagley explains, "the indelible mark of physical appearance, with higher prestige accruing to Caucasoid features and the lowest to Negroid features, remains as an important set of criteria by which to classify people in social races [in Brazil]" (Wagley [1959] 1965: 540). In Brazil, relatively high rates of miscegenation gave rise to an assortment of phenotypes that resulted in regionally variable systems of categorization, with dozens of different designations for various admixtures (such as *cafuso, caboclo, and mameluco*).

As Davis (1991: 21) explains, however, there is also considerable amount of phenotypic variation among persons both self-identified and classified by others as "black" in the U.S. The difference between these cases is not the fact of race mixture itself, but rather *the symbolic construction of race mixture*. That being said, even if it were the case that there is "more" phenotypic variation in Brazil than the U.S. (in terms of skin color, hair, facial features), raw phenotypic variation, on its own, *does not automatically give rise to myriad social categories of "race."* Rather, the ability to *see differences*, is the result of a prolonged and complex process of *social learning* best described by Bourdieu's formulation of the relationship between habitus and field[13]. Thus, the [putative] differences between the U.S. and Brazil (in terms of the significance of physical appearance for ethnoracial classification and consequently, *racial domination*) are not to be found "in the peculiarities of some *national character* – or "soul" but *in the particularities of different collective histories*" (Bourdieu [1994] 1998: 3) (crucially, post-Emancipation Brazil did not have an equivalent to the violent, terroristic regime of "Jim Crow," despite recent declarations to the contrary, see Hernandez 2013).

Extricating oneself from the messy bramble that is the comparative study of "race relations," especially in the case of the U.S. and Brazil, necessitates not only a clear, *epistemological break* from the folk concepts and notions of the U.S. (or any other particular case), but also, the forging of *new* analytic tools. In order to make a clear epistemological and conceptual break from the "race relations," "racial formations," (cf. Omi & Winant 1994), and "colorism," paradigms, I use an extended conceptualization of *bodily capital* (cf. Wacquant 1995) designed to capture skin tone and hair, as salient and consequential markers of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil. Certainly, skin tone and hair are not *bodily capital* in and of themselves, no, they only *become such* when invested in a game/world (or more properly, *field*) where such traits make a difference. This, however, is precisely the case in the U.S. and Brazil where skin tone and hair are both salient markers of ethnoracial difference. Such a conceptualization breaks with prior attempts to theorize "colorism" by referring to

[13] Bourdieu writes that practice is, "the product of a dialectical relationship between a situation and a habitus, understood as a system of durable and transposable dispositions which, integrating all past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions, and make it possible to accomplish infinitely differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata acquired in prior practice" (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 261).

these "racially-coded" phenotypic traits as *social capital* (Hunter 2002) or *epidermal capital* (Bonilla-Silva 2009).

In this study, following Glenn (2009), I am particularly interested in the *symbolic* dimension of bodily capital. Bourdieu writes, "[S]ymbolic capital, commonly called prestige, reputation, fame, etc., is the form assumed by different kinds of capital [economic, cultural, and social] when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1991: 230). Further elaborating upon this concept, Bourdieu continues, "Symbolic capital – another name for distinction – is nothing other than capital, of whatever kind [including bodily], when it is perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the incorporation of the structure of its distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident. Distinctions, as symbolic transformations of *de facto* differences, and, more generally, the ranks, orders, grades, and all the other symbolic hierarchies, are the product of the application of schemes of construction which are the product of the incorporation of the very structures to which they are applied; and recognition of the most absolute legitimacy is nothing other than an apprehension of the everyday social world as taken for granted, an apprehension which results from the almost perfect coincidence of objective structures and incorporated structures" (Bourdieu 1991: 238). The importance of symbolic capital in Bourdieu's theoretical framework cannot be understated. Wacquant (1992) notes, "The notion of symbolic capital is one of the more complex ones developed by Pierre Bourdieu, and his whole work may be read as a hunt for its varied forms and effects" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119).

I am interested in how these particular phenotypic characteristics (i.e. skin tone and hair as markers of ethnoracial difference in the U.S. and Brazil) may be (*mis)recognized* as the legitimate, inherent "proof" of the honor (or dishonor) of its bearer. Consequently, my examination of the significance of *bodily capital* draws from Goffman's (1963) theory of *stigma*. Goffman (1963) explains, "stigma [is an] attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not attributes is really needed. An attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself..." Much like stigma, bodily capital is also a *relational property*. While dark skin may be negatively valued and even an impediment in a majority white setting (e.g., a predominantly white private school, or a boardroom at a Fortune 500 company) or even a majority black setting (e.g., a Jack n' Jill cotillion or a meeting of the Tennessee Blue Vein Society (Russell et al. 1992: 52), dark skin may also be advantageous in certain settings (and light skin, negatively valued and a potential impediment) such as a Garveyite UNIA rally or the case of black men in the marital market, with some findings suggesting a correlation between dark skin and the perception of racial authenticity, loyalty, and physical strength (Johnson 1934; Hunter 2005).

These fluctuations in the value of skin tone as *bodily capital* are missed by the vast majority of researchers of "colorism" who focus, almost exclusively, on how being lighter-skinned is better than being darker-skinned (see, for example, Russell et al. 1992, Bond and Cash 1992, Herring et al. 2004, Dixon & Maddox 2005, and Golden 2005). Such considerations of the possibly *variable* value of lighter and darker skin tone are rare in the literature on "colorism" in the U.S. among black Americans (an exception is Hunter 2005) and are totally absent in our literature on "race and color" in Brazil (see, for example, Twine 1998, Sheriff 2001, Goldstein 2003).

Ultimately, utilizing this extended, re-conceptualization of *bodily capital* is essential to carrying out an analytically sound *comparative sociology of ethnoracial division* in the U.S. and Brazil. By utilizing this concept I am able to, at the very least, cleanly break from: (1) the misguided definition of "race" as "physiology" or "physiognomy" (Omi & Winant: 54) and "ethnicity" as "culture," (2) the

"race relations" paradigm which tends to conflate ethnoracial classification (i.e. in terms of ethnoracial categories) and "color," (e.g. skin color, but also hair) (see above), (3) the vast majority of the literature on "race and color" in Brazil which *also* conflates "race" (in terms of ethnoracial classification into ethnoracial categories) and "color" (e.g. skin color, but also hair), and (4) the literature on "colorism," both in terms of its U.S.-centric myopia (here I compare *across* cases), but also, its tendency not to view skin color as a *relational property* (see above) and to conceptualize skin color, haphazardly, as *social capital* or *epidermal capital*.

Chapter Overview and the Contributions of this Study

In comparing the salience, significance, and consequences of *bodily capital* (i.e. skin color and hair) in the U.S. and Brazil (among black Americans and Brazilians, respectively), this dissertation makes a number of substantial contributions to an entire constellation of literature(s) on ethnoracial dynamics in the U.S. and Brazil, respectively, as well as in *comparison* to one another. For example: (1) there are no previous studies of the socioeconomic consequences of *skin color* specifically in Brazil, instead researchers utilize noisy census categories which are determined by a range of factors, of which skin color, is just a single element (see above), (2) there are no recent previous studies that utilize in-depth interviews in to examine the salience and significance of skin tone (and hair) in a variety of domains (e.g. friends, family, dating, mating, policing, etc.). Instead, the literature is dominated by *ethnographies*, usually conducted in either Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, or Bahia (see, for example, Twine 1998, Sheriff 2001, Sansone 2003, and Goldstein 2003), and (3) there is no previous study which compares the significance and consequence of skin tone (and hair) in the U.S. and Brazil, despite explicit arguments that such a comparison would help illuminate just how different and/or similar the U.S. and Brazil are in terms of "colorism" and ethnoracial division (especially against the backdrop of recent arguments about whether the U.S. and Brazilian "racial orders" are "converging" or "diverging," see Skidmore 1993, Bonilla-Silva 2002, and Daniel 2007).

In this study, I address each of these gaps utilizing the quantitative analysis of several nationally-representative surveys of the U.S. and Brazil, in addition to 100 in-depth interviews (50 in each country) of black Americans and Brazilians which focus on the salience and significance of *bodily capital* in shaping social experiences in a variety of realms: public, commercial, and intimate alike (Part III, forthcoming). This project is comprised of three parts. Part I sets out the problematic I address both theoretically and empirically. I discuss: (1) conceptual issues looming over the study of ethnoracial classification and inequality in the U.S. and Brazil respectively, as well as in comparative perspective over the past hundred years or more (centrally the conflation of folk notions and analytic concepts, particularly, the unreflexive borrowing of U.S. folk notions to understand both the U.S. *and* Brazil), by way of an intellectual history which focuses primarily on key figures' conceptions of "race" and "color" and their understandings of ethnoracial inequality and (2) alternatives to these practices and the current "race relations" paradigm by way of an *epistemological break* with dominant scholarly practices rooted in the concept of *bodily capital* (e.g. phenotypic characteristics such as skin tone and hair, as forms of *symbolic capital,* cf. Bourdieu) and an analytic concept of *racial domination* (which includes a re-conceptualization of "race," as a particular specie of social classification, Wacquant 1997).

Part II of the dissertation utilizes several nationally-representative surveys of the U.S. and Brazil to: (1) assess whether skin tone *continues* to be a major factor of stratification among black Americans in the early 21st century despite recent arguments to the contrary (see Pattillo 1999; Gullickson 2005; Lacy 2007), (2) to examine if skin tone is a significant predictor of the frequency of

perceived discrimination among black Americans (which current research has often hypothesized, but has had difficulty demonstrating empirically), (3) to test if skin tone is a significant predictor of social distance among black Americans, even after controlling for their socioeconomic status (previous research reports that SES is associated with social distance among black Americans, see Chapter 3), (4) to examine the relationship between skin tone and health among black Americans, (5) to analyze whether "race-color" categories (i.e. census categories, which rely on self-classification) used in virtually all research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil are *empirically* distinct from skin color and (6) to determine whether skin color data (i.e. interviewer-rated skin color), which researchers have lacked in Brazil despite making claims about "the significance of skin color in Brazil," is a *better* predictor of key stratification outcomes than the standard "race-color," census categories.

In Part III (forthcoming), I "attend to the meanings and lived experience" of ethnoracial division tied to gradations of skin tone (and hair) among black Americans and the Brazilian population at-large. I do so by drawing on 100 in-depth interviews (50 in each country) of black Americans and Brazilians (both men and women) (across the "color" continuum), focusing on a variety of realms: public, commercial, and intimate. These interviews were critically important because the quantitative analysis of nationally-representative surveys tell us very little about what sort of *mechanisms* led to the results I report. Researchers (especially in the U.S.) point out that we are in need of in-depth interviews, specifically, to figure out how skin tone inequality is generated and is reproduced in the U.S. The interviews serve a similar purpose in Brazil, where again, recent work (e.g. Telles 2004 and Bailey 2009) is great at detailing inequality in terms of the standard "race-color" census categories, but are mostly silent about the *lived experience* of such inequality, especially inequality as it is associated with gradations of skin tone (and/or hair) specifically.

CHAPTER ONE

Ships Passing in the Night:

"Race" and "Color" in the Social Science of the U.S. and Brazil

This chapter builds upon the Introduction by retracing the interlinked intellectual histories of studies of ethnoracial division in the US and Brazil. Such work is essential to clear a path for more effective comparisons between these two canonical cases, as well as analytically sound, comprehensive renderings of each case on its own terms. I do so because characterizations of the Brazilian racial order have consistently relied on comparisons to the United States (see Marx 1998, Telles 2004, and Bailey 2009). Furthermore, in some respects our understanding of the U.S. 'racial order' has both relied upon and been reinforced by drawing contrasts between the U.S. and Brazil (Andrews 1996; Seigel 2005). This is especially the case in ongoing debates regarding the possible futures of the U.S. 'racial order,' which have hinged upon comparisons between the U.S. and Brazil (see Daniel 2007 and Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009). Yes these works too often fails grapple with the sedimented and enduring *history* of cross-national debates about these two cases over the past century. Existing scholarship thus tends to be unreflexive about the framings and categories currently utilized to make claims about the past, present, and possible future(s) of the U.S. and Brazilian racial orders.

I detail how a mélange of political motivations, geopolitical pressures, and unreflexive comparisons served not only as the foundation for the idea that Brazil is a "racial democracy," but also, *when* and *how* the notion of racial democracy was called into question, and how scholars analyze ethnoracial division in Brazil today utilizing a U.S.-centric framework which obscures the well-documented gradational nature of ethnoracial division and inequality in Brazil, specifically, the significance of "color." Juxtaposed with this genealogical analysis of the study of ethnoracial division in Brazil, is a historically-informed examination of how the adoption of folk notions of "race" as analytic concepts and academic work that tracks closely with sociopolitical conditions and concerns have resulted in the submersion of the study of the significance of skin color for black Americans. Thus, we are left with scholarship that in *both* cases elides the significance and consequences of skin color by utilizing categories and/or concepts developed in the U.S., which are not only inadequate to fully capture the complexity of the U.S. case itself, but also Brazil, where such categories and concepts are not only inadequate, but also *incongruent* to the realities of Brazilians in everyday life.

This comparative-historical, intellectual history of the scholarship on color and racial division in the U.S. and Brazil reveals that (1) scholarship which uncritically relies upon the folk notions of the U.S. has had an overwhelming influence on how ethnoracial division in Brazil has been conceptualized and understood by scholars from both Brazil and the U.S. since at least the late 19th century and (2) the rise of the Civil Rights Movement and the collapse of Jim Crow led scholars to shift their focus to the study of *social problems of the black lower class* (e.g. crime and deviance in the "inner-city", dissolution of the family, and educational inequality), at the cost of erasing continuing differences of

color – a topic which was omnipresent in earlier work on black life in America (see Johnson 1934, Powdermaker 1939, Myrdal 1944, Drake and Cayton 1945, and Frazier 1940, 1957); This dissertation serves as a corrective to overcome these obstacles and clear a path for more accurate comparisons between these two canonical cases of ethnoracial division which have an enormous influence on the study of ethnoracial division and racial domination in general.

I begin this comparative intellectual history by tracing back the emergence of the notion of "racial democracy," an idea which was inextricably linked to concerns over nationhood and progress in the crucible of late-19th century "race science," in addition to politically motivated, historically contingent comparisons to the U.S. which, unfortunately, relied upon the folk notions and categories of the United States. Next, I trace how these transnational debates between noted intellectuals and political elites about "progress" and ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil helped buttress the well-established understanding of the U.S. as a rigid, black-white dichotomy based on the "one-drop rule," with the implication that skin color was somehow *less* important in the U.S. than in Brazil.

Roots of the Twin Myths of "Racial Democracy" and "Racial Purity"

Though it is often forgotten, the very notion "racial democracy," was a reaction, more precisely, a *refutation* of the existence of the U.S. dichotomy in Brazil. "Racial democracy" is the notion that, in Brazil, class differences are far more important for life chances than "race" or "color." Moreover, there are no "true races," in the sense that one would find in the U.S. with its clear dichotomy between black and white. Instead, Brazil, according to the notion "racial democracy," is a land where everyone is "mixed" and consequently, everyone is "just Brazilian." On this view, Brazil was a land where 'racial snobbery and prejudice' were unknown and there was 'perfect equality of the races' (Skidmore 1974). As I explained in the Introduction, such thinking is quite different than what was widely thought about the U.S. in the mid-to-late 19th century. In the United States, there was no expectation of "racial equality," instead slaves were not citizens, they had no rights, and given the prevailing ideas of "race science" in the 18th and 19th centuries, slaves (i.e. African descendants) were biologically inferior to whites (i.e. Europeans). In the transition from slavery to Emancipation and Jim Crow, the overriding distinction in American society between free and unfree became overtaken by a line drawn between individuals with any known trace of African ancestry and the rest of the country (Fields 1993). In many ways, given the international stature of the U.S. on the world stage, the nature of ethnoracial division in the U.S. (i.e. a dichotomy based on centrally on ancestry) became a litmus test for whether or not *other countries* "truly" suffered from a "race problem."

Such a dynamic is precisely what the historian George Reid Andrews (1996) explains in his underappreciated article "Brazilian Racial Democracy 1900-1990, An American Counterpoint," where he highlights how intellectual exchanges between Brazilians and North Americans have had an indelible impact on characterizations of "race relations" in both countries (though to a notably greater extent on Brazil). The first of these exchanges developed among protagonists of the emerging "race science" and geopolitical jockeying over nationhood and progress which were thoroughly racialized (Skidmore 1974; Loveman 2009). In the late 19th century, after pressure from the United States and

Europe led to the end of slavery in Brazil (Toplin 1981), concerns over the "racial stock" of the Brazilian population reached new heights, as Brazilian elites became increasingly worried about the status of Brazil as a nation on the world stage. At this point in Brazilian history, *descent* was actually considered an important marker of "racial" difference, but with so much "race mixture," it was generally held a large portion of the Brazilian population was simply a 'mix of the three sad races, native, African, and European,' and consequently, a continuum of *physical appearance* was the defining feature of ethnoracial division in Brazil, instead of a strict dichotomy in the mode of the U.S. (Degler 1971; Skidmore 1974; Stepan 1991).

Like their American and European counterparts, the Brazilian elite were heavily influenced by the race science of the late 19th century which proposed that nations made up of non-Europeans were fated to backwardness while "pure European" nations would continue on their trajectory of "progress" (Skidmore 1974). Such thinking, such as the theories of de Gobineau, also held that nations of mixed-race persons, or "mulattos," would fare even worse than non-European nations, as some race scientists maintained that "hybrids" were congenitally inferior and unfit to survive (Skidmore 1974). Given such concerns, a large portion of the Brazilian elite (e.g. politicians, social scientists, estate owners, upper-class, etc.) agreed that the only answer was to "whiten" Brazil by importing European immigrants (Skidmore 1974; Stepan 1991).

For example, in 1911, in a series of lectures at Stanford University, Manoel de Oliveira Lima, a Brazilian intellectual-in-exile in the United States, argued that while he thought that miscegenation during the colonial period was "morally reprehensible," Brazil would overcome its "backwardness" by importing European immigrants in order to avoid being "drowned by the spreading of inferior races" (Skidmore 1974: 72). On this view, Brazil was rapidly whitening and it did not even have the stain of a pernicious race problem, the likes of which afflicted the United States. Given Lima's assessment of the U.S. and its "race problem," however, what could explain the young country's aggressive and successful rise on the world stage? To Oliveira Lima, it was the "integrity of the **purity of the white race** which contributed so greatly to the *present* superiority" of the U.S (Seigel 2005: 70).

Oliveira Lima was a career diplomat and historian who spent the 1890s in Washington, D.C. (Skidmore 1974: 71). He wrote a book about America whose first chapter was entitled "The Negro Problem." In in he compares and contrasts the U.S. South during Jim Crow to the Brazilian Northeast. Oliveira Lima claimed, without much evidence, that "the fate of the American slave was infinitely worse than in Brazil" (Skidmore 1974: 71). Oliveira Lima's aim was to depict Brazil as a legitimate nation on the world stage and his strategy, was to highlight how 'racially progressive' Brazil was *in comparison* to the United States. He writes, "Indeed, in your country [the U.S.], which is in so many ways the most progressive in the world. the racial question continues pressing. Yet we of Latin American have already settled this same problem... by fusion... in which the inferior elements will shortly disappear. Thus, when mulattoes and half castes shall no longer exist among us... you will be

threatened with preserving indefinitely within your confines irreducible populations of... hostile sentiments[14]."

Yes, the general consensus on the U.S. at this point in history was that its rigid dichotomy between black and white maintained a "racial" caste system where the disqualification of individuals with *any known trace of African blood* to be legitimately "white" guaranteed the 'racial purity' of the nation. Even still, as "race science" was increasingly discredited, however, the Brazilian elite's stance began to shift, culminating in explicit resistance to such ideas at the First Brazilian Eugenics Conference in 1929: the president of the conference, Edgar Roquette-Pinto, argued against the notion that "mixed-breeds" were congenitally inferior (Telles 2004: 32). Shifting tides within the field of "race science" were central in providing a scientific rationale for this counter-argument, as the Brazilian elite (primarily policy makers) looked abroad and found in the pioneering work of German-American anthropologist Franz Boas the scientific rationale to reject a "race science" that condemned a portion of the Brazilian population to extinction in the worst case, or perpetual backwardness at the very least.

Franz Boas, the famous Columbia University professor, not only influenced Mr. Roquette-Pinto and many others among the Brazilian elite, but also the young Gilberto Freyre. With the help of his mentor, Manoel de Oliveira Lima (a Brazilian intellectual in exile in the U.S.), Freyre journeyed to Columbia University to study under the tutelage of Franz Boas. Freyre's contention that being mixed-race was not only unproblematic, but perhaps distinctly *advantageous* began to form, inspired by Boas. Instead of viewing "race" as something biological, Boas proposed that the "real differences" among mankind were matters of culture. Freyre utilized such thinking in his famous book *Casa Grande e Senzala* (translated in 1946 as *The Masters and the Slaves*).

While many readers assume that *The Masters and the Slaves* was the fruit of an *organic,* Brazilian intellectual, the reality is that Freyre was educated in the U.S. In fact, his first stop in the United States, before his sojourn at Columbia University, was Baylor University in the Jim Crow South. One day, walking through a nearby town, Freyre noticed a terrible odor in the air. After asking around, Freyre was informed that the smell was left over from the lynching of a black American some days earlier (Skidmore 1974: 4). Freyre, the child of a wealthy Brazilian landowner, was shocked by such an occurrence. For him, in comparison to what he witnessed in the U.S., Brazil had 'no race problem.' Certainly, Brazil had never known the horrors of Jim Crow, and its relatively fluid "color" continuum was very different than the rigid "color line" (cf. Du Bois 1903) of the U.S. (which was actually based on ancestry and not color!). As the Brazilian sociologist Bernadete Ramos Beserra (2011: 197**)** emphasizes, "Gilberto Freyre's *The Masters and the Slaves* [*Casa Grande e Senzala*] was the result of both a political and a personal need to assess who he was (as a citizen of Brazil) after living and studying in the United States for several years. Thus it was an effort to understand himself and Brazil *as part of his dialogue with the United States* ."

[14] Cited in Seigel (2005: 70).

In *The Masters and the Slaves*, Freyre lays out three major arguments: (1) being "mixed-race" is advantageous and the modern "race science" of the day is bunk (though the palimpsest of biological, *descent-based*, understandings of "race" is clearly apparent in the notion "mixed-race"), (2) slavery was less harsh in Brazil than the U.S., and (3) "race relations" (i.e. interpersonal relations and inequality between the "races") in Brazil were generally mild and harmonious compared to almost everywhere else in the Western world[15].

In the end, both Lima and Freyre's ideas about the significance of ethnoracial division in Brazil was the result of positioning Brazil relative to the United States and their comparisons relied heavily upon U.S. conceptions of "race." Consequently, the very notion "racial democracy" was from its origins shaped by the folk notions of the United States on "race." This comparison cast the United States as "racially pure" and Brazil as a "racially mixed" paradise of harmonious relations between the "races" (note the logical contradiction between the idea of "race mixture" and *relations* between "races," which highlights the imbrication of notions of *descent* and *physical appearance* as the basis of ethnoracial division in Brazil).

At the same time that Jim Crow and the "one-drop rule" were seen as ensuring the "purity of the white race" in the United States, such institutions were increasingly under attack by prominent black intellectuals. In their arguments, these black intellectuals tended to rely upon the idea that Brazil was indeed a "racial democracy" in order to highlight the injustices faced by black Americans in the United States. For example, despite vehemently disagreeing with Roosevelt that "the best men of both races" essentially agreed on the separation of races (i.e. Jim Crow), W.E.B. Du Bois writes in *The Crisis* in 1914 (286), in agreement with Roosevelt, that "Brazil is absorbing the Negro race. There is no color bar to advancement." Along the same lines, the eminent black sociologist E. Franklin Frazier shared these views in his 1942 article in the magazine *Common Sense* (Issue 11), entitled "Brazil Has No Race Problem," he argues, "Despite all the philanthropy and inter-racial work, Negroes and white people [in the U.S.] still do not know each other after three hundred years of association. Whereas in Brazil white, brown, and black people know each other as individual human beings, white people in the United States only know the Negro as a symbol or stereotype."

These comparisons, however, not only uncritically accepted the idea that Brazil was truly a nation where ethnoracial division was of little consequence, but, importantly, these comparisons were undergirded by the assumption that "black" in the U.S. and "black" in Brazil had the same meaning. Frazier, who traveled to Bahia, was explicit about this: *"[I]f we apply the definition of a Negro used in the United States to Brazil*, we find that under a system of free competition the Negro in Brazil has out-

[15] While one may wonder what the *national* discussion on the significance of "race," in Brazil, the reality is that there was not much of a discussion at all – at least not at the national-level. Consequently, the vast majority of what is known about ethnoracial division in Brazil in the first few decades of the 20th century comes from either: (1) discussions among the Brazilian elite about "whitening" or (2) the idea of "racial democracy" (Skidmore 1983).

stripped the Negro in the United States…" [emphasis mine]. It is critical, however, to understand that *blackness* in the U.S. and *blackness* in Brazil are not equivalent (and consequently, "whiteness" as well). As I explained in the Introduction, the U.S. and Brazil have deeply rooted historical differences in their logics of ethnoracial classification. Given the general presumption of *shared ancestry* in a "mixed-race" nation (Brazil), the dominance of phenotypical markers for ethnoracial categorization in Brazil, inflected by social properties (e.g. socioeconomic status, but also gender, age, and region) meant that many "blacks" in the U.S. would not be considered "black" in Brazil; in fact, "some U.S blacks in the United States may be considered white in Brazil" (Telles 2004: 79). Hasty comparison between the U.S. and Brazil, however, tended to ignore these important differences.

Take, for example, newspaper and magazine articles written by black Americans at the turn of the 20th century after their voyages to Brazil. Robert S. Abbott, the founder of the country' leading black newspaper, the *Chicago Defender*, wrote after his trip to Brazil in 1923: "For a Negro visiting South America it is certainly worth all the time and money entailed. It was a delight beyond words to have observed the social life of the Negro, say, in Brazil, where untrammeled by any racial feeling, he is climbing higher and higher in the scale of achievement… One wonders, no doubt, how it can be that in a land where slavery is yet in the memory of most adults, society is free of any prejudice or rancor against the once enslaved Race… there [is] perfect equality between the races in Brazil"(Hellwig 1992: 75). Cyril V. Briggs, who created the pro-black magazine *The Crusader* in 1918, writes of Brazil in 1920 that, "race snobbery and prejudice are unknown in Brazil. The country has had many high officials, including even the Chief Executive, who were patently of Negro blood. The Brazilian navy and army are largely composed of Negroes. All the big dreadnaughts have Negro crews. It is the land of opportunity *par excellence* for the Negro at this time" (cited in Hellwig 1992: 38). One wonders though, if all of the "*Negroes"* Briggs identified would have thought of themselves as *negroes* or would even have been classified in Brazil as *negroes* (Telles 2004). While the category *negro* did exist in Brazil, its use was infrequent or even rare in everyday life. These comparisons do not consider that the definition of "negro" in the U.S. and Brazil were not the same – this is the difference between a logic of racial classification based on *the mark of origin* (ancestry) vs. *the mark of appearance* (cf. Nogueira 1955).

These travel accounts, and the comparisons made by many black intellectuals, are the perfect example of *allodoxia.* North Americans misread the Brazilian "color continuum through a dichotomous lens. Consequently, they were surprised when they probably should not have been surprised at all. The *regimes of racial domination* in Brazil and the United States differed dramatically – from their logics of ethnoracial categorization to the relative absence of violence along ethnoracial lines in Brazil compared to the horrors of Jim Crow, and the noted absence of segregation strictly defined in terms of "race or color" in Brazil compared to the many 'black cities within the white' (cf. Drake & Cayton 1945) strewn across the North American landscape. Just because darker-skinned individuals or "African-descendants" were not being lynched or explicitly barred from equality via the legal system, however, should not have been taken that Brazil was a nation totally free of ethnoracial division and inequality. In reality, Brazil was simply *different* than the U.S.

Furthermore, given that ethnoracial categorization in Brazil was based on a color continuum, and not a dichotomous descent-based hierarchy governed by hypodescent, it should have been *little* to *no surprise* that many of the black Americans (given the variation in their physical appearance: skin tones, hair types, etc.) who traveled to Brazil would not have the same experiences they had back home during Jim Crow. Take, for instance, the fact that Robert S. Abbott's wife Helen was a quadroon (1/4th African ancestry) with fair skin and blue eyes, who was often mistaken for white even in the U.S. (Hellwig 1992: 81). Would such a fair-skinned woman with blue eyes be considered *preta* or even *morena* in Brazil? Would such a woman be treated negatively in everyday life, in accordance with the well-documented stereotypes against darker-skinned individuals in Brazil (Wagley 1952)? No, she would not. In Brazil, Helen would most likely just be classified as *white*, but in the United States, while she may have been able to pass for white, she would have only been able to do so if she hid the fact that her grandmother or grandfather was black.

The U.S.-Brazil contrast rested upon a foundation of the unreflexive usage of the folk concepts and categories of one country (the U.S.) in another country (Brazil), without being aware of "the power that language has to make everything look the same" (Wittgenstein 1977: 14-15). As Bourdieu and Wacquant ([1999] 2005: 197 fn 40) put it, "The problem of language [here]… is at once crucial and thorny. [S]ocial scientists stock their technical language with so many theoretical 'faux amis' based on a mere lexicological facsimile, without seeing that these morphologically twinned words are separated by the whole set of differences between the social and symbolic system in which they were produced and the new system in which they are inserted." We cannot forget that "[T]he cognitive, psychological operations at work in Brazil are of a different kind and embedded in a different structure of relationships than those in the United States" (Segato 1998: 148).

This characterization of the two nations, which Seigel (2005: 77) deems "[T]he twin myths of racial democracy and racial purity," has dominated scholarship on the two countries over generations. Therefore, while Skidmore (1993) questions whether the "Bi-Racial U.S.A. vs. Multi-racial Brazil" contrast is *still* valid (given putative "challenges" to the one-drop rule in the U.S. by "multiracials" and the rise of the Latino population), I question whether this contrast was *ever* valid. The reality seems to be that the U.S. and Brazil *shared* elements of their systems of ethnoracial division, but these shared elements were misread as proof that the countries were, in fact, roughly the same, so one could, without issue, simply use the categories of one country (the U.S.) to study and understand the other (Brazil). By this logic, if *negroes* (defined by ancestry) in the U.S. faced the terrors of Jim Crow, but *negroes* (defined by physical appearance) in Brazil did not, then Brazil was indeed a "racial democracy."

Despite these issues, notably the lack of actual analysis of ethnoracial division and inequality in Brazil, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decided to develop a series of studies of "race relations" in Brazil to uncover the secrets of this "racial paradise" with the hopes of gaining valuable lessons for the U.S. and other countries with "race problems." After the Holocaust, there was a profound motivation among social scientists to discredit naturalized conceptions of "race" and put an end to ethnoracial inequality all over

the world. In the next section, I discuss how these studies, conceived of in the crucible of the canonical U.S.-Brazil contrast, I have detailed above, ironically laid the foundation for the first, systematic questioning of the idea of "racial democracy" in Brazil.

The "Failure" of the UNESCO Studies: Debating "Racial Democracy"

In September 1949, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) promoted an anti-racist program on the heels of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which was issued in December of 1948 (Maio 2001). In fact the very creation of UNESCO was inspired by a reaction of revulsion at the horrors of the racist Nazi regime that had driven the globe to World War II. It was against this backdrop that a series of studies about Brazilian's putatively unique and "harmonious" system of race relations were commissioned. As UNESCO officials put it, their objective was: "organizing in Brazil a pilot investigation about contacts between race and ethnic groups in order to determine the economic, social, political, cultural and psychological favorable or unfavorable to the existence of harmonious relations between race and ethnic groups[16]."

Perhaps, given this objective, it is somewhat unsurprising that the main locale chosen for these studies was Bahia in Brazil's fabled Northeast where Gilberto Freyre was born and raised until his travel for study in the U.S. It was here that E. Franklin Frazier traveled and wrote in his 1942 *American Sociological Review* article, "The Negro Family in Bahia," that Brazil essentially had no "race problem." On his view, it was an exaggeration to believe that Brazil was a nation totally free of 'racial animus,' but compared to the United States, Brazil had virtually no ethnoracial inequality. In fact, he conjectured, as the caste system of Jim Crow in the U.S. eroded, the United States would end up very similar to Brazil (Frazier [1944] 1992). Plans for a such a regionally-constrained view of Brazil, inspired by the reputed "harmonious" "race relations" of the Northeast, however, were ultimately scrapped as social scientists involved with the project pushed to include the more industrialized Southeastern region of Brazil as well.

The primarily ethnographic UNESCO studies yielded mixed results (see the Introduction). While researchers in the Northeast reported "mild discrimination" on the basis of "race or color" (Wagley 1952), researchers focused on the South and Southeastern regions of Brazil noted palpable discrimination against "negros" (though they do not clearly define the term) and expressed pessimism that the fate of *negros* would improve (Bastide & Fernandes 1955). Even still, *all* of the researchers generally agreed that "race or color" was far less important than "class" for the life chances of Brazilians (see Wagley 1952; Harris 1952; Bastide & Fernandes 1955). Disagreements among the researchers generally were a matter of their interpretation of the degree to which there was *interpersonal* conflict on the basis of ethnoracial difference in Brazil. While Wagley and Harris tended to consider interpersonal relations between the "races" as mostly positive, Bastide and Fernandes contended that interpersonal relations between the "races" were fraught with tensions, especially

[16] UNESCO archives, cited in Maio (2001: 119).

between the descendants of European immigrants and *negros* (again, undefined!) who were in direct competition on the labor market. Despite these differences and the lack of clarity on *how* the researchers defined *negro,* all of the researchers generally agreed that Brazil was different than the United States in terms of ethnoracial categorization. That is, at the same time that the researchers used the term *negro*, which, without clearly defining it, runs the risk of being understood as *equivalent* to the term *negro* in the United States, the researchers still maintained that *physical appearance* was the primary basis of ethnoracial classification in Brazil. It is important, however, to note the slight confusion in their usage of ethnoracial terminology.

One of the major differences between Brazil and the United States the UNESCO researchers highlighted was "interracial" marriage (defined by the researchers as marriage between *negros* and whites, but also between individuals of different skin colors). Swiss-U.S. anthropologist Alfred Métraux, who was a key member of the UNESCO project, concluded that despite "interracial" marriage being frequently reported, the reality was that such marriages usually involved persons of the same class and often of approximate colors[17]. Even still, Métraux (1951) concluded that Brazil was "an example of a country where relations between the races are relatively harmonious, but it would be an exaggeration... to claim that racial prejudice is unknown[18]." Moreover, even Charles Wagley (1952), who generally reported only "mild discrimination" in Northeast Brazil writes that *negros* are often the targets of stereotyping and that their features are "universally considered ugly." At each and every turn, the idea that Brazil was a land totally free of ethnoracial strife, that is, the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy," was put into doubt by the UNESCO studies.

Unfortunately, the term *negro* remains either undefined in many of the UNESCO studies or, in the case of Wagley, it is simply the U.S. folk notion of *negro*, despite his explanation that physical appearance is the basis of ethnoracial categorization in Brazil and that he does not maintain a "genotypical" understanding of "race." He writes, "In Brazil, three racial stocks - the American Indian, the Negro, and the European Caucasoid - have mingled and mixed to form a society in which racial tensions and conflicts are especially mild, despite the great racial variability of the population... In Brazil, a caste-like society with rigid barriers between the racial groups did not develop as it did in the United States" (Wagley 1952: 7). Consequently, it's unclear if *negro* in Brazil was at all equivalent to *negro* in the U.S. Again, one sees history repeating itself – scholars study without the usage of an analytic concept of "race." Even though Wagley's concept 'social races' comes close to being an analytic concept, his uneven usage of the concept in his *analyses*, renders the concept mostly window-dressing.

One of the researchers involved in the first study inspired by the UNESCO studies, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, highlighted that many of the findings of previous studies of ethnoracial division in Brazil, particularly of the Northeast, were flawed in their reliance upon the U.S. folk categories,

[17] Schwartzman (2007) reports similar findings in a much more recently conducted, nationally-representative study. Why not, it's not relevant to this intellectual history? You're not assessing the crosstemporal validity of these claims here

[18] Cited in Maio (2001: 133).why as note and not in text as before?

experiences, and expectations. He writes, "When American authors such as Pierson and Wagley tried to explain the Brazilian inter-racial co-existence patterns and compare them with North America's, it was not by chance that they finally convinced themselves that Brazil did not, in fact, have 'racial prejudice'" (Cardoso 1965: 124). As with the young Gilberto Freyre and many other black American scholars, including Du Bois and Frazier, Brazil was once again, viewed mostly in comparison to the United States, instead of on its own terms. Instead of simply accepting that Brazil was not a "racial democracy," many of the UNESCO researchers, while noting that Brazil was not *totally* free of "racial prejudice," ended up mostly accepting the key tenets of "racial democracy," such as Brazil was a nation with "harmonious inter-racial relations" and no serious "racial barriers," so *class* was more important than "race or color" for determining Brazilians' life chances (Wagley 1952; Bastide & Fernandes 1955).

Even though the UNESCO researchers generally agreed that "race" was less important than class in Brazil, their findings were interpreted to suggest that Brazil was not *technically* a "racial democracy" because the prevailing definition held by many social scientists all over the world was that a true "racial democracy" would be *totally* free of ethnoracial prejudice and inequality (see UNESCO, "The Race Question"). Consequently, many social scientists viewed the UNESCO studies as a "failure" because no clear lessons could be extracted from the studies to teach other nations about how to be 'harmonious' in terms of their 'inter-racial relations.' Moreover, Fernandes, who studied the South and Southeast, was unique in his view that Brazil would most likely *always* have some degree of tension between *negros* and whites (again, these terms are undefined in his analysis). His views inspired other researchers to take another look at ethnoracial division and inequality in Brazil, especially by using statistical techniques (as Fernandes did), instead of just ethnographies. Andrews (1996: 491) explains, "[S]everal of the young Brazilian scholars who had taken part [in the UNESCO studies] -- most notably Thales de Azevedo and Florestan Fernandes -- subsequently went on to make the deconstruction of racial democracy one of the central concerns of their scholarly careers. They continued to publish critiques of Brazilian race relations and trained younger scholars who followed the same line." In the next section, I discuss this revisionist shift in the literature on ethnoracial division in Brazil and highlight how the persistent influence of U.S. understandings and assumptions, which undergirded this shift, have further muddled our understanding of racial categorization and stratification in Brazil– ironically, by downplaying or marginalizing the significance and consequences of Brazil's *gradational* "color" continuum, and instead, viewing Brazil as a *denegated* version of the United States.

The Revisionist Turn in the Study of Ethnoracial Division in Brazil

With the sociopolitical shifts brought on by the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., the canonical contrast between the U.S. as a society with an undeniable 'race problem' and Brazil as a "racial democracy," began to be more forcefully challenged, primarily by Brazilian researchers who were educated in the United States. This challenge, drew, once again, largely from the experiences, categories, and theories of the United States. While most studies of ethnoracial division in Brazil were

"almost exclusively based on small samples of towns in the predominantly nonwhite North and Northeast" (Telles 2004: 99), by the 1980s (after a period of military repression in the 1960s and 1970s which silenced research on ethnoracial inequality), armed with nationally representative data from the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE), scholars-activists attacked the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy." At this point in Brazilian history, the national consensus after the period of military repression was that Brazil was a land free of ethnoracial division and inequality. While many Brazilians may not have truly believed this, the reality is that such an idea of Brazil was promoted by the Brazilian government both within Brazil and outside of it.

The most influential of the revisionist work in the late 1970s and 1980s was conducted by Brazilian sociologist Nelson da Valle Silva and the Argentinian sociologist Carlos Hasenbalg. Like Freyre so many decades before, Silva and Hasenbalg both earned degrees in the United States. Silva earned his Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and Hasenbalg earned his Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Silva's (1978) dissertation, titled "White-Nonwhite Income Differentials: Brazil-1960" an almost word-for-word copy of the book, *Black-White Income Differentials* by Stanley Masters, published in 1975. Their studies copied the "race relations" research of the United States in more than just name. Their studies utilized the folk categories of the United States and attempted to force Brazilian reality into those categories. One of Silva's objectives, beyond simply disproving the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy" by quantitatively demonstrating that "blacks" were worse off than "whites" on the labor market, even after taking their human capital into account (a finding Silva would view as evidence of "racial discrimination"), was to empirically test the famous "mulatto escape hatch" theory proposed by Carl Degler (1971).

On Degler's view, mulattos (on his view, individuals with "negro" and "white" ancestry) uffered less discrimination than *negros* and consequently, mulattos enjoyed higher levels of educational attainment, occupational status, and economic standing. This dynamic, in Degler's view, was a key feature of ethnoracial division in Brazil. As an alternative, Silva, inspired by "Black Movement" activists who argued that Brazil was "really" a "bi-racial" nation like the United States and discussions to the contrary were an attack' on "black consciousness" (Nascimento 1979), decided to *biracialize* Brazil by lumping together *pretos* and *pardos* into a single *negro* or 'nonwhite' category. In other words, Silva decided to simplify the triadic system that was *already* a simplification of Brazil's gradational, "color" continuum. Silva writes" "[T]o consider Blacks and mulattos as composing a homogenous 'nonwhite' racial group does no violence to reality. Rather than being a mere simplification, the joint analysis of Blacks and mulattos constitutes a sensible approach to the analysis of discrimination in Brazil" (Silva 1985: 43). What is Silva's evidence to support this assertion? Silva (1985) finds that while there is socioeconomic inequality between *pardos* and *pretos*, the *primary* axis of socioeconomic inequality is between whites (*brancos*) and nonwhites[19] (i.e. *pretos*

[19] Hasenbalg (1985) reports similar findings and Telles (2009) reaches the same conclusion in his recent re-analysis of IBGE data from 1980-1990; though his earlier work found some socioeconomic differences between blacks and browns (Telles and Lim 1998).

and *pardos*). Brazil, on this view, is a *majority* nonwhite nation – the *negro* majority finds itself oppressed by a *white* minority.

Silva's (1985) study, including his famous article, "The Cost of Not Being White in Brazil" was interpreted by many as proof in support of the Black Movement stance that Brazil was "really" "bi-racial" like the United States and that the triadic system used by the Brazilian government was an attack on "black consciousness" (for more on this, please see Loveman et al. 2012). As Loveman et al. (2012) explain, this stance became hegemonic in the Brazil and the Brazilian government in the 1990s, into the 2000s (for more on this see Bailey 2008, 2009) even led campaigns urging Brazilians to view themselves dichotomously, as either black or white. Some U.S. researchers, however, noted the logical flaw in the idea that just because *stratification* outcomes appear to be best predicted by utilizing only two ethnoracial categories in statistical models, that *the lived* experience of ethnoracial division in everyday life could be understood using only two ethnoracial categories. Melissa Nobles (2000: 127), for example, bluntly argues that the *negro* "majority" created by scholar-activists lumping together *pretos* and *pardos* is no more than a "paper creation"[20]. Silva conflates ethnoracial stratification with ethnoracial classification and discrimination in everyday life.

The statistical significance of the *negro* category should not have been interpreted as evidence that the *negro* category was relevant in everyday life in Brazil and equivalent to the term black in the United States, but this is precisely what occurred within the "Black Movement" who influenced policy makers in the Brazilian government. "[A]ccording to negro movement actors and race scholars, *negros* are defined as all browns and *pretos* [blacks]. Using that definition there is no doubt about the low level of groupness of the *negro* population… In the 1995 and 2002 national datasets, 2 and 5 percent of browns chose *negro,* respectively. Hence, *negro* clearly does not substitute for brown or *preto*, nor does it appear to be an umbrella nonwhite term that represents a racialized social group… [N]egro movement organizations have distanced many nonwhite Brazilians by insisting that they self-label as *negros*. Not only does this clearly violate the principles of self-classification, but it also suggests that **there is no internally defined racialized group that includes all nonwhites in Brazil**" (Bailey 2009: 57-58). Instead of viewing such findings as evidence that the *negro* category was a "paper creation" however, "Black Movement" activists and many prominent researchers in the U.S. and Brazil, explain non-identification as *negro* away as evidence of "false consciousness" (see, for example, Hanchard 1994 and Twine 1998).

Again, to understand this shift we must turn to Freyre because a central aspect of this revisionist phase is a direct reaction against Freyre's U.S-dependent idea that Brazil is a "racial democracy." While Gilberto Freyre helped counter the rationale for the Brazilian elite's "whitening" project by focusing on the contributions of Africans and Amerindians to Brazilian culture and the putative advantages of being a "mixed-race people," Hasenbalg (1985: 25) counters that, Freyre also

[20] Or, as Robert Miles (2003) puts it, it is possible to "believe the wrong thing for the right reasons" (Miles 2003, 6). What does this have to do? "Right" insofar as the MNU's avowed stance of seeking political and economic rights for the most vulnerable in one of the World's most profoundly unequal modern Democracies.

"created the most formidable ideological weapon against Blacks" – namely the idea that Brazil was a land of equal opportunities for all – regardless of their skin color. While Brazil did indeed have ethnoracial inequality and researchers were correct to challenge the idea that Brazil was free of ethnoracial discrimination and inequality, the revisionist turn of the 1980s goes further to propose that the notion of "racial democracy" is an impediment to the kind of mobilization (and dichotomous schema of self-classification) that obtained in the case of African-Americans in the U.S. Not only then was the idea that Brazil was a "racial democracy" a *myth*, but this myth had pernicious consequences for an inchoate, self-denying population of "Afro-Brazilians" who refused to mobilize together in a fashion similar to black Americans in the U.S. (Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998). This view was rooted in a politically-motivated conflation of stratification, as is represented in statistical models, and the *lived experience* of ethnoracial division in everyday life. Indeed, even Hasenbalg admits, decades after this revisionist turn began that, "[w]hen we [Hasenbalg and Silva] study [racial] inequalities juxtaposing whites and nonwhites (*pretos* and *pardos*), we are *referring strictly to processes of socioeconomic stratification* [emphasis mine]. When we examine other dimensions of social life, that [binary] juxtaposition is not adequate" (Guimaraes 2006: 263, cited in Bailey 2009: 210).

The position held by many "Black Movement" activists is that individuals are rejecting their African ancestry and are simply refusing to see that they are "really" negros, or "*Afro-descendentes*." This glosses over the fact that to identify simply as *negro* would paper over the fact that so many Brazilian families are composed of people who may self-identify or be identified as *black, white, and brown* – not to mention a plethora of other nonofficial categories along the phenotypic continuum. In other words, Brazil is a nation where ethnoracial division is simply more complex than a simple dichotomy or even a triadic categorization system. In Brazil, *hybridity,* the sense of *shared* "mixed" ancestry is the expectation and "purity" is the exception. Consequently, Beserra insists that "The enterprise of substituting Brazilian racial ideology based on *mestiçagem* with a U.S. ideology based on segregation has required, first of all, eliminating the 'brown' category, because it gets in the way of a system of thought that, in contrast to the Brazilian system, is not used to dealing with ambiguity. The justification for merging 'browns' with 'blacks' is that the socioeconomic performance of 'browns' is closer to that of 'blacks' than to that of 'whites.' It is crucial to understand, however, that, notwithstanding its resemblance to one category or the other, 'brown' is a category in its own right. Thus, the challenge is not to merge it with 'black,' as has been done by scholars in the U.S. tradition since Hasenbalg, but *to attempt to grasp its full reality*."

What the category *negro* and its twin, "*Afro-descendente*," is none other than the imposition of the United States's one-drop rule on a society where such thinking never developed and considerable evidence demonstrates is still alien to the reality of most Brazilians. The ill-fit of the *negro* category with everyday realities in Brazil society is exemplified by the fact that *even self-identification as negro does not directly correspond with claiming African ancestry*. Bailey (2009: 82) reports that of the mere 7 percent of individuals who self-classified as negro in a recent, nationally representative survey (PESB 2002), only 49% claimed African ancestry. Thus, he concludes that "[T]he results suggest a disconnection between color and ancestry in the Brazilian imagination… In the popular

imagination, color rather than ancestry appears to be the defining mark of category membership in Brazil."

Consequently, the position of scholars that non-identification as *negro* is the result of "false consciousness" and a *rejection* of African heritage finds little support in social scientific research. Even those who do self-classify as *negro* may still not conceive it as having anything to do with *ancestry* as opposed to *color.* "Colour is important precisely because ancestry is assumed to be held constant as nearly everyone is perceived as representing part of the two poles [black and white]. For example, it has been found that, in Brazil, 38 per cent of self-classified whites claim some African ancestry and 66 per cent of blacks claim some European ancestry. Therefore, even at the racial poles, there is a feeling of being part of the black/white mixture" (Sue 2009: 1061). The revisionist turn is characterized by the problematic, continued, unreflexive reliance on U.S.-centric categories that do not necessarily fit Brazilian realities[21]. A principal casualty of this revisionist turn is considering the significance of Brazil's gradational, *color* continuum. As many scholars turn to dichotomous analyses of Brazil which cover over the considerable heterogeneity of physical appearance, and thus, *experiences* that Brazilians face in everyday life (Carvalho et al. 2004). Ironically, while many scholars speak of the significance of color in Brazil, they utilize an analytic framework with an ancestry-based, dichotomous understanding of ethnoracial inequality which ignores Brazil's gradational system of ethnoracial classification in everyday life.

Activists and the Brazilian government, along with many researchers have utilized studies on *stratification* to justify the imposition of a dichotomous model of Brazilian ethnoracial division that is alien to the experiences of Brazilians in their everyday lives. While Brazilians do use the categories *white, brown, and black* in everyday life, the reality is that even the *triadic* scheme is a simplification of Brazil's noted *color continuum.* Making matters worse is that this dichotomous model operates on the assumption of *shared African ancestry*, but only among *pardos and pretos*, when in reality, almost *anyone* can claim some trace of African ancestry in Brazil. Furthermore, Brazilians' interpretations of the ethnoracial categories *white, brown, and black* rely on *physical appearance* and not *ancestry* (Bailey 2009), consequently, even if lumping blacks and browns into a single *negro* category was somehow legitimate, at least in terms of stratification, explaining the *negro* category should have never appealed to ancestry.

Nevertheless, a dichotomous vision of Brazil has become hegemonic despite many researchers in the U.S. and Brazil decrying its proliferation (for more on this see Telles 2004, Bailey 2008, Bailey 2009, and Loveman et al. 2012.) Certainly, the role of NGOs, multinational foundations and think-tanks which, in funding research on "Afro-Brazilians" and "racism" (e.g. the REVISTA DE ESTUDOS AFRO-ASIATICOS) have had an undeniable influence on how color and racial division is

[21] Beserra (2011: 196) claims, for example, "The study of Telles [2004] is an important and complementary contribution to the field of race relations in Brazil *from a U.S. perspective*... Although [Telles] is aware of the differences between Brazilian and U.S. societies, [he] applies to the study of Brazil the same framework developed to explain U.S. race relations and racism."

studied in Brazil, specifically by legitimating the universalization of U.S. categories and concepts in Brazil and elsewhere (Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] 2005).

Scholar-activists in the "Black Movement" and policy makers in the Brazilian government, simultaneously push for the "unmixing" (i.e. Brazil seen in dichotomously in "black and white", cf. Bailey) of the Brazilian population to fight against racism *and* a re-configuration of how ethnoracial division in Brazil is studied which presupposes the validity of such an "unmixing" in advance. "Rather than creating a political project based on reality, the black movement seeks to change Brazilian reality so that its political project of creating a mass movement and constructing a popular black identity will make sense" (Beserra 2011: 200).

This most recent phase in the study of ethnoracial division in Brazil is anchored in revisionist stance arrayed against Freyre's notion of "racial democracy." In this phase (1980s-Present), instead of simply refuting the idea that Brazil ever was a "racial paradise" free of ethnoracial inequality, takes the flawed step to demonstrate how Brazil is secretly no different than the U.S. (if not, even worse), with the implicit logic that the only "real" instance of "race" or "racism" is that as exists in the United States. In other words, while some of the merits of such a stance are clear – Brazil is *not* a racial democracy – it is unfortunate that another aspect, in fact a central feature, of this transformation is the smuggling in of a U.S.-centric, dichotomous understanding of racial difference into Brazil, as if to prove that Brazil really is a country defined by race – just like the canonical case of "race" itself, the United States. (in words eerily reminiscent to those of Camara cited above), it seems that the plan is for "[T]he round pegs of Brazilian racial dynamics [to] be whittled and planed in such a way that the square holes of existing U.S.-based theories of racial attitudes may eventually seem a 'natural' fit" (Bailey 2009: 224).

In other words, the dominant paradigm of "race relations" formed in the United States, which is already an oversimplification of a considerably more complex reality in the U.S., is being used to guide research in Brazil, a country where, until the past few decades, scholars had consistently expressed amazement at the sheer complexity and fluidity of its racial order. In any case, despite these epistemological obstacles hindering our understanding of ethnoracial division in Brazil, whether a dichotomous modeling of *stratification* based simply on two "race-color" categories, or a triadic modeling of *stratification* based on the three standard "race-color" categories is a *better* predictor of ethnoracial inequality in Brazil than a *skin color continuum* is an empirical question. In Chapter 5, I directly examine whether a skin color continuum is a better predictor of key stratification outcomes in Brazil utilizing the first, nationally-representative data set to ever include interviewer-rated skin color data in Brazil. In the next section, I discuss the historical emergence of this dichotomous approach to ethnoracial division in the United States and how the significance of color was erased as academic framings and foci tracked sociopolitical concerns after the fall of Jim Crow and the pressing crisis of "racial integration."

The Lost Legacy of Color and the Crisis of "Racial Integration"

As I explained in the Introduction, the topic of skin color was always a part of analyses of black life in the United States in scholarship on ethnoracial division in the first half of the 20th century. Charles S. Johnson (1934) observes, for example, in his depiction of a rural Alabama town, that darker-skinned black women didn't want to marry lighter-skinned black or mulatto men because darker-skinned black women considered lighter-skinned black men (and mulatto men) untrustworthy and "poor providers for dark women" (Johnson 1934: 57). St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1945) dedicate several pages of their seminal work, *Black Metropolis*, to phenotypic distinctions and biases among blacks residing in Chicago's ghetto. They detail the existence of 'negro social clubs' with 'unspoken' rules regarding how light skinned someone must be to join them (Drake and Cayton 1945: 497). In line with Frazier's (1940) observations, Drake and Cayton (1945) caution the reader from quickly assuming that most blacks prefer the absolutely *lightest* skin tones. They astutely note that "most color evaluations are imprecise. What one man calls a 'dark' woman another may call 'light'." Furthermore, many blacks explicitly prefer a medium, brown-skin tone and straight, 'good' hair, similar to the "Brazilian *moreno* ideal" (Drake & Cayton 1945: 504). One black male interviewee states: "I never go out with dark women because they just don't interest me. I prefer a light person for a sweetheart or a wife. They are more affectionate, lovable, and understanding. They are usually more attractive; they're prettier; they have good hair. They're more intelligent. I don't look for coal mines; I look for gold mines" (Drake & Cayton 1945: 498).

With the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, however, academic interest in the phenotypic distinctions made within the black population began to decline. This was especially the case given that many researchers believed that the Black Power Movement was successful in ending skin color biases among black Americans (though they tended to ignore than nonblacks *also* discriminated against blacks based on gradations of skin color). Hannerz (1969) reports from his ethnography, conducted at the height of the Black Power Movement, that "grades of skin color do not seem to be strongly correlated with esteem any more, and the men seem to be turning away from hair processing. Black people, the familiar argument goes, should learn to value their ascribed selves. Their notion of beauty should not be 'light, bright, and damn near white.' In short, they should not want to be somebody else – 'black is beautiful'" (Hannerz 1969: 196).

The efficacy of the Black Power Movement to powerfully re-shape phenotypic preferences within the black population, however, is questionable (Craig 2009). In a systematic study of Negro youth (ages 12-17) conducted by Claud Anderson and R.L. Cromwell in 1970[22], the authors find, "of all the questions in the study, the highest consensus was reached in the opinion that most Negroes feel black to be beautiful (80.2% positive). This trend did not reflect the complex positive and negative associations to gradations in Negro skin color." (Anderson and Cromwell 1977: 80). found strong associations between light brown skin being associated with "the smartest girl, smartest boy, nicest

[22] The survey Anderson and Cromwell used was actually directly based off of the survey Charles S. Johnson designed for his study of black Americans in the South in 1934, *The Shadow of the Plantation*.

person, cleanest person, one best liked to marry, one's future offspring, one's own preferred color, the best color to be, prettiest skin, handsomest Negro boy, prettiest Negro girls, and children the father likes best" (Anderson and Cromwell 1977: 80). The authors also found strong associations between dark brown skin being associated with "the dumbest Negro, dirtiest Negro, person one would not like to marry, what one would like one's offspring not to have, what one would prefer not to be, Negroes with bad hair, person with the ugliest skin complexion, ugliest Negro boys, ugliest Negro girls, children whom the mother dislikes, and Negroes who have the hardest time making friends in school" (Anderson and Cromwell 1977: 80-81).

Despite such evidence of the continuing importance of color among black Americans in the late 1960s and 1970s (in spite of the Black Power Movement), the topic simply disappeared. The subject of urban poverty and family structure became a topic of widespread discussion and debate following the release of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1965) report on the Negro family. Moynihan (1965:5-6) argued that "the Negro community is dividing between a stable middle-class group that is steadily growing stronger and more successful and an increasingly disorganized and disadvantaged lower-class group" (Wilson and Aponte 1985: 239). Scholarship shifted its focus to the *social problems* of the black poor (ca. 1970-2000). In these studies of the black "ghetto poor" (sometimes referred to in this literature as the *underclass*[23]), discussions of color among black Americans were absent. For example, the significance of color among black Americans was never mentioned in the landmark study *The Declining Significance of Race* (Wilson 1978), even as it stressed rising socioeconomic differences *within* the black population.

Even ethnographies and community studies, whose *strength* it is to richly detail the everyday lives of poor blacks in the U.S., also ignored the issue of color within the black population (Stack 1971; Anderson 1978). Instead, the topics of family structure, crime, poverty, and "social disorganization" prevailed. Recent, well-regarded ethnographies of the black urban poor continue to omit the matter of color (see, for example, Anderson 1992, 2000; Duneier 1992). The dominant concerns of racial inequality in housing, crime, and socioeconomic class, has placed the matter of color within the black population firmly on the back-burner. This obtains even in ethnographies and community studies of the black *middle class* (Pattillo 1999, 2007), a subpopulation whom previous generations of scholars identified as extremely concerned about skin color (see Frazier 1957).

Despite this shift away from skin color, however, there is strong evidence that skin tone remains a key factor of socioeconomic stratification within the black population. Students of ethnoracial inequality have missed out on an important factor of socioeconomic (and status) stratification within the black population. Even Keith and Herring (1991), whose seminal AJS paper documented the importance of skin tone inequality among black Americans, was mostly ignored by stratification researchers and scholars of "race relations" (see the Introduction). The issue is not that the study of ethnoracial division

[23] For surveys of this literature see William Julius Wilson and Robert Aponte's (1985) review of urban poverty and Carole Marks's (1991) review of the 'urban underclass.' For a critical assessment of this literature see Wacquant (1997, 2008).

and stratification along the black/white ancestral dichotomy is illegitimate. No, scholarly concerns shift over time and this is perfectly understandable. The issue here is that the shift towards the sociology of black social problems had the consequence of submerging the continued significance of skin color for black American life chances – a factor which, according to existing studies is perhaps as important for understanding ethnoracial stratification as the black/white boundary based on ancestry is. Without taking skin color into account in their analyses, it is unclear if a substantial portion of the "black-white inequality" so many researchers dedicate their careers to documenting is explained simply by the difference between being marked as black or white based on ancestry, or the *combination* of blackness defined by ancestry and where any particular black individual lies along a skin color continuum from light-to-dark. Consider, for example, the recent finding by economists that ilight-skinned blacks have wages that are not statistically different than whites (Goldsmith et al. 2006).

A key aspect of this shift away from skin color, similar to how scholars have studied Brazil, is the problematic relationship between categories of practice and categories of analysis which, I argue, has helped us to forget the importance of skin color. As Niemonen (1997: 20) emphasizes in his comprehensive analysis of all articles on race and ethnicity published in the American Journal of Sociology, the American Sociological Review, Social Forces, and Social Problems between 1969 and 1995, "On the whole, the articles published in all four journals reify race and ethnicity... *[T]hey rely on common sense and ahistorical levels of understanding [and] borrow U.S. Census categories without evaluation or critique*." Reliance on common sense is exemplified by definitions of "race" that state that "race" is a matter of phenotypic difference (Omi and Winant 1994; Cornell and Hartmann 1997), which, ironically, is untenable precisely in the country where this notion was developed (the United States), pertaining to the case of black Americans, who are considered "black" *regardless* of their *color* in accordance with the one-drop rule (Davis 1991).

Thus, not only have scholars shifted away from skin color, despite evidence of its continued significance, but the very shift away from *color* in the first place is undergirded by the unreflexive reliance upon the U.S. folk idea of "race" as being synonymous with skin color. Consequently, even though the vast majority of researchers study "racial inequality" utilizing self-classification data which relies primarily on *ancestry*, they often discuss their findings using language that implies that the inequality they discover between blacks and whites is the result of 'prejudice against blacks on the basis of their skin color' (see, for example, Massey & Denton 1993). Ironically, they could actually be correct! It may, in fact, be the case that the black-white divide covers over a much more complex process of inequality in the United States for black Americans, where life chances among them are not simply determined by the simple fact of their blackness, but rather, *how* light or dark their skin color is. Certainly, the findings of Keith and Herring (1991) published in AJS suggest precisely this.

In recent years, however, researchers have wondered if skin tone still stratifies the black population. Given that the data Keith and Herring used in their study is now nearly 30 years old and one prominent study, published in *Social Forces*, claims that the significance of skin color for black Americans' life chances diminished significantly between 1950 and 1980 such that there was no relationship between skin color and educational attainment for black Americans born after 1953 –

whether skin color *remains* a significant factor of stratification within the black population is an open question. In Chapter 2, I utilize newly available, nationally-representative data on black Americans to examine whether skin tone remains a significant factor of stratification among black Americans in the early 21st century.

Ships Passing in the Night: The U.S. and Brazil in Comparative Perspective

In this chapter I have argued that the study of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil is hindered by myriad epistemological obstacles which make fruitful and accurate comparisons between these two cases difficult, but also, have had pernicious effects on our understanding of each case on its own terms. Principally, by relying upon the folk categories, experiences, and theories of the United States, scholarship on ethnoracial division in the U.S. has tended to downplay the significance of skin color, whilst using the term "color" in their discussions, and scholarship on ethnoracial division in Brazil has relied upon "race-color" categories that do not represent Brazil's skin color continuum – especially as researchers move from using *three* "race-color" categories to only *two*. In other words, I have detailed the *historical unfolding* of the marginalization of the significance of skin color in both the United States and (ironically) in Brazil, in favor of a dichotomous, "one-drop rule" understanding of ethnoracial division, which is unsuited to the United States, but also to Brazil.

I have illustrated how an unequal exchange, which has continued in various forms for over a century, where U.S. folk categories are imposed on Brazil, has led to the ironic submersion of considering the significance of skin color and Brazil's gradational, color continuum – while any lessons Brazil may have for our understanding of ethnoracial division in the United States is generally ignored.This dissertation aims to challenge what has been the trend in so many analyses of color and racial division in the U.S. and Brazil – the lopsided, unilateral "exchange" of ideas and lessons between these two cases. As Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] (2005: 185) explain, "[T]he intellectual current flows in one direction only: U.S. categories and problematics (starting with the dichotomous black-white division) Travel south, but Brazilian experiences and counterpoints are rarely if ever repatriated north to question the peculiar ways in which the United States has constructed its 'race' question and how this construction has in turn been unthinkingly transcribed into the analytical apparatus of its national social science."

By setting out a framework where folk categories are not borrowed from either society and used as analytic categories, I attempt to put the U.S.-Brazil comparison on firmer *analytic* ground in order to help us understand, more comprehensively, the nature of the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Brazil as instances of *racial domination*. From quantitative analyses to ethnographies, most current scholarship on the Brazilian case remains firmly enmeshed in a web of categories and concepts constructed in the U.S. By inverting my analytic gaze in making skin color (and hair) my primary focus in the U.S. case, I make the unique move of taking seriously any lessons Brazil may have for the U.S. case. Making this move is important because even work that *does* focus on the significance of color now questions whether or not skin color *continues* to be consequential in the United States (Gullickson 2005). In terms of ethnographies studying the significance of color in the U.S. there are currently *none*; and

interview-based work remains profoundly limited, both in terms of sample size and the scope within which color is thought to be significant (e.g. only among women and only regarding matters of beauty and self-esteem). Moreover, even work on Brazil that invokes the U.S. as a comparative case virtually ignores that skin color is significant in the U.S. *too* (see Bailey 2009, for example, or Twine 1998, Sheriff 1998, Sansone 2003, and Daniel 2007). In Chapter 2, I utilize a nationally representative survey of black Americans to examine whether skin color significantly affects black Americans' life chances in the early 21st century, as it did in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries.

CHAPTER TWO

Skin Tone Stratification among Black Americans in the 21st Century

An incredibly rich literature exists which expertly details ethnoracial inequality in the U.S. In particular, much ink has been spilled recounting the complex and enduring history of ethnoracial inequality between whites and black Americans. For example, scholars highlight how black Americans face steep penalties in the labor market (Pager 2003), in the criminal justice system (Western 2006), in terms of wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Conley 1999), housing and poverty (Massey 2008). In addition to this well documented inequality between blacks and whites, however, there is considerable *intraracial* inequality related to skin tone differences within the black population. Evidence shows that skin tone is a significant predictor of personal and family income, net of education, occupation, parental socioeconomic status, region, urbanicity, and marital status (Keith and Herring 1991: 772). Darker-skin blacks have less income and are more likely to be unemployed (Johnson et al. 1998), in poverty (Bowman et al. 2004), have lower occupational prestige and wealth (Seltzer and Smith 1991), and have worse health outcomes, such as high blood pressure (Harburg et al. 1978; Krieger et al. 1998). Thus, for black Americans, there are at least two dimensions of inequality: (1) between blacks and nonblacks and (2) within the black population according to gradations of skin tone (Hunter 2005).

In contrast to work that dominated the latter half of the 20th century, studies of black life from the first half of the 20th century, consistently detailed how skin color patterned interpersonal relationships among black Americans and significantly affected their life chances (Johnson 1934; Frazier 1957; Drake and Cayton 1945). "Within the Negro group every possible shade of color between jet black and creamy white exists; and variations occur even within the same shade... For Negroes in 'Cottonville,' color is highly important socially and hence economically, as well as sexually... A light skin is considered an asset from all three viewpoints. With the preference for a light complexion is associated a desire for "good", that is straight, hair... To make a 'good' marriage means to 'marry light,' to be 'well-born' very often implies being born with a light skin" (Powdermaker 1939: 64).

While work in the early 20th century examined the impact of color among black Americans in detail, with the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement (which explicitly attempted to address skin color inequality, at least among blacks), scholarship on black life shifted away from matters of color and towards issues of economic inequality, crime, deviance, and life in the inner-city. In the shadow of Jim Crow, concerns over black-white equality made sense – scholars critically examined whether "racial integration" was leading to "racial equality." Unfortunately, such an overwhelming interest in black life telescoped through the lens of social problems, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century, had the consequence of creating a blind-spot in our scholarship – the continuing significance of color. In fact, scholars found that between 1950 and 1980 there was as much socioeconomic inequality between darker-skin and light-skin blacks, as there is between blacks and whites as a whole (Hughes and Hertel 1990).

Thus, despite studies, cited above, which illustrate how color was an important factor of socioeconomic stratification among black Americans until at least 1980, scholarship on color inequality has often been relatively marginalized in comparison to the study of racial inequality between blacks and whites as a whole. As Herring (2002: 19) puts it: "For the most part, [the

importance of skin tone differences] has often been overshadowed by or subsumed within more general issues of racism and race relations." The submersion of the significance of skin color as a topic in U.S. social science is a topic I took up in much more detail in Chapter 1.

As nationally-representative data on skin tone in the U.S. has been limited, the majority of the studies of the significance of skin tone among black Americans have necessarily relied heavily on the National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980 (see Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005; Hochschild and Weaver 2007a). Consequently, it has been extremely difficult to ascertain if skin tone inequality among black Americans persisted to the end of the 20th century and continues to the present-day (i.e. the early 21st century). Hersch (2006), for example, uses the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI 1992) and the Detroit Area Study (DAS 1995), and finds that the socioeconomic significance of skin tone has diminished very slightly between 1979 and 1995 (i.e. the relationship between skin tone and wages specifically), but the latter two data sets are not nationally representative. Moreover, even these data are now nearly twenty years old. In contrast to Hersch (2006), Gullickson (2005) argues that the substantial color-related socioeconomic stratification that obtained throughout the first half of the 20th century among black Americans diminished significantly and on most outcomes nearly disappeared completely between 1950 and the late 1980s based on his analysis of the National Survey of Black Americans.

This leaves a tension in the current literature: *does skin tone stratification still persist for black Americans in the early 21st century?* In order to address this question, recently generated, nationally representative data is required. Fortunately, such data has become available and in this study, I address this gap in the literature by analyzing data from the recently conducted National Survey of American Life (2001-2003) which was designed by many of the same principal investigators responsible for the National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980). Importantly, this data set includes a large number of individuals who came of age a generation or more *after* those individuals surveyed in the original NSBA (1979-1980) – individuals whose experiences are formed by what obtains in the post-Civil Rights era. Marshaling data from this nationally representative survey, conducted decades after the NSBA, I analyze the relationship between skin tone and a variety of outcomes and assess whether or not skin tone stratification persists among black Americans in the early 21st century, and if so, to what extent it persists.

Specifically, I analyze the association of skin tone with black Americans' household income, educational attainment, occupational status, employment status, marital status, and their spouse's skin color and educational attainment – net of a variety of traditional stratification measures. Most of these findings reveal that significant skin tone stratification among black Americans *does persist* into the 21st century – and in some instances, may have even become *more* consequential. Before attending to these findings, however, it is important to provide a brief overview of why and how skin tone has affected the life chances of black Americans, as well as current debates regarding the present and future of skin tone stratification among black Americans specifically and in the United States generally.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLOR: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Skin color's importance originated during slavery, where, as Keith and Herring (1991: 2) point out, lighter-skinned blacks were privileged by whites and thought to be more aesthetically appealing and intellectually superior to darker-skinned blacks – thinking that typically rested on a foundation of "race science" which held that lighter-skinned blacks (i.e. those who had kinship ties with whites, hence the lightness of these individuals' skin tones), were *less* African and more European and thus

superior to other blacks (Reuter 1917). The adoption of such thinking by whites afforded lighter-skinned blacks advantages in obtaining education, property, and even their freedom (i.e. manumission). Blacks of lighter-complexions were more likely to be skilled workers, professionals, and even own their own farms (Gatewood 2000; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007). These advantages, notably their much greater wealth in comparison to all other blacks and their heightened status, were passed down selectively over generations as many lighter-skinned blacks practiced homogamy (Bodenhorn 2006).

Even churches were not neutral zones; many African American churches operated within a 'color caste system,' both during and after slavery, with certain denominations known for only allowing blacks of the fairest complexions to worship there (Frazier 1963: 31). For example, some churches used brown paper bag tests to determine who was eligible for admission. Those with skin darker than the brown paper bag were refused entry. Some churches even painted their doors a light shade of brown and anyone darker than the door was told to worship elsewhere. St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1945) dedicated several pages of their seminal work, ***Black Metropolis***, to discussing phenotypic distinctions and biases among blacks in *Bronzeville*. The authors detail the existence of "negro social clubs" with "unspoken" rules regarding how light skinned someone must be in order to join them (Drake and Cayton 1945: 497). They also find, similar to the studies cited above, the high premium black men put on light skin and "good hair" in the marital market. One black male interviewee states, "I never go out with dark women because they just don't interest me. I prefer a light person for a sweetheart or a wife. They are more affectionate, lovable, and understanding. They are usually more attractive; they're prettier; they have good hair. They're more intelligent. I don't look for coal mines; I look for gold mines" (Drake and Cayton 1945: 498).

It is important to note the *gendered* nature of skin color dynamics. Much of the current literature suggests that black women face harsher penalties for darker-skin tone than black men. Scholars maintain that this is due to the incredible importance of aesthetics and beauty for women's' life chances. Accordingly, Keith and Herring's (1991: 773) findings from the National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980) reveal that skin color is a significant predictor of educational attainment, occupational status, and family income among black *women* only. Light skin color, in particular, is strongly associated with notions of beauty that are thoroughly racialized and inextricably interwoven with European aesthetic standards. Beauty, conceptualized as a form of capital (Hunter 2002), can afford women considerable advantages in their lives, from gaining employment, to wages at work, and their treatment in the criminal justice system. Evidence from the NSBA 1979-1980 showed that lighter-skinned black women, for example, tend to marry higher status spouses (i.e. spouses with higher educational attainment) than all other black women, even after controlling for their own educational attainment (Hunter 2005: 47).

Despite many studies which highlighted the importance of color in myriad realms of black life in America, concerns about racial equality (between blacks and whites) in the aftermath of Jim Crow led to declining academic interest in the impact of color within the black population. For one, some believed that the Black Power Movement, with its explicit message that "Black is Beautiful" altered the value of color among black Americans (Hannerz 1969). Researchers found, however, that even when black adolescents, aged 12 to 18, explicitly professed that "Black is Beautiful," they still displayed some of the same color biases of previous generations (Anderson and Cromwell 1977). Anderson and Cromwell (1977) found strong associations between light brown skin being associated with "the smartest girl, smartest boy, nicest person, cleanest person, one best liked to marry, one's future offspring, one's own preferred color, the best color to be, prettiest skin, handsomest Negro boy, prettiest Negro girls, and children the father likes best" (Anderson and Cromwell 1977: 80). The

authors also found strong associations between dark brown skin being associated with "the dumbest Negro, dirtiest Negro, person one would not like to marry, what one would like one's offspring not to have, what one would prefer not to be, Negroes with bad hair, person with the ugliest skin complexion, ugliest Negro boys, ugliest Negro girls, children whom the mother dislikes, and Negroes who have the hardest time making friends in school" (Anderson and Cromwell 1977: 80-81).

Thus, evidence suggests that color bias persisted even during the Black Power Movement and color remained a considerable factor of socioeconomic stratification among blacks throughout the Civil Rights Movement and even during the Black Power Movement (Keith and Herring 1991; Hughes and Hertel 1990). It is possible, however, that not enough time had passed by 1980 for the effects of ostensible shifts in the significance of "race" and "color" to take hold. Perhaps, as Gullickson (2005) contends, "racial integration" presented black Americans with "white gatekeepers," for whom gradations of skin tone were "less salient" than "black gatekeepers," and consequently, according to his analysis, the significance of skin color among black Americans has continually diminished since the 1950s and made skin color inequality nearly non-existent for blacks by the late 1980s[24].

Moreover, while whites may not make as fine-tuned distinctions of blacks, based on skin tone, as blacks commonly do of one another (Hill 2002), White judges still sentenced blacks with more stereotypically black facial features and darker skin tone to an average of eight additional months of hard time compared to blacks with lighter skin and less Afrocentric features - even after taking account of different criminal histories (Eberhardt et al. 2004; Blair et al. 2004). Both lighter-skinned black men and black women received more lenient sentences and served less prison time than darker-skinned inmates even after controlling for their previous criminal histories[25] (Gyimah-Brempong and Price 2006; Viglione et al. 2011). In a survey experiment, [white] subjects exposed to Hurricane Katrina victims were less generous in their support for disaster relief assistance if the target they encountered was dark-skinned (Iyengar and Hahn 2007). Audit studies of housing and experimental studies of hiring document differential treatment of blacks by skin tone (Yinger 1995; Wade et al. 2004) where white subjects preferred light-skinned applicants to blacks with a darker appearance in an exercise in which they were asked to hire for an engineering firm. Moreover, both blacks *and* whites describe lighter-skin blacks as motivated, educated and attractive, while being more likely to describe darker-skinned blacks as unattractive, criminal, unintelligent, and lazy (Maddox and Gray 2002)[26]. Consequently, while it may be the case that "white gatekeepers" may have an increased role in shaping the life chances of blacks compared to previous decades where "black gatekeepers" may have had a more direct role (Gullickson 2005), the reality is that "white gatekeepers" *also* discriminate among blacks according to gradations of skin color and these distinctions matter a great deal for black American's life chances.

Furthermore, some scholars argue that the rise of the Latino and multiracial populations since the 1980s may make skin color in the United States even *more* significant than it has ever been. That is, in an era where overt racial discrimination has declined considerably (Bobo et al. 2012), efforts to roll back Affirmative Action have been increasingly successful, and the rhetoric of colorblindness proliferates – according to this thinking – skin color will become even more salient and consequential

[24] An exception is the case of lighter-skinned blacks with attaining higher status spouses (Gullickson 2005: 173).
[25] In fact, in other analyses of the National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003, I find that darker-skinned black Americans have higher odds of being arrested and having a family member in jail, net of their age, educational attainment, occupational status, household income, and a host of other sociodemographic factors.
[26] The aforementioned studies were cited in Weaver (2012).

as a factor of stratification and discrimination than it has ever been, as the U.S. racial order becomes more "complex, multi-layered, and Latin American" (Bonilla-Silva 2006: 179). To be clear, according to their argument, even though overt racial discrimination may be waning, color discrimination will not only survive, but, may even *increase.* In fact, recent psychological experiments show that even though subjects can often suppress racial stereotyping and discrimination, they are often unable to do so with skin color bias, *even when they are explicitly told about the problem* (Blair et al. 2004: 674)[27].

While it remains to be seen if the significance and consequences of skin color will increase in the United States, evidence does show that skin color stratification among black Americans has existed since at least the 18th century (see Gatewood 2000; Bodenhorn 2006, Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007) and seems to have persisted in some form until at least 1980 (Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991). That is, despite the relative marginalization of skin color as a topic in U.S. social science and myriad hypotheses and declarations of its demise as a consequential factor of inequality among black Americans (see Gullickson 2005), evidence strongly suggests that skin color has continuously remained a significant factor for black Americans' life chances for at least the past two hundred and fifty years or more (i.e. from the 18th century until at least 1980). Given this, I hypothesize that skin color remains strongly associated with black Americans' life chances in the early 21st century. To test this hypothesis, I examine the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), which shares many of the same principal investigators responsible for designing the often utilized NSBA 1979-1980, and examine whether the significance of color persists among black Americans in a variety of realms of life in the early 21st century.

DATA AND METHODS

The dataset I use to analyze skin tone stratification among black Americans in the early 21st century is the National Survey of American Life 2001-2003. The field work for the study was completed by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research's Survey Research Center, in cooperation with the Program for Research on Black Americans. The NSAL sample has a national multi-stage probability design which consists of 64 primary sampling units (PSU's). Fifty-six of these primary areas overlap substantially with existing Survey Research Center National Sample primary areas. The remaining eight primary areas were chosen from the South in order for the sample to represent African Americans in the proportion in which they are distributed nationally. The data collection was conducted from February 2001 to June 2003. The interviews were administered face-to-face and conducted within respondents' homes; respondents were compensated for their time (Keith et al. 2010).

A total of 6,082 face-to-face interviews were conducted with persons aged 18 or older, including 3,570 African Americans, 891 non-Hispanic Whites, and 1,621 Blacks of Caribbean descent. The overall response rate of 72.3% is excellent given that African Americans (especially lower income African Americans) are more likely to reside in major urban areas which are more difficult and expensive with respect to survey fieldwork and data collection. The African American sample is nationally representative of Black households in the 48 coterminous states with one adult aged 18 and over (Jackson et al. 2004). The analyses presented here are restricted to native born U.S. blacks[28]. Another advantage of this data set compared to the NSBA (1979-1980) is this data set's much larger

[27] Cited in Weaver (2012: 166).

[28] All respondents in this study are self-identified African-Americans born in the United States, as was the case in Keith and Herring's (1991) analysis of the NSBA 1979-1980.

sample size (N = 3,133). Analyses were also conducted comparing the samples of native-born U.S. blacks and non-native born Blacks, as well as both of these samples combined[29].

MEASURES

In order to assess the association between skin tone and a variety of stratification outcomes, I use age and sex as control variables. *Age* is a continuous variable. *Female* is coded as a dummy variable where 0 = Male and 1= Female.

Dependent and Independent Variables

Household income is a continuous variable ranging from 0-X_{max} in number of U.S. dollars (as per standard stratification research practice I use the log of household income). *Educational attainment* (and *Mother's educational attainment*) is a continuous variable capturing the number of years of completed education, ranging from 0-X_{max}. *South (Region)* is a dummy variable where 0 = Non-South and 1 = South. *Rural* is a dummy variable where 0 = Non-Rural and 1 = Rural. *Skin Color*[30] is a scale ranging from 1-5 where 1 = "Very Light Skin" and 5 = "Very Dark Skin" (Keith et al. 2010). *Marital status* is a binary variable where 0 = Not Married and 1 = Married/Cohabitating.

Next, *Occupational Status* is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10 where 1 = "Manual Task-based labor" to 10 = "Professional/Managerial Position". *Employment Status* is a binary variable where 0 = Unemployed or Out of the Labor Force and 1 = Employed. While it may be true that being unemployed and out of the labor force may seem to be distinct states (perhaps for women with children in particular), studies by economists demonstrate that being unemployed and out of the labor force are experienced in psychologically *non-distinct* ways and that these two states are also empirically indistinguishable for the vast majority of the labor force[31] (Clark and Summers 1979; Goldsmith et al. 1995). In fact, Clark and Summers (1979: 31) estimate that the rate of transition between these two states is so high that they conclude that "many of those classified as not in the labor force are functionally indistinguishable from the unemployed."

[29] Interestingly, I find no significant skin tone results for non-native born Blacks of West Indian or Caribbean descent. While a full discussion of this finding is beyond the purview of this study, scholarship suggests that immigrant status (selection bias and verbal accent) differentiates non-native born Blacks of West Indian or Caribbean descent from both native born Blacks and native born Blacks of West Indian or Caribbean descent (Waters 1999).

[30] The distribution of respondent's skin tones is: 2.7% 'Very Dark,' 15.3% 'Dark,' 18.34% 'Somewhat Dark,' 41.91% 'Medium,' 12.19% 'Somewhat Light,' 7.05% 'Light,' and 2.51% 'Very Light.'

[31] "Half of all unemployment spells end with individuals leaving the labor force, nearly half who withdraw from the labor force continued to want employment, but inability had led them to temporarily stop searching. The authors also find that 34% of the individuals who withdraw from the labor force re-enter the labor force within a month and 44 percent re-enter within two months" (the vast majority re-enter in an unemployed status) (Clark and Summer 1979 – cited in Goldsmith et al. 1995: 2). While being "out of the labor force" may mean something different for men as opposed to women, there were only slight differences in the averages of women reporting being "out of the labor force" as opposed to men (only 3.8% more women reported being 'out of the labor force' compared to men in the sample).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Analysis

Variable	Mean (Std. Dev)	Min.-Max.	N
Age	43.07 (16.257)	18-93	3133
Years of Education	12.27 (2.51)	4-17	3133
Occupational Status	5.35 (2.50)	1-10	1999
Employment Status	0.65 (0.48)	0-1	3133
Marital Status	0.34 (0.47)	0-1	3133
Region (South)	0.66 (0.47)	0-1	3133
Rural	0.21 (0.41)	0-1	3133
Skin Color Scale (1 = Very Light Skin to 5 = Very Dark Skin)	2.78 (1.16)	1-5	3133

FINDINGS

The findings presented in this study are the result of OLS, logistic, and ordered logistic regression analyses (for the use of similar measures and models in assessing skin tone inequality see Keith and Herring 1991; Hunter 2005; Villarreal 2010). I present models for the sample as a whole, in addition to men and women separately (where priority merits) to test the net effects of skin tone on outcomes for men versus women.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

In 2004, the median household income of black families was 62% of white families' median income (Conley [1999] 2010: 11). Comparatively, according to the National Survey of American Life, conducted between 2001 and 2003, the median household income of the darkest-skinned black respondents was 72% of the lightest-skinned black respondents' median household income. Moving beyond descriptive statistics, the results presented in Table 2 demonstrate that skin tone continues to have significant main effects on black Americans' household incomes in the early 21st century. I find that the lighter-skinned one is the higher their family income, even after controlling for individual's educational attainment, their mother's educational attainment, marital status, region, rural residency, and even if the respondent is employed or not[32]. These results are consistent with findings going back many decades (Drake and Cayton 1945; Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991). Most scholars

[32] In further analyses, I also ran a model controlling for both employment status and occupational status in addition to the other control variables, even in this model skin tone remained a significant predictor of respondent's household incomes.

contend that this advantage in earnings can be traced to color discrimination by both blacks and nonblacks in a variety of realms (e.g. schools, at work, etc.) Given that these results (as was the case in the NSBA, 1979-1980) obtain even when after controlling for respondents' mother's educational attainment and their mother's occupational status (results not shown), these findings suggest that the association between skin color and earnings is not simply a lingering legacy of the past, but rather, due to contemporary social processes of differential treatment according to gradations of skin color.

Table 2. Results of OLS Regression, Household Income

	(1) Household Income
Age	0.00585**
	(0.00174)
Sex	-0.242***
	(0.0376)
Educational Attainment	0.129***
	(0.00879)
Employed	0.502***
	(0.0466)
Married	0.506***
	(0.0414)
South	-0.0376
	(0.0579)
Rural	-0.0140
	(0.0440)
Skin Color Scale	-0.0406*
	(0.0154)
Constant	8.008***
	(0.164)
Observations	3090
r^2	0.330

Note: Household income is log(Household income). Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Descriptive statistics of education by skin tone reveal that the lightest-skinned black Americans have over a full year of more education than the darkest-skinned black Americans. In Table 3, I utilize OLS regression to examine if skin tone is associated with educational attainment net of respondent's

age, sex, marital status, region, rural residency, and even their mother's educational attainment[33]. The results indicate that skin tone is strongly associated with black Americans' educational attainment[34] net of these controls. This amounts to a gap of over a *half of a school year* between the lightest and darkest-skinned black Americans, *even after controlling* for the aforementioned factors – a result that is 33% larger than what was found in the NSBA 1979-1980. Moreover, in contrast to what was found utilizing the NSBA 1979-1980 (Keith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005), I find that skin tone is associated with the educational attainment of both black women *and* men. I do not find that this association is specific to women only or stronger for women compared to men (results not shown).

Unfortunately, existing literature offers no specific explanatory theory for why there would be a relationship between skin tone and educational attainment. It is plausible (and perhaps likely) that as research demonstrates how black boys are at times treated as "troublemakers" and seen as "adults" when behaving poorly in comparison to boys of other races (Ferguson 2003), it may be the case that *darker-skinned* black boys face even more of this form of discrimination from their teachers (white, black, or otherwise) than all other black boys. This is especially likely given studies which find that both blacks and whites often view darker-skinned black males as threatening, violent, and criminal (Maddox and Gray 2002). Also, there may be some degree of self-selection out of the school system given such stereotyping and possibly discriminatory treatment against darker-skinned black boys. In the case of black women, one study finds that young black girls often face harsh stereotyping in school settings and perhaps color bias forms one aspect of this discrimination (Wallace et al. 2011).

The research of the author suggests that both black and nonblack teachers discriminate against black students according to the lightness or darkness of their skin (see Part III). As one scholar puts it, "Teachers and administrators are prone to make distinctions among African American children about who the 'smart kids' are and who the 'good kids' are" (Hunter 2005: 49). Such evaluations are likely to include skin color as a factor. Further research, however, is needed to better specify the mechanism(s) causing the association between educational attainment and skin tone among black Americans.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

I utilize logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between skin tone and employment status net of a variety of sociodemographic characteristics. The results demonstrate that skin tone is not significantly associated with employment status (i.e. being employed or being unemployed/out of the labor force) net of respondents' age, sex, years of education, marital status, region, and rural residency. In contrast to previous studies, however, I find that being darker-skinned is somewhat associated with *higher odds* of being employed ($p \leq 0.10$). This finding is very different than that of findings from over twenty years ago (Seltzer and Smith 1991; Keith and Herring 1991). As most research finds that darker-skin is a disadvantage for labor market outcomes, it is hard to explain why, in this case, having darker-skin may be somewhat an advantage. It is important to remember, however, that the association I find is not technically statistically significant. Furthermore, being able to find work, is not the same as finding *high status* work. It may be the case that darker-

[33] I also found that skin tone was significantly associated with respondent's educational attainment even after taking their mother and father's educational attainment into account together in the same model (results not shown).

[34] Analyses were also run using educational attainment as a categorical variable (see Keith and Herring 1991: 766), this did not alter the results.

skinned blacks are able to stay employed at higher rates than other blacks, but the work they find is of lower occupational prestige. I examine the association between skin tone and occupational status among the employed in the next set of analyses.

Table 3. Results of OLS Regression, Educational Attainment

	(1) Educational Attainment
Age	0.0156**
	(0.00476)
Female	0.120
	(0.0984)
Mother's Education	0.211***
	(0.0200)
Married	0.528***
	(0.0933)
South	-0.161
	(0.149)
Rural	-0.421**
	(0.152)
Skin Color Scale	-0.119**
	(0.0423)
Constant	10.04***
	(0.411)
Observations	2579
r^2	0.113

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 4. Results of Logistic Regression, Employment Status

	(1) Employed
Age	-0.0396***
	(0.00489)
Sex	-0.279*
	(0.116)
Educational Attainment	0.216***
	(0.0253)
Married	0.448**
	(0.132)
South	0.294*
	(0.109)
Rural	0.132
	(0.124)
Skin Color Scale	0.0658+
	(0.0399)
Constant	-0.291
	(0.491)
Observations	3130

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

+p <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

The results presented in Table 5 demonstrate that darker-skin is negatively associated with occupational status among employed black Americans, even after controlling for their education, marital status, region, and rural residency. Such findings emphasize the persistence of skin tone stratification in the labor market among black Americans for at least the past thirty years (Johnson et al. 1998). Comparing the association of skin tone with occupational status for black men and women, however, reveals a truly novel finding. I find that for black men, the lighter their skin, the higher the odds that they have higher status jobs even after controlling for their educational attainment and other sociodemographic characteristics. Taking the top occupational category as an example, for *each* one point increase in skin tone darkness, respondents' have 12% lower odds of attaining a professional or managerial position even after controlling for their education and other sociodemographic characteristics. Across a 5 point skin color scale, this means that the darkest-skinned black males have nearly 50% lower odds of attaining the same high status occupation as the lightest-skinned black

males, even after controlling for their educational attainment and other sociodemographic characteristics.

While I find that skin tone is a significant predictor of occupational status for the sample as a whole (and men), I find no association between skin tone and the occupational status of black women specifically. By contrast, Keith and Herring's (1991) analysis of the NSBA 1979-1980 finds that skin tone affects the occupational status of black *women* only; specifically, lighter-skinned black women enjoyed *higher* occupational status than darker-skinned women (Model 2). Thus, the findings presented here suggest that there may have been a shift in the relationship between skin tone and occupational status for both black men and black women.

A compelling explanation for this change is perhaps transformations in the U.S. racial order brought about by the Civil Rights Movement. It is fair to assume, following Gullickson (2005), that with heightened "racial integration," blacks came into more sustained contact with "white gatekeepers." Given that "white gatekeepers" may find darker-skin black males threatening, these darker-skinned black males may be sorted into lower status jobs or find it difficult to move up the ranks in their occupation. This would be consistent with the literature on the fear of darker-skinned black males which would lead them be being more often sentenced to the death penalty than lighter-skinned black male by white judges (Eberhardt et al. 2006) and psychological research which demonstrates that white subjects preferred light-skinned applicants to blacks with darker skin tones in a hiring experiment (Wade et al. 2004).

In the case of black women, the lack of an effect for skin tone as regards occupational status is harder to pin down and is certainly worthy of further investigation. At the very least, the results of this study illustrate how gender, skin tone, and processes of stereotyping and discrimination (both inter- and intraracially) interact to yield different stratification outcomes. Undoubtedly though, much more research must be done to uncover the mechanisms by which this result may become more intelligible. I will discuss the significance of skin color at work for both black men and women using in-depth interviews in Part III.

MARITAL STATUS

Table 6 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of the ability of skin tone, social background, and demographic characteristics to predict the marital status of black Americans. I find that there is no significant association between skin tone and marital status among black Americans. While this finding may seem surprising given how much is typically discussed about skin tone and relationships among black Americans (see Bond and Cash 1992 and Hunter 2005), other studies have also failed to find a connection between skin tone and marital status among black Americans as well. Hamilton et al. (2009), for example, also find that skin tone does *not* predict the marital status of black women once sociodemographic characteristics are taken into account (based on their analysis of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 1992-1994). That said, it is not as if there is *no* association between skin tone and marital status among black Americans. Hamilton et al. (2009: 25) find that amongst black women between the ages of 16 and 29, there does appear to be a "beauty queue" (cf. Hunter 2005) where darker-skinned black women will be passed over for marriage, *ceteris paribus*, for lighter-skinned black women – especially in a context where there is a shortage of marriageable black men. Furthermore, there is evidence that lighter-skinned black women marry higher status spouses (Hunter 2005; Hamilton et al. 2009). I test if this continues among black Americans early 21st century in the next set of analyses.

Table 5. Results of Ordered Logistic Regression, Occupational Status

	(1) Occupational Status	(2) Occupational Status (Women)	(3) Occupational Status (Men)
Age	0.00908*	0.00304	0.0176**
	(0.00367)	(0.00473)	(0.00527)
Sex	0.869***		
	(0.0906)		
Educational Attainment	0.444***	0.491***	0.400***
	(0.0302)	(0.0439)	(0.0395)
Married	-0.0460	0.0877	-0.214
	(0.0954)	(0.118)	(0.163)
South	-0.275*	-0.281*	-0.294
	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.169)
Rural	-0.268*	-0.178	-0.321
	(0.102)	(0.143)	(0.180)
Skin Color Scale	-0.0857*	0.0397	-0.127*
	(0.0397)	(0.0539)	(0.0609)
Constant	2.406***	2.485***	1.720***
	(0.407)	(0.603)	(0.505)
Observations	1999	1259	740

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression, Marital Status

	(1) Married
Age	0.0168***
	(0.00329)
Sex	-0.628***
	(0.0919)
Educational Attainment	0.0967***
	(0.0225)
Employed	0.492**
	(0.137)
South	0.262**
	(0.0958)
Rural	0.209
	(0.136)
Skin Color Scale	0.0102
	(0.0373)
Constant	-2.463***
	(0.342)
Observations	3130

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

SPOUSE'S EDUCATION AND SPOUSE'S SKIN COLOR

Next, I examine the impact of skin tone among married black Americans in the early 21st century. First, I analyze the relationship between skin tone and spouse's education. The results presented in Table 7 demonstrate that lighter-skin tone is positively associated with spouse's education even after controlling for respondent's demographic characteristics, occupational status, and even their own education (which is typically the strongest predictor of spouse's education, regardless of race or color). This result is consistent with the findings from previous studies and the NSBA (1979-1980) (Hunter 2005; Hamilton et al. 2009).

Critically though, further analyses reveal that the relationship between lighter-skin color and spouse's education only obtains for black women. Specifically, I find that for each 1 point increase in the lightness of respondent's skin tones, black women's spouses complete another .21 years of

schooling. This means that even after controlling for black women's own educational attainment, occupational status, and whether or not they have a job, the lightest-skinned black woman is likely to marry a man with an entire year of more education than the darkest-skinned black woman. The magnitude of the result presented in this study is almost exactly the same as an earlier analysis of the National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980 (Hunter 2005: 48), even though the analysis presented here utilizes even more control variables and has a slightly larger sample size. I found no relationship between skin color and spouse's education for black men (results not shown). This highlights, once again, how gender and skin color interact to yield stratification outcomes within the black population and is clear evidence of how beauty, as a form of capital (cf. Bourdieu), is exchanged for higher status mates (Hunter 2002, 2005).

Table 7. OLS Regression, Spouse's Education

	(1) Spouse's Educational Attainment (All)	(2) Spouse's Educational Attainment (Women)
Age	-0.00514	-0.0153
	(0.00445)	(0.00832)
Sex	-0.760***	
	(0.142)	
Educational Attainment	0.426***	0.467***
	(0.0409)	(0.0646)
Employed	0.454**	0.699*
	(0.154)	(0.269)
Occupational Status	0.114***	0.124*
	(0.0297)	(0.0524)
South	-0.0977	-0.265
	(0.117)	(0.176)
Rural	-0.204	-0.274
	(0.195)	(0.299)
Skin Color Scale	-0.132**	-0.206*
	(0.0458)	(0.0824)
Constant	7.383***	6.779***
	(0.544)	(0.683)
Observations	1005	540
r^2	0.334	0.321

Table 8. Ordered Logistic Regression, Spouse's Skin Color

	(1) Spouse skin color
Age	-0.00111
	(0.00409)
Sex	-0.968***
	(0.0975)
Educational Attainment	-0.0249
	(0.0172)
Employed	0.160
	(0.128)
South	0.0814
	(0.124)
Rural	-0.129
	(0.141)
Skin Color Scale	0.386***
	(0.0808)
Constant	-2.150***
	(0.390)
Observations	1550

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

I also test if there is a relationship between respondent's skin color and their spouse's skin color. Bodenhorn (2006), for example, reports the existence of skin-tone based homogamy within the black population stretching back to the 18th century. Such a form of homogamy has been reported in qualitative literature for many decades, but a direct test of its empirical existence has not yet been tested (to the knowledge of the author). In order to test whether or not skin tone homogamy persists I use the skin color scale variable following the logic that, *ceteris paribus*, the skin tones of spouses tend to approximate one another (even after controlling for various socioeconomic factors). Evidence of this occurring is revealed in Table 8, where ordered logistic regression results reveal a strong association between respondents' skin tone[35] and their spouse's skin tone. The findings suggest that

[35] For the sake of consistency and sample size attrition, I prefer to report models using self-reported skin tones (respondent and spouse) for this outcome, as many interviewers were unable to assess respondent's spouse's skin tones. As the scale reliability (alpha) of the self-reported and interviewer-rated skin tones is very high (0.80) this should not cause a problem for the interpretation of the results. In order to ensure this was the case,

the skin tones of respondents' and their spouses, even though lighter-skin women tend to marry higher status mates, are either the same or approximate[36]. This is even after age, sex, educational attainment, employment status, occupational status, region, and rural residence are taken into account. Remarkably, by comparison, the strength of skin-tone based homogamy within the U.S. black population is nearly three-fourths as strong as educational homogamy within the U.S. population as a whole (Schwartz and Mare 2005; Schwartz 2010).

DISCUSSION

The main goal of this study was to ascertain whether or not skin tone is still a significant factor of stratification within the U.S. black population in the early 21st century. Using the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), a nationally representative survey conducted decades after the National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980), I demonstrate that skin tone remains a persistent factor of stratification among black Americans. Skin tone significantly affects black Americans' household income, their educational attainment, occupational status, and even the skin tones and educational attainment of their spouses.

In contrast to previous findings, this study demonstrates that skin tone is associated with the educational attainment of both black women *and* men, even after taking into account respondent's mother's educational attainment (see Table 3). The consequences of skin tone, however, differ for black men and women in certain circumstances – the labor market in particular, where darker-skinned black males tend to be employed in lower prestige jobs than lighter-skinned black males, all else being equal. Thus, scholarship on skin color inequality among black Americans highlights how *gender* interacts with racial background and phenotypic traits to produce varying outcomes. .

While a voluminous literature emphasizes inequality between blacks and whites (or blacks and nonblacks), there is also considerable inequality among blacks themselves due to differences in skin color. That is, beyond matters of self-esteem and beauty (Bond and Cash 1992), skin tone is a significant factor of *socioeconomic stratification* and social differentiation within the U.S. black population. Thus, the well-documented skin color inequality that has existed since at least the 18th century (Gatewood 2000; Bodenhorn 2006; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007) appears to have survived into the early 21st century. As the results of this study (and earlier studies) demonstrate, by controlling for parent's education, the findings presented here are most likely the result of bias (both inter- and intraracial) which cannot be completely traced back as ancestrally accumulated disadvantage (Hill 2002) – color inequality is reproduced generation after generation.

It is certainly possible that shifts in the "U.S. racial order" brought on by the rise of the Latino and multiracial populations since the 1980s may be a factor which is sustaining or perhaps, exacerbating, the significance of color in the United States and thus, for black Americans (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Finding that skin color predicts the educational attainment of both black women and men, instead of just women as was found decades earlier (Keith and Herring 1991), and that skin color predicts the occupational status of both black women and men, also instead of just women, as was

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however, I also ran models using interviewer-rated skin tones for the respondent and still found that respondent's skin color was still a significant predictor of their spouse's skin color net of the same controls.

[36] The association between respondent and spouse's skin tones obtains for both black men and black women respectively (results not shown).

found in earlier work (Keith and Herring 1991), is perhaps evidence of this. It is important to remember, however, that color has *always* been significant among black Americans in the United States and the results of this study, in concert with previous work, demonstrate that color has continued to be significant factor of social and economic inequality among black Americans from at least the 18th century to Jim Crow to the Civil Rights Movement (including the Black Power Movement), all the way to the present-day.

Even in an era where overt discrimination has ostensibly waned and explicit racism is frowned upon in public (Bobo et al. 2012), color discrimination has survived. There are at least two compelling reasons why this would be the case. For one, as was mentioned earlier, studies show that while racial stereotyping can be suppressed, individuals are often unable to suppress *color* discrimination, even when they are told in advance about the problem (Blair et al. 2004). In fact, even during the Black Power Movement, young blacks who explicitly professed that "Black is Beautiful" still expressed negative stereotypes of darker-skinned blacks (Anderson and Cromwell 1977).

Another reason for color discrimination's survival may be the persistent conflation of "race" and "color." As Jones (2009: 224) explains, "The terms race and color have been used interchangeably throughout U.S. history… [E]xamples are plentiful, including common phrases like 'colored people' and 'colored folk,' W.E.B. Du Bois's use of 'the color line' and similar references to the 'color barrier.' Even Dr. Martin Luther King's exhortation that children be judged not by the 'color of their skin but by the content of their character' can be seen as a call for the elimination of racial discrimination." Though they are indeed related concepts, they are not synonymous (Jones 2009: 225). While racism may affect an individual regardless of the person's color, two individuals belonging to the same ethnoracial category may face differential treatment due to their varying skin tones (Jones 2009: 234). Conflating "race" and "color" then, ends up obscuring the significance of color, and even our legal system often conflates the two. For example, one defendant in a color lawsuit, the IRS, argued that there couldn't be discrimination because "skin color and race are essentially the same characteristic" (Nance 2005: 465[37]). Being careful to treat "race" and "color" as analytically distinct, yet related concepts, is important then not only for our scholarship, but also for matters of justice in our legal system.

Skin color inequality highlights the need to look beyond mere census categories when examining inequality in the United States – there are at least two dimensions of [ethnoracial] inequality in the U.S.: that which obtains between blacks and whites as a whole, and that which obtains within the category black according to gradations of skin tone. Thus, analyses which rely on census categories to compare blacks to whites obscure what is in fact a much more complicated picture of inequality on at least two levels. That is, nested within the rigid, black-white, ancestry-based dichotomy yielded by the one-drop rule, there is a skin color continuum which also shapes the life chances and experiences of black Americans.

Perhaps the relative marginalization of scholarship on the significance of skin color for black Americans, compared to the much more visible research on black-white inequality, in addition to the persistent conflation of "race" and "color," is the very nature of ethnoacial classification in the U.S. for blacks – the "one-drop rule," which assigns individuals a "racial status" *regardless* of their phenotype. As Hochschild and Weaver (2007b: 160) astutely point out: "[Racial] classification systems can have a third impact, beyond reinforcing inequality and helping to create the conditions for fighting it; they can also *mask disparities* [emphasis added], which restricts citizens' capacity to derail them." In other

[37] Cited in Weaver (2012).

words, the violence of Jim Crow, in conjunction with the political and symbolic labor exerted to impose the rule of hypodescent on "negroes, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons," which was mostly successful by the 1930s, was not only essential in the forging of a sense of *linked fate* and ethnoracially-inflected political unity among individuals of various degrees of African and European lineage marked by varying skin tones and hair types, but also had the side effect of *suppressing and repressing* critical vectors of inequality (e.g. skin shade) within this population of "New People" (cf. Williamson 1980) – black Americans.

It is possible that current logic of racial classification in the U.S. for black Americans, since the imposition and virtually unanimous acceptance of the "one-drop rule" by 1930 (both by blacks and nonblacks), has both bolstered political mobilization among those who view themselves as black (due to ancestry) and hindered political mobilization[38] around skin tone-based inequality and socioeconomic stratification among black Americans – all despite the fact that such skin tone-based inequality, as this study and many others demonstrate, is incredibly consequential. For Hochschild and Weaver (2007a) this very dynamic is the *Skin Color Paradox*[39].

It still remains relatively unclear, unfortunately, what mechanisms *specifically* may lead to skin tone inequality. Social psychological research, cited above, continues to demonstrate that color bias persists among blacks and nonblacks, but such findings, while important, stop short of illustrating in detail *how color works* in everyday life. Many scholars end their analyses with admitted speculation about white gatekeepers and intraracial preferences for certain skin tones among black Americans, but it is readily apparent that there is a clear need for much more research to be done, especially ethnographic research and in-depth interviewing which could help shed light on the mechanisms and processes by which skin tone stratification persists in the early 21st century: via intraracial processes (i.e. discrimination among black Americans) and interracial processes (i.e. discrimination between blacks and nonblacks) in a variety of domains (e.g. at school, at work, in public, marriage, policing, etc.). Certainly, paying more attention to which outcomes specifically are more affected by interracial interactions than intraracial interactions will be important as we seek to uncover the mechanisms that lead to skin tone effects. At the very least, by drawing upon 50 in-depth interviews of black Americans (Part III), I hope to uncover some of the elusive mechanisms which can help us explain *how* and *why* skin color shapes black Americans life chances.

It is also critically important to keep in mind that skin tone stratification is not simply a curious phenomenon that only exists among black Americans. Within the U.S. case alone, scholars observe that both lighter-skinned (and more phenotypically European) blacks *and* Latinos, on average, all earn more money, complete more years of schooling, live in better neighborhoods, and marry higher-status people than darker-skinned members of the same ethnoracial population (Murguia and Telles 1996). Thus, as the study of color continues its resurgence, future research which compares and contrasts the significance of skin color among other populations in the U.S. will add much needed depth to our understanding of these processes. Moreover, internationally comparative work which examines the significance of skin color in the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere will also be critically important to help deepen our understanding of skin tone stratification and guide scholars towards building richer and rigorous theories about how, when, and why skin color shapes individuals' life chances in countries all over the world. This project, which compares the significance of skin

[38] Hochschild (2006) "When Do People Not Protest Unfairness?: The Case of Skin Tone Discrimination."
[39] Recent work demonstrates that a similar "skin color paradox" operates among Latinos where skin color shapes life chances, but not political attitudes (Faught and Hunter 2012).

color among black Americans in the United States and within the Brazilian population as a whole, aims to initiate this line of research.

Table 9. A Summary of the Findings of Recent Skin Tone Studies

Study	**Skin Tone Effect(s)**	**Data Set(s)**
Keith and Herring (1991), Hunter (2005)	Occupational Status[1], Educational Attainment[1], Family Income[1], Spouse's Education[1]	National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980
Hersch (2006), Goldsmith et al. (2007)	Educational Attainment[1], Wages	National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980, Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 1992-1994, Detroit Area Study 1995
Hamilton et al. (2009)	Marital Status[2]	Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 1992-1994
This Study	Household Income, Educational Attainment, Occupational Status[3], Spouse's Educational Attainment[1], Spouse's Skin Color	National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003

Note: Effect obtained for entire sample unless otherwise stated.
[1] Women only. [2] Women aged 16-29 only. [3] Men only.

CHAPTER THREE

The Cost of "Color" in the United States: Skin Color, Social Distance, Discrimination, and Health among Black Americans

I explained in Chapters 1 and 2 how the focus of literature on black life in America shifted over time from the sort of holistic community studies of Du Bois (1899) and Drake and Cayton (1945) to studies of the social problems faced by black Americans in the wake of Jim Crow. A casualty of this shift was taking seriously the "intraracial relations" and "diversity" among black Americans. Some of the most well-known and influential works on black Americans, however, have been precisely those works which are the exception and focus on heterogeneity among black Americans. The most well-known example of such work is almost certainly William Julius Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race* (1978) which highlighted the existence and supposed consequences of increasing intraracial socioeconomic bifurcation among black Americans, putatively, as a result of the Civil Rights Movement. According to Wilson, the Civil Rights Movement resulted in "racial integration" which created the conditions for the growth of a substantial "black middle class" which was becoming increasingly distant, at least economically, from the rest of the black population.

Following the lead of this highly influential text, other researchers discovered that this intraracial socioeconomic division was important to explain a range of differences among black Americans in other realms of life. For example, scholars report that blacks with higher SES report greater social distance from blacks as a group (Broman et al. 1988; Demo and Hughes 1991; Thornton et al. 1997). Such quantitative findings corroborate what has long been held about social differentiation among black Americans due to socioeconomic class (Frazier 1957) and recent work on the black middle class by Mary Pattillo (a student of William Julius Wilson) (see, *Black Picket Fences*) and Karyn Lacy (see *Blue Chip Black*).

Socioeconomic division among blacks not only affects their closeness to one another, however, it also maps onto significant differences in their health. Recent studies find that that there is a five-year gap in life expectancy at age 25 between blacks and whites, but there is an even larger difference *within each* ethnoracial population by education (Williams and Sternthal 2010: 19). Consequently, while there are "residual effects of race at every level of SES" for health outcomes, scholars are advised to present "racial data" stratified by SES within "racial groups" (Williams and Sternthal 2010: 23). In sum, differences in SES within the black population affect not only their closeness to one another as a "community," but also how long they can expect to live, differences so important (in terms of these health outcomes) that they often are *larger* than the differences between blacks and whites as a whole.

In addition to class, however, there is another striking factor of heterogeneity within the black population, skin tone, which is the primary focus of the present study. Skin color, as a marker of status, is well-documented to pattern interpersonal relationships within the black population. This is evinced, at least in part, by literature which details the existence of exclusive social clubs with bars against darker-skinned blacks (Drake and Cayton 1945; Graham 1996) and how dating and marriage between blacks is often affected by skin shade (Bond and Cash 1992; Ross and Louie 1997), so much so that one author describes the existence of a beauty queue (Hunter 2005) where darker-skinned women are passed over for marriage in favor of lighter-skinned women, especially by higher status mates. In fact, in my analysis of the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), I find, just as was

revealed in earlier analyses of the National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980 (Hunter 2005), that lighter-skinned black women tend to marry spouses with higher educational attainment, even after controlling for their own educational attainment and occupational status (see Chapter 2).

Skin color not only patterns interpersonal relationships between black Americans, however, scholars have also found that skin shade is a significant predictor of family income, net of individual's educational attainment, occupational status, region, marital status, and urbanicity (at least until 1980) (Keith and Herring 1991). Moreover, skin shade is also significantly associated with individual's educational attainment, even after controlling for their parent's socioeconomic status (Keith and Herring 1991). In Chapter 2, I report that skin tone remains a significant predictor of life chances among black Americans in the early 21st century. Consequently, the incredibly significant socioeconomic differentiation within the black population so famously described by Wilson (1978) maps onto gradations of skin complexion among black Americans. In other words, in addition to patterning interpersonal relations between blacks, skin shade also predicts *traditional stratification outcomes* (e.g. educational attainment, household income, occupational status, etc.). Taken together, evidence suggests that skin color has *continuously* been a significant predictor of socioeconomic differentiation among black Americans since at least the 18th century until the early 21st century (Drake and Cayton 1945; Bodenhorn 2006; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007; Keith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005; see Chapter 2).

Zooming out then, scholarship on ethnoracial inequality finds significant disparities in SES between blacks and whites as a whole, but there are also significant *intraracial* disparities in SES *within* the black population which are significantly associated with gradations of skin tone. Consequently, while the research that does focus on heterogeneity among black Americans typically focuses on socioeconomic differentiation, evidence shows that skin tone, which receives much less attention, is a strong predictor of this socioeconomic differentiation. Thus, as scholars find that SES differences among blacks significantly affect their feelings of closeness to one another and even their health, given that skin tone is a significant predictor of SES itself, one may surmise that *skin tone* may also significantly affect intraracial feelings of closeness and possibly, even health outcomes (even after controlling for SES differentiation within the black population).

Literature on the relationship between skin color and intraracial feelings of closeness, as well as skin color and health, however, remains limited. The vast majority of the research on the health of black Americans stays at the level of interracial comparisons (between blacks and whites as a whole) and when it moves to intraracial differences, SES is typically the major factor investigated to explain any intraracial variation in outcomes. To the knowledge of the author, there are no existing studies which investigate whether *skin color* is significantly associated with feelings of closeness within the black population, rather, current studies examine the role of *socioeconomic status* in affecting intraracial feelings of closeness (Broman et al. 1988; Thornton et al. 1997).

Regarding mental health among black Americans, many studies show that experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment are prevalent among black Americans and these experiences are associated with emotional distress and depressive symptoms (Paradies 2006; Williams and Mohammed 2009). In fact, some studies show that even the mere *anticipation* of discrimination has negative consequences for the health of black Americans (Sawyer et al. 2012). **B**lack Americans report higher amounts of discrimination and tend to have worse mental health outcomes than non-Hispanic whites (Williams et al. 2012).

Predicting the frequency of perceived discrimination or mental health outcomes *within* the black population, however, is much less straightforward. Of the few studies which focus on this issue,

scholars typically propose that socioeconomic status may be an important factor which affects mental health among black Americans. Surprisingly though, while many scholars do find that poorer individuals (i.e. those of lower socioeconomic status) typically have higher prevalence of depression, recent studies find *no consistent relationship* between socioeconomic status and depression among black Americans (Hudson et al. 2012).

Some scholars propose that *skin tone* may be a key factor of differential exposure to discrimination and consequently, linked to variation in rates of depression and poorer mental health among black Americans (Borrell et al. 2006; Keith et al. 2010). Here the thinking is that darker-skinned black Americans are exposed to greater amounts of discrimination than lighter-skinned black Americans and are likelier to report poorer mental health outcomes. While this may seem reasonable, findings regarding the skin color, discrimination, and mental health relationship are inconclusive. First of all, only a few studies have investigated the relationship between skin tone and perceived discrimination among black Americans, let alone skin tone, discrimination, *and* mental health (Keith et al. 2010); and, of the few studies which have investigated the relationship between perceived discrimination and skin tone, results have been decidedly mixed. One study finds that darker-skinned black Americans were much more likely to report being discriminated against (Klonoff and Landrine 2000), while another study found no relationship between skin tone and prevalence of perceived discrimination whatsoever (Borrell et al. 2006).

Moreover, in contrast to the scholarship on racial discrimination and mental health outcomes, which typically finds a clear link between racial discrimination and poorer mental health (i.e. a black-white disparity in mental health putatively explained by blacks being exposed to higher amounts of discrimination than whites), studies of racial discrimination and *physical* health find only mixed results. Some studies find a positive relationship between racial discrimination blood pressure (Landrine and Klonoff 1996), some find a negative relationship (Krieger 1990), and some find no relationship whatsoever[40] (Broman 1996; Clark 2000). By contrast, studies *have* found that *skin tone* is a predictor of hypertension among black Americans (i.e. darker-skinned blacks report having hypertension more often) (Harburg et al. 1978; Krieger et al. 1998), but uncovering the link between skin tone and hypertension has remained elusive. The most commonly hypothesized mechanism linking skin tone and rates of hypertension is that skin tone, once again, is likely related to differential exposure to discrimination among black Americans, but as I just explained, findings on the relationship between skin tone and rates of perceived discrimination among black Americans have remained inconclusive, with some studies finding no relationship (Borrell et al. 2006; Keith et al. 2010) and some studies finding a positive relationship (Klonoff and Landrine 2000).

In sum, scholarship on mental health among black Americans typically remains at the level of comparisons between blacks and whites as a whole, and when studies attempt to explain *intraracial* variation in mental health among black Americans, scholars propose that socioeconomic status *should* be an explanatory factor (as SES is among whites and other ethnoracial populations), but findings on this are mixed (Williams and Sternthal 2010; Hudson et al. 2012). Of the few studies that propose skin tone as a candidate to predict intraracial variation in mental health among black Americans, findings are also mixed, as the key mechanism linking skin tone to mental health outcomes, prevalence of discrimination and/or unfair treatment, has not consistently been shown to be associated with gradations of skin tone (Borrell et al. 2006; Keith et al. 2010, for an exception see Klonoff and Landrine 2000). Research on physical health, however, does find an association between skin tone and

[40] Cited in Arriola (2002).

hypertension, but as Klonoff and Landrine (2000) explain, the *link* between skin tone and hypertension remains difficult to uncover, because of the lack of clarity on whether skin tone is related to variation in perceived discrimination among black Americans.

Ultimately then, there is still much to be learned about the potential relationship(s) between skin tone, discrimination, and health outcomes (both mental and physical) among black Americans (Williams and Mohammed 2009; Keith et al. 2010). In this study, I utilize a recently conducted, nationally representative survey, the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), to address this constellation of interrelated quandaries and gaps in our literature on heterogeneity among black Americans, both in terms social distance, and their mental and physical health. I find that skin tone is significantly associated with black Americans' feelings of closeness to one another, how much they agree with negative stereotypes about blacks as a group, prevalence of perceived discrimination and unfair treatment, rates of depression, and even hypertension. In the following section, I go further in-depth to situate the present study in a nexus of literature(s) on "racial disparities" in health, skin tone inequality, and "multidimensional" approaches to the study of "race."

ETHNORACIAL DIVISION AND HEALTH AMONG BLACK AMERICANS

E. Franklin Frazier (1957) explains in *The Black Bourgeoisie*, the elevated socioeconomic status of lighter-skinned blacks finds its roots in slavery. Lighter-skinned slaves, (i.e. typically those with direct kinship ties to whites), were favored by slave owners and were predominantly given work as house slaves as opposed to field slaves (Russell et al. 1992). Working in the house as opposed to the fields dramatically increased the chance that lighter-skinned blacks would be literate and trained in a trade. Also, the vast majority of the free black population was composed of lighter-skinned blacks and mulattos (Davis 1991). Furthermore, nearly all blacks regarded as prominent by whites were lighter-skinned or mulatto (Reuter 1918). Despite the fact that given post-Emancipation, more opportunities opened up for blacks of all colors, the substantial social, educational and economic advantages of lighter-skinned blacks undoubtedly gave these blacks, who practiced homogamy and other forms of social closure, an undeniably immense head-start in relation to all other blacks (Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2007).

As was noted above, the importance of skin color for socioeconomic status among blacks persisted well into the first half of the 20th century (Frazier 1940; Edwards 1959). Hughes and Hertel (1990) find substantial evidence that the impact of skin tone on the educational attainment, socioeconomic and marital status of blacks remained virtually unchanged from 1950-1980. The authors find that the impact of skin tone on the socioeconomic status of blacks is nearly as strong as the impact of race on the socioeconomic status of blacks in comparison to whites (Hughes and Hertel 1990: 1114). Drawing from the same nationally representative data set, Keith and Herring (1991) find that skin tone is a significant predictor of personal and family income net of education, occupation, parental socioeconomic status, region, urbanicity, or even marital status (Keith and Herring 1991: 772). Darker-skinned blacks are at a significant empirical disadvantage in comparison to lighter-skinned blacks and even medium-tone blacks. In Chapter 2, I report that skin tone stratification among black Americans has persisted until the early 21st century.

In addition to skin tone significantly affecting socioeconomic status, scholars often find that darker-skinned females pay a heavy penalty when it comes to mate selection. While studies conflict over whether or not black females prefer lighter-skinned mates as black males prefer lighter-skinned mates (Bond and Cash 1992; Hunter 2005), recent studies find that dark-skinned black women are consistently passed over for marriage by middle-to-high status black males (Hunter 2005; Hamilton et

al. 2009). In Chapter 2, I find that skin tone continues to be associated with marrying higher status mates for black women in the early 21st century. This finding is consistent with the various accounts of black marital patterns going back to the antebellum South (Johnson 1934; Powdermaker 1939; Drake and Cayton 1945; Bodenhorn 2006).

The significance of skin tone among black Americans is not simply a matter of intraracial dynamics; skin tone also affects how black Americans are treated in *interracial* contexts. While studies find that white's phenotypic distinctions of black Americans based on skin color may not be as fine-tuned as the phenotypic distinctions black Americans draw among themselves (Hill 2002), the reality is that skin tone still matters a great deal in relations between blacks and whites. For example, one study finds that blacks with darker skin tone were sentenced to an average of eight additional months of prison time compared to blacks with lighter skin tone, even after taking their prior criminal records into account (Eberhardt et al. 2004; Blair et al. 2004; Gyimah-Brempong and Price 2006; Viglione et al. 2011). Moreover, audit studies of housing find that lighter-skinned blacks are treated better by whites in real estate transactions and experimental studies of hiring practices report that white subjects preferred lighter-skinned blacks to darker-skinned blacks when making hiring decisions (Weaver 2012). Furthermore, there are well-documented stereotypes of darker-skinned blacks, held by both black *and* whites, which describe darker-skinned blacks as unintelligent, unattractive, criminal, and lazy; by contrast, both blacks and whites often stereotype lighter-skinned blacks as motivated, educated, and attractive (Anderson and Cromwell 1977; Maddox and Gray 2002).

Given these dynamics, some scholars maintain that darker-skinned blacks constitute a subgroup of black Americans who are particularly vulnerable to ill treatment by both other blacks and whites. In fact, there is evidence that both blacks and whites react more negatively toward blacks with "more Afrocentric physical features" (e.g. darker skin tone and certain facial features) than those with "less Afrocentric physical features" (Blair et al. 2002; Eberhardt et al. 2004; Maddox 2004). Social psychologists refer to such dynamics as evidence of "subgroup prejudice" where individuals may not only face stigma and discrimination for belonging to a particular social category (e.g. ethnoracial category, gender category, etc.), but face different forms and possibly more or less in both amount and harshness in terms of stigma and discrimination, based on belonging to a particular *sub*-category of the larger category in question (Uhlmann et al. 2002). Given this, lighter and darker-skinned blacks can be thought of as subcategories of the ethnoracial category – black. In fact, scholarship on black Americans reveals the use of *color labels* among black Americans (Parrish 1946; Wilder 2010), such as *High yellow* and *Blue-black* (labels which have been in consistent usage for well over a century), which correspond to these socially salient subcategories (e.g. "light skinned" and "dark skinned," respectively), which are very similar (though not precisely equivalent comparatively, see Part III) to the well-documented myriad color categories Brazilian use in everyday life (Harris 1970; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009),. Consequently, while it is certainly likely that *all* blacks face discrimination, the amount and kind of discrimination and unfair treatment they receive may vary considerably *within* the black population, along a *continuum* of phenotypic difference[41] correlated with various subcategories rooted in gradations of skin tone.

Thus, it seems that while the vast majority of our literature remains at the level of disparities between blacks and whites as a whole, what is often ignored in such work is just how important skin

[41] This continuum of intraracial phenotypic variation is often referred to as racial phenotypic prototypicality, that is, how much one visually resembles a *prototypical* member of a racial category (see Maddox 2004; Wilkins et al. 2010).

color is as a factor of socioeconomic differentiation and potentially differential treatment by both other blacks and whites (as well as other nonblacks) within the black population. Therefore, scholarship on stratification and "racial inequality" in the U.S. would be well served by paying closer attention to the potential role that skin color may have in affecting the life chances of black Americans.

As was explained earlier though, while it may be reasonable to think that given skin tone's importance among black Americans, skin tone *should* be associated closely with perceptions of discrimination, linked to health outcomes, and even social distance within the black population, current research has remained very limited on these matters and the few studies which do attempt to link skin tone to discrimination and health outcomes, at the very least, report mixed findings. It is surprising that findings in the literature have been mixed, but these "inconsistent findings may reflect differences in sample compositions as well as the measures of skin tone and discrimination employed" (Keith et al. 2010: 3). Reviewing some of this literature, it seems very likely that this is the case. Many studies only focus on *subsections* of the black population, for example, one study only examines blacks between the ages of 24 and 42 (Krieger et al. 1998), another study examines blacks between the ages of 33 and 45 (Borrell et al. 2006), and yet another study analyzes the relationship between skin color, discrimination, and depression among black women only (Keith et al. 2010).

Arguably, even more culpable for these inconsistent findings than using limited samples of black Americans, however, are the measures of discrimination and skin tone employed in current research. For one, many studies only concern themselves with "racial" discrimination; but, as scholars astutely point out, given the emotional gravity of "racial discrimination" for respondents and matters of unreliable recall and other cognitive biases, it is important to ask questions about discrimination in terms of unfair treatment in general, as opposed to only "racial discrimination." "Building attribution into the question is likely to underestimate discriminatory encounters for which the attribution is uncertain" (Williams and Sternthal 2010: 31). Furthermore, many studies simply ask respondents if they have *ever* experienced "racial discrimination." Such measures pose a serious problem for studies attempting to link skin tone to variation in perceived discrimination among black Americans, because as the few studies of skin tone and perceived discrimination unsurprisingly find, nearly *all* black Americans, regardless of their skin tone, report experiencing "racial discrimination." For example, Keith et al. (2010: 10) note *that 88% of respondents reported experiencing unfair treatment regardless of their skin tone*; and Borrell et al. (2006: 1422) report that 75% of their respondents claimed that they faced "racial discrimination." This leaves very little variation for gradations of skin tone (or anything else) to predict.

Moreover, measuring chronic exposure to discrimination rather than measuring particularly traumatic episodes of "racial discrimination," or even whether individuals "*ever* experienced racism," may be more important for those concerned with explaining health outcomes (Williams and Sternthal 2010: 29). Research shows that even though it may be more difficult to measure chronic stressors, chronic stressors are stronger predictors of the onset and course of diseases than acute life events (Cohen et al. 1995[42]). Accordingly, research finds that the Everyday Discrimination Scale, a form of which I use in this study, was associated with subclinical cardiovascular disease (Lewis et al. 2006[43]). In the main, research supports using measures of unfair treatment and discrimination that do not necessarily carry the label "racial," and using measures which capture the *amount* of perceived discrimination respondents' report, instead of whether respondents perceive *any* discrimination at all.

[42] Cited in Williams and Sternthal 2010.
[43] Cited in Williams and Sternthal 2010.

In addition to these issues with measures of discrimination, there are also inconsistencies and confusion regarding the measures of skin tone used in current research. For one, some studies have relied on the use of spectrophotometers which have been used to measure levels of melanin in individuals' skin for cancer research[44] (Dwyer et al. 1998), in the hopes of "objectively" determining the skin tone of respondents (see Krieger et al. 1998; Borrell et al. 2006). In these studies, scholars typically measure the skin reflectance of respondents' inner arms, which immediately begs the question of what area of the body are discriminators most likely to see when they encounter respondents in everyday life? As research has demonstrated, judgments of race and racial subgroup prejudice tied to skin tone involve individuals seeing each other's *faces* (Blair et al. 2002; Maddox 2004). While skin tone is not the *only* trait that matters in terms of racial classification and subgroup prejudice – facial features *also* matter (and hair type) – skin tone is the *primary* feature associated with "racial discrimination" and subgroup prejudice (i.e. color discrimination); and skin tone is *highly correlated* with the facial features that matter in contexts of racial and subgroup discrimination (lip size and shape, nose size, etc.) (Blair et al. 2002; Maddox and Gray 2002; Maddox 2004). Given this, it seems somewhat misguided to measure the skin tone of subject's inner-arms, which are often much lighter than subject's faces and, relative to the face, have little to no documented relevance in contexts of interpersonal discrimination.

Bracketing the matter of where researchers measure respondents' skin tone, however, what's more troubling about the use of spectrophotometers in research on skin tone and discrimination are the putative reasons why scholars claim to need to use spectrophotometers in the first place – "objectivity." As Villarreal (2012: 501) astutely points out in his reply to a comment on his article on skin tone stratification in Mexico written by Flores and Telles (2012), "[A]dherence to a notion of objectivity in the measurement of skin color is incongruent with much of what we have learned about race and ethnicity over the past several decades. *Like perceptions of race, perceptions of individuals' skin color are necessarily subjective.* The fact that they are subjective does not, of course, mean that they do not have social consequences. On the contrary, *people's behavior toward others is affected by how they perceive them, including, in many instances, by how they perceive the color of their skin.* This perception may not correspond precisely with an exact measurement of their skin pigmentation... *[Thus], a better measure of skin color to examine potential discrimination is how individuals are perceived rather than an 'objective' measure of their skin pigmentation*" [Emphases mine].

If our aim is to understand the relationship between skin tone and discrimination, it would be more appropriate to simulate, as best as possible, what observers are seeing when they encounter respondents in everyday life. Given the primacy of *perception* and its inherent subjectivity, interviewer-rated skin tone data seems preferable to spectrophotometer reflectance scores – accordingly, many studies on skin tone stratification in the U.S. (Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991; Gullickson 2005) and Mexico (Villarreal 2010) make use of precisely such data.

Going further, however, stopping at "simulating" everyday life by using *only* interviewer rated skin tone may be somewhat short-sighted. There is evidence that self-reported skin tone data may *also* be important in understanding discrimination and inequality. Considering the significance and consequences of self-reported race data has been a mainstay of the literature on ethnoracial classification and inequality in Brazil for quite some time (Telles and Lim 1998; Telles 2004;

[44] Research finds that higher levels of melanin density are protective against risk for melanoma. Spectrophotometers are useful to get a precise measurement of individuals' melanin density to make scientific comparisons to other individuals of various skin phenotypes (Dwyer et al. 1998).

Schwartzman 2007; Bailey et al. 2013). This work highlights how, in Brazil, individuals may "whiten" or even "darken" themselves in accordance with their socioeconomic status (i.e. individuals with higher SES may "whiten" themselves or be seen as "whiter" than their actual skin color and the reverse for those with lower SES). Recent work is beginning to consider such *Brazilian-esque* possibilities in the United States where ethnoracial classification is thought to and generally found to be much more rigid (Davis 1991).

For example, one study finds that social position influences ethnoracial classification in the United States – individuals who are unemployed, incarcerated, or impoverished are more likely to be classified by others and self-identify as black, regardless of how they previously were classified by others or self-identified (Saperstein and Penner 2012). The authors view this as evidence that "race in the United States is more fluid than commonly believed" (Saperstein and Penner 2012: 708), though they do concede that the fluidity they see in ethnoracial classification should not be interpreted as *permanent* shifts in classification and that the levels of "fluidity" they find in their study of the U.S. are *substantially lower* than what has been found in Brazil (see Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). Indeed, comparatively there are *extremely significant* differences between the U.S. and Brazil in terms of the consistency of ethnoracial classification: findings from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Harris and Sim 2002) reveal that 99.8% of self-classified "blacks" were also classified as "black" by interviewers, compared to only 51% of self-classified "blacks" (*pretos*) being classified as "black" by interviewers in Brazil, according to findings from the nationally representative Pesquisa Social Brasileira, 2002 (Bailey 2009: 50).

Without skin tone data, interpreting "racial fluidity" in the U.S. is very difficult, certainly lighter-skinned individuals would be much more vulnerable to shifts in their ethnoracial classification by observers. Fortunately, fixed-effects were used to "control for skin tone," which the authors considered to be a "time-invariant characteristic," but adding this control to their models eliminates most of their significant results (i.e. 75% of the significant results) (Saperstein and Penner 2012: 707, 717). The authors' astute realization that skin tone may play an important role in contexts of ethnoracial inequality and classification (and "fluidity"), given their attempt to control for skin tone using fixed-effects, is well-appreciated, given what scholars have reported about skin color and ethnoracial classification and identification over the past 80 years or more (Davis 1991).

Even with these important caveats considered, however, this intriguing line of research importantly attempts to unfetter researchers from some of the pernicious presuppositions about the U.S. case which have continued to plague research on ethnoracial inequality in the U.S. and beyond. Indeed, inconsistencies in self-reports vs. ascription by others may be an *under-appreciated dimension of analytic leverage* to gain further insight on processes of ethnoracial inequality – even in the United States (Campbell and Troyer 2007). Thus, while it is true that ethno*racial* classification (between categories) is not exactly the same as *skin tone* perceptions (within ethnoracial categories), this intriguing research on the U.S., and long-standing findings on ethnoracial classification and inequality in Brazil, do suggest that self-reports of skin tone data *may* be an heretofore under-appreciated dimension of analytic leverage to gain further insights on racial and color inequality in the United States – even among, arguably, the most *consistently* classified ethnoracial population in the world – black Americans (both in terms of ascription by others and self-identification). It is somewhat reasonable to propose that, "different research questions [may] require different types of data on race [or skin tone]. For example, observed race [or skin tone] might be the best for studies of discrimination, or access to goods and services, while self-reported race [or skin tone] might be more useful for studies of attitudes and motivations" (Saperstein 2006: 70).

In fact, one of the only studies to ever find that skin tone was associated with the amount of discrimination black Americans perceived used *self-reported* skin tone data (Klonoff and Landrine 2000) (darker-skinned blacks reported higher levels of perceived discrimination). Could it be that this association was related to using *self-reported* skin tone data as opposed to spectrophotometer reflectance scores or even interviewer-rated skin tone data? Unfortunately, the authors do not even consider this as a possibility, instead, they write, "This study is limited by the use of self-reported (instead of measured) skin color... these self-reports of skin color [are] *inferior to direct measurement*... [though they] nonetheless may be a valid procedure for assessing skin color among Blacks" (Klonoff and Landrine 2000: 356) [emphasis mine]. That is, rather than viewing self-reported skin color data as another possibly viable analytic dimension with its own potential to predict outcomes of discrimination and inequality, the authors only see such data as "inferior" to "measured" skin tone data, but possibly 'still valid for usage in such research.' Given recent research on the U.S. and long-standing findings on Brazil, however, it could be possible that there is a relationship between how light or how dark individual's *think they are* and their ethnoracial attitudes or even their perceptions of discrimination. The possibility of such a relationship is presaged by recent theorizing on the "multiple dimensions" of ethnoracial identification.

This recent theorizing on ethnoracial identification highlights several important dimensions such as: internal (subjective self-identification), expressed (the "race" you say you are to others), observed (the "race" others actually assume you to be), and reflected (the "race" you believe others assume you to be) (Roth 2010: 1294; Khanna 2010). Of particular importance in this study is the "reflected" dimension. While observations of skin tone may associate strongly with discrimination outcomes, "reflected appraisals[45]" (cf. Mead 1934) of one's skin tone may be critically important predictors of social distance (attitudes), prevalence of perceived discrimination, and even hypertension and depression. Khanna (2010) argues, for example, that many blacks explain that they identify as black only, even despite being "bi- or multiracial," because other blacks and whites see them as black only. Khanna (2010) proposes that, these "reflected appraisals" of one's ethnoracial self-identification, that is, the negotiated internalization of observers' ascriptions of their race, are a key mechanism by which the "one-drop rule" persists (Harris and Sim 2002).

Likewise, given the importance of skin tone among black Americans, both in encounters with other blacks, but also nonblacks (especially whites), it is possible that experiences of unfair treatment and discrimination are internalized by black Americans such that their own appraisals of how light or dark their skin is, is a stronger predictor of not only their attitudes regarding other blacks (i.e. social distance), but also, how much discrimination they perceive, how likely they are to report being depressed, and even the incidence of hypertension. That is, while interviewer-rated skin color data may be a reasonable measure of how much discrimination black Americans may face or perceive in their daily lives, *self-reported* skin color data may be an index of the *accumulated experiences of differential treatment* black Americans have faced over their life course such that black Americans who perceive greater amounts of discrimination may actually view themselves as *darker* than individuals who perceive less amounts of discrimination. Such an index of internalized discrimination over the life course may be more appropriate, in certain contexts, to predict various health outcomes.

[45] "Reflected appraisals" draws from Charles H. Cooley's (1902) concept, the "looking-glass self" and was explicitly formulated by Mead (1934). For more information on "the looking-glass self" see Yeung and Martin (2003) and symbolic interactionism, more generally, see Blumer (1969, 2004).

While such a possibility has, to the knowledge of the author, not yet been considered in the literature, I exploit a unique feature of a recently conducted, nationally representative survey, the National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003 (Jackson et al. 2004), its *two* measures of skin tone (self reports and interviewer-rated) to, at the very least, test whether self-reported skin tone data are significantly associated with the outcomes of interest. I use these measures comparatively, as well as in the same models, to test whether self-reported skin tone data may be a better predictor of the various outcomes at-hand than interviewer-rated skin tone data, extending recent work on "multidimensionality" in ethnoracial inequality in the U.S. and Brazil (Telles and Lim 1998; Saperstein 2006, 2012; Bailey et al. 2013) and the multiple dimensions of racial identification (Khanna 2010; Roth 2010).

My main goal, however, is to examine skin tone as a critical factor of heterogeneity within the black population, which is so often seen as homogeneous (Du Bois 1899; Smith and Moore 2000). I wonder if by emphasizing interracial dynamics, if current work in health research, for example, may miss out on examining potentially important intraracial dynamics which could help further explain racial disparities in health. In fact, some studies, cited above, already demonstrate that in certain health outcomes there are more differences *within* race due to class and gender than there are *between* "races" – yet, this work stops short of directly examining how or why this could be the case. In this study, I propose skin tone as a potential factor leading to intraracial health disparities. In total, I examine whether skin tone is significantly associated with social distance, perceptions of discrimination, depression, and even hypertension among black Americans, even after controlling for a variety of important sociodemographic characteristics.

MEAD AND BOURDIEU: "REFLECTED APPRAISALS," HABITUS, AND BEYOND

Before I describe the data and methods utilized in my analyses, I want to briefly note that the hypothesized causal mechanism proposed in this study, "reflected appraisals," on the view of this author, is best understood when elaborated in terms of its affinities with the work of Pierre Bourdieu. As regards this connection, Bourdieu himself explains, "I came across [Mead and Dewey] very recently … the affinities and convergences are quite striking, and I believe I understand what their basis is: my effort to react against the deep-seated intellectualism characteristic of all European philosophies (with the rare exceptions of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty) determined me, unwittingly, to move very close to philosophical currents that the European tradition of 'depth' and obscurity is inclined to treat as foils, negative reference points… I would say that the theory of practical sense presents many similarities with theories, such as Dewey's, that grant a central role to the notion of habit, understood as an active and creative relation to the world, and reject all conceptual dualisms upon which nearly all post-Cartesian philosophies are based: subject and object, internal and external, material and spiritual, individual and social, and so on" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 122[46]).

Yes, Mead, Dewey, and Bourdieu both fundamentally agree on the importance of the habitual dimension of human action. Despite this acknowledgment of the importance of the habitual, both theorists emphasize the spontaneity and indeterminacy of human action in the face of solving new problems and adjusting to social situations. Even more fundamental, they both disavow a position that views distinctions between subject and object, material and ideal, and structure and agency (or individual *and* society) as ontologically legitimate. In particular, Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, in its

[46] Cited in Aboulafia (1999: 152).

aim to overcome these pernicious dualisms shares much with the general tenets of the classical American pragmatist project. The *habitus,* in the words of Bourdieu, captures 'the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality.' On this view, "[practice] is the product of a dialectical relationship between a situation and a *habitus*, understood as a system of durable and transposable dispositions which, *integrating all past experiences*, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions, and make it possible to accomplish infinitely differentiated tasks, thanks to the analogical transfer of schemata acquired in prior practice" (Bourdieu [1972] 1977: 261).

One way of understanding "reflected appraisals" as a mechanism which may lead to the outcomes I investigate in this study is to view them, actually, as *habitus* at work – that *integration of all past experiences*, which "function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions," such that, how individuals view themselves, in terms of the lightness or darkness of their skin, is an index for how they are (and have been) treated in their everyday lives. In fact, I hypothesize that for certain outcomes (e.g. depression and hypertension), this index, as represented by "reflected appraisals", or *habitus*, more broadly, will be an even stronger predictor than mere interviewer-rated skin color, because instead of simply capturing how light or dark-skinned outsiders believe respondents are, self-rated skin color (as an operationalization of *habitus*) captures the "internalization" of their treatment from others (e.g. friends, family, colleagues, etc.) over the life course, in all of the myriad *fields* within which the respondent has lived over their life course.

That is, on this view, self-rated skin color picks up the *trajectory of the agent* over the life course (both temporally and "spatially" in terms of social fields). Moreover, on this view, self-rated skin color picks up *divergences* (however slight), between how light or dark a single, black American interviewer thought the respondent was on a particular day, and how *various* outsiders have classified/treated the respondent in terms of the lightness or darkness of the respondent's skin color (as well as divergences and convergences between how light or dark the respondent think they are versus how light or dark outsiders believe the respondent to be). Understood this way, self-rated skin color then, is truly a potentially critical "variable," which may not at all be "inferior," (see Klonoff and Landrine 2000) but rather, misunderstood and underappreciated in current research. Thus, in this study, through the use of self-rated skin color, *habitus* is *generative* of research both *analytically* and *empirically*, not simply some rhetorical flourish tacked, however haphazardly, onto the study in the form of mere narrative explication.

While a fuller treatment of the theoretical apparatus I am sketching out is beyond the purview of this particular chapter, I remind the reader that in this project, skin tone is conceptualized as a specie of *bodily capital* (see the Introduction), I am particularly interested in the *symbolic* dimension of bodily capital[47] (cf. Bourdieu). Or in other words, how phenotypic characteristics (Read: bodily capital) can

[47] Bourdieu writes, "[S]ymbolic capital, commonly called prestige, reputation, fame, etc., is the form assumed by different kinds of capital [economic, cultural, and social] when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1991: 230). Further elaborating upon this concept, Bourdieu continues, "Symbolic capital – another name for distinction – is nothing other than capital, of whatever kind [including bodily], when it is perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the incorporation of the structure of its distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident. Distinctions, as symbolic transformations of *de facto* differences, and, more generally, the ranks, orders, grades, and all the other symbolic hierarchies, are the product of the application of schemes of construction which are the product of the incorporation of the very structures to which they are applied; and recognition of the most absolute legitimacy is nothing other than an

be (*mis)recognized* as the legitimate, inherent 'proof' of the honor (or dishonor) of its bearer[48]. On the view, *bodily capital*, possessed by individuals, has differential effects on individuals' self-concepts, behaviors, and life chances, depending on the various *fields* (cf. Bourdieu) they inhabit and move through over their life course. It is critically important to remember that habitus is not a "black box," it is not a "theoretical *deus ex machina,*" (DiMaggio 1979: 1464, cited in Wacquant 2013: 3) – it is a "standing invitation to investigate the social constitution of the agent" over time and through social space (Wacquant 2013: 3). Habitus is both "empirical object (*explanandum*) and method of inquiry (*modus cognitionis*)" (Wacquant 2013: 2). Accordingly, whether the hypotheses regarding the possible significance of self-rated skin color (as an operationalization of *bodily capital* and perhaps, *habitus*) find some degree of support by the empirical analyses is an open question. In the section that follows, I give further details on the National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003 and the methods of analysis and measures I utilize in my analyses.

DATA AND METHODS

The dataset I use to analyze the relationship between skin tone and social distance, perceived discrimination, and health among black Americans in the early 21st century is the National Survey of American Life 2001-2003. The field work for this study was completed by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research's Survey Research Center, in cooperation with the Program for Research on Black Americans. The NSAL sample has a national multi-stage probability design which consists of 64 primary sampling units (PSU's). Fifty-six of these primary areas overlap substantially with existing Survey Research Center National Sample primary areas. The remaining eight primary areas were chosen from the South in order for the sample to represent African Americans in the proportion in which they are distributed nationally. The data collection was conducted from February 2001 to June 2003. The interviews were administered face-to-face and conducted within respondents' homes; respondents were compensated for their time (Keith et al. 2010).

A total of 6,082 face-to-face interviews were conducted with persons aged 18 or older, including 3,570 African Americans, 891 non-Hispanic Whites, and 1,621 Blacks of Caribbean descent. The overall response rate of 72.3% is excellent given that African Americans (especially lower income African Americans) are more likely to reside in major urban areas which are more difficult and expensive with respect to survey fieldwork and data collection. The African American sample is nationally representative of Black households in the 48 coterminous states with one adult aged 18 and over (Jackson et al. 2004). The analyses presented here are restricted to native born U.S. blacks[49]. Another advantage of this data set compared to the National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980) and other data sets used for similar studies, is the NSAL's much larger sample size (N = 3,288).

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apprehension of the everyday social world as taken for granted, an apprehension which results from the almost perfect coincidence of objective structures and incorporated structures" (Bourdieu 1991: 238). The importance of symbolic capital in Bourdieu's theoretical framework cannot be understated. Wacquant (1992) notes, "The notion of symbolic capital is one of the more complex ones developed by Pierre Bourdieu, and his whole work may be read as a hunt for its varied forms and effects" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119).

[48] Keeping in mind, of course, the variation in the distribution and "value" of bodily capital within the various fields (i.e. the contexts individuals act in, the other actors within said fields, and importantly, the historical trajectory of said fields which also has an effect on the "value" of bodily capital).

[49] All respondents in this study are self-identified African-Americans born in the United States, as was the case in Keith and Herring's (1991) analysis of the NSBA 1979-1980.

Control Variables

In order to examine the significance of skin tone among black Americans, I use a variety of sociodemographic control variables such as age and sex. *Age* is a continuous variable. *Female* is coded as a dummy variable where 0 = Male and 1= Female. I describe the other dependent and independent variables used in my analyses next – I begin with the dependent variables.

Dependent Variables

Poverty index is a categorical variable ranging from 0-17 which represents the degree to which respondents are above, below, or at the poverty line[50] (*Poverty index* = $\frac{Household\ Income}{Poverty\ Threshold}$). *Educational attainment* is a continuous variable capturing the number of years of completed education, ranging from 0-x_{max}. *South (Region)* is a dummy variable where 0 = Non-South and 1 = South. *Rural* is a dummy variable where 0 = Non-Rural and 1 = Rural. *Marital status* is a binary variable where 0 = Not Married and 1 = Married/Cohabitating.

Employment Status is a binary variable where 0 = Unemployed or Out of the Labor Force and 1 = Employed. While it may be true that being unemployed and out of the labor force may seem to be distinct states (perhaps for women with children in particular), studies by economists demonstrate that being unemployed and out of the labor force are experienced in psychologically *non-distinct* ways and that these two states are also empirically indistinguishable for the vast majority of the labor force[51] (Clark and Summers 1979; Goldsmith et al. 1995). In fact, Clark and Summers (1979: 31) estimate that the rate of transition between these two states is so high that they conclude that "many of those classified as not in the labor force are functionally indistinguishable from the unemployed." In the models predicting hypertension, I also control for obesity (which is a major predictive factor of hypertension). Obesity is a categorical variable where which ranges from 1-6 using BMI scores where 1 = Underweight and 6 = Obesity Class III (BMI greater than 40).

Independent Variables

As explained above, I utilize two measures of skin tone in this study. One measure of skin tone is interviewer-rated s*kin color*[52] is a scale ranging from 1-7 where 1 = "Very Dark Skin" and 7 = "Very Light Skin" (Keith et al. 2010); it is important to note that interviewers, in this study, were matched for

[50] I also ran models utilizing respondent's household incomes, but this does not significantly change the results. I prefer to utilize the poverty index because it captures, instead of simply raw income, the actual earning power of respondents relative to impoverishment. As poverty is widely held to be a major, chronic stressor, it is important to control for respondent's degree of impoverishment and not simply their raw income.

[51] "Half of all unemployment spells end with individuals leaving the labor force, nearly half who withdraw from the labor force continued to want employment, but inability had led them to temporarily stop searching. The authors also find that 34% of the individuals who withdraw from the labor force re-enter the labor force within a month and 44 percent re-enter within two months" (the vast majority re-enter in an unemployed status) (Clark and Summer 1979 – cited in Goldsmith et al. 1995: 2). While being "out of the labor force" may mean something different for men as opposed to women, there were only slight differences in the averages of women reporting being "out of the labor force" as opposed to men (only 3.8% more women reported being 'out of the labor force' compared to men in the sample).

[52] The distribution of respondent's skin tones is: 2.7% 'Very Dark,' 15.3% 'Dark,' 18.34% 'Somewhat Dark,' 41.91% 'Medium,' 12.19% 'Somewhat Light,' 7.05% 'Light,' and 2.51% 'Very Light.'

race with respondents, so interviewer ratings of skin color in this study were blacks interviewers rating the skin tones of other blacks[53] (Jackson et al. 2004). This is important because research shows that blacks make finer-tuned phenotypic distinctions within the black population than whites[54] (Hill 2002). The other measure of skin tone is self-reported skin tone, which is a scale ranging from 1-5 where 1 = "Very Dark Skin" and 5 being "Very Light Skin." These two measures are, unsurprisingly, quite related and their alpha coefficient of scale reliability is 0.80. Even still, I use both of these measures in comparison, as well as, in combination to test whether a particular measure of skin tone not only reveals more or less inequality among black Americans, but also, to examine which measure is perhaps a *stronger* predictor of the outcome at hand even after controlling for the other measure of skin tone.

Principal Outcomes

In the analyses that follow, I also employ multiple measures of discrimination and unfair treatment. The first of these measures quantifies how much discrimination respondents perceived due to their skin color from whites and blacks separately. Each measure of *perceived discrimination due to skin color* is a categorical variable ranging from 1-5, where 1 = Very Often and 5 = Never. I also use a measure of *perceived discrimination* in general (i.e. "Everyday Discrimination," see Williams and Sternthal 2010), which is a scale composed of 10 different types of unfair treatment, such as: the frequency the respondent reports feeling like they are treated with less courtesy than others, or less respect than others, and the frequency the respondent feels like people act like they are not smart or people act afraid of them, call them names or insult them, or even how frequently the respondent feels as if they are threatened, harassed, or followed in stores (National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003). This measure of discrimination, following (Williams and Sternthal 2010; Keith et al. 2010: 7), captures the perception of daily discrimination which has been found to be more closely linked to depressive symptoms and distress. Similar to the measure of perceived discrimination due to skin shade, this measure of perceived discrimination in everyday life is also a frequency scale which ranges from 1-6, where 1 = "Almost Everyday" and 6 = "Never." The alpha coefficient for the reliability of this scale is 0.89.

In addition to these measures of discrimination, I also make use of variables intended to represent social distance among black Americans. The first of these variables is a measure of feelings of closeness to blacks as a group which is a scale variable composed of several items, such as: "How close are you in feelings or ideas to poor blacks, or young blacks, or middle-class blacks, etc." The alpha coefficient for the reliability of this scale is 0.86. Responses range from 1-4, where 1 = "Very Close" and 4 = "Not Close at All." This type of scale has been used in previous research on social distance among black Americans as well (see Broman et al. 1988; Demo and Hughes 1990). The other

[53] As sociodemographic information about interviewers was unavailable, I am unable to control for interviewer effects, but again, whether interviewers ratings of respondents skin colors are affected by their own characteristics does not negate whether or not skin color is associated with respondents' feelings of distance to other blacks, perceptions of discrimination, depression, and incidence of hypertension. Moreover, as explained above, I utilize *two* measures of skin color – interviewer-rated and self-reports. These two measures are highly correlated and reliable (alpha coefficient .80).

[54] Comparing white interviewers ratings' of skin color to black interviewers' ratings would be a potentially compelling analysis as well, but as whites were not used as interviewers for black respondents in the NSAL (2001-2003), I am unable to analyze any differences between whites perceptions of black respondents' skin color and black interviewers assessments of black respondents' skin color.

variable I use to represent social distance is a scale variable composed of three questions about how true respondents felt various negative stereotypes of blacks as a group were. These items are: "How true is it that Blacks are lazy (1), give up easily (2), and are violent (3)?" This scale has an alpha coefficient of reliability of 0.70.

Finally, to examine the relationship between skin tone and health among black Americans, I utilize variables measuring a key aspect of mental and physical health, respectively. The mental health variable I use is self-reported depression. Respondents were asked whether or not they have felt "sad/depressed/empty" for a several day period, I code this as a dummy variable where 0 = "No" and 1 = "Yes." The physical health variable I use is reported hypertension. Respondents were asked whether a medical professional has informed them that the respondent is suffering from high blood pressure. Again, I code this as a dummy variable where 0 = "No" and 1 = "Yes."

FINDINGS

The findings presented in this study are the result of OLS, logistic, and ordered logistic regression analyses that are weighted to take into account the complex design of the NSAL 2001, 2003 (e.g. stratification and clustering). Similar measures and modeling have been used to study the significance of skin tone in previous studies (see Keith and Herring 1991; Hunter 2005; Villarreal 2010; Keith et al. 2010).

Perceived Skin Color Discrimination from Whites and Blacks

The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 utilize ordered logistic regression and demonstrate that skin tone is a significant predictor of how much discrimination respondents perceive due to their skin tone from both whites and other blacks, net of respondents' age, sex, socioeconomic status, whether or not they are employed, live in the south, or a rural area. Lighter-skinned blacks perceive significantly *less* skin color discrimination from whites than all other blacks, and perceptions of color discrimination decrease as respondents' skin colors descend from the darkest category to the lightest-skin category. Going further, however, I also test whether self-rated skin color or interviewer-rated skin color is a *stronger* predictor of how much color discrimination respondents perceive from whites and other blacks, respectively. While the results presented in Table 2, Model 1 demonstrate that interviewer-rated skin color is a significant predictor of how much discrimination black respondents perceive from whites due to respondents' skin color, the results presented in Table 2, Model 2 reveal that *self-rated skin color* is also a strong predictor of how much discrimination black respondents perceive from whites due to respondents' skin color, in fact, the effect of interviewer-rated skin color on perceived color discrimination from whites disappears once self-rated skin color is taken into account (Table 2, Model 3). That is, above and beyond *observers'* rating of respondents' skin tones, self-rated skin color is strongly associated with how much color discrimination respondents perceived from whites.

These findings strongly suggest that even though self-rated skin color and interviewer-rated skin color are highly correlated, they are not precisely equivalent. Rather, *reflected appraisals* of respondents' skin color are stronger predictors of how much discrimination respondents perceive, on account of their skin color, from whites. This makes sense. As experiences of being classified as black by others makes individuals more likely to simply self-identify as black, in accordance with the "one-drop rule" (Khanna 2010), experiences of unfair treatment and/or discrimination due to skin shade may have a critical influence in how light or dark-skinned respondents *think* that they are. Consequently, these *feelings* of how light and dark one's skin is, are even stronger predictors of how much

discrimination respondents perceive from whites due to respondents' skin tone, than interviewers' ratings of their skin color.

Intraracial skin color discrimination may be another matter entirely. The results presented in Table 3, however, also demonstrate that skin tone is a strong predictor of how much discrimination respondents perceive due to their skin shade, even from other blacks. Instead of the relationship being a simple continuum, however, where the lighter one's skin is, the less discrimination from blacks individuals perceive due to their skin shade – as was the case with discrimination from whites (see Table 2), the relationship *within the black population* is much more complicated. To model this complexity, I present results comparing how much discrimination from other blacks due to skin shade, the very lightest-skinned, the very darkest-skinned, and medium-tone blacks perceived.

Corroborating a long-held contention in the literature[55], I find that medium-tone blacks actually perceive *significantly* less discrimination from other blacks due to their skin shade, than both the very lightest-skinned and very-darkest skinned blacks (Table 3, Model 2). Moreover, I find that both very light skinned and very dark skinned blacks report significant amounts of discrimination due to their skin shade within the black population[56] (Table 3, Models 1 and 3). Such findings support research which details how darker-skinned black women and men often feel stigmatized among other blacks as less attractive and less intelligent (Maddox 2004; Hunter 2005), while lighter-skinned blacks feel stigmatized among other blacks for allegedly being "racially inauthentic" (Hunter 2005: 93-94). Interestingly, while women are more likely to perceive discrimination due to their skin shade from whites, there were no significant differences in how much discrimination due to skin shade from blacks, black men and women perceived. This suggests that, even though much research emphasizes the importance of skin color for black women, it is important to also consider how much skin complexion matters for black men as well.

Ultimately, these results lend substantial quantitative validation to the findings of qualitative research on "colorism" that has been conducted for several decades regarding the politics of skin color among black Americans (Powdermaker 1939; Frazier 1940; Drake and Cayton 1945; Anderson and Cromwell 1977; Hunter 2005).

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[55] In line with Frazier's (1940) observations, Drake and Cayton caution the reader from quickly assuming that most blacks prefer the absolutely *lightest* skin tones. Instead, many blacks explicitly prefer a medium, brown-skin tone, similar to the "Brazilian *moreno* ideal" (Drake and Cayton; 1945: 504).

[56] I find that both self-rated and interviewer-rated skin color are significant predictors of how much color discrimination respondents perceive from other blacks, respectively. In contrast to what was found in the case of perceptions of discrimination due to skin shade from whites, however, I find that self-reported skin color is only a slightly stronger predictor of how much discrimination due to skin shade blacks perceived from other blacks (results not shown). This is somewhat unsurprising considering that the interviewers utilized for the NSAL were black themselves. Consequently, while in the case of perceived color discrimination from whites, self-rated skin color may pick up *both* the probability that an individual is discriminated against *and* the "internalization" of discriminatory experiences over the life course, such that the latter is a stronger predictor of perceived color discrimination than the former – in the case of color discrimination from other blacks, this added analytic leverage may not be as strong given that black interviewers ratings of respondents skin tones are a likely match for how much color discrimination respondents perceive from other blacks. Even still, self-rated skin color is a slightly stronger predictor of how much color discrimination lighter-skinned and darker-skinned blacks perceived from other blacks.

Closeness to Blacks

Given evidence of skin color discrimination within the black population, both in the present study (see Table 3), and the bulk of existing literature on "colorism," I also examine whether feelings of closeness to blacks as a group are affected by respondents' skin tones. Previous work has examined whether closeness to blacks as a group is affected by differences in socioeconomic status within the black population (Broman et al. 1988; Demo and Hughes 1991; Thornton et al. 1997), but no previous study, to the knowledge of the author, has examined whether skin color also affects feelings of closeness among black Americans – perhaps, even after controlling for socioeconomic status.

In Table 4, I present the results of an OLS regression analysis of the relationship between skin tone, a host of sociodemographic variables (including socioeconomic status variables), and a composite scale of items on how close respondents feel to blacks of various background (a similar scale was also used in Broman et al. 1988; Thornton et al. 1997). I find that skin tone is a significant predictor of respondents' feelings of closeness to other blacks, net of respondents' age, sex, socioeconomic status, employment status, marital status, and whether respondents live in the south or a rural area. The lighter-skinned respondents are, the *less close* they report feeling to blacks as a group. As was the case in modeling perceptions of color discrimination, I also find that self-reported skin tone is a better predictor of feelings of closeness to other blacks than interviewer-rated skin tones (in fact, interviewer-rated skin color is not a significant predictor of closeness to blacks in any of the models). This accords with the hypothesis of Saperstein (2006: 70) regarding self-reports of "race," which she argues may be more appropriate to model "attitudes and motivations." Once again, *reflected appraisals* of skin color (i.e. self-reports) reveal themselves to be an under-appreciated, yet potentially important analytic dimension to enrich our knowledge of ethnoracial dynamics – in this case, feelings of intraracial closeness, or *social distance*.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Analysis

Variable	Mean (Std. Dev)	Min.-Max.	N
Age	43.14 (16.34)	18-93	3288
Years of Education	12.27 (2.52)	4-17	3288
Employed	0.65 (0.48)	0-1	3288
Poverty Index	2.44 (2.25)	0-17	3288
Marital Status	0.34 (0.47)	0-1	3288
Region (South)	0.66 (0.48)	0-1	3288
Rural	0.21 (0.41)	0-1	3285
Skin Color Scale (Interviewer-Rated) (1 = Very Dark Skin to 7 = Very Light Skin)	3.75 (1.26)	1-7	3111
Skin Color Scale (Self-Rated) (1 = Very Dark Skin to 5 = Very Light Skin)	2.88 (0.89)	1-5	3275

Table 2. Results of Ordered Logistic Regression (Weighted), Discrimination due to Skin Shade (Whites)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	-0.00638*	-0.00543+	-0.00602*
	(0.00283)	(0.00278)	(0.00285)
Sex	0.258**	0.244**	0.256**
	(0.0788)	(0.0734)	(0.0795)
Educational Attainment	0.0434*	0.0496**	0.0438*
	(0.0173)	(0.0162)	(0.0175)
Employed	-0.200+	-0.220*	-0.201+
	(0.100)	(0.0953)	(0.101)
Poverty Index	0.0334+	0.0329*	0.0345+
	(0.0174)	(0.0155)	(0.0171)
Married	-0.0359	-0.0283	-0.0387
	(0.0784)	(0.0729)	(0.0801)
South	0.214*	0.214*	0.211*
	(0.0994)	(0.0955)	(0.101)
Rural	-0.0356	-0.0388	-0.0261
	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.121)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	0.132**		0.0782
	(0.0378)		(0.0492)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		0.209***	0.108*
		(0.0432)	(0.0514)
Constant	-1.381***	-1.203***	-1.260***
	(0.316)	(0.306)	(0.331)
Observations	3088	3250	3077

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).
+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

Table 3. Results of Ordered Logistic Regression (Weighted), Discrimination due to Skin Shade (Blacks)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	-0.00879**	-0.00915**	-0.00929**
	(0.00276)	(0.00283)	(0.00277)
Sex	-0.0576	-0.0613	-0.0390
	(0.0865)	(0.0863)	(0.0863)
Educational Attainment	0.00263	0.000881	0.00394
	(0.0147)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)
Employed	-0.147	-0.159	-0.155
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Poverty Index	0.00341	0.00354	0.00470
	(0.0174)	(0.0177)	(0.0179)
Married	-0.144+	-0.138	-0.139
	(0.0806)	(0.0836)	(0.0821)
South	0.129	0.141	0.131
	(0.0930)	(0.0908)	(0.0902)
Rural	-0.0749	-0.0886	-0.0891
	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.114)
Self-Rated 'Very Dark' Skin	-0.563**		
	(0.191)		
Self-Rated 'Medium' Skin		0.302**	
		(0.0953)	
Self-Rated 'Very Light' Skin			-0.367+
			(0.183)
Constant	-3.743***	-3.605***	-3.720***
	(0.269)	(0.258)	(0.272)
Observations	3256	3256	3256

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).

+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

Table 4. Results of OLS Regression (Weighted), Closeness to Blacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	-0.00351***	-0.00319***	-0.00341***
	(0.000658)	(0.000613)	(0.000667)
Sex	-0.0182	-0.0168	-0.0215
	(0.0256)	(0.0242)	(0.0252)
Educational Attainment	-0.000909	-0.000198	-0.000352
	(0.00440)	(0.00417)	(0.00438)
Employed	-0.00916	-0.0135	-0.00966
	(0.0331)	(0.0330)	(0.0324)
Poverty Index	-0.000665	0.00184	0.000894
	(0.00541)	(0.00472)	(0.00509)
Married	-0.00424	0.000531	-0.00279
	(0.0235)	(0.0230)	(0.0232)
South	-0.114***	-0.128***	-0.114***
	(0.0264)	(0.0265)	(0.0259)
Rural	-0.0752**	-0.0802**	-0.0775**
	(0.0273)	(0.0268)	(0.0263)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	0.0152		-0.00123
	(0.0104)		(0.0122)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		0.0323*	0.0326+
		(0.0154)	(0.0186)
Constant	1.974***	1.922***	1.927***
	(0.0700)	(0.0772)	(0.0789)
Observations	3094	3258	3081
r^2	0.030	0.033	0.031

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).
+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

Belief in Negative Stereotypes of Blacks

In addition to examining the relationship between skin shade and how close blacks feel to one another as a group, I also examine the relationship between skin shade and how true respondents think are various negative stereotypes of blacks as a group. I view this as yet another dimension of *social distance* within the black population. Table 5 presents the results of OLS regression analysis of a composite scale of three items of negative stereotypes of blacks: "How true is it that Blacks are lazy (1), give up easily (2), and are violent (3)?" This scale has an alpha coefficient of reliability of 0.70. As in the previous analyses, I find that skin color is a significant predictor of how much respondents agree with negative stereotypes of blacks as a group, even after controlling for respondents' age, sex, education, employment status, household income, marital status, and whether respondents live in the south or a rural area[57]. The lighter-skinned respondents are, the *less* they agree with negative stereotypes of blacks. This may suggest that lighter-skinned respondents are less likely to "internalize" negative stereotypes about blacks.

In contrast to previous findings, however, I find that *interviewer-rated skin tone* is a better predictor of how much respondents agree with negative stereotypes of blacks. While a clear explanation for this shift is beyond the capability of this data set and the present study to determine, it is possible that given that this is a question of how much respondents who are black themselves, agree with *negative* stereotypes of blacks, their evaluation of how true a negative stereotype of blacks is, may be more influenced by their perceptions of *other* blacks, than themselves specifically (and thus less related to an evaluation of themselves, or relatedly, how light or dark they think their skin is). In any event, this novel finding certainly deserves further attention in future research.

Perceived Discrimination

In order to address a long-standing quandary in the literature on skin color and discrimination, I utilize OLS regression analysis to examine the relationship between respondents' skin color and how much discrimination or unfair treatment they perceive in general, in their everyday lives, even after taking into account their sociodemographic characteristics. The results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that skin color is indeed significantly associated with how much discrimination or unfair treatment black Americans perceive in their everyday lives, even after controlling for their age, sex, education, employment status, degree of impoverishment, marital status, and whether they live in the south or a rural area. The lighter-skinned black respondents are, the less discrimination or unfair treatment they perceive in their everyday lives. This finding corroborates a long-standing hypothesis, which has been difficult to substantiate in the literature, that skin tone may be a factor of differential exposure to discrimination (Williams and Mohammed 2009; Keith et al. 2010). While, these results do not imply that lighter-skinned blacks face less "racial" discrimination, it is important to consider that studies show that "the generic experience of discrimination [causes] psychological distress… regardless of the attribution [reason] and characteristics of the target" (Williams et al. 2012: 977).

I also examine whether interviewer-rated skin color data or self-rated skin color data is a stronger predictor of perceived discrimination among black Americans. While the results presented in Table 6, Model 1 demonstrate that interviewer-rated skin tone data is a significant predictor of how

[57] Socioeconomic status is also a predictor of how much respondents agree with negative stereotypes of blacks. Blacks with more education and higher household incomes are significantly less likely to believe negative stereotypes of blacks. This may be due to these blacks having different reference groups than blacks of lower socioeconomic status.

much discrimination respondents perceive in their everyday lives, an important finding in its own right, I also find that *self-rated* skin color data is a *stronger* predictor of perceived discrimination among black Americans than interviewer-rated skin color data. This emphasizes how *reflected appraisals* of skin tone are an underappreciated and potentially vital dimension of "race" which are not "inferior" to interviewer-rated skin color data or "measured" data (using a spectrophotometer), but rather, are a *different* form of skin color data, and in this context, *superior* to interviewer-rated skin color data.

Table 5. Results of OLS Regression (Weighted), Negative Stereotypes of Blacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.00225*	0.00262**	0.00222*
	(0.000927)	(0.000947)	(0.000940)
Sex	-0.0757**	-0.0696*	-0.0746**
	(0.0272)	(0.0265)	(0.0268)
Educational Attainment	0.0671***	0.0670***	0.0671***
	(0.00627)	(0.00591)	(0.00635)
Employed	-0.0238	-0.0141	-0.0197
	(0.0377)	(0.0363)	(0.0388)
Poverty Index	0.0182+	0.0189*	0.0170+
	(0.00946)	(0.00926)	(0.00943)
Married	-0.0608	-0.0467	-0.0590
	(0.0385)	(0.0363)	(0.0379)
South	0.0455	0.0319	0.0481
	(0.0489)	(0.0497)	(0.0493)
Rural	-0.0417	-0.0471	-0.0449
	(0.0414)	(0.0417)	(0.0416)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	0.0348**		0.0336*
	(0.0114)		(0.0165)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		0.0416+	0.00113
		(0.0208)	(0.0299)
Constant	1.726***	1.723***	1.725***
	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.150)
Observations	3101	3266	3089
r^2	0.060	0.058	0.059

Table 6. Results of OLS Regression (Weighted), Perceived Discrimination

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.0143***	0.0144***	0.0146***
	(0.00127)	(0.00120)	(0.00126)
Sex	0.215***	0.214***	0.212***
	(0.0456)	(0.0446)	(0.0462)
Educational Attainment	-0.00280	-0.00304	-0.000426
	(0.00724)	(0.00729)	(0.00739)
Employed	0.00531	0.00460	0.00129
	(0.0386)	(0.0376)	(0.0380)
Poverty Index	0.00548	0.00715	0.00588
	(0.00978)	(0.00890)	(0.00971)
Married	0.0461	0.0471	0.0470
	(0.0466)	(0.0444)	(0.0472)
South	0.187**	0.176**	0.187**
	(0.0595)	(0.0578)	(0.0596)
Rural	0.0470	0.0534	0.0566
	(0.0440)	(0.0459)	(0.0452)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	0.0314+		0.00295
	(0.0155)		(0.0253)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		0.0669**	0.0572
		(0.0222)	(0.0362)
Constant	3.780***	3.714***	3.682***
	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.147)
Observations	3105	3269	3092
r^2	0.095	0.098	0.099

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).
+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

Depression

Next, I utilize logistic regression analysis to examine whether skin shade is associated with the likelihood that respondents report being "sad/empty/depressed for a several day period." Given that scholars have proposed that skin tone may be a factor of differential exposure to discrimination, a hypothesis I find support for above (see Tables 1, 2, and 6), and discrimination is held to be a stressor which can lead to depressive symptoms (Krieger et al. 1998; Klonoff and Landrine 2000; Borrell et al. 2006; Williams and Sternthal 2010; Keith et al. 2010), it stands to reason that skin shade should be associated with the prevalence of depression among black Americans. The results presented in Table 7 demonstrate that, even after controlling for respondents' age, sex, education, employment status, degree of impoverishment, and whether they live in the south or a rural area, skin color is strongly associated with depression among black Americans[58]. The darker-skinned one believes they are, the more likely they are to report being depressed. In agreement with previous studies on depression among black Americans, I also find that black women are much more likely to report feeling depressed (regardless of their skin tones) (Krieger et al. 1998; Williams and Mohammed 2009; Harnois and Ifatunji 2011). Additionally, the relationship between depression and socioeconomic status is mixed, the poverty index is not significantly associated with reported depression and neither is educational attainment, this is somewhat in agreement with standing research on depression among black Americans (Williams et al. 2007; Gavin et al. 2009; Hudson et al. 2012).

As in many of the analyses above, *self-reported* skin color is a stronger predictor of depression among black Americans than interviewer-rated skin color. Specifically, I find that for each 1 point increase in the lightness of respondent's self-rated skin color, they have 11% lower odds of suffering from depression. Over a 5 point scale, this amounts to a gap of 44% in the odds of suffering from depression between the lightest and darkest-skinned black Americans. Surprisingly though, interviewer-rated skin color is not significant in any of the models presented in Table 7 except when included *along with* self-rated skin color. When included along with self-rated skin color, interviewer-rated skin color is *positively* associated with depression such that the lighter-skinned the respondent is, the *more likely* they are to report being depressed – this is in sharp contrast to the finding that the *darker-skinned* respondents think they are, the *more likely* they are to report being depressed.

This surprising finding may suggest that depression among black Americans, in terms of its relationship with skin color, may result from the confluence of multiple dimensions of inequality: (1) differential treatment in everyday life as measured by interviewer-rated skin tone, (2) the accumulative effects of differential treatment in everyday life over the life course as possibly measured by self-rated skin tone (i.e. "reflected appraisals"), and (3) possible conflicts over how light or dark-skinned individual's believe themselves to be compared to what outsiders (at least other blacks) think.

Of these three factors, I think number 3 is particularly important given evidence that conflicts between internal and outsider-ascriptions of "race" may cause psychological conflict and lead to poorer mental health outcomes (see Campbell and Troyer 2007[59]). It may be the case that the findings

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[58] In addition to these controls, following Keith et al. (2010), I also tested whether a sense of mastery (i.e. control over one's fate) mediates the relationship between discrimination and depression. I find, similar to Keith et al. (2010), that mastery does mediate symptoms of depression among black Americans, even still, skin color remains a statistically significant predictor of depression among black Americans, even after controlling for mastery (results not shown).

[59] Recent work proposes that self-classification as opposed to outsider's perceptions of individual's "race" may yield inequality by different mechanisms and may even cause stress to individuals who are "misclassified."

presented in Table 7, Model 3, may be best understood as revealing the importance of divergences between how light or dark outsiders think individuals are and how light or dark individuals think themselves to be. These findings may show, for example, that individuals who believe themselves to be *darker-skinned* than interviewers did, suffer from depression. This highlights the importance of "reflected appraisals" (and habitus) – a self-report of skin color seems to represent treatment over the life course even more "accurately" than that of what a single interviewer's (who is also black) judgment of the respondents skin color. Moreover, a self-assessment of "color" is likely to pick up more than *skin color alone*. Other phenotypic traits such as hair and facial features (e.g. lips, nose, etc.) have also been shown as important markers of ethnoracial difference both across and *within* ethnoracial categories (Maddox and Gray 2002) and given that skin tone is not assessed all on its own (barring the case of "machine" measurements), it is likely that self-reports of "color" are capturing the entire "phenotypic package" and how outsiders react to the respondent (and have reacted to the respondent) over the life course (temporally and "spatially" in terms of social space).

In any case, the analyses of these data presented here, on their own, are unable to make definitive statements about how to interpret such findings. Consequently, I offer this intriguing finding to future research to examine (though I will also take up this topic in Part III). At the very least, I will attempt to address this finding by way of the in-depth interviews of black Americans I analyze in Part III of this project. There is some evidence, however, even in this standalone study that self-rated skin color may indeed operate as hypothesized above. Namely, self-rated skin color is the *strongest* predictor of depression among black Americans, even in the model where interviewer-rated skin color is *positively* associated with depression, the effect of self-rated skin color *increases* compared to the model where interviewer-rated skin color is not included (i.e. a *main effect* of self-rated skin color) and is significantly larger than the effect of interviewer-rated skin color. Specifically, I find that for each 1 point increase in the lightness of respondent's self-rated skin color, there are 21% lower odds of suffering from depression*, even after* controlling for the respondent's interviewer-rated skin color.

Moreover, self-rated skin color remains a significant predictor of depression among black Americans even after controlling for skin shade discrimination from both blacks and whites, as well as interviewer-rated skin color, all in the same model (results not shown). In further testing I found that both skin shade discrimination from whites and other blacks are also significantly associated with depression among black Americans. Skin shade discrimination from other blacks, however, is a *slightly stronger* predictor of depression among black Americans than skin shade discrimination from whites (results not shown). Such a finding suggests the importance of considering *horizontal relations* among black Americans as consequential for important health (and possibly, stratification) outcomes. Considering these *horizontal relations*, unfortunately, is precisely what the vast majority of social

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Campbell and Troyer (2007: 760), for example, hypothesize that American Indians who are misclassified as being another "race" feel stress due to being "misclassified" and consequently suffer psychological consequences. Their findings seem to support their general hypothesis, as the results reveal that "misclassified" American Indians are more likely to report considering suicide and attempting suicide. Moreover, misclassified American Indians are also more likely to be involved in ethnic solidarity organizations, which suggests the importance of maintaining their ethnoracial "identity." While others have pointed out that the misclassification found by Campbell and Troyer (2007) may not necessarily be solely related to "misclassification" by observers, the fact remains that scholars should take multiple measures of "race," seriously as a fruitful domain of research, especially, inconsistencies between how individuals self-identify over time and how observers ascribe individuals' "race" (Roth 2010: 1294).

science on "race relations" and "racial disparities in health" has avoided (see above, but also, Chapters 1 and 2).

Shifting gears, however, at the very least, these findings suggest that previous work which has relied solely on interviewer-rated skin color data, or spectrophotometer rated skin color data, may have missed the link between skin color and depression among black Americans due to not having this particular form of skin color data (Krieger et al. 1998; Borrell et al. 2006). Once again, self-reported skin color data is not "inferior," rather it is *different* than interviewer-rated skin color data, despite being highly correlated with said data, and in this context, as well as others reported earlier, it is actually a *better* predictor of the outcome in question than interviewer-rated skin color data.

While the findings presented in Table 7 suggest a relationship between skin tone and depression among black Americans, an important finding in its own right, it is possible that the relationship between skin tone and depression may be mediated by experiences of perceived discrimination (in general, or due to respondents' skin tone specifically), especially considering that many scholars maintain that discrimination is a stressor which is linked to depressive symptoms (Turner et al. 1995; Krieger et al. 1998; Williams and Mohammed 2009; Keith et al. 2010). I find that perceived discrimination, in general, is associated with depression among black Americans (i.e. less perceived discrimination means less incidence of reported depression), but *even after controlling* for perceived discrimination, along with respondents' age, sex, education, employment status, degree of impoverishment, marital status, and whether or not respondents live in the south or a rural area, skin color (both interviewer- and self-rated) is *still* a significant predictor of depression among black Americans (result not shown).

Taken together, these findings corroborate the long-held suspicions of many researchers who have maintained that skin color, most likely, is associated with differential exposure to discrimination and consequently, affects the mental health of black Americans[60]. The findings presented in this study differ from that another recent study, which did not find an association between skin color, discrimination, and depression among black Americans (Keith et al. 2010). In contrast, to this study, however, I utilize *both* measures of skin color (interviewer-rated and self-reported), as well as multiple measures of discrimination; moreover, I analyze both black women *and* men, as opposed to black women only. This highlights that even though color has been documented to be *more* important for black women than black men, this does not mean that color is *not* important for black men too.

Hypertension

Finally, in Table 8, I use logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between skin tone and hypertension among black Americans, even after controlling for their age, sex, educational attainment, employment status, degree of impoverishment, whether they live in the south or a rural area, and even their body mass index (BMI). I find that even though age and obesity are highly significant predictors of hypertension (i.e. older respondents and respondents with higher BMI), skin tone (self-rated) is significantly associated with hypertension among black Americans, even after controlling for their sex, education, employment status, household income, marital status, whether respondents live in the south or a rural area, age and BMI.

Specifically, for each 1 point increase in the darkness of the respondent's skin tone (self-rated), their odds of suffering from hypertension increase by 16%. Over a 5 point scale, that means that the

[60] I find no relationship between skin tone and major depression, however, net of sociodemographic background controls.

darkest-skinned black Americans have 64% higher odds of suffering from hypertension compared to the lightest-skinned black Americans, after controlling for their socioeconomic status, age, and even their BMI, among other factors.

I extend previous work by testing whether skin tone, discrimination, *and* hypertension are significantly associated. As research demonstrates that environmental stressors, such as discrimination, are factors which may increase the likelihood of the manifestations of poor physical health (e.g. hypertension) (Krieger et al. 1998), I examine the association between hypertension and discrimination due to skin shade from blacks and whites, as well as perceived discrimination in everyday life. I find that while skin tone is a significant predictor of hypertension (Harburg et al. 1978; Krieger and Sidney 1996), perceived discrimination in general, and discrimination due to skin shade (from blacks or whites) are not significantly associated with hypertension after controlling for respondents' skin tone, sociodemographic characteristics, and BMI. I also tested if the three measures of discrimination are associated with hypertension *without* controlling for respondents' skin tone (or BMI), I find that both discrimination due to skin shade from blacks and whites are significantly associated with reports of hypertension among black Americans, but once one controls for BMI this effect disappears. By contrast, self-rated skin color remains a strong predictor of hypertension among black Americans even after controlling for the same sociodemographic characteristics (including age and BMI) and *all* of the various forms of discrimination (e.g. general, color discrimination from blacks, color discrimination from whites) and interviewer-rated skin color (results not shown).

Once more, the findings presented here illustrate the utility of using multiple measures of skin color, as self-reported skin color was significantly associated with hypertension, while interviewer-rated skin color was not. Such results may support my hypothesis regarding "reflected appraisals" of skin tone, where the darker or lighter-skinned an individual feels that they are is an index of differential exposure to various forms of discrimination over the life course. On this view, self-rated skin color is a reasonable measure of respondents' perceptions of ill-treatment over the life course, and consequently, are a strong predictor of exposure to "chronic stressors," the likes of which have been linked to subclinical cardiovascular disease in previous studies of discrimination and physical health (Lewis et al. 2006; Williams and Sternthal 2010). While settling the plausibility of such a mechanism is beyond the purview of the present study, the work of Khanna (2010) and Roth (2010) on "reflected appraisals" (cf. Mead 1934) and ethnoracial identification, in conjunction with the theoretical framework of Bourdieu (see above) seems a promising avenue for further investigation (i.e. the study of "reflected appraisals," habitus (capital and field), and health).

Table 7. Results of Logistic Regression (Weighted), Depression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	-0.0116***	-0.0106***	-0.0122***
	(0.00308)	(0.00273)	(0.00296)
Sex	0.381**	0.440***	0.392**
	(0.118)	(0.113)	(0.117)
Educational Attainment	-0.00130	0.00771	-0.00165
	(0.0181)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)
Employed	-0.0347	-0.0669	-0.0511
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.107)
Poverty Index	0.00288	0.00128	0.00431
	(0.0282)	(0.0251)	(0.0286)
Married	-0.123	-0.154	-0.137
	(0.0918)	(0.0932)	(0.0918)
South	-0.448***	-0.445***	-0.454***
	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Rural	-0.0733	-0.0912	-0.0756
	(0.0981)	(0.0956)	(0.0995)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	0.000928		0.123*
	(0.0386)		(0.0468)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		-0.116*	-0.235**
		(0.0591)	(0.0765)
Constant	0.202	0.392	0.459
	(0.269)	(0.261)	(0.275)
Observations	3021	3182	3008

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).
+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

Table 8. Results of Logistic Regression (Weighted), Hypertension

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.0620***	0.0612***	0.0614***
	(0.00389)	(0.00369)	(0.00387)
Sex	0.166	0.205+	0.172
	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.119)
Educational Attainment	-0.0309	-0.0377	-0.0352
	(0.0296)	(0.0294)	(0.0293)
Employed	-0.101	-0.0870	-0.0935
	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Poverty Index	-0.0522	-0.0501	-0.0570
	(0.0341)	(0.0301)	(0.0337)
Married	0.170	0.137	0.166
	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Obesity (BMI)	0.401***	0.407***	0.399***
	(0.0424)	(0.0390)	(0.0424)
South	-0.294*	-0.272*	-0.291*
	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.118)
Rural	0.224	0.196	0.215
	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Interviewer-Rated Skin Color Scale	-0.0262		0.0558
	(0.0386)		(0.0430)
Self-Rated Skin Color Scale		-0.133*	-0.168*
		(0.0624)	(0.0774)
Constant	-4.112***	-3.776***	-3.848***
	(0.534)	(0.495)	(0.512)
Observations	2933	3091	2920

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses are weighted in order to account for the survey's complex design (e.g. clustering and stratification).
+p <.10, *p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 (Two-Tailed Tests)

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I utilized a recently generated, nationally-representative survey, the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), to examine the relationship(s) between skin tone, social distance, discrimination, and health among black Americans in the early 21st century. I find that skin tone is significantly associated with feelings of closeness to other blacks as a group, how much black Americans agree with negative stereotypes about black Americans, how much black Americans perceive that they are victims of discrimination in their everyday lives, how likely they are to report being depressed, and even the likelihood of suffering from hypertension, net of a variety of sociodemographic and other relevant controls. Such findings highlight just how much heterogeneity within the black population is obscured by the standard "race relations" literature which stays at the level of black-white comparisons. Though interest in skin color is beginning to resurge with discussions of putative shifts in the "U.S. racial order" being brought about by the rise of the "Latino" and "multiracial" populations (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009), it is important to remember that skin tone has *always* mattered for the life chances of black Americans and thus, skin color has *always* mattered in the United States.

This study makes numerous contributions to a nexus of literature on black Americans, "racial" disparities in health, and more. The results of this study reveal that even after taking socioeconomic status differences within the black population into account, skin tone is a significant predictor of black Americans' feelings of closeness to one another as a group, and even how much they agree with negative stereotypes of black Americans. Thus, while many researchers have highlighted the importance of class differences among black Americans (Dawson 1995 and his notion "linked fate"), this study shows that skin tone may be even more decisive, as it not only predicts SES (see Chapter 2; Keith and Herring 1991), but remains significant for myriad outcomes, even *after* taking SES into account

Pinning down the relationship between perceived discrimination and skin tone is important as many researchers find that discrimination is strongly associated with a variety of mental and physical health outcomes (Williams and Collins 1995; Krieger et al. 1998; Williams and Sternthal 2010). Addressing an important gap in the literature on "racial" health disparities, I find that skin tone is significantly associated with frequency of perceived discrimination among black Americans, a relationship which has been widely hypothesized to exist by researchers, but only yielded mixed findings (Klonoff and Landrine 2000; Borrell et al. 2006; Keith et al. 2010). In contrast to these previous studies, I examine a much larger sample size and examine the significance of skin color among both black women *and* men. Moreover, I utilize multiple measures of discrimination. Accordingly, I find that skin tone is also associated with depression and hypertension among black Americans in the early 21st century. Such a finding updates previous studies on skin tone and hypertension among black Americans which have relied upon data that is now several decades old, but, more importantly, this study reveals a link between skin tone and depression which has been widely hypothesized in the literature, but elusive to confirm (Keith et al. 2010).

Exploiting a unique feature of the National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), its two measures of skin tone (interviewer-rated and self-reported), I find that self-reports of skin tone are not an "inferior" measure of skin tone as has generally been assumed in the literature (see Klonoff and Landrine 2000 for example), but, in many cases are even *stronger* predictors of the various outcomes analyzed in this study than interviewer-rated skin tone data. I link this novel finding to a symbolic interactionist phenomenon known as "reflected appraisals" (cf. Mead 1934), which scholars have

recently theorized as a mechanism which may explain, at least in part racial self-identification[61] (Khanna 2010; Roth 2010). On this view, the accumulative history of outsiders' ascriptions of individuals' race affects how individuals' self-identify. I propose that accumulative experiences of discrimination may have a similar effect on black Americans in terms of how light or dark they think themselves to be. That is, the relationship between discrimination and skin tone may be so tightly linked, that victims of discrimination may even *think* of themselves as darker than even observers do, and consequently, self-reports of skin tone are stronger predictors of perceived discrimination than even interviewer-rated skin tone data because self-evaluations of lightness or darkness *always already* take into account experiences of differential treatment and discrimination (i.e. the explanatory pathway here is one of endogeneity and not a *direct* effect *per se*; a "direct" effect of skin tone on a given outcome would presumably be better captured by utilizing interviewer-rated skin tone data).

To be clear, this mechanism is more complex than the term "internalization" has come to denote in most social science research. Following Blumer's (2004) explication of the significance of Mead's work for understanding the social world, it is critical that we, as analysts, do not simply relegate social interaction "to the status of a neutral medium." Instead, we must strive to fully grasp how symbolic interaction (the very ground of the social world itself) "is a generative or formative agency in its own right." As Blumer explains (2004: 31-33), at length,

> "Sociologists, despite the verbal homage they pay to social interaction, [often] treat [social interaction] essentially as a neutral medium for the operation or play of social factors derived from the organization or structure of the society... [Consequently], the behavior of people in interaction and the interaction itself are customarily explained in such terms as norms, values, social roles, social positions, folk-ways, mores, and cultural definitions. In such usage, social interaction is reduced to a mere forum for the play of societal or structural factors. Social interaction adds nothing to the analysis, existing, so to speak, as merely the stage on which the decisive parts are played by other factors that determine how the participants are to act... Social interaction as such as swallowed up in the social structure within which it is alleged to take place... **This picture of social interaction as a neutral medium is not changed, of course, by merely making some type of combination of psychological and sociological factors, such as internalization of group norms and values in the individual in the form of motives, or some type of socialization of drives or feelings** [emphasis mine]... The significant thing about [symbolic] interaction is that the action of participants is formed by their having *to take account*

[61] Taking a step further, however, it is important to consider that the findings of this study suggest that "reflected appraisals" can be an element, not only of racial self-identification, but also *inequality*. That is, we must consider how the processual emergence of the mind and the self in 'the matrix of social interactions,' (Mead 1934) which is the very ground from which "reflected appraisals" can exist, is often one of domination and thus – *symbolic violence*. Symbolic violence, following Bourdieu, "is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications of which their social being is the product" (Bourdieu [1998a] 2001a: 170). For more, please see Bourdieu's *Pascalian Meditations* (especially Chapters 4, 5, and 6) and *Masculine Domination*, a text which could be re-written as *Racial Domination* with only the slightest of revision.

> of the actions of the others [emphasis in original]... In symbolic interaction one never goes sailing along merely on one's own but has to deal with the hard fact of the actions of the other participants. **These actions of others set the conditions around which one's own line of conduct has to be built up** [emphasis mine]."

While, a full examination of the hypothesis that "reflected appraisals," (here conceptualized as an aspect of *habitus*, see earlier section) may indeed function in such a way that individuals' self-reports of the lightness or darkness of their skin may *always already* take account of the negotiated "internalization" of their treatment by others, with the consequence that self-reports of skin tone are not only *valid* measures (*contra* the defenestration of such data in previous research, see, for example, Klonoff and Landrine 2000), but in some circumstances, *preferable* compared to interviewer-ratings of skin tone (because self-reports of skin tone, at a given point in time, may pick up, besides phenotypic differentiation, the *cumulative experience of discrimination by others* over the life course), is beyond the purview of the present study. I offer this compelling possibility as a potentially fruitful avenue for future research.

At the very least, it is important to consider that researchers have recently found that some individuals in the U.S. self-identify as "black only," despite being "biracial" or "multiracial," because they are almost always treated by other blacks, whites, and members of other ethnoracial populations as if they are black only (Brunsma 2006; Khanna 2010), which these authors view as the result of "reflected appraisals" at work. That is, one's self-identification into an ethnoracial category involves the "internalization" of outsiders' treatment and ascription of individuals over time. Certainly, the case of Brazil shows how self-classifications of "race" may take into account individual's socioeconomic status, in addition to their phenotypic traits (principally, skin tone) (Telles 2004; Schwartzman 2007), and how the inextricable linkage between "race" and socioeconomic status (typically referred to as "whitening" and "darkening") complicates standard analyses of ethnoracial inequality in the country. The possibility of somewhat similar processes occurring *within* the U.S. black population in terms of *skin tone*, is in the view of this author, an intriguing topic worthy of further investigation. The incredible significance of skin color among black Americans, at the very least, demonstrates how the U.S. case, telescoped through the lens of Brazil (in the privileging of phenotype as opposed to mere census-level, ethnoracial classification), may have much more in common with Brazil than scholars have previously recognized.

Moreover, the significance of skin color among black Americans also reveals how much diversity and heterogeneity is masked by the "one-drop rule" which simply lumps individuals together regardless of their phenotype, as long as they have some trace of [known] African ancestry. Yes, "[racial] classification systems can have a third impact, beyond reinforcing inequality and helping to create the conditions for fighting it; *they can also mask disparities, which restricts citizens' capacity to derail them*" (Hochschild and Weaver 2007: 160). It is important for scholars to resist taking on the "one-drop rule" as their analytic lens when studying racial inequality. Doing so obscures not only the incredible heterogeneity that exists within the black population, but how even ethnoracial inequality (i.e. inequality between blacks and whites), may be partially explained by differences of skin tone within the black population that are typically ignored in standard work on "race relations."

This study, as well as other studies of the significance of skin color among black Americans, Latinos (Murguia and Telles 1996), and recently, Mexicans (Villarreal 2010), demonstrates how important it is to distinguish folk concepts from analytic concepts in conducting sociological research (Wacquant 1997; Loveman 1999). Unfortunately, "race" and "color" are often conflated, not only in everyday life, but more importantly, by researchers (Jones 2009). Ordinary language is littered with

references to "colored people" or how "the color of one's skin" may determine their life chances, even Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s exhortation that children be judged "not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character," can be seen as the sort of conflation of "race" and "color" that takes place in everyday discourse. It is important to remember, however, that even though "race" and "color" may overlap in practice in everyday life and everyday discourse, they are *analytically* distinct, and researchers should remain ever "epistemologically vigilant" against the uncritical adoption of folk concepts as analytic concepts[62].

Future research should continue to take seriously how skin color affects life chances in the United States, especially because shifts in the racial order (in the Post-Civil Rights era), specifically, the well-documented *decline* in overt racial discrimination (Bobo et al. 2012), may not lead to similar shifts in terms of color discrimination. Studies show that while "racial" stereotyping can often be suppressed, individuals are often unable to suppress *color* discrimination, even when they are told in advance about the problem (Blair et al. 2004). In fact, even during the Black Power Movement, young blacks who explicitly professed that "Black is Beautiful" still expressed negative stereotypes of darker-skinned blacks (Anderson and Cromwell 1977).

The findings of this study also have implications for policy. For one, the study of skin color highlights how potential interventions to lessen "racial" health disparities must consider more than just "race" alone, or even "race" in conjunction with socioeconomic status. This study shows how skin color, which has long been hypothesized to affect health among black Americans, as a factor of differential exposure to discrimination (Krieger et al. 1998; Williams and Mohammed 2009), is worthy of further attention in research on "racial" health disparities and possible interventions to lessen said disparities. At the very least, the findings here suggest that researchers may want to include self-rated measures of skin tone in their surveys.

Bracketing matters of cross-national comparison, theoretical explorations of symbolic interactionism, *habitus* (*bodily capital* and field), ethnoracial inequality (both within and between ethnoracial categories), the separation of folk and analytic concepts, or even this study's implications for policy and the future collection of Census data, however, in the main, this chapter reveals, using a nationally-representative survey, with one of the largest samples of black Americans ever amassed by researchers (National Survey of American Life, 2001-2003), that gradations of skin tone are significantly associated with social distance, frequency of perceived discrimination, and even depression and hypertension among black Americans in the early 21st century. Such findings highlight how inequality is indeed *embodied*, as Krieger (1999: 296) explains, "[H]ow we literally incorporate biologically – from conception to death – our social experiences and express this embodiment in population patterns of health, disease, and well-being." Or, following Bourdieu [1998b] (2001b: 23), the *somatization of the social relations of domination*. While, long-standing research has demonstrated such a phenomenon in terms of "racial" disparities in health *between* blacks and nonblacks as a whole,

[62] "Epistemological vigilance is particularly necessary in the social sciences, where the separation between everyday opinion and scientific discourse is more blurred than elsewhere… [For] the sociologist, familiarity with his social universe is the epistemological obstacle *par excellence,* because it continuously produces conceptions or systematizations and, at the same time, the conditions of their credibility. [P]reconceptions or 'prenotions' – 'schematic, summary representations' that are 'formed by and for experience' – derive their self-evidence and their 'authority,' as Durkheim observes, from the *social functions they fulfill*" (Bourdieu et al. 1968: 13).

this study demonstrates how, *even within the black population*, which undoubtedly faces a considerable degree of social stress due to discrimination – inequality is not experienced or embodied equally.

Chapter Four

Towards a Regional Model of "Race" in Brazil

Ethnoracial classification and categorization in Brazil are strongly tied to the variation of phenotypic characteristics such as: skin tone, hair texture and color, eye color, and the shape of one's nose, lips, and mouth (Degler 1971; Telles 2002). Consequently, while African-Americans in the U.S. have been racially classified as black regardless of their phenotype, due to the rule of hypodescent where "one-drop" of black blood makes one black (since at least the turn of the 20th century) (Davis 1991) -- some African-Americans designated as black in the U.S. would be considered "white" (*branco*) or "brown" (*pardo*) in Brazil (Telles 2004).

In contrast to the U.S., there are myriad racial categories that are used in daily practice and in different census-style formats in Brazil. For example, there are at least three major racial classification systems: (1) the official census format which was developed by the IBGE in 1940 which includes the following categories: white, brown, black, yellow (for Asians), and Indian[63]. (2) The so-called "Black Movement" format[64] which has only two categories: black and white. (3) The system(s) of daily practice with an abundance of color categories such as: *Moreno claro*, *tostada* (toasted), *corada* (ruddy), *castanha-clara* (clear, cashewlike), etc. (Harris 1970; Hanchard 1994; Bailey 2009: 61).

Compared to the United States, many scholars maintain that race in Brazil is fluid, ambiguous, and contextual (Wagley 1965; Harris 1970; Degler 1971; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004). For example, anthropologist Marvin Harris (1970) reported that two biologically-related siblings were classified into two different racial categories in his study of racial classification and categorization in Northeastern Brazil. Similarly, in an often-cited example of racial ambiguity in Brazil, many authors note a recent case where two identical twins were classified into two different racial categories by a Federal university attempting to determine the brothers' racial classification for the purpose of utilizing Brazil's new affirmative action system (Htun 2004; Bailey 2008).

Moreover, recent studies note the critical importance of highlighting that racial categories don't necessarily imply the existence of racial *groups* in the Brazilian context as perhaps they may in the U.S. (Bailey 2009). At first glance then, if both the U.S. and Brazil have "race" then it would appear that they operate differently from one another. Brazilian racial categories don't exhibit high levels of *groupness* as they're believed to in the U.S.; and Brazilian racial categories have very little correlation with ancestry (Harris 1970; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). Brazilian census categories and extra-official categories, are not necessarily equivalent to "bounded groupings" socially, culturally, nor even politically (Piza and Rosemberg 1999; Nobles 2000; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). In fact, as was mentioned earlier, Brazilian racial categories are fluid, contextual, and ambiguous.

Following Jenkins (1994), Loveman (1999) explains, "The extent to which categories and groups do correspond, and the conditions under which they do so, should be recognized as important theoretical questions that are subject to empirical research. By adopting a conceptual framework that fails to maintain the analytical distinction between category and group, classification and identity, such

[63] In Portuguese: *branco* (white), *pardo* (brown), *preto* (black), *amarelo* (yellow), and *indio* (Brazilian native, added in 1991).

[64] For more information on the Black Movement (*O Movimento Negro*) and historical development and contemporary deployment of the Black Movement format see Hanchard 1994, Daniel 2007 and Bailey 2008.

potentially rewarding avenues of research and theorization are foreclosed[65]" (Loveman 1999: 892). Or in other words, "The concept of boundary [or category] does not necessarily imply that the world is composed of sharply bounded groups. [E]thnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally" (Wimmer 2008: 976). This aspect of the analytic approach sketched above is absolutely critical to be able to account for "race in Brazil", in particular, with all of its fluidity and ambiguity.

Scholars have acknowledged that racial classification and categorization in Brazil are affected by age, sex, level of education, and class (Hasenbalg 1985; Silva 1985; Telles 2004; Bastos et al. 2009). For example, younger Brazilians are much more likely to use the new *negro*[66] racial category than all other Brazilians (Sansone 2003; Bailey 2009). It is also well-documented that education and income may allow some relatively darker Brazilians to "whiten" themselves both in how they are regarded by those who know them and how they self-classify. "Whitening" tends to operate primarily through the mechanism of intermarriage between Brazilians of approximately lighter and darker skin tones (Schwartzman 2007).

Yet, there is another element which affects racial classification, categorization, and attitudes in Brazil that is widely acknowledged, but only inconsistently well integrated into the scholarly literature on race in Brazil – region. Previous studies have found that rates of intermarriage, level of development, racial composition, and the relationship between race and education all vary regionally within Brazil (Telles 2004). Moreover, regarding region, many scholars contend that racial classification and categorization may be more fluid and ambiguous in the Northeast of Brazil (e.g., Bahia) compared to the Southeastern region of Brazil (e.g., São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro) (Frazier 1942; Pierson 1942; Sansone 2003). Relatedly, Degler (1971) maintained that racial classification, categorization, and attitudes were far more restrictive and rigid in the Southern region of Brazil due to the influx of European immigrants in the region. Evidence of such regional variation is readily apparent in the UNESCO studies of "race relations" in Brazil conducted in the 1950s and the seminal work of Gilberto Freyre (1930).

Early in the colonial history of Brazil both the Dutch and the English invaded the region now called Pará in the North, searching for pepper and seeking to extract powder from the native Brazilian, guarana tree (Capistrano de Abreu [1907] 1998). Additionally, there is the well-documented history of Europeans being recruited to immigrate to 'whiten' Brazil after the end of slavery (Andrews 1991; Skidmore 1974). Portuguese immigrants (as well as Italians) settled in parts of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, while further South, Germans, Poles, and Italians came in droves to the three Southern states of Paráná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul (Skidmore 1993).

All of this has had a marked effect on the racial demography of Brazil. While the state of Bahia (Northeast), with its population of some 14 million people, for example, is at least 16% black (preto) and nearly 65% brown (pardo), Rio Grande do Sul (South) is only 6% black and 11% brown – it is over 80% white (branco) (IBGE-PNAD 2005). The state of Pará in the North is 23% white, in contrast to the state of São Paulo which is nearly 70% white (IBGE-PNAD 2005).

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[65] For a more in-depth discussion of the pitfalls of "groupism" in the study of race, ethnicity, and nationality see Brubaker (2004).

[66] This category was created by the Black Movement in Brazil and collapses the official census categories of brown (*pardo*) and black (*preto*) together into one category (Silva 1985).

In fact, even after controlling for regional variation in racial composition there is still regional variation in rates of intermarriage throughout Brazil which "may reflect differences in subcultures of racism" (Telles 1993: 160). Thus, it could also be the case that "the identification of a person as belonging to one race or another in Brazil may be constructed quite differently across regions" (Telles 1993: 160). In other words, "white" (*branco*) may mean something slightly different in Bahia than it does in Rio de Janeiro or Goiás. Pinho (2009) notes the following exchange between popular Brazilian musicians Caetono Veloso and Gilberto Gil: "Gil is a mulato, dark enough to, even in Bahia, be called black. I [Veloso] am a mulato, light enough to, even in São Paulo, be called white… Caetano's statement emphasizes that there are different regional standards of whiteness and blackness in Brazil: São Paulo, not coincidently represented as "the most developed region," is also deemed one of the "whitest" in Brazilian common sense. If São Paulo is among the whitest regions of the country, it is therefore "harder" to be considered white there. At the opposite pole of São Paulo's whiteness is Bahia's blackness… Yet, while it may seem "easier" for a mestiço to be considered white in Bahia's "ocean of blackness," there is also the notion that being *baiano* alone is enough to unwhiten one-self, as is expressed in the pejorative label *branco da Bahia* (a white from Bahia), which is implicitly equated with *branco sujo*, or "dirty white." Needless to say, the "dirt" stems from the black-identified features that many *baianos* carry in their bodies, hair, and faces. Expressing a regional bias, the label *branco da Bahia* confirms, on a geographical basis, that there are several "degrees of whiteness" in Brazil: the more one heads south, the greater are the chances of finding more "purely European" forms of whiteness" (Pinho 2009: 49-50). Consequently it stands to reason that if there is considerable regional variation as regards racial classification and categorization in Brazil, then it is indeed "[I]nappropriate to speak of a homogenous Brazilian racial system, which should be differentiated by region" (Telles 1993: 159).

Despite acknowledging that region may affect racial classification and categorization in Brazil, the issue of regional variation as regards racial classification, categorization, and attitudes has remained a somewhat marginal topic in the literature. As Telles (2004: 95) puts it, "There is little or no work on difference [of racial classification, stratification, and attitudes] by region or racial composition since empirical studies tend to concentrate on a single locale". This is particularly remarkable (and problematic) considering that some scholars have even proposed that Brazil may, in fact, have different regionally-determined racial systems (Telles 1993; Guimarães 1999).

Using data drawn from a nationally representative public opinion survey conducted in Brazil in 2002 (*Pesquisa Nacional Brasileira*, or PESB), I examine whether or not there is significant regional variation in the racial classification of a series of photographs, controlling for regional racial composition and individuals' age, sex, level of education, and income and specify its nature and magnitude. I find that there is indeed substantial regional variation in the classification and categorization of the photographs – even after controlling for regional racial composition. There is also evidence to suggest that there is *intraregional* variation in racial classification and categorization in the case of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (both in the Southeast of Brazil). Additionally, I also find that there is significant regional variation in racial attitudes throughout Brazil, even after controlling for regional racial composition and individuals' age, sex, level of education, and income.

Ultimately, I argue that one of the main reasons why better integrating our knowledge of regional variation into the literature on race in Brazil is so important is because of the need to understand ethnoracial categories on their own terms; in the case of Brazil regional variation is an often missing piece of this puzzle. I conclude by addressing several methodological and theoretical

consequences of these findings for the study of race in Brazil as well as for the comparative study of "race" in Brazil and the U.S.

UNCOVERING REGIONAL VARIATION IN BRAZIL

Regional variation is a critical aspect of understanding race on its own terms in Brazil. Coincidentally recent work done in another country in Latin America, Colombia, gives useful hints as to better integrate the relationship between race and place in our research**.** . For example, Peter Wade notes that blacks and mulattos are so prevalent in Chocó, Colombia, that the term *Chocoano* is essentially synonymous with being black (Wade 1993: 54). In contrast, Whites and *mestizos* so thoroughly dominate the Antioquia region that the term *Antioqueño* is used as a synonym for "white" in daily practice (Appelbaum 1999: 632). Region is, in fact, the *central* analytic lens Peter Wade (1993) uses in his qualitative analysis of race relations in Colombia.

Unfortunately, however, the literature on racial inequality, classification, and attitudes in Brazil has been inconsistent in integrating knowledge of regional variation into analyses of Brazilian racial dynamics. Bieber (1997: 154) explains, "The tendency to extend a localized understanding of race to all of Brazil persists, repeating Gilberto Freyre's oft-criticized extension of a regional portrait of race relations in coastal Pernambuco to the whole of Brazil". Or, as Telles points out in his critique of Carl Degler's seminal work on race in Brazil, "The attitudinal studies that Degler cited were limited to highly select samples, such as college students in Recife, high school students in Rio de Janeiro, and a group of middle-class persons in Florianopolis. Thus he provided us with no generalizable knowledge of Brazilian racial attitudes" (2004: 184).

The problem of extrapolating interpretations from a single region to the whole of Brazil (or at the very least not taking seriously the ramifications of regional variation in Brazil) persists in recent literature on racial attitudes in Brazil. Bailey (2009: 165) reports that there is "significant majority support among Brazilians of all color categories for race-targeted initiatives as measured through the 2000 CEAP/DataUff survey". While this may be the case (as evidenced by other nationally representative surveys), the 2000 CEAP/DataUff survey, however, was only conducted in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Consequently, it is misleading to present these findings as representative for Brazil as a whole. In fact, these findings about support for race-targeted intervention in Brazil (Read: the state of Rio de Janeiro) may not at all be surprising considering that the State of Rio de Janeiro is 46% nonwhite (IBGE 2008). This is in sharp demographic contrast to the state of Rio Grande do Sul, further South of Rio de Janeiro, which is only 17% nonwhite (IBGE 2008). Could it be the case that less nonwhites also means less support for race-targeted intervention(s) in Brazil? This is a question the CEAP/DataUff 2000 survey from the state of Rio de Janeiro is unprepared to address.

We must avoid over-generalizing about "race in Brazil" from such popular research sites as Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. As Bieber notes, it is impossible not to notice the striking differences in racial dynamics between Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo when reading the current literature on race in Brazil (Bieber 1997: 154). In this study, I highlight these striking differences by making *region* the central focus of my analysis. I pose the following questions:

(1) Is there regional variation in "racial" classification (in both dichotomous and census formats) throughout Brazil?

(2): Is there regional variation in *how* such classification is made (i.e., variation in categorization) throughout Brazil?

(3): Is there also regional variation in "racial" attitudes throughout Brazil?

(4): If there is widespread regional variation throughout Brazil, which factors help to explain this regional variation in "racial" dynamics throughout the country (individual characteristics such as age, sex, income and level of education and/or regional variation in racial composition)?

Addressing these questions will give us a much more specific and comprehensive understanding of "racial" dynamics in Brazil. Consequently, this study is an important step towards a deeper understanding of race in Brazil on its own terms.

DATA

The empirical section which follows, addresses regional variation as regards both racial classification and racial categorization in Brazil. The analysis is based on data drawn from a national probabilistic attitudinal survey taken in Brazil (the Pesquisa Nacional Brasileira, or PESB) that was conducted in 2002 at the Federal Fluminense University in Rio de Janeiro with funding from the Ford Foundation (Alberto Carlos Almeida, Edward Telles, and Stanley Bailey were all instrumental in its production). The PESB shares many similarities with the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) and the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of which it was modeled after. A stratified, multi-stage sampling technique was used which drew a sample of 2,362 adults (18 and older). The sample sorted 27 stated into five regions. Weights were included to correct for oversampling by region and by questionnaire version, as well as by age, sex, education, working and non-working populations, and are used for all of the analyses included in this article. The response rate was 77%.

For the purpose of identifying potential regional variation, I selected six major states from the five different geographic regions in Brazil: Pará (North), Bahia (Northeast), Goiás (Midwest), São Paulo (Southeast), Rio de Janeiro (Southeast), and Rio Grande do Sul (South)[67].

METHODS AND FINDINGS

The findings reported in this section are the result of a series of multinomial and ordinal logistic regressions[68] which reveal not only regional and even intraregional variation (as represented by the six states chosen for analysis here) in how the men in the eight photographs were classified, but also regional variation regarding the phenotypic characteristic survey respondents claimed was the most important for them to classify the men in the eight photographs. As there is a substantial amount of results presented, I will discuss only key findings due to space constraints – I invite the reader to examine all the tables included here for further information.

[67] Estimated population by state: Pará: 7 million, Bahia: 14 million, Rio de Janeiro: 15 million, São Paulo: 40 million, Rio Grande do Sul: 11 million, Goiás: 6 million. (IBGE 2008).

[68] Base outcomes are the most commonly chosen outcome for each individual case. Results should be interpreted as in comparison with Rio de Janeiro unless otherwise stated. Rio de Janeiro was chosen because of the substantial amount of scholarly attention given to Rio de Janeiro (See Sheriff 1998; Twine 1998; Goldstein 2003; Bailey 2004). Moreover, a series of cross-tabulations with chi-square tests for statistical significance of association between racial classification, categorization, and attitudes by region were also conducted and are available from the author by request.



FIG. 1.—Photographs of Brazilian men of varied skin tones, from the PESB

Regional Variation in Racial Classification in Brazil

Tables 1 and 2 present the results of ordinal logistic regression analysis of the racial classification (in official census format) of the men in the eight photographs. As many studies base themselves in Rio de Janeiro, both ethnographically (Sherriff 1998; Twine 1998; Goldstein 2003) as well as quantitatively via large-N survey research (Bailey 2004), the analyses discussed here all use Rio de Janeiro as the excluded region (unless otherwise stated).

While there is no statistically significant regional variation in the racial classification of the men in photographs 1, 4, and 5, there is statistically significant regional variation in the racial classification of the men in photographs 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8. For example, the probability[69] that the man in photograph 8 would be classified as *pardo* (brown) in Pará is double that of Rio de Janeiro (19% in Pará vs. only 9% in Rio de Janeiro) even after controlling for individuals' age, sex, income, and level of education. In addition it is also important that one notes the signs of the coefficients for photograph 1 – São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Goiás are all in the opposite direction of Pará and Bahia – these differences suggest differences *amongst* the various regions.

In photograph 7 I find that Goiás is the most dramatically different region from Rio de Janeiro. In Rio de Janeiro the man in photograph 7 has nearly a 90% predicted probability of being classified as

[69] Predicted probabilities were obtained by using the STATA spost suite (prtab and prchange) developed by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese (Scott and Freese 2001).

branco (white), the same man only has a 70% probability of being classified as *branco* (white) in Goiás – even after controlling for individuals' age, sex, income, and education. Again, while the results for Pará, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul were not statistically significant, the coefficients are in the opposite direction of both Bahia and Goiás which suggests differences *amongst* these regions in addition to their differences (or lack thereof) with Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, in photograph 6, Goiás is also statistically significantly different from Rio de Janeiro. The man in photograph 6 has only an 8% probability of being classified as *preto* (black) in Rio de Janeiro, but a 17% probability of being classified as *preto* (black) in Goiás.

While the results presented in Table 1 do suggest significant differences in racial classification based on regional variation, these results only control for individuals' age, sex, income, and education. Differences in racial demographics are still to be accounted for as they are typically believed to be the strongest predictor of regional variation in racial dynamics in Brazil (Degler 1971; Telles 2004).

The findings in Table 2 are the results of ordinal logistic regression analysis of the racial classification of the men in the eight photographs which controls for not only individual characteristics, but the racial composition of each region (i.e. percentage of the region that is white). There are *still* statistically significant regional differences in racial classification for the men in photographs 2, 3, 7, and 8, even after controlling for individuals' age, sex, income, and education in addition to each region's racial composition.

Returning to the man in photograph 7, I find that the probability of this man being classified as *pardo* (brown) in Bahia is nearly 25% compared to only 10% in Rio de Janeiro – even after controlling for individuals' age, sex, education, income and regions' racial composition. Even more stark are the differences between Goiás and Rio de Janeiro. The man in photograph 7 has a 30% probability of being classified as *pardo* (brown) in Goiás compared to only 10% in Rio de Janeiro. There are also then differences regarding the probability that the man in photograph 7 will be classified as *branco* (white). For example, the man in photograph 7 has an 89% probability of being classified as *branco* in Rio de Janeiro compared to only 68% in Goiás. In addition, there are also differences between Bahia and Rio de Janeiro – the man in photograph 7 has an 89% probability of being classified as white in Rio de Janeiro, but only a 74% probability of being classified as such in Bahia. Moreover, the probability that the same man would be classified as *pardo* is 15% higher in Bahia than in Rio de Janeiro. The differences in the signs of coefficients (even when the results are not statistically significant) suggest further divergences in racial classification amongst the various regions (e.g. Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo).

The man in photograph 2 has more than twice the chance of being classified as *preto* (black) in Rio Grande do Sul compared to Rio de Janeiro (19% vs. 7%). The telltale differences in the directions of the coefficients for each region suggest that, even though these differences may not be statistically significant, there are some differences amongst the various regions – in particularly Bahia compared to all other regions.

While most analyses of racial classification focus solely on the classification outcome, questions in the PESB 2002 allow us to determine which phenotypic characteristic (e.g. skin tone, hair, eye color, nose, and lips) individuals' deemed the most important to *make* their classification decisions. Thus, I draw a distinction between the actual outcomes (i.e. classification) individuals made concerning the racial classification of the men in the eight photographs and the phenotypic cue they deemed the most important characteristic to make these classification decisions (i.e. categorization). The results presented in table 4 highlight the importance of this distinction as certain regions can virtually agree on the racial classification of an individual, but still differ in terms of *categorization*;

additionally, regions can have marked differences in the racial classification of an individual, yet still virtually agree in terms of *categorization* – taken together this suggests that different regions tend to use and understand the same nominal categories in slightly different ways.

For example, take the man in photograph 7 again – above I established that Goiás significantly differs from Rio de Janeiro in regards of how to racially classify him – the man in photograph 7 has a predicted probability of 89% of being classified as white in Rio de Janeiro as opposed to only a 68% probability in Goiás. Additionally, the man in photograph 7 has a 30% probability of being classified as brown (*pardo*) in Goiás compared to only 10% in Rio de Janeiro. Yet, when one compares the frequency of the Goiás and Rio de Janeiro's samples responses for the most important characteristic used to classify the man in photograph 7 there are no statistically significant differences in terms of the importance of skin tone or hair type and only a slight difference in terms of the importance of eye color.

Or, take the man in photograph 6 – above it was established that there were no statistically significant regional differences in his classification – most agreed that the man in photograph 6 should be classified as brown (*pardo*). Does this agreement in classification, however, also mean agreement in *categorization*? In this case it does not. There is a predicted probability of 85% that skin tone is the most important characteristic used to racially classify the man in photograph 6 in Rio Grande do Sul, compared to 70% in Rio de Janeiro. The difference between Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia on the importance of skin tone is even starker as evidenced by Rio Grande do Sul's positive statistically significant coefficient and Bahia's negative, but not statistically significant coefficient. There are also marked differences between regions concerning the importance of hair type. There is nearly a 20% predicted probability in Rio de Janeiro that hair type is the most important characteristic used to racially classify the man in photograph 6 compared to only 5% in Rio Grande do Sul.

The primacy of skin tone in Rio Grande do Sul compared to Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and the rest of Brazil corroborate Degler's (1971) and Telles's (2004) suggestion that racial dynamics in the South of Brazil may be much more "black/white" and "U.S.-style) than in the rest of Brazil which may have a more complex calculus of racial classification and categorization which emphasizes skin tone, but also places a premium on gradations of hair type and facial features. Relatedly, one may also argue, based on the findings presented here, that the primacy of skin tone as a marker of racial classification increases significantly as one moves further South within Brazil. In contrast, hair type appears to be a much more important marker for racial classification in Bahia than in the rest of Brazil. Again, that there are these differences in categorization, however, does not necessarily mean that there will be significant regional differences in how the same person would be racially *classified* across regions.

Thus far we've shown that there are significant regional differences in both racial classification and categorization in Brazil. Is there also, however, regional variation in racial attitudes? In the next section, I will examine how respondents from different regions in Brazil answered two attitudinal survey questions about the men in the eight photographs (PESB 2002).

Table 1. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression, Racial Classification in Official Census Format.

Photo #	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pará	-0.936 (0.558)	-0.741 (0.423)	0.088 (0.429)	0.403 (0.833)	-0.087 (0.752)	-0.670* (0.344)	0.237 (0.450)	-0.821* (0.373)
São Paulo	0.725 (0.571)	-0.123 (0.317)	-0.276 (0.300)	0.922 (0.637)	0.255 (0.531)	0.045 (0.221)	0.475 (0.319)	0.430 (0.337)
Bahia	-0.732 (0.515)	-0.416 (0.364)	-0.174 (0.349)	-33.722 (1.06e+07)	0.149 (0.607)	-0.502 (0.273)	-0.819** (0.312)	-0.689* (0.333)
Rio Grande do Sul	0.359 (0.622)	-0.582 (0.354)	-0.347 (0.338)	-0.193 (0.827)	-1.102 (0.848)	0.001 (0.252)	0.460 (0.374)	0.118 (0.366)
Goiás	-0.074 (0.670)	-1.008** (0.376)	0.783* (0.395)	0.623 (0.781)	-1.191 (1.109)	0.089 (0.285)	-1.255*** (0.322)	0.518 (0.457)
Education	0.303 (0.184)	-0.300** (0.112)	-0.048 (0.107)	-0.342 (0.223)	-0.481* (0.210)	0.098 (0.082)	-0.254* (0.106)	-0.032 (0.116)
Race								
Income	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Sex	0.412 (0.324)	-0.319 (0.204)	0.133 (0.198)	-0.216 (0.399)	-0.200 (0.372)	0.001 (0.153)	0.108 (0.195)	-0.130 (0.209)
Age	-0.019 (0.011)	0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.009 (0.012)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
Pseudo R-Square	0.095	0.031	0.016	0.078	0.066	0.039	0.073	0.052
chi2	35.853***	27.931***	14.645	22.745**	20.368*	50.482***	64.314***	41.185***
Cut 1	-6.124*** (1.397)	-3.915*** (0.654)	-2.331*** (0.618)	2.073 (1.234)	1.933 (1.124)	-2.845*** (0.512)	-5.645*** (0.699)	-5.019*** (0.743)
Cut 2	-2.203* (0.987)	1.871** (0.630)	3.285*** (0.631)	4.135** (1.318)	4.385*** (1.250)	2.465*** (0.469)	-2.519*** (0.603)	-1.989** (0.645)
N	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000

Omitted variable: Rio de Janeiro for region. Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 2. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression, Racial Classification in Official Census Format. (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
São Paulo	0.254 (0.764)	-0.497 (0.467)	-0.231 (0.449)	1.125 (0.963)	0.212 (0.799)
Bahia	0.275 (0.483)	0.382 (0.426)	-0.269 (0.442)	-33.156 (6.41e+06)	0.243 (0.749)
Rio Grande do Sul	-0.436 (0.956)	-1.211* (0.617)	-0.272 (0.597)	0.150 (1.329)	-1.176 (1.218)
Goiás	0.310 (0.594)	-0.704* (0.332)	0.746* (0.365)	0.458 (0.667)	-1.155 (1.074)
Racial Composition	0.030 (0.018)	0.024 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.027)	0.003 (0.024)
Education	0.303 (0.184)	-0.300** (0.112)	-0.048 (0.107)	-0.342 (0.223)	-0.481* (0.210)
Income	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Sex	0.412 (0.324)	-0.319 (0.204)	0.133 (0.198)	-0.216 (0.399)	-0.200 (0.372)
Age	-0.019 (0.011)	0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.009 (0.012)
Pseudo R-Square	0.095	0.031	0.016	0.078	0.066
chi2	35.853***	27.931***	14.645	22.745**	20.368*
Cut 1	-4.500** (1.459)	-2.629*** (0.797)	-2.484** (0.804)	1.373 (1.501)	2.084 (1.439)
Cut 2	-0.579 (1.080)	3.157*** (0.803)	3.132*** (0.810)	3.435* (1.571)	4.536** (1.540)
N	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000

Omitted variables: Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará for collinearity. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 2 (Cont'd). Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression, Racial Classification in Official Census Format. (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(6)	(7)	(8)
São Paulo	-0.292 (0.336)	0.594 (0.464)	0.016 (0.470)
Bahia	0.219 (0.369)	-1.074* (0.444)	0.194 (0.340)
Rio Grande do Sul	-0.568 (0.455)	0.661 (0.626)	-0.579 (0.597)
Goiás	0.364 (0.270)	-1.352*** (0.294)	0.854* (0.416)
Racial Composition	0.021 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.026* (0.012)
Education	0.098 (0.082)	-0.254* (0.106)	-0.032 (0.116)
Income	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Sex	0.001 (0.153)	0.108 (0.195)	-0.130 (0.209)
Age	0.028*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
Pseudo R-Square	0.039	0.073	0.052
chi2	50.482***	64.314***	41.185***
Cut 1	-1.683* (0.664)	-6.056*** (0.907)	-3.595*** (0.814)
Cut 2	3.627*** (0.652)	-2.930*** (0.836)	-0.565 (0.730)
N	990.000	990.000	990.000

Omitted variables: Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará for collinearity. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 3. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression, Racial Classification in Black Movement Format.

Photo #	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pará	0.019 (0.569)	1.919 (1.050)	-37.123 (1.12e+08)	-0.341 (0.286)	-0.283 (0.285)	0.005 (0.298)
São Paulo	3.137** (1.055)	1.286** (0.449)	0.461 (0.830)	0.079 (0.199)	-0.346 (0.202)	0.222 (0.215)
Rio de Janeiro	33.286 (5.27e+06)	1.688* (0.656)	-36.983 (8.24e+07)	0.015 (0.237)	-0.109 (0.239)	0.147 (0.256)
Rio Grande do Sul	1.769* (0.784)	2.778** (1.045)	-0.701 (1.233)	-0.106 (0.228)	-0.010 (0.227)	0.696** (0.265)
Goiás	2.017 (1.060)	0.555 (0.515)	0.414 (1.013)	-0.902** (0.289)	0.268 (0.257)	0.730* (0.305)
Education	-0.130 (0.264)	-0.644** (0.217)	-0.062 (0.350)	-0.277*** (0.075)	-0.208** (0.076)	-0.085 (0.084)
Income	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Sex	-0.300 (0.498)	0.798* (0.375)	-0.190 (0.634)	-0.243 (0.138)	0.050 (0.139)	-0.251 (0.156)
Age	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.024 (0.025)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.013* (0.005)
Pseudo R-Square	0.160	0.121	0.073	0.031	0.017	0.022
chi2	29.981***	35.877***	8.785	41.633***	22.972**	24.732**
Cut 1	-3.777** (1.415)	-3.415** (1.078)	2.992 (1.877)	-0.823* (0.409)	-0.195 (0.408)	-0.938* (0.458)
N	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000	990.000

Omitted variable: Bahia for region. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 4. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression: "Which physical characteristic was the most important in classifying the person in the photograph?" (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(1)			(2)		
	Skin Tone[a]	Hair Type[b]	Eyes[b]	Skin Tone	Hair Type	Eyes
São Paulo	0.462	-0.473	-0.877*	0.491	-0.654	-1.620*
	(0.541)	(0.542)	(0.356)	(0.389)	(0.351)	(0.785)
Bahia	-0.383	0.368	0.626	-0.704	-0.220	-0.657
	(0.493)	(0.494)	(0.382)	(0.376)	(0.351)	(0.872)
Rio Grande do Sul	0.829	-0.864	-1.618***	1.01	-1.946***	-1.589
	(0.722)	(0.724)	(0.489)	(0.532)	(0.520)	(1.005)
Goiás	0.836	-0.859	0.031	0.119	-0.258	-0.641
	(0.571)	(0.571)	(0.282)	(0.316)	(0.292)	(0.677)
Racial Composition	-0.006	0.006	0.024*	-0.009	0.007	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Education	0.311*	-0.318*	0.045	0.109	-0.197*	-0.078
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.230)
Income	0.0009	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(.0002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Sex	0.244	-0.233	0.433*	0.249	-0.220	0.662
	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.170)	(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.455)
Age	-0.005	0.005	0.008	-0.169**	0.014*	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)
_cons	0.939	-0.922	-2.913***	1.399*	-0.681	-4.178**
	(0.946)	(0.946)	(0.700)	(0.702)	(0.646)	(1.557)
Pseudo R-Square	0.033	0.035	0.035	0.032	0.053	
chi2	69.04***	70.049***	70.049***	69.10***	86.841***	
N	972.000	955.000	955.000	968.000	955.000	

Omitted variable(s): Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará (collinearity). Standard errors in parentheses.
[a]Base outcome is hair type. [b]Base outcome is skin color.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 4 (Cont'd). Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression: "Which physical characteristic was the most important in classifying the person in the photograph?" (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(3)			(4)		
	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes
São Paulo	0.647* (0.330)	-0.831* (0.412)	0.433 (1.246)	-0.055 (0.392)	0.093 (0.398)	-9.261*** (1.182)
Bahia	0.048 (0.327)	0.444 (0.437)	1.415 (1.173)	1.07** (0.362)	-1.060** (0.370)	18.839*** (1.565)
Rio Grande do Sul	0.954* (0.446)	-2.227*** (0.633)	-0.760 (1.740)	-0.088 (0.512)	0.068 (0.528)	-16.800*** (1.772)
Goiás	0.546 (0.281)	0.061 (0.338)	-0.163 (1.177)	0.176 (0.312)	-0.140 (0.314)	-24.688 (8.26e+06)
Racial Composition	-0.003 (0.009)	0.017 (0.013)	0.011 (0.040)	0.020 (0.107)	-0.020 (0.011)	0.592*** (0.040)
Education	0.028 (0.086)	-0.183 (0.110)	-0.254 (0.256)	0.182 (0.103)	-0.183 (0.104)	-0.272 (0.389)
Income	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)
Sex	0.114 (0.159)	-0.491* (0.207)	0.002 (0.477)	0.215 (0.188)	-0.201 (0.190)	0.070 (0.744)
Age	-0.017** (0.005)	0.012 (0.007)	0.034* (0.015)	-0.014* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.014 (0.023)
_cons	0.974 (0.599)	-1.469 (0.794)	-5.015* (2.202)	0.016 (0.656)	-0.065 (0.665)	-35.366 (.)
Pseudo R-Square	0.034	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.051	0.051
chi2	72.50***	82.681***	82.681***	71.98***	68.510***	68.510***
N	967.000	955.000	955.000	969.000	955.000	955.000

Table 4 (Cont'd). Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression: "Which physical characteristic was the most important in classifying the person in the photograph?" (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(5)			(6)		
	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes
São Paulo	0.072 (0.438)	-0.020 (0.446)	-1.806 (1.564)	0.787* (0.385)	-0.515 (0.391)	-10.522*** (0.952)
Bahia	0.804* (0.410)	-0.873* (0.416)	-0.124 (1.311)	-0.306 (0.379)	0.684 (0.379)	20.246*** (1.058)
Rio Grande do Sul	0.055 (0.577)	-0.057 (0.589)	-35.848 (3.09e+07)	1.59** (0.550)	-1.053* (0.534)	-16.880*** (1.235)
Goiás	0.704 (0.421)	-0.685 (0.423)	0.355 (0.944)	-0.095 (0.306)	-0.130 (0.316)	-26.990 (1.77e+07)
Racial Composition	0.013 (0.122)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)	0.608*** (0.031)
Education	0.357** (0.118)	-0.349** (0.119)	-0.771 (0.437)	0.222* (0.101)	-0.112 (0.098)	-0.297 (0.315)
Income	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Sex	0.607** (0.211)	-0.581** (0.214)	0.112 (0.778)	0.355 (0.189)	-0.256 (0.181)	-0.295 (0.553)
Age	-0.011 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.176** (0.006)	0.018** (0.006)	-0.017 (0.022)
_cons	-0.775 (0.753)	0.719 (0.758)	-1.785 (2.667)	1.07 (0.705)	-1.435* (0.702)	-33.531 (.)
Pseudo R-Square	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.052	0.034	0.034
chi2	83.03***	83.873***	83.875***	91.91***	71.488***	71.488***
N	971.000	955.000	955.000	966.000	955.000	955.000

Omitted variable(s): Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará (collinearity).Base outcome is skin color. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 4 (Cont'd). Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression: "Which physical characteristic was the most important in classifying the person in the photograph?" (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Photo #	(7)			(8)		
	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes	Skin Tone	Type of Hair	Eyes
São Paulo	0.816* (0.403)	-0.654* (0.333)	-9.530*** (0.953)	0.657 (0.348)	-0.738 (0.389)	0.599 (1.236)
Bahia	-0.340 (0.424)	-0.022 (0.327)	19.927*** (0.920)	0.218 (0.345)	0.266 (0.382)	0.587 (1.245)
Rio Grande do Sul	2.17*** (0.623)	-0.972* (0.449)	-16.063*** (1.242)	1.94*** (0.515)	-1.633** (0.561)	-0.161 (1.668)
Goiás	-0.006 (0.334)	-0.537 (0.282)	7.492*** (0.809)	0.274 (0.291)	0.112 (0.307)	-0.166 (1.177)
Racial Composition	-0.015 (0.013)	0.003 (0.010)	0.586*** (0.027)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.007 (0.012)	0.015 (0.040)
Education	0.164 (0.109)	-0.043 (0.087)	-0.528 (0.274)	0.197* (0.095)	-0.217* (0.102)	-0.668* (0.271)
Income	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Sex	0.508* (0.206)	-0.086 (0.160)	-0.332 (0.480)	0.213 (0.175)	-0.336 (0.191)	-0.378 (0.458)
Age	-0.013 (0.007)	0.016** (0.005)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.014* (0.006)	0.018** (0.006)	0.009 (0.015)
_cons	1.41 (0.774)	-0.967 (0.599)	-31.588 (.)	0.657 (0.639)	-1.079 (0.710)	-2.119 (2.189)
Pseudo R-Square	0.054	0.034	0.034	0.054***	0.052	0.052
chi2	84.68***	70.638***	70.638***	89.12***	91.355***	91.355***
N	967.000	955.000	955.000	962.000	955.000	955.000

Omitted variable(s): Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará (collinearity).Base outcome is skin color. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Regional Variation in "Racial" Attitudes

Do Brazilians deny that "racism" exists in their society? Relatedly, do the majority of Brazilians actually support the new race-targeted, quota systems for employment and spots in prestigious, federal universities? These are of course pressing matters with clear political consequences. Bailey (2004) attempts to address these questions (and more) and concludes that the vaunted "Myth of Racial Democracy"[70] (i.e., the idea that Brazil is a racial Parádise where 'races' don't exist because everyone is mixed and consequently, racism does not exist) does not prevent the majority of Brazilians from recognizing racism and supporting affirmative-action style legislation. The author writes, "In summary, the results from the survey of racial attitudes in Rio de Janeiro in 2000 suggest that the racial commonsense *in Brazil* [emphasis mine] framed by researchers with the myth of racial democracy does not appear to be characterized by a lack of antiracist consciousness" (Bailey 2004: 746). The author admits earlier in the paper, however, "The data used in this study can be generalized narrowly only in the state of Rio de Janeiro" (Bailey 2004: 733). Unfortunately, Bailey fails to properly integrate this insight into the discussion of his study's findings.

The matter of what other parts of Brazil think about race in their society is an empirical question. A few survey questions from the PESB 2002, however, will allow us to discover if there are regional differences in racial attitudes. The results that follow are from a series of ordinal logistic regressions, which allow us to discover how respondents from six different states, in the five geographic regions of Brazil responded to the following questions:

(1) "Which person would you prefer to marry your daughter the men in the eight photographs?"

(2) "Which man would you prefer to be your boss?"

Table 5 presents the result of ordinal logistic regression analysis of responses to the question "Which person would you prefer to marry your daughter in the eight photographs?" Individuals were given three choices: (1) White, car mechanic, (2) Brown, car mechanic, and (3) Black, high school teacher. One of the principal investigators of the PESB 2002, Alberto Carlos Almeida (2007: 259), reports that the inhabitants of the South and Southeast have a relatively higher preference for their daughter to marry the white car mechanic than all other regions – according to his cross-tabulations (note these do not control for regional variation in racial composition or individual characteristics). Using ordinal logistic regression, as opposed to cross-tabulations, I find that São Paulo (Southeast) is actually statistically significantly different than Rio de Janeiro (also, Southeast). In São Paulo, individuals have a predicted probability of 64% to "prefer their daughter to marry the white, car mechanic" instead of the brown car mechanic or black high school teacher compared to only 44% in Rio de Janeiro – even after controlling individuals' age, sex, income, and education and regional racial composition. In Rio Grande do Sul, this preference is even stronger with a predicted probability of 71% that individuals in Rio Grande do Sul would "prefer their daughter to marry the white car mechanic" instead of the brown car mechanic or black high school teacher (again controlling for individual and regional characteristics). It is also interesting to note that while the result for Bahia is not statistically significant -- the direction of its coefficient is the opposite of that of Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo.

Table 6 presents the results ordinal logistic regression analysis of the question "Which man would you prefer to be your boss?" Individuals were given three choices: (1) White, high school teacher, (2) Brown, lawyer, and (3) Black, lawyer, *nordestino* (Northeasterner). I find that Bahia is

[70] For more information on the "Myth of Racial Democracy" see Hasenbalg 1985; Skidmore 1993; Hanchard 1994; Bailey 2004.

statistically significantly different than all other regions, even after controlling for individuals' age, sex, income, and education in addition regional racial composition. Individuals from Bahia have a predicted probability of 48% for preferring the white, high school professor to be their boss compared to 32% in Rio de Janeiro; individuals from Bahia have a predicted probability of 21% for preferring the black, lawyer, *nordestino* to be their boss compared to 33% in Rio de Janeiro. All of which demonstrates some degree of regional variation in racial attitudes.

Table 5. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression: "Which person would you prefer to marry your daughter?"

1	White (*Branco)*, car mechanic
2	Brown (*Pardo)*, car mechanic
3	Black (*Preto)*, High school teacher

Pará	-0.014 (0.283)	São Paulo	-0.848** (0.317)
São Paulo	-0.841*** (0.219)	Bahia	0.060 (0.288)
Bahia	0.045 (0.244)	Rio Grande do Sul	-1.080** (0.417)
Rio Grande do Sul	-1.068*** (0.248)	Goiás	-0.379 (0.241)
Goiás	-0.385 (0.266)	Racial Composition	0.000 (0.009)
Education	-0.015 (0.079)	Education	-0.015 (0.079)
Income	-0.000 (0.000)	Income	-0.000 (0.000)
Sex	-0.114 (0.143)	Sex	-0.114 (0.143)
Age	-0.011* (0.005)	Age	-0.011* (0.005)
Pseudo R-Square	0.037	Pseudo R-Square	0.037
chi2	59.625***	chi2	59.625***
Cut 1	-1.214** (0.444)	Cut 1	-1.190* (0.551)
Cut 2	-0.368 (0.442)	Cut 2	-0.345 (0.550)
N	787.000	N	787.000

Omitted variable(s): Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará (collinearity).Base outcome is skin color. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

Table 6. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression: "Which man would you prefer to be your boss?" (Controlling for Racial Composition).

Options

1	White (*Branco)*, High school teacher
2	Brown (*Pardo)*, Lawyer
3	Black (*Preto)*, Lawyer, *Nordestino*

São Paulo	0.254 (0.310)
Bahia	-0.687* (0.298)
Rio Grande do Sul	0.114 (0.406)
Goias	0.096 (0.245)
Racial Composition	-0.013 (0.009)
Education	-0.141 (0.078)
Income	0.000 (0.000)
Sex	0.134 (0.141)
Age	-0.016*** (0.005)
Pseudo R-Square	0.014
chi2	23.636**
Cut 1	-2.134*** (0.564)
Cut 2	-0.713 (0.559)
N	755.000

Omitted variable(s): Rio de Janeiro for region. Pará (collinearity).
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (Two-Tailed Tests).

EXPLAINING REGIONAL VARIATION IN "RACIAL" DYNAMICS IN BRAZIL

These findings strongly suggest that there is a substantial amount of regional (and sometimes even intraregional) variation in racial classification, categorization, and attitudes in Brazil (net of individual variation in age, sex, and education and regional variation in racial composition). As scholars have already documented racial classification in Brazil occurs along a gradational, "color" continuum that is rooted in the variation of phenotypic traits such as skin color, hair type (both texture and color), the shape of lips and nose, and eye color (along with the "whitening" or "darkening" effects of class position – income and education); Brazilian racial categories are fuzzy, fluid, contextual, and ambiguous by their very nature. The findings of this study suggest, however, that there is another layer of complexity -- even the dynamics of the "color" continuum itself are fluid and contextual with regionally-determined *thresholds* for classification into one category or another, in addition to variances in which phenotypic markers are used to make classificatory decisions (i.e. categorization).

What appears to explain this regional variation, in full support of the current literature, is the significant regional variation in racial composition throughout Brazil. While Goiás in the Midwest, and Pará and Bahia in the North and Northeast respectively, all boast solid nonwhite (blacks and browns) majorities, Rio Grande do Sul in the South is over 80% white (IBGE 2008). Moving from the predominantly nonwhite Northeast to the predominantly white Southern regions of Brazil invariably yields significant variation in how race is understood and used in daily practice. Even still, the findings of this study demonstrate that there are significant regional differences in racial classification, categorization, and attitudes *even after* racial composition is controlled for. This strongly suggests that there may be more at work than mere regional differences in racial composition – the same conclusion Telles (1993) reached in his pioneering study of regional variation in rates of intermarriage in Brazil.

Different states and regions have their own unique histories that undoubtedly affect their racial dynamics. As Barbara Weinstein (2003) highlights, "Regional identity in the state of São Paulo [circa 1930] became associated in Brazilian culture not only with industry, modernity, and economic progress, but also with *whiteness* and a particular narrative of Brazilian history that marginalized the role of Afro-Brazilians in the construction of the nation" (Weinstein 2003: 238) [71]. Pinho continues saying that, "I [Pinho] would add that if *paulista* [those from São Paulo] intellectuals were invested in establishing racialized assumptions about modernity as white, scholars in the Northeast of Brazil were confirming racialized assumptions of Brazilian tradition as embedded in *mestiçagem*" (Pinho 2009: 49). This also helps, in part, to explain the significant differences in racial classification, categorization, and attitudes between São Paulo and Bahia.

Regional differences have been so important in Brazilian history that there have even been civil wars and secessionist movements all throughout the country[72]. In the South, for example, there was the War of the Farappos in Rio Grande do Sul from 1835-1845. In this war, the residents of Rio Grande do Sul (known as *gauchos*) fought against the Brazilian federal forces over the (unfair) taxation of Rio Grande do Sul's main product *charque* (a type of dried meat) (Hartmann 2002). For nearly a decade the *Riograndense Republic* (also known as the *Piratini Republic*) remained autonomous and

[71] Cited in Pinho (2009).

[72] Other examples of civil wars to secede from Brazil include: *Canudos War* in Bahia from 1896-1897, the *Contestado War* in the South (Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul) from 1912-1916, and the *Paulista War of 1932* (São Paulo) (Flores 2001).

independent from Brazil until Brazilian federal forces finally overtook the belligerent Republic (Flores 2001).

While this may seem to be a mere footnote in Brazilian history, this war is referred to (along with the fact that the South of Brazil is far more developed and richer than the rest of Brazil) to this very day by two different contemporary secessionist movements[73] which seek independence from Brazil – the *Pampa Independence Movement* based in Rio Grande do Sul and *O Sul e Meu Pais* ("The South is My Country") with members in the three southern Brazilian states of Parána, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina. While members cite historical and economic reasons, many have criticized these particular movements of being racist and seeking to create a "truly European" nation apart from the "mixed-race" country of Brazil (Blount 1993).

While a comprehensive, comParátive analysis of the *historical* specificities of each region and state analyzed in this study is beyond the purview of this particular endeavor, it is important to note at the very least, that the regional variation revealed in this study reflects not only differences in racial demographics, but also *historical* differences which still resonate contemporarily manifested differentially based on geographical location.

As was mentioned earlier, Peter Wade's (1993) pioneering study of race in Colombia used region as its central analytic lens. What's important to draw from Wade's analysis is that race (e.g. classification, categorization, and attitudes) not only *structures* relationships between individuals, regions, and nations (i.e. race as causal factor), but is also *structured* by relationships between individuals, regions, and nations. In this way the causal arrow is not even an arrow, it is more justly a circuit of causation with influential factors flowing both ways: "I [Wade] emphasize the embeddedness of racial dynamics in contexts of social relations and look at sets of circumstances in which the racial order is structured in different ways by local conditions... the significance of local conjuncture(s) draws attention to the importance of a spatial dimension" (Wade 1993: 43).

Thus, that *Chocoano* is essentially synonymous with being black (Wade 1993: 54) and *Antioqueño* is used as a synonym for "white" in daily practice (Appelbaum 1999: 632) reflects the *regionalization* of racial dynamics in Colombia due to such factors as frontier expansion and migration. Likewise, in the Brazilian case, the inextricable linkage between *blackness* and Bahia reflects not simply Bahia's racial demographics, but also its particular role in frontier expansion (i.e. a largely slave-based agricultural region) and Brazil's colonial history (Sansone 2003).

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Theoretically, the findings presented here not only help us to better understand Brazilian racial dynamics on their own terms by highlighting the importance of regional variation in Brazil, but also teach us lessons more broadly about racial dynamics in general. Understanding the logic of various cases of racial inequality on their own terms, as much as this is possible, helps us to gain a broader and analytically more robust understanding of racial inequality, classification, categorization, and attitudes in general by highlighting how the logic of race in one case may differ from the logic of race in another case and thus complicate our knowledge of race in general which may be drawn too much from popular canonical cases. For example, the global study of race relies either explicitly or implicitly on the canonical case of racial inequality – the United States – thus, it's critically important to pay close

[73] For more information on these movements see: *O Sul e Meu Pais* http://www.patria-sulista.org/ and the *Pampa Independence Movement* http://www.pampalivre.info/index.html .

attention to how Brazil *differs* from the U.S. case and what that tells us about racial dynamics in global perspective as well as what these lessons may teach us about the U.S. case itself.

The regionalization of racial dynamics may, for example, not be unique to Brazil or Latin America. The historical work of Williamson (1980) on the disappearance of the "mulatto" category in the U.S. highlights distinctive, regional differences in the logic of the racial classification of "blacks" in the U.S. (particularly in Charleston, South Carolina and New Orleans, Louisiana). Williamson (1980) details how in Louisiana, racial classification was much more complex than in the rest of the country – in Louisiana racial classification followed a much more *Latin American* dynamic, with a clearly delineated intermediate racial category between black and white. This was exemplified by the well-known category of *creole*. Even today there is evidence that, in the case of "biracials (black-white)", the probability of having ones biracial identity validated by others depends on the geographic region within which one lives in the U.S. (Brunsma 2006). In the South, no biracials self-classified as white, in contrast to the East, where no biracials self-classified as black (Brunsma 2006: 568). Consequently, region may be an important factor in explaining racial dynamics in the U.S. as well, which in the current literature receives very little attention. By explicitly paying more attention to the possible regionalization of race in the U.S. we may learn new lessons about the U.S. case (i.e. by asking new questions or re-framing old ones) and thus expand our knowledge of racial dynamics in general.

In addition to the implication drawn from this study that region (i.e. the spatial dimension) is also a potentially fruitful vector of significance when studying racial dynamics there are also previous studies which highlight that Brazilian racial categories do not exhibit high levels of *groupness* as they're believed to in the U.S.; and Brazilian racial categories have very little correlation with ancestry (Harris 1970; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). "In fact, as regards the racial classification of black Americans, the U.S. is quite unique: "Due to the peculiar circumstances of their colonization, Americans in the United States are alone in defining "race" solely on the basis of descent, and this, only in the case of African Americans: one is "black" in Chicago, Los Angeles, or Atlanta, not by the color of one's skin but for having one more ancestors identified as black… The United States is the only modern society to apply the 'one-drop rule' conjointly with the principle of hypodescent, according to which the offspring of a mixed union find themselves automatically assigned to the group deemed inferior – here the erstwhile named 'Negroes'" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998: 183).

Understanding the relationship between ancestry, skin color, and racial classification in the U.S. and Brazil is critically important because of how it may force us to re-frame dominant definitions of race and ethnicity. Many scholars maintain that "race" and "ethnicity" are two different (perhaps at times overlapping) domains, where race implies phenotype and ethnicity implies cultural difference (Omi and Winant 1994; Cornell and Hartmann 1998). This understanding of "race and ethnicity", however, is in fact the folk understanding of race and ethnicity as it exists in the U.S., where "race" is associated with African Americans, and "ethnicity" is associated with various immigrant populations (Wimmer 2008). Quizzically, however, this folk (and academic) understanding of "race and ethnicity" fails to account for the canonical, U.S. case of "race" – African-Americans, who are racially defined by their ancestry (via the "one-drop rule"), *not by their phenotype* (Davis 1991).

Moving from the U.S. case to other cases, this distinction between "race and ethnicity" also falls apart[74]. For example, there is the case of the Japanese *burakumin* who are both physically and linguistically indistinguishable from other Japanese. Despite this lack of physical and linguistic

[74] See Wacquant 1997, Wade 1997, and Wimmer 2008 for further discussion.

difference, the burakumin have been segregated, discriminated against in matters of employment and marriage, and even referred to as, "the lowliest of people, resembling animals," by the Japanese government (Yoshino and Murakoshi 1977: 63). In the Edo Period (1603-1867), for example, government sanctioned discrimination and segregation created territorially stigmatized burakumin settlements, known as dōwa chiku (Hane 1982). The folk (and at times academic) conceptualization of race *and* ethnicity simply cannot account for this case[75].

Consequently, some scholars have moved towards a more universal, analytic conceptualization of "race" designed to account for such differences in the various strains of race and ethnicity throughout time and space (Wacquant 1997; Loveman 1999; Brubaker 2009). At the very least, the global comParátive study of "race" suggests that we should view "race" as an invidious social distinction (Berreman 1972), a "well-founded fiction[76]" (Bourdieu [1994]1998: 66-67), as but one species of social classification among many others, such as class, age, gender, etc. (DaCosta 2007: 212).

In this view, the matter of what "race" (or for that matter, "ethnicity") *is*, is of little importance. What's of critical importance is both describing and explaining the specific historical development, contemporary reproduction (as well as transformation), and the material and symbolic consequences of the various strains of "race and ethnicity" that exist throughout space and time. Viewed this way, analysts of "race and ethnicity" are behooved to pay close attention to the historical vicissitudes of the socioeconomic and political processes of boundary maintenance and construction, social closure (the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion), and the specific manifestations of the various forms of ethnoracial domination: categorization, segregation, discrimination, ghettoization and violence (Wacquant 1997; Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2008).

Thus, to sum up the theoretical lessons learned here about Brazil not only contribute to our understanding of racial dynamics in Brazil on their own terms by specifying the nature and magnitude of regional variation insofar as racial classification, categorization, and attitudes throughout Brazil, but also add to the growing list of ways in which the Brazilian case adds certain wrinkles and complications (e.g. variation in racial category *groupness*, fluidity and ambiguity of classification at

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[75] The same issue arises when one attempts to describe racism as being rooted in physical difference. Miles (2003: 6), for example, writes, "If racism has been conceived in terms of the physical distinctiveness of its victims, academic and political developments throughout the 1990s have shown the poverty of this conceptualisation. It is impossible to describe how Bosnian Muslims are physically distinguishable from Bosnian Serbs, or Rwandan Hutus from Tutsis".

[76] Thus, like "family", "race" is "[O]nly a word, a category, a collective principle of construction of collective reality…In other words, it is a common principle of vision and division, a *nomos*, that we all have in our heads because it has been inculcated in us through a process of socialization performed in a world that was itself organized according to the division into [races]. This principle of construction is one of the constituent elements of our habitus, a mental structure, which having being inculcated into all minds socialized in a particular way [in a given society], is both individual and collective... [Race] is a principle of construction that is both immanent in individuals and transcendent to them, since they encounter it in the form of objectivity in other individuals… Thus '[race]' is an objective social category, a mental category, which is the matrix of countless representations and actions which help to reproduce the objective social category'… The near-perfect match that is then set up between the subjective and objective categories provides the foundation for an experience of the world as self-evident, taken for granted. And nothing seems more natural than [race]; this arbitrary social construct seems to belong on the side of nature, the natural and the universal" (Bourdieu [1994] 1998: 66-67). For evidence of this point of view, see Omi and Winant (1994: 5).

the census-level and in everyday life, and the relatively loose relationship between racial classification and ancestry) to an understanding of race solely based on findings from the United States.

Methodologically, the findings of this study suggest the continuing need for the better integration of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Without the rich, detailed data generated by qualitative methods in Brazil (Frazier 1942; Pierson 1942; Burdick 1998a; Twine 1998; Sheriff 2001; Sansone 2003; Baran 2007), understanding regional variation in how race operates and is understood throughout Brazil would be nearly impossible. Scrutinizing taken for granted categories of analysis (and discovering new ones) is precisely one of the great strengths of ethnography (Small 2009). On the other hand, short of nationally-representative studies it would be nearly impossible to specify the nature and magnitude of regional variation in racial classification, categorization, and attitudes throughout Brazil. Ultimately, by better integrating our knowledge of both qualitative and quantitative studies, we can improve our knowledge of racial dynamics in Brazil on their own terms, which is not only a local gain, but also a potential gain for the study of race in the U.S. and beyond.

Chapter Five

The Consequences of "Race" and "Color" in Brazil

For decades, research has reported that skin tone is strongly associated with individuals' life chances (e.g. educational attainment, income, marital status, occupational status, etc.). Studies show that skin tone inequality occurs among black Americans (see Chapter 2) and Latinos in the United States (Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991; Hamilton et al. 2009; Telles and Murguia 1990; Murguia and Telles 1996), Filipinos and Filipino Americans (Rondilla and Spickard 2007; Rondilla 2009), Mexicans (Villarreal 2010), and notably, throughout Latin America (Wade 1993; Golash-Boza 2010). In the main, such studies have been relatively marginalized compared to the dominant "race relations" paradigm which stays at the level of comparisons between ethnoracial "groups," – usually of blacks and whites (see Chapter 1).

In accordance with the structural opposition typically drawn between the U.S. as descent-based system of ethnoracial division and Latin America as a phenotypically-based system of ethnoracial division, when researchers consider "the significance of skin color" they almost without fail think of Latin America. Within Latin America, the canonical case of a "pigmentocracy" is typically held to be Brazil. In Brazil, educational attainment, income, occupational status, and residential segregation are all strongly associated with individuals' skin tones (Telles 2004; Lovell and Wood 1998). This research primarily focuses on the country's black-white continuum which scholars typically operationalize using the three major census categories: black (*preto*), white (*branco*), and brown (*pardo*), which 99% of the Brazilian population self-identifies as belonging to.

These categories are typically referred to as "race-color" categories which are thought to capture a skin color continuum that ranges from individuals with very fair skin to individuals with very dark skin color (Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). Thus, in contrast to the United States, where ethnoracial classification is strongly linked to ancestry (but strictly, only in the case of black Americans), in Brazil, *physical appearance* (primarily skin tone, but also hair, and facial features) is widely held to determine which "race-color" category individuals self-classify into and are classified by others as belonging to. Despite the putative centrality of physical appearance in Brazil, however, in reality "race-color" categories do not *only* represent phenotypical differences in skin color within the Brazilian population – a fact I explain in further detail below. Consequently, while much of the literature claims to focus on "the significance of skin color" in Brazil, this is only partially correct – the categories used in most analyses represent far more than skin color alone and are significantly affected by a variety of non-phenotypical factors.

Ethnoracial classification in Brazil is affected by individuals' socioeconomic status, gender, age, and region of residence (Silva 1994; Telles and Lim 1998, Telles 2004; Schwartzman 2007). In other words, while one may make use of census categories to study inequality, the reality in Brazil is that individuals with lower socioeconomic status may "darken" themselves and individuals with higher socioeconomic status may "whiten" themselves – the census-level, "race-color" categories always already *include* some degree of socioeconomic status (Carvalho et al. 2004: 333). In other words, individual's self-classification into "race" categories may *already* take into account

individuals' sense of their own socioeconomic position relative to others[77]. Moreover, even ethnoracial classification by others is often affected by the same aforementioned characteristics, the "race," socioeconomic status, gender, and region of classifiers all affect how *they* classify others (Harris 1970; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004). Such a dynamic leads to inconsistency between self- and other classification in Brazil (Telles and Lim 1998). For example, one researcher finds that while 77% of self-classified whites were also classified as white by others, only 60% of self-classified browns and 56% of self-classified blacks were also classified as such by interviewers (Bailey 2009: 50).

Furthermore, with widespread regional variation in ethnoracial classification, utilizing Brazilian census categories without disaggregating by region introduces yet *another* degree of noise in Brazilian census data – depending on where an individual resides, the probability that they will be classified as "white," "black," or "brown" may change significantly (Guimarães 1999; Pinho 2009). In Chapter 4, I provide the first quantitative assessment of the magnitude of regional variation in ethnoracial classification in Brazil. I find quite substantial differences in the probability that the same individual will be classified as "black," "white," or "brown" in Brazil, even after controlling for the age, sex, educational attainment, income, and "race" of the classifier, in addition to regional variation in ethnoracial demographics.

Consider that a major concern in the literature on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil is the well-known ambiguity and fluidity of Brazilian "race-color" categories (Telles 2002), as well as the multiple, overlapping systems of "race-color" classifications that Brazilians utilize. For example, there are at least three well-known ethnoracial classification systems: (1) the official census format which was developed by the IBGE (Brazilian census bureau) which includes the following categories: *branco* (white), *pardo* (brown), *preto* (black), *amarelo* (yellow) (Asians), and *indigena* (native), (2) the so-called "Black Movement" format which has only two categories: black (*negro*) and white, and (3) the system(s) of daily practice with an abundance of "color" categories such as: *Moreno claro*, *tostada* (toasted), *corada* (ruddy), *castanha-clara* (clear, cashewlike), etc. (Harris 1970; Bailey 2009: 61). Classifications do not neatly match one another across these levels. One may, for example, self-classify as *pardo* in the Census, but be considered *moreno claro* by friends and family.

Given all of this, at best, Brazilian census categories only provide a *rough approximation* of the vast phenotypic variation and *experiences* represented by Brazilian population (Carvalho et al. 2004) (i.e. "the subtle gradations of color socially recognized in Brazilian culture," as Lovell and Wood (1998) put it). Consequently, a surprising aspect of our current literature on inequality in Brazil is that, ironically, despite being widely held as *the* canonical case of a skin color continuum – researchers *have not been studying the significance of skin color*, but instead the significance of *self-classification* (and sometimes ascription by others) into ethnoracial categories, of which skin color is just *one* of many other elements[78] (Guimarães 2012: 3). Thus, we are confronted with a surprising

[77] In recent literature on ethnoracial self-classification in the U.S., researchers have suggested that the persistence of the "one-drop rule," may be explained, in large part, by how individual's internalize how outsiders treat them and ascribe them into ethnoracial categories, this mechanism is referred to as a "reflected appraisal" (Khanna 2010). I discuss this concept in the context of the present study in further detail later on in this article.

[78] Guimarães (2012: 3) reports that skin color, other physical traits, ancestry, culture, and socioeconomic status are all aspects of self-classification in Brazil (listed in order of importance), according to data from the IBGE (2008). To overcome this surprising limitation of existing data, Bailey et al. (2013) utilize photo comparisons to

and considerable lacuna in our understanding of inequality in Brazil – a lack of data on skin color specifically. As Telles (2012: 1166) rightly points out, "racial identity [self-classification] measures also pick up, besides color and phenotype, social effects that might influence one's identity, including class, gender, age, region, and social desirability. As a result, they might not adequately capture ethnoracial discrimination, which depends on the evaluation of race by others." All of this emphasizes the critical importance of utilizing *skin color* data to study ethnoracial inequality in Brazil – skin color data, ostensibly, would be far less "corrupted" by the "social effects" that Telles, myself, and others have discussed.

Alas, the study of ethnoracial inequality in Brazil has proceeded without the use of skin color data specifically – instead, research has relied upon "race-color" census categories, which as I have explained, do not neatly map onto the considerable variation in skin color that so much of our literature claims is the key to understanding ethnoracial classification and inequality in Brazil. Addressing this surprising gap in the literature, in this article, I utilize the first nationally representative survey to include interviewer- rated skin color data in Brazil, the Latin American Public Opinion Project – Brazil (2010), to address this surprising limitation of our current literature. Moreover, I also utilize these data to engage with recent debates in the literature on ethnoracial inequality and classification in Brazil. Specifically, I extend work that compares how self vs. other ethnoracial classification in Brazil yields different estimates of ethnoracial inequality (Telles and Lim 1998; Bailey et al. 2013), by adopting a "multidimensional" approach to analyze whether self-classification into particular census categories (the most commonly used measure of "race" in research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil) vs. interviewer-rated skin tone data is a stronger predictor of inequality in Brazilian society and how the appropriateness of certain data may depend on the context in question. That is, the analyses here shed light on recent debates regarding whether or not "race" and "color"[79] should be considered as *analytically* distinct concepts (Banton 2012; Guimarães 2012; Telles 2012), by testing whether "race" and "color" (i.e. skin color) are *empirically* distinct.

Currently, the terms "race" and "color" are used interchangeably in everyday life, by the Brazilian government, as well as in social science – but given that self-classifications of "race" include much more than gradations of skin color (or other ethnoracially-coded phenotypical traits), it may be more appropriate to consider "race" and "color" as analytically distinct concepts. By putting both self-classified "race" and interviewer-rated skin color into the same models to see which (if any) variable remains a significant predictor of the various outcomes of interest in this study, I test whether it may be the case that even though "race" and "color" may overlap to some degree, there may not be *enough* overlap between these categories to treat them as rough equivalents of the same categorical system.

Such an analysis takes up the charge of recent work on the "multiple dimensions" of "race"

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try to tap into the significance of phenotype, and while this is an improvement over standard census categories, it is still not skin color data as has been utilized in recent work on skin tone stratification in Mexico which examined interviewer-rated skin tone data (Villarreal 2010) or work on skin tone stratification in the United States which also utilizes interviewer-rated skin tone data (Hughes and Hertel 1990; Keith and Herring 1991, but also, see Chapters 2 and 3).

[79] I refer to "race" as self- and other-classification into Census categories, and "color" as *skin* color to avoid confusion considering the widespread tendency to use the word "color" to also mean "race" in the sense of self and other-classification into Census categories which takes into account a variety of factors, of which, *skin* color is just one of many elements (Guimarães 2012).

(see Telles and Lim 1998; Campbell and Troyer 2007; Bailey et al. 2013; Saperstein 2009, 2012). In this study I not only test whether skin color is a better predictor of various stratification outcomes than "race," but to be more specific, I examine whether *interviewer-rated* skin color is a better predictor of these outcomes than *self-classified* "race." Unfortunately, these dimensions are often conflated, with the terms "race" and "color" being used interchangeably in both our literature on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil and the U.S. Getting this right is of particular importance because as I have explained, researchers almost exclusively rely upon using census categories which are based on self-classification, but this obscures how these categories may be less appropriate to model inequality in Brazil than measures based on interviewer-ratings, especially of skin color specifically.

This study is critically important, not only in its novelty as the first analysis in our literature to precisely quantify the significance of skin color *specifically* in Brazil, after so many decades of studying "the significance of skin color" whilst actually utiziling "race-color" census categories (which as I have just explained are determined by a multitude of factors of which skin color is just one component), but also for *comparison* to other countries, both within Latin America and North America as well, where studies report considerable skin color-based inequality utilizing skin color data (e.g. the case of Black Americans, Latinos, and myriad immigrant populations in the United States, see Hughes and Hertel 1990, Keith and Herring 1991; Murguia and Telles 1996; Glenn 2009, but also, see Chapters 2 and 3)

Ultimately, the findings of this study reveal that skin tone is a better predictor of respondent's educational attainment and respondent's occupational status, even after controlling for various important sociodemographic factors *and* respondent's self-classified "race" (i.e. census category membership). On the other hand, I find that while skin color is a significant predictor of respondent's household income, self-classified "race" appears to be a *better* predictor of respondent's household income than skin color, which I explain as an example of the processes of "whitening" and "darkening" in ethnoracial classification in Brazil (Telles 2004; Schwartzman 2007). These findings, highlight the importance of using multiple measures of "race" to more comprehensively understand ethnoracial inequality, but importantly, these results also demonstrate that while the terms "race" and "color" may be used interchangeably, by the Brazilian government and in everyday life by Brazilians, *as well as by scholars*, it is more appropriate to consider "race" and "color" as *analytically distinct, yet overlapping* concepts considering that they are *empirically* distinct.

RECENT DEBATES AND ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ETHNORACIAL INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL AND BEYOND

As I explain in the Introduction and Chapter 1, scholarship on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil in the past few decades has moved beyond the relatively small-scale ethnographic studies that were common in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s towards large-scale, nationally-representative data sets made available by the IBGE (the Brazilian Census Bureau) (Piza and Rosemberg 1996; Telles 2004). These studies, the most notable of which were those conducted by Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva, utilized newly generated, nationally-representative data collected in the 1970s to put to rest the long-standing notion that class was a stronger determinant of life chances than "race" or color" in Brazil (Hasenbalg 1985; Silva 1985). This work was incredibly important in moving forward the study of ethnoracial inequality in Brazil by demonstrating that "race" mattered in a climate where such thinking was often met with skepticism and denial. Another key aspect of this work, however, was a direct confrontation of the lauded ethnoracial ambiguity and fluidity in

Brazilian society. Against the notion that ethnoracial ambiguity and fluidity was a key feature of ethnoracial division in Brazil, Silva and Hasenbalg made use of statistical analyses that lumped the census categories black and brown into a single, *negro* category (Silva 1985; Hasenbalg 1985). In so doing, they promoted a view of Brazil that was, in reality, much more like the United States – a white vs. nonwhite dichotomy.

In their view, the theory that individuals belonging to the intermediate ethnoracial category brown (often referred to as *mulatos*) enjoyed advantages compared to blacks – the well-known Mulatto Escape Hatch theory of Degler (1971) – covered over the "reality" that the principal ethnoracial fissure in Brazilian society was between whites and nonwhites (i.e. both blacks and browns). While debate over the legitimacy of lumping blacks and browns into a single category continues to rage on in the literature (Nobles 2000; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009; Loveman et al. 2012), what *is* clear is that such analyses obscure the well-documented *gradational* nature of inequality and discrimination in Brazil which, as previous studies have demonstrated, is inextricably linked to nuances in physical appearance (e.g. skin shade, hair type, and facial features) (Harris 1970; Burdick 1998; Sansone 2003). As Lovell and Wood (1998: 92) put it, "Silva's findings [which support lumping together blacks and browns as *negros*] are not encouraging for those who wish to focus on the *subtle gradations of color that are socially recognized in Brazilian culture*. [emphasis mine]" Such analyses then, are not examining the significance of color *per se*, but rather, by utilizing a binary scheme of ethnoracial classification in their analyses of inequality they are, in fact, examining the significance of a black-white, U.S.-style dichotomy where such nuances of "color" are lost.

In addition to this tension in the literature is a lack of clarity about whether "race" and "color" are equivalent or analytically distinct concepts. The terms "race" and "color" (*cor* in Portuguese) are used interchangeably on the Brazilian census and in everyday life by Brazilians, as well as in social science. Telles (2004) contends, for example, "Brazilians often prefer the notion of color rather than race because it captures fluidity. Nevertheless, the Brazilian notion of color [*cor*] is equivalent to race because it is associated with a racial ideology that ranks persons of different colors [phenotypes]" (Telles 2004: 218). This avoids the question of whether these concepts should be used interchangeably by *scholars*[80]. Banton (2012: 1115), for example, argues emphatically that these concepts should *not* be used interchangeably by scholars and calls for a separation of folk and analytic concepts. Banton (2012) even goes as far as to argue that that the subtitle of Telles's well-known *Race in Another America,* "An Examination of the Significance of Skin Color in Brazil," is a misnomer, because Telles did not, in fact, examining the significance of skin color.

Determining whether or not "race" and "color" are empirically and analytically distinct is important not only to help us better understand the Brazilian case on its own terms (i.e. as possibly distinct from other cases of ethnoracial division), but also because recent work on ethnoracial classification and inequality in both the U.S. and Brazil emphasizes how using multiple measures of "race" (most notably self vs. other classification) may lead to *different* accounts of the extent of inequality in a country and perhaps suggest a variety of mechanisms which may help explain said inequality (Campbell and Troyer 2007; Campbell 2009; Roth 2010; Saperstein 2012; Bailey et al. 2013).

Specifically, this work emphasizes how self-classification as opposed to outsider's perceptions

[80] For more on the pitfalls of uncritically using folk concepts as analytic concepts see Wacquant (1997), Loveman (1999), and Brubaker (2012).

of individual's "race and/or color" may yield inequality by different mechanisms and may even cause stress to individuals who are "misclassified." Campbell and Troyer (2007: 760), for example, hypothesize that American Indians who are misclassified as being another "race" feel stress due to being misclassified and consequently suffer psychological consequences. Their findings support their general hypothesis, as the results reveal that misclassified American Indians are more likely to report considering suicide and attempting suicide. Moreover, misclassified American Indians are also more likely to be involved in ethnic solidarity organizations, which suggests the importance of maintaining their ethnoracial identity. While others have pointed out that the misclassification found by Campbell and Troyer (2007) may not necessarily be solely related to misclassification by observers, the fact remains that considering the differential consequences of multiple measures of "race," is a potentially fruitful avenue of research, especially, inconsistencies between how individuals self-identify over time and how observers ascribe individuals' "race" (Roth 2010: 1294).

Saperstein (2012), for example, examines whether self-classification vs. classification by others into ethnoracial categories has consequences for ethnoracial inequality. She reports (2012: 1497-1498) that in the United States "women who are seen as white but identify as black report [health treatment] that is similar to other women who are seen as white, while women who are seen as black but identify as white report [receive health treatment] more similar to other women who are seen as black. However, the same pattern does not hold for family income. [W]omen who are seen as white but identify as black fall on the 'white' side in terms of health treatment, but the 'black' side in terms of family income."

Taken together, these studies demonstrate the value of examining the consequences of viewing "race" as a "multidimensional social construct," which depending on the dimension analyzed may lead to or reveal different aspects of ethnoracial inequality. One study demonstrates how inconsistency in ethnoracial classification can actually influence psychological health and shape ethnopolitical attitudes (Campbell and Troyer 2007), while the other study demonstrates how outsider's appraisal of an individual's "race" may be more important than individuals' self-classification as regards healthcare treatment (a domain of direct interpersonal interaction and potentially discrimination) (Saperstein 2012).

In the main, these studies of the United States are similar to research done on the case of Brazil which also focuses on classificatory inconsistency and its consequences for conceptualizing and measuring ethnoracial inequality. A long-standing concern in the literature on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil regards the ambiguity and fluidity of ethnoracial classification in the country (Telles 2002). Consequently, individual's self-classification into ethnoracial categories may diverge from that of an outsider's ascription of individuals into ethnoracial categories. This research compares inequality using self-classification and outsider ascription measures and generally finds that interviewer-classification into ethnoracial categories reveals more inequality than using self-classification measures of "race" (Telles and Lim 1998; Bailey et al. 2013). Moreover, this research also demonstrates that using different measures of "race" (i.e. self vs. other classification) dramatically affects the ethnoracial composition of Brazil (Bailey et al. 2013). Importantly, this work shows that instead of viewing classificatory inconsistency as an error, it is important to consider how discrepancies between self- and other-classification can yield "analytic leverage" to examine how multiple measures of "race" can deepen our understanding of ethnoracial inequality by pointing "researchers toward one set of mechanisms and away from others" (Bailey et al. 2013: 12).

As opposed to only *comparing the extent of inequality* given a particular measure or dimension of "race," I extend these related lines of research, by using *multiple* measures of "race" in the *same*

model (see Telles and Lim 1998, Campbell 2009, and Saperstein 2012), to examine whether self-classification into an ethnoracial category (the type of data used by virtually all recent research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil) vs. interviewer-rated skin tone gives *different* information about inequality in Brazil. I do so in order to determine which measure (if any) has a direct effect on the outcome in question even after controlling for the other measure of "race" (Telles and Lim 1998; Campbell 2009; Saperstein 2012). To be clear, this builds upon previous work which compares the *amount* of inequality in a given outcome using different measures of "race" in Brazil (see Telles and Lim 1998; Bailey et al. 2013) by examining *which dimension of "race" is strongly associated with a particular outcome, even after controlling for the other dimension of "race*." After all, while one measure of "race" may reveal *more* (or less) inequality than another, it may not be the case that *either* measure of "race" is empirically *distinct* from the other (i.e. remains significant, even after controlling for the other).

Likewise, such an analytic design is particularly well-suited to testing whether "race" and "color" are analytically distinct by testing if these measures are *empirically* distinct; and, given the lack of data on skin tone, specifically, in Brazil, this study analyzes, for the first time, whether skin tone matters *above and beyond* self-classification into census "race-color" categories for the examination of inequality in the country. Consider, for example, in the case of household income and healthcare treatment in the United States, Saperstein (2012: 1497) uses multiple measures of "race" in the same models and concludes that "the two measures of race [race and physical appearance (or color)] should *not only be treated as conceptually or theoretically distinct, but as empirically distinct as well* (emphasis mine). Each measure captures different information about a person's life experiences that is (differently) useful in understanding the creation and maintenance of ethnoracial disparities." In this study, if the "race" and "color" variables I utilize in my analyses only cancel one another out then there is indeed solid support for treating them as roughly equivalent, even if one measure reveals more or less inequality than the other measure – if I do not find this, however, and one measure is significant even after taking the other into account, then this would suggest that it is more appropriate to view "race" and "color" as *analytically* distinct, yet perhaps *overlapping* concepts.

DATA AND METHODS

For the analyses that follow, I utilize the Brazilian survey of the 2010 America's Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2010). The survey is nationally representative and has a sample size of 2,482. The LAPOP survey is well-suited to the kind of analyses I focus on here due to the ethnicity module, designed by the Project on Ethnicity and "race" in Latin America (PERLA) at Princeton University, which includes an interviewer-rated skin color variable. This skin color variable is based on interviewer's rating interviewee's skin tones (facial skin tone) according to a palette of 11 skin tones ranging from very light (1) to very dark[81] (11) (see Figure 1).

In addition to the skin color scale variable, I also utilize a variety of "ethnoracial" categories. In some models I utilize the "race-color" categories *branco* (white) and *pardo* (brown) in

[81] For comparability to previous studies done on skin color stratification in Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere I divide the continuum into 5 categories, ranging from very light (1) to very dark (5) and use this variable as the *skin color scale*. In separate analyses, I also used the skin color scale without dividing the continuum into 5 categories (i.e. a continuous 11-point scale), this yielded no appreciable differences in the results (results not shown).

comparison to *preto* (black), these are the standard census categories used by most researchers of ethnoracial inequality in Brazil, social movement activists, and the Brazilian government. I also utilize a variable that combines the census categories black and brown into a single category – *negro* (in accordance with the paradigm adopted by activists and the Brazilian government, see Bailey 2009 and Loveman et al. 2012). Using these "race" variables and the skin color scale variable together in the same models allows me to quantitatively test whether or not "race" and "color" are *empirically* and thus, *analytically* distinct.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

I also make use of data on respondents' social background and demographic characteristics, either as controls or dependent variables (depending on the analysis). These variables include: individuals' educational attainment (*Education*, in years 0-X_{max}), marital status (*Married,* 1 = Married and 0 = Single or divorced*),* the head of household's occupational status when the respondent was a child (*Parent's occupational status,* a scale of 1-15, where 1= Professional, e.g. lawyer, doctor, etc. and 15 = Laborer, e.g. farm worker), whether or not the respondent is employed (*Employed*, 1 = Employed and 0 = Unemployed), respondent's occupational status (also on a scale of 1-15, where 1= Professional and 15 = Laborer), whether the respondent lives in a rural area (*Rural,* 1 = rural and 0 = urban), and whether the respondent lives in the developmentally advanced and ethnoracially "whiter" South region of Brazil (*South*, 1 = South and 0 = Non-south region) (For descriptive statistics of these variables, see Table 1).

Such variables have been used by many other studies of ethnoracial inequality in the U.S., Brazil, and beyond (see Keith and Herring 1991; Villarreal 2010; Loveman et al. 2011; Bailey et al. 2013). Importantly, the analyses that follow are the results of OLS, logistic, and ordered logistic regression models of the significance of both self-classified "race" and interviewer-rated skin color in Brazil. The use of such techniques is standard in the current research on ethnoracial inequality in the U.S., but surprisingly, as Bailey et al. (2013) point out many researchers of ethnoracial inequality in Brazil tend to rely solely upon bivariate analyses and descriptive statistics, which stops short of examining whether membership in census categories are strongly associated with various stratification outcomes *after controlling* for individual's sociodemographic characteristics. Please note that I present the results of weighted regression analyses which take into account the complex design of this survey (e.g. clustering and stratification).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Analysis

Variable	Mean (Std. Dev)	Min.-Max.	N
Age	39.08 (15.78)	18-89	2310
Sex (Female)	0.52 (0.49)	0-1	2319
Years of Education	8.14 (3.93)	0-17	2274
Parent's Occupational Status	8.83 (4.08)	1-15	1931
Employed	0.53 (0.49)	0-1	2314
Married	0.63 (0.48)	0-1	2311
Region (South)	0.17 (0.37)	0-1	2319
Rural	0.14 (0.35)	0-1	2319
Skin Color Scale (1 = Very Light Skin to 5 = Very Dark Skin)	2.76 (1.02)	1-5	2319

FINDINGS

EDUCATION

Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression models of the educational attainment of Brazilians by their "race" and skin color. The results presented in model 1 indicate a strong association between individual's self-classified "race" (white) and their educational attainment even after controlling for their parent's occupational status and other demographic factors. These results indicate that self-classified whites have higher odds of having more education than self-classified blacks or browns, even after controlling for their parent's occupational status and other sociodemographic factors.

The results of model 3, however, demonstrate that the relationship between self-classified "race" and educational attainment disappears once individual's interviewer-rated skin color is taken into account. That is, above and beyond an individual's self-classification into one of the three Brazilian census categories, skin color is strongly associated with educational attainment, net of respondent's parent's occupational status and other sociodemographic controls. Specifically, I find that, even after controlling for self-classified "race," for each 1 point increase in the lightness of

respondent's skin tone (as judged by interviewers), they have over 7 months *more* education. Over a 5-point scale, this is a gap of nearly **3 full years** of education between the lightest and darkest-skinned respondents. In model 5, I also test whether the skin color scale remains significantly associated with educational attainment even after including the *negro* variable (census categories black and brown lumped together) in the model (the use of such a variable is becoming increasingly common in research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil). While model 4 indicates a significant association between educational attainment and the *negro* category ($p \leq .000$), model 5 demonstrates that this association disappears once individuals' skin tones are taken into account. Once again, skin color is strongly associated with educational attainment above and beyond self- classification into a particular ethnoracial census category ($p \leq .000$) – even when the black and brown categories are combined.

In the main, these results suggest that interviewer-rated skin color is a better predictor of educational attainment in Brazil than self-classified "race." Importantly, as the models presented here control for parent's occupational status, the findings here suggest that educational inequality due to color discrimination is *contemporary* – it is not simply disadvantage passed down from a previous generation. Given the critical importance of education as a factor in employment status, occupational status, and earnings, these findings serve as clear evidence of the cost of color in Brazil.

Why is interviewer-rated skin color a better predictor of educational attainment than self-classified "race"? Outsiders' perceptions, as opposed to individuals' self-classification, may more closely align with discrimination individuals' face in everyday life (Telles and Lim 1998; Roth 2010; Saperstein 2012; Bailey et al. 2013), as Telles (2012: 1166) points out, "racial identity [self-classification into census categories] measures also pick up, besides color and phenotype, social effects that might influence one's identity, including class, gender, age, region, and social desirability. As a result, they might not adequately capture ethnoracial discrimination, which depends on the evaluation of race by others." Such "social effects" are well-documented in the Brazilian case, in particular, in keeping with the adage "money whitens," where individuals' self-classifications also rely on their own perception of their social standing in society at-large (i.e. socioeconomic status) (Twine 1998; Sansone 2003; Schwartzman 2007).

The findings of this study highlight the value of using skin color data, as opposed to just census-level, "race-color" categories. Importantly, this study extends previous work which either utilizes a single measure of "race" or compares the degree of inequality across multiple measures of "race." For example, models 1 and 2 show that if either measure was used on its own we could soundly conclude that skin color *or* self-classified "race" is strongly associated with educational attainment in Brazil. Moreover, if we were to only compare the degree of inequality given our measures of "race" in this study, we would find that *both* self-classified "race" and interviewer-rated skin color reveal nearly the same degree of inequality which *may* imply that they are roughly interchangeable (see models 1 and 2). Putting these measures in the same model, however, reveals that even though both measures are significantly associated with educational attainment, the effect of self-classified "race" on educational attainment disappears once interviewer-rated skin color is taken into account (see models 3 and 5). This suggests not only that these two measures are *empirically* distinct, but also that interviewer-rated skin color is a more appropriate measure in this context than self-classified "race."[82]

[82] It is important to keep in mind that I am not testing the significance of self-reported skin color vs. self-classification into census categories or interviewer ascription of individuals into "race" categories (i.e. census

EMPLOYMENT

Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression analyses of the relationship between self-classified "race," interviewer-rated skin tone, and whether or not one is employed. Models 1 and 2 suggest that both self-classified "race" and interviewer-rated skin tones are not significantly associated (at least at the p. ≤ .05 level) with employment status in Brazil[83]. This is not to say, however, that there is no color or ethnoracial inequality in the Brazilian labor market. Arcand and D'Hombres (2004) find that there is indeed ethnoracial inequality in the Brazilian labor market, but attribute the large share of it to unequal *educational* opportunities (for more on the centrality of education in ethnoracial inequality in Brazil, see Loveman et al. 2011). Accordingly, the findings of this study, where educational attainment is significant in each and every model, may pick up on this educational difference. Given that the findings presented in Table 2 strongly suggest that skin color is highly associated with educational attainment, even after controlling for social background and demographic characteristics, it may be the case that the relationship between employment status and skin color is indirect; that is, the relationship between employment status and skin color may be mediated by education.

Figure 1. LAPOP/PERLA Skin Color Palette

categories) vs. interviewer-rated skin color. Self-reported skin color data and interviewer-rated "race" data (i.e. census classification by outsiders) were not included in the LAPOP 2010 data set. Consequently, it may be the case that interviewer ascription into census categories may be a better predictor of the outcomes in question here than even interviewer-rated skin color data. Moreover, it may be the case that self-reported skin color data may be a significant predictor of the various outcomes under examination in this study. It is important to remember, however, that the vast majority of research on ethnoracial inequality relies upon self-classified "race" data (i.e. census data) and most research on skin color uses interviewer-rated skin color as opposed to self-reported skin color (Keith and Herring 1991; Hughes and Hertel 1990; Villarreal 2010). Thus, this study is important because it compares the significance of the most commonly used measure of "race" (self-classification) vs. the most commonly used and accepted measure of skin color data (i.e. interviewer-ratings of individual's skin color).

[83] I also tested a model where interviewer-rated skin color is used without self-classified race (with the same controls), but interviewer-rated skin color was not significant in this model either (results not shown).

Table 2. Ordered Logistic Regression. Education by Race and Color

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	-0.0517***	-0.0522***	-0.0523***	-0.0517***	-0.0522***
	(0.00595)	(0.00608)	(0.00604)	(0.00595)	(0.00603)
Female	-0.103	-0.144	-0.140	-0.104	-0.136
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.107)
Parent's Occupational Status	-0.0895***	-0.0866***	-0.0854***	-0.0896***	-0.0858***
	(0.0114)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.0113)	(0.0111)
Rural	-1.243***	-1.304***	-1.254***	-1.235***	-1.261***
	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.171)	(0.161)	(0.170)
South	-0.0524	0.0327	-0.0284	-0.0591	-0.0232
	(0.167)	(0.158)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.170)
White (*Branco*)	0.591**		-0.0794		
	(0.171)		(0.242)		
Brown (*Pardo*)	0.153		-0.201		
	(0.137)		(0.181)		
Skin Color Scale		-0.301***	-0.302***		-0.273***
		(0.0419)	(0.0550)		(0.0382)
Negro				-0.467***	-0.121
				(0.119)	(0.123)
Constant	-6.367***	-7.534***	-7.674***	-6.956***	-7.537***
	(0.363)	(0.329)	(0.519)	(0.296)	(0.328)
Observations	1866	1895	1866	1866	1866

Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All analyses are weighted to take into account the complex design of the survey (e.g. stratification and clustering). p* < .05; p** < .01; p*** < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Table 3. Logistic Regression. Employment Status by Race and Color

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	-0.0187***	-0.0191***	-0.0189***	-0.0187***	-0.0189***
	(0.00424)	(0.00417)	(0.00420)	(0.00425)	(0.00424)
Female	-1.168***	-1.184***	-1.173***	-1.167***	-1.174***
	(0.0859)	(0.0891)	(0.0859)	(0.0858)	(0.0860)
Educational Attainment	0.0860***	0.0854***	0.0846***	0.0861***	0.0844***
	(0.0147)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
Married	0.237*	0.246**	0.239*	0.238*	0.240*
	(0.0962)	(0.0916)	(0.0951)	(0.0961)	(0.0955)
Rural	0.0108	-0.00688	0.0103	0.0166	0.0124
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.271)
South	0.111	0.0916	0.112	0.105	0.110
	(0.199)	(0.183)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.199)
White (*Branco*)	0.0176		-0.0753		
	(0.153)		(0.183)		
Brown (*Pardo*)	0.0943		0.0435		
	(0.175)		(0.189)		
Skin Color Scale		-0.0190	-0.0434		-0.0497
		(0.0418)	(0.0484)		(0.0453)
Negro				0.0589	0.118
				(0.113)	(0.125)
Constant	0.511*	0.638*	0.713*	0.528+	0.653*
	(0.236)	(0.297)	(0.295)	(0.282)	(0.305)
Observations	2217	2253	2217	2217	2217

Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All analyses are weighted to take into account the complex design of the survey (e.g. stratification and clustering). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

Next, I examine the relationship between self-classified "race," skin color, and respondent's occupational status. To be clear, occupational status is rated on a scale of 1-15 where a score of 1

refers to professionals such as lawyers and doctors and a score of 15 refers to agricultural laborers. The results of the logistic regression analysis presented in models 1 and 4 demonstrate that self-classified "race" is not significantly associated with respondent's occupational status once individual's educational attainment and other sociodemographic characteristics are taken into account. By contrast, individual's skin color is significantly associated with occupational status even after controlling for respondent's educational attainment and the same sociodemographic controls (model 2). Specifically, I find that for each 1 point increase in the darkness of respondent's skin tone, there is a 10% increase in the odds of respondent's having a lower status job, even after controlling for respondent's educational attainment and other relevant sociodemographic factors. Over a 5-point scale, this is a gap of 40% in the odds of having a lower status job between the darkest and lightest-skinned respondents. The results presented in models 3 and 5, however, show that neither self-classified "race" nor skin color are significantly associated with respondent's occupational status when they are included in the same models together.

Taken together, these results reveal that if we relied solely upon self-classified "race," which as I have pointed out above is what the vast majority of our scholarship on ethnoracial inequality do indeed rely upon, we may have concluded that there is no association between "race" and occupational status in Brazil. Furthermore, given the rampant conflation of self-classified "race" categories with color, researchers may even conclude that there is no association between *color* and occupational status in Brazil – indeed, they may conclude, it's *really* educational attainment that determines the prestige of individual's occupations in Brazil. By utilizing measures of self-classified "race" *and* skin color, however, the findings of this study show that there is a significant association between color and occupational status in Brazil, even *after* taking educational attainment into account.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Table 5 presents the results of ordered logistic regression analyses of the relationship between self-classified "race", interviewer-rated skin tone, and individuals' household income. As in the previous analyses, I test whether self-classified "race" or interviewer-rated skin tone is a better predictor of the outcome in question. Model 1 shows that self-classified "race" is strongly associated with individuals' household incomes net of their social background and demographic characteristics. Model 2, however, shows that interviewer-rated skin color is also strongly associated with individuals' household incomes, net of the same social background and demographic characteristics. I find that the odds of belonging to the next highest income bracket decrease by 10% for each 1 point increase in the darkness of respondent's skin. Over a 5-point scale, this amounts to a 40% gap in the odds of belonging to the next highest income bracket between the darkest and lightest-skinned respondents. Taken together, as was the case regarding educational attainment, if a researcher used only *one* of these measures, they may reasonably conclude that *either* measure was strongly associated with household income.

The findings of model 5, however, demonstrate that the association between skin color and household income disappears once self-classified "race" (the *negro* variable, i.e., blacks and browns together) is taken into account. Specifically, the findings presented in model 5 suggest that instead of household income being associated directly with a *continuum* of skin color, there is a stark divide between self-classified whites and nonwhites (or *negros*). I find that the odds of being in the next highest income bracket are 29% lower for *negros* compared to whites. Thus, in contrast to interviewer-rated skin color, self-classification into ethnoracial categories appears to be a better

predictor of respondents' household incomes than interviewer-rated skin tone data in accordance with the well-documented processes of "whitening" and "darkening" (a.k.a. "money whitens"). This extends the analysis of Telles and Lim (1998) who contend that their findings demonstrate that *classifiers* whiten and darker *others* based on the socioeconomic status of the classified – the findings here may suggest that individuals also whiten and darken *themselves* based on their own socioeconomic status with the consequence that ethnoracial self-classification predicts household income even after controlling for their interviewer-rated skin tone (see model 5).

Evidence of individuals re-classifying themselves has previously been found in studies which demonstrate that a large portion of "upwardly mobile" black Brazilians re-classified themselves from black to brown between 1950 and 1980[84] (Carvalho et al. 2004). The quantitative findings of this study seem to support considerable qualitative evidence of the inextricable linkage between self-classification into ethnoracial categories and evaluations of ones' economic standing in Brazil (Twine 1998; Sansone 2003). While this study alone cannot hope to resolve once and for all whether such dynamics are at work in causing these results, the preponderance of qualitative evidence of such dynamics occurring (Twine 1998; Sansone 2003), and other studies pointing to this possibility (Carvalho et al. 2004; Schwartzman 2007) strongly suggest that future research should seriously consider investigating such processes.

Moreover, the findings of this study, which seem to suggest that individuals' self-classifications into ethnoracial categories *always already* take into account their socioeconomic status, build upon a recent study which finds that *intergenerational* classification (i.e. whitening or darkening of children) operates through educational attainment (which was used as a proxy for socioeconomic status). This recent study finds that black or brown parents with relatively high educational attainment are more likely to classify their children as brown or white respectively (Schwartzman 2007). The findings of this study (and the recent study on intergenerational ethnoracial classification) point to just how critical socioeconomic status may be as a major determinant of ethnoracial classification in Brazil.

Even still, it is critically important to remember that skin color is also significantly associated with respondent's household income (model 2). Consequently, the findings of this study should not be interpreted to suggest that discrimination is not to blame for darker-skinned Brazilians having lower household incomes. Rather, given that self-evaluations of "race" seem to already take into account an assessment of individual's sense of their socioeconomic position relative to others, self-classified "race" may be an *even stronger* predictor of respondent's household income than interviewer-rated skin color. In other words, it may be the case that individuals internalize *experiences of discrimination* (due to their skin color, among other factors) and their sense of their own socioeconomic position and this influences what "race" they classify themselves as. Certainly, qualitative evidence of this occurring has been found in previous studies (Twine 1998; Sansone 2003) and there is some limited quantitative evidence of such re-classification occurring in Brazil as well (Carvalho et al. 2004; Schwartzman 2007).

Some individuals in the U.S. self-identify as black only, despite being "bi-racial" or "multi-racial," because, as they explain, they are almost always treated by other blacks, whites, and members of other ethnoracial populations as if they are black only (Brunsma 2006; Khanna 2010). Khanna (2010) argues that this dynamic may be best captured by the concept "reflected appraisal," (cf. Mead

[84] Specifically, the authors find that there were 38% less blacks and 34% more browns in Brazil between 1950 and 1980, even after controlling for a host of demographic factors (Carvalho et al. 2004).

1934[85]) where one's self-identification into an ethnoracial category involves the negotiated internalization of outsiders' treatment and ascription of individuals over time. In fact, Khanna (2010) argues that this mechanism may be a major factor explaining the persistence of the "one-drop rule," despite the growth of the multiethnoracial population.

Thus, while it is seems reasonable to maintain that interviewer-ratings of individual's skin tone may be an important measure (and possibly even more appropriate) to pick up how much discrimination individuals face in their everyday lives from outsiders (Telles 2012), self-classification into "race" categories may be significantly affected by these experiences of differential treatment and ascription into "race" categories by others and consequently, may, in some circumstances, be *even stronger* predictors of certain stratification outcomes than interviewer-rated skin color data alone (though for different reasons).

While such possibilities have been a topic of discussion in the literature on ethnoracial classification and inequality in Brazil for several years (Telles 2004; Carvalho et al. 2004; Bailey et al. 2013), and more recently, even considered to take place among multiethnoracial individuals in the United States (Brunsma 2006; Khanna 2010), the present study cannot hope to resolve, definitively, if such processes are in fact taking place. For one, it is difficult to determine, within the present study, why household incomes would be more vulnerable to such re-classifications or "reflected appraisal" effects than educational attainment. At the very least, however, this study does suggest that such processes may in fact be taking place and I offer the examination of such processes and mechanisms as a critically important topic for future research (but I will examine this via in-depth interviews in Part III).

[85] The notion of "reflected appraisals" draws from Charles H. Cooley's (1902) concept, the "looking-glass self" and was explicitly formulated by Mead (1934). For more information on "the looking-glass self" see Yeung and Martin (2003).

Table 4. Logistic Regression. Occupational Status by Race and Color

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	-0.0105^{+}	-0.0105^{+}	-0.0105^{+}	-0.0105^{+}	-0.0105^{+}
	(0.00526)	(0.00551)	(0.00533)	(0.00528)	(0.00536)
Female	0.290*	0.281*	0.296*	0.290*	0.295*
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.123)
Educational Attainment	-0.233***	-0.232***	-0.230***	-0.233***	-0.231***
	(0.0242)	(0.0237)	(0.0237)	(0.0243)	(0.0238)
Rural	0.801**	0.807***	0.808***	0.796***	0.810***
	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.224)
South	-0.0697	-0.0587	-0.0780	-0.0684	-0.0781
	(0.220)	(0.199)	(0.223)	(0.220)	(0.223)
White (*Branco*)	-0.221		-0.0538		
	(0.269)		(0.372)		
Brown (*Pardo*)	-0.0600		0.0259		
	(0.267)		(0.310)		
Skin Color Scale		0.0963*	0.0788		0.0751
		(0.0443)	(0.0735)		(0.0591)
Negro				0.172	0.0795
				(0.146)	(0.182)
Constant	-5.688***	-5.286***	-5.339***	-5.467***	-5.294***
	(0.386)	(0.359)	(0.514)	(0.372)	(0.366)
Observations	1137	1148	1137	1137	1137

Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All analyses are weighted to take into account the complex design of the survey (e.g. stratification and clustering). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 5. Ordered Logistic Regression. Household Income by Race and Color

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.0270***	0.0281***	0.0265***	0.0270***	0.0269***
	(0.00306)	(0.00281)	(0.00297)	(0.00305)	(0.00299)
Female	-0.599***	-0.620***	-0.613***	-0.598***	-0.601***
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Educational Attainment	0.240***	0.239***	0.236***	0.239***	0.238***
	(0.0165)	(0.0162)	(0.0161)	(0.0163)	(0.0157)
Married	0.322***	0.328***	0.324***	0.319***	0.320***
	(0.0623)	(0.0594)	(0.0629)	(0.0598)	(0.0598)
Employed	0.227+	0.202+	0.224+	0.224*	0.223*
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Rural	-1.010***	-1.014***	-1.010***	-1.040***	-1.042***
	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Region (South)	0.501*	0.600**	0.505*	0.521*	0.523**
	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.195)
White (*Branco*)	-0.00406		-0.236		
	(0.132)		(0.184)		
Brown (*Pardo*)	-0.468***		-0.595***		
	(0.115)		(0.134)		
Skin Color Scale		-0.110*	-0.108+		-0.0225
		(0.0485)	(0.0623)		(0.0542)
Negro				-0.373**	-0.346*
				(0.115)	(0.132)
Constant	-2.146***	-2.164***	-2.655***	-2.136***	-2.194***
	(0.374)	(0.421)	(0.445)	(0.406)	(0.427)
Observations	2115	2148	2115	2115	2115

Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. All analyses are weighted to take into account the complex design of the survey (e.g. stratification and clustering). $^{+}\ p < 0.10$, $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

DISCUSSION

In this article, I utilized the first nationally representative survey to include interviewer-rated skin tone data in Brazil (LAPOP 2010) to address a surprising limitation of our current literature – the lack of actual data on skin color specifically. As was explained above, research on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil has usually relied upon census categories which, to be sure, do include skin color as a determining element, but are in fact, influenced by a host of factors, of which skin color is only *one* element (Guimarães 2012). Moreover, these categories are noted to be noisy, fluid, and ambiguous as individuals' self-classifications, as well as classifications made by others are strongly affected by socioeconomic status, gender, age, and region (Carvalho et al. 2004; Telles 2004). In this study, I found that skin tone, specifically, is strongly associated with educational attainment and household income, as well as occupational status.

Importantly, however, I also found that self-classified "race" is also strongly associated with educational attainment and household income, net of the same controls. Thus, the results of this study showed that if we utilized only one of these measures of "race," we may have soundly concluded that self-classified "race" or interviewer-rated skin tone was strongly associated with individuals' educational attainment and household income. Given the rampant conflation of "race" and "color," we may have also concluded that "race" (and thus "color") is not a significant predictor of Brazilians' occupational status once one controls for education and other important sociodemographic factors. This further emphasizes the importance of using multiple measures of "race" to more comprehensively understand inequality.

The findings of this study also show that skin color is a significant predictor of occupational status, even after controlling for educational attainment *and* self-classified "race" (i.e. the census categories virtually all researchers use to study inequality in Brazil). By adopting a "multidimensional" analytic design which used both measures in the same model, I extended previous work that focuses on comparing how different measures of "race" may yield different estimates of inequality and demonstrated that interviewer-rated skin color is a better predictor of educational attainment and occupational status, while self-classified "race" is a better predictor of respondents' household income. That is, while self-classified "race" is indeed a strong predictor of individuals' educational attainment, the direct effect of self-classified "race" disappears once interviewer-rated skin tone is introduced into the same model and *only* interviewer-rated skin tone remains statistically significant; on the other hand, while skin color is a significant predictor of respondent's household income on its own, the direct effect of skin color on household income is diminished once self-classified "race" is taken into account.

These findings, while novel to our literature on color and ethnoracial inequality in Brazil (given the lack of data on skin color specifically and its reliance on self-classified "race" data), which has mostly focused on comparing the degree of inequality given different measures of "race", seems to corroborate much of the thinking on "whitening" and "darkening" and the nature of ethnoracial classification in Brazil (Telles and Lim 1998; Carvalho et al. 2004; Telles 2004; Schwartzman 2007), as well as recent literature on multidimensionality and ethnoracial inequality in both the U.S. and Brazil (Roth 2010; Saperstein 2012; Bailey et al. 2013). Empirical evidence to support an analytic distinction between "race" and "color" (i.e. skin color in this study), is particularly crucial considering the theoretical framework I elaborated in the Introduction which views skin tone (and hair) as forms of *bodily capital* in the U.S. and Brazil which are used to construct ethnoracial division in everyday life, but are not afforded the same weight to construct ethnoracial

division universally (i.e. across *all* instances of ethnoracial division).

A limitation of this study, however, is that there were no self-reported measures of skin tone, nor interviewer-rated ascriptions of respondents into "race" categories. Consequently, it is difficult to adjudicate whether skin color *in toto* is a stronger predictor of the outcomes in this study than "race" both in terms of self-classification and interviewer-ascription and vice versa. One could imagine that, at the very least, interviewer's ascriptions of respondent's "race" may be strong predictors of the various outcomes (e.g. educational attainment, occupational status, etc.) examined in this study. The strength of interviewer-ascription of the respondents into "race" categories, however, would, given what is reported regarding ethnoracial classification and discrimination in Brazil, most probably be significantly associated with interviewers' assessments of respondents' skin tones. Furthermore, to the knowledge of the author, most studies of the significance of skin color utilize *interviewer-rated* skin color data and not self-reports. Consequently, the value of examining the effect of self-reports of skin color on the various outcomes analyzed here in comparison to interviewer-rated skin color or interviewer-ascribed "race" remains unclear.

Ultimately, the considerable value of this study is that it compares the significance of self-classified "race" (or census categories), which virtually all current research on ethnoracial inequality on Brazil utilizes, with interviewer-rated skin color, a form of skin color data which virtually all studies of the significance of skin color utilizes (see Keith and Herring 1991; Villarreal 2010; Chapter 2) – except, ironically, in Brazil, which despite so much discussion about the significance of skin color, has lacked (until now). Thus, this study is important because it compares the significance of the most commonly used measure of "race" (i.e. self-classification) and the most commonly used and accepted measure of skin color data (i.e. interviewer-ratings of individual's skin color).

A major implication of this study is that "race" and "color" (i.e. physical appearance) tap into different dimensions of individuals' life experiences and the ethnoracial disparities they face. They are not simply substitutable and do not refer to the "same underlying thing" (cf. Bailey et al. 2013). I find, as Saperstein (2012: 1497) did in the case of the United States, that "using multiple measures of race, in combination, is necessary to understand ethnoracial disparities in life outcomes." Neither measure is "the best" overall, rather, "both aspects of "race" together affect a person's life outcomes -- and affect different outcomes in different ways" (Saperstein 2012: 1498). Thus, "each classification scheme captures a distinct dimension of the multidimensional social construct of race. '[R]ace' in Brazil is partly a matter of self-identification and partly a matter of identification by others. Thus, the degree of consistency across measures will vary across time and place, and no single measure of 'race' can be presumed, a priori, to be a proxy for others" (Bailey et al. 2013: 10).

Accordingly, while "race" and "color" may be used interchangeably in everyday life by Brazilians, as well as on the Brazilian census, the findings here suggest that they should not necessarily be used as interchangeable or "equivalent" in social science, as is commonly the case. Instead, we must consider the concepts of "race" and "color" as analytically distinct, yet perhaps inextricably linked and overlapping. The findings presented here serve as compelling evidence in support of Golash-Boza's argument (2010: 153) that it is important to distinguish between "race" and color in analyses of ethnoracial categorization in Latin America (based on her study of ethnoracial categorization in Peru). Consequently, we should distinguish census-level self-classification from processes of classification and discrimination which occur in everyday life. This is increasingly important as the Brazilian government and many studies

adopt a scheme of ethnoracial classification, the binary, black-white Black Movement format, which further simplifies, what is already a simplification of Brazil's gradational continuum of color and ethnoracial difference (Carvalho et al. 2004; Bailey 2008, 2009; Loveman et al. 2012).

Looking beyond the case of Brazil, treating "race" and color as equivalent not only occurs in the Latin American context, but also the United States (Jones 2009). For example, the conflation of "race" and color in the U.S. is prevalent in everyday life and in the legal system, as I explain Chapters 1 and 2. Notably, such conflation also affects Latinos who experience color and ethnoracial discrimination as well (Hernandez 2007; Roth 2010). There is considerable phenotypical variation within the Latino population and as such there is also considerable mismatch between their ethnoracial self-identification and how they appear ethnoracially to others, thus, Census measures of "race" are not a good indicator of phenotype (Roth 2010: 1307). Color discrimination causes differential treatment both between and within ethnoracial populations and this aspect of "race" is lost in Census measures (Roth 2010). As a result there are blind-spots in the coverage of Latinos under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well, because many judges view ethnoracial diversity in the workplace as evidence that employers have not discriminated (Hernandez 2007). Following this logic, "if there are Dominicans in the workplace, the employer cannot be discriminating against Dominicans, even if all those employed are light-skinned" (Roth 2010: 1307). This is a blind-spot in our legal system due to the conflation of "race" and "color."

In the end, "race" and color are *not* analytically equivalent in Brazil, Latin America, or even the United States, despite being used interchangeably in everyday life, by governments, in the legal system, and, all too often, by scholars as well. Consequently, as is the case in social science on Brazil, those who study ethnoracial inequality in the U.S. should beware accepting the practices of the folk world (or the legal system, which often just mirrors the practices of the folk world) as their analytic lens (Wacquant 1997). Examining the social world, telescoped through the lens of folk concepts, may blind us to complex, multidimensional processes that produce and reproduce discrimination and ethnoracial inequality. Thus, I agree that "[d]iscussions of "race" should adopt language that communicates the multiplicity of social processes involved... We must also develop the tools to accurately measure the different concepts and ensure that the most appropriate measures are used for different functions" (Roth 2010: 1308).

A theoretical framework designed to capture the complexity of ethnoracial dynamics is important as we look to build more robust, universal theories capable of guiding comparative research where the meanings attached to and the operation (or even existence) of various dimensions of "race" may vary across domains and across national boundaries (or even within them). Or, one could even compare how *within* the United States, the significance of skin color and processes of ethnoracial categorization (outsider ascription), [self-] classification, discrimination, and inequality may be different across ethnoracial populations, for example, Latinos and black Americans (see Hunter 2005 and Faught and Hunter 2012). Research could examine how the salience of phenotype as a marker of ethnoracial boundaries may vary within and between ethnoracial populations, as well as within and across national boundaries. Or, as the case of Japan's *burakumin*, demonstrates, how some countries' conceptions of "race" are *not* rooted in phenotypical difference, but rather *religiously-based, ancestrally-transmitted* stigma (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1967).

Conducting quantitative and qualitative research which helps us to build and test such

theories will be of the utmost importance as comparative research which examines the significance of multiple dimensions of "race" across domains (e.g. educational attainment, income, and employment), as well as within and across national contexts will be an essential and foundational aspect of moving us towards a richer and deeper understanding of color and ethnoracial division in global perspective. This study, in concert with recent work, which focuses on "race" as a multidimensional social construct, is but a prelude to building the sort of theoretical framework(s) that the study of ethnoracial dynamics necessitates. At the very least, this study, and other recent work, demonstrates the value of utilizing multiple measures of "race," both comparatively and in combination, to more deeply understand how ethnoracial inequality is produced in various ways in everyday life.

Future research which builds upon and extends this line of research, is cautious about uncritically adopting folk concepts and categories as analytic concepts and categories, is careful to distinguish between different levels of analysis (e.g. census-level, "official" classification from categorization and classification in everyday life), and is sensitive to how complex ethnoracial processes (both within and between ethnoracial categories) can be conceptualized as forms of social closure and boundary-making, maintenance, and challenging, will not only make impactful contributions to our academic literature, but also, help inform better policy, procedures, and laws to identify and combat myriad forms of discrimination and inequality in countries all over the world.

Chapter 6

Rethinking "Race" and "Color" in the U.S. and Brazil… Again.

In this conclusion, I begin with a brief re-cap of the empirical findings of the previous chapters. I then utilize these findings to address the assumptions underlying recent debates about the so-called "Latin Americanization of U.S. Race Relations" (Bonilla-Silva 2002; Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009) and the proposition that the U.S. and Brazilian "racial orders" are converging (Daniel 2007). As was explained in the Introduction and Chapter 1, research on "race relations" typically highlights a structural opposition between the U.S. as a rigid, dichotomous, descent-based system of ethnoracial division vs. Brazil as a fluid, ambiguous, gradational, phenotypical system of ethnoracial division (Skidmore 1993). Even though *ancestry* is the basis of ethnoracial classification in the U.S. (though strictly so only for black Americans), evidence shows that *skin tone* remained a powerful factor of stratification *within* the black population from slavery until at least 1980 (Reuter 1917; Frazier 1940, 1957; Keith and Herring 1991; Russell et al. 1992; Gullickson 2005; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2006). While studies of black life in America in the first half of the 20th century almost always discussed the role of skin tone in shaping interpersonal relationships and patterning life chances among black Americans (Powdermaker 1939; Frazier 1940; Myrdal 1944; Drake & Cayton 1945), in the collapse of Jim Crow and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, scholarly concerns (in concert with popular concerns) shifted towards "racial equality" between blacks and whites as a whole.

While such a shift is in focus was perfectly legitimate, a casualty of this shift was considering the significance of skin color for black Americans' experiences and life chances. Even though the study of skin color was increasingly marginalized relative to the dominant "race relations" paradigm which tended to focus on black-white inequality, especially in terms of urban poverty, crime, and segregation, evidence showed that skin tone continued to significantly affect some of the very same stratification outcomes researchers examined in terms of the traditional black-white ethnoracial divide – this evidence, however, was either ignored or misinterpreted altogether (see Introduction and Chapter 1).

In many ways, in the past few decades, the study of skin color among black Americans seemed to be taboo (see Russell et al. 1992 and Hunter 2005) and/or anachronistic. Researchers explicitly wondered if skin color still mattered for black Americans' life chances so long after slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow? One study utilized the National Survey of Black Americans (1979-1980) and claimed to demonstrate that skin color was no longer a factor of stratification among black Americans in the post-Civil Rights Era (Gullickson 2005). The author claimed that "skin tone differentials" were so slight by the last wave of the NSBA (1987-1988) that the relationship between skin tone and educational attainment disappeared completely for black cohorts born after 1953. In Chapter 2, however, I utilized the newly conducted National Survey of American Life (2001-2003), which was designed by many of the same Principal Investigators responsible for the NSBA (1979-1980), and showed that skin tone remains a considerable factor of stratification among black Americans. From educational attainment to occupational status and even household income, black Americans' skin tones correlate strongly with gradations in the color of their skin.

On the other hand, scholarship on ethnoracial division and inequality in Brazil went through several transformations. At the turn of the 20th century, social science generally held that there was no "race problem" in Brazil – instead, *class* was what "really" determined

individuals' life chances (Freyre 1933). The centerpiece of "racial democracy" was simply the idea that Brazil, unlike the United States, was a land where "the color of your skin" was not a barrier to your success. In fact, "everyone was Brazilian," and there were no true divisions in society along ethnoracial lines – Brazil was a society characterized by hybridity, an amalgam of 'three races' (native, European, and African) (Freyre 1933). With the general consensus that Brazil was a land of 'racial harmony,' UNESCO planned a series of studies designed to glean the secrets of "harmonious inter-racial relations" (UNESCO: 4). These studies, however, raised doubts about whether Brazil was indeed a "racial democracy." On the one hand, researchers generally agreed that class was more important than "race" for determining Brazilians' life chances (Harris 1952; Hutchinson 1952; Wagley 1952; Bastide and Fernandes 1955), but there was notable disagreement on whether darker-skinned Brazilians would be able to progress socioeconomically in the future as Brazil's economy expanded.

Inspired by the UNESCO studies, after a period of silence on ethnoracial division brought on by military repression, researchers utilized newly available data from the IBGE to analyze whether "race" was indeed a major factor of stratification in Brazilian society (Silva 1978, 1985; Hasenbalg 1985). As was explained in the Introduction and Chapter 1 though, this new strain of research borrowed heavily from the experiences, theories, and categories of the United States and ended up promoting a view of Brazil that was radically different than in previous generations. In this new mode of research, Brazil was actually a 'bi-racial' society, in terms of stratification, but also in terms of behavior (Silva 1978, 1985). Thus, simply lumping together blacks and browns into a single 'negro' category, under the presumption of shared African ancestry (hence the term *negro's* interchangeable usage with the *Afro-descendente*), arguably 'did no violence to Brazilian reality' (Silva 1985). The *bi-racialization* of Brazil was aided by the confluence of researchers trained in the U.S. who simply borrowed U.S. understandings and theories in their analyses of Brazil (e.g. Silva and Hasenbalg), incredibly influential U.S.-led NGOs (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999 [2005), and "Black Movement" activists who were influenced by the 'bi-racial' vision of the U.S. and the legacy of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement.

What was lost in this transformation was the *gradational* nature of ethnoracial division in Brazil that work of previous generations had so expertly detailed (see, for example, Harris 1952, 1970 and Wagley 1952). Moreover, given the long-standing conflation of census-level classification (which is based on individuals' answering a question about their "race or color") with actual data on skin color (as judged by outsiders), social science on ethnoracial inequality in Brazil claimed to be studying the significance of "skin color," while actually studying the association between self-classification into "race-color" categories which are significantly affected by age, socioeconomic status, gender, and region and consequently, are somewhat endogenous with the stratification outcomes researchers examine, and are not necessarily "equivalent" with Brazil's "color" continuum, strictly speaking. In other words, our literature on the "significance of skin color in Brazil," proceeded without the use of data on skin color, the likes of which was available in the U.S. where the study of skin color was actually marginalized relative to the dominant "race relations" and "racial formation" paradigms. The further simplification of a triadic system of categorization via the usage of only *two* categories – *negro* and white – would represent further analytical distance between the categories used in social science research and the *gradational* nature of ethnoracial classification and possibly, ethnoracial *stratification* in Brazil.

The Significance of Skin Color in the U.S. and Brazil

In Chapter 5, I utilized the first nationally representative survey to include interviewer-rated skin color data on Brazil, and demonstrated that census-level "race-color" categories are *empirically* distinct from skin color. Moreover, I demonstrated that skin color is a better predictor of educational attainment and occupational status than the standard "race-color" categories used in the vast majority of our current research. Only household income is more strongly associated with "race-color" categories than skin color, a finding I explain as evidence of the processes of "whitening" and "darkening" in Brazil where how much one earns is inextricably interwoven with individuals' self-classifications into the standard, census-level "race-color" categories.

Comparatively, I find that skin color is a significant predictor of educational attainment, occupational status, and household income among black Americans and the Brazilian population at-large. In other words, despite the structural opposition typically drawn between the U.S. as an ancestry-based system of ethnoracial classification and Brazil as a phenotype-based system of ethnoracial classification, the reality is that skin color is a significant factor of stratification in both countries. In fact, excepting educational attainment, the strength of the association between skin color and occupational status, and skin color and household income is somewhat stronger among black Americans than within the Brazilian population as a whole. Such an empirical finding is certainly a shocking revelation considering the relative scholarly attention given to skin color in the U.S. and putatively given to skin color in Brazil. Moreover, given the large number of control variables available in the NSAL (2001-2003), which I used to examine skin tone stratification among black Americans, relative to the LAPOP 2010 (Brazil), the strength of the associations I find between skin color and stratification outcomes in Brazil may be relatively over-stated.

Consider, for example, educational attainment. In the NSAL analyses I included a control for respondent's parent's *educational attainment*, not simply their parent's *occupational status*, as was the case in the analyses of the LAPOP data. While parent's occupational status is an adequate control for social background, utilizing parent's actual educational attainment is a much more appropriate control for respondent's social backgrounds in analyses of individual's educational attainment. Thus, while the gap between the lightest and darkest-skinned black Americans in terms of educational attainment is smaller than that of the lightest and darkest-skinned Brazilians (i.e. a gap of half of year among black Americans compared to a gap of nearly 3 years among Brazilians), *descriptive statistics* (which do not suffer from the possible confounding of a different set of control variables) reveal that the gap between the lightest and darkest-skinned black Americans and Brazilians is actually much closer – a gap of nearly 1 year between the darkest and lightest-skinned black Americans and a gap of nearly 2 years between the darkest and lightest-skinned Brazilians. Given that Brazil is well-documented to be one of the most unequal societies in the world, especially in terms of educational inequality (see Telles 2004 and Loveman et al. 2012), the fact that the gap between the darkest and lightest-skinned black Americans and Brazilians (at-large) is only a year is actually quite remarkable.

According to this study, the association between occupational status and skin color is actually somewhat stronger among black Americans than it is within the Brazilian population as a whole. While the NSAL and LAPOP are not exactly comparable data sets, I utilized the same set of control variables in both sets of analyses. I find that the gap between the darkest and lightest-skinned black American men in terms of the odds of their employment in high status occupations is nearly 50%, compared (the darkest-skinned black males having far higher odds of

having a lower status job), while there was no significant relationship between skin color and occupational status among Brazilian men specifically. Instead, the association between skin color and occupational status only held within the Brazilian population as a whole.

Comparatively, the gap in the odds of having a high status job between the darkest-skinned and lightest-skinned black Americans was 36% compared to a gap of almost 40% between the darkest and lightest-skinned Brazilians. Though this may suggest that the association between skin color and occupational status is *slightly stronger* among Brazilians than among black Americans, a closer look at the results shows that this is not necessarily true. For one, the association between living in a rural area and occupational status is much stronger in Brazil than among black Americans. Secondly, both analyses control for educational attainment and the relationship between educational attainment and skin color is somewhat stronger within the Brazilian population than among black Americans. Consequently, while the data sets are not precisely comparable, the findings reported in Chapters 2 and 5 suggest that the strength of the association between skin color and occupational status among black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole is either: (1) approximately the same or (2) slightly stronger among black Americans – especially considering that the effect of skin color on the occupational status of black American men is stronger than the effect of skin color on the occupational status of black American men and women together (i.e. the entire sample) and there was no significant association between skin color and the occupational status of Brazilian men.

The association between family income and skin color among black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole is quite similar. Utilizing a categorical scale of household income for black Americans, instead of raw household income, similar to the categorical scale variable for household income available in the LAPOP 2010 (Brazil) data set, I find that the strength of the association between skin color and household income among black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole is almost exactly the same.

Again, the NSAL and LAPOP are not exactly comparable, but they are both nationally representative data sets, and in this case, I utilized the same set of control variables to analyze the relationship between skin color and household income among black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole[86]. Despite these data sets being somewhat different, however, I find that the coefficient for the skin color scale variables in the analyses of family income in the NSAL and LAPOP (Brazil) are almost *exactly* the same: -0.110 (LAPOP) and -0.10 (NSAL) (results not shown). This finding is remarkable given the considerable inequality in Brazilian society at-large, compared to the U.S. (Telles 2004). This study shows that, even though inequality in Brazilian society is much larger overall than in the U.S. regardless of individual's "race" or skin color, there is as much inequality in family income among black Americans in terms of skin color as there is within the Brazilian population as a whole (in terms of skin color).

Ultimately, the findings of this study demonstrate: (1) skin color remains a significant factor of stratification among black Americans despite recent arguments to the contrary (see Gullickson 2005), (2) skin color is a significant predictor of stratification outcomes in Brazil, and in most cases, is an even *stronger* predictor of stratification within the Brazilian population than the standard, "race-color" categories currently used in most research – even though most researchers claim to be studying the "significance of skin color," (cf. Telles 2004) using "race-color" categories that are both *analytically* and *empirically* distinct from *skin color* itself (see Chapter 5), and (3) comparatively, skin color is as powerful a basis of stratification among black Americans alone, as it is within the Brazilian population at-large – and in the case of

[86] For a similar cross-data set comparison, please see Flores & Telles 2012 and Villarreal 2012.

occupational status, even moreso. Thus, against the backdrop of the structural opposition between a dichotomous, ancestry-based system of ethnoracial classification in the U.S. (for black Americans) and a gradational system of ethnoracial classification based primarily on physical appearance (e.g. skin color) in Brazil, the reality is that skin color is a significant predictor of key stratification outcomes in *both* societies in the 21st century; and perhaps, an even more significant predictor of life chances among black Americans alone than it is within the Brazilian population at-large – all in spite of the fact that the study of skin color in the U.S. is marginalized compared to the dominant "race relations" paradigm which examines inequality between blacks and whites as a whole (i.e. an ancestral dichotomy), while it claims, in its reliance upon folk notions, to be studying inequality faced by black Americans "on the basis of their skin color" (Massey & Denton 1993: 34).

Americanization, Latin Americanization, and Other Visions of the Future of Ethnoracial Division in the U.S. and Brazil

In this penultimate section, I focus on recent work which proposes various interpretations and hypotheses regarding the future(s) of ethnoracial division in the U.S. (and to a lesser degree, Brazil). Such work signals yet another phase in the messy, confusing interrelationship between the study of ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil. While most work comparing ethnoracial classification, stratification, and attitudes in the U.S. and Brazil focuses on highlighting the "fundamental differences" between these two cases (Skidmore 1993), in the past few years, there has been fervent debate over the 'Latin Americanization of Race in in the U.S.' thesis (hereafter LAT). The foundation of this thesis is the contention that there are *increasingly* many fundamental similarities regarding ethnoracial classification and stratification in the U.S. and Brazil. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2002) contends that today, the strength of the U.S. binary ethnoracial order (i.e. the black-white boundary) is being seriously challenged by "multiracials" and Asian and Latino immigration. Bonilla-Silva (2004: 224) argues that "race relations in the United States are slowly but surely becoming 'tri-racial,' much like they are in Latin America". Specifically, he emphasizes the facts that in the post-Civil Rights era, the number of interracial unions has increased and "multiracial" activists successfully lobbied the U.S. Census Bureau to allow them to "mark one or more races" on the 2000 Census. These elements, along with the absolutely central element to Bonilla-Silva's thesis – the socioeconomic impact of skin tone in the United States (Black, Latino, and Asian). The importance of skin tone is, for Bonilla-Silva, proof positive that the U.S. is drifting away from its "one-drop rule"/"bi-racial" model and moving rapidly towards a "tri-racial," Latin-American model, which Bonilla-Silva refers to as a "pigmentocracy" (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009).

This "tri-racial" system of ethnoracial classification and stratification in the U.S is composed of three "racial tiers: 'Whites,' 'Honorary Whites,' and 'Collective Black.' Most 'multiracials' will fit into the new 'Honorary Whites' category, along with Asians (Filipinos, Vietnamese, Hmong, and Laotians excluded). The 'White' group will include 'traditional' Whites, new 'White' immigrants, and in the near future, assimilated White Latinos. The 'collective Black' [category] will include Blacks, dark-skinned Latinos, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and maybe Filipinos" (Bonilla-Silva 2004: 221).

While the LAT is correct that skin tone remains salient and consequential within the U.S. black population (see Chapter 2), it misreads this as (1) a new development and (2) proof of the U.S.'s *Latin Americanization*. There is no indication that skin tone stratification in the U.S. is anything new. Thus, the idea that *today* the importance of skin tone portends some *shift* in the

"U.S. biracial order" is suspect**.** Consequently, while it may be the case that the socioeconomic impact of skin tone both within and across populations in increasing, in the case of black Americans, this increase would occur inside of a *descent-based* hierarchy – as has been the pattern in U.S. history. The fact that some scholars today react as if skin tone stratification in the U.S. is something new, is just more evidence of how submerged the topic has become in the midst of more dominant concerns about macro-level inequality, crime, and poverty.

Furthermore, the U.S. and Brazil still differ significantly in the logic of their systems of ethnoracial classification. Notably, the persistence of the "one-drop rule" in the U.S. for black Americans cannot be ignored (Brunsma 2006; Khanna 2010), in spite of so much discussion over the 'rise of the multiracial population,' the fact remains that a mere 2.4% of the U.S. population chose to "mark one or more" on the 2000 Census; and "intermarriage," while increasing, remains the exception and not the rule – especially between blacks and whites, but also, blacks and nonblacks in general (Pew Research Center Analysis of 2008 American Community Survey). Comparatively, "when whites and nonwhites comprise similar proportions of the population, whites are 2.6 times more likely to marry whites rather than blacks or browns in Brazil, the comparable ratio is over 50 for the United States" (Telles 2004: 193). Consequently, if the growth of the "multiracial" population and "intermarriage" is evidence of the U.S. 'Latin Americanizing,' the U.S. appears to have a very *long* way to go.

Moreover, this says nothing of the *meaning* of intermarriage – in Brazil such marriages are more common between individuals who are "approximate" in terms of their "race-color" self-classification (Schwartzman 2007) and are typically seen as examples of status exchange (i.e. "whitening") where darker-skinned males are relatively more educated than their lighter-skinned mates (Burdick 1998; Telles 2004: 189-192; Schwartzman 2007). Certainly, such intermarriage does not "challenge" Brazil's ethnoracial continuum where "whiteness" is valorized in relation to "blackness" (thinking here of the two extremes on the "color" continuum), no, such marriages have been viewed as one of the *defining* features of Brazil's "pigmentocracy," where lighter-skinned women are highly desired and darker-skinned women are undoubtedly the *least desired* mates. Consequently, it is unclear why an *increase* (however small) in intermarriage in the U.S. should necessarily seen as a "challenge" to the U.S. 'racial order' – intermarriage taking place via *status exchange* along clearly defined ethnoracial (and gendered) lines would only *reinforce* the valorization of "whiteness" over "blackness," not necessarily challenge it. The fact that within the U.S. black population alone, lighter-skinned black women, *ceteris paribus*, tend to marry higher status mates than darker-skinned black women (similar to the case of Brazil *across* the "color" continuum; i.e. "intermarriage" on the basis of skin color within the black population, see Powdermaker 1939, Drake & Cayton 1945, Frazier 1957, Bond & Cash 1992, Hunter 2005, and Hamilton et al. 2009, but also Chapter 2), has never been interpreted as a *challenge* to the valorization of *light skin color* within the black population (i.e. a *challenge* to the black American skin color hierarchy) – no, such dynamics were one of the main targets of "The Black Power Movement" and their famous motto: "Black is Beautiful;" such dynamics were explicitly seen as "proof" that many black Americans (especially black men) were "colorstruck" (Russell et al. 1992; Hunter 2005; Golden 2005).

Strangely, for all of the discussion about the increasing socioeconomic impact of skin tone within and across ethnoracial populations, the three "racial tiers" designated in the LAT do not actually refer to *skin tone* or even a "color" continuum. Given evidence that skin tone is as powerful a basis of stratification among black Americans as it is within the Brazilian population as a whole, it makes little sense to propose a theory where skin tone is ostensibly increasing in

importance, but *all* black Americans are lumped into a single "collective black" category regardless of their skin tone. Moreover, the "Honorary White" and "Traditional White" categories are not skin color categories either.

Not only does the LAT misunderstand the U.S., however, it also misunderstands Latin America and Brazil. Consider, for example, the inclusion of Asians and Latinos in the LAT which putatively is a comparison with "Latin America" even though countries in Latin America lack comparable populations (especially Brazil). Moreover, despite the alleged importance of skin tone in the LAT, Bonilla-Silva concedes that current data suggests that there is not a neat correspondence between intermarriage rates and skin tone for whites and Asians and whites and Latinos (though, to be fair, this may become the case in "the future") (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009). More fundamentally, however, the very notion that "Latin America" can be simply characterized as having a "tri-racial system," is erroneous. First of all, this homogenizes Latin America. What obtains in Brazil is not necessarily what obtains in Puerto Rico or Mexico or Venezuela – and even in Brazil, there are strong regional variations in ethnoracial categorization (see Chapter 4). The LAT could be made more precise by restricting its focus to a U.S.-Brazil comparison, which is implicitly the foundation of the LAT[87]. Furthermore, it is not true that Brazil's system of ethnoracial division is "tri-racial," no, ethnoracial division in Brazil is best characterized as a gradational, "color" continuum and the three, standard "race-color" categories are *already* an oversimplification of this continuum – both in terms of the *lived experience* of ethnoracial difference in everyday life, but also *empirically* (see Chapter 5). It is important to remember the work of Harris (1970), for example, who characterizes Brazil as having a continuum-style model where skin tone gradations represent a hierarchy without discrete ethnoracial-group boundaries. His account emphasizes the fact that Brazilians use dozens of 'color categories' to place individuals and themselves along a phenotypic gradient from light to dark in everyday life. Bailey's (2009) more recent analyses of ethnoracial categorization in Brazil which rely upon the quantitative analysis of survey data mostly corroborate Harris's experimental survey and ethnographic findings.

As was explained in the introduction, ancestry is not the basis of ethnoracial categorization in Brazil. Consequently, while blacks in the U.S. are defined by their ancestry in accordance with the "one-drop rule," in Brazil 'whites', 'blacks', and 'browns' all claim some degree of African ancestry. For example, according to a nationally-representative survey, in Brazil, 38 percent of self-identified whites claim some African ancestry and 66 percent of blacks claim some European ancestry (Telles 2004). "Therefore, even at the racial poles, there is a feeling of being part of the black/white mixture. The degree to which an individual represents more of one pole or the other is partially measured by phenotype, a characteristic which affects treatment in society" (Sue 2009: 1059). Moreover, categorization into the standard "race-color" census categories, which are ostensibly the inspiration for the LAT's "three racial tiers," are significantly affected by individuals' class, education, region of residence, and more (Sansone 2003; Telles 2004; Schwartzman 2007; Bailey 2009; Guimaraes 2012). This is much different than a system of "three racial tiers" filled with various ethnoracial populations sorted according to a curious mix of their ancestry and [putatively] their skin tones.

To be fair, how to characterize ethnoracial stratification and classification in Brazil (as well as throughout Latin America) is still a matter of heated debate. Sue (2009) contends that much of this disagreement in the literature is related to difference in methods and data. For example, Sue (2009) argues that quantitative work typically falls on the side of viewing Brazil

[87] Consequently, I will focus on what obtains in Brazil instead of Latin America as a whole in this essay.

"bi-racially," while ethnographic work typically highlights racial fluidity in Brazil. Painting the disagreement in how to characterize ethnoracial classification, stratification, and attitudes in Brazil as primarily a matter of method and data, however, is insufficient.

Even ethnographic accounts disagree on how to characterize Brazil. For example, anthropologist Robin Sheriff (2001: 55-58) argues that 'beneath the surface' of racial ambiguity in Brazil, there is clear binary, racial polarization, based on her study of race in a favela in Rio de Janeiro. She details a world in which many relatively-dark skinned Brazilians express negative sentiments about dark skin, kinky hair, and 'Negroid' facial features, yet openly declare and understand themselves to be *negros*, in open opposition to using the term *moreno.* She highlights the rigidity and stability of racial classification in everyday life in Brazil. In contrast, while Sansone (2003) finds, similar to Sheriff (2001), that Brazilians of all colors have strong biases against persons with dark skin and kinky hair (in his study of two middle-class and poor neighborhoods in Salvador, Bahia), Sansone highlights how racial classification and self-identification shift from day to night and from one's place of employment to one's household. Sansone concludes that Brazilians don't divide their world into a "black part and a white part" (2003: 52). In fact, Sansone notes that many darker-skinned Brazilians don't recognize themselves as *negros* (as was the case in Sheriff's study) and instead prefer using less-racially significant terms such as *moreno* and *mista* (mixed). Here a shift in the region being studied appears to affect how Brazil is characterized as a whole. In any case, negative feelings towards those at the bottom of the ethnoracial hierarchy says nothing about how ethnoracial division is *constructed* – none of Sheriff's findings impugn the dominance of phenotype as the primary basis of ethnoracial classification in Brazil.

A related misunderstanding of Brazil (and thus, "Latin America") implicit in the LAT, on a *metatheoretical* level, is its presumption that ethnoracial categories automatically yield ethnoracial *groups*. This is a common misconception rooted in the very logic of the "race relations" and "racial formations" paradigms of the U.S. Recent work on the nature of Brazilian ethnoracial categorization, however, flatly dispenses with the idea that official and non-official ethnoracial (or 'color') categories in Brazil are tightly aligned with ethnoracial *groups* (Bailey 2009). The relative lack of *groupism* in Brazil makes Bonilla-Silva's test of 'subjective' measures (ethnoracial attitudes and self-classification) problematic for several reasons: chiefly, Bonilla-Silva expects the ethnoracial populations within his new "tri-racial" tiers to behave as if they are corporate, ethnoracial *groups*. That is, he expects ethnoracial attitudes to correspond with one's placement in his "tri-racial, pigmentocratic hierarchy." This expectation is rooted in the smuggling of a U.S.-based group position perspective on 'race relations' (see Bobo and Hutchings 1996) into a theory about the U.S. becoming "Latin-Americanized," which is soundly dispelled by Bailey's (2009) recent analyses of ethnoracial attitudes in Brazil, not to mention what we already knew about ethnoracial categorization and attitudes in Brazil thanks to the UNESCO studies of the 1950s (Harris 1952; Hutchinson 1952; Wagley 1952). As Sue (2009: 1065) succinctly puts it, "In essence, a U.S.-based understanding of racial attitudes is being used to test a theory about Latin Americanization. If we were to use a Latin-American based understanding of race, we would not anticipate one's structural standing to be an indicator of one's racial attitudes." The LAT misses that the articulation of ethnoracial classification and stratification *varies* across cases and consequently, one cannot simply propose that the relationship between ethnoracial classification and stratification will be a tight fit as has been the case for U.S. blacks historically.

While the LAT depends upon the idea that skin tone gradations will allow us to predict ethnoracial stratification, educational attainment, patterns of segregation, ethnoracial attitudes, rates of intermarriage, and self-classification - the presumption that objective, subjective, and social interaction measures should be measured on the same scale is directly the *opposite* of what has been found in Brazil. Telles (2004) explains that the high levels of ethnoracial stratification co-exist with relatively high rates of intermarriage and ethnoracial sociability and low levels of ethnoracial segregation in Brazil. For Telles (2004), this is "the paradox of Brazilian race relations" – the separation of *horizontal* (interpersonal) and *vertical* (macro-level stratification) relations. The LAT does not take this complexity into account. Instead, in Bonilla-Silva's model, high levels of segregation and stratification will co-exist with low-levels of intermarriage and ethnoracial attitudes will be predicted by skin tone.

By continuing to view Brazil (and Latin America) through the U.S. lens, the LAT is rooted in fundamental misunderstandings about what actually obtains in Brazil and throughout Latin America. To be fair, these misconceptions are not idiosyncratic to Bonilla-Silva's provocative theory. Instead, many of the misconceptions about Brazil and the tendency to view Brazil through the U.S. lens is the dominant tendency in the literature (see Introduction and Chapter 1. Ultimately, the flaws of the LAT are symptomatic of broader, long-standing issues having to do with the methodological and conceptual shortcomings of most social science on ethnoracial division on the U.S. and Brazil individually, as well as in comparative perspective.

Similar to the comparative work which emphasizes the "fundamental differences" between racial classification and stratification in the U.S. and Latin America, much of the debate on the 'Latin Americanization of race' in the U.S. has focused on the macro-level (official ethnoracial classification, socioeconomic stratification, and rates of intermarriage) as opposed to the subjective experience of race and phenotypic distinction (associated with ethnoracial classification) in everyday life. We should not assume that putative similarities at the macro-level (ethnoracial classification and ethno-somatic stratification) automatically yield similarities at the level of everyday life. In fact, I find that *nested* within the U.S. descent-based system of ethnoracial categorization is a *Brazilian-esque* skin color continuum within the black population which is significantly associated with differences in black Americans' educational attainment, household incomes, and occupational status – a skin color continuum as strongly associated with these key stratification outcomes as Brazil's skin color continuum is associated with these same stratification outcomes within the Brazilian population as a whole. In other words, the U.S. has a descent-based system of ethnoracial division inflected by phenotype *inside* the black population. Nevertheless, "the existence of a skin-colour hierarchy in the US has not been interpreted to mean that a tri-racial system exists, as the black/white boundary is seen as marking he major racial cleavage in society" (Sue 2009: 1060). Also, similar to what obtains within the Brazilian population *in toto,* U.S. blacks also use a variety of 'color labels' to distinguish amongst themselves (Parrish 1946; Lake 2003). A recent study suggests that many of these labels, such as 'High yellow,' 'Light-Bright',' and 'Blue-black,' have remained in consistent usage for nearly a century (Wilder 2009). Still, such findings have not been interpreted to mean that the U.S. is *Latin-Americanizing* in decades past.

Consequently, surface similarities between these two cases need not mean that the U.S. is somehow *becoming* Latin Americanized, or *Brazilianized*. For example, while there may indeed be similar phenotypic preferences for lighter skin, straightened hair[88], and stereotypically

[88] The absence of much discussion of the social significance of hair is a glaring omission from the most of the comparative work on ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil.

European facial features in the U.S. (including within the black population) and in Brazil, the *subjective experience* (principally, the self-understandings and emotions individuals attach to their experiences and daily practices) of these phenotypic distinctions and biases may still differ between these two cases (which I investigate in Part III utilizing in-depth interviews and direct observation). Unfortunately, neither Bonilla-Silva, nor Daniel examines the *subjective lived experience* of ethno-somatic difference (cf. Patterson 2005). Thus, in order to more comprehensively assess whether or not the U.S. and Brazil are on converging or diverging paths, scholars must pay more attention to the level of everyday life. Moreover, it would be helpful to compare these two cases directly at the level of everyday life, but to date, I know of no study which actually makes this comparison directly (which is a central rationale for Part III, forthcoming).

Without analyzing the *lived experience* of phenotypic distinctions and biases in everyday life (i.e. the meanings and emotions individuals attach to their life experiences, quotidian practices, and treatment by others and of others) it is problematic to suggest that what obtains at the macro-level corresponds to *experiences* in everyday life (i.e. whether ethnoracial differences on one level translate to the other level). In fact, the disjuncture between racial classification in the Census and racial classification (as well as racial attitudes) and heterogeneity of experience in everyday life is one of the central findings in the literature on racial classification in Brazil. Likewise, in the case of the U.S., we should not assume that once we know someone's ethnoracial self-classification (or how they're classified by others), we know all that we need to about their everyday life experiences – just because of correlations between belonging to certain ethnoracial categories and various empirical outcomes. "African Americans do not experience race as a monolithic single state. African Americans distinguish between themselves and Whites, to be sure, but they also distinguish between and among themselves based on physical features, socioeconomic status (SES), gender, and skin tone" (Celious and Oyserman 2001: 150).

Consequently, the LAT's prediction that the "centrality of black identity will" persist (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2009: 59) is already flawed in at least two senses. First of all, it is unclear what Bonilla-Silva means by "the centrality of black identity". What exactly is "black *identity*[89]"? Whose "black identity" are we discussing and what's central about it? Second, if the U.S. is indeed *Latin Americanizing*, then shouldn't the "*centrality* of black identity" be severely diminished? Daniel (2007), in contrast, argues that black identity may become more 'diffuse.' This, however, immediately begs the question: "More diffuse than what?" Neither Bonilla-Silva, nor Daniel, fully divorces themselves from the presumption of the existence of a mostly homogenous, black *community*. Scholars have put forth an ambitious theory about two countries' "converging paths" before properly understanding what dynamics obtain in either country individually. The fundamental issue here is that they do so by imposing the folk categories and theories of one society (U.S.) on the other (Brazil).

Such issues are apparent in a recent study which claims to find evidence of "racial fluidity" in the United States (Saperstein & Penner 2012; for a brief discussion see Chapter 3). This study finds correlations between social position and ethnoracial classification in the United States – individuals who are unemployed, incarcerated, or impoverished are more likely to be classified by others and self-identify as black, regardless of how they previously were classified by others or self-identified (Saperstein & Penner 2012). The authors view this as evidence that "race in the United States is more fluid than commonly believed" (Saperstein & Penner 2012:

[89] For a fuller discussion of the inadequacy of "identity" as a social scientific concept, see Brubaker and Cooper (2000).

708) and that the *Brazilian-esque* processes of "whitening" and "darkening" are possibly at work in the United States; though, to be fair, they do concede that the "fluidity" they see in ethnoracial classification should not be interpreted as *permanent* shifts in classification and that the levels of "fluidity" they find in their study of the U.S. are *substantially lower* than what has been found in Brazil (see Telles 2004; Bailey 2009).

Yes, comparatively there are *extremely significant* differences between the U.S. and Brazil in terms of the "fluidity" of ethnoracial classification: findings from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Harris and Sim 2002) reveal that 99.8% of self-classified "blacks" were also classified as "black" by interviewers, compared to only 51% of self-classified "blacks" (*pretos*) being classified as "black" by interviewers in Brazil, according to findings from the nationally representative Pesquisa Social Brasileira, 2002 (Bailey 2009: 50). Consequently, finding that "of the respondents who identified as black in 1979, 98% identified as black in 2002, with 1.4% responding as white and 2.3% as nonblack, nonwhite" (Saperstein & Penner 2012: 697) is simply further evidence of the rigidity of the U.S. 'racial order' and certainly *not* evidence of its fluidity (especially concerning the well-known black/white boundary). The authors admit that the vast majority of the "fluidity" they examine concerns Thus, one wonders how the authors can claim that they have found evidence that "race in the United States is more fluid than commonly believed," given that most recent work argues that [any] shifts in the U.S. 'racial order' are being brought on by/will be the result of *increasing* Asian and Latino immigration and the rise of the "multiracial" population (Gans 1999; Yancey 2003; Rodriguez 2007; Lee & Bean 2004, 2007, 2010; Frank et al. 2010; Patterson 2000; Bonilla-Silva 2002; Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich 2009; Hochschild et al. 2012). Even more puzzling is that such theorizing, on the part of the authors, misses that the basis of ethnoracial classification in the U.S. (for black Americans) remains *ancestry* while *physical appearance* is the primary basis of ethnoracial classification in Brazil – what is the nature of the "fluidity" that they claim to have found? Would "fluidity," even *if* solid evidence of it had been found, have the same *meaning* in the U.S. as it does in Brazil? The authors do not spend much time discussing such matters.

Moreover, the interpretations of the authors regarding "racial fluidity" in the U.S. are especially dubious considering that the survey they analyze has no data on respondents' *skin* color, which the authors admit is a key factor that affects how interviewers classified the respondents in their survey (Saperstein & Penner 2012: 683), and when they utilize a "fixed-effects" model to ostensibly control for "skin color," (which the authors claim is a "time-invariant" characteristic) over **75%** of their significant results disappear[90] (Saperstein & Penner 2012: 699, 707, 719-720). Given all of this, is it possible that much of the "fluidity" the authors report is simply the result of lighter-skinned individuals being classified differently by different interviewers over a 20 year period? That is, the "fluidity" regarding the 6% of the overall sample that was classified differently in consecutive years and the 20% of the sample that was classified

[90] Across the 4 regression models predicting "racial classification and identification" (i.e. "interviewer-classified race" and "self-identified race") 49 of the variables were statistically significant (Saperstein & Penner: 699, 707, but also see Table A4 on p. 720). Across the 4 regression models predicting "interviewer-classified race" and "self-classified race" presented in Table A3, included "respondent fixed-effects" (ostensibly to control for both skin tone and ancestry), only 11 variables were statistically significant (Saperstein & Penner 2012: 719). This means that only 22% of the variables that were significant in the models without the "respondent fixed-effects" remained significant in the models *with* the "respondent fixed-effects" (that were ostensibly designed to control for skin tone, but also ancestry).

differently over a 20 year period by different interviewers, using different interview methods (e.g. face-to-face and over the phone) (Saperstein & Penner 2012: 688) appears *not* to be a matter of "social position," and hence processes of "whitening" and/or "darkening" (according to the authors), but rather, a matter of discrepancies in how interviewers perceive the "race" of others in the absence of information about respondents' ancestry – which is perfectly expected given the primacy of the visual cues of skin tone, hair, and facial features for ethnoracial categorization (in *everyday life* when information about ancestry is unknown) and the considerable phenotypic variation within the U.S. black population alone (see the Introduction, Chapter 1, 2, and 3), not to mention "Latinos" (Murguia & Telles 1996; Frank et al. 2010). Viewed this way, the authors' study, seems to be yet another case of *dual* confusions and misunderstandings of ethnoracial division in the U.S. *and* Brazil, leading to dubious analyses, interpretations, and conclusions.

Similar mistakes plague the hypotheses other scholars have proposed about the possible future(s) of the U.S. "color line" – notably, the conflation of ethnoracial categorization based on *ancestry* and processes of ethnoracial categorization in everyday life, in the absence of information about ancestry, which tend to rely upon the visual cues of skin color (but also, hair and facial features). That is, the authors discuss putative challenges to the "color line" without reference to the actual significance of *skin color* among black Americans (i.e. stratification and differences in life experiences), but curiously, *with* reference to the significance of skin color among "Hispanics" and "Latinos" (Lee & Bean 2010). Of these hypotheses, however, Orlando Patterson's, published in *The New Republic* (2000), entitled "Race Over," is the most provocative and ironic. He writes,

> "[those] who insist the color line will define the next 100 years are altogether wrong. The racial divide that has plagued America since its founding is fading fast -- made obsolete by migratory, sociological, and biotechnological developments that are already under way. By the middle of the twenty-first century, America will have problems aplenty. But no racial problem whatsoever… [T]he social virus of race will have gone the way of smallpox. The twenty-first century, relieved of the obscuring blinkers of race, will be a century of class and class consciousness, forcing the nation to finally take seriously its creed that all are created equal."

With such thinking – the circle is completed. Almost echoing *verbatim* Freyre in 1933, and his mentor Manoel de Oliveira Lima decades before him (see Chapter 1), not to mention the many other researchers and politicians who maintained such ideas in the first half of the 20th century (see, again, Chapter 1) – by 2050, according to Patterson, "the social virus of race will have gone the way of smallpox, [and] the twenty-first century… will be a century of *class* and *class consciousness*" and the United States will be none other than a "racial democracy."

How, according to Patterson (2000), will this occur? On his view, a mix of "cultural and somatic mixing" on the West coast will produce a mainly "Eurasian but with a growing Latin element," poor whites, blacks, and Latinos will be bound together by "social resentment" and a "lumpen-proletarian hip-hop culture," and the "Old Confederacy" of the Southeast will still have race divisions, but these will be drowned out by the other changes in the rest of the nation. These "migratory" and "sociological" factors along with 'biotechnological' advancements will allow "Americans [to] gain the means to genetically manipulate human appearance." There will be "dramatic new methods of changing hair texture and skin color" that will allow black Americans to "opt for varying degrees of hybridity." Apparently in this "post-racial" society of the future, due to immigration and cosmetic surgeries, everyone will look "mixed," or as Yale University professor of ecology and evolutionary biology, Stephen Stearns recently put it (also

noting immigration and eroding national boundaries): "a few centuries from now, everyone will look like Brazilians[91]." The irony of such proclamations, given the centuries-long, tragically flawed interrelationship of U.S. and Brazilian social science on ethnoracial division (see the Introduction and Chapter 1) is simply beyond the capability of words to do justice to. At the very least, it is, on my view, as fundamentally problematic to claim that racism will *always* define the U.S., as it is to proclaim, that in just a few decades, "the social virus of race will have gone the way of smallpox" and "America will have no racial problem whatsoever."

All of these hypotheses and proclamations, at the very least, suffer from conflations and confusions related to the usage of the [folk] experiences and [folk] categories of the United States, which, as I discussed at-length in the Introduction and Chapter 1, are not only unsuited to the United States and the case of black Americans specifically, but are also unsuited for Brazil (or any other cases of ethnoracial division); but, even more fundamental than these confusions and conflations of folk vs. analytic concepts, all of these hypotheses suffer from an ironic and very profound *historical amnesia* (more precisely, *anamnesis*). Even still, since these proclamations are only *predictions* (including the LAT), though the assumptions they rest upon are severely flawed, they *may become true* in the future – only time will tell.

Towards a Comparative Sociology of Ethnoracial Division

By first *historicizing* the categories and framings used by researchers, as well as the [folk] categories and [folk] framings used in each society, before carrying out my comparative analysis (see the Introduction and Chapter 1), I,"[t]he researcher, both more modest and more ambitious than the collector of curiosities, [sought] to apprehend the structures and mechanisms *that are overlooked – although for different reasons – by the native and the foreigner alike* [emphasis mine], such as the principles of construction of social space or the mechanisms of reproduction of that space, and [I sought] to [construct] a model aspiring to a *universal validity* [i.e. the combination of *bodily capital* and *an analytic of racial domination*]. In that way it is possible to register the real differences that separate both structures and dispositions (habitus), the principle of which must be sought not in the peculiarities of some *national character* – or "soul" but *in the particularities of different collective histories*" (Bourdieu [1994] 1998: 3).

The *real differences* between these cases are not to be found simply in the extent of "race mixture," nor even in the significance of "race or color," the findings of this study demonstrate quantitatively that skin color may actually matter *more* for the life chances of black Americans than it does within the Brazilian population as a whole – a truly astounding result. Moreover, both the U.S. and Brazil are technically "multiracial" societies and in both cases a multitude of ethnoracial categories rooted in gradations of *skin color* and *ancestry* (though with differential weights accorded to each basis) were used even at the level of the National Census (though this changed over time in *each* case). No, the *differences* are to be found in their *collective histories*.

From the socioeconomic and demographic conditions of colonial Brazil and the colonial U.S. to the differences in each society after Emancipation (i.e. Jim Crow in the U.S., but not in Brazil, contrary to recent arguments, see Hernandez 2013) to the differential geopolitical power of each nation – these two cases, for all of their [surface] similarities, cannot be understood glibly as either *converging upon* or *diverging from* one another. Making matters even more complicated for such glib comparisons is that, in this instance, the *collective histories* of these two cases – and for better or worse, their presents – are intertwined (see Chapter 1, but also, Rout

[91] "Will All Humans Eventually Look Like Brazilians?" September 19th, 2012, by Natalie Wolchover. Avaiaable: http://news.yahoo.com/humans-eventually-look-brazilians-140349518.html

1973, Andrews 1996, Bourdieu & Wacquant [1999] 2005, and Seigel 2005). Consequently, we must instead look to the nature of the *categories* used in these systems of ethnoracial division, both in everyday life, but also at the level of the national census – for this, we must look to [history] of the State (i.e. the *bureaucratic field*), that massive reservoir of *symbolic power*, so uniquely capable to define the terms of the real (i.e. *nomos*, the principle of social vision and division).

Given all of this, it is unclear what is really meant by the idea that the U.S. and Brazil are "converging." Is it that the U.S. moves to be more like Brazil (i.e. the LAT, but also Daniel 2007), or that Brazil moves to be more like the U.S. (Daniel 2007) (or was secretly, always much more like the U.S. than people were willing to admit or to see?; see Silva 1985; Hasenbalg 1985; Hanchard 1994; Twine 1998; Sheriff 2001), or is that there will be *shared* elements of ethnoracial division in both cases, thus the movement is really towards an *intermediate* type? A careful reading of the history of these cases, along with an analytically sound understanding of the present, suggest that the U.S. and Brazil have always and continue to *share* key aspects of their respective systems of ethnoracial division in the early 21st century (i.e. the significance of skin color regardless of whether ethnoracial categorization is primarily a *descent-based* dichotomy or a *continuum* of physical appearance). In the final analysis, it seems that E. Franklin Frazier was *mostly* correct in his conclusion about the U.S. and Brazil in comparative perspective in 1944 which for a host of reasons, seems to have been forgotten:

> "In spite of [the] differences between the racial situation in Brazil and the United States, it should be pointed out by way of conclusion that the development of race relations in the two countries reveals some underlying similarities. In both countries, the close association of whites and blacks produced a class of mixed-bloods. Although, in the United States, an attempt to maintain a caste system has prevented the identification of the mixed-bloods with the whites through the process of 'passing,' persons with Negro blood have passed into the white race… Race mixture in the United States, as in Brazil, has been one of the chief factors in the social differentiation of the non-white population, and it has facilitated the social mobility of colored individuals. The relation of color differences to occupational structure in Brazil closely parallels the same phenomenon in the segregated Negro community in the United States. Moreover, as in Brazil, this phenomenon in the United States is a rough index to the process of acculturation, though it does not lad to complete assimilation, because of the attempt to maintain a racial caste in the United States" (Frazier [1944] 1992: 135-136).

As ironic as it is, it seems that not only have we come full circle (see Patterson 2000), but history is repeating itself (though most researchers, in their shared state of *anamnesis*, remain unaware of this): E. Franklin Frazier continues, "[as] the attempt to maintain a caste system [in the U.S.] becomes less effectual, [it] is likely that the racial situation [of the U.S.] will approximate the situation in Brazil" (Frazier 1944 [1992]: 136). Three decades later, Degler (1971: 268) concluded that "the patterns of race relations in the two countries [the U.S. and Brazil] are converging." Is it really the case, however, that long-standing similarities are a sufficient basis to speculate on whether two cases are *converging?* Ultimately, I find myself in roughly the same position as Wacquant (2008: 258-259) at the conclusion of his *comparative analysis of advanced marginality* – I quote him at-length (though with a few thematic revisions):

> "[A]re we witnessing an *epochal convergence of [regimes of ethnoracial division in South America] on the U.S. pattern? [Or, even a convergence of regimes of ethnoracial*

> *division in the U.S. on the Brazilian pattern?]* Backed by the methodical comparison of [ethnoracial division in the U.S., focusing on black Americans and within the Brazilian population as a whole], I argue that, contrary to widespread journalistic portrayals and the hasty pronouncements of scholars inspired by the political mood of the day more than by solid empirical investigation, such is not the case [though it could become the case in the future]: although [these cases] share common structural forces, [ethnoracial division] follows different social dynamics on the two continents that correspond to the distinct state configurations, [logics of ethnoracial classification], and [their] legacies of [racial domination, from slavery to Emancipation]. Lumping these variegated dynamics under the catch-all term [Latin Americanization] – or one of its derivatives – such as [multiraciality, cf. Daniel 2007], as a number of commentators on ["race relations"] are wont to do – is neither empirically illuminating nor analytically correct. The combined resurgence of [concerns over skin tone inequality (though this is often misunderstood), "multiracials," immigration, and ultimately, the possible *likenesses* of the U.S. and Brazil] [along with] the [continued] hegemony of U.S.-rooted concepts across the globe, must not blind us to the persistent divergences in the ways whereby societies produce, organize, and construct [ethnoracial division], *even as its structural sources are similar* across nations…"

In Part III (forthcoming), I take a look *deeper*, *beneath the surface* as it were, to examine the *lived experience* of *bodily capital* and ethnoracial division in the U.S. and Brazil, using in-depth interviews and direct observation. Such an analysis, it is my sincere hope, will further illuminate, both empirically and analytically, 'the real differences' that separate both structures and dispositions (habitus) related to *ethnoracial division* and *racial domination* in the U.S. and Brazil – but also, (most likely) their many *family resemblances*.

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