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Southside, We Outside: Policing and Placemaking in Historic Jamaica, Queens, New York

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Southside, We Outside: Policing and Placemaking in Historic Jamaica, Queens, New York

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

by

Debanjan Roychoudhury

2022

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Southside, We Outside: Policing and Placemaking in Historic Jamaica, Queens, New York

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Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2022

Professor Karida Brown, Co-Chair

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The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly known as "The Kerner Commission" after its chair Otto Kerner, was assigned by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 to report on the causes of urban uprisings over the course of four consecutive summers. 'Rioting' took place in 150 American cities and resulted directly from police violence against African Americans. The report concluded that the nation was moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal. Fifty years later, urban (and suburban) uprisings following police murders again illuminate the trajectory that the Kerner Commission cautioned against. Protests over several summers challenging excessive police use of force, police violence,

and the role of police in enforcing structural racism in the U.S., culminated in 2020, during the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, and have since taken place around the world.

Developing a qualitative study of policing in the Jamaica section of Queens County, New York seeks: 1) to better understand the ways in which policing and police violence in urban communities have been contested during the post-1968 era of massive demographic, political, economic, and cultural change and 2) to investigate how and why the American "War on Drugs" has emerged and police power has expanded and the ways this historic process has shaped Black American neighborhoods, politics, and subjectivity.

The findings of this study deepen our understandings of the American police-community dialectic by centering Black agency, politics, and press. Guided by critical discourse analysis and "conceptual metaphor theory," data is drawn from Black Press, White Press, the archives, and civic organization membership, to examine discourse on protests, civic, and political action, following the historic killings of 10-year-old Clifford Glover in 1973, and 23-year-old Sean Bell in 2006. This study's recovery of the collective memory of Clifford Glover is the most extensive social science treatment of the first murder trial of an on-duty police officer in New York City history. Linking this largely forgotten past to the innovation of Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) in southeast Queens following the 1988 assassination of 103rd Precinct officer Edward Byrne, reshapes the study of mass incarceration.

The dissertation of Debanjan Roychoudhury is approved.

Darnell Montez Hunt

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University of California, Los Angeles

2022

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For my Amma and Dida for teaching me to build altars and be a medium. I speak through you. For my mother, Kanchana, my father, Abi, my brother Debangshu, my sister Monisha, for raising me and sheltering me and covering me with love. For Marcus, Karida, Jemima, Darnell, you all nurtured my intellectual and creative spirit, for seeing something in me when I couldn't quite find the words. I am endlessly grateful and indebted to you and could not imagine a more complete, appropriate, and perfect committee for my project and for my person. Thank you. For my partner Katherine, for seeing possibility in my impossible mind, for bearing with me and caring for me and holding me through the storms that brewed in me while I tried against my own obstruction to complete this. For my community, scattered, for imperfect solidarity, for commitment to a higher cause, for everyone that's ever taught me or talked to me or listened to me go on. I am not able at this time to fully articulate what this all means to me. I am sure that that will come with time and with space. For divine timing, for prayer, for memory, for eulogy. For love, for home, for finding ourselves in each other. I am because we are.

VITA

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Chapter 1: Introduction

If Queens is indeed "The World's Borough,"[1] then Jamaica is emblematic of the Black planet. Queens County, the easternmost borough of New York City, neighbors Nassau County and the rest of Long Island stretching to the Atlantic Ocean. Queens is the largest and second most populous of the five New York City boroughs and the most ethnically and linguistically diverse urban area in the world (ny.gov). Though the entire city is steeped in neighborhood pride, Queens County residents are the only ones who write 1 of 91 distinct Queens neighborhoods, the most in the city (nyc.gov), on their postal addresses (Fruhlinger 2019). While residents of the other boroughs will simply write Brooklyn, Bronx, or Staten Island, with Manhattanites addressed at New York, NY, Queens residents get specific, signaling not only the massive size of the borough but also a deep seeded loyalty for their enclaves.

Southeast Queens, made up of Queens Community Districts 12 and 13, is one of the last remaining Black regions of Queens, New York, and the field site subject of this study. Making up almost the entire eastern boundary of the largest American city, Queens Community Districts 12 and 13 are comprised of the neighborhoods of Hollis, Jamaica, South Jamaica, Springfield Gardens, Rochdale, St. Albans, Bellerose, Bellaire, Brookville, Cambria Heights, Floral Park, Glen Oaks, Laurelton, New Hyde Park, Queens Village, and Rosedale, which make up 22.2 square miles of land directly north of John F. Kennedy International Airport and the Jamaica Bay. As noted by New York City Department of City Planning, these neighborhood names and boundaries are not officially designated. The majority of the approximately half-million residents that presently call this section of New York home are Black and almost half are foreign-born (New York City Planning Community District Profiles).

[1] Queens' slogan on city billboards welcoming travelers to the borough read "The World's Borough" so named for the World's Fair that took place in 1968 as well as for ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious diversity.

The region of New York City known as southeast Queens, originally the independent town of Jamaica before incorporation of Queens into the City of Greater New York in 1898, was not always a Black community. How southeast Queens became a predominantly Black place, and what has occurred there in the years since is the subject of this novel study. Understanding the evolution of political contention over the expansion of police power in the midst of Black economic progress in southeast Queens contributes significantly to knowledge of urban American social life. The region has historically been patrolled chiefly by the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) 103rd and 105th Precincts, before the 113th Precinct was established in 1974, splitting the southern region of what was originally just the 103rd Precinct (nypdangels.com). The 103rd Precinct remains the police jurisdiction tasked with patrolling the central commercial and municipal hub of downtown Jamaica, or Jamaica Center, the corridor that includes Jamaica Avenue, known locally as "The Ave." Jamaica Avenue is home to Jamaica Station, the fourth busiest rail station in North America, connecting New York City to the Long Island suburbs, and via John F. Kennedy International Airport, to the entire world (mta.info).

Understanding the relationship between Jamaica, Queens residents and the NYPD 103rd Precinct over the past half century provides important insights for the illumination of several intertwined twenty-first century social problems. Utilizing theories of critical discourse and collective memory to study news reporting constitutes a thorough historical analysis of how expansive and unchecked police power has been politically contested over the lifespan of a community. In doing so, this study ties together and contributes novel findings to research on post-1968 migration and racialization, urbanization and suburbanization, and disinvestment and reinvestment in the age of mass incarceration.

That story begins in this study with the tragic police shooting death of a 10-year-old boy named Clifford Glover in South Jamaica, Queens, on April 28, 1973. The potency of this powder keg moment for the entire community, and its foreshadowing of policies far beyond, is uncovered and archived in chapter 2. The extensive analysis of racialized press discourse in this study comprises the first social science treatment of both the youngest victim of police shooting in the city's history and the acquittal of the first New York City police officer put on trial by jury for murder while on duty.

From out of the aftermath of the acquittal of the police officer responsible for killing Clifford Glover, and longstanding disinvestment especially in the commercial center of Jamaica in southeast Queens, the prevailing drug market and consequential violence that overwhelmed the region is discussed in depth in chapter 3. The first deployment Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) following the 1988 assassination of rookie 103rd Precinct officer Edward Byrne is explored in depth, contrasting the government response to the high-profile police killings and officer acquittals at the heart of this study. The swift mobilization of millions of dollars in federal and local resources to unprecedentedly incarcerate and punish, en masse, low-level drug offenders is explored in depth, offering important insight into the national war on drugs strategy, across several presidential administrations, catalyzing in Southside, Jamaica, Queens around the collective memory of one slain police officer during the most violent time in the city's history.

This study culminates with in-depth analysis of news reporting on the police killing of 23-year-old Sean Bell in Jamaica, Queens on November 26, 2006, what was supposed to be his wedding day, by a team of 103rd Precinct officers in a barrage of over 50 bullets, all of whom were acquitted of murder charges in a bench trial in 2008. Employing the same critical discourse analysis of racialized press discourse used to study the police shooting death of Clifford Glover

and eventual acquittal of all officers involved allows for a unique analysis of discourse on victims, communities, and officers involved in police killings in one neighborhood and precinct over time in chapter 4. One of the principal findings of this study is the "loss of memory," how Clifford Glover's place in the history of southeast Queens fades from public record, entirely unmentioned when Sean Bell is killed by police from the same exact NYPD 103rd Precinct over three decades later, once again sparking mass protests and collective action.

Bringing us to the contemporary contention around present expansion of policing in southeast Queens, chapter 5 focuses on the political climate that sees the rise of Black electoral politics and the 2021 election of South Jamaica's own Eric Adams, the first Black mayor of New York since David Dinkins, elected in 1989. Current Queens and city leadership's political struggle over the future of policing in Black neighborhoods, specifically the role of Crisis Management Service organizations as an alternative to hyperpolicing and incarceration is explored. Learning about the present political debate about police power, economic development, and the future of southeast Queens gives us crucial insight into how local and federal policies around criminal justice, economic reinvestment, and the continual cycle of outmigration and in migration are interrelated.

Pieced together, the 5 chapters that follow, plus the methodological appendix, trace the discourses that emerge following two high profile police killings, officer acquittals, and collective action in the 103rd Precinct of Jamaica, Queens. The discourses that appear, often in contention between White Press and Black Press, relate to the victims, their families, and communities impacted by police violence. How does the region of southeast Queens, made up of neighborhoods emblematic of economic progress, especially as defined by Black homeownership, simultaneously become depicted as a center of urban blight, narcotics

trafficking, and crime, warranting unparalleled police power and innovative technologies of arrest and hyperincarceration amidst the crack cocaine epidemic?

The findings of this study contribute uniquely to research on urban policing. First, the comparison of Black Press and White Press establishes a necessary link between news discourse on police violence and perceptions of the people and communities disproportionately impacted by fatal police encounters. The focus on one neighborhood in the most populous American city demonstrates the impact of police violence over time and the necessity to trace specific, place-based histories of police killings and officer acquittals. Finally, this research centers the role of Black discursive news making, as a means of placemaking, especially in contrast to mainstream news discourse around victims of police violence and, by extension, their communities.

Central to this project's conceptualization of memory is the theoretical framework of colonial aphasia. Writing about disabled, or deadened, racial histories in France, Ann Laura Stoler (2011) coined the phrase to better describe and define what often is referred to as "forgotten history" or "collective amnesia." Describing the active process of making colonial legacies unavailable, she writes:

> But forgetting and amnesia are misleading terms to describe this guarded separation and the procedures that produced it. *Aphasia*, I propose, is perhaps a more apt term, one that captures not only the nature of that blockage but also the feature of loss…It is not a matter of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken (Stoler 2011, p. 125).

Enabling racial histories that have been disabled requires looking into the documented representation of those histories themselves. Specifically, the ways that police violence operates in Black communities and is depicted and reported on reveals the ways communities are

discussed collectively and acted upon. How police and other city funding is decided is linked to how crime, safety, and communities themselves are imagined.

Perhaps the most remarkable finding of this research arises not from a narrative presence around police violence in Black communities as with 'no angel' discourse and the conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER , but instead from a discursive absence. The data that I intended to compare across time was discourse around policing in one neighborhood. Controlling for geographic context and jurisdictional precinct allowed me to compare, across time, discourse on collective action in the wake of police killings and officer acquittals. Thus, the case of Jamaica, Queens, where the killings of Clifford Glover in 1973, and Sean Bell in 2006, by NYPD 103rd Precinct officers occurred, provides insight into the historic relationship between police violence, protest, and press media coverage.

Despite this historic comparison, I found no mention of the death of Clifford Glover, or the aftermath of Officer Shea's acquittal, in reporting from *The New York Times* or the *New York Amsterdam News* in 2006 or 2008. My search captured front-page reporting in the immediate wake of both killings and acquittals.

Demonstrated through evidence from news reporting following the police killings of Clifford Glover in 1973, and Sean Bell in 2006, in both cases by 103rd Precinct officers, and the swift federal response to the assassination of 103rd Precinct officer Ed Byrne in 1988, via the advancement of War on Drugs policing, I show that, in the last half century, Jamaica, Queens has become exemplary of how expanded police power, mass incarceration, and disinvestment deterred the gains of an entire generation of urban Black residents.

My argument is anchored in three principal findings, that carry across both the police killings of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell, and the acquittals of all officers involved in both cases:

1) ‘No Angel’ discourse dehumanizes, vilifies, and criminalizes victims of police violence, as well as the families and friends of those victims as a means of justifying police misconduct. 2) The conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER depicts Black neighborhoods as disordered and violent in the aftermath of police violence and officer acquittals, criminalizing entire communities for protesting police actions. 3) The Loss of Memory enables the continuation of unfettered police expansion without proper reconciliation, reform, or repair.

The outcomes of what has occurred in Jamaica, Queens, over the past fifty years, has had far reaching consequences beyond the community itself, the protests following the 1973 and 2006 police murders of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell echoing far beyond just the 103rd Precinct. The sweeping expansion of municipal police funding and discretion in response to the 1988 assassination of Officer Ed Byrne, treating street level narcotic trafficking with severity previously reserved for federal crimes, laid the foundation for drug policing for decades to follow and the effects of the innovative punitive technologies introduced in Jamaica, Queens continue to have collateral consequences on urban communities nationwide. Perhaps, just as importantly, the cultural creations, first of Jazz and then of Hip Hop, made in the place that experienced these simultaneous phenomena, the civil rights advances, and the treacherous violence, have shaped the entire planet in the five decades since 1973. As the world continues to come to Jamaica, Queens, so too have the residents of Jamaica, Queens given back to the world.

The Origins of Jamaica, Queens

Jamaica is named for the Jameco (or Yamecah) Indians who first inhabited the region, “Jameco” being the Algonquin word for beaver, which were plentiful and widely traded. The Jameco established their trail near what was formerly “Beaver Pond,” now known as Baisley

Pond (Queens Library). The first English settlers arrived from Long Island in 1655, gaining control from the Dutch who had called the region “Rustdorp” or “rest-town.”

In 1655, the first English settlers paid the Native Americans two guns, a coat and some gunpowder for the land lying between the old trail, present day Jamaica Avenue, and “Beaver Pond,” which would later become Baisley Pond (Queens Library). The first church in Queens, also the oldest Presbyterian church in the country, was built here in 1662. The name Jamaica was adopted for the entire southeast portion of Queens in 1680. Jamaica became the county seat in 1683 when Queens was organized as one of the counties of New York State by the British. The court and county and clerk’s office were established there (Cultural Collaborative Jamaica).

Natives were victims of mass genocide, and there were also 1,300 enslaved Africans in Queens County by 1727. On March 16, 1656, Peter Stuyvesant, governor of New Netherland, granted a charter for the area to fifteen English families. The charter was intended to start a new plantation halfway between Hempstead and Canarsie (Suggs 1975). During the early 1800’s, South Jamaica was inhabited by many Black families. These families were originally brought in as slaves to work the tobacco plantations in the area, and they chose to remain after slavery was abolished in New York State in 1820 (Gamble 1974). Jamaica was granted a village charter from New York State and incorporated in 1814.

Established as the conglomeration of four separate towns in 1897, the present-day county of Queens is made up of what were originally the towns of Flushing, Newtown, and Jamaica (WNET). Like other Black neighborhoods in New York City, Jamaica was home to European immigrant settlers for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Established as a market village and transportation center for the farming communities of Long Island, South Jamaica was originally settled by mostly Germans, Jews, Italians, and Poles. Prior to the 1920s,

Black people accounted for fewer than 5% of South Jamaica residents (Owens 1997). Between 1920 and 1940, however, considerable numbers of Black New Yorkers who were emigres from Harlem, the city's main node of Black settlement, resettled in southeast Queens. By 1925, Jamaica was the premier shopping center for all Central Queens and in the 1930's was the financial heart of Queens. The first self-service supermarket in the country, King Kullen, opened in 1930 on Jamaica Avenue. By 1940, Black people comprised more than 60% of the area's residents (Rose 1984).

Figure 1. Map of the Village of Jamaica, Queens County, New York: Every Lot and Building. Library of Congress, 1876.



Until the middle of the 20th century, Jamaica was the center of commerce, government, and entertainment for most of Queens and parts of Brooklyn and Nassau County. A primary reason for its growth has been its uniqueness as a transit hub, with the converging of 10 Long Island Railroad (LIRR) branches, 13 bus lines, 4 major Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) subway lines, 5 adjacent highways and connecting transportation to John F. Kennedy International Airport. Beginning in the 1960's, however, Jamaica experienced erosion in its position as the borough's largest business district.

Figure 2. Early British Map of Jamaica and Jamaica Bay



New regional shopping malls in neighboring Nassau County siphoned off downtown retail activity, resulting in the closing of downtown Jamaica department stores, the relocation of two headquarter banks, and the departure of its largest industry, along with the loss of jobs and economic activity linked to those anchors (Cultural Collaborative Jamaica).

The transition of Jamaica from a majority ethnic white neighborhood to majority Black was greatly aided by the mid-twentieth century highway and housing policies of the federal government. Outward growth, in the 1930s and 1940s, as opposed to the upward growth of the 1920s, was facilitated by the construction of public parkways and

expressways that allowed for easier suburban to central city commutes. The ability to live and work in two places, spread across a long distance, provided a strong incentive for ethnic white outmigration from the city's older neighborhoods (Caro 1975).

Although Jim Crow permeated New York's urban and suburban neighborhoods and institutions, neighborhoods in Queens County were well-known sites of Black aspiration, achievement, pleasure, and creativity, dubbed the "home of the Jazz" by the Flushing Town Hall (Clerge 2020). During the Harlem Renaissance, Queens became a site of second settlement for Black people who wanted larger living spaces than Harlem could provide. Many were jazz musicians, artists, and intellectuals; some belonged to the old Black bourgeoisie (Gregory 1998). Many neighborhoods in Queens County were bastions of Black aspiration, achievement, pleasure, and creativity. The first Black jazz musicians to move to Queens were jazz singer Eva Taylor and her husband, Clarence Williams, a music publisher, and businessman. They purchased a home and several adjacent lots in a rural area of Jamaica in 1927.

Figure 3. Cover of Queens Jazz Trail



Billie Holliday, Dizzie Gillespie, Count Basie, Fats Waller, Ella Fitzgerald, James Brown, and Jackie Robinson all purchased property in the Black suburban demi-paradises of Jamaica Queens, Black New York's version of the *Gold Coast*, named for the Gatsby-esque mansions that lined the north shore of Long Island. In 1947, they were joined by the acclaimed author, playwright and activist Shirley Graham and William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, who moved to a modest home in Addisleigh Park and married in 1951. In defiance of anti-Black

covenants, some white homeowners sold their homes to elite Black buyers. These neighborhoods became known for housing some of the country's most affluent Black people (Clerge 2020). White retaliation against monied Black neighbors mirrored national trends of suburb making. As housing development revved up in the 1920s, so did the political and social articulations of White power over them, including a surge in the presence of the Ku Klux Klan in Queens and on Long Island (Clerge 2020).

Figure 4. Queens Jazz Trail Map and excerpts







In 1927, the same year Eva Taylor and Clarence Williams purchased their home in Jamaica, Queens, one thousand white-robed Klansmen marched in a Memorial Day Parade along Queens Boulevard in Jamaica. As Orly Clerge (2020) puts it, "The prewar and wartime development of New York's suburbs involved a collision between White efforts to maintain exclusion and Black working-class and middle-class placemaking."

White suburbanization was strengthened by lending policies and practices of the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans' Administration, encouraging urban residential flight through subsidies, low down-payments, and long-term loans. During the 1950s and 1960s, Black people in New York City gained access to better paying employment, especially in the public sector, which fostered a growth in Black household incomes. Following the pattern displayed by the middle-class of other racial and ethnic groups, Black middle-income families, as well as a considerable number of working-class ones, exited from older urban neighborhoods as residential opportunities appeared in other areas. In southeast Queens, the Black middle-class moved eastward out of South Jamaica and settled into neighborhoods like St. Albans, Hollis, and Springfield Gardens that were once middle-class white (Owens 1997).

Throughout the 1970s, the economic base of South Jamaica deteriorated, and the neighborhood became one of the most economically depressed places in New York City. Although it was an area of the city desperately in need of public and private investment, South Jamaica did not receive it, resulting in residents experiencing increasing levels of private and public disinvestment in and around the neighborhood. Initially, as packing, processing, and freight industries declined in the area during the 1950s, new employment opportunities became

available to the residents of South Jamaica in the emergent retail and services industry of Jamaica Center, the commercial hub of southeast Queens (Owens 1997).

During the latter part of the 1960s, experts had predicted that Jamaica Center would become New York City's newest regional center of commerce—an outer borough business area that would attract private investment and stem the middle class move to the suburbs (Regional Plan Association 1968). This prediction proved false, however, as instead of witnessing a growth in private investment, business start-ups, and new jobs, Jamaica Center experienced a dramatic dislocation of jobs, along with capital and business flight. The area's three big retailers—Macy's, Gertz, and Mays—closed their doors and moved out of the neighborhood that was once New York City's third largest retail center and the nation's fourth busiest rail center. Additionally, the area saw the closing of the *Long Island Press* in 1977, once its largest employer, and the loss of the headquarters of the Jamaica Savings Bank. As the rate of store closings and commercial vacancies rose in the vicinity of South Jamaica, so did property abandonment, crime, poverty, and out-migrations of middle-class Black families (Jacobs 1982).

What happened beyond this point in time is the subject of this study. As jobs dislocated, and employment dipped, drug markets expanded, and territorial violence emerged. As New York City on the whole experienced economic hardship, crime and urban blight took hold, or so we're told. What is the true origin of the American War on Drugs and mass incarceration?

The Black Planet

Borrowing from the legendary Hip Hop collective Public Enemy's third studio album, the title *Fear of a Black Planet* (1990) remains both ominous and omniscient[2]. The upbringings of Public Enemy group members, hailing from the Roosevelt suburb on Long Island, New York,

[2] Originally recorded in 1989, the work was selected for the National Recording Registry by the Library of Congress in 2004, an annual selection of recordings that are "culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant."

gathered in Jamaica, Queens, surely inspired the title of their third album, whose subheading reads "The Counterattack on World Supremacy." Understanding the link between place and politics is crucial to understanding the context around this album's release in 1990, the most murderous year in the city of New York's history.

Long before the oratorical rhymes of Chuck D filled the airwaves, Queens was known as the Home of Jazz, the residence of choice for hundreds of the genre's leading players. One of the most iconic titles and anthems of its time, "Fight the Power" was the lead single off *Fear of the Black Planet*, also known as the theme to Spike Lee's classic film, *Do the Right Thing*.[3] "Our freedom of speech is freedom or death, we've got to fight the powers that be" is the iconic refrain that concludes the track's first verse, a solemn and concise summation of the urgency of Hip Hop, and the continuity of protest, both sonic and in the streets.

To begin to fully grasp the significance of Jazz first, then Hip Hop, and the nexus of Black cultural expression in late twentieth century New York City, the "golden era" of Hip Hop, we must delve deeply into the historic, geographic, and political context that gave rise to this movement at the crossroads of urban and suburban, Black American and Afro-diasporic, middle class and working class, that still dominates music, fashion, media, and culture globally to this day. Here, we journey across time and space to the metaphorical center of that feared Black planet at a time of great upheaval and change, where promises of progress and prosperity met with inevitable backlash. To Jamaica, southeast Queens, New York City, 1973.

In the span of less than one year, two 10-year-old Black boys were killed on separate occasions by New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers, inciting protests and violent

[3] Public Enemy's "Fight the Power" is inspired by the Isley Brothers song of the same name, released in 1975 as the lead single from the landmark *The Heat Is On* album by the Cincinnati, Ohio-bred group that has since been inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and been awarded the Grammy Lifetime Achievement Award.

discontent throughout the city. On April 28, 1973, Clifford Glover was killed in Queens by officers from the 103rd Precinct, just over eight months after August 15, 1972, the day that Ricky Bodden was killed on Staten Island by officers from the 120th Precinct, the youngest reported individuals killed by New York police at the time.

Bodden was born in British Honduras and emigrated to the U.S. from Belize in 1965 with his mother, Eva, whom he lived with. Clifford Glover's stepfather, Add Armstead, was walking him to work, which he always did on Saturdays, when he was killed. Armstead had moved to New York from Fredericksburg, Virginia a few decades prior, and began living with Clifford's mother, Eloise, in 1971. The circumstances surrounding officers' suspicions and eventual decisions to use lethal force bear significant similarities. Bodden was being pursued by police after exiting the backseat of a stolen Pontiac with two older children, neither of them armed. Glover was approached by plainclothes officers because he and his stepfather allegedly fit the description of taxicab robbery suspects, neither of them armed. Both children were shot in the back and killed while running (Kracijek 2017).

Ricky and Clifford were both children of the Black planet, born of the forced transnational transport of African peoples westward, and subsequent mass migration of Blacks from the southern United States, the Caribbean, and Central America northward. Though their origins are different, their memories are intertwined in evocation of what New York City children endured in the midst of 1970s economic decline and the expansion of police power. In the aftermath of Bodden's and Glover's deaths, residents of New Brighton, Staten Island and Jamaica, Queens took to the streets, shouting in the language of the unheard. Decades later, the 2006 killing of 23-year-old Sean Bell in a 50-bullet barrage by 103rd Precinct officers in Queens

and the 2015 chokehold death of 43-year-old Eric Garner by 120th Precinct officers in Staten Island would again incite protest throughout the boroughs and the nation.

The police killings of 10-year-olds Ricky Bodden and Clifford Glover in 1972 and 1973, and the high-profile police killings of Eric Garner and Sean Bell decades later, in the same exact NYPD precincts and New York City neighborhoods, provide important historical context for understanding the contemporary relationship between policing, police violence, politics, and protest. Police killings serve as touchstones to evaluate the public response to policing at large. Elucidating the impact of police violence on individual neighborhoods and cities entails revisiting specific incidents of police violence and collective action in urban Black communities that have received news and press coverage, local and national, and, in turn, what policy changes did or did not result from news reporting on these public expressions of dissent and discontent.

Prior to the police killings of Clifford Glover and Ricky Bodden that reignited the flame of protests opposing police violence in Black communities in New York in 1972 and 1973, there had been consecutive summers of urban rioting throughout the nation opposing police violence throughout the United States that ultimately led, in part, to the passing of landmark civil rights legislation in the late 1960s. The 1968 Kerner Commission Report, more formally known as The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, was created by President Lyndon B. Johnson's Executive Order 11365 on July 28, 1967. The order was issued after days of uprising in Detroit, Michigan and Newark, New Jersey, both sparked by police violence, characterized by arson, looting, dozens of deaths, and hundreds of injuries (Cobb 2021). President Johnson charged the eleven-member Kerner panel with answering three questions: "What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?"

Over the fifty-plus years that have followed, these questions have proven as relevant as they are repetitive, as demonstrated throughout this study. The report found that, though in almost every instance riots were touched off by police violence, police were merely the spear's tip of much broader systemic and institutional failures. The report attributed the riots to lack of economic opportunity, failed social service programs, police brutality, white racism, and biased media. This study addresses the interlocking of these underlying issues in one metropolitan, historically Black community over time.

The conclusions the report found echoed what many Black social scientists, thinkers, and lay philosophers had already known, that the so-called Negro problem was, in fact, a White problem: "What white Americans have never fully understood— but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." This was true for Black communities across the U.S., and it was certainly true for Queens, New York.

The Color Line and The World's Borough

On New Year's Eve in 1974, a year and a half after—and under four miles from where—Clifford Glover was killed by 103rd Precinct officers in South Jamaica, Ormistan and Glenda Spencer were awoken in the middle of the night by a loud noise. A pipe bomb had been thrown through the front window into their living room at 243-11 146th Ave. in the Rosedale neighborhood of southeast Queens. The Spencer family migrated from the island of Trinidad in the West Indies to New York City in 1973, after having lived in London. At first, they lived with Ormistan's mother in Ozone Park, another neighborhood in south Queens, before moving into Rosedale, an area they said they knew nothing of before purchasing their home there in July 1974 (Moyers 1976, Clerge 2020).

Before the Spencers moved in, their house was set on fire with gasoline, but despite this they moved. Attached to the pipe bomb that exploded on the front porch of the Spencers' Rosedale home and smashed through the windows of their house was a note that read: "Nigger be warned. We have time. We will get your firstborn first." It was signed, "Viva Boston. KKK," a reference to the violent refusal of white parents to accept the busing of Black students to schools in South Boston, the latest anti-integration protest in two decades of widespread resistance to school desegregation (Clerge 2020) since the US Supreme Court case *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954).

"In England, you hear about this happening in the South," Ormistan Spencer said in a 1975 interview with Bill Moyers, "but you just don't think it happens in New York City." Ormistan and Gloria Spencer learned, as did millions of Black migrants to the urban American north from the American south, the Caribbean, and Latin America, the wise and cautionary words of Malcolm X that "if you black, you were born in jail, in the North as well as the South. Stop talking about the South. As long as you south of the Canadian border, you South." New York was certainly no exception to the rule that the "southern horrors" that migrants fled would turn into northern nightmares. Following 1971, more than ten acts of violence were aimed at the few Black families living in Rosedale at the time before the New Year's Eve bombing of the Spencers' home—a bomb intended to kill the Spencer family.

The Spencers and their three young boys feared for their lives, especially after their youngest son was beaten up twice in their own front yard. The bombing galvanized supporters from beyond Rosedale, who gathered outside the Spencer home. White people in Rosedale gathered to counter the protest that they alleged was being spurred by outsiders. While protesters

chanted, “What do we want? The right to live where we choose!” and “Smash the KKK,” Rosedale’s white residents sang “God Bless America, my home sweet home.”

One Black protester present explained when interviewed by Bill Moyers:

> You know, every time good people want to live anywhere, they’ve been harassed. Even in the ghetto, for instance, our kids are being shot down, you know, kids are being harassed. And then you move to a neighborhood, you say, I want to move out here into a peaceful neighborhood, bombs are being thrown into your house and that’s not right. People have the right to live where they want to live in America. If I have $40,000 to spend on a house, I’m supposed to live in that $40,000 house (Moyers 1976).

He explained further: “They want to keep their community white. So that means this country is separated, this country is divided. You mean you want a divided country; I live on this side of the railroad track, and you live on the other side. Well, that’s not the United States then. That’s the divided states.”

In the same telecast film, *Rosedale—The Way it Is* (1976), a white moderate who didn’t want to be interviewed for the film, told WNET reporters Bill Moyers and Richard Kotuk, that while they “don’t approve of violence,” they’re “determined to keep Rosedale from turning Black.” They say that the “acts of a few bomb-throwing racists have obscured their case.” Bill Moyers narrates:

> What they’re trying to prevent, they say, is this: [camera pans to show dilapidated homes]. This is the ghetto of South Jamaica, also in Queens, just 3 miles from Rosedale. It’s a familiar story. Once residential and almost all-white, now South Jamaica is the home of 70,000 people, most of whom are poor and Black. Almost half of them earn less than $4,000 a year. 30,000 live on welfare. As the neighborhood dipped, crime rates soared. It is 1,600% higher than in Rosedale. More than 9,000 crimes were committed here last year. The schools of South Jamaica have some of the lowest reading levels in the city. There isn’t one public elementary school where more than one-half of the children read at or above grade level. Even closer to Rosedale, the very next community in fact, is Laurelton. In the last five years, it’s gone from 35% to 65% Black. So, when they look north and west, the whites in Rosedale see coming the very changes they once fled.

Moyers continues:

> When they look east, they see this: [pans to a white man mowing his lawn in a vehicle in front of a large home]. Directly across the New York City line are some of the most fashionable and expensive suburbs in America, with homes ranging well over $100,000 in price. School and property taxes on one of these homes, for a single year, can be higher than the down payment on a house in Rosedale. Beyond are other affluent communities of Nassau County whose per capita income is among the highest in America. Two and one-half million people live in Nassau and neighboring Suffolk counties. Only 5% of them are Black.

Bill Moyers, who served as Press Secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1965 to 1967, says in his 1976 film, that whites in the suburbs feel insulated from the rapid changes that struck New York. Property values and political policies discourage low-income people, white or Black, from moving to Long Island, because they just can't afford it. This, he argues, is why the working- and middle-class Black families like the Spencers, who can't afford the suburbs, have their "eye on Rosedale" and it's why "the whites who already live here feel hemmed in with nowhere to go. They're determined to hang on." He explains:

Figure 5. Map of Southeast Queens neighborhoods and Long Island. *Bill Moyers' Journal* (1976).



> This is one way they're doing it, with a home referral service run by an organization known as ROAR: ROAR, Return Our American Rights, is dedicated to keeping Rosedale white. Its home referral service was set up to make sure that, if whites moved out, they would sell their homes to other whites. ROAR keeps a listing of families who are selling, makes contact with prospective white buyers, then shows the homes.

While one member of ROAR showed a white couple a home for sale in Rosedale, he alluded to the type of white ethnic solidarity he felt should be shown amongst residents:

> The main feature about Rosedale is just about everybody is hardworking people, they have a heck of a lot of pride in their homes, in the community, and we've got just about everything over here. We've got Chinese, we've got Jews, we've got Italians, we've got Slovaks, you know, a melting pot. This is—I can honestly say about Rosedale, it is America, period. A melting pot, a great melting pot and you got it right here in this community, a hell of a great community, I can't emphasize that enough. I think this neighborhood with people like yourself coming in…are going to help keep Rosedale just the way it is—a beautiful white ethnic community, and when I say ethnic, boy, we've got it…I don't think it'll change, they're trying, they're trying like hell to knock us out. They overpublicize a heck of a lot of things, things that happened in Springfield Gardens, they call Rosedale. Just to, you know, put the spotlight on Rosedale, maybe to scare people but it's not working. Nobody's running. Nobody is running and if they have to move, they'll give the home to ROAR.

In "The World's Borough," the hardworking immigrant narrative coalesced around white supremacy to the tune of anti-Blackness for southern and eastern Europeans. The collective memory of migration in Queens, New York confirms the presence of a Black-white binary among immigrant groups from different regions of the racialized world.

Pieced together, the passages from journalist Bill Moyers' 1976 landmark production, *Rosedale: The Way it Is* demonstrate how whites in southeast Queens used both formal and informal means of racial social control to prevent Black families' residential mobility following the end of legal housing discrimination with the introduction of the 1968 Fair Housing Act. This is crucial context for understanding the racial, economic, and political climates of both Jamaica and its surrounding residential enclaves at the time of the police

killing of Clifford Glover and the unrest, discontent, and mass dissent it spurred. Southeast Queens became predominantly Black at this exact time and the history uncovered in this study begins with this demographic migratory process.

Before the Spencers moved into Rosedale, there were 20 homes for sale. in 1976, there were over 200. This too, Moyers contends, is an old story:

> The fear of blockbusting can make a rumor come true. People act as if it's happening, and then it happens. ROAR is trying to stop it with some unusual tactics. When a white owner has sold to Blacks, ROAR has followed that family into their new neighborhood, demonstrated outside their home and told their new neighbors that this family sold to Blacks. ROAR is an angry outfit. The Justice Department has asked for an injunction against ROAR's activities, accusing them of harassing and intimidating tactics. Some moderates say its militance doesn't reflect Rosedale as a whole, but no other group effectively offered an alternative. So, ROAR, with the acquiescence of people who would not themselves have been militant, became the only game in town.

One of the two men charged with bombing the Spencer home, both of whom were acquitted of all charges by a jury of all white peers, was a member of ROAR. When interviewed, he stated: "This is something that someone dreamed up, that we have to mingle. I don't really think that that's life. I think we have basic differences; our lifestyles are entirely different. If I don't feel that I want to mingle with Blacks, there's no law in the world that can make me."

Another member of ROAR (Return Our American Rights), the "whites' rights" organization, explains his racist sentiments that the rest of southeast Queens has already been changed for the worse by inward migration of Black Americans:

> I mean, it's been proven in neighborhood after neighborhood, when they come, what happens to the neighborhood? I mean, you could go right from here in towards the city. You got Laurelton, which was beautiful, you got Springfield Gardens that was beautiful, nobody from Rosedale would walk down Merrick [Boulevard] in Laurelton at night. No white people.

The same white man defending ROAR's actions goes on to explain how white flight occurs, partially reflecting how Black Belts (Drake and Cayton 1945) begin to form in northern cities, after being asked "If they have the money to buy the house, why can't they come?":

> Because they're going to—Black people—well, because they'll come first and then maybe a couple of people will panic in the neighborhood. This is what happens, we'll be truthful, a couple of whites will panic, and they'll sell, and if they can't sell right away—it'll take the real estate a year or so—maybe they'll sell to the real estate. Then the real estate will maybe start renting it to welfare, and then you start getting the lower-class in. And then, the people next to these low-class people, these low-class Blacks, maybe they'll sell, so then you got three houses with Blacks in it. And then the next two go, and then the next two go, and then the next two go, and before you know it, you got all the low class in here, and here is your middle-class Black running again, and he goes in and screws up another white neighborhood.

The people who believe themselves to be white, who joined white extremist organizations like ROAR, maintained residential segregation through violence and other tactics meant to terrorize and threaten anyone Black who wished to buy homes, and anyone who intended to sell homes to Black families. This was the economic and spatial conglomeration of whiteness in the United States.

So, what of the creation of Blackness? How did the Black migrants, moving to northern metropolises configure their consciousness? Ormistan explains:

> I say, if I can afford to buy this house, wherever it is, that's where I'll be. And he can't dictate to me, or tell me where I should be. The constitution and the laws of this country says that everyone should have equal rights and I am demanding my equal rights. I look at it this way: when the house was up for sale, it was open to anybody. There was no notices anywhere saying that no Blacks allowed, or no Spanish allowed, or no Haitians or no Jews or no Italians. Therefore, since I was able to buy the house, I have a right to it, I have a right to live in it, and I have a right to do what I like in this house, 'cause it's my home. It's as simple as that. No one else has any form of—or any reason to tell us what we should do, or we can't live here, or we shouldn't live here or we've got to move. No one else, we decide that.

Support for the Spencers came from beyond Rosedale. In a *chocolate cities* linked fate (Hunter and Robinson 2018, Dawson 1994) sense, the Spencers found support in Black communities

throughout Queens County. Rev. Timothy Mitchell led the congregation at Ebenezer Baptist Church in Flushing, where hundreds bore witness. “Be a hedge all around them,” he proclaimed. “I’ll be alright someday, trouble will be over someday. I’ll wear a crown someday, if in my heart, I do believe, I’ll wear a crown someday,” the congregation sang as the Spencers bowed their heads and closed their eyes in prayer.

Glenda Spencer responds to the white racist attacks on her family and on all the Black families of southeast Queens, and in the Rosedale’s across America:

> We are here to stay, as a race, and right now, as a people, we are right here, and we’re going to stay here. Nobody’s going to change that. I mean, there are Black people who are harassed constantly, this isn’t—I said before—this has not been a unique situation, it’s happening to too many people all over the world, too many people in America this is happening to. And, many people, even your people in the neighboring communities, always says the easiest solution to the problem is—we now are the problem right here—and the

All Glenda and Tony Spencer wanted to do was live a peaceful life in the suburbs. As Tony put it, "We haven't been in America long enough yet to make enemies." Yet their home in Rosedale, Long Island, has been bombed repeatedly, and they told September McCall's how they and their children are weathering the storm. In spite of it all, Glenda and Tony agree that "We Won't Be Chased Away."

> solution to the problem is, like you say, move. And then another problem comes up, so you'll be constantly running, and we can't run away from our Blackness. We can't. So, let's face that fact that we are Black, and we've been harassed constantly, whether it's here, whether it's in the job situation, whether it's on busing, whatever, and we have to decide at a time, what are we going to do about it as people...what are the good people going to do? What are the—you know, people as people, whether you're Black, whether you're white. What are the people going to do about situations like this, or situations that's happening all over?

Figure 6. The Spencers in front of their Rosedale home and Accompanying article. *McCall's* (1975). Courtesy of the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library.



In Brief

McCall's

THE MAGAZINE FOR THE NEW SUBURBAN WOMAN

CONTACT: Tracy Nicholas (212) 983-8653

FOR RELEASE: THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 1975

DESPITE BOMBINGS AND HARRASSMENT, BLACK FAMILY SAYS "WE WON'T BE CHASED AWAY"

NEW YORK, AUGUST 21ST: "The people in this town are so set in their ways, so locked up in their own minds, so frightened of anything new in their lives, that they don't see next door. Sometimes I think a person could drop dead and nobody would put out a hand to help," says Tony Spencer in September McCall's.

Tony, his wife Glenda, and their three sons moved into a house in Rosedale, New York, a year ago, seeking the peace of the suburbs, but after two severe bombings and countless threats, Glenda says, "The old myths are still alive. People still believe that where Blacks move in, crime and violence follow and property values drop. Money. That's what it's really about. People don't count in America. There's no motive for anything but dollars and cents."

"Publicly, the white residents deplore the violence. Everyone seems to agree that it is a stupid way to keep Blacks out. But few argue - at least out loud - for letting Blacks in," writes author Natalie Gittelson. She quotes a neighbor: "We don't think of them as black. They're such attractive, intelligent, well-spoken people - not like other Negroes."

The most telling effect of the violence has been on the children. Glenda told McCall's that "Afterwards the boys were terrified. You know how children are. They let their imaginations run away with them. But we try hard not to let it bring them down...It's we who have to stop and think, don't let them walk the dog. I wish they could go outside without protection, but it's better that they play only in the school yard now...

McCall's reports that the Spencers are determined to weather the storm in Rosedale. They have had some protection, provided by Police Captain Edward Walsh, who remarked; "if blacks don't have as free and open access to the houses they want to live in as whites, then all the laws of the land are hypocritical and this country is in worse trouble than it knows." Glenda Spencer, however, had an almost-forgiving attitude as she told McCall's: "We don't expect the whole town to love us. We happen to be victims of the times. And we can't hate all Rosedale either. A person who's rational won't blame a whole community for the acts of a few. Besides, what good does more hate do?"

Even so, it appears the Spencers were not surprised at the acquittal of two men accused of bombing their home. Glenda said, "It's worse for the children. They are very discouraged. It's all too obvious how they feel. But Tony and me? We were expecting it."

# # #

McCall's, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

When the interviewer asks, "what are you going to do?" Mrs. Spencer replies in no uncertain terms:

> What are we going to do as a family? We here. We here right now. We're going to stay here. We're definitely going to stay. It bothers us, I mean it's natural, we're human beings, so it must affect us, it must affect our whole lives. I mean, the firebombing affected our whole lives, and a pipe bombing affected our whole lives, but as long as—whenever we die, we're going to die Black. We just can't get away from that. No way can we get away from that.

The stance of the Spencers was unwavering, paving the way for the next generation of southeast Queens residents, migrants from all corners encompassing the furthest reaches of the Black Planet.

Collective Memory and Police Violence

Public confidence in, and distrust of, state institutions—including in this case both local municipal police, as well as federal authorities—is historically informed. For Black communities

that have endured various forms of racial injury, abuse, and discrimination from public and private institutions, contemporary incidents of police misconduct and violence are part of a historical continuum where police are at the "spear's tip" of a much larger set of social inequalities, as demonstrated in extant literature. The present day police-community dialectic, specifically in Black communities, then, is best understood as the result of a rich reserve of memory often absent from dominant productions of knowledge and history (Nora 1989), but evident among Black people in urban Black spaces (Anderson 2014) due to the persistence of Black oral tradition (Brown 2016), Black documentation and publication (Wells-Barnett 1892), and through ongoing Black political struggle (Gregory 1999; Hunter 2013; Morris 1984).

Black space, as understood by Elijah Anderson (2014) describes those parts of American cities that are relegated to where "the Black people live." It is understood in opposition to White space, where Black people are not to be found residing, or in relation to the Cosmopolitan Canopy, where these two worlds may collide, momentarily without tension or disruption. The present study considers how police violence is publicly and historically understood, concentrated in Black space or the "Black Belts" of American Cities (Drake and Cayton 1945).

I argue that Black space, Black communities, Black Belts, *chocolate cities*, may also be understood as "internal colonies" within the United States, as argued by Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967) and Robert Allen (1970), meaning that "direct and overall subordination of one people, nation, or country to another with state power in the hands of the dominating power" explains the rebellions of the 1960s and the neocolonial, or neoliberal, turn of economic disinvestment coupled with increased state punitive power in the decades since.

Elucidating the impact of police violence on individual neighborhoods and cities starts

with revisiting incidents of police violence and mass collective action in urban Black communities that have necessitated federal intervention. Riots erupted routinely in urban centers in response to unjust police practices during the mid-twentieth century. The riots in Watts, California, Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan are the most notable of the 1960s, each leading to national military intervention, (Parenti 2015) occupying the rebelling internal colony, and provoking the landmark Kerner Commission Report in 1968, famously declaring that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."

This study expounds historical research dealing with racialized discourse on urban people publicly contesting police killings of unarmed Black people in the United States. To frame this analysis, I turn to and adapt the conceptualization of racialized discourse in press media from Ida B. Wells-Barnett's (1892) classic Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in all its Phases. In her investigative work, by contrasting the reporting of Black-owned-and-operated newspapers with White ones, she demonstrates that White men's panic around miscegenation—consensual sexual relations—between White women and Black men was at the core of lynch law and not, as many at the time contended, sexual assault and rape.

In fact, in many cases, Black men were coerced into sexual activity by White women who threatened their livelihood if they chose not to engage. In contrast, White men were committing acts of sexual assault and rape that went completely unpunished. Whereas Wells-Barnett reported on the role of the "Afro-American Press" in investigating the circumstances surrounding lynch law in the American South, I instead analyze news reporting on the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century problem of police violence, specifically in New York City. This study extends Wells-Barnett's (1892) analysis by asking whether similarly racialized depictions of criminality and brutishness are still at play in how individuals killed by

police are characterized, especially emphasizing the role of Black Press in challenging and bringing these mischaracterizations and racist depictions to light.

Wells-Barnett (1892) refers to “The Malicious and Untruthful White Press” reporting libelous depictions of hypersexual and inherently criminal Black men who must be controlled before their urges engulf them. In using Wells-Barnett’s work as a starting point, I also contribute to research connecting the American era of lynching by mob to contemporary racial disparities in police use of force, especially as organized around place (King et al. 2009).

Following the work of Darnell Hunt (1997) and Regina Lawrence (2000), this study contributes to research on mass media depictions of police violence and collective action in the wake of acquittals of police officers charged in the shooting deaths of unarmed people, a rare occurrence. For contemporary context, approximately 1,000 people a year are killed by law enforcement officers in the United States. Since 2005, only 121 total officers have been arrested on charges of murder or manslaughter in on-duty killings. Of 95 officers whose cases have concluded, 44 were convicted, but often of a lesser charge, only 27 of those convictions being brought for murder or manslaughter (Stinson et al., 2019).

Between 2015 and 2019, 4,937 people had been shot and killed by American police. Only 6 percent of victims were unarmed, though these often account for the most high-profile cases. Between 2015 and 2019, the number of deadly police shootings of unarmed people has generally declined, from 94 unarmed people killed in 2015 to 55 unarmed people killed in 2019, 328 total unarmed people killed by police between 2015 and 2019. Of those 328 unarmed people killed by police in the United States between 2015 and 2019, charges were only brought against officers in 60 of those instances, leading to only 19 convictions overall. Police are so extremely rarely

convicted of murder, that only 27 convictions of manslaughter or murder have been handed out since 2005, despite police killing well over 15,000 people since then (Stinson et al., 2019).

Being that police officers even being charged with murder is so rare, it is especially significant that this phenomenon occurred twice in the neighborhood of Jamaica, Queens, involving NYPD officers from the 103rd Precinct. Perhaps just as important, officers were acquitted of all charges in both instances, first by jury in 1974 following the police murder of Clifford Glover, then by bench trial in 2008 following the police murder of Sean Bell.

When police kill unarmed people, and in those very rare instances where police are actually charged in the death of an individual in their custody, the news media play a very important role in reporting on these high-profile cases of police misconduct and use of force. Following the police assault of Rodney King, Darnell Hunt analyzes racialized audience perceptions of television news during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, I analyze news discourse on urban uprisings in the wake of police killings in one New York City community and police precinct over time.

Lawrence (2000) demonstrates how frontpage news coverage of police brutality in mainstream publications like *The New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* are largely defined by police accounts of incidents, though media visibility does allow the socially marginalized to voice dissent. Cathy Cohen's (1999) exploration of reporting in the New York Amsterdam News guides my conceptualization of Black political struggle and boundary making. Cohen's (1999) analysis of depictions of Black gay men and Black drug users troubles how intraracial boundaries were maintained during the AIDS epidemic in determining which Black people's deaths were worthy of coverage. My analysis cuts across these seminal studies, focusing

specifically on the depiction of Black victims of police violence and the collective action that follows police killings, asking what different newsrooms deem worthy of coverage.

This study also extends the essential work of Michael Huspek (2004). His study explores local White Press and Black Press reporting on the 1998 police killing of nineteen-year-old Tyisha Miller, a young Black woman, while she was unconscious in her car in Riverside, California. Huspek's theoretically guided empirical analysis of press practices confirms that oppositional views in press replicate the worldviews of their readerships. He argues, as did Wells-Barnett, that White Press distort truth and reality by often erasing the role of race in their reporting altogether and by presuming an unbiased and objective treatment of criminality and police action. He advocates, as did Wells-Barnett, for the significance of Black Press as a means of gaining a more complete understanding of the truth of racial violence instead of, as critics suggest, thinking of non-mainstream, ethnically specific news media as biased or niche and incomparable to the journalistic rigor of White Press. I conduct a similar study to Huspek (2004), but of police killings of a boy and young man in two different eras in the same community, allowing for historic comparison across time.

In the time following police shootings of unarmed individuals, news media play a pivotal role in discursively setting the tone and providing information on what happened: who was killed, where were they killed, and why were they killed? Consequently, these questions probe the public to consider whether death was a preventable outcome, and whether use of lethal force was at all necessary or justified. Thus, the discourse around victims and perpetrators of police killings informs collective consciousness and memory about police power and the allowable treatment of people by authorized state agents.

Newspapers play an important role in the process of emotion management in the wake

of police violence by regulating discourse. According to Michael Schwalbe and colleagues (2000), emotional subjectivity can be conditioned in ways that reproduce inequality. This means that news depictions of police killings of unarmed Black children and adults, as well as depictions of collective protests in the wake of officer acquittals, could reproduce inequality by conditioning emotional "control" by those enraged by the actions of officers, judges, juries, and other state actors by encouraging sympathy for officers when they kill.

This study conceptualizes collective memory as mutually constitutive: the broader national collective memory of events involving police violence and urban uprisings and the local neighborhood memory, in this case of Jamaica, Queens, New York, are simultaneously informed by news coverage from journalists both in local, demographically targeted papers and nationally published mainstream newspapers. Central to this study's framework is more fully understanding the relationship between the news and collective memory.

According to Ron Eyerman (2009), cultural trauma contributes to the formation of collective identity and the reworking of collective memory. This study evaluates the way police violence functions as cultural trauma and how the reworking of collective memory contributes to the shaping of collective identity for residents of one predominantly Black community. How might a place, and the people living there, remember? How might that collective trauma be forgotten and then re-membered in a way that continuously shapes collective identity over time?

When police use lethal force and kill both young and adult civilians, people rely on various sources of news to learn about what unfolded during the fatal encounter (Hunt 1997; Lawrence 2000; Zimring 2017). From the reason for initial contact to escalation of violence and eventual use of force to kill, readers may come across varied and differential accounts of the actions of officers and victims, based on their news source. News media provide crucial

information about the events leading up to police officers' use of deadly force, as well as vital facts—or fictions—about the victims and officers involved. The way these events are described bear meaning for how the public interprets where and why police use lethal force, and for what laws, policies, and practices are at stake.

A contemporary example of how public discontent affecting political discourse following a high-profile police murder, eventually shaping policy outcomes is how the filmed and highly publicized killing of forty-three-year-old Eric Garner by NYPD 120th Precinct officer Daniel Pantaleo on Staten Island in 2014 led to statewide and national dialogue about the justifiability of police use of chokeholds, despite a state grand jury's decision not to indict Pantaleo that same year. Another example of public discontent with police violence leading to widespread calls for reform is the highly publicized police killing of twenty-six-year-old Breonna Taylor by Louisville Municipal Police Department plainclothes officers in 2020, which led to calls for discontinuing no-knock raids and other military-style tactics broadly or otherwise defunding municipal police altogether. All of this following a grand jury decision not to charge officers involved in the death of Breonna Taylor.

In addition to better understanding public outcry following police killings and officer acquittals as sparkplug moments for pushing policy change around American policing, it is necessary for the purpose of this study to also acknowledge the role of press media in shaping the public's views on whether police use of force is justified. Specifically, analysis of how the public responds to media reports that uncritically reproduce police accounts contributes to extant literature on police legitimacy, public accountability, and the role of the press in determining both. Two contemporary instances of news reporting around the victims of high-profile police killings illuminate Black mistrust of the "White Press" following police killings.

The first example of contentious relations between Black Americans and mainstream news media relevant to the framework of this study surrounds the phrase ‘no angel’ as it is used by New York Times writers to describe Michael Brown, the eighteen-year-old who was gunned down by police in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, spurring protests and collective political action nationwide, largely under the banner of #BlackLivesMatter. The New York Times published a controversial profile on Michael Brown who was shot to death by Darren Wilson, a White police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014. In it, the author writes “Michael Brown, 18, due to be buried on Monday, was no angel, with public records and interviews with friends and family revealing both problems and promise in his young life” (Eligon 2014). I mention this profile because it informs my first finding: the prevalence of ‘no angel’ discourse in describing Black victims of police shootings.

The second example of Black contention with white media reporting on victims of police violence relevant to this study involves a decision made by the family of Eric Garner, the father who was asphyxiated by police in the Staten Island borough of New York City, spurring protests around the city and country. The family of Eric Garner, following the death of Eric Garner’s outspoken activist daughter, Erica, publicly proclaimed that they would not speak to White reporters about anything pertaining to their family’s loss. This decision sparked outrage from many, as they felt it was unfair to single out white journalists in this way (Harriot 2018).

Both these contemporary instances of critiques of journalism conducted by “White Press” reporters on Black victims of police violence—as well as their families and communities—convey the tense relationship between Black families and communities and the mainstream

press, especially following police killings of unarmed Black people, an aspect of racialized news reporting that harkens back to the Kerner Report.

Perceived (il)legitimacy of, and consequent ramifications for, law enforcement officials when they use deadly force depends greatly on one's sources of news media (Hall 1978; Huspek 2004; Stone and Socia 2017). News reporting on the officers and victims involved in police killings impacts how the role of local law enforcement officials and police power is understood and imagined, both in its current state and its potential future.

Existing research suggests that news consumption directly impacts perceived police legitimacy. The relationship between engagement with contemporary forms of media, such as digital—internet and social media—modes of obtaining news and attitudes toward police are explored in depth by Jonathan Intravia and colleagues (2020). They find that consuming "negative" police stories on the internet is associated with perceiving the police as less legitimate. Jane F. Gauthier and Lisa M. Graziano (2018) find that consumption of Internet news is related to negative attitudes about police and exposure to "negative" news about police impacts perceptions, but only if the coverage is seen as fair. The present study adds to this literature by examining how Black and mainstream press report differently on police killings over time and how differential and often oppositional reporting impacts perceptions of police.

Current research finds that police officers perceive 'hostile' media coverage of policing as negatively impacting civilian attitudes towards police, causing a fear that allegations of misconduct could be a potential consequence (Nix and Pickett 2017). Further, research finds that police organizations exploit their relationship with news media to maintain legitimacy in the face of public criticism (Chermak and Weiss 2005). The implications of this relationship between the police and press media require further analysis, with an emphasis on differential and contested

coverage of police accounts, especially from mainstream and ethnically targeted news outlets. This study is the first to analyze the reporting of both Black Press and White Press on separate police killings and officer acquittals that occur in the same neighborhood and precinct, allowing for a unique comparative analysis to evaluate discourse over time.

More Cops, More Crime: A *Chocolate Cities* Approach to Urban Policing

> The controlled press—the white press—inflames the white public against Negroes. The police are able to use it to paint the Negro community as a criminal element. The police are able to use the press to make the white public think that 90 percent, or 99 percent, of the Negroes in the Negro community are criminals, and once the white public is convinced that most of the Negro community is a criminal element, then this automatically paves the way for the police to move into the Negro community exercising Gestapo tactics, stopping any black man who is on the sidewalk, whether he is guilty or whether he is innocent, whether he is well-dressed or whether he is poorly dressed, whether he is educated or whether he is dumb, whether he's a Christian or whether he's a Muslim, as long as he is black and a member of the Negro community the white public thinks that the white policeman is justified in going in there and trampling on that man's civil rights and on that man's human rights.
>
> Once the police have convinced the white public that the so-called Negro community is a criminal element, they can go in and question, brutalize, murder unarmed, innocent Negroes and the white public is gullible enough to back them up. This makes the Negro community a police state. This makes the Negro neighborhood a police state. It's the most heavily patrolled, it has more police in it than any other neighborhood, yet it has more crime in it than any other neighborhood. How can you have more cops and more crime? Why? It shows you that the cops must be in cahoots with the criminals.
>
> --Malcolm X, Los Angeles, California, May 4, 1962

> They just keep saying, 'Oh it's a disproportionate percentage of a particular ethnic group.' That may be, but it's not a disproportionate percentage of those who witnesses and victims describe as committing the murder. In that case, incidentally, I think we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little. It's exactly the reverse of what they say. I don't know where they went to school, but they certainly didn't take a math course. Or a logic course.
>
> --Mayor Michael Bloomberg, New York, New York, June 28, 2013

Shortly after midnight on April 27, 1962, Los Angeles Police Department officers raided the Nation of Islam's Mosque No. 27, ultimately shooting seven people, including 28-year-old Ronald Stokes, a Korean War veteran, who was shot in the back and killed. Malcolm X, formerly Malcolm Little, was shaken by the news of the temple's ransacking and especially of his friend Stokes's death (Marable 2011). In a press conference held at the Statler Hilton, Malcolm spoke with conviction about police violence and of the role of the white press in perpetuating false and criminalizing depictions of Black people in order to justify violent policing in Black communities. Malcolm's argument about the role of the white press in criminalizing Black people and playing on the gullible fears of whites provides historical context for contemporary rhetoric around police violence and the role of police more broadly. Narratives of Black criminality "inflame" the public to support aggressive and racist policing practices to this day.

A half century after the police killing of Ronald Stokes in Los Angeles, a controversial New York Police Department practice had come under great scrutiny in Malcolm's final resting place. The NYPD's Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) program relies heavily on profiling appearance and behavior to deem whether someone is suspicious, after which police detain and search persons for weapons or other contraband. This tactic is more formally known as a *Terry* stop, after the Supreme Court case *Terry v. Ohio* in 1968. The Court's decision made suspicion of danger to an officer grounds for a "reasonable search," (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 1968), a vague doctrine which ultimately expanded the discretion and power of police.

NYPD's use of Stop-and-Frisk peaked in 2011, with over 635,000 stops made that year, before the tactic was ruled unconstitutional after a class action lawsuit was brought against the city in 2013 (Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al). Mayor of New York at the time Michael Bloomberg responded to criticism that the practice was racist—90% of the people stopped were

Black or Latinx though they comprise half the city's population—by stating that, because of crime stats, minority residents of New York City were, on the contrary, not stopped enough and white residents were actually stopped too often. The mayor's conclusion is that because they supposedly cause all crimes, the number of minority residents stopped was not disproportionate even though a vast majority of all stops across the years turned up nothing criminal.

The long, brutal history of police violence in American cities is best understood sociologically as a dialectic between the people and the state (Anderson 1992). While city government officials and politicians like Michael Bloomberg articulate the racial logics used to justify hyperpolicing, the public facing arm of mass incarceration, leaders like Malcolm X articulate arguments against it, raising consciousness, mobilizing, and supporting resistance in the navigation, management, and avoidance of police contact and brutality, both on an individual and collective level. Better understanding the historic, intergenerational impacts of policing for the people experiencing it daily in the communities that bear the brunt of police misconduct advances research on the enduring social problems of urban policing and disinvestment.

As Logan & Oakley (2017) note, we are now more than 50 years removed from President Lyndon Johnson's 1967 appointment of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, better known as the Kerner Commission. Though the commission had been appointed in immediate response to the Detroit uprisings taking place at the time, Black collective response to police violence in cities across the country had hit its peak for a few years at that point. In the summer of 1964, the police killing of 15-year-old James Powell by an off-duty police lieutenant set off uprisings in Harlem, New York (Grant 1968).

The police killing of Ronald Stokes in 1962 was in many ways a watershed moment of William Parker's reign as chief of police for the Los Angeles Police Department. Uprisings

would later be set off in the Watts community of Los Angeles in 1965, in response to the police assault of 21-year-old Marquette Frye and his pregnant mother, Rena Price. The uprisings that then took place on the West Side of Chicago in 1966, and subsequently in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan in 1967, were all set off by incidents of police brutality (Sugrue 1996). The "Long Hot Summer of 1967" saw uprisings across the country in cities big and small, and most of the so-called riots were touched off by police violence in Black communities. The comprised collective action of Black people in cities forced President Johnson to act.

The Kerner Commission aptly reported their basic conclusion: "Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal." The report is a landmark document detailing the segregated conditions of American cities and what ultimately led to the rebellions of the mid-1960s, its findings earning vast approval from both Black and white readers. They write that "what white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." So how, sociologically speaking, did we get here?

The passage of civil rights legislation like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act marks accomplishments of the preceding movement for Black life. It should not be taken as mere coincidence that 1963 marked a century since the Emancipation Proclamation. Historical emphasis is placed on certain aspects of Black protest and activism, usually political and collective action revolving around attaining voting rights and access to fair housing and equal employment.

Rather than thinking of protests and collective action as one-off responses to racism, Aldon Morris (1984) argues that Black protest was strategically rooted in organizational agency

guided by Black-led institutions like the Urban Defense League (UDL), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE). By focusing on the local historical emergence of mass militancy, Morris abandons the top-down approach to studying Black collective action and decenters the individuals often emphasized in civil rights literature.

Morris illuminates the organization of the 1953 mass bus boycott in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and specifically the sovereignty of the Black community as they struggled to make do without public transportation. He speaks even of sovereign policing:

> The movement's leadership set up their own "police department," and city policemen remained outside the black community during the boycott. According to [Reverend T.J.] Jemison, the movement's "police department" did an effective job patrolling the community and providing them with bodyguards.

Morris reminds us of Baton Rouge's blueprint for Black-led "community" policing during the long struggle for civil and human rights. Uncovering and contextualizing Black communities' sovereign approaches to policing advances scholarship on the subject and meaningfully contributes to contemporary dialogue about police reform.

As Morris poignantly demonstrates, the era often thought of and imagined as "The Civil Rights Movement" can not be restricted to the dates often associated with its legacy. The longer freedom struggle stretches back to the beginnings of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Americas, and forward to the modern racial regime. The uprisings of the mid-1960's mark an important moment, especially for urban Black rebellion in opposition to police violence, but the issues that made the moment rife for rebellion were engrained in policy and practice long before the start of any rioting.

Urban sociological analysis of Black communities can be broken down into asset and deficit models (Hunter and Robinson 2016). It is significant that 1965 marks a watershed

moment in the American historical and sociological constructions of race, gender, class, and the city: the policy report *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* was authored by senator and sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The report was emblematic of much of the thinking of the time, what Hunter and Robinson (2016) call the cultural deficit approach to understanding Black communities' navigation of inequality. The report argues in favor of the "culture of poverty" hypothesis and emphasizes the role of poor Black mothers as strong matriarchal figures, ultimately leading to the degradation of Black men's masculinity and consequently the Black family unit. Moynihan's framework solidified the use of the cultural deficit frame as a means to define social problems and shape public policy, even as the report acknowledged the role of structural conditions in perpetuating poverty and inequality.

The period preceding the mid-twentieth century was marked by multiple migrations of Black Americans from the rural South to the North, Midwest, and Western United States. Living in segregated sections of the city led to the establishment, maintenance, and ultimate demise of many Black institutions. The seminal work published at this time on Black life in the city comes from Drake and Cayton (1945). Their work *Black Metropolis* describes the conditions that Black migrants endured after escaping racist violence in the South with the hope of refuge in the growing city of Chicago, Illinois. The study is still one of the most in-depth and nuanced engagements with the city as field site, especially one centered around the heterogeneity of urban Black populations.

Drake and Cayton (1945) describe the mixed nature of interactions between urban immigrants and Black migrants in various types of Chicago neighborhoods at the time, complicating the American racial binary:

> There are certain mixed, lower-class neighborhoods which have a tradition of hostility toward Negroes; in others, hostility arises only occasionally. In most of these, Negroes are

> living among the foreign-born. The equilibrium is easily disturbed in these areas, and a trivial incident may precipitate a crisis…There are other low status areas where Negroes and whites live side by side as neighbors in proportions of from one-fourth to two-thirds Negro. In such situations Negroes are in intimate contact with foreign-born groups. Relations seem to be most harmonious with Italians, Mexicans, and Jews, and least with the Irish and Poles…The social life is generally separate, and Negroes in such areas often look down on the foreign-born. One colored woman, for instance, said: "We're not segregated here. Who are these 'hunkies' to segregate you? Most of them are as black as I am."

Drake and Cayton (1945) are unique in their study of urban Americans as they rely heavily on Chicagoans themselves for the data and evidence to support their arguments, something not true of earlier studies of urban life (Du Bois 1899).

Drake and Cayton (1945) speak to several important conditions of urban America in the early 20th century. First, the social fact of segregation is complicated by class as well as ethnicity and relations between Black Chicagoans and their foreign-born neighbors are defined by Black residents in a way that may conflict with the presumption of a Black-white binary. Racialization of foreign-born residents living among urban Black enclaves requires further historical study. Second, Black Chicagoans had more harmonious relations with some immigrant groups than others, some claiming that the social distance between foreign-born Chicagoans and Black Chicagoans is shorter than that of foreign-born Chicagoans and white Chicagoans.

Drake & Cayton's (1945) study of mixed neighborhoods in Chicago illuminates the way that urban Black Americans make sense of the racial dynamic of their communities. One respondent articulates their viewpoint about the relationship between Italians and Black people in Chicago: "I have been in this neighborhood twenty years. I think Italians get along better with colored than other whites" (Drake and Cayton 1945: 141). This does not mean that mid-twentieth century relations in Chicago at this time between Black migrants and white immigrants were without tension or hostility as that is certainly not the case, but it is to say that more fully

understanding racial formation in the United States requires the type of nuanced and ethnographically grounded approach taken in *Black Metropolis*, centering Black people's agency in defining race relations.

Black Metropolis lay the groundwork for present studies of racial residential inequality. White violence toward Black residential mobility is described: "It is in middle-class white neighborhoods adjacent to Negro communities, when a mass invasion is feared, that antagonisms become most highly organized. Such spots become "contested areas." There were several such areas in Midwest Metropolis on the eve of the Second World War" (ibid., 182). This description of racially contested areas of Chicago in the 1940s contextualizes contemporary disputes about neighborhood investment, demographic change, and displacement, especially as mediated by policing (Muniz 2015). The "mass invasion" of Black migrants feared by people believing themselves to be white articulates spatial segregation in the near century that follows.

Drake & Cayton's (1945) history of Chicago's Black Belt explains the same phenomenon that occurred throughout American metropolises. Racially restrictive housing covenants gave rise to the enforced segregation of Black Chicagoans. "Black Metropolis has become a seemingly permanent enclave within the city's blighted area…Negroes, regardless of their affluence or respectability, wear the badge of color. They are expected to stay in the Black Belt." The Black Belt of Chicago gave rise to sovereign Black institutions as was the case in cities across the nation, described in the neighborhood of Bronzeville:

> While Bronzeville's institutions differ little in form from those in other Midwest Metropolis communities, they differ considerably in content. The dissimilarity springs primarily from two facts: Because the community is spiritually isolated from the larger world, the development of its families, churches, schools, and voluntary associations have proceeded quite differently from the course taken by analogous white institutions; and, second, Bronzeville's "culture" is but a part of the larger, national Negro culture, its people being tied to thirteen million other Negroes by innumerable bonds of kinship, associational and church membership, and a common minority status. The customs inherited by

> Bronzeville have been slowly growing up among American Negroes in the eighty years since slavery (ibid.: 212).

Articulating what political scientist Michael Dawson (1994) calls the linked-fate perspective of Black Americans, Drake and Cayton (1945) articulate the *chocolate city* ideal long before that terminology comes into the fore (Farley et al. 1978). They aptly comment on the indigenous nature of Black institutions which may come from "spiritual isolation" from the larger public, but also derive strength from being part of a larger, national, and even global, Black culture.

Black Chicago life during this period is bookended by separate race riots, the act of hateful whites burning, pillaging, and attacking Black people's property and Black people themselves. The first of these riots occurs in 1919, just over a century ago. The second occurs in 1945 when *Black Metropolis* is written, and is described in the Black-owned and operated press, the *Chicago Defender*:

> Hate-crazed incendiaries…have in the past several months attacked some 30 homes occupied by Negroes on the fringes of the black belt, solely because these colored citizens have desperately crossed the unwritten boundary in their search for a hovel to live in. Buildings have been set afire, bombed, stoned and razed. Their occupants have been shot and slugged.

They write about the inaction of the Chicago police in preventing these violent attacks: "To date the Chicago Police Department has done virtually nothing to apprehend the guilty. With the hot summer days ahead, there is dire danger in continued inaction. Today racial dynamite is scattered about the South side. It needs but a spark to explode." The *Chicago Defender* demanded at the time that the city suspend restrictive covenants and post full and complete police protection for Negroes moving into houses. The Chicago riots of 1919 and 1945 and the inaction of Chicago police illuminate Black discontent with the state decades before the long hot summer of 1967.

The 1920s were a time of contention over fair and adequate housing for urban Black Americans in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as well. Picking up where W.E.B. Du Bois' (1899)

canonical *The Philadelphia Negro* leaves off, Marcus Hunter's (2013) *Black Citymakers* establishes the role of Black Philadelphians in shaping, changing, and fighting the political decisions and conditions of their day. Hunter and Du Bois both find that the housing conditions of Philadelphia's Seventh Ward were insufficient and inadequate, and Hunter (2013) explores in depth how Black Philadelphians rallied around the issue of housing reform immediately following the tragic tenement collapse of 1936.

Prior to addressing unequal and unfair housing in the 1930s, Black Philadelphians of the Seventh Ward struggled through a different collapse, the bankruptcy of two Black banks in 1925. Following emancipation from enslavement, one of the keys to accumulating wealth for Black people was through banking institutions. The failure of the two Black banks in Philadelphia—Brown & Stevens and Cosmopolitan—was devastating, resulting in Black Philadelphians losing the entirety of their accumulated savings as well as the foreclosure of Black businesses. The consequence of the banks failing was beyond just financial loss, however, as institutional failures also result in institutional mistrust and distrust for years to come.

Hunter (2013) positions the important of Black banking in the context of Black economic disenfranchisement, especially for Seventh Ward patrons dealing with the majority white businessmen on South Street. Unfair business practices and racial exclusion on South Street ultimately led to the boycott of 1916. Hunter (2013) notes the central role of Black police officers during this boycott. He writes:

> When the *Philadelphia Tribune* reported that the South Street Businessmen's Association had called for the reassignment of black police officers patrolling the Black Seventh Ward, black Philadelphians threatened to boycott white-owned and -managed businesses on South Street. Specifically, the *Philadelphia Tribune* confirmed accusations of unfairness when it stated that white businessmen had targeted black police officers due to their role in thwarting attempts by white proprietors to swindle and take advantage of black customers (ibid.: 40).

Black police played an important role in mediating business exchanges on South Street when white businessmen would purposely try to cheat Black customers. The reassignment of Black officers to other locations would prove to be a crucial turning point for Black patrons of the South Street market who then decided to boycott the business district altogether. The undercutting of Black police who were protecting Black patrons affirmed the need for Black self-sufficiency and the interests of Black business. Hunter (2013) provides essential historical context, animating the underdiscussed dual role of Black police officers in urban America.

The turn of the twentieth century is marked by two central and foundational works of urban sociology of Black Americans: Ida B. Wells-Barnett's (1892) *Southern Horrors* and W.E.B. Du Bois' (1899) *The Philadelphia Negro*. Both these seminal texts establish much about the nature of racial violence and inequality across urban America, their authors serving as intellectual forebears for a rich tradition of Black sociology. While Du Bois addresses with the urban social problems of Philadelphia's Seventh Ward with detail, Wells-Barnett unpacks the libelous and malicious "White Press" and its mischaracterizations of Black men to justify mob lynchings in Memphis, Tennessee, ultimately advocating for the power of the Black Press in reporting the truth of racist violence, in the urban South or anywhere else where that violence and those horrors may occur. Wells-Barnett also advocates for collective boycotts of white institutions, and outmigration to the North and West (Wells-Barnett 1892).

This research extends urban and public health research on the determinants of policing behaviors and "justifiable" homicides (Gilbert and Ray 2015) as well as the role of race in state and city policing more broadly (Vargas and McHarris 2017). This study adds a specific example of police violence in one neighborhood over time and the pervasiveness of "racial threat" in determining what is a "justifiable" police killing. Similarly, this article also expands upon recent

research on police violence and Black crime reporting (Desmond et al. 2016) by historically analyzing the communal reception of police following killings of unarmed civilians and officer acquittals. Additionally, the larger context of "ghettoization" as the vehicle for policing Black lives, as theorized by sociologists John R. Logan and Dierdre Oakley (2017), provides background on policing urban Black communities, which I expand upon with this study of the historic linkages between policing and placemaking. Further, sociologist Geoff Ward (2018) contextualizes the pivotal role of White supremacy as basis for policing practices throughout U.S. history and the centrality of racial social control to policing since its conception as a means of selective law enforcement. These histories, he argues, are living, and must receive this treatment in research.

At the heart of New York City's policing strategy in the late twentieth and early twenty first century lies the "Broken Windows" theory of neighborhood disorder and policing. The Broken Windows theory asserts that any form or sign of neighborhood disorder leads to further disorder and crime and the ultimate degradation of a community (Wilson and Wilson 1982). This means that one broken window will ultimately lead to the decline of an entire building because one window left unfixed shows a lack of care about the building's physical condition. This philosophy, with roots in social psychology, is extended to punish low-level crimes or quality-of-life behaviors, like loitering, vagrancy, graffiti, and jumping turnstiles. Former Police Commissioner Bill Bratton supported a policy of severe punishments for quality-of-life crimes in early 1990s New York City when the metropolis was "plagued" with criminal activity. This mode of policing was credited with contributing to the city's large drop in violent crime over the past three decades. In April 2015, Bratton, who was once again commissioner under Mayor Bill

de Blasio, wrote that he stands by broken windows even when considering charges that the strategy has racially disparate impacts on arrests and incarceration (Kelling and Bratton 2015).

Bill Bratton argues that higher punishments for lower levels of crime are preventative measures and ultimately decrease the number of individuals incarcerated over time. However, many argue that these policies disproportionately affect young Black and Latinx residents and ultimately give them criminal records that lead to further disenfranchisement in education and career opportunities. Through the enactment of more vague loitering and vagrancy laws, higher levels of discretion are now placed in the hands of police officers over determining legal or criminal gatherings in public space. It is in this vagueness of "broken windows", order-maintenance statutes that racist notions of criminality are legitimized, and Black citizens become subject to widespread police harassment (Roberts 1999). This, Dorothy Roberts argues, is what leads to the subconscious or overt racism affecting decisions over whom to arrest, fine, or issue a verbal warning.

Understanding the vagueness of order-maintenance policing and its implications for racial bias are essential to my research. At present, Native Americans and African Americans are killed by police in the United States at the highest rates, and though the American fact of police violence in minority communities has become recognized in national dialogue, there is much work to be done by social science researchers to study police stops as a primary site of American and global racial formations (Roychoudhury 2018). Extending the work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994), understanding policing and other forms of governmental surveillance as a primary site of racial formation and boundary-making help us to better understand subjectivity and collective consciousness in the current era of virtually unlimited and expanding police power. Brittany N. Fox-Williams (2018) documents the extent to which "on track" Black youth

and young women in New York avoid, manage, and symbolically resist encounters with police. Furthermore, Victor Ray (2019) theorizes that organizations are inherently racialized, and my study contributes to furthering understandings about the racial dynamic of police institutions, as well as mass media, both historically and contemporarily.

Ahistorical representations of police violence present police killings as an issue unique to the contemporary moment. Situating collective resistance to police power requires tracing specific histories of advocacy for reform and justice in the face of suppression. This article addresses the case of one such historic, communal struggle. It is difficult to enumerate the violence endured by urban communities of color at the hands of law enforcement over the past century but one of the most exhaustive documents attempting to do so was presented to the United Nations by its authors William Patterson and Paul Robeson in 1951. The petition, titled "We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People" was presented as proof that the racism of the United States Government and its agencies was a crime punishable under the UN Genocide Convention. The petitioners included several prominent African Americans including foundational sociologist William Edward Burghardt Du Bois.

The crimes outlined in this petition included, among many examples of systematic injustice, extensive evidence of police violence including killings as well as beatings, framings, and unjustified arrests that continue unchecked by government authorities. They write of the challenge of enumerating state violence against Black Americans: "The vast majority of such crimes are never recorded. This widespread failure to record crimes against the Negro people is in itself an index to genocide" (Patterson 1951, p. 57). Their evidence was incidents of police violence from 1945 to 1951. Significant to this study, they list in their petition that on November 1, 1949, Mrs. Lena Fausset of Jamaica, New York, was beaten by policewoman Mary Shanley

when she inadvertently bumped into the policewoman on the street. Mrs. Fausset, they write, was assaulted by officer Shanley in the 103rd Precinct (Patterson 1951, p. 113).

Marcus A. Hunter and Zandria F. Robinson's (2016) "The Sociology of Urban Black America" summarizes over a century of sociological research on urban Black Americans dating back to Ida B. Wells-Barnett's (1892) Southern Horrors and W. E. B. Du Bois' (1899) The Philadelphia Negro. Hunter and Robinson (2016) divide the extant research into 'assets'-based and 'deficits'-based frames of approach to the study of urban Black American life. According to the authors, the deficit frame includes scholarship emphasizing both the structures that negatively affect urban Black people and the cultural "deficits" that either are adaptations to those structural realities or, as some argue, are the cause of hardships themselves. The asset frame includes scholarship focusing on the agency and cultural contributions of urban Black Americans.

Many urban sociological studies on police violence fall under what Hunter and Robinson (2016) refer to as the deficit frame of studying Black communities. They emphasize a "ghetto" culture of crime, violence, and discontent toward police, framing the presence of police as emerging from a necessity to combat social disorder. The current study is an assets-based approach to the study of urban Black cultural responses to urban policing and police violence over time.

I emphasize the role of place and time as essential to understanding news representation of collective action in the wake of police killings, a novel approach to analysis of news discourse on police violence and officer acquittals. Newspaper reports differ on their acceptance or challenge of official police accounts of events and whether other factors, such as race, place, and age of victims played a role.

Documenting the persistence or absence of collective memory allow contextualization of contemporary political struggle in the wake of police violence. Doing so can have tremendous impact on police reform and even, in the case of the Chicago Police Department, help advocate for reparations for communities that have endured incessant harm at the hands of local law enforcement (Venkatesh et al. 2015). Though recent research has assessed with great depth the level to which routine encounters with law enforcement shape larger attitudes about government (Lerman and Weaver 2014), focusing only on the routineness of contemporary encounters with police may miss the broader historical context necessary to fully understand collective opinions of policing.

Exploring the role of policing within predominantly Black communities is crucial to understanding the life course of the neighborhoods themselves. Existing research about policing and neighborhood context finds that police officers are more likely to use higher levels of force when encountering persons in disadvantaged and high-crime neighborhoods. This is true regardless of situational factors: whether the individual is resisting arrest, and regardless of officer training, education, or age (Terrill and Reisig 2003).

Understanding the role of policing within the trajectory of a neighborhood helps us understand the purpose of policing itself, as many formerly disinvested communities become the sites of demographic change and reinvestment over time.

Chocolate City Melting Pot

The landmark Hart-Celler Act of 1965 reversed the restricted immigration quotas that had been in place since 1924 (Ngai 2004). In the half century since this legislation was passed, mass migration to the United States has taken place, with millions settling in the country's metropolitan areas, in pursuit of economic and educational opportunity. Often segregated from white communities, recent immigrants have settled in urban ethnic enclaves, alongside or among

African American neighborhoods. Historically contextualizing this changing, shifting, and emerging dynamic is crucial to social study, especially amidst the continuing phases and processes of urban renewal.

As more and more migrants make their way to American cities, intraracial, interracial, intraethnic, and interethnic dynamics take shape. These processes are often informed by a White-Black-Native triumvirate, the Black-White binary and Native erasure being the principal guiding logic used by social scientists and policymakers alike. Cities remain unequal, and migrants across space and time weave racialized, socialized, and politicized threads within the global metropolis, caught in the geopolitical, cross-hemispheric, ethnoracial web of White Supremacy.

The traditional Black-White binary of the sociology of race & ethnicity becomes complicated in the post-1965 context in a way summated by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's theory of the tri-racial dynamic, or the Latin Americanization of race in the United States. Bonilla-Silva (2006) attempts to capture this balanced imbalance of the tri-racial order of stratification by categorizing this system of U.S. racialization under the categories of "White", "Honorary White", and "Collective Black." Contemporary research on racialization is advanced by analyses of emergent systems of social control and punishment. Studying the expanding role of police over time deepens our understanding of how spatial and racial boundaries are maintained.

Christina Greer's (2013) pioneering work on Black migrants to New York City grapples with the comparative intraracial and interethnic tensions of being African American, Afro-Caribbean, and of recent African immigrant origin, especially as it relates to labor in the American city. She points out the binary logic in which Black immigrants become entrenched: *All of the Blacks are American. All of the Immigrants are Latino. But some of us are…?* The fundamental dichotomy here is clear. To be Black is to be U.S. American in origin, and to be

foreign-born automatically implies non-blackness, normally affiliated with the largest minority group in the United States, people who are panethnically Latinx.

Sociological research on, and mass media depictions of, Black migrants often draw on the notion that to adhere to Blackness as identity or to comingle, cooperate, and conspire with African Americans is to "downward assimilate" (Alba and Nee 1997). This narrative enforces the cultural deficit assessment of the condition of Black Americans and utilizes the narrative of "ethnicity" to construct African or Caribbean immigrants as more hardworking and upwardly mobile, making these "new" Black peoples the better Black people. Pierre (2010) finds that the discursive uses of Black immigrant "cultural distinctiveness," though packaged as a recognition of Black heterogeneity, is in fact predicated on cultural racism targeted at all Black Americans.

Jemima Pierre's (2010) rejection of ethnicity theory as a meaningful way to explain differences in the experiences and outcomes of recent Black immigrant groups versus multigenerational Black Americans provides an important lens into the way discourse informs narrative, research, and policy. Pierre recounts the police killing of 22-year-old Amadou Diallo by four New York Police Department (NYPD) officers in 1999. Diallo was an immigrant from the African nation of Guinea and the repeated mention of his status as an African immigrant allowed for white media sources to paint Diallo as more innocent than if he had been a non-foreign-born Black American. 1990s mass media featured several portrayals of Black immigrant success in juxtaposition to Black American failures. One article published in the *Economist* in 1996 asks, "Why do black immigrants do so much better than blacks who are born in America?" responding that "attitude makes part of the difference… black immigrants are more entrepreneurial than native-born blacks" (Pierre 2010).

Narratives of ethnicity are utilized to advance the notion that foreign-born, recent migrants are more successful than native-born Black Americans using the logic of African American cultural inferiority. This propagation in the media as well as among individuals in ethnic communities advances the notion that American Black people are lazy, criminal, and have the wrong attitude toward government and other institutions. Abandoning all historical context and political economic factors—such as the fact that post-1965 African immigration, like Asian immigration, is narrow and selective for migrants with high levels of education—allows for ethnicity to serve as a thin veil for antiblack logics, using racial fiction to form ethnic factions (Bashi Treitler 2013, Steinberg 2001).

Accounting for the ways that blackness permeates the lives of Black migrants does not entail abandoning the study of Black heterogeneity or Black ethnic difference. The opposite, in fact, is true. Comparatively studying difference in and among Black populations can lead to further complicated and more in-depth study of urban Black life. In fact, it is ahistorical to leave out migration from the story of how Black Americans reach the American metropolis. Studies of urban Black northern, midwestern, and western experience often obscure or do away altogether with the connection of Black American migrants from their origins in the American south. Black Americans fled the horror of racial violence in the form of public mob lynchings following the Civil War and American Reconstruction, searching for freedom and opportunity; often, that meant leaving rural life behind and heading for urban centers (Robinson 2014, Brown 2018). The central role of the south as homeland should never be lost or forgotten in studies of urban social life and race relations in the United States.

Studying urban communities alongside one another allows researchers to account for the varied localized experiences that emerge. (Hunter and Robinson 2018; Sharkey 2018; Halle

2003). Asking, for example, what are the varied experiences of Black migrants who fled for different cities, sharing similar origins, whether it be in the American or the Global South, north or south of the equator, east or west of the prime meridian, gives us a sense of what is common and what is divergent. Probing the full gamut of differences that occur along the lines of gender, sexuality, class, and place lead to fuller understandings of political heterogeneity (Cohen 1999; Franklin Frazier 1957; Pattillo 1997, 2007; Gregory 1999; Robinson 2013). Black ethnic experiences matter as do the experiences of other immigrants living in historically and predominantly Black communities. Dually studying the ethnic group experiences and racial formations of people of color, alongside one another give way to more full understandings of the shortcomings and challenges of urban institutions like schooling, policing, housing, labor, and healthcare as well as the myriad ways people overcome, enact change, and make do under even the most blighted circumstances.

The experiences of Black ethnics regarding unwarranted police contact, profiling, and violence indicate that racial categorization is meaningful in the study of urban life, even as understanding ethnic difference is essential for social study. The ways that immigrant groups come to understand themselves racially, central to the study of racial formation, must also be rooted in critical analysis of institutional practices and structural inequality.

Understanding the experiences of urban Black people across region and national origin opens the door for only further analysis: How about the experiences of Latinx or other "nonblack" populations vis-à-vis punitive systems of social control? How might, for example, Dorothy Roberts' (2012) study of the interlocking systems of prison and welfare in the lives of Black mothers apply broadly to the racialization of mothering? She writes, "The intersection of

prison and foster care is only one example of many forms of overpolicing that overlap and converge in the lives of poor women of color." How might we approach this overpolicing?

As of 2009, African and Afro-Caribbean immigrants accounted for a combined 2.78 million people in the United States. Black immigrants from other regions accounted for an additional 485,000 (Capps et al. 2011). Who are these Black immigrants from other regions? How might this Black immigrant identity intersect with pan ethnic identities, like Latinx and Asian, or national origin?

Table 1. Black Immigrants* by Region of Origin, United States, 1980 to 2008-09

	1980 (thousands)	1990 (thousands)	% Change 1980 to 1990	2000 (thousands)	% Change 1990 to 2000	2008-09 (thousands)	% Change 2000 to 2008-09
All immigrants	14,079	19,682	40	31,133	58	38,234	23
All Black immigrants	816	1,447	77	2,435	68	3,267	34
Black African immigrants	64	184	188	574	212	1,081	88
Black Caribbean immigrants	453	897	98	1,428	59	1,701	19
Black immigrants from other regions	299	366	22	433	18	485	12

Note: * Black immigrants are those who responded "Black" either alone or in combination with any other race to the survey's race question in 2000 and 2008-09. In 1980 and 1990, respondents were not given multiple race options, and so the responses for these years are for the Black race only.
Source: MPI analysis of data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 US Census of Population and Housing (census); 2008-09 American Community Surveys (ACS), pooled.

Studying race doesn't mean abandoning the study of ethnicity altogether but it does entail interrogation of the role of ethnicity, and how ethnicity theories instantiate African American inferiority due to cultural deficits, and not structural constraints, falsely proposing that immigrants have favorable cultural traits related to work and family.

Researching the experiences of Latinx and Asian migrants to U.S. cities requires critical study and historical contextualization of the racialization of these groups, both prior to and post-1965 (Menjivar 2000; Bald 2013; Ortiz 2018). Archival and historical records paint a complex picture of what urban American living has meant to these diverse groups. Take, for example, the Zoot Suit Riots that occurred in 1943 in Los Angeles, California. The zoot suit, worn by Mexican men who styled themselves as *pachucos*, rooted in a sense of Chicano cultural pride, became affiliated with gang activity, crime, and with the culture that white Angelenos at the time detested, symbolizing a broad racial disdain for Mexican immigrants whose migration to Los Angeles made the city home to the largest concentration of ethnic Mexicans outside Mexico. American servicemen stationed in Southern California attacked Mexican Americans wearing the zoot suits and brutalized African Americans and Filipino Americans dressed similarly. The white American military men felt that the baggy zoot suits were unpatriotic (Mazon 1988).

The impetus for the infamous wartime Zoot Suit Riots comes from racialized policing in Los Angeles. After the unsolved killing of José Gallardo Díaz in 1942, LAPD officers arrested 17 young Mexican Americans as suspects. Nine of the defendants were convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to serve time in San Quentin Prison. The convictions were ultimately overturned but the story gave rise to panic about Mexican American youth gangs and so-called juvenile delinquency (ibid.). The zoot suits that had become popular at the time were seen by American soldiers, sailors, and Marines in Los Angeles as in violation of wartime fabric rations, and symbolic of disloyalty to American military forces during the second world war. The panic created by press depictions of Mexican youth and the military disapproval of their way of dress led to one of the most violent race riots in American history, 25 years before some of the most comprehensive civil rights legislation was passed.

The Zoot Suit Riots tell us a great deal about race and ethnicity in the American city. Police profiling and harassment of Latinos in Los Angeles has a deep and rich history and white hatred of Mexican migration precipitated a race riot not dissimilar from the anti-Black race riots that occurred throughout the country during the summer of 1943. The violence was specifically anti-Mexican and anti-Chicano in this case but that did not prevent Filipino Americans and African Americans from being attacked just the same. The criminalization and fear mongering facilitated by press propaganda evoke similar caricatures used to justify racist killings and brutality, whether by lynch mob or police violence (Hall 1978). Contemporary depictions of Mexican and Central American migrants as criminals fueled by gang violence utilize this same playbook to provoke white supremacist violence against a new wave of Brown and Black migrants (Menjivar 2000). The words of Malcolm continue to ring true.

Post Policing: Black Sociological Futures

Urban uprisings in protest of police violence have once again brought issues of race and policing back to the national forefront. Better understanding the long historical continuum of urban resistance to highly concentrated, racialized policing entails fully accounting for the myriad ways communities of color, and Black communities specifically, have engaged with and responded to police violence in all its forms. Just as there was much dispute in the early 1960s around the reasoning for police action the night Ronald Stokes was killed, there continues to be dispute on multiple forms of media, old and new, about the role of police and the consequences of their actions. Understanding policing and police violence not only as structural impediments and constraints but also as institutions that people engage, lead, and rebel against, is essential to more wholly comprehending this enduring social problem.

The growing body of social science literature on cities, race, and policing over the past half century has engaged with increased investment in, reliance on, and mistrust of, police (Vargas and McHarris 2017; Desmond et al. 2016; Soss and Weaver 2017), the unprecedented growth of prisons (Gilmore 2007, Hinton 2017), enduring neighborhood effects and segregation (Sampson 2013; Hunt 1996; Hunt and Ramon 2010; Massey 2001; Kurwa 2015), and the technological advances of the surveillance state (Harcourt 2006; Zimring 2017; Shedd 2015). With the urban uprisings of the mid-1960s, growing racial animus among the "silent" white majority enabled government to pass sweeping legislation allowing for this massive growth centered around panics of rising crime and disorder. Law and order had to be restored for social balance and the racial hierarchy to be maintained. Christian Parenti (2015) explains:

> The great criminal justice expansion began as a federal government reaction to the society-wide rebellion of the late 1960s. It was a crucible in which white supremacy, corporate power, capitalism, and the legitimacy of the US government, at home and abroad, all faced profound crisis. The Civil Rights Movement had transmogrified into the Black Power movement. "Third World" Marxist and nationalist groups like the Black Panthers and the Young Lords began arming. During riots in Newark, Watts, and Chicago, black people shot back at cops and the National Guard; in Detroit, urban "hillbillies" — poor white Southerners who had also been displaced by the mechanization of agriculture — fought alongside their black neighbors. Transwomen, drag queens, and gay men fought the cops who came to raid the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village. Women organized, filed successful lawsuits, and staged large protests against discrimination. Even the US Army was in rebellion. In Vietnam draftee insubordination took the form of increasing drug use, combat refusals, and even "fragging" — the murder of overly gung-ho officers.

Parenti positions the criminal justice expansion, one stemming not from private interests in the prison industrial complex but rather from state sanctioned criminal justice expansion. He continues, discussing specifically the urban uprisings that took place from the late 1960s onward:

> Added to all this was the increasingly regular rioting that gripped America's inner cities. Every summer from 1964 through the mid-1970s saw a riot season, in which multiple major American cities were wracked by massive, violent, fiery, spontaneous uprisings of mostly, but not exclusively, unemployed and underemployed African-American youth. Cops were shot, whole commercial districts were looted and burnt, and all of it was captured on TV.

> Importantly, these domestic social explosions hurt US imperialism abroad. In the context of the Cold War, burning cities put the lie to official American mythologies. If capitalism and liberal democracy were so much better than socialism, why were black people in America so furious?

The author's broad explanation of the social groups most harmfully impacted by state repression rising up and countering corrupt and brutal policing in their communities, coupled with public disinvestment from social programs, provides critical insight into the way present rebellions against, and negotiations with, the police state in the present should be studied.

More contemporary research has engaged with the multiple facets of police violence and their impacts on several overlapping and interlocking communities, each with their own unique histories countering surveillance and terror from police in their lives: Black girls and women (Jones 2009, Ladner 1971), Muslims and other religious and racial minorities amid the post-9/11 political climate of the War on Terror and the Patriot Act (Rana 2011), Latinx people (Rios 2011, Rios 2017), undocumented people (Gonzales 2015; Golash-Boza 2015; Armenta 2017), queer and trans people (Hanhardt 2016), sex workers (INCITE!), people with disabilities and addictions, the homeless (Stuart 2016), the poor (Desmond 2017, Duck 2015), the afflicted (Ralph 2014), the downtrodden (Goffman 2014). The time has come for social scientists, policymakers, activists to truly reckon with what the prison and punitive system has become: the catch-all solution for all our country's social problems. The investment has been immense, and the return has been clear. More people are locked up, on parole, awaiting trial, and in some way entangled in the web of the carceral state than ever before in any country in modern history (Gurusami 2018).

Now more than ever the literature points in the direction of abolition, divestment, and alternatives to policing in favor of decarceration (Gilmore 2007; Hernandez 2017; Davis 2012). The prison system is an extension of the American plantation, both using forced labor to fuel

economic enterprise and racial capitalism. The historical arc of this study is meant to reinforce this narrative comparison, linking the lynchings that led Black people to flee southern communities to the police killings that now quicken the displacement and reinvestment of urban neighborhoods formerly known as ghettos. As jails like the notorious Riker's Island in New York become redistributed, as prisons and police become "reformed," the question rises again: How might we plan communities without an overreliance, or any reliance, on police or prisons?

The modern invention of police in their current state was a reform—rooted in a history that begins with unregulated, unsanctioned private slave patrols. The question arises as to what will present itself in its place were there to ever be collective sovereignty over police (Vitale 2017). The privatized technological surveillance industry may one day replace the need for municipal policing and physical prisons. To look forward, we must ground ourselves in the past.

Uncovering the legacies of policing in American cities requires revisiting the colonial nature of American imperialism abroad and at home. The stop-and-frisk policing tactics now affiliated with U.S. policing derive from the British imperial system of policing in its colonies (Elliott-Cooper 2021). U.S. police function as occupying forces in urban communities of color, punishment bureaucrats claiming to "protect" and "serve" in the name of "law enforcement" (Karakatsanis 2019). U.S. police have been revealed, on multiple occasions by federal investigations, to extort Black residents to gain funds and revenue through the cash bail system and asset forfeiture. Black residents are assigned a racial tax, one that is paid for through money and time, false arrests, being coerced into lineups as false suspects.

Studies of the U.S. system of racialized policing are furthered through comparison across borders. What might police violence in the United Kingdom, South Africa, Palestine, and Brazil tell us about the issues of extrajudicial punishment and criminality that are faced by Black and

Brown people across national contexts? How is discourse and narrative employed by politicians and mass media to further aggressive policing tactics and government repression? In beginning to engage with these questions, we turn again to the words of Malcolm X.

On February 11, 1965, ten days before he was assassinated, Malcolm X delivered an impassioned speech on police violence and global white supremacy at the London School of Economics. In it, he covered a plethora of things he had grown weary of in his last days, of which I will share a section to illuminate a framework for studying police violence in the modern metropolis, transnationally and through a postcolonial lens:

> Where the government fails to protect the Negro he is entitled to do it himself. He is within his rights. I have found the only white elements who do not want this advice given to undefensive Blacks are the racist liberals. They use the press to project us in the image of violence. There is an element of whites who are nothing but cold, animalistic racists. That element is the one that controls or has strong influence in the power structure. It uses the press skillfully to feed statistics to the public to make it appear that the rate of crime in the Black community, or community of nonwhite people, is at such a high level. It gives the impression or the image that everyone in that community is criminal. And as soon as the public accepts the fact that the dark-skinned community consists largely of criminals or people who are dirty, then it makes it possible for the power structure to set up a police-state system, which will make it permissible in the minds of even the well-meaning white public for them to come in and use all kinds of police methods to brutally suppress the struggle on the part of these people against segregation, discrimination, and other acts that are unleashed against them that are absolutely unjust.
>
> They use the press to set up this police state, and they use the press to make the white public accept whatever they do to the dark-skinned public. They do that here in London right now with the constant reference to the West Indian population and the Asian population having a high rate of crime or having a tendency toward dirtiness. They have all kinds of negative characteristics that they project to make the white public draw back, or to make the white public be apathetic when police-state-like methods are used in these areas to suppress the people's honest and just struggle against discrimination and other forms of segregation.
>
> A good example of how they do it in New York: last summer, when the Blacks were rioting—the riots, actually they weren't riots in the first place; they were reactions against police brutality. And when the Afro-Americans reacted against the brutal measures that were executed against them by the police, the press all over the world projected them as rioters. When the store windows were broken in the Black community, immediately it was made to appear that this was being done not by people who were reacting over civil rights

> violations, but they gave the impression that these were hoodlums, vagrants, criminals, who wanted nothing other than to get into the stores and take the merchandise.
>
> But this is wrong. In America, the Black community in which we live is not owned by us. The landlord is white. The merchant is white. In fact, the entire economy of the Black community in the States is controlled by someone who doesn't even live there. The property that we live in is owned by someone else. The store that we trade with is operated by someone else. And these are the people who suck the economic blood of our community.
>
> And being in a position to suck the economic blood of our community, they control the radio programs that cater to us, they control the newspapers, the advertising, that cater to us. They control our minds. They end up controlling our civic organizations. They end up controlling us economically, politically, socially, mentally, and every other kind of way. They suck our blood like vultures.
>
> And when you see the Blacks react, since the people who do this aren't there, they react against their property. The property is the only thing that's there. And they destroy it. And you get the impression over here that because they are destroying the property where they live, that they are destroying their own property. No. They can't get to the Man, so they get at what he owns.
>
> This doesn't say it's intelligent. But whoever heard of a sociological explosion that was done intelligently and politely? And this is what you're trying to make the Black man do. You're trying to drive him into a ghetto and make him the victim of every kind of unjust condition imaginable. Then when he explodes, you want him to explode politely! You want him to explode according to somebody's ground rules. Why, you're dealing with the wrong man, and you're dealing with him at the wrong time in the wrong way.

The rest of Malcolm's speech ties together this tragedy in American cities and British cities to the struggle of people across the world against white American imperialism, from the Congo to South Vietnam. He goes on to critique neocolonialism in the form of "dollarism" and humanitarianism, a critique that is ahead of its time, capturing the extent of the neoliberal foreign aid complex that keeps the third world indebted to Western powers. He also critiques tokenism, foreshadowing debates around affirmative action and brown faces in high places. He argues that Black people in the West have risen up because "they are part of the oppressed masses of people all over the world today who are crying out for action against the common oppressor." Perhaps that time has come again, and social scientists ought to take note.

Chapter 2: The Collective Memory of Clifford Glover

Figure 7. Early map of NYPD Precincts in Queens pre-1970s



Using the comparative case of Black Press and White Press reporting on the 1973 police killing of Clifford Glover and the 2006 police killing of Sean Bell, both in the NYPD 103rd Precinct of Jamaica, Queens, New York, I ask the following: 1) How do newspaper media depict the actions and character of police officers and victims when police kill unarmed people in the same community over time? and 2) How do Black press and White press differentially report the actions of community residents and leaders after police killings and officer acquittals?

Expanding upon research of urban Black political and social movements with attention to police power and news reporting, this study draws on newspaper coverage from *The New York Times* and the *New York Amsterdam News* to assess reporting on two separate police killings and officer acquittals. Using the linguistic method of critical discourse analysis, guided by conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 2003)—the theory that our everyday language about social matters is guided by overarching metaphors—I analyze news coverage of the police killings of Glover and Bell, in both cases caused by gunshots fired by undercover officers from the New York Police Department (NYPD) 103rd Precinct. I chose these two instances of police violence because their study is essential to a longer community history of policing in Jamaica, Queens over time and because both police killings had resonant outcomes for policing throughout the city of New York.

I comparatively study news coverage of police violence, across time, within one community and NYPD police precinct with the aim of contributing to current scholarship on both localized institutional histories of police violence and racialized discourse about victims of police violence in communities where police use of force is concentrated. Central to understanding current social movements against the expansion of police and police powers in the urban—as well as suburban and rural—United States is the disentanglement of discourse around fatalities caused by police. News reporting on officers involved and victims of lethal police use of force informs how the public understands police killings, police work, and the role of government itself. This means that perceptions of individual incidents of police violence inform overall beliefs and opinions about the police and potentially impact civic participation (Lerman and Weaver 2014).

The findings of this study elucidate crucial aspects of news reporting following fatal police shootings, namely the ways that Black and White News sources differentially frame the same incidents. This study contends that Black Press and White Press engage in similar discourses about what occurred during two separate police killings, one of a boy and one of a young man, in the same neighborhood, decades apart, but often in contested ways. I also argue that both newspapers fall short of delivering the full historic context of localized police violence over time in this community.

First, what I term 'no angel' discourse is used by White Press to adultify youth and vilify, criminalize, and further dehumanize Black victims of police violence as well as their families and close associates. Any instance in which efforts are made to highlight police reporting on why the officers were justified in opening fire on Black victims is analyzed under the subheading of 'no angel' discourse. Black Press utilizes this discourse to a far lesser degree to describe victims, and additionally points criticism back at the officers involved and reports on a previous pattern of misconduct that may be predictive of violence and murder. They also question parallel police investigations conducted to try and retroactively justify police shootings in the face of litigation. Second, the conceptual metaphor Community as Disaster[4] is utilized by both Black and White Presses to depict the fear of violence and "civil disorders" in the aftermath of police killings and officer acquittals. Though utilized differently, and while Black Press amplifies voices from a wider array of community members and leadership, the panic around a city's "eruption" following police violence, is employed similarly. Thirdly, both presses contribute to a "discontinuity" or loss of memory as neither press references the prior police killing of Clifford

[4] In this article, each citation of a news text instance of a conceptual metaphor or discourse is *italicized* (e.g., *no angel*, *eruption*, and *tipping point*). Following cognitive metaphor analysis conventions, we present the semantic domains and metaphor itself using **small caps**, as in the metaphor **COMMUNITY AS DISASTER**.

Glover in relation to the police killing of Sean Bell, even though both took place in the same community and precinct and bear other revealing similarities.

The study of news reporting on police violence against Black youth specifically necessitates a discussion of the dehumanization and adultification of Black children, both boys and girls. Psychologists Philip A. Goff and colleagues (2014) find that Black boys are perceived as being more responsible for their actions and as being more appropriate targets for police violence; they are seen as older and less innocent than their White same-age peers across four studies using laboratory, field, and translational methods. Dehumanizing associations of Black boys with animals predicted actual racial disparities in police violence toward children. This is pivotal to understanding further the importance of journalistic standards and the power of media in depicting and potentially further dehumanizing/adultifying Black children who are the victims of police killings.

The role of the police is still unclear. In the year 1973, the New York City 103rd Precinct employed more uniformed police officers than any other in the city but solved only 22.6% of crimes in the area. Only 2 of the city's 82 police precincts had more crime. Simultaneously, NYPD officers were using more and more force. The death penalty was abolished in New York State in 1965, but that year, police shot and killed 27 people in New York City. A subsequent study conducted by the NYPD themselves found that a starkly disproportionate number of these killings involved white police and Black victims.

In the early 1970s, four Black plainclothes police officers had been killed by other policemen, one such instance occurring in the 103rd Precinct, just a year prior to Clifford Glover's death.

At the time, southeast Queens was 90% Black and Hispanic (Hauser 1980). In 1973, New York City's 103rd Precinct reported the third most felonies in the entire city, including 45% more murders than the city-wide precinct average and 167% more rapes. On April 2, 1973, twenty-six days before Clifford Glover was killed, a police captain named Glanvin Alveranga, the son of Jamaican immigrants, was named Commanding Officer of the 103rd Precinct, making him the first Black precinct commander in the history of Queens. At the time, Black cops made up less than 8% of the NYPD, despite Black people making up over 20% of the city's population. The 103rd Precinct, which patrolled the largest Black section of Queens only employed thirteen Black police at the time, out of 413 total officers (Hauser 1980).

Figure 8. NYPD 103rd Police Precinct, Queens, NY. 1973.

On April 28, 1973, Add Armstead woke up to go to work. Born in Fredericksburg, Virginia, on June 14, 1922, his birth was assisted by an elderly midwife who had been raised in slavery. The eighth of nineteen children, he dropped out of school in second grade and could not read nor write. At age twenty-one, he moved north to New York, where he had worked as a laborer for over thirty years. One of millions of African American Great Migrants, Armstead was thrust from his private life into the public that morning. He explains how his son was killed, in an interview with Thomas Hauser:

> Shea! Yeah, I know that name. He made a pact with the devil. You see, God and Satan be sittin' in heaven with suitcases full of souls, and they trade them back and forth. And the devil, he's got another suitcase with every kind of temptation you can imagine. Shea made a pact with the devil. The devil took his soul, and now Shea does his bidding. I know

> because I was there the morning Shea shot my boy. If I'd been drunk or causing trouble, it might have been different, but there weren't none of that. Me and Clifford was just walking along when Shea killed him dead. Some nights, I still wake up and hear the bullets whistling over me (Hauser 1980).

Armstead explains how the death of Clifford Glover affected his faith and his view of police:

> After Shea killed my boy, there was a time when any man with a uniform and badge was my enemy. Every cop, I hated. Then God called me. I was sitting in church, cursing God for everything that had gone wrong, when I felt my breath growing short. My throat closed up and I couldn't breathe. Right then I heard the voice of God. He said, 'Add, the devil could have killed you that Saturday morning, but I saved you to preach the Gospel.' I heard God's voice, and I begged for forgiveness. I said, 'Lord, I surrender everything. Lord, I'll give you everything. Lord, I'm in your hands (Hauser 1980).

He talks about regaining his faith in God:

> Hate tears up a man's insides. When Jesus was on the cross, He said, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,' That's why I forgive Shea. God says that Shea's my brother. If Shea walked in this door right now and said, 'I'm hungry,' I'd give him something to eat. There's no way a man can love God if he hates his own brother. That's what matters to me now. Loving God. But there's more you came to ask me, so I'll tell you more (Hauser 1980).

Armstead then recounts his life story, how he has five brothers and four sisters still living, while nine of his siblings have died. He was the oldest living son. He described his mother, Sarah:

> She was a big woman, weighed a little more than two hundred pounds. At hog-killing time, she worked in the yard. But the rest of the time, she stayed at home. I guess raising nineteen of us was work enough. She was born a Baptist, lived like a Baptist, and died a Baptist. Always told us to go to church, and I never gave her no trouble except once. One Sunday, instead of praying like I was supposed to, I went fishing with George Young. The canoe turned over and I couldn't swim, nearly drowned before George saved me. Right then, I figured the Lord was trying to tell me something. That's the last time I went fishing on Sunday (Hauser 1980).

He described his father, whom he was named after, and the work ethic he instilled:

> My father hauled wood for a living. His name was Add, and I look a lot like he used to. He and my mother ran out of names by the time they got to me, so they named me Add, Junior. My father was a hard man, but he taught us the best he knew how. He gave us what he could and we didn't have no palace, but what we had was all right. I was never ashamed. My father worked us hard when we was children. I didn't get much book learning because

> he made me quit school in second grade so I could help him out at work. Every day except Sunday, him and me would chop down a load of trees. Then we'd saw them into eight-foot sections and bring them back by horse and wagon to the yard, where my brothers cut them down some more. Finally, we'd load the wood back on the cart and take it to people's houses for their stoves. It was hard work but honest money. We got five dollars a load, three or four loads a day (Hauser 1980).

Add describes how when he'd get tired of working, his father would make him keep going. That's how he was with all his children. Once, when he came home at midnight, and Add hadn't chopped up some logs, his father woke him and made him go outside in the snow and do it. Another time, when repairing a piece of machinery, Add's father hit him on the head with a hammer for looking like he wasn't going to lift something heavy, and he still had the scar to prove it:

> My mother told him, 'You're going to kill that boy.' But it was for my own good. My father said, 'You have it hard now and it will be easier later on.' He was right. Sixteen years I've been able to hold onto the same job because of what he taught me. Children today don't have that. Everything comes too easy to them. That's why there's so much juvenilism. There are more young junkies in jail today than ever before because they don't have good fathers that keep on them. I laugh at some of those kids, the way they misbehave. But deep down inside, it breaks my heart. All I had to do was just look like I wasn't going to do what I was told and I got the belt. But I'll say this about my daddy and mama. None of their children ever went wrong. Nineteen of us, and none of us ever went bad (Hauser 1980).

Add Armstead goes on to describe the tough times his family had when he was young. They didn't have money for nineteen pairs of shoes, and one time he got frostbite walking through the snow barefoot. Sometimes they only had cornpone and boiled potatoes for dinner, but he says he usually made out okay. If he was hungry, he walked along the road and looked for empty soda bottles to turn in at the store for bread and cheese. He then describes his experiences with race, both in his youth down south and as an adult up north in New York:

> Most folks was good to us. Most folks left us alone. There wasn't much problem with color. Up here in New York, people throw rocks and hide their hand. They talk like they're your friend, but they treat you like a nigger. Down south, if a man don't like you because of your color, he says so. Down south, if a colored man is working for a white and lands in

> jail, his boss calls the sheriff and says, 'Let my nigger go.' I got nothing against the civil rights movement. Things are better now because of it. But at the time it was going on, it never crossed my mind (Hauser 1980).

Armstead then described what led him to settle permanently in New York:

> About the time I was seventeen, I left home and went to work for a man named Mr. Cupid. He put a cot and stove in his hen house, and I got along there just fine. Then, maybe three years later, my brother Joe moved up north. After a while, he come home to visit and told us how good things were, so I decided to see for myself. It was cold when I got to New York. I almost went back home, but after a while I decided to stay. The first job I had in the city was driving a cab. Then I cleaned cesspools for a couple of years and carted coal. After that, I worked as a longshoreman. Partway through World War II, I went to work for a man named Jack Reynolds at a wrecking yard on Springfield Boulevard in Queens. I worked with Mr. Reynolds for fourteen years. About the time we got started, I met Lola.

Add Armstead goes on to describe the time he spent with Lola, his first wife, whom he fell in love with on Christmas eve, 1945, and married on the first Tuesday of 1946. He says they had a lot of nice years together, he and Lola. They had eight children, three boys and five girls. The first boy died from asthma when he was two months old, and their daughter Margie was shot to death by her husband. Their other children were still alive at the time that Armstead was interviewed for *The Trial of Patrolman Thomas Shea,* published in 1980. He says that he loved Lola but did some running around that maybe he shouldn't have. She told him she'd forgive him, but she won't regret. After being released after a bad accident on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1959 that left him hospitalized for almost a year, Lola had fallen in love with another man and gone to live with him until she died in 1971. "Heart trouble," he explained. Add Armstead was called to the morgue to identify her body. "I loved that woman," he professed.

Figure 9. Add Armstead, Eloise Glover, and Patricia Glover the day after Clifford Glover died. *New York Times*.

After Lola left Add, he says he went near crazy from being alone. He lived with his brother for a while, but that didn't work out, so he lived alone again. Then his mother died, and after that his father passed away. Add went home for his father's funeral and gave the undertaker the only suit he had so his "daddy could be buried proper." Right after that, he met Mrs. Eloise Glover:

> Mrs. Glover was a nice woman, very good with children. We met in a little restaurant on South Road and New York Boulevard in Queens. One day, she came in when I was having lunch, and I bought her something to eat. Then a friend of mine told me, 'Don't mess with her because she's married.' After that I was perfectly proper. I didn't do anything but we stayed friends. I bought her lunch almost every day. And once, someone broke into her home, so I helped fix the lock on her door. Another time, something in the bathroom broke, so I fixed it. Then her husband ran out and left her with two children; Clifford and Henry, both of them babies. I started seeing her more, and she had two more children—Patricia and Darlene. Both of them are mine. Finally, about 1971, she asked me to move in.

Armstead then discusses his relationship with Clifford, and what he instilled, in depth:

> I liked all of Mrs. Glover's children, but me and Clifford got along the best. He was eight years old when I moved in, and he took to me real good. Mr. Reynolds had died by then, and I'd gotten another job at a junkyard right by our home. Most of the time, I cut up old cars with a torch. It was the best job I ever had. The boss sold all the radiators, batteries, and motors, but I could keep anything else I wanted. One day, I made sixty-seven dollars selling copper wire and a heater I found in the car. Working in a junkyard gets in your blood. I figured Clifford could learn it real good. So when he turned ten, I started bringing him along. Every day after school he'd come down to the yard and stay until I got off. Then, if I went for a beer, he'd come keep me company. He was a nice boy, very intelligent. He'd have been a good mechanic someday. Saturdays, he'd come to work the whole day. That's where we was going when Shea killed him.

Finally, Add Armstead reflected on the fatal interaction that ended Clifford's life that morning:

> I suppose I'm lucky. If I'd died that morning, hell would have been my home. I was a sinner. But Clifford had no sin on him. He was pure. Right now he's by the side of the Lord. That's all I want. That's all any man needs. To die and be by the side of the Lord. You see, someday, you and me gonna pass away. The houses we live in and this city gonna pass away. But the Word of God will live forever. Remember that, my friend. The Word of God will live forever. There might not be no justice in this world, but don't you worry none. They got plenty of it in the next. I'm getting on in years, and someday me and Clifford gonna meet up again. Lord, that'll be the day (Hauser 1980).

It's difficult to say whether Add Armstead or Mrs. Eloise Glover ever found peace after the way their son was shot down in cold blood, or if such a feeling is even possible. So many families have experienced living past the senseless killing of a family member, a relative, a friend. The afterlives of victims of police killings often come to encompass so much more than just their immediate families and loved ones but it is still important to center their voices in the narratives that outlive them. As Thomas Hauser (1980) put it:

> A child is dead and the echoes of the shot that killed him will reach far beyond the Shea and Glover families. They will shake New York City, its police and politicians, its black and white citizenry, and send tremors across the nation as Shea becomes the first New York City cop in fifty years to be indicted and tried for murder for a shooting in the line of duty.

The pages that follow detail the echoes of those gunshots, and the tremors being felt a half century later.

"No Angel" Discourse

Just as important as understanding what exactly occurred on April 28, 1973, the morning that 10-year-old Clifford Glover was killed by gunshot wounds from a weapon fired by 103rd Precinct patrolman Thomas Shea, is how those events were reported by different news outlets, how information about police violence, and subsequent collective action, is conveyed to, and received by, the public. Further, what remains to be understood is how victims of police killings, even ones that were once as high profile and reported on widely as the death of Clifford Glover, come to be (dis)remembered. This study interrogates these very inquiries.

Figure 10. Clifford Glover



Recent police killings of unarmed Black people, subsequent acquittals of officers involved, and worldwide protests have once again brought issues of racism in policing to the national forefront. The 2020 protests for George Floyd and Breonna Taylor; the 2015 uprisings in Baltimore, Maryland and Ferguson, Missouri for Freddie Grey, Michael Brown; and many more are all part of a long history of Black protest in response to police violence dating back to the 1960s and even further back to revolts against slave patrols in the early colonial period (Logan and Oakley 2017; Turner et al. 2007).

Recent research has considered the impact of high levels of police contact and police use of force as it relates to mass incarceration (Hinton 2015; Rios 2009, 2017), deleterious health effects (Sewell and Jefferson 2016), increased deportation (Armenta 2017; Golash-Boza 2014), overall trust in police (Desmond et al. 2016; Fox-Williams 2018), as well as attitudes toward local and national authorities more broadly (Lerman and Weaver 2014). Studies post-Ferguson

find that mainstream news representations largely support official police narratives of instances where Black victims are killed by police, and that digital media is often used to challenge these narratives (Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Stone and Socia 2017). Less understood is how public contestation of official police reports, within and beyond press media, following publicized instances of police violence, is related to local and global civic action over time. The present study examines how police narratives are taken as fact or challenged in reporting from two widely read news sources—one Black-owned weekly, the other a mainstream daily—in New York City, pertaining to two separate police killings in the same neighborhood and police precinct, thirty-three years apart.

While offering analysis of mainstream news sources' accounts of police violence and unverified police reports, this study also makes transparent the positionality of Black News sources in historically addressing the persistence of police violence and the propagation of police narratives following officer-involved fatalities, taking an assets-based approach to understanding Black journalistic agency in the wake of American police killings. This is a *chocolate city* (Hunter and Robinson 2018) analysis focusing not solely on the role of state institutions in perpetuating racial inequity in Black communities, but also the central role of Black-owned-and-operated institutions, in the making and remaking of social conditions, challenging police authority in court, in the news, and on the streets.

Following the killing of ten-year-old Clifford Glover by Patrolman Thomas Shea on April 28, 1973, in Jamaica, Queens, the first headlines released by *The New York Times* and *New York Amsterdam News* are telling in that they frame the same incident quite differently. *New York Amsterdam News* starts their headline by describing the state of Black people as "Seething" over "Slaying of Boy, Ten." There is no mention of the police in this headline but one of the

subheadings reads, “Wilkins Calls It A ‘Police Murder’” while another reads “His Only Fault Was Being Black.”

The *New York Amsterdam News* front page from May 5, 1973, features a photo of Clifford Glover dead in his coffin, eyes closed, and hands folded.

Figure 11. Front page and article in *New York Amsterdam News* May 5, 1973

Blacks Seething Over Slaying Of Boy, Ten: 'His Only Fault Was Being Black'
New York Amsterdam News (1962-1993); May 5, 1973;
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: New York Amsterdam News
pg. A1

Wilkins Calls It A "Police Murder"

Blacks Seething Over Slaying Of Boy, Ten

'His Only Fault Was Being Black'

In a show of unity seldom seen since the stirring "Sixties", Blacks in Manhattan joined hands with Blacks in Brooklyn and Queens to register a seething protest over the fatal shooting of a ten-year-old Black boy by a white police officer last Saturday morning.

Although the protest began in an angry, but orderly fashion, it erupted in violence on Monday and Tuesday nights with the most violent eruption coming Tuesday night.

Tuesday night's action saw the bombing of a police van and three police officers struck by bricks. Five Black youths were arrested for possession of Molotov cocktails. This scattered violence centered in the vicinity of New York Boulevard in South Jamaica.

Looting

Store windows were broken along New York Boulevard Tuesday night and police said there were instances of looting on a small scale.

The disturbances were punctuated with sharp statements by Black leaders who condemned the fatal shooting of ten-year-old Clifford Glover by patrolman Thomas J. Shea.

Mayor Lindsay, in a statement, said, "This shooting raises the most serious questions that can only be answered by a full, careful and rigorous investigation." The Mayor added that the police commissioner "would review the department's policies and procedures, with regard to the use of firearms in such situation to see that every feasible step is taken to prevent this kind of deplorable incident in the future."

"Inflamatory"

Borough President Percy Sutton sharply criticized Police Commissioner Designate, Donald F. Cawley, for siding with the Patrolmans Benevolent Association in protesting the charge of murder lodged against officer Shea by the Queens District Attorney's office.

"I am very disturbed about the conduct of the in-coming police commissioner," Sutton said.

"I thought that his speech on Sunday was inflamatory. It was precipitious and so unlike Police Commissioner Murphy. I thought Police Commissioner Cawley rushed in to defend the police when he didn't really have information as to whether he ought to be defending a particular policeman. I think he ought to move forward to give all the support he can to good morale in the department. But I think in the course of his speech and in the interview he was absolutely inflamatory.

(Please turn to Page A-2)

Law and Order?
TEN-YEAR-OLD CLIFFORD GLOVER RESTS IN HIS COFFIN — THE INNOCENT VICTIM OF OFFICER THOMAS SHEA. (INSET ABOVE)

Getting In the Act
These youngsters, some very very young, joined in the protest of the killing of the ten year old youth by a white policeman. Note signs carried by group. (Harris photo)

Harlemites In Queens
Carl Lawrence, (second in line) head of the New York Branch of the NAACP, is shown on the picket line in Queens where he led a New York group in a joint demonstration with others from Brooklyn and Queens protesting the killing of a 10-year-old youth by police. Lady in front is unidentified. (Harris Photo)

—His Only

(Continued from Page A-1)

It does not speak well for his success as police commissioner in the City of New York."

No Arms

Roy Wilkins called the boy's slaying "a wanton and inexcusable exercise of the most extreme force by armed police against unarmed civilians."

"It was a case of police murder with the victim as, almost always, being Black, and the killer white. The statements and actions of the Patrolmans Benevolent Association in this killing were obscene. Nothing can excuse the killing of a ten-year-old boy who was not connected, in any way, with a crime. His only fault was that he was Black."

A Demand

At a press conference called by CORE, and attended by a number of Black community leaders including, Victor Solomon of CORE, Livingston Wingate of the New York Urban League, Leonard De Champs of CORE, City Councilman Charles Taylor, Queen Mother Moore and Eugene Calendar of the New York Urban Coalition, a statement was issued demanding that city police be removed from investigation of the case and that Maurice Nadjari, state anti-corruption prosecutor be assigned to make the investigation.

The statement also called upon Governor Rockefeller to remove Frederick Ludwig, acting District Attorney of Queens.

The CORE statement said a witness has been found who is willing to testify that she saw Patrolman Shea "kick and curse the dying or dead body of Clifford Glover."

The slaying of the youth, said to be the youngest ever slain by a New York City policeman, inevitably recalled the 1964 incident in Yorkville when 15-year-old James Powell was shot dead by Lieutenant Thomas R. Gilligan.

That incident touched off riots in Harlem and other places in New York.

There were those Tuesday who vocally stated that all the ingredients were present for another riot and silently hoped that none would take place.

The caption reads "Law and Order? TEN-YEAR-OLD CLIFFORD GLOVER RESTS IN HIS COFFIN—THE INNOCENT VICTIM OF OFFICER THOMAS SHEA." Here, the portrayal of Clifford Glover is as a ten-year-old boy, an "innocent victim" of Officer Thomas Shea. There is an inset of Thomas Shea's face within the same image. The image of Clifford Glover laying lifeless in an open casket invokes the memory of Emmitt Till, the fourteen-year-old boy from Chicago, Illinois who was notoriously and viciously murdered in Mississippi because a White woman lied about him, even though Till is not mentioned explicitly. There is no such image of Clifford Glover in *The New York Times* front-page article released the day after his death. There is only an image of Martin Bracken, the Queens assistant district attorney who announced the arrest of Officer Thomas Shea.

The New York Times reports on the initial police reports of the incident, in which Clifford Glover is made out to be 'no angel.' This is in stark contrast to the claim of the *New York Amsterdam News* that "his only fault was being Black" and that he was "the innocent victim of Officer Thomas Shea," demonstrating oppositional standpoints. *The New York Times* piece written on April 29, 1973, by Emanuel Perlmutter focuses on initial reports made by the policemen involved:

> According to the initial police reports of the incident, the boy, Clifford Glover of 109-50 New York Boulevard, South Jamaica, had *run away and pointed a gun* at Officer Shea and his partner, Walter Scott, when the policemen stopped the boy and his stepfather, Add Armstead, to question them about the holdup (Perlmutter 1973, p. 1, emphasis added).

The article continues further:

> Officer Shea; who the police said fired three shots at the boy, reportedly told superior officers that after the boy was shot, he had *given his gun to his stepfather*, who threw it into a wooded area near 112th Avenue and New York Boulevard. […] After searching the area, the police reported that no such weapon was found (Perlmutter 1973, p. 1, emphasis added).

There is no such discussion of the patrolmen's reports of Glover ever having had a gun, pointing a gun at the officers, or giving said gun to his stepfather who supposedly threw it into a wooded

area described to any extent or at any length in the *New York Amsterdam News* front-page article about his death.

Figure 12. Front Page and Article in *New York Times* April 29, 1973

Officer Kills a Suspect, 10; A Murder Charge Is Filed; P.B.A. ...
By EMANUEL PERLMUTTER
New York Times (1923-Current file); Apr 29, 1973; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times
pg. 1

Officer Kills a Suspect, 10; A Murder Charge Is Filed

Boy Was Slain During an Investigation of a Queens Taxi-Driver Robbery—P.B.A. Calls Arrest 'Outrage'

By EMANUEL PERLMUTTER

A Queens policeman was charged with murder last night about 12 hours after he shot and fatally wounded a 10-year-old boy while investigating the holdup of a taxi driver.

The arrest of the police officer, Thomas Shea, 36, a plain-clothes member of the 103d Precinct's anticrime patrol, was ordered by Assistant District Attorney Martin Bracken after an all-day investigation of the 5 A.M. shooting.

According to the initial police reports of the incident, the boy, Clifford Glover of 109-50 New York Boulevard, South Jamaica, had run away and pointed a gun at Officer Shea and his partner, Walter Scott, when the policemen stopped the boy and his stepfather, Add Armstead, to question them about the holdup.

Officer Shea, who the police said fired three shots at the boy, reportedly told his superior officers that after the boy was shot, he had given his gun to his stepfather, who threw it into a wooded area near 112th Avenue and New York Boulevard.

However, after searching the area, the police reported that no such weapon was found.

The Glover boy, described as weighing 90 pounds and standing 4 feet, 11 inches tall, was believed to be the youngest person ever killed by a New York City police officer. He was struck once in the right shoulder and once in the chest and died at Mary Immaculate Hospital about an hour after the shooting.

Martin Bracken, Queens assistant district attorney, announcing arrest.

P.B.A. Protests Arrest

The arrest of Officer Shea drew immediate protests from the leadership of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, which termed it an unwarranted departure from normal procedures when a police officer kills a suspect while on duty. Customarily, the policeman is suspended pending a departmental investigation.

Officer Shea, who was suspended from the force upon his arrest, was arraigned at Queens Criminal Court before Judge Allen Moss, who ordered him held in $25,000 bail pending a hearing next Wednesday.

Mr. Shea was represented by James H. Cahill, a P.B.A. lawyer, who asked for parole of his client after describing him as a 12-year veteran of the force who lived with his wife and two children.

Mr. Cahill said that Robert McKiernan, the P.B.A. president, who was present in court,

Continued on Page 18, Column 3

Policeman Is Held in Killing of Boy, 10

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

would personally vouch for Mr. Shea's appearance in court and would put the entire reputation of the P.B.A. on the line in the matter.

Judge Moss, who earlier had rejected a request by Assistant District Attorney James Delaney that bail be set at $50,000, also refused to accept a P.B.A. check for the $25,000 bail figure, and ordered Mr. Shea kept in custody until the amount could be raised in cash.

Mr. McKiernan, who later called the proceedings against Officer Shea an "outrage," said his organization would try to raise the amount as soon as possible.

In announcing the arrest at the 103d Precinct station house, Mr. Bracken, the Assistant District Attorney, said: "After listening to statements concerning the death of Clifford Glover and hearing statements by officers, I directed the arrest of Patrolman Shea for the crime of murder." He gave no further information.

No actions were taken against Officer Scott, who did not fire his weapon during the incident.

The Glover boy lived with his mother, Eloise; his stepfather, Mr. Armstead, and two younger sisters and a brother at the New York Boulevard address a few blocks from the scene of the shooting.

Last night, Mr. Armstead was arrested and given a summons for having an unregistered pistol in the Pilot Automotive Wrecking Company yard at 115-05 New York, Boulevard, where he worked as a mechanic. The police said the weapon was not the one the officers maintained the slain boy had had.

"They killed my son in cold blood. There was no reason that boy had to be killed the way he was."

Mrs. Glover's other children, Henry, 6; Darleen, 6, and Patricia, 2, clung to her as she spoke.

She said that Mr. Armstead worked in a car-wrecking lot at 112th Avenue and New York Boulevard and that he frequently took Clifford with him when he left for work Saturday mornings at 5 o'clock.

Chief of Detectives Louis C. Cottell, who conducted a personal inquiry of the shooting, gave the following account of the incident at a news conference yesterday afternoon in the Jamaica station house.

He said that Officers Shea and Scott, who were in civilian clothes, had stopped the boy and his stepfather as they were about to enter the wrecking lot.

Chief Cottell said that the two officers identified themselves and asked them about a taxi holdup that had occurred nearby about an hour earlier.

It was at this point that Mr. Armstead and the boy fled, with the two officers in pursuit.

The holdup that led to the shooting had occurred at Van Wyck Expressway and Linden Boulevard when Frank Damiani, of 149-42 85th Street, Ozone Park, who was driving a taxi, was hailed by two men.

Mr. Damiani said that his two passengers ordered him to drive to 107th Street and 33d Avenue. Then, he said one of the men pointed a gun at him and said: "This is a ripoff." At this point Mr. Damiani said, he stopped his cab, jumped out and fled. The taxi was later found abandoned in Jamaica.

Neighbors of the slain boy said yesterday that he was a well-behaved youngster who attended a church conducted by the Rev. Albert Johnson at a storefront at 108-34 New York Boulevard. They said he was known as "a good boy" at Public School 40, 109-20 Union Hall Street, Jamaica, where he was a pupil.

The New York Times does not just describe Glover as having potentially engaged in criminal activity with regards to his being gunned down by policemen. He is also described as "weighing 90 pounds and standing 4 feet, 11 inches tall", "believed to be the youngest person ever killed by a New York City police officer." There is also reporting on how Glover is described by those who knew him: "a well-behaved youngster who attended church conducted by the Rev. Albert Johnson at a storefront at 108-34 New York Boulevard" and that "he was known as 'a good boy' at Public School 40, 109-20 Union Hall Street, Jamaica, where he was a pupil."

Though the descriptions of Clifford Glover as "a well-behaved youngster" and "a good boy" may not seem to fit with the 'no angel' thesis, the descriptors of him as "suspect" in a taxi robbery, in addition to the suspicions of his having carried a gun, which he allegedly passed to his stepfather after being shot, certainly do. In the wake of Glover's death, his stepfather becomes subject to scrutiny surrounding the gun that Officer Shea claimed was thrown into a wooded area nearby but was never found. Not only victims of police violence, but also their families, friends, and fellow community members, are implicated in 'no angel' discourse. The following evidence qualifies this claim.

On the night of Clifford Glover's killing, his stepfather Add Armstead was arrested. *The New York Times* reports:

> Last night, Mr. Armstead was arrested and given a summons for having an unregistered pistol in the Pilot Automotive Wrecking Company yard at 115-05 New York Boulevard, where he worked as a mechanic. The police said the weapon was not the one the officers maintained the slain boy had (Perlmutter 1973, p. 18).

The unregistered pistol found at Mr. Armstead's place of work was uncovered because of Officer Shea's false report that Glover handed a gun to his stepfather after he was shot, according to *The New York Times*. The arrest of Mr. Armstead and subsequent reporting in *The New York Times* depicts criminality in coordination with the police killing, even as the two are reported not to have any connection.

Further reporting in *The New York Times* from April 30, 1973, illuminates the 'no angel' thesis. Ronald Smothers wrote in the front-page article "Officer Swore and Fired, Victim's Father Says":

> Defensiveness about his clothes was recalled by people familiar with his behavior at Public School 40, a block from his home. Clifford was in a fourth-grade class for boys with *behavior problems*, an acquaintance said, and 'although he was *no angel* there was nothing vicious in the things he did.' The acquaintance said Clifford often talked back to teachers

> and teased other students to get attention but added 'I know he had a good heart' (Smothers 1973, p. 23, emphasis added).

The article also reports on Mr. Armstead:

> Police sources said yesterday that Mr. Armstead had a record of *three misdemeanor arrests* dating to 1965, but they had no record of their final disposition. One charge was for *selling skim milk as whole milk*, of which Mr. Armstead claimed no knowledge. Another was *second-degree rape*, for which he served four months of a six-month prison term. At that time, second-degree rape was defined by the state's penal law as an act of sexual intercourse by a man over 21 years of age with a female under 18, not involving force. The third charge was for *possession of stolen license plates*, for which he served 23 days and paid a $125 fine. 'I've paid my debt,' he said (Smothers 1973, p. 23, emphasis added).

Mr. Armstead's past misdemeanors and Clifford Glover's behavior problems are reported by *The New York Times* two days after his death by lethal force under suspicion for a crime they did not commit. The *New York Amsterdam News* has no such description of Armstead's arrests or Glover's behavior problems in school in their coverage for the week following his death. The information reported by *The New York Times* provides important context on policing and criminality as well as school discipline for the time and geographic context when and where Armstead and Glover lived. The *Times* also reports on why Armstead and Glover were fleeing from Officer Shea, according to police and Armstead:

> Police accounts of the shooting say that 36-year-old officer Thomas Shea and his partner, both white plainclothes men, stopped Mr. Armstead and Clifford to question them about a nearby holdup of a cab driver. The two ran, the police said, and Officer Shea fired three shots, one of them hitting Clifford. As Mr. Armstead described the incident, "We were walking not saying anything to each other, and this car pulls up and this white fella opens the door with a gun. He said '*You black son of a bitches*' and fired.' Mr. Armstead said the man had not identified himself as a policeman. He said he had run because he had $114.82 in his pocket and was afraid that he would be robbed (Smothers 1973, pp. 1, 23).

Mr. Armstead's account of the shooting differs significantly from Officer Shea's. It is important to note what information is reported about Mr. Armstead and what information is reported about Officer Shea. Armstead's past arrests are reported but there is no mention in articles from either newspaper that I analyzed of Officer Shea's prior misconduct.

In March of 1972, departmental charges were filed against Officer Thomas Shea for striking the head of a fourteen-year-old Hispanic boy in Woodside, Queens twice with the butt of his gun while making an arrest. Two weeks later Officer Shea shot at a twenty-three-year-old robbery suspect twice in West Manhattan hitting him once in his neck. The suspect was indicted for attempted murder because Officer Shea claimed he fired his weapon because the suspect shot at him but no gun belonging to the suspect was found and charges against the young man were dropped (Hauser 1980).

COMMUNITY AS DISASTER

Immediately following the killings of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell, their lives, and the lives of those closest to them, were placed under heavy scrutiny. Additionally, the collective action spurred by their deaths became the focus of much of the reporting of *The New York Times* and *New York Amsterdam News*. Reporting from the *New York Amsterdam News*, immediately following the death of Clifford Glover by gunshots from 103rd Precinct Officer Thomas Shea, made several references to the Black community, both in Queens and throughout New York City. Here we see the emergence of the conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER where terminology used to describe Black people and majority-Black communities in the wake of police violence mirrors that which describes volcanoes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters:

> Blacks *seething* over slaying of boy.
>
> In a show of unity seldom seen since the stirring "Sixties", Blacks in Manhattan joined hands with Blacks in Brooklyn and Queens to register a *seething* protest over the fatal shooting of a ten-year-old Black boy.
>
> Although the protest began in an angry, but orderly fashion, it *erupted* in violence, the *most violent eruption* coming Tuesday night. The scattered violence *centered* in the vicinity of New York Boulevard in South Jamaica (*New York Amsterdam News* 1973a, p. A1, emphasis added).

This reporting of disaster in the *New York Amsterdam News* continues after the acquittal of Officer Shea, found not guilty of murder or of manslaughter in the death of Clifford Glover. They report:

> Following the shooting last summer, angry community residents went on the *rampage* breaking store windows and staging a demonstration at the 103rd Precinct.
>
> "I hate to think of what will happen if Shea is acquitted," said a community worker of Jamaica who never missed a day of the trial. "It can be a very *explosive* situation. Shea is well known in the community for what he is and the people of the community know he's guilty" (Todd 1974, p. A1, emphasis added).

Figure 13. Officer Thomas Shea, celebrating his acquittal with his lawyers. *New York Times*.



After Shea's acquittal, *The New York Times* reported on the same protests that followed the killing of ten-year-old Clifford Glover the year prior. They racialize the collective action taken by New Yorkers in the wake of the tragedy:

> The shooting by the white officer of young Glover, who was black, touched off several days of *disturbances* in the poor and predominantly black community of South Jamaica. But the only organized protest at the courthouse yesterday was a line of about 20 pickets, with whites outnumbering blacks. One of the signs said: "A shield is not a license to murder children" (Johnston 1974, p. 27, emphasis added).

The article contrasts the "disturbances" that took place in "poor and predominantly black" South Jamaica with the "only organized protest" at the courthouse, which was characterized by "whites outnumbering blacks." Here, then, there is the association of collective action in poor Black communities as "disturbances" that are disorganized in comparison to the "only organized protest" which was majority White. The subheading for the section directly after this quote is titled: "Community *Braced*" furthering the community as disaster metaphor. The plan of caution, in preparation to brace for the anticipated disaster and chaos to come, is described:

> Last night in South Jamaica, in the New York Boulevard section where the shooting took place, leaders of the black community assigned 20 staff members of the Central Queens Association, the community corporation, to patrol the area in cars and jointly arranged with Queens police headquarters to have another staff member available to accompany the police in patrol cars, if necessary. "The community feels *shock, anger* and a sense of a miscarriage of justice," said James Heyliger, a spokesman for the association. "Youth gangs and other people, too, will be upset over what they consider a sellout by community leadership—a decision to trust to the trial, even after the basically white middle-class jury was selected, even though the average people never had any faith in it" (Johnston 1974, p. 27, emphasis added).

The Loss of Memory

There was once a plan to dedicate the lot where Clifford Glover died by creating a safe place for children to play. The *New York Amsterdam News* reported under the headline "Queens Elks Dedicate Glover Boy Death Lot":

> The recent tragedy involving the death of 10 year old Clifford Glover in South Jamaica has created city wide interest and regret. The Queens Lodge hereby make the following announcement: On Saturday, May 12th, The Queens Lodge No. 1001 will announce, at an open gathering, our offer of the vacant lot – 112th Ave. and New York Blvd. (where Glover was slain) for recreation for neighborhood youngsters. The lot is owned by Queens Lodge. Representatives from city agencies including The Borough President and the Mayor's Office will be invited. Also 103rd Precinct. Local leaders of community-based organizations will be asked to participate (*New York Amsterdam News* 1973b, p. B11).

Currently, there is no dedication to Clifford Glover in the built environment of the city. This, I argue, is why the death of Clifford Glover has been erased from collective memory, the public archive, and the written record.

This doesn't mean that, at the time, there were not living testimonies of the collective pain, grief, suffering, and anger felt by Black communities across the world for Clifford Glover. Both the poet Audre Lorde and recording artist Stevie Wonder paid homage to Clifford Glover, the latter having performed at Glover's funeral in South Jamaica.

Audre Lorde wrote the poem "Power" in dedication of Clifford Glover and the acquittal of Thomas Shea. The full poem is a powerful memorial of what occurred in Jamaica in 1973.

> The difference between poetry and rhetoric
> is being ready to kill
> yourself
> instead of your children.
>
> I am trapped on a desert of raw gunshot wounds
> and a dead child dragging his shattered black
> face off the edge of my sleep
> blood from his punctured cheeks and shoulders
> is the only liquid for miles
> and my stomach
> churns at the imagined taste while
> my mouth splits into dry lips
> without loyalty or reason
> thirsting for the wetness of his blood
> as it sinks into the whiteness
> of the desert where I am lost
> without imagery or magic
> trying to make power out of hatred and destruction
> trying to heal my dying son with kisses
> only the sun will bleach his bones quicker.
>
> A policeman who shot down a ten year old in Queens
> stood over the boy with his cop shoes in childish blood
> and a voice said "Die you little motherfucker" and
> there are tapes to prove it. At his trial
> this policeman said in his own defense
> "I didn't notice the size nor nothing else

only the color". And
there are tapes to prove that, too.

Today that 37 year old white man
with 13 years of police forcing
was set free
by eleven white men who said they were satisfied
justice had been done
and one Black Woman who said
"They convinced me" meaning
they had dragged her 4'10" black Woman's frame
over the hot coals
of four centuries of white male approval
until she let go
the first real power she ever had
and lined her own womb with cement
to make a graveyard for our children.

I have not been able to touch the destruction
within me.
But unless I learn to use
the difference between poetry and rhetoric
my power too will run corrupt as poisonous mold
or lie limp and useless as an unconnected wire
and one day I will take my teenaged plug
and connect it to the nearest socket
raping an 85 year old white woman
who is somebody's mother
and as I beat her senseless and set a torch to her bed
a greek chorus will be singing in 3/4 time
"Poor thing. She never hurt a soul. What beasts they are." (Lorde 1978)

Following the funeral of Clifford Glover on May 4, 1973, scattered incidents of looting and attacks on whites flared along New York Boulevard, now Guy R. Brewer Boulevard, in Jamaica, Queens. According to the *New York Times*, several groups of youths, numbering 400 in all, roamed the shopping district along Jamaica Avenue and the rain-swept streets of South Jamaica through the afternoon, "menacing whites and stoning their cars and stripping the shelves of four groceries and a liquor store."

The funeral was held at the Mt. Zion Baptist Church, 107th Avenue and Union Hall Street, four blocks from where Clifford Glover lived with his family. All 600 seats in the church were full and a crowd of 800 more had gathered outside to listen on loudspeakers. The Rev. Vaster Johnson delivered an emotional eulogy. “His sun went down long before noon,” he said. continuing:

> There are many questions, and I wish I could tell you the answers. Some ask, is there any difference from a rope 100 years ago in Alabama or a gun now in South Jamaica? I wonder if it was the price of being black standing before a gun with a white finger on the trigger. Let us not be overwrought, but let's talk about conscience. Conscience will overtake that man in the end. But we must not let conscience do it all. Only God has the right to take a life.

Many public officials attended the funeral, but Mayor John Lindsay sent a telegram of sympathy on his behalf. Stevie Wonder arrived to help with the benediction but that’s the extent to which the *New York Times* reports on his attendance. The *New York Voice*, however, reports that Stevie Wonder sang “Were You There When They Shot an Innocent Ten-Year-Old Child?” to the tune of “Were You There When They Crucified My Lord?” an important detail that may otherwise be lost to archival obscurity.

Another important historical fact is that attending Clifford Glover’s funeral was partly the inspiration for “Living for the City,” one of Stevie Wonder's most powerful singles off his legendary 1973 album, *Innervisions*. The police murder of Clifford Glover, and the acquittal of Officer Thomas Shea, set a dangerous precedent for the decades of adjudication of police officers for murder, while on duty, to come. Though political leaders, activists, and masses of New Yorkers protested, as in the civil disorders of the 1960s and, though less acknowledged, the 1970s, their words and actions went unheard by administrations on a local and national level. The chapters to follow discuss these missed opportunities in depth.

The *New York Times* reporting detailed the protests that broke out after Clifford Glover's coffin was carried out to a waiting hearse, and then moved to Plain Lawn Cemetery in Hicksville, Long Island. They describe the civil disorders that broke out:

> When the cortege had gone, a crowd of 400 gathered and set off on a 14-block walk to the 103d Precinct station at 91st Avenue and 168th Street. There was an attempt to sing "We Shall Overcome," and then the people broke into the chant, "We Want Shea!"
>
> There were barricades outside the station, and the crowd stood behind them for an hour, taunting the policemen. Some carried signs reading, "You are a cop when your gun protects the poor and oppressed, You become a dirty mother pig when you kill an innocent boy"; "Thomas Shea, You have a debt to pay," and; "Momma, Momma, hide your child, The cops are shooting as if they're wild."

Protesters expressed their discontent with police misconduct, delineating between what makes a "cop" and what makes a "dirty mother pig." The article continues:

> The crowd then set off again along the route they had come. Storekeepers along the way hurriedly put down protective gates in front of their windows. On New York Boulevard, a group of youths broke off from the milling, angry march and ran into Jerry's Pizza at 92-28. The counter attendant fled through the back, the youths scooped up slices of pizza; and ran on.
>
> Squads of policemen in riot helmets followed the march, trying to direct traffic around it and protect the few whites in the area, but also seeking to avoid a direct confrontation.
>
> At Liberty Avenue, the crowd stopped and began to pound on cars driven by whites. A man past 60 careened by, his face bloody and all the windows on the driver's side of his car smashed. A young woman had her windshield broken and, terrified, drove through the crowd at top speed toward Jamaica Avenue.
>
> The woman's car had struck a boy on the leg and a part of the crowd ran after her screaming she had killed a child. Sgt. John Prendergast of the 103d Precinct rescued her and took her to safety.
>
> A heavy rain began to fall and the crowd, growing smaller, broke into a grocery at South Road and New York Boulevard. Children ran from the scene carrying items from the shelves.
>
> Further down the boulevard, at Brinkerhoff Avenue, Dave's Market was set upon and stripped. A block further, a station wagon abandoned by a white driver was in flames. Three stores at 109th Avenue —New York Boulevard Supermarket, Lee's Beer and Soda Center,

> and a liquor store—were attacked and emptied. Men ran off with cases of beer and shopping carts filled with groceries.
>
> By dusk, the police had established order in most of the troubled area, although there were still sporadic reports of incidents.
>
> The three men arrested, all from South Jamaica, were identified as Johnny Darwin, 31, of 145-26 Ferndale Avenue; Robert Patterson, 23, of 107-13 New York Boulevard, and Charles Spencer, 36, of 166-05 Nadel Place, all were charged with burglary.
>
> After the looting of Lee's Center, the wrecked store was set afire. The Fire Department was called and put out the two alarm blaze.
>
> Most of the area residents were off the streets by 10 P.M. Policemen were posted in groups of three and four at intersections along New York Boulevard.
>
> At 109th Avenue, the silence was broken by the sound of a persistent burglar alarm at a supermarket looted several hours earlier.

The *New York Times* emphasized civil disorders in the wake of Clifford Glover's funeral and the fear of violence against whites in Jamaica in the May 4, 1973, article written by Paul L. Montgomery, titled "Youths Rampage After Slain Boy's Rites." Meanwhile, the *New York Voice*, published with the subtitle "N.Y.'s Fastest Growing Interracial Newspaper," published their frontpage article titled "Community Deplores Youth's Slaying" on the same day.

Reporting from the *New York Voice* starkly contrasted that of the *New York Times*. The frontpage photograph from the May 4 issue featured demonstrators holding signs saying, "Stop Trigger-Happy Cops' War Against The Poor And Working People!" and "We Protest Bullets For the Working Poor, Black & White – While Billions Are Stolen From Them!" The caption for the photograph reads:

> Demonstrators, both Black and White, are shown marching outside the 103rd Police Precinct last Monday evenings, protesting the shooting of 10-year-old Clifford Glover by Patrolman Thomas Shea. Peaceful picketing, as well as episodes of violence, have occurred nightly as a result of the death, which took place in the early hours of Saturday morning. As of this writing, a grand jury is investigating the charges of murder that were brought against the patrolman. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, along with the Police Commissioner, have protested the "murder" charge, saying it should be reduced to

> "manslaughter." Community spokesmen in Southeast Queens have insisted on retaining the more charge prior to disposition by the grand jury.

Focusing on the interracial demonstrators, both peaceful and violent, the *New York Voice* painted a very different picture of the racial dynamics of protest and collective action following police violence than did the *New York Times*.

Following Clifford Glover's funeral, the *New York Voice* published an article by Mary Gardner Lopez, titled "Funeral Services For Slain 10-Year-Old" with the subtitle "His Sun Went Down Long Before Noon," and discussed the tension between protesters and leaders pleading for restraint from the crowd. Lopez writes:

> Clenched fists were brandished by the crowd outside Mt. Zion Baptist Church (just five blocks from the modest home of Clifford Glover) where funeral services were held last Thursday, May 3, for 10-year-old Clifford who was killed by police officer Thomas J. Shea in South Jamaica.
>
> After the services a marching demonstration went to the 103rd police precinct to protest the slaying. But other community leaders uttered pleas of restraint to the crowd, who resorted to rock throwing and looting, as well as loud chanting to express their anger at the senseless shooting.

She concludes by writing: "From everywhere came people—short people, tall people…people fat and lean, sad and angry…but Black for the most part. White citizens, politicians and city officials were conspicuous by their absence."

Figure 14. *New York* Article, "Youths *Times* Rampage After Slain Boy's Rites," May 4, 1973



The New York Times/May 4, 1973

Violence occurred after a funeral service for Clifford Glover at the Mount Zion Baptist Church (1) when crowds of mourners marched to the 130d Precinct station (2) and demonstrators smashed car windows at New York Boulevard and Liberty Avenue (3) and looted stores at New York Boulevard and Brinkerhoff Avenue and at 109th Avenue (4).

Youths Rampage After Slain Boy's Rites

Stores Stripped and 11 Are Hurt in Jamaica

By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY

Scattered incidents of looting and attacks on whites flared along New York Boulevard in South Jamaica, Queens, yesterday following the funeral of a 10-year-old black boy who was shot and killed by a white policeman last Saturday.

Several groups of youths, numbering perhaps 400 in all, roamed the shopping district along Jamaica Avenue and the rain-swept streets of the South Jamaica ghetto through the afternoon, menacing whites and stoning their cars and stripping the shelves of four groceries and a liquor store.

3 Are Arrested

At nightfall, the police of the 103d Precinct listed seven civilians and four policemen as injured, none seriously. There were nine incidents of malicious damage to cars or stores and two muggings. Three men, all allegedly caught looting stores along New York Avenue, were arrested.

The South Jamaica area, a black neighborhood south of the Long Island Rail Road tracks, had been tense since the shooting of the boy, Clifford Glover, near dawn on Saturday.

The boy, believed to be the youngest person shot by a policeman in the city, was with his stepfather, Add Armstead, when they were approached by two plainclothes policemen, Officers Thomas J. Shea and Walter Scott, for questioning about a holdup.

Mr. Armstead said that he and ran. Officer Shea said the 10-year-old pulled a gun. He fired three shots, two of which struck the youth. No gun was found at the scene.

Officer Shea, who was charged with murder, is free on $25,000 bail. He was the subject of two incidents in 1972. In one, he allegedly pistol-whipped a 14-year-old boy. In the other, he shot and wounded a 23-year-old man who he said



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Whites Are Threatened and Autos Stoned

and a charge of attempted murder against the man was dismissed.

The funeral yesterday was at the Mt. Zion Baptist Church, 107th Avenue and Union Hall Street, four blocks from the boy's home. By the time the choir began the hymn "Stand Up, Stand Up for Jesus," moaning then shouting the words, the 600 seats in the modest brick church were full and a crowd of about 800 more had gathered outside to listen on loudspeakers.

The Rev. Vaster Johnson delivered an emotional eulogy. "His sun went down long before noon," he said of the boy, continuing:

"There are many questions, and I wish I could tell you the answers. Some ask, is there any difference from a rope 100 years ago in Alabama or a gun now in South Jamaica? I wonder if it was the price of being black standing before a gun with a white finger on the trigger."

"Let us not be overwrought, but let's talk about conscience," he went on. "Conscience will overtake that man in the end. But we must not let conscience do it all. Only God has the right to take a life."

Borough President Percy E. Sutton of Manhattan told the gathering that when a policeman has been killed in action, many public officials have found their way to that funeral." He referred to a message of sympathy from Mayor Lindsay, who did not attend. "I thought it was necessary telegram," Mr. Sutton said.

Others who delivered tributes were Simeon Golar, chairman of the Housing Authority; the Rev. Albert S. Johnson, the Glover boy's pastor, and the Rev. John B. Mason, pastor of Mt. Zion.

The boy's pastor delivered a message of peace. "This little boy is in the presence of the Lord, he ain't here no more," he said while the congregation murmured, "That's right."

"If he was here, he'd ask his young friends to cool it," he said.

The New York Times/Don Hogan Charles

The boy's stepfather, Add Armstead, and mother at service at Mount Zion Baptist Church

The New York Times/Don Hogan Charles

The boy's stepfather, Add Armstead, and mother at service at Mount Zion Baptist Church

crowd when Stevie Wonder, the soul singer, arrived to help with the benediction. Then the coffin was carried out to a waiting hearse, and the funeral cortege moved off to Plain Lawn Cemetery in Hicksville, L. I.

When the cortege had gone, a crowd of 400 gathered and set off on a 14-block walk to the 103d Precinct station at 91st Avenue and 168th Street. There was an attempt to sing "We Shall Overcome," and then the people broke into the chant, "We Want Shea!"

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At 109th Avenue, the silence was broken by the sound of a persistent burglar alarm at a supermarket looted several hours earlier.

Figure 15. *New York Voice* articles, May 4 and 11, 1973

N.Y.'s Fastest Growing Interracial Newspaper

The New York Voice 15¢

Vol. XIV No. 57 May 4, 1973 Entered as Second Class Matter At Post Office, Jamaica, N.Y. Subscription Rate: $4.50 Per Year

Community Deplores YOUTH'S SLAYING

Demonstrators, both Black and White, are shown marching outside the 103rd Police Precinct last Monday evening, protesting the shooting of 10-year old Clifford Glover by Patrolman Thomas Shea. Peaceful picketing, as well as episodes of violence, have occurred nightly as a result of the death, which took place in the early hours of Saturday morning. As of this writing, a grand jury is investigating the charges of murder that were brought against the patrolman. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, along with the Police Commissioner, have protested the "murder" charge, saying it should be reduced to "manslaughter." Community spokesmen in Southeast Queens have insisted on retaining the more serious charge prior to disposition by the grand jury. (See Voice Editorial, Page 4.) *(Voice Photo by Wilson)*

Are We In For Another Long, Hot Summer ?

VOICE Editorial

A New York City policeman, Thomas Shea, has been charged with the murder of a 10 year old boy. The situation is fraught with the danger that this may be the beginning of another "long, hot summer." We join the millions of other New Yorkers who pray that we are not in for a repeat of the 1964 situation, when a similar slaying in Yorkville touched off a whole era of rioting. It is tragic when the violence that follows one injustice leads to the harming of other innocent people. But it is a syndrome that is hard to control, once launched. While we cannot bring the slain youth back to life, we have to search for the "whys and wherefores," so this senseless killing will be the LAST ONE.

Most of Shea's fellow policemen and neighbors in the suburban town where he lives think the killing should be written off as a "tragic accident" involving "poor judgement," arising out of the fact that policemen must make "split decisions."

Such reasoning cannot be accepted under present circumstances. Perhaps it might pertain under other circumstances. But when these "tragic accidents" occur regularly and when they always involve White policemen versus Black victims, including children, then the situation is drastically changed. This makes a PATTERN. The hundreds of picketers that paraded outside the 103rd Police Precinct in Jamaica this week called it by its right name: racism. No one can say all these instances are a coincidence. Therefore the "freak accident" thesis or "isolated incident" explanation cannot be upheld.

However, no one is ever tried for racism, or for the way any other hateful attitude might affect his entire range of judgement. He is tried for a specific act, including his intent at the time of the act. To come down to the events of last weekend, whatever else develops in this case, no one, not even the P.B.A., can claim that either the stepfather or the slain boy came near to fitting the description of the suspects whom the police were seeking. The "gun" that the boy was said to point at the officers (while reeling), or "what appeared to be a gun" has yet to be found.

While the question of racism may barely arise at the trial, it is THE FACT in the streets, and in the minds of every minority resident of the city, as well as every individual that has felt the oppression of ugly social attitudes. We hear from every quarter, "If the boy had been White it wouldn't have happened." If Robby Capers (the slain Black detective, killed by another policeman) had not been Black he would still be alive. It has been said again and again, and still the killings go on.

But if the laws and the courts do not have much to do with racial attitudes, concentrating rather on overt acts of discrimination, the Police Dept. had better take notice, otherwise there will be chaos on their hands. It is time for commanding officers to get tough with the cop on the beat, for his well being and ours, about how and when he uses his gun. It is time to stop trusting to the officer's "judgement" and start issuing specific guidelines for every officer to follow, all the more so when that "judgement" is shot through with bigotry. The boy's stepfather reported that the officer used a racial curse before firing. Now, there is something overt! Let the Police Dept. start by rooting out such filthy profanity, which everyone knows is as common as the skies (and the uniforms) are blue. And why was not Shea suspended from the Police force following another brutality case, still pending, involving the pistol-whipping of a boy a year ago?

There is also the matter of what to do about plainclothesmen in unmarked cars approaching citizens and (in these crime-crazy times) actually expecting people to BELIEVE that they are cops. We contend that plainclothes detectives should be severely limited in their contact with the public, except in foiling a criminal act actually taking place, or as undercover agents. Then, there is much work to be done by the "community relations" officers of the Police Dept., many of whom are trying to do an honest job. But the task is overwhelming. As long as some are trigger happy, the efforts of all the others are undone.

The Voice received many calls from enraged readers. One suggested that community hearings should be held in every locality on the subject of the frictions that have developed as a result of brutality incidents, in order to give these problems a thorough airing. We think it is a good suggestion.

Finally, there is the responsibility of Congress in failing to pass gun control legislation, thus making cops prey to every two-bit deviant, and giving them the partly justified neurosis that every passerby is their enemy. But we (and the police) must unfortunately live with this national stupidity. The first step is to DEMAND that jittery policemen STOP making innocent Black people the scapegoat of their general fears and frustrations.

THE NEW YORK VOICE

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Clergy Group Demands Justice

The following statement was issued Tuesday by Rev. Samuel Holder of Dunton Presbyterian Church and Rev. Joseph Morrison of Springfield Gardens Methodist Church, speaking in the name of the Queens Interfaith Clergy Council, regarding the slaying of 10-year old Clifford Glover by a policeman in Jamaica, Queens, last weekend.

A shocking tragedy has occurred in our community! Once again we have seen one of our Black youth cut down before he tasted of life. As for the reasons surrounding the death of Clifford Glover, we call upon the judicial process to deal fairly and squarely with all of the facts.

Charges and countercharges have been made. Such arguing produces a volatile atmosphere...while energies are diverted from the pursuit of truth.

The death of Clifford Glover has produced a smouldering fire of resentment. Because of these fires a community seething with anger must be assured that justice will be done. Nothing Less Is Acceptable.

Violence has already erupted. This we strongly condemn as self-defeating and will not and cannot lead to justice nor can it bring our slain brother back.

The Queens Interfaith Clergy Council has visited with, prayed and comforted the Glover family; will provide finances to the family and encourages other community residents and organizations to do likewise; has contacted various clergy to lend the "reassuring presence of the church" to the family; is developing plans to lend the voice of the church to this community tragedy.

We call upon all community organizations to take a bold stand for human dignity by uniting together, in a constructive fashion, to see that this does not happen again.

Community Spokesmen Draft Demands Regarding Behavior Of Police On Beat

Wednesday, May 2nd, a press conference was held at the South East Queens Community Corporation headquarters to state the position of the community on the recent death of 10 year old Clifford Glover. The conference was attended by leaders of the community and included Walter Ramsey, president of the Jamaica Branch NAACP, James Heyliger, executive director of the South East Queens Community Corporation, and others.

The basic demands of the NAACP stress the need for residency requirements for police officers.

A militant appraisal of the occurences, widely expressed at the meeting, characterized young Glover's death as a demonstration of systematic genocide.

An indictment of the press was delivered by Reverend Timothy Mitchell of the Council of Churches Task Force on Racism for the way the media has played up the civil disturbances and overlooked the frustration of the people. Incidents of violence reportedly have been suffered by the community at the hands of the police in the past few days, but precise information was unavailable.

The consensus of those present, contained in the statement sent by Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National NAACP, called the tragedy, "a wanton and inexcusable exercise of the most extreme force by armed police against an unarmed civilian." A need for police residency requirements met general agreement.

FAIR QUESTION

Small fry to father – "How come soda pop will spoil my dinner and martinis give you an appetite?"

SWEET OBLIVION

Perhaps if we could forget our troubles as easily as our blessings we would live better.

'100 Black Men' Pays Funeral

All funeral expenses for the burial of 10-year-old Clifford Glover, who was slain by a policeman last Saturday morning in Queens, have been paid by the 100 Black Men, Inc., J. Ralph Hill, co-owner of the McClester Funeral Home announced, Wednesday.

J. Bruce Llewellyn, president of the organization of several hundred Black men from all walks of life, presented a check for $871.25 to the deceased youth's mother, Mrs. Eloise Blackwell, and his stepfather, Add Armstrong, who was with him at the time of the incident.

Learning of the poor financial circumstances of the family, Llewellyn said that his club decided to take positive action in order to relieve them of this financial burden. Friends and strangers had donated small sums of money toward the funeral expenses, but this hardly exceeded $100.00 he said.

"In times of tragedy such as this," said Llewellyn, "it is important that blacks come together to aid this family. Until justice and fairness is fairly dispensed by our law enforcement agencies, Glover's murder is a warning to all blacks that their city streets aren't safe."

Aftermath Of Shooting

Last week, following the funeral of 10-year-old Clifford Glover, the predicted disturbaces occurred and, as usual, the losers were primarily the poor and the minority residents who live in the area. In one publicized case, the Black owners of a liquor store in Jamaica were put out of business by looting, arson and vandalism. In this and other instances, employees were put out of work, residents of the very community where Clifford Glover lived. One Black observer commented with sarcasm," If you were to ask the looters the name of the boy whose death they were supposedly protesting, some of them probably couldn't even tell you." And so the process of self-destruction of a community continues.

All this results from the inhumanity of one cop in a few moments of time, when the trigger was pulled on a fleeing child. We wonder if the average policeman on the beat realizes the awesome power he has to turn an entire population into turmoil. A gesture by Shea (whose temper was already known in the police dept.) and a life is wiped out, a community is filled with sorrow and panic, a few use the incident as a pretext to get something for nothing, and the rest suffer from a vicious circle of violence followed by police overreactions. At the same time we believe that the majority of the "men in blue" deplore the situation caused by one individual who had hangups that should have been dealt with a long time ago.

The mother of Clifford Glover is assisted as she leaves the church where the funeral was held.

(Voice photo by James Edge)

"His Sun Went Down Long Before Noon"

Funeral Services For Slain 10-Year-Old

By MARY GARDNER LOPEZ

Clenched fists were brandished by the crowd outside Mt. Zion Baptist Church (just five blocks from the modest home of Clifford Glover), where funeral services were held last Thursday, May 3, for 10-year-old Clifford who was killed by police officer Thomas J. Shea in South Jamaica.

After the services a marching demonstration went to the 103rd police precinct to protest the slaying. But other community leaders uttered pleas of restraint to the crowd, who resorted to rock throwing and looting, as well as loud chanting to express their anger at the senseless shooting.

Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, in addressing the crowd at the funeral, alluded to instances when policemen have been killed in action. Many public officials found their way to the funeral, but in this instance a telegram was sent by the Mayor. Mr. Sutton stated that he thought it was necessary that he do more than send a telegram — he was there in person.

Other officials in attendance were Housing Authority Chairman Simeon Golar, Assemblyman and Mrs. Guy Brewer, Larry Cormier, Archie Spigner, Eleanor Holmes Norton, City Human Rights Commissioner, and Stevie Wonder, the blind singer who sang "Were You There When They Shot an Innocent Ten-Year-Old Child?" to the tune of "Were You There When They Crucified My Lord?"

The Rev. Vaster Johnson, in an emotional sermon, said of Clifford, "His sun went down long before noon," the words which were also inscribed on the youth's epitaph. He compared this incident to hangings of 100 years ago in the South, stating that "conscience will overtake that man in the end. We must not let conscience do it all because only God has the right to take life."

Rev. John Mason, pastor of the church, delivered the eulogy to a highly emotional, over-flowing crowd which packed the church as well as the surrounding streets.

Clifford Glover was interned at a cemetery in Hicksville, L.I.

From everywhere came people — short people, tall people, people fat and lean, sad and angry, but Black for the most part. White citizens, politicians and city officials were conspicuous by their absence.

HELPING HAND: J. Bruce Llewellyn, president of the 100 Black Men, Inc., right, contributes a check for $871.25 to Mrs. Eloise Glover Blackwell to pay for the funeral expenses of her 10-year-old son, Clifford Glover, shot and killed by a policeman two weeks ago in Queens, N.Y. Looking on are, l. to r., Rev. Robert Lawton; mortician J. Ralph Hill; Kenneth Drew, Voice publisher and a member of the Black Men; and the youth's stepfather, Add Armstead, who was with him at the time of the killing.

The mother of Clifford Glover is assisted as she leaves the church where the funeral was held.

(Voice photo by James Edge)

HELPING HAND: J. Bruce Llewellyn, president of the 100 Black Men, Inc., right, contributes a check for $871.25 to Mrs. Eloise Glover Blackwell to pay for the funeral expenses of her 10-year-old son, Clifford Glover, shot and killed by a policeman two weeks ago in Queens, N.Y. Looking on are, l. to r., Rev. Robert Lawton; mortician J. Ralph Hill; Kenneth Drew, Voice publisher and a member of the Black Men; and the youth's stepfather, Add Armstead, who was with him at the time of the killing.

Police Department Reports Yearly Civilian Complaints

Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy has released the Civilian Complaint Review Board Annual Report for 1972.

Commissioner Murphy said, "Experience has shown that civilian complaints generally arise from some type of negative conduct arising in situations between policemen and the public...The fact that only 3,704 complaints were received is a tribute to the discipline and professionalism of the men and women of the department.

"I am also encouraged by the public's response. Although the total number of formal complaints remains relatively small, the increases I believe reflect the public confidence in our disciplinary process."

The report shows that formal complaints against members of the service increased for the fifth consecutive year. The Board received 3,704 complaints in 1972 compared to 3,165 in 1971. The number of complaints has nearly triple since 1967.

For the first time, the combined number of complaints received from Blacks and Hispanics (1,648) exceeded those received from Whites (1,630).

The majority of the complaints received, as in past years, were for unnecessary force, and discourtesy.

The number of members of the service receiving disciplinary charges increased from 186 in 1971 to 216. In addition 134 members received command discipline.

Eighty-two members received formal instructions after minor complaints against them were found to be substantiated. Seven members of the department were suspended because of civilian complaints, and three of these were arrested.

The number of complaints arising from traffic incidents increased from 238 in 1971 to 1,033 in 1972. 1,890 cases were found to be unsubstantiated on the merits as opposed to 2,229 in 1971.

In 1970, there were 211 civilian complaints arising from demonstrations. In 1972, that number fell to 42. The Police Dept. believes the decline can be attributed in some measure to better training and supervision and by the creation of a Civilian Observer Corps, which was proposed by the Board after the Columbia University demonstrations of 1968.

Poet's Corner

Reflections On A Dead Boy

By GERALD W. DEAS

In memory of ten year old Cliff Glover, only one of the little boys who was killed by the unconcerned. Who are the concerned?

Who killed this boy?
I said, who killed this boy?
Was it you? Tell me, was it you?
To keep him alive, what did you do?

His frail body was running around
His frail body fell to the ground
Who helped him to grow? Who helped the boy to grow?
People, did you help? Did he know?

No time to cry people, don't cry
Little boys are still going to die
Did you cradle Cliff in your arms?
Did you protect Cliff from life's harms

Little boys are not born to die.
On birthdays loved ones don't cry
Your love must not dry up with your tears
For little boys will still live in fears

With love we must keep the little boys alive

Figure 16. Images from Clifford Glover's Funeral, 1973

Figure 18. Stevie Wonder at Clifford Glover's Funeral, 1973

Chapter 3: The Collective Memory of Ed Byrne

This chapter analyzes the historic significance of the first deployment of Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) by United States police forces. Discussed in the pages that follow are the political and social meanings of the innovation of these forces by the New York Police Department in Jamaica, Queens, following the assassination of 103rd Precinct rookie officer Edward Byrne in 1988. His death was used to mobilize the "War on Drugs" nationally by then-president George H.W. Bush, who campaigned with Byrne's badge, using the killing as a symbol of the dangers of uninhibited urban drug crime. The deployment of Tactical Narcotics Teams for

the first time in 1988 signaled an important enhancement in the punitive and carceral approach to curbing drug use and sale in American cities by using undercover officers to round up and arrest individuals in areas where drug trafficking was rampant. This coincided with the introduction of other military tactics to municipal policing such as battering rams, further plainclothes units, and no-knock raids that have since come under great public scrutiny. Locating the origin of where these specialized police units were first deployed situates our understanding of policing, protest, race, and crime, specifically in the Jamaica, Queens community, within space and time. Tracing the history of policing in this neighborhood enables in-depth historical analysis of the sociopolitical significance of this moment to ongoing contemporary debate about the actual role of police in reducing crime, as the effectiveness of this approach is debated in existing research.

During the early hours of February 26, 1988, 22-year-old New York Police Department 103rd Precinct rookie officer Edward Byrne was ambushed and killed by four assailants in Jamaica, Queens, New York, while sitting in his patrol car, guarding the house of a witness in a drug case. The fallout from this single event has had a tremendous impact on urban America in the over three decades since, shaping policing, policy, and politics both in the community where it occurred and far beyond. The purpose of this chapter is to historically contextualize the political significance of Ed Byrne's assassination and better understand how this event went on to shape the contemporary landscape of urban policing. In centering the first deployment of Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) by the NYPD in Jamaica, Queens, immediately following Ed Byrne's death in 1988, I recover the local history of this event and how "revanchist" policies governed New York policing through utilization of undercover and military-style tactics since the 1990s. Thus, this chapter contributes a critical piece of historical insight to understanding the

current, ongoing public response to the drastic transformation in police power in the late twentieth century.

Recovering the spatial and temporal origin of Tactical Narcotics Teams allows examination of the evolution of American police power over time. Using Jamaica, Queens, New York as a historical case study for the politicization of drug crime and violence in support of expanded police power and uninhibited officer discretion, I trace how policing has evolved specifically in this one community, while simultaneously assessing larger trends. The neighborhood that revolted in response to the police murder of 10-year-old Clifford Glover and subsequent officer acquittal just 15 years prior experienced unprecedented levels of police aggression that remained a feature of the community for decades to come.

Ultimately, the national "War on Drugs" agenda, first propagated by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s, and then continued by almost every United States president since, requires further and more focused analysis. Amidst renewed calls for reform of, and accountability from, local law enforcement authorities, it is important to analyze in depth how policies continue to support pro-police power funding or whether they will actually shift toward placing more restrictions and accountability on licensed law enforcement officials. In the wake of the monumental 1968 Kerner Commission Report, administered by the President Lyndon B. Johnson administration, following hundreds of urban uprisings over consecutive summers, sparked by police violence, there have been several opportunities to reduce aggressive police contact. Instead, the opposite has occurred. Police power has since expanded beyond the Kerner Commission authors' imaginations, despite all their cautionary warnings that this would only deepen divides and incite violence, the consequence of brutal and discriminatory tactics.

Beginning with the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, proposed in 1965, the same year the Voting Rights Act was signed into law, outlawing discriminatory voting practices, support for expanded police power has been concurrent with the advancement of equal rights for Black people and other racial minorities. For example, in 1968, the same year as the Kerner Commission Report, The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was passed to assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of crime and to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government (U.S. Department of Justice). It did not take long for the punitive and carceral approaches to social inequality, especially in urban America, to rear their ugly head.

In June 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a "war on drugs." He dramatically increased the size and presence of federal drug control agencies and pushed through measures such as mandatory sentencing and no-knock warrants. A top Nixon aide, John Ehrlichman, later admitted:

> You want to know what this was really all about. The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I'm saying. We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or blacks, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did. (Drug Policy Alliance)

Nixon temporarily placed marijuana in Schedule One, the most restrictive category of drugs, pending review by a commission he appointed led by Republican Pennsylvania Governor Raymond Shafer.

In 1972, the commission unanimously recommended decriminalizing the possession and distribution of marijuana for personal use. Nixon ignored the report and rejected its recommendations. Between 1973 and 1977, however, eleven states decriminalized marijuana

possession. In January 1977, President Jimmy Carter was inaugurated on a campaign platform that included marijuana decriminalization. In October 1977, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to decriminalize possession of up to an ounce of marijuana for personal use.

Within just a few years, though, the tide had shifted. Proposals to decriminalize marijuana were abandoned as parents became increasingly concerned about high rates of teen marijuana use. Marijuana was ultimately caught up in a broader cultural backlash against the perceived permissiveness of the 1970s (Drug Policy Alliance).

In New York City, police corruption had become publicized in the early 1970s, thanks to the Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, known as the Knapp Commission, after its chairman Whitman Knapp. The five-member panel was initially formed in April 1970 by Mayor John Lindsay to investigate corruption in the New York City Police Department. The publicity generated to investigate the NYPD came from the revelations of corruption by two officers within the NYPD itself, Patrolman Frank Serpico and Sergeant David Durk.

The Knapp Commission issued its final report on December 27, 1972, exactly four months prior to the police murder of 10-year-old Clifford Glover in Jamaica, Queens, New York. The commission found widespread corruption in the New York City Police Department, and made several recommendations, including that commanders should be held accountable for their subordinates' actions, commanders should file periodic reports on key aspects that breed corruption, field offices of the Internal Affairs division should be created at all precincts, undercover informants should be placed in all precincts, improvements should be made to screening and selections methods and standards, and that there should be an overall change in police attitudes. The commission reports:

> Feelings of isolation and hostility are experienced by policemen not just in New York, but everywhere. To understand these feelings one must appreciate an important characteristic

> of any metropolitan police department, namely an extremely intense group loyalty. When properly understood, this group loyalty can be used in the fight against corruption. If misunderstood or ignored, it can undermine anti-corruption activities. the commission reports.

The 1972 Knapp Commission, in addressing the "thin blue line" ideal of police loyalty, also addresses the "bad apple" narrative about individual misdeeds by individual cops, at length:

> The interaction of stubbornness, hostility and pride has given rise to the so-called "rotten-apple" theory. According to this theory, which bordered on official Department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must promptly be denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his individual corruption may be symptomatic of an underlying disease.
>
> This doctrine was bottomed on two basic premises: First, the morale of the Department requires that there be no official recognition of corruption, even though practically all members of the Department know it is in truth extensive; second, the Department's public image and effectiveness require official denial of this truth.
>
> The rotten-apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform. To begin with, it reinforced ad gave respectability to the code of silence. The official view that the Department's image and morale forbade public disclosure of the extent of corruption inhibited any officer who wished to disclose corruption and justified any who preferred to remain silent. The doctrine also made difficult, if not impossible, any meaningful attempt at managerial reform. A high command unwilling to acknowledge that the problem of corruption is extensive cannot very well argue that drastic changes are necessary to deal with that problem. Thus neither the Mayor's Office nor the Police Department took adequate steps to see that such changes were made when the need for them was indicated by the charges made by Officers Frank Serpico and David Durk in 1968. This was demonstrated in the Commission's second set of public hearings in December 1971.
>
> Finally, the doctrine made impossible the use of one of the most effective techniques for dealing with any entrenched criminal activity, namely persuading a participant to help provide evidence against his partners in crime. If a corrupt policeman is merely an isolated rotten apple, no reason can be given for not exposing him the minute he is discovered. If, on the other hand, it is acknowledged that a corrupt officer is only one part of an apparatus of corruption, common sense dictates that every effort should be made to enlist the offender's aid in providing the evidence to destroy the apparatus.

The 1972 Knapp Commission Report remains one of the most thorough examinations of the causes of police corruption and the barriers to stemming the tide of police violence and all other manners of criminal activity among these hired professional government workers. Among

their findings was that there were two particular classes of corrupt police, “Grass Eaters,” who accept gratuities but do not pursue corruption payments, and “Meat Eaters” who spend a good deal of time aggressively looking for situations they can exploit for personal and financial gain.

Unfortunately, as with other similar reports, the cautionary recommendations were not heeded, and the New York Police Department, as with local departments around the country, only received further funding and resources, continued to police with even less inhibition and even more powerful military grade weaponry and tactics. The result of two more decades of corruption was another Commission on police corruption in New York City, formed by Mayor David Dinkins, the first Black mayor of New York: the 1992 Mollen Commission, formally known as The City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department. The report concludes:

> Today’s corruption is not the corruption of Knapp Commission days. Corruption then was largely a corruption of accommodation, of criminals and police officers giving and taking bribes, buying and selling protection. Corruption was, in its essence, consensual. Today’s corruption is characterized by brutality, theft, abuse of authority, and active police criminality.

Arguably, the police corruption of 1992 New York is worse than the police corruption of 1972 New York. Thirty years later, many of the same problems persist in this “apparatus of corruption” and only continue to expand. In tracing that continual expansion of police power up to the present day, we first turn our attention to the pivotal 1988 advancement of the war on drugs and mass incarceration through innovations in military-style policing tactics in urban American Black communities, namely Jamaica, Queens, New York

Tactical Narcotics Teams (T.N.T.): Catalyzing the War on Drugs

The effectiveness of specialized police units and tactics are dubious at best. This study of the historic origin of Tactical Narcotics Teams elucidates how other even more modern

technologies of policing, such as hot spot policing, gang databases, stop-and-frisk, and plainclothes units, perpetuate police violence, in some cases completely unchecked, and most do not actually prevent crime for occurring, but rather just displace the problem from its current location. Further, some argue that violent policing actually exacerbates civilian violence. The history of policing in Jamaica, Queens illuminates this relationship.

Before we can begin to make sense of the murder of Ed Byrne and the political mobilization of this single event in expanding police power in the years since, we must first remember the historic migrations and policies that made Jamaica, Queens a Black community, covered in chapter 1.

Southeast Queens, whose residents are mostly middle class and working class, is comprised of approximately 12 majority-Black neighborhoods, representing class heterogeneity. According to Nathan et al. (1995), the neighborhoods in southeast Queens exemplify how some Black neighborhoods stave off the "slum" and increase opportunities for Black people to move from poverty to prosperity, representing "the flipside of the urban underclass." A map created by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Urban Studies Group in 1989 using New York Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) data characterized the 12 southeast Queens neighborhoods: Jamaica Center and South Jamaica were classified as "Working Class"; Baisley/Rochdale, Hollis, Jamaica Estates, Queens Village, St. Albans, South Ozone Park, and Springfield Gardens were classified as "Middle Class"; Cambria Heights, Laurelton, and Rosedale were classified as "Higher Income" based on median household income, home ownership (by percentage), unemployment (by percentage), families in poverty (by percentage) and education (B.A. or higher, by percentage).

Figure 19. Southeast Queens Neighborhoods and Classifications. 1995.



The stories of Clifford Glover and the Spencer family illustrate dichotomous and shared Black experiences in 1970s southeast Queens. Though Clifford Glover was the son of working-class Black parents from the American south, attending P.S. 40 in South Jamaica, and Ormistan and Glenda Spencer were middle-class Trinidadian immigrants residing in Rosedale, they were all viciously confronted by violence, one at the hands of NYPD 103rd Precinct officers and the other by an angry mob of white vigilantes. Both experiences shed light on larger overarching themes for Black Americans, the fates of police violence and residential segregation, violently enforced boundaries in valuable markets, and reminders of one's place in a racialized society. Though the story of Black people in Queens is a triumphant one, defined in part by artistry and affluence, it is also one of suffering and suppression.

Fifteen years after the killing of 10-year-old Clifford Glover by 103rd Precinct police, the murder of rookie 103rd Precinct officer Ed Byrne would catalyze the subsequent generation of police policy and tactics. The killing came at the height of the crack cocaine trade in southeast

Queens and signaled a major turning point in the American "War on Drugs." The city reached a record-high number of homicides in 1988, later eclipsing that mark in 1990 at 2,245, which has remained the record ever since. The one homicide, the assassination of 103rd Precinct officer Ed Byrne, stands apart from the thousands of others because of the symbolic power of killing police.

Publicly, the murder of Ed Byrne was deemed unacceptable by elected officials, requiring a swift and harsh response from politicians and policy makers, dedicating unforeseen economic resources to punishing street-level narcotics trafficking. This response came in the form of unprecedented, sweeping reforms aimed at rooting out the United States' urban drug problem. This involved innovations at the local level for municipal police while also depending on federal resources for reinforcement. These reforms have ultimately led us to the uninhibited militarized policing urban residents across the United State are familiar with today, the violent occupation style policing that has led to public outcry following brutal police actions for over a decade now. The four men, all in their early 20s, responsible for Ed Byrne's assassination were tried, convicted, and sentenced to the maximum available at the time, 25 years to life. That the killers were caught and have been incarcerated for their actions was not justice enough for Ed Byrne's murder. The entire nation rallied to the call for reaction to this tragic killing of a police officer and the national "revanchist" campaign to take America's cities back. That campaign began in the same neighborhood where Ed Byrne was killed.

On March 15, 1988, the *New York Times* published an article, titled "18 Are Arrested By Task Force On Its First Day." In it, journalist George James describes a historic innovation in policing, one that has since gone on to define a generation of urban American drug policy. He writes, "The New York City Police Department's new 118-member Tactical Narcotics Team took to the streets of South Jamaica, Queens, for the first time yesterday, and by evening had

made 18 arrests in a buy-and-bust operation in an expanded 1.6-square-mile section." James goes on to quote Capt. Ryan Thomas, a former narcotics officer who was transferred from the Bronx patrol command to head the new team: "We're out to try to dry up drug dealing from a river to a small trickle." A mere 17 days after Ed Byrne's murder, the first Tactical Narcotics Team was assigned to southeast Queens, laying the foundation for the subsequent three decades of policing and urban policy.

The coordinated city, state, and federal effort was announced by Mayor Ed Koch on March 7, 1988, to rid a 22-square-mile area of southeastern Queens of the "chaotic and often violent" drug trade by targeting a square mile section at a time. Once an area is cleaned up, within 30 to 90 days, the force, known as T.N.T., will move on to another major drug area (James 1988). Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward, New York City's first Black Police Commissioner, announced on the first day of T.N.T. deployment that the first section, originally bounded by 110th Avenue, Sutphin Boulevard, Baisley Boulevard and Merrick Boulevard, would be expanded by about four or five blocks to South Road and encompass the South Jamaica Houses, a public housing project built in the 1940's and known as "The 40's." Ward said the area around the project was the territory of a drug gang known as the Supreme Team. Two suspects, 19-year-old Todd Scott and 24-year-old Scott Cobb, in the execution-style murder of Edward Byrne, lived in the housing project.

One of the first reported drug arrests occurred shortly before 2pm on Merrick Boulevard at 109th Avenue when an undercover officer asked a young man, "Who was doin'," a phrase asking who was selling crack. The men then directed the officer to another man nearby who sold the officer two vials of crack for $5 each, according to Sgt. Floyd Williams, who heads one of 14 T.N.T. "operational modules" of five investigators and two undercover officers each.

Figure 20. The car where Officer Edward Byrne was ambushed examined by police, 1988

While another undercover officer, called a "ghost," watched the two suspects, the officer who made the purchase returned to an unmarked car and called for the arresting officers. Two cars with investigators, including Sergeants Williams, converged on the two men and the officers arrested them on charges of sale of a controlled substance, a B-felony. From the time Officer Byrne was killed, February 26, to March 10, 1988, 502 narcotics-related arrests were made, mainly in southeastern Queens, an average of 36 a day (James 1988).

T.N.T. programs represented a paradigm shift in the city's anti-drug efforts toward order maintenance policing more generally (Turner 2019). The T.N.T. program, which at the time was the largest of its kind ever established was a move which epitomized a growing call to "let cops be cops," or in other words, leave policing to the discretion of police. Committing more than $116 million to the program in 1989 alone, this provided, as Commissioner Ward bragged,

"more resources to the war on drugs than any other municipality in the country" and "a drug war army second only to the Drug Enforcement Agency " (Letwin 1990). Armed with battering rams, military tactics and equipment, T.N.T. made an undeniably symbolic gesture to launch its inaugural operation in South Jamaica, Queens, where Edward Byrne was killed.

The Bennett Plan

Following the local implementation of Tactical Narcotics Teams in Jamaica, Queens in early 1988, the punitive strategy and carceral approach to drugs went national. In September 1989, the George H.W. Bush administration presented its National Drug Control Strategy—popularly known as the "Bennett Plan." The Bennett Plan vociferously rejected drug legalization and, like every other federal drug war program since the Nixon administration, devoted seventy percent of the Plan's proposed resources to law enforcement, including federal prosecutors, courts, and prisons (Letwin 1990). Even though the Bennett Plan identified the typical cocaine user as a white male high school graduate living in a small city or suburb, the domestic portion of the plan stressed an increase in street-level narcotics enforcement directed at the inner-city crack crisis. Figures purportedly showed a decline in suburban hard drug use. Such programs would effectively address that crisis: "when neighborhood police increase the number of drug arrests in an area, when they put pressure on local drug transactions through surveillance and undercover work, and when they force dealers to take refuge in less conspicuous places, the drug markets that menace neighborhoods cease to flourish."

The Bennett Plan's January 1990 supplement declared that "street level enforcement techniques…have already shown success in so many neighborhoods" and therefore handed up a "stunning rebuke to cynics and defeatists" of the drug war. Though politicians from both parties criticized the Bennett Plan on several grounds, they did not challenge the need for, or the

importance of, narcotics enforcement. Similarly, though some such as Congressman Charles Rangel and 1988 Presidential Candidate Rev. Jesse Jackson were skeptical of the Bennett Plan, other congressman such as Charles Schumer and others representing communities most directly affected by the crack crisis have supported drug enforcement and specifically urban street-level narcotics programs (Letwin 1990).

The Bennett Plan was federal policy adopting from local law enforcement in action. As Hinton and Cook (2020) explain, city police departments led the charge in crafting and circulating proactive policing strategies in the 1970s and 1980s, which refined patrol activities and surveillance functions on city streets, neighborhood blocks, and community centers in districts with high rates of reported crime. Proponents of the proactive policing paradigm promoted four key features for local law enforcement reform: (a) experimentation with new tactical units and preventive patrols, (b) incorporation of military-grade weaponry and surveillance strategies, (c) advancement of electronic and computer-based technologies for intelligence gathering and crime analysis, and (d) usage of data science to analyze, monitor, and map reported and predicted crime trends in the segregated low-income communities most targeted by policymakers. These initiatives were supported by police field researchers and local law enforcement tacticians alike, as promising methods for improving police effectiveness, ameliorating police-community tensions, and moving beyond traditional policing models by the 1990s (Hinton and Cook 2020).

Existing research finds that the urban drug war conducted in New York City, where the crack crisis was arguably most advanced, and where local law enforcement efforts were most ambitious, consistent with the Bennett Plan's approach—the two largest anti-drug efforts, Operation Pressure Point I and the Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT)—failed to stem the crisis

(Letwin 1990). Ultimately, for the mayor, police officials, and some members of the media, the success of the T.N.T. program was proven by a marked increase in arrests and the development of specialized drug courts designed to process the byproducts of the new brand of street-level drug policing (Turner 2019). In the first 11 months of 1988, citywide felony drug arrests made up 90,000 of 279,000 arrests in the city, a rate "more than twice that of five years before."

Accordingly, drug prosecutions soared, with drug felony filings increasing 288% between 1985 and 1989 (Wachtler 1989). Further upstream, state prison sentences for felony drug convictions climbed 16.9% in 1988, and by 1990 more than 30% of state prison inmates (9,719) were doing time for drug crimes, an increase of over 300% (Letwin 1990). By April 1, 1990, roughly 5,400 people had entered state prison as a direct result of T.N.T. operations (Letwin 1990). As the campaign continued, and T.N.T. rounded up more and more drug users and dealers, seized countless "crack houses," and shuttered public housing units, city administrators hailed TNT as central to improved "quality of life" and restored social order (Ward and Harding, 1988). By and large, the aggressive zero-tolerance, "order maintenance" tactics like T.N.T., which were unleashed on the most marginalized residents and neighborhoods of New York City for the better part of two decades, continue today—justified by an illusory politics of security (via the police power) which purport to make the city "safe" (Turner 2018).

While homicide afflicting urban communities today is less than one quarter of what it was in 1988, the illusory politics of security here is intended to suggest the illusory politics of security *as* police power. 1988 was not the first year of violence due to illegal drug markets in South Jamaica, nor was this the first time that communities like South Jamaica, Queens looked toward the state for help in solving this problem. Yet, the safety of the community was seemingly only ever threatened *after* Byrne was killed. Although the connection between police

tactics and these changes is contentious and complex, the narrative remains centered on police power, a liberal figment designed to reaffirm the state's power over life and death (Turner 2018).

Despite the propagation that this modern and militarized form of policing, with specialized units specifically meant to eliminate drug markets are successful in combating drug crime, the actual results suggest that they are anything but. With regards to Operation Pressure Point, 46,903, arrests were made in the first 2000 days, 36,102 of them for narcotics offenses. However, OPP-1 has not been the success claimed by its supporters. From the earliest days, drug traffickers adapted themselves to the program by shortening the duration and increasing the size of transactions, altering their time and location, and by utilizing more lookouts and other personnel. Those dealers who were arrested and prosecuted were quickly replaced by others. Thus, a few months after the program began, residents were left with the impression that "the drug market is seething, just under the surface, ready to explode if the police break the stalemate by withdrawing from the Lower East Side." The program had survived five years since its conception at those points (Letwin 1990).

At the time, T.N.T. was part of the largest local narcotics program ever established (Letwin 1990). In fiscal year 1989, New York City spent almost a billion dollars on drug related enforcement, and, from 1988 to 1990, spent $116 million on T.N.T., which, according to Ward, represented a commitment of "more resources to the war on drugs than any other municipality in the country." By the end of 1989, 2,100 officers were expected to be assigned to narcotics enforcement, 725 of them in T.N.T., a drug army second to only the DEA's 2,800 agents. There is, however, a great deal of evidence that T.N.T. has failed to have any substantial impact. The crack trade had simply adjusted to T.N.T., moving their operations into building lobbies and stairwells, heavily fortified apartments or abandoned buildings, or storefronts containing

apparently legitimate businesses (Letwin 1990). Return and replacement is particularly evident after T.N.T. withdrawal. No one has been heard to claim that police operations have resulted in any decline in drug abuse. Rather, reliance on the criminal justice system to deal with the crack crisis has only overwhelmed and traumatized the police, courts, city jails, state prisons, district attorneys, and public defenders involved (Letwin 1990). Not to mention the irreparable damage of incarceration for those needing treatment, and the irreversible economic and familial loss of so many lives lost to the criminal justice system and removed from the formal labor market.

The Mobilization of Memory

The U.S. government and the Jamaica, Queens, neighborhood where NYPD 103rd Precinct Police Officer Edward Byrne was killed, have enshrined the memory of Byrne so that what occurred to him serves as a symbol of the strength of the state in punishing any attacks on its officers, while simultaneously divesting from communities where gun violence is rampant. President Bush kept Byrne's shield with him during his presidential campaign and kept it on his desk in the Oval Office. Bush's memorialization of Byrne led to his financing of the Byrne Justice Program, which provided money to the Department of Justice for drug investigations and takedowns. He befriended the Byrne family and the Bushes and Byrnes stayed in touch over the decades that followed.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance, The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program is the leading source of federal justice funding to state and local jurisdictions. The JAG Program provides states, tribes, and local governments with critical funding necessary to support a range of program areas including law enforcement, prosecution, indigent defense, courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation, technology

improvement, and crime victim and witness initiatives and mental health programs and related law enforcement and corrections programs, including behavioral programs and crisis intervention teams. Since fiscal year 2005, BJA has funded over 22,000 direct JAG awards, totaling over $7 billion.

Figure 21. President George H.W. Bush delivering an address from the White House library to the nation's schoolchildren, holding Edward Byrne's badge, 1989.

Locally, the memory of Edward Byrne has also become a permanent fixture of the Jamaica, Queens landscape. Police Officer Edward Byrne Park is located on North Conduit Ave., 135th Ave. between 130th Pl. and 134 St. in South Ozone Park, just north of the John F. Kennedy International Airport in southeast Queens. In 2018, a street sign honoring Byrne was unveiled outside the 103rd Precinct. Every year for over three decades, NYPD brass, police officers, and Fire Department of New York (FDNY) personnel gather outside the 103rd Precinct in Jamaica to pay homage to Byrne.

The outcomes of the war on drugs, initiated in the 1970s and actively pursued in the late 1980s, are felt to the present day. The years that followed have seen much recreation of similar tactics that have been used to suppress political dissent to state and private disinvestment, while simultaneously criminalizing and incarcerating young Black males and further excluding them from participating in formal labor markets and receiving higher education. The impacts that these punitive carceral approaches to drug crime have had on Black families and communities are incalculable but present research is beginning to uncover how reparative policies and approaches to these grave, systemic government and policy failures may look. Before discussing the present state of policing, incarceration, and alternative approaches to community investment and violence interruption, we must uncover the ways in which military style hyperpolicing bore down on the residents of southeast Queens in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Understanding and contrasting the public and political treatment of the assassination of 103rd Precinct police officer Ed Byrne in 1988 helps us better understand the public and political treatment of the police killings of Clifford Glover in 1973 and Sean Bell in 2006.

Figure 22. Street sign honoring Edward Byrne, 2018

Figure 23. Car parked at Inwood St. and 107th Ave. where Byrne was killed, 2013.

Chapter 4: The Collective Memory of Sean Bell

The intervening period between the killings of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell saw significant demographic, social, and economic shifts within southeast Queens communities. Specifically, after the killing of Clifford Glover in 1973, the late 1970s and 1980s saw both the rise of ethnic minority immigrant groups in the area and simultaneous concern around rising drug crime and ensuing violence. Today, the area policed by the 103rd and 113th NYPD Precincts is organized as Queens Community Board 12, formally referred to as the neighborhoods of Jamaica and Hollis. The population of Queens Community Board 12 is 61% Black (non-Hispanic) and 43% foreign-born. There are also significant Hispanic (17%) and Asian (11%) populations of any race.

This characteristic of the area allows for further study of an important aspect of policing and police violence: the experiences of those who are Black and foreign-born or Black ethnics. Though the present study does not specifically answer the question of how non-Black ethnic minority groups are treated by police and how this shapes subsequent attitudes toward police and racial identity. The historic study of this neighborhood furthers understandings of the impact of policing and police violence on multiethnic, multicultural Black and immigrant communities in the United States.

November 26, 2006, was supposed to be Sean Bell's wedding day. Bell was engaged to his high school sweetheart, fiancé Nicole Paultre, the mother of his two young daughters, Jada and Jordyn. Bell was 23 years old at the time of his death by gunfire from four NYPD 103rd Precinct police officers and was studying to be an electrician. Bell was a pitcher on the baseball team for John Adams High School in Ozone Park, while he was a student there, and also studied acting in Flushing. Bell had just left his bachelor party in a strip club where police say

undercover officers were investigating complaints of prostitution and drug dealing. One cop allegedly heard a member of Bell's bachelor party say "get my gun" during a scuffle in the club. What happened next and what caused police to open fire was to be determined by investigation from the district attorney.

Nicole Paultre, now Nicole Paultre-Bell, told a New York radio station that the cops were “murderers.” She said, in an interview with Larry King a week after Sean Bell was killed, that she’s “just trying to be strong, be strong for the girls.” At the time, Jada was 3 years old, and Jordyn had just turned six months. Nicole wore her wedding ring and Sean was buried wearing his. She spoke of him further, when asked what Sean was like, saying “Sean, he's -- he's incredible. He's the type of person that if he had it and you didn't and you asked, you needed it, he would give you the shirt off his back. He's incredible. A loving man and he cared for his kids and his family, his mom and dad, and myself. He's a strong guy, strong man…a great father.”

Nicole Paultre, who was only 22 years old at the time, discussed her faith that there would be justice for her husband: “I have faith that we will definitely get justice. This was -- this was wrong. I mean, everyone sees it. They have no -- they have nothing to show that this can be justified. I mean, if they do, we know it's wrong. I know it's wrong.” She also discussed staying in Queens, not moving to Atlanta as her husband Sean had planned: “Yes, I believe I'll stay here in Queens. This is where we lived, this is where we began to raise our family. So far, I'm going to stay home.”

‘No Angel’ Discourse

Following the police killing of Sean Bell, reporting from *The New York Times* revolved around the location of Club Kalua, where he was celebrating his “bachelor party” the night

before he was supposed to be wed. The front-page article titled "Police Kill Man After a Bachelor Party in Queens" by Robert D. McFadden printed on November 26, 2006, states:

> Hours before he was to be married, a man leaving his *bachelor party at a strip club in Queens that was under police surveillance* was shot and killed early yesterday in a hail of police bullets, witnesses and the police said (McFadden 2006, p. 1, emphasis added).

The article continues:

> Witnesses told of chaos, screams and a barrage of gunfire near Club Kalua at 143-08 94th Avenue in Jamaica about 4:15 a.m. after Mr. Bell and his friends walked out and got into their car. Mr. Bell drove the car half a block, turned a corner and *struck a black unmarked police minivan bearing several plainclothes officers*. Mr. Bell's car then backed up onto a sidewalk, hit a storefront's rolled down protective gate and *nearly struck an undercover officer before shooting forward and slamming into the police van again*, the police said. In response, five police officers fired at least 50 rounds at the men's car, a silver Nissan Altima; the bullets ripped into other cars and slammed through an apartment window near the shooting scene on Liverpool Street near 94th Avenue (McFadden 2006, p. 1, emphasis added).

As with the shooting of Clifford Glover, there is a police report about suspects trying to get away and the threat of force against officers involved. The officers' claim is that Sean Bell was using the Nissan Altima that he was driving as a weapon when exiting the "strip club that was under surveillance." This is justification on the part of the officers involved for firing fifty rounds of ammunition into the vehicle. The officers were in plainclothes and undercover, meaning they were not uniformed, as in the case of the shooting of Clifford Glover in 1973.

Reporting from *The New York Times* on then Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg illuminates why, according to them, NYPD officers chose to pursue Sean Bell and his friends Joseph Guzman, and Trent Benefield. The *Times* reports:

> Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg said in a statement last night that it was too early to draw conclusions about the case. "We know that the N.Y.P.D. officers on the scene had reason to believe *an altercation involving a firearm was about to happen* and were trying to stop it," he said (McFadden 2006, p. 1, emphasis added).

The statement that the police present expected an altercation as well as the alleged involvement of a firearm reinforces the 'no angel' discourse about police victims. As in the case of the shooting of Clifford Glover in 1973, a firearm was never uncovered:

> Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly said at a news conference last night that the men's car had been hit at least 21 times. He said he did not know what triggered the shooting and that it was too early to tell if it was justified. No guns were found at the scene, and no charges have been filed against the men, the police said (McFadden 2006, p. 1).

Later in the article, the rationale for officers' pursuit of Bell and his friends is again clarified:

> In a statement, Commissioner Kelly said that about 4 a.m. *a group of men confronted a man outside the strip club* and that *one man in the group yelled, "Yo, get my gun"* (McFadden 2006, p. 1, emphasis added).

In the front-page article on the killing released by *The New York Times* two days later, November 28, 2006, there is simultaneous reporting that the officers felt their actions were justified and that officers violated protocol:

> In a move that suggests the officers feel their actions were justified, the lawyer representing the men said he had contacted Mr. Brown's office and offered to have the officers speak to prosecutors and appear before a grand jury voluntarily without immunity (Cardwell and Chan, 2006, p. 1).

Later in the same article:

> Some policies appear to have been violated in the shooting, which occurred when, according to police, undercover officers fired 50 bullets at Mr. Bell's car after he drove into one of the officers and an unmarked police van. Officers are trained to shoot no more than three bullets before pausing to reassess the situation, Mr. Kelly said in his most detailed assessment of the shooting yet. Department policy also largely prohibits officers from firing at vehicles, even when they are being used as weapons (Cardwell and Chan, 2006, p. 1.)

Reporting by *The New York Times* in the wake of the killing of Sean Bell reports on the details of the incident by offering both why police acted upon their suspicions and the ways in which they violated department protocol and policies.

The *New York Amsterdam News*, in contrast, reports more critically on the actions of the officers and does not offer the same depiction of Sean Bell and his friends as suspects. In their December 7 issue, under the headline "Unity and Outrage: In pursuit of justice for Sean Bell," Nayaba Arinde reports:

> On November 25, as Bell and his two friends left Club Kalua just after 4 a.m., Detective Michael Oliver in plainclothes also exited the club. He claims to have heard someone mention a gun, and then he let off 31 shots. Four colleagues joined in the shooting frenzy. When the smoke cleared, Bell was dead and Guzman, 31, and Benefield, 23, lay bleeding and handcuffed. Finding no weapon, police quickly came up with the widely questioned theory that there was a fourth man, who somehow escaped the hail of bullets, removed the alleged weapon, and got away. However, there was never any fire returned, and both Guzman and Benefield denied that there was a fourth man. Cops conducted raids, pulled up grates and were generally accused of harassing folk, conducting parallel investigations as distractions (Arinde 2006, p. 34).

The *New York Amsterdam News* here flips 'no angel' discourse on its head, pointing the finger of criticism and scrutiny back at the police officers involved in this case. Arinde writes scathingly of plainclothes Detective Oliver's decision to fire his weapon thirty-one times based on his claim of hearing someone mentioning a gun. Additionally, she writes of the questionable police report of a "fourth man" who got away. Here, this imagined additional suspect at the scene is the subject or figure of 'no angel' discourse. Put differently, the fictitious "fourth man" is the 'no angel' here that is responsible for the officers' action and retaliation. Finally, she describes cops on the case as conducting raids, pulling up grates and harassing folk, conducting parallel investigations to distract from the truth.

What the author and the *New York Amsterdam News* do here is inform the public of the parallel investigations that occur after a suspect, a Black person, is gunned down and the killing is "justified" by the potential discovery of evidence that officers then claim prompted their on-the-spot decision to enact violence. The writers for the *New York Amsterdam News* took a position similar to their 1973 reporting when they stated, "His only fault was being Black" a distinct departure from "He was no angel." Their criticism of the police's parallel investigation is absent from *The New York Times* reporting, positioning the two papers at odds with one another. The *Times* focused on the alleged criminality of Black victims of police violence, while the *Amsterdam News* criticized the police's actions, explicitly naming race as the defining factor in their decisions to shoot and kill.

Figure 24. Map of account of police killing of Sean Bell from *New York Times*, 2006



1 **1 a.m.** Two undercover officers are inside Club Kalua.
3 a.m. One officer overhears a dancer at the club complain to a man that she is being bothered. The man she complains about appears to the police to pat his waistband, indicating that he has a gun.
One undercover officer who overhears the exchange with the dancer later exits to notify his supervisor and backup team of possible trouble.

2 **4 a.m.** An altercation occurs outside Club Kalua involving as many as eight or nine men. According to police reports, one of the men, said to be in Sean Bell's party, says, "Yo, get my gun."

3 **The men** split into two groups and disperse. An undercover detective follows one, including the person alleged to have made the remark about his gun, as they make their way east on 94th Avenue and turn south on Liverpool Street.
Backup teams, a Toyota Camry with a lieutenant and two officers and a minvan with two officers, follow.
The men enter a Nissan Altima parked on Liverpool Street.

4 **The undercover** detective approaches the front of the Altima, and the car moves forward, striking him. The Altima then continues forward and crashes into the minivan.
The Altima drives backward onto the sidewalk, striking the gate in front of a building, then forward, striking the minivan again.
According to the police, the undercover detective fires first, a total of 11 times.The two officers in the minivan get out and fire 34 shots between them. Two officers in the Camry fire a total of five times.

The New York Times

Figure 25. Front page and article from *New York Amsterdam News*, 2006

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UNITY AND OUTRAGE

In pursuit of justice for Sean Bell



(Hasan Shabazz photo) (Stanley Reppolski photo)

Blood & Crips united as New Yorkers from all boroughs protested all week the police shooting death of Sean Bell.



(Damaso Reyes photo)

City Council Members Charles Barron, Robert Jackson and Darlene Mealy were among the crowd—perhaps 500 strong by 5 p.m.—who attended the anti-police brutality rally Wednesday, which was relocated to Foley Square from One Police Plaza by organizers, The Black Men's Movement.

By NAYABA ARINDE
Amsterdam News Staff

"What we have is a spirit of unity in this city," Rev. Al Sharpton declared. "We want the young people to come out, along with labor leaders and ministers and elected officials as we march for justice."

For the last two weeks, pastors, politicians, activists and so-called gang-bangers have taken to the streets in pursuit of swift justice for Sean Bell, who was gunned down in a hail of NYPD bullets just hours before his wedding on November 25.

This last fortnight has been reminiscent of a city all fired up in the wake of the 1999 41-shot police barrage which left Amadou Diallo with 19 hits to the body and an international incident on the record.

Wednesday residents, activists, community and religious leaders and elected officials from across the board joined a rally at One Police Plaza, which had ironically been scheduled for over a month to protest other alleged police abuses.

And there are more to come. Saturday will see an NAACP protest outside the 103rd Precinct in Jamaica, Queens; and New Black Panther Party boycott rallies on Harlem's 125th Street and on Queens' Jamaica Avenue. Sharpton has another march planned along

(Continued on Page 34)

the ritzy Fifth Avenue for December 16th.

"Warning, this is not a civil rights march!" current New Black Panther Party head Malik Zulu Shabazz, said on the megaphone last Saturday, as hundreds participated in a permit-less protest through Jamaica, Queens. Winding

(Continued on Page 34)

Daughtry walks for Darfur in Belgium

By HERB BOYD
Special to the AmNews

Freedom Walks are nothing new for the Rev. Herb Daughtry, but to participate in a 100-mile trek in Belgium, from Brussels to Antwerp, is unprecedented for the intrepid minister.

"I'm leaving Thursday with a contingent led by Yahya Osman of the Darfur Rehabilitation Project," said Daughtry. "We will be going to headquarters of the European Union where we will rally and then began the march to Antwerp, some 100 miles away."

Given that he will be only abroad until Sunday, the pastor of the House of the Lord Church in Brooklyn said he wouldn't be able to complete the entire trip. "I need to get back by Sunday to continue our prayer vigils at the United Nations," he said.

Daughtry has also been providing support and counseling for the families of the victims involved in the recent Queens shooting.

Joining Daughtry in Belgium will be members of Amnesty International and other activists, all of whom are distressed by the lack of response to the accelerating genocide in Darfur, Sudan.

The prayer vigils and rallies led by Daughtry began last month, and he is determined to stay on the case "until something is done to bring peace and stability in Darfur," he said.

Hillary floats presidential run possibility

By TANANGACHI MFUNI
Amsterdam News Staff

For two politicians who haven't as yet stated their plans for 2008, Democratic Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton are generating a lot of presidential buzz these days.

This past week Clinton met with Cong. Charles Rangel at a Harlem restaurant presumably to discuss the possibility of her run.

While Obama, the senator from Illinois and the U.S. Senate's only Black representative, is crisscrossing the country, making media appearances and tactfully averting questions about a possible '08 presidential run, Clinton seems to be stealthily securing her base here in New York and nationwide, arranging meetings with Democratic who's-who like Governor-elect Eliot Spitzer, fellow Senator Charles Schumer and Harlem Congressman Charles B. Rangel.

"She's absolutely going to run," said political consultant Kevin P. Wardally. Currently political and governmental affairs director for consulting firm Bill Lynch Associates, Wardally previously worked on Clinton's 2000 campaign for U.S. Senate.

"She has the pedigree, [and] there's no denying her foreign policy experience, understanding of [the electoral] process and fundraising prowess," said Wardally, who added that Clinton's eight years as first lady also makes her a viable presidential candidate.

Rep. Charles Rangel and Sen. Hillary Clinton

While Wardally might be enthusiastic about the recently re-elected New York

(Continued on Page 11)

Bell

(Continued from Page 1)

through traffic, oft times ignoring community police directives, a vocal and amped-up crowd stopped periodically in the middle of the street and demanded that holiday shoppers "come out of them shops," and join the impromptu, proposed 50-day boycott. Drivers honked their horns in support, and some marchers leaned through open car windows and pumped the horns of drivers slow or reluctant to do so themselves.

Perhaps the most poignant moment was when members of the Bloods and Crips symbolically joined red and blue bandanas, and with what seemed like long-awaited relief, announced that with a common goal in sight, they would join forces to combat the scourge that is police brutality.

(Damaso Reyes photo)

Anti-police brutality rally on Wednesday, drew hundreds to Foley Square.

Venting loudly, young men and women challenged police officers stationed three deep behind barricades outside the 103 Precinct. "We're united on this. Y'all ain't getting off on this one. We dropping all that other stuff. We going in on this one," hollered a Blood member.

"The Bloods and the Crips finally realize that they must unite, organize, mobilize and agitate against government-sponsored police terrorism," said Divine Allah, youth minister with the New Black Panther Party, noting the significant one-year anniversary on December 13 of the California execution of Tookie Williams, and this week's 37th anniversary of the Chicago police shooting deaths of Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. "The Bloods and the Crips realize that we have to be strong together. If they must bang, they must bang for freedom and liberation. By recognizing who the real enemy is, it can lead to long-range development of uncompromising future leadership in the Black community."

"The young people have a right to be outraged," Sharpton told the AmNews. "What happened to Sean, Trent and Joseph directly threatens their lives and existence. They may use language that others may not, but you can't tell people in pain how to holler."

During a meeting on Monday night, Sharpton said, "I had about 20 of them with me, and the thing I said is that they should have been involved before. But they are involved now and they must be welcomed, and we must stand with them and behind them."

"Our community is getting close to a tipping point," said Councilman Charles Barron. "People are sick and tired of the inadequate response to the continued murder of our young men at the hands of New York City Police officers."

On November 25, as Bell and his two friends left Club Kalua just after 4 a.m, Detective Michael Oliver in plainclothes also exited the club. He claims to have heard someone mention a gun, and then he let off 31 shots. Four colleagues joined in the shooting frenzy.

When the smoke cleared, Bell was dead and Guzman, 31, and Benefield, 23, lay bleeding and handcuffed.

Finding no weapon, police quickly came up with the widely questioned theory that there was a fourth man, who somehow escaped the hail of bullets, removed the alleged weapon, and got away. However, there was never any fire returned, and both Guzman and Benefield denied that there was ever a fourth man. Cops conducted raids, pulled up grates and were generally accused of harassing folk, conducting parallel investigations as distractions and intimidating tactics. Attorney Charlie King was called on to represent several witnesses who feared police retaliation when they told their story of no fourth man and no gun. Sharpton quipped that the fourth man was Jesus, while marchers at Saturday's rally said the fourth man was a cop.

"The Police Department's Internal Affairs Bureau has made appropriate inquiries in the shooting's aftermath, providing all information to the Queens District Attorney," was the statement sent to the AmNews Wednesday afternoon from Deputy Commissioner of Public Information Paul J. Browne.

Meanwhile, 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement and the NAACP have expressed little confidence in the ongoing investigation and have called for the appointment of an independent State Special Prosecutor.

Nicole Paultre, Bell's fiancée and the mother of his two daughters went on cable TV on Monday and said that she was not angry, that she did not blame the entire NYPD, just the individuals involved.

Announcing the NAACP March For Justice taking place this Saturday, December 9, at 11 a.m. (at 168th Street and Archer Avenue in Jamaica), Hazel Dukes, president of the NAACP New York State Conference declared, "The New York State as well as The national NAACP is calling for long-term and in-depth changes in the policing of African-Americans and African-American communities. It is clear that there is a clear, well-documented, deep-seated failure of reasonable and respectful policing policies and practices where African-Americans are involved."

In a statement, she continued, saying that the "death toll of unarmed individuals killed by police is almost exclusively African-Americans." She further noted, "Not only are there few, if any, administration sanctions for abuse of authority, but the criminal conduct is rarely ever deemed to be criminal, and so they get away with murder."

The NAACP is calling for the appointment of a state special prosecutor because she determined, "The relationship between the Queens District Attorney's office and the police is just too cozy."

Word is that Queens D.A. Richard Brown may interview Det. Michael Oliver, Det. Mark Cooper, Det. Paul Hedley, P.O. Michael Carey, and an unnamed undercover by next week.

While he praised the sentiment of Bed-Stuy rapper Papoose's mix tape cut "50 Shots," Divine Allah called out other rappers like 50 Cent to become involved at this crucial time. "There were 50 shots in 50's' 'hood—where is he on this? Where are Nas and Mobb Deep? Where is Jay-Z? Do they think that because they have moved on up to the so-called higher echelons in which they choose to circulate in, that this does not affect them? They should be out there rallying with people. To not do so is like saying they are not involved at all, so therefore people don't need to support me and buy my album from the store, they can just go get it from the bootleggers."

Allah continued, "On Saturday we witnessed the masses taking to the streets to show the massive unity and outrage. The marchers took control of the direction and energy of the march with no inhibitions."

"In a city that is 60 percent people of color, people of color are being watched on national TV being shot down like dogs," said Maurice Carver, host of the community access show "Black Men Screaming." "Even Bull Conner did not slaughter us in the streets like the NYPD. Get angry, get mad, but please get active!"

In light of the Bell shooting and the Atlanta police 130-shot killing of 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston, original Black Panther Sadiki "Shep" Ojore Olugbala said, "We want an immediate end to [this]. We believe we can end police brutality and murder of Black people in our Black community by organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our Black community from racist police oppression and brutality."

Rev. Betty Neal of the Ministers of Harlem U.S.A Inc. called the Amsterdam News to find out about the New Black Panther Party boycott rally of 125th Street scheduled for Saturday at 3 p.m.

"I don't prejudge until the case is fully investigated," she told the AmNews. "I just want justice. I want the truth and the facts. I want to join the march because they didn't find any weapons or drugs on [the victims. Those fellas were clean to me. I want to demonstrate for justice. That's what [Sean's fiancée Nicole] said—she wants—justice. As Spike Lee said, I want them to 'do the right thing.'"

As for Lee, Sharpton spoke of the filmmaker as he told the AmNews that December 16 will be the 4th birthday of Jada, Sean and Nicole's oldest daughter.

"Spike Lee said that he and some other entertainers want to do something for Jada. On December 16, her daddy would have been taking her shopping, so we are going to do something for her on that day as we rally down Fifth Avenue and shop for justice for her father."

COMMUNITY AS DISASTER

Following the killing of Sean Bell in 2006, the *New York Amsterdam News* recalled the shooting of Amadou Diallo by NYPD officers seven years prior:

> This last fortnight has been reminiscent of a city *all fired up* in the wake of the 1999 41-shot police barrage which left Amadou Diallo with 19 hits to the body and an international incident on the record (Arinde 2006, p. 34, emphasis added).

Later, in the same article, reference is made to the community being on edge, close to the brink of chaos, destruction, disaster:

> "Our community is getting *close to a tipping point*," said Councilman Charles Barron. "People are sick and tired of the inadequate response to the continued murder of our young men at the hands of New York City police officers" (Arinde 2006, p. 34, emphasis added).

Reporting from *The New York Times* on the meeting between Mayor Bloomberg and Black leadership from around the city held immediately after Bell's death illuminates the metaphor further:

> Although several of the leaders at City Hall expressed confidence in the mayor and the police commissioner, the emotional meeting, which began with *outbursts of anger* and ended calmly, laid bare some of the rifts among New York's black leaders themselves. Many, however, expressed concerns that the administration was failing to deal with what they described as continuing tensions between black residents and police officers even when the officers are not white. "There were some *heated exchanges*," said the Rev. Herbert Daughtry, an influential Pentecostal minister in Brooklyn. "We all agree that there is a pattern of police abuse of power, and this abuse of power ranges from police killing to police brutal behavior to disrespect. We reiterated that over and over again." Mr. Daughtry warned the mayor not to confuse patience with complacency. "There is *a temperature in our communities that is rising*, and the *tension is intensifying*," he said. "*While we don't want to try to ignite anything, we'd be blind to overlook what's happening and not to sound the alarm*" (Cardwell and Chan, 2006, p. B4, emphasis added).

The conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER is employed by Rev. Daughtry to explain the severity of the situation. His account of the meeting is that "we all agree" about "a pattern of police abuse of power" ranging from "police killing to police brutal behavior to

disrespect" and that those points were reiterated during the meeting with the mayor repeatedly. Daughtry's understanding of the problem not only with police killings, but also with policing in New York's Black communities, is underscored by his warning to not confuse "patience with complacency." The concern here then is the community erupting once again. The disaster conceptualized as earthquake, volcano, or wildfire, is a Black community that has grown impatient and fed up with police violence, ignited by police killing.

After the trial and acquittal of all officers involved in the fatal police shooting of Sean Bell, *The New York Times* focused on how peaceful the protests were in comparison to collective action in response to prior police shootings:

> Unlike some previous verdicts in police shootings, the acquittals in the Bell case have so far been largely met with a *muted response*. Thousands of protesters did not fill the streets, *no unrest ensued*.
>
> At a news conference at the Harlem headquarters of the Rev. Al Sharpton's National Action Network, Mr. Sharpton and other activists, politicians and community leaders praised the *overall peaceful response* that followed the verdict, and vowed to fight the judge's decision in *strategic rather than bellicose ways.*
>
> "Some in the media seemed disappointed, they wanted us to play into the hoodlum, thug stereotypes," Mr. Sharpton said. "*We can be angry without being mad*." And while many onlookers shouted their support, others admitted *restlessness* and a *yearning for something more*. But Nkrumah Pierre, a banker who lives on Long Island and who marched in the protest on Sunday, said: "We've progressed to the point where *we don't need to act out in violence. This is an intelligent protest, and a strategic protest*" (Buckley and Lueck, 2008, p. B3, emphasis added).

The New York Times reports on the type of protest undergone by Black community members following the police killing of Sean Bell as contrasting with COMMUNITY AS DISASTER discourse, positioning the protests as having progressed to a point of more "intelligent" and "strategic" action.

After the trial and acquittal of all officers involved in the fatal shooting of Sean Bell, the *New York Amsterdam News* evoked COMMUNITY AS DISASTER with their headline in all caps: "AFTERMATH: New York City reacts to Sean Bell verdict." While White Press, in this study, focuses on interviewing Black individuals considered to be leadership and authority figures, much of this article centers around Black people's call to "shut the city down!" bringing up various reactions from interviewed individuals, including a far wider variety of political opinion from Black residents, from gang members to artists to businesspeople to clergy:

> The initial community reaction to the police acquittals in the killing of Sean Bell on his wedding day, November 25, 2006, has been more than predictable: *anger, frustration and disgust*. From *initial shock* to a grassroots call for a complete economic boycott on Saturday, May 3. "I'm not surprised by the verdict at all," said Bomani of rap group United Front. "I'm just surprised and hurt by the reaction of the people: that *New York did not get torn to the ground*" (Arinde 2008, p. 1, emphasis added).

The article continues reporting on Bomani's contrast between New York being torn down with New York being shut down, delineating the difference between violent protest and economic boycott:

> Last year, United Front recorded the powerful and controversial album "50 shots for Sean Bell." This week, the Brooklyn-Harlem duo is part of a movement calling for a dollar-free Saturday. Bomani stated, "We are *shutting down* New York City on Saturday, May 3 for Sean Bell. We urge all [Black and Latinos] not to spend a single dime anywhere in New York city. No gas, no food, no cloth" (Arinde 2008, p. 1, emphasis added).

The *Amsterdam News* further reported on the tension between different forms of collective action in the wake of police killings and officer acquittals:

> "I'm *outraged* at a blatant abdication of justice," Queens Council Member James Sanders told the AmNews. Bell was, and Guzman is, his constituent, said the city legislator. "The *community is outraged*: we feel that there was never an attempt to bring justice here. My personal view was that the strategy our New York City community of justice seekers had was not holistic. *We did not take it to the streets*. We were told if we *raised our voices*, if we showed our resolve, that they may take this trial away from us. We allowed them to set the pace and the path—and we followed it to our detriment. *We need to take this back to*

> *the street* and have a holistic approach, a legal approach, a mobilization approach—and all of us work in harmony" (Arinde 2008, p. 1, emphasis added).

Council Member Charles Barron's statement on the state of Black communities in New York following the bench trial and acquittal elaborates the conundrum of peacefully complying with the justice system, from police killing to bench trial and acquittal:

> Brooklyn City Council Member Charles Barron asserted, "There's no legal rationale for what Judge Cooperman did. He was obviously a pro-cop judge and had no intention of convicting the three defendants. By talking about the victims the way he did, by talking about the demeanor of the witnesses, and about the lawsuit—which they do have a right to file—he showed his obvious disdain." Barron slammed the prosecution as ineffective. "This is why Marq Claxton from 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement and myself called for a special prosecutor from the beginning. They have said to us that they haven't got past Dred Scot. It is *incumbent on us to protect ourselves by any means necessary.* We have the God-given and constitutional right to do that. Alton Maddox has said over the years that they should abolish bench trials. When police officers kill innocent civilians, as public servants they should be forced to face a public jury—not just a judge. Right after Sean Bell, 6 Black men died at the hands of police—they have not eased up during the duration of this trial. "*If young people rise up or do what they need to in order to protect themselves from killer cops sanctioned by the system to kill them with impunity—what would you tell them*? Because *they are now target practice,* and *it is open season on them*: Amadou Diallo—41 bullets. Sean Bell—50 bullets. What is the appropriate response? We are looking at creating a Malcolm-King Community Patrol to prevent police and community violence. You've got to stop the criminals in blue jeans and the ones in blue uniforms" (Arinde 2008, p. 31, emphasis added).

Barron states that cops killing with impunity are the source of young people "rising up." Young people, he declares, are doing what they need to in order to protect themselves from "killer cops", a "God-given and constitutional right." Councilman Barron advocates for the abolition of bench trials and a Malcolm-King Community Patrol to prevent police and community violence. In retrospect, Barron's warning that disaster was pending was a premonition.

Figure 27. *New York Times* article following acquittal of officers for murder of Sean Bell, 2008

Verdict in Sean Bell Case Draws a Peace ful Protest but Some Demand More
Buckley, Cara;Lueck, Thomas J
New York Times (1923-Current file); Apr 28, 2008; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times
pg. B3

Verdict in Sean Bell Case Draws a Peaceful Protest, but Some Demand More

By CARA BUCKLEY
and THOMAS J. LUECK

The circle of people was thin but spread wide, looping an intersection in the heart of Harlem on Sunday and blocking long lines of cars and buses in four directions. In the middle of the circle stood a cluster of angry people, and in that cluster stood a young man with a bullhorn and a question.

"Why isn't everyone else out here with us?" the man, Robert Cuffy, 22, asked. The circle of people, roughly 150 strong, stared back. It was two days after a judge acquitted three New York City detectives in the shooting death of Sean Bell, who died on the morning of his wedding day 17 months ago after the detectives fired a total of 50 bullets at his car.

Unlike some previous verdicts in police shootings, the acquittals in the Bell case have so far been largely met with a muted response. Thousands of protesters did not fill the streets, no unrest ensued. Still, on Sunday, some protesters and advocates around the city demanded federal investigations into the case and greater oversight of the police, while others puzzled over why the verdict had not yielded a stronger response.

At a news conference at the Harlem headquarters of the Rev. Al Sharpton's National Action Network, Mr. Sharpton and other activists, politicians and community leaders praised the overall peaceful response that followed the verdict, and vowed to fight the judge's decision in strategic rather than bellicose ways.

"Some in the media seemed disappointed, they wanted us to play into the hoodlum, thug stereotypes," Mr. Sharpton said. "We can be angry without being mad." And while many onlookers shouted their support, others admitted restlessness and a yearning for something more.

"People are hungry for leadership that's not there," said Calvin B. Hunt Jr., who listened to the news conference and joined the protest that followed, marching down Malcolm X Boulevard and blocking the intersection at 125th Street. He spoke longingly of prominent black activists in the 1960s and 1970s, among them Malcolm X, Angela Davis and Huey Newton. "After the Amadou Diallo verdict, we marched till we had corns on our feet, and nothing changed," he said. "In this verdict, there was no justice. So why should there be peace?"

His sentiments were shared by some others in the crowd. A poet who gave his name as Thug Love said gang members from the Bloods and Crips should unite to "police and protect their own community" the way the Black Panthers did decades ago. A concert promoter, who goes by the name Goddess Isis, said that the news conference sounded to her like "politics as usual," and that the community needed grassroots leaders with concrete solutions to ongoing problems, like police harassment.

"We are on our own here," she said.

But Nkrumah Pierre, a banker who lives on Long Island and who marched in the protest on Sunday, said: "We've progressed to the point where we don't need to act out in violence. This is an intelligent protest, and a strategic protest."

Still, others on Sunday called for changes within the system, in particular the ways in which the city's police are monitored.

At a news conference outside Police Department headquarters in Lower Manhattan, civil rights advocates and lawmakers — including Norman Siegel, the former executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union; State Senator Eric Adams of Brooklyn; and Marq Claxton of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care — called for the appointment of a permanent statewide special prosecutor, to supersede district attorneys in cases of police shootings or alleged police brutality.

Too often, the advocates said, district attorneys have close relationships with the police, muddying prosecutorial independence. The advocates also said the timing of the proposal was influenced by the ascension of David A. Paterson to governor.

"For the first time we realistically have someone in the governor's seat that understands the need for these reforms," Mr. Siegel said.

The proposal, Mr. Siegel said, was loosely patterned on the former Office of the Special State Prosecutor for Corruption, created under Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller in the early 1970s on the recommendation of the Knapp Commission, which uncovered corruption in the Police Department. That office was disbanded in 1990.

Advocates call for a permanent statewide special prosecutor.

Risa Heller, a spokeswoman for Mr. Paterson, said the governor would review the recommendation. "Like all New Yorkers, the governor takes the issue of police wrongdoing very seriously, but he also believes that the overwhelming majority of police officers perform their duties honorably and conscientiously," Ms. Heller said.

In Harlem, one of the protesters, Melanie Brown, who is 29 and lives near the street in Queens where Mr. Bell was killed and two of his friends, Joseph Guzman and Trent Benefield, were wounded, said she believed that every response, no matter how seemingly small, helped.

"What happens next happens," she said, as protesters chanted and hoisted aloft Pan-African flags, striped in red, black and green. "Right now this is a unity thing."

PHOTOGRAPHS BY MICHELLE V. AGINS/THE NEW YORK TIMES

About 150 people marched along Malcolm X Boulevard in Harlem on Sunday to protest the acquittals in the Sean Bell case.

Nicole Paultre Bell, left, and Joseph Guzman, right, attended a news conference on Sunday held by the Rev. Al Sharpton.

Figure 28. *New York Amsterdam News* article following Sean Bell verdict, 2008

AFTERMATH
New York Amsterdam News; May 1-May 7, 2008; 99, 19; Ethnic NewsWatch
pg. 1

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AFTERMATH

New York City reacts to Sean Bell verdict

(Bill Moore photo)
Rev. Sharpton and Bell family leave court after Judge Cooperman annouces acquittals of three NYPD detectives.

Wright out! Obama severs ties to former pastor

By HERB BOYD
Special to the AmNews

Ever since he launched his presidential campaign—which seems like eons ago—Senator Barack Obama has managed to maintain a cool, unfazed demeanor, keeping his emotions off his sleeve and tightly under wraps. But that calm, unperturbed facade was slightly breached Tuesday when from a podium in Winston Salem, N.C., he announced his official public and possibly irreparable divorce from the controversial Rev. Jeremiah Wright Jr.

The deep, personal moorings that had allowed him to bridge gaps between "different kinds of people," were suddenly, and sadly, washed away by a series of public appearances by his former pastor. There was a slow, almost mournful cadence in his voice, perhaps wishing he didn't have to say what he felt, at last, had to be said.

"Before I start taking questions," Obama told a group of reporters and supporters, "I want to open it up with a couple of comments about what we saw and heard yesterday. I have spent my entire adult life trying to bridge the gap between different kinds of people. That's in my DNA, trying to promote mutual understanding to insist that we all share common hopes and common dreams as Americans and as human beings. That's who I am. That's what I believe. That's what this campaign has been about."

The "yesterday" Obama referred to was Rev. Wright's appearance at the National Press Club, and what disturbed him most was the minister's "outrageous" remarks and the notion that Obama's race speech in Philadelphia last month was nothing more than "political posturing."

"Yesterday, we saw a very different vision of America," Obama said, extrapolating on the pastor's press conference. "I am outraged by the comments that were made and saddened over the spectacle that we saw yesterday."

Those words accompanied a painful expression on Obama's face as he began

(Continued on Page 31)

Community plans after Bell verdict

By NAYABA ARINDE
Amsterdam News Editor

"Shut this city down!" was the painful cry issued at the stunning completion of what Joseph Guzman called a "mockery of a trial," after Judge Arthur Cooperman acquitted Mike Oliver (31 shots), Gescard Isnora (11 shots) and Michael Cooper (four shots) in the tumultuous Sean Bell case. Outside Queens Criminal Court, some people all but fell out, and angry words smacked community affairs officers as emotion-filled Black people pushed to get out of the confined space created outside the courthouse, cordoned off by cops and TV cameras.

The initial community reaction to the

(Continued on Page 34)

Reaction to Bell decision

By HERB BOYD
Special to the AmNews

Reaction to the acquittal of the detectives in the shooting death of Sean Bell and the wounding of his friends has been as widespread as it has been bitter and angry.

The most emotional reaction came from the hundreds of people waiting for the verdict last Friday outside the Queens courthouse.

"This is a travesty, a miscarriage of justice," said one young lady who resisted all efforts to be consoled. "They murdered him once and now they've murdered him again."

A calmer response was registered on Monday by Congressman John Conyers of Michigan, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, who met with Rev. Al Sharp-

(Continued on Page 40)

Feds called to investigate case

By CYRIL JOSH BARKER
Amsterdam News Staff

Rev. Al Sharpton met with a congressional delegation on Monday after a weekend of rallying and protesting. The next step: strategic planning and federal charges. Friday's verdict acquitting all three NYPD officers charged in the death of Sean Bell has prompted some governmental officials to step in. The seven-member delegation included Rep. John Conyers from Michigan, Rep. Charles Rangel and Rep. Gregory Meeks.

The group of congressional leaders, along with Sharpton, Nicole Paultre-Bell and the Bell family, came together

(Continued on Page 40)

Employment Barriers of the Formerly Incarcerated Damage Our Communities

Urban Agenda by *David R. Jones*
Community Service Society of New York President
See Page 3

Aftermath

(Continued from Page 1)

police acquittals in the killing of Sean Bell on his wedding day, November 25, 2006, has been more than predictable: anger, frustration and disgust. From initial shock to a grassroots call for a complete economic boycott on Saturday, May 3.

"I'm not surprised by the verdict at all," said Bomani of rap group United Front. "I'm just surprised and hurt by the reaction of the people: that New York not did get torn to the ground."

Last year, United Front recorded the powerful and controversial album "50 shots for Sean Bell." This week, the Brooklyn-Harlem duo is part of a movement calling for a dollar-free Saturday. Bomani stated, "We are shutting down New York City on Saturday, May 3 for Sean Bell. We urge all [Black and Latinos] not to spend a single dime anywhere in New York City. No gas, food, no cloth."

On Tuesday night there was a meeting at the midtown offices of United Health Care Workers 1199 (Valerie Bell's union), with elected officials, activists and members of the Bell family.

Rev. Al Sharpton, who co-organized the strategy session, sat with Sean's parents, William and Valerie. City Council Member Charles Barron told the AmNews that four committees were set up: civil disobedience, economic boycott, Mother's Day boycott and a march committee.

"We will be making an announcement about details on Thursday at 7 p.m., at Rev. Daughtry's House of the Lord Church in Brooklyn," said Barron. "People are very passionately committed; we had a diverse gathering with elected officials, clergy, college students and all types of groups. They may have won the case, but they have launched a movement. We are going to pressure the Justice Department to convene a grand jury and send these cops to jail."

"I think the U.S. Attorney's actions will depend on their reading of the political climate, as well as an assessment of the strength of the legal case—in that order," said activist attorney Roger Wareham. "Our options are to find new and creative ways to force the legal system to do what it is supposed to do in theory."

State Senator Eric Adams told the AmNews he is pushing for "a special prosecutor and to have a special police investigator who operates out of the attorney general's office." The job would be to protect and process the crime scene when someone is killed, seriously injured or likely to die; or it's a case of corruption.

"There is no reason why a member of the police department should also be the person conducting the investigation. It is the ultimate conflict of interest," Adams said.

Since last Friday's verdict, all over the city there have been impromptu rallies and marches. More police than usual have been patrolling urban areas like Bed-Stuy, Harlem and South Jamaica. An uneasy atmosphere exists.

On April 25, 2008, in the packed courtroom of Judge Arthur Cooperman people awaiting his verdict were completely surrounded by an extra phalanx of court officers—two-by-two in the aisle and hugging the four sides of the courtroom. At exactly 9 a.m. Cooperman came to the bench. Within 10 minutes, after briefly pausing to demand the removal of Trent Benefield's talkative baby, the soon-to-be-retired judge delivered his stunning verdict. When Cooperman began by talking about the horrors cops faced on vice detail, and the motives, demeanor and inconsistencies of witnesses, it dawned on some in the courtroom what was about to go down. Ruling out "sympathy and emotional response," he determined that he had to "analyze the mindset of each defendant, not what the victims did." But the prosecution was ineffective in trying to prove its case, said the judge, and argued the defense case of the cops' fear that Joseph Guzman had a gun. Without going through each count, Cooperman simply declared each of the defendants not guilty.

The Bell family looked shocked. Somebody began sobbing, Benefield stormed out, the court awoke from its temporary stupor and exited as the defendants reveled in their sudden good fortune. Sharpton helped a devastated Nicole Paultre-Bell out of the room.

It was pure chaos outside the courtroom. For 20 minutes or so, the Bell family, and those of Guzman and Benefield, conferenced in a room, while rows of court officers—some with bullet-proof vests on—lined the hall way. Outside was frantic as the word spread quickly. When the families emerged was when the crowd, feeling collectively disrespected, agitated a little louder, and some pushed against link-armed cops a little harder.

The victims and the families brushed past waiting journalists and headed straight to the cemetery, to visit with Sean Elijah Bell.

An enraged Sharpton boomed that justice had been "aborted" and that the community might decide to march on the homes of the judge or the acquitted officers, or One Police Plaza.

"We need to visit this judge en masse…We're gonna be strategic. We're gonna shut this city down," the minister said as he urged attendees at the post-verdict House of Justice rally to sign up for the "Freedom Brigade."

Michael Hardy, the civil attorney for Nicole Paultre-Bell, Guzman and Benefield, said that the Bell family and the victims were "blatantly robbed"—and this after co-operating. "This system will give you nothing. It leaves you raw and you've got to respond to that," he said.

"The court has let us down. But I will keep praying," Nicole Paultre-Bell told the AmNews the day after the verdict. "I will be at every march, every rally for Sean," said the mother of two young girls.

(Lem Peterkin photo)

The congressional delegation and elected officials meet the Bell family and victims in Queens.

On Tuesday a host of elected officials, including Rep. John Conyers, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Rep. Charles Rangel, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, met with Sharpton, the Bell family and Guzman and Benefield. In the Jamaica Avenue office of Cong. Greg Meeks, the Congressional delegation discussed the demand for a Federal investigation into the violation of the civil rights of Sean Bell, Guzman and Benefield.

"It's a crime against humanity," said Rangel.

"The two most powerful members of Congress came to New York and disagreed with Cooperman's decision," said Sharpton of Conyers and Rangel.

"I'm outraged at a blatant abdication of justice," Queens Council Member James Sanders told the AmNews. Bell was, and Guzman is, his constituent, said the city legislator. "The community is outraged: we feel that there was never an attempt to bring justice here. My personal view was that the strategy our New York City community of justice seekers had was not holistic. We put all our eggs in one basket—in the legal arena—and we started acting like fine English gentlemen. We did not protest. We did not take it to the streets. We were told if we raised our voices, if we showed our resolve, that they may take this trial away from us. We allowed them to set the pace and the path—and we followed it to our detriment. We need to take this back to the street and have a holistic approach, a legal approach, a mobilization approach and a religious approach—and all of us work in harmony."

Sanders told the AmNews, "I wasn't happy with the prosecution. I thought that they presented a weak case."

History has shown that our most successful struggles have been won using a multi-pronged approach, Sanders analyzed. The greatest victories have been achieved, he said, "When we were creative, innovative and always came up with something new."

Brooklyn City Council Member Charles Barron asserted, "There's no legal rationale for what Judge Cooperman did. He was obviously a pro-cop judge and had no intention of convicting the three defendants. By talking about the victims the way he did, by talking about the demeanor of the witnesses, and about the lawsuit—which they do have a right to file—he showed his obvious disdain."

Barron slammed the prosecution as ineffective.

"This is why Marq Claxton from 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement and myself called for a special prosecutor from the beginning. They have said to us that they haven't got past Dred Scot. It is incumbent on us to protect ourselves by any means necessary. We have the God-given and constitutional right to do that.

"Alton Maddox has said over the years that they should abolish bench trials. When police officers kill innocent civilians, as public servants they should be forced to face a public jury—not just a judge. Right after Sean Bell, 6 Black men died at the hands of police—they have not eased up during the duration of this trial.

"If young people rise up or do what they need to in order to protect themselves from killer cops sanctioned by the system to kill them with impunity—what would you tell them? Because they are now target practice, and it is open season on them: Amadou Diallo—41 bullets. Sean Bell—50 bullets. What is the appropriate response? We are looking at creating a Malcolm-King Community Patrol to prevent police and community violence. You've got to stop the criminals in blue jeans and the ones in blue uniforms."

While boycotts and confabs are being discussed in some quarters, elsewhere direct action is being considered, despite what Mayor Michael Bloomberg and presidential candidate Barack Obama have said.

Planning a Day of Mourning, New York State Conference NAACP President Hazel N. Dukes said, "The NAACP demands that the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division follow through on its reported monitoring of the case and launch a thorough investigation.

Marq Claxton, spokesperson for 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement, said, "It is hypocritical for people to claim that there is a need for comprehensive reform in the NYPD, yet support and heap accolades on Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. It is as if they don't realize that he created the perfect environment that led to the death of Sean Bell. The commissioner himself is responsible for the strategies and initiatives that have led to the further oppression and killing of innocent Black people. Everyone should be on record as to whether Ray Kelly should not remain as Police Commissioner."

The conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER is utilized in discourse by political leadership and reproduced by news and other media coverage in the wake of police killings. In response to the use of lethal force by 103rd Precinct police officers in both 1973 and in 2006, and then after the ensuing officer acquittals—in trial by jury in 1974, and by bench trial in 2008—narratives of urban disorder and social unrest are propagated. The fear is that Black communities will rebel once again, as has happened in the past, and that this upsets the collective social status quo and police power will once again be scrutinized. This fear is discussed by both newspapers and explains the relationship between policing, news, and rebellion in segregated metropolises.

The Discontinuity of Memory

Central to this project's conceptualization of memory is the theoretical framework of colonial aphasia. Writing about disabled, or deadened, racial histories in France, Ann Laura Stoler (2011) coined the phrase to better describe and define what often is referred to as "forgotten history" or "collective amnesia." Describing the active process of making colonial legacies unavailable, she writes:

> But forgetting and amnesia are misleading terms to describe this guarded separation and the procedures that produced it. *Aphasia*, I propose, is perhaps a more apt term, one that captures not only the nature of that blockage but also the feature of loss…It is not a matter of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken (Stoler 2011, p. 125).

Enabling racial histories that have been disabled requires looking into the documented representation of those histories themselves. Specifically, the ways that police violence operates in Black communities and is depicted and reported reveals the ways they are thought of and then acted upon through policy.

Perhaps the most remarkable finding of this research arises not from a narrative presence around police violence in Black communities as with 'no angel' discourse and the conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER , but instead from a discursive absence. The data that I intended to compare across time was discourse around policing in one neighborhood. Controlling for geographic context and jurisdictional precinct allowed me to compare, across time, discourse on collective action in the wake of police killings and officer acquittals. Thus, the case of Jamaica, Queens, where the killings of Clifford Glover in 1973, and Sean Bell in 2006, by NYPD 103rd Precinct officers occurred, provides insight into the historic relationship between police violence, protest, and press media coverage.

Despite this historic comparison, I found no mention of the death of Clifford Glover, or the aftermath of Officer Shea's acquittal, in reporting from *The New York Times* or the *New York Amsterdam News* in 2006 or 2008. While my search through the digital archives of both publications using ProQuest has not been exhaustive, it does capture front-page reporting in the immediate wake of both killings and acquittals. I have also searched through the pages of far more articles and op-ed pieces from several news publications than those I've utilized for this project and have found no mention of Clifford Glover in any articles written about Sean Bell.

The conclusion of this study, corroborating the more mainstream documentation of Clifford Glover's death by police murder in the 2022 *Showtime* documentary series executive produced by Nasir "Nas" Jones, "The Supreme Team," demonstrates a disruption of memory, a loss of knowing in relation to the police murder of Clifford Glover. That memory is linked in the docuseries, to the formation of the Supreme Team gangsters and the proliferation of drug trafficking as well as the foundation of Hip Hop culture in southeast Queens. Upcoming work will link Clifford Glover and the Supreme Team, the assassination of Ed Byrne to what occurred

in 2006 when police killed Sean Bell in a hail of bullets in the same neighborhood and precinct. Also in focus is the role of formerly incarcerated and system impacted youth, men, and women in Queens in promoting public safety, preventing street violence and police violence and their partnership with the NYPD 103rd Precinct. Despite this, workers for New York State's Crisis Management Service organizations don't get a fraction of NYPD funding.

In both eras, and in both publications, there is mention of other Black victims of police violence and a *chocolate cities* linked fate between Black people who have died, or who could die, at the hands of police:

> The slaying of the youth, said to be the youngest ever slain by a New York city policeman, inevitably recalled the 1964 incident in Yorkville when 15-year-old James Powell was shot dead by Lieutenant Thomas R. Gilligan. That incident touched off riots in Harlem and other places in New York. There were those Tuesday who vocally stated that all the ingredients were present for another riot and silently hoped that none would take place (*New York Amsterdam News* 1973a, p. A2).

> At their home in South Jamaica, Mr. Armstead and Mrs. Eloise Glover, the victim's mother, said they were surprised by the acquittal and that only a guilty verdict would have been "any justice at all." "It could have been anybody's child," Mrs. Glover said (Johnston 1974, p. 27).

> In light of the Bell shooting and the Atlanta police 130-shot killing of 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston, original Black Panther Sadiki "Shep" Ojore Olugbala said, "We want an immediate end to [this]. We believe we can end police brutality and murder of Black people in our Black community by organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our Black community from racist police oppression and brutality" (Arinde 2006, p. 1).

> "People are hungry for leadership that's not there," said Calvin B. Hunt Jr., who listened to the news conference and joined the protest that followed, marching down Malcolm X Boulevard and blocking the intersection at 125th Street. He spoke longingly of prominent black activists in the 1960s and 1970s, among them Malcolm X, Angela Davis and Huey Newton. "After the Amadou Diallo verdict, we marched till we had corns on our feet, and nothing changed," he said. "In this verdict, there was no justice. So why should there be peace (Buckley and Lueck, 2008, p. B3)?

Though there is significant work done by reports from both publications to link the killings of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell, as well as the officer acquittals in both cases, to other police shootings occurring contemporarily, there is a continuity missing. Especially in the last quote from the *Times*, there is mention of the Amadou Diallo verdict and how this reflects poorly on the New York Police Department, evoking the potential for "no peace."

There is no mention, however, in any of the articles studied, that when Sean Bell is killed, and the police involved are acquitted, that this was not the first time that a police killing of a young unarmed Black person sparked uprisings and protests in this neighborhood, challenging the actions of 103rd Precinct officers. This historic continuity would better illuminate how communities respond when feeling failed by their judicial system and local government. It may also shed light on what has been done, and advocated for, in the past and what remains unchanged. The reporting of each paper informs how collective action is retrieved, imagined, and understood by the public, specifically in the wake of police killings. How people remember the past shapes how they respond to repeated violence over decades and across generations. Capturing collective memory from longtime residents, while they are still in the neighborhood, is crucial to understanding the role of intergenerational resistance to perpetual police violence in urban Black communities. This, I believe, was a missed opportunity by both papers in reporting on police violence, Black and White.

The mourning and memorialization of victims of police violence require their own study. The street where Sean Bell was killed by NYPD officers has since been renamed Sean Bell Way. I argue that because his name is etched into the built environment of this community, his life cannot be forgotten, and that Jamaica, Queens will forever be associated with the memory of Sean Bell. There is no such memorial for Clifford Glover, however. There was once a plan to

dedicate the lot where Clifford Glover died by creating a safe place for children to play. The *New York Amsterdam News* reported under the headline "Queens Elks Dedicate Glover Boy Death Lot":

> The recent tragedy involving the death of 10 year old Clifford Glover in South Jamaica has created city wide interest and regret. The Queens Lodge hereby make the following announcement: On Saturday, May 12th, The Queens Lodge No. 1001 will announce, at an open gathering, our offer of the vacant lot – 112th Ave. and New York Blvd. (where Glover was slain) for recreation for neighborhood youngsters. The lot is owned by Queens Lodge. Representatives from city agencies including The Borough President and the Mayor's Office will be invited. Also 103rd Precinct. Local leaders of community-based organizations will be asked to participate (*New York Amsterdam News* 1973b, p. B11).

Currently, there is no dedication to Clifford Glover in the built environment of the city. This, I argue, is part and parcel of why the death of Clifford Glover has been erased from collective memory, the public archive, and the written record. It is for this reason that the murder of Clifford Glover was not invoked when officers from the same precinct killed Sean Bell in the same neighborhood thirty-three years later.

Harkening back to Stoler's (2011) theory of colonial aphasia and Michel-Rolph Trouillot's (2015) notion of historical "silences," the collective memory of the death of Clifford Glover, killed by 103rd Precinct officers in Jamaica, Queens, was not lost passively to the doldrums of time, but erased actively through absenting the boy's life in telling the story of New York City children in the late twentieth century. The fact that Glover's memory is not evoked when Sean Bell is killed in the same neighborhood, thirty-three years later, by either major news source, signals that, because there was no memorial to honor Glover's memory, there was no public and living monument to what had occurred and then recurred. This is not the case when Bell dies because his death was honored, forever altering the spatial organization and collective memory of police violence and communal grief in Jamaica, Queens.

Figure 29. Sean Bell's mother, Valerie Bell, standing in front of his mural in Jamaica, Queens

Figure 30. Protesters kneel at Sean Bell Way in Jamaica, Queens, 2020



Chapter 5: Conclusion

The results of this study have implications for our interpretations of state violence and political activism in the transformations of urban neighborhoods over time. Furthermore, my exploration of the construction of memory surrounding police killings of Black people contributes to scholarship on power in the production of history and adds a locally informed neighborhood level lens to research on police-community relations over time. Knowing how and why communities respond to police violence across time gives us a historically informed understanding of the persistence of police killings up to this current national moment. Though Black political responses to various forms of state and financial transformations have been studied (Hunter 2013, Gregory 1998), local communal action over time in response to police violence in one neighborhood has not been conducted this extensively. This research intervenes in this crucial manner during a time when dissent of policing practices are once again dominating headlines. A return to past events of police violence and communal mobilization provides insight about central questions in the fields of urban sociology and policing, adding to both subfields a *chocolate city* theoretical framework in which Black communities, press, and political struggle are centralized. Finally, my project grapples with questions about the historical construction and collective memory in the creation of identity and its outcomes for reform and justice in the wake of police killings and the sociocultural implications of this American colonial aphasia.

The purpose of this study, then, is to publish a book, to film a documentary, to propose a bill for the City of New York to formally recognize the memory of Clifford Glover, and for this memory to be formally enshrined in the physical landscape of Jamaica, Queens. On April 28, 2023, 50 years will have passed since Add Armstead and Eloise Glover lost their son. The utility of memory is for that day to never again be forgotten, for Cliffie to be memorialized in the

neighborhood he lived, for the community that advocated for him, in life and death, to be recognized, vindicated, and honored in the lives of those who have come after.

On the day that New York Police Department 103rd Precinct officer Thomas Shea was acquitted by a jury of 12 of his peers—11 white men and 1 Black woman—of all charges for killing 10-year-old Clifford Glover, Shea and his lawyers celebrated with many of the jurors at a restaurant on Queens Boulevard. That same day, word of the verdict reached a baseball field on the grounds of the South Jamaica Houses, known locally as the 40 Projects. The current mayor of New York City, Eric Adams, then a 13-year-old from the neighborhood, was waiting to bat.

"We were playing a Long Island team that happened to be all white," said Adams, former NYPD officer, Brooklyn Borough President, elected mayor of New York in 2020. "When the news came out, about 200 people emerged on the field. They just took the baseball bats and started beating the white players, chanting, 'Shea got away.'"

The Long Island baseball team had come to Queens as part of "an interracial, inter-neighborhood thing," Mr. Adams said. "It was their first visit." The Jamaica team tried to stop the assault but could not. "That was all the outrage," he said, adding that "because of what happened, a lot of our guys quit the team, never played baseball again." Southside was outside.

For his generation of Black boys and girls, Mr. Adams said, the verdict "brought a lot of despair." Later, Mr. Shea would be fired despite a rally by police officers and the pleas of his lawyer, Jacob Evseroff, who said his client was needed on the force "to protect us from the animals who roam the streets of New York."

The year after Clifford Glover died, the number of shots fired by officers declined by nearly half. In 2013, the number of shots fired was 248, the fewest since the Police Department began keeping detailed records in 1971; at the peak, in 1972, officers fired 2,510 bullets.

Mayor Eric Adams was interviewed by Jim Dwyer for the *New York Times* in 2015, a piece that recalled the memory of Clifford Glover, remarking on the time that had passed since the uprisings of 1973 and its relevance to the recurring police violence that led to uprisings throughout the nation, a half century to the day since the 'civil disorders' of the '60s. Never once in this piece, even in referencing the community where this occurred, was Sean Bell's memory evoked as a recurrence of police violence and collective uprising in Jamaica, Queens.

Figure 31. Firearms Discharge Incidents, 1971-2010



The *Times* piece does capture and revisit what happened to Clifford Glover's family since the loss of their son and, to a lesser extent, what happened to Jamaica. They describe the parallel investigations conducted by police officers in an attempt to defame Add Armstead and Clifford Glover, and prove Shea's innocence:

> In the hours and days that followed the shooting, armies of investigators scoured the streets and sewers, pored over court records and arrived, without warrants, to search the homes of

> Clifford's family and relatives. "Guys were trying to help Shea, and coming up with all kinds of stuff," said Mr. Gaudelli, who was the chief homicide prosecutor in Queens at the time. "Someone showed up with a starter's pistol, but as soon as you pressed them on it, they folded. There was no gun. Shea says that the kid turned and appeared to have a gun," Mr. Gaudelli said. "That's what got him indicted: The ballistics made Shea a liar." Because Mr. Shea had spoken freely with his superiors, the largest police union began a campaign urging its members not to talk after a shooting until a union lawyer had arrived.

This set a dangerous precedent, for which victims of police brutality and misconduct have suffered for decades. Not only was Shea acquitted, but the police only gained unfettered power to act without fear of recourse. While Shea was unhindered in that moment, for Clifford's family, everything changed.

> "They wrote that we were poor," Darlene Armstead, a younger sister, said this week. As she and three other siblings, Kenneth, Pauline and Patricia Armstead, described the household this week, the family may not have had much money, but before Clifford's killing, it was sound. Darlene's father, Add Armstead, who was Clifford's stepfather, went to work every morning at a junkyard. The family had dinner each night at the same time, around one table, Ms. Armstead said, then watched cowboy shows on television. On summer weekends, neighborhood children feasted in the backyard on watermelon laid out on a door, covered by a sheet, that rested on two clean garbage cans. Add Armstead and his brothers enjoyed cigars and burgers. "My father taught us structure," Darlene Armstead said. She had to make beds. One brother had to clean the yard and bring out the garbage. Clifford, a fourth grader at Public School 40, went with his stepfather on weekends to the junkyard, carrying his own little wrench.

Dwyer then goes on to describe how Glover was killed, and Shea's testimony that followed:

> On the morning of April 28, 1973, a Saturday, Add Armstead woke Clifford before dawn so they could be at the yard to move cranes into place for a delivery. They walked a few blocks along New York Boulevard — known today as Guy R. Brewer Boulevard — when an unmarked car pulled alongside them. Mr. Armstead, carrying wages that he had been paid the day before, said he and Clifford ran, afraid that they were going to be robbed. Hearing shots, he flagged down a patrol car, not realizing that Clifford had been felled. Mr. Shea testified that he did not realize that Clifford, who stood just five feet tall and weighed less than 100 pounds, was a child. After the shooting, prosecutors said, Mr. Shea's partner, Walter Scott, was recorded on a radio transmission saying, "Die, you little," adding an expletive. Mr. Scott — who by coincidence has the same name as the man killed in North Charleston — denied it was his voice.

Dwyer then reports how Clifford's death tore his family apart:

> Clifford's death sent his mother, Eloise Glover, into a tailspin. "My mother turned on my father — 'Did you have a gun, they said you had a gun,' " Darlene Armstead said. "It caused them to break up. My mother lost her mind." The family received a settlement from New York City that, in the memory of the children, came to about $50,000, most of which the mother lent to local churches but never got back. "My mother didn't want no one to know when she going outside," Ms. Armstead said. "She always used the back door." Ms. Armstead recalled sleeping nights on chairs in hospital emergency rooms while her mother was being treated, and living off restaurant handouts. "She was going to pay this guy to board up the house and she would pay him to bring the food to us," she said. The children went to foster care and group homes. One brother was in a psychiatric institution for about 10 years. Her mother, who had diabetes, died in 1990 at age 54. Add Armstead died in 2005, at 83. "They put guns on him; they said he had guns at work, at home," Kenneth Armstead said. "To demonize him would help Shea's story."

That's the extent to which the *New York Times* reported. They then closed the story with a quote from Eric Adams: "You know what? It has just gone too far. The pathway of Shea's bullet physically stopped when it hit Clifford Glover, but the emotional pathway probably still continues to this day."

Eric Adams's tenure as New York City mayor, formerly Southside resident, will stand as an eternal reflection of how far policing has gone, and how much the bullet that killed Clifford Glover continues its pathway. Eric Adams is police reform personified. Having served as an officer in the New York City Transit Police and then the New York Police Department for over 20 years, Adams rose through the ranks and retired a captain. Born in 1960 in Brownsville, Brooklyn, the son of migrants from Alabama, Adams grew up poor in his childhood, fearing eviction from his family's tenement in Bushwick. His mother, who worked as a housecleaner, saved up enough money to buy a house in South Jamaica in 1968. Adams became gang involved as a teenager and was arrested for criminal trespassing with his brother. When in police custody, they were beaten by NYPD officers until a Black cop intervened. Adams was sent to a juvenile detention center for a few days before being sentenced to probation.

After being beaten by police, Eric Adams suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and since has said that the assault he endured motivated him to enter law enforcement, specifically the way the Black police officer who intervened conducted himself. After graduating from high school, attending college while he worked as a mechanic and a mailroom clerk at the Brooklyn District Attorney's office, he went on to earn an associate degree, a B.A. and then an M.P.A. He graduated second in his class from the New York Police Academy in 1984.

On the force, Adams faced discrimination from his white colleagues, something that is endemic to the experience of Black officers. In 1986, white police officers raised their guns at Adams when he was working as a plainclothes officer, mistaking him for a suspect. During the 1990s, Adams became increasingly involved with both Black police organizing and approaches to community patrol that didn't involve the municipal police. He served as president of the Grand Council of Guardians, an African American patrolmen's association. He also worked with the Nation of Islam on patrolling housing projects and even suggested that Mayor David Dinkins meet with Minister Louis Farrakhan and hire the Nation of Islam's security company to patrol the projects officially.

In 1995, following his release from jail for a rape conviction, he co-founded 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care, in response to the election of Rudy Giuliani as Mayor. 100 Blacks, as the organization is called, is an advocacy group for Black police officers seeking to reform criminal justice and often speak out against police brutality and racial profiling. The group has also held tutorials training Black male youth how to deal with the police if they are detained, enhancing their *second sight* in seeing the entities that see and surveil them. In 2006, the same year Adams retired, he was put under surveillance and investigated by the NYPD for publicly critiquing Mayor Michael Bloomberg on television.

Now, as mayor, Adams wants police to retain and expand the powers that he has criticized, and even fallen prey to, throughout his career and his life. Adams has raised the ire of organizers and activists who see his election not as a sign of progress toward eliminating racial biases and abuse from policing, but rather a Black advocate for continuation of the same brutal tactics in the name of law and order. Black New York voters overwhelmingly support Eric Adams, however, a trend of support for Black law enforcement that extends to other major metropolitan areas, *chocolate cities* across the nation.

The False Choice

The complicated and beautiful tension among Black communities and Black voters is the political organization around support for law enforcement as a means of deterring crime and violence: how best to preserve and protect the Black Planet? This tension is front and center in southeast Queens, especially among activists and civic leaders, young and elderly alike, often in direct opposition to one another. This tension and debate play out in community engagement, online, at dinner tables, and at the voting booths. Are police a necessary part of violence prevention or are there other entities, leaders, and organizations better suited to answer that call? This has been the subject of my work with Eastern Queens Alliance (EQA), whom I co-facilitated a public forum and panel with, bringing together police leadership, elected officials, the Borough President and District Attorney, and violence intervention activists who specialize in crisis management in southeast Queens, along with the Civilian Complaint Review Board.

Meeting with the Eastern Queens Alliance (EQA) over months, organizing this forum, and hearing from stakeholders present illuminated that complex dynamic between the police, who have historically opposed any outside intervention, and violence prevention organizations

that are now gaining legitimacy, locally and federally, after working in communities like southeast Queens for decades. The dichotomy between law-and-order approaches to crime deterrence, and apprehension for any and all police contact altogether played out in our forum in January 2022, the same month of Eric Adams' inauguration. Assemblymember Khaleel Anderson, of Assembly District 31, which represents parts of Far Rockaway, Rosedale, South Ozone Park, Springfield Gardens, and John F. Kennedy International Airport, became the youngest Black Assembly Member in New York State history when he was elected for his first term in November 2020. Anderson represents the future of Black politics in southeast Queens.

Positioned as an activist alternative to the career politicians who have long led in the region and throughout the city, 25-year-old Assemblymember Khaleel Anderson commanded the attention of our virtual panel and audience of over 100 as he began to describe what he calls the "false choice" offered to Black communities:

> As we're having the discussion about safety and talking about how communities feel most safe, and what we can do to make sure communities feel most safe, we have to talk about the false choice that our communities have been given. The false choice is that—and it's to the surveyor's point, in regards to wanting to see more police—we've been given a false choice, a false equation: we've been told that police equals safety and that's the only way that we can be safe in our communities, if it's somebody wearing a uniform and a badge can walk through our neighborhoods.

His time to speak is up, so Anderson yields to the moderators, but he revisits:

> Public safety doesn't just mean property safety. It means the safety of family, it means the safety of community, it means the safety of individuals, but we've been given a false choice: We've been told, as a community, throughout our entire existence, that the only way that we can achieve safety is that if someone, a man wearing a blue outfit and a badge is the only way and means of us being safe and I don't subscribe to that false dichotomy. I think that our communities are safe when we have brothers like Kevin Livingston [Founder of 100 Suits for 100 Men] walking through tough neighborhoods and speaking to young people and mentoring them. I think that we have safe neighborhoods when we have brother Steve Board and Ronald Summers at the United Black Men of Queens, who are doing incredible work through My Brother's Keeper and a number of different initiatives, helping to deter our young men and being more proactive and preventative, rather than reactive, and going into schools. I feel safe when folks like brother A.U. Hogan and LifeCamp,

> among all other groups, are doing the proactive work to help keep our communities healthy and safe. I feel safe when our communities have resources. Data, as I started out by saying that—I was talking about a study that was done by Clemson University that found that every 1% increase in food insecurity equates to a 12% increase in violent crimes. So, if we are addressing these issues of food insecurity, of lack of mentorship, a lack of recreation, lack of resources, holistically, if we're addressing them, we'll see our—the trends of crime and the trends of violence and the trends of some of these fights and disturbances decrease. If we look at alternative sources, like last session, we passed a bill that would have folk be able to call, instead of 911, 988 when there is a mental health crisis. That's groundbreaking. We're hopeful that we'll pass legislation that would put a residency requirement on the NYPD, requiring folks to live in the neighborhoods that they police because that very important local experience of the neighborhood is so important and it'll impact the philosophy in which folks police. That's something that we need to get done. The repeal of 50A [police misconduct transparency], thank you Jonathan for acknowledging the work that the legislature did, I have to give credit to my colleague Assemblywoman [Alicia] Hyndman who was in the legislature during that time, but I was an activist on the outside pushing to make sure that police transparency records were made public and that's really important. My point here is that public safety and keeping our neighborhoods safe and alternatives to policing is a holistic discussion. It's a discussion about, 'how do we use the most effective tools in our toolbox?' If we're going to build a house—Last point, Tunisia, I'm sorry I see it, last thing—if we're going to build a house, and building that house requires a number of tools in our toolkit to build that house, every nail, every screw cannot be used—a hammer can not be used for every nail and every screw and often times our community sees policing as the way to achieve public safety and that's a false choice that we have to talk our community out of so that we can focus to the root causes of why crime is perpetuating in our communities (Eastern Queens Alliance police community forum).

Assemblymember Khaleel Anderson gets to the heart of the issue. While police budgets continue to bloat, the investments truly needed for communities to thrive go missing. Police do not keep communities safe, and they don't solve crimes at high enough rates to justify even a fraction of what they're being allocated. An assets-based approach to the study of Black life and policing acknowledges that places are made despite safety not being assured. Communities must have advocacy that stems from those most impacted. Involving those most impacted by the war on drugs and mass incarceration is where the most direct, nuanced, and reparative approaches will arise; where it is most needed is where it already exists, at the center, within, and harnessing that centripetal energy keeps the planet in orbit.

White Institutions, White Society

The landmark 1968 Kerner Commission Report, more formally known as The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was created by President Lyndon B. Johnson's Executive Order 11365 on July 28, 1967. The order was issued after days of uprising in Detroit, Michigan and Newark, New Jersey, both sparked by police violence, characterized by arson, looting, dozens of deaths, and hundreds of injuries (Cobb 2021). President Johnson charged the eleven-member Kerner panel with answering three questions: "What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?" That report anchors this study, as the 50-plus years that follow illustrate missed opportunities laid out by the Commission.

Over the fifty-plus years that have followed, these questions have proven as relevant as they are repetitive. The report found that, though in almost every instance riots were touched off by police violence, police were merely the spear's tip of much broader systemic and institutional failures. The conclusions the report found echoed what many Black social scientists, thinkers, and lay philosophers had already known, that the so-called Negro problem was, in fact, a White problem: "What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it" (Cobb 2021, p. 8).

One of the principal White institutions at the center of the Kerner report's critical findings was the news media. The President asked specifically: "What effect do the mass media have on the riots?" The Commission found that though newspapers, radio, and television made a real effort to give a balanced, factual account of the 1967 "disorders", the media had thus far failed to report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and the underlying problems of race relations. One interviewer reported: "The average black person couldn't give less of a damn about what the media say. The intelligent black person is resentful at what he

considers to be a totally false portrayal of what goes on in the ghetto. Most black people see the newspapers as mouthpieces of the 'power structure'" (Cobb 2021, p. 248).

This study, like those pivotal studies of racialized news coverage in the past (Cohen 1999; Hunt 1992; Huspek 2004; Wells-Barnett 1892), is ultimately about "the truth" of racist police violence—not only how an unarmed victim who has not committed any crime died, but also how they lived. I argue that, by extension, news reports on victims of police violence also depict and define other residents of the communities where police killings occur. What is said about victims of police violence comes to characterize entire communities impacted by violent policing. White news institutions reproduce libelous police reports claiming that victims resisted arrest or that weapons were found and then exaggerate the extent to which disgruntled Black residents engage in violence while downplaying police brutality and false arrests during protests against police killings, reports that are fiercely disputed by Black News publications. This study contributes to our understandings of these contestations of truth, especially as it relates to these incidents of brutality and fatality, both historic and contemporary.

One of the recommendations of the historic 1968 Kerner Commission Report echoes the iconic words written by Ida B. Wells-Barnett more than seven decades prior: More balanced, in-depth coverage necessitates the hiring and training of more Black personnel. Black news institutions simply do not have the financial resources to compete in hiring publishers, editors, broadcasters, and reporters. To address this gap, the Commission in 1968 recommended the establishment of a central organization to develop, gather, and distribute talent, resources, and information to keep the work of the press in this field under review: an Institute of Urban Communications on a private, nonprofit basis. Future research should interrogate why such an institution never came into existence.

Where the Black media aims to popularize, traditional media tends to sensationalize and/or trivialize; where one may emphasize the victim the other may emphasize the officer —or, perhaps despite differing intentions, both end up emphasizing the officer. The lack of resourcing for Black news may be part of why consistent coverage becomes impossible and that the local collective memory of police violence and protest can fade with time. The most unique aspect of this study is that it focuses on two historic police killings, one of a Black boy and the other of a young Black man, in the same neighborhood and police precinct, thirty-three years apart, capturing the local historical relationship between police killings, officer acquittals, protest, and newspaper reporting over time to capture difference in racialized discourse between mainstream and Black publications. This, I hope, inspires a similar method and design of research for social problems in other locales.

Research that explores Black agency in newsmaking introduces a larger dynamic of Black discursive creation that challenges mainstream media portrayals that dehumanize, criminalize, and vilify Black people and Black communities. In relation to the historic community of Jamaica, Queens, New York, future research should consider discursive practices that challenge mainstream portrayals of Black people and communities, from news media to art forms like Jazz and Hip Hop, both of which Jamaica, Queens is renowned for. Analyzing contestations of police violence as indicative of civic engagement with perceived governmental and institutional failures entails considering narrative discourse and subjectivity beyond any one medium of communication.

The findings of this study contribute uniquely to research on urban policing. First, the comparison of Black Press and White Press establishes a necessary link between news discourse on police violence and perceptions of the people and communities disproportionately impacted

by fatal police encounters. The focus on one neighborhood in the most populous American city demonstrates the impact of police violence over time and the necessity to trace specific, place-based histories of police killings and officer acquittals. Finally, this research centers the role of Black discursive news making, as a means of placemaking, especially in contrast to mainstream news discourse around victims of police violence and, by extension, their communities.

Ida B. Wells-Barnett articulated three pathways for Black people to resist Lynch Law: the press, boycotts, and migration. All three are relevant to the alleviation of police killings and police violence in American Black communities today. The comparison of New York Amsterdam News and The New York Times demonstrates often oppositional reporting between mainstream publications and publications owned and operated by Black people for Black audiences. Though this study focuses on print media, the findings impact our understanding of discourse on newer media platforms like Twitter and digital publications (Bonilla and Rosa, 2015; Lee 2017; Moody-Ramirez and Cole, 2018).

In remarking upon the press, I demonstrate that 'no angel' discourse as well as the conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER guide Black and White publications' contrasting discussions of police killings, officer acquittals, and ensuing protests. I also demonstrate how Black Press reports on a wider variety of political opinion from Black residents, from gang members to artists to businesspeople to clergy. White Press, in this study, focuses on interviewing Black individuals considered to be leadership and authority figures.

'No angel' discourse reifies inherent and assumed criminality, ascribing that trait to Black victims of police violence. Though criminality, or being 'no angel,' is theorized here in relation to police killings, the narrative applies to the more quotidian treatment of Black people by state agents. This theory of discourse expands upon Dorothy Roberts' (1999) work on the

wide net cast for police officers to abuse power by the vague legislative language of "disorder" and furthers our understanding of the meaning of "order-maintenance policing." This contribution is buttressed by my finding that the conceptual metaphor COMMUNITY AS DISASTER guides discourse around urban communities during, as well as after, protests and unrest stemming from disillusionment with judges and juries who do not indict police officers for murder.

This article finds that, though Black Press like the New York Amsterdam News can perpetuate 'no angel' and COMMUNITY AS DISASTER discourse, they actively resist these narratives by focusing the critical lens of their reporting on police officers involved, not victims who are suspected of criminality. In contrast, publications like The New York Times uncritically report descriptions and narratives given by police under the guise of objective neutrality that can be "malicious and untruthful" (Wells-Barnett 1892); or at the very least perpetuate dangerous myths about Black criminality to justify police use of force.

In addition to Wells-Barnett's power of the press, boycotting as a method of resistance to police violence is remarked upon in coverage following the death of Sean Bell and the acquittal of all officers involved. It could be considered as an alternative to the "eruptions" of violence that have become affiliated with Black protests of the past. Though migration isn't explicitly mentioned in this study, gentrification and the rising cost of living is effectively forcing much of the longstanding Black population to move outside of New York City. This work builds on Wells-Barnett's (1892) analysis as well as current research on residential displacement of Black Americans, in that out migration of Black people—both outward and southward to suburbs and other locales—may be connected to, and implicated by, police violence (Kurwa 2015).

Ultimately, though perhaps unintentionally, the written history of police violence and rebellion in the Jamaica, Queens community was disrupted between the years 1973 and 2006. It is noteworthy for researchers, practitioners, and activists alike that police were "getting away with murder" across generations and went unnoted by both Black and White newspapers. This fact is essential to understanding continued discontent with police violence. Historic "silences" in the memory of victims of police violence, and the acquitted officers, allows police brutality to occur continuously in new forms, because there is a discontinuity in the legacy of protest, resistance, and calls for reform.

I advocate for a renewed research agenda, focused on the historical entanglement of individual police departments in Black neighborhoods, with an especial focus on racialized discourse in the justification or disavowal of state-sanctioned police violence. Let us as researchers make plain, and make specific, the troubled legacies and histories of American policing and the role of the press in shaping public discourse about those impacted most.

Chapter 6: Methodological Appendix

In considering police violence in Jamaica, Queens, it is important to understand the community itself. The Jamaica section of the borough of Queens is one of the largest historically Black communities in all of New York City. A heterogeneous community consisting of both massive public housing projects as well as middle class areas of mostly Black homeowners, the community spans class categories. Home to populations of Latinx, West Indian, West African, as well as South Asian diaspora immigrants—both from the subcontinent and the Caribbean—the neighborhood is ethnically heterogeneous as well. Located in Southeast Queens at the boundary between New York City and neighboring Nassau County on Long Island, Jamaica is one of the

region's main transit hubs for the Long Island Railroad, Metropolitan Transit Authority, and John F. Kennedy International Airport (Brown 2005; Hauser 1980).

Community Board 12, shown in Figure 32, which makes up the geographic area patrolled by the New York Police Department's 103rd and 113th Precincts, is made up of the neighborhoods of Jamaica, South Jamaica, Hollis, St. Albans, Rochdale, and Springfield Gardens. The New York Police Department's 103rd Precinct is located on Jamaica Avenue, the center of the community's busy commercial district. Southeast and Southwest Queens, nestled between the East New York neighborhood of Brooklyn to the west and Long Island to the east, are comprised of numerous other neighborhoods: Rosedale, Cambria Heights, Laurelton, Queens Village, Ozone Park, South Ozone Park, Woodside, and Richmond Hill.

Figure 32. Map of Community Board 12, patrolled by NYPD 103rd and 113th Precincts.



The community and the two police killings central to this study make for rich comparison. In both killings, there are commonalities beyond just their occurrence in the same neighborhood and the same precinct. First, officers in both instances were dressed in plain clothes, a practice developed by officers to maintain anonymity while conducting investigations.

In 2020, the NYPD disbanded its "anti-crime" plainclothes units, because "the plainclothes units were part of an outdated policing model that too often seemed to pit officers against the communities they served, and…were involved in a disproportionate number of

civilian complaints and fatal shootings by the police" according to commissioner Dermot Shea (Watkins 2020). Second, in both the 1973 and 2006 police killings, the claim of a gun being present at the scene was significant to officer testimonies about what occurred. Officers in both instances claimed to either see a gun or hear that someone threatened to get a gun to settle an argument, even though in both cases neither claim was sustained, and no guns were found. Policework and police power in the Jamaica, Queens community, and throughout New York City more broadly, came into question during the fallout of both the deaths of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell.

The intervening period between the killings of Clifford Glover and Sean Bell saw significant demographic, social, and economic shifts within southeast Queens communities. Specifically, after the killing of Clifford Glover in 1973, the late 1970s and 1980s saw both the rise of ethnic minority immigrant groups in the area and simultaneous concern around rising drug crime and ensuing violence. The 103rd Precinct was split into the 103rd and 113th Precincts in 1973. Today, the area policed by the 103rd and 113th NYPD Precincts is organized as Queens Community Board 12, formally referred to as the neighborhoods of Jamaica and Hollis. The population of Queens Community Board 12 is 61% Black (non-Hispanic) and 43% foreign-born. There are also significant Hispanic (17%) and Asian (11%) populations of any race.

This characteristic of the area allows for further study of an important aspect of policing and police violence: the experiences of those who are Black and foreign-born or Black ethnics. Though the present study does not specifically answer the question of how non-Black ethnic minority groups are treated by police and how this shapes subsequent attitudes toward police and racial identity, the historic study of this neighborhood furthers understandings of the impact of

policing and police violence on multiethnic, multicultural Black and immigrant communities in the United States.

Around the time of Clifford Glover's death, Southeast Queens was 90% Black and Hispanic (Hauser 1980). In 1973, New York City's 103rd Precinct reported the third most felonies in the entire city, including 45% more murders than the city-wide precinct average and 167% more rapes. Only 22.6% of the reported felonies were solved. On April 2, 1973, twenty-six days before Clifford Glover was killed, a police captain named Glanvin Alveranga, the son of Jamaican immigrants, was named Commanding Officer of the 103rd Precinct, making him the first Black precinct commander in the history of Queens. At the time, Black cops made up less than 8% of the NYPD, despite Black people making up over 20% of the city's population. The 103rd Precinct, which patrolled the largest Black section of Queens only employed thirteen Black police at the time, out of 413 total officers (Hauser 1980).

Any discussion of police-community relations in Jamaica, Queens in the intervening period between 1973 and 2006 is incomplete without discussion of the killing of twenty-two-year-old 103rd Precinct officer Edward Byrne in 1988. The rookie cop was guarding the house of a witness in a drug case when he was killed by men hired to carry out the assassination, making this event a national symbol of urban drug crime. Swift and punitive carceral action was mobilized through deployment of the nation's first Tactical Narcotics Teams (T.N.T.), tasked with arresting street-level dealers en masse and deployed in Jamaica, Queens following the killing of Edward Byrne. The wave of drug arrests that followed made the community of Jamaica, Queens exemplary of the "War on Drugs." Then-president George H.W. Bush even displayed Byrne's badge 14072 in the White House, using the moment to advocate for aggressive and targeted policing. Chapter 4 addresses these events comprehensively.

Critical Discourse Analysis

The analysis for this research draws on newspaper coverage of two police killings of unarmed Black individuals that occurred in the same neighborhood and police jurisdiction thirty-three years apart. Patrolman Thomas Shea of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 103rd Precinct shot and killed ten-year-old Clifford Glover in 1973, and a team of NYPD 103rd Precinct officers shot and killed twenty-three-year-old Sean Bell in 2006. I use two different newspapers to analyze the narratives constructed by Black and White press media in the wake of the aforementioned officer-involved shootings. I examine coverage in The New York Times, a daily, internationally renowned, mainstream publication with the slogan "All the News That's Fit to Print," and the New York Amsterdam News, the oldest Black weekly publication in New York City with the slogan "The New Black View."

These two newspaper sources were selected based on their widespread readership and influence as press media. The New York Times is the second most circulated newspaper in the United States and the New York Amsterdam News is consistently among the top five most circulated African American newspapers in the United States, though their circulation has been steadily declining (Vogt 2016). Previous studies have analyzed police violence using "mainstream" news sources while others have analyzed police violence comparing "mainstream" and Black news sources. This unique comparison across time within the same geographic and jurisdictional location allows for in-depth analysis of the discourse around Black individuals killed by police over time, with specific attention to the communities in which they reside.

Systematic analysis of discourse surrounding police killings of unarmed Black people entails engagement with the social theories of Michel Foucault (1980), who argued that discursive practice reveals the (oppressive) social relations that are constituted in everyday

social interaction. Foucault's argument that discourse informs social relations underscores George Lakoff's (1987) conceptual metaphor theory: metaphors provide a framework that people use to make sense of behavior, relations, objects, and people, to the point that people forget that semantic associations they created with metaphors are not natural, but conventional correspondences between one semantic domain and another.

The narratives about police officers, victims of police violence, and Black people in cities construct and constitute the social structures of these relations themselves. The enactment of discursive practices reaffirms ideological practices and stances (Santa Ana et al., 2007). To analyze newspaper data, which includes articles from both The New York Times and the New York Amsterdam News following the events of April 28, 1973, and November 25, 2006, I use the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Santa Ana 2002) approach to critical discourse analysis. This approach entails line-byline analysis of news articles, done by hand, focusing on the context (full line), token (phrase), target (subject), and source (descriptor) of each event, person, or process written about. In the case of this study, coverage revolves around the people involved in these two police killings, the trials that follow, the community at large especially during protests, and commentary on the judicial and policing processes involved. These make up the targets for which there are several sources, guiding the organization of the conceptual metaphors that arise and make up the findings of this study. See Table 2 for a sample of this coding process.

I selected and analyzed front-page articles that appeared in the issues that were published directly after the shootings and acquittals in both instances from both newspapers, totaling ten articles. All the articles are frontpage headlines and were released around the same dates, adjusted for the fact that one newspaper is daily, and the other is weekly. In my representation of

the data, I have added italics for emphasis on significant target phrases. Each post-killing and post-acquittal headline from both newspapers in 1973 and 2006 is listed in Table 1. Analytical attention is paid to each description and depiction of victims, officers, community residents, and politicians, both Black and otherwise.

Table 1. Data Sources: Front-page headlines from *New York Amsterdam News* and *The New York Times*, 1973-1974 and 2006-2008, post-killing and post-acquittal articles

Newspaper	**Headline**	**Date**
New York Amsterdam News	Blacks Seething Over Slaying of Boy, Ten	5/5/1973
	Shea Verdict Outrages Courtroom Spectators	6/15/1974
	Unity and Outrage	12/7/2006
	Aftermath	5/7/2008
The New York Times	Officer Kills a Suspect, 10; A Murder Charge is Filed	4/29/1973
	Officer Swore and Fired, Victim's Father Says	4/30/1973
	Jury Clears Shea in Killing of Boy	6/13/1974
	Police Kill Man After a Bachelor Party in Queens	11/26/2006
	Bloomberg Calls 50 Shots by the Police 'Unacceptable'	11/28/2006
	Verdict in Sean Bell Case Draws a Peaceful Protest, but Some Demand More	4/28/2008

Table 2. Sample of critical discourse analysis conducted by hand. The article analyzed is titled "Blacks Seething Over Slaying of Boy, Ten" from *New York Amsterdam News*, May 5, 1973.

0.	**Context**	**Token**	**Target**	**Source**
1.	Blacks seething over slaying of boy	Blacks seething	Blacks	Seething
2.	In a show of unity seldom seen since the stirring "Sixties", Blacks in Manhattan joined hands with Blacks in Brooklyn and Queens	A show of unity	Blacks in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens	Unified
3.	to register a seething protest over the fatal shooting of a ten-year-old Black boy	Seething protest	Blacks in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens	Seething
4.	Although the protest began in an angry, but orderly fashion, it erupted in violence	The protest	Blacks protesting	Angry, but orderly
5.	Although the protest began in an angry, but orderly fashion, it erupted in violence	The protest	Blacks protesting	Erupted in violence
6.	the most violent eruption coming Tuesday night.	The protest	Blacks protesting	Violent eruption
7.	This scattered violence centered in the vicinity of New York Boulevard in South Jamaica	The scattered violence	South Jamaica	Epicenter of violence
8.	The disturbances were punctuated with sharp statements	The disturbances	Blacks protesting	Disturbances
9.	"This shooting raises the most serious questions that can only be answered by a full, careful and rigorous investigation."	This shooting	Police killing	Raises serious questions
10.	"every feasible step is tak to prevent	This kind of deplorable incident	Police killing	Deplorable incident

	this kind of deplorable incident in the future." – Mayor Lindsay			
11.	"I am very disturbed about the conduct of the in-coming police commissioner." – Borough President Percy Sutton	The conduct of the in-coming police commissioner	Police commissioner conduct	Disturbing
12.	"I thought that his speech on Sunday was inflammatory."	Police commissioner's speech	Police commissioner conduct	Inflammatory
13.	"It was precipitous."	Police commissioner's speech	Police commissioner conduct	Precipitous

The Utility of Memory

Through the critical study of the history of police and place, as it relates to Black migration, residential mobility, and political advocacy, this study is concerned with the utility of memory. Though studies of urban policing have covered the rise of mass incarceration, the wars on drugs and crime, the advent of penal governance, this study contributes uniquely to the extant literature by focusing on the place-based, racialized experience of police violence. This is critical to understand the role of place in shaping the political response to policing and incarceration that has engulfed urban America following the 1960s.

In answering the expected methodological questions about field site selection, why I choose to conduct a case study approach, and specifically, most importantly, why Jamaica, Queens? I will lean on Jacqueline Nassy Brown to explain. Brown (2005) speaks about why she chooses to conduct ethnography of Black Liverpuldians and quotes one of her participants, Scott, on why, in his words, "To understand Black people, you've got to understand Liverpool." Like many Black cities, towns, provinces, and villages the world over, Black people's corner of Liverpool, Granby Street, by absolutely all accounts, was once vital and teeming. Now, it was a

ghetto, commonly described as "dead." So, to understand Jamaica, Queens, to understand Black people, and to understand protest, politics, and the modern police state, how do I explain what it means to study my hometown, the place that raised me, that made me who I am.

In a section titled "Geographies of Race," Brown (2005) explains that her ethnography argues that British cultural notions of localness have shaped all aspects of racial politics in Liverpool. Surely, she argues, the very question of "context," of place and localness mediates racial phenomena of all kinds: racial classification, racial subjectivity, racial community and identity formation, as well as understandings of racism and resistance to it. She continues:

> The naturalization of place through ideas about its efficacy is beautifully captured in Scott's own thesis, which hands ultimate explanatory power directly over to Liverpool—or *place*—which you've *got* to understand. I would argue, though, that what one must really understand is not Liverpool, per se, but "Liverpool," the signifier.

In the same vein as Brown's (2005) exploration of Liverpool as place, site, as signifier, I employ the same utilization of Jamaica, of "Southside" not just as place, but as signifier.

Southside, We Outside is a political orientation to the socioeconomic outcomes of racialization, residential mobility, migration, and suppression. Southside, We Outside is a methodological and theoretical approach to place-based studies of race and resistance, specifically the contestation of police power, disinvestment, and state repression. Not only is this study concerned with the opposition to incarceration, but of the building of new worlds, of grassroots approaches to human centered justice and decarceration. The answer to the problems faced in this community are ultimately coming from those within the community, not outside it.

The aim of this research is to explore how sociopolitical responses to state violence are represented in historical production and in the memory of those who experience it. A historical "fact" is a product not of what happened, but rather what is said to have happened, a result of power in the production of knowledge (Trouillot 1995). History is the reconstruction of what is

no longer, while memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present (Nora 1989). The divergence and convergence of the history and the memory of police violence is central to this study. Why is the memory of Clifford Glover lost, and why does it matter to the history of this neighborhood, long after the blaze of a community on fire, crying out for justice, has dissipated? This study is concerned with what forgetting does, and what purpose remembering, (re)memory, might serve.

The persistence of memory is essential to the historical contextualization necessary to broaden our understanding of contemporary political struggle in the wake of police violence. Though recent research has assessed with great depth the level to which routine encounters with law enforcement shape larger attitudes about government, (Lerman & Weaver 2013) focusing on the routineness of contemporary encounters with police misses the large historical component inherent to communal knowledge of policing.

This study's conceptualization of memory is the theoretical framework of colonial aphasia. Writing about disabled racial histories in France, Ann Laura Stoler coined the phrase in order to better describe and define what often is referred to as "forgotten history" or "collective amnesia." She writes:

> "But forgetting and amnesia are misleading terms to describe this guarded separation and the procedures that produced it. *Aphasia*, I propose, is perhaps a more apt term, one that captures not only the nature of that blockage but also the feature of loss…It is not a matter of ignorance or absence. Aphasia is a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things. Aphasia in its many forms describes a difficulty retrieving both conceptual and lexical vocabularies and, most important, a difficulty comprehending what is spoken" (Stoler 2011).

The history of police violence in American urban communities is not one that has been "forgotten" due to a "collective amnesia," or even ignorance. That history has been dismembered, and this research project seeks to capture that lexical and conceptual vocabulary

spoken by community residents, a vocabulary perhaps not so difficultly spoken as difficultly comprehended, understood, and learned.

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