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Who Gets In? Nonstate Actor Access at International Organizations

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The dissertation of Heidi M. McNamara is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Who Gets In? Nonstate Actor Access at International Organizations

by

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Why do some international organizations work closely with private sector actors, while others collaborate with nongovernmental organizations and other civil society organizations? What leads international organizations to choose to work with one type of actor while screening others out? I argue international organizations primarily collaborate with nonstate actors in order to access two key benefits: information and political support. Who gets in, and conversely who gets left out, is a function of which nonstate actors' skills the international organization and its member states will most benefit from. Organizations that spend their time coordinating and regulating international behavior will rely heavily on the assistance of private sector actors, while organizations that spend their time implementing projects and working on the ground in member states will collaborate primarily with civil society actors.

I test this theory of differential nonstate actor access at international organizations using an original dataset which details the access that 72 international organizations provide to private sector actors and civil society actors. I show that international organizations with a broader policy scope offer more access to nonstate actors generally, and that the type of work the organization is engaged in can be used to predict with whom they choose to work.

I further support these empirical findings using two case studies which examine in more detail the access that international organizations in the tails of the distribution provide to nonstate actors. First, I look at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which coordinates member states' defense capabilities and collaborates extensively with private sector actors, and second, I look at the Council of Europe, which works to improve human rights conditions on the ground and allows access exclusively to international nongovernmental organizations.

This dissertation speaks to important questions of whose voice is heard at the international policymaking table, the balance of perspectives policymakers receive, and the power of nonstate actors in our political system.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This book is about the role of nonstate actors in international organizations (IOs). Nonstate actors, both from civil society and the private sector, have policy agendas that make them care about decisions being made at the international level. Their role has been extensively studied at the domestic level (e.g. Broz and Hawes (2006); Drutman (2015) and Hafner-Burton and McNamara (2019)), but we know much less about if, when, and how nonstate actors play a role in shaping outcomes directly within international organizations. This book sheds light first on the question of whether or not nonstate actors have access, and then delves deeper into questions of who is allowed access under what conditions and which types of access they are given.

Who gets access to international organizations matters. Despite President Donald Trump's general disregard for the importance of international collaboration and the broader conservative push for greater isolationism, IOs remain responsible for a wide range of decisions with direct impact on people's lives around the world. Where and how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) chooses to engage shapes conflict globally; the vaccines and health screenings the World Health Organization (WHO) provides save lives. But resources are limited and IOs have to make decisions about where to focus their efforts. These choices have distributional consequences: some children will receive vaccines and some will not; NATO will engage in some conflicts and avoid others. It therefore matters whose perspective international policymakers hear. If NATO policymakers only

hear from defense contractors they will come to different conclusions than if they listened to a wide range of perspectives. It matters who has a seat at the table.

Historically, IOs have been treated as insulated institutions where negotiations can occur outside the spotlight of domestic politics (Putnam 1988). The empirical reality, however, is that nearly all IOs involve outside, nonstate actors in their policymaking process, at least to some extent. And there is tremendous, previously unexplored, variation in which types of actors—civil society actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or private sector actors such as firms and industry groups—are privileged with access, and the forms that access takes. Of the 72 IOs examined in this book, 68 provide at least some form of access to nonstate actors. 54 IOs give access to both civil society actors and private sector actors. Six collaborate only with civil society actors, and eight work only with private sector actors. Only 23 of the 72 organizations I examine offer private sector actors and civil society actors equal opportunities for access, and four of those 23 do not allow any access at all. What drives the remaining 49 IOs to give more access to one type of nonstate actor or the other? Why do they allow some types of nonstate actors in, while screening others out?

This book argues that IOs' decisions about nonstate actor access—whether to offer it, how much to give, what type, and to whom—are driven by their need for outside expertise and support. Nonstate actors provide IO policymakers with useful information about the needs of relevant populations, technical capabilities of various sectors, and the implications of different policy options. Nonstate actors can also lend their support to IOs in order to help them implement projects, increase compliance, and build local buy in for policies. This expertise and buy in can be useful to IOs and can incentivize them to incorporate relevant nonstate actors into their policy development process.

Further, I argue that *whose* information and buy in is most useful to the IO varies based on the type of work the IO engages in. Various IOs are engaged in a wide range of activities: some, like the World Bank, work to implement development projects on the ground, while others, such as the International Telecommunication Union, coordinate technological standards across borders. These different activities benefit from different types of assistance. Similarly, different nonstate

actors possess unique expertise and their support will therefore be useful to different IOs. In broad strokes, this book argues that IOs engaged in coordinating and regulating international behavior will primarily benefit from collaboration with private sector actors, and IOs working to implement projects on the ground will benefit most from working with civil society actors.

Using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, I show there is previously unexplored variation in the kinds of nonstate actors that gain access at different IOs. Some IOs, such as NATO, work extensively but almost exclusively with private sector actors, giving defense contractors a voice in shaping their agenda. Others, such as the Council of Europe (COE), rely on the support of NGOs to monitor human rights abuses across their member states and hold governments accountable. Still others, such as the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, work extensively with both private sector actors and civil society actors. These differences are important. While both civil society actors and private sector actors come to the table with their own agenda, private sector actors are ultimately driven by their bottom line while civil society actors, in addition to seeking their own survival, are typically motivated by some normative drive. The pervasive position of nonstate actors, and particularly private sector actors, has been a topic of great debate within American politics for decades (Lohmann 1995; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Drutman 2015). And, despite the empirical challenges, firms have been shown to have substantial influence over American political outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons 2009; Ban and You 2019; Hafner-Burton and McNamara 2019). Though the mechanisms of involvement are different at the international level than the domestic level, the pervasive nature of nonstate actor access at IOs raises the same concerns about influence that have been raised at the domestic level. However, until now, we did not have a clear picture of who had access where or what that access looked like. This book shows there are clear, systematic differences in nonstate actor access at international organizations and opens the door to further exploration of the implications of these differential amounts and combinations of access.

This book asks important questions such as: how do IOs choose who to collaborate with and how they will structure those collaborations? What are the implications—normatively and

for policy—of these different choices? What role do private sector actors and civil society actors play in determining policy outcomes at the international level? Are there ways IOs can structure nonstate actor access to collect the benefits—information and buy in—that nonstate actors have to offer without handing over undue influence over policy decisions and decreasing their democratic accountability?

A New Theory of Access

Existing theories of nonstate actor access within international organizations focus on NGOs (Steffek 2013; Tallberg et al. 2013). NGOs are indeed important players in communicating the preferences and problems of local communities up to the international level. It has been argued that including NGOs in IOs' policy development helps to ameliorate democratic deficit and hold IOs accountable (Nye Jr. 2001; Tallberg et al. 2015). Yet, it is unclear whether including more nonstate actors actually makes IOs more democratically legitimate—some scholars argue no (Agné, Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015)—and, as I will show in this book, NGOs are by no means the only nonstate actors with a pervasive presence at IOs. Are the implications of private sector access different than those of NGO access? We cannot know until we understand the conditions under which IOs choose to collaborate with each type of actor. In order to assess the impact of nonstate actors of all kinds on international policy development, we therefore need a theory that accounts for these different types of actors and their varied skillsets.

In this book I argue that there are both costs and benefits associated with opening an IO's doors to nonstate actors. These costs and benefits are both political and logistical, and vary based on how much access is given, the type of access offered, and to whom it is granted. Functionally, when the benefits outweigh the costs we should observe nonstate actors gaining access to the IO. Nonstate actors offer IOs two key benefits: expertise and support. I argue that as the scope of an IO's policy portfolio grows and the more technical in nature its policy, the more the IO will value the informational input of nonstate actor experts and the more nonstate actor access we should expect

that IO to offer. Additionally, the theory suggests that IOs without clear enforcement mechanisms, or those who rely on the direct compliance of nonstate actors for the success of their policy proposals will place more value on the buy in of nonstate actors and thus offer them more access in order to build that support. These institutional factors, in combination with member states' preferences, shape the amount of access IOs offer to nonstate actors.

Which type of assistance the IO seeks—whether information or support—will also effect the types of access the organization will choose to provide. When IOs want to gather information from nonstate actors we should expect that they will structure access that facilitates the sharing of information from nonstate actors to the IO, without relinquishing control over policy decisions. When IOs want to build support for their work and their policy agenda, they should structure access in such a way that it makes nonstate actors feel included in the policy development process and like they have a stake in the success of the policy, such that they will work to see it carried out. Different types of access allow IOs access to different types of assistance from different types of nonstate actors; this variation in options provides IOs with a portfolio of choices to strategically collaborate with nonstate actors.

Which nonstate actor's assistance is most useful depends primarily on the type of work that IOs do. NGOs connect IOs with local leaders, build local support for their policies, and monitor member states' behavior. These types of assistance are most useful to IOs that work on the ground implementing projects and helping member states come into compliance with international treaties. Private sector actors have expertise in market conditions and future technological developments, and their support can be particularly useful when the success of an IO's policies rely on private sector firms' direct compliance. These types of assistance offer the most help to IOs that regulate economic or other international behavior or work to coordinate member states' policy. IOs strategically facilitate access for nonstate actors that provide the most useful types of assistance for the challenges the IO faces.

The variation in the amount and type of access given, as well as who it is given to, make up a strategic portfolio for IOs. Ideally, IOs can establish access mechanisms that incentivize relevant

nonstate actors to participate and place reasonable limits on the policy influence those nonstate actors receive in return for their assistance.

What is Access?

There are multiple ways we can conceptualize the idea of providing nonstate actors "access" at IOs. This book introduces a dataset that codes six distinct types of access IOs sometimes offer to nonstate actors. These categories are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, but in brief, IOs can allow nonstate actors to sit on their decision-making boards, they can allow nonstate actors to become longstanding formal observers of their organization, they can form nonstate actor advisory boards, they can host consultations with nonstate actors, they can allow nonstate actors to attend their meetings in an observatory manner, and they can participate in public-private partnerships with nonstate actors. Yet, when exploring these various methods of collaboration, we are left with multiple ways of structuring our analysis of the impact of access.

First, we can think about the raw number of access points nonstate actors are offered. Under this conceptualization, IOs would each be given a score of zero to six indicating the number of distinct types of access they provide to nonstate actors. This conceptualization is intuitive and straightforward; however, it lacks recognition of the variation that exists within different possible types of access. It would assign equal weight to allowing nonstate actors to observe the IO's meetings as it would to allowing nonstate actors a vote on the final decision-making board. These forms of access are arguably not equivalent in their importance and the amount of influence they cede to nonstate actors. The number of ways an IO interacts with nonstate actors captures one aspect of the amount of access, but neglects the variation within different forms of access.

Second, we can think of nonstate actor access in terms of the depth of access offered. Under this conceptualization each access type could be weighted based on the relative depth. However, depth itself is a complex concept. We can think of it as a rough approximation of the amount of influence over policy that a nonstate actor could gain from access, or we could think of it as a

measure of proximity to final decision-makers that nonstate actors gain through access. Most IOs have multiple levels of decision-making within their policymaking process. Being allowed access to the early policymaking stages likely has different implications than being allowed access near the final decision-making stage (Hooghe and Marks 2015; Tallberg et al. 2015). The depth of access could therefore be conceptualized in a variety of ways to capture a more sophisticated understanding of the "amount" of access nonstate actors have at IOs.

Third, we can conceptualize of access as a function of the benefits it provides to IOs. Different types of access facilitate different kinds of interactions between IO member states, bureaucrats, and nonstate actors. Some, such as advisory boards and consultations, facilitate the passage of information from nonstate actors to IOs in need of expertise. Others, such as allowing nonstate actors to observe meetings or allowing nonstate actors to become formal observers, provide information about the IO's work and priorities to nonstate actors and help build support for the work of the IO within the body of included nonstate actors. We can therefore categorize types of access not just by the "amount" of access they provide to nonstate actors, but also by the purpose of the access and the benefits received by the IOs that choose to open themselves in this manner.

This book builds upon these rough conceptualizations of access to explore how IOs offer nonstate actors access, the types and amount of access they offer, and to whom. No matter which conceptualization of access you prefer, nonstate actor access at IOs proves to be both pervasive and diverse. Nonstate actors, whether from civil society, the private sector, or both, are involved somewhere in the policymaking process at 94 percent of the IOs sampled in this book. Recent work in international relations has begun to recognize the pervasiveness of nonstate actors at the IO level, but has previously ignored the diversity of which nonstate actors have access where (Raustiala 1997; Dunoff 1998; Vabulas 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013). In contrast, I will show there are real differences in which IOs offer access to private sector actors and which choose to collaborate with civil society actors.

Plan for the Book

For the remainder of the book, I rely on a multi-methods approach to explore nonstate actor access at IOs. Utilizing an original dataset, I quantitatively analyze the systematic patterns of nonstate actor access. Additionally, I rely on case studies to develop historical narratives of access at individual IOs in order to gain a deeper understanding of IOs' motivations for offering the specific combinations of nonstate actor access we observe. By approaching the questions raised by this project from multiple directions, this book offers a more complex analysis of nonstate actor access at IOs.

Chapter 2 develops a new theory of nonstate actor access at IOs. I argue that IOs offer nonstate actors access when the benefits they can receive from collaboration outweigh the potential costs associated with opening their doors. Primarily, I argue that IOs benefit from the information and support that nonstate actors can provide. Further, I suggest that which nonstate actors are invited in is a function of whose assistance will be most useful to the IO given their work and policy goals. This theory is the first, to my knowledge, to differentiate the conditions under which we should expect IOs to collaborate with different types of nonstate actors.

Chapter 3 introduces an original dataset and uses that data to empirically assess the observable implications of the theory developed in Chapter 2. The dataset maps the access that 72 international organizations, across a variety of issue areas and regions, offer to private sector actors and civil society actors. It is the first data that allows us to examine when different types of nonstate actors enjoy access at IOs and the types of access they receive. I show that there are systematic differences in IOs that shape both the amount of access they offer to nonstate actors overall, and which actors they choose to collaborate with.

Chapter 4 introduces my case study selection strategy and walks through the theoretical expectations and observable implications we should look for in each of the case studies. I argue that when exploring a relatively new area of analysis, selecting cases based on extreme values of the dependent variable allows for deeper analysis after quantitative assessments have already been conducted (Seawright 2016).

Chapter 5 offers an historical narrative of nonstate actor access at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO gives private sector firms substantial levels of access: including them on advisory boards that provide policy advice to all levels of NATO decision-makers, and hosting a variety of industry events where private sector firms are able to share their expertise and network with one another and with NATO officials. Despite the prevalence of private sector access at NATO, I argue this access is structured in such a way that it provides NATO with useful information without handing decision-making power directly to nonstate actors.

Chapter 6 provides a case study analyzing the nonstate actor access at the Council of Europe. The COE, in contrast with NATO, works exclusively with international NGOs. They allow NGOs to become formal observers and have institutionalized an entire branch of the organization devoted to facilitating NGO participation in the COE; however, powerful NGOs frequently sidestep these formal avenues of access and liaison directly with COE officials, raising concerns about accountability and transparency. Chapter 6 also provides a comparative analysis of the two case studies, arguing that, while NATO's access may raise more eyebrows initially because they work primarily with the private sector, they have structured their access in such a way that it effectively limits the influence of the included defense companies, while the COE's reliance on collaborating with NGOs outside the confines of official access raises concerns about democratic accountability and the influence of powerful NGOs.

This book is about the emerging and ever-more pervasive role nonstate actors play in the workings of international organizations. It provides a first step toward a deeper understanding of the implications of incorporating nonstate actors into international policymaking processes. While my approach focuses on tracing the observable, formal access that IOs choose to offer, I do not neglect the broader normative implications associated with relying on nonstate actors, who have their own priorities and agendas, to achieve quality policy outcomes at the international level. International policymaking dynamics are complex and we can only speak to small portions of big questions. Yet it is important to ask the big questions and answer what we can; the decisions made at the international level affect every person and policy area. From a normative and practical perspective,

it is important to understand how IOs' policymaking processes work. This book shows that an important, understudied aspect of this process is the role of nonstate actors.

Chapter 2

Who Gets In? A Theory of Nonstate Actor Access

It has long been argued that one of the key benefits of cooperation through international organizations (IOs) for member states is insulation from domestic politics and pressure by interest groups (Putnam 1988). Yet this insulation has been criticized for creating a democratic deficit, allowing bureaucrats to make important decisions with little direct input or restriction from citizens (Dahl 1999; Moravcsik 2004). In practice, however, most international organizations do offer interest groups some degree of formal access, but there is tremendous variation in both *who* they invite to the table and *how* they do so. Some, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), give private sector organizations substantial influence. Others, like the Council of Europe (COE), work closely with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and allow them to become formal participants within the organization.

What explains these different approaches? Why have states given private sector firms broad access at NATO but none at the COE, while making NGOs important players in the development of COE policy but not at NATO? This chapter develops a theoretical argument to explain these differences in nonstate actor access across international organizations.

At the heart of the argument is a trade off. While institutional insulation has benefits, giving nonstate actors some form of access may improve the organizations' efficiency, transparency, and public support (Raustiala 1997; Scholte 2011; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Alter 2014), yet it simultaneously raises concerns about how their involvement might bias policy outcomes (Coen 1997; Bouwen 2002). Disagreement about these tradeoffs has led to the development of a sizable literature on the role of nonstate actors in international governance. This project builds upon that literature by offering a theoretical argument about which type of actor best serves IOs' needs under different conditions.

In this chapter, I make two main arguments. First, I argue nonstate actors offer two key benefits to IOs. Nonstate actors provide an efficient source of expertise. This is particularly useful when the IO is underfunded and cannot easily conduct its own research, or works in a highly technical issue area where expertise is difficult to acquire or information is privileged. Nonstate actors can also provide political support for organizations and their work. This buy in is critical for IOs when they lack enforcement capabilities and need assistance implementing their policies. Projects are more likely to be successful if they have the support of local nonstate actors. To acquire these two benefits, IOs offer nonstate actors access and collaborate with them throughout the policy development and implementation process.

As the disagreement within the existing literature highlights, offering nonstate actors access comes with potential costs for IOs. We thus should only expect organizations to offer access when they have more to gain than potentially lose, and, crucially, in order to minimize their costs, they should only offer access to relevant actors. To this end, my second main argument is that the type of work an international organization engages in can be useful for understanding whom they allow access. Different types of work require different expertise and the support of different actors for successful implementation and enforcement. Specifically, I argue that organizations working in areas where they directly implement projects and policies will rely more heavily on the assistance of civil society groups, while organizations that are responsible for regulating behavior will work

more closely with private sector actors. The distinct needs of an IO shape the conditions under which we can expect different combinations of nonstate actor access to occur.

This project breaks down the existing literature's dichotomy surrounding the insulation of international organizations. Rather than positioning IOs' relations with nonstate actors as either good or bad, I offer a theory which outlines the conditions under which it is beneficial to collaborate with different types of nonstate actors. Existing work on nonstate actors in international relations either looks at private sector actors alone (Mattli and Woods 2009; Prakash and Potoski 2010; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Green 2013), only NGOs (Raustiala 1997; Dunoff 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Vabulas 2011), or both but combines all nonstate actor types into one grouping (Tallberg et al. 2013). No existing studies explore the variation in the type of nonstate actors allowed access at different IOs. By glossing over the differences in who is given access, the existing literature misses one of the main sources of variation in nonstate actor access at the international level. This project is the first to address this variation and offer a theory explaining why different international organizations allow different types of nonstate actors access under different sets of conditions.

In the following chapters, using both statistical analyses and case studies, I show that there are real differences in where private sector actors gain access compared to civil society groups. This is important; instead of considering all nonstate actor access to be equivalent, I show we need to be cognizant of the variation in who is allowed a voice at the table and the ramifications of these different combinations of access. The rest of this chapter is devoted to developing this theory. First, I discuss nonstate actor access's relation to democratic deficit; second, I discuss the costs and benefits of allowing nonstate actor access—namely, expertise and political support—; and finally, I theorize how much access IOs will allow nonstate actors and which specific actors get in under different conditions—conditions that are determined by both the member states' preferences and the particular needs of the IO, as dictated by their type of work.

Democratic Deficit and Nonstate Actors

The existing debate in international relations has reluctantly come to recognize that nonstate actors do indeed have access at the international level (Dunoff 1998; Nye Jr. 2001; Tallberg et al. 2013). This participation comes in three primary forms. First, nonstate actors have been found to exert influence over international outcomes through domestic channels (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Broz and Hawes 2006; Hafner-Burton and McNamara 2019). These actors can lobby their domestic governments and bureaucracy in order to make their preferences about international policy known; their domestic governments can then work on their behalf to make those preferences come to life in policy within the IOs where they are members. In particular, this literature focuses on nonstate actors successfully lobbying in the United States. Second, nonstate actors may provide international governance where states have failed to cooperate (Falkner 2003; Pattberg 2005; Mattli and Woods 2009; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Green 2013). When states are unable to reach international bargains, the nonstate actors with an interest in the area may see enough benefit from cooperation to coordinate amongst themselves and build regulatory schemes without the assistance of nation states. This entrepreneurial governance can be self-motivated by the nonstate actors, or states may specifically delegate governance to outside actors when they realize they are unable to come to an agreement. This has been particularly prevalent in environmental agreements, where states have struggled to overcome cooperation problems. Third, nonstate actors may have direct access at the IO level (Vabulas 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013, 2014). It is this form of direct access that I am interested in here.

Despite the agreement that nonstate actors are active participants in international politics, there is still disagreement about the existence of a democratic deficit at the international level. Insulation from domestic pressures and interests is one of the main benefits of negotiating at the international level (Putnam 1988). Yet, too much insulation leads to non-responsive policy and bureaucrats that are not held accountable for their decisions; namely, it creates a democratic deficit (Dahl 1999).

Nonstate actors have been proffered as a potential solution to this democratic deficit. They can help provide a channel of information from citizens to international organizations and back (Raustiala 1997). Including nonstate actors in policy development processes can lead to more efficient and responsive policy (Scharpf 1997; Börzel and Risse 2005); nonstate actors can provide organizations with helpful information (Raustiala 1997; Betsill and Corell 2008); and nonstate actors can assist IOs by monitoring and reporting on compliance with policy (Dai 2002; Raustiala 1997). However, democratic responsiveness, and therefore a decrease in the democratic deficit, is only possible when the access granted to nonstate actors is inclusive and representative of member states' populations (Dunoff 1998; Moravcsik 2004). Rather than decreasing the democratic deficit, offering selective access or nontransparent access may actually decrease the responsiveness of an organization (Börzel and Risse 2005; Brühl and Rosert 2009). Providing access to nonstate actors may also increase sovereignty costs (Tallberg et al. 2013), and raise criticisms of bias and nonstate actor "capture" (Dunoff 1998). Nonstate actor access is therefore not a panacea; increased democratic deficit or bias in favor of specific nonstate actors may result from unequal nonstate actor access.

The existing literature raises these conflicting concerns. Predominantly normative in nature, much of this literature lacks theoretical assessments of what drives nonstate actor access at the international level. Before delving into the implications of different types of nonstate actor access, we must first understand why IOs offer access in the first place. The remainder of this chapter strives to fill this void by developing a theory of nonstate actor access at IOs—why IOs offer nonstate actor access, how much access they provide, and to whom.

Costs to Access

Nonstate actor access at the IO level is determined both by the IO's member states' individual preferences, and, importantly, the institutional needs of the organization. Existing international relations literature argues that outcomes at IOs are primarily the result of the preferences of

their member states, particularly powerful member states (Ikenberry 2009). I do not dispute the importance of member states' preferences. Instead, I argue that even when holding the influential preferences of member states constant, the IO's institutional need for information and political support shape both the amount of nonstate actor access that they allow and the actors to whom access is granted.

Yet, providing nonstate actors with access, and thereby decreasing the organization's level of insulation, raises the potential for real costs for IOs. First, collaborating with outside actors requires facilitation. This facilitation utilizes staff resources—taking up valuable time and energy that could be put toward other projects. The use of staff time may be especially costly at IOs that are understaffed or underfunded and have limited time and resources. The more actors that are offered access, the higher these costs become. It becomes increasingly difficult to reach consensus on issues as more voices and opinions are present. Though dealing with these differences of opinion early on may lead to better policy outcomes and broader support for the organization—one of the key goals of allowing access in the first place—it elongates the initial policymaking process and makes it more costly to make decisions.

Second, working with nonstate actors may raise public perception costs and decrease the legitimacy of the organization (Börzel and Risse 2005; Brühl and Rosert 2009). If access is given only to specific interests, especially private sector interests, it does not provide a representative sample of opinions to policymakers and, instead of decreasing the democratic deficit, can increase the possibility of bias (Bouwen 2002; Coen 1997). Where this limited access is offered, the public perception of the IO may become worse, particularly if the organization is not fully transparent about who it allows in. This creates a tradeoff—allowing broad access increases institutional costs and potentially wastes the time of IO staff trying to manage these collaborations, but offering limited access to a narrow group of interests increases the potential for bias and does nothing to decrease the democratic deficit. If access is not decreasing the democratic deficit or providing other benefits, then the IOs may be unnecessarily relinquishing their insulation.

Third, nonstate actor access may bias policy decisions (Coen 1997; Bouwen 2002). Allowing special interest lobbying at the domestic level has been shown, under certain conditions, to skew policy outcomes in favor of those interests that are active (Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons 2009; Bombardini 2008; De Figueiredo and Richter 2013; Drutman 2015; Ban and You 2019; Hafner-Burton and McNamara 2019). The same effect is likely at the international organizational level. Allowing different types of nonstate actors access therefore raises the probability of different costs for IOs. While it is beyond the scope of this project to measure the *influence* of nonstate actors and the potential resulting bias in policy, before we can explore the implications of nonstate actor access, we must understand why different actors gain different types of access under different conditions. This project tackles this first step.

In light of these costs, there must be important reasons for IOs to open their doors to nonstate actors. The incentive to open to nonstate actors can come from member states' preferences and from the needs of the IO itself.

Benefits to Access

In addition to the potential costs described above, international organizations reap clear benefits from their collaboration with nonstate actors. I argue these benefits take two general forms. First, nonstate actors provide IOs and their policymakers with information and expertise. Second, nonstate actors offer IOs critical political support and buy in when they need it most.[1] There are conditions under which the value of these benefits outweighs the potential costs IOs may endure and they choose to provide nonstate actor access.

Information and Expertise

International organizations provide a venue for interstate negotiations and the development of policy with global implications. The topics discussed at this level vary widely: some organizations

[1] I use the terms "buy in" and "political support" interchangeably throughout.

work on coordinating technical standards across borders, others implement ambitious development projects, and still others regulate the use of shared resources. The purview of organizations also varies, with some IOs focusing on one small (though important) issue, such as the Universal Postal Union which coordinates postal services across countries, and others dealing with a broad range of topics and problems, such as the World Bank which funds and implements a wide variety of infrastructure and development projects in many countries simultaneously. These distinct missions require different informational inputs.

Nonstate actors, from either civil society or the private sector, provide a valuable source of information for IOs. They possess authority over their area of expertise and can lend this authority to IOs through collaboration. Different actors possess different expertise and can be useful under different conditions (Haufler 2010). IOs working on coordinating technological standards may need the expertise of the private sector firms involved in developing the relevant technology. For example, one of the main activities of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) is coordinating technical interoperability so that trains can travel swiftly and safely across international borders. The cooperation of the private sector is critical for ensuring this coordination is successful (A. Kuzmenko, personal correspondence, April 11, 2018). IOs responsible for assisting with regional development may rely on input from local NGOs to know what types of development projects would be most successful and to learn where the need is greatestt. As an example, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has an open public consultation process where NGOs can submit issues of regional importance in order to bring them to the attention of the organization.[2] Many employees at IOs are career bureaucrats, and while they may have experience in the subject matter the organization handles, their primary responsibility is to facilitate the cooperation of the IO's member states, rather than to be experts in the minutiae of policy implications. Outside actors can provide this detailed information. Additionally, many IOs work at a high level of coordination and have a "thirty-thousand foot" view of problems; it can be useful to gain the perspective of those

[2]For more information see `http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/framework-for-pacific-regionalism/`.

individuals and groups that spend their days working on the same issues at the ground level. In exchange for sharing their expertise, nonstate actors gain access to international policymakers.

The provision of nonstate actor access at IOs is, in theory, a two-way interaction: the IOs have to supply the opportunity for access to nonstate actors, and nonstate actors must want to participate. For the purposes of this project, I make the assumption that if an IO opens its doors, relevant nonstate actors will be there waiting to come in. The demand side of the interaction—nonstate actors wanting in—is assumed to always be present. Holding the demand for access constant allows me to isolate the variation in the supply of access offered by IOs. While I make this assumption partially to simplify the theoretical interaction, anecdotal evidence from unstructured interviews with many IO bureaucrats and existing research suggest it is justifiable. Recent work exploring the expansion of nonstate actor access at IOs finds that "states have been the principal source of most decisions to open up international organizations" (Tallberg et al. 2013, 16). This suggests that, when IOs provide access to nonstate actors, this is motivated by the preferences of their member states, rather than bureaucrats or external pressure from nonstate actors.[3] I do not assume that all nonstate actors want access at every IO at all times, but simply that relevant actors who care about the decisions made in the organization will want to be included in the policy process in any feasible manner. Therefore, when IOs' member states decide to collaborate with nonstate actors, the relevant actors are ready and willing to cooperate. This does not mean that member states have to allow access to *all* nonstate actors who want access. In fact, it is critical to my theory that IOs are selective in whom they allow access. In reality, there is variation in the demand for access by nonstate actors. However, by looking at the institutional decisions to grant formal access—the supply side—this project provides a foundation for future work where this assumption is relaxed and the variation in the utilization of access is examined as well.

International organizations are not the only policymakers to utilize nonstate actors as sources for information. At the domestic level, nonstate actors are routinely consulted on all manner of

[3]One could imagine, however, that member states with active domestic-level collaboration with nonstate actors may face domestic pressure to push for openness at the international level that might translate into those states preferring to open the IOs of which they are members to nonstate actors.

policy decisions. In the United States for example, nonstate actors can lobby elected policymakers and bureaucrats and are able to present at congressional committee meetings and share their views publicly. While lobbying certainly presents the opportunity for inappropriate levels of bias and influence, at its root, this reliance on nonstate actors for information represents a mutually beneficial relationship between policymakers and nonstate actors (Drutman 2015). The policymakers—whether elected or bureaucratic—get access to important information and expertise and are able to make more informed policy decisions, and the nonstate actors are able to share their preferences and possibly influence policymakers in their preferred direction. The conditions that make this relationship work—policymakers who need information, nonstate actors who have information and want a say in shaping policy—also exist at the international level. While the forms of access may vary from the formal lobbying and public testimony seen at the domestic level, the informational goals are similar within IOs.

One could also imagine IO policymakers accessing nonstate actors' information through less formal modes of communication. After working in an issue area for a little while, IO bureaucrats and representatives likely have personal relationships with relevant nonstate actors. They could reach out to these actors individually to ask for input. Casual interaction like this, whether in the hallway or over coffee, certainly does occur. By keeping contact with nonstate actors informal, the IO avoids some of the potential costs of collaborating with nonstate actors: there are fewer institutional costs because informal contact is done outside of formal work time, and they may not pay public perception costs if the contact is difficult to observe. However, if contact is unbalanced and not transparent and discovered it may lead to even worse public backlash than formal access can cause. Yet informal access is not sufficient for IOs to gather the information they need, or we would not see formal mechanisms of access at nearly every organization.

Formalized access offers IOs two main benefits over informal access. First, especially where member states are democratic, allowing nonstate actors access to IOs can ameliorate cries of democratic deficit. As Börzel and Risse (2005) highlight, the participation of nonstate actors does not guarantee a decrease in democratic deficit or inherently make international governance more

effective if the participation is selective or lacks transparency. But, by institutionalizing access in a formal way, IOs increase the transparency of their collaboration and make it easier for the public to observe. Regardless of whether or not the access is fully representative of citizens' views, by reaching out to nonstate actors and including them in the policymaking process, IOs give themselves some protection from accusations of democratic deficit. This is particularly true when a broad range of access points are offered to a variety of nonstate actors.

Second, by establishing consistent, formal channels of access, international organizations benefit from economies of scale with respect to gathering nonstate actor input. Reaching out to nonstate actors in any form is an effort to gather information more efficiently—by working with actors that already have the necessary expertise, international organizations can access this information easily without investing the resources needed to have bureaucrats become experts themselves (Börzel and Risse 2005). This can be made even more efficient through formalization. Informal contact with nonstate actors requires individual contact with each actor to gather information and support. The international organization's bureaucrats must then also aggregate all of the information and opinions they gather in order to understand the overall position of nonstate actors. Formal access mechanisms can relieve some of this responsibility and make the gathering of information more efficient. For instance, when international organizations form nonstate actor advisory boards, they can ask the board to write a report presenting the aggregate position of all of the members on a particular topic. This puts the responsibility for working out their differences of opinion on the nonstate actors, instead of on the organization's bureaucrats. Using this formalized mechanism, the international organizations can quickly receive advice and expertise from a variety of experts and it comes in an efficient, useable form.

By offering nonstate actors formalized mechanisms of access, IOs benefit from the nonstate actors' specific expertise and receive invaluable information about the constraints the organization faces. By providing information about what types of policies are acceptable to local populations or firms in an affected industry, knowledge about the types of policies that have previously been

successful, and experience with implementation, nonstate actors help IOs to understand the state of the world and the constraints on their ability to implement and enforce policy decisions.

Buy in and Political Support

In addition to expertise, nonstate actors can provide international organizations with political support. There are many conditions under which an organization may benefit from additional local support and buy-in. Examples include: when they lack institutional enforcement capacity, when they face a legitimacy crisis, and when they need to implement programs on the ground in member countries. Nonstate actors can be a particularly useful source of this type of support and buy in. But only when they support the organization and its policy decisions.

In order to generate buy in from nonstate actors, IOs offer them access to the organization. This strategy works for two reasons. First, as explored above, when international organizations incorporate the expertise of relevant nonstate actors into their policy development process, the resulting policies will be better—more responsive to local needs, more in line with recent technological advances, and better supported by those who are affected. When policies are responsive and built on the advice of local actors, they are more likely to be seen as legitimate and hence complied with by local populations. Relying on private expertise can increase the acceptance and legitimacy of global governance structures broadly among populations (Börzel and Risse 2005; Prakash and Potoski 2010), and can increase the support for the organization and policy from the specific nonstate actors that are granted access. When supportive, these nonstate actors then become unofficial goodwill ambassadors for the organization and its policies. NGOs that have been a part of an IO's policy development process and feel that their voice was heard will be much more likely to speak favorably of that organization and policy throughout their network. Similarly, a private sector firm that feels involved in the policy development process directly at an IO is less likely to go around the international governance structure to try to influence international issues through their domestic government.

Second, by including nonstate actors in the policy development process, IOs help them to feel like they have a stake in the success of the policy and they may become local advocates on behalf of the organization's work. When nonstate actors feel involved and heard they will be more likely to comply with the policy themselves, which is important if they are the intended target of the policy change, and will be more likely to advocate on behalf of the policy within their community. Allowing relevant nonstate actors access and involving them in the policy development process can therefore be an effective way for international organizations that lack clear enforcement capabilities to generate support and compliance for their policies and programs (Börzel and Risse 2005; Prakash and Potoski 2010).

IOs garner nonstate actor buy in by allowing these actors access and providing them with information about the inner workings of the organization, giving insight into the logic of their decisions, and helping them to feel invested in the work of the IO. By building a network of support for themselves and their policies, IOs seek to directly alter the constraints they face. These constraints may be related to compliance, public perception of the organization, implementation of policies, or enforcement capacity. A supportive network of nonstate actors can ease each of these challenges IOs may face. Where nonstate actor access in pursuit of expertise, described above, allows IOs to learn about the constraints they face and receive information from nonstate actors, access in pursuit of buy in provides information to nonstate actors in an attempt to improve the external limitations the IO faces. These two benefits—information and buy in—help us to understand why member states relinquish the insulation of their IOs and choose to provide nonstate actors access, in spite of the potential costs.

How much access and to whom?

While many IOs offer nonstate actors access for the reasons theorized above—to access information and generate buy in—there is substantial variation in the *amount* of access nonstate actors gain, what that access looks like, and *which* nonstate actors are allowed in. The costs

and benefits of providing nonstate actor access vary for IOs based on the specific type of access they choose to offer, and to whom they offer it. If their member states desire, IOs can structure nonstate actor access in such a way that they receive information from the nonstate actors without relinquishing much, if any, control over policy decisions, thereby limiting the potential bias induced by including nonstate actors. For instance, when the World Bank holds consultations about their proposed projects they open the door for nonstate actors to come and share their perspective but do not cede any decision-making power. Other forms of access, such as allowing nonstate actors to sit on work groups or decision-making boards, allow those outside actors much more influence over policy decisions in exchange for their expertise and support. We should therefore expect the type of access points IOs choose to offer to vary based on their goals for their collaboration with nonstate actors.

When trying to maximize the information they receive from expert nonstate actors while limiting the amount of decision-making power they cede, IOs should be expected to include nonstate actors in consultative processes and to form nonstate actor advisory groups where they can gather formal advice from nonstate actors on relevant topics without including them in their decision-making processes. These types of access allow for the one-way transmission of information from the nonstate actors to the IOs. If, instead of information, IOs' member states want to collaborate with nonstate actors in order to build support for the organization and its work, we should expect them to bring nonstate actors into their policymaking process in ways that give the nonstate actors information about the IO—rather than the other way around—and make them feel included in the policymaking process. For instance, IOs might allow nonstate actors to attend their meetings, might cooperate with nonstate actors through public-private partnerships, might allow nonstate actors to become formal, longstanding observers and participants in their organization, or might allow them to sit on their decision-making boards. The variety of access types available to IOs allows them a strategic portfolio of options; by choosing a type of access that maximizes their goals—whether for information or buy in—while limiting their perceived costs, IOs can be strategic in their collaboration with nonstate actors. I argue that this variation in type of access, as well as the

amount of access offered and to whom, can be explained by the combination of the IO's member states' preferences and the IO's own institutional needs—how much information and buy in they need, and from whom. This dual logic is developed here.

Member State Preferences

The literature has long recognized that preferences of member states influence outcomes at IOs. This makes sense. IOs are designed by states to help coordinate better international outcomes than could be negotiated without formal institutionalization (Abbott and Snidal 1998); it is therefore to be expected that IOs are responsive to the desires of their members. The amount of access an IO offers to nonstate actors, and which actors gain access, are outcomes that member states likely have preferences over. While some of these preferences may be individualistic, others are more systematic and can be theorized. Before delving into the role of IOs' institutional needs in the next section, I develop the logic of member states' preferences over nonstate actor access here.

We know that states' international experiences shape the way they operate at the domestic level. The interaction between states' domestic political environments and their international institutional community has a variety of effects. For instance, Robert Putnam (1988) classically argues that membership in an IO can constrain the "win set" of a domestic political actor. Similarly, Judith Goldstein (1996, 1998) shows how multilateral trade agreements tie the hands of domestic policymakers. Jon Pevehouse (2002) finds that membership in international organizations with a high democratic density of members can lead to democratization at the domestic level of member states that are not originally democratic. The reverse is also true: the domestic experience of states shape the international organizations where they are members. For example, IOs with primarily homogenous, democratic memberships are more likely to place conditions on accession that require new members to also have democratic rule (Pevehouse 2002).

There are a variety of reasons to think that democratic governance at the domestic level will make states more inclined to desire nonstate actor access at the international level. First, in practical terms, if states' representatives work with nonstate actors at the domestic level, they will

expect to have access to those resources when working at the international level as well. When policymakers, bureaucrats included, are accustomed to having access to the expertise and support nonstate actors can supply, their home states should support allowing nonstate actor access in the IOs where they are members. Second, democracies' citizens should also have greater expectations for transparency and inclusion at the international level. Collaboration with nonstate actors is one way international bodies can signal transparency and commitment to democratic principles (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). Democratic states should therefore prefer nonstate actor access in order to signal transparency to their domestic publics. Democracies thus have two main reasons for supporting nonstate actor access at IOs where they are members: information for their policymakers, and to help build support for the organization at the domestic level.

A high density of democratic member states should also make an IO more likely to offer *deeper* levels of access to nonstate actors. Democratic populaces are primed to be more concerned about democratic deficits at the international level. When individuals are used to a certain level of democratic accountability in their relations with their domestic government, they come to also expect democratic processes at other levels of governance. This is typified by the extensive concern about a democratic deficit at the European Union (Moravcsik 2002; Crombez 2003; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Schneider 2018). Where member states' citizens are concerned about democratic responsiveness and have the ability to hold their government accountable through domestic democratic processes, we should expect that member states will be in favor of not just providing nonstate actors access to IOs but providing them with deeper, more impactful types of access that give the nonstate actors a real voice in the policymaking process.

The motivation to allow nonstate actor access in order to build domestic support for the IO weights democracies' preferences toward allowing civil society groups access. While they may value the information provided by both civil society and private sector actors at times, civil society groups will be more valuable when building grassroots support. These groups tend to work closely with citizens and can facilitate the transmission of information from an IO where they are active back to the domestic populace. Governments that rely on popular election to stay in power have

more incentive to want to hear what civil society organizations have to say. Collaboration with civil society can help democratic governments keep a finger on the pulse of their citizens' needs, which in turn helps them shape their policy agenda—both domestically and internationally—to be more responsive to the preferences of their constituents.

Non-democratic states may have alternative priorities for their international cooperation that incentivize them to oppose nonstate actor access at IOs, particularly access for civil society actors. Existing literature suggests that non-democracies often join IOs as a way to signal their (insincere) commitment to global norms (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), and are more likely to shirk on their international commitments than democracies (Schultz 1998, 1999). If a state joins an IO as a "smokescreen" for noncompliance (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), their preferences over institutional design will look different than those states that genuinely plan to fulfill the obligations of their membership. Member states planning to shirk their commitments will oppose measures that increase the level of observation and transparency. Non-democratic states should therefore oppose greater levels of nonstate actor access at IOs where they are members, and where access is granted, they should prefer collaborating with private sector actors who will be less likely to shame them domestically for poor behavior.

In addition to member states' individual domestic political conditions shaping their preferences over nonstate actor access, the collective decision-making processes within the IO will also structure the bargaining game member states play. The decision-making structure of international organizations varies greatly, changing the internal dynamics in which member states have to cooperate. For instance, some organizations, such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), have just a handful of member states that are all regionally homogeneous, of relatively equal size, and enjoy equal voting rights within the IO. Other organizations, such as the World Bank, have broad membership all around the globe, include powerful member states such as the United States and much less economically and politically powerful states such as Bolivia, and grant different states varying weights in the IO's voting processes. All of these factors influence the amount of power

states have within the IOs where they are a member, their preferences for how much access to give to different types of nonstate actors, and their ability to make their preferences reality.

International organizations with large memberships are, by design, more heterogeneous. The more members an IO has the broader the dispersion of member states' size, economic capability, political institutions, and more. These diverging experiences lead to member states with a variety of expectations for the IO. One topic these member states' preferences may differ on is how much access to offer to different nonstate actors. When there is disagreement about how much access to give to nonstate actors, the institutional decision-making rules of the IO become more important. Institutions that require unanimous approval of decisions will likely require states to make deals with one another and create issue linkages in order to build consensus. This type of elite dealmaking is not pretty, and is not something states likely want observed (Schneider 2018). Issue linkage is a key bargaining strategy used by states in IOs (Oye 1985; Putnam 1988; McKibben 2016). While it is exactly this type of behind-closed-doors dealmaking that creates concerns about a democratic deficit at IOs and generates calls for transparency, the ability to negotiate out of the public eye is a major benefit of international negotiations (Putnam 1988). Member states of IOs where this is the norm are unlikely to support additional nonstate actor access that might jeopardize their ability to build consensus. IOs that rely on majoritarian decision-making processes, on the other hand, need smaller coalitions to pass their preferred policies and therefore have less need for backroom deals in order to build support for their agenda.

There are reasons to think that, as the number of member states grows, the average state's preferences over nonstate actor access should become more open, especially to civil society actors. As IOs become larger, each individual member state has less influence and less opportunity to observe the behavior of other member states. This adds value to the expertise that nonstate actors can provide—information on the behavior of other member states, the preferences of individuals in other states, and more. Many IOs rely on self-reporting of behavior by members and as their membership grows it becomes more difficult for other member states to observe the behavior of their compatriots. The added diversity of member state preferences, in combination with the added

difficulty of observing other members' behavior, increases the probability of shirking. Civil society actors can serve as third party observers and report back any aberrant behavior (Raustiala 1997). The larger an IO is, the more valuable a third party monitor becomes.

The value of third party "fire alarm" monitors (such as civil society actors) that can alert states of co-members' shirking further increases when IOs lack "police patrol" monitoring mechanisms which automatically catch aberrant behavior (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Compliance at the international level is particularly difficult to generate because states are reticent to yield their sovereignty enough to grant IOs true enforcement capability. While civil society actors cannot necessarily hold shirkers accountable, when other member states and the IO bureaucracy are aware of the behavior of shirking states, they can impose social sanctions or initiate any existing enforcement mechanisms the IO does possess.[4] I argue the value of nonstate actors', and especially civil society actors', input is therefore higher in IOs that do not have the institutional capacity to monitor their members' behavior, and in large organizations where unobserved shirking is easier.

Larger, global IOs also tend to work on broader issues such as peace-building or development. These diverse agendas benefit from broad-based support—the kind of support that nonstate actors are particularly adept at providing. I therefore argue that the larger an IO's membership, the more access we should expect them to offer nonstate actors.

Particularly important member states, such as the United States, may exert outsized influence over nonstate actor access at IOs, among other decisions. When much of the existing international order was formed in the wake of World War II, the United States held an even more dominant position of power in the global order than it does today. This dominance allowed policymakers from the United States to shape the international institutional landscape to meet the preferences of the United States and reinforce its preferred power structure (Ikenberry 2009). As part of this effort, the United States dictated the institutional design of many of the IOs that remain important today (Ikenberry 2009). Within the United States' domestic policymaking process, nonstate actors have a strong presence and are active at nearly every point in the policy development and implementation

[4]Civil society actors, though, may be capable of some level of social sanctioning, and, in human rights in particular, NGO "naming and shaming" campaigns have been effective (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

process (Georgiou 2004; Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons 2009; Drutman 2015; Milner and Tingley 2015; Ban and You 2019). Private sector actors are a particularly important force (Drutman 2015; Hafner-Burton and McNamara 2019). While these actors have found success lobbying for their international policy preferences at the domestic level (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Broz and Hawes 2006; Hafner-Burton and McNamara 2019), they also prefer to access international organization directly. In an effort to recreate domestic governance structures, the United States can be expected to push for similar levels of private sector actor access at the international level as they offer at home. I therefore argue that, when the United States is a member of an IO, we can expect that organization will offer proportionally more access to private sector actors. Though other global leaders may also have outsized influence and can pressure other states in a hierarchical manner to support their agenda (Lake 2009), the historical role the United States played in writing the rules of global governance—arguably in such a way so as to perpetuate its own power—make its membership in IOs particularly important to pay attention to (Ikenberry 2009).

Given that it is primarily member states that determine nonstate actor access at IOs (Tallberg et al. 2013), their preferences about *who* to include and how much access to allow are important. I argue these preferences are shaped both by their own domestic political experiences and the internal bargaining environment of the organization. But just as different types of actors present varying benefits and risks to member states, the value of their input to the IO as a whole also varies. Our understanding of nonstate actor access at the international level can be improved by also examining the institutional needs of IOs. The following section explores the conditions that structure this variation.

Institutional Needs

Thus far, I have argued that nonstate actors are allowed access to international organizations when the value of the information and political support they can provide outweighs the potential costs of including them. Some of this calculus is predicated on the individual preferences of the IO's member states and the institutional conditions shaping those member states' bargaining processes

within the IO. However, even conditioning on the preferences of member states, the institutional value of nonstate actor expertise and buy in also shapes the amount and type of access different nonstate actors are allowed at IOs. International organizations are responsible for a wide range of subjects and vary greatly in the type of activities in which they engage. Civil society actors and private sector actors offer distinct skillsets, which prove valuable to IOs under different conditions. States come to the table with their own preferences, but they also want the IO to be successful, and therefore must consider the needs of the organization when determining how much access to provide to different types of nonstate actors.

Information

There are a variety of conditions under which the information and expertise that nonstate actors can provide becomes particularly beneficial to IOs, helping to outweigh the potential costs and incentivizing more access for nonstate actors. The particular expertise of civil society and private sector actors will be valuable to IOs under different conditions. These conditions are theorized here.

First, outside sources of information may be particularly important when IOs are understaffed or underfunded. Many organizations cannot afford their own research divisions and thus must rely on outside sources of policy research, such as nonstate actors. However, even when IOs are well-funded, they may choose not to invest in their own researchers and instead outsource their information gathering. For example, the European Space Agency (ESA) strategically chose not to have their own research branch because they worried that it would steal too many researchers from national-level space programs, particularly in their smaller member states (Krige and Russo 2000). Instead, they facilitate the cooperation of researchers from across their member states through a series of advisory boards and consultation mechanisms in order to access the information and expertise necessary to select missions and prioritize spending. By bringing together outside actors with relevant expertise, the ESA is able to stay up to date on technological and scientific advances while allowing the local scientific communities of their member states to flourish. The scientists benefit from collaborating with researchers in their field from across Europe, have a chance to

shape the regional space program, and gain access to expensive technology that is only available at the regional level; the ESA benefits from the knowledge of the top of the field without having to invest in their own research division; and member states benefit from maintaining robust domestic space programs while also utilizing the economies of scale available from regional coordination: a win-win-win.

Relatedly, as organizations' responsibilities grow and the scope of their policy portfolio expands, it becomes more difficult for their internal bureaucrats to stay abreast of all of the relevant policy expertise. When an IO works on one specific issue, it may be possible to recruit employees with knowledge in that area and, as they work there, they will gather more expertise. But, in organizations where the scope of their policy purview is wide and they are continually taking on new projects and priorities, it is extremely difficult for the IO's staff to maintain expertise in all of the divergent policy areas. Instead of expecting the internal staff to be experts in an unrealistic range of topics, IOs reach out to outside experts and rely on informational input from these actors to shape and advise the development of policy. It becomes more efficient for the organization to focus staff resources on facilitating collaboration with outside experts and processing the information gathered for policymakers, rather than doing the original research themselves. The broader the scope of the organization's mandate, the more valuable outside expertise becomes. When they have a broad scope of work, IOs should be expected to allow more access to nonstate actors, but not necessarily deeper access—they should offer access mechanisms that facilitate the passage of information from nonstate actors to the IO, while limiting the amount of decision-making power ceded by member states.

Outside expertise may be critical when an IO deals with highly technical policy topics. Even if they operate in one narrow issue area, if that policy is complex and relates to quickly developing technologies the input of outside experts may be useful. As an example, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) grants consultative status to NGOs. This gives NGOs a door into the inner workings of the IMO, providing them with access to policymakers, a voice in shaping IMO policy, and the ability to make their preferences known. Because the IMO has a relatively small Secretariat,

they are not able to provide the issue area expertise that policymakers need to make informed decisions. Instead, the IMO turns to outside actors who are able to furnish them with information and uses their bureaucrats' time to facilitate the nonstate actor access and help coordinate member states. This is a particularly useful resource for specialized agencies like the IMO that deal with highly technical policy.[5]

When any of these institutional conditions—a small research budget, a broad policy scope, or a technical issue area—exist, the value of nonstate actors' expertise will increase for an IO, incentivizing the organization's member states to allow more, but not necessarily deeper, nonstate actor access.

Buy in

Institutional conditions also shape the value of nonstate actor buy in for an IO. I argue international organizations will benefit more from the support of nonstate actors when they have no effective enforcement capacity, when they implement policies in member states, when they need nonstate actors directly to comply with their policies, and when they are seen as outsiders or lack legitimacy.

Many international organizations are structured without clear enforcement mechanisms. Member states are hesitant to cede their sovereignty and therefore often prefer international agreements which allow them some leeway. When designing international agreements, states care about both the success of the organization and its ability to enforce policy decisions, and also their own policy discretion. These preferences stand in opposition to one another—the more legalistic the organization's design and the stronger its enforcement capabilities the more likely it is to be effective at coercing compliance, but also the less discretion member states themselves will be allowed. This tradeoff leads to diverging preferences amongst member states over the ideal level of legalization within international organizations (Kahler 2000; Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 2000; Smith 2000; Allee and Huth 2006), and a broad range of institutional designs with varying levels of

[5]This conclusion is based on personal correspondence with an IMO Secretariat staff member who wishes to remain anonymous, December 20, 2017.

enforcement capability. When organizations do not have the ability to enforce their decisions themselves, the support and buy in of nonstate actors becomes more valuable. When nonstate actors support the policy decisions of an IO they can pressure their home states to comply and augment the domestic benefits states see from compliance, thereby increasing the probability of compliance.

Nonstate actor buy in can also be particularly valuable to IOs when they work directly to implement programs and policies. When implementing projects locally, the support of the local population, businesses, and NGOs can be critical to the success of the project. This increases the value of local nonstate actor buy in to the IO. By including relevant nonstate actors in the development of the project, the IO can build local support and help generate buy in from locals, easing implementation challenges. The political support and buy in of nonstate actors can be particularly valuable for IOs' policy implementation efforts when they are faced with skeptical local populations. IOs are sometimes seen as tools of imperialism and Western imposition. This can be particularly true in developing countries and areas with a history of colonialism. Even when there is not a negative history associated with the organization, they are still often distant institutions that lack transparency; they feel far away from local populations and are frequently seen as disconnected as a result. This view of IOs as distant and imposing others' agendas becomes problematic when those organizations try to implement programs. In order to successfully run a program, the organization needs the cooperation of the local population. If the organization itself is seen skeptically, the support of local NGOs or well-known businesses can ease tensions and generate goodwill for the program and the international organization. For example, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) helps build support for regional integration with their Chamber of Commerce. These private sector collaborators "can mobilize public opinion by removing apprehensions and misgivings" about SAARC's efforts to integrate regional economies (I. Ali, personal communication, November 22, 2017). Collaboration with nonstate actors improves correspondence between policymakers and citizens, helping to bring the organization closer to home and making it more responsive to the needs of local populations (Reinicke et al. 2000).

A third time when nonstate actor buy in becomes especially critical to IOs is when they need the direct compliance of those actors. The decisions of some IOs, such as NATO, are directed at member state behavior. These decisions may still be relevant to nonstate actors, but they will be carried out by member states. For instance, when decisions about military intervention are relevant to defense contractors that might win valuable contracts to provide weapons and support, but are directly carried out by member states' militaries. For these organizations, it is member states' compliance that is needed. For other IOs, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), policy decisions directly regulate the behavior of nonstate actors. For instance, the ITU recently released new guidelines regulating the quality of player experience for online video gaming.[6] To successfully change the online gaming environment, these recommendations need to be taken up and accepted by the private sector companies responsible for online gaming. The buy in of those companies is therefore critical to the success of this ITU policy.

When their institutional design leaves them without the ability to coerce compliance, international organizations must turn toward other strategies to generate acquiescence. Hurd (1999) argues actors comply with international regimes for one of three reasons: because they are coerced, because it is in their self-interest, or because they believe the rule to be legitimate. Without coercion as an option, many international organizations seek to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of their member states and the local populations and companies within their member states, so that even if their policy is not seen as strictly in the member's self interest, they will be more likely to comply. When international organizations are seen as legitimate, member states and local actors help execute their policies, supervise compliance, and are more likely to be compliant themselves (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). Nonstate actors, both from the private sector and civil society, can assist with building legitimacy, but only if they agree with the policy and "buy in" to the work of the organization.

Legitimacy is also a broader issue for many IOs. Lots of discussion exists, both within academia and outside of it, about the European Union's "legitimacy crisis" and democratic deficit

[6]See `https://www.itu.int/itu-t/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=13396`.

(Moravcsik 2002; Crombez 2003; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Schneider 2018). IOs' challenge of being seen as a legitimate source of governance is not unique to the European Union, however. Problems of legitimacy plague IOs such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Danner 2003), NATO (Holmberg 2011), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Seabrooke 2007), and many more (Zweifel 2006; Zaum 2013). When legitimacy crises are a relevant issue for an IO, collaborating with nonstate actors can be a particularly valuable avenue for increasing public transparency and generating legitimacy. When nonstate actors buy in to the work of an IO, they can help provide support and increase the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the public. This buy in can be bolstered by including nonstate actors in the policymaking process by giving them access to observe and/or influence the the IO's policy decisions.

I have argued, as the value of nonstate actors' expertise and support increases, member states should become more supportive of offering nonstate actors access at the IO, even after controlling for their own innate preferences. This logic applies not only to the overall amount and type of access nonstate actors enjoy at an IO, but also to the type of actor allowed in. Given their distinct skillsets, private sector actors' and civil society actors' assistance will be valuable to IOs under different conditions.

Whose Assistance is Valuable?

There is wide variation in not only how much access nonstate actors enjoy at IOs, but also the kind of nonstate actor allowed in. Which actors are allowed access is a reflection of whose assistance is most valuable to the organization and its member states. Private sector actors and civil society groups are useful under different conditions. One factor that determines whose assistance is most valuable to an IO is the type of work the organization engages in. When IOs implement projects on-the-ground, civil society actors can be especially useful partners. Civil society actors possess critical information about social and human rights conditions within communities that may otherwise be difficult for international organizations to observe. They can serve as "fire alarms," alerting IOs of deteriorating conditions or states that are not complying with their commitments

(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Raustiala 1997), helping organizations identify where investment will be most beneficial and where additional attention is needed. Civil society organizations, and particularly NGOs, have experience working with local populations and implementing public projects. This experience allows them to provide IOs with useful information about the local conditions and limitations. Prior experience also gives these groups relationships with local leaders and can help them connect IOs with local resources.

Having the support of relevant NGOs can help IOs, which are frequently seen as distant and imposing, gain the necessary local support to implement projects. For example, the Commonwealth liaisons with NGOs in order to take advantage of local expertise and overcome the perception that they represent a colonial imposition (Bourne 2004). The types of assistance civil society actors provide will be most useful to organizations that routinely implement projects at the local level. IOs working in these areas depend on the expertise and support of civil society organizations for the successful development and implementation of their policies.

While international organizations implementing projects on the ground may use products and services from the private sector, and certainly collaborate with private sector actors at times, their projects more closely mirror the work of NGOs and they thus benefit the most from information and support from those civil society actors that are also active in similar areas. As an example, the World Health Organization (WHO) frequently partners with local NGOs in order to make their programs more effective—these NGOs have relationships with local leaders, have experience developing projects in those locales, and can be important partners for successfully implementing programs. While WHO also works with private sector actors—for instance, for the procurement of medication and the development of vaccines—it primarily relies on the assistance of NGOs for running its programs and gathering information about local conditions. When implementing projects and delivering services at a local level, the assistance of NGOs is most valuable.

Private sector actors, in contrast to civil society organizations, offer particularized expertise on market conditions, future product development, and the technical capabilities of new technologies. The political buy in of private sector firms can also be critical for the success of IOs. Given the

lack of international enforcement, it can be especially important to have the support of private sector actors when the success of a policy relies on their direct compliance—whether it be updating their technologies to a more environmentally friendly process, halting the use of bribes and other unethical behavior in international business, or committing to a global best practices charter. When IOs' policy agendas need to be adopted by private sector firms rather than nation states, the buy in of these nonstate actors is valuable. These types of information and support will be most useful to organizations working on the coordination or regulation of international activity, which frequently pertains directly to private sector interests.

For example, NATO works closely with defense companies to ensure that the technology they are developing matches the alliance's future security needs. By collaborating with companies early in the development process, NATO gets the technology they seek and increases the chance of it being compatible across member states, and defense companies get an inside view into the priorities of some of their biggest customers (NATO 2017). In order to implement policies that require the cooperation of private sector actors, IOs can bring these interests into the policy formation process earlier and gain their support. This allows the organization to both benefit from the private sector actors' intimate knowledge of the issue, making the organization's eventual policy decision more informed, and also generate buy in amongst the actors that need to follow the policy.

The value of different types of nonstate actors' assistance, and these categories of organizations, are not mutually exclusive. Many organizations do a variety of types of work and have a multitude of needs when it comes to the services nonstate actors can provide. There are many occasions where the expertise and support of many types of nonstate actors can be valuable, and organizations benefit from allowing both civil society and private sector actors access. For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) facilitates the movement of goods, services, investments, and people across borders by aligning regulations and standards, as well as implementing capacity building projects that enhance skills across their member states.[7] To assist their work across these many issue areas, APEC relies on input from both private sector actors and civil society. For

[7] See `https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC` for more information about APEC's work.

instance, the APEC Business Advisory Council brings together high-level business representatives from each member country to advise and assist APEC.[8] They also work closely with NGOs on a variety of policy steering groups, and include both private sector firms and civil society groups at their ministerial meetings.[9] By engaging with nonstate actors broadly, APEC receives information from a variety of sources and builds support for their work.

While it may lead to a more democratic ideal of a plurality of voices, providing access to a broad swath of actors may also lead to costs for the organization. Just like member states, nonstate actors have distinct preferences and will advocate for those preferences when given the opportunity. Sorting out conflicting information and combatting negative voices raises the costs associated with offering nonstate actors access. It may be less costly—and therefore more strategically beneficial—for IOs to open their doors only to nonstate actors with whom they agree (Vabulas 2011). Nonstate actor access, even deep levels of access, may therefore not lead to a more democratic chorus of voices if only a narrow swath of well-aligned actors are allowed in.

The legitimacy generated by including nonstate actors in policy discussions at the international level varies based on who is allowed in. If the organization only needs to generate compliance amongst a narrow swath of interests, they may only allow access to those actors. This narrow access may generate buy in within that specific population, but does not increase the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the broader population. Rather than decreasing the democratic deficit and making the organization more accessible, offering access to only one type of actor runs the risk of biasing outcomes and actually increasing the democratic deficit. If, on the other hand, the organization wants to generate broad feelings of legitimacy and encourage the compliance of whole populations, they should offer access to a wide array of nonstate actors. The broader the inclusion, the more legitimate the organization becomes (Börzel and Risse 2005). The organization, then, must balance these contradictory weights: they need to offer enough access to appear legitimate to the

[8] See http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/Other-Groups/APEC-Business-Advisory-Council.aspx for more on the APEC Business Advisory Council.

[9] See http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/Electronic-Commerce-Steering-Group.aspx and http://mddb.apec.org/Documents/2015/SOM/SOM3/15_som3_005.pdf for more information.

target population and may pay additional costs if they give access to too narrow a group of actors, but want to limit the potential costs associated with offering access more generally. Organizations must therefore be strategic in who they offer access to.

The theory developed above works to distinguish some of the conditions that might lead organizations to offer more access to one type of actor or another. Following the logic developed earlier that IOs primarily offer nonstate actors access to secure political support and to access information, I argue that the type of work the organization is involved in shapes the way it values various nonstate actors' assistance, and therefore the type of actor that it allows access. By tracing how the institutional conditions of an organization impact the type of information and political support organizations require, we can understand the observed variation in the access IOs offer to private sector and civil society actors. When the institutional conditions lead an organization to require the assistance of civil society groups, we can expect them to receive more access; and when conditions lead them to value the support of the private sector, private sector actors will be privileged.

Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that the value international organizations and their member states place on nonstate actor input shapes who they allow in, how much access they allow, and what that access looks like. I further argue that their valuation of nonstate actor assistance is structured by both member states' individual preferences and the institutional needs of the organization.

The domestic political experiences of member states, along with the internal bargaining environment of the international organization, shape member states' upfront preferences for nonstate actor access. But even after considering these preferences, the specific needs of the organization remain important. Nonstate actors provide IOs with expertise and buy in, in exchange for access. Information becomes particularly valuable when an IO has a broad policy scope and is under-supported. Nonstate actor buy in is especially useful when the IO lacks an enforcement mechanism

or any other way to coerce compliance. The more valuable an IO finds the assistance of nonstate actors, the more access they will provide, within the constraints of the costs associated with providing access.

The real innovation of this project, however, comes in theorizing the conditions under which IOs will value the input of *different types* of nonstate actors. I argue that civil society organizations are more useful to IOs that implement programs and deliver services on the ground. The assistance of private sector actors is more valuable to IOs that regulate or coordinate international activity. While these categories are not mutually exclusive, we can use the type of work an IO engages in to shape our expectations of which nonstate actors will be allowed access. There are reasons to believe that the implications of policymakers—at the domestic or international level—collaborating with private sector actors are distinct from the implications of collaboration with civil society actors. While NGOs also come to the table with their own agenda, on average, civil society organizations represent at least some facet of the interests of society. Private sector firms, on the other hand, though they may do good in the world, are primarily driven by their bottom line; publicly traded firms in particular have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to pursue profit. This suggests that offering access to different types of nonstate actors raises distinct concerns and the potential for particular biases.

By breaking down the dichotomy in the literature, this project provides a fresh approach to thinking about the role of nonstate actors in international governance. Nonstate actor access is not simply good or bad. Not all actors are created equal. Different groups provide international organizations with useful expertise and support under different conditions, but they also likely cause different biases and raise different costs. The implications of allowing private sector actors access vary from the ramifications of working with NGOs. These consequences—whether beneficial or negative—need further exploration. Given these varying dynamics, it is no longer sufficient to think of all nonstate actor access at the international level as equivalent. If we are to understand the role nonstate actors play in shaping international policy, we must first understand who has a seat at the table and what that seat looks like. This project is a first attempt.

This chapter offers the first theory of nonstate actor access at international organizations that differentiates between actor types. The theory is operationalized and empirically tested in the following chapter. Understanding how IOs choose which nonstate actors to allow and how much access to provide gives us insight into the debate over democratic deficit and the legitimacy of international governance.

Material from this chapter has been submitted for publication as a journal article and is currently under review. Heidi M. McNamara is the sole investigator and author of this paper.

Chapter 3

Explaining Nonstate Actor Access at International Organizations

This project seeks to understand the ways international organizations collaborate with nonstate actors. It asks descriptive questions such as: how much access do IOs give? What types of access do they give? Who do they give it to? And explanatory questions such as, what explains these differences? Why do some organizations work exclusively with private sector actors while others collaborate only with civil society, and many others work with both? What do IOs receive from their collaboration with nonstate actors? There is wide variation in the combination of nonstate actor access points that IOs choose to allow. Different ways of interacting with outside sources of information and support are useful to IOs and their member states at different times and under different conditions. This chapter provides an empirical assessment of both these descriptive puzzles and the theory developed previously to answer the explanatory questions.

In the previous chapter, I developed a theory suggesting that the combination of nonstate actor access points chosen by IOs result from both the IO's individual needs for information and political support, and also the internal bargaining processes that aggregate member states' inherent preferences. When IOs work on a wide variety of issues, their employees are unable to be experts in all of those topics and they therefore need to gather information from other sources and will reach

out to relevant nonstate actors. They will also value the inclusion of nonstate actors when they need more legitimacy and buy in to be successful with their policy agenda. I argue these factors shape the amount of access IOs give to nonstate actors, even when accounting for the individual preferences of member states and the IO's processes for aggregating these preferences. *Who* an IO gives access to, then, is driven by which actors' information and support is most valuable to the IO and its member states. I argue that the value of a nonstate actor's expertise and buy in is determined by the type of work an IO engages in and that work's relation to the nonstate actor. Organizations working on the ground to implement projects and work directly with locals will value the assistance of NGOs who can help them connect to local leaders and opinion-makers. IOs responsible for coordinating and regulating international behavior value the input of the private sector actors that are involved in these endeavors.

This chapter takes this theory as a starting point, develops hypotheses from the empirical implications, and tests these hypotheses. First, I introduce an original dataset which maps six forms of nonstate actor access at 72 international organizations. Importantly, this data differentiates between access given to civil society actors and that given to private sector actors, allowing me to test the varying motivations that lead IOs to collaborate with different types of actors. Second, I derive empirically testable hypotheses from the previous chapter's theory. Third, I offer descriptive assessments of the dependent and independent variables that will be used in the empirical analyses. Finally, I provide regression analyses examining both the amount of access IOs offer to nonstate actors, and their motivations for offering access to different types of nonstate actors. The empirical analyses offered in this chapter provide strong support for the theory. Even after accounting for member states' preferences and the IO's decision-making institutions, the needs of the organization shape the value of nonstate actors' input. The type of work an organization engages in changes whose input is most valuable, and the scope of that work shapes how much assistance they benefit from.

Levels of Access

The following empirical analyses rely on an original dataset which differentiates between access international organizations offer to private sector actors and access granted to civil society actors. These data map six distinct forms of access and notate when organizations offer each to different types of nonstate actors. For the purposes of this project, I define nonstate actors as a group of people, an organization, or a company seeking or receiving special advantages or particular policy outcomes that reflect their preferences. Specifically, the data tracks access granted to civil society—NGOs, think tanks, academics—and to private sector actors—private sector firms, and industry groups.

The dataset maps access these two main types of nonstate actors enjoy at 72 IOs. To be included in the sample, an international organization must meet at least all but one of the following criteria: first, they must have a physical headquarters and website; second, they must have at least 50 permanent organization staff members; third, they must have a written constitution or convention; and fourth, they must have a decision-making body that meets annually (Hooghe and Marks 2015). These restrictions on the sample ensure that the organizations included are reliably researchable using their website and publicly available documents, and remain active with a meaningful role in shaping international policy.[1] 72 of the international organizations identified by the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organization dataset meet these criteria and are included here (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2015). The Appendix provides a list of all included organizations.

Nonstate actors enjoy a variety of different types of access at IOs. These access mechanisms range from shallow forms of access where nonstate actors are able to provide information or receive information but have little direct influence, to much deeper forms where they play an important decision-making role in the organization. The data differentiate six distinct forms of access, along a continuum of depth. At the deepest level, representatives of nonstate actors may sit

[1]This is important because many international organizations are never formally disbanded even after they become essentially non-operational (Wallace and Singer 1970; Gray 2018).

on IOs' decision-making boards. For example, the national delegations to the annual conferences of the International Labour Organization (ILO) include a delegate from the business community and the labor community, in addition to two government representatives. These business and labor representatives are chosen by their respective communities, not their governments. Each representative has an equal vote, and the industry and labor representatives are allowed to vote independently of their government's representatives and each other.[2] This gives nonstate actors direct influence over ILO policy outcomes. IOs with this type of nonstate actor access are coded as having nonstate actor *Board Members*.

At a slightly lower depth of access, IOs may also designate nonstate actors as *Formal Observers* without giving them formal voting rights on decision-making boards. Formal observers, as coded here, require nonstate actors to go through some formal approval process and play an ongoing role within the organization. Their exact role may vary across organizations—some allow formal observers to sit on work groups, other formal observers provide regular feedback or regularly attend meetings—however, to reach this designation the nonstate actors must be officially approved by a formal screening process. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) serves as an example of an organization with formal observers. WIPO allows other IOs, NGOs, and industry groups to become "accredited observers". This designation allows approved organizations to attend WIPO meetings and consult with WIPO representatives on policy decisions. This status, however, is not open to the public and requires groups to go through a formal application and approval process before they are allowed access.[3] By allowing formal observers, WIPO gains access to the expertise and unique perspectives of nonstate actors.

At a still lower level of depth, IOs may form advisory boards made up of nonstate actors. These boards provide information, advice, and counsel to the organization. They are usually, though not necessarily, an invitation-only group of nonstate actors whose counsel is particularly prescient to the IO. They may be longstanding formal boards, or convened on an ad hoc basis to address a particular issue. The European Space Agency's (ESA) Science Programme Committee serves as an

[2]For more information see `http://www.ilo.org/ilc/AbouttheILC/lang--en/index.htm`.
[3]For more information see `http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/observers/`.

example. This board brings together relevant academics and scientists from ESA member states to advise the organization on mission selection and the scientific suitability of different proposals. While final decisions over mission selection are made by a board of member state representatives, the Science Programme Committee offers critical advice and expertise (Krige, Russo and Sebesta 2000). This committee is coded as an *Advisory Board*.

IOs can also get information from nonstate actors through more shallow forms of consultation. They may hold open hearings—similar to congressional committee hearings at the domestic level—where nonstate actors can come to share their preferences and advice, or send out surveys to relevant actors to gather information. Similar to advisory boards, these consultations may be held at regularly scheduled intervals or they may be convened on a more ad hoc basis when it is beneficial to the IO. For instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO) hosts an annual Public Forum where representatives from civil society, academia, the private sector, and more can come share their perspective on recent developments in global trade.[4] This open forum is coded as the WTO holding *Consultations*.

IOs may also allow nonstate actors to attend their meetings, without requiring formal approval as they do for formal observers. Attendees may be required to register, but they do not need to be individually approved by the organization or their home government. *Meeting Attendance* gives nonstate actors the opportunity to observe the IOs' meetings, but not necessarily any chance to meet or influence policymakers, or participate in any substantive way. It is therefore coded as a lower depth of access. For example, the World Bank allows NGOs, think tanks, academics, and others to attend their biannual meetings and observe the decision-making process. Though they also hold adjacent consultations with nonstate actors through their Civil Society Policy Forum, attendance at the World Bank's actual meetings primarily provides the opportunity for observation.

Lastly, the most shallow form of access in the dataset accounts for *Public-Private Partnerships* (PPPs) between IOs and nonstate actors.[5] PPPs have recently been identified as a way of

[4]For more information see `https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm`.

[5]I consider PPPs to be the lowest level of access IOs offer to nonstate actors because they do not necessarily provide an opening into the broader workings of the organization; however, nonstate actors may gain substantial control over the project on which they are partnered. In light of this conflicting depth—shallow at the full institutional level,

making government projects more efficient and effective. These joint efforts can also be useful at the international level. What these partnerships look like can vary widely—some organizations work with nonstate actors to implement training programs, while others collaborate on complex projects—but to be coded as a PPP they must represent some joint cooperation between an IO and a nonstate actor. As an example, INTERPOL partners with a variety of private sector actors. One collaboration, the Travel Document Initiative, partners INTERPOL with Entrust Datacard to develop a secure system of electronic travel documents. This initiative has been ongoing since 2009.[6]

These six forms of nonstate actor access at IOs were identified through preliminary coding of a random subsample of the 72 organizations in the full sample. Not all organizations offer nonstate actors access (four do not offer any access), and no IOs offer all six types of access. To summarize, in descending order of depth, the six types of access are: allowing nonstate actors to serve as voting board members, allowing nonstate actors to be formal observers, allowing advisory boards made up of nonstate actor members, holding consultations with nonstate actors, allowing nonstate actors to attend and observe organization meetings, and participating in public-private partnerships with nonstate actors. This continuum is represented in Figure 3.1. The distribution of access points IOs offer to each category of nonstate actor is displayed in Figure 3.2. For both civil society actors and private sector actors, consultations are the most frequent form of access and serving as board members is the rarest. The frequency of consultations and advisory groups supports the previous chapter's supposition that IOs frequently reach out to nonstate actors in order to acquire information and expertise.

Nonstate actor access, regardless of the depth of the access point, does not necessarily translate directly into influence over IO policy outcomes. Coding access, rather than influence, was the natural choice because control over access aligns more readily with member states' ability to

but potentially quite deep when it comes to a particular policy or project—PPPs are a bit of an outlier to the natural continuum of the depth of access an IO can offer to a nonstate actor. As such and in order to be conservative, I rerun all of my analyses excluding PPPs as a robustness check; my results hold and are reported in the Appendix.

[6]For more information see https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/International-partners/Entrust-Datacard-Group.



Figure 3.1: Continuum of Nonstate Actor Access Points at IOs

shape institutional design. Additionally, access is empirically observable, while influence is not. It is therefore important to remember that the data introduced here measures avenues of nonstate actor *access* to IOs only. Identifying these varying types of access and who gets which type where offers a window into which actors have a seat at the table—who gets inside information about the decisions being made within international organizations, who provides information to international policymakers, and whether a plurality of interests have a voice.

Explaining Nonstate Actor Access

I now seek to test the implications of the theory developed in the previous chapter using this original dataset. In the following sections, I derive empirical hypotheses, describe the operationalization of the variables, and offer empirical support for the theoretical prediction that, in combination with member state preferences, the institutional needs of an organization shape how much nonstate actor access an IO gives and to whom.



Figure 3.2: Types of Access Granted to Nonstate Actors

Empirical Hypotheses

This project asks two main questions, each with two components to the theorized answer. First, I seek to explain *how much* nonstate actor access IOs offer. Second, I ask *which* nonstate actors gain access under different conditions. The theory developed in the previous chapter suggests that the answers to each of these puzzles depends on both the inherent preferences of the IO's member states about nonstate actor access, and on the particularized needs of the IO itself. This theory lends itself to empirically testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived here. I begin by identifying the conditions that are theorized to influence the amount of access nonstate actors enjoy at IOs, then turn to the conditions that shape which nonstate actors are allowed in.

How much access?

The first question posed by this project is: What shapes IOs' decisions over how much access to offer nonstate actors? The theory developed in the previous chapter suggests that, following existing literature, member states' preferences and the internal collective decision-making process within the IO are important for determining how much access nonstate actors are allowed. Yet, even holding these factors constant, conditions unique to each IO and the work it does are also important.

A series of empirical hypotheses are derivable from each of these branches of the theory. When it comes to member state preferences and the bargaining game internal to the IO, the theory suggests that the domestic governance structure of the member states matters, that the number of member states in an IO matters, and that the voting rules of the IO matter. These predictions are laid out in *Hypothesis One*.

Hypothesis One: The preferences of an IO's member states, and the IO's internal bargaining environment that aggregates them shape the amount of nonstate actor access allowed.

a) The higher the proportion of democratic member states in an IO, the more nonstate actor access the IO will offer.

b) The more member states an IO has, the more nonstate actor access it will provide.

c) When the IO's policymaking process relies on unanimity, the IO will allow less nonstate actor access.

After holding these conditions constant, my theory suggests that the internal needs of an IO change the value of nonstate actor assistance and shape the amount of access offered. I argue that nonstate actors provide IOs with two main benefits: information and buy in. Conditions unique to each IO change the value of these benefits, and thus the value of nonstate actor access. The internal conditions that are expected to matter are laid out in *Hypothesis Two*.

Hypothesis Two: The institutional needs of an IO for the information and buy in nonstate actors can provide change the value of nonstate actor assistance and effect the amount of access the IO offers.

a) The broader the scope of an IO's policy portfolio, the more access they will allow nonstate actors.

b) When the IO does not have an institutionalized enforcement mechanism, they will allow more nonstate actor access.

Who gets in?

The second main question posed by this project is: What shapes IOs' decisions over which nonstate actors to allow access? Similar to deciding how much access to offer, member states' preferences are important here. *Hypothesis Three* describes the theory's expectations about member state preferences. But, after holding these preferences constant, the needs of the IO change the value of different types of nonstate actors' assistance. Under some conditions, the information and support that can come from private sector actors is particularly useful to an IO. Under other conditions, civil society actors have the information the IO needs and can provide the necessary support. The factors that effect an who an IO prefers to give access to are laid out in *Hypothesis Four*. For a detailed exploration of the logic behind each of these claims, see the previous chapter.

Hypothesis Three: The preferences of an IO's member states, and the bargaining environment internal to the IO that aggregates these preferences, shape who the IO allows access.

a) The higher the proportion of democratic member states, the more access an IO will give to civil society actors.

b) The more member states an IO has, the more access an IO will give to civil society actors.

c) When the United States is a member of an IO, it will give private sector actors more access.

Hypothesis Four: The type of work an IO engages in shapes the value an organization places on different kinds of nonstate actors' assistance.

a) IOs that coordinate or regulate international activity will offer more access to private sector actors.

b) IOs that implement programs and run projects directly in member states will offer more access to civil society organizations.

The variables used to test these hypotheses are operationalized in the following sections. I then turn to empirical models to test the relationship between these various conditions and the amount of access IOs grant to different types of nonstate actors.

Dependent Variables

The raw data described above, while illuminating for looking at specific cases or access types, does not offer an intuitive overview of nonstate actor access. To test the hypotheses derived above, we need a measure of the amount of access offered to different nonstate actors by IOs. I code three types of dependent variables to capture these concepts: a simple *Count of Access Points*, a measure of the *Deepest Access Point*, and an aggregate *Weighted Access Measure* to capture the amount of access IOs offer to nonstate actors generally (*Hypotheses One* and *Two*), and also each of these measures of access separated by whether the access is given to civil society actors or to private sector actors (*Hypotheses Three* and *Four*).

The first composite variable I generate is a simple *Count of Access Points*. This variable captures the variation in the number of distinct types of access IOs offer to nonstate actors. It



Figure 3.3: Distribution of Count of Access Points Granted to Nonstate Actors

disregards any inclination of the potential differences in the depth of access provided by different types of access and treats them all as equivalent. It takes on a value of zero if the organization offers no access to nonstate actors, and could take on a maximum value of six if an organization allowed PPPs, Meeting Attendance, Consultations, Advisory Boards, Formal Observes, and Board Members. The observed maximum, taken on by nine IOs including the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Telecom Union, is four. The median number of access points offered across the sample is two. The distribution of *Count of Access Points* is displayed in Figure 3.3.

The *Count of Access Points* measures the breadth of types of access granted to nonstate actors, but it does not capture the differences in the depth of access. This is perhaps the most straightforward way to measure the "amount" of access an IO offers to nonstate actors. It is clear, concise, and does not rely on any additional judgement calls in the coding with respect to the relative depth of different access points or the relative weights that should be assigned to each type of access. For these reasons, I find it a valuable way to operationalize the amount of access an IO grants to nonstate actors. Yet, an organization like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which allows nonstate actors to attend their meetings and occasionally holds nonstate actor consultations receives the same value as an organization like the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which has a standing nonstate actor advisory board and allows nonstate actors to become formal observers and have a real voice in shaping policy decisions. These combinations of access



Figure 3.4: Distribution of Deepest Access Points Granted to Nonstate Actors

offer nonstate actors substantively different depths (one might say "amounts") of access, but receive the same value the way the *Count of Access Points* variable measures access.

One way to address this deficiency is to measure the *Deepest Access Point* an organization offers to nonstate actors. To calculate this variable, I order the types of access by their relative depth: PPPs, meeting attendance, consultations, advisory boards, formal observers, and board members. This order roughly captures the relative amount of policy responsibility and influence over IO outcomes that is conferred on nonstate actors. The *Deepest Access Point* variable assigns a "1" to organizations that only offer PPPs, a "2" to organizations whose deepest form of access is allowing meeting attendance, a "3" to organizations whose deepest access is holding consultations, all the way up to a "6" for allowing nonstate actors to serve as decision-making board members. The median *Deepest Access Point* IOs offer is a nonstate actor advisory board (4). The distribution of this variable is displayed in Figure 3.4.

The *Deepest Access Point* variable measures the depth of access, but misses the breadth captured by the *Count of Access Points* variable. An organization like the International Maritime

Organization (IMO) which allows formal observers but no other forms of access takes on the same value (5) as an organization such as the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which participates in PPPs, allows nonstate actors to attend their meetings, regularly consults with nonstate actors, and allows nonstate actor formal observers. The access offered to nonstate actors by these organizations is clearly of a different nature, but both look the same using the *Deepest Access Point* measure. Each of these variables—the *Count of Access Points* and the *Deepest Access Point*—captures a different component that helps us understand the amount of access nonstate actors enjoy at IOs which may be of interest, but only one aspect. To try to capture both the breadth and the depth of access offered, I calculate a *Weighted Access Measure*.

The *Weighted Access Measure* multiplies each access point offered by an IO by its relative depth, using the same ordering of depth as was used to calculated the *Deepest Access Point* variable, and then sums all of the different types of access offered. In this way, it accounts for both the number of access points an IO offers and the relative depths of access provided by those access points. Though it relies on more assumptions about the relative weight and depth of different types of access, it also provides us with valuable insight into the breadth and depth of nonstate actor access enjoyed at the IO level. The theoretical possible maximum for this variable if an organization offered all six types of access would be 21. The observed maximum is 14, which is taken on by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The median observed value is seven. Figure 3.5 displays the distribution of the *Weighted Access Measure*.

These three variables—*Count of Access Points, Deepest Access Point, Weighted Access Measure*—each capture slightly different understandings of how to measure the "amount" of access IOs offer to nonstate actors.[7] While each conceptualization has drawbacks, they each also have interpretive value and, when taken together, provide us with a diverse look at nonstate actor access at the IO level. They are used to test *Hypotheses One* and *Two*.

To test *Hypotheses Three* and *Four*, derived above, I recalculate the *Count of Access Points, Deepest Access Point* and *Weighted Access* given to civil society actors and private sector actors

[7]Data was collected in the summer of 2016 and represents a cross-section of time.



Figure 3.5: Distribution of Weighted Access Measure for Nonstate Actors

separately. These are used to evaluate the conditions under which IOs choose to give access to one type of nonstate actor or another. Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 display the distributions of these variables.

Independent Variables

To empirically test the hypotheses derived above, we need a variety of measures that capture the conditions within member states and IOs. Here, I walk through each sub-hypothesis individually to describe the operationalization of each concept.

Hypothesis 1a suggests that the domestic political environment of member states shapes their preferences over nonstate actor access. The theory suggests that democratic states will be more open to nonstate actor access. To test this hypothesis, I calculate the proportion of member states that are democratic in an IO. This *Democratic Density* variable measures the percent of an IO's member states which have a Polity II score of at least six and are therefore considered democracies.[8]

[8]IO membership data comes from Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2004) and Polity II data comes from Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2002). Data is from the year 2010.



Figure 3.6: Distribution of Count of Access Points by Type of Nonstate Actor



Figure 3.7: Distribution of Deepest Access Point by Type of Nonstate Actor



Figure 3.8: Distribution of Weighted Access Measure by Type of Nonstate Actor

A positive coefficient on this variable will suggest that the more member states are democratic, the more access the IO gives to nonstate actors and support *Hypothesis 1a*. This *Democratic Density* variable is also used to test *Hypothesis 3a*, where a positive coefficient in the civil society models will suggest that the more democratic an organization's member states, the more access will be given to civil society organizations and offer support for the theory.

Hypotheses 1b and *3b* both suggest that the number of member states in an IO shape the organization's nonstate actor access. The operationalization of this concept is straightforward. The variable *Number of Member States* provides a count of the number of member states in the IO.[9] Here, again, positive coefficients will support the theory and suggest that the more member states an organization has the more access it offers to nonstate actors and to civil society actors specifically.

Hypothesis 1c suggests that the institutional rules structuring decision-making within the IO shape the amount of nonstate actor access their member states' support offering; where decisions are made by unanimous consent, member states may need to engage in more backroom dealing in order to build support for their policy preferences and will therefore have lower levels of support for nonstate actor access that would provide witnesses to their dealmaking. To operationalize this

[9]Membership data comes from Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2004) and is from the year 2010.

concept, I rely on data from Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015). This data codes the voting rule at IOs' main decision-making bodies. From here, I coded a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the IO relies on unanimity for their primary decision-making. Unfortunately, this dataset only has partial overlap with my sample of organizations; 50 of the 72 organizations in my sample are also included in the Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015) dataset. I therefore run all of my analyses with and without the *Unanimity* variable to maximize my sample size. A negative coefficient on the *Unanimity* variable will provide support for the theory, suggesting that IOs that rely on unanimous decision-making processes provide lower levels of nonstate actor access.

Hypothesis 2a posits a relationship between the breadth of an IO's policy portfolio and the amount of access they offer to nonstate actors. Here, I rely on the measure of policy portfolio scope developed by Hooghe and Marks (2015).[10] They code organizations' participation in 25 non-exclusive policy areas and use that to calculate the breadth of the scope of the IO's policy portfolio. Some organizations, such as European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) have very narrow mandates and only work in one specific issue area. Others, such as the European Union (EU), essentially operate as supra-governments and are responsible for a wide variety of policy areas. The theory previously developed suggests that the broader the scope of an organization's policy portfolio—the more issues they engage in—the more open they should be to nonstate actors in order to access the information and expertise those actors can provide. We should thus expect a positive coefficient on the *Scope* variable.

The final variable needed to test the *amount* of access IOs offer to nonstate actors is whether or not the organization has a formalized enforcement mechanism. *Hypothesis 2b* suggests that if the IO does not have an enforcement mechanism, they will allow more nonstate actor access in order to build support for their policies and have third-party observers of member state compliance. To operationalize this concept, I again rely on Hooghe and Marks (2015). Their data codes whether or not IOs have a dispute settlement mechanism, and some characteristics of those institutionalized mechanisms. Dispute settlement mechanisms vary greatly in their ability to actually hold shirkers

[10]Data represents 2010.

accountable for their noncompliance. Because of this variation, I use the data from Hooghe and Marks (2015) to code a dichotomous indicator for whether or not an IO has a dispute settlement mechanism that has a remedy for noncompliance built into it. These "remedies" come in multiple forms—some create retaliatory sanctions, while in other cases the IO's court's rulings have direct effect at the domestic level (Hooghe and Marks 2015). I am therefore testing the effect of not just having a dispute settlement mechanism, but one with real teeth for holding states accountable. My theory suggests that when an IO does not have a strong dispute settlement mechanism allowing them the ability to enforce their decisions, they will allow more nonstate actor access. We should therefore expect a negative coefficient on the *Enforcement Mechanism* variable.

Turning to the rest of the factors that should affect which nonstate actors are given access, *Hypothesis 3c* suggests that IOs where the United States is a member will provide more access to private sector actors. I include a dichotomous measure of whether or not the United States is a member of the IO (*USA Member*).[11] Here, a positive coefficient in the private sector models will support the theory.

Hypothesis 4 posits that the type of work an IO engages in will shape which nonstate actors are granted access. To operationalize this concept, I coded whether each organization engages in coordinating and regulating behavior and/or whether they spend their time implementing projects on the ground. IOs are coded to *Implement Projects* if they work directly in member states to implement policy or run specific programs. This could look like government capacity building projects and trainings, infrastructure construction, or a vaccine drive. Workshops amongst professionals, which nearly every IO runs at some level, were not included. IOs are coded to *Coordinate and Regulate* if they regulate state or nonstate actor behavior across multiple member states' jurisdictions or seek to coordinate the behavior of state or nonstate actors across multiple states' jurisdictions. These IOs frequently mention "harmonization", "integration", "cooperation" or other such terms when describing their work. These variables were coded by examining the organizations' own descriptions of their work and their founding documents that lay out their specific work product.

[11] United States' membership data is taken from Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2004).

Much as the theoretical argument developed above does not preclude IOs from both regulating international activity and implementing projects on the ground in member states, these issue area categorizations are not mutually exclusive. Of the 72 organizations in the sample, 11 organizations are coded to only *Implement Projects*, 39 to only *Coordinate and Regulate*, 18 to both *Coordinate and Regulate* and *Implement Projects*, and four are coded to do neither. This empirical variation suggests that which nonstate actors are most beneficial to IOs varies across organizations. To support the theory developed in the previous chapter, we should expect a positive coefficient indicating more access is granted to private sector actors on the variable *Coordinates and Regulates* in the private sector model, and a positive coefficient indicating more access is given to civil society actors on the variable *Implements Projects* in the civil society model. Descriptive statistics for each of these variables is included in Table A3 of the Appendix.

Empirical Results

To test the hypotheses derived above, I run a series of empirical models. These results are divided into two groups. First, in Table 3.1 I test *Hypotheses One* and *Two* relating to the amount of access IOs give to nonstate actors. Second, in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 I test *Hypotheses Three* and *Four* relating to the which nonstate actors IOs choose to provide access to.

The models exploring the first question—how much access IOs grant to nonstate actors—rely on three dependent variables. Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.1 use the *Count of Access Points* dependent variable, Models 3 and 4 use the *Deepest Access Point* dependent variable, and Models 5 and 6 use the *Weighted Access Measure*. These varying operationalizations of the concept "amount" offer different insight into the access nonstate actors enjoy at international organizations. All models are cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors. To decrease any concerns about endogeneity, all independent variables used in this project represent 2010, while the dependent variables were coded in 2016.

In general, *Hypothesis One* enjoys strong support across the empirical models. The more democratic the membership of an IO, the more access that IO offers to nonstate actors (*Hypothesis 1a*). The significance of this result decreases with the smaller sample size in Model 2 but the coefficient remains positive. There is also strong support for *Hypothesis 1b*, which suggests that the more members an organization has the more access nonstate actors will enjoy. This result holds strongly in every model except Model 4, where the sample size is smaller and the dependent variable measures only the deepest point of access. The effect of unanimous decision-making (*Hypothesis 1c*) is negative across all models, despite the smaller sample size, and is statistically significant where the dependent variable represents a count of the number of access points. This suggests that, as hypothesized, where IOs rely on unanimous decision-making, they offer fewer access points to nonstate actors though the access points they do allow may not be any less deep. The preferences of member states and the internal bargaining environment of IOs shape the amount of access those organizations give to nonstate actors.

Hypothesis Two received mixed support in the empirical models. The scope of an IO's policy portfolio (*Hypothesis 2a*) shapes the amount of access IOs give to nonstate actors, but not necessarily the depth of that access. The broader the scope of a policy portfolio, the more access points an IO will offer. This result holds strongly even with the smaller sample size of Model 2. However, the results are not significant in Models 3 and 4 where the dependent variable measures just the deepest point of access. This suggests that when IOs need to access nonstate actors' expertise they will offer more access points, but not necessarily deeper points of access. This makes sense—an IO could gather information from nonstate actors through consultations or advisory boards without having to cede the influence over policy that allowing nonstate actors to become board members or formal observers requires. In this way, IOs are able to gain the best of both worlds: they get the information they need and still maintain control of the policymaking process.

Hypothesis 2b, on the other hand, receives no empirical support. Across all models, there is no statistically significant relationship between the amount of access an IO offers nonstate actors and whether or not they have a strong enforcement mechanism. This could be for a few reasons. First,

there may truly be no relationship between an IO's ability to enforce its policy and the amount it cooperates with nonstate actors. Second, it may be that my measure of IOs' enforcement mechanisms is incorrect. Or third, it may be that even when IOs have strong enforcement mechanisms they would still benefit from increasing local buy in. I think this third option to be most likely. IOs of all shapes and sizes seek to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of their member states, their members' citizens, and other international players such as nonstate actors. Though having a strong enforcement mechanism may help them to enforce policy at the end of the line, they would prefer high levels of compliance without having to arbitrate and force acquiescence. As such, the political support of nonstate actors that can be generated by including them in the policy development process is likely valuable to IOs regardless of whether or not they have a dispute settlement mechanism. The intricacy of this relationship between nonstate actor access and political support is further explored in the case studies included in the following chapters.

Table 3.1: OLS: Predicting the Breadth and Depth of Access Granted to Nonstate Actors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	**Count of Access Points** (Robust SE)	**Count of Access Points** (Robust SE)	**Deepest Access Point** (Robust SE)	**Deepest Access Point** (Robust SE)	**Weighted Access Measure** (Robust SE)	**Weighted Access Measure** (Robust SE)
Democratic Density	1.412**	1.235	2.179***	2.045*	4.986***	5.255**
	(0.608)	(0.781)	(0.799)	(1.054)	(1.676)	(2.148)
# of Member States	0.009***	0.006***	0.006***	0.005	0.024***	0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Unanimity		-0.666**		-0.594		-1.234
		(0.268)		(0.436)		(0.864)
Scope	0.062***	0.075***	-0.003	-0.000	0.100*	0.114*
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Enforcement Mech.	0.020	0.012	0.177	0.307	0.237	0.463
	(0.259)	(0.252)	(0.335)	(0.390)	(0.806)	(0.808)
Constant	0.375	1.000	2.256***	2.723***	1.481	2.357
	(0.490)	(0.722)	(0.624)	(0.915)	(1.292)	(1.966)
R^2	0.328	0.437	0.257	0.347	0.319	0.404
N	72	50	72	50	72	50

[1] Significance levels: *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Next, I turn to the question of why IOs offer different amounts and types of access to civil society actors and private sector actors under different conditions. This original dataset is the first to differentiate between the access civil society actors are given and that given to private sector actors. Before turning to regression analyses, Figure 3.9 offers an intuitive picture of the balance of access and support for *Hypothesis 4*. Here, you can see the raw distribution of *Weighted Access* granted to each type of nonstate actor by IOs that fall solely in the "Implementing" category, solely in the "Regulating" category, and those that engage in both types of behavior. Organizations that primarily implement projects and those that both implement projects and regulate behavior offer, on average, more access to civil society actors. While those that engage only in regulating behavior on average offer more access to private sector actors.



Figure 3.9: Weighted Access Offered to Each Type of Nonstate Actor, by IO Type

Next, the results of the empirical models testing *Hypotheses Three* and *Four* are displayed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In Table 3.2, all models are cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 examine the *Count of Access Points* given to civil society actors (Model 1) and private sector actors (Model 2). Models 3 and 4 test the *Deepest Access Point* granted to civil society actors (Model 3) and private sector actors (Model 4). Finally, Models

5 and 6 explore the *Weighted Access* given to civil society actors (Model 5) and private sector actors (Model 6). In addition to the independent variables predicted by the theory and described above, each of these models controls for the amount of access given to the other type of nonstate actor by the IO under observation; for example, Model 1 controls for the *Count of Access Points* given to private sector actors and Model 4 controls for the *Deepest Access Point* given to civil society actors. These controls account for the possibility that allowing one type of nonstate actor access makes an IO more likely to also provide access to other types of nonstate actors.

Both the preferences of member states and the work of an IO matter in IOs' decisions about whom to give access. IOs with higher proportions of democratic member states offer significantly more access points and deeper access points to civil society (*Hypothesis 3a*). Similarly, IOs with larger memberships also give civil society actors significantly more and deeper access points (*Hypothesis 3b*). Interestingly, while the United States' membership does not make IOs give more access to private sector actors, it is strongly associated with giving civil society actors less access than IOs where the United States is not a member (*Hypothesis 3c*). Giving more access points to the other kind of nonstate actor is also associated with each type of actor getting more points of access, though not necessarily deeper access points.

Hypothesis Four also finds strong support across all models. IOs that spend their time implementing projects are significantly more likely to provide civil society actors more access points and deeper access points than IOs that do not implement projects. IOs that coordinate and regulate international behavior are significantly more likely to offer private sector actors more access points and deeper access, than those that do not coordinate or regulate. The type of work an international organization engages in has strong consequences for the which nonstate actor they choose to offer access.

Table 3.2: OLS: Predicting the Breadth and Depth of Access Granted to Civil Society Actors and Private Sector Actors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	**Count of Access Points Civil Society**	**Count of Access Points Private Sector**	**Deepest Access Point Civil Society**	**Deepest Access Point Private Sector**	**Weighted Access Measure Civil Society**	**Weighted Access Measure Private Sector**
	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)
Implement Projects	0.938***	0.411	0.855***	0.569	2.067***	0.996
	(0.237)	(0.290)	(0.298)	(0.433)	(0.721)	(0.897)
Coordinate/Regulate	-0.424	0.759**	-0.493	0.966*	-1.346	2.374**
	(0.267)	(0.301)	(0.375)	(0.537)	(0.866)	(0.978)
Democratic Density	0.877*	0.286	2.540***	0.871	4.074**	1.310
	(0.524)	(0.567)	(0.920)	(1.010)	(1.707)	(1.570)
# of Member States	0.007***	-0.001	0.014***	-0.003	0.027***	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
USA Member	-0.524**	0.359	-1.383***	0.434	-2.579***	1.299
	(0.247)	(0.345)	(0.445)	(0.603)	(0.856)	(1.146)
Count Access to PS	0.300**					
	(0.118)					
Count Access to CS		0.320**				
		(0.131)				
Deepest Access to PS			0.185			
			(0.131)			
Deepest Access to CS				0.200		
				(0.147)		
Weighted Access to PS					0.269**	
					(0.123)	
Weighted Access to CS						0.273**
						(0.123)
Constant	0.549	0.104	1.002	0.980	1.424	-0.049
	(0.474)	(0.463)	(0.820)	(0.847)	(1.443)	(1.420)
R^2	0.562	0.289	0.422	0.134	0.482	0.216
N	72	72	72	72	72	72

[1] Significance levels: *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

The models presented in Table 3.2 assume that the decision to give private sector actors access and civil society actors access are innately different decisions. The models importantly

control for the possibility that these decisions effect one another, but they are still treated as separate decisions. It is possible, even likely, however, that there are other factors that are not as easily observed as the amount of access given to the other type of nonstate actor that likely effect IOs' decisions about who to give access to. In other words, the unexplained errors of these models are likely to be correlated. To account for this possibility, I rerun each of these models using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, where the error terms of the regressions are allowed to correlate. Table 3.3 reports the results of the paired models. Results remain substantively the same. In fact, the support for the theory is even stronger: IOs that coordinate and regulate are not only expected to offer private sector actors more access, they are significantly more likely to offer civil society actors fewer access points, all else equal. Additionally, the United States' membership not only predicts lower levels of access for civil society actors, as before, but also more access points for private sector actors. Interestingly, the result for the democratic density of an IO's membership drops away for the *Count of Access Points* model, but remains strongly significant for the *Deepest Access Point* and *Weighted Access* models, suggesting that democratic members prefer giving deeper levels of access to civil society actors.

Table 3.3: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: Predicting the Breadth and Depth of Access Granted to Civil Society Actors and Private Sector Actors

Variable	(1) **Count of Access Points Civil Society** (SE)	(2) **Count of Access Points Private Sector** (SE)	(3) **Deepest Access Point Civil Society** (SE)	(4) **Deepest Access Point Private Sector** (SE)	(5) **Weighted Access Measure Civil Society** (SE)	(6) **Weighted Access Measure Private Sector** (SE)
Implement Projects	0.743***	0.101	0.723*	0.384	1.677**	0.403
	(0.230)	(0.257)	(0.383)	(0.407)	(0.753)	(0.786)
Coordinate/Regulate	-0.594**	0.816***	-0.648	1.027**	-1.849**	2.554***
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.464)	(0.474)	(0.917)	(0.896)
Democratic Density	0.722	0.005	2.294***	0.350	3.467**	0.186
	(0.479)	(0.504)	(0.842)	(0.923)	(1.639)	(1.709)
# of Member States	0.007***	-0.003	0.014***	-0.005	0.026***	-0.011
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
USA Member	-0.576**	0.480*	-1.411***	0.686	-2.728***	1.866*
	(0.274)	(0.286)	(0.475)	(0.520)	(0.930)	(0.971)
Count Access to PS	0.547**					
	(0.104)					
Count Access to CS		0.584***				
		(0.111)				
Deepest Access to PS			0.356***			
			(0.109)			
Deepest Access to CS				0.386***		
				(0.118)		
Weighted Access to PS					0.501***	
					(0.109)	
Weighted Access to CS						0.508***
						(0.110)
Constant	0.472	-0.066	0.791	0.752	1.339	-0.407
	(0.418)	(0.437)	(0.739)	(0.771)	(1.419)	(1.439)
R^2	0.530	0.530	0.403	0.403	0.451	0.451
N	72	72	72	72	72	72

[1] Significance levels: *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Overall, the theory developed in the previous chapter receives strong empirical support. When assessing both *how much* access IOs choose to offer and *to whom* they choose to give it, both

the institutional needs of the IO and the internal decision-making processes that aggregate member state preferences are important. In particular, the work of an IO shapes the value they place on nonstate actor assistance. The broader the scope of the IO's policy responsibility, the more they reach out to nonstate actors for expertise and assistance. The kind of work they engage in—whether regulation or implementation—dictates which type of nonstate actor's assistance they seek. When IOs need help implementing projects and developing policies that will be acceptable at the ground level, civil society actors are their best resource; when IOs need to develop regulation that accounts for market realities and will be accepted by international players, private sector actors provide the best assistance.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter provides strong support for the theory developed in the previous chapter. The results indicate that international organizations value different types of nonstate actor input under varying conditions. This value is determined both by the work of the organization and its own needs for information and political support, and by the preferences of member states, as structured by the organization's decision-making institutions. The empirical models offered here give three main findings: first, the broader the scope of the organization's policy portfolio, the more access points nonstate actors can expect to have. Second, organizations that primarily coordinate and regulate international activity tend to offer more access to private sector actors; while organizations that implement projects tend to give more access to civil society organizations. Third, internal bargaining structures also affect who gets access and how much access they enjoy but, importantly, do not overshadow the effect of the IO's own work.

The empirical results have several important implications for our understanding of international governance. First, the data introduced here show that nonstate actor access at international organizations is both widespread and diverse. Nearly all organizations work with nonstate actors in

some capacity. But the types of access that they allow nonstate actors, and which actors they allow in, varies greatly.

Second, they show that different nonstate actors can provide useful assistance to international organizations under different conditions. The input of civil society actors is not equivalent to the input of private sector actors. Importantly, international organizations appear capable of accessing information and support from those nonstate actors they find relevant and thereby receiving the assistance they seek without opening their doors to all types of actors. Depending on the demands of their work, international organizations value the input of civil society and private sector actors differently.

Third, different types of nonstate actors enjoy substantial access, and potentially influence, at different venues within the broader structure of international governance. That IOs most value the input of relevant nonstate actors may seem a bit functionalist and is reasonable from the organization's perspective, but it also suggests that the actors with the most to win or lose from a particular policy are those that are being provided the opportunity to potentially shape policymakers' views on the subject. If defense contractors are the only nonstate actors NATO's policymakers converse with, they will form a different picture than they might if they also regularly spoke to peace-building NGOs. While access certainly does not equate to influence, and many of the access mechanisms limit the amount of direct influence a nonstate actor could have over policy, these results still raise the concern of bias.

These empirical results provide a first step toward understanding the role of nonstate actors in shaping international policymaking processes. While they leave many questions unanswered, it is important to first understand who has access and what that access looks like before we turn toward questions of influence and bias. The following chapter provides a closer look into a few specific international organizations, qualitatively tracing the nonstate actor access they provide with a particular emphasis on understanding the organizations' decision-making mechanisms and why they chose the nonstate actor access we observe.

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Chapter 4

Examining the Mechanism: Selecting Case Studies

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe (COE) both collaborate extensively with nonstate actors, but they take divergent approaches as to *who* to work with. NATO works closely with private sector actors and a small amount with academics, while the COE allows NGOs broad access but does not give any access to private sector interests. Can these differences be explained by the theory developed in an earlier chapter? We know that empirically the theory helps to explain the broad patterns of nonstate actor access, but is it also useful for understanding the microcosms of particular cases?

The following chapters utilize two in-depth case studies to explore international organizations' rationale for offering the particular combination of nonstate actor access we observe. The quantitative analyses of the previous chapter apply the theory in broad strokes. They show that there are clear patterns in the amount of access IOs offer to nonstate actors, and which nonstate actors are allowed access under different conditions. The quantitative evidence suggests that the broader the scope of an organization's policy portfolio, the more nonstate actor access they are likely to provide. They also suggest that organizations working primarily to regulate and coordinate international activity tend to work more closely with private sector actors, while IOs implementing

projects on the ground collaborate more with civil society actors. These general patterns are useful for understanding the landscape of nonstate actor access at IOs, but do little to illuminate the decision-making rationale of particular IOs. For this level of understanding, I now turn toward qualitative explorations of two organizations. Through these two case studies, I develop a narrative about the history of nonstate actor access at IOs.

First, I explore the nonstate actor access provided at NATO. NATO is a security alliance that works almost exclusively with private sector interests. This highly skewed balance of access—toward private sector interests with only low levels of access granted to academics—sets NATO at the extreme within my sample of IOs. Relying on transcript and documentary-based evidence, I argue that NATO works primarily with private sector actors in order to access their privileged information about technological capabilities, and to coordinate the development of desired technologies. Collaboration with private sector actors allows NATO to more efficiently provide for the common defense of its members while maintaining the high level of security required of a defensive alliance.

Second, in the following chapter I explain the nonstate actor access allowed at the COE. The COE is a European organization for the promotion and protection of human rights. They collaborate exclusively but extensively with civil society actors—specifically international nongovernmental organizations. Again relying on both transcript and documentary-based evidence, I argue that NGOs provide the most useful assistance to the COE because they are able to report on local human rights conditions and help implement local projects. By working with NGOs, the COE aligns itself with likeminded organizations that broaden the reach and effectiveness of the IO's work.

These contrasting case studies provide the opportunity to analyze the varying motivations IOs have for collaborating with different types of nonstate actors at different levels. The evidence provided here offers strong support for the theory developed previously: the type of work an IO engages in leads it to benefit from collaboration with different types of nonstate actors. As a result, different nonstate actors receive access to different IOs, and other actors are excluded.

In this chapter, I detail my case selection strategy. In the following chapters, I walk through the history of nonstate actor access at NATO and the history of nonstate actor access at the COE, as well as discuss the similarities and differences of the two cases.

Case Selection

There are a variety of strategies for selecting qualitative case studies after regression. The optimal strategy depends on the goal of the case study.[1] Here, I discuss my rationale for choosing cases based on extreme values of the dependent variable.

The quantitative analyses of the previous chapter used ordinary least square regressions and seemingly unrelated regressions to analyze variation in the dependent variables—the amount of access nonstate actors enjoy at IOs, and which actors are privileged. But because of data limitations those regressions only represent a cross section of time, and are unable to fully explore all of the hypotheses developed in the theory. The following chapters use qualitative case studies to build upon these quantitative results to develop a narrative across time about the history of nonstate actor access at IOs. I explore questions such as: are there additional factors—beyond those explored in the empirical models—that are important to IOs' decisions about who to give access to and how much to allow? Does an IO's desire to generate buy in lead to additional access, as the theory predicts? How has nonstate actor access at IOs changed over time?

Nonstate actor access at IOs is a relatively newly identified phenomenon in international relations. Though many IOs have collaborated with nonstate actors for decades, it is only in the last twenty years that scholars of international relations have recognized nonstate actors as direct players in international organizations.[2] Because of this, there is—compared to other areas of international relations—relatively little known about the role of nonstate actors. Nearly all of the existing research looking at nonstate actors' efforts directly within IOs focuses on NGOs (Raustiala 1997; Dunoff

[1] For a nice overview of case selection strategy options see Seawright (2016) Chapter 4.

[2] For some early examples of work that recognizes the direct role of nonstate actors in IOs see Coen (1997); Raustiala (1997) and Dunoff (1998).

1998; Vabulas 2011; Tallberg et al. 2013).[3] Exploring the varying conditions that lead IOs to offer different *types* of nonstate actors access is, therefore, an entirely new realm of exploration.

When exploring a new area of knowledge, selecting case studies using extreme values of the dependent variable is warranted (Collier and Mahoney 1996). Though this selection method does not maintain any meaningful variation in the outcome—you must, of course, already know the outcome in order to select on it—it does allow us to search for omitted variables and alternate explanations that were not included in the quantitative analyses of the previous chapter (Seawright 2016). This is a useful strategy when researching a new area, such as the variation in the type of nonstate actor granted access at IOs (Collier and Mahoney 1996).

Seawright (2016) argues that selecting cases based on extreme values of the main independent variable can be even more useful for identifying omitted variables; however, the main independent variable in this case is categorical and does not have "extreme" cases. Of the 72 organizations in the sample, 39 are categorized as "Regulating and Coordinating" only, 11 are categorized as "Implementing Projects" only. As the coding only provides for these categorizations, along with IOs that fall in both categories and those that fall in neither, there are no true "extreme" values to select on. I therefore select my cases from the tails of the dependent variable's distribution.

In addition to allowing the identification of potential omitted variables and a deeper interrogation of the mechanisms driving IOs' choices about nonstate actor access, case studies allow for the examination of nonstate actor access at IOs over time. While the cross-sectional analyses of the previous chapter are informative, the evolution of nonstate actor involvement at the international level is interesting and deserves further exploration here. We know that, in general, nonstate actor access at IOs has become much more widespread, especially in the last 25 years (Tallberg et al. 2013), but we do not know if these trends apply equally to private sector actors and NGOs, or if one type of actor has become more common over time. Analysis of a couple cases will help us to understand the possible spectrum of how nonstate actor access at IOs has evolved over time.

[3]Tallberg et al. (2013) include both private sector actors and NGOs in their analysis but do not differentiate, and their discursive focus remains on the role of NGOs.

In order to find the extremes of offering more access to one type of actor or another, I calculated a *Weighted Access Differential* by subtracting the *Private Sector Weighted Access* from the *Civil Society Weighted Access*. This variable takes on negative values when the IO provides more access to private sector actors and positive values when civil society enjoys more access. It is useful for identifying which IOs have nonstate actor access that is skewed to one type of actor or the other, and those that provide equal amounts of access to both types of actors (values of zero). I select the cases with the most skewed balance of access—NATO on the private sector side, and the COE on the civil society side—as my case studies.

NATO offers private sector actors three types of access points, for a *Private Sector Weighted Access* of eight, and civil society only one, for a *Civil Society Weighted Access* of one. Though a few other IOs offer private sector actors four access points, none have a larger *Weighted Access Differential* between the access that they provide to private sector actors and the access given to civil society actors; NATO's nonstate actor access is the most skewed toward private sector actors of any IO in the sample. The COE provides civil society actors with three types of access, for a *Civil Society Weighted Access* of 12, while providing private sector actors with no mechanisms of formal access. Similar to NATO, though a couple IOs offer civil society actors slightly more access than the COE, they also provide private sector actors with substantial access; the COE's nonstate actor access has the largest *Weighted Access Differential* in favor of civil society actors. In line with theoretical predictions, NATO is categorized as "Regulating and Coordinating", while the COE is categorized as "Implementing Projects". The cases are therefore, as much as possible, also representative of the "extremes" of the main explanatory variable.

Table 4.1 displays all of the organizations in my sample, categorized by the type of work they engage in and then arranged according to their *Weighted Access Differential*. For reference, their values for the other dependent and independent variables used in the empirical analyses of the previous chapter are also included. You can see that NATO takes on the lowest value of *Weighted Access Differential*, signifying nonstate actor access that is most skewed toward private sector actors of any organization in the sample. The COE takes on the highest value, suggesting their

nonstate actor access is more skewed toward civil society actors than any other organization in the sample. In other respects, NATO and the COE are fairly similar. They each offer three nonstate actor access points. They both have moderate policy agenda scopes—NATO covers four issue areas and the COE covers eight. They both have highly democratic memberships—NATO's membership is coded as 93 percent democratic, while the COE's is 88 percent democratic. They both also have moderate numbers of members—NATO has 28[4] and the COE has 47—and rely on unanimous decision making. All of the European NATO members (all NATO members except Canada and the United States) are also members of the COE. The organizations differ significantly on only a couple of values: the United States is a member of NATO, but not eligible for membership in the COE, and the COE has a strong enforcement mechanism while NATO does not. In many ways NATO and the COE are comparable organizations within my sample.

[4]NATO had 28 member states in 2010, when the independent variables in my analysis represent. Montenegro joined in 2017 bringing the membership to 29.

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Regulate and Coordinate Only										
NATO	-7	8	3	4	4	0.93	28	1	1	0
COMESA	-5	5	2	4	17	0.37	19	0	1	1
OPEC	-5	5	2	3	1	0.07	12	0	1	0
Benelux	-4	4	2	3	11	0.67	3	0	1	1
OECD	-4	7	2	4	4	0.94	34	1	1	0
BIS	-4	4	1	4	2	0.87	56	1		0
EFTA	-4	4	1	4	2	0.60	4	0	1	1
NAFTA	-4	4	1	4	1	0.67	3	1	1	1
WCO	-4	11	3	5	2	0.58	176	1		0
CIS	-3	4	2	3	19	0.21	9	0	1	0
OIC	-3	3	1	3	12	0.26	56	0		0
SICA	-3	7	2	4	14	0.78	7 0	1		1
UPU	-3	7	2	4	1	0.57	191	1		0
SACU	-3	3	1	3	8	0.62	5	0		0

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table, Continued

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Regulate and Coordinate Only										
Interpol	-2	3	2	2	1	0.57	188	1		0
SCO	-1	7	2	4	13	0.11	6	0		0
EAC	-1	4	2	3	16	0.50	5	0		1
WTO	0	10	3	5	2	0.63	153	1	0	1
EEA	0	4	1	4	5	0.94	30	0		1
ICAO	0	9	3	4	1	0.57	188	1		0
OTIF	0	7	2	5	1	0.82	45	0		0
ALADI	0	0	0	0	6	0.67	12	0	1	0
WIPO	0	6	2	5	1	0.58	184	1	0	0
Mercosur	0	3	1	3	18	0.78	5	0	1	1
CCNR	0	10	3	5	3	0.75	5	0		0
CEMAC	0	0	0	0	12	0.11	6	0	1	1
NordC	0	3	1	3	17	0.71	8	0		0
GCC	0	0	0	0	11	0.11	6	0	1	0

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table, Continued

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Regulate and Coordinate Only										
AU	0	7	2	4	15	0.39	53	0		0
OAPEC	0	3	1	3	1	0.08	10	0		0
ECCAS	0	0	0	0	15	0.17	10	0		0
CAN	0	6	2	4	19	0.57	4	0	1	0
ITU	4	13	4	5	1	0.57	192	1		0
ISA	5	8	2	5	3	0.64	60	0	0	0
IMO	5	5	1	5	1	0.60	169	1	0	0
SELA	5	8	2	5	6	0.74	27	0	1	0
ASEAN	5	11	3	5	18	0.40	10	0	1	1
LOAS	9	9	3	5	12	0.14	22	0	1	1
IWhale	9	9	2	5	4	0.75	88	1	0	0
Implement Projects Only										
ComSec	0	8	2	5	11	0.61	54	0		0
CABI	0	7	2	6	5	0.67	45	0	0	0

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table, Continued

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Implement Projects Only										
OIF	0	6	2	5	5	0.50	56	0		0
SPC	1	6	3	3	14	0.64	26	1	0	0
IBRD	2	10	4	4	2	0.58	187	1	0	0
IAEA	3	6	3	3	4	0.63	151	1	0	0
GEF	4	8	3	4	4	0.60	182	1	0	0
FAO	5	13	4	5	7	0.58	191	1	0	0
OAS	5	11	4	5	13	0.75	35	1	0	1
IOM	5	9	3	5	3	0.66	127	1	0	0
COE	12	12	3	5	8	0.88	47	0	1	1
Regulate and Implement										
IMF	-4	14	4	5	4	0.58	186	1	0	0
SAARC	-4	8	3	4	14	0.44	8	0	1	0
IGAD	-1	4	2	3	12	0.25	6	0	0	0
APEC	-1	10	4	4	8	0.70	21	1		0

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table, Continued

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Regulate and Implement										
ILO	-1	12	3	6	2	0.58	183	1		0
UNWTO	0	10	3	5	3	0.55	160	0	0	0
SADC	0	8	3	4	17	0.53	15	0	1	0
PIF	0	4	2	3	14	0.50	16	0	1	1
OECS	0	4	2	3	16	0.33	7	0	1	1
EU	1	10	4	4	24	0.93	27	0	0	1
Caricom	1	8	3	4	17	0.50	15	0	1	0
ECOWAS	4	8	3	4	21	0.50	12	0	1	1
WHO	4	8	3	4	5	0.57	193	1	0	0
OSCE	4	7	2	4	8	0.78	56	1	1	0
UNIDO	5	9	3	5	4	0.56	173	0	0	0
WMO	5	6	2	5	5	0.57	189	1	0	0
UN	7	11	4	5	12	0.57	192	1	0	0
UNESCO	10	11	4	5	6	0.57	193	0	0	0

Table 4.1: Case Selection Table, Continued

IO	Weighted Access Diff.	Total Weighted Access	Count of Access Points	Deepest Access Point	Scope	Dem. Density	# of Members	USA Member	Unanimity	Enforce. Mech.
Neither Regulate nor Implement										
ESA	0	8	3	4	3	0.91	18	0	0	0
PCA	1	1	1	1	1	0.65	112	1		0
CERN	10	11	3	6	1	0.91	20	0	0	0
ICC	10	10	3	5	2	0.76	114	0	0	1

Yet, they choose to collaborate with very different types of nonstate actors. Table 4.2 displays the breakdown of access points that NATO and the COE offer to different types of nonstate actors. NATO allows private sector actors on advisory groups, conducts routine consultations with private sector actors, and collaborates with both private sector and civil society actors (academics in this case) through public-private partnerships. The COE allows civil society actors (international NGOs) to become formal observers, sit on advisory groups, and participate in consultations; they do not offer any access to private sector actors. The next chapter details the nonstate actor access offered by NATO. The COE is explored in the chapter following that.

Table 4.2: Breakdown of Access Points

IO	**Weighted Access Diff.**	**Board Members Civ. Soc.**	**Formal Observers Civ. Soc.**	**Advisory Board Civ. Soc.**	**Consultations Civ. Soc.**	**Meeting Attendance Civ. Soc.**	**PPPs Civ. Soc.**
NATO	-7	0	0	0	0	0	1
COE	12	0	1	1	1	0	0

IO	**Board Members Priv. Sec.**	**Formal Observers Priv. Sec.**	**Advisory Board Priv. Sec.**	**Consultations Priv. Sec.**	**Meeting Attendance Priv. Sec.**	**PPPs Priv. Sec.**
NATO	0	0	1	1	0	1
COE	0	0	0	0	0	0

Expectations

In addition to quantitative support offered by regression analyses in the previous chapter, we can look for support for the theory by digging deeper into specific cases. Before diving into the specifics of NATO and the COE in the following chapters, here I outline the observable implications

of the theory that we should look for when examining each organization. As discussed above, NATO and the COE are similar on many of the factors discussed in the theory. This makes them nicely comparable cases and makes it easier to attribute any differences in nonstate actor access to the ways that they do differ: namely, the nature of their work. I therefore focus my discussion on the expectations we can derive from this aspect of the theory.

The theory suggests that IOs that spend their time coordinating and regulating international behavior will rely more closely on the assistance of private sector actors, while IOs that implement projects and work directly on the ground in member states will lean on civil society actors for help. At the broadest level, if my theory is correct, we should expect to see that the COE primarily offers access to civil society and NATO to private sector actors. We know this to be true because I selected the cases based on the access they provide; however, we can dig deeper into the mechanisms at work here.

NATO works to coordinate its member states' defense capabilities and respond to crises. My theory suggests, because of these coordinating tasks, NATO should collaborate primarily with private sector actors. More specifically, my theory predicts IOs that work with private sector actors in order to access their technological expertise, learn about market conditions, and build support for policies that need the acquiescence of private sector firms to be successful. If the theory is correct, we should observe NATO offering private sector actors informational types of access that allow them to collect the expertise of included actors without ceding influence over final policy (advisory boards and/or consultations). Given that NATO coordinates at the state level and does not need direct compliance from private sector actors, they should not be seeking the third kind of support outlined by the theory; we should therefore expect to see NATO avoid giving private sector actors the types of access that give nonstate actors the ability to directly shape policy and would help generate buy in for NATO policy (board members and formal observers). The following chapter, which explores nonstate actor access at NATO, will examine these observable implications of the theory and develop an historical narrative of the development of nonstate actor access at NATO more broadly.

My theory also suggests IOs that implement projects rely on the assistance of NGOs and other civil society actors in order to get a lay of the land, make connections with local leaders, build support for their organization in the places where they work, and have additional sources of information about the conditions on the ground. If the COE is attempting to access these types of support, we should see them working with civil society in a few particular ways. First, we should observe them meeting with civil society representatives in the countries they visit; by meeting with local civil society groups, the COE can access information about current human rights conditions from a source outside the official government reports and be alerted to any new or arising issues they should bring up in their meetings with the government. Second, they should ask included civil society actors to bring information about the COE's work back to their home communities. If civil society groups act as conduits of information from the COE to their communities, their inclusion in the work of the COE can help build support for the organization and its priorities. Third, we should observe the COE offering civil society actors a variety of types of access that both facilitate the gathering of expertise from included civil society groups and bring civil society groups into the fold in ways that help them feel included and build support for the organization's work. In other words, we should see some informational types of access (advisory boards, and consultations) and some buy in-building types of access (board members, formal observers, meeting attendance, and PPPs) offered. The chapter exploring the COE's relationship with nonstate actors will examine these specific theoretical expectations, as well as provide an historical exploration of the development of nonstate actor access at the COE.

Building upon the broad exploration of the theory in the previous empirical chapter, the following two chapters use narrative exploration to help develop a deeper understanding of why IOs choose to open their doors to nonstate actors, who they choose to allow in, and the specific types of access that they decide to offer.

Chapter 5

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a political and military alliance of 29 European and North American countries.[1] The treaty establishes a system of mutual defense, wherein member countries are bound to come to the defense of one another if they are attacked. In addition to standing ready to aid one another in case of attack, NATO engages in substantial efforts to coordinate military activities amongst its members, prevent international conflict, and manage crises.

Founded in 1949, NATO was originally established to provide collective security against the Soviet Union and ensure that Europe was able to rebuild without concerns of Eastern encroachment.[2] In response to communist North Korea's invasion of South Korea, concerns of Soviet aggression increased and the United States—through NATO—reinforced its militaristic presence in Europe. In turn, the Soviet Union formed its own regional alliance—the Warsaw Treaty Organization (also commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact)—to counterbalance against NATO. Though the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have since collapsed, NATO remains an important player in coordinating international stability. It is the largest peacetime military alliance in the world (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949* 2016).

[1] As of June 5, 2017, when Montenegro became the 29th member.

[2] For more on the early history of NATO see: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato.

In recent years, NATO shifted focus toward fighting terrorism, protecting against cyber attacks, and responding to contemporaneous crises as they arise.[3] These efforts require member states' militaries to collaborate. NATO itself does not have its own standing military, and instead relies on member states' commitment of their own troops. Though decisions to begin operations require unanimity within NATO, the ultimate decision for a state to volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources to a NATO mission is voluntary. These contributed troops and equipment are placed under NATO command for a specific mission and become "NATO forces".[4] This means that troops and equipment from many countries must come together to form a new fighting body. If different states' equipment is not compatible with other states', it can lead to significant inefficiencies and coordination problems.

As an alliance of dozens of states, a primary component of NATO's work is coordinating the defense capabilities of member states, such that they can be utilized in harmony for the greater defense. Defense coordination has always been complex; soldiers speak different languages, have different weapons and tools, are used to different command structures and working processes. As defense technology has become increasingly complicated and technical, this coordination has become even more difficult. For instance, NATO must now ensure that the different missile and radar systems across its many member states can integrate. Cyber defense systems must also be able to speak to one another while simultaneously protecting each country's classified information. In line with this work, NATO is coded as "Coordinating and Regulating" in my quantitative dataset. Successful navigation of all of the coordination challenges NATO faces requires an understanding of the complex technical capabilities of different resources. The private sector firms responsible for engineering and developing these technologies are priceless resources for assisting NATO's coordination efforts.

[3]For instance, NATO has been active in fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and has assisted with the recent refugee crisis in Europe. For more information on recent NATO activities see: https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/126169.htm, and https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. For more on the role of NATO in the 21st century, see Sandler and Hartley (1999).

[4]NATO itself only owns a fleet of Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) surveillance aircraft. For all other troop and equipment needs, the organization relies on contributions from member states. For more see: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_50316.htm.

Achieving coordination across so many different militaries and each of their individual systems requires NATO to have both its own integrated military leadership structure and a bureaucratic leadership structure to coordinate defense procurement, nuclear planning, and political responses to military crises. These bureaucracies in turn have a series of mechanisms for collaborating with outside actors—including non-member states, other international organizations such as the United Nations, and nonstate actors—to help them develop coordinated defense systems, bring together disparate actors, and anticipate future needs.

In 2013, NATO released a formal "Framework for NATO-Industry Engagement".[5] This document outlines the goals of NATO's interactions with industry actors, and establishes principles to guarantee that the organization's collaboration with nonstate actors is beneficial and safe for all parties. These principles include that NATO-industry interactions should be: controlled by NATO member states, voluntary on the part of industry representatives and member states, transparent, inclusive, and of mutual benefit to all parties (NATO 2013, 4). This statement suggests that NATO cares about limiting the influence of the nonstate actors they allow in and keeping control in the hands of member states, all while creating a mutually beneficial arrangement that incentivizes nonstate actors to share their relevant expertise. Based on these principles, a variety of access mechanisms have developed at NATO. Each of these access points is detailed in the following sections.

Committees

One mechanism through which international organizations, such as NATO, can collaborate with nonstate actors is by establishing advisory committees. These committees can serve a variety of purposes and be formatted in many ways. For instance, they can be made up entirely of outside nonstate actors, or they can be a blended group of member state representatives, IO bureaucrats, and nonstate actors. The committees' agenda can be driven by the IO—for example, the IO can "commission" reports on specific topics from the committee in order to get advice and expertise on

[5] Available at: https://diweb.hq.nato.int/indrel/Shared%20Documents/FNIE_Brochure.pdf.

a particular issue—or the committee itself can have the independence to report on issues that its members feel are important to the IO. This second set-up gives the committee more agenda-setting capability than the first. Nonstate actor advisory committees serve as an efficient way for IOs to gather expertise, especially since they require nonstate actor experts—who may hold different opinions on a topic—to work together to come to a consensus opinion to submit to the IO. This saves the IO's bureaucrats from having to sort through and collate multiple positions and potentially conflicting advice. Committees can also help nonstate actors feel involved in the policymaking process, which gives them a stake in the success of the policy and makes them more invested in the work of the IO. NATO itself has a handful of formal advisory committees established through which they access the expertise and support of private sector actors.

NATO Industrial Advisory Group

Dating back to 1968, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) is a high-level consultative and advisory body made up of senior executives of defense companies from NATO member countries. Operating under the Conference to National Armament Directors (CNAD), the senior NATO committee responsible for promoting armaments cooperation amongst member states, the NIAG provides advice and expertise on a wide variety of industrial matters (*NIAG Homepage* 2019). It was founded to "ensure that the industrial viewpoint and technological development could inform the work of NATO and to help stimulat[e] better and more cost[-]effective armaments cooperation" (L. Foissey, personal correspondence, 9 Jan 2019). The NIAG originally provided analysis from an industry perspective on topics that CNAD requested. Since 2013 they have also been writing unsolicited reports on topics they want to bring to broader attention, and they now offer advice to NATO more broadly beyond CNAD (*NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)* 2019).

The NIAG is made up of high level executives from NATO member states and partner countries. Each member state has a "Head of Delegation" who gets to select the other industrial representatives. Different countries have different processes for choosing their members, but all members "hold positions of responsibility in companies engaged in defence and security activities

and/or national defence and security industry associations or federations" (*Introduction* 2019). According to the U.S. NIAG Delegation Handbook, these representatives should be of the President, Senior Vice President, or Vice President level (U.S. Department of Defense 2001). The plenary body of the NIAG meets three times each year to approve reports and coordinate smaller working groups that specialize in specific topics. Each NATO country is allowed to send up to four delegates to the plenary sessions, but many have extra members to ensure they will be able to have full representation at every meeting (U.S. Department of Defense 2001).

Though the industry representatives from each country are independent, in practice, they often coordinate their positions with their state's defense department. For instance, the United States' delegation typically has a coordinating meeting amongst themselves, and, when useful, military personnel, before each plenary session of the NIAG. These meetings are held at the Pentagon, signaling the Department of Defense's (DOD) clear desire for their support of U.S. policy. The United States' handbook for delegates states, "The U.S. Delegation, like those of other NATO countries, has the latitude to express its industry views, not necessarily those of the government. While this gives the U.S. Delegation a certain degree of autonomy, historically the views of the Delegation have been supportive of DOD" (U.S. Department of Defense 2001, 3). This suggests a thinly veiled expectation that the U.S. delegation to the NIAG tow the line and represent the preferences of the United States' policymakers.

It is also commonplace for industry representatives that sit on the advisory board to report back to their domestic governments and militaries. For instance, the U.S. delegation is expected to provide the DOD with information on the "defense material cooperation among NATO nations; United States defense industry issues; and bilateral and other multilateral defense material issues, projects, and initiatives of interest to the U.S. worldwide" (U.S. Department of Defense 2001, 3). In this way, the nonstate actor advisory board provides NATO's member states with a third party monitor of other member states' behavior and capabilities. Industry representatives on the NIAG may share different information with one another than their countries' NATO representatives, and thus provide an additional source of information about a state's co-member states.

NATO receives a few clear benefits from the NIAG. First, NATO values the access to industrial 'know-how' that the NIAG provides (*Benefits of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)* 2019). The expertise provided covers new and emerging technology, the state of global markets for defense products, and strategic knowledge about coordinating NATO's response to crises and presenting a solid defensive front. In order to remain up-to-date in their expertise, the NIAG's membership has changed over time to include newly relevant industries. For example, in the last two decades, cyber security has become a critical component of combat and defense. In response to this emerging threat, the NIAG began including representatives from cyber security firms and internet service providers. This broader membership led to the production of reports such as "Private Sector Contribution to Cyber Defence Action Plan" and "Transatlantic Defence Technological and Industrial Cooperation" (NATO 2019). Second, the NIAG provides NATO with formal reports on capability development activities (*Benefits of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG)* 2019). These technical reports are written by specialized work groups under the NIAG, which are typically made up of engineers and scientists employed by the NIAG representatives' companies. They provide technical advice on transatlantic industrial cooperation, achieving NATO interoperability, and building public-private partnerships; and answer questions such as "What is the current state-of-the-art on the topic of the study?", "What does future technology offer?", "What is practical, achievable, and affordable?", and "What is the best way to achieve interoperability?" (*Introduction* 2019).

In return for providing their advice and expertise, industry representatives who participate in the NIAG also get a series of benefits (*Introduction* 2019). First, they gain access to NATO officials and member states, and are able to work collaboratively with these government and IO workers. This provides opportunities for private sector representatives to talk with NATO policymakers and share their opinions, while also gaining insight into their plans. Second, participation in the NIAG provides ample opportunity for networking with NATO governments—who may become customers—and industry representatives from other member states—who may be competitors or technological collaborators. A NIAG representative from a major US defense contractor I spoke

with said that this can be particularly important for connecting with smaller NATO member states. Third, participating in the NIAG imparts a deeper understanding of NATO's current and future capability needs. According to that same NIAG representative, participation in the NIAG does not make a firm more likely to win a NATO bid, but it does provide insight into what NATO is doing, how they think, and how they approach projects. Though industry representatives are not supposed to use this privileged information to take advantage of competitors that do not participate in the NIAG, it is understood that "no-one can be expected to forget what he has seen or heard" (U.S. Department of Defense 2001, 9). The NIAG adopted a "Moral Code" at its plenary meeting on April 29, 1969, soon after its founding, which aims to guide members on the appropriate way to handle the privileged position they often find themselves in as a result of their participation. While they are not supposed to take advantage of this, the privileged information members receive through participation in the NIAG may be a substantial benefit. These perks incentivize high level defense industry executives to devote their time and resources to sharing their expertise with NATO through the NIAG.

The diversity of membership on the NIAG helps to keep final reports balanced and neutral. One might worry, for instance, that the self-proposed reports could be used by private sector firms to push their particular niche technology. Jeffrey Kohler, a former member of the United States' NIAG delegation, says that this is, at times, indeed the case, but that "other companies would join [the committee] to ensure the effort was prepared and presented in a neutral way" (J. Kohler, personal communication, September 19, 2018). Though all of the members of the NIAG represent a corporate perspective, because they come from competitive firms, at times their interests offset one another to provide NATO with a balanced report. At other times, however, their interests align to push a generalized corporate defense agenda. For instance, in our conversation, Mr. Kohler stated that the NIAG as a whole "had significant concerns over the erosion of the NATO industrial base" given that the "current state of national defense spending that is generally below NATO goals" (J. Kohler, personal communication, September 19, 2018). In these times, when the agendas of all the industry members of the NIAG align, NATO may receive information that pushes an

industry-centric worldview, and, importantly, this is not counterbalanced by any collaboration or consistent conversation with other sectors of society.

The NIAG is NATO's longest standing institutionalized mechanism for collaborating with nonstate actors. For five decades it has served as a conduit for information from business executives who understand the defense market and the direction of technological advance to NATO policymakers. And it has provided defense industry executives with the opportunity to liaison with NATO policymakers and other high-level executives.

Industrial Resources and Communications Services Group

While the NIAG is the most established consultative branch of NATO, policymakers also gather private sector actors' expertise through a series of other advisory groups. For instance, the Industrial Resources and Communications Services Group (IRCSG) advises NATO on best practices in the area of civil communications and ways to improve national communications resilience (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018, 5). In addition to providing information directly to NATO policymakers, the IRCSG is available to support civil and military contractors in their work for NATO.

The IRCSG reports directly to NATO's Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC). The CEPC is NATO's top advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and works to coordinate civil resources toward NATO's objectives (*Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC)* 2019). The CEPC advises the North Atlantic Council on a variety of issues relating to civil preparedness within member states—preparedness for terrorist attacks, natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and more. In pursuit of these goals, the CEPC brings together member states' governments, military representatives, and industry experts. The CEPC interfaces with industry representatives through the IRCSG.

In the protection of civil infrastructure and citizens, private sector actors can be critical allies. Industry representatives have insider information about the state of local conditions and technological weaknesses. They provide NATO with important expertise about member states'

levels of preparedness and weaknesses. For example, the IRCSG recently wrote a report on "ageing infrastructure and vulnerabilities to computer technology applied in process control systems" and a report on "best practices in Electricity, Gas, and Oil Critical Infrastructure Protection" (Jahier 2017). These are topics that are important to NATO's efforts to secure member countries from attack and on which private sector actors have unique insight. By harnessing their expertise through the IRCSG, NATO is able to take advantage of particularized knowledge that would otherwise be costly for bureaucrats to gather.

NAtional Technical EXperts

Another committee, the National Technical Experts (NATEX) plays a unique role in the NATO bureaucracy. These industry representatives are appointed by their home government and act as liaisons between NATO and their home business communities. They work directly with the NATO Communications and Information Agency to help companies from their home state work with NATO. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen described their role as "liais[oning] with national governments and industry about opportunities and facilitat[ing] engagement with the [NATO Communications and Information] Agency" (Scaruppe 2014). Each NATO member state has at least one NATEX representative, though some states opt to have multiple (Scaruppe 2014; The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service 2015).

NATEX representatives play a dual role. First, NATEX members act as representatives of their home states' industry. They liaison to help NATO understand the capabilities of their nation's industry, and to help companies understand NATO's needs. Second, they serve as a single point of entry for their nation's business interests that want NATO contracts. Each country's NATEX works with their businesses to prepare contract bids and can provide inside information to help their home companies win the contract. For instance, the Canadian Trade Commissioner's website suggests that "The NATEX can be helpful in assisting with matters such as particular sensitivities and "hot-buttons" that "you're not going to see on a request-for-proposals". For example, there might be dissatisfaction with the previous service provider" (The Canadian Trade

Commissioner Service 2015). Working with their country's NATEX can also help smaller companies navigate the complicated NATO procurement process (The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service 2015). This inside information—though theoretically available to any company through their own country's NATEX—helps resourceful private sector companies make competitive bids and win NATO contracts. The NATEX role is therefore an important one; having a good NATEX representative can help a country's defense industry win large contracts, a huge financial boon.

Consultations

In addition to formal advisory committees, NATO regularly consults with private sector actors through a variety of interfaces. Consultations allow NATO to access relevant expertise from private sector actors without the bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to maintain advisory committees. Each of these opportunities for collaboration are outlined here.

Framework for Collaborative Interaction

The primary way that NATO consults with industry is through the Framework for Collaborative Interaction (FFCI). The FFCI was proposed at the Allied Command Transformation Industry Day in 2008 and, after being well-received, formally established in 2009.[6] The FFCI provides a framework for collaborating with both private sector industry actors and academia on non-procurement related topics of capability development. These interactions can take place at a variety of levels of depth, depending on what both NATO and the involved nonstate actors feel is necessary (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018).

The FFCI framing document and website lay out the deepening levels of involvement: Level 0 includes non-focused interactions, where no special agreement between actors is necessary. Examples of Level 0 interactions are informal meetings, and presentations by industry actors at the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Industry Day. Level 1 interactions explore specific

[6]More on NATO's various industry days below. For more on the initial proposal see: https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/id/ffci_booklet.pdf.

capability problems and may require an agreement to protect background information before proceeding. In this type of collaboration, the nonstate actors may provide NATO with advice on whether or not it is feasible to develop a particular capability. Level 2 interactions are limited scope collaborative activities to address specific issues within a capability development area, and require an agreement to protect basic information. Examples of Level 2 contributions from industry actors include assessments of the range of potential solutions to a capability problem, and collaborative work to ensure interoperability of domestic militaries' systems with NATO systems. This might occur through NIAG studies, workshop meetings, or panel discussions. Level 3 interactions are "collaborative projects between ACT and industry to facilitate concept development and enable both ACT and industry to benefit from practical testing, demonstration or experimentation of potential capability solutions" (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018). Examples of this level of collaboration include field trials of capability solutions, and assessment of feasibility of prototype solutions. This depth of interaction through the FFCI is still developing, and thus still requires that nonstate actors contribute through their home member state; however, the FFCI is working to host these collaborations directly in the future. Finally, the FFCI hopes to someday include Level 4 interactions that would include collaborative "discovery" projects related to capability development. These deep collaborations might include co-designing and constructing new capabilities (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018). These varying depths of collaboration are displayed in Figure 5.1.

The FFCI's framing memo lays out a clear set of 13 principles around which the work of the FFCI must be conducted. These principles are: Integrity, Fairness and openness, Transparency, "Costs lie where they fall"—indicating that nonstate actors will cover any financial cost of their participation themselves—, Mutual benefits, Value for effort, Fair treatment and positive partnering, Professional proficiency, Accountability, Uniformity, Responsiveness, Security, and that NATO must retain full decision-making power throughout the collaborative process (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018). These principles indicate that while NATO is interested in creating deeper opportunities for collaboration with nonstate actors, they recognize the importance



(a) Types of Collaboration

(b) Levels of Collaboration

Figure 5.1: Levels of Nonstate Actor Collaboration through the FFCI

Figures sourced from the *Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* (2018).

of maintaining autonomy and avoiding impropriety. Even in the deepest forms of collaboration they envision occurring through the FFCI, NATO remains the final arbiter of decisions; decision-making power is never delegated to nonstate actors.

Collaboration through the FFCI is designed to be mutually beneficial for NATO, member states, and academic and private sector contributors. NATO and its member states receive three main benefits from FFCI collaboration: first, they gain the ability to develop improved capabilities that are specifically formulated for their needs and priorities; second, they gain accelerated capability development that ensure industry partners are ready with necessary technology when the need arises; and third, they enjoy reduced costs when joint solutions to common problems across member states can be found (*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018). Benefits to academic and private sector industry partners fall in five main categories: first, they receive increased knowledge of NATO and NATO member states' priorities for future R&D; second, they are able to develop solutions that better fit member states'—their customers'—requirements which increases their competitiveness and market prospects; third, they are able to influence NATO's capability development; fourth, by working collaboratively, they may be able to identify new areas of application for technologies they already have; and fifth, they are able to be more efficient in their product development because they can focus more exclusively on real military requirements

(*Framework for Collaborative Interaction Homepage* 2018). These benefits incentivize both academic and private sector actors to work with NATO to solve problems facing the alliance and member states. Though the collaborations facilitated through the FFCI are not related to procurement, they are still mutually beneficial.

Consultations with NATO Committees

Industry actors can also participate in NATO policymaking tangentially through committees that are not made up of nonstate actors. For instance, the CNAD organizes their armaments strategy through three "Main Armaments Groups" (MAGs)—Army, Air Force and Naval. Each of these MAGs and their respective subgroups are responsible for all activities in their area of armament and report directly to the higher CNAD council. Industry is included for advisory purposes both indirectly through the NIAG, and also through consultation directly between the MAG and relevant industry representatives during MAG meetings (CNAD 2000; NATO 2013; CNAD 2016).

Another example is the NATO Security Committee. Similarly, this committee is made up of representatives from member states' National Security Authorities, not private sector actors themselves (NATO 2011). However, the Security Committee interfaces with outside private sector actors when relevant topics come up. Neither the CNAD MAGs or the Security Committee are made up of private sector actors, as other advisory committees previously discussed such as the NIAG, but they provide additional opportunities for private sector actors to interface with NATO policymakers.

Events and Conferences

In addition to collaborating with private sector and academic actors in a more ongoing manner throughout the year, as described above, NATO hosts a variety of "Industry Days" and conferences that bring together NATO policymakers and private sector actors.

NATO-Industry Forum

The NATO-Industry Forum is one such conference. First launched in 2013, the NATO-Industry Forum brings private sector executives together with NATO policymakers for an annual two-day summit. This forum provides high-level industry representatives the opportunity to share their opinions on how best to facilitate more useful cooperation between NATO and industry (*NATO-Industry Forum* 2018). The forum includes both keynote speakers—from the private sector and from NATO—and smaller break-out sessions on specific topics where private sector executives can have more intimate conversations with NATO policymakers about topics relevant to their expertise or interests.[7]

The smaller issue-specific break-out sessions provide private sector executives the opportunity to share their expertise with high-level NATO policymakers, as well as liaison with other members of industry to identify collaborative opportunities. In addition to the NATO-Industry Forum being an opportunity for NATO to consult with private sector experts, it is a chance for private sector companies to gain insight into the needs and priorities of NATO's future procurement schedule. NATO recognizes that "for industry to contribute effectively to NATO capabilities they require an understanding of the Alliance's plans and vision, an idea of the budget likely to be available and an indication of the commitment to pursue innovative solutions" (*NATO-Industry Forum* 2018). The NATO-Industry Forum is one mechanism through which private sector actors can gain knowledge about NATO's priorities.

Multiple day forums such as this, with hosted lunches, evening receptions, and a common hotel—in addition to all of the formal conference meetings—foster a collegial environment that allows for casual interactions between private sector actors and NATO policymakers. An executive of a large US defense contractor I spoke with suggested that the most valuable part of the NATO-Industry Forum was getting access to people you otherwise would not have the opportunity to speak with and said that most of the interesting conversation happens "offstage". The depth of access provided by these conversations in hallways or over a glass of wine is difficult to measure, but they

[7]For an example forum agenda see: https://act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2018/nif/20180831_agenda.pdf.

certainly provide an additional level of access—and potentially influence—that is not available to firms that are not present at the forum. While small and medium enterprises are welcome to attend the NATO-Industry Forum, the barriers to their attendance—both financial and logistical—are larger than for large firms that already have an established relationship with NATO. Firms with existing relationships enjoy renewed rapport with NATO bureaucrats and member states' representatives. In this way, NATO-hosted conferences provide formal informational benefits to both NATO and private sector actors, as well as more casual networking opportunities.

Industry Days and Procurement Seminars

In addition to the newer NATO-Industry Forum, different branches of NATO host a series of Industry Days throughout the year (NATO 2013). These events allow different branches of NATO to liaison with relevant private sector actors, sharing their goals with industry and receiving expert advice from the private sector representatives. The specific goals of the Industry Days vary based on the mission of the hosting agency. For example, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) host an annual industry day "specifically dedicated to the development of information exchange and cooperation," alerting industry representatives of command, control, and communication projects that NATO hopes to fund in the next 18 months (NATO 2013, p. 6).

As another example, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) also hosts industry-specific industry days where they provide "insight to industry representatives from NATO and partner countries on future requirements in these business areas and solicit industry participation in proposing potential capability solutions (NATO 2013, p. 6). NATO's various Centers of Excellence also organize industry days that bring together NATO members and industry experts to gain understanding about the latest technological advancements (NATO 2013, p. 6).

Other NATO agencies host virtual conferences that allow private sector actors and academics to consult with NATO at a lower cost. For example, the NCIA Technology Watch is a regular virtual event that brings together private sector representatives and NATO bureaucrats to discuss and consult on technological topics (NATO 2013, p. 6).

Exercises

The final way that NATO collaborates with outside nonstate actors is through joint exercises. For example, the Coalition Warfare Interoperability Experiment provides "a venue for testing and evaluating NATO and nations' interoperability" with respect to their Command, Control, Communications, and other defense technologies (NATO 2013, p.6). Private sector actors are often present at these multi-nation exercises to provide logistical support, observe what types of technology would make the process smoother, and assist with the coordination of defense capabilities.

Discussion

NATO's formal non-procurement relations with the private sector date back five decades. Today, the NATO-nonstate actor collaborative environment is complex and broad in terms of the types of collaboration and the depth of access; however, the range of actors allowed access at NATO remains quite narrow. Primarily, NATO liaisons with private sector actors, as well as occasional contact with academia. NGOs receive no formal avenues of access NATO policymakers directly through the Alliance.[8]

In conversations with both NATO bureaucrats and private sector firms' representatives at NATO, NATO's collaboration with industry is generally regarded as successful. NATO primarily sees it as an opportunity to gather information from relevant industry actors. Additionally, NATO uses contact with industry to get the private sector on board with longterm plans, ensuring the Alliance will have the technological support it needs in the future. Private sector companies gain insight into NATO's priorities—insight which can inform their product development decisions—and gain the opportunity to network with government representatives who may otherwise be difficult to access. They also make connections with other companies working on similar products that may be

[8]Other actors could still plausibly influence NATO policy decisions by lobbying their domestic government to represent their views within NATO.

either their competition or possible collaborators on future projects. Collaborations between NATO and industry are mutually beneficial.

Though side conversations between industry, NATO bureaucrats, and member state representatives certainly occur, the formal mechanisms of access are routinely utilized. When NATO wants the opinion and expertise of the private sector, they reach out to the NIAG to commission a report. When the private sector feels NATO is neglecting an important issue, they present it at the next Industry Days or generate an NIAG report and send it to the relevant branch of NATO. Though these formal avenues of access limit the direct influence of individual private sector actors, they still respect them as a useful way to interact with the NATO Alliance.

This case study provides three important insights. First, the nature of NATO's work—coordinating member states' defense capabilities and responses to crises—makes the Alliance value the expertise and support of private sector firms. The balance of access they choose to provide to nonstate actors reflects this evaluation: nearly all access is given to private sector firms.

Second, the formal access that NATO provides to private sector firms is well structured to achieve its goals. NATO receives the information and support it seeks but does not relinquish control over policy decisions; private sector firms do not expect to influence policy and are therefore happy to participate in exchange for limited insights into NATO's decision-making processes and networking opportunities. The idea that "the engagement with industry, whether in the competitive or non-competitive phase has to follow strict rules to protect a level playing field" (L. Foissey, personal correspondence, 9 Jan. 2019), articulated by one NATO bureaucrat I spoke with, was reiterated across all my conversations with both NATO employees and private sector representatives; it seems that everyone respects that interactions between nonstate actors and NATO will take place within strict guidelines that limit the individual influence of any one firm.

Finally, despite the general regard for the success of NATO-industry relations, the limited breadth of nonstate actors that are allowed access to NATO call into question the assertion that nonstate actor access at IOs increases democratic accountability. NATO clearly receives important informational inputs from their contact with nonstate actors, but they do not receive a balanced

view of the world; instead, they hear the view of a select group of defense contractors. While the expertise of these actors helps NATO make informed policy decisions, it does not provide for the dissemination of information about NATO's activities back to member states' citizens; there is no "check" on NATO's behavior and their level of transparency is not increased. While increasing democratic responsiveness is only one possible benefit of nonstate actor access at IOs, it is important to be careful of how we describe relations between IOs and nonstate actors. Not all access is created equally; just because an IO works with nonstate actors does not mean they will be more accountable.

Chapter 6

The Council of Europe

This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of nonstate actors' access at the Council of Europe (COE). In contrast to NATO's heavily private sector-weighted access, the COE formally collaborates exclusively, but extensively, with international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). As a human rights organization, the COE works with member states to improve human rights conditions on-the-ground, runs trainings and programs, and monitors member states' compliance. These efforts rely on the input and assistance of relevant INGOs for their success. As a result, the COE provides INGOs with a highly institutionalized form of participation and has integrated them—at least on paper—into nearly every aspect of the organization's workings. The COE's relations with INGOs have not, however, always been this extensive or formally institutionalized. In this chapter, I trace the development of INGO access at the COE over time. By building a historical narrative about the access that nonstate actors receive, we gain greater understanding of the COE's incentives for providing access and their decision-making processes surrounding who they choose to allow in, and, conversely, who they exclude.

The Council of Europe is a regional international organization made up of 47 European countries. Similar to NATO, the COE was founded in 1949. Its mission is to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law throughout its member states and the world (*Council of Europe: Values* 2018). The COE pursues these goals through a variety of means. Its members are party to

a series of international conventions including the Convention on Cybercrime, the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, and the European Convention on Human Rights. It also monitors member states' progress toward the organization's goals through independent expert monitoring bodies, and has a group of constitutional experts that offer legal advice to countries around the world (*Council of Europe: Values* 2018).

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is perhaps the most well-known branch of the COE. Originally founded in 1959, this court enforces the European Convention on Human Rights and has direct jurisdiction over the COE's member states. Though the ECHR forms the cornerstone of the COE, it is only one of the COE's numerous tangible achievements and processes for monitoring member states' compliance. For example, all members of the organization have successfully banned the death penalty. This is now a precondition of accession for any prospective members (*Council of Europe: Achievements* 2018). Independent monitoring serves as another example of success: the COE expects its member states to uphold high standards of human rights and democratic processes, and requires all member states to be subject to independent monitoring. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture makes unannounced visits to prisons and other detention centers in member states to observe how detained individuals are treated (*Council of Europe: Achievements* 2018). The COE also runs a series of programs in member states on specific topics. For instance, in defense of cultural diversity, the organization has organized teacher trainings, hosts an annual dialogue with religious communities and representatives of non-religious beliefs, and has developed a set of tools to improve language teaching. To promote free and open democracy, the COE's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities provides election monitoring services (*Council of Europe: Achievements* 2018). These are just a few examples of the many ways the COE implements their values on the ground. In line with their work product, the COE is coded as *Implementing Projects* in my dataset.

The implementation and monitoring that the COE engages in benefits from the assistance of civil society. As a component of their work toward inclusive democracy, the protection of human rights, and strong rule of law, the COE works extensively with civil society. In particular, they work

with a body of over 300 INGOs that provide a link between the COE and European citizens. Over time, this collaboration has become formally institutionalized as the Conference of International Non-governmental Organizations of the Council of Europe. Today, the Conference of INGOs is an official branch of the COE and plays an ongoing and extensive role in the organization. On paper, it provides NGOs the opportunity for broad access to the policy development and implementation processes of the COE. However, many powerful NGOs find it ineffective and prefer to work directly with COE bureaucrats. Private sector actors, in contrast, are not allowed any access, whether formal or informal. The following sections develop the history of the Conferences of INGOs to explore the access that nonstate actors enjoy at the COE.

Consultative Status: The Early Days 1952-1975

NGOs were first granted consultative status at the COE in 1952, just three years after the founding of the COE. Prior to 1952, the COE had irregular meetings with civil society organizations but these interactions were given greater formality through the establishment of a formal Consultative Status. This early demarcation was a first step toward formalizing civil society access at the COE. The COE was only the second IO to grant civil society organizations formal status, following the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Härtel 2016, 553).

This early form of consultative status required NGOs to register with the COE prior to becoming involved in IO proceedings (Härtel 2016, 553). These consultations were, though formalized for their time, still fairly ad hoc by modern standards. Specifically, the Committee of Ministers Resolution stated that, "The Committee of Ministers may, on behalf of the Council of Europe, make suitable arrangements for consultation with international non-governmental Organisations which deal with matters that are within the competence of the Council of Europe" (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1951). Though lacking in detail, this resolution represented a huge step toward institutionalizing nonstate actor access at IOs.

The next step toward deeper institutionalization came in 1972, when the Committee of Ministers agreed on a new resolution outlining a more formal consultative status for INGOs and

creating an Advisory Council made up of INGOs. The resolution outlines how INGOs may apply to be included on the list of approved organizations, and the responsibilities and privileges associated with inclusion (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1972). These activities include being allowed to "provide information, documentation and advice" to the Secretary General, giving "maximum publicity to Council initiatives or achievements of Europe in the fields of their competence", and allowing COE Secretariat observers at their meetings (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1972). These directions suggest that the COE hoped to gain advantage both from access to the NGOs' expertise and from their ability to build local support for the organization's work.

Though this change represented a large increase in the formal opportunities for civil society organizations to address the COE, some argue that the new Consultative Status created more obligations than rights (Härtel 2016, 553). Civil society organizations were expected to support the work of the COE and represent its efforts back to their home communities—in other words, they were expected to give their political support and buy in—without getting any concrete form of influence over policy in return. These limitations remain concerns about COE cooperation with civil society today (Härtel 2016, 554).

The Beginnings of a Formal Conference: 1976-2002

The first steps toward a formal Conference of INGOs were taken in 1975, when COE "Secretary General, Georg Kahn-Ackermann, invited the some 130 INGOs which had consultative status at that time to organise themselves so that they could have a common representation with the different bodies of the Council of Europe" (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). According to Dr. Anna Rurka, the current President of the Conference of INGOs, NGOs understood that they had a bigger voice if they worked together instead of individually and thus worked to organize themselves and provide a platform for their collaboration with the COE. This resulted in a series of working group meetings of INGOs on how best to organize themselves

into a useful, collaborative body that could both assist the COE with achieving its goals and help NGOs feel heard and included in the policy process.

The first attempt at institutionalized INGO representation at the COE took the form of the "INGO Liaison Committee" (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). This committee had 15 members who were elected by mail-in ballot from amongst the INGOs that had consultative status in 1976. However, this committee's institutionalized representation of INGOs soon expanded. The Liaison Committee quickly proposed a "Plenary Conference of INGOs" and this Conference met in January of 1977 to adopt its first Rules of Procedure (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). Within a year, the COE Committee of Ministers formally recognized the Conference of INGOs as an institution of the COE and granted it an official secretariat, access to meeting rooms at COE headquarters, and interpretation services at its meetings (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). Over the next few decades, the institutionalization of INGOs as an influential aspect of COE policymaking and project implementation continued.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a joint Parliamentary Assembly-INGO Committee was established (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). This Committee brought together nine members each from the COE's parliamentary committee and the INGO Liaison committee to improve information sharing and other relations between civil society and the COE.

The Conference of INGOs began to gain some financial independence from the COE in the 1990s, when it set up a voluntary contribution system paid by member INGOs (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). This allowed the Conference to operate with more freedom because they are no longer limited to activities that the COE was willing to fund; however it still also relies on COE funding for much of its work.

Overall, this period was a time of expansion and deepening for relations between the COE and civil society. This expansion was made possible because of COE Secretary Generals who were interested in deeper collaboration with NGOs, but the more formal institutionalization was driven by

the initiative of NGOs themselves in an attempt to have more impact—one might say influence—in exchange for their involvement. By the end of this era, civil society actors had a formal venue for collaborating with one another and with the COE, and were able to leverage this institution to engage in conversation with the COE about a wide range of topics.

Consultative Status and the Conference of INGOs: 2003-Present

In 2003, the Council of Europe increased the depth of the INGO's role in COE policymaking by transitioning Conference members from "consultative status" to "participatory status" (*The history of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe* 2017). This participatory status allows INGOs to serve on steering committees, expert committees, and other policymaking bodies throughout the Council of Europe. The Conference of INGOs was formally recognized as one of the "Four Pillars" of the COE in 2005, providing information, monitoring, and implementation, as well as helping the COE be more democratically responsive to its member states' citizens and their needs (*Conference of INGOs* 2018).

In addition to clarifying the relations between INGOs and the different COE bodies, the 2003 changes created an Advisory Council on Youth made up of 30 youth sector NGOs, and allowed some INGOs to receive "special participatory status" such that they are now allowed to lodge collective complaints under the European Social Charter (Härtel 2016, 553). Local civil society organizations that do not qualify for membership in the Conference of INGOs are also now able to get "observer status" if they are deemed relevant to local and regional authorities related to the COE (Härtel 2016, 553).

In 2016, the COE Committee of Ministers released an updated resolution outlining the role of the Conference of INGOs, the conditions that INGOs must meet in order to be granted participatory status, and the procedures for granting and rescinding participatory status. Organizations that are granted participatory status are allowed to submit memoranda directly to the Secretary General, have access to the Parliamentary Assembly's documents, and are encouraged to participate in COE activities (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international*

non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe 2016). Additionally, they are expected to be goodwill ambassadors for the COE's work within their home communities, publicize the work of the COE to their constituencies, and report on their activities to the Secretary General (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe* 2016). The Committee of Ministers remains insulated from direct civil society access.

To be granted participatory status, INGOs must meet a series of conditions including having a democratic governance structure, having members in at least five COE member states, and having been in existence for at least two years prior to application (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe* 2016).[1] Other conditions for membership closely reflect the reasoning for nonstate actor-IO collaboration developed in this project's theory. For instance, approved INGOs must be "particularly representative in the field(s) of their competence, fields of action shared by the Council of Europe" and must be "capable of contributing to and participating actively in Council of Europe deliberations and activities" (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe* 2016, Appendix Section 2.e and 2.i). These conditions suggest that the Committee of Ministers wanted to specifically limit the approved INGOs to those actors that could provide useful information and assistance to the COE. Approved organizations must also be "able to make known the work of the Council of Europe to society" (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe* 2016, Appendix Section 2.j). This last condition highlights the role civil society organizations can play in building local support for IOs' work and the information-disseminating mechanism that IO's can tap into by including civil society organizations in their policy development process. Despite these relatively stringent conditions for membership, multiple representatives of human rights organizations I spoke with suggested that the broad membership of the Conference of INGOs made it less effective because many organizations that are not primarily related to the

[1] A full list of conditions is available in Section 2 of the Appendix to CM/RES(2016)3, available here: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=090000168068824c.

promotion of human rights are included and dilute their message. More than 300 INGOs now enjoy formal participatory status at the COE.[2]

Other Access Mechanisms

In addition to working directly through the Conference of INGOs, the Council of Europe interacts with civil society actors in more direct, ad hoc ways. These consultations happen both at the COE headquarters in Strasbourg and on the ground in member states during site visits. They are typically individual interactions between specific NGOs and one or more COE officials. According to multiple officials I spoke with, consultations are a critical way for the COE to receive information from civil society. They provide the opportunity for civil society to alert COE officials of local problems, offer a counterpart to what member state governments say or do, and give an additional source of information from which COE officials can base their own conclusions.

As an example, one COE official I spoke with said that when he worked with a monitoring committee their site visits typically consisted first of a visit with local civil society and then meetings with government officials. By meeting with civil society representatives first, the COE's monitoring committee felt they had a better feel for the conditions on the ground and walked into their meetings with government officials—who typically wanted to convince them everything was in good order—more educated and prepared to raise relevant issues and hold the government to account. In this way, civil society groups provide a critical "check" on government power.

This same official, who now staffs the Parliamentary Assembly, said that when his office has specific questions they reach out directly to relevant NGOs for information. For more broad issues they might involve the Conference of INGOs, but their primary source of nonstate actor support comes from ad hoc consultations with NGOs that they think are relevant.

Civil society groups themselves also value direct consultations with the COE. One NGO representative I spoke with suggested that they went to the Conference of INGOs for general information and access to documents, but if they really cared about a particular issue it was much

[2]For a full list of organizations with participatory status see: http://coe-ngo.org/#/ingos.

more effective to liaison with COE officials directly and host informational sessions to share their perspective. While the Conference of INGOs is open to any INGO that meets its membership criteria, this more informal access to COE bureaucrats is much more feasible for a large NGO that is already powerful and possesses a mandate in its issue area than it would be for a small, unknown NGO looking to make a name for itself.

In addition to the informational benefits the COE receives from civil society consultations, some of the COE officials I spoke with cautioned that, as with any source, information from civil society should be received carefully. NGOs, though frequently seen in a more positive light than private sector firms, also have agendas and are, in effect, lobbyists. In human rights in particular, NGOs often advocate for ambitious goals which are not realistic or possible. According to one COE official I spoke with, the COE must be careful to remember that, while they see themselves in an aspirational light, they are not in fact an NGO and their instructions come from more pragmatic member states. Therefore, while input from NGOs is useful, it needs to be critically analyzed and often needs to be tempered before being accepted. If other officials are less cognizant of these concerns and take civil society input at face value, the influence of those NGOs that are powerful enough to be able to work around the Conference of INGOs and directly interact with COE officials will increase. In spite of these challenges, the less institutionalized forms of contact between the COE and civil society provide important channels of information for the COE, and potentially influence for NGOs.

Discussion

On paper, civil society organizations enjoy broad and deep formal access at the COE. The COE was one of the first IOs to offer formal collaborative opportunities for nonstate actors. Today, civil society organizations are allowed to become formal participants and have their own formal branch of the institution with which to coordinate themselves and participate in shaping COE policy. This institutionalization allows civil society the opportunity for participation while insulating the

key decision-making parts of the COE. Yet, within civil society and the COE bureaucracy, there remain strong critiques of the COE's interactions with NGOs.

Multiple representatives from major human rights INGOs I spoke with suggested that they found the Conference of INGOs to be a mostly ineffectual mechanism for effecting change, and that they preferred to work informally with members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE (PACE) to lobby their preferences. While their organizations officially remain members of the Conference of INGOs—they said it was the easiest way to get access to documents, calendars, and other paperwork—they rarely interact with the Conference unless they feel the reports coming out reflect a skewed view that runs counter to their preferences. Rather than viewing the Conference of INGOs as a mechanism for influencing COE policy, these advocates saw it as an opportunity to engage in inter-NGO advocacy, something they found an ineffectual use of time. Logistically, attending Conference of INGOs meetings can actually make it more difficult to work directly with COE bureaucrats because their meetings are often scheduled at the same time as the plenary meetings of the PACE. For well-known INGOs that have already made a name for themselves, working around the Conference of INGOs and interacting directly with member states and the secretariat is a more effective strategy. These organizations host small group meetings where they can brief COE policymakers and diplomats on relevant issues, and get themselves invitations to brief informal groups of decision-makers.

In our conversations, these INGO representatives suggested that rather than creating a respected space for civil society to participate in policy development the Conference of INGOs dilutes their message and credibility, and keeps them from directly contacting COE member states. For instance, the COE does not provide any formal space for civil society to speak directly to the Committee of Ministers. Instead, everything is filtered through the Conference of INGOs' committee and work group process. Rather than participating in these work groups, many larger INGOs prefer to initiate their own, informal, contact to lobby PACE members. This workaround gives powerful INGOs additional, non-observable access to COE decision-makers.

The concerns voiced by powerful NGOs were echoed in my conversations with COE bureaucrats. For instance, one said that in his view the Conference of INGOs had never "met its potential". When his office has a question or problem that they think civil society will be helpful with they reach out directly to whichever NGOs they think are relevant, rather than to the Conference of INGOs. This serves to further elevate the influence of powerful groups, while not providing the opportunity for smaller voices to be heard.

The Conference of INGOs offers more benefit to small INGOs that may not have the name recognition or resources to work outside the bounds of formal access. Small INGOs are able to network with other civil society organizations and have a venue for voicing their opinions. Though it may not be the most direct route for influencing policymakers' opinions, it may be more than small organizations would otherwise be able to access. Yet, the broader view that the Conference of INGOs is ineffective means that it is not called upon for advice and small NGOs therefore have diminished opportunities to shape policy.

When I spoke with Dr. Anna Rurka, the current President of the Conference of INGOs, she presented a mixed perspective (A. Rurka, personal communication, December 14, 2018). She suggested that the Conference is important for ensuring that smaller NGOs have a platform and the Conference's internal democratic process provides legitimacy for their positions. She recognizes that large human rights NGOs do not need the formal Conference to be heard, but argues that smaller NGOs do. One of her goals during her tenure as President is to reframe the conversation with large NGOs from them seeing the Conference as an obstacle, to showing how their goals are aligned and they can work together to facilitate deeper civil society engagement. In many instances their goals are indeed aligned. Both Dr. Rurka and the representatives of large NGOs I spoke with mentioned their desire for more direct access at the Committee of Ministers and expressed frustration that they felt NGOs were asked to give more to the COE than they received in return.

In spite of these challenges, the Conference of INGOs does appear to successfully procure buy in for the COE. Through their own requirements for participation, the COE ensures that they receive grassroots-level support-building from the NGOs that are included; one of the requirements

of membership is that NGOs share information about the COE with their constituencies and help build support for COE policies (*Resolution CM/Res(2016)3 Participatory status for international non-governmental organisations with the Council of Europe* 2016). So while NGOs may not receive the influential benefits they seek from participation and the information the COE receives is limited, the Conference of INGOs does still provide benefits to the COE.

Yet, while the Conference of INGOs provides a space for civil society to feel included in the COE decision-making processes, it does not provide the all-inclusive venue for civil society participation that it purports to. The top of the civil society pyramid—large, well-known and well-funded human rights INGOS—sidestep the formal channels of access. Additionally, the stringent approval process to be included in the Conference of INGOs inhibits the ability of civil society groups that oppose the work of the COE to join, limiting the spectrum of opinions COE policymakers hear to mostly supportive voices and effectively ensuring the COE can screen out civil society organizations that vocally disagree with their strategies (Härtel 2016, 557).

From a democratic deficit perspective, this is troubling. Though informal nonstate actor interaction with policymakers likely occurs at every IO, ideally this informal access would be to supplement effective formal avenues of access. Instead, the COE's highly institutionalized civil society access pays lip-service to norms of inclusion, while effectively isolating their policymakers from direct, formal contact with nonstate actors that they do not wish to talk to. The COE's existing process of collaboration with civil society, where small NGOs participate through formal mechanisms and major organizations bypass the official avenues of access and instead create their own more effective—influential—access points, reinforces the existing power differential within the NGO community. The COE's willingness to work outside the official channels with powerful organizations reinforces those actors' privileged positions.

By investing in an inefficient mechanism of cooperation that civil society organizations frequently work around, the Conference of INGOs absorbs COE resources—as well as the resources of human rights organizations—without providing efficient information gathering services for the COE. Though it does provide some level of buy in from member organizations, overall the

Conference of INGOs is seen to be ineffectual at affecting policy. The general dissatisfaction with the Conference of INGOs as an institution is further supported by the repeated efforts to improve it over the last few decades. If the institution worked as everyone hoped and fulfilled both the COE's and the INGOs' needs it would not need to be restructured every few years, as it has been. Ironically, though, by making the Conference increasingly institutionalized, the historical changes have likely made the problems worse: the inner workings of the Conference have become more bureaucratic and less nimble, and the Conference is now more of its own institutional branch of the COE and thus more insulated from other branches of power. This higher level of institutionalization makes both powerful NGOs and COE bureaucrats more inclined to work around the formal structure instead of through it. These workarounds, in turn, further undermine the efficacy of the Conference and increase the power differential between small and large NGOs.

Yet, this may all be purposeful. From the Committee of Ministers' perspective, things are working fairly well. Though NGOs are dissatisfied with the level of real access they gain from the Conference of INGOs, the Committee of Ministers have access to the information they want from NGOs—either formally through the Conference of INGOs or informally through side contact with larger NGOs—and they do not have to be responsive in return. Dr. Rurka told me that it is a misconception that the Conference of INGOs gives open access to the COE; "the Committee of Ministers does not want to be open to NGOs" (A. Rurka, personal communication, December 14, 2018). So while the combination of broad but ineffectual formal civil society access and more influential informal access is problematic from a democratic perspective, it provides the COE Committee of Ministers with the information and buy in they benefit from with very few costs. One NGO representative I spoke with went so far as to say that the COE is an intergovernmental organization and as such it does not really want the Conference to work; it needs to say it works with civil society to be socially acceptable, but many member states do not actually want to let NGOs in. Nonstate actor access at the COE is not designed to effectively increase democratic accountability, but that does not mean it is a failure from the IO's perspective; democracy, after all, is not always the goal (Dahl 1999).

In and of itself, NGOs' critique that the Conference of INGOs does not provide them with the ability to influence COE policy is not troubling; many IOs purposefully limit the amount of influence nonstate actors gain through participation in order to maintain the sovereign decision-making powers of their member states. But if the formal access mechanisms are seen to give so little back to participating NGOs that those NGOs either choose not to participate in the future—thereby withholding their expertise and support from the COE—or choose to circumvent the formal mechanisms in favor of informal access that is less transparent and less regulated, this raises concerns. IOs walk a fine line between providing deep enough access to incentivize nonstate actors' participation while still maintaining their decision-making sovereignty; the COE is falling off its tightrope.

Comparison of Cases

The juxtaposition of NATO and the COE's choices for whom to allow access and how to structure that cooperation provides insight into the challenges associated with nonstate actor access at the international organizational level. Each of these organizations chooses to collaborate extensively, but nearly exclusively, with a select group of nonstate actors: NATO works almost only with private sectors and the COE works only with a narrow range of international human rights-related NGOs. This, in and of itself, raises concerns about the scope of perspectives the IOs receive and the ability of outside actors to hold them accountable. By only allowing in a small group of relevant nonstate actors, both IOs insulate themselves from potentially contradictory views.

A comparison of these cases also highlights the importance of designing smart institutions that limit the influence of nonstate actors while still giving them enough access to find the access useful and efficient, such that they are willing to participate. NATO's active private sector advisory boards and frequent industry networking days bring together private sector experts in a way that is beneficial to both the IO and the private sector actors. NATO receives information and advice from industry experts, as well as priming industry actors to design the future technology they anticipate

needing; private sector firms get to network with one another, with NATO bureaucrats, and other NATO members they might not regularly have contact with, and also have the opportunity to share their strategic opinions with NATO policymakers. Though the expertise gained by NATO from these interactions is filtered through a report-writing process and does not allow any individual firm direct influence over the result, companies are still enthusiastic about participating and find value from their interactions. Overall, NATO's nonstate actor access mechanisms are generally regarded as useful and effective for their purpose. They keep the influence of private sector actors limited but provide efficient support and information to NATO.

The Council of Europe's Conference of INGOs provides a formal mechanism for other branches of the COE to request input from INGOs and for INGOs to provide expertise and opinions on COE policy development. On paper, this form of access provides INGOs with deep involvement in a variety of COE policymaking processes. But in practice, the highly bureaucratic Conference is frequently sidestepped both by COE bureaucrats looking for information and by powerful human rights NGOs that are dissatisfied with the way the Conference dilutes their impact. By making the Conference of INGOs overly institutionalized and expansive, the COE undercut its effectiveness. The COE's official INGO access mechanisms are broadly regarded as ineffective. As a result, actors on both sides work around them. These workarounds cause the voices of powerful NGOs to be amplified while smaller groups get left trying to work through the ineffective official channels where their voice is drowned out. The overly bureaucratic nature of the purportedly democratic Conference of INGOs results in a highly undemocratic actual process of interaction between civil society and the COE. Having formal access mechanisms for nonstate actors clearly is not enough to create democratic accountability—those mechanisms have to be effective. Yet, democratic accountability is not the only goal: through their patchwork of formal and informal contact, the COE's Committee of Ministers gain access to the information and support they need from NGOs without formally opening themselves up to continued contact with nonstate actors. In other words, they get the benefits they want without losing their insulation.

The effectiveness of official nonstate actor access mechanisms matters from a democratic deficit perspective because they can provide transparency and constrain the impact of nonstate actors. If, as in the case of the COE, we observe formal access that provides one level of influence but both the IO and the nonstate actors frequently collaborate outside the official framework it becomes much more difficult to assess the level of influence that nonstate actors have over policy. And while some informal collaboration is bound to happen—bureaucrats make friends with people who work at companies and NGOs, people meet in the hallways and at coffee shops, colleagues move in and out of positions between the public and private sectors—the more informal access that occurs the more difficult it is to discern who has a voice and how powerful that voice is. While IOs are not required, or even intended, to be popularly democratic (Dahl 1999), there is still a general norm of transparency and providing nonstate actors with access has been a common strategy for becoming transparent (Grigorescu 2007; Tallberg et al. 2018). When the formal mechanisms of access are ineffective and sidestepped in favor of informal access that is more difficult to observe, the formal access only pays lip-service to true transparency.

The divergent experiences of NATO and the COE also challenge our conventional views about "good" and "bad" nonstate actors. As one high-level COE bureaucrat told me, we have historically viewed NGOs as non-problematic "good guys" who are working for the greater good when actually NGOs have agendas too and, effectively, are lobbyists. Nearly everyone I spoke with at the COE, without prompting, raised concerns about the influence of NGOs and the outsized voice they can have in shaping COE policy decisions. Further supporting this observation, the NGOs I talked with spoke convincingly about how they seek out greater levels of influence: namely, by avoiding the formal Conference of INGOs and seeking out interactions directly with COE bureaucrats and member state representatives. The experience at NATO is different. Private sector actors are active participants in the formal avenues of access but do not see themselves as having a direct influence over NATO policy. One vice president of a major U.S. defense company I spoke with said at NATO the levers of influence are so dispersed that it would be nearly impossible for one firm or even the combined effect of their advisory boards to make a clear difference. Clearly, the

level of influence and potential bias introduced by collaborating with nonstate actors has more to do with the effectiveness of the institutional design than which actors are allowed in. This contradicts our conventional view that it is private sector actors, not civil society, that bias policy outcomes.

It is important to note, however, that the different perceptions of nonstate actor access at NATO and the COE are driven, at least in part, by different expectations. Private sector firms that are active at NATO do not expect to be able to directly influence policy. One vice-president of a major U.S. defense contractor I spoke with said that their interactions with NATO were "not the same thing at all as lobbying Congress. We have lobbyists. I'm not a lobbyist. Our lobbyists are able to influence policy very directly on the Hill" (personal communication, October 5, 2018). The implication of this statement is that they do not expect to directly influence policy at NATO, and yet they still find their participation there to be useful.

NGOs that liaison with the COE, on the other hand, are seeking direct responsiveness from the COE to their concerns. They want to be able to see that the information they provide has an impact. They are therefore dissatisfied when the formal channels of access at the COE do not provide the opportunity for direct influence. This expectation is shaped by the COE's own rhetoric about the importance of including civil society in all levels of decision-making; however, their rhetoric diverges from their real-life practices. Both the formal access given to NGOs at the COE and to private sector firms at NATO provide the respective IOs with important sources of expertise and support, but do not allow outside actors direct influence over the inner circle of decision-making. Yet this is seen as problematic and ineffective at the COE, where they espouse the importance of including civil society in decision-making processes, and seen as appropriate and useful at NATO, where they stress the importance of limiting the influence of included industry actors.

Despite these complicated conditions, the experience of both NATO and the COE support the theory developed in this project and provide insight into the relationship between nonstate actors and international organizations. In both these cases, the IO's work was directly related to which actors they chose to collaborate with. NGOs and private sector actors have different skillsets and bodies of expertise; both the COE and NATO capably set up their collaboration in such a way that

they only work with the nonstate actors who can provide valuable information and support for their particular work. More than just being dictated by whether they implement projects or coordinate international behavior, these cases illuminate the mechanisms by which these different types of work lead IOs to choose different nonstate actor partners. The COE works on the ground in member countries to observe behavior and hold member states accountable. In this observation, NGOs act as extra sets of eyes and ears. NGOs also help the COE to keep a finger on the pulse of public opinion with respect to human rights. NATO, by contrast, works at a high level to coordinate the defense capabilities of numerous member states. These defense capabilities are much less easily observed by the public and civil society. Instead, the private sector firms involved in the production of relevant technology provide NATO with insight into technological capabilities and future problems. The type of work these IOs conduct shapes whose assistance is most useful, and therefore, with whom they choose to collaborate.

Overall, the comparison of NATO and the COE provides us with a few key lessons. First, the type of work an IO engages in clearly shapes which nonstate actors they value working with. NATO, focusing on coordinating defense capabilities and other highly technical tasks, relies heavily on the assistance of private sector actors. The Council of Europe, responsible for monitoring human rights practices and improving human rights conditions, works only with NGOs. This offers additional support for the theory developed in this project. Second, these cases highlight the importance of well-designed institutions. Having formal access mechanisms for nonstate actors is clearly not enough; those institutions need to be designed in such a way that both the IO and the nonstate actors benefit and are incentivized to participate, while also constraining the amount of influence the nonstate actors enjoy over policy outcomes. This also requires that we interrogate our assumption that more democratic outcomes are always best—nonstate actor access at IOs may be designed in a way that only pays lip-service to norms of transparency and accountability but that may well be purposeful. Third, the contrast between the NGO involvement at the COE, which is generally regarded as problematic (Härtel 2016), and the private sector involvement at NATO, which is seen as much more successful, require us to question the general sentiment that NGOs are good actors

that increase the level of democratic accountability in government while private sector actors are bad actors that lead to biased policy. Instead of seeing the involvement of nonstate actors in policy development as a dichotomous good or bad, we must think more critically about the ways in which they are included in the process, the balance of which actors are allowed in, and the distribution of preferences and opinions that are presented to policymakers. The role of nonstate actors in global governance is much more complex than we have previously allowed for and our assessments of the implications of access must reflect this complexity.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This book is about the emerging and ever-more pervasive role nonstate actors play in the workings of international organizations. The book argues nonstate actors—from the private sector and civil society—can be useful resources for international policymakers. These nonstate actors provide IOs with critical expertise on policy and local conditions, as well as offering support for the organizations' proposals and work. Though IOs risk a variety of costs—from logistical costs to negative public perception—when they open their doors to nonstate actors, the information and buy in these actors can provide frequently outweighs the potential costs. This project endeavors to provide a first look at the variation in the access that IOs grant to nonstate actors. I have shown there is previously unidentified variation in not just the amount of access IOs allow, but the types of access and the actors to whom it is given. I offered evidence through both quantitative analyses and case studies that the type of work an IO engages in shapes whose assistance is most useful to the organization and therefore with whom they choose to collaborate. Organizations that spend their time working on the ground to implement projects rely primarily on the assistance of NGOs and other civil society actors, while those organizations responsible for coordinating and regulating behavior at the international level collaborate principally with private sector actors.

IOs' choices about who to allow in have complementary implications about who they screen out. Of the 68 organizations I examine that choose to collaborate with nonstate actors, only 19

allow civil society and private sector actors equal amounts of access. That means 72 percent of international organizations offer unequal access to different types of nonstate actors. And even among those organizations that provide more equitable access, there is no guarantee that all actors are truly offered access, just that some private sector and some civil society actors are allowed in; it could still be that only ideologically-aligned nonstate actors are privileged while those that might challenge the IO are screened out. The patterns of nonstate actor access described by this project thus raise concerns about accountability and democratic deficits at international organizations.

Nonstate Actor Access and the Democratic Deficit

It has been argued that including nonstate actors, and particularly civil society actors, in the policymaking processes of IOs can increase transparency and democratic accountability (Tallberg et al. 2018). This makes sense. Earlier in this book, I argued that nonstate actors can serve as third-party monitors that can watch the behavior of member states and the IO and report any aberrant activity. Including a broad range of actors, some who agree with IO and some who do not, can also serve as a check on the power of the IO's bureaucracy—they can provide a wide spectrum of perspectives to IO policymakers, and report back on the work of the IO to their various constituencies. By including a broad range of nonstate actors, IOs can make themselves more "democratic".

Yet, it is unclear if being democratic and transparent are necessarily good things for an IO to be. The insulated nature of international policymaking allows states to negotiate without immediate accountability to the whims of their domestic publics (Putnam 1988). Negotiations occurring behind closed doors allow states to engage in more effective issue-linking and come to mutually beneficial compromises (Schneider 2018). The more IOs open their doors to nonstate actors and welcome them into the depths of policymaking, the less privacy they will have to work out their differences and find compromise. Even when the member states' domestic governments are democratic and accountable to their publics, they may be better able to deliver good policy

when IOs are non-democratic and not transparent. So while norms of transparency have flooded the international policy world (Tallberg et al. 2018), from a policy standpoint a democratic deficit may not be undesirable at the IO level.

Yet even if you assume that democratic accountability is a good goal for IOs to aspire to, nonstate actor access may not be the best route to achieve it. At the very least, providing nonstate actor access is not enough to create democratic accountability; the level of accountability generated by including nonstate actors depends crucially on *who* gets in. If access is given to one type of actor but not a broad swath of perspectives and interests, that access likely makes the IO less democratically accountable than if no access was given at all. Including only nonstate actors that agree with the IO will create an echo chamber effect and is unlikely to broaden the perspectives available to IO decision-makers. This is also true of access given to civil society actors, even though they have historically been seen as the "good guys". Civil society actors still have agendas and different perspectives—some will agree with the IO and others will prefer alternate approaches. If nonstate actors are selected for involvement based on their preference congruence with the IO, as Vabulas (2011) argues, their involvement will not lead the IO to be more responsive.

In addition to who is allowed in, the type of access also matters. Including a wide range of actors in ways that give the IO information but do not allow the nonstate actors any opportunity to observe the IO's behavior or put any constraint on it does not necessarily lead to more democratic accountability. Allowing nonstate actors influence over policy will only increase the democratic responsiveness of the IO if the nonstate actors truly represent a cross-section of society. Nonstate actor involvement, in and of itself, is not enough to increase the democratic legitimacy of an IO (Agné, Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015), and more access is not necessarily better even if you assume democratic accountability to be the goal.

Regardless of whether or not a democratic deficit exists at the international organizational level or if we should care, it is important to have a clearer idea of who the actors are that have a voice at the international policymaking table. NGOs are not the only nonstate actors with access at IOs and I have shown that civil society actors and private sector actors get access under different

conditions. There are big, important decisions being made at the IO level and it is important to know who has a voice at that table.

Nonstate Actor Demand for Access

In this book I make the assumption that if IOs choose to open their doors, relevant nonstate actors will be willing to collaborate with them and participate in any way the IO chooses to allow. In reality, there is likely variation in both nonstate actors' demand for access and their willingness to cooperate in the manner prescribed by IOs. Some of this potential hesitancy to cooperate how the IO wants them to is noted in the Council of Europe chapter of this book, where I show that powerful NGOs find the formal avenues of collaboration with the COE to be ineffective and instead try to work directly with COE bureaucrats to have more direct influence. If we relax the demand-side assumption and allow there to be variation in nonstate actors' demand for access there are a few possible implications.

First, it could be that nonstate actors actively push for access at IOs and that their demands are what (partially) shapes who IOs choose to let in. This may happen indirectly through lobbying at the domestic level. For instance, private sector firms might lobby within their home government for their government's representatives to push for private sector firms' inclusion at an IO where the country is a member. If the company's home state is powerful enough in the IO, this may be an effective strategy. It could also occur more directly with nonstate actors using available access at IOs to push for ever-deeper and more influential forms of access. As a hypothetical example, an IO might have initially allowed nonstate actors to attend their meetings and submit memos, and the nonstate actors could use those memos to express the value they could provide to the IO and leverage them into a more powerful advisory committee.

The ever-more pervasive presence of nonstate actor access within IOs, as documented by Tallberg et al. (2013) and discussed in this book, suggests that either nonstate actors pressure IOs for more and deeper access once they have a foothold in the institution or that once IOs begin to

collaborate with nonstate actors they recognize their value and offer them increasingly important roles. Both of these phenomenon have been documented at the domestic level as well (Drutman 2015). Nonstate actor access at IOs, like congressional lobbying, is sticky and potentially reinforced by the demands of nonstate actors themselves. The more they are involved, the more value they find from collaboration and the more influence over policy outcomes they seek. If IOs offer nonstate actors access as a result of pressure from those same actors, the very existence of access would be a signal of the influence nonstate actors have over IOs.

The second potential implication of relaxing the demand-side assumption, at the other end of the spectrum, is that it could be that IOs want nonstate actors to help them and the relevant nonstate actors are uninterested or unwilling to assist. IOs might open doors that no one wants to walk through. This phenomenon is difficult to observe. Observationally it seems that at least *some* nonstate actors typically respond to calls from IOs, but that does not necessarily mean those are the ideal nonstate actors the IO hoped to engage with. One observable implication of this could be that IOs might offer their preferred nonstate actors deeper and deeper forms of access that give away more decision-making power in order to entice the nonstate actors to participate and make it "worth" the effort involvement requires of nonstate actors. If the targeted nonstate actors are hesitant to provide information and support to an IO without receiving influence over policy decisions in return, by holding out on the IO they might be able to negotiate for deeper, more influential forms of collaboration. This could be one interpretation of the phenomenon identified by Tallberg et al. (2013), where they show that nonstate actor access at IOs has become more prevalent over time.

It might also be the case that collaborating with IOs is logistically and financially costly enough that only large, powerful nonstate actors find it worth the costs of involvement; it might be proportionally more costly for smaller firms and NGOs to pay the logistical and financial costs required to be involved with IOs, such as paying to send staff to meetings and having staff that are informed about opportunities for access. This might make it infeasible for smaller nonstate actors to be involved even if they are interested and think it would be valuable. If IOs care about attracting a diverse group of nonstate actors, they should take institutional steps to offer inclusive types of

access. For example, the Pacific Islands Forum allows NGOs to teleconference into meetings, has a fund to help pay for smaller organizations to send representatives to meetings, and ensures they advertise their meetings with advance warning to allow nonstate actors to plan their travel. This is therefore another way that nonstate actor access at IOs can vary: the institutional support the IOs offer to encourage inclusive access. By taking formal steps to try to include both small and large nonstate actors and lower the costs of their participation, IOs can ameliorate some of the challenges that might keep smaller actors from collaborating when IOs want them to.

Implications

Issues of international governance and institutional design are complex and this project only speaks to small portions of big questions. Future work in this area should work to relax the demand-side assumption that I make throughout this book. Steffek (2013) offers a theory for civil society access at IOs from both the IO's perspective and the NGOs'; however, he does not include private sector actors in his theorization and he does not offer any empirical tests of his theory. I have shown here that it is not just NGOs that have widespread access at IOs—private sector actors are pervasive as well—and we thus need to tailor our theories and analyses to differentiate between types of nonstate actors.

Future analyses should also work through the different patterns of nonstate actor access within smaller groups of IOs. There is value, as a starting point, in looking at the whole cross-section of international institutions. This project provides us with a picture of the broad patterns of access, but is unable to specify the mechanisms that could be drawn out in more detail when only looking at a subset of IOs. By looking at a smaller group of related IOs, future work can dig deeper into the preferences of member states, the benefits different nonstate actors can provide to IOs in specific issue areas or regions, and the implications of different forms of collaboration.

Finally, future work should also explore the implications—for policy, democratic accountability, and other such important outcomes—of differential balances of nonstate actor access. What

combination of nonstate actors leads to the most accountability? What combination leads to the most responsiveness? What combination leads to the best IO performance? In a recent attempt to explain IO performance, Lall (2017) argues that partnering with outside nonstate actors can protect IO's policy autonomy because the presence of nonstate actors alters the payoff of states pursuing their national interests. He recognizes that the preference alignment of nonstate actors and IOs will matter for outcomes, as well as the depth of their interactions and the complementarity of their skillsets. Yet, he stops short of comparing the effectiveness of IOs that utilize different types of nonstate actors in different ways. This area of research is prime for more exploration. Questions of how differential levels of nonstate actor access have developed over time, as well as questions of which types of collaborations between nonstate actors and IOs work well and under what conditions remain unanswered and have important implications for the development of effective international institutions.

While this project leaves many questions unanswered, it offers the first exploration into the variation of private sector and civil society access at the international level. This previously unexplored variation has important implications for our understanding of global governance. First, I show that a much wider range of nonstate actors is involved in shaping international policy than previously recognized by international relations literature. Private sector actors—who have historically been ignored in work looking directly at international organizations—have formal, non-procurement-related channels for collaboration at 76 percent of the international organizations in my sample. This suggests that private sector actors, in addition to the more frequently examined NGOs, are a pervasive presence in the global institutional framework.

Second, I show that there is variation in the type and balance of access that IOs provide to different types of nonstate actors. That different forms of collaboration offer IOs different benefits and that they should offer these types of access to the nonstate actors that can provide the most benefits with the lowest costs is a functionalist understanding of the world, but it allows us insight into IOs' reasoning. It forces us to think through the constraints placed on IO decision-makers and their decisions about what is "beneficial" and for whom. If we, for normative or policy-

related reasons, want IOs to be democratically responsive, we should incentivize them to offer broad, inclusive access and provide institutional support for smaller nonstate actors. But if we, for normative or policy-related reasons, want IOs to be insulated from domestic politics and have the space to negotiate compromises behind closed doors, we should support providing nonstate actor access that is closely tailored for the specific actors that possess necessary expertise or whose buy in is necessary for the success of the IO's policy. Neither of these patterns of access is necessarily better or worse than the other, it is just that they achieve different goals. Different combinations of access lead to different results and can, and should, be introduced strategically to achieve different objectives.

Third, this project suggests that some forms of access are better at constraining nonstate actor influence than others. For example, NATO's interactions with the private sector are strictly structured to keep decision-making in the hands of NATO officials and to incentivize competitive firms to counterbalance one another's opinions. The private sector firms have an avenue for sharing their opinions and NATO officials gain expertise without losing control over final policy decisions. The COE, on the other hand, also keeps its final policymakers insulated from nonstate actors that operate through its formal advisory boards, but allows ad hoc interactions between policymakers and powerful NGOs which provides some nonstate actors with more direct channels of influence than others.

That nonstate actors, and particularly private sector firms, are a pervasive presence in international policymaking should not come as a surprise. Despite the debate about the utility and relevance of international organizations, the reality is that many international organizations have the power to make important decisions with broad implications for people and businesses. Nonstate actors from both civil society and the private sector have reason to care about the decisions made at the international level and, just as they attempt to influence outcomes in domestic politics, we would expect (and do in fact find) that they also attempt to be involved with international policy development processes. Yet, unlike at the domestic level, where, at least in the United States, nonstate actors attempts to influence policy are channeled through a couple of main portals—

lobbying and campaign contributions—that are at least to some limited degree, or could be, regulated and publicly reported, much less is known about nonstate actor involvement in international organizations. This project is a first attempt to shed light on the prevalence of and variation in private sector and civil society access at the international organizational level.

Appendix

To test the robustness of the empirical results, Table A1 and Table A2 recreate the main models from the Chapter 3, excluding PPPs from the dependent variable. There is some argument that PPPs provide deep access to nonstate actors because they can lead to nonstate actors having substantial control over particular projects. While I argue that potential control over specific projects does not equate to control over the organization as a whole, I rerun the analyses excluding PPPs to be conservative. The main results hold.

Table A1: OLS: Predicting the Breadth and Depth of Access Granted to Nonstate Actors, No PPPs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	**Count of Access Points**	**Count of Access Points**	**Deepest Access Point**	**Deepest Access Point**	**Weighted Access Measure**	**Weighted Access Measure**
	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)
Democratic Density	1.260**	1.390**	2.173***	2.045*	4.834***	5.410**
	(0.486)	(0.648)	(0.801)	(1.054)	(1.570)	(2.024)
# of Member States	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.005	0.021***	0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Unanimity		-0.176		-0.594		-0.744
		(0.218)		(0.436)		(0.843)
Scope	0.035**	0.043**	-0.001	-0.000	0.073	0.081
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.053)	(0.058)
Enforcement Mech.	-0.002	0.094	0.185	0.307	0.215	0.545
	(0.215)	(0.220)	(0.335)	(0.390)	(0.784)	(0.790)
Constant	0.361	0.326	2.223***	2.723***	1.466	1.683
	(0.438)	(0.647)	(0.644)	(0.915)	(1.240)	(1.890)
R^2	0.250	0.331	0.239	0.347	0.291	0.370
N	72	50	72	50	72	50

[1] Significance levels: *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table A2: OLS: Predicting the Breadth and Depth of Access Granted to Civil Society Actors and Private Sector Actors, No PPPs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable	**Count of Access Points Civil Society**	**Count of Access Points Private Sector**	**Deepest Access Point Civil Society**	**Deepest Access Point Private Sector**	**Weighted Access Measure Civil Society**	**Weighted Access Measure Private Sector**
	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)	(Robust SE)
Implement Projects	0.492**	-0.058	0.961***	0.554	1.586**	0.511
	(0.239)	(0.292)	(0.327)	(0.466)	(0.730)	(0.911)
Coordinate/Regulate	-0.174	0.731***	-0.452	0.965	-1.140	2.357**
	(0.236)	(0.270)	(0.414)	(0.579)	(0.863)	(0.977)
Democratic Density	1.021**	0.312	2.580***	0.757	4.167**	1.261
	(0.467)	(0.486)	(0.962)	(1.028)	(1.682)	(1.524)
# of Member States	0.005***	-0.003	0.014***	-0.004	0.025***	-0.007
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
USA Member	-0.459*	0.527*	-1.512***	0.550	-2.527***	1.508
	(0.266)	(0.284)	(0.480)	(0.652)	(0.906)	(1.104)
Count Access to PS	0.291**					
	(0.125)					
Count Access to CS		0.360***				
		(0.125)				
Deepest Access to PS			0.200			
			(0.139)			
Deepest Access to CS				0.193		
				(0.151)		
Weighted Access to PS					0.286**	
					(0.126)	
Weighted Access to CS						0.298**
						(0.122)
Constant	0.124	-0.113	0.833	1.053	0.991	-0.278
	(0.411)	(0.433)	(0.882)	(0.883)	(1.411)	(1.409)
R^2	0.396	0.246	0.410	0.115	0.434	0.203
N	72	72	72	72	72	72

[1] Significance levels: *p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table A3 provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the empirical analyses of Chapter 3.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variable	**N**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**SD**
Count of Access Points	72	0	4	2.306	1.057
Count of Access Points to Civil Society	72	0	4	1.903	1.235
Count of Access Points to Private Sector	72	0	4	1.694	1.002
Deepest Access Point	72	0	6	3.944	1.342
Deepest Access Point to Civil Society	72	0	6	3.417	1.875
Deepest Access Point to Private Sector	72	0	6	3.139	1.595
Weighted Access Measure	72	0	14	6.931	3.350
Weighted Access Measure to Civil Society	72	0	13	5.736	3.864
Weighted Access Measure to Private Sector	72	0	14	4.764	3.164
Scope	72	1	24	7.986	6.339
Unanimity	50	0	1	0.5	0.5
Enforcement Mechanism	72	0	1	0.264	0.444
Coordinate & Regulate	72	0	1	0.792	0.409
Implement Projects	72	0	1	0.403	0.494
Democratic Density	72	0.071	0.944	0.575	0.220
# of Member States	72	3	193	70.917	73.600
USA Member	72	0	1	0.389	0.491

Sample of International Organizations

African Union (AU)

Andean Community (CAN)

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Benelux Community (Benelux)

Center for Agriculture and Bioscience International (CABI)

Caribbean Community (Caricom)

Central African Economic & Monetary Union (CEMAC)

Central American Integration System (SICA)

Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)

Central Office for International Railway Transport (OTIF)

Common Market for East/South Africa (COMESA)

Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec)

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Council of Europe (COE)

East African Community (EAC)

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

European Economic Area (EEA)

European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)

European Space Agency (ESA)

European Union (EU)

Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Fund (GEF)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

International Seabed Authority (ISA)

Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought Protection (IGAD)

International Criminal Court (ICC)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF)

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

International Telecommunications Union (ITU)

International Whaling Commission (IWC)

Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)

Latin American Economic System (SELA)

League of Arab States (LAS)

MERCOSUR

Nordic Council

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Organization Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

Organization Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Organization Islamic Conference (OIC)

Organization Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE)

Pacific Island Forum (PIF)

Organization of American States (OAS)

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

South Pacific Commission (SPC)

Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org (UNESCO)

UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations (UN)

Universal Postal Union (UPU)

World Bank (IBRD)

World Customs Organization (WCO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)

World Trade Organization (WTO)

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