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Moral Psychology and Support for the Use of Force in the International System

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Richard Hanania

2018

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Moral Psychology and Support for the Use of Force

in the International System

by

Richard Hanania

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2018

Professor Marc Trachtenberg, Co-Chair

Professor Robert Trager, Co-Chair

Why and under what circumstances do people support aggressive action in the international system? And can political psychology actually give us insights into state behavior? This dissertation argues against conventional accounts that hold that the public is rational and strategic with the regards to the use of power. Relying on the concepts of the cognitive miser and rational ignorance among the voting public, the author uses experimental methods to show that with regards to foreign policy individuals are motivated by the same prejudices and moral intuitions that guide domestic political behavior. The first chapter argues against folk realist theories and shows that constructivist theories based on the need to maintain a positive self-image do a better job of predicting when Americans support the use of force abroad. Another chapter shows

that when Americans consider altruistic policies, hearing that the policy in question can financially benefit the United States makes them *less* likely to support it. Furthermore, the implications of differences between conservatives and liberals are explored. When conservatives are considering whether to support humanitarian intervention, they show a bias towards helping Christians over Muslims, but no racial prejudice. Liberals, in contrast, show little to no religious prejudice but are more likely to want to intervene in the scenario where whites are oppressing blacks rather than the other way around. Prejudice can even influence more abstract moral values, as when conservatives heard about Christians being killed by Muslims, they were not only more likely to support humanitarian intervention, but also to say that the United States had a general moral obligation to help foreign populations facing government persecution. The final chapter explores whether psychological differences between conservatives and liberals matter with regards to the making of foreign policy. Relying on measures of affinity, or S-scores, the author uses United Nations General Assembly voting data from six Anglophone democracies to show that in each of these countries conservative governments vote less in line with the rest of the world. This work hopes to inspire future research that can continue to establish a link between political psychology and research on state behavior.

The dissertation of Richard Hanania is approved.

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2018

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Richard Hanania graduated with a BA from the University of Colorado in 2009 with a major in linguistics and a minor in Russian. He received his JD from the University of Chicago Law School in 2013, the same year that he entered UCLA as a PhD candidate in political science. He begins a post-doctoral research fellowship at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University in fall 2018. Richard's previous works have appeared in peer-reviewed publications such as *International Studies Quarterly* and the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, and in the popular press including the websites of *The Atlantic* and *The Washington Post*.

Introduction

As of 2015, the United States had military bases in over 70 countries. It has treaty obligations to defend nearly as many countries across the globe (Vine 2015). Never before has a state taken such a broad view of its interests. While it can be argued that this necessary in order to project power abroad, when the US has used force over the last few decades, it has often been with a mainly humanitarian justification, as in Libya and the former Yugoslavia. Even the two wars initially begun to address perceived security concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan developed into nation building efforts in which the United States spent much of the lives and treasure invested on goals relating to issues such as literacy, the establishment of representative democracy, economic development, and women's rights.

Realism, which until recently has been the dominant paradigm in international relations for decades, argues that states can be expected to pursue their material and economic interests. Looking at American use of force over the last few decades, however, it is to a great extent difficult to see what economic and security interests are being pursued. Indeed, some of the most prominent realists agree on this point, having written a series of books over the last few years criticizing American foreign policy on precisely these grounds (e.g., Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2018). In making their normative argument, they implicitly indict realism as a lens through which to understand how states interact with one another.

Given that realists themselves doubt that the United State behaves in accordance with their recommendations, where else can we look to understand how the United States interacts with other countries abroad, particularly with regards to decisions to use force?

This dissertation uses the frameworks of political psychology and public opinion research in order to understand what drives foreign policy preferences in, and ultimately the behavior of, the United States, and to a lesser extent other democracies. It brings together work from political psychology and international relations to argue against narrowly defined material self-interest as the main driver of public opinion and ultimately policy. The findings and theories presented seek to move towards unifying work on international relations with the rest of political science by arguing that political action in both of these realms is driven by many of the same instincts and intuitions, at the mass and elite levels. While foreign policy is different from domestic politics in many ways, this work seeks to show that the psychological mechanisms that underlie thinking about these two areas of politics are not too dissimilar. I am also concerned with foreign policy outputs, and the final chapter seeks to directly show how political psychology can be used to make predictions about outcomes we care about.

In recent years, scholars have argued that folk realism explains American foreign policy preferences (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). Partisans of this view argue that showing that the public is folk realist can provide micro-foundations for realism as a model of state behavior. Yet their empirical claims about public opinion are in tension with a long line of research showing the importance of symbolic concerns, ideology, prejudice, and emotions in shaping political views more generally (Kinder and Sears 1981; Caplan 2011). Although such research has been around for decades, the literature in recent years has largely focused on the emergence of the unique figures of Barack Obama and Donald Trump and given us insights into the last few presidential

elections, providing further confirmation for long held views of public opinion (Pettigrew 2017; Tesler 2012).

This view of politics lines up with those of constructivists, who use different methodology but, like students of domestic politics, stress the socially constructed and learned nature of political beliefs and preferences (Wendt 1999). People search for a logic of appropriateness with regards to foreign policy behavior, yet their moral views are also shaped by moral foundations and prejudices that differ by ideology (Haidt 2012; Tesler 2012). This dissertation expands on the views of constructivists by joining them with insights from political psychology. It begins by explaining and empirically establishing the moral ideas relating to foreign policy that Americans have in common, and goes on to explore the most important differences that correspond to the left/right axis. In one important finding, conservatives are prejudiced for Christians over Muslims, while liberals have a racial prejudice in favor of blacks over whites. I also show how liberals are more willing to sacrifice the well being of the United States for the interest of foreign countries, although Americans across the political spectrum show indications of being uncomfortable trading crude material interests against saving lives.

Throughout the dissertation, I test the theory that political psychology is the best lens through which to understand foreign policy preferences among the general public and potentially state behavior. The first chapter presents the theoretical basis that informs much of the rest of the dissertation. Individuals are "cognitive misers" who prefer answering simple questions to more complex ones (Orbell and Dawes 1991). I combine this finding with the observation from the paradox of voting literature showing that the average citizen has no incentive to be rational with regards to voting or political opinions

more generally, since one vote will never change the outcome of the election. This means that individuals seek expressive utility from the political process and move towards preferences that create and maintain a positive self-image (Caplan 2011). While this may be true for domestic politics, it is especially likely to be so with regards to foreign policy preferences, a policy area that most citizens do not have direct experience with and where sacred values, whether humanitarian or nationalistic, are often at stake.

For public opinion to be worth studying, it must also predict foreign policy behavior. While showing all the ways in which political psychology explains relations between states is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I aim to show how a well-studied finding from research on mass preferences can help explain at least one important aspect of foreign policy behavior. We may expect conservatives being higher on in-group favoritism to manifest itself at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009), where right leaning governments should vote less in line with the rest of the world. I find that this is indeed the case, a result that can hopefully inspire future work that builds connections between political psychology and topics of interest to international relations scholars.

Co-authored with Robert Trager, Chapter 1 presents four hypotheses derived from the idea that individuals seek collective self-esteem and tests them against hypotheses derived from folk realism. In each case, we find evidence for hypotheses related to the idea that individuals seek collective self-esteem in the international arena. We find no support for the theory of folk realism, which holds that people are mostly motivated by a concern for national security and economic growth. We argue that unless there is a direct and clear threat to the existence of the state or the living standards of its people, material

and security concerns do not drive preferences over whether to use force abroad. We seek to show how our results are consistent with previous studies that authors have used in order to argue for folk realism.

In Chapter 2, I deal with the issue of prejudice in foreign policy preferences. Previous scholars have analyzed foreign policy attitudes through the framework of what Rathbun et al. (2016) call the "vertical hierarchy model," where more basic ideas of right and wrong drive individuals towards foreign policy preferences that are consistent with fundamental values. I argue that while there is certainly some truth to this paradigm, the role of prejudice has been relatively neglected. I show that, with regards to preferences over humanitarian action, people are more sensitive to the identities of the perpetrators and victims than they are to objective criteria such as the degree of the oppression being suffered. Conservatives have a preference towards helping Christians being victimized by Muslims over the opposite scenario, while liberals show little preference either way. At the same time, it is conservatives who lack prejudice when the race of the relevant parties is being manipulated. Liberals, in contrast, have a preference towards helping blacks being victimized by whites relative to the scenario in which the roles are reversed. Not only does prejudice affect preferences; it can also change what people think about right and wrong. Conservatives were more likely to say that their country had a moral obligation to help those being persecuted by their government when they heard about Christians being killed by Muslims.

I examine the roots of international altruism and provide more evidence against material interests determining policy preferences in Chapter 3. Taking a cognitive-interactionist approach, I show that whether individuals support altruistic policies

depends on both preexisting moral and ideological commitments and perceptions of interest. Importantly, we observe a backfire effect, where people actually become less likely to support humanitarian intervention or foreign aid when it is argued that such policies are economically beneficial to the United States. This can be predicted from the sacred values protection model, which argues that individuals are discomforted by the thought of trading off the sacred against the profane and therefore engage in "moral cleansing" whereby they refuse to consider taking the potentially self-interested path.

As the first three chapters focus on public opinion, the reader may rationally wonder whether any of it matters. It is possible that the foreign policy bureaucracy and the media, along with what has been called the "deep state," decides American policy abroad with little input from the masses. Being ignorant of foreign affairs and with a short attention span, the public may be easily manipulated to go into any direction desired by government leaders and a media that not only has its own preferences, but relies on state officials for access and information. In the view of many realists, while the mob may be swayed by sentimentalism and emotion, leaders have a special obligation to engage in wise statecraft regardless of what the public thinks (Mearsheimer 2001; Kennan 1984).

While most of this dissertation concerns itself with public opinion, Chapter 4 seeks to show that at least one finding presented—namely, that liberals are relatively altruistic towards foreigners—is relevant to foreign policy. In other words, Chapter 4 makes a connection between differences between conservatives and liberals, on the one hand, and decisions made by governments of different ideologies, on the other. One consistent finding in the moral psychology literature is that conservatives show more

loyalty to the ingroup and are lower on measures of universalism (e.g. Haidt 2012; Caprara, Vecchione, and Schwartz 2009). In Chapter 4, I argue that if this difference matters for foreign policy, it should manifest itself in a country being less cooperative with the rest of the world when conservatives are in power. Using data on UN General Assembly voting from the six major Anglophone democracies, I show that in the postwar period liberal governments have voted more in alignment with the rest of the world. The findings are robust, and do not appear to be explained by conservatives coming to power in more turbulent times. Thus, at least from the perspective of UN voting, differences among conservatives and liberals in the general public translate into different policies when various groups of elites come to power. The conclusion provides ideas for future research to test both the claims made about public opinion and those regarding actual policy-making among foreign policy leaders.

Overall, this dissertation makes two broad arguments. First of all, consistent with what many realists have long believed, the American public reasons about foreign policy through a moralistic, and at times prejudicial, lens. They care about maintaining a positive self-image when faced with decisions about whether or not to use force. While folk realism is correct in its belief that people support defending the country when its independence or existence is threatened, this does not necessarily translate into citizens being concerned with more medium- to long-term realist goals such as maximizing economic well-being and relative power compared to other states. A theory of folk realism that simply said that people did not want their state to fall or be overwhelmed by a foreign army marching in from abroad would be trite. Rather, the heart of folk realism is the assumption that people are influenced by considerations of relative security and

power because of a deeply held belief that other states cannot be trusted, including when those goals are in tension with considerations of humanitarianism or moralistic principles such as following international law (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). Yet Chapter 1 shows that predictions derived from the folk realist literature fail to predict support for policies.

If concern with relative security and power does not drive foreign policy preferences, then what does? This leads to the second unifying theme in this dissertation, which is that we must look to moral psychology to understand when and why individuals want to go to war. The need to maintain a positive self-image is central to how people think about foreign policy preferences, and leads them to desire that their country act in ways that they consider appropriate and moral in the international arena. While many aspects of what provides collective self-esteem are the same regardless of ideology, liberals have a higher baseline level of international altruism, and prejudices that differ from those of conservatives. These ideological differences can potentially explain outputs in international relations that scholars are interested in such as voting patterns at the United Nations. The findings presented complement previous work on how ideology influences the use of force (Bertoli, Dafoe, and Trager 2017) and can hopefully inspire future work on the connection between ideology and behavior in international politics, particularly in the context of international institutions.

Chapter 1

Virtue in Our Own Eyes: How Moral Identity Defines the Politics of Force

In 2011, in response to a violent crackdown on protests by the government, the US launched a war on Libya that succeeded in overthrowing the Qadaffi regime. Almost immediately afterwards, the country was engulfed in anarchy and civil war. Critics of the Obama administration found no shortage of reasons why the war was a bad idea from a national security perspective (Walt 2011; Mearsheimer 2014). Less than a decade earlier, Qadaffi had given up his weapons of mass destruction program in exchange for better relations with the United States. What kind of message did overthrowing him send to adversaries who might contemplate doing the same (Lieber and Press 2013: 8–9)? Anarchy in Libya also contributed to the migrant flood that would create deep fissures both within individual states and across the European Union. Most of these results were foreseeable at the time, and few credible strategic arguments could be made for the intervention. In fact, in an op-ed published in major papers in their respective countries, the leaders of the United States, France, and Great Britain defended their decision to go to war in terms that almost exclusively focused on the moral obligation in question, providing only some idle speculation that if left in power Qadaffi might return to terrorism (Cameron, Obama, and Sarkozy 2011). Clearly believing that this was the most effective way to influence public opinion, the three leaders neglected to talk much about what the consequences of the ongoing intervention had been for their own countries, instead stressing the claim that they had already prevented a “bloodbath" in Libya and the

nature of the “unconscionable betrayal” of the Libyan people that would occur if Qadaffi were left in power.

If national interest, meaning the pursuit of wealth and power (Gilpin 1999: 68), cannot explain this major war undertaken by the leaders of the largest Western powers, what can? Constructivists have answered questions about the nature of state interest by pointing to the universal need that states have to maintain collective self-esteem (Wendt 1999; Hopf 1998), yet those using survey and experimental methods have often come to the conclusion that the American public is ‘folk realist’ in its orientation (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Drezner 2008). This chapter is among the first works to use survey methods in order to test theories about the malleability of state interests derived from the constructivist literature. We argue that foreign policy decision making among the American public today is driven mainly by a need for collective self-esteem, which is made up of four principal components. In order to maintain a positive self-image for their country, Americans desire that their state refrain from engaging in unnecessary harm to others, that its symbols not be denigrated, that it avoid hypocrisy in its international dealings, and that it respects the sovereignty of other states.

We find evidence that arguments about national honor and morality help drive foreign policy decision-making among American respondents. The chapter uses experiments where the demands of a desired self-image conflict or are in tension with power and material interest calculations and find that in each experiment, the former triumphs over the latter. Surprisingly, when Americans consider a prospective intervention for security purposes abroad, the number of expected foreign casualties, more so than the number of American casualties, drives popular approval. While interest

calculations would suggest overlooking norm-transgressions by strategic partners, the opposite is the case: Americans favor intervention in larger numbers against a country that is violating the rights of its own citizens when that country is a US ally. In considering using force abroad, the danger of being accused of hypocrisy outweighs the threat of a rising power, and desecration of national symbols can be more important than the deterrent effect of a nuclear capability. In other words, hypotheses about public opinion derived from the constructivist literature make better predictions than those that assume that the American public reasons largely in strategic terms in order to maximize security and power.

These findings contrast with those from surveys and experiments, which seem to paint a picture of an American public that is realist in outlook (Drezner 2008) and largely responsive to cost-benefit calculations (Kertzer 2016). Mass opinion is said to be concerned first and foremost with the economic and security interests of the United States, and the public is thought to be distrustful of foreign countries and worried about relative gains. We argue that a form of folk realism is most likely to be correct when national survival is on the line or the nation is threatened with a huge drop in living standards. Since in recent decades few potential or actual American wars have fit that description, the need to maintain collective self-esteem is most likely to drive foreign policy decision-making among the modern US public under most plausible scenarios. Taken together, these findings suggest that ideas matter in international relations either because public opinion influences how leaders behave, or, because with regards to moral reasoning leaders themselves are not too dissimilar from those that they represent. The results also explain the growth in recent decades of advanced democracies undertaking

costly humanitarian missions without plausible security rationales (Finnemore 1996; Jackson 1993), including the Libya intervention.

We begin by discussing the constructivist literature on interest formation and the historical research derived from it, focusing on how the need that states have to create and maintain collective self-esteem has driven major phenomena in the international arena. From this body of work, we derive four foundations of a positive self-image in the international arena for citizens living in an advanced democracy such as the United States. We then contrast this view to the ideas expressed in the folk realist literature and argue that theories based on collective self-esteem are more likely to predict foreign policy preferences. The following sections describes the hypotheses and the four experiments we conducted to test them. Each experiment tests a hypothesis derived from one of the four aspects of collective self-esteem against a folk realist alternative. Finally, we discuss the results of our experiments and compare and contrast our findings with those of earlier studies.

Collective Self-Esteem and the "Folk Realist" Public

More and more, scholars are accepting the effect that moral ideals have in international relations. Examining some of the most historically important shifts in the international system–by delving into the historical literature and convincingly excluding alternative theories–researchers have established the central role that moral concepts have played in creating phenomena such as humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), the territorial integrity norm (Zacher 2001), and decolonization (Jackson 1993). Similarly, analysis of the historical literature shows that concerns over national honor and prestige are central to understanding many of the great projects undertaken by states throughout

world history (O'Neill 2006). This desire to live up to moral ideals is said to stem from the need states have to maintain a positive self-image (Wendt 1999: 233–36). This line of research has greatly expanded our understanding of international relations, building on, but sometimes contradicting, theories that took the nature of state interests for granted and argued for the causal importance of the structure of the international system and the distribution of power above all else (Waltz 2001).

Constructivists argue that leaders act in ways that are consistent with humanitarian principles because of the need to create and maintain a positive self-image. This is fundamental to the development of preferences over the behavior of states, constituting what Wendt (1999:233–36) calls a "universal national interest." While this need is fundamental, however, its implications vary over time and how it is satisfied depends on cultural conditioning and the nature of interactions with others (Hopf 1998; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Checkel 2001). Often, gaining or maintaining national honor means behaving in ways that are consistent with great power status (Barnhart 2016), which can translate into, for example, acquiring nuclear weapons (O'Neill 2001) or maintaining colonies (Cohen 2014:36–50; Bell 1996). In these instances, national honor is derived from showing strength or demonstrating a certain level of technological or organizational prowess. Exactly which behaviors bring honor to a state changes over time. While holding colonies may have been a source of pride for the most developed countries in the world a century ago, today it would be a mark of shame (Barnhart 2016; Jackson 1993).

For many constructivists, an identity contains information in the form of norms about what actions are consistent with it. These actions are called "appropriate" and thus

identity circumscribes a domain of acceptable behavior. Actors are expected to choose from within this domain (Checkel 2005: 804–05). This is why states follow norms, even when they do not have a material incentive to do so (Shannon 2000). To bolster this point, researchers have studied costly actions undertaken by major states and other international phenomena that do not appear to have plausible security or material rationales. These include humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), decolonization after the Second World War (Jackson 1993), the development of the norm against the seizure of territory (Zacher 2001), the British campaign against the Atlantic and North African slave trades (Kaufmann and Pape 1999; Löwenheim 2003), the prohibitions against piracy and drug trafficking (Nadelmann 1990), and the non-use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999, 2005, 2007; Paul 2009; Hanania 2017a). In these studies, authors bring attention to the recent development of a norm, discover the individuals and countries most responsible for creating and disseminating it, and cast doubt on possible motivations based on economic or security concerns, thereby pointing to ideational factors as the main causal agents behind the practice or process under investigation.

We argue that, among citizens of modern developed countries, there are four main aspects of maintaining collective self-esteem for their states. First, people need to see themselves as behaving in ways consistent with humanitarian ideals, which means the avoidance of causing unnecessary harm to others. Singer (1981, 2011) has noted what he calls the expanding circle of empathy. Humans have an inherit concern with the well being of themselves and their close relatives. Yet intelligence also gives us the ability to reason abstractly, and see that from the perspective of a neutral observer there is nothing privileged about the interests of any specific individual. Over time, then, humanity

expands its concern from the self and the immediate family only, to the ingroup, to all of humanity, and, eventually all sentient life forms. Pinker (2011:174–80) argues that this process is responsible for the historical declines we see in torture, slavery, and warfare and the expansion of individual rights. Particularly following the rise of the Enlightenment and humanist values in the eighteenth century, in the contemporary United States and elsewhere, collective self-esteem requires valuing human life across the globe. Psychologists have found that at the individual level the belief that one is benevolent is an important aspect of individual self-esteem (Kwan, Kuang, and Hui 2009), and the same applies with regards to collective identities.

Second, there is the desire not to be denigrated, or to see symbols mocked, defaced, or disrespected. Scholars have found conflicts involving sacred symbols to be some of the more intractable in the world (Alderice 2009; Ginges and Atran 2008; Sheikh, Gómez, and Atran 2016). For religious believers, sacred symbols take the form of shrines, temples, holy texts, and sacred tombs. Even among those living without religious dogma, nationalism involves giving special symbolic meaning to certain land and objects such as flags or historical battlefields (Smith 2010). When groups fight over sacred land or other tangible objects or places with symbolic significance, actors gain legitimacy by taking uncompromising positions, which in turn makes it difficult to arrive at bargains that can satisfy both sides (Hassner 2009; Goddard 2006; Toft 2006).

A third component of maintaining collective self-esteem is avoiding hypocrisy, or not acting in ways inconsistent with professed ideals. While individuals can and do engage in self-deception, when contradictions are made clear or highlighted by others either domestically or abroad, individuals adjust their behavior in order to correct the

discomfort that they feel. In thinking about how interests change over time, scholars have therefore stressed the importance of discourse (Hopf 2002:153–94; Hansen 2013). This point is easily misunderstood, as discourse does not itself cause anything. Rather, once states–or, more precisely, the individuals who lead them–accept a certain principle, they become prone to accepting a logical extension of it (Florini 1996; Legro 1997). In that sense, discourse changes behavior through psychological mechanisms that drive states to avoid hypocrisy and other forms of behavior that would hinder their ability to maintain self-esteem. This idea is similar to what Elster (1998) describes as the "civilizing force of hypocrisy," where actors subject to public scrutiny are more likely to behave in accordance with the public good rather than in a purely self-interested manner. Hypocrisy is derivative of the three other principles in the sense that once those principles are established, then individuals desire not to act in ways that are inconsistent with them.

Johnston (2001) points to the central role that hypocrisy plays in socializing actors in the context of international institutions. Others have focused on how this principle can motivate costly action taken in the international arena. Finnemore (1996) argues that in the 1990s Western powers were sensitive to criticism that due to the race of the victims they wanted to intervene for humanitarian reasons in Bosnia but not Somalia, leading to intervention in the latter before the former. Löwenheim (2003) similarly shows that the British fought against white slavery among the North Africans because it wanted to show that its intentions in stopping the Atlantic slave trade were sincere rather than rooted in self-interest. Up to that point, leaders of other states and members of the international community could claim that the British wanted to end the Atlantic slave trade in order to hurt the economies of its rivals, while the Royal Navy allowed North

Africans to continue in a similar practice as long as they left British ships alone and only targeted rivals.

Finally, there is the idea that independent agents should in general not interfere in each other's affairs. This assumption underlies discourse on human and individual rights, and also on the sovereignty of nations. Under international law, states are independent and equal (Biersteker and Weber 1996). This concept is taken for granted when we, for example, accept the right of states to tax and regulate the lives of 'their' citizens and not others, or believe that it is completely unremarkable for the navy of a country to be able to sail only in certain waters (Wendt 1992:412–18). The idea relates to a sense of positive self-image not only because states should therefore want to protect their own sovereignty; they should also have an aversion towards intervening in the affairs of others. In fact, countries that have opposed or tried to place limits on the principle of humanitarian intervention have done so on the grounds that such wars violate sovereignty (Bellamy 2006), an indication that even those that do engage in these kinds of wars give credence to the countervailing principle.

While the historical record suggests that collective self esteem is important for modern states, the body of work on the topic exists uncomfortably alongside a literature that argues that the American public reasons about foreign policy mainly through the lens of a concern about national security, economic well-being, maintaining superpower status, and relative gains, a theory that has been called "folk realism" (Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). Americans are said to think in terms of relative gains, especially when the trading partner is seen as powerful or wealthy (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Rousseau 2002). In one important study, Herrmann, Tetlock and

Visser (1999) found that Americans become more likely to want to go to war if there is a threat of losing access to natural resources necessary for American prosperity, and conclude that Americans are intuitive strategists with regards to foreign policy in a way consistent with realism.

It is important to note that folk realism goes beyond the idea that Americans seek the security of their country and want to avoid drastic declines in the standard of living. According to Kertzer and McGraw (2012:246), while there are many schools of realism, one of the things that all realists have in common is the idea that they stress "the importance of prudent self-interest over moral high-mindedness." We argue that folk realism, at the very least, means a concern with direct harm to the nation and its citizens and maintaining relative power with regards to other states through checking potential rivals and maintaining a reputation for trustworthiness in the international arena. Therefore, to be consistent with folk realism, the general public, in forms that are relatively simple compared to formal models, should use heuristics when thinking about foreign policy that are utilized in order to achieve at least these goals (Drezner 2008; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). An implication is that individuals should put relatively less emphasis on symbolic and moral concerns, thereby placing folk realism in tension with theories based on the maintenance of group self-esteem through moral behavior.

If the public has such an outlook, it represents something of a puzzle, since, as already mentioned, scholars have shown that developed democracies undertake humanitarian missions that bring no material or security gains and carry high costs (Kaufmann and Pape 1999; Löwenheim 2003), arguing that the need for a positive self-

image explains this. Is there a way to reconcile these findings? How do people develop their foreign policy preferences when the need to maintain collective self-esteem is in conflict with the acquirement of security and power? Below, we argue that the need to maintain collective self-esteem has more influence on preferences over the use of force, and present experiments designed to test this theory.

Why Collective Self-Esteem Should Be Better at Predicting Public Opinion

There are three main reasons to suspect that Americans are motivated mostly by a need to maintain a positive self-image for their country rather than security and power interests when thinking about most kinds of potential conflict. First, research from domestic politics shows that unless the costs and benefits are made absolutely clear and primed, objective self-interest does a poor job of explaining policy preferences (Kinder and Sears 1981; Caplan 2011:chapters 3-4). Scholars have had much more success finding a connection between political views and individual-level dispositions such as prejudice and willingness to endorse abstract moral principles (e.g., Kinder and Sears 1981; Haidt 2012; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Tesler 2012). Theories as to why generally focus on the theory of the 'cognitive miser,' which says that individuals prefer to answer simple questions over complex ones (Orbell and Dawes 1991; Kahneman 2011), and the fact that in political decision making the individual does not have an incentive to arrive at a self-interested answer since the probability of one individual's vote changing policy is practically zero in a modern state (Caplan 2011). Participation in the political process has therefore come to be seen as something that is done not out of material interest, but as an expressive behavior that brings mainly psychological rewards (Hillman 2010; Tyran 2004).

We should expect this to be even truer in international politics, where costs and benefits are less easily discerned and distributed amongst all members of the population, and where sacred values are often at stake and people are therefore least open to reasoning about costs and benefits (Hassner 2009; Goddard 2006). Indeed, investigations into public opinion with regards to issues that involve interaction with the rest of the world, such as international trade (Sabet 2016) and immigration (Lucassen and Lubers 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005), confirm what we know from domestic politics and what is implied by economic theories of voting. Interest, even if measured at the level of particular industry in which an individual works, is a second-order effect on attitudes towards free trade, only having an influence among those that do not have strong feelings either way with regards to foreign cultures (Sabet 2016). In the realm of foreign policy, we may expect something similar, especially since the distributional or economic effects of a given policy are at least as uncertain as they are with regards to trade or immigration policy. Tomz and Weeks (2013) find that those living in the United States and Great Britain are less likely to want to go to war with other democracies due partly to the belief that doing so is less moral than going to war with an autocracy. This finding is consistent with the view that foreign policy preferences are driven by a desire to maintain positive collective self-esteem, as individuals are more likely to want to attack a government with a more normatively undesirable system. Attacking a state that is perceived as moral makes it more difficult for individuals to believe that their state is acting benevolently, which is one component of maintaining collective self-esteem.

Second, previous work showing that concerns over security and power have a major influence on public opinion usually focus on circumstances in which citizens are

threatened with the destruction of the state or a major decline in its standard of living (DeNardo 1995; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). This is consistent with literature from domestic politics showing that self-interest matters when the costs and benefits of a policy are specific and individuals are primed to think about them (Chong 2013; Rho and Tomz 2017). There is good reason to believe, however, that such results will not hold under most conditions, since in normal political times concerns over morality are most salient when people think about public issues (Kinder and Sears 1981; Haidt 2012). While sometimes leaders do hype up threats as existential in nature, such as was the case in the run up to the Second Iraq War, most of the time the US public is debating whether to take steps to protect against marginal threats or engage in humanitarian missions. Over the last few decades, it has become vanishingly rare for countries to disappear or be swallowed up by fellow states (Zacher 2001), and the United States in that time period has mostly been fighting what are exclusively wars of choice that do not pose a threat to the survival of the state (Auerswald 2004; Freedman 2005). As we are concerned with American public opinion with regards to realistic options that the modern voter is likely to face, our experiments use examples that are derived from or similar to recent American controversies over whether it is appropriate to use force abroad. Under such conditions, concerns over collective self-esteem should be paramount, since there is no existential threat to the country.

Finally, research reveals that, as many realists have themselves argued (Mearsheimer 2001:chapter 1), the American public is indeed hostile to realist principles. Among a sample of non-elite Americans, only small minorities would endorse bedrocks of realism such as the ideas that the use of force is one tool of politics among many, that

other states cannot be trusted, or even that increasing military might should come at the expense of opening up trade with other nations (Kertzer and McGraw 2012:248). This is consistent with the emerging anthropological view that in most societies and under most circumstances, when people engage in violence it is because of a moral belief that they are doing so in order to uphold a principle and in order achieve some greater good (Fiske and Tage 2014). Indeed, recent research shows that individual-level variation in personality and core moral values influence foreign policy orientation (Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014), while attempts to ground views of international politics in objective interest have been less successful (Sabet 2016; Lucassen and Lubers 2012). Below, we explain the experiments we have designed to test our theory that constructivist theories of foreign policy preferences formation best explain preferences over when it is permissible to use force abroad.

Predictions

In this chapter, we derive four hypotheses from the constructivist literature, in addition to four based on folk realism. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we predict that,

H1, Collective Self-Esteem: *The need to maintain collective self-esteem outweighs material or economic factors as a determinant of popular approval of the use of military force abroad.*

We present four sub-hypotheses derived from the constructivist literature discussed above. First, related to the idea that one's state should not cause unnecessary harm to others, or the benevolence requirement, is what we call the foreign casualties hypothesis. To see one's state as benevolent, it must refrain from causing excessive death

and destruction abroad. Scholars studying the history of warfare have highlighted the development of the civilian immunity norm (Traven 2015; Carpenter 2003, 2016). American identity in particular includes a commitment to human rights, and the US military has created mechanisms and institutions to protect non-combatants in wartime (Kahl 2007). A disproportionate response to a threat that killed thousands of civilians would be inconsistent with the self-image that Americans have of themselves. Therefore, H1a (Foreign Casualties): *Higher expected casualties on the other side in a military operation decreases support for the use of force.*

The second component of national self-esteem is the desire not to be denigrated. Harm to a nation can take the form of physical or psychic damage. A national symbol such as a flag has no inherent meaning other than what members of a community ascribe to it (Ross 2006; Saurette 2006). While in the realm of physical reality the flag is no more than a piece of cloth, its symbolic destruction, even undertaken thousands of miles away, should be expected to cause an emotional response that will affect decision-making with regards to whether individuals want to go to war (Adler 2013). Although there is no material interest at stake, because people have symbolic interests, we predict that,

H1b (Symbolic Harm): *Attacks on symbols of national identity increase support for the use of force.*

A positive self-image is also threatened when a nation can be accused of hypocrisy. This has led scholars to focus on discourse that notices and criticizes contradictions in behavior as key to progress on human rights norms (Hopf 2002; Hansen 2013). Today, western countries are often accused of hypocrisy when they provide support for regimes that commit atrocities and otherwise restrict the rights of their people

(e.g., Mertus 2008). An alliance with such a regime may make Americans fear that their country is behaving hypocritically, which should, if theories of collective self-esteem can predict public opinion, cause a sense of discomfort (Finnemore 1996; Löwenheim 2003). If the question is raised of whether to overthrow such a dictator, an alliance with him may have an effect that is counter-intuitive.

H1c (Hypocrisy) *When a country violates international humanitarian norms, an alliance relationship with that country increases support for the use of force against it.*

Finally, the idea of respecting the sovereignty of other states, that they are equal in their relations and have proper control over their own territory, is a fundamental bedrock of international society (Biersteker and Weber 1996) and our final component of collective self-esteem. In colloquial terms, this is the idea that states should, all else equal, mind their own business by not intervening in affairs that are internal in nature or disputes involving third parties that do not directly affect the interests of the potential intervener. The idea of respecting sovereignty is inherently intertwined with principles of fairness and the desire to avoid hypocrisy. If citizens do not like the idea of foreigners intervening in the affairs of their own state, they should be sensitive to criticisms that they are doing the same.

H1d (Respect for Sovereignty): *Framing a proposed intervention as violating the sovereignty of a foreign state decreases support for aggressive action.*

In contrast to the hypotheses presented above, folk realism would predict that,

H2, Folk Realism: *Security and power interests outweigh other factors as determinants of popular approval of the use of military force abroad.*

Although there are many kinds of realism, they all stress that with regards to foreign policy decision-making states and individuals should care about direct harm to the nation, relative power, and maintaining a reputation for cooperation (see Kertzer and McGraw 2012). A concern with national interest above all would first predict that a course of action will become less appealing when the potential adversary can inflict greater harm on the acting country. The most direct harm that can befall a nation is to see its own citizens being killed, and in an experiment one can manipulate the ability of the other side to damage the United States by increasing the number of casualties predicted in a war or building up the capabilities of the enemy. Over the last several decades a larger number of casualties seems to be correlated with a decrease in support for specific conflicts among the American public (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Eichenberg 2005). However, this relationship seems to depend on the conflict in question, and it is difficult to say whether this is a directly causal relationship, or that higher casualties are correlated with a decrease in belief about the morality of the cause or the prospects of success.

H2a (American Casualties): *Higher expected American casualties in a military operation decreases support for the use of force.*

With regard to military capabilities, there is a wide literature on nuclear deterrence that argues that when both states have nuclear weapons, the probability of war decreases (Schelling 2008; Waltz 1990, 2012). If another state is strong, power considerations should make individuals more likely to want to engage in buck passing or avoid conflict altogether, while fighting a weaker state should be an easier way of getting

what one wants (Mearsheimer 2001:ch. 1).[1] This leads to the following folk realist prediction.

H2b (Nuclear Weapons): *There will be less support for an attack on a country that possesses nuclear weapons.*

Realists also stress the importance of a reputation for reliability with regards to foreign policy. International relations is often conceptualized as an iterated game where a reputation for cooperation is essential to long-term success and accomplishing foreign policy goals (Lipson 1984; Grieco 1988; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Guisinger and Smith 2002; Tomz 2007). States form alliances, make threats, sign agreements, and otherwise generally rely on other countries believing that they are trustworthy and that their promises are valid. While Americans may be discomforted by the thought of supporting regimes that violate human rights, an alliance in place should make individuals less likely to support an attack when all else is equal.

H2c (Reliability): *An alliance relationship with a country decreases support for the use of force against that country whether or not it violates international humanitarian norms.*

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[1] Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) found that American respondents are more likely to want to go to war against a state that has nuclear weapons, all else being equal, and have interpreted this as being consistent with folk realism, arguing that respondents are more eager to check a rising power. We doubt that this is a correct interpretation of their findings, because, as we note, most realists who have studied the question have argued that states will be less likely to want to go to war with a stronger country, particularly if it has nuclear weapons (see Schelling 2008; Mearsheimer 2001). Moreover, the theory that people will want to check a rising power is tested more directly in H2d.

Finally, perhaps the most basic idea in folk realism is that states care about relative power (Mearsheimer 2001; Drezner 2008). If the public distrusts other states, then perceiving a potential rival as a rising power threatening American interests should make individuals more aggressive towards that country. This conflicts with the idea of sovereignty, which says countries should stay out of the affairs of others unless there is a direct harm. Regardless, when all else is equal, folk realism predicts that,

H2d (Relative Power): *Framing a country as a threat to American power and standing increases support for aggressive action.*

The "cognitive miser" approach (Kahneman 2011) would lead us to doubt that people make foreign policy decisions based on long-term threats to the country. In contrast, if the public thinks in terms of strategy and relative power (Kertzer and McGraw 2012), then priming individuals to see the actions of a rival as increasing its ability to harm in the US should lead Americans to want to take a more aggressive stance.

Experimental Design

This section explains the design of four experiments created to test these collective self-esteem hypotheses against folk realist alternatives. The experiments were fielded by Survey Sampling International on a representative sample of the U.S. population in July 2016 (N = 2,715). Each presented a scenario in which the U.S. government might consider the use of force or aggressive action abroad and asked respondents whether they would approve of such a decision. We tested collective self-esteem and folk realist hypotheses directly through treatments derived from these two literatures. We also conducted mediation analyses to corroborate the interpretation of the primary treatment effects. Further, since folk realism is partly characterized by its lack of

concern for morality in the international arena (Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Drezner 2008), each finding supporting an idea that collective self-esteem based on a moral principle matters counts against folk realism. The exact prompts and question wording for each experiment can be found in the appendix. Table 1 lays out the four experiments, the policy space being explored in each, and the corresponding hypotheses being tested.

	Policy Space	Self-Esteem Hypotheses (H1)	Realist Hypotheses (H2)
Experiment 1	Casualties	*Foreign Casualties (H1a)*: Higher expected casualties on the other side in a military operation decreases support for the use of force.	*American Casualties (H2a)*: Higher expected American casualties in a military operation decreases support for the use of force.
Experiment 2	Symbolic/Physical Harm	*Symbolic Harm (H1b)*: Attacks on symbols of national identity increase support for the use of force.	*Nuclear Weapons (H2b)*: There will be less support for an attack on a country that possesses nuclear weapons.
Experiment 3	Alliances	*Hypocrisy (H1c)*: When a country violates international humanitarian norms, an alliance relationship with that country increases support for the use of force against it.	*Reliability (H2c)*: An alliance relationship with a country decreases support for the use of force against that country whether or not it violates international humanitarian norms.
Experiment 4	Sovereignty	*Respect for Sovereignty (H1d)*: Framing a proposed intervention as violating the sovereignty of a foreign state decreases support for aggressive action.	*Relative Power (H2d)*: Framing an action as a threat to the power and standing of the country in question will increase support for aggressive action.

Table 1.
Four Experiments.

Experiment 1: Casualty Hypotheses (Humanitarianism)

The first experiment tests the collective self-esteem and folk realist casualty hypotheses *Foreign Casualties, H1a* and *American Casualties, H2a* by presenting respondents with a scenario in which a dictator is supporting terrorism against the United States. His attacks have led to American deaths, with more to come if nothing is done. Respondents are asked whether they would support going to war to get rid of the dictator. The collective self-esteem casualty hypothesis is tested through varying the number of expected foreign casualties, and the folk realist casualty hypothesis is tested by varying the number of American casualties. In the American casualties treatment, the United States is said to be expected to lose 0, 10, 100, or 1,000 soldiers. In the foreign casualties treatment, the number of innocent foreign civilians that will be killed in the attack is 50, 500, 5,000, or 50,000. The two treatments are fully crossed. The scales are chosen because the experiment is designed to understand what drives preferences in plausible scenarios, and to reflect the finding that historically the American public is sensitive to the log of casualties, not their absolute numbers (Mueller 1973, 1994). While nothing precludes individuals being concerned with both American and foreign casualties, willingness to sacrifice American lives for a greater good does not hurt the collective self-esteem of the nation in the way that a callous disregard for the well being of others does. By manipulating the numbers killed on each side, this experiment is able to determine which casualties matter to the American public in a war to defend American lives.

Experiment 2: Physical/Symbolic Harm Hypotheses (Denigration)

This experiment tests the effects of symbolic harm to the nation (*Symbolic Harm, H1b*) and the potential for physical harm (*Nuclear Weapons, H2b*) on approval of the use of force. In the vignette, a foreign country called Lyko arrests five American diplomats and puts them on trial for subversion. Respondents were told that "It is clear that these individuals are actually innocent, but were only arrested so that the leader of Lyko can present the United States as an enemy to unite his country." The experiment consists of two fully crossed binary treatments. In the first, Lyko is described as possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons. In the second, the Lyko government either leads a rally where the American flag is burned and the prisoners are humiliated and made to give false confessions or no such rally occurs. The *Symbolic Harm* hypothesis predicts that the burning of the flag would have substantial effect on approval of the use of force; the *Nuclear Weapons* hypothesis predicts that the increased costs of attacking a nuclear-armed state would decrease support for the use of force.

Experiment 3: Alliance Hypotheses (Hypocrisy)

In the third experiment, a foreign dictator is murdering his own people. In once scenario, he is presented as a long-term ally of the United States cooperating in the war against terrorism, while in the other, he only works with the American government out of self-interest. When the dictator is facing an internal rebellion from the people he is oppressing, respondents are asked whether the US should support his overthrow. Thus, this experiment tests whether an alliance relationship with a norm violator increases (*Hypocrisy, H1c*) or decreases (*Reliability, H2c*) support for the use of force against the regime. Unlike the other experiments, in this one the two main theories being tested are irreconcilable; if there is support for one, then there is direct evidence against the other.

We also vary whether the dictator previously broke a settlement agreement to check whether respondents were driven to punish norm breaking generally (rather than norm-breaking that infringes US collective self-esteem) or were influenced by the foreign leader's likelihood of being an unreliable ally.

Experiment 4: Power/Fairness Hypotheses (Sovereignty)

The fourth experiment explains the dispute between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea. Respondents are shown a map of the region indicating the extent of Chinese claims as well as the conflicting rights of other nations to 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The respondents were then asked whether they would support sending ships through the disputed territorial waters, a policy that "would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region."

In the control condition, the vignette simply explains the situation. The first treatment, *US Unfair*, adds text framing a U.S. intervention in the affair as violating regional sovereignties, testing the *Sovereignty Hypothesis, H1d*. Respondents are told that since China does not interfere in American relations with its neighbors, "why should the United States take a position on the South China Sea?" Further, "By challenging China on this issue, the United States is enforcing its will on the rest of the world. This is unjust, as it makes the United States the judge of how other states should behave, a role that it should not claim for itself." The second treatment, *US Threat*, tests whether the framing of Chinese behavior as a threat to American power and dominance in the region (*Relative Power, H2d*) influences support for the deployment of force. Respondents are told that "China appears to be deliberately flouting the world order with which the U.S. is

identified and the aggressive statements of Chinese leaders regularly single out the United States. Many nations in the region and around the world are closely observing the dispute as a sign of which power will control the future of the region and the world."
We add one more treatment to check whether US respondents primarily react to framings that suggest the US is violating a norm, and therefore challenge collective self-esteem, or to framings that a norm has been violated by a potential adversary. This allows us to investigate whether a general concern for fairness is at work as opposed to the specific requirements for collective self-esteem. In this third treatment, we frame the conflict as one in which China is behaving unfairly by pushing around its neighbors (*China Unfair*). Respondents were told that it is ``not fair that practically every country in the world sticks to the 200-mile rule, except for the Chinese, who apparently believe that because they are powerful they can push around their neighbors." If respondents react to this treatment to the same degree as they react to the *US Unfair* treatment, this supports the alternative view that general concerns about fairness are primary determinant of foreign policy preferences. By contrast, if there is support for H1d and *China Unfair* does not have a discernible effect, this provides additional support for the theory of collective self-esteem, since an argument about the US violating the sovereignty of others has an impact, while China violating the sovereignty or rights of others does not (see Rothschild and Keefer 2017).

Results

In each experiment, the collective self-esteem hypotheses are strongly supported and folk realist hypotheses are not. To analyze the effects of expectations of foreign and American casualties on support for the use of force in Experiment 1, we

employ the regression analyses shown in Table 2. The *American Casualties* and Foreign *Casualties* variables are on a 1-4 scale according to the four treatment conditions for each. The dependent variable, support for war, is also on a 1-4 approval scale. We find that regardless of model specifications, Foreign Casualties is statistically significant ($p < .001$) and we find no discernible effect of American casualties. Each level increase in foreign casualties is associated with a move of .07 in the less hawkish direction. The results remain unchanged if we add demographic and ideological controls. If support for military action is treated as a binary variable, a change from the minimum number of foreign casualties in the treatment conditions (50) to the maximum number (50,000) decreases support for war from 72% to 62%.

Table 2.
Support for War on Four-Point Scale.

Model	**1** **OLS**	**2** **Ord Prob**	**3** **OLS**	**4** **Ord Prob**
Foreign Casualties	–0.06*** (0.02)	–0.07*** (0.02)	–0.05*** (0.02)	–0.06*** (0.02)
American Casualties	–0.01 (0.01)	–0.01 (0.02)	–0.01 (0.02)	–0.01 (0.02)
Female			–0.13*** (0.03)	–0.18*** (0.04)
Education			–0.01 (0.02)	–0.02 (0.02)
Ideology			0.11*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.02)
Constant	2.86***		2.82***	
Observations	2,705	2,705	2,592	2,592
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0	0.04	0.02

note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

This difference in the effects of foreign and American casualties is not the result of the higher number of foreign casualties examined in some treatment conditions; if we limit the analysis to the treatment conditions in which the range of foreign casualties is less than the range of American casualties, the results are largely unchanged. This is in part because, as predicted and consistent with earlier findings, the marginal effect of increasing foreign casualties on support for force is greater at lower levels of casualties. The largest effect on support is in the change from 50 to 500 deaths; the differences in support between 500 and 5,000 and between 5,000 and 50,000 are lower. The estimated effects of foreign and American casualties are shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Foreign and American Casualties

The effect of foreign casualties on willingness to use force does not correlate with political ideology; Republicans and Democrats react similarly. The results are also

similar whether the use of force contemplated is conventional or nuclear even though support for the latter is much lower (Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013). These sub-analyses, and all mediation and sub-group analyses referenced below, are described in greater detail in the appendix.

Figure 2 shows the results from the other three experiments. Experiment 2 confirms that concerns about symbolic harm can outweigh concerns about physical harm. Burning the U.S. flag and humiliating U.S. diplomats increase support for the use of force ($p < .035$). This effect is strongest in the center of the ideological distribution of respondents (see appendix) and is not driven by instrumental considerations: the flag burning treatment does not make respondents more likely to believe that ``not responding to Lyko would hinder the ability of the US to achieve other important foreign policy goals" ($p = .5$). In contrast to the effects of symbolic harm, the potential for physical harm, represented by the presence of nuclear weapons in the foreign state, actually appears to increase support for the use of force ($p < .06$), not decrease it as the folk realist, *Nuclear Weapons (H2b)* hypothesis predicts.



Figure 2. Experiment 2 - 4 Treatment Effects.

In Experiment 3, we see that being an ally of the United States *increases* the desire to overthrow the dictator, with the effect being about 0.1 standard deviations ($p < .01$). There is no evidence that the effect is driven by particular parts of the ideological distribution of respondents. As predicted, the instrumental value of solidarity with allies was outweighed by the collective self-esteem need for social distance from norm violators. We also tested whether the dictator violating an agreement with the persecuted minority group would increase support for intervention and found no such effect. This is consistent with H1, or the idea that people are more motivated by their desire for collective self-esteem rather than general moral feelings about the conduct of others or concerns about the reliability of allies.

The results of the last experiment support the *Sovereignty Hypothesis (H1d)* over the *Relative Power Hypothesis (H2d)*. Framing U.S. intervention in South China Sea

disputes as violating regional sovereignties decreases support for intervention ($p < .001$), while framing Chinese actions in the region as a threat to US power and is actually associated with a slight decrease in support for the use of force ($p < .58$). The estimated effect of *China Unfair* rounds to zero. Mediation analysis confirms that respondents made a moral rather than an instrumental judgment in response to the sovereignty violation framing. As Figure 3 illustrates, there is no effect of *US Unfair* on respondents' views about the need for the U.S. to protect its interests or on the benefits of not appearing weak. Only participant response to the explicit moral framing “states should mind their own business" is clearly influenced by the treatment. Regression analysis of support for the use of force on the mediators alongside treatment and demographic variables shows that all four of the mediators shown in Figure 3 are highly significant predictors. Thus, a mediation analysis identifies the moral response that states should “mind their own business” as an important mediator. When we conduct the form of mediation and sensitivity analysis recommended in Imai, Keele, and Tingley (2010), we find that this single moral mediator accounts for a little less than a third of the total treatment effect.



Figure 3. Effect of Sovereignty Treatment on Mediators.

We also find that the sovereignty violation framing treatment interacts strongly with the pre-treatment importance that respondents place on governments acting fairly, again confirming that moral rather than instrumental considerations drive these changes in approval of the use of force. To analyze this, we estimated regression models of support for force on the interaction of the importance of governments acting fairly with the sovereignty violation prime. The results are illustrated in Figure 4. In the control condition, represented by the blue line in the figure, the importance that respondents place on governments acting fairly has a statistically significant positive effect on approval of the use of force. The sovereignty framing triggers fairness concerns among those who consider fairness important and thus decreases their propensity to approve of

force. Under the sovereignty violation prime, represented by the red line in the figure, this effect is dramatically reversed. Then, the importance of fairness to respondents has an extremely large negative impact on approval of the use of force. In addition to supporting our interpretation of the treatment effect, this result is interesting in itself, particularly in what it says about the ability of media (Baum and Potter 2015) and political elites (Zaller 1992; Stein 2015; Trager and Vavreck 2011) to tap in to moral dispositions.



Figure 4. Sovereignty Framings and Fairness Values Interact.

Discussion and Conclusion

We find strong support for H1, but virtually none for H2. In each experiment, predictions derived from the belief that citizens seek collective self-esteem had the

anticipated effect, while folk realist hypotheses consistently failed. Perhaps the most surprising finding is that American casualties did not predict support for war across our sample. While this seems to contradict previous empirical work (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006, 2009; Eichenberg 2005), there is some evidence to suggest that the connection between casualties and support for war exists only when elites are divided and there are public doubts about potential outcomes (Larson 1996: 28–30; Gartner and Segura 1998). Furthermore, it is possible that casualties decrease support for war partly because citizens treat casualties as a signal that their country is likely to lose, as we know that confidence in success predicts support for war (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). Kertzer (2016) finds that being told about higher expected casualties before a conflict begins does not decrease resolve, implying that what really matters is casualties relative to expectations. This is consistent with Gartner (2008), who conducted a series of panel experiments in which only casualty trends, but not total casualties, were strongly associated with decreasing support for continuing a war. By taking a prospective rather than retrospective approach, specifying the mission and the expected result, we seek to isolate causation directly. A mission to stop terrorism should have widespread support among the American public (Drezner 2008), and our prompt ensured the reader of success. When holding prospects for success and support for the mission constant, then, we find that only foreign, but not American casualties, predict support for war.

While the government in Experiment 2 violated international norms by holding diplomats hostage, the added insult of burning the American flag increased support for war. Not only did nuclear weapons not lead to more people wanting to attack, but there is weak evidence that they made Americans more eager to go to war. It appears that the

infliction of symbolic harm was more important than the potential to cause actual damage in influencing support for conflict. Experiment 3 was designed to test a folk realist theory directly against a hypothesis derived from the belief that individuals seek collective self-esteem in the international arena. When the dictator in question was a long-standing ally of the United States, Americans were more likely to want to overthrow him. One may call this the "Qadaffi effect," naming it after the leader who survived nearly a quarter century as an enemy of the west but lasted less than 10 years as an ally. While realists differ on many points, all of them would likely agree that we would not expect a reputation for trustworthiness to be sacrificed for the sake of humanitarian ideals (e.g., Kydd 2005). Although this result may be inconsistent with some rational choice models, it can be predicted by the moral psychology literature that tells us that individuals often engage in acts that can be described as 'moral cleansing,' where they become more steadfast in their moral beliefs when confronted with uncomfortable tradeoffs (Tetlock et al. 2000; Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan 2011). The findings also shed light on why in American politics there has been a long history of critics accusing our leaders of 'betraying our allies,' particularly when they have questionable human rights records (e.g., Ledeen 2013; Berman 2001).

Experiment 4 differed from the others in seeking out opinions about an ongoing dispute. By far, the largest influence, compared to the null scenario, was in the prompt where the United States was accused of violating the sovereignty of another by unjustifiably interfering in its conflict with others. There was no effect when it was argued that Americans needed to stand up to China in order to maintain its relative power. In order to test our theory of collective self-esteem against the possibility that

maybe individuals are simply influenced by any arguments about fairness, we included a prompt that stressed the unfairness of Chinese actions but found no effect, implying that when they contemplated action in the international arena what Americans really cared about was their own collective self-esteem, not fairness as a general principle (see Rothschild and Keefer 2017). The effects of *US Unfair* were also twice as large among those who called themselves political liberals compared to those who identified as conservative. Clearly, preexisting dispositions and ideology have a role to play in how information and arguments are perceived and translated into desired action.

Overall, the results were in each experiment are consistent with the idea that people seek to maintain a positive self-image in the international arena, doing so through acting in accordance with humanitarian ideals, reacting to the denigration of symbols, avoiding hypocrisy, and respecting the rights of others. Predictions derived from the folk realist literature failed, whether the harm in question was direct (potential military damage, American casualties), or more attenuated (a loss of relative power, a decline in reputation). At least when the existence of the country or its way of life is not directly threatened, it appears that foreign policy preferences over the use of force are driven by a need to maintain a positive sense of self. Mediation analysis supports predictions derived from the constructivist literature with regards to collective self-esteem. The effects of ideology and more general moral principles were mixed, with those who identify as liberals and care more about fairness being more affected by prompts that accused the United States of behaving unfairly.

Despite these findings, theories of folk realism seem to have empirical support in the literature, and we use the rest of this chapter to discuss how we reconcile our

findings with previous work on the topic and suggest future avenues of research. First, we believe that some of the seeming contradictions can be reconciled by considering our finding on the morality of respecting the sovereignty of other nations. Drezner (2008) shows that the public has relatively low levels of support for democracy promotion, nation building, and the spread of human rights as foreign policy priorities, and takes this as evidence for folk realism. It is also possible, however, that Americans are skeptical of such goals due to a respect for the sovereignty of other nations and cultures. A clue in favor of this point of view is found in the extremely high levels of support for compliance with international law, and the experimental finding that international law influences support for policies, even those that are purely domestic in nature (Drezner 2008; Chilton and Tingley 2013; Wallace 2013). Giving normative consideration to international law may mean that Americans are fine with promoting certain principles abroad if doing so has normative justification in accepted rules that are meant to apply to all members of the international community. Otherwise, the promotion of democracy and human rights in general is seen as an unjustifiable interference in the affair of others.

A second problem with the folk realism interpretation of the data is that Americans have generally showed more support for humanitarian interventions than other forms of conflict (Jentleson and Britton 2008), implying that when the human rights violations in question reach the level of mass murder or genocide, qualms about interfering in the affairs of others go away. This is not what a folk realist theory would predict, as it implies that the degree of oppression suffered by others does not matter. A rejection of human rights and democracy promotion by itself should not be automatically

taken as a rejection of a moral concern for others in international affairs; it may be a manifestation of a morality that has different considerations.

Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro (1999) also presented findings that seem to contradict the results found here when they conducted two experiments that involved potential American intervention in a dispute between two other countries. People were more likely to want to go war when they are told that stopping an attack is important to American security and economic interests, compared to the scenario when respondents were explicitly told that the United States had no such interest in the conflict. Yet we do not know whether interest mattered only because such a treatment was paired with an aggressive action taken by a third party. One may have a default position that a conflict between two outside parties is none of the business of the United States, unless the attack somehow infringes on the legitimate rights of the United States itself. A folk realist interpretation, or the idea that interest is the independent motivating force, would predict that Americans will likely want to go to war if its economic or security interests are threatened by a third party *even when that third party is acting in accordance with morality and international law*. There is no evidence that this is the case, and in fact there are very low levels of support for the idea that a goal of foreign policy should be to promote US business interests abroad (Drezner 2008). An unjustified attack against a third party that threatens American national or economic interests might be in the eyes of the public conceptually not much different from a direct attack.

Furthermore, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro (1999) have in each of their experiments only two treatment conditions related to interest: one where interests are said to be threatened, and another where interests are said to not be threatened. We therefore

do not know what the results would be if no mention of interests was made at all. Respondents may take the explicit repudiation of a security or economic interest as a sign that the conflict is morally none of the business of the United States. Without a null condition, we cannot be certain that it is a concern with economic and security interests, rather than an explicit repudiation of such interests as important, that is driving the results.

Certain scholars have found evidence of folk realist thinking among Americans when it comes to preferences over international trade (Rousseau 2002; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). It would be a mistake to assume, however, that such findings tell us something about preferences regarding conflict. War and the use of state violence invokes sacred values, in which moral intuitions are different from what they are when people consider more mundane matters (e.g., Fiske and Tage 2014; Tetlock 2003; Atran and Ginges 2015). Among these differences is the finding that when sacred values are at stake people are less likely to be incentivized by material interests or consider tradeoffs against non-sacred values (Ginges and Atran 2009). Note how while virtually all countries have days of remembrances, parades, and sacred places of burial for soldiers of previous wars, the same honors are never extended to successful trade negotiators.

Finally, the findings here should be noted in light of Kertzer's (2016, 2017) work showing that over time support for war decreases when people are told about casualties or the reputation effects of pulling out of a conflict. Regarding the effects on reputation, his first experiment showed an effect that was only borderline significant. Clear results were achieved only when an ally was publicly shaming the United States for its refusal to defend it. These findings are consistent with the view that reputation effects

only matter when they are explicitly spelled out and made unusually salient by a researcher, or even with the interpretation that morality was really driving the results, since an ally publicly shaming one's country can lead an individual to believe that abandoning that ally would be an unacceptable betrayal.

The finding by Kertzer that more casualties over time reduces willingness to stay the course is consistent with previous works on casualties reducing support for war in natural experiments (Mueller 1973, 1994). Yet it must be noted that in Kertzer's work, being told about expected casualties in advance actually increased resolve. Seeing that a higher number of expected casualties has no effect in Experiment 1, and that it actually increases willingness to continue fighting in a previous experiment, means that it may be too simple to say that Americans are particularly sensitive to casualties. Experiment 1 held constant the probability of success and the consequences of inaction, and found no effect of American casualties. More research will be needed that takes seriously the hypothesis that casualties affect support for war only when they are taken as signals regarding the likelihood of success (see Gartner 2008).

None of these our findings suggest that there is no segment of the public that thinks in folk realist terms. For example, Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) find that under various conditions about a third of Americans oppose using nuclear weapons against terrorists due to the precedent that it would set. Yet even more Americans had no problem using nuclear weapons when they increased the odds of success, implying that when there is wide-ranging support for a goal most of the public tends not to think too many steps ahead. This is consistent with our view of the "cognitive miser," which casts

doubt on the proposition that Americans are intuitive medium to-long term strategists with regards to foreign policy.

Because survey questions and some experiments can be open to multiple interpretations, it is important to conduct studies specifically designed in order to see what happens when folk realism and morality-based approaches are tested against one another. Before this work, the only study to do this was Kertzer and McGraw (2012), who presented respondents with 12 questions that asked participants to either endorse a principle of realism or an opposite view. In 9 of the 12 cases, a majority endorsed the non-realist principle. Of the three conditions in which individuals endorsed the realist principle, in one case the non-realist principle that individuals declined to endorse was the idea that the United States should spread democracy abroad, which, as discussed above, can be rejected on moral grounds. Two-thirds of respondents thought that upholding international law was more important than protecting American corporations and a similar number believed that force should only be used for defensive purposes.

Clearly, Americans respond to direct attacks on their nation, as we saw in the 'rally round the flag' effect (Baum 2002; Chapman and Reiter 2004) in the aftermaths of Pearl Harbor and the attacks of September 11. Yet this alone does not tell us much about folk realism unless it is defined so narrowly as to almost be meaningless. To make an analogy, the observation that a man punches back when he is hit would not provide much evidence that he is only interested in his own wealth and security, much less that he is indifferent to considerations of morality when he is seeking those goals. For folk realist theories of public opinion to have explanatory power and go beyond the mundane, they must show directly that most individuals do not care about their country behaving

morally and that they make it a priority to maintain relative economic and military power in the medium- to long-term. Our results appear to contradict this outlook, and provide strong evidence that with regards to the use of force under most circumstances people are motivated mainly by the need to maintain a positive image of their country.

While our findings may be in conflict with interpretations of data by more recent scholars, they are consistent with the views of some of the most prominent realists of the postwar era. Decades ago, Kennan (1994:208) lamented the "indulgence of the desire to appear virtuous in our own eyes" that made US policy inflexible and unable "to act usefully in more significant areas of international life." More recently, Mearsheimer (2001: ch. 1), argued that "Americans appear to have an especially intense antipathy toward balance-of-power thinking," because realism "clashes with their basic values."

Constructivists, in contrast, have usually focused on collective self-esteem and moral considerations from the perspective of those that wield ultimate decision-making power. Until now, however, this body of research has yet to fully test the possibility that the mechanisms that constructivists believe operate at the elite level also predominate at the level of public opinion. If public opinion affects foreign policy in the United States and other democracies (Risse-Kappen 1991), then we have a direct link between the variables that determine the level of support for aggressive action and actual state behavior. Hopefully, the experiments presented here can inspire a research agenda that can help ground constructivist theories of international behavior in the beliefs, motivations, and intuitions of the general public.

Chapter 2

How Prejudice Shapes Foreign Policy Preferences and Values

In late 2015, France suffered a wave of coordinated terrorist attacks that left 130 dead and hundreds more injured. In response, Facebook created an option that allowed people to change their profile photos to a picture of the French flag, and millions of Americans and Europeans took advantage of this feature. While the company may not have imagined that it would face backlash over this gesture, critics accused Facebook of racism (Baker 2015; McHugh 2016). After all, there had been recent terrorist attacks that killed dozens or hundreds in countries such as Kenya, Pakistan, and Lebanon, yet none of these events had elicited similar reactions. The critics wondered whether the fact that the Paris attack occurred in a European country made it seem like a much larger tragedy in the eyes of Westerners.

While this recent episode may seem trivial, it reflects a fundamental truth about international politics that is easily overlooked. Unquestionably, issues of identity and prejudice affect how we see the world. Westerners care more about terrorist attacks in countries where the people are ethnically or culturally similar to themselves. Likewise, the Muslim world takes a disproportionate interest in the suffering of the Palestinians, while Russia concerns itself with the fate of its co-ethnics in neighboring states. Although these kinds of prejudices clearly play an important role in international politics, western countries such as the United States pride themselves on their supposed adherence to universal values. Yet even Americans and Britons are more likely to perceive a threat from a potential adversary when the country in question is culturally distant (Johns and

Davies 2012; Tomz and Weeks 2013, 2015). It still remains an open question, however, whether prejudice shapes foreign policy preferences in deeper and more fundamental ways. When individuals consider whether to engage in humanitarian action, for example, does the desire to help people suffering in foreign countries depend more on the circumstances that they find themselves in or on the identities of the oppressors and the oppressed? Can prejudice not only shape perceptions of threat, but also lead to *post hoc* justifications about moral obligations in the international system?

Previous work into the field has looked at foreign policy preferences through the perspective of what Rathbun et al. (2016) call the vertical hierarchy model. In this view, the policy orientations and concrete preferences that political scientists are interested in are driven by more fundamental views of right and wrong. While this framework is compelling, much has less attention has been paid to the possibility that the prejudices that have been so extensively studied in the domestic context (e.g., Kinder and Sears 1981; Tesler 2012) are also pivotal in determining how Americans want to interact with the rest of the world. Research shows that political preferences are driven not only by abstract moral values (Haidt 2012; Rathbun et al. 2016), but also prejudice towards individuals and groups (Baum and Groeling 2009; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004). It is surprising, then, that despite a large literature on the moral foundations of foreign policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Holsti 2009; Kertzer et al. 2014), there has been relatively little experimental work addressing the possibility that the role of prejudice may be as extensive in foreign policy as it is in the domestic sphere.

This chapter presents the prejudice first model, and investigates under what conditions Americans of different ideologies become more or less willing to intervene for

humanitarian reasons. In the first experiment, the relevant dimension of identity is religion, with some respondents being told that Christians were killing Muslims while others heard the opposite. In the second experiment, the researcher varies the races of the oppressors and the oppressed. Finally, the chapter address the possible causes of an isolationist foreign policy orientation among Americans from the perspective of the prejudice first model, exploring not only the degree to which Americans are prejudiced in their foreign policy preferences, but also how prejudice varies by partisan identification. It is often said that there was a point in American history when "politics stopped at the water's edge." While this adage may or may not have accurately represented the early Cold War consensus, few today doubt that Americans reason about foreign affairs through partisan lenses (DeLaet and Scott 2006). This means that, if prejudice is an important determinant of domestic policy preferences, then we might expect Americans to take their ingrained attitudes with them when they begin thinking about international relations.

Moral Values and Foreign Policy Preferences

Earlier research argued that people generally held "nonattitudes" towards foreign policy questions, showing little consistency in their views beyond being sensitive to media coverage and elite cues (Converse 1974; Zaller 1992). Over time, this school of thought has given way to a view that finds nuanced patterns in how Americans want their country to interact with the rest of the world (Aldrich et al. 2006; Holsti 2009). More recent scholarship investigates how more general moral convictions at the individual level affect foreign policy preferences (Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014). Through their analysis of election data, scholars have found that public opinion not only has a

structure, but that it can in certain cases determine the results of elections (Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2007; Karol and Miguel 2007). Politicians, in turn, pay attention to public opinion on foreign policy issues and adjust their positions in order to satisfy voters (Hildebrandt et al. 2013).

In recent years, analysts have tried to go one step deeper than earlier scholars, asking the question of whether more fundamental values are shaping foreign policy preferences. They have generally relied on either Moral Foundations theory (Haidt 2012; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009) or the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2001). Using Moral Foundations theory, it appears that harm/care and fairness/reciprocity predict support for cooperative internationalism (CI), while authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity are associated with militant internationalism (MI) (Kertzer et al. 2014). In terms of the Schwartz model, CI is associated with universalism, and MI is linked to conservation values (Rathbun et al. 2016). Consistent with previous research, these studies show MI and CI to be linked to values associated with conservatism and liberalism respectively.

This kind of research relies on what has been called the vertical hierarchy model (Rathbun et al. 2016). In this framework, when stepping into the political sphere, people bring preexisting abstract attitudes towards right and wrong with them. As a result they form general ideas about the appropriate way for their country to interact with the rest of the world, which in turn leads to specific policy preferences. This makes inherent sense, as one would expect our evolutionary history to equip us with certain moral ideas but not directly determine how we feel about relatively recent phenomena such as international diplomacy. Both the Schwartz model and Moral Foundations explicitly ground their

theories in evolutionary psychology, arguing that the values measured were developed in order to aid us in our struggle for individual and group survival (Haidt 2012; Schwartz and Bardi 2001).

The vertical hierarchy model is certainly compelling and can help us understand both differences between individuals and those of differing ideologies. Yet a glance at the world around us shows that it can only tell part of the story. Most times and places, the main political divisions we see fall along cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic fault lines. One could imagine a study that found that Muslim Americans were more conservatives on social issues than Christian Americans. A researcher may be tempted to conclude that some people are higher on purity/sanctity than others, and those that care more about this value decided to become Muslims, while those that are more indifferent to this value became Christians! But because we know that individuals overwhelmingly adopt the religious identity that they are born into, it is more likely that people "decided" to be Christians or Muslims first and then accepted the value systems associated with their religion. Of course the analogy is not perfect; Western democracies pride themselves on having citizens that are independent, willing to consider issues for themselves, and vote according to their own moral values and interests. Yet even in these societies identity remains central. In American presidential elections, race is by far the best single predictor of voting, trumping income by a wide margin (Tyson and Maniam 2016). It is unlikely that ethnic or racial differences in moral values can explain the large variations we see across demographics.

This chapter presents the prejudice first model. Rather than placing moral values at the top in a chain of causation, this model holds that people begin by asking "who am

I?", or, more precisely, "whose side am I on?" They then form specific views, taking the position that is associated with being on the side of the group that they identify with. Finally, moral values or general policy orientations come last, as *post-hoc* justifications of the prejudices and policy preferences that are prior to them. Figure 1 illustrates the difference.



Figure 1. Two Models.

This chapter borrows from Brown (2011:11) in defining prejudice as an attitude or emotion that values the material and social well being of the individuals of one group over another. This definition breaks with some whose definition of prejudice includes a feeling of hatred or disgust towards certain groups, or a view of them as intrinsically

inferior (Kinder 2013; Kinder and Drake 2009). The broad definition of prejudice used here gives us a simple tool that can explain a large variety of phenomena in the field of foreign policy preference formation. For example, most Americans are prejudiced in the sense of prioritizing the well being of fellow citizens over that of foreigners. While some Americans may very well have feelings of hostility or hatred towards people of other countries and consider them inferior, such attitudes are not necessary to say that Americans are prejudiced. It is important to also note that the prejudice first model does not necessitate that the individual be prejudiced towards helping one's own group. For example, during the Cold War a communist living in the United States may have been prejudiced in favor of the Soviet Union despite having American citizenship. For that individual, the identity "communist" overrides that of "American."

While the vertical hierarch model assumes that we go from more abstract to more concrete, the prejudice first model assumes the opposite. This intuition is motivated by the discovery that people have limited cognitive resources, and will prefer answering an easier question to grappling with a more difficult one (Kahneman 2011). As noted in chapter 1, this is especially likely to be true in the case of thinking about politics, where people are highly unlikely to directly face the consequences of their preferences, and are free to seek expressive utility from the political process (Caplan 2011). Applying moral intuitions to policy issues is difficult, especially compared to simply deciding which side you are on first and then adopting the correct belief system.

The prejudice first model is not intended to supplant the vertical hierarchy model, but to complement it. Both models are clearly simplifications and contain some truth. It is unquestionably the case that people sometimes adopt positions for principled reasons and

are guided by moral intuitions. At the same time, it is no less subject to doubt that we also engage in tribal thinking, adopting and abandoning positions depending on how we feel towards the parties endorsing or being affected by them (e.g., Tesler 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Both models are true in part because people seek to avoid cognitive dissonance, or the realization that there are inconsistencies between their differing beliefs or between their beliefs and actions (Mullainathan and Washington 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). The degree to which we are driven by tribal thinking versus the extent to which values shape preferences surely differ across societies and between individuals. In some countries, identity is an almost perfect predictor of voting and explains most of the variation in moral and political attitudes. In other times and places, people are allowed to pick their "tribe," and the vertical hierarchy model is more useful, although even in these cases once the tribe is formed we would expect to see aspects of the prejudice first model. The United States is clearly somewhere in between these two extremes, as demographic factors reliably predict political attitudes (Hersh and Nall 2015), but individuals do show a certain degree of autonomy and moral reasoning in their deliberations, and coalesce around issues as well as identity. Therefore, while not seeking to replace the vertical hierarchy model, this chapter argues that the prejudice first view of foreign policy preference formation has been relatively neglected. There are three reasons why it deserves more consideration in the literature.

First of all, we find direct evidence of the prejudice first model in studies showing that partisans take cues from elites on issues, sometimes changing their views on a topic virtually overnight. A 2015 experiment asked Americans their views on the issues of entitlement reform, universal healthcare, affirmative action, and the Iran nuclear deal

(Edwards-Levy 2015), presenting each proposal as being made by either a Democrat or then-candidate Trump. Republicans were more likely to support any of the four policy ideas when they were presented as Trump proposals. Although the effect on Democrats was less universal across issues, they still showed significantly more support for universal healthcare and affirmative action when they were shown to be favored by then-President Obama rather than candidate Trump. Natural experiments from the recent past show how quickly public opinion can change based on what politicians tell their followers on both sides of the aisle. After President Obama endorsed same-sex marriage in 2012, support for it among African Americans immediately jumped by 18 points according to one poll (Demby 2012), while the 2016 presidential run of Donald Trump appears to have led Republicans to shift their views of Vladimir Putin (Nussbaum and Oreskes 2016). These anecdotal examples are supported by a large literature that shows the degree to which elite cues influence policy attitudes (Baum and Groeling 2009; Hooghe, and Marks 2005).

Second, as analysts of domestic politics in the United States have found, racial identity trumps practically all other variables in predicting voting behavior (Hersh and Nall 2015). When scholars have measured preferences with regards to issues such as school busing and affirmative actions, attitudes to the group in question have been shown to dwarf the impact of economic interest objectively measured (Kinder and Sears 1981; Caplan 2011: chapters 3-4). Nonwhites vote overwhelmingly Democratic, while attitudes towards African Americans and other minorities predict how white Americans think and feel about practically every issue. Prejudice—whether racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic in nature—appears to be more than simply one variable out of many affecting political

preferences. It is often the variable that has the greatest influence on attitudes towards policy. The universal importance of group prejudice can be seen in the degree to which combatants in civil wars coalesce around ethnic and religious identities (Sambanis 2001).

Finally, it is clear that prejudice has a role to play in how individuals consider issues of war and peace. Scholars of public opinion and political psychologists have focused on how the identity of a target state affects citizens' perceptions of an enemy and their willingness to take action against it. Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) argue for an image-focused view of international relations, presenting a schema in which the public divides foreign countries into the categories of ally, enemy, degenerate, and colony (see also Herrmann et al. 1997; Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston 2005). Depending on the relevant category being invoked, individuals make assumptions about the capabilities and intentions of the country in question. One of the most relevant discoveries in this area is the finding that in the US and Great Britain respondents are less likely to want to go to war if the potential target is a democratic state (Johns and Davies 2012; Mintz and Geva 1993; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Tomz and Weeks 2013, 2015; Herrmann et al. 1997). These studies are important because they suggest a mechanism that may be partly responsible for the democratic peace: the public may be less likely to support war against those who share a similar political system. Americans are also more likely to want to strike at an enemy that violates human rights and to see such states as threatening (Tomz and Weeks 2015). The same applies if a potential adversary is Muslim rather than Christian, although the effects are only apparent among respondents who are themselves Christians (Johns and Davies 2012). These findings have led to research on how the media acts as a filter through which perceptions of potential adversaries are formed (Li et

al. 2016; Castano, Bonacossa, and Gries 2016; Castano, Sacchi, and Gries 2003; Stein 2016; Assouline and Trager 2016).

This chapter presents the results of three different experiments to test the validity of the prejudice first model and explores whether it can explain the abstract values that people adopt in addition to their policy preferences. The first two experiments involve humanitarian intervention, and predict that conservatives and liberals will be prejudiced with regards to whom they want to help but in different ways. In the final experiment, we utilize a widely-used measure of isolationism to see the extent to which manipulating how Americans feel about their own country makes them want to withdraw from the international arena.

Humanitarian Intervention and Prejudice

Studies done thus far on how perceptions of the enemy affect support for conflict have often assumed that citizens reason in a strategic context. Yet today virtually all wars fought by developed democracies have a humanitarian component; leaders take great pains to avoid casualties, build schools and hospitals, and in many cases try to leave behind democratic institutions. While prejudice has been shown to play a role in the perception of threat, does attitude towards the affected parties matter when respondents are asked to consider interventions that are exclusively humanitarian in nature?

Jentleson and Britton (1998) discovered that wars framed as humanitarian missions traditionally have had more support among the American public than other forms of conflict. Within this specific category of war, what makes humanitarian interventions more or less popular? Scholars have found that such conflicts have more support if they are endorsed by international organizations such as the UN or domestic

political elites (Grillo and Pupcenoks 2017) and are seen as having a higher likelihood of success (Boettcher 2004; Lyon and Malone 2009). They become less popular when respondents are told of the possibility of American or foreign casualties (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Eichenberg 2005). Perhaps surprisingly, although there appears to be a preference for multilateralism over unilateralism in state building operations, the effect is nonexistent when the military mission is primarily humanitarian in nature (Jentleson and Britton 1998).

Relatively little research, however, has explored how the nature of the enemy affects preferences for humanitarian action in the international system. Humanitarian intervention is the perfect place to look for bias in foreign policy preferences, as it involves what is essentially a form of international charity. Although previous studies show that prejudice influences perception of the intention and threat coming from a potential adversary (James and Davies 2012, Stein 2016), such results could reflect an underlying strategic reasoning. A rational actor may conclude that there is greater threat coming from a state that has a different regime type or culture than one's own (Huntington 2011). But differences in support or opposition to humanitarian intervention can only be the result of prejudice, or favoring the well being of one group over another.

In the context of humanitarian intervention, groups and individuals are prejudiced when, all other circumstances being equal, their attitudes towards the use of force or other aggressive actions such as placing sanctions are determined in part by the identities of the oppressors or those being persecuted. In other words, moral or political judgments are made based on the identities of those affected rather than universalist principles. Prejudice, as defined in this chapter, exists across the political aisle. An earlier literature

tended to only look for—and find—prejudice among those with conservative political leanings (e.g., Whitley 1999; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 1999). Other scholars, however, have taken issue with this characterization, and found that conservatives and liberals are both biased, but in favor of and against different groups of people (Duerte et al. 2015; Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson 2013; Crawford 2012; Ray 1985). There are two clear prejudices that we should expect to show up among different groups of Americans.

Religious Prejudice

Humans all over the world tend to divide themselves by religion and show a preference for members of their own faiths. The majority of Americans identify as Christians. Muslims, in contrast, not only make up a minority of the population, but also fall outside of the cultural mainstream and, compared to other racial and ethnic groups, are seen quite negatively by the American public (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009). This prejudice is driven in part by perceptions of threat that are reinforced whenever there are terrorist attacks committed by Islamic extremists (Wilke and Grim 2010). Johns and Davies (2012) find that when Americana are told about a developing state developing nuclear weapons, conservatives are more likely to see a Muslim state as a threat than a Christian country. This leads to our first prediction.

H1: *Americans will be biased towards helping Christians over Muslims in foreign policy.*

We have no reason to think that all Americans are equally biased, however. First, conservatives are more likely to themselves be believing Christians (Layman 1997, 2001). Second, liberals often see themselves as champions of minorities that are

discriminated against, and there is evidence that in some contexts they actually exhibit an anti-Christian or pro-Muslim bias (Crawford 2012). Therefore, we would expect that,

H2: *This bias towards helping Christians will be most pronounced among conservatives.*

The prejudice first model predicts not only that prejudice will influence policy preferences, but that it will also change ideas about morality. As individuals are thought to move from more concrete instincts to those that are more abstract, the prejudice will manifest itself in a desire to help the favored group, which in turn could affect perceptions of how the United States should behave in the international arena (Figure 1). Therefore,

H3: *After hearing about Christians being prosecuted, conservatives will more likely to agree that the US has an abstract moral obligation to help people persecuted by their governments,*

H4: *This greater likelihood to support an abstract obligation to help will be mediated through greater support for war in the scenario when Muslims are harming Christians,*

Racial Prejudice

As virtually any state or national exit poll will show, Americans tend to vote along racial lines. Whites tend to support the Republicans, while non-white Americans, especially blacks, vote overwhelmingly for Democrats. Among white Americans, racial attitudes predict ideology and partisan identification (Kinder and Sears 1981). Once race is accounted for, in fact, over the last few presidential elections the connection between income and voting has been small to nonexistent (Tyson and Maniam 2016). One may therefore expect liberals to be biased towards helping blacks persecuted by whites, while conservatives are more likely to want to take action to support whites persecuted by

blacks. However, previous research suggests that if bias exists, it is likely to be there among liberals only.

Tetlock et al. (2000) showed that when told a policy disproportionately hurt African Americans, liberals were more likely to oppose it, while they were unaffected if they knew that it disproportionately harmed white Americans. Conservatives, in contrast, showed no preference in either direction. Uhlmann et al. (2009) carried out a version of the famous trolley experiment, where they asked individuals whether it was morally appropriate to throw 1 large man in front of a trolley in order to save 100 lives. However, for half of the participants the man being thrown had a stereotypically black name, while for others he was given a stereotypically white one. It was implied that the 100 people being saved were predominately of the opposite race from the person who might be thrown. Liberals were more likely to want to throw Chip Elsworth III in front of the trolley than Tyrone Payton, while changing the name had no statistically significant effect on conservatives. The results were replicated in a follow-up experiment where they asked participants whether it was appropriate to throw an individual overboard in order to save others on a lifeboat. Finally, when Norton, Vanello, and Darley (2004) asked Princeton graduates to judge between two roughly equal candidates for college admissions, they found that participants preferred the black applicant over the white one even though were unwilling to attribute their decision to race. While this study did not ask about political ideology, we may presume that Princeton undergraduates were poverwhelmingly liberal.

Therefore, I predict that,

H5: *Among liberals, there will be a bias in favor of taking action to help blacks being persecuted by whites over helping whites persecuted by blacks.*

H6: *Conservatives will show no racial bias.*

Note that H5 does not necessarily imply that liberals are consciously biased (see Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson 2012). Rather, in randomized conditions, they are more inclined towards helping blacks, even when everything besides race is held constant in a given scenario.

Determinants of Isolationism

While CI and MI are related to liberalism and conservatism respectively, isolationism has puzzled students of American foreign policy preferences. Observers have noted that pundits and thinkers on both the far right and the far left are often highly critical of American foreign policy and urge the country to focus more on its internal affairs (Rachman 2016; Hanson 2008). Scholars that have investigated the moral roots of isolationism have found limited success. Rathbun (2007) showed that Americans who support isolationism tend to be those who have a stronger attachment to fellow Americans but less attachment to the international community. Some have tried to use the Schwartz or Moral Foundations frameworks to investigate whether support for an isolationist foreign policy can be explained by the vertical hierarchy model. Yet Kertzer et al. (2014) found that none of the five Moral Foundations predicted support for isolationist principles. Rathbun et al. (2016) used the Schwartz moral values framework and although they found that isolationists were high on conservation values and low on benevolence, the associations were not very strong. This is in contrast to the findings on CI and MI, which have been well explained by the vertical hierarchy model. While

support for isolationism varies among the mass public depending on the international situation and economic variables (Ketzer 2013), scholars have had less success connecting the disposition to other ideological or moral principles.

Why is isolationism so hard to pin down? It is not identified exclusively with either side of the political spectrum, and is difficult to explain in terms of the most prominent frameworks from moral psychology. Yet some popular understandings of isolationism suggest that it could be best understood through the lens of the prejudice first model. A critic of this orientation argues that the outlook has been rooted in the belief that the United States is "hardly a moral state, and thus had no business spreading its pathologies abroad," which is why "a Noam Chomsky now often sounds like a Ron Paul" (Hanson 2008). This chapter argues that isolationism stems in part from a sense of alienation from one's own country, or at the very least those who make major decisions about foreign policy. This sense of non-belonging can come from a variety of sources, including the belief that one's country is seriously flawed or heading in the wrong direction, or that its leaders are somehow unrepresentative of the public. Isolationism has less of an ideological component than MI or CI. Rather, what is key is that the isolationist feels alienated from the polity that others would like to see influence the rest of the world. This is perhaps why isolationism is associated with both the far right and the far left in the United States. This also explains the widely observed bipartisan consensus that perhaps until recently led centrists of both parties to defend American involvement abroad (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). Presumably, those who are centrist in their politics are most satisfied with the status quo, and more likely to want to spread American values. In the prejudice first model, attitudes are driven less by moral intuitions

about the value of cooperation and appropriateness of using force in the international system, and more by how closely one identifies with the United States.

Therefore, I put forth two predictions that the prejudice first model makes about support for an isolationist outlook.

H7: *Conservatives will become more isolationist when presented with evidence that the United States is trending liberal, compared to a scenario where the United States is presented as a conservative country.*

H8: *Liberals will become less isolationist when presented with evidence that the United States is trending liberal, compared to a scenario where the United States is presented as a conservative country.*

Methodology

This chapter involves three different experiments. The first two were designed to test for racial and religious prejudice in preferences over humanitarian intervention and were part of the study discussed in chapter 1. The third experiment was carried out through MTurk with the recruitment of 1,502 individuals, and was designed to test whether the prejudice first model can explain why individuals adopt an isolationist outlook. Exact prompt and question wording for each experiment can be found in the appendix.

Experiment 1

Respondents were asked to provide demographic information and to rate themselves on a five-point ideological scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” In both experiments, the researchers altered the identities of those doing the oppressing and the group being persecuted along racial and religious lines. Other parts of the

vignette were also manipulated for two reasons. First, it is to address the possibility that we are unintentionally inserting confounding variables while testing our variables of interest (see Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2015; Tomz and Weeks 2013). In particular, the vignettes specify the degree of discrimination and the permissibility of an attack under international law. In none of the examples was the potential target presented as any kind of threat to the United States, and participants were only made aware of potential downsides of intervention to American interests. Therefore, differences in willingness to use force among respondents should reflect prejudice towards the actors involved and not any confounding variables. Second, adding other manipulations allows the researcher to test the effects of prejudice against other variables. It is important not only to study the role of prejudice in shaping foreign policy preferences, but to also see how important prejudice is compared to other variables that can plausibly influence support for aggressive action.

In Experiment 1, Zykonia is an African country that is composed of Christians and Muslims, with one religious group or the other, depending on the prompt, making up 90% of the population. Members of the majority begin killing the minority. Respondents are told that either hundreds or tens of thousands have been killed, to manipulate the extent of the persecution. Finally, in one vignette. participants read that bombing Zykonia would be inconsistent with international law, while the rest are told that it is permissible for the US to intervene under the concept of the "right to protect." The survey then asked whether the respondents would support a bombing campaign to prevent further deaths. They were also told to indicate their level of agreement with the statement that "The US

has a moral obligation to help those who are targeted by their governments" on a seven-point scale, in order to test for H3 and H4.

Experiment 2

In the second experiment, Cyton is a biracial state, made up of blacks and whites, located in either Europe or Africa depending on which is the majority population in a given prompt. The country is having economic problems, and the government begins to blame the prosperous minority—once again, either black or white—living in its midst. The state begins to expropriate property from the disfavored group and discriminate against it in hiring. Changing the races of the oppressors and the oppressed allows us to see the effects of racial prejudice when the circumstances are as similar as possible. In half of the prompts, a few individuals from the minority are killed. The government is presented as either picking on the minority unfairly or being justified in claiming some members of the group were responsible for economic troubles. Finally, some respondents are told that the US has a treaty to defend human rights on the relevant continent, while others hear that the US traditionally tries to stay out of the internal affairs of the region. Participants are then asked whether the United States should put sanctions on Cyton and whether they could see themselves supporting a war if the situation deteriorated further. Once again, the intervention is presented as only bringing potential harms to the United States.

Experiment 3

In the final experiment, individuals were asked to provide basic demographic information, and once again identify themselves politically on a five-point scale. Half of participants read a text where the United States was presented as trending liberal, while

the others heard an argument that the country was very conservative compared to other developed nations. Participants are then asked to answer four questions commonly used in the literature to measure support for an isolationist foreign policy (Rathbun 2007; Rathbun et al. 2016).

Results and Discussion

In Table 1, we see the results of six OLS regressions models based on Experiment 1. Respondents were divided into three groups: those that identified as very or somewhat liberal, those who called themselves moderates, and a third group that said that they were very or somewhat conservative. We include all the treatment variables in each model. They are as follows:

Muslim Majority. Coded as 1 if Muslims are the majority oppressing a Christian minority, 0 in the opposite scenario.

International Law. Coded as 1 if the mission is said to be consistent with international law, 0 otherwise.

High Kill. If hundreds are killed, this is coded as 0, and as 1 if tens of thousands are killed.

Certain demographic and socioeconomic variables correlate with ideology, and in order to determine whether the effects we are interested in are influenced by these factors, I control for the most important of them.

Sex. 0 = male, 1 = female.

Education. 1 = no high school degree, 2 = high school graduate, 3= college graduate, 4= post-college degree.

Age. Broken down into 13 cohorts, from 18-25 to 81 and over.

Ideology. Within the categories of conservative and liberal, there is a dummy variable for whether respondents said that they were very or somewhat conservative/liberal. In the models for liberals, 0 = very liberal, and 1 = somewhat liberal. For the models involving conservative respondents, 0 = somewhat conservative, 1 = very conservative. This is done so that the variable *Ideology* can consistently be interpreted as indicating more conservative across the models.

Non-white is coded 0 if the individual identified as white, 1 otherwise. Since ideology and party identification are connected with race, this is done to ensure that the differences that appear to be based on ideology are not actually driven by racial or ethnic identity.

Models 1-3 take willingness to bomb Zykonia (*Support for War*) on a four-point scale as their dependent variable. Responses are coded from 1 through 4 for strongly oppose bombing, somewhat oppose bombing, somewhat support bombing, and strongly support bombing. Model 1 only includes liberals, Model 2 only includes moderates, and Model 3 only includes conservatives. Models 4-6 have the same independent variables, but the dependent variable is changed to dichotomous support for bombing (0= no, 1 = yes).

Table 1.
Support for Bombing Zykonia, by Ideology.

Dep variable:		Support bombing (4 pt scale)			Support bombing (dichotomous)	
Model	1 (Lib)	2 (Mod)	3 (Cons)	4 (Lib)	5 (Mod)	6 (Cons)
Muslim Majority	0.14* (0.07)	0.11* (0.05)	0.41*** (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
Int'l Law	0.51*** (0.065)	0.33*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
High Kill	0.17** (0.065)	–0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.10** (0.04)	–0.04 (0.03)	0 (0.03)
Ideology	0.04 (0.07)		0.08 (0.06)	0 (0.04)		0.05 (0.03)
Female	–0.30*** (.067)	–0.24*** (0.05)	–0.24*** (0.06)	–0.15*** (0.04)	–0.17*** (0.03)	–0.11*** (0.03)
Non-white	0.05 (0.07)	–0.01 (0.06)	–0.14* (0.07)	0.03 (0.04)	–0.01 (0.03)	–0.06 (0.04)
Education	–0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	–0.01 (0.02)	0 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Age	–0.02* (0.01)	0 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	–0.01 (0.01)	0 (0)	0.01 (0)
Constant	2.56*** (0.21)	2.48*** (0.15)	1.91*** (0.34)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.61*** (0.09)	0.17 (0.22)
Obs	694	967	922	694	967	926
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.05	0.11	0.11	0.06	0.08

note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

We find strong support for both H1 and H2. In every model, the coefficient for *Muslim Majority* is positive, with the largest effects being on conservatives. While liberal

and moderate support for bombing increases by 5% when Muslims are the majority, the effect on conservatives is nearly four times as strong. Consistent with previous research (Chilton 2013, 2014; Wallace 2013, 2014) an action being consistent with international law makes respondents more likely to want to intervene. To conservatives and moderates, it mattered little whether respondents were told that hundreds or tens of thousands had been killed. Liberals, however, became 10% more likely to support an attack in treatments with the higher number of victims. For conservatives, the identity of the oppressors and the oppressed mattered more than any other treatment variable. The effect of *Muslim Majority* on conservatives does not meaningfully change if more robust regression models are used, and the results continue to be statistically significant if probit or logistic regression is used in place of Model 6.

Table 2 presents Models 7-9. This time, the dependent variable is whether respondents agree with the statement that the US has a moral obligation to help those being harmed by their own governments on a seven-point scale (*Moral Obligation*), with a higher number indicating greater agreement. The independent variables are the same as in Table 1.

Table 2. Support for Moral Obligation to Help Others.
(7-pt scale)

Model	7 (Lib)	8 (Mod)	9 (Cons)
Muslim Majority	0.12	0.22**	0.36***
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Int'l Law	0.27**	0.20*	–0.02
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)
High Kill	0	0.17*	0.08
	(.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Ideology	–0.08		0.40***
	(0.11)		(0.10)
Female	–0.35***	–0.22**	–0.39***
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Non-white	–0.03	–0.03	–0.33**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Education	0.13	0.11	0.23***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Age	–0.01	–0.03	–0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	4.76***	4.28***	3.04***
	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.53)
Obs	693	970	923
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.03	0.07

note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

Consistent with H3, we find that conservative Americans in particular are more likely to agree that there is a moral obligation to interfere after hearing about Muslims killing Christians. A smaller effect is found for moderates, while the coefficient for liberals is in the expected direction but not statistically significant. Figure 2 shows the results of a mediation analysis through the use of structural equation modeling (Preacher

and Hayes 2004) that tests H4, which predicts that, consistent with the prejudice first model, the belief about the moral obligation to help others will be mediated through support for war.



Among conservatives, 87% of the effect that *Muslim Majority* has on *Moral Obligation* is mediated through *Support for War*. Once the mediator is accounted for, the effect of *Muslim Majority* on *Moral Obligation* becomes statistically insignificant, which implies that there is full mediation. A similar result is found if we use the four-step approach from Baron and Kenny (1986). Overall, the results show strong support for the prejudice first model, implying that we arrive at our moral ideals in part to justify actions that we want to take based on prejudice towards the affected parties.

One may ask why *Support for War* is assumed to mediate *Moral Obligation*, rather than vice versa. We believe that the model used makes more sense, in that people are likely to know their attitudes towards a given policy before they are able to present reasons for their beliefs. This is seen in how partisan cues help determine support for specific policies (Tesler 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Furthermore, when mediation analysis is conducted with *Moral Obligation* as the mediator variable and *Support for War* as the outcome variable, only about 20% of the effect of *Muslim Majority* is mediated. Since there is stronger evidence of mediation when there are non-significant direct effects of the treatment on the outcome variable (Baron and Kenny 1986), the model with *Support for War* as the mediator is preferred.

Figure 3 shows support for intervention based on ideology. When there is a Christian majority killing Muslims, ideology has no discernable effect on desire to intervene; liberals and conservatives are about equally hawkish. However, in the opposite scenario, where Christians are the victims, conservatives become much more likely to want to go to war. The largest effect of the treatment is on those who call themselves "very conservative"; while only 46% of this group wants American military force to be used to stop Christians killing Muslims, the number goes up to 69% when Christians are the victims. As individuals become more conservative, the effect of the treatment increases.



Table 3 shows the results of six regression models involving Experiment 2. In the first three, the dependent variable is willingness to put sanctions on Cyton on a four-point scale from "strongly oppose" to "strongly support." In the second set of models, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought that they could support using military force to intervene if the situation deteriorated further, once again on a four-point scale. The treatment variables are as follows.

White Majority is coded 1 if whites are the majority oppressing a minority black population in Europe, 0 if blacks in Africa are oppressing a white minority.

Justified Grievance is 1 if the minority being prosecuted had some role in bringing about the economic problems of the country, 0 if the government is scapegoating them without cause. This is to account for the possibility that respondents may make assumptions about the degree to which grievances are justified based on the identities of the actors or the location of the dispute (see Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2015).

Killings is 1 in cases where a few individuals are killed as a result of government scapegoating the minority in question, 0 otherwise.

Treaty is coded as 1 in treatments in which the United States has a treaty to uphold human rights on the continent in question, 0 if respondents are told that it has traditionally tried to stay out of the problems of the region. This is to address the possibility that moving the location of the conflict to a different continent influences ideas about norms regarding the use of force there.

The same controls for ideology, sex, age, and education mentioned in the previous models are also included.

Table 3.
Aggressive Action against Cyton, by Ideology.

Dep variable:		Support sanctions (4 pt scale)			Open to military force (4 pt scale)	
Model	10 (Lib)	11 (Mod)	12 (Cons)	13 (Lib)	14 (Mod)	15 (Cons)
White Majority	0.27*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	–0.03 (0.05)
Justified Grievance	–0.19** (0.06)	–0.05 (0.05)	–0.11 (0.06)	–0.09 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	–0.07 (0.06)
Killings	–0.04 (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)	0.14** (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.16** (0.06)
Treaty	0.19** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Ideology	–0.05 (0.07)		0.16** (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)		0.18** (0.06)
Female	–0.25*** (0.06)	–0.21*** (0.05)	–0.27*** (0.06)	–0.08 (0.06)	–0.06 (0.05)	–0.17** (0.06)
Non-white	–0.07 (0.07)	–0.08 (0.06)	–0.20** (0.07)	–0.04 (0.06)	–0.07 (0.05)	–0.27*** (0.07)
Education	0.13** (0.04)	–0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	–0.01 (0.04)	–0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	–0.03*** (0.01)	–0.03*** (0.01)	–0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	2.90*** (0.22)	2.95*** (0.15)	2.34*** (0.32)	3.27*** (0.20)	3.10*** (0.14)	2.49*** (0.31)
Obs	694	968	925	691	970	925
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06

note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

There is strong support for both H5 and H6. We find that the largest treatment effect for liberals in both Model 10 and Model 13 is *White Majority*, while this time it is conservatives that show no identity-based bias. Figure 4 and Figure 5 reveal the change in support for sanctions and war depending on ideology and the identities of the perpetrators and victims in a given scenario.





While in the previous experiment conservatives were biased while liberals were relatively indifferent to identity, here we see the opposite. Among those who are very liberal, support for sanctions went from 67% to 83% when the identity of the oppressing race was changed from blacks to whites. The effect was much smaller on those who identified as somewhat liberal, and practically non-existent among everyone else.

Moving on to Experiment 3, Figure 6 shows the 95% confidence intervals on standardized isolationist score by ideology and prompt received for liberals and conservatives.



We find initial support for H7 and H8. Conservatives become much more isolationist when receiving the liberal prompt, while for liberals the opposite is true. In order to ensure that these differences are not based on confounding due to demographic variables and check for statistical significance, Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions for Experiment 3, once again dividing respondents into categories of liberals, moderates and conservatives. The variable *Conservative Prompt* is 1 if the individual received the prompt that portrayed the United States as a relatively right-wing country, with the reference text being the one that argues that the Unite States is becoming more liberal. Ideology is once again 1 or 0, with 1 being more conservative. Education and age are broken down into six groups, with higher numbers indicate older and more educated. The dependent variable, *Isolationism*, is standardized in each of the models.

Table 4.
Support for Isolationism, by Ideology.

Model	16 (Lib)	17 (Mod)	18 (Cons)
Conservative Prompt	0.11 (0.07)	–0.02 (0.09)	–0.26* (0.11)
Ideology	–0.15 (0.08)		0.04 (0.13)
Female	0.02 (0.08)	–0.08 (0.10)	–0.07 (0.11)
Education	–0.04 (0.03)	–0.08* (0.04)	–0.02 (0.05)
Age	–0.17*** (0.04)	–0.07 (0.05)	0 (0.05)
Constant	0.81*** (0.23)	0.67** (0.23)	0.08 (0.60)
Obs	742	443	325
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.01	0.01

note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

Adding controls does little to change the effect of the prompts. When conservatives receive the conservative prompt, they shift 0.26 standard deviations on the isolationism scale towards more interventionist preferences. We therefore find some evidence for H8. There is less support for H9, although the coefficient shows liberals shifting 0.11 standard deviations in the opposite direction, with the result approaching significance at the $p < .10$ threshold.

Other Treatments and Demographic Effects

In the first two experiments, females are consistently less likely to support aggressive action across the various models, a finding consistent with previous research (Eichenberg 2003). Despite this, the results presented are inconsistent with previous work

that indicates that if the mission of a conflict is framed as humanitarian in nature, the gender gap can go away or even be reversed (Brooks and Valentino 2011). There is no indication that women are any more isolationist than men in Experiment 3, although it must be noted that isolationism is not necessarily the opposite of hawkishness. The other demographic variables of race, age, and education for the most part have inconsistent if any effects. One exception is the finding that non-white conservatives are generally less hawkish than white conservatives, a result that does not appear in any previous literature. It would be interesting if future studies sought to replicate this result and explain why this may be the case. Unsurprisingly, there is more support for aggressive action when there is a treaty in place to defend human rights or the action is presented as consistent with international law (Chilton 2013; Wallace 2013), and the effect of international law is greater on liberals than on other groups.

Interestingly, the *degree* of oppression perpetrated on victims seems to matter little. In the Zykonia example, only liberals were more likely to want to intervene when a higher number of people were killed. Yet only conservatives were affected by the degree of oppression when the question was whether to use force against Cyton. Even when the coefficients for these variables are statistically significant, they tend to be dwarfed by the effects of treaties, international law, and prejudice. Thus, while there appears to be some support for humanitarian intervention across the political spectrum, it does not seem that people tend to think about the issues involved in largely utilitarian terms. This is unsurprising, as cost-benefit analysis is mentally taxing, and it is much easier to follow a few simple rules such as how much one likes the groups involved or whether an action would be sanctioned by law.

Conclusion

According to Rathbun et al. (2016, 124) "we now know that foreign policy attitudes have structure and that values supply the mortar that holds them together." Certainly, scholars have found correlations between abstract moral values and foreign policy preferences. And because frameworks derived from moral psychology query individuals on generalized principles, while foreign policy attitudes are domain-specific, it is reasonable to conclude that the former are the cause of the latter (see Haidt 2012). This chapter presents a possibility that is commonplace in political psychology (e.g., Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004; Tesler 2012), but has been overlooked in the literature on foreign policy preferences. Perhaps prejudices not only drive preferences, but shape the moral rationalizations that we use to justify our principles. Prejudice clearly has a large effect on domestic policy preferences, and there is little reason to doubt that the same biases we see at home are conceptually important when Americans consider the choices facing their country abroad.

When deciding whether to support a humanitarian intervention or other costly actions such as imposing sanctions, public rhetoric suggests that people mainly consider the good that can be done for the group being helped and the potential downsides of the given policy. It would be considered taboo to express the view that in considering whether to save human life, one should make decisions based on the identities of those involved. Yet on both sides of the political aisle, identity mattered even more than other factors that one would think are important. The evidence here is consistent with previous research that shows that liberals are in favor of helping blacks over whites (Uhlmann et al. 2009; Tetlock et al. 2000) and conservatives are partial towards Christians over

Muslims (Johns and Davies 2012). Importantly, these treatments have larger effects than case-specific factors such as whether the proposed intervention is consistent with international law or the degree to which the oppressed group is suffering. While the extent to which prejudice shapes domestic political attitudes has been known for decades (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder 2013), previously it may have been possible to implicitly assume that the only prejudice important for foreign policy preferences among a US population is the preference for Americans over foreigners (see Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Yet the results here suggest that prejudice based on race and religion may be as important in foreign policy as it is in the domestic sphere. Not only do prejudices affect foreign policy preferences, but through changing policy attitudes, the evidence here indicates that they influence abstract moral ideas about how the United States should behave in the international system. In effect, the prejudice first model turns the vertical hierarchy model on its head.

Future scholars should also not examine prejudice in isolation, but see whether the various results here and in other experiments can come together to tell a coherent story about foreign policy preference formation. The results presented indicate that in deciding whether to engage in humanitarian intervention, people are more affected by prejudice, the existence of treaties, and international law than they are by the degree of oppression or the details of the dispute between the foreign peoples in question. The cognitive miser model implies that individuals seize on the questions that require the least mental energy in order to make political decisions (Orbell and Dawes 1991), and "Do we have a treaty to do something?" and "How do I feel about the groups affected?" are easier

to answer than “How does the degree of oppression influence the cost/benefit ratio of starting a new war?”

The findings here are not meant to imply that the vertical hierarchy model has been contradicted. But they do imply that when scholars find connections between abstract values and more concrete preferences, they should be aware of the possibility that the causal arrow goes in both directions. To give an example from previous work in the field, take the finding that during the Cold War conservatives scored higher on MI, while liberals were more in favor of CI (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990). It may have been sensible to assume that this difference was based on conservatives being more open to the morality of using force abroad more generally (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Another possibility, however, is that the nature of the enemy as an atheistic left-wing dictatorship made conservatives more hawkish. It is interesting to ponder an alternative universe where the rival superpower was a totalitarian system committed to white Christian supremacy rather than economic equality and international solidarity, and whether under those circumstances we would have seen liberals more open to the use of force abroad. Here, we note that when the main international enemy of the United States was fascism in the 1930s, by far the largest anti-war movement in the country was on the political right (Kauffman 2008). History suggests that whether the perceived enemy of the day is “fascism,” “communism,” “Islamic extremism,” or “Putinism,” may determine which side of the political aisle is more likely to support an aggressive posture. Scholars of foreign policy preference formation should do more to consider the possibility that general attitudes towards the appropriateness of the use of force abroad may be less

fundamental than the relationships individuals have with their societies and the nature of the potential adversary.

Chapter 3

Conservatives, Liberals, and the Interest Taboo

After the government of Angela Merkel in September 2015 announced that her country would not have any limits on the number of refugees it would take in, Germany ended up accepting around 1 million asylum seekers over the course of the year (Guardian 2015). This has caused great friction both within Merkel's coalition and between European countries, potentially threatening the entire EU project (Wilshire 2016). The German government itself estimated that it would spend €93.6 billion between 2016 and 2020 on various forms of welfare and integration, which is more than two and a half times the annual defense budget (Reuters 2016). In the short run at least, integrating over a million people from the heart of the Muslim world will likely pose challenges that are equal to or greater than those faced by states like France and Belgium, who took in Middle Eastern immigrants over a much longer period of time and face security threats to this day. Merkel's decision was one of the most consequential actions taken by a European leader in years and will have major domestic and foreign policy implications for decades to come. Yet her actions are difficult to explain through some conventional theories of international relations, which posit that states are mainly concerned with their own interests and unburdened by considerations of humanitarianism or international law (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001).

Unsatisfied with conventional paradigms and motivated by the enduring conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere, some scholars have recently begun to study sacred

values. When certain culturally sanctioned values are at stake, conflicts tend to be longer lasting and compromise becomes more difficult (Alderice 2009; Ginges and Atran 2008; Sheikh, Gómez, and Atran 2016). However, perhaps because it is sometimes most difficult to see what is right under our noses, there has been little exploration of the sacred values of people living in Western countries in the context of foreign policy attitudes. The suicide bomber, who is willing to give his own life to kill others, poses perhaps the most obvious puzzle for rational choice theory. But while we may make a different moral judgment regarding the humanitarian, her behavior is just as theoretically interesting. The same logic applies to countries. Why do some nations risk life and treasure on humanitarian intervention, or give billions in foreign aid? Why do some open their borders to refugees who often stress the social safety net and are difficult to assimilate, while others slam the door shut? Are humanitarian policies a mask for behavior that is in reality self-interested, as some have claimed (e.g., Blum 2013; Hoeffler and Outram 2011)? Or are such decisions reflective of a value system that has been too often ignored by scholars of international relations?

This chapter investigates the moral psychological foundations of altruism in the international arena. It follows a cognitive-interactionist perspective (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999), arguing that in the international sphere people bring with them certain predispositions in their thinking about how to balance the interests of their co-nationals against the well being of those living in foreign countries, and that they are affected by whether they are forced to think about potential economic benefits or costs deriving from certain policies. From the perspective of Moral Foundations Theory, altruistic policies are more likely to be supported by political liberals, because they place less emphasis on the

loyalty/betrayal foundation (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Furthermore, this chapter introduces the concept of the Interest Taboo, or the idea that the possibility of a country deriving a material benefit from a policy can make it less appealing than it otherwise would be. The implication is that countries do not only sometimes act in ways that are contrary to their own material interests. When considering humanitarian policies, even thinking about an option in terms of what it can do for one's own country can make a course of action seem less appealing. Previously this phenomenon of the backfire effect has been shown to exist when religious or nationalist principles are at stake (Ginges and Atran 2009a, 2009b). I argue that attitudes and intuitions regarding humanitarian values, at least in the United States and presumably other Western countries, share many of the same characteristics of taboos that we are more familiar with.

I present the results of two separate studies, surveying Americans and covering the issues of humanitarian intervention, refugee acceptance, and foreign aid. As expected, conservatives adopt views that are less altruistic than those of liberals, meaning that those on the right more heavily prioritize helping fellow Americans. More surprisingly, making an argument appealing to national interest does not make people more likely to support a policy, regardless of political orientation. Arguments about national interest have no influence on whether people want to accept more or fewer refugees. In the cases of foreign aid and humanitarian intervention, altruistic policies become *less* popular when people are told that they are in their national interest. This implies that critics of the view that states always act in their national interest may not go far enough. Regarding certain prominent international issues, states may be less likely to act when they can derive obvious benefits from a given policy.

Political Ideology and Support for International Altruism

Given the nation-state system that we live under and the wide support it receives, most individuals favor co-nationals over foreigners to some certain extent. But we can define altruistic political preferences in the context of foreign policy attitudes as support for policies that *less significantly* favor the well being of members of one's own nation over that of foreigners. If, for example, an American citizen would sacrifice one million dollars of US government spending to save one foreign life, we can say that person is more altruistic than an individual who will only support that much spending to save at least 10 people abroad, even if both of these individuals would place more value on the life of an American.

Moral psychologists have explored how conservatives and liberals differ with regards to fundamental values. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Moral Foundations theory is perhaps the main framework that political scientists have used in recent years to explain variation in political preferences (e.g. Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014). Haidt (2012) and his colleagues present a theory of morality that has five dimensions: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Cross-cultural comparisons reveal that that there is something unusual about people who are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010a, 2010b). Individuals in these societies tend to place most of their emphasis on the two dimensions of care/harm and fairness/cheating. The more educated and politically liberal the sample of Westerners is, the more that they adhere to WEIRD morality (Haidt 2012). In other societies, more emphasis is placed on the maintenance of interpersonal relations and behaving in

accordance with a divine will. While Western liberals reason mainly using only the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations, conservative morality is like that of non-Western cultures in being more balanced.

There are two Moral Foundations traits that are likely to be relevant to considerations of international altruism. First, there is the care/harm foundation, which conservatives and liberals value about equally (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Rooted in the evolutionary imperative to look after the well being of vulnerable children and other relatives, the care foundation makes us sensitive to signs of suffering and distress (Haidt 2012:153–57), and is invoked in the international arena when citizens of one country hear about the suffering of those abroad. Individuals high on this trait have been found to be more supportive of CI (Kertzer et al. 2014), placing relatively high emphasis on defending human rights abroad (Lindsey and Lake 2013).

The second moral foundation likely to be relevant to international altruism is loyalty/betrayal (Haidt 2012:161-164). People high on this trait value loyalty among members of their own "team," whether it is co-nationals, members of a religious or ethnic group, or, in politically less relevant contexts, a sports franchise (Frimer, Gaucher, and Schaefer 2014; Bassett et al. 2015). The flip side of the coin is dislike or hatred for those considered traitors. People high on the loyalty/betrayal foundation value symbols such as national flags, believe that it is morally justifiable to favor members of one's own group over others, and are more supportive of militant internationalism (Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014) and maintaining American international power (Lindsey and Lake 2013).

Whether implicitly or explicitly, foreign policy preferences always involve some kind of tradeoff between the well being of co-nationals and citizens of other states, whether one is considering a military strike that risks harming foreign civilians, how much to tax one's own citizens to provide help to those who are in need abroad, or even the nuances of how to enforce international trade treaties. Every country puts their own citizens first; even the most liberal states only spend a fraction of their national budget on foreign aid, devoting most of the rest of government revenue to programs related to domestic social welfare and defense (Dahl 2006). Yet cultures and individuals at the same time differ greatly in the extent to which they favor their own people over foreigners, as can be seen in how much different nations invest in various forms of foreign aid and collective goods such as environmental protection and the maintenance of international organizations (see Brysk 2009; Alesina and Dollar 2010).

In the international arena, all else being equal, those who are relatively high on care/harm should be more likely to want to act in order to help the most unfortunate members of the international community. At the same time, putting a great deal of emphasis on loyalty/betrayal should predict less support for altruistic policies, due to the relatively high level of concern such individuals have with looking after their ingroup. Policies that can do a great deal of good for foreign peoples in exchange for a relatively low cost to one's own country invoke both the care/harm and loyalty/betrayal foundations, and these two traits pull in different directions.

Interests and Foreign Policy Preferences

Traditionally, realism has been the dominant paradigm in international relations (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 2001). This theory treats states as unitary, rational actors that

mainly look after their own interests, which are narrowly defined as security and power. Because money buys security and power, to many realists "the pursuit of wealth and pursuit of power are indistinguishable" (Gilpin 1999:68). Since there is no third party enforcer to settle disputes, states go to war when they believe that it is advantageous to do so, but not in order to do good towards foreign peoples.

The experiments in Chapter 1 did not support the idea that the public is intuitively strategic and self-interested when thinking about foreign affairs (Drezner 2008; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 2009). This view is supported by studies of morality that provide evidence against the view that in the political realm, individuals, much less states, are motivated by self-interest or even utilitarian ends (e.g., Chong 2013; Haidt and Graham 2007; Waldmann and Dieterich 2007). Fiske and Tage (2014) argue that the vast majority of violence in society, including war, is committed by people who believe that they are doing what is necessary in order to regulate some kind of relationship. Experiments regarding support for war and the proper response to terrorism show that our moral intuitions and judgments are rarely consistent with instrumental reasoning (Ginges and Atran 2009a; Ginges et al 2007; 2011).

Sacred values in particular differ from those related to material or instrumental concerns in that they motivate actions that seem to be undertaken with relatively little concern about prospects for success or material reward. Scholars have therefore focused on sacred values as key to some of the most intractable disputes in the international arena (Atran and Axelrod 2008; Atran, Axelrod, and Davis 2007; Susskind et al. 2005; Bazerman, Tebrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni 2008). It is difficult to achieve bargains that

satisfy both sides in disputes over sacred lands in particular, since the contested resource is indivisible in nature (Hassner 2003; Toft 2006).

Scholars have also borrowed from moral psychology in a series of studies investigating whether being offered a material incentive influences support for compromising on emotionally charged issues relating to international politics. They have found that, when sacred values are at stake, offers appealing to interest can work in ways that are contrary to intuition. Palestinians judged it as unacceptable for the family of an individual undertaking a martyrdom operation to ask for compensation; the higher the amount asked for, the more people were inclined to disapprove (Ginges and Atran 2009a). In a study of *madrassah* students in Indonesia, subjects were more likely to support a violent response to a deal that would compromise the ability to implement the *sharia* if their country was offered material incentives (Ginges and Atran 2009b). When certain segments of the Palestinian and Israeli populations were offered money to their side as part of a deal to give up sacred territory, they were less likely to support such a settlement (Ginges and Atran 2011). This phenomenon has also been found to exist among certain Iranians with regards to the development of nuclear energy (Dehghani et al. 2010), and among Hindus and Muslims in India (Sachdeva and Medin 2009).

This seems to make little sense from a rationalist perspective. How could the offer of a material incentive make an offer *less* appealing? Tetlock et al. (2000; Tetlock 2000, 2003) have introduced the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM), which posits that people are discomforted by the thought of trading off sacred values against economic concerns. For example, many will resist the idea of putting a monetary value on their religious beliefs or the safety of their children. Ginges and Atran (2009b) argue that this

is what we see in international relations, where people reject the idea of trading off religious or nationalist principles for the sake of personal peace and comfort. When confronted with such a tradeoff, individuals have an emotional reaction that leads to a "backfire effect." If this phenomenon also exists in the minds of leaders or influences them through public opinion, it may mean that some conventional methods of solving conflicts are counterproductive. While the backfire effect has been found to be relevant when nationalistic or religious principles are at stake, it remains an open question whether the same principle applies when people are offered an economic incentive in order to encourage them to support a purely humanitarian policy.

A Cognitive-Interactive Approach to Understanding International Altruism

Following Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999), this chapter argues for a cognitive-interactive approach to investigate support for international altruism. This means that individuals bring certain moral predispositions with them when they consider foreign policy, but that their level of support on any given issue will also be influenced by how the topic is presented and whether it is portrayed as an exclusively altruistic mission or as part of a policy space that also calls for a consideration of national interest. The individual matters, as those of differing ideologies will have different levels of baseline support for altruistic international policies. At the same time, those of every ideology will see a decline in support for internationally altruistic policies when they are thought of in terms of national interest, whether beneficial or costly.

First, consider the level of the individual. Liberals and conservatives are both high on care/harm, but conservatives place a great deal more emphasis on loyalty/betrayal (Hadit 2012; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). This implies that liberals should be more

eager to support policies that do a great deal of good abroad for a relatively small cost to their own country. At the same time, it would be wrong to predict that conservatives will never support a policy that is meant to help foreigners at a cost to Americans. Rather, when a policy is purely altruistic in nature, those on the political right will see their desire to help counterbalanced by loyalty to their own country and its people. This will lead to lower support for altruistic policies relative to liberals, who value care/harm but not loyalty/betrayal. The first prediction is therefore as follows.

H1: *Compared to conservatives, liberals will be more likely to favor altruistic policies.*

It is important to note that Moral Foundations is not the only framework in common use among political scientists. Many have also made use of the Theory of Basic Human Values developed by Schwartz (1992; Schwartz and Bardi 2001; Schwartz et al. 2001). In terms of this paradigm, we can note that liberals score higher on universalism, or the belief that the interests and well being of all people should be taken into account when making moral decisions (Caprara, Vecchione, and Schwartz 2009). This is consistent with the view of Moral Foundations Theory, which finds that conservatives favor the well being of the members of their in-group more because they are higher on the loyalty/betrayal foundation. Because Moral Foundations Theory has been more commonly relied upon in the political science literature, this chapter follows that tradition and discusses support for altruistic international policies from that perspective. Note, however, that the Schwartz framework can be used to make the same prediction on the grounds that conservatives place less value on the trait of universalism.

Next, we consider how the moral predispositions people have interact with arguments about the national interest. Although the backfire effect has been shown to

apply when religious or nationalist principles are at stake (Ginges and Atran 2009a, 2009b; Dehghani et al. 2010), we may have reason to doubt that we will see this phenomenon in a western sample considering altruistic policies. Liberals and those who fall into the WEIRD category (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010a, 2010b) rely almost exclusively on the fairness/cheating and harm/care foundations. For them, hearing that a policy is in the national interest may only make it more appealing. If one can do good for the world, the argument that doing so can also help one's own nation should only be a plus.

However, previous work on taboos and the backfire effect imply that people will feel discomfort when pairing the moral imperative to save lives with the economic interests of the nation. Experiments show that individuals reject tradeoffs between the sacred and profane under a wide variety of circumstances. To take a few examples, individuals resist assigning price values to their children's lives, acts of friendship, loyalty to one's country, or even mundane objects that have sentimental value (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; McGraw and Tetlock 2005). When confronted with these "taboo trade-offs," they engage in "moral cleansing" by becoming steadfast in their refusal to consider such tradeoffs and condemning more harshly those that do (Tetlock et al. 2000; Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan 2011).

This implies that when considering the possibility of their country deriving an economic benefit from helping others, individuals will have a negative emotional reaction. When the sacred imperative to save lives is paired with the mundane consideration of material gain for their country, the policy in questions goes from being an issue of helping others to one where the respondent is forced to consider a taboo

tradeoff. Discomfort at the thought should lead to moral cleansing, which in this case means forgoing any potential benefits derived from the humanitarian policy in question by becoming less willing to support it. This leads to the following prediction.

H2: *Arguments appealing to national interest will make people less likely to support altruistic policies.*

This hypothesis should apply to both conservatives and liberals. As discussed above, it is not the case the conservatives do not value care/harm; they place almost as much emphasis on this value as do liberals (Haidt 2012). Yet for conservatives, this foundation is counteracted by the greater weight they place on loyalty/betrayal, and that should lead to a lower level of baseline support for altruistic policies. At the same time, there should still be a backfire effect among conservatives as there is among moderates and liberals.

Historically, the rhetoric of public officials has often shown sensitivity to a potential backfire effect, as leaders downplay any national advantage derived from past and present wars. President Woodrow Wilson, in his 1917 War Message to Congress, said, "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make" (Hodge and Noland 2007:396). General Mark Clark (1950:6–7) wrote about his experience in the European theater of the Second World War and his visit to the graves of American servicemen in Italy. "If ever proof were needed that we fought for a cause and not for conquest, it could be found in these cemeteries. Here was our only conquest: all we asked of Italy was enough of her soil to bury our gallant dead." Secretary of State Colin Powell would use the same justification for the War in Afghanistan more than half

a century later. While cynics may find such statements to be self-serving, there is no reason to *a priori* dismiss the idea of a values-driven foreign policy.

The least support for a policy should be found when individuals are told that the policy in question imposes a cost on the United States, rather than a benefit. Under such circumstances, there is still a taboo-tradeoff, but now the United States is harmed rather than helped. Therefore,

H3: *Support for altruistic policies will be at their lowest when they are presented as a net cost to the acting country.*

This fits into the literature on humanitarian intervention, where we see that public opinion data shows that among Americans such wars are more popular than other forms of armed intervention, but that support plummets when pollsters mention the possibility of casualties (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Eichenberg 2005). Previously, this has been interpreted to mean that Americans are less likely to support an altruistic policy when there is a cost to doing so. While that may be true, the theory presented here suggests that even thinking about a humanitarian intervention in terms of national interest reduces support, even if the outcome is thought to be a net gain for the intervening country. Future research should do more to investigate the extent to which the SVPM and the backfire effect can explain how people think about altruistic international policies outside laboratory settings.

Methodology

In order to test the three hypotheses presented, I carried out surveys on attitudes towards humanitarian intervention, the admittance of refugees, and foreign aid. Each of these policy areas can be called altruistic in that they involve one's own country making a

relatively small sacrifice in order to save lives or significantly improve the living conditions of foreigners. Participants were Americans recruited through MTurk, and taken to a page on SurveyMonkey. Each experiment began by asking participants to provide basic demographic information. They were then asked which political party they identified with, if any, their level of education, and how liberal or conservative they are on social issues, economic issues, and overall. Each participants receives one of three vignettes in each experiment: one that makes no mention of national interest, another that presents an altruistic policy as being in the national interest, and a final one that argues that the same policy hurts the United States.

Experiment 1

Participants are asked to read one of three texts on humanitarian intervention. One text is neutral, and briefly explains the arguments for and against such wars. A second group is provided a text that is the same, but with a small argument added about how humanitarian intervention is good for American interests. The final prompt argues that humanitarian interventions can be costly and therefore ill advised. Respondents are then asked the extent to which they support humanitarian intervention on a five point scale. The choices were "strongly disapprove," "somewhat disapprove," "neither approve nor disapprove," "somewhat approve," and "strongly approve."

This is the base text:

> *The question of whether Western nations should engage in humanitarian intervention is a topic that is highly debated. Many argue that when a dictator is killing his own people, it is morally just for other nations to step in and stop the killing when they can do so without putting their own people at risk. They point*

to the shame many countries feel for having stood back and done nothing in the period leading up to the Holocaust.

Others argue that Western nations have no right to intervene in the conflicts of other people. Furthermore, overthrowing a government or bombing a country can lead to all kinds of unintended consequences that are not foreseeable before the war.

At the end of the explanation, respondents read one of three conclusions to the passage. The first presented the costs of humanitarian intervention as neutral, the second presented such war as economically beneficial to the United States, and the third argued that they were costly.

Humanitarian Intervention (Neutral):

[Base text] +

The financial costs of humanitarian intervention tend to be very small, relative to other kinds of conflict and government spending.

Humanitarian Intervention (Benefit):

[Base text] +

Supporters of humanitarian intervention also point to the potential financial benefits. By overthrowing unfriendly governments, American businesses can often move in and open up more opportunities for trade.

Humanitarian Intervention (Costly):

[Base text] +

The financial costs of humanitarian intervention also tend to be high. Such operations often cost millions of dollars a day. People against such wars argue that money should instead be spent at home.

Experiment 2

Next, participants were asked to read a text about the admittance of refugees. The neutral version of the text is as follows.

Refugees (Neutral):

There is a great deal of debate about whether Western nations should let in more refugees from countries that are suffering due to poverty and civil war. Some argue that turning away such people would be inconsistent with humanitarian values. The United States lets in about 80,000 refugees a year.

One third of participants only read the base text. Other participants were asked to read a paragraph that presented refugees as beneficial to the receiving country, and the last group heard that they might commit crimes and be harmful to the national economy.

Refugees (Benefit):

[Refugees (Neutral)] +

Furthermore, letting in refugees may be economically beneficial to the host countries. Many Western countries suffer from a shortage of young labor, and new migrants can be a source of revenue that can help save social welfare programs.

Refugees (Costly):

[Refugees (Neutral)] +

> *Opponents of letting in refugees point out that these migrants often come in with few skills. They therefore often end up unable to support themselves and use many government services. Therefore, bringing in refugees often ends up being an economic drain on the host country.*

Participants were then asked their opinions about letting refugees into their country. The statement they were given began "My country should…" and the options were "Let in no refugees," "Let in fewer refugees," "Keep the number of refugees the same," "Increase the number of refugees," and "Take in as many as possible."

Experiment 3

The format for Experiment 3 was the same as the first two but with a new group of respondents. Each participant read one of three texts on foreign aid, and then was asked for their opinion on the subject.

Foreign Aid (Neutral):

> *The United States spends more than $16 billion a year on foreign aid meant to help poorer countries. More than a third of that money goes to global health initiatives such as preventing HIV and AIDS. Thanks partly to American efforts, in recent years certain African countries have seen a reduction in the disease by as much as 50%. In parts of the developing world, more young girls are being educated than ever before. According to a recent nonprofit report, millions of children have had their lives saved by foreign aid over the last few decades. Despite these facts, foreign aid remains controversial, and politicians often call for cuts in order to save money.*

Other participants read the neutral text, but were then presented with another paragraph.

Foreign Aid (Benefit):

[Aid (Neutral)] +

Defenders of foreign aid argue that, in the long run, it can provide economic benefits to the United States. By helping foreign countries develop, they can become better trading partners and create new economic opportunities for American businesses.

Foreign Aid (Costly):

[Aid (Neutral)] +

Many would like to see foreign aid either cut or eliminated. People argue that a government should look after the interests of its own citizens. The $16 billion a year spent on foreign aid can go towards health care, education, and infrastructure in the United States. This is especially true at a time when American wages are stagnating and millions suffer from a lack of health care and the soaring costs of education.

They were then asked to complete a sentence that began "I would like to see the US foreign aid budget…" The choices were "eliminated or cut significantly," "cut slightly," "stay the same," "increased slightly," and "increased greatly."

Results

Experiments 1 and 2 included 1,427 respondents, of which about 55% were female. Table 1 shows two different regressions from Experiment 1. Model 1 is an OLS model with the dependent variable being how the respondents answered the question

regarding their support for humanitarian intervention on a five-point scale, with higher being more supportive. *HI Benefit* is coded as 1 for those who received the prompt that portrayed humanitarian intervention as beneficial to the country, 0 otherwise. The variable *HI Cost* is coded as 1 for those who received the prompt that argued that such wars are costly. Those that received the neutral script are treated as the reference group. *Ideology* is on a five-point scale, from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” Model 2 changes the dependent variable to whether respondents somewhat or strongly oppose humanitarian intervention (1 = Yes, 0 = No).

Table 1.
Humanitarian Intervention.

Dep var.	**HI Opinion (1)**	**HI Oppose (2)**
Ideology	–0.10***	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female	0.13**	–0.05*
	(0.05)	(0.02)
HI Benefit	–0.15***	0.04^{+}
	(0.06)	(0.02)
HI Cost	–0.21***	0.06*
	(0.06)	(0.02)
Constant	3.82***	–0.08**
	(0.08)	(0.03)
Observations	1,427	1,427
Adjusted R^2	0.03	0.01

note: $^{+}$ p < .1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

As we can see, both *HI Benefit* and *HI Cost* led respondents to be less favorably inclined towards humanitarian intervention. Unsurprisingly, the costly prompt has the greatest effect, but even presenting humanitarian intervention as beneficial with regards

to the national interest makes individuals less supportive. Interestingly, moving from a neutral to a beneficial prompt has a larger effect than a one-point increase in ideology. In Model 2, *HI Benefit* is associated with a 4% higher probability of opposing humanitarian intervention, which is greater than the 2.5% change resulting from a one-point increase in *Ideology*.

Table 2 shows the results for the question on number of refugees admitted. The dependent variable in Model 3 is on a five-point scale, ranging from “eliminated or cut significantly” to “increased greatly.” In Model 4, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent wanted to reduce the number of refugees coming into the country, and 0 otherwise. *Ref Benefit* and *Ref Cost* are coded according to whether respondents read the prompt that presented refugees as a financial benefit or cost to their country (1=Yes, 0=No).

Table 2.
Refugee Acceptance.

Dep var.	Ref. Opinion (1)	Ref. Oppose (2)
Ideology	–0.53***	0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female	0.12*	–0.05*
	(0.05)	(0.02)
Ref Benefit	–0.01	–0.01
	(0.07)	(0.03)
Ref Cost	–0.05	0
	(0.07)	(0.03)
Constant	4.31***	–0.11**
	(0.09)	(0.04)
Observations	1,427	1,427
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.19

note: $^+$ p < .1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

In neither model does the coefficient for *Ref Benefit* or *Ref Cost* reach statistical significance. In contrast to the question on humanitarian intervention, however, the effects of *Ideology* are extremely large. A one-point shift in the conservative direction on a five-point scale increases the probability of wanting to reduce or eliminate the number of refugees coming into the country by almost 20%. Attitude towards refugees seems to be so closely related to ideology, that it leaves almost no room for appeals to interest in either direction. Only 17% of liberals wanted to cut the number of refugees, compared to 69% of conservatives. Because of this, Models 3 and 4 are those with by far the highest R^2 values in this chapter.

Figure 1 shows the percentage of people opposing humanitarian intervention by political ideology across the different prompts. Moderates are the only group actually

most likely to oppose humanitarian intervention in the *HI Benefit* scenario, even compared to *HI Cost*. Other results follow the patterns we would expect from Table 1.



The second study investigated the effects of arguments about interest on attitudes towards foreign aid. It recruited 889 participants, about evenly divided between males and females. Table 3 shows that opinions towards foreign aid follow the patterns we see in the question about humanitarian intervention. *Aid Ben* and *Aid Cost* refer, respectively, to the prompt that presented foreign aid as a benefit and the one that argued it was a cost to the country. Model 5 has as its dependent variable attitude towards foreign aid on a five-point scale, with higher numbers meaning that the individual wants to spend more

money. Model 6 takes its dependent variable as 1 if the individual wanted to cut or eliminate foreign aid, and 0 otherwise.

Table 3
Foreign Aid.

Dep var.	**Aid Opinion (1)**	**Aid Oppose (2)**
Ideology	–0.27***	0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Female	–0.13^{+}	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.03)
Aid Benefit	–0.16*	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.04)
Aid Cost	–0.50***	0.27***
	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	3.76***	–0.02
	(0.11)	(0.05)
Observations	889	889
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.10

note: $^{+}$ p < .1, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001

Aid Benefit is associated with a respondent being 10% more likely to favor cutting or eliminating aid. That is about equal to the effect of a one-point shift in ideology, going, for example, from somewhat liberal to moderate or from moderate to somewhat conservative. *Aid Cost* has an effect that is even greater, as is expected. Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents wanting to cut foreign aid depending on ideology and prompt received.



Liberals are more than twice as likely to favor cutting foreign aid when presented with *Aid Ben*, compared to *Aid Neutral* (from 14% to 29%). Moderates and conservatives are 15% and 8% more likely to favor cutting aid respectively. The group that most wanted to cut foreign aid was conservatives who read *Aid Cost* (77%). As robustness checks, I conducted regression models with Huber weighting on all models used in this chapter and a probit regression on models 2, 4, and 6, which had dichotomous dependent variables (Huber 1973). The results did not meaningfully change.

Discussion and Conclusion

We find very strong evidence for H1. Liberals are more altruistic in their foreign policy preferences than conservatives, even when the issue involves the use of force abroad. This raises questions regarding the conventional view that conservatives are more likely to support war (e.g., Berinsky 2007; Zaller 1994). Are those on the political right more accepting of the use of force when all else is equal? Or is it simply that

conservatives are more likely to have nationalist values and favor their country above others, and this translates into a higher approval rate for most conflicts? As we can see from Experiment 1, liberals are theoretically more likely to support humanitarian intervention. This implies that liberals may not be as anti-war as is generally believed. Rather, they may tend to become anti-war because they are suspicious of nationalism and disapprove of the stated goals of most conflict. If they can be convinced that a war is good for the international community, liberals may be the group most likely to be in favor of it.

There is also extremely strong evidence for H2 with regards to humanitarian intervention and foreign aid. Hearing an argument that these policies are good for the national interest makes people less likely to support them, likely due to the influence of a tradeoff taboo. Once a virtuous seeming policy is tainted by a hint of self-interest, people become less altruistic than they otherwise would be. Presenting a policy as costly makes it even less appealing, as the individual is not only faced with a taboo tradeoff but an argument that their country will be worse off as a result. Research showing that support for humanitarian intervention drops when casualties are mentioned (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2005) should consider the possibility that there would be less support for these kinds of wars even if the consequences for the country are seen as materially beneficial.

Ideology is the variable most closely associated with whether people wanted more or fewer refugees. Here, it did not matter whether the issue was presented neutrally, as a net benefit, or a cost. While there is no indication of a backfire effect regarding this issue, the fact that arguments about interest had no effect on support is nonetheless

counterintuitive. It may be that the issue of refugees, like immigration is general, is so politically polarizing that people's minds are already made up. While conservatives and liberals differ on attitudes towards humanitarian intervention and foreign aid, these are issues that are not as clearly partisan. For arguments about interest to have an effect either way, perhaps it must first be necessary that people are open to changing their minds.

The study of sacred values has added to our understanding of international relations. People attach a great deal of importance to symbols and ideals that provide only non-tangible benefits. The evidence presented here suggests that Americans of all ideologies, like non-Americans in other studies (Ginges and Atran 2009a, 2009b; Dehghani et al. 2010), resist the idea of considering a tradeoff between sacred imperatives and seeking an economic gain. This leads to a backfire effect, where material incentives for their country make people less likely to support an altruistic policy.

The findings presented here should motivate future research on how moral psychology influences foreign policy preferences with regards to international altruism, and the role that interest plays. Here, the author used a sample that was exclusively American. It therefore remains an open question whether the backfire effect with regards to humanitarian values exists in other cultures, or those that do not subscribe to WEIRD morality. There may be some variation of the backfire effect that is subject to certain cultural parameters. For example, people of other countries may only support defending people of the same ethnic background or religion abroad, and be less likely to do so if they are offered a material incentive. This same dynamics may not apply if the same population is asked about humanitarian intervention in general. On the other hand, even conservatives, who have morality profiles more similar to those of people from non-

western cultures, show a backfire effect. It remains an open question how universal this characteristic of moral reasoning about humanitarian issues is.

Future studies should also look into why there is a backfire effect on the issues of humanitarian intervention and foreign aid, while arguments about interest have no effect either way on support for refugees. Do only the first two policy areas invoke sacred values, while the other does not? If so, it is difficult to see why, as all of these policy areas involve helping foreigners at some cost to Americans. With more research, scholars can perhaps construct a typology that can explain how concerns about interest interact with specific issue areas in foreign policy. One possibility is that there would have been a backfire effect had the plight of refugees been made to appear more dire. The experiments explicitly made the connection between American policy and lives saved in the cases of foreign aid and humanitarian intervention; respondents may have assumed that refugees would survive either way or perhaps go to another country if they were not taken in by the United States. Another possibility is that there is some inherent difference between the issue of refugee acceptance on the one hand and humanitarian intervention and foreign aid on the other. There is still a great deal to learn about when material interests make a policy more appealing, when interest has no role, and when there is a backfire effect.

Findings on how beliefs about interest interact with preexisting perceptions of what is sacred can also influence historical research into major foreign policy decisions. Scholars of international relations must be guided by theory when delving into the historical record; otherwise they risk being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of available evidence (Trachtenberg 2006:ch. 2; Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). While there

is controversy over the extent to which material interests drive foreign policy, few have considered the possibility that economic interest may be a reason to refrain from following a given course of action. Perhaps the Interest Taboo can give us a clearer understanding of certain historical episodes while dispelling misconceptions about what drives foreign policy in the United States and Europe. Hints of this can be found in constructivist accounts of campaigns by the United States and Great Britain that have arguably been undertaken in part precisely so that no one could argue that the acting country was deriving a tangible benefit from stated policies (Löwenheim 2003; Finnemore 1996). Incorporating research on taboo trade-offs into this historical research can help enrich our understanding by giving us a more complete picture of the psychological motivations of key actors.

Along with researchers, advocates for or against more altruistic international policies may also want to take into account the findings presented here. Scholars have already warned that in negotiations with nationalist or religious principles at stake, offers of material interest can backfire (Ginges and Atran 2011). Yet analysts have yet to seriously consider the possibility that the same may be true with regards to humanitarian policies, and this oversight is reflected in our debates over these issues. Polls show that Americans are more likely to want to cut foreign aid than practically any other part of the federal budget (Pew Research Center 2013). Scholars have therefore sought to explain why, and look for ways to increase support for this form of international altruism (e.g., Wood 2016). The results presented here indicate that part of the problem may be that supporters of foreign aid often make appeals to interest, defending it as an "economic imperative" (Foreign Policy Initiative 2013) or presenting it as a universal panacea that

can do everything from making Americans richer to preventing conflicts across the globe (e.g., Ingram 2017). Yet the experiments conducted in this chapter imply that those who hope to convince their fellow citizens to engage in more international altruism should focus on moral arguments rather than appealing to interest, which can be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. The relative lack of support for foreign aid among the American public may be partly due to the misguided view of politicians and activists that to build support for their preferred policies they must argue that being generous to the rest of the world provides a tangible benefit to their own country.

Chapter 4

Are Liberal Governments More Cooperative? Voting Trends at the UN in Six Anglophone Democracies

"Since I saw treaties as essentially only political documents, and the whole debate over what was 'legally binding' in 'international law' as just another theological exercise, I didn't care about the answer."–John Bolton, 2008

"Our enduring strength is also reflected in our respect for an international system that protects the rights of both nations and people–a United Nations and a Universal Declaration of Human Rights; international law and the means to enforce those laws."–Barack Obama, 2014

Conservatives and liberals are different. Not only with regards to politics, but they are also prejudiced for and against different groups and disagree on basic issues of right and wrong (Haidt 2012), even among elites (Holsti and Rosenau 1988). Clearly, we expect in the normal course of politics that these differences matter, and in the domestic realm at least observers can directly see values at work shaping choices made by various governments in the form of, for example, tax and spending policy. Unfortunately, however, there has been relatively little work on whether electing conservatives or liberals actually matters for foreign policy in a systematic way. While we may have the sense that the election of a certain leader will lead to a predictable change in foreign policy behavior consistent with the ideology of that individual, such an assumption cannot be taken for granted. Thus, while this dissertation has up to this point focused to a

great extent on differences between the moral psychologies of conservatives and liberals with regards to foreign policy preferences, this chapter seeks to show that at least some of these differences affect policy.

Clearly, every administration is unique to a certain extent. Yet there may be reasons to be skeptical of the idea that the day-to-day work of foreign policy varies based on who is in office in any predictable way. Realism, the dominant paradigm in international relations for decades, says that state behavior is determined by the balance of power and other structural forces (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001). Foreign policy elites also tend to share a certain set of values and assumptions. When the United States was locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union, it was common to speak of the "Cold War consensus" among foreign policy elites (Fordham 1998), which was immediately followed by the "Washington consensus" in favor of open markets and the promotion of democracy abroad (Williamson 1993). Critics of President Bush from the right attacked him for engaging in nation building (Buchanan 2007), while President Obama's enemies from the left similarly criticized him for not closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay and carrying out drone strikes that killed and wounded civilians abroad (West 2017). The vast majority of the bureaucracy that makes foreign policy is composed of career officials who work under administrations of both parties, and even the political appointees are sometimes individuals who have a reputation for bipartisan service. Foreign policy observers have often repeated the adage that "where you stand depends on where you sit,'" (Allison 1969) which implies that circumstances will force whoever occupies a certain position of leadership to behave similarly to what others would do if they held the same office. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that relatively few scholars examining electoral democracies

have found consistent and quantifiable differences in foreign policy based on the ideology of the party in power.

At the same time, as mentioned before, liberal and conservative elites in the United States differ in their foreign policy preferences, as do their constituencies (Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990). It is therefore not unreasonable to infer that this translates into major policy differences when leaders enter office. Certainly, rhetoric surrounding the United Nations and international law trends towards the idealistic side among liberal politicians, while more cynical and dismissive commentary is more often found on the right. Scholars, however, have not begun to consider the use of quantitative methods in order to test theories about how ideology shapes foreign policy behavior in western democracies.

There are then reasons to suspect that leader ideology matters greatly in foreign policy and other reasons to suspect that its influence is minimal. In order to adjudicate between different theories, this chapter uses UN voting patterns in order to investigate how ideology affects foreign policy in the six major Anglophone democracies. It finds that, across each one of these states, left-wing government vote more in line with the rest of the world at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Part I discusses what it actually means to say that two states share interests, including the standard method to measure interest similarity in the literature, and previous research into its determinants. In Part II, I review the research showing that liberals and conservatives have different moralities and how this impacts foreign policy preferences among the general public and elites. I bring together the literatures on partisan morality and interest similarity to present theories on when we can expect administrations in the six Anglophone democracies to

vote more or less like the rest of the world. The next two sections present the methodology and the results. We find that among the six major Anglophone democracies, left-leaning governments consistently vote more in line with other nations. Robustness checks show that these effects are found in each of the countries examined and are not driven by the time-dependence of the data or the possibility that electorates gravitate towards conservative leaders in times of international turbulence. The chapter concludes with thoughts and suggestions regarding future research on the roots of state preferences and how political psychology can predict state behavior.

Measuring Interest Similarity

What does it mean to say that two states share the same or similar 'interests'? As Wolfers (1952) already noticed over sixty years ago, the term 'national interest' is endlessly flexible and means different things to different people. While some stress an objective standard that focuses on wealth and relative power (Mearsheimer 2001), there is a general recognition that states can pursue a wide variety of goals, including the fulfillment of moral ideals including greater international cooperation (Finnemore 1993; Risse 2015). Scholars interested in measuring state preference and similarity have therefore mostly focused on the subjective definition of national interest, where we say that two states share interests if they seek the same ends. Early work used security alliances as a proxy to gauge interest similarity (Bueno de Mesquita 1975, 1978, 1981; Stoll 1984) Unfortunately, such measures can be crude or misleading, as alliance profiles show relatively little variance over time, only capture interest similarity in one area of international affairs, and are often imposed by history and circumstance. Therefore, scholars have turned more and more to data from the United Nations General Assembly,

which often has hundreds of votes per year, in order to have a broader and more detailed picture of the structure of international politics (Alker 1964; Signorino and Ritter 1999). Focusing on revealed preferences as measured by how states vote, if two countries tend to find themselves on the same side on a wide variety of international controversies, we can say that they share similar interests.

The UN affinity index has become standard as the best proxy for interest similarity (Gartzke and Jo 2006; Gartzke 2006), and is often used as an independent variable in a wide range of literatures, most notably among those trying to explain which countries receive foreign aid (Strömberg 2007; McLean 2012; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser 2014; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Affinity scores, or S-scores, are calculated by dyad-year, on a scale from -1 for two countries that are as far apart as possible to 1 for two countries that vote in perfect alignment (see Gartzke 2006; Signorino and Ritter 1999). They are based on an equal weighting of alliance commitments and voting at the UNGA. The more that two countries have similar alliance portfolios and tend to vote the same way at the UN, the more similar their interests are in any given year, or the higher the S-score. As UN votes occur much more often than shifts in alliances, for all practical purposes most of the variance we see within dyads over time will be based on changes in voting patterns at the UN.

This chapter uses higher affinity scores as proxies for "better" or "closer" relations. Of course, S-scores do not capture all dimensions of a relationship. However, because they are the best measure we have of interest similarity, it is not imprecise to use them as proxies for what we are interested in. If two states are allied with the same countries and vote the same way, it is reasonable to expect to see more cooperation

between them than we do in a dyad where the opposite is true. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, I will use terms such as “higher affinity score,” “more similar interests,” and “closer relations” interchangeably (see also Smith 2016).

While some scholars have taken interest similarity as a given and used it to predict other phenomena, there are two research traditions focused on interest similarity itself as a dependent variable of interest. First, scholars have for decades tried to find the fault lines in the international system and map the structure of international politics. An early analyst was Russett (1966), who used factor analysis to find seven different voting groups in the 18th Session of the UNGA. Iida (1988) showed that there was increasing agreement among the developing world countries throughout the 1980s. Most importantly, using spatial models of distance to reveal clustering, scholars have found that during the Cold War, the world was indeed bipolar, with one group of states clustering around the United States and another more closely allied with the Soviet Union (Voeten 2000; Holloway 1990; Alker 1964). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the East-West division has been eroded and replaced by a conflict with the US and those that agree with the neoliberal order on the one side and a group of developing states that resist American hegemony on the other (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000, 2004; Carter and Stone 2015).

In addition to mapping the structure of international politics using behavior at the UNGA as a proxy, a second body of literature has used voting similarity to answer narrower, and in some ways, more fundamental, questions relevant to international politics. Rather than simply examining the structure of international politics, this literature asks why states come to share similar interests in the first place. Because the

United States has been central to international politics since the second half of the twentieth century, researchers have asked what makes other states come closer or pull further apart from that country. When there is a transition away from a non-democratic leader, there appears to be a regression to the mean effect, where countries that were close to the United States move further apart and those that were hostile become less so (Ratner 2009; Smith 2016). In democratic states, however, leader change does not appear to affect relations with the United States (Smith 2016). This may be due to larger and wealthier countries having more stable preferences with regards to issues at the UN (Brazys and Panke 2017). In general, countries with leaders who just came into power (Dreher and Jensen 2013), and, among OECD states, those having a right-wing government in office (Potrafke 2009) tend to be closer to the United States. In addition to work on the United States, Strüver (2016) finds that China has closest relations with states that are similar in regime characteristics and degree of sociopolitical globalization. As China continues to become a more important force in the international sphere, there are sure to be more studies examining the determinants of its voting patterns and who its allies and adversaries are.

While it is important to understand what determines closeness to the United States, researchers thus far have mainly focused on the qualities and changes of the other member of the dyad. There has yet to be a work on how changes within the United States affect its relationships vis-à-vis other countries. Yet focusing only on potential friends and enemies means that we are missing half the picture. As a more general matter, processes or changes within the United States that influence its relationships with other

countries might have analogues in other western democracies that share similarities in terms of culture, history, and institutions.

Conservatives, Liberals, and International Cooperation

While alliance with or opposition to the United States has been the main fault line in international politics since the end of the Second World War, within the United States the primary division in politics is between liberals and conservatives, and scholars have delved into differences in foreign policy preferences between these two camps. Once again, how individuals balance the interests of their "in-group" against the interests of outsiders is likely to be key. As discussed already, in the context of Moral Foundations Theory, conservatives score higher than liberals on the loyalty/betrayal foundation. This means that they are more likely to morally disapprove when individuals are disloyal to their country or relevant in-group (Haidt 2012; Frimer, Gaucher, and Schaefer 2014; Bassett et al. 2015). While liberals do not necessarily approve of those who engage in betrayal, they are less likely to value loyalty highly when compared to other moral considerations such as treating people fairly and refraining from harming others. Similarly, the Schwartz framework of Universal Basic Values finds that people who vote for more left-wing parties score higher on universalism, defined as favoring "understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature" (Piruko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011:539). These fundamental value differences, among other traits, seem to influence attitudes towards foreign policy just as they partially determine how citizens feel about domestic policy (Kertzer et al. 2014).

While this field of research is inherently interesting, it is still an open question the degree to which these differences actually influence foreign policy. One step in that

direction has been the work of Holsti and Rosenau (1988, 1990), which shows that many of the foreign policy differences that we see between conservatives and liberals among the general public also exist among elites of various ideological persuasions. Yet even if this may be the case, it does not necessarily follow that replacing a conservative government with a liberal one, or vice versa, will lead to major changes in foreign policy. Realists believe in the causal importance of the international balance of power, which, taken to its logical conclusion, would predict that those of differing ideologies will tend to react similarly given the same set of circumstances and constraints (Mearsheimer 2001). Seemingly with every turnover of administration in the United States, there is no shortage of ideologues on both sides disappointed that the current president is acting too similarly to a disfavored previous leader (Buchanan 2007; West 2017). And even if leaders change in democracies, many decisions continue across time to be made by the same career bureaucrats, who may be able to either run circles around or directly influence the relatively few political leaders on top (Milner and Tingley 2015: 157–84). For these reasons, we may expect liberal and conservative administrations to behave similarly. One may make an analogy with regards to government spending in the United States. Although Republican elites and their voters favor a smaller role for the state, federal spending increases at least as much under Republican administrations as it does under Democrats (McMaken 2016). On the issue of the size of the federal government, at least, institutional, political, and bureaucratic pressures appear to overwhelm the ideological convictions of those in power. We cannot be sure that the same is not true with respect to foreign affairs.

Therefore, while it may be natural to suspect that differences between conservatives and liberals in foreign policy preferences and orientations can be observed in policy differences, we cannot be sure that this is the case without direct empirical evidence. If we were to see differences between conservatives and liberals in foreign policy behavior, how would they manifest themselves? At the UNGA, we may well expect liberals to have closer relations with most other countries, even in a world where it was completely clear what the economic and security consequences of any particular vote would be. This is due to liberals' greater support for cooperative internationalism, which appears to be rooted at least in part in their tendency to more highly value the well being and concerns of those that they have no political or social connection to (Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014). Sometimes, the best interests of a state and the best interests of the rest of the world diverge. Climate change, for example, tends to harm poorer and more tropical countries more than wealthy industrial states. At the same time, it is the largest economies that would need to bear much of the cost of any solution. Conservatives and liberals on this issue, among others, are likely to differ in how they balance the interests of their own countries against those of the rest of the global community.

In formal terms, imagine a state i deciding whether or not to support a given resolution. All other members of the international community ($1, 2, ... n$) are symbolized by j. V_i is the total value that state i places on an assembly resolution passing. The net benefits of a resolution being adopted for any given state k are represented by B_k. The weight state i places on its own interests is represented by α while β is the value it places on the well being of the rest of the world. Since α and β are weighted measurements, they

total 1. State *i* knows what the consequence of the vote will be for itself, and can infer the benefits or costs of a given resolution for states *j...n* based on how each state plans to vote. For any state *j*, state *i* believes that the consequences are either -1, 0, or 1, depending on whether *j* votes against, abstains, or votes for a resolution. Thus, we say that,

$$V_i = \alpha B_i + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{B_j}{n} \tag{1}$$

State *i* votes for a proposal if,

$$\alpha B_i + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{B_j}{n} > 0 \tag{2}$$

We can say that the second factor in equation 2 is B_w, which is a number between –1 and 1. Since $\alpha = 1 - \beta$ and $\beta = 1 - \alpha$, we can rewrite equation 2 to say that *i* will vote for a proposal if,

$$\frac{\alpha}{\beta} > -\frac{B_w}{B_i} \tag{3}$$

This equation can in turn be rewritten as,

$$\frac{\alpha B_i}{1-\alpha} > -B_w \tag{4}$$

As α approaches 1, the left side of the equation approaches either ∞ or $-\infty$, depending on the sign of B_i. In other words, the higher the value of α the more that B_i, or whether the resolution is a net positive or negative for state *i*, is the sole determinant of how state *i* votes. Conversely, we can see what happens as α approaches 0,

$$lim_{\alpha \to 0} \frac{\alpha B_i}{1 - \alpha} > -B_w = B_w > 0 \quad (5)$$

Under such conditions, state *i* will vote exclusively based on whether the proposal in question is a net positive or negative for the rest of the world, as inferred by whether most countries vote for it. We should expect α and β to differ based on ideology. When a conservative government is in power in state *i*, we should expect $\frac{\alpha}{\beta}$ to be higher. When that is the case, more weight is placed on the benefits and costs to state *i*, while when liberals are in power, more consideration will be given to the net benefit to the rest of the world. If other nations vote largely based on their own interests, then we should expect liberal governments to be more likely to vote in accordance with other countries most of the time. If state *j* itself has a low α, then it votes in accordance with the rest of the world. Yet even if α is high for state *j* and it votes only based on what is in its own interest, then if state *i* has a low α it takes the interests of state *j* into consideration. Regardless, then, of the α and β values of states *j...n*, a higher α value for state *i* should be associated with being less likely to vote in agreement with the rest of the world most of the time.

This model is true regardless of whether we consider the interests involved in any particular resolution to be tangible or symbolic. Yet until this point the analysis has

assumed that the interests of one state do not take into account the considerations of another. This way of framing the issue may be disputed by constructivists, given their view that states are social entities shaped by expectations, social learning, and norms (Finnemore 1993). In particular, when participating in international organizations, representatives of states may find themselves morally persuaded by others and come to identify with the ideals and goals of the organization itself (Lewis 2005; Park 2005). In this framework, states do not simply begin to adopt the same preferences as others because they logically and systematically consider the payoffs to other parties of a given action. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 1, they adopt a "logic of appropriateness" that expands the very concept of the "self" and leads to an internalization of the assumptions, beliefs, and goals of those that they work with (Lewis 2005: Risse 2015). International organizations are effective in shaping behavior "in part because the rational-legal authority they embody is widely viewed as legitimate and good." (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:401) The extent to which UN representatives are prone to be affected by this socialization process determines the degree to which they can be expected to consent to the agenda of other member states (Peevehouse 2002; Flockhart 2005).

Conservatives are more likely to be resistant to socialization by international institutions. At the UN especially, the processes and institutions that facilitate socialization and a convergence of values and beliefs among some people may have the exact opposite effects among those prone to mistrust foreigners or international organizations, as conservatives are (Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat 2004). Psychologists and political scientists have shown that in the political realm we tend to selectively seek out information that confirm our worldview and ignore that which

contradicts it (Garrett 2009). Being exposed to facts that go against ideological priors can sometimes even backfire, making individuals feel more strongly about their set beliefs (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). It is reasonable to therefore suspect that individuals who go to international organizations expecting them to be hostile to the national interest will indeed find that to be the case.

Backing up this view, we see that opposition to international organizations tends to be a characteristic of the political right. It was Republican resistance that torpedoed Woodrow Wilson's attempts to bring the United States into the League of Nations (Cooper 2001:330–75). Throughout the postwar era and up to the present day, American conservatives have expressed skepticism about the United Nations, as was perhaps clearest under the ambassadorship of John Bolton. In Europe, while Euroscepticism has occasionally been associated with the far left, the cause of championing national sovereignty against foreign influences has become a defining feature of what is often referred to as the "far right." (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002) One may imagine that liberals go to international organizations primed for cooperation and predisposed to be convinced by arguments about what is good for the international community. Conservatives, being more skeptical of and hostile to the UN and its agenda, are more likely to chart their own path. Whatever effects socialization has are likely to be muted or even reversed when those who are interacting with international organizations are politically conservative.

It is therefore not only that conservatives are more likely to prioritize the interests of their own country when they diverge from those of other nations. Rather, those on the right should be far less likely to internalize the perceived interests of the

international community as their own. On some UN votes, it should be clear that there is a tradeoff between the well being of one's own country and what is good for others. At the same time, liberals, even when they use the language of "national interest," should be more likely to internalize the idea that it is in the "national interest" to help citizens of other countries or defer to their concerns. In justifying the humanitarian intervention in Libya, for example, President Obama warned that a massacre in Benghazi would have "stained the conscience of the world" and that "[i]t was not in our national interest to let that happen (Remarks by the President 2011)." Others may have a less expansive definition of "national interest," one that does not include preventing atrocities that do not in any way directly threaten their own country. Environmental and social issues that mostly affect the developing world, for example, are more likely to be seen as relevant to the subjectively defined national interests of liberal governments, even though they may be excluded from a more standard use of the term. The more that "national interest" is defined subjectively, the more that the lines between α and β become blurred. Regardless of whether we use a more or less tangible definition of the term, however, we end up with the same prediction. Conservative should both place less weight on the interests of other countries, and be more resistant to a socialization process that expands the definition of national interest to include the agenda of the international community.

H1: *Governments led by right-leaning parties will have lower affinity scores than those led by left-leaning parties.*

At the same time, there may be certain countries with which conservatives have better relations than would be expected. First of all, conservatives may get along better with allies if they see them as part of the ingroup to which loyalty is owed (Haidt 2012).

Therefore, we may see that conservative governments get along relatively well with states that are allied with the West, such as members of NATO. In the United States, Republicans have often criticized Democratic presidents for allegedly betraying allies for the sake of ideals such as democracy and human rights (Schmitz and Walker 2004; Karsh 2016). In terms of Moral Foundations theory, the loyalty/betrayal foundation, which pulls conservatives away from the rest of the international community, may at the same time exert the opposite effect when they are dealing with allies. Therefore, I predict,

H2: *Right-leaning governments will have higher affinity scores than would be predicted in relation to countries that are allies.*

What about the enemies of a state? It may be rational to believe that any interaction effect would lead conservative governments to have worse relations with rivals, through the same psychological mechanisms that bring them closer to allies. While a country in NATO may be considered an ally and therefore become an honorary member of the ingroup, conservatives should have deeper antipathy towards the enemies of their country. However, some have also observed the "Nixon goes to China" effect, where right-leaning governments have more political room to find areas of cooperation with rivals (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998). Liberal leaders, in contrast, may fear being criticized as weak and cozying up to the mortal enemies of the nation. Therefore, with the data used, I test two possible theories.

H3a: *Right-leaning governments will have higher affinity scores than would be predicted in relation to enemy countries.*

H3b: *Right-leaning governments will have lower affinity scores than would be predicted in relation to enemy countries.*

As the United States has historically stood against communism, I define enemy countries as those with a communist government. Occasionally, the Untied States has allied with communist governments against a common foe, as when it moved closer to Yugoslavia and China in response to those countries breaking with the Soviet Union. At the same time, considering a communist form of government a proxy for hostility should give us an objective definition of enemy country that will be accurate the vast majority of the time. Even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the United States has continued to have strained relations with the few remaining communist states in the world such as Cuba and North Korea.

Finally, among the six Anglophone countries tested, we may expect the effects of ideology not to be constant across states. Larger and more powerful countries may be better able to chart their own security and economic path, and less likely to be pressured to go along with the rest of the world. Countries that are less powerful may be subject to greater economic pressure and have to rely on others for their security, leaving less room for those with certain ideological predispositions to follow their convictions. This leads to the final prediction of this section.

H4: *More powerful countries will see greater variation in affinity scores based on party in power.*

Methodology

This chapter investigates the affinity scores of the six major Anglophone democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland. These states were chosen because they have been stable democracies in the postwar period and share a common history and culture. The politics of these nations are

contested according to the left-right divisions that form the background for studies on psychological differences between conservatives and liberals (see Talhelm et al. 2015; Haidt 2012).[2] They are also countries where the government as a whole belongs to a single party, meaning that the cabinet official in charge of foreign policy belongs to the same party as the head of government. This is unlike some countries in continental Europe, where the foreign minister often belongs to a different party than the chief of state. This can be seen in Germany, for example, where Chancellor Angela Merkel belongs to the center-right party but has had two foreign ministers that come from the main center-left party.

For every year between 1946 and 2008, each country was classified as liberal or conservatives based on who the head of government was. In the United States, foreign policy is mostly determined by the President, while the other five countries have a parliamentary system. Table 1 lists the right-leaning and left-leaning party for each state. Table 2 shows the number of years each country was headed by a liberal or conservative party. For years during which there was a transition, I count the party that was in power

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[2] Although this chapter tends to use these terms interchangeably, for the hypotheses I use “right leaning” rather than “conservative" and “left leaning" rather than “liberal." This is to avoid confusion since the term “liberal” in the United States means something completely different in other contexts. For example, the right-leaning party in Australia is called the Liberals. Although it would be strange to call the Liberal Party the “conservative” one, few knowledgeable observers would doubt that the Liberals are the right-leaning party in Australia. When the terms “conservative” and “liberal” appear in this chapter, they are used in accordance with their definitions in the United States.

for the majority of the year. Table 3 provides the first test of H1 and shows standardized affinity scores for each country under left- and right-leaning governments, and in total, using the *s3un4608i* variable from Gartzke and Jo (2006), which calculates affinity scores based on whether countries voted yes, no, or abstained on UNGA resolutions. The affinity scores are standardized based on the mean and standard deviation of all affinity scores across the world between 1946 and 2008. Table 3 shows, for each of the Anglophone countries, the number of countries that had affinity scores closer to that state when liberal government were in power, and the number of states that had more interest similarity under conservative governments.

Table 1
Liberal and Conservative Parties by Country

Country	Left Party	Right Party
US	Democrats	Republicans
UK	Labour	Conservative
Canada	Liberal	Progressive Conservative/Conservative
Australia	Labor	Liberal
NZ	Labour	National
Ireland	Fine Gail	Fianna Fáil

Table 2
Summary Statistics

Country	Years (total)	Years (liberal)	Years (conservative)	Observation Years	Observation Years (liberal)	Observation Years (conservative)
US	63	27	36	8960	3,616	5,344
UK	63	28	35	8960	4,124	4,836
Canada	63	44	19	8960	6,109	2,851
Australia	63	21	42	8960	3,125	5,835
NZ	63	25	38	8960	3,702	5,258
Ireland	63	18	45	8936	2,387	6,549

Table 3
Standardized Affinity Scores and Comparative Relations

Country	Average Affinity			Standard Deviation	Better Relations			Lib Better (%)
	Lib	Con	Total		Lib	Con	Ties	
US	-1.96	-2.63	-2.38	1.32	182	7	0	96.3
UK	-.94	-1.36	-1.17	.96	171	17	0	91.0
Canada	-.64	-.79	-.69	.88	163	31	0	84.0
Australia	-.36	-.74	-.61	.92	165	29	0	87.7
NZ	-.25	-.49	-.39	.86	145	44	2	75.9
Ireland	-.25	-.29	-.28	.71	130	58	1	68.7

*All results statistically significant, $p < .001$

Although Table 3 shows the number of countries political parties of differing ideologies had closer relations with, we cannot be certain that the ideology of the ruling party is a cause of the disparities we see. Conservatives and liberal governments come to power at different times, and this might be driving the results. For example, if there are more countries allied with the West in certain eras, then whichever party was more likely to be in power during that time period will be expected to have better relations with most countries. Over the second half of the twentieth century, we saw the number of states

admitted to the UN increase, due to, among other reasons, decolonization and the end of the Cold War. For each of the six states, then, I conduct an OLS regression with the unit of observation being the dyad-year and the universe of observations being all dyad-years involving that country from 1946 to 2008. The dependent variable is the standardized affinity score for the two states in the given year. The main predictor variable of interest is *Conservative*, coded as 1 if for most of the year a conservative government is in power, and 0 if the prime minister or president was from a liberal party for most of the year. There are two categories of independent variables added to each regression. The first takes into account the nature of the states in the international system at any given time.

NATO and *Communist*. The *NATO* variable is coded as 1 if the non-Anglophone country of the dyad was a member of NATO during the relevant year, 0 otherwise, and likewise for states that were *Communist*. Since NATO members are aligned with the West, and communist countries have tended not to be, these controls account for the possibility that parties of one ideology tended to be in power when there were more natural allies in the world and fewer adversaries.

Polity. Democracies are thought to share the same interests because they have the same values (Fuhrmann 2009; Lipson 2013). This means that any finding regarding ideology and cooperation could be accounted for by the possibility that there are more democracies when members of one party are in power. I therefore add a control for Polity score, measured between -10 to 10, taken from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research website (Marshall and Jaggers 2001).

A second category of variables deals with the changing nature of the international system as a whole.

Cold War. This is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the dyad-year falls between 1947 and 1991. There is evidence that UN voting patterns changed after the fall of the Soviet Union, with more countries having become willing to oppose the United States and its closest allies in international organizations (Voeten 2000, 2004).

Volatility. This variable is based on the standardized average distance, or S-score, between any two states in the international system in a given year, directly addressing the possibility that those of one ideology tend to come to power in times of greater international discord (see Voeten 2013).

Finally, the interaction variables *Conservative*NATO* and *Conservative*Communist* are added in order to test for H2 and H3 respectively.

It is not difficult to imagine, for example, that voters turn to more conservative parties in times of international turmoil (Hayes 2005). Controlling directly for international volatility, along with the Cold War period and the characteristics of other states in the UNGA themselves, helps to account for this possibility. As discussed in greater detail in the next section, other methods are used in order to ensure that the results are not time dependent, but rather driven by ideology itself.

Results and Discussion

As can be seen in Table 3, within each country, the left party tends to have closer relations with the vast majority of other states. In New Zealand, around 69% of states have better relations under liberal governments. That number jumps up to over 96% in the United States, where only 7 out of 182 countries have a higher S-score when Republicans are in power. The other countries have results that are not as extreme, but

still reach statistical significance at the $p < .001$ threshold when using a Bernoulli distribution framework testing against the null hypothesis.

We therefore begin with strong support for H1 and H4. In the US and the UK, the conservative parties are farther apart from nearly every country in the world at the UNGA. While the results for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland are not as strong, the patterns are clear. This does not ensure, however, that having a liberal party in power actually leads to closer relations with the world. In order to see whether this is the case, Models 1-6 below are OLS regressions for each of the six Anglophone countries, including the variables discussed above.

Table 4.
Predictors of Voting Similarity.

Model	1 US	2 UK	3 Canada	4 Australia	5 NZ	6 Ireland
Conservative	–0.67*** (0.02)	–0.28*** (0.02)	–0.24*** (0.02)	–0.21*** (0.02)	–0.09*** (0.02)	–0.15*** (0.02)
NATO	1.09*** (0.05)	0.97*** (0.04)	0.61*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.03)	–0.03 (0.03)
Communist	–1.23*** (0.06)	–0.52*** (0.05)	–0.65*** (0.03)	–0.30*** (0.05)	–0.31*** (0.04)	–0.46*** (0.04)
Polity	0.04*** (0)	0.04*** (0)	0.04*** (0)	0.03*** (0)	0.03*** (0)	0.03*** (0)
Cold War	1.08*** (0.03)	–0.14*** (0.02)	–0.05** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	–0.11*** (0.02)	–0.02 (0.02)
Volatility	–1.13*** (0.03)	–0.08*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.66*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.02)
Conservative * NATO	–0.10 (0.06)	0.12* (0.05)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.48*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.04)
Conservative * Communist	0.66*** (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	–0.39*** (0.06)	–0.36*** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Constant	–2.79*** (0.02)	–0.99*** (0.02)	–0.58*** (0.01)	–0.52*** (0.02)	–0.20*** (0.02)	–0.14 (0.02)
Observations	7,853	7,853	7,853	7,853	7,853	7,853
Adjusted R^2	0.52	0.44	0.38	0.35	0.36	0.32

Note: $*p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, $*** p < 0.001$

We find strong evidence for H1 and H2. In each of the six Anglophone democracies, having a conservative government in power is associated with more distant relationships with the rest of the world. The variable *Conservative*NATO* is statistically significant in the expected direction in five of the six models, with the exception being in the model with the United States, where there is a null finding. While the effects of

having a conservative government appear to be almost universally negative with regards to international cooperation, the impact is in most cases mitigated greatly where the other country is already an ally.

Both H3a and H3b find support, but in different countries. The coefficient for *Conservative*Communist* is positive and statistically significant for the United States and Canada, negative and statistically significant for Australia and New Zealand, and not significant for Ireland and the United Kingdom. The "Nixon goes to China" effect appears to be real in the United States, from which the phrase comes, but there is little evidence for it elsewhere. This is not too surprising, since, as mentioned before, there are reasons to anticipate that conservative governments will get along better with allies and other reasons to expect them to be more hostile than liberals. Which effect predominates in any given country may depend on the political context.

The variables *NATO*, *Communist*, and *Polity* behave in the ways expected. The United States generally had better relations with other countries during the Cold War, as is consistent with previous research on the growing isolation of the United States over time (Voeten 2004), while the collapse of the Soviet Union seems to have moved the other five countries slightly closer to the rest of the General Assembly. It is also of note that the models do a very good job of explaining the data. No less than 32% of the variance in any model is explained by the included variables, with the number being as high as 52% in the case of the United States.

Figure 1 shows, for each of the six Anglophone countries, all data points reflecting affinity scores under left-leaning and right-leaning governments. Each dot is a dyad-year, with green representing more democratic states for that year and yellow less

democratic states. The figure is a clear visualization of the finding that while Anglophone democracies have closer relations to more democratic states in general, when conservatives are in power the average affinity score tends to go down regardless of the political characteristics of the other member of the dyad. For each country and governing ideology, the box plot marks the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles.

Figure 1. Affinity Scores by State and Ideology



There appears to also be support for H4, with the largest effect of *Conservative* being found in the Untied States. To test this theory statistically, I run a simple regression model with the effect of a conservative government as the dependent variable and with the independent variable being the average of the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score across the time period studied for each nation. This model gives a result that is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ threshold despite there being only six observations. Figure 2 shows the effect of switching ideology based on average CINC score for each of the six countries.



Figure 2. Effects of Ideology Based on Power.

Although the results appear at first glance to perhaps be driven by the United States, which is a great outlier in its power, when that country is dropped from the model the coefficient actually increases ($p < .08$). Despite the small sample size, then, we see strong evidence for H4. This is consistent with the view that larger and more powerful states have more autonomy in their foreign policy, as those with less power are more subject to being significantly influenced by the international context in which they operate.

A few methods are used in order to conduct robustness checks on the main results presented in this chapter. First, I rerun the models in Table 4 with a new variable added called *Lagged Affinity*, which is, for each dyad-year, the affinity score for that dyad from the previous year. This biases the model again the main claims made in this chapter,

since there is no change in government for most years, meaning for any particular year *y*, the affinity score of *y-1* is more likely than not to be driven by same party that is in power in year *y*. Despite this introduced bias, we still find the coefficient for *Conservative* to be statistically significant in each model in the expected direction, albeit with reduced effects. I also rerun the models using robust regression in Stata, which eliminates large outliers (Cook's distance > 1) and then performs Huber and biweight iterations. The variable *Conservative* remains statistically significant in all models and its coefficient actually increases for the United States and the United Kingdom.

A final way to test for time dependency is to look at transition periods, or times when the government within a country changes hands from one party to another. Figure 3 shows the change in affinity score for every transition between 1946 and 2008. The numbers are calculated by taking the average standardized affinity scores of the first two full years of the incoming administration minus those of the last two full years of the outgoing administration. In a few cases, in the two relevant years when a party was in power it was led by two or three leaders. Transitions to liberal governments are in blue with hallow dots, transitions to conservative governments are in red with solid dots.



Figure 3. Effects of Transitions

Of 18 transitions to a liberal government (liberal transitions), 13 (72%) resulted in better relations with the world. Of 21 conservative transitions, 14 (67%) are associated with an overall souring of relations. While Smith (2016) found no effect of leader change on US relations with other states using UNGA data, he did not account for ideology, which may have led to a canceling out between the improvement in relations with new Democratic administrations and the souring of relations that tends to accompany a new Republican president. Figure 3 appears to be consistent with what knowledgeable observers may have expected based on what we know about politics in the countries

studied. Unsurprisingly, the largest souring of relations occurred during the transitions to Reagan and Thatcher, two figures that continue to inspire conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic. At the top of Figure 3 we see that the largest improvement in relations was the 1970s transition of Gorton/Mcmahon to Whitlam in Australia. Prime Minister Whitlam's Labor government was known for its "emphasis on closer relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region," in a shift that "was both qualitatively and quantitatively different from the anti-communist thinking that had dominated" before (Ungerer 2007:545). Among the changes made were a formal recognition of communist China and a movement towards the Non-Aligned Movement at the UN.

If it was the case that voters tended to choose conservatives during times of international turmoil and liberals during more peaceful times, that would be reflected in the last few years of each outgoing administration, and this would have a tendency to minimize differences between conservative and liberal governments during transition years. Yet we consistently see relationships between, on the one hand, the ideologies of the outgoing and incoming governments, and, on the other, shifts in affinity scores. This gives credence to the theory that it is ideology itself that is influencing how these governments vote at the United Nations. Perhaps voters anticipate the degree of international turmoil in the coming years and vote accordingly. Such a theory, however, probably makes unrealistic assumptions about the sophistication of voters, especially considering research showing that the general public tends to lack basic knowledge about international affairs (Bennett et al. 1996).

Conclusion

Political psychology has greatly expanded our understanding of differences between conservatives and liberals both at the mass and elite levels, and how these differences relate to foreign policy preferences (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Rathbun et al. 2016; Kertzer et al. 2014). Unfortunately, however, there has been little statistical analysis of the extent to which these differences matter. Some of the most important phenomena that international relations scholars are interested in, such as war and alliance formation, may occur too infrequently for us to draw strong conclusions about differences in state behavior based on ideology. Voting at the UNGA, however, provides enough data in order to develop and test theories of international behavior.

Previous analyses of voting patterns at the UN have generally been independent of the political psychology and public opinion literatures. Rather, they have focused on broad historical trends since the end of the Second World War (Voeten 2000) or relied on theories of ruling coalition formation to discover how regime change influences the relations that a country has with the United States (Smith 2016; Dreher and Jensen 2013). This is the first work that investigates how ideology influences voting at the UN in developed democracies across practically all international relationships. By bridging work on UNGA voting patterns and research on how political psychology and ideology affect foreign policy preferences, this chapter hopes to inspire new avenues of research for both literatures.

First of all, the literature on political psychology and foreign policy preferences, particularly on differences between conservatives and liberals, should so more to investigate the extent to which previous findings influence decision-making in the real

world. In particular, does the prediction that liberals are better for international cooperation manifest itself in international forums other than the UN? And, other than voting patterns, are there other aspects of international politics where the liberal tendency towards international cooperation might be expected to manifest itself? Given the amount of leader turnover we see and the variety of international institutions that have been created and continue to function since the end of the Second World War, it should not be too difficult to test theories about how we would expect the United States and other democracies to behave based on the ideology of those currently in power. In addition, there exists the possibility of greatly enriched qualitative work on how the ideologies and psychological predispositions of leaders affect relations with allies and enemies across the world.

Second, research on voting at the UN should do more to focus on how domestic politics influences patterns of cooperation, particularly in developed democracies. Previous work has mainly investigated how leader transitions affect relations with a particularly country such as the United States or China (Brazys and Panke 2017; Strüver 2016). There may, however, be other events that lead states to make broad changes and result in better or more strained relations with the vast majority of the countries across the globe. Perhaps the most extreme example of this presented in this chapter is the finding that, in the United States, Republican administrations have closer relations with only 7 of the 189 countries for which voting data is available. While a turnover in leadership may be the most obvious event that can change relations with the rest of the world, it is unlikely to be the only factor that researchers are able to discover.

Finally, the results presented can also add to the literature on the influence of leaders. Some of this work has tended to stress the importance of life experience (see, e.g., Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Horowitz and Stam 2014), while a focus on ideology has shown us that revolutionary leaders are more likely to be involved in conflict abroad (Colgan 2013). In general, however, quantitative work has tended to overlook ideological differences between leaders in developed democracies, perhaps due to the assumption that such states have preferences that are relatively stable across time (Smith 2016). Yet research shows us that conservatives and liberals differ in in a variety of ways both obvious and subtle (see, e.g., Carney et al. 2008; Hanania 2017b). While the results here support the idea that these differences matter at the United Nations, there are likely to be other outputs of international politics that people care about that are also influenced by ideology.

In addition to the contribution this chapter makes to the academic literature, its findings have implications for how we think about the foreign policy consequences of elections in developed countries. While the results indicate that liberal governments increase international cooperation, the results do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that this is normatively desirable. To liberals, the findings here may reinforce previously held views on how politicians who share their ideological leanings are more likely to create a world of international harmony. Conservatives, however, may look at the same data and see right-leaning governments taking a stand for the interests and values of their people. In this view, a lack of international comity is not necessarily a bad thing, particularly if unilateral action and the turmoil that it brings are needed to decisively deal with foreign policy challenges (see, e.g., Krauthammer 2002). How the results here are

interpreted in the realm of politics and the normative implications that should be drawn from them are nonetheless beyond the scope of this chapter.

Appendix

This appendix is divided into four sections. Part I provides summary statistics revealing baseline support for aggressive action in each of the four experiments in Chapter 1. Part II includes a series of robustness checks with regards to the main findings of the same chapter. Using ordered probit analysis rather than OLS regression, we find that the main findings still hold. In Part III, I show that the effects of the prompts vary very little based on the ideology of the respondent. Finally, I lay out the exact question and prompt wording for each of the four experiments in Chapter 1 and the three experiments in Chapter 2.

Baseline Support for War, Chapter 1

Unlike Chapter 2, Chapter 1 does not discuss baseline levels of support for war. The numbers are interesting in that they reveal a relatively hawkish population. A majority either somewhat or strongly supported aggressive action in all four experiments. The numbers are shown in the four tables of this part, which correspond to the four experiments. The numbers are the parentage either somewhat or strongly supporting war, or in the case of Experiment 3, the percentage who thought aggressive action would be somewhat or very justified.

Table 1
Experiment 1

	50 (forcas)	**500**	**5,000**	**50,000**	**average**
0 (amcas)	75	63	64	56	65
10	68	67	70	64	67
100	71	63	63	68	66
1,000	73	71	61	60	66
average	72	66	65	62	66

Table 2
Experiment 2

	Lyko nukes	No nukes	Average
Burn flag	81	80	81
No burn flag	78	75	77
average	80	78	79

Table 3.
Experiment 3.

	Broke agreement	No broken agreement	Average
Ally	68	68	68
Not ally	63	64	64
average	66	66	66

Table 4.
Experiment 4.

	Null	China Unfair	US Unfair	US Threat	Total
% supporting sending ships	56	58	50	56	55
obs.	428	429	444	449	1,750

Although the least support for aggressive action is found in Experiment 4, not much should be read into this result. That is because Experiment 4 was the only one in which respondents were given the option of neither supporting nor opposing aggressive action. In every other example, respondents had to either support or oppose the policy in question.

Robustness Checks

Table 5 shows the results of ordered probit models for experiments 2-4. As can be seen below, the results reported in the paper remain robust, and the hypotheses based on folk realism lack support as they did in the main analysis.

Table 5
Ordered Probit.

	Experiment 2	**Experiment 3**	**Experiment 4**
Lyko Nukes	0.07 (0.04)		
Burn Flag	0.08* (0.04)		
Broke Agree		0 (0.04)	
Ally		0.10* (0.04)	
China Unfair			–0.01 (0.07)
US Unfair			–0.23*** (0.07)
US Threat			–0.05 (0.07)
Observations	2,702	2,705	1,750
Prob > Chi2	0.03	0.04	0

Note: *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

In experiment 1, we also asked respondents whether they would be willing to use force if the scenario as described was exactly the same but nuclear weapons would have to be used. We see foreign casualties being significant at the $p < .05$ threshold while American casualties still do not have an effect.

Table 6.
Use Force with Nukes.

	Model 1 (OLS)	Model 2 (Ordered probit)
American Casualties	0	0
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign Casualties	–0.04*	–0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	2.3	2,707
Observations	2,707	2,707

Note: *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

On a four-point scale measuring support for war in Experiment 1, bringing in the possible use of nuclear weapons shifted the mean in a less hawkish direction by 0.5 ($p < .001$), or about half of a standard deviation. In discussing experiment 3, we describe a two-step analysis of mediators in the main text. This analysis is entirely consistent with the form of mediation analysis recommended in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010). Indeed, the two forms of mediation analysis are mathematically identical for linear variables. When we examine the mediator that "states should mind their business," the Imai, Keele and Tingley approach yields the following:

Table 7.
Mediation Analysis.

	Effect Mean	95% CI (left tail)	95% CI (right tail)
ACME	–2.49	–4.17	–0.99
Direct Effect	–4.39	–8.70	–0.10
Total Effect	–6.89	–11.30	–2.39
% of Tot Eff mediated	36%	21.9%	100%

Imai, Keele and Tingley also recommend performing an analysis of the sensitivity of the results to the key identification assumption, or Sequential Ignorability. The following graph illustrates the sensitivity to this assumption.

<Insert ACME analysis here>

Effects of Ideology

Consistently across samples and the various treatment conditions of Chapter 1, conservatives were much more hawkish than liberals. Before conducting theese experiments, there may have been good reasons to suspect that those of differing ideologies would respond differently to various prompts. For example, one might expect that conservatives, who place more value on loyalty to the ingroup (Haidt 2012) would care more about American casualties in Experiment 1. Respondents identified themselves on a five-point scale from very liberal to very conservative. Table 8 and Table 9 show ordered probit regression models with the respondents broken down by ideology for the four experiments. All of the dependent variables are the same is in Tables 1–4.

Table 8
Effects by Ideology 1.

Experiment	1			2		
Ideology	Lib	Mod	Con	Lib	Mod	Con
American Casualties	–0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	–0.04 (0.03)			
Foreign Casualties	–0.07* (0.04)	–0.05 (0.03)	–0.08** (0.03)			
Nukes				0.10 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)
Burn Flag				0.09 (0.08)	0.20** (0.07)	–0.01 (0.07)
Observations	722	1,003	980	457	659	634
Prob > Chi2	0.10	0.20	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.51

Note: *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 9
Effects by Ideology 2.

Experiment		3			4	
Ideology	Lib	Mod	Con	Lib	Mod	Con
Broke Agree	0.05 (0.08)	0 (0.07)	–0.02 (0.07)			
Ally	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)			
China Unfair				–0.10 (0.14)	0.14 (0.11)	–0.07 (0.12)
US Unfair				–0.35* (0.14)	–0.18 (0.11)	–0.18 (0.12)
US Threat				–0.17 (0.14)	0.07 (0.11)	–0.06 (0.12)
Observations	721	1,004	980	720	1,000	977
Prob > Chi2	0.25	0.24	0.45	0	0.01	0.29

Note: *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Given the smaller sample sizes, most of the treatments found to have an effect in the main regressions become statistically insignificant. In general, however, the coefficients remain in the expected directions. We must note that two results stand out. First of all, conservatives are not affected by flag burning, as one might expect. Second, in Experiment 4, the effect of *US Unfair* on liberals is about twice as large as it is for conservatives and moderates. This is consistent with the finding that those who care about government treating people fairly are most impacted by that particular treatment. Interestingly, however, ideology and *Gov Fair* are uncorrelated (r = –0.01), suggesting that the two mechanisms affecting the size of the treatment *US Unfair* operate independently.

Question and Prompt Wording

Within each experiment, the parts of the prompt that were varied across respondents are indicated as such by brackets. Text not in brackets represents text that was received by all participants.

Chapter 1, Experiment 1

Prompt received

A dictator is supporting terrorists who have attacked the United States, and plans to continue doing so. Military leaders determine that the dictator and his fellow leaders can be killed by air, [[with no American casualties] or with [10,100, or 1,000 casualties due to pilots being shot down]]. Unfortunately, the attack will leave [50, 500, 5,000, or 50,000] innocent civilians dead in the foreign country. If the leader is not killed now, one cannot know whether there will be another chance to stop him.

Question

What policy would you prefer?

Strongly Support Killing the Dictator (4)

Support Killing the Dictator with Reservations (3)

Oppose Killing the Dictator with Reservations (2)

Strongly Oppose Killing the Dictator (1)

Question

If everything were the same as described above, including the number of expected deaths, but nuclear weapons had to be used because the dictator was in an underground bunker, would you support using nuclear weapons to kill the dictator?

Strongly Support Killing the Dictator (4)

Support Killing the Dictator with Reservations (3)

Oppose Killing the Dictator with Reservations (2)

Strongly Oppose Killing the Dictator (1)

Chapter 1, Experiment 2

<u>Prompt received</u>

It is a tradition that states give immunity to diplomatic personnel in a foreign country. This is considered to be the basis of respectful relations between states. In breach of this tradition, the country of Lyko decides to arrest 5 American diplomats and put them on trial for subversion. It is clear that these individuals are actually innocent, but were only arrested so that the leader of Lyko can present the United States as an enemy to unite his country. [[After arresting the American diplomats, the government of Lyko holds a rally where it burns the American flag and humiliates the prisoners by forcing them to give confessions.] or [blank]] [[Lyko does not have nuclear weapons, but has a moderately strong military.] or [Lyko has a moderately strong military along with nuclear weapons and there is a small chance that they would be used in the case of conflict.]]

<u>Question</u>

Would using military force to get the them back be justified, even if there is a possibility that this will lead to a wider war?

Very Justified (4)

Somewhat Justified (3)

Somewhat Unjustified (2)

Very Unjustified (1)

<u>Question</u>

Do you agree that not responding to Lyko would hinder the ability of the US to achieve other important foreign policy goals?

Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)

Chapter 1, Experiment 3

Prompt

[[Imagine that there is a foreign dictator named Kligor, who is a long-time ally of the United States. Kligor has for years been sharing intelligence and helping the American government find terrorists.] or [Imagine that there is a foreign dictator named Kligor. Although not friendly to the United States, Kligor, out of his own self-interest, has been sharing intelligence and helping the American government find terrorists.]] Recently, however, he has become more brutal and begun slaughtering hundreds of his own people. One group being targeted, the Zyphors, begins asking for the US to help them overthrow this dictator. [[Kligor had previously reached an agreement with the Zyphors but broke it and is now attacking them.] or [blank]] Some worry that by overthrowing Kligor we may be left with a state more hostile to American interests.

Question

What policy do you support?

Strongly support trying to overthrow the dictator (4)

Support overthrowing the dictator with reservations (3)

Support doing nothing with reservations (2)

Strongly support doing nothing (1)

Chapter 1, Experiment 4

In this experiment, the initial paragraph and the picture given were the same for all respondents, while the second paragraph was randomly changed across participants.

Prompt received by all

China claims that it has exclusive rights to use the resources in most of the South China Sea, treating it as territorial waters. This violates the freedom of the seas and has angered many of its neighbors as traditionally states are only entitled to use resources that are up to 200 miles off their coast. In 2016, an international tribunal ruled against China on this matter. However, China is sticking to its original position and has even begun building artificial islands in the disputed waters. In the picture below, the red line shows what China claims, and the blue lines show the 200-mile limits for each country that would be the norm under international law.

Figure 2. Map of South China Sea.

<u>Null prompt conclusion</u>

[The US is debating whether to send ships through the disputed territory. This would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region. But it would send a message that the United States does not accept the Chinese position.]

<u>China Unfair</u>

[The US is debating whether to send ships through the disputed territory. This would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region. But it would send a message that the United States does not accept the Chinese position. Those who want to send American ships claim that it is not fair that practically every country in the world sticks to the 200-mile rule, except for the Chinese, who apparently believe that

because they are powerful they can push around their neighbors. Therefore, the United States has a moral obligation to send ships through the disputed waters and show that such violations of international law will not be tolerated.]

US Unfair

[The US is debating whether to send ships through the disputed territory. This would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region. But it would send a message that the United States does not accept the Chinese position. Some argue that China does not interfere in American relations with its neighbors. Therefore, why should the United States take a position on the South China Sea? By challenging China on this issue, the United States is enforcing its will on the rest of the world. This is unjust, as it makes the United States the judge of how other states should behave, a role that it should not claim for itself.]

Chinese Race (not discussed in chapter)

[The US is debating whether to send ships through the disputed territory. This would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region. But it would send a message that the United States does not accept the Chinese position. There is evidence that Chinese leaders are motivated by the view that the Chinese race is superior to its neighbors and therefore that it is China's destiny to dominate the region. This is reflected in statements by the Chinese leadership and in the disrespectful way that China treats the smaller nations in Asia and racial minorities within its country.]

US Threat

[The US is debating whether to send ships through the disputed territory. This would anger the Chinese, and even create the small possibility of a war in the region. But it would send a message that the United States does not accept the Chinese position. Those who want to send American ships claim that China's actions are a direct challenge to the United States. China appears to be deliberately flouting the world order with which the U.S. is identified and the aggressive statements of Chinese leaders regularly single out the United States. Many nations in the region and around the world are closely observing the dispute as a sign of which power will control the future of the region and the world.]

<u>Question</u>

What policy would you support?

Strongly support sending ships through the disputed waters (5)

Somewhat support sending ships through the disputed waters (4)

Neither support nor oppose sending ships through the disputed waters (3)

Somewhat oppose sending ships through the disputed waters (2)

Strongly oppose sending ships through the disputed waters (1)

<u>Question</u>

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. Responses range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).

1. The United States should use force if necessary in this dispute.

2. Powerful countries have an obligation to protect the less powerful.

3. The United States should take action so as not to appear weak in international affairs.

4. Conduct such as China's should be countered

5. The United States should take action to protect its interests.

6. States should mind their own business.

Chapter 2, Experiment 1

Prompt received

Zykonia is a country in Africa that is [[90% Muslim and 10% Christian] or [90% Christian and 10% Muslim]]. Recently, tensions have started to increase between the two communities, and a new leader begins to scapegoat the [[Christian] or [Muslim]] minority. His followers destroy [[churches] or [mosques]] and massacre [[hundreds] or [tens of thousands]] of [[Christians] or [Muslims]], and experts warn that more may be killed. The only way to stop thousands from dying would be to bomb the militias responsible for the violence. Doing so, however, would cause a handful of countries allied with Zykonia to cut ties with the United States. This may hurt the US economy and lead to more difficulty in fighting terrorism, although we cannot be sure what the results would be. [[As Zykonia is a sovereign state and member of the UN Security Council, legal experts agree that it would be against international law for the United States to intervene in this conflict.] or [Legal experts agree that the United States attacking Zykonia over its treatment of its minority would be acceptable under the international law, due to the principle of the "right to protect" those suffering mass killing.]].

Question

Which policy do you support?

Strongly support bombing Zykonia (4)

Somewhat support bombing Zykonia (3)

Somewhat oppose bombing Zykonia (2)

Strongly oppose bombing Zykonia (1)

Question

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The US has a moral obligation to help those who are targeted by their governments.

Answers on a 7-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”

Chapter 2, Experiment 2

Prompt received

Cyton is [[an African] or [a European]] country with a relatively prosperous [[white] or [black]] minority living in it. Recently, the leadership has begun to blame the [[white] or [black]] minority for economic problems that the country is having. [[Experts, however, believe that the economic problems are due to the government’s mismanagement of the economy.] or [Experts agree that many members of the [white] or [black] minority did contribute to the economic problems through unfair trade practices carried out by certain members of the community.]] The country begins forcibly taking land from [[white] or [black]] residents, and distributing it among the [[black] or [white]] population. They also pass a series of laws giving [[blacks] or [whites]] preferential treatment in jobs. [[Some individuals are even killed during forced confiscations, and others live under the threat of violence.] or [blank]] Some call on the United States to place sanctions on the country in order to change its behavior, while others say that that would hurt the American economy and that we shouldn’t intervene in an internal matter. [[The US has generally tried to stay out of internal [[African] or [European]] affairs.] or [The US has previously signed a treaty promising to help uphold human rights in [Africa] or [Europe].]]

Question

What policy would you support?

Strongly support sanctions (4)

Support sanctions with reservations (3)

Oppose sanctions with reservations (2)

Strongly oppose sanctions (1)

Question

If the oppression gets worse, could you imagine supporting the US using military force to change the situation?

Absolutely (4)

Under some circumstances (3)

Probably not (2)

Definitely not (1)

Chapter 2, Experiment 3

Conservative prompt

The United States remains the most conservative country in the industrialized world. Compared to other countries with similar levels of wealth, Americans have more gun rights, lower taxes, more socially conservative values, and a less active federal government. Republicans currently control both Houses of Congress and the majority of governorships and state legislatures.

Liberal prompt

America is a changing country. While the country was 90% white only a few decades ago, today non-whites make up the majority of births. Because these groups vote Democrat, the country has therefore been moving to the left. This means that in the future we will likely see more activist government policies such as expanded healthcare and

more liberal social policies. In fact, government spending has been growing over time without any indication that it is slowing down

Questions

With this in mind, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. Options are *strongly disagree*, *somewhat disagree*, *somewhat agree*, and *strongly agree* on a four-point scale.

1. America's conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down.
2. The United States is the world's only superpower and must thus become involved in any region when political stability is threatened. (Reverse scored)
3. Our allies are perfectly capable of defending themselves and they can afford it, thus allowing the United States to focus on internal rather than external threats to its well-being.
4. We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own problems

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