Title

Community and Capital: The Aristocratic System of Power in the Age of Cicero

Author

Littlestone-Luria, Adam California

Publication Date

2020

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Community and Capital: The Aristocratic System of Power in the Age of Cicero

By

Adam Littlestone-Luria

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Carlos Noreña, Chair
Professor Erich Gruen
Professor Duncan MacRae

Spring 2020

Abstract

Community and Capital: The Aristocratic System of Power in the Age of Cicero

By

Adam Littlestone-Luria

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Carlos Noreña, Chair

In this dissertation, I make the case that a suite of social institutions—bonds within and between families, for instance, and especially *amicitia*, which is the focus of this project—played a defining role in the nature of the regime. This framework allowed a diverse "aristocratic community"—not only senatorial families in the city of Rome, but also wealthy proprietors throughout Italy, in conversation with an array of "sub-elites," such as freedmen and Greek intellectuals—to act together. As is widely acknowledged, elite culture under the Republic was notably agonistic. *Amicitia* helped compensate for competition, counterbalancing rivalry with a potent thread of collective action. In addition, scholars regularly highlight the steep hierarchies that characterized Roman society at all levels. But *amicitia* again furnished a counterforce, often diminishing hierarchies in practice and helping to institute an ethic of what we might describe as "aspirational parity." All hierarchies could at least in theory melt away, and even the society's most rarified circles were open to recruitment of new members. The aristocratic community's "Republic" was a system of power in which collective action could outperform competition, and stratification and exclusivity might yield to equalization and permeability.

The chapters are divided into two sections, which investigate respectively the dynamics and the institutional function of "peer" and "asymmetric" *amicitia* bonds. In the first section, I discuss the function of friendships between the society's *principes* and their importance as organizing forces within the system of power in the 50s. Chapter 1 engages with bonds between Cicero and three of his consular "peers"—Lentulus Spinther, Metellus Nepos, and Appius Claudius. These provide case studies of highly intentional *amicitia*, helping us delineate the nature of the institution in its most idealizing form and to understand the role of high-level friendship ties in the aristocratic community's social framework. I suggest, moreover, that, as a response to their growing fear that the collective social weight of the dynasts might overbalance the system, Cicero and his fellow *principes* took special care to invest in their peer bonds, even cultivating bonds with fellow *consulares* with whom they might otherwise have remained at odds. In Chapter 2, I turn to Cicero's bonds with the Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. Although the three magnates threatened to undermine the traditional parity in the permeable circle of the community's top men, Cicero nonetheless went out of his way to cultivate *amicitia* bonds with each of them. This was partly an attempt to protect himself and to thrive as much as possible within restrictive limitations. But I argue that Cicero also tried to use the rhetoric of parity—the sense that *amici* were one another's "second selves"—to subtly encourage the dynasts to play by the traditional "rules of the game." An investigation of Cicero's relationships with these

outstanding figures provides clues as to the nature of the regime change beginning in the 50s, which would come to fruition under Caesar in the 40s and would ultimately resolve itself into a monarchic Principate.

The second section focuses on the dynamic of asymmetry within *amicitia*, both in friendships between aristocrats at different ages and career stages and as exemplified in the recommendation process. Chapter 3 presents two case studies of Cicero's asymmetric friendships with rising junior aristocrats: Sestius and Caelius Rufus. As I seek to demonstrate, these bonds assisted the rise of the younger friend; they created reliable power resources for the senior partner; and they brought the interests and voices of people at a variety of levels of influence and status into the conversation that defined the society's broader agendas, policies, and priorities. In Chapter 4, I treat the dynamics of recommendation. I analyze recommendations between senior aristocrats and rising members of the successor generation, using Cicero's recommendation of Trebatius to Caesar—a highly intentional process, extending across multiple letters—as a window. Then, I undertake a broad exploration of the dynamics of recommendations between elites and sub-elites from different backgrounds and circumstances. This investigation of *commendationes* showcases interchange between senators, *equites*, freedmen, and Greek intellectuals, bringing the breadth and diversity of the aristocratic community to the fore. With the second section, I endeavor to show how vertical bonds could facilitate a degree of coherence within a multi-generational, Italy-wide elite, helping it operate, in its assorted subgroups, as an agenda-setting ruling "class" (or, more precisely an interlocking collection of networks) for the imperial Republic.

In the conclusion, I address directly the question of regime change. I attend to continuities and transformations in the institution of *amicitia*. By locating shifts in its function—both as ideal and as social practice—we can better understand what it meant for a "Republic" to become a "Principate."

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank the three members of my committee: Carlos Noreña for unmatched guidance and insight at every stage of the process and, at the same time, for allowing sufficient space for my own thought to flourish; Duncan MacRae for encouraging me to confront areas of improvement that I might otherwise have avoided and for helping to turn the dissertation experience into a venue for extraordinary intellectual growth; and Erich Gruen for providing the expansive perspective that helped me envision and then reframe the boundaries of the argument. This project benefited immeasurably from the presence of these three separate but complementary venues for discussion and development.

Beyond the committee, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to members of Stanford's Politics department. Josiah Ober helped me articulate several of my key arguments, while Barry Weingast provided ongoing mentoring and directed me towards some of the scholarly conversations that proved most illuminating as I reflected on the nature of politics and society.

Writing a dissertation has been an exceptional opportunity, and an accelerant for self-development. Without my dear friends, especially Jasper and Kirk, I might never have internalized many of the core lessons of this extended journey, and I would have retained far less access to joy during the process. Our conversations and tea- and chocolate-fueled work sessions were integral. The teashops Téance, Blue Willow, and Far Leaves played host to most of my hours of research and writing, and I will remain indebted to the Bay Area's extraordinary tea community for my whole life.

Most of all, I want to thank my parents. Our communion during this process helped create adult friendships that I cherish more than anything else.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Community

To the extent that the regime in the late Republic "worked," it was a system of rule by a community, acting as a community. In 44, when Cicero composed his *De Officiis* and *De Amicitia*, he embarked on an enterprise of recovery, seeking to mend a system he believed had been sapped of its essence. Looking back on what had been lost, he chose to highlight the effective function of the community as the foundation of a healthy society—the virtues and duties that facilitated the exercise of power. A true "aristocrat" was a family man and a businessman. Ideally, he would serve the community as a magistrate, but this was by no means necessary. What was fundamental to his role as one of the society's "best" people was his investment in the interpersonal framework. He had to be a good father, son, and husband, and perhaps most important of all, a good friend. To recover "Republicanism," Rome would require a renaissance in interpersonal virtue.

The idea of "community" lies at the heart of my argument. I take Cicero's retrospective prescription seriously. The "Republic" Cicero grew up in, at least at such times as it managed to function, was a system of rule by an "aristocratic community." An expansive and permeable elite group presided over Roman society in the mid-first century, centered in the city of Rome, but drawn increasingly from municipal centers dotted throughout Italy. This body worked as a collective to negotiate the full range of priorities, policies, and agendas that came up for debate in the society—an informal brand of hegemony, but a potent one. The aristocratic community's internal discourse determined what could be contested and what would remain beyond contestation. This interchange was mediated by a powerful but fluid framework of social institutions.

I will make the case that these social institutions—bonds within and between families, for instance, and especially *amicitia*, which will be the focus of this dissertation—played a defining role in the nature of the regime. This framework allowed a diverse "aristocratic community"—not only senatorial families in the city of Rome, but also wealthy proprietors throughout Italy, in conversation with an array of "sub-elites," such as freedmen and Greek intellectuals—to act together. As is widely acknowledged, elite culture under the Republic was notably agonistic. *Amicitia* helped compensate for competition, counterbalancing rivalry with a potent thread of collective action. In addition, scholars regularly highlight the steep hierarchies that characterized Roman society at all levels. But *amicitia* again furnished a counterforce, often diminishing hierarchies in practice and helping to institute an ethic of what we might describe as "aspirational parity." All hierarchies could at least in theory melt away, and even the society's most rarified circles were open to recruitment of new members. The aristocratic community's "Republic" was a system of power in which collective action could outperform competition, and stratification and exclusivity might yield to equalization and permeability.

The Republican System of Power

This dissertation intervenes in the ongoing debate about the nature of the Republican regime. We can trace the roots of this discussion to a time before the late Republican period itself, when Polybius began to reflect on the nature of Rome's system of power, in terms both of its legal framework and its social dynamics.[1] For the modern debate,

[1] Andrew Erskine, "How to Rule the World: Polybius Book 6 Reconsidered," in Bruce Gibson, Thomas Harrison (eds.), *Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 231-245

the legalism of Theodore Mommsen's *Römischen Staatsrecht* laid the groundwork, with a juridical reading of the Roman state at the center of his picture.[2]

Rome's elite already played a key role in Mommsen's portrait, but it was only in the early twentieth century that scholars began to locate the internal dynamics of the aristocratic stratum at the center of the discussion.[3] The publication in 1912 of Matthias Gelzer's *Die Nobilität der Römischen Republik* is usually seen as the beginning of this trend.[4] Gelzer put forward a model with the senatorial *nobilitas* at its center. He proposed that the entire *imperium Romanum* was bound together by patron-client networks, with the leading members of noble families at their heads. This inescapable web of vertical dependencies, reciprocal obligations, and duties assured the dominance of a few, leaving little room for the expression of any "democratic" element. Gelzer, alongside prominent followers such as Ronald Syme and Friedrich Münzer, drew up a model of the system in which aristocratic competition was framed as the central organizing principle.[5] These scholars agreed that the pursuit of power,

---

highlights the expansive nature of Polybius' portrait, going far beyond bare "constitutionalism." Benjamin Straumann, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) reads Polybius as the first Roman "constitutionalist," operating with a more expansive definition of the term, see especially 149-161. Many scholars still regard Polybius as the best starting point for understanding the Roman constitution—see, for instance, Fergus Millar, "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.," *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984), 2, Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8, 16-26, 214-219, Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, "Demokratische Verfassungselemente in Rom aus der Sicht des Polybios," in Jörg Spielvogel (ed.), *Res Publica Reperta: Zur Verfassung Und Gesellschaft Der Römischen Republik Und Des Frühen Prinzipats* (Stuttgart: Fran Steiner, 2002), 25-35, and Leandro Polverini, "Democrazia a Roma?: La Costituzione Repubblicana Secondo Polibio," in Gianpaolo Urso (ed.), *Popolo e Potere nel Mondo Antico, 23-25 Settembre 2004* (Pisa: ETS, 2005), 85-96

[2] Theodore Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1871-1888); Wilfried Nippel, Bernd Seidensticker (eds.), *Theodor Mommsens Langer Schatten: das Römische Staatsrecht als Bleibende Herausforderung für die Forschung* (Hildesheim; New York: Olms, 2005) for the history of Mommsen's influence. While Mommsen is sometimes dismissed for excessive legalism, he was not the anachronistic *Begriffsjurist* that he is sometimes imagined to have been. He took care to locate the terminology in his *Staatsrecht* in its political and social context.

[3] Mommsen's emphasis on formal institutions has by no means disappeared from contemporary scholarship. Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) is exemplary, painting a picture of the formal institutional structure that balances comprehensive treatment with concision. He locates the formal institutional structure in the context of culture and society. Herrik Mouritsen, "The Incongruence of Power: the Roman Constitution in Theory and Practice," in Dean Hammer (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Wiley, 2015): 146-163 provides a brief but more current account. The individual institutions have received their own treatment. On the assemblies, Lily Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) and E.S. Staveley, *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972) are still both essential, and now Henrik Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). On the consulship, see Francisco Pina Polo, *The Consul at Rome: the Civil Functions of the Consul in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) and Hans Beck, Antonio Duplá, Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and on the praetorship T. Corey Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the Senate, Marianne Bonnefond-Coudry, *Le Sénat de la République Romaine de la Guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1989), Francis Ryan, *Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998). This selection can only gesture at the massive literature on the Republic's formal institutional structure.

[4] Matthias Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der Römischen Republik* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912). Recently, however, Simon Strauß, *Von Mommsen zu Gelzer?: die Konzeption Römisch-Republikanischer Gesellschaft in "Staatsrecht" und "Nobilität"* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017) has sought to qualify the distinctions, locating foreshadowings of the socio-historical aspects of Gelzer's work in Mommsen's.

[5] Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) and Friedrich Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1920). On the legacy of this tradition, especially, but not exclusively, of Münzer, see Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, "Fact(ions) or Fiction? Friedrich Miinzer and the Aristocracy of the Roman Republic Then and Now," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 8 (2001): 92-105. Syme subscribed to Robert Michel's well-known "iron law" of oligarchy, according to which all societies were in practice dominated by an oligarchy, whatever the name and theory of the constitution. Thus, Syme viewed Augustus' "Roman revolution" as a transition from one ruling clique to another, if one drawn from a slightly different demographic. For the "iron law," see Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die Oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens* (Leipzig, W. Klinkhardt, 1911), with the trenchant critique at Josiah Ober, *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 18-31, also Hartmut Galsterer, "A Man, a Book, and a Method: Sir Ronald

wealth, and glory—and most of all, the yearly contest for the consulship and its attendant status rewards—was the dominant purpose of political action. "Politics" and "history" were the province of a few dozen of the society's top men.[6]

Bloodlines, marriages, adoptions, and *amicitiae* helped weave the *nobilitas* into "parties" or "factions."[7] Howard Scullard, another proponent of this approach, described an "elaborate system of groupings and counter-groupings," providing the "real, unadvertised and unofficial, basis of Roman public life."[8] These static and exclusive groups faced off in the community's various institutional venues. Most of all, this confrontation took place in the Senate. While during criminal trials and at elections, the assemblies hosted some of the contestation, the formal institutional spaces were hoops to jump through. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp puts it well when he notes that Republican "factionalism" had, by the mid-twentieth century, become "a metahistorical law."[9] The central goal was to win and keep the consulship, which represented the essence of "power" within this system. Instead of concrete policies and practical problems, not to mention broad programs or reforms, it was the constant scrum between the scions of these families that set the terms for contestation. It was through prosopography—mapping bloodlines, marriages, adoption, obligations, and *amicitia*—that these scholars believed that they could reconstruct the history of Republican power.

Some important practitioners of this method perceived the limits of such *nobilitas*-centered prosopography. Erich Gruen serves as an *exemplum*. He used prosopography with great skill, and his *Last Generation of the Roman Republic* kept the social relations of the senatorial aristocracy at the center of the picture.[10] But he brought out the fluidity of most aristocratic affiliations and groupings, dismissing the notion that unitary factions collaborated across the generations to dominate politics. By 1950, Gelzer himself was expressing doubt about the zealous schematism of Münzer and Scullard, and the crudeness of the consequent portrait.[11] By the 1960s, Christian Meier, Peter Brunt, and Robin Seager were working to reconceive the nature of this system of power more directly, dissatisfied both by Mommsen's *Staatrecht* approach and by aristocratic party politics.[12] As late as 1990, John North could still describe this prosopographic factionalism as an established

---

Syme's Roman Revolution after Fifty Years," in Kurt Raaflaub, Mark Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 1-20, Uwe Walter, "Der Historiker in Seiner Zeit: Ronald Syme Und Die Revolution Des Augustus," in Jörg Spielvogel (ed.), *Res Publica Reperta: Zur Verfassung Und Gesellschaft Der Römischen Republik Und Des Frühen Prinzipats* (Stuttgart: Fran Steiner, 2002), 137-152.

[6] See Syme, *The Roman Revoution*, 459, 476 for clear expressions of the limited nature of this clique.

[7] Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1949) was one of the essential contributions in terms of the function of these presumed "parties," explication of issues surrounding noble-client relations, the use of state religion as a mechanism of expedience and control, and the practical mechanisms for delivering the vote.

[8] Howard Scullard, *A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BC* (London, Methuen, 1935, 1980), 333.

[9] Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, English 2010), 6.

[10] Erich Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Thomas Broughton, "Senate and Senators of the Roman Republic: The Prosopographical Approach," in Hildegard Temporini (ed.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Vol. 1.1.* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1972), 250–265 demonstrated a similar appreciation both of the utility and the limits of the prosopographic approach. Erich Gruen, "*The Last Generation of the Republic* Revisited," in Matthias Haake and Ann-Cathrin Harders (eds.) *Politische Kultur und Soziale Struktur der Römischen Republik* (Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2017), 553-567 provides a recent reflection back on the Münzerian moment in scholarship by one of the most eminent participants.

[11] Matthias Gelzer, "Review of Scullard, 1951," *Historia* 1 (1950): 634-642.

[12] Christian Meier, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der Späten Römischen Republik*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966, with Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, especially 10-11, 13-22 for an analysis of Meier and his impact. Brunt published a sequence of articles throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, collected and updated in Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Robin Seager, "*Factio*: Some Observations," *Journal of Roman Studies* 62 (1972): 53-58 questioned both the "party" paradigm and the questionable utility of the terminology of *factio*.

orthodoxy, assailing the model as the "frozen waste theory of Roman politics," but William Harris was right to call this an assault on an "artificial target."[13]

Throughout nineteenth and early- and mid-twentieth century scholarship, historical research on Roman power remained largely a study of the elite. Ernst Badian's comment in 1968 that the study of the Roman Republic is "basically the study not of its economic development, or of its masses or even of its great individuals: it is chiefly the study of its ruling class" reveals the dominance of an elite-centric mentality up to that date.[14] But Peter Brunt's critique in his 1969 review of Badian's *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* is testament to a rising consciousness of the limits of such a narrow perspective—a budding awareness that, even if the evidence creates an inevitable tilt towards the prominent, it was essential to fight back against distortions created by elitist literary evidence.[15] Brunt's research during the 1960s and 1970s played a key role in expanding awareness of the importance of investigating issues beyond the central aristocratic narrative, if we hope to comprehend the function and development of the polity. This research certainly did not exist within a vacuum. It exemplified a nascent understanding by a collection of scholars such as Claude Nicolet and Moses Finley of the need to take into account the interests and interventions of an elite beyond the high-level senatorial families, including *equites*, *novi homines*, and Italian provincial notables.[16] In addition, non-elite populations took on new importance, and groups such as soldiers, the urban and rural poor, and even the normal citizens of Italian towns and cities were granted new prominence.[17] According to this frame, Republican history, even the central "political" narrative, was not merely a story of *nobiles*.

So when Fergus Millar launched his assault on the "frozen" *Adelsparteien* paradigm in the mid-1980s, he was attacking something of a straw man.[18] Nonetheless, his intervention did initiate an important transformation. As scholars made room for other sources of power and historical change—*novi homines*, *equites*, and soldiers, for instance—they still had taken it largely for granted that the social and political order of the Republic was basically aristocratic, or even "oligarchic." A senatorial "aristocracy of office" dominated the picture,

---

[13] John North, "Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 277-287; William Harris, "On Defining the Political Culture of the Roman Republic: Some Comments on Rosenstein, Williamson, and North," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 288-294.

[14] Ernst Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), 92.

[15] Peter Brunt, "Review of E. Badian's *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 59 (1969): 270–1: "I regret that Badian has concluded with an *obiter dictum* that the study of the Roman Republic is 'chiefly the study of the ruling class.' In practice the nature of our evidence often makes it so, but even the activities of the ruling class can be understood only imperfectly without knowledge of the whole context of society, and I see no way of demonstrating that the sufferings of the ruled are less worthy of our attention."

[16] Peter Brunt, "The *Equites* in the Late Republic," in *Deuxième Conférence Internationale d'Histoire Économique, Aix-en-Provence 1962, I: Commerce et Politique dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Mouton, 1965), 117-137, "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War," *The Journal of Roman Studies* LV (1965): 90-109. Claude Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)*, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974 was also conscious of the need to take a broader elite seriously; Timothy Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) takes seriously the need to engage with permeable borders of the senatorial elite. Moses Finley's *oeuvre* was also integral to the development of a more diverse picture of power, exemplified by his *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[17] For instance, Peter Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," *The Journal of Roman Studies* LII (1962): 69-86 on the concerns of soldiers, "The Roman Mob," *Past and Present* 35 (1966): 3-27 on the urban poor and its role in mob violence, and soon after 1969, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 14.,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) on broader Italian constituencies and demographics, as well as *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971).

[18] Millar, "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.," represented the beginning of this campaign, followed by "Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 B.C.),' *Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1986): 1-11, "Political Power in Mid-Republican Rome: *Curia* or *Comitium*?," *Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1989): 138-150, "Popular Politics at Rome in the Late Republic," in Irad Malkin, Wolfgang Zeev Rubinsohn, *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World. Studies in honor of Z. Yavetz* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 91-113; *The Crowd in the Late Republic* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) was the most comprehensive and developed statement of his positions.

and the families with a consular tradition formed this already limited group's preeminent inner circle. Their members retained a virtual, although not quite an absolute, monopoly on the consulship. Since the higher magistrates occupied the senior ranks of the Senate after their formal terms in office, these *nobiles* steered the Senate, as well. Because of this arrangement, the Senate acted as the institutional core of the society's "aristocracy," and thus, as the actual decision-making body and the *locus* of "rule."

Millar proposed a radical alternative to this basic understanding. He followed Polybius in highlighting a "democratic" element, but then exceeded and even contradicted the Polybian frame by granting preeminence to popular power.[19] Since, in "constitutional" terms, the *populus Romanus*, as represented by the assemblies, held sovereign power, Millar suggested that we should take their practical role seriously. The system may or may not have been a "democracy" in the fullest sense of the term (Millar came to embrace the extreme position more dogmatically as years passed).[20] But along with a collection of other scholars who joined him in this new enterprise, Millar sought to centralize the "democratic" features, claiming popular initiative in elections, legislation, and political violence, and highlighting engagement between orator and audience.[21] Daily political concerns were worked out not so much within the *curia* and in backroom deliberations among *nobiles*, but out in the open, in the central civic spaces. Orators confronted a citizen audience capable of making meaningful choices between substantive alternatives, both in electoral and legislative contests.

There was a rapid backlash against this "democratic" reading of the system of power. But if it was Millar's intention to spur creative reconsideration, more than it was to prove his radical thesis, then he has certainly succeeded. His one-sided barrage prompted a vibrant, if sometimes excessively vitriolic, dialog. The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a quest for adequate terms to describe the Republic's peculiar socio-political order and to articulate the relationships between the society's segments and strata. As early as the 1990s, William Harris put out a review article of new works, including the article of North's that coined the "frozen waste" label, which anticipated many of the criticisms that would

---

[19] Millar himself acknowledged that when Polybius "needs to give a one-word characterization of the Roman political system (XXIII, 14, I), he calls it 'aristocratic,'" but he quickly added that in this very passage, Polybius "found it necessary to emphasize also the democratic and popular element in the working of the state." Millar could not allow his own attentive reading to undermine his thesis.

[20] Especially in its earlier years, Millar's assault was far more cautious and qualified than is often credited by detractors. For instance, he allowed at "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.," 19 that "we may still not want to characterize this as democracy." By 1998, however, Millar was claiming in *The Crowd in the Late Republic* that the Roman Republic "has to be characterized as a democracy."

[21] In line with this trend (although these authors were more and less completely aligned with Millar's project), see, for instance, John Paterson, "Politics in the Late Republic," in Timothy Wiseman (ed.), *Roman Political Life, 90 B.C.-A.D. 69* (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1985), 21-43, Paul Vanderbroeck, *Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior in the Late Roman Republic (ca. 80–50 B.C.)* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1987), Alexander Yakobson, "*Petitio Et Largitio*: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic," *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992): 32–52, "Secret Ballot and Its Effects in the Late Roman Republic," *Hermes* 123 (1995): 426-442, *Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), "The People's Voice and the Speakers' Platform: Popular Power, Persuasion and Manipulation in the Roman Forum," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 23: 201–12, "Popular Power in the Roman Republic," in Nathan Rosenstein, Robert Morstein-Marx (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 383-400, Robert Morstein-Marx, "Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*," *Classical Antiquity* 17 (1998): 259-88, "*Res Publica Res Populi*," review of A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 19 (2000): 224–33 (even these earlier works of Morstein-Marx's show inklings of the doubt he would later express about the democratic frame—he has demonstrated an impressive willingness to revise his perspective in light of new evidence and investigation), Timothy Wiseman, "Democracy *Alla Romana*," *Journal of Roman Archeology* 12 (2000): 537-540, "Roman History and the Ideological Vacuum," in Timothy Wiseman (ed.), *Classics in Progress*: *Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 285-310.

develop.[22] In 1995, Martin Jehne edited a volume, with contributions from Hölkeskamp and Egon Flaig, which pushed back with more firmness against an excessively "democratic" reading of the system.[23] They suggested that popular participation should be viewed more as a *Konsensritual* than as an expression of involvement by the entirety of the commons in the practical business of decision-making.

In 2001, Henrik Mouritsen delivered a fresh appraisal of the evidence regarding the voting power of the *populus Romanus*.[24] He rejected a "democratic" reading of voting institutions, but this was no return to the model of control by a network of clientelistic dependencies. Indeed, his book can be seen as the final nail in the coffin for such an understanding. Nonetheless, Mouritsen painted a picture of a voting framework that was notably elite-centered. For Mouritsen, as in Jehne's model of *Konsensrituale*, there was a gulf between the cultural expression of popular sovereignty and the concrete realities of power in practice. The *populus Romanus* was granted great respect as a political concept, while in practice, the bulk of the population was kept at a distance from substantive decision-making, with the poor almost entirely disenfranchised.[25] In conclusion, Mouritsen suggested that even the increased use of the popular assemblies in the late Republic should be seen as a reflection of a "breakdown of elite cohesion rather than of social control."[26] "Popular power" was a matter of using popular sovereignty and manpower as a weapon in internecine struggles within the elite more than it was an expression of an increasingly articulate popular will.

Millar's "radical" revisionism was, in one important sense, highly traditional. It adhered, as has been argued by Jehne and Hölkeskamp, to a meta-historical conceptual framework in the tradition of nineteenth-century *Begriffsjurisprudenz*, beholden more to ideal types than to the concrete data of a particular historical moment.[27] Newly emboldened to return the aristocratic element to center stage by Mouritsen's pioneering work on aristocratic dominance of the vote, but building on a foundation already laid by Christian Meier in his 1966 *Res Publica Amissa*, a number of scholars began to argue that we should decenter "constitutionalism" as we reconstruct the Republic.[28] They suggested that it would be more illuminating to engage with a broader "political culture"—with values, traditions, and practices that informed the worldview of Romans both inside and outside the elite. Focus should be trained especially on the social psychology that legitimized and perpetuated elite

---

22 William Harris, "On Defining the Political Culture of the Roman Republic: Some Comments on Rosenstein, Williamson, and North," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 288-294.

23 Martin Jehne (ed.), *Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der Römischen Republik* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995).

24 Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*.

25 Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, highlights, on a basic level, that there would have been daunting practical limits—issues of space in voting assemblies, distance from the gathering place, and citizens' need to labor all preventing broad participation. This created a (16) "gap between the ideal and the reality of Roman politics, between the *populus Romanus* and the crowds which filled the Forum and the Saepta." See also, the critique made by Harris, "On Defining the Political Culture of the Roman Republic: Some Comments on Rosenstein, Williamson, and North," of the failure to define the size of the constituency of the *plebs urbana* that Cicero addressed as (291) "close to the center of the entire problem of how we should define the political culture of the Roman Republic, for the size and nature of this portion were by no means accidental: they in fact mirrored the position of the citizens within the state."

26 Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, 131.

27 Jehne put forward this critique first in *Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der Römischen Republik*, 8; Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Senatus Populusque Romanus: die Politische Kultur der Republik : Dimensionen und Deutungen* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), especially the extended review of Millar's *The Crowd in the Late Republic* at 257-277 developed this line extensively, also *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 12-14. Straumann, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution*, 14-15 locates Millar's work in the context of the broader historiography on Roman constitutionalism.

28 Meier, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der Späten Römischen Republik*.

rule—on the dialectic interchange between mass and elite that helped to create a society that was in practice ruled by its upper stratum, whatever the formal niceties of the "constitution."[29]

Even before the release of Mouritsen's work on voting, Harriet Flower's groundbreaking 1996 book on ancestor masks began to demonstrate the utility of studying the symbolic devices underpinning elite dominance.[30] Flaig, Jehne, and Hölkeskmap produced a flood of mutually reinforcing work, with Flaig showing how aristocratic behavior facilitated *plebejischer Gehorsam*; Jehne underlining the integrative nature of interactions between upper- and lower-class actors as a mechanism for affirming elite supremacy; and Hölkeskamp exploring the value system and how it prevented escape from the vertical social arrangements that characterized Republican society.[31] Beck highlighted the centrality of the senatorial *domus* as a venue in the political culture.[32] Meanwhile, Robert Morstein-Marx spoke of an "ideological monopoly" that prevented even an imagined escape from the extant hierarchies.[33] While in earlier work he had been willing to entertain a moderated version of the "democratic" model, by the time he published his groundbreaking study of Republican

---

[29] Again, we might see Harris, "On Defining the Political Culture of the Roman Republic: Some Comments on Rosenstein, Williamson, and North," as an early move in this direction. He suggested (293) "we need answers in concrete social terms if we are to define Roman political culture." He concluded his review article by pointing to a suggestive list of aristocratic behaviors that helped reinforce elite preeminence across generations—"youthful military service, combat by champions, the distribution of booty, criminal prosecutions, the invention of coin-types, the financing of games and other performances, the giving of banquets, the triumph, public works, elaborate funerals, the patronage of poets, and the more direct manipulation of public opinion through oratory." Indeed, as Michael Crawford, "Reconstructing What Roman Republic?," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 54, no. 2 (2011): 105-14 (a review full of much praise) points out, Hölkeskamp has overplayed the novelty of the focus on the cognitive and symbolic dimension, which goes back at least to the 1970s.

[30] Harriet Flower, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Research on the Augustan period in the years immediately preceding was a precursor for this new turn in Republican historiography—exemplified by Paul Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988, original German 1987).

[31] Their work is extraordinarily rich, and this summary cannot even begin to do it justice. For Flaig, see especially Egon Flaig, *Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2003); for Jehne, in addition to *Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römischen Republik*, see Martin Jehne, "Jovialität und Freiheit," in Bernhard Linke, Michael Stemmler (eds.), *Mos Maiorum: Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), 207-235, "Wirkungsweise und Bedeutung der Centuria Praerogativa," *Chiron* 30 (2000): 661–78, "Integrationsrituale in der Römischen Republik: Zur Einbindenden Wirkung der Volksversammlungen," in Gianpaolo Urso (ed.) *Integrazione Mescolanza Rifiuto: Incontri di {opoli, Lingue e Culture in Europa dall'Antichità all'Umanesimo* (Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2001), 89-113, "Feeding the Plebs with Words: The Significance of Senatorial Public Oratory in the Small World of Roman Politics," in Catherine Steel, Henriette van der Blom, (eds.), *Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); for Hölkeskamp, in addition to *Reconstucting the Roman Republic*, "Fact(ions) or Fiction? Friedrich Miinzer and the Aristocracy of the Roman Republic Then and Now," and *Senatus Populusque Romanus: die Politische Kultur der Republik : Dimensionen und Deutungen*, see "The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People?" *Scripta Classica Israelica* 19 (2000): 203–33, "Konsens und Konkurrenz: Die Politische Kultur der Römischen Republik in Neuer Sicht," *Klio* 88 (2006): 360–96, "'Prominenzrollen' und 'Karrierefelder'—Einleitnede Bemerkungen zu Thematik und Begriffen," in Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Wolfgang Blösel (eds.), *Von der Militia Equestris zur Militia Urbana: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im Antiken Rom* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2011), 9-28, "The Roman Republic as Theatre of Power: The Consuls as Leading Actors," in Beck, Duplá, Jehne, Pina Polo, *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*, 161-181.

[32] Hans Beck, "From Poplicola to Augustus: Senatorial Houses in Roman Political Culture," *Phoenix* 63 (2009): 361-384. Research on the senatorial *domus* was not new in 2009—these investigations can be traced back at least to Timothy Wiseman, "*Conspicui Postes Tectaque Digna Deo*: The Public Image of Aristocratic Houses in the Late Republic and Early Empire," in Yvon Thébert, *L'Urbs: Espace Urbain et Histoire (1er Siècle av. J.C.-IIIe Siècle ap. J.C.)*, (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1987), 393-413.

[33] Robert Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), "'Cultural hegemony' and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite," in Steel, van der Blom (eds.), *Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome*, 29-47, "Persuading the People in the Roman Participatory Context," in Dean Hammer (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 294-309.

contiones in 2004, he conceived of these public meetings as starkly asymmetric communicative venues, reinforcing status gaps more than they brought the "people" into the conversation.[34]

To a great extent, an aristocratic vision of the system of power remains dominant in the most recent scholarship. In 2017, Mouritsen provided a distilled articulation of the nature of the system of power, building on the lessons of recent scholarship. In practice, the *populus* is left as little more than "a vital but essentially passive source of public legitimacy," although Mouritsen takes care to highlight the role that the ceremony of popular sovereignty played in the long-term legitimacy of the system.[35] On this reading, even the struggles of the late Republic were products of divisions inside the elite rather than conflict between distinct ideological groups. In fact, he argues that the Republican framework only remained effective to the extent that "the bodies which held the power did not exercise it."[36] In a delicate compromise, the true aristocratic system of power ran parallel to the society's "constitution," and only when aristocrats began to use the formal institutional devices as weapons in intra-elite competition did the collective dominance of the ruling class break.

For my own argument, in very broad terms I take Mouritsen's picture as accurate. The Republic operated under a system of power in which the internal machinations of the upper stratum generated the range of options and agendas subject to society-wide decision-making. But it is important to highlight a few addenda and corrigenda.

Regarding the "constitution," Benjamin Straumann has noted the dangers inherent in reducing the "constitutional" to "political culture," arguing that such a move leaves us "unable to account adequately for the specific normative weight and juridical quality of certain rules in the late Roman Republic"—in fact that "it is precisely one of the defining features of the political culture of the late Republic as evidenced by the sources that this was a culture where political institutions and procedures were expressed in *juridical norms*."[37] That is to say, the formal institutional framework, while it was certainly not rigidly codified in a single document, had significant normative force. Transgressions against the framework receive such attention in the sources, as Straumann argues, specifically because they represented violations of a robust "constitutional" structure.

Meanwhile, James Tan has expressed concern about the extent to which we can presume that this aristocracy-centric political culture was capable of creating ideological monotony. He questions how much, with all these cultural concepts and experiences that furnished the foundation of elite dominance, every single Roman would have "internalized them, translated them into action, and then reproduced them with minimal variability over long periods of time."[38] Furthermore, Tan articulates a number of essential additions and qualifications to the communicative focus of the political culture turn. The first is a focus on historical change—on the idiosyncrasy of particular moments, and the capacity for concepts, practices, and transcripts to be revised and recombined without any overt fracture in the overarching frame.[39] Rome's "constitution" may have remained nominally unchanged, but as the city-state extended its empire to span three continents, the structure of power

---

[34] As noted above, Morstein-Marx, "Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*," and "*Res Publica Res Populi*," for his earlier more "democracy friendly" position.
[35] Henrik Mouritsen, *Politics in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 61.
[36] Mouritsen, *Politics in the Roman Republic*, 166.
[37] Straumann, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution*, 15-16 (the italics are Straumann's).
[38] James Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), xvi.
[39] Harriet Flower, *Roman Republics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) also expressed discomfort with the excessively synchronic character of contemporary scholarship.

experienced grave discontinuities.[40] The second is an emphasis on the importance of wealth, which represents a corrective to the absence of economics in much of the recent political culture scholarship.[41] The last of Tan's correctives is a caution about the limits of the literary evidence. For the most part, we have access only to accounts written by elite males. We should be wary of supposing that we can comprehend the psychological experience of the other members of the society with any depth.[42]

Material and immaterial factors both play a profound role in power relations, but we can feel a higher degree of confidence about the effects of material inequality in creating disparities than we can about the ineffable dominion of a symbolic system. It is by casting light on the historical process by which elite actors gained and maintained a massively disproportionate share of the society's wealth, and then by examining the practical implications of this disparity in the decision-making process, that Tan believes that we can best understand elite dominance over the relatively less advantaged members of Roman society.[43]

Tan takes care to emphasize that, while it is not rare to find an ancient city-state dominated by wealthy families, the level of aristocratic dominance in the late Republic was no inevitability. Roman expansion transformed the nature of the collective enterprise in ways that challenged the very definition of a "city-state," and the functional balance between the society's groups shifted in response to this geographic extension. The poor likely never exercised much power as a coherent agent. But before imperial expansion obviated the need for *tributum*—a property levy paid by relatively well-off citizens as a percentage of wealth—this limited but still significant non-elite constituency exercised notable bargaining power.[44] During the Punic Wars, for instance, the elite was forced to negotiate with this group to fund fleets.[45] After 167, however, when high imperial revenues subsidized the cancellation of *tributum*, the elite could operate with more independence, undertaking large-scale policies without haggling with people of lower property brackets for financial support. Tan makes the case that the abolition of *tributum* removed the collective bargaining power that the wealthier non-elite citizens had retained until then.

By the mid-second century, then, we might say that non-elite property owners had lost the financial "ownership stake" that they had until then retained in the "commons." This process of removing the citizen financial stake reached its logical culmination in 60,

---

[40] This frustration with a relatively static picture perhaps also stands behind the recent effort by Harris to map the long-term evolution of Roman power from the early Republic to the seventh century of the Common Era, and the dialectic relationship between the power relations within the mutating polity and the power relationships between the Roman system and outsiders—William Harris, *Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[41] Tan acknowledges that he is not the only scholar to have noted this lack. In an otherwise positive review of Hölkeskamp's *Reconstructing the Roman Republic* positive, Nathan Rosenstein, "Review of Karl Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*," *Classical World* 105 (2012): 276–7 criticized this absence (277): "missing however is any analysis of how the economy affected ordinary Romans' acceptance of aristocratic rule…Did citizens follow their elite leaders because political culture determined their thought-world or because of the material benefits they brought them?" See also, Crawford, "Reconstructing What Roman Republic?," who criticizes Hölkeskamp's (originally Meier') disregard for the impact of economic change as (111) "simply mad."

[42] Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, xvii.

[43] Philip Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution* (Oxford: University Press, 2014) laid groundwork for Tan's study, explaining the processes by which the Roman economy evolved, expanded, and differentiated to the point that it could separate the elite off into such an elevated and dominant position.

[44] Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, xix with n. 29 and 30 for references regarding *tributum*.

[45] Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, 93-117 for the First Punic War, 118-143 for the Second Punic War.

when *portoria* were finally abolished.[46] It is perhaps appropriate that the ultimate decade of the "Republican" system witnessed the end of the last traces of non-elite investment in *res publica*—the final form of direct citizen contribution to the "common wealth" of the treasury. My project focuses on these years—a historical moment when, as much as the Republican system was in many ways beginning to fracture, its characteristic elite dominance had reach the zenith of an extended developmental cascade.

Prompted by Millar's goad, this past generation's scholars have enjoyed remarkable success in their attempts to explain the dialectic relationship between mass and elite. *Pace* Millar, they have made a strong case against the capacity of the *populus* to act with any coherence and consistency as a "collective agent."[47] Especially after the mid-second century, non-elite citizens put electoral support and manpower on the table, but they were no longer a key source of public finance.[48] Elections tended to thwart lower-class expression, and developments in the late second century, especially the broadening of the census requirement to serve, diluted whatever vestiges of bargaining power the lower property classes retained.[49] By the late Republic, although non-elites might gain access to decision-making conversations on an individual level, the elite did not have to contend with a group capable of constructing and putting forward articulate alternatives to the policies and agendas generated within the upper stratum.[50]

This modern scholarship has done an admirable job describing the material and symbolic mechanisms by which the elite dominated Roman society; of showing how, whatever the formal niceties of the "constitution," this community maintained a hold over agendas and priorities; and of locating the development of this arrangement within a diachronic framework. To a large extent, the focus of this conversation has been trained on the dialectic relationship between the mass and the elite. But a study of the dialogue between groups can only take us so far as we seek to understand the nature of the "regime."

In order to comprehend the process of rule in the late Republic, I suggest that it is essential to turn within the community of elites that acted as sovereign in practice. Superficially, this might look like a return to the focus of an earlier generation—prosopographers such as Gelzer, Münzer, and Syme who trained their attention on the aristocratic echelon. But where they were satisfied to draw a social map of the community of *nobiles*, taking the goals and the tools of power largely for granted, I make no such assumptions. Instead, I argue that, to understand the system of rule, it is necessary to

---

46 For which see Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, xix with n. 31 for further references.

47 This is by contrast with the model proposed for Athens in Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), which has sparked such productive debate not only about the nature of the regime in Athens, but regarding the function of nominally participatory regimes across ancient societies. His answer to the question of whether or not the elite "ruled" in Classical Athens was a resounding "no." A distinct "elite" did exist, but Ober proposed that the society's decision-making was accomplished by means of "reciprocity achieved through discourse" between this upper stratum and the rest of the citizen populace. Note the attempt, however, in Loonis Logghe, "Plebeian Agency in the Later Roman Republic," in Richard Evans (ed.), *Mass and Elite in the Greek and Roman Worlds: From Sparta to Late Antiquity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017), 63-81 to apply the mass-elite paradigm to Rome.

48 The literature on the relationship between war and the Roman system of power is vast. On manpower, Peter Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 14*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) is fundamental.

49 For these manpower transformations, see Luuk de Ligt, "Roman Manpower and Recruitment During the Middle Republic," in Paul Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 114-131.

50 For the potential impact of individual voices, see Lisa Mignone, "Living in Republican Rome: 'Shanty Metropolis'," in Evans (ed.) *Mass and Elite in the Greek and Roman Worlds: From Sparta to Late Antiquity*, 100-117, which argues for the interpenetration of elite and non-elite in housing arrangements, allowing perspectives from outside the upper stratum to influence elite conversations.

investigate the elite community's potent, but ever-evolving system of social institutions. We must examine the bonds uniting each aristocrat's *domus*-based "family organization"—the fundamental unit of social organization and collective action; familial links between *domus* groups, such as marriage and adoption, which served a key function not only in organizing alignments, but also in mediating the transfer of the assets underpinning aristocratic status between generations; and the *amicitia* links of different degrees of parity and asymmetry that played perhaps the most important role of all in translating a kaleidoscope of actions by individuals and small subgroups into something that could even begin to resemble a collective "ruling will." These social institutions mediated interchange between the members of Rome's upper stratum, helping to integrate extensive competition into a framework that relied fundamentally on collaboration. They provided what we might describe as the "functional constitution" of the aristocratic system of power, in which the social action of a diverse collection of elites combined to articulate the full range of agendas, priorities, and policy options for the entire society. As the most dynamic of these institutions, and hence as the most important for mediating action instead of merely alignments and priorities, *amicitia* will provide the central focus of this study.

The "Aristocratic Community"

But who actually belonged to the ruling "aristocratic community" that dominated Roman society?[51] By contrast with a system like Athens', in which the deliberative structure appears to have actually integrated voices from a range of socio-economic layers within the *demos* into the conversation about the society's direction, in late Republican Rome, the discursive space in which the trajectory of the polity was articulated appears generally to have been a far more exclusive preserve.[52]

Rome's senators certainly formed the aristocratic community's nuclear constituency. Across the length of Republican history, this group dominated public affairs and exercised a unique symbolic preeminence. Before complicating the picture of the boundaries of the aristocratic community, we must first emphasize the centrality of this senatorial group and the special position of its members. Even Münzer, Syme, and Gelzer, who granted such predominance to a limited circle, never claimed that the *nobilitas* was a hereditary aristocracy, at least in the sense that its members received their privileges by right of descent.[53] The

---

[51] The literature on concepts of "aristocracy," "nobility," and "elite" is vast, both for Rome and for the premodern world more broadly—especially, Werner Conze, Christian Meier, "Adel, Aristokratie," in Reinhart Koselleck, Werner Conze, Otto Brunner, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache In Deutschland* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972), 1-48, John Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), Jonathan Powis, *Aristocracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), Otto Oexle, "Aspekte der Geschichte des Adels im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (1990): 19-56, the contributions in Otto Oexle, Werner Paravicini (eds.), *Nobilitas: Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), Beat Näf, "Nobilitas," in *DNP* 15/1: 1070-1084 (mainly on *nobilitas* as a topic of historiography, with additional bibliography), Gudrun Gersmann, "Adel," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit* 1 (2005): 39-54, Ronald Asch, *Europäischer Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit: eine Einführung* (Köln: Böhlau, 2008), Hans Beck, "Die Rolle des Adligen: Prominenz und Aristokratische Herrschaft in der Römischen Republik," in Hans Beck, Peter Scholz, Uwe Walter (eds.), *Die Macht der Wenigen: Aristokratische Herrschaftspraxis, Kommunikation und "Edler" Lebensstil in Antike und Früher Neuzeit* (Oldenbourg, Munich 2008), 101–123 and Uwe Walter, "Aristokratische Existenz in der Antike und der Frühen Neuzeit: einige Unabgeschlossene Überlegungen," 367-394 in the same volume are important recent contributions.

[52] E.g. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*, as noted above.

[53] Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, e.g. 3, 8, 98, 411; Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, e.g. 10; Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der Römischen Republik*, e.g. 59. There has been ongoing debate about the boundaries of the related terms *nobilitas* and *nobilis*. Mommsen originally proposed a relatively expansive definition in his *Römisches Staatsrecht*—that a *nobilis* was anyone who had the right to the *ius imaginum* (i.e. descended from curule magistrates). Gelzer countered in his *Die Nobilität der Römischen Republik*, that the term signified descent direct from a consul in the male line. This quickly became the *communis opinio*, but the debate reignited in the 1980s with Peter Brunt, "*Nobilitas* and *Novitas*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 72 (1982): 1–17 arguing

patriciate, by contrast, was such a closed caste, and the patrician families did retain special, if limited, prerogatives throughout Republican history.[54] But as the "struggle of the orders" ended, and Rome extended control over much of Italy, the interplay of expansion and internal integration contributed to the formation of an "aristocracy of office" of both patricians and plebeians. In response to these conditions, this patricio-plebeian *nobilitas* developed a culture of internal compromise, and the collective will of the group was channeled through the institutional center of the Senate.[55] These power holders developed a consolidated social identity, ideological framework, and economic basis.[56]

A relatively consistent group of families maintained a position at the summit of *res publica*. But this *nobilitas* was never formalized under the Republic, nor were its borders fixed. Some families maintained their status across generations, while others floated in and out of this inner circle, a number disappearing entirely and others making only occasional appearances in magisterial lists.[57] Nonetheless, across societies, even among ruling groups that are not formally closed, aristocratic collectivities tend toward exclusivity, whether or not they attain it as an absolute.[58] The precise composition of the senatorial stratum certainly remained in flux as a result of the "turnover of political families" and "varying rates of succession," and a trickle of *novi homines* penetrated the permeable boundary of the society of *nobiles*.[59] But the group did manage to institute some degree of "heritability" of status between generations.[60] This was a collectivity, moreover, which derived both legitimacy and self-definition through its engagement with public affairs. Meier famously claimed that a man

---

broadly in line with Mommsen's position. Shackleton Bailey, "*Nobiles* and *Novi* Reconsidered," *The American Journal of Philology* 107 (1986): 255-260 sought to restore Gelzer's, in turn, arguing that none of the twelve apparent exceptions convinces. Bailey's concluding observation puts the entire debate in perspective (260): "we must not forget that these terms are governed by usage, not by legal definition." Whatever side one chooses, the term should be viewed as a descriptor of socio-political, rather than legal, status. See also, Leonhardt Burckhardt, "The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts *Nobilitas* and *Homo Novus*," *Historia* 39 (1990): 77–99, as well as Henriette Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34-59, which provides an important recent addition to the debate, noting that the category of *nobilis* remained negotiable and relative.

[54] On the patriciate, Christopher Smith, *The Roman Clan: The Gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) is important (and revisionist); see also, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Die Entstehung der Nobilität: Studien zur Sozialen und Politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jh. v. Chr. 2.* (Stuttgart, Frank Steiner Verlag, 1987), e.g. 33, Tim Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000 – 264 B.C.)* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 242-271.

[55] Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Die Entstehung der Nobilität: Studien zur Sozialen und Politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jh. v. Chr. 2.*, set the terms of the contemporary conversation for the development of this group after the Struggle of the Orders and as a response to the extension of Roman control; also, his "Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the *Nobilitas*," *Historia* 42 (1993): 12-39, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 76-97, Stephen Oakley, "The Roman Conquest of Italy," in John Rich, Graham Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World* (London: Routledge, 1993), 9-37, Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars*, 340-398, Jean-Michel David, *The Roman Conquest of Italy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), Gary Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[56] More diverse elite demography in the late Republic would put a serious crack in this consolidated ideological framework.

[57] Keith Hopkins, Graham Burton, "Political Succession in the Late Republic (249-50 BC)," in *Death and Renewal: Sociological Studies in Roman History* 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 31-119 broke new ground in the study of the continuity and fluidity of the senatorial group; also important are Ernst Badian, "The Consuls, 179-49 BC," *Chiron* 20 (1990), 371-414 and Hans Beck, *Karriere und Hierarchie: die Römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des Cursus Honorum in der Mittleren Republik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005).

[58] Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 89 makes this point, with references.

[59] Quotes from Hopkins, Burton, "Political Succession in the Late Republic (249-50 BC)," respectively 112, 117. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14* has become the classic study of entry of *novi homines* into the senatorial stratum.

[60] Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* and John Dugan, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) make clear what effort it could take for these *novi homines* to break into the inner circles of the senatorial group. They had to walk a fine line, alternately playing up their outsider status and embracing traditionalism.

who was involved in politics was part of the aristocracy by definition, and that to be part of the aristocracy meant being involved in politics.[61] This was entirely true for the senatorial stratum in the Republic, since this constituency was defined, and in fact created, by victory in electoral contests.

Both as outstanding individuals and as a distinguished group, senators were the society's most prominent leaders. As civic magistrates, commanders, and priests, they served as the leading actors in the dialogue about the direction of the society that took place in public. While a non-senator might serve as an advocate in court, for the most part, senators monopolized the "speaking roles" in *res publica*. They stood out as the protagonists in the community's shared narrative of the progress of the polity. Even at *contiones*, where magistrates were in theory permitted to summon anyone to speak, the conveners seem to have turned almost exclusively to senatorial colleagues to make oratorical contributions.[62]

At this point, however, it is essential to return to our discussion of the functional nature of the regime. Public, formal institutional venues certainly played a key role in the system of power. But the assemblies served more as "rituals" than as venues for the articulation of policy, reinforcing collective civic identity and bestowing the stamp of popular sovereignty on proposals first constructed by aristocrats.[63] Recent scholarship has demonstrated convincingly that even the *contiones* served a performative and legitimating function more than they furnished space to work out substantive issues.[64] The Senate was something more of a true deliberative space, but much of the consideration that determined the direction of the polity took place off scene. In the system of power, there was plenty of room for influence from actors who were not senators.

The simple dichotomous construct *senatus populusque Romanus* does not capture Rome's complex social reality. By the late Republic, this was especially true. The group of

---

[61] Meier, *Res Publica Amissa*, 47, with Hölkeskamp, *Die Entstehung der Nobilität: Studien zur Sozialen und Politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jh. v. Chr. 2*, 248, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 89.

[62] Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, 40. He notes, however, that in very occasional circumstances magistrates might bring forward "men of modest station, even women, if their purpose was to attest publicly to some allegation" (a freedman, a lower class informer, Sempronia the sister of Ti. Gracchus). Millar, *The Crowd in the Roman Republic*, 46 made much of the fact that Dionysius of Halicarnus 10.40.2 implied that it was normal to allow opponents of a bill to speak, but attestation is poor—Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, 163 n.10—and in any case this was opposition from other senatorial speakers.

[63] Keith Hopkins, "From Violence to Blessing: Symbols and Rituals in Ancient Rome," in Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, Julia Emlen (eds.), *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 479-498 first proposed, for instance, that we might view the comitial procedures as "rituals"—formalized and regularized actions that take on significance extending beyond the acts themselves, which through repeated performance can take on a vital role in constituting a community's identity. Egon Flaig, "Entscheidung und Konsens: Zu den Feldern der Politischen Kommunikation zwischen Aristokratie und Plebs," in Jehne (ed.), *Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der Römischen Republik*, 77-127, *Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom*, Jehne, "Integrationsrituale in der Römischen Republik: Zur Einbindenden Wirkung der Volksversammlungen," in Gianpaolo Urso (ed.) *Integrazione Mescolanza Rifiuto: Incontri di Popoli, Lingue e Culture in Europa dall'Antichità all'Umanesimo*, "Politische Partizipation in der Römischen Republik," in Hansjörg Reinau, Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg (eds.), *Politische Partizipation Idee und Wirklichkeit von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 103-144, Mouritsen, *Politics in the Roman Republic*, 67-72.

[64] The argument made at Mouritsen, *Politics in the Roman Republic*, 72-94 is important, distilling and expanding on the last generation's debate on the nature of the *contio* and the extent to which it should be viewed as a *locus* of "democratic" decision-making. On the *contio*, the bibliography is now immense, growing by leaps and bounds since the publication of Francisco Pina Polo, *Contra Arma Verbis: der Redner vor dem Volk in der Späten Römischen Republik* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996). Other highlights include his, "*Contio*, *Auctoritas,* and Freedom of Speech in Republican Rome," in Stéphane Benoist (ed.), *Rome, a City and its Empire in Perspective: the Impact of the Roman World through Fergus Millar's Research = Rome, une Cité Impériale en Jeu: l'Impact du Monde Romain selon Fergus Millar* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 45-58, as well as Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, see also his "'Cultural Hegemony' and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite," and "Persuading the People in the Roman Participatory Context." Morstein-Marx's later works take a more qualified position on the issue of "cultural hegemony," and he notes that new explorations have led him to grant a degree more influence to at least some form of more "popular deliberation (whatever that might mean in practice).

senators should by no means be viewed as coterminous with the "elite." This selection of men who participated personally in the *cursus honorum* was embedded in a broader class of the prosperous—*equites*, most prominently, as well as a more nebulous collection of so-called *boni*. The interests and opinions of these proprietors commanded significant respect and attention from the members of the senatorial "aristocracy of office." Because these men dominated the first census class, their good will was essential to anyone hoping to win election, and they played a key role in determining the *communis opinio* that was a constitutive feature of success. Perhaps most important of all, they were all participants in a common social world, with no wall separating the senators from their non-senatorial fellows among the affluent. Senatorial statesmen were certainly the most prominent players. But they were not the only participants in this "aristocratic community." I propose, instead, that we should envision a ruling social collective composed of a far more diverse array. Senators were joined by other well-heeled proprietors—"gentlemen" or *liberales*.

Hölkeskamp has called it a "fundamental fact of Roman aristocratic life" that no career alternative besides the traditional *cursus* offered any comparable rewards and possibilities in terms of prestige, political influence, and wealth.[65] In many ways, this was unquestionably true across the length of Republican history. Senators retained preeminence in *res publica* and a unique command over publicly granted symbolic rewards. But developments in the size and composition of the polity during the second and early first centuries expanded the boundaries of the community, and the structural differentiation of the economy opened up new avenues to wealth. Enrichment through war was no longer the only means to acquire extraordinary stocks of material resources.[66] Military command and provincial service continued to offer extensive opportunities for enrichment.[67] But new sources of wealth and the somewhat diminished role of warfare, at least as as an omnipresent feature of daily life for Romans living at the heart of the empire, allowed for alternative possible career strategies for elite actors.

Hölkeskamp states that the "the curriculum vitae, the personal identity and the 'persona' of an aristocrat were 'exclusively' defined and completely determined by his *cursus honorum*."[68] This is only the case, however, to the extent that we take "aristocrat" and "senator" to be identical—a framing that is somewhat misleading, especially with respect to the realities of influence in the late Republic. From the late second century, it became increasingly possible for members of the aristocratic community to follow non-senatorial trajectories and still wield high levels of social and financial influence.

The senatorial *patres* had never served as the entire elite, but in the late second and early first centuries, the diversity of distinct elements in the aristocratic community increased to a striking degree. For instance, the *equites* took on an increasingly assertive role in the aristocratic social landscape as an *ordo* distinct from the Senate, with coherent interests and

---

[65] Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 91.

[66] Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution* provides an important treatment of the radical transformations in both the size and the nature of the Roman economy in the wake of the imperial expansion during the second century, with Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, on the complex dynamics of negotiating who benefited from the spoils of empire. For the relationship between command and wealth, see Nathan Rosenstein, "War, Wealth, and Consuls," in Beck, Duplá, Martin Jehne, Pina Polo (eds.), *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*, 133-158, and William Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) provides one of the classic discussions of the issue.

[67] Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, 68-91 for the use of provincial positions for enrichment, exploring the blurry line between legal and extra-legal.

[68] Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 91.

their own formal powers.[69] Among the *equites*, the *publicani* were especially prominent.[70] As a result of their wealth and organization, they retained a particularly potent capacity to exercise influence in the conversations that set the direction of the polity. Senators ignored the interests and priorities of these *societates* only at their peril.[71] But it was not only organized companies that commanded significant pull. Although individual equestrian businessmen varied widely in status and influence, certain knights managed to acquire wealth and social clout that could rival even some of the higher-level senators.[72]

As much as these knights developed specific interests and priorities of their own, the senators and equestrians were all part of the same wider community. Although Rome's ruling group became broader and more diversified during the middle and late Republic, diversification and integration went hand in hand. Some sense of affiliation might have persisted within collections of individuals sharing a common background.[73] But increasingly, beginning in the second century and especially after the Social War, the elite across Italy came to participate in a common social framework, connecting *nobiles* in the capital with *negotiatores* based in Italian *municipia*.[74] This pan-Italian community came to share an ever more cohesive background and idiom, with its members associated in interlocking networks. Moreover, in addition to their complex webs of personal ties, these well-heeled proprietors were joined by transactional interchange—linked together through business partnerships,

---

[69] Caillan Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) provides an up to date history of the order, tracing developments from the early Republic through the imperial period (8th C BCE-5th C CE) and locating the equestrian phenomenon in comparison to other aristocratic models throughout history. Davenport notes (38) that it was only after 129 that the senatorial and equestrian *ordines* were formally separated. Senators and equestrians took on increasingly differentiated roles in the century preceding, regarding pursuits such as tax collecting, trade, and money lending. Jury service played an essential role in the public prominence of the *ordo*, especially after the *lex Sempronia de repetundis* in 123. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic* is essential for the development of these courts—see 198, 202, 214-215, 236-238. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* established fundamental aspects of the social and political history of the *equites*; Arthur Stein, *Der Römische Ritterstand: ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und Personengeschichte des Römischen Reiches* (Munich: Beck, 1927) was an important first monographic treatment, Herbert Hill, *The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952) added substantially (in spite of its misleading title); this was soon superseded, however, by Claude Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974), which remains an essential analysis and prosopography.

[70] Ernst Badian, *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in Service of the Roman Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) is still fundamental on the *publicani*.

[71] I will discuss the case of *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) in Chapter 1—an example that highlights the influence of this group—in which Cicero noted to his *amicus* Lentulus Spinther that it was unwise to anger this constituency, even for a powerful consular.

[72] Kathryn Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 45 (1996): 450-471 gives a clear picture of how an equestrian could sometimes exercise more influence even than important *consulares*, through personal financial holdings, banking activities, and social networking.

[73] For instance, Kathryn Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," in Jonathan Powell, Jeremy Paterson (eds.), *Cicero the Advocate* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 96-116 studies the subtle loyalties and reciprocal links that might persist among men emerging from Italian, equestrian roots as they sought to advance in the capital city.

[74] The Rome-Italy dynamic was extremely complex, taking centuries to work out. Henrik Mouritsen, *Italian Unification: A Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography* (1998) is essential for the integration process; see also, Arthur Keaveney, *Rome and the Unification of Italy* (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Social networks linking city of Rome-based aristocrats with Italians were already becoming established before the Social War—see, John Patterson, "Elite Networks in pre-Social War Italy," in Michel Aberson, Maria Biella, Massimiliano Di Fazio, Pierre Sánchez, Manuela Wullschleger (eds.) *E Pluribus Unum?: l'Italie, de la Diversité Préromaine à l'Unité Augustéenne* (Bern; Berlin: Lang, 2016), 43-55 and "The Relationship of the Italian Ruling Classes with Rome: Friendship, Family Relations and Their Consequences," in Martin Jehne, Rene Pfeilschifter (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in Republikanischer Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Alte Geschichte, 2006), 139-153. On the economic aspects of integration, see the entries in T.C.A. de Haas, Gils Tol (eds.), *The Economic Integration of Roman Italy Rural Communities in a Globalising World* (Leiden: Brill, 2017). Gary Farney, "Romans and Italians," Jeremy McInerney (ed.) *A Companion to Ethnicity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 2014), 437-454 and *Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) treats ethnic questions.

property sales, inheritances, and debtor-creditor relationships.[75] For the senators and the *equites* alike, matters of business, finance, and property formed the practical substrate of much of their activity.

In addition to this web of aristocratic men, it is essential to emphasize that a range of other actors with close personal access to this network also played key roles in the community's vital backroom conversations. The women of aristocratic families should be viewed as aristocrats themselves, capable of mustering significant financial and social resources and sometimes able to move events.[76] Sub-elites such as freedmen and Greek intellectuals also made significant contributions.[77] They may not have possessed the symbolic and financial resources, or the social clout, to make them full "aristocrats" in their own right. But these sub-elites were linked to the elite community by reciprocal obligation, intellectual communion and debate, and affection. They had access to backroom conversations, and their personal interests and priorities were not ignored. On a fundamental level, moreover, they could help determine which intellectual and moral ideas gained prevalence in aristocratic discourse.

I take care, throughout this dissertation, to describe this diverse group as Rome's "aristocratic community" rather than as its "aristocracy." Of the actors involved, the senators and *equites*, and even the aristocratic women, possessed recognizably aristocratic status—distinguished by financial and symbolic resources. Not all of the participants in this community could claim such elevation personally. But they all operated within a loosely unified social and cultural discursive space, differentiated, at least to a degree, from the rest of Roman society. It was from the conversations that take took place within this group—among aristocrats such as senators and *equites*, aristocratic women, and the sub-elites closely associated with elites and their households—that essentially the full range of policies, priorities, and agendas emerged that came up for public discussion.[78]

Five Forms of "Capital"

---

[75] For the aristocratic community's combined transactional-social system, see especially Koenraad Verboven, *The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*, (Bruxelles: Latomus, 2002). Christian Rollinger, *Solvendi Sunt Nummi: die Schuldenkultur der Späten Römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros* (Berlin: Verlag Antike, 2009) and Marina Ioannatou, *Affaires d'Argent dans la Correspondance de Cicéron. L'Aristocratie Sénatoriale Face à ses Dettes* (Paris, De Boccard, 2006), "Liens d'Amitié et Opérations de Crédit à la Fin de la République Romaine," in *Mémoires de la Société pour l'Histoire de Droit*, 62 (2006): 11-40, and "Le Code de l'Honneur des Paiements: Créanciers et Débiteurs à la Fin de la République Romaine," *Annales* (2001): 1201-1221. Rollinger's and Ioannatou's work is important for the transactional system in general terms and specifically regarding the web of debtor-creditor relations and their social implications. Élizabeth Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993), especially 213-248 on the role of recommendations in this financial and social framework.

[76] Susan Treggiari, *Servilia and Her Family* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) provides an important treatment of the potential power of an outstanding female power player, see also her *Terentia, Tullia and Publilia: The Women of Cicero's Family* (London/New York: Routledge, 2007). Alison Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," *Arethusa* 46 (2013): 65-85 shows the potential independence and social clout even of a younger aristocratic woman.

[77] Henrik Mouritsen, *The Freedman in the Roman World* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) for a comprehensive treatment of the practical and ideological position of freedmen. Koenraad Verboven. "The Freedman Economy of Roman Italy," in Sinclair Bell, Teresa Ramsby (eds.), *Free at Last!: the Impact of Freed Slaves on the Roman Empire* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 88-109 for the importance of freedmen in the Italian economy of the late Republic and pan-Mediterranean trade, highlighting their indispensable and often strikingly independent role; Georges Fabre, *Libertus: Recherches sur les Rapports Patron-Affranchi à la Fin de la République Romaine* (Paris: De Boccard, 1981) on the complexities of relations between *liberti* and their former masters. Some household slaves might also be counted in this category, depending on the unique circumstances of the personal relations between each *dominus* and *servus*. With regard to the intellectual and moral power of Greek intellectuals in the late Republican community, Elizabeth Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) testifies to the importance and power of Greeks in these erudite conversations.

[78] Texts of a variety of genres served a key function in sustaining these "conversations."

What distinguished this "aristocratic community" from the other constituencies within Roman society was its access to resources. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, wealth and property created the material conditions necessary for elite lifestyle. But in addition, a suite of more abstract assets played a key role. The concept of "symbolic capital" has enjoyed wide popularity among scholars of Roman political culture, as a device for explaining aristocratic dominance and making sense of the perpetuation of this preeminence across generations.[79] This is a useful frame, especially for understanding the particular role and power of the senatorial stratum. But I suggest that this model is too limited. It helps to explain the more overtly "political" aspects of Rome's system of power, and some of the goals and tools of aristocratic power unique to the individuals and families that chose to engage directly with the *cursus honorum*. But the aristocratic system of power extended well beyond *res publica*. The introduction of the concept of "social capital" is a constructive start, but for this project, it will be useful to speak of five categories—financial, symbolic, social, ethical, and knowledge capital.[80] Together, these helped differentiate the ruling community from the rest of Roman society; motivated individual and collective action; and served as "currencies" for the exercise of influence. Furthermore, within this framework, one of the core goals was to pass on accumulated stocks of these resources to the next generation, both as a personal bequest to a family's own children and as the community's collective inheritance.

Financial

As is the case across human societies, money and power were intimately linked in the Roman Republic.[81] Indeed, it was the possession of wealth and property that gave the aristocratic community its basic coherence and that created its shared interests. Both senators and equestrians maintained landed properties and houses, as well, increasingly, as portfolios of credit-based assets.[82] It is especially telling with regard to the nature of the

---

[79] Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 107-124 is a commendable summary of the role of this concept in recent historiography.

[80] This paradigm builds on, but also to some extent departs from, the concepts first developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John Richardson, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (Westport: Greenwood, 1986): 241-58 is the *locus classicus* on social, cultural, and symbolic capital—see also, *Sozialer Sinn: Kritik der Theoretischen Vernunft* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1987). In addition, see the contributions in Ingo Mörth, Gerhard Fröhlich, (eds.), *Das Symbolische Kapital der Lebensstile* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1994), Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, "Kulturelle und symbolische Praktiken: das Unternehmen Pierre Bourdieu," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 16 (1996): 111-130, Sven Reichardt, "Bourdieu für Historiker? Ein kultursoziologisches Angeebot an die Sozialgeschichte," in Thomas Mergel, Thomas Welskopp (eds.), *Geschichte Zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte* (Munich: Beck, 1997), 71– 93, Gerhard Goehler, Rudolf Speth, "Symbolische Macht: Zur Institutionen-Theoretischen Bedeutung von Pierre Bourdieu," in Reinhard Blankner, Bernhard Jussen (eds.), *Institutionen und Ereignis: über Historische Praktiken und Vorstellungen Gesellschaftlichen Ordnens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), especially 37, Ute Daniel, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte: Theorien, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter* (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2001), especially 79, Lutz Raphael, "Habitus und Sozialer Sinn: Der Ansatz der Praxistheorie Pierre Bourdieus," in Friedrich Jaeger, Jürgen Straub (eds.), *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften* 2 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2004), 266-276, Egon Flaig, "Habitus, Mentalitäten und die Frage des Subjekts: Kulturelle Orientierungen Sozialen Handelns," in Friedrich Jaeger, Burkhard Liebsch, (eds.), *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften* 3 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2011), 356-371.

[81] The entries in Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, John Serrati (eds.), *Money and Power in the Roman Republic* (Bruxelles: Editions Latomus, 2016) explore this issue from many angles, providing expansive references. Beck's contribution, "Wealth, Power, and Class Coherence: The *Ambitus* Legislation of the 180s B.C.," specifically explores issues of wealth in unifying the elite stratum.

[82] Israël Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics* (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1975) is fundamental on senatorial assets; Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)* is the classic study regarding equestrian resources; Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution* charts the development of aristocratic portfolios and the differentiation of assets in the mid-late Republic (both material and credit-based); Rollinger, *Solvendi Sunt Nummi: die Schuldenkultur der Späten Römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros*, and Marina Ioannatou, *Affaires d'Argent dans la Correspondance de Cicéron. L'Aristocratie Sénatoriale Face à ses Dettes*, "Liens d'Amitié et Opérations de Crédit à la Fin de la République Romaine," and "Le Code de l'Honneur des

system that the aristocratic community managed to retain such a high proportion of the income from the spoils of empire as private wealth. The public purse remained poor even as personal fortunes ballooned, with aristocrats retaining command over resources that might otherwise have been deployed to increase "state" capacity.[83]

Writing to Atticus in 44, Cicero could draw an equivalence of sorts between a man's *res* and his *existimatio* (*rem dico? immo vero existimatio*).[84] If his *res familiaris* descended into an unhealthy state, his capacity to engage with *res publica* could be radically compromised. To a large degree for an aristocrat, houses and lands furnished the substrate of his social role. Physical properties provided the income that underpinned elite lifestyle, and they served as bases of operations for business ventures. In addition, they served an important function as social spaces—venues for the performance of an aristocrat's personal power as a *pater familias* and *patronus*, sites of the private interchange among the members of the aristocratic community that I have suggested was so important for the society's direction, and bases of operations for action in *res publica*.[85] A threat to a family's possession of its *patrimonium* represented an assault on *liberalitas*, since the capacity to live as an aristocrat relied on these vital assets. The family's *nomen* was emptied of its value if decoupled from its ancestral *res familiaris*. Moreover, the whole aristocratic community was caught up in a shared transactional system of loans, gifts, auctions, and inheritances, and each aristocrat's "social" *nomen* and his reputation for *fides* depended on his reputation as financial operator.[86] Since wealth underpinned aristocratic preeminence, an aristocrat would struggle to maintain social or "political" power if his hold over his property slipped. As a consequence, both senators and equestrians had to make it their main daily "job" to care for the health of their property.

Paiements: Créanciers et Débiteurs à la Fin de la République Romaine" specifically on these intangible assets, as well as William Harris, "A Revisionist View of Roman Money," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 96 (2006): 1-24, discussing the use of debt obligations as a form of transferable currency, and Fritz Heichelheim, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums: vom Paläolithikum bis zur Völkerwanderung der Germanen, Slaven und Araber* (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1938), 554-557, Charles Barlow, *Bankers, Moneylenders, and Interest Rates in the Roman Republic* (North Carolina, Univ., Diss., 1978), 155-168, and Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution*, 107-128, especially 109-110 for a discussion of the function of *nomina*.

[83] This is one of the fundamental arguments of Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, see especially 3-39, where he details this process of aristocratic enrichment at the expense of the "state."

[84] *Ad Atticum* 426 (XVI.15): "Did I say property? Really [I should say] reputation" (*rem dico? immo vero existimatio*). Thomas Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 45-59 discusses the fluid meaning of *existimatio*, the evolution of the term over time, and how it could describe different scales of personal value. It had its roots in the financial and material but came to embrace a wide range of sources of reputation. It was with good reason that terms such as *nomen* and *fides* had meanings that were both financial and social, and there was no clear line between financial and social "good name" and "trustworthiness."

[85] Much research has been carried out on the role of the aristocratic (mostly the senatorial) *domus* in social and political culture: Hans Beck, "From Poplicola to Augustus: Senatorial Houses in Roman Political Culture," *Phoenix* 63 (2009): 361-384 is a recent important contribution; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "The Social Structure of the Roman House," *Papers of the British School at Rome* 56 (1988): 43-97 and Timothy Wiseman, "*Conspicui Postes Tectaque Digna Deo*: The Public Image of Aristocratic Houses in the Late Republic and Early Empire," in *L'Urbs: Espace Urbain et Histoire (1er siècle av. J.C.-IIe siècle ap. J.C.)* (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1987), 393-413 are both still fundamental; also, Ray Laurence and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Domestic Space in the Roman World: Pompeii and Beyond* (Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archeology, 1997); Rolf Rilinger, "*Domus* und *Res Publica*.: Die Politisch-Soziale Bedeutung des Aristokratischen 'Hauses' in der späten römischen Republik," in *Zwischen Haus und Staat: Antike Höfe im Vergleich* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997); Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, "Under Roman Roofs: Family, House, and Household," in Harriet Flower (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 113-138; Henner von Hesberg, "Die Häuser der Senatoren in Rom: Gesellschaftliche und Politische Funktion," in Werner Eck and Matthäus Heil (eds.), Senatores Populi Romani: *Realität und Mediale Präsentation einer Führungsschicht* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 19-52.

[86] Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome*, 45-59 provides discuesses the semantic connections between the verb *existimare* (and its more basic form *aestimare*) and the conceptions of debt (and value more generally both social and financial). The meaning of *nomen* as "debt" was probably influenced by Greek usage, as Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution*, 109 n. 12 points out. Barlow, *Bankers, Moneylenders, and Interest Rates in the Roman Republic*, 156-157 notes the semantic flexibility of the term, which could be used to signify an entry in an account book regarding a sale, fine, debt, or loan.

This is a practical reality we glimpse in the *Ad Quintum* and *Ad Atticum* collections. We see what a large portion of an aristocrat's time and attention he was compelled to devote to managing his property, organizing purchases and sales, attending auctions, and negotiating the repayment of debts.[87] Aristocrats were linked, as quickly becomes evident, in a complex web, composed not only of their own transactional relationships and obligations, but also those of family members and friends. The pursuit and protection of this most concrete form of capital can be viewed as one of the core goals of aristocratic existence.[88] The possession of stocks of this form of resource was a basic qualification for aristocratic standing, required by senatorial and equestrian men, as well as by their female relations, as a *sine qua non* for their status claims.[89]

Symbolic

In recent decades, scholars who study the political culture of the late Republic have highlighted the importance of symbolic capital as a constitutive factor for aristocratic identity, as a key reason for the ongoing preeminence of the elite, and as a vector for the perpetuation of status across generations. The boundaries of the concept can sometimes blur, shading, for instance, into "social" and "cultural" capital.[90] But in the context of the conversation about the Roman system of power, discussion has revolved predominantly around the symbolic rewards that senators could derive from successful engagement with *res publica*.[91] Families could accumulate a growing stock, as members acquired countable "deposits" via victory in contests for *honores*—especially consulships, dictatorships, and

---

[87] *Ad Quintum* 6 (II.2) is a prime example—a letter Cicero wrote to Quintus while the latter was in Sardinia in January of 56. We see Cicero acting as the organizing agent in complex transactions and dealings regarding the reconstruction of his brother's Palatine house. Quintus had written to ask about debts due from Lentulus and Sestius, the repayment of which would help with the financing of the construction, and Cicero had followed through by speaking with Atticus' *procurator* Cincius. Spanning the twenty-four years from 68, when the two friends were setting Cicero up for his run for the praetorship of 66, to the end of 44, after Cicero had already plunged into his campaign against Antony, the collection provides the closest thing we have to a portrait of Cicero's career. It is telling, then, that both the first and last letters in the chronological sequence—*Ad Atticum* 1 (I.5) and 426 (XVI.15)—betray a deep concern for the financial, with *res familiaris* and communal financial business woven together with the events of *res publica*.

[88] It was with good reason that Cicero's ideal "dutiful" aristocrat in his *De Officiis* was a "businessman" and that the protection and extension of property, as well as "business ethics," took on such a prominent role in the text—J. Jackson Barlow, "Cicero on Property and the State," in Walter Nicgorski (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 212-241 discusses the role of property in the text, highlighting the tension Cicero perceived between the atomistic pursuit of wealth and a more communal ethic. Note how the "ethical" and "unethical" positions both presuppose the preeminence of property among the priorities of the aristocratic readers.

[89] Roman women could inherit property in their own right, and they could even retain ownership once married. They were not merely "aristocrats" by association with their male relatives. On Roman women and inheritance, see Suzanne Dixon, "Family Finances: Tullia and Terentia," *Antichthon* 18 (1984): 78-101, J.A. Crook, "Women in Roman Succession," in Beryl Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspective* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 58-82, John Evans, *War, Women and Children in Ancient Rome* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 71-83; on the recovery of heritable property, see Jane Gardner, "The Recovery of Dowry in Roman Law," *Classical Quarterly* 35 (1985): 449-453; on dotal property (including money, land, farms, buildings, livestock, slaves, gold, clothing, jewelry, household goods, and more), see Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian* (Oxford: Oxford University Place, 1991), 323-364—women retained significant property rights, except in the increasingly uncommon *manus* marriage.

[90] For the fluidity of the concept, see Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 108-109, Gerhard Fröhlich, "Kapital, Habitus, Feld, Symbol: Grundbegriffe der Kulturtheorie bei Pierre Bourdieu," in Mört, Fröhlich (eds.), *Das Symbolische Kapital der Lebensstile*, 35, Flaig, "Habitus, Mentalitäten und die Frage des Subjekts: Kulturelle Orientierungen Sozialen Handelns," 362.

[91] Egon Flaig, "Politisierte Lebensführung und Ästhetische Kultur: eine Semiotische Untersuchung am Römischen Adel, *Historische Anthropologie* 1 (1993): 193-217 was among the first to apply Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital directly to Roman political culture—also his *Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom*, Beck, *Karriere und Hierarchie: die Römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des Cursus Honorum in der Mittleren Republik*, Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, as well as "What's in a Text? *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*—Approaches and Aims Once Again," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 54 (2011), especially 122-123.

censorships—and most of all by winning the right to celebrate triumphs. The subtle gradations in value between different "deposits" created a basis for comparison among senatorial families.[92] The efficacy of this framework relied on an idiom of legitimation actively embraced throughout the elite and accepted by enough of the society to give their symbolic deposits currency. Moreover, in order to derive benefit from symbolic riches, senatorial families depended on consensus about the relative value of the different deposits.[93]

Polybius' description of the *pompa funebris* highlights the essential function of symbolic capital in differentiating the office-holding families from the rest of Roman society, turning the senatorial stratum into a uniquely "honorable," if not necessarily uniquely well-heeled or cultured, subgroup among the aristocrats.[94] We might even say that it was a family's *imagines* and their associated *tituli*—and the history of meritorious deeds and formal tributes by the *populus Romanus* they represented—that constituted its *nobilitas*.[95] Accumulation of symbolic capital within the families whose members had managed to win public honors gave *nobilitas* a heritability of sorts. Indeed, to a degree, this heritability extended to the women of office holding families, with their inheritance of *imagines* from their male forebears granting them a share in "senatorial" status.[96] But for men and women alike, this heritability was always subject to diminution and decay, and each generation of *nobiles* needed to refill their families' symbolic accounts with new deposits of their own.[97] By extension, the grand total of accumulated family achievement became part of the collective heritage of the families with a history of public achievement, perpetuating the ongoing preeminence of these office-holding families in public affairs.[98]

---

92 Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 109 for gradations and comparability of "deposits."

93 Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Replubic*, 111, 121.

94 Polybius, *Histories* 6.53. Harriet Flower, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) is still the definitive discussion of the *pompa funebris*. On the *laudatio funebris*: Ralph Covino, "The *Laudatio Funebris* as a Vehicle for Praise and Admonition," in Christopher Smith and Ralph Covino (eds.), *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 69-81; also, Flower, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*, 128-158 and Wilhelm Kierdorf, *Laudatio Funebris: Interpretationen und Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der Römischen Leichenrede* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980). The physical *domus* was vital for symbolic self-presentation: Henner Von Hesberg, "Die Häuser der Senatoren in Rom: Gesellschaftliche und Politische Funktion," in Werner Eck, Matthäus Heil (eds.), *Senatores populi Romani: Realität und Mediale Präsentation einer Führungsschicht* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 19-46; Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp, "Das Römische Haus—die Memoria der Mauern," in Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp and Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp (eds.), *Erinnerungsorte der Antike: die Römische Welt* (Munich: Beck, 2006).

95 Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, famously claimed that the whole position of a *nobilis* as such depended on an official *ius imaginum* that he gained as a reward for holding curule office. Flower, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*, 32-59 complicates this picture, arguing convincingly that any formal *ius imaginum* is a modern construction; the use of *imagines* had traditionally been policed within the family, as constrained by social pressure from fellow aristocrats (although under the Principate, it did become subject to more top-down regulation).

96 See Lewis Webb, "Gendering the Roman *Imago*," *Eugesta* 7 (2017): 140-183 making the case that *imagines* (and their accompanying *tituli*) could serve as an inheritance and *dos* for an elite woman—a deposit of symbolic capital, which embodied her social position and status.

97 Cicero's argument in *Pro Murena* showcases this dynamic perfectly. Servius Sulpicius Rufus premised his prosecution of Lucius Licinius Murena for *ambitus* on the idea that the victory of a *novus homo* over a *nobilis* would necessarily require bribery and corruption. Cicero did not question the basic assumption that having curule magistrates among one's ancestors would naturally grant advantage. But he pointed out the antiquity of Rufus' honored forebears and his lack of recent curule ancestors, 16: "Although your nobility is certainly of the loftiest kind, Ser. Sulpicius, nevertheless it is better known to the learned and the historically inclined, but more obscure to the people and to voters. For your father was of equestrian rank, your grandfather distinguished by no particular glory. Thus, memory of your nobility has to be dug out, not from the fresh words of [living] men but from the antiquity of the annals" (*tua vero nobilitas, Ser. Sulpici, tametsi summa est, tamen hominibus litteratis et historicis est notior, populo vero et suffragatoribus obscurior. Pater enim fuit equestri loco, avus nulla inlustri laude celebratus. Itaque non ex sermone hominum recenti sed ex annalium vetustate eruenda memoria est nobilitatis tuae*).

98 This formulation was the subject of contention within the aristocratic community. For instance, as Wolfgang Blösel, "*Mos maiorum*: Von der Familientradition zum Nobilitätsethos," in Bernhard Linke, and Michael Stemmler, Mos maiorum: *Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, 25–97 points out, individual patrician families tried to use their individual family's *maiores* to give themselves a unique

On the one hand, symbolic capital should be viewed as a goal in its own right. One of the main reasons to embark on a public career would have been to accumulate a personal stock of symbolic rewards and to enjoy the attendant glory, as expressed both in particular moments such as triumphs and in generally elevated status and prerogatives granted in venues such as the Senate.[99] As we seek to understand the Republican system of power, it is important to take into account the importance of reputational rewards as goals in themselves. For senators, the publicly granted symbolic spoils of contestation in *res publica* were of special import, since they helped to constitute the unique senatorial brand of *dignitas* and *auctoritas*. On the other hand, symbolic capital could serve as a tool. *Imagines* and the ancestral symbolic resources that they represented gave the men who inherited them an edge in electoral contests, as the *commendatio maiorum* granted advantage in the struggle to win future symbolic deposits.[100] This was a recursive process, with accumulated resources facilitating the capacity of the collector and of his descendants to gain and enjoy further rewards.

Social

The boundaries between the concepts of "symbolic capital" and "social capital" are often left indistinct.[101] But while all "abstract" resources blend into each other to some degree, it will be useful to maintain two discrete conceptual categories. As has become the norm within Roman political culture scholarship, I apply the framework of symbolic capital specifically to those reputational rewards generated by successful action in the theater of *res publica*. By contrast, social capital within the aristocratic community was a matter of relationships and networks, as well as the increased capacity for collective action generated by the existence of a rich web of interpersonal relationships.[102]

Definitions abound in sociology and political theory. Bourdieu's is a useful starting point. He describes social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition."[103] Since then, some scholars have described social capital mainly as a resource possessed by individuals—located in individual personal relationships and networks—while others have highlighted the importance of the collective,

---

superiority. *Novi homines* like Cato the Elder, and later Cicero, actively worked to counter this construction, highlighting the value of the *maiores* of a collected and permeable senatorial stratum, which had room for *novi homines*. Thus, there was some tension between capital accumulation by the individual family and by the Roman community as a whole. This tension was a product, as I suggest, of some of the fundamental challenges faced by an aristocratic community that had developed its core traditions as a limited city-state but that had expanded to embrace elites from a wide range of Italian municipalities.

[99] For an in depth exploration of the triumph, see Mary Beard, *The Roman Triumph* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Ryan, *Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate* for the prerogatives given to senators of different formal grades, 247-293, for the role of *consulares*, with the right to speak first in debate.

[100] On *imagines* and the *commendato maiorum*, see Flower, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*, 60-90, Morstein-Marx, "Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*," especially 273-274, 279, Lauren Kaplow, "Redefining *Imagines*: Ancestor Masks and Political Legitimacy in the Rhetoric of New Men," *Mouseion* 8 (2008): 409-416, Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 121-122.

[101] E.g. Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 107-108: "these two forms can usually hardly be separated or even notionally distinguished."

[102] Social scientists have shown how social capital is key for solving collective action problems—e.g. John Brehm, Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 999-1023 identifies "social capital" as (999) "the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitate resolution of collective action problems." Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) is a classic discussion of the collective action problem; also, Gary Cox, Matthew McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1993).

[103] Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," 249, distinguishing social from "economic" and "cultural" capital.

choosing to emphasize norms and trust over specific personal ties.[104] But in all cases, as sociologist James Coleman notes, visions of social capital share "two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure."[105]

Thus, social capital can either be viewed as the property of individuals and their individual relationships, or of a network, a community, or even an entire civic system. For this dissertation, both conceptions have great utility. With regard to the first, aristocrats built social capital by investing in individual relationships and networks. This investment created conditions of trust that could facilitate collective action among subgroups within the aristocratic community. It enabled cooperation among family members, personal friends, and friends of friends, with these consortia extended (as I will discuss in Chapter 4) by the recommendation process. Social capital, in this sense, facilitated collaboration. Within these smaller subgroups, the search for social capital was not a zero-sum process. Indeed, the social capital of one member increased the capital stocks of his or her fellows. At this scale, however, social capital accumulation can also be seen as a tool for competition, allowing these limited groups to operate under the conditions of internal trust that gave them the cohesion to contend with other analogous units. This is the most common understanding of social capital I employ—the mutually created stock of interpersonal resources shared between personal connections. Moreover, we might view this social capital as at least somewhat heritable, since parents could often pass on to succeeding generations their connections both with peer contacts and with lower-level affiliates.

In addition, the whole community built a joint stock of social capital, at least to the extent that its members were willing to invest in creating conditions of trust. The Republican elite needed to maintain a framework that allowed its members to pursue their own prosperity and to guide the broad direction of the society together. Repeated and continuous social investment in the massive web of personal relationships played a vital role in creating what we might describe as the "system of *fides*" that allowed the aristocratic community to rule as a community.[106] It is with good reason that, when Cicero wanted to undertake "institutional repair work" on a broken system, he wrote his *De Amicitia* and his *De Officiis*.[107]

---

[104] Bourdieu's work has a tendency to emphasize the role of social capital in advancing the particular aims and interests of certain well-networked individuals and groups over others with less social capital—as a consequence, in reproducing inequalities. Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: Americas' Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995): 65–78 put forward a community-based model. He sees social capital more as the resource of an entire community than of individuals or subgroups, facilitating social harmony and the health of the society, rather than the success of some groups at the expense of others, see also his *Making Democracies Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995) presents another influential community-wide approach.

[105] James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95–120.

[106] Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, "Social Capital and Community Governance," *The Economic Journal* 112 (2002): 419–436, emphasizing that the behaviors necessary for community governance (419) "trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one's community and to punish those who do not…were recognized as essential ingredients of good governance among classical thinkers from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Burke." They draw a contrast with the model of *homo economicus* that has come to dominate modern theory. Good formal rules are now usually privileged over virtue and citizen training.

[107] This agenda is especially clear in *De Officiis*. Barlow, "Cicero on Property and the State," makes the essential point that Cicero was pushing back against a tide of (230) "individualism, economic or political," also pointing out that Cicero was responding to a set of immediate conditions that undermined *fides*—(220) "[Caesar] rewarding political loyalty with the confiscated estates of fellow citizens undermined the trust (fides) that is fundamental to the polity." E.M. Atkins, "*Domina et Regina Virtutum*: Justice and *Societas* in *De Officiis*," *Phronesis* 35 (1990): 258-289 discusses the role the concept of *fides* plays in the text—it means "credit" simply, but also as (68) "mutual trust and trustworthiness, [*fides*] is the cement of society…the strength of relationships that enable individuals to cooperate in a common life." Atkins argues moreover (279) that Cicero, "since he articulates the details of the justice whose role is to foster *societas*, quite rightly describes it as a *fundamentum*

These two texts represented an exhortation to invest in social capital and also a lesson in how to do so—both the in social capital of the personal network and in that of the entire community.

Ethical

Ethical capital is the social credit built up through virtuous and trustworthy behavior. To operate effectively within the aristocratic system of power—a framework dependent on trust and collaboration—a participant had to build up a reputation. Each member of the community had to cultivate a personal, social reputation as a good faith operator, constituted by and stored in the favorable opinion of other actors. This form of resource is intimately connected with both symbolic and social capital, but it is worth distinguishing as a separate category. Within the context of this project, it will be useful to define symbolic capital as a reputational stock derived from successful engagement with *res publica*, while social capital was a kind of asset centered in the reciprocal awareness of the utility of ongoing social trust and collaboration. Ethical capital can be viewed as an analog to symbolic capital, in the sense that it was concerned with reputation. But while symbolic capital was a matter of "public" reputation, ethical capital was a force within personal networks. Moreover, as much as ethical capital helped aristocrats in the process of creating social capital, it can be defined as the personal reputation that helped give an individual social credit, rather than the stocks of mutual obligation and affection stored in specific relationships.

Like social capital, too, ethical capital was not zero-sum, and friends, family members, and allies could assist each other in its creation with impunity. In fact, by helping each other build reputations for "goodness," the members of a network could create a "tide that lifted all boats," with family members and *amici* reflecting and advertising one another's moral reputation, both in speech and in text. Indeed, ethical capital can be viewed as property held both by individuals and by groups—families and even networks of allies and friends. The ethical capital of these individuals and groups alike helped them undertake collective action with other actors and groups in the system. This is not to say that there might not be a competitive element. Connections helped each other accumulated ethical resources, but this did not prevent individuals from striving to achieve the highest level of such assets for themselves. Beyond this, we often see competition among groups for moral superiority.

Ethical capital can also be viewed both as a reward and as a tool. Personal recognition by fellow members of the aristocratic community should itself be conceived as one of the key goals of engagement with the aristocratic community's complex system of social and financial power. On a basic level, it was desirable in itself to be considered virtuous. Aristocrats wanted to have their virtues reflected in the words of their fellows and monumentalized in their texts. In addition, a high "ethical credit score" created the social trust that allowed the individuals and groups to operate with greater efficacy in social and financial transactions—a capacity essential for the exercise of influence. Furthermore, ethical capital could be passed across generations, if again only imperfectly, parental virtue providing the succeeding generation with the "seed" for acceptance and trust within the community's transactional web.[108]

---

iustitiae." Throughout the article, Atkins emphasizes the priority on social bonding (the creation of social capital, that is) as central to Cicero's treatment of ideal virtues.

[108] Beverley Williams, Lesa Woodby, Patricia Drentea, "Ethical Capital: 'What's a Poor Man Got to Leave?'," *Sociology of Health & Illness* 32 (2010): 880–897 describes an analogous phenomenon with poor people in modern times, who, in the absence of the financial resources to leave an inheritance to children, hope "to leave loved ones some form of ethical

Knowledge

Knowledge capital, the final category, played an indispensable role in elite differentiation and in the perpetuation of status across generations.[109] Various knowledge resources were essential both to aristocratic activity and identity: intellectual and cultural knowledge; the social knowledge that facilitated participation in aristocratic society; and the skills and understanding necessary for aristocratic business and finance, military leadership, and successful engagement with civic institutions. Knowledge capital is a concept often discussed as a property of modern firms, corporations, and organizations.[110] In a similar manner, within Roman aristocratic families and networks, the community stored the practical, social, and cultural knowledge that allowed individuals and groups to flourish and helped the entire aristocratic community differentiate itself from the rest of society.

Concern shared by a family's adult members for the whole group's reputation and status could inspire passionate preoccupation with the education and training of children—with conveying knowledge capital to worthy heirs. In elite families, parents traditionally took a primary role in their children's education, usually with the aid of tutors. While aristocrats sometimes supplemented household-based education with public classes, the family served as the center point for what Anthony Corbeill has labeled "citizen training."[111] Since Rome had no publicly sponsored education, acquisition of knowledge, training in skills useful for the exercise of influence, and cultivation in decorous self-presentation all began within the aristocratic *domus*.[112] A system of intergenerational mentorship, exemplified by *tirocinium fori* and *tirocinium militiae*, also facilitated knowledge transfer, allowing the community to

---

currency to facilitate interactions with others." In Rome's aristocratic community, a text might be a vehicle for transmitting ethical capital across generations. Consider Cicero how dedicated his *De Officiis* to his son. In the preface, Cicero catalogued his own virtues and contributions to the society, and he made a show of passing on this ethical competency with the text, testimony to readers that the young man would grow into an ethical actor like his father. Fannie Lemoine, "Parental Gifts: Father-Son Dedications and Dialogues in Roman Didactic Literature," *Illinois Classical Studies* 16 (1991): 337-366 explores the traditional practice among authors of didactic texts of dedicating their works to their sons, also for paternal dedications, Robert Kaster, *Guardians of Language* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1988), 66-68.

109 Eric Hanushek, Ludger Woessmann, *The Knowledge Capital of Nations: Education and the Economics of Growth* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2015) provides an introduction to "knowledge capital" as used in the business and economic development literatures, arguing for the close link between the success of a community and its stored intellectual resources.

110 Blandine Laperche, *Enterprise Knowledge Capital* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017) provides an up to date treatment of the modern literature on this subject.

111 Anthony Corbeill, "Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions," in Yun Lee Too, *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 261-288 for education as "citizen training," with an emphasis on utility and civic applications (e.g. the art of oratory was embraced while literature, art, and music were deemphasized as core elements of primary curriculum). For parents as educators, Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 20.4; for Greek educators, *Aemilius Paulus* 6.9; for tutors in the home, Stanley Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 20-33.

112 As Cicero had Scipio Aemilianus assert in *De Republica* IV.III: "our people did not want there to be one system of learning for free-born boys fixed or marked out by law or laid out publicly or uniformly in all cases, a matter upon which the Greeks have expended much vain labor, and the one matter in which our guest-friend Polybius berates the negligence of our institutions" (*disciplinam puerilem ingenuis, de qua Graeci multum frustra laborarunt, et in qua una Polybius noster hospes nostrorum institutorum neglegentiam accusat, nullam certam aut destinatam legibus aut publice expositam aut unam omnium esse voluerunt*). Even once some public classes and lectures became available at a secondary level, these could only benefit a privileged minority who had already mastered a preliminary curriculum available only in the home. Suetonius, *De Grammaticis* 3-5 gives evidence for the beginning of publicly available instruction in the first century BCE; with Robert Kaster, *Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80-82 and 107-109. The censorial edict from 92 that prohibited Latin rhetorical training was in line with this trend—Suetonius, *De Rhetoribus* 1 describes censorial and senatorial pronouncements against Latin rhetoricians. Since non-elite actors could far more easily absorb training offered in Rome's native language, Latin education represented a threat to elite differentiation. But Greek learning remained an elite possession: it could only facilitate differentiation, however, if preliminary access could be kept under the auspices of the family.

perpetuate elevated status across generations.[113] Aristocrats required high levels of knowledge simply to act and speak like aristocrats, and to engage in basic elite activities such as managing business enterprises and transactions, running for office, serving as advocates, commanding armies, and administering *provinciae*. In broad terms, this knowledge was the proprietary stock of the whole aristocratic community, including sub-elites who participated in elite discourse such as Greek intellectuals and freedmen. But simultaneously, the possession of intellectual resources could help the community's subgroups in their attempts to get ahead at the expense of their fellows.

Capital and Community

It was the possession of stocks of these five forms of capital that granted entrée to the society's decision-making community. We must emphasize, however, that each member of the community did not need to possess significant personal stocks of all five forms. A senatorial man who managed vast assets, won his way up the ranks of the *cursus honorum*, celebrated a triumph, built peer and asymmetric social connections, worked to construct and perform his moral quality, and spent his *otium* on textual production and exchange, might have possessed a balanced suite of all of the forms. But such a comprehensive portfolio was by no means necessary for participation in the ruling regime. For example, as much as an equestrian operator might not possess symbolic capital of his own, his financial resources, social network, reputation as a good faith operator, erudition, and business know-how could grant him a level of influence in the community's personal networks to rival even a high-level senator. The forms of capital were not perfectly commensurable, but this diversity in the kinds of assets allowed for a degree of "portfolio specialization."

This paradigm also helps explain the role of women, freedmen, and Greek intellectuals. Female actors could themselves hold capital stocks sufficient to participate as "aristocrats" in their own right, capable of using social networks, personal reputations, and intellectual and cultural resources to influence events. Indeed, if we follow Lewis Webb's argument, they could even possess symbolic capital of their own, if only by inheritance.[114] The sub-elite participants in the network also qualified for partial membership in the community as a result of their own possession of capital stocks. Freedmen and Greek intellectuals possessed social capital invested in personal bonds with senators and equestrians. In addition, each of these groups could possess knowledge that helped grant them voice in elite conversations—about property management for freedmen, for instance, and literature and philosophy for Greek intellectuals.

Through her social capital, a woman might be able to exercise more sway than certain high-level men; a freedman might serve a decisive function in financial arrangements; and a Greek intellectual might be able to sway conversations between high-level Romans about the appropriate moral direction of the polity. The aristocratic men dominated the more overt aspects of power, of course, especially the senators. But by looking at this system through the lens of capital stocks, we can derive a more subtly differentiated vision of what it meant to have and to wield power within this structure. In this context, no clear boundary

---

[113] On the intergenerational transfer of knowledge in the ancient world, see the contributions in Therese Fuhrer, Almut-Barbara Renger (ed.), *Performanz von Wissen: Strategien der Wissensvermittlung in der Vormoderne* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2012), especially in this context, Fabian Goldbeck, "Strategien der Wissensvermittlung in Rom: Zum sog. *Tirocinium Fori* in der Späten Republik und der Frühen Kaiserzeit," 71-93. Maurizio Bianco, "Il *tirocinium adulescentiae*," in Thomas Baier (ed.), *Generationenkonflikte auf der Bühne: Perspektiven im Antiken und Mittelalterlichen Drama* (Tübingen: Narr, 2007), 113-126 highlights the role of *tirocinium* as a force for aristocratic integration within the community (focusing on the Principate, but the conclusions are nonetheless relevant).

[114] Webb, "Gendering the Roman *Imago*."

separated social, financial, and informational power from "political" power, and there were no purely "political" rewards.

This paradigm can do important work in helping us understand the practical nature of the late Republican aristocratic regime. In a sense, the system was circular. Power was the product of the possession of these tangible and intangible assets, but it was also exercised, perhaps even exclusively, in service of the acquisition of further "deposits." The individuals and groups engaged with this landscape were not personally trying to "rule." Instead, we should imagine that they were working to acquire material and symbolic rewards for themselves, their families, and their networks of intimates. Once they had acquired a respectable payout for themselves and their collection of intimates among their contemporaries, they prioritized passing on a "nest egg" of material and abstract resources to successors. These aristocrats were engaging in collective action to accomplish highly personal goals. As a result of the fact that many of these rewards only existed as the product of the network—and not only the obvious reputational and social assets, but also the debt-based financial assets rooted in social trust—this framework perpetuated collaboration, helping to transform a community into a governing structure.

Social Institutions

Thus far, I have proposed that the late Republican regime operated as a system of rule by a community, acting as a community, with the collective action of the participants directed at and facilitated by material and abstract resources. My purpose in this project is to begin to explicate how community rule—by and through these five forms of capital—operated in practice. To understand the character of the system, it will be most useful to place its social institutions in the foreground of analysis. They provided a sort of "functional constitution" for this system.

Institutions are the formal and informal rules and norms, which coordinate social, political, and economic relations.[115] While institutions are made manifest by people and organizations, they are the rules themselves, providing structure and shaping action, but not identical with their concrete products.[116] They lead to enduring patterns of behavior, but

---

[115] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) is one of the seminal accounts of institutions and institutional change in the social science literature, building on foundational work in Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Francesco Guala, *Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) for a theory that covers not only social and informal institutions, but also formal ones. Gretchen Helmke, Steven Levitsky, "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda," *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (2004): 725-740 for a summary of the literature on informal institutions. Sue Unsworth, *An Upside Down View of Governance* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2010) investigates the interaction of formal and informal institution, exploring a flipped perspective where priority is placed on informal rather than formal institutions—a model with useful implications for the project of this dissertation. Geoffrey Hodgson, "What Are Institutions?," *Journal of Economic Issues* 40 (1): 1–25 is another of the important treatment of the question of definition, defining institutions as "the systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interaction," and see his "On Defining Institutions: Rules versus Equilibria," *Journal of Institutional Economics* 11 (2015): 497–505 on whether we should conceive of institutions as rules or equilibria.

[116] On institutions and organizations, North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, 3-5. See also, Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) frame the distinction between institutions and organizations well: institutions are the (15) "patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships of individuals. Institutions include formal rules, written laws, formal social conventions, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs about the world, as well as means of enforcement." Organizations "consist of specific groups of individuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior." Avner Grief, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) points out that organizations contain their own internal institutional structure. Thus, the two terms can describe different conceptual facets of the same phenomena.

while they can exert action-guiding force by molding incentives and habits, they are not impossible to transcend. Because they are perpetuated by self-willed agents, they change over time, reformed by the actions and decisions of the people implicated.[117] Roman society as a whole was organized by a multifarious social framework, including institutions mediating relationships of extreme status disparity, such as slavery and *patrocinium-clientela*. But for understanding the practice of power within the aristocratic regime, it will be of most use to focus on the institutions mediating the community's internal dynamics. Indeed, I also suggest, as will become relevant to my argument on a few occasions throughout the dissertation, that the "aristocratic network" as such, and even the aristocratic community as a whole, might be viewed as social institutions. That is to say, personal networks, as well as the entire social landscape, were "supposed" to work in certain ways. Aristocrats were guided by these norms, and they could also take advantage of institutionalized expectations as they designed actions and social strategies. Aristocrats knew, for instance, specifically how news travelled through personal networks within the community, and they could anticipate how a new marriage bond would create change in the landscape of alignments.

The links within and between family units provided a substrate for alignment and collective action, and they furnished a framework for the bequest of resources across generations. A basic understanding of the institutional role of the aristocratic family will be essential to the argument presented in the chapters that follow. I have chosen, however, to focus on relationships of *amicitia*, which were pervasive and powerful, but at the same time fluid. Thus, *amicitia* acted as one of the most useful structures for organizing interchange. The ideology and practice of this institution set the terms for the dynamics of social power and thus, as I argue, for the function of the regime. Both as social practice and as theoretical ideal, the multifaceted institution of *amicitia* helped define what it meant for Rome's system of power to exist as a "Republic."

Families

The "family organization" arrayed around each adult male aristocrat—the "family unit" or *domus*—acted as the basic subgroup for collective action in Rome's system of power.[118] Bound by a mixture of institutionalized commitment and personal affection, at least ideally, it could provide each member of the aristocratic community with a nucleus of trustworthy cooperation in the midst of a sea of uncertainty and contestation.[119] Such a consortium was composed of a range of actors. The *domus* was not limited to the "reproductive triad" of husband, wife, and children, and each family unit tended to include a diverse cast of dependents and subordinates.[120] Sibling bonds, marriages, and adoptions

---

117 On institutional change, North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, 3; see also, Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*.

118 *Domus* is perhaps the most useful single Latin terms for this collective. As Treggiari, *Servilia and Her Family* puts it (24): "*domus*, 'house' or 'household', sometimes covered the group of relations which lived together, but included staff and other inhabitants." As Richard Saller, *Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 80-88 notes, the expansion in the usage of the word *domus* to include extended family is mostly post-Republican (as in the "house of the Claudii").

119 Both Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian* (Oxford: Oxford University Place, 1991), 229-253 and Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 83-90 argue that concepts sometimes considered "modern"—such as affection and the sentimental view of the family—were pervasive in the Roman world and prevalent in Roman marriages and between parents and children.

120 Treggiari, *Servilia and Her Family*, 23 notes that the word *familia* did not refer specifically to this reproductive triad, and that the Romans had no more convenient term than *coniunx/uxor liberi[que]* to describe this small collective. The term *familia* had different connotations, meaning, according to the *OLD* either "all persons subject to the control of one man, a household" (hence excluding wives who were not in *manus*), "the slaves of a household," or more generally, "a body of persons closely associated by blood or affinity." Beyond the aristocratic members of the *domus*-based organization, there

could join personal organizations of various *patres familias* into multi-household consortia, capable of undertaking long-term collaboration and collective action.[121] These groups cooperated in the acquisition, redeployment, and inheritance of social, symbolic, ethical, and knowledge capital; and the adult members worked together to nurture and educate children as ready to inherit these accumulated resources. Financial collaboration, too, was essential, arguably the primary practical function of the family "firm."[122] Within the aristocratic system, we should not view any goals or priorities as entirely separate from family interests. Collaboration and contention for power, both in *res publica* and behind the scenes, amounted to an ongoing effort to accumulate material and abstract resources for the family and to pass them on to heirs raised as worthy representatives of the family "brand."

While all social institutions are inevitably unstable—the product of the behavior of their participants—bonds within and between families did often take on special priority as guiding structures within the aristocratic community. Furthermore, the aristocratic *patres familiae* participated in a shared enterprise of "collective parenting" for the rising generation. This helped to create, in turn, what we might envision as a kind of "family consciousness," shared among the community's family consortia. While in practice, the aristocratic community was no big happy family, this "collective parenting" nonetheless helped to strength the sense, not only within subgroups but also throughout the community as a whole, that the Italy-wide elite shared priorities.

On its surface, this argument about the centrality of family recalls Münzer's model of "factions" or "parties" formed by and around the great patrician and plebeian *gentes*. But this resemblance only extends as far as the choice to centralize the family, as a defining factor in system of power. Münzer's "parties" emerged from the loftiest *gentes* and families, which he believed shared self-evident solidarity, and from the links these families built with other "clans" of *nobiles* through alliances of marriage and adoption.[123] This limited band conspired to dominate elections to the consulship, which he and his followers viewed as preeminent. By giving priority to a single executive office, as both goal and instrument of power, Münzer and his successors felt empowered to map the contours of the system of power with prosopographic studies of consular lists.

---

was also a kaleidoscopic cast of non-aristocratic participants. Cicero's own family organization is a case in point. Susan Treggiari, *Terentia, Tullia and Publilia: The Women of Cicero's Family* (London/New York: Routledge, 2007), notes the range of slaves belonging to each of the adult members of the family (see 33, 37, 43, 50-51, 58, 81, 107, and 160); freedmen/women (10, 81); and a panorama of other ongoing participants in *domus* life (e.g. *clientes* 14, 37-38; a doctor 101-102, 111, 139). Each of the adult members of the organization had especially trusted freedman agents of their own—e.g. Tiro (Cicero), Philotimus (Terentia). Henrik Mouritsen, *The Freedman in the Roman World*, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) is useful on the role and status of such freedmen. Keith Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 181 notes that while relationships between husbands and wives or parents and children do not have to be minimized, "those bonds did not necessarily have, at all times and in all cases, an absolute and exclusive primacy in the Roman family mentality."

121 Cynthia Bannon, *The Brothers of Romulus: Fraternal Pietas in Roman Law, Literature, and Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) highlights the tradition of effective collaboration within fraternal consortia. Moreover, the marriage bond between Quintus and Atticus' sister Pomponia helped link the two families more closely, giving them a mutual investment in the propagation of capital stocks across generations. On adoption as a mechanism for inter-family collaboration, see Mireille Corbier, "Divorce and Adoption as Roman Familial Strategies," in Beryl Rawson (ed.), *Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome* (1991), 47-78, Christiane Kunst, *Römische Adoption: Zur Strategie einer Familienorganisation* (Hennef: Clauss, 2005); Hugh Lindsay, *Adoption in the Roman World* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) provides a social and legal account of Roman adoption, along with a cross-cultural comparison; Jane Gardner, *Family and* Familia *in Roman Law and Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1998, 114-208 offers a keen analysis of adoption as a legal mechanism for reshaping the *familia* at will.

122 Richard Saller, "The Roman Family as a Productive Unit," in Beryl Rawson (ed.), *A Companion to Families in the Greek and Roman Worlds* (West Sussex: Blackwell, 2011), 116-128 points to the economic centrality of the family as the primary vehicle for the transmission both of property and of the knowledge undergirding production and income generation.

123 The term "clan" here is translating the German *Geschlecht*/Latin *gens*, often used interchangeably by Münzer.

By contrast, I propose that the aristocratic community's family groupings constantly constituted and reconstituted their boundaries, as they worked to collaborate in service of varied aims. Within certain limits—remarkably flexible, as we will see—the shapes and sizes of these groups fluctuated continuously, as did their goals. Even biological ties could sometimes be fallible. After all, even such supposedly "natural" links were still subject to the social choices of self-willed agents.[124] There was a "factionalism" of sorts within the late Republican elite, although I choose to avoid the term in the account that follows. But instead of a fixed "parties," what we encounter is an interpersonal system that never remained static.[125] Münzer's portrait of the aristocratic family, both of the individual family units and of the alignments between them, displays a lack of fluidity. I propose that such an inert vision is misleading. In addition, his reductionist vision of their dominant goals—the consulship, specifically, and public affairs more generally—leaves much of the activity and motivation of the ruling community out of the picture.

But like Münzer, I grant that family was a structuring principle for the social system. Family bonds, both constructed and innate, provided fundamental institutional guidelines for alignment and behavior. Moreover, many family clusters had significant staying power. As a result, consideration for family could move policy—concern for immediate family, as well as solidarity among the members of broader groups linked by descent, marriage, and adoption. Power players often made the decisions that shaped public affairs guided by the interests of their kin and by pressures arising from these networks.

It is important to emphasize, too, that a range of individuals helped shape and define families' priorities and concerns; not merely the *patres familias*, but men and women from various generations. These individual figures and their own personal concerns were not compelled blindly by family interests or subsumed entirely into the group. Thus, each full-grown aristocratic male acted as a central, but not altogether dominant, figure in his own personal family organization, which was a variegated micro-coalition of relatives, slaves, freedmen, as well as other less permanent members of the household such as Greek philosophers, doctors, or young aristocratic mentees. The interests and priorities of such groups were the product of interchange among the whole range of actors. Each organization was bound, in turn, to the analogous consortia surrounding other adult males to whom its central actor was connected by blood, marriage, or adoption, or by intergenerational mentorship or *amicitia*.[126] This process scaled up, as groups came together for collective action on a larger scale. The personal priorities of these groups combined to set the agenda for the entire civic community.

A fluid system of bonds among families organized the aristocratic community's social landscape, with *domus*-based units serving as the nodes in the networks of loyalty, trust, and obligation. As much as, at times, this mutability could cause ruptures, it also facilitated collaboration and connection. Using socially institutionalized bonds to join previously

---

[124] This turned out to be especially true during the early 40s, when civil war shook the community. The aristocratic community's whole framework of social institutions began to appear fragile, and even carefully guarded family organizations such as Cicero's threatened to crumble. Cicero's divorce with Terentia and tensions with his brother Quintus and his nephew Quintus *minor* can all be viewed as products of the tensions of the civil war years, which presented extraordinary challenges to the institutional structure of the system.

[125] Hölkeskamp, "Fact(ions) or Fiction? Friedrich Münzer and the Aristocracy of the Roman Republic: Then and Now," 98-100 points to an awareness of this fluidity by some of Münzer's followers, highlighting Alan Astin and Erich Gruen. My argument is in line with the fluidity highlighted in these works, but I distance myself from the priority placed on magistracies.

[126] Keith Bradley, "Fictive Families: Family and Household in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius," *Phoenix* 54 (2000): 282-308 paints an illuminating portrait of such a complex network of *agnati* and *cognati*.

separate groups, *domus*-based consortia could construct the broader landscape of interconnection, and thus, as I argue, of power. These groups were often at odds and in competition, but the possibility remained that new marriages, adoptions, or mentorship links might join unaligned groups as members of the same extended familial collective.

"Family interests" and "public policy goals" can be difficult to distinguish in this system. To a large extent, family goals—accumulation of heritable stocks of symbolic and financial capital, for instance—were the agendas contested in *re publica*. I do not suggest a "party" model in any strong sense, but to the limited extent we can speak of agenda-setting "parties," these were indistinguishable from the networks of *domus*-based consortia, connected into broader constellations both by familial links, and more flexibly, and hence more frequently, by bonds of *amicitia*.[127]

Amicitia

Amicitia was an essential social institution within the aristocratic community, linking both individuals and the *domus*-based organizations that formed the subunits of aristocratic society.[128] It is my core priority, in this dissertation, to show how *amicitia* operated as a social institution, mediating the personal alignments and interchange that were essential to the function of the system of power.[129] The institution helped create conditions in which a community of aristocrats, varying widely in origin and formal rank, could collaborate to exercise sway over Roman society. In seeking to understand a political regime, it is essential to engage both with its functional character and its theoretical framing. I will make the case that not only as a social practice, but also as an idealizing discourse, *amicitia* played a central role in defining the unique character of the "Republican" system of power. Thus, *amicitia* was integral to Rome's distinctive species of "Republicanism."

Lily Ross Taylor famously described *amicitia* as "the good old word for party politics."[130] She made the case that *amicitiae* were nothing more than patron-client relationships dressed up euphemistically as "friendships," and that the system was basically a mechanism to win elections. Brunt attacked this model, questioning the close connection between *amicitiae* and voting.[131] The premise is now widely accepted that electoral results were not directly correlated with tallies of *amici*, but there is still debate as to whether we should emphasize the personal and affective side of *amicitia* or place political utility (narrowly

---

127 There has been extensive discussion of the agenda power of parties in modern political science literature. While, of course, the institutional structures were radically different, we might see families and groups of families in the late Republican system as filling this particular function of modern parties—see Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) with references; also their *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, esp. 233-278.

128 As Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," *Apeiron* 23: 165-185 puts it (166): "Friendship as analyzed by Cicero is, among other things, a mechanism for the distribution of power between and within small subsets of the Roman aristocratic elite." I address the question of definition for the term *amicitia* below, but for now, I should note that I will use the term "friendship" as a synonym for *amicitia* throughout the dissertation. This is an imperfect analog, but not entirely misleading—addressed by Craig Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-62 and Paul Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 28-76.

129 Christian Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," *Ciceroniana on line* I, 2 (2017): 343-367 comes perhaps closest, working on drawing up a schematic picture of the practice and the practical utility of aristocratic friendship in the late Republic. This is an important step, and altogether in line with my agenda in this project.

130 Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*, 8, in a like manner, Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, 157 called *amicitia* a "weapon of politics."

131 Peter Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, already anticipated, to a degree, by Meier, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der Späten Römischen Republik*.

defined) at the foreground of our analysis.[132] *Amicitia* plays such a prominent role in sources of all genres that there has been little doubt as to its importance in Republican society. It is only relatively recently, however, that scholars have begun to provide more satisfying answers to questions about how to understand its role more systematically, locating and beginning to map its role in social and also economic relations.[133] I propose in this dissertation that this was a system in which there was no sharp distinction between "personal" and "political" goals, strategies, or venues. According to such a frame, the contrast that has long exercised scholars between "personal" and "political" *amicitia* retains little of its meaning.

Personal amicable links—between peers and near-peers, as well as between actors divided by various degrees of asymmetry—were essential for organizing alignments and coalitions; for coordinating collective action within and between fluid subgroups; and for constructing, deconstructing, and reconstructing hierarchies. Alongside devices such as marriages and adoptions, which entailed more concrete commitments, friendship was one of the vital institutional mechanisms channeling the social dynamics of Rome's ruling community. Since it was more versatile than these familial bonds, *amicitia* played a commensurately more active role in mediating the fluid dynamics of aristocratic interchange.[134] The informal, trust-dependent character of friendship, as one of the few human relationships not mediated by exogenous rules, made it flexible.[135] But, at the same time, this quality left the institution with an inevitable fragility.

Friendship was not merely a mechanism for coordinating between the interests of different individuals and groups; it also created its own set of considerations and priorities. These were rooted, as I contend, in personal responsibilities to *amici* and their associates, on the one hand, and in the effort to live up to exemplary models of virtuous friendship, on the other, in a collaborative effort to accumulate social and ethical capital.[136] The individual interests of friends became matters of keen concern, as did the goal of building up a reputation for virtuous participation in idealized *amicitiae*.

Social performance was essential to aristocratic *amicitia*.[137] The actions undertaken in these relationships need to be viewed as display, designed for consumption both by the

---

[132] For the wide acceptance of Brunt's basic premise, see e.g. Christian Rollinger, *Amicitia Sanctissime Colenda: Freundschaft Und Soziale Netzwerke in Der Spaten Republik* (Heidelberg: Verlag Antike 2014), although Jörg Spielvogel, *Amicitia und Res Publica: Ciceros Maxime Während der Innenpolitischen Auseinandersetztugen der Jahre 59-50* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993) still saw a closer link than Brunt.

[133] Verboven, *The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic* was a pioneer in this new attempt to map what we might view as the Roman community's "social economy." Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," seeks to begin to map the catalog of *officia* that friends owed each other.

[134] In social scientific language, friendship is a "voluntary" and "achieved" relationship, involving a degree of choice and will, as opposed to an "ascribed" bond such as kinship, which is assigned by external circumstances. For these distinctions, see Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship*, 23, Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 33-38.

[135] Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 38-45 underlines the informal and trust dependent character of friendship.

[136] *Inimicitae*, by reflection, could also create their own priorities, which sometimes contradicted other interests (e.g. policies); David Epstein, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43*, (London: Croom-Helm, 1987), (2) points out that *inimicitae* could create "uncharacteristic or apparently unprofitable conduct" inexplicable without the relational, personal context. *Amicitiae* and *inimicitae* alike acted as institutional guides to behavior, sometimes capable of superseding other priority-setting mechanisms.

[137] Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," 347-351, for instance, highlights the performative character of *amicitia*. Paul Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) discusses ancient friendship as social performance and relates this discussion to modern sociology literature. Brian Krostenko, *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001) is the essential treatment of social performance in late Republican aristocratic culture.

"internal" audience within the friendship and by an "external" audience of other actual and potential connections.[138] The participants in friendships showed off virtues to one another, and they helped each other establish an image of ethical quality recognized by a wider community.[139] Behavior within friendships was closely scrutinized. Virtuous conduct was praised, even as ingratitude and apathy were quickly censured. Social and moral reputation—perhaps best encapsulated by the word *existimatio*—existed as a product of such display.

Amicitia had important institutional functions, nourishing networks and facilitating the effective exercise of personal power. One of its roles was in the distribution of scarce economic resources, both within the aristocratic community and between elite and non-elite members of Roman society, mediating the flow of financial capital through debt and credit, auctions, and inheritances. There is still much to be said concerning the interconnection between economic and social power, as well as the links between the nature of the financial transactional system and the language and ideology of social power. Nonetheless, scholars over the past two decades have made a strong start, and as a consequence, while financial capital will appear throughout this study, I have chosen not to make it my primary focus of the current study.[140] I concentrate instead on social power, and on social and reputational resources and goals. By giving aristocrats an idiom that helped them identify with their fellows, *amicitia* helped them to recognize and acknowledge—and at times to create—contacts with aligned concerns, who shared their perspective on proper values and standards of conduct. By facilitating the development of such a sense of "identity," *amicitia* helped aristocrats use associates as trustworthy power resources. Ideally, mutual aid would create a recursive virtuous cycle of affection and respect.[141]

Aristocratic power depended, to a large extent, on personal presence. Thus, it was sharply restricted by the practical constraints of time and space.[142] But the sense of identity created by *amicitia* gave its practitioners a chance to transcend these limitations, if through a kind of social fiction. If an aristocrat saw a friend as sufficiently similar to himself, he could trust him to act as a stand-in—to make his power manifest by an act of "impersonation." Thus, by extending the reach of personal presence, *amicitia* allowed each friend's personal power to expand by an order of magnitude.

---

138 On the one hand, this performance took place in physical venues. Much of it can be viewed almost as "set piece" ritual—morning greeting ceremonies (*salutationes*), dinner parties (*convivia*), one friend accompanying the other to the *forum* (*deductio*), or displays of idle walking through the city (*adsectatio*). For the rituals, see Fabian Goldbeck, *Salutationes: die Morgenbegrüßungen in Rom in der Republik und der Frühen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010), Dirk Schnurbusch, Convivium: *Form und Bedeutung Aristokratischer Geselligkeit in der Römischen Antike* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011), Christian Rollinger, *Amicitia Sanctissime Colenda: Freundschaft Und Soziale Netzwerke in Der Spaten Republik* (Heidelberg: Verlag Antike 2014), 133-179; for the movements, Timothy O'Sullivan, *Walking in Roman Culture* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Ida Östenberg, Simon Malmberg, Jonas Bjørnebye (eds.), *The Moving City: Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome* (London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), especially 13-22, Elke Hartmann, *Ordnung in Unordnung: Kommunikation, Konsum und Konkurrenz in der Stadtrömischen Gesellschaft der Frühen Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2016), 94-102. On the other hand, this took place in texts, including in letters—a process discussed further below.

139 Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 37 notes the competitive element of friendship—what Cicero would describe in his *De Amicitia* as an *honesta certatio*.

140 See especially, Verboven, *The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*, Rollinger, *Solvendi Sunt Nummi: die Schuldenkultur der Späten Römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros*, Ioannatou, *Affaires d'Argent dans la Correspondance de Cicéron. L'Aristocratie Sénatoriale Face à ses Dettes*, "Liens d'Amitié et Opérations de Crédit à la Fin de la République Romaine," "Le Code de l'Honneur des Paiements: Créanciers et Débiteurs à la Fin de la République Romaine."

141 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1990) contains one of the most important sociological discussions of cyclic reciprocity in friendship, see especially 122-123.

142 Thomas Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 103 points this out in another context, discussing the text (rather than the *amicus*) as an expansion of that presence: "aristocratic power depends on the presence of the aristocrat." It makes sense that, in a culture of power rooted in personal presence, aristocrats would have sought various ways to extend that most precious of power resources.

One of the central pillars of the idealizing discourse of *amicitia* in the late Republic (a discourse I treat a greater length later in this introduction) was the conceit that friends should be so similar that they were like "second selves." But this was more than merely an element in the rhetoric of friendship. I will argue that "second selfhood"—both when evoked explicitly and as it appeared more subtly as part of the practice of *amicitia*—played a key role in the nature of aristocratic power and in the social function of political practice. The idealizing frame helped transform aristocratic friendships into more secure and trustworthy power resources, both by facilitating greater emotional association between the *amici* and by making the participants commit to such identification before an audience.

The "second self" model is not unique to Roman *amicitia*—it drew in part on the Greek philosophical tradition.[143] But we can imagine how the conditions of Roman politics, especially the geographic spread of the polity, gave it an exceptional utility. As a result, the conceit acted as a "socio-political institution" to a far greater extent than it would have in the Greek world. Indeed, as will become clear in the chapters that follow, this mechanism was an essential structure of power, allowing Rome's aristocratic community to exercise collaborative hegemony over the city of Rome and the territory under its sway. It helped aristocrats cope with the complexities and practical demands of political, social, and economic interests that reached across the extended polity of the late Republic's expanding imperial system.[144] Since personal presence was required to carry out many associated responsibilities, aristocrats were often on the move. But multiple sites might require attention at once, and it was impossible to be present at all at once. An aristocrat needed agents. Although he could often use slaves, freedmen, or contractors, some matters required more direct "embodiment." The *alter ego* conceit facilitated a useful measure of artificial "self-replication."

The fiction of "second selfhood," as well as the attendant practice, helped create conditions under which the aristocratic community could exercise hegemony as a network of (at least aspirational) "peers." I propose that this was both a fundamental element of the Republican system of power and one of the key features that distinguished the Republican arrangement from the more steeply hierarchical regimes that followed—regimes in which the community still played a key role in governance, but the collective no longer served as the direct agent of hegemony.

The Meaning of Amicitia

Amicitia is an expansive concept, and it evades easy definition. But for the purpose of this project, it is essential that we engage directly with questions about its meaning. Some elite texts did attempt to define the term, or at least to put forward ideals.[145] We should emphasize, however, that these depictions are limited, inasmuch as the authors focused on peer bonds between aristocratic men, largely ignoring the experiences of women and of men

---

[143] Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* VII.VIII (1241b.13-24) argues that friendship is fundamentally based on equality—the antithesis of the master-slave relationship; also, *Nichomachean Ethics* VIII.V (1157b.37). Ideas of "doubling" by friends were common in literature, rhetoric, and philosophy, both Greek: Aristophanes' speech in Plato, *Symposium* 189c-193d, and Roman: Horace, *Carmina* 1.3.8, 2.17.5, Diogenes Laertius 7.23. David Konstan, *In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 33-60 offers one of the best discussions of the theory and practice of this "second self" frame, in the Greek and Roman traditions. Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 46-53 for the relationship between the theory and practice of this conceit in Rome.
[144] Kay, *Rome's Economic Revolution* is key on the increasingly complex economic interests of Roman aristocrats.
[145] Cicero's *De Amicitia*, Valerius Maximus' *Dicta et Facta Memorabilia*, Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*, and Catullus' poems.

outside the elite.[146] Such exemplary *amicitia* had its roots in commonality of interests and background, equality, and even sameness. In the context of *vera et perfecta amicitia*, each man was the other's "second self." Such friends could even be described as sharing a single soul. While this ideal does not cover the range of uses for the language of friendship across other genres of evidence (inscriptions or letters from Vindolanda, for example), it will still be of great utility, since it furnished standards for many of the friendships I examine in the chapters that follow.

Debate persists regarding the relationship between ideal and reality—between theory and the practice of *amicitia* within the aristocratic community and across Roman society more broadly. Real-life *amicitiae* seldom managed to perfectly mirror the idealizing model, but nonetheless, this discourse should be viewed as more than a pet project of philosophers and poets. It inflected the language of interchange, creating an idiom that Jon Hall has dubbed "aristocratese."[147] Moreover, it furnished a general pattern, whereby connections might adopt a common moral discourse, as well as shared practical concerns and cultural interests. At the very least, the ideal had the capacity to steer behavior as a loose institutional template. As an informal framework, however, it was always subject to transformation. The ideal was both action-guiding and guided by the choices of its practitioners.

We should not ignore the inherent tensions between the realities of social practice and an idealizing discourse that was grounded in the rhetoric of equality. Indeed, Paul Burton has pointed out that friendship, because it is a process based in time—rooted in a back and forth of gifts and services—has asymmetry built into its deep structure. One friend would always have been beholden to the other, at least to some limited degree. But this practical asymmetry, as Burton argues that Cicero was well aware, could coexist productively with aspirational parity.[148]

Amicitia did not only join peers and near-peers. It also linked elites and sub-elites separated by a significant social gap. Even in conditions of stark asymmetry, however, the principle of equality in amity retained its importance as a standard. In fact, we can view this ideal of parity among friends as one of the distinguishing features of the aristocratic community's "Republican" regime. In fact, as I will suggest at the end of the dissertation in my Conclusion, the transformation in this standard was one of the elemental distinctions between the system of "rule by aristocratic community" in the Republic and the subsequent monarchical model, in which an elite collective was still implicated in governance, but had lost its hold on hegemony. As long as a "Republican" framework persisted, the idiom of *amicitia*, and the sense of identity that it helped create between contacts, facilitated a system of power rooted in aspirational parity among a wide range of actors from a variety of backgrounds. Nonetheless, the *amicitia*-based rhetoric of connection that linked the late-Republican ruling elite only managed the contradiction between parity and asymmetry by calling some impressive conceptual gymnastics into service.[149]

---

[146] Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship*, 63-115 contains detailed treatment on our evidence for friendships between women, using sources stemming from a variety of registers.

[147] Jon Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)—this was an idiom laced with the language of *amor* and with common tropes such as likeness in character and interests, as well as shared *humanitas* and *urbanitas*. See also, Jacques-Emmanuel Bernard, *La Sociabilité Épistolaire chez Cicéron* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013), "Le Langage de l'*Amicitia* dans les Lettres de Cicéron à Appius Claudius," in Perrine Galand-Hallyn (ed.), *La Société des Amis à Rome et dans la Littérature Médiévale et Humaniste* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 95-112, Jean Pierre De Giorgio, *L'Écriture de Soi à Rome: Autour de la Correspondence de Cicéron* (Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus, 2015).

[148] Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 64-75.

[149] For instance, *De Amicitia* XIX (69): "it is of the utmost importance that the superior should be equal to the inferior in friendship. For often there are certain exceptional circumstances, as was the case with Scipio in 'our crowd,' as I will call it. He never placed himself above Philus, never Rupilus, never Mummius, never to any of his inferior order of friends…and he

We must emphasize, of course, that the language of *amicitia* could not cause consciousness of disparity simply to evaporate when *amicitiae* developed between men separated by a large gap—whether created by socio-economic distance or by age and level of advancement. But the argument advanced by Richard Saller and Paul Millet in the 1980s, that we can define many *amicitiae* under the cross-cultural rubric of "patronage," does not convince. They take "patronage" to encompass any relationship that was reciprocal, personal, durable, and (as Millet added) sealed by extra-legal ties.[150] But none of these terms disambiguates "patronage" from "friendship." Moreover, *clientela* may have been far less "extra-legal" than this definition requires.[151] As Claude Eilers has recognized, the problem with this definition is that "all friendship would become patronage, except when it involves equals."[152] I suggest that it obscures more than it illuminates to look for "patronage," except in explicit instances in which the speaker uses terminology of *patrocinium* and *clientela*—for instance, between freedmen and the former masters, with Roman aristocrats and provincial communities, or with the crowds of *clientes* attending *salutationes*. These relationships were all bonds between aristocrats and non-aristocrats. In our discussion of social ties among members of the elite, we should reserve the term "client" for cases of legal representation. Between aristocrats, rhetoric of parity characterized social interchange, and this language was more than merely a "cover" for inequity. The egalitarian connotations of *amicitia* helped create conditions under which all parties could at least imagine asymmetries lessening. In an particular instance, the gap may have been too great to surmount. But in the social system as a whole, as long as the society remained a "Republic," no individual could remain entirely nonpareil.

To return directly to the question of definition, although we lack a perfect semantic equivalent for *amicitia* in English, for a working understanding of the term, we can employ a cluster of words and concepts that hover around it (many of which could also be applied to other kinds of interpersonal association) to triangulate its semantic center of gravity: trustworthiness or faithfulness (*fides*); goodwill and affection (*voluntas*, *bene velle*, *amor*); and a self-perpetuating cycle of favors granted, favors owed, and influence exercised (*beneficia*, *officia*, *merita*, *gratia*).[153] This mixture of trust and fidelity, affection, or at least the plausible performance of affection, and services and obligations provided much of the substrate for the aristocratic system of power. We do not have to choose between "affective" and "operational."[154]

---

wished all his connections to become greater through his agency" (*maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis…suosque omnis per se posse esse ampliores volebat*). This passage embodies the (productive) tension between a superiority clearly perceived and a desire that the association should elevate all involved, without demeaning any of the participants.

150 Richard Saller, "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), Paul Millett, "Patronage and its Avoidance in Classical Athens," in Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society* (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 15-47.

151 Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 31 n. 19 explores the evidence for formal and legal structures regulating the institution of *clientela*. It is varied and extensive, but the various instances can also each be seen as questionable for their own reasons.

152 Claude Eilers, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6-7. But the recent Angela Ganter, *Was die Römische Welt Zusammenhält: Patron-Klient-Verhältnisse zwischen Cicero und Cyprian* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015) still embraces a more expansive definition of "patronage."

153 Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship*, 23 suggests this triangulation approach.

154 This multi-faceted portrait is in tension with a thread in modern scholarship, which has downplayed the affective component of *amicitia*, highlighting the prominence of reciprocal service. As Michael Peachin (ed.), *Aspects of Friendship in the Graeco-Roman World*, (Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2001) puts it (135 n. 2): "the standard modern view...tends to reduce significantly the emotional aspect of the relationship among the Romans, and to make of it a rather

Cicero: A Life of Amicitia

Since, in this dissertation, I read *amicitia* largely through the lens of Cicero's experience and his personal networks, it is worth engaging with his personal experience of the institution in order to frame the impact of his history on the picture that emerges. Friendship mattered to every aristocrat navigating the corridors of the system of power, and Cicero's intimate engagement with *amicitia* was by no means unique.[155] Nonetheless, his particular experience of friendship did lead him to engage with the institution in an especially articulate fashion.

From the first stages of his career, as Cicero fought his way through the hurly-burly of aristocratic competition, he learned to count on friends. When he first sought entry into *res publica*, he benefited from the friendship of senior aristocrats who helped augment his skills and his social network, much as later in his career he would serve as a mentor for junior *amici* in turn.[156] Moreover, the bonds he forged with coevals during his early training were also vital. [157] For instance, his link with his fellow law student, and subsequently his fellow consular, Servius Sulpicius Rufus proved lasting. Cicero was still reliably tapping this connection in the last decade of his life, calling on his friend as a potent power resource and a source of aid for lower-level *amici* whom he forwarded as *commendati*.

Cicero's lifelong link with his "second brother," the equestrian Atticus, was perhaps the most important friendship of all—running from their student days to the end of Cicero's life. Atticus chose not to run for office himself, so in terms of the conventions of the *cursus honorum*, he remained Cicero's "inferior." But this was no "patronage" relationship. Atticus served as Cicero's partner, and in some instances he even subtly seems a superior.[158] He helped Cicero organize his rise up the ladder of offices, benefiting himself by placing an indebted intimate so high in senatorial circles. They together accumulated a widespread network of connections among the senators and *equites*; they assisted one another in building ethical reputations; they poured joint effort into the production of ideas and texts; and they collaborated as business partners—"second selves" in estate management, purchases and sales, and debt negotiations. Their *amicitia* bond allowed them to collaborate consistently.

---

pragmatic business." Maria Caldelli, "*Amicus/-a* nelle Iscrizione di Roma: l'Apporto dell-Epigraphia al Chiarimento di un Sentimento Sociale," in *Aspects of Friendship in the Graeco-Roman World*: 21-30 goes as far as to take it as a formal relationship, entailing specific reciprocal obligations. But David Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) has argued that we should be wary of overstating the business-like character of *amicitia*, pointing to passages in Roman literature that indicate that its core was *amor* and *caritas*—e.g. Cicero, *De Amicitia* VII (26) and *Partitiones Oratoriae* 88; also his "Friendship and Patronage," in Stephen Harrison (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Latin Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005): 345-359, with his position more developed in *In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Many recent works have attempted to elide the dichotomy, and embrace a paradigm where utility and affection can exist side by side, indeed bolstering each other—e.g. Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship*, Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic."

155 For the relationship between Cicero's *amicitiae* and his decisions concerning *res publica*—Spielvogel, *Amicitia und Res Publica: Ciceros Maxime Während der Innenpolitischen Auseinandersetztugen der Jahre 59-50*.

156 The jurist Quintus Mucius Scaevola gave him instruction in law and the famed orator Lucius Licinius Crassus guided his rhetorical training. For these early years, see Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, 12-28 and Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch*, 1-15.

157 Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, 14-15

158 Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?" notes Atticus' periodic superiority. The Cicero-Atticus friendship provides a perfect illustration of the dynamic noted by Burton, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, 64-75 (a dynamic that he argues Cicero showed consciousness of in his *De Amicitia*) according to which even friendships framed as egalitarian display periodic, and sometimes alternating asymmetry, based on the current "balance of payments" in the basic process of gift exchange that characterizes friendship.

They maintained a two-*domus* consortium, joined in the administration and expansion of their stocks of symbolic, social, ethical, knowledge, and financial capital.[159]

Across the length of his career, Cicero relied on *amici* as interlocutors in his intellectual endeavors. As was the case for many aristocrats, at least those with erudite proclivities such as Cicero and Atticus, as well as their *amici* Brutus and Caesar, Cicero's "literary" and "political" friendships were in no way distinct. Even among these "politicians"-cum-"businessmen"-cum-"litterateurs," Cicero's argument that textual production was one of his key responsibilities as a leader of the civic community might be considered at least somewhat tendentious.[160] Nonetheless, these statesmen seem to have viewed their literary and scholarly pursuits as largely inseparable from their other activities within the system of power. Not every aristocrat chose to invest equal energy into erudition, but for many, it was a priority. In the chapters that follow, I examine the importance of literature in Cicero's amicable exchange both with fellow *consulares* and with young mentees. Textual composition, commentary, and dedication were vital in the back and forth of the aristocratic community's socio-political framework. Literary activity provided a *locus* of shared passion, and it furnished a vector for the transmission of obligation in the ongoing cycles of reciprocity that underpinned social bonds.

During the years he spent scaling the ladder of offices, Cicero cultivated friendships with aristocrats already established in the culture of *honores* in the city. As he networked in the aristocratic community's senatorial circles, Cicero's background as a municipal *novus homo* gave him an "outsider" status that was difficult to shake off. *Amicitia* served as a strategic tool in his efforts to overcome this handicap. Cicero took care to lay down bonds with "traditionalist" senators like Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, for instance.[161] He poured particular attention into his connection with the anomalous Pompey, who occupied a powerful but somewhat uncomfortable position in the 60s. Indeed, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, it was in the context of this relationship that Cicero most explicitly brought the Scipio-Laelius model into his discussion of *amicitia*—an analogy that would furnish an *exemplum* for his ideal.

As Cicero established himself in the community's networks of power, his amicable networking served as crucial a function as did his his bravura oratory or his efforts canvassing for votes. Indeed, we should not view these endeavors as separate. Cicero

---

[159] Aided by the marriage bond between Cicero's brother and Atticus' sister, which gave both men a common interest in the children of the next generation of their linked multi-*domus* organization.

[160] Many works over the past two decades have treated the relationship between literature and politics for Cicero, and during the late Republican and early imperial period more broadly. Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome* is fundamental on the relationship between literature and politics; Yelena Baraz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) explores Cicero's philosophical literature from the 40s as an attempt at a new kind of "politics" under Caesar; Sarah Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) discusses the growing importance for Cicero and his contemporaries of textual production as a replacement for "political" activity during a period of restriction of *res publica* proper. The role of literary activity in Caesar's career offers a point of comparison, revealing that Cicero was not alone among the *principes* in elevating literary action among his priorities and in recognizing the interpenetration of literature and power. For Caesar's literary production and for the role of this activity in creating his position in Roman society, see the entries in Luca Grillo, Christopher Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) (further references on Caesar as a literary man in this dissertation's Chapter 2).

[161] Early in his career, Cicero cultivated a range of contacts through his services as an advocate, but as an "outsider," he was not yet welcomed by established *principes* even superficially. For Cicero's earliest connections, see Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 12-28, Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch* (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969), 1-15. We begin to see him connecting with the leading *nobiles* during his bid for the consulship—Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, 44-59 and Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch*, 61-70. Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 456 grants Atticus a key role in the very existence of the bond between Cicero and Hortensius, and in his alliance with the whole batch of "optimates."

invested in friendships through activity as an advocate and in the course of his *ambitiones*.[162] In his quest to gain influence, the intimate ties Cicero constructed and maintained with a range of equestrians were no less important than his relations with senators, as much as his interactions with *equites* were less public and performative. He befriended not only higher-level knights such as the "banker" Atticus and the well-resourced *negotiator* Egnatius Rufus, but also various more modest proprietors and traders. These *equites* were integral to his success, from the beginning of his career until its end. Cicero's own equestrian background seems to have left him with a closer sense of affinity and practical alliance with the *equites*, especially as a identifiable collective, than many men who reached consular rank from a senatorial background.[163] But neither phenomenon—the general and fundamental importance of *amicitia* as a basis of social power, or the essential role of links between senators and equestrians—was unique to his case. It is illustrative that Cicero's friends among the *nobiles* all relied on *amicitiae*, too, and they were all intimate with the equestrian operator Atticus. Hortensius and Brutus may even have been as close to Atticus as was Cicero himself.[164] Cicero plugged himself into a social and financial network in which both elite *ordines* were woven together in a thick and ever-shifting lattice of obligation and affection.

As much as Cicero wanted to have faith in these connections, at the end of 59, the edifice of *amicitia* he had constructed gave way under pressure. His relations with his core of intimates held firm, including his bond with Atticus.[165] So too, it appears, did many of his links with the *equites*. Some of these knights even proved willing to perform their grief with public displays of affectionate support—uncharacteristic for members of an *ordo* that usually shied away from personal engagement with *res publica*.[166] In letters from 59 and 58, however, Cicero expressed disillusionment with his friends among the *principes*. While they had promised protection from Clodius' demagoguery, as it happened, they sat on their hands as Cicero was driven from the city.[167] These events cast in sharp relief the perils of friendships that failed to live up to standards of *fides*. Friendship was invaluable, but the institution was

---

162 The *Commentariolum Petitionis* is the *locus classicus* on the importance of *amictiae* in building influence and the links between courts and, especially, elections and *amicitia*. I provide references regarding the scholarship on this text in the context of my arguments in Chapters 1 and 2.

163 Dominic Berry, "*Equester Ordo Tuus Est*: Did Cicero Win His Cases Because of His Support for the *Equites*?," *The Classical Quarterly*, 53 (2003): 222-234 argues that the support of equestrian contacts (and the favor of the group *qua* group, which shared a loose sense of common interest) was fundamental to Cicero's forensic success. Berry also discusses the influence of municipal *equites* on elections, if they could be mobilized. For the evolution of the *ordo* as a distinct constituency with a coherent identity and agenda—Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order*.

164 Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 464 even claims that (at least in the case of Hortensius in general and with Brutus during the notorious Salaminian affair) Atticus proved a closer friend to these old-blooded *nobiles* than he was to Cicero—perhaps an overstatement, but it is illustrative that this could seem plausible. Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," points to special ties between men of Italian municipal background who were making their way in the urban center. These "outsider" friends stuck together, at least to a limited degree.

165 Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 465 notes a subtle chilling in their friendship that occurred later around 51-50, but this was brief and passed quickly.

166 As an example, see *Ad Familiares* 434 (XI.16), which testifies that Cicero's friend L. Lamia, "during the 'Clodian times,' when he [Lamia] was a leading member of the equestrian order and he strove with great steadfastness on my behalf, was banished by Gabinius, who was consul" (*Clodianis temporibus, cum equestris ordinis princeps esset proque mea salute acerrime propugnaret, a Gabinio consule relegatus est*). Shackleton Bailey gives this definition of *princeps* as "leading member" in his commentary; Cicero was exiled, Bailey tells us, to a distance of 200 miles from Rome. A substantial group of knights put on mourning garb: *Pro Sestio* 26 (XI) and Plutarch, *Cicero* 31.1; some even attempted to enter the Senate to intercede on his behalf and appeared on the Capitol under arms—*Pro Sestio* 28 (XII).

167 W. Jeffrey Tatum, *The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 151-170 gives a detailed account of events during these years; also, Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, 89-121, Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch*, especially 105-140, Thomas Mitchell, *Cicero, the Senior Statesman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 127-161.

only granted power by the ethical quality of the individuals implicated: without trustworthy commitment, so-called *amicitia* lacked substance. During his exile, and in its aftermath, Cicero poured new *amor* into his *amicitae* with the associates whose loyalty had weathered the tempest intact.[168] Throughout Cicero's life, he remained aware of the fragility of friendship and keenly conscious consequences for the aristocratic system of power if this all-important social institution ceased its smooth operation.

After his return from exile, activity as a friend was central to Cicero's conception of his role in elite society. As he wrote to Lentulus Spinther in 54, in *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), "I merely strive not to be found wanting either by friends (or even by others not connected to me so intimately) in service, counsel, and labor" (*tantum enitor ut neque amicis neque etiam alienioribus opera, consilio, labore desim*). The letters show his friendships in practice, and these epistolary relations during these years will provide the bulk of the evidence for my discussions in the chapters that follow. In the treatises, especially those from after the first civil war, Cicero discussed friendship's ideal form—delineating its essential function in Rome's aristocratic social system, looking to bring new life to a social institution that he viewed as critical.

In his *De Amicitia* and his *De Officiis*, Cicero displayed deep concern with the definition of true friendship and emphasized its necessity to the function of Rome's broad ruling elite.[169] These texts highlight the extent to which the aristocratic community's system of power relied on *amicitia* as one of its fundamental institutions. Cicero recognized that well-functioning friendship was essential to the operation of the intricate mechanism. In his treatises he was trying to engage in institutional "repair-work" as well as description.[170] Unlike some of his philosophical predecessors, Cicero presented his "ideal" for friendship as a template for real life.[171] He was trying to set the institutional parameters for social bonding for *viri* who conceived themselves as "good," both for the sublime associations among the society's best men and for their more mundane ties with others.[172] *Vera amicitia* was an agreement in all things human and divine, based in *virtus* and sealed by *benevolentia* and *caritas*. Its essence resided in a lofty consensus about proper purposes, pursuits, and opinions.[173] Both in his writings and in ongoing discourse with his *amici*, Cicero spent his life constructing this standard—an evolving ideal that reached its full articulate form in these treatises from his final years.

While Cicero's idealizing portrait had a normative edge, it should also be seen as a reflection of a shared social reality. Indeed, a compelling case can be made that both its

---

168 Francois Prost, "*Amor* et *Amicitia* dans la Correspondance d'exil de Cicéron," *Vita Latina* 191-2 (2015): 7-35 discusses the persistent (and even redoubled) *amor* and *amicitia* Cicero shared with core intimates, alongside his profound disappointment with less loyal associates.

169 Baraz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics*, 1-12 for a reconstruction of the intellectual, literary, and political context for the treatises in the 40s.

170 Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," 166 describes friendship usefully as "an institution of the classic Republic" that Cicero was recalling and analyzing in the *De Amicitia*.

171 For instance, *De Amicitia* V (18): "we ought to examine things as they actually exist in the practice and life of the community, not those conditions which are imagined or desired" (*nos autem ea quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus*); Willy Evenepoel, 'Cicero's Laelius and Seneca's letters on friendship,' *L'Antiquité Classique* 76 (2007): 177-183 points out (178) that this is a conscious attempt to distance himself from Stoic predecessors (but not from Aristotle).

172 At *De Amicitia* VI (22), Cicero recognized the gradation in the different kinds of real friendship, many varieties of which had real value.

173 *De Amicitia* VI (20): "for friendship is nothing else except the agreement in all things human and divine, sealed with goodwill and affection" (*est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio*); "that in which all the vital force of friendship resides, complete agreement in purposes, interests, and opinions" (*id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*).

descriptions and its prescriptions belonged to a discourse familiar throughout the elite, and perhaps even throughout society.[174] Cicero's Republic—not merely the Republic he invented during moments of *otium*, but the one he inhabited day by day—was ruled by a community of *amici*. His philosophical dialogues intervened in an ongoing conversation, both spoken and written, about what *amicitia* was and how it should work. These ideals were no mere philosophical fantasies. The fullest expression of *vera et perfecta amicitia* can hardly have been common, but Rollinger puts it well when he describes such an idealizing discourse as "a normative background in front of which the practice of *amicitia* played out."[175]

There is good reason that social ethics occupied such a central position in ancient political thought.[176] In the success or failure of any hegemonic structure, the smooth functioning of its social institutions played a vital role. Theory, here, can be read as insight into what had made community-based rule work. The system was a multi-actor equilibrium—a community of proprietors engaged in a mannered social dance, with their interchange mediated by the idiom and ideals of *amicitia*. So long as this framework remained a "Republic," no individual could be elevated beyond the reach of equality with his aristocratic peers.

Cicero's Letters

Cicero's letters provide the core evidence for the chapters that follow. They offer an extraordinary window onto the aristocratic community's social practice—a uniquely detailed portrait of the backroom conversations behind major events in *res publica*; the negotiation of friendships, alliances, and marriages; and the business, finance, and property concerns and transactions that consumed such a large proportion of the attention of the aristocratic community's diverse membership. These letters are the most fine-grained evidence preserved for the day-to-day practice of power from any period of Roman history. In many ways, it is the very quality of the evidence for the two and a half decades covered by the correspondence, 68-43 BCE, which drives us to focus any study that relies on close reading of the subtleties of social practice in this period. Without evidence of this quality and quantity, it would be impossible to make an attempt to reconstruct the "regime behind the regime" in any detail or to get at the importance of the social institution of *amicitia* in this framework.[177] As a result, we have to take care to limit claims about the nature of aristocratic social practice, and the hegemonic structure that it generated, to this historical moment, although we can plausibly extrapolate at least with respect to the later Republican period.

We must always keep in mind that our vision of this system is channeled through Cicero and his relationships and networks. This represents something of a limitation, to be sure. But the evidence is of such a quality that, with careful reading, we can use it to reconstruct a broader social landscape. In the nearly nine hundred fifty pieces of correspondence preserved in the *Ad Familiares*, *Ad Atticum*, *Ad Quintum*, and *Ad Brutum*,

---

174 Indeed, Paul Burton, "Genre and Fact in the Preface to Cicero's *De Amicitia*," *Antichthon* 41 (2007), 13–32 locates the text in a long Roman "optimate" tradition of thinking on friendship, and his "*Amicitia* in Plautus: A Study of Roman Friendship Processes," *The American Journal of Philology* 125 (2004): 209-243 proposes that the description of friendship in the *De Amicitia* shows striking correspondences with the portrait of friendship that emerges from close scrutiny of the mid-Republican popular comedies of Plautus.

175 Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," 346-347.

176 Konstan, *In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome*, 2-3 makes this point about the widespread centrality of social ethics to ancient political thought.

177 It is with good reason that Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* used Cicero's letters as the foundation of his analysis of *amicitia* more generally.

nearly every major senatorial power player from the period makes an appearance.[178] In addition to this conspectus of the senatorial community, the letters also offer a sampling of the interchange between senators and members of the other aristocratic *ordo* of *equites*; between adult aristocratic men and the women and children of their family; and between aristocrats and their sub-elite associates.[179] Moreover, just over ten percent of the letters preserved in the *corpora* were composed by other writers besides Cicero. Thus, the collection represents a surprisingly comprehensive sample of aristocratic society, it demonstrates the interaction between different substrata, and it includes voices besides Cicero's. These qualities help us confirm that his behavior was not entirely idiosyncratic, and allow us to note epistolary practices outside the ordinary when they emerge. Cicero approached his society from a particular perspective—a *novus homo* who viewed the permeability of aristocratic society with a kindly eye, and was perhaps more dependent on words for the security of his social position than some of his fellows.[180] But he was rooted in that society—made by its networks and norms far more than he made them.

As much as these letters offer a window onto a strikingly broad sweep of the social world inhabited by Rome's aristocrats and their affiliates, they cannot be read as a simple record. Letters occupied a complex cultural location in Roman aristocratic society, perched at the intersection between communication, social action, and literature.[181] Through their letters, contacts transmitted information, exchanged advice, and requested and acknowledged favors and services, both for themselves and for *commendati*. Letters were a medium for action, and indeed, they represented actions in themselves. Beyond specific purposes, aristocrats also used letters to secure and affirm their social networks, especially when their capacity to engage in face-to-face contact was hampered by absences from the urban center.[182] Friendship had to be regularly affirmed and demonstrated in more and less public venues. As Rollinger points out, many of the letters had no clearly discernable aim, merely serving as devices that could reignite *amicitia* when more immediate opportunities for reinforcement were unavailable.[183] Amanda Wilcox has highlighted the role of letters as

---

178 Peter White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): "it should be noticed that, except for Publius Clodius, no major politician of the 50s and 40s is unrepresented in the published corpus by a letter either sent or received." His Appendix 1 for quantification and numbering.

179 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 96-108 for a comprehensive catalogue of correspondents.

180 Amanda Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 4 notes Cicero's exceptional dependence on words (and specifically letters) for his social position. Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* and Dugan, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works* point out other genres in which Cicero's words played a special role in his social positioning, helping him overcome status insecurities.

181 Roy Gibson, Andrew Morrison (eds), "What is a Letter?," in Ruth Morello, Andrew Morrison (eds.), *Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-16 offers a keen discussion of generic definition.

182 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 3-30 underlines the role of security of social position as one of the deepest concerns underlying epistolary interchange. He makes the important point (19) that face-to-face interchange was an expectation between aristocratic contacts—letters were a stopgap at best. The epistolary genre was already well developed and well theorized by Cicero's day. On the epistolary genre's theorized conventions, among many others, see Michael Trapp, *Greek and Latin Letters: An Anthology with Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 42-46, 316-326 for discussion and samples of theoretical passages regarding the subcategories of letters, Carol Poster, "A Conversation Halved: Epistolary Theory in Greco-Roman Antiquity," in Carol Poster, Linda Mitchell (eds.), *Letter-Writing Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present* (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 21-51. Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 19-23 on the epistolary genre's conventions and the process by which aristocrats learned to make use of them, casting immersion more than formal instruction as the primary means of instruction.

183 Rollinger, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," 348-349. White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 23 notes how even when there was specific business, the rhetoric often seems designed to locate particulars in a texture of ongoing connection.

"gifts"—tokens in the cycles of reciprocity that underpinned aristocratic *amicitia*.[184] Thus, we must read the entries in Cicero's *corpora* of letters as artifacts of a social process. These texts served both to affirm friendships and to locate these links in a broader landscape of social alignments and interchange.[185] Furthermore, aristocrats carried out their epistolary communication in an idiom characterized by a highly normalized framework of politeness, and they demonstrated acute self-consciousness as they modulated the formality and informality of their discursive style.[186]

By the conceit of the epistolary genre, letters were framed as private communications. Each was addressed to a specific reader, with the rhetoric designed to foreground the dyadic frame.[187] Even in the context of the dyad, we must keep self-fashioning aims in mind and recognize the necessity of performance within the context of the friendship. An aristocrat's reputation existed as a product of the opinion of fellow members of his community, and each letter represented an attempt to convince the recipient of his virtue and value as a contact. There were both collaborative and eristic stakes. On the one hand, correspondents were working to frame themselves and the narrative of events within the community in terms that would facilitate further collective action. On the other hand, there was often an underlying competiveness in aristocratic friendship—a subtle contest to be the better friend and, by implication, the better aristocrat.[188] The letters paint the participants as competitors in affection, and also, at times, as rivals in literary and scholarly attainment, in virtue, and even in the affection of others. This eristic edge appears in some surprising circumstances. Even letters of consolation in moments of grief could turn gently agonistic.

Even in the context of intimate and lasting *amicitiae*, epistolary action still had important implications. It helped writers cultivate the social and ethical capital that could be derived froms the friendships, and it facilitated ongoing collaboration in *res publica* and in matters of business, finance, and property. When Cicero traded letters with closer friends such as Caelius Rufus and Lentulus Spinther—indeed, even when he and Atticus wrote back and forth—the correspondents were engaged in strategic role-playing. Their rhetoric appears designed to accomplish important aims of social cohesion and of investment in these vital social capital assets. Indeed, since these most intimate friendships furnished an aristocrat's most reliable power resources, we might even say that had the highest stakes of all.

While the dyad was central to the conceit of the epistolary genre, in practice, privacy was often limited. To be sure, a correspondent might hope that the contents might remain screened from other eyes. In a letter to Gaius Trebonius from 46, for instance, Cicero could assert that he thought it reasonable to claim that he had written to Gaius Licinius Calvus

---

184 Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles.

185 For instance, White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 84 notes that a regular closing strategy in the letters was to advert to common social ties shared with addressee.

186 Jon Hall, "Politeness and Formality in Cicero's Letter to Matius (Fam. 11.27)," *Museum Helveticum*, 62.4 (2005): 193-213 and *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, Bernard, *La Sociabilité Épistolaire chez Cicéron*, "Le Langage de l'*Amicitia* dans les Lettres de Cicéron à Appius Claudius," De Giorgio, *L'Écriture de Soi à Rome: Autour de la Correspondence de Cicéron*. On the strategic use of informality, Harm Pinkster, "Notes on the Language of Marcus Caelius Rufus," in Eleanor Dickey and Anna Chahoud (eds.), *Colloquial and Literary Latin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 186-202. Meike Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018) brings elements of communication theory to Cicero's letters, analyzing the analogies and distinctions between in person conversation and epistolary exchange. Her work helps to cast light on the possibilities and limits of using the letters as evidence for social interchange more broadly.

187 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, e.g. 85 notes how Cicero might adopt particular rhetorical strategies to play up the dyadic nature of the interchange.

188 Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles, 11 underlines the eristic tendency in Roman *amicitia*, exemplified by Cicero's letters.

with no more expectation that it would circulate beyond its intended addressee than he had that the letter Trebonius was reading at the moment would make the rounds (*ego illas Calvo litteras misi non plus quam has quas nunc legis existimans exituras*).[189] So it was at least conceivable that a letter might remain a personal conversation between sender and recipient. At the same time, however, this case provides evidence of precisely the opposite—the possibility that the contents might become widely known.

There does appear to have been a basic assumption that certain familiar letters were in some sense supposed to remain "private," and some read as if they were intended for the eyes of the recipient alone.[190] In terms of the intention of the correspondent, it seems that the expectation of privacy ranged along a spectrum, from the confidential and personal all the way up to letters addressed explicitly to the Senate and People of Rome. Even with the most confidential letters, however, no writer could rest assured that his words would not leak. For one, letters were always subject to the vicissitudes of delivery, a process which implicated far more people than merely the sender or recipient. This included bearers of various degrees of trustworthiness, and even if the bearers were dependable themselves, they could also always be waylaid.[191] In addition, the receipt of a letter was not necessarily a "private" process, since each piece of correspondence passed through the *domus* on its way into his hands of the addressee. The letter would have been vulnerable to the curious eyes of household staff or other aristocratic members of the broader consortium. Indeed, in an incident that reveals both the expectation of privacy and the ease of its breach, Cicero reported to Atticus that he once unsealed and scanned a letter from Pilia to Quintus, only to reseal it without revealing his indiscretion to his brother.[192]

Even if, at the time of its delivery, a letter reached its recipient without complication, senders would often keep copies of the letters they had dispatched. As a consequence, there was nothing to prevent either party from later circulating a transcript. As White notes, the fact that letters were freely copied and kept on hand for subsequent use complicates their status as private exchanges, or even as artifacts of particular occasions.[193] Nothing prevented a person from later passing on a copy of a letter that he had either written or received to third parties. Thus, no correspondent could assume that "confidential" words would not become widely known. Cicero might have decried it as a breach of etiquette when Antony read out one of Cicero's confidential letters before the Senate, but aristocrats always had to remain conscious of the possibility that their words might spread. In the letter to Trebonius cited above, Cicero might have been able to claim that there was one way of writing when the author intended the words only for the eyes of the addressee, another when he imagined a broader audience (*aliter enim scribimus quod eos solos quibus mittimus, aliter quod multos lecturos*

---

189 *Ad Familiares* 207 (XV.21): "I sent that letter to Calvus no more thinking it would get out (into circulation) than the one you are reading now" (*ego illas Calvo litteras misi non plus quam has quas nunc legis existimans exituras*).

190 Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 24 claims that much of the *Ad Atticum* collection should be read in this light—as intended only for Atticus' eyes.

191 On the delivery process and confidentiality, the treatment in John Nicholson, "The Delivery and Confidentiality of Cicero's Letters," *The Classical Journal* 90 (1994): 33-63 is foundational, with discussion and minor correction in White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 11-18 and Francisco Pina Polo, "Circulation of Information in Cicero's Correspondence of the Years 59-58 BC," in Cristina Rosillo-López (ed.), *Political Communication in the Roman World* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017), 81-106.

192 *Ad Atticum* 220 (XI.9). The assertation by Nicholson, "The Delivery and Confidentiality of Cicero's Letters," 82-83 of a "taboo" against reading private letters seems somewhat overstated.

193 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 16.

putamus).[194] But this distinction was flimsy at best. After all, Cicero and Atticus were constantly attaching copies of other friends' letters in their own correspondence, and it seems to have been common practice to read letters aloud before company.[195] When he put words to page, an aristocrat had to be aware that he was committing them to an unpredictable audience. Indeed, Wilcox is right to note that in a culture that placed such a premium on public visibility, the cannier social operators might have welcomed the wider circulation of at least some of the letters they framed as private.[196]

Some letters occupied a middle position, addressed to a single person, but with a shadow audience lurking just out of sight. Hall has dubbed such letters "semipublic"—almost certainly aimed at an audience beyond the addressee, even if the author could never be certain how many other people would gain access, or who precisely these additional readers would be.[197] The cases most often cited, both of which appear on multiple occasions throughout the analysis in the chapters that follow, are *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) to Lentulus Spinther and Cicero's first letter to his brother in *Ad Quintum* 1 (I.1).[198] The former put forward a carefully crafted justification of Cicero's actions on behalf of Caesar and Pompey in the year after Luca in 55. The latter was a highly stylized "manual" on how to carry out the role of provincial governor with virtue and moderation, laced with literary and philosophical references, and cleverly crafted to record and perform Cicero's own history of virtuous conduct. Both made a show of Cicero's quality as a trustworthy and affectionate contact.

For the purposes of this dissertation, this semi-public category takes on special significance. To varying degrees, I suggest that we ought to read many of Cicero's letters in this light. This perspective is particularly important as we examine the letters he traded with the aristocratic community's other *principes*. In such an "open" epistolary culture, high-level statesmen would have expected, and at times facilitated, the dissemination of their epistolary exchange. Sometimes they even circulated drafts beforehand for comment, involving other members in the process of constructing, rather than merely consuming, the correspondence.[199] We should read these letters, at least potentially, as performances to a dual audience—designed for the eyes both of the explicit addressee and the broader social network of which writer and recipient were members. Even within sequences of letters between Cicero and his fellow *principes*, we can sense variation, with *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) at the high end of a spectrum of "publicness." Nonetheless, if to varying degrees, many of these letters should be read with the understanding that their authors were conscious of the performative potential of the text. Thus, correspondents could argue "theses" about their own social position and moral quality, with the expectation, or at least the hope, that their words might make a contribution to their *existimatio*.

---

194 *Ad Familiares* 207 (XV.21): "we write differently such things as we write when we think that only those to whom we send them will read them, than when we think they will have many readers" (*aliter enim scribimus quod eos solos quibus mittimus, aliter quod multos lecturos putamus*).

195 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 21 describes the act of reading letters aloud in company as an effort to inject the presence of the writer into the event's social dynamic.

196 Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles, 8.

197 Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 25.

198 Shackleton Bailey proposes that both were clearly intended for a broader audience.

199 In *Ad Atticum* 188 (VIII.9), Cicero reported to Atticus that "the letter of mine which you report has been spread about, I do not take amiss, in fact, I have even given it to many people myself to be copied" (*epistulam meam quod pervulgatam scribis esse non fero moleste, quin etiam ipse multis dedi describendam*); in 298 (XII.27) we hear of Cicero passing a draft of a letter to Caesar to Atticus' friends for feedback. Cicero gave letters regularly to Atticus for comment—for instance, 111 (V.18) and 254 (XII.18). It was not only Cicero who circulated drafts: in 411 (XVI.4) we see Cicero providing comments to Sextus Pompeius, in *Ad Familiares* 399 (XI.19), D. Brutus requested feedback.

All of the letters existed, therefore, as part of a wider landscape of social performance.[200] There might be eristic aspects of friendship, but for the most part, the performative elements in such epistolary exchanges between *amici* remained collaborative. If impressions from their correspondence spread—if copies circulated, or one or the other of the correspondents read a letter aloud in his house—it could disseminate and reinforce the impression of the strength of the bond, increasing the community-wide perception of each man's social weight. Moreover, by showing off the particulars of their virtuous participation in the valorized social institution of *amicitia*, the correspondents could advertise their superior quality. The moral reputation that they could derive from the bond bore fruit in the form of ethical capital—both a reward in itself, and also the foundation of succesful participation in the ongoing social interchange that underpinned the aristocratic system of power. The letters existed in a culture of copying and dissemination, in which texts could serve to "monumentalize" memory.[201] While letters were more casual than more formally "published" texts, the boundaries between "literature" and "letter" were highly permeable, especially for the practiced literati who populated Cicero's social space.[202] Indeed, some time in the 30s, before the "publication" of the letters in their organized collections, Cicero and Atticus' *amicus* Cornelius Nepos was already able to gain access to a stock of letters exchanged between the well-known duo as he worked on his biography of Atticus. While the letters, unlike Cicero's more formally "published" treatises, were not yet *editi*, they were nonetheless accessible, at least to a member of their more immediate social circle.[203]

This leads to another consideration that it is important to keep in mind as we employ these letters as evidence. The four collections were all assembled by an editor or editors at some date after Cicero's death. There were precedents for publication of letter collections. Cicero had access, for instance, to epistolary *corpora* that purportedly came from Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, and Cato the Elder.[204] So the idea may have crossed Cicero's mind that his letters might eventually be published in some form of collected and edited selection. But White makes a strong case that, at least as Cicero wrote the letters, he likely did not keep the possibility of more formal publication at the foreground of his consciousness.[205] Most of the collecting work was certainly undertaken by someone besides Cicero, and our access to whatever "historical truth" is contained in Cicero's letters is filtered through this editor's

---

200 On the notion of social performance in the Ciceronian context: Krostenko, *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance*. Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 25 notes, in this vein, that the "semipublic nature of these epistolary encounters also made them an excellent venue for 'social performance.'"

201 Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text* treats this late Republican textual culture, exploring the changing role of the text in aristocratic society.

202 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 89-116 investigates the relationship between letters and literature, examining the issues of whether or not circulation was intended, of whether topics of general interest were included that would make the letter amenable to circulation, and of elevated language. Some factors made letter more and less like "literature," but all were spectra rather than absolute distinctions. See also, Gregory Hutchinson, *Cicero's Correspondence: A Literary Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and "Ciceros Brief als Literatur (Ad Att. 1.16)," *Hermes* 121 (1993): 441-451.

203 Cornelius Nepos, *Atticus* 16.3 reports that the *libri* "have been published at large" (*in vulgus editi sunt*).

204 White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 91-92 for a discussion of precedents and the prospects of publication that might have been in Cicero's mind.

205 *Ad Atticum* 410 (XVI.5) is the only positive indication that Cicero considered undertaking some form of collection himself—a year and a half before his death, he wrote to Atticus that there was currently no collection of his letters at the moment, but that Tiro retained a collection that could provide the core, and some more could be obtained from Atticus. Only after editing and correcting them would he be willing to release them. There has been some debate as to whether such an effort was in fact undertaken, and whether it became the kernel of *Ad Familiares* XIII. See White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 91 n.5 and Hutchinson, *Cicero's Correspondence: A Literary Study*, 5 n.4 for discussion and references for this debate. Both find the proposition dubious.

choices.[206] We are left with a selection, and a selection designed with specific narrative and thematic purposes, at that.

A craze took hold in the seventeenth century for dismantling the order imposed by the collector, and imposing a chronological reorganization in its place.[207] But in 2002, Mary Beard encouraged a return to the original sequence, in order to understand the craft that went into the formation of the collections as literary artifacts in their own right.[208] Editorial selection has had a profound impact on our access to Cicero's letters. What we have preserved is only a small sample of the mass of correspondence Cicero would have sent over the course of his life.[209] This subset is inflected towards "political" content, emphasizing senatorial actors.[210] It is especially indicative of the multifaceted nature of the system of power that, in spite of this editorial bias, the correspondence still conveys so much information about less overtly "political" social and financial interchange.[211] This was a system with borders extending well beyond the limits of overtly "public" affairs.

Moreover, all the selections and orderings were designed to convey specific messages about Cicero's virtue, his social position, and his role in the progression of events during the 60s-40s. Within the past decade, scholars have undertaken extraordinary work regarding what Francesca Martelli labels the "epistoliterary dynamics" of the specific sequences and collections.[212] She reminds us, too, that, although the editor was likely active at a historical moment relatively near to the original composition, this narrative layer was nonetheless the product of a post-Republican environment.[213]

In this dissertation, I undertake to reconstruct aspects of the social institutional structure within the Republican context. As a result, as much as the investigation of the collections as literature is a worthy enterprise in itself, for the purpose of this project, it is most important to try to see past any obfuscating effects of posthumous refashioning. We cannot place unthinking trust, for instance, in the narrative arcs across multiple letters, or in the moral argumentation that emerges from particular epistolary orderings. Nonetheless, since the editor was likely someone acquainted with Cicero and his social world, certain editorial choices might actually shed light on moral and narrative themes that might otherwise have remained obscure. For these purposes, the question remains open as to whether the collector's intervention does more to blur the image of Cicero and his community or to sharpen it.

---

[206] White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 33-34 and Appendix 1 provide discussion of various possible editors (Tiro, Atticus, Cornelius Nepos, or some collection of editors).

[207] On the history of this trend, both with Cicero's and with other collections, see Roy Gibson, "On the Nature of Ancient Letter Collections," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 102 (2012): 56-78.

[208] Mary Beard, "Ciceronian Correspondences: Making a Book Out of Letters," in Timothy Wiseman (ed.), *Classics in Progress*: *Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 103-44.

[209] Even within letters, we have to beware the possibility of judicious trimming. White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 40-41 explores the evidence for cutting and the potential implications of unnoticed excisions.

[210] White, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*, 31-62 examines the nature of the editorial choices across the collection and the selection biases that reveal themselves upon careful study.

[211] Letters that included important details about *res publica* were regularly laced with, and indeed often dominated by, other aristocratic concerns.

[212] See, for instance, Francesca Martelli, "Une Lettre Arrive Toujours à Destination," *Arethusa* 49 (2016): 393-397 for this term. Luca Grillo, "Reading Cicero's *ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," *The Classical Quarterly* 65, no. 2 (2015): 655–68, as well as Beard, "Ciceronian Correspondences: Making a Book Out of Letters," and Gibson, "On the Nature of Ancient Letter Collections," have all examined the rhetorical effects of the internal architecture of the collections on our reception of the narrative and its characters.

[213] Martelli has recently attempted to uncover the new meanings that the collected books would have taken on under the new conditions of the Principate when they were assembled, with the editor looking back on a now-lost Republican world—Francesca Martelli, "The Triumph of Letters: Rewriting Cicero in ad Fam. 15," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 107 (2017): 90-115, also providing references on a ballooning bibliography on the literary qualities of the published collections.

Organization of the Following Chapters

The chapters that follow are divided into two sections, which investigate respectively the dynamics and the institutional function of "peer" and "asymmetric" *amicitia* bonds. In the first section, I discuss the function of friendships between the society's *principes* and their importance as organizing forces within the system of power in the 50s. Chapter 1 engages with bonds between Cicero and three of his consular "peers"—Lentulus Spinther, Metellus Nepos, and Appius Claudius. These provide case studies of highly intentional *amicitia*, helping us delineate the nature of the institution in its most idealizing form and to understand the role of high-level friendship ties in the aristocratic community's social framework. I suggest, moreover, that, as a response to their growing fear that the collective social weight of the dynasts might overbalance the system, Cicero and his fellow *principes* took special care to invest in their peer bonds, even cultivating bonds with fellow *consulares* with whom they might otherwise have remained at odds. In Chapter 2, I turn to Cicero's bonds with the Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. Although the three magnates threatened to undermine the traditional parity in the permeable circle of the community's top men, Cicero nonetheless went out of his way to cultivate *amicitia* bonds with each of them. This was partly an attempt to protect himself and to thrive as much as possible within restrictive limitations. But I argue that Cicero also tried to use the rhetoric of parity—the sense that *amici* were one another's "second selves"—to subtly encourage the dynasts to play by the traditional "rules of the game." An investigation of Cicero's relationships with these outstanding figures provides clues as to the nature of the regime change beginning in the 50s, which would come to fruition under Caesar in the 40s and would ultimately resolve itself into a monarchic Principate.

The second section focuses on the dynamic of asymmetry within *amicitia*, both in friendships between aristocrats at different ages and career stages and as exemplified in the recommendation process. Chapter 3 presents two case studies of Cicero's asymmetric friendships with rising junior aristocrats: Sestius and Caelius Rufus. As I seek to demonstrate, these bonds assisted the rise of the younger friend; they created reliable power resources for the senior partner; and they brought the interests and voices of people at a variety of levels of influence and status into the conversation that defined the society's broader agendas, policies, and priorities. In Chapter 4, I treat the dynamics of recommendation. I analyze recommendations between senior aristocrats and rising members of the successor generation, using Cicero's recommendation of Trebatius to Caesar—a highly intentional process, extending across multiple letters—as a window. Then, I undertake a broad exploration of the dynamics of recommendations between elites and sub-elites from different backgrounds and circumstances. This investigation of *commendationes* showcases interchange between senators, *equites*, freedmen, and Greek intellectuals, bringing the breadth and diversity of the aristocratic community to the fore. With the second section, I endeavor to show how vertical bonds could facilitate a degree of coherence within a multi-generational, Italy-wide elite, helping it operate, in its assorted subgroups, as an agenda-setting ruling "class" (or, more precisely an interlocking collection of networks) for the imperial Republic.

In the conclusion, I address directly the question of regime change. I attend to continuities and transformations in the institution of *amicitia*. By locating shifts in its function—both as ideal and as social practice—we can better understand what it meant for a "Republic" to become a "Principate."

Chapter 1: *Consulares* and their *Amicitiae*—Parity, Performance, Practicality, and Affection

A Brief Introduction: to Section 1: Networking Among the *Principes*

Consulares were some of the aristocratic community's most visible figures, and their *amicitiae* were subject to special scrutiny. The prominence of friendships among the *principes* drove Cicero to take great pains as he constructed relationships with fellow ex-consuls, and his high-level *amici* reciprocated with their own careful intentionality. The self-conscious and deliberate nature of these links—bonds that these *consulares* appear to have designed as expressions of an idealizing discourse—makes them particularly illuminating as we seek to understand the nature of the social institution of *amicitia* in the late Republican system of power.

After an introduction that frames the overarching argument of this first section's two chapters, I devote each of these chapters to close examination of the links Cicero built with his fellow "peers." In this first chapter, I examine the relationships Cicero constructed with *consulares* beyond the circle of the dynasts, using his friendships with Lentulus Spinther, Metellus Nepos, and Appius Claudius as case studies. In the subsequent chapter, I analyze Cicero's friendships with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. In each chapter, I engage with these friendships both as expressions of the institution of peer *amicitia* and as windows onto the nature of this core social mechanism within the aristocratic community. I argue that the institution of high-level *amicitia* between nominal peers played a fundamental role in the social practice of power—in organizing the landscape of alignments, facilitating the extension of the power of personal presence, and brokering social resources. I also propose that this institution helped define the aristocratic community's conceptual understanding of its "Republican" system of power—a framework in which parity and power sharing were paramount, and a wide variety of actors could at least aspire to win their way into the circle of *principes* who shared the summit. Furthermore, I show how these *principes* attempted to use the institution to navigate unfamiliar challenges in the years between Caesar's consulship and the outbreak of civil war—novelties that threatened to undermine a "Republican" regime rooted in rule by a community.

Before plunging into analysis of specific cases, it is important to say a few words to situate these friendships of *principes* and the role that such alignments played in the system of power in the late Republic. While we should resist the temptation to envision the *consulares* as a distinct "executive committee," ex-consuls nonetheless occupied a uniquely distinguished position within the aristocratic community and its system of power.[1] *Consulares* possessed substantial stocks of the resources underlying influence, accumulated either in pursuit of office or as a reward for victory in the canvass. These men were set apart especially by the symbolic capital they derived from their *honos* and the concentration of social capital they had been compelled to muster to triumph in a sequence of electoral contests.[2] In addition, each man who had climbed to the pinnacle of the *cursus honorum* would have accumulated a thick web of connections in order to win election—a network extending across a variety of constituencies, both inside and outside the elite.[3] Of course, *consulares*

---

[1] Friedrich Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Roman Aristocratic Parties and Families)* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1920) famously framed the circle of consuls and *consulares* as such a governing college.

[2] Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 109 discusses *honores* as "deposits" in the symbolic capital account.

[3] The *Commentariolum Petitionis* is the *locus classicus* for the importance of amicable connections in winning elections—both with subordinates and with statesmen already advanced farther along the *cursus honorum* than the office seeker. A candidate could not merely rely on existing friends: instead, running for office required him to work actively to forge new ties. Indeed, the canvass justified broader networking than would otherwise be socially acceptable (25): "[during a canvass], as you cannot in the rest of life, you are able to link whomever you wanted into your network of friends" (*potes honeste, quod in cetera vita non queas, quoscumque velis adiungere ad amicitiam*). On the *commentariolum*: Andrew Sillett, "Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum*: a Philosophical Approach to Roman Elections," in Edmund Cueva, Javier Martínez (eds.), *Splendide Mendax*: Rethinking Fakes and Forgeries in Classical, Late Antique, and Early Christian Literature (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2016), 177-191, focusing on the provenance of the text and Michael Alexander, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis* as an Attack on Election Campaigns," *Athenaeum* 97 (2009): 31-57 for the authorial intent. Jeffrey Tatum,

also accumulated ethical, knowledge, and financial capital, just as the entire community of aristocrats did, but these forms were less obviously tied to those components of their aristocratic identity that were explicitly tied to their consular status.

Long after their tenure in office ended, moreover, *consulares* remained contacts well worth cultivating for members of the elite throughout Italy. Their centrality in informal personal networks, in addition to the visible position they commanded in *res publica* (especially within the Senate itself), gave them a central social location and valuable institutional access.[4] As a result, connections between *consulares* could act as organizing forces within the aristocratic community's networks. This was not merely because their *nobilitas* made these men the "highest-level" players in formal terms, although they were granted a unique brand of respect for this reason. In addition to, and perhaps even more than, their symbolic preeminence, it was the decades they had spent gathering and cultivating contacts that gave them an outstanding social location on the community's strategic map.[5]

The power of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus loomed ever larger during the 50s. Cicero and the other *consulares* who remained outside this dominant clique felt pressure building on the influence wielded by men of their station. The collection of *consulares* traditionally served both as the *principes* of the Senate and as some of the best-connected senior aristocrats in the community's social interchange. But it was becoming increasingly clear that the dynasts were distorting the balance of power within the system, as they consolidated a preeminent coalition composed of their own united family organizations and personal networks.[6] While they sensed the threat to their influence, nonetheless, during these years, many senior statesmen took great pains to ingratiate themselves with the dynasts. Indeed, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, Cicero himself poured energy into befriending each of the three during the 50s, although he tried to avoid self-abasement as much was as possible in light of the disparity in relative power. Others of Cicero's consular *amici* such as Lentulus Spinther and Appius Claudius also cultivated analogous links.

Quintus Cicero: A Brief Handbook on Canvassing for Office (Commentariolum Petitionis) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2018) provides the first full-length commentary, as well as up to date references and discussion of the text, its purposes, and its provenance.

[4] Michael Fronda, "*Privata Hospitia, Beneficia Publica*? Consul(ar)s, Local elite and Roman Rule in Italy," in Hans Beck, Antonio Duplá, Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 232-255 describes the extensive networking between Italian elites and *consulares*, pointing out that the prominent position of consuls and *consulares* in public affairs made them attractive contacts for members of the Italian aristocracy who needed representatives of their interests with access to institutional channels; for consuls' responsibilities when actually in office, see Francisco Pina Polo, *The Consul at Rome: the Civil Functions of the Consul in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[5] *Consulares* were certainly uniquely distinguished, but they were preeminent only in a qualified sense. While a consular did command an outstanding position in senatorial deliberation, his authority did not necessarily trump that of a man lower on the ladder of formal *honores* even in the context of the Senate (consider Cato the Younger—able to exercise influence in the aristocratic community with relatively minimal electoral success, but bolstered by his ethical and financial position, and by the "knowledge capital" that unpinned his skill as an orator). Outside the limited context of senatorial debate, even a man with no *honores* to his name could command social resources able to overwhelm a consular's (Atticus' influence regularly trumped Cicero's, backed up by impressive financial, social, and cultural networks). Nonetheless, the *consulares* did command unique respect, which set them apart from, if not always far and away above, fellow aristocrats. Matthew Roller, "The Consul(ar) as *Exemplum*: Fabius *Cunctator*'s Paradoxical Glory," in Beck et al. (eds.), *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*, brings out their prominence as Roman society's most common *exempla*. Martin Jehne, "The Rise of the Consular as a Social Type in the Third and Second Centuries BC," (same volume) traces the development of the consular role that we see in action in our period: since they were free of military duties after their time in office (and after any proconsulships), they became the leaders of policy in the *urbs*—specifically, their role as leaders in the Senate became increasingly institutionalized (if informally, since the Senate's institutional authority was not formally legal until the Augustan period). Ayelet Lushkov, *Magistracy and the Historiography of the Roman Republic. Politics in Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) also treats consular exemplarity.

[6] Of course, we should always recall the real differences that continued to create division among the dynasts themselves. As much as they sometimes tried to act with unity, they never maintained cooperation as a single bloc for long. Erich Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) is still one of the best accounts of the divergent backgrounds, interests, and priorities of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus.

But likely even to the dynasts themselves, it was far from evident that they were trying to deconstruct the fundamental nature of the system rather than, for instance, stretching existing norms and institutions to serve their personal interests.[7] Although at times, in letters to Atticus from the 50s for instance, we catch Cicero bemoaning the decline, and even the disappearance, of *res publica*, in truth, the dynasts were only sidling out of the system of community-based rule step by step.[8] Thus, for many established members of the community's highest circles, even as they felt compelled to curry favor with these three extraordinary actors, peer bonds with other consular peers remained a high priority. Indeed, we should recall that although the dynasts' influence extended far beyond the traditional consular position, in terms of formal honorific status they were *consulares* themselves. As a consequence, the boundary was fuzzy in relationships between dynasts and other *principes* between egalitarian *amicitia* and flattering sycophancy.

It is true that a portion of the dynasts' influence was rooted in armed force and the networks they built among their soldiers and officers, but much of their authority had similar fundamental sources to that of other actors in the aristocratic community.[9] Furthermore, they continued to express and exercise the outsized power they accumulated in familiar terms.[10] That is to say, much of their influence was rooted in social, symbolic, ethical, financial, and knowledge capital accounts. Their core goals still revolved around accumulating such resources, and they used them as the currency of their influence. They, too, were intimately tethered to many of their fellows by the same kinds of bonds of *amicitia* as Cicero and other *principes*, and they still depended on networks governed by the same social institutions to turn their influence into results, if not quite to the same degree as their nominal peers. Even as Cicero and his other consular *amici* built their own separate connections with each other—parallel to and separate from the dynasts' coalition—Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar were all continuing to actively link themselves into the system in their own right. All of the players were trying to accumulate and channel power through social maneuvering and coalition building. To a certain extent, we can even envision the dynasts' association as conventional in kind, however outsized its influence.

Nevertheless, we should emphasize one essential difference. As much as they continued to employ existing institutional channels, the dynasts appear to have been less attached to the preservation of equality at the top than were many of their fellow *principes*. The late Republican

---

[7] Among the dominant accounts of the "fall" of the Republic, there is some dispute as to this question of the intentionality of the dynasts' innovations. Both Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* and Christian Meier, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der Späten Römischen Republik* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966) argue against the idea that the major players were actively and consciously working to undermine the nature of the system; with Peter Brunt, *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic* (London: Norton, 1972) and *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* claiming a greater degree of intention in the dynasts' exploitation of circumstances. Matthias Gelzer, *Caesar: der Politiker und Staatsmann*, (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960) is still unmatched as an account of the sources. More recently, Robert Morstein-Marx and Nathan Rosenstein, "The Transformation of the Republic," in Nathan Rosenstein, Robert Morstein-Marx (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006): 624-637 reframes the transformation as a loss of an always-tenuous cohesion among a naturally fractious elite—they lean against the intentionality model; Tom Stevenson, *Julius Caesar and the Transformation of the Roman Republic* (London; New York: Routledge, 2015) is also skeptical of intentionality, even in the 40s.

[8] For instance, as Cicero wrote to Atticus in 54—*Ad Atticum* 92 (IV.18): "we have lost, my dear Pomponius, not only the vital essence and the blood, but even the outward appearance and countenance of the traditional civic community. There is no 'commonwealth' to bring me delight—in which I can take my repose" (*amisimus, mi Pomponi, omnem non modo sucum ac sanguinem sed etiam colorem et speciem pristinae civitatis. nulla est res publica quae delectet, in qua acquiescam*). This was a letter, as Shackleton Bailey tells us in his commentary, that Cicero wrote when he felt compelled by Pompey to try to reconcile with his former enemy Gabinius. Writing to Lentulus Spinther in *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), however, Cicero would engage in elaborate rhetorical gymnastics to justify his choice regarding Gabinius, framing it as an expression of his true (if shifting) opinions, and to claim that he retained a measure of freedom in his actions.

[9] Caesar and Pompey came to their positions as "dynasts" by very different paths. Caesar's early career was largely traditional. It was precisely through the building up of "capital" by time-tested means that he found himself in a position to amass military power. Crassus, too, was deeply implicated in the aristocratic community's familiar networks and mechanisms for the accumulation of influence. Pompey, by contrast, was a military adventurer from the start (beginning his accelerated rise by mustering three "private" legions in support of Sulla in the late 80s).

[10] Less familiar to Pompey, we might note, than to the other dynasts, or to the community at large.

aristocratic community's framework facilitated striking social fluidity. Even at the summit of the system, substantial space always remained for asymmetries to collapse into parity. So while the dynasts' authority existed in dialogue with traditional community dynamics, at the same time, they were pushing against some of the community's established norms about the nature of hierarchy—norms that were integral to the fundamental essence of the "Republican" system of power. They sought to create a coalition that could overwhelm the balance of power in a system that had hitherto been predicated on a dynamic multi-actor equilibrium between a cast of actors, without either hard boundaries or unalterable hierarchies. It appears that they were attempting to distort organization of power to their personal benefit, but they took advantage of the existing structure to accomplish these goals.

In the letters Cicero exchanged with fellow *consulares* during the 50s, the correspondents went out of their way to establish and reinforce their own separate relationships, without direct mediation by the power of the dynasts. This was an attempt, as I will argue in the first chapter of this section, to pool their own resources and influence, which were still substantial, in order to balance against the dynasts' extraordinary collection of social weight. They worked to create a loose coalition of their own, or at least a "coalition of the *status quo*," trying to maintain influence in the face of the dynasts' increasing dominance. In this enterprise, however, they were clearly loath to oppose or anger the dynasts, and thus to risk a violent response. We should emphasize that Cicero was not the only consular beholden to the dynasts. As early as 58, for instance, in *Ad Atticum* 67 (III.22), he could write to Atticus that Lentulus Spinther was entirely within Pompey's power (*totum esse in illius potestate*).[11]

Peer bonds between *principes* had long been important to the system of power. But as Cicero and his fellow *consulares* worked to maintain a measure of independent clout during this transitional decade, they took extra care to create links with each other. As testament to the importance they placed on this enterprise, we can point to attempts to establish friendships by men who would otherwise likely have remained at odds, as well as efforts to maintain these bonds in spite of both external interference and internal discord.

Moreover, it was not enough for these *consulares* merely to cultivate personal affection and individual interchange. Building on the insight that influence within the aristocratic community was, to a great extent, grounded in social perception, I suggest that these men were highly conscious that they had to perform and advertise their successful connections in order to derive the full social benefit. To serve this end, they did everything they could to represent their peer friendships as true and complete expressions of ideal *amicitia*, both to each other—the "internal audience" within the friendship—and to the aristocratic community at large. For instance, Cicero can be found working to convince Lentulus in 56 that nothing was more desirable to him than that his overwhelming gratitude and obligation to Lentulus should be recognized both by Lentulus and by everyone else (*mihi nihil fuit optatius quam ut primum abs te ipso, deinde a ceteris omnibus quam gratissimus erga te esse cognoscerer*).[12] We can imagine that the internal performance helped solidify the connection as a trustworthy asset. Meanwhile, the external performance would have increased the aristocratic community's perception of each *amicus*' social weight, demonstrating his access to an impressive portfolio of social capital assets.

---

[11] *Ad Atticum* 67 (III.22): "he [Lentulus] is completely in that man's [Pompey's] power" (*eum totum esse in illius potestate*). Shackleton Bailey mentions in his commentary that Lentulus was also on good terms with Caesar at the time—for which, see Caesar, *Bellum Civile* I.22. Nonetheless, as we will see, the dynasts' dominance did not prevent Cicero and Lentulus from maneuvering together for their own independent ends, although they avoided actions directly at cross-purposes with the gang of three.

[12] *Ad Familiares* 15 (I.5a): "nothing was more desirable to me then that I should be recognized first by you yourself, and then by all others to be as grateful as it is possible to be towards you" (*mihi nihil fuit optatius quam ut primum abs te ipso, deinde a ceteris omnibus quam gratissimus erga te esse cognoscerer*).

If by cultivating and performing their *amicitiae*, Cicero and his peers could create broad awareness of their social weight, both as individuals and as a group (if a loose one), they might retain a measure of independent influence in an aristocratic culture that the dynasts' merger threatened to dominate. By asserting membership in a club of uniquely distinguished senators—by claiming a degree of organizational identity of their own, with the union solidified by agreement about interests and virtues—I propose that these *consulares* were working to hold on to their role as stakeholders in late Republican society's core hegemonic process. They made extraordinary efforts to invest in the kind of peer bonds with fellow *principes* that already served as a central institution for the organization of power and collective action within the aristocratic system, and they went out of their way to advertise their shared access to the power resources that these friendships created.

Letters could serve as devices to create awareness of these links. It is important to recall the culture of epistolary circulation and dissemination that I discussed in the Introduction. I noted that letters were framed as private communications, and authors sometimes in fact hoped for privacy. But some were intended for dissemination, especially much of the correspondence exchanged between high-level *amici* such as the *consulares* we are examining in this chapter. Of course, Cicero and his consular friends were sufficiently prominent within the aristocratic community that their relations generated keen interest. If they allowed their letters to "leak," we can imagine that they could expect an audience. Because of the open character of the community's epistolary culture, their letters could disseminate to a broader readership an impression of the health of their friendship and the quality of their individual behavior in the context of the relationship. As much as letters were personal by the conceit of the genre, in practice they served as vehicles for increasing the community's perception of the writer's "connectedness," as well as of his virtuous behavior in the context of friendships. These letters could help their authors translate their individual relationships into social and ethical capital, increasing the social power of both the writer and the recipient.[13]

The chapter that follows, the first of two in this section, is devoted to an analysis of the letters Cicero exchanged with Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57), Lentulus' colleague Metellus Nepos (cos. 57), and Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54). These exchanges let us see the process of constructed and performed high-level *amicitia* in action, as these *principes* tried to use friendships to shore up their influence under pressure.

Considering the high-stakes conditions of the 50s, we might expect these relationships between senior statesmen to have functioned as naked alliances for the pursuit of overt power. But as we examine Cicero's letters, I will show that this is decidedly not the case. Instead—and this tells us a lot about the rich texture of Roman *amicitia* during this period—the participants took care to present the relationships, both to each other and to an external audience, as highly-developed, multi-faceted constructs, rooted in an agreement in virtue and shared interests, and also as partnerships in private and public affairs.

It seems that Cicero and Lentulus would have been friends under "normal" conditions, but the exceptional circumstances of the 50s were needed to drive collaboration between Cicero and the Metellus and Appius—men with whom Cicero had previously maintained hostile relations and with whom he would likely have remained at odds without such a potent stimulus for change. To a degree, as I will contend, the "institutionalized" characteristics of all of these friendships would have allowed these bonds to function as effective power resources, and as sources of the social and ethical capital that served as both resource and goal within the system of power. But the lasting warmth between Cicero and Lentulus created a level of trust that granted their collective action an

[13] Jon Hall, "Politeness and Formality in Cicero's Letter to Matius (Fam. 11.27)," *Museum Helveticum* 62 (2005), 201 points out that, because of the dissemination of correspondence, letters could become an important source of social capital.

additional level of consistency. "Sincere" affection could play an essential role in the efficacy of the institution.[14]

But of course, on a deeper level, all these connections were about power. To a large extent, the friends invested in such relationships to preserve, protect, and extend their influence. The *consulares* were all looking to use these "peer" bonds to protect the capacity of themselves and their personal family organizations to freely pursue the goals that had traditionally motivated action within the aristocratic system: that is, the accumulation and redeployment of various forms of material and abstract capital—money and property, on the one hand, and symbolic, ethical, social, and knowledge capital on the other. Moreover, in addition to increasing the community's perception of each friend's social weight, these friendships allowed the *principes* to become functional power resources for each other, especially by acting as direct representatives of one another's interests—"second selves" who could extend personal presence during spells of absence.

I turn in the second chapter of the section to Cicero's *amicitia* bonds with the dynasts—relationships undertaken with ready cooperation from Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. These are worth examining both as expressions of the institution of "peer" *amicitia* in themselves and as case studies in the tensions and transformations of the 50s. Cicero worked to maintain their participation in the familiar communal system of power, using the rhetoric of *amicitia* to restrain their drift away from the community's norms. Most notably, Cicero went out of his way to highlight his own parity in status and his equal contribution in the friendships he shared with each of the three. Even as the dynasts undermined true parity, moreover, we will see that they clearly valued and cultivated their *amicitia* with Cicero. They had not yet transcended a system where the institution of "peer" *amicitia* seemed not only relevant but also integral to their social power.

We must keep Cicero's unique perspective in mind as we examine these high-level friendships.[15] He was an articulate proponent of an *amicitia* ideal that was normative and at least somewhat tendentious, and the discourse within each friendship was inevitably inflected by Cicero's proclivities. Nonetheless, Lentulus, Appius, and Metellus not only recognized and reflected Cicero's rhetoric and goals, but also generated much of the interchange and content of the relationship without prompting. Even Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus not only returned Cicero's investments in the friendship in kind, but also initiated gestures of their own. Cicero and his interlocutors were operating within an idiom that was mutually recognizable and that they all knew how to use. This idiom was far from static, however. While high-level peer *amicitia* was a robust structure, these friends were implicated in a constant process of reconstruction. Sometimes as conscious agents and sometimes only half-aware of their intervention, they subtly reformed the institutional norms of the discourse.

Parity among a select circle of *principes*, whether "real" or rhetorical, was fundamental to the aristocratic system of power—one of the central pillars, as I propose, of the "Republican" framework. Throughout his career, Cicero worked with his fellow senior statesmen to bolster this discourse of peer reciprocity, both in affection and in the exchange of reciprocal service and support. We see these efforts both in his relations with *consulares* who were still his peers in practice and with the dynasts who, in spite of the insistent rhetoric of equality, were clearly the senior partners in terms of practical influence. Furthermore, and this was perhaps a more idiosyncratic preoccupation, Cicero saw it as the duty of the community's leaders to follow the advice of Plato

[14] David Konstan's work has been integral in bringing forward the affective character of *amicitia*, a feature often deemphasized in twentieth century scholarship—see his *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and now, recently, *In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[15] I discuss the effects of Cicero's life experience of friendship on his perspective at length in the Introduction.

and Xenophon and to model proper behavior for their juniors and subordinates.[16] Thus, he worked to develop and perform exemplary friendships with his fellow *principes*, with the hopes of encouraging imitation by members of the rising generation. Ideally, high-level friendships between the society's most public men could serve as models for proper behavior by participants in the aristocratic community of any age or status.

Consulares Beyond the Circle of the Dynasts

Lentulus Spinther

As one of Cicero's longest lasting friendships among the *principes*, and as a bond that would have existed even without the extraordinary pressures of the 50s, his relationship with Lentulus provides a good starting point for our exploration of the institutional of high-level peer *amicitia* within the late Republican aristocratic community.[17] Cicero and Lentulus had been friends and collaborators since 63, when, as curule aedile, Lentulus helped Cicero suppress Catiline's conspiracy.[18] In the years that followed, Lentulus proved his quality as a contact, demonstrating both goodwill and practical utility. He agitated for Cicero's return from exile, and the day he took office as consul in 57, he put forward the motion for Cicero's recall.[19]

Especially during and after Lentulus' consulship, he and Cicero constructed and publicized a friendship of *principes* designed to mirror the standards of ideal *amicitia* as much as possible. Their bond was founded on a number of pillars: affection; practical, strategic, and intellectual interests; and a shared vision of the proper direction for the aristocratic community and the moral formation of its individual members.[20] We should emphasize, moreover, that these were not merely preexisting standards to which they were subscribing. Their interactions and conversations also played a role in defining the very standards that gave shape to their friendship and others like it. While Cicero took the lead in forming the rhetoric of the bond, Lentulus also collaborated actively. Both labored to represent the relationship as a complete expression of the kind of ideal *amicitia* appropriate between two men at the summit of the aristocratic community's hierarchy, making careful efforts to include a particular collection of components in their friendship.

Their hopes that they could retain a measure of influence independent of the dynasts ebbed and flowed throughout the mid-50s. In *Ad Familiares* 18 (I.7) from 56, the year of Lentulus' proconsulship, we find Cicero hoping that Lentulus would be able to parley social and symbolic resources accumulated during his proconsulship into substantial influence—the greatest and highest place in the *civitas* (*summum atque altissimum gradum civitatis*). But the next year, in 19 (I.8), Cicero expressed despair that their "friends" (the dynasts) were so firmly in control that their position was likely remain thus for a generation (*sunt quidem certe in amicorum nostrorum potestate, atque ita ut nullam*

---

[16] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "the sort of people the principal citizens are in a commonwealth, so do the rest of the citizens tend to be" (*quales in re publica principes essent talis reliquos solere esse civis*)—Cicero said he was quoting Plato, but it is in fact almost an exact quote from Xenophon's *Cyropaidaeia* 8.8.5.

[17] On Lentulus' background, see Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 144-145 and the prosopographical entry at Élizabeth Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993), 399-401.

[18] Sallust, *Bellum Catiliniae* 47.3.

[19] *Pro Sestio* 70 (XXXII) for Lentulus' support before his consulship, 107 (L) for a *contio* he held to drum up support; in *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), Cicero expressed how much he owed Lentulus a debt of gratitude for his invaluable assistance during the process. Shackleton Bailey points out in his introduction to this sequence of letters with Lentulus that Cicero saw this debt as significant enough to override any minor sources of annoyance, citing *Ad Quintum* 6 (II.2); Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 60-88 and Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch* (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969), 71-104 for the events during this year (among numerous other accounts).

[20] For instance, *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) shows how Cicero offered encouragement and assistance for Lentulus' son's upbringing, sending his *De Oratore* for educational purposes. Cicero and Lentulus were collaborating to shape the tenor of statesmanship in the next generation. The educational link across the generations would also have helped associate their two *domus*-based units for consistent collective action.

mutationem umquam hac hominum aetate habitura res esse videatur).[21] But even through these uncertain years, Cicero and Lentulus maintained a consistent effort to use the institution of inter-consular friendship to preserve sufficient collective social weight for them to remain non-negligible.

From the start of a series of letters beginning in 56—a sequence likely intended for broader dissemination—Cicero cast himself as a debtor for Lentulus' assistance during his exile, seeking to inaugurate what he clearly hoped would become an ongoing cycle of exchange.[22] In the first letter of the sequence, *Ad Familiares* 12 (I.1) from January 56, Cicero claimed that it would be impossible to offer recompense sufficient to satisfy his own sense of obligation and gratitude, but at the same time, he made sure to show himself expending effort that any observer would deem ample (*ceteris satis facio omnibus*).[23] In other letters from the same period, we see Cicero actively promoting his friend's interests while Lentulus was out on provincial service as the proconsular governor of Cilicia. Cicero worked in conjunction with their other consular friends Hortensius and Lucullus, although without the collaboration that implicitly should have been forthcoming from others of their consular colleagues (*cognovi Hortensium percupidum tui, studiosum Lucullum… praeterea quidem de consularibus nemini possum aut studi erga te aut offici aut amici animi esse testis*).[24] With these claims, as I will show, Cicero was operating on multiple levels, serving both his own and his friend's reputation and standing. By extension, he was seeking to increase the social weight exercised by the association of their combined *domus*-based organizations and by their personal networks of social affiliates—networks which, of course, overlapped to a large degree between these two friends and gained additional coherence from their intimate alliance.

We should emphasize how Cicero served his own interests by displaying his consistency as a friend. Such a performance would reinforce his particular bond with Lentulus. By adding that only he and a few other *consulares* were willing to make an effort to help, he was implying that this kind of assistance was scarce, at least at this particular moment. Thus, Cicero was making an implicit case that Lentulus should view their connection as a dear resource and, thus, as highly valuable. With this rhetoric, Cicero was cultivating the personal tie with Lentulus and highlighting its utility to both participants. This represented an investment in his social capital account with this particular friend

---

[21] In *Ad Familiares* 19 (I.8): "[events] are securely in the power of our friends indeed, and to such a degree that it seems that there will be no transformation in this generation" (*sunt quidem certe in amicorum nostrorum potestate, atque ita ut nullam mutationem umquam hac hominum aetate habitura res esse videatur*).

[22] The sequence of letters takes up a large portion of the first book of *Ad Familiares*: 12 (I.1), 13 (I.2), 14 (I.4), 15 (I.5a), 16 (I.5b), 17 (I.6), 18 (I.7), 19 (I.8), 20 (I.9). As Shackleton Bailey describes in his commentary, the sequence was mainly concerned with the long scandalous story of Ptolemy XII and the controversy surrounding his restoration to the Egyptian throne—a series of events that ended up involving many of the most important figures in the aristocratic community (Bailey provides a reconstruction of the context). Israel Shatzman, "The Egyptian Question in Roman Politics (59-54 B.C.)," *Latomus* 30 (1971): 363-369 is one of the more detailed studies. Hall, "Politeness and Formality in Cicero's Letter to Matius (Fam. 11.27)," 201 cites the longest of these letters, *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), as an example of a letter clearly intended for dissemination. Shackleton Bailey comments that Cicero would at the very least have expected his addressee to pass on the substance of the letter, whether or not Lentulus ended up circulating the actual text. Luca Grillo, "Reading Cicero's *ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," *The Classical Quarterly* 65 (2015): 655–68 is essential on the strategies of the collection as such and the rhetorical purpose of *Ad Familares* I. Jon Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36 notes the constructedness of the polite rhetoric of this sequence of letters—a civil and urbane performance, as we might add, entirely proper to a correspondence that was intended for dissemination and designed to serve each friend's reputation.

[23] *Ad Familiares* 12 (I.1): "I act in your interest with every ounce of duty, or should I say 'piety,' towards you, in a manner that seems sufficient to all others, but that never seems enough for my own satisfaction" (*Ego omni officio ac potius pietate erga te ceteris satis facio omnibus, mihi ipse numquam satis facio*). Shackleton Bailey points out in his commentary that Cicero uses the term *pietas* in relation to all the principal architects of his restoration (Lentulus, Milo, and Pompey). Grillo "Reading Cicero's *Ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," 658 points out that Cicero was framing their shared loyalty in this letter as secure in a way that Lentulus' other friendships were not: "Cicero constructs his relationship with Lentulus by way of their common cause in opposition to other people."

[24] *Ad Familiares* 18 (I.7): "I have found Hortensius exceedingly desirous of offering his aid, Lucullus extraordinarily zealous…Besides these I can give testimony of no service toward you, duty, or friendly spirit from any others among the *consulares*" (*cognovi Hortensium percupidum tui, studiosum Lucullum...praeterea quidem de consularibus nemini possum aut studi erga te aut offici aut amici animi esse testis*). Cicero drew out the parallel between Lentulus' ill treatment and his own abandonment by powerful friends in the lead-up to his exile.

and an effort to reinforce their trust and their capacity to work together. In addition, Cicero's claim would act as an advertisement to the rest of the community of his quality as a contact. If the letter ended up circulating, this would have been especially true. But even if exact copies of the letter failed to make the rounds, the positive impression would still likely spread through second-hand report.

In a system in which the exercise of power was so dependent on trust, a reputation for consistency was an indispensable ingredient in the recipe for influence. Cicero was implying that he deserved praise for his virtuous behavior. Although he shied away from explicit boasting, his words suggest that others were in fact already praising it.[25] Since, as is my contention, abstract rewards were some of the most important stakes of both competitive and cooperative activity within the aristocratic framework, we can view Cicero's desire to accumulate his own ethical capital as a central aim in itself. He was cultivating a species of status grounded in a reputation as a generous and reliable actor who could be counted on to treat his friends well and serve their interests. An aristocrat such as Cicero would build such a reputation across the length of his career. This ethical capital was a reward for his actions in itself, and it was also currency that would underwrite future effective collaboration, both with Lentulus and with other affiliates.

I suggest that Cicero designed this sequence of letters to Lentulus to serve Lentulus' position and status, as well as his own. Cicero's performance advertised the exceptional quality of his friend's assistance during his exile, publicizing not only Lentulus' high quality behavior as a connection but also his capacity to use his influence to accomplish practical results in the competitive arena of *res publica*. A reputation for consistency and concrete effectiveness would have further perpetuated a man's power.[26] In a framework in which informal links were fundamental, influence and efficacy would have depended on a reputation for trustworthiness, combined with prior evidence of an ability to sway the network. The fact that Lentulus had come to Cicero's aid in his distress was an impressive demonstration of both qualities, especially since this intervention had been successful. Thus, we can also view this exchange as an attempt by Cicero to bolster Lentulus' reputation and influence, as Cicero went out of his way to acknowledge and to advertise his friend's service and the efficacy of his social power.

The highly constructed *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) provides a particularly salient instance of this dynamic of letter-as-advertisement. Written in 54, after the dynasts' preeminence had become both undeniable and increasingly oppressive, this was the last of the letters to Lentulus preserved in the *Ad Familiares corpus*.[27] As noted earlier in this chapter, scholars often cite this as a clear instance of a letter intended for dissemination. Cicero's epistle served, at least in part, as an elaborate defense of his conduct since Luca, and he provided a broad exposition of his behavior in *res publica* and in the social back-and-forth behind the scenes. It appears that he intended to excuse himself both to Lentulus and to a range of other readers with whom he hoped Lentulus would share the contents.[28]

---

[25] Self-praise within Roman aristocratic culture was always a complex issue, as power players sought to derive reputational benefit from their actions without coming across as distastefully conceited—Kathryn Tempest, "Combating the Odium of Self-Praise: Cicero's *Diuinatio in Caecilium*," in Christopher Smith, Ralph Covino (eds.) *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea: Classical Pr. of Wales, 2011), 145-163 notes analogous complexities in oratory; Cicero went somewhat overboard with his consulship—see, for instance, John Dugan, "*Non Sine Causa sed Sine Fine*: Cicero's Compulsion to Repeat his Consulate," *The Classical Journal* 110 (2015): 9-22.

[26] Cicero brought out the exceptional the value of consistency during calamity in *De Amicitia* XVII (64): "how severe, how difficult do continued associations during other men's calamities appear to most people" (*quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates*). The importance of consistency would have seemed particularly salient to Cicero, as he had personal experience with abandonment by men he had trusted when he was exiled.

[27] Andrew Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), locates this letter in the context of the later 50s. He suggests that, although Cicero was forced to acknowledge that (215) "consular rank appropriate to a courageous and resolute senator" had become increasingly inaccessible, he "did not abandon the ideal" of participation in public life—though he found himself sometimes compelled to deploy his still-potent influence "in ways which he did not approve."

[28] This follows Shackleton Bailey's commentary.

But I propose that *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) should be viewed as far more than an erudite *apologia*. First of all, it was a written promise of his incredible fondness (*incredibilem…amorem*)—a kind of promissory note, which would hold him bound to Lentulus with ongoing affection and obligation as if by a kind of contract. In addition, we might picture it as a "gift" of sorts. With the letter, Cicero was offering his friend as tangible a transfer into his account of ethical capital as he could—a monument of his virtuous and effective participation in the community.[29] I propose that Cicero could use the text as a vehicle to transfer a grant of abstract assets—symbolic and ethical capital given tangible form. Texts could grant tangible form to some of the intangible commodities—social, ethical, and symbolic capital, for instance—that were of prime importance, both as goals and tools, within the community's institutional structure.[30]

When he wrote his *De Amicitia* in 44, Cicero would maintain that no true friendship exists except between good men (*nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*).[31] Throughout the exchange between Cicero and Lentulus, in a manner that foreshadows this claim, we see both *consulares* taking care to highlight and appreciate each other's virtuous character and conduct. We can again turn to *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) for an illustration. Cicero expressed delight that he held in his hands textual testimony that his friend recognized his *pietas* (*periucundae mihi fuerunt litterae tuae, quibus intellexi te perspicere meam in te pietatem*).[32] Both men were taking care to perpetuate a cycle where each would mutually recognize the other's virtue. Lentulus was marking Cicero's *pietas*, while Cicero was noting and appreciating the gesture. This back and forth was important for two reasons. First, it reinforced their bond with each other internally, strengthening their affective link. Second, we can view it as a performance for the rest of the community. The letter, which Cicero likely intended for broader dissemination, had the capacity to spread evidence that both he and Lentulus were the kind of men with sufficient virtue to participate in *amicitia* of the highest caliber—a capacity that, as Cicero proposed in *De Amicitia*, was both rare and valuable among men of affairs.[33] The struggle for ethical capital was not necessarily a zero-sum game, but it was still a competitive arena, and the very fact of sharing *vera amicitia* with another *princeps* was a victory in itself.

Cicero's choice to highlight the virtue of *pietas* is also significant.[34] By opting to evoke the particular brand of reverent loyalty owed to the family (as well as to the *patria* and its gods), Cicero

---

[29] For the relationship between epistolary exchange and gift-exchange—Amanda Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012); this issue has much more currency in the scholarship on high imperial and late antique epistolography, sometimes linked with discussion of early-Medieval gift-giving as a social practice. Catherine Conybeare, *Self and Symbols in the Letters of Paulinus of Nola.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Shane Bjornlie, "*Amicitia* in the Epistolary Tradition: The Case of Cassiodorus' *Variae*," in Katariina Mustakallio, Christian Krötzl (eds.), *De Amicitia: Friendship and Social Networks in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Institutum Romanům Finlandiae, Rome, 2009): 135-154, 136: "careful observance of style in letters by Pliny the Younger and Sidonius Appolinaris reminds us that the letter itself often served as a gift." Where I differ is in viewing the letter as a gift of symbolic and ethical capital made tangible.

[30] The dedication of the *De Officiis* to his son is also an interesting twist on this phenomenon. We might view the text as a sort of abstract capital "bequest," capable of facilitating the transfer of symbolic and ethical capital across generations.

[31] *De Amicitia* V (18): "this, however, I believe first of all, that friendship is not possible except among good men" (*Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*).

[32] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "your letter was exceptionally agreeable to me, through which I perceived that you have thoroughly grasped my (familial) loyalty towards you" (*periucundae mihi fuerunt litterae tuae, quibus intellexi te perspicere meam in te pietatem*).

[33] *De Amicitia* XVII (64): "true friendships are only found with difficulty among those who are wrapped up in office holding and public affairs" (*verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in eis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur*). Events during the 50s and early-40s may well have reinforced this perception of scarcity, as well as Cicero's conviction that he needed to invest time in moral and institutional repair work through his *philosophica*.

[34] Famously, in *De Republica* VI (XVI), Cicero framed *pietas* as due in a large measure to parents and relatives, but even more to *res publica*—to "the commons" we might say; also, *De Inventione* II.LII (161) for a similar definition focusing on kin and *patria*. Amanda Wilcox, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's* Ad Familiares *and Seneca's* Moral Epistles, 32-33 discusses "the extension of kinship terms to people who are not actually relatives." Gertrude Emilie, "Cicero and the Roman *Pietas*," *The Classical Journal* 39 (1944): 536-542 brings out the uses of *pietas* by Cicero for family and the *patria* but also, importantly, his extension of the concept to friends. Moreover, she discusses the importance Cicero gave to *pietas* as a motive force for action, noting that he granted respect to actions prompted by *pietas* (to family, *patria*, and friends) even when they told against his own interests.

implied that his and Lentulus' mutual regard and care was strong enough that it could approximate the connection between family members, rooted both in dutiful reciprocity and in deep affection.[35] Moreover, as Richard Saller points out, *pietas* was a matter of reciprocity and affection, not merely of obedience to authority.[36] Thus, it was an especially useful concept for peer friendships, not merely for asymmetric bonds. This shared morality allowed these two high-level friends to participate in an interest group united by a "familial" sensibility. Family-style links were powerful, but the boundaries limiting the rhetoric of kinship were permeable. By importing such a familial idiom into their interchange, friends could extend the closeness and commitment inherent in blood relationships to associations created by the looser institutional bonds of *amicitia*.

In addition to expressing his delight that Lentulus had recognized his *pietas*, Cicero reciprocated by praising an expanded suite of virtues, highlighting his friend's temperance and moderation, his open lack of dissimulation, and his high-minded nobility (*temperantiam et moderationem naturae…animum…etiam apertum et simplicem*).[37] Cicero drew attention to these virtues, while underlining the similarity of their character and motivations (*quae me moverunt, movissent eadem te profecto*).[38] Thus, as I propose, Cicero was able to stake a subtle claim to these same qualities for himself. After all, since the ideal friend was an *alter ego*, one man's virtue was, by implication, the other's as well. The friendship between the *consulares* allowed each man to consolidate his reputation for the possession of and commitment to a broad suite of virtues by praising his "second self," rather than indulging in explicit self-praise. By extension, this function strengthened the bond even further, because each man now had part of his reputation vested in the other's active good opinion—an ethical capital stake he would forfeit if the connection soured.

Another element that the two friends seem to have taken care to include in the curated context of their correspondence was frank advice—a key component, as I will suggest, of the idealizing discourse of *amicitia* and a central practical tool in the operation of high-level peer *amicitia* as a functional institution. While correction and criticism might be hard to swallow, the model friend Cicero would later portray in *De Amicitia* was ready both to give and receive counsel.[39] In line with this emerging ideal, Cicero and Lentulus made sure to introduce this dynamic into the internal interchange of their friendship, and they highlighted its presence in the portrait of the relationship

---

[35] Stefan Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 256 puts it well: such a frame involved "transferring to a stranger to whom one owed one's life or something as valuable as life the affection and reverence due to one's father."

[36] Richard Saller, "*Pietas*, Obligation and Authority in the Roman Family," in Peter Kneissl, Volker Losemann (eds.), *Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Festscrift für Karl Christ zum 65. Geburtstag* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), 393-410 points out (399) that the Romans associated *pietas* in the context of the family not so much with submission to higher authority as with reciprocal affection and obligations shared by all family members.

[37] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "for I know the temperance and moderation of your nature, I know that your spirit, which is not only as friendly as can be towards me, is also suffused with no malice towards others, and that by contrast it is not only lofty and noble but also frank and guileless" (*novi enim temperantiam et moderationem naturae tuae, novi animum cum mihi amicissimum tum nulla in ceteros malevolentia suffusum contraque cum magnum et excelsum tum etiam apertum et simplicem*). We should recall that the definition and importance of the virtues was at the center of Cicero's efforts in his *philosophica*, and he claimed that *temperentia* and *moderatio* were fundamental virtues for the proper functioning of the system of power. On the individual level, as Cicero emphasized in *De Officiis* I.XXVII (93-94), these two qualities were part of the *decorum* necessary for proper participation in the aristocratic system (he discusses various facets of these virtues throughout the text)—Malcolm Schofield, "The Fourth Virtue," in Walter Nicgorski, (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 43-57 provides extensive discussion of *moderatio* and *temperantia* as components of the multi-faceted "fourth virtue" of *decorum*.

[38] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "the factors that have moved me would have been the same as the motives that drove you" (*quae me moverunt, movissent eadem te profecto*); in the same volume, Jonathan Powell, "Cicero's *De Re Publica* and the Virtues of the Statesman," in Nicgorski (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, 14-42 treats such virtues as characteristics of the different regime types Cicero discussed in his *De Re Publica*.

[39] *De Amicitia* XIII (44): "let us dare to trade advice freely" (*consilium verum dare audeamus libere*); XXIII (88) provides a more complete account of the duty to give and receive advice. Thomas Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," *Apeiron* 23, 169 points out that Cicero understood and acknowledged the contrast between his prescription and ordinary practice. It is important to note, however, that Lentulus was implicated in the creation and perpetuation of this system in this interaction.

that they painted for their respective circles. Thus, as Lentulus contemplated the end of his term in Cilicia, Cicero claimed that both affection and consciousness of his friend's services prompted him to offer counsel (*cum beneficiis tuis tum amore incitatus meo*).[40] It was important that Lentulus do everything possible to augment an already illustrious reputation. But Cicero warned him that it would be shortsighted to limit his attention to winning glory abroad. He should think ahead to his return and try to capitalize on the new assets he had accumulated during his years as consul and proconsul. That is to say, Cicero advised Lentulus that he easily could, and thus that he should, make use of his glorious military reputation, as well as the connections he had collected through his canvass and on campaign, to capture and hold one of the highest positions in aristocratic society (*te facillime posse obtinere summum atque altissimum gradum civitatis*).[41] In another instance of this advisory function, near the end of the extensive *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), Cicero called on his authority as a friend to advise Lentulus that he should placate a group of *publicani* he had offended (*eum tibi ordinem aut reconcilies aut mitiges*). Cicero presented this counsel with great care, however. He made sure to commend Lentulus' *aequitas* (*aequitatem tuam non potui non probare*) even as he put forth his corrective—a thoughtful acknowledgement that his friend had acted with virtue in upholding the interests of his provincial subjects at the expense of rapacious tax-farmers.[42] When offering advice to an intimate connection, especially if the letter was expected to circulate, Cicero apparently understood that it was important to locate his correction in a background of praise.[43]

As these two examples indicate, high-level *amici* might choose to broadcast their engagement in the exchange of advice. This was a component of the discourse that they projected in an ongoing act of joint self-fashioning, representing themselves as virtuous peers at the summit of the system.[44] We should note, too, that Cicero and Lentulus were not working from a static playbook. In fact, they were constructing the ideal even as they worked to live up to it. Informal institutions like *amicitia* had significant power to guide action, and they could not be cast aside and replaced all at once. But they were always open to refashioning. This point is important to keep in mind as we examine any of the social institutions guiding relations within the aristocratic system. To a greater or lesser extent, they all remained in a state of flux—subject to reform, both conscious and unconscious. Indeed, it was through exactly this kind of back and forth that the exchange of advice would have first became part of the ideal. This mutability created space for Cicero's theoretical

---

[40] *Ad Familiares* 18 (I.7): "I advise you spurred not only by your services but also by affection" (*te vero [e]moneo cum beneficiis tuis tum amore incitatus meo*).

[41] *Ad Familiares* 18 (I.7): "you could easily obtain a high and exceptionally lofty position in civil society" (*te facillime posse obtinere summum atque altissimum gradum civitatis*).

[42] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "I propose with as much authority as I can to you that, if you can by any means, you reach reconciliation with or at least soften the feelings of that group towards yourself. While that is challenging, nonetheless it seems to me to be appropriate to your wisdom" (*tibi…sum auctor ut, si quibus rebus possis, eum tibi ordinem aut reconcilies aut mitiges. id etsi difficile est, tamen mihi videtur esse prudentiae tuae*). This was not a change of policy for Lentulus, who, like Cicero himself, had taken care of equestrians' interests in past. It was a struggle for both men to balance the interests of provincials (a weaker constituency, but one owed protection as a moral duty) and those of equestrian businessmen (a potent interest group). Shackleton Bailey points out that Lentulus' integrity in his financial dealings is supported by the fact that he was experiencing financial difficulties in 51, citing *Ad Atticum* 110 (V.17). This tension between virtue and profit was, as Bailey highlights, a perennial dilemma of Roman governors.

[43] We see a similar dynamic at work when Cicero presented his brother with gentle advice about how he could improve his performance as propraetorian governor of Asia (Quintus also faced challenges about how to make virtuous choices with regard to governance)—*Ad Quintum* 1 (I.1). Like *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), as Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 131 notes, this letter to Quintus was "written for discreet circulation, intended to create or confirm support for the ostensible recipient."

[44] The parallel process of self-fashioning in Ciceronian oratory has received treatment in John Dugan, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), although by the nature of the genre it treats (oratorical), it does not take place in dialogue between two correspondents as it can in the letters. Henriette Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) is also essential on Cicero's oratorical self-fashioning strategies, and her *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) broadens the scope to explore such self-fashioning by a variety of aristocrats throughout the community. It was not only Cicero who was concerned with molding his image in oratory. This reinforces the idea that the self-fashioning enterprise in the correspondence was also likely not a Ciceronian idiosyncrasy.

interventions, especially his treatises from the 40s, in which he focused directly on the nature of the informal institutional structure of aristocratic society.[45]

In addition to helping these two *amici* perform their adherence to an ideal, the exchange of advice served an additional function. In the guise of counsel, men like Cicero and Lentulus could negotiate the internal consensus for their subgroup of allies, allowing them to bring their collective influence to bear with greater efficacy. Even as late as 54, when he composed *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), Cicero appears to have imagined that—if Lentulus returned to Rome covered in military glory, and if he worked to channel that glory into influence at home by cultivating a web of men tied to him by relationships constructed in the extra-urban circumstances of his camp—he had an exceptional opportunity. He might then be able to set himself up as a figure in the aristocratic community on terms of relative parity with the dynasts, or at any rate, of less extreme inequality. Caesar, we should note, was engaged in an analogous enterprise with his Gallic command during the same period. By the 50s, this seems to have become a recognized strategy for cultivating a power base. We can envision Cicero and Lentulus tentatively exploring the possibility that they might be able to use Lentulus' military position to acquire a measure of independent influence for the subgroup composed of their linked family organizations and their close *amici*. The two *consulares* evidently recognized the effectiveness of the dynast's tactics. In this exchange, they were exploring, with great circumspection, the possibility that they might echo Caesar's strategy.

Regarding the case of the *publicani*, Cicero realized how important it was for his and Lentulus' subgroup that they retain the support of an interest group with such potent, if subtle, influence within the aristocratic community.[46] It is important to recall here that even though equestrian did not pursue office, they were members of the ruling elite.[47] In fact, this episode shows how the voices of equestrians—especially of the organized *societates* of public contractors—helped determine priorities within the system of power: their concerns could drive men occupying official positions to bend their behavior.

Cicero noted that his friend had treated the *ordo* with great consideration in the past (*semper ornasti*).[48] But it may be that as a patrician, Lentulus had a less keenly developed sense that his personal success was founded on backing from *equites*.[49] By contrast, Cicero began life as an equestrian, and his career would never have gotten anywhere without equestrian backing. At each stage, *equites*—both *publicani* and Italian landowners—had formed the center of his support base within the broader aristocratic community. Time and again, Cicero prioritized their interests. In

---

[45] For instance, in his *De Officiis* and *De Amicitia*. Although formal rules might change slowly, the function of the informal institutional structure was always open to subtle reconstruction. Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 73-82 points out that the manner of "play" within any system will depend on the knowledge, skills, and learning of the individual participants. This has profound implications for institutional change, which can take place even in the absence of rules-based reform.

[46] Caillan Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) provides an extensive discussion of the role in the late Republic both of the *publicani* and, more broadly, of the increasingly important and defined *ordo equestris*.

[47] As Timothy Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 67 puts it: "the distinction between senators and *equites*, though intermittently of great political importance, tends to disguise the essential homogeneity of the moneyed class." Claude Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974), 20-30 notes that a senator was an *eques* who had held a senior magistracy. I offer more comprehensive discussion of the composition of the aristocratic community in the Introduction, along with further references.

[48] Cicero, *In Verrem* (I and II) for the principal evidence for the structure and function of the *societates* of *publicani* in the late Republic; Ernst Badian, *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in Service of the Roman Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) is the classic treatment of the *publicani* and their social, political, and economic role in the late Republic. He makes the intriguing case that these equestrian associations did work that would otherwise have been carried out by the families of the ruling elite. I would qualify this by noting that the organizations of *publicani* were also composed of *patres familias* and their associated family organizations—equestrian families were aristocratic families, too, merely made up of equestrians rather than of senators.

[49] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "[that order] which you have always treated honorably" (*quem semper ornasti*). The author of the *Commentariolum Petitionis* (3 and 50) made much of Cicero's tight connection to the *publicani* specifically, as well as to the *ordo equester* as a whole.

return, they provided essential assistance in each of his major struggles against rivals.[50] So although both men needed equestrian goodwill if they wanted to retain influence during the 50s, Cicero's personal awareness of equestrian influence would have been far more acute. As a consequence, he had to provide gentle reminders of the importance of retaining the support of the *publicani* for their subgroup.[51] He called on his authority as a friend to argue that it would be in line with Lentulus' *prudentia* to reconcile with them, or at least to mollify their feelings (*mihi videtur esse prudentiae tuae*).[52]

Thus, the exchange of advice was more than merely a component of the idealizing discourse of *amicitia*. It also provided a venue for the negotiation of ethical and strategic consensus between the consular protagonists of two aristocratic personal organizations. They were able to work out their conjoined subgroup's collective moral identity and, in the process, to advertise their ethical "brand" to other members of the community. At the same time, advice also served as a mechanism that allowed friends to articulate practical policy priorities and network alignments. Cicero used this dynamic of advice between *amici*—a dynamic which should be viewed as a component of the institution of aristocratic friendship—to steer their subgroup towards a particular course of action: towards supporting the financial interests of a constituency whose goodwill he believed essential to the perpetuation of their own influence (even if he and Lentulus were compelled to support some ethically questionable financial practices to retain the benevolence of individual *equites* and of the *ordo* more broadly).

According to the *amicitia* ideal, in addition to recognizing and reflecting each other's virtue and exchanging advice, friends ought to share agreement in interests and purposes. It was essential that this agreement should extend beyond nakedly operational collaboration. Thus, Cicero and Lentulus took care to cultivate joint passions and pursuits that extended beyond the overt interests in the perpetuation and extension of power in *res publica* and behind the scenes.[53] This can be viewed both as a product of natural shared interests and as a conscious choice to make their friendship reflect norms from the idealizing discourse. Their effort to extend the range of the friendship manifested itself most clearly in their literary and intellectual interchange. Although Cicero was more active as a writer, philosopher, and scholar than his fellow consular, Lentulus also cared about investing in this facet of their *amicitia*. For this reason, from his perch in Cilicia, Lentulus had been begging Cicero to send any recent literary products (*rogas ut mea tibi scripta mittam quae post discessum tuum scripserim*).[54] It appears that he expected to keep up with everything his friend wrote.

Cicero promised to fulfill his request by sending a selection. For Lentulus' son, Cicero attached the product of "gentler Muses," his *De Oratore*, with the idea that it might prove useful for

---

[50] Dominic Berry, "*Equester Ordo Tuus Est*: Did Cicero Win His Cases Because of His Support for the *Equites*?," *The Classical Quarterly*, 53 (2003), 228 provides an elegant summary of Cicero's connection with the *ordo* as a whole: "It was what we might call a 'special relationship.' Cicero had a very wide network of friends among the equestrian order: he went to great lengths to cultivate their friendship and to do whatever was possible, within reason, to promote their interests. In return, he received invaluable support from them, in his rise to the consulship (which would have been impossible without their backing), in his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, before and during his exile, during his governorship, and at other times. The relationship was mutually beneficial, and, as well as mere co-operation, there seems to have been liking, trust, and understanding on both sides."

[51] The importance of equestrians like Oppius and Balbus for the victory of the Caesarians highlights their key function in the landscape of power during the lead-up to the civil war, during the war itself, and in its aftermath—we see this influence at work in, for example, *Ad Familiares* 235 (VI.8), in which Cicero reported the depth of their influence with Caesar to A. Caecina. Moreover, the Caesarians (especially Caesar's own backstage equestrian operators) took care to cultivate Atticus, as Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 467 points out. Cicero's and Lentulus' own coalition of intimates included equestrians—for instance, Atticus and others of Cicero's equestrian contacts that receive more detailed treatment in the subsequent chapters on asymmetric friendships.

[52] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "it seems to me to be appropriate to your prudence" (*mihi videtur esse prudentiae tuae*).

[53] *De Amicitia* IV (15)—ideal *amici* should be "joined in public and private affairs" (*coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata*), but this union should not be confined to mundane practical matters. Like Scipio and Laelius, *amici* should share "that in which all the vital force of friendship resides, complete agreement in purposes, interests, and opinions" (*id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*).

[54] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "since you ask that I send those of my writings to you which I have written since your departure" (*Quod rogas ut mea tibi scripta mittam quae post discessum tuum scripserim*).

the young man's education (*arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutilis*).[55] He sent speeches for Lentulus' own perusal (*orationes quaedam*), which, as monuments of performances in public contexts, were the most obvious shared intellectual fodder for two aristocrats who had both selected participation in *res publica* as a core pursuit. Finally, with some (probably feigned) hesitation, he allowed his friend to read a manuscript of his *De Temporibus Suis*, an epic poem he had been drafting on his exile and return, which he had been holding back from publication. He worried that, if he tried to fit in everyone who deserved credit, the account would extend to an infinite length (*erat infinitum*).[56] Lentulus, of course, was one of the men who deserved the most credit of all in this context. Cicero portrayed his fellow consular not only as an eager reader, but also as a critic competent to offer subtle judgments across the full spectrum of genres. He described their literary passion as a joint pursuit that they had cherished across the length of their friendship (*veteribus nostris delectationibus*).[57]

Each text served a purpose beyond pleasurable exchange. Published speeches were often used for educational purposes, and the speeches Cicero sent could have accompanied the *De Oratore* as examples of the orator's craft for the younger Lentulus to study. But on a deeper level, by sharing written copies of speeches, Cicero and Lentulus had a chance, through a relatively private channel, to work on articulating the narrative that they and their associates would in turn present to the broader elite community in more public venues such as the Senate and the courts, as well as in speeches before the *populus*. The narrative texture aristocrats crafted behind the scenes can be viewed as an essential factor in defining the system's contours and shading. By exchanging speeches, Cicero and Lentulus could coordinate their voices, both in public venues and in backroom conversations. Unified rhetoric could give their subgroup's agenda more force, aligning the two *principes*' messaging and helping them present a consonant vision of the proper trajectory and morality for the polity.

Beyond its overt educational objective, the *De Oratore* also aided the two men in this ongoing effort to construct a shared narrative. Here, it helped them articulate how the next generation should be trained and what constituted appropriate (and outstanding) behavior for a decorous aristocratic participant in the community's system of social power. The epic, too, can be seen as a contribution to this joint story-making project. By allowing Lentulus into the circle of editors, Cicero was inviting his friend to collaborate in shaping and propagating a vision of the recent past that would testify to the success of their subgroup's influence and that would redound to the ethical credit of both *consulares*.

---

[55] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "I return to the gentler Muses…I have written in the Aristotelean fashion, as has been my customary choice, three books in disputation and dialogue *On Oratory*, which I judge will not lack utility for your young Lentulus" *(referoque ad mansuetiores Musas…scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatione ac dialogo De Oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutilis*). I suggest that the bond between Cicero and Lentulus' son helped link the two *consulares* (and by extension their family organizations) through shared cared for the "parenting" of the next generation—a cross-generational bond thickening the mesh of connection. Shackleton Bailey suggests that the reference to the "gentler Muses" may be a veiled reference to Plato, *Sophist* 242d. By referring to the "Aristotelian fashion," as Bailey points out, Cicero was distinguishing these later dialogues where he himself appeared from those earlier works where he did not.

[56] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "but it would have been an infinite process to name everyone who deserved well of me" (*eos quos erat infinitum bene de <me> meritos omnis nominare*) he said that he would have sent Lentulus the poem before, since it offered eternal proof both of Lentulus' services and Cicero's gratitude, but that he had been hesitating to publish it. This poem was almost certainly a sequel to the *De Consulatu Suo* (a text he had worked up and ultimately published more broadly in the late 60s), which he never disseminated beyond a circle of closer intimates—Stephen Harrison, "Cicero's *De Temporibus Suis*: The Evidence Reconsidered," *Hermes* 118 (1990): 455-463 and Katharina Volk, "The Genre of Cicero's *De Consulatu Suo*, *J. E. G. Zetzel anno sexagesimo quinto completo*," 93-112 (especially 94) both discuss the evidence for and context of the lost poem (no direct quotations whatsoever remain of this sequel and only fragments survive of the *De Consulatu Suo*). Shackleton Bailey comments that the poem had already been sent to Caesar, whose comments were not wholly laudatory, citing *Ad Quintum* 20 (II.16). Bailey suggests that this letter indicates that Cicero was considering posthumous publication.

[57] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "whatever literary and scholarly products I am able to produce, our old delights, I will submit each and every one willingly to your judgment, since you have always taken delight in these pursuits" (*quantum litteris, quantum studiis, veteribus nostris delectationibus, consequi poterimus, id omne <ad> arbitrium tuum, qui haec semper amasti, libentissime conferemus*).

This capacity to store ethical credit in literary artifacts was another compelling reason for aristocrats to invest energy in textual exchange. I propose, for instance, that we might envision the "publication" of a speech as a mechanism that aristocrats could use to transform verbal activity in the public sphere into something more concrete.[58] No matter how glorious public performances might have been in the moment, such acts were ephemeral by nature. As an edited transcript circulated through the community's literary networks after "publication," it could act as a monument to the memory of activity in *res publica*—a far more tangible asset of symbolic and ethical capital than mere memory.[59] With the epic, to an even greater extent than with the speeches, Cicero was staking a claim to the symbolic capital he saw as his due for *res gestae*, and not only for himself, but also for his fellow protagonists in the grand events of his personal story. In addition, the text would provide undying testimony (*testes… sempiterni*) to the quality of their relationship, a friendship which itself bore witness to both men's impeccable character, since the pursuit of virtuous *amicitia* was both appropriate and essential for an exemplary aristocrat.[60]

With each of the texts, the two friends were articulating a joint narrative of the past, situating both their own noteworthy acts and their commendable friendship in the community's landscape of collective memory. Emperors would monopolize, or at least dominate, many of the traditional opportunities for publicly granted symbolic rewards.[61] The dynasts exercised no such monopoly, but they did influence electoral results and snatched much of the symbolic capital available from public tributes like triumphs and supplications.[62] Members of the aristocratic community would have understood the threat that this posed to their traditional sources of glory. We can imagine how, as a result, textual exchange between aristocratic *amici* would have become increasingly important as a substitute or, at any rate, as a supplement to an increasingly lean harvest of honors.[63]

---

[58] On the publication of speeches, see for instance, Aislinn Melchior, "Twinned Fortunes and the Publication of Cicero's *Pro Milone*," *Classical Philology* 103 (2008): 282-297, Thomas Frazel, "The Composition and Circulation of Cicero's *In Verrem*," *Classical Quarterly* 54: 128–42, and Brian Walters, "The Circulation and Delivery of Cicero's *Post Reditum ad Populum*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 147 (2017): 79-99.

[59] Note, by way of comparison, how Cato *maior* chose to include his own speeches in his *Origines*—an attempt to monumentalize his action in *res publica* in text. On the text, see Eleanor Jefferson, "Problems and Audience in Cato's *Origines*," in Saskia Roselaar (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 311-326, specifically focusing on the intended audience for Cato's performance.

[60] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "for [the three books of *De Temporibus Meis*] bear witness to your meritorious services to me and to the brotherly devotion I offer in return, and they will continue to forever" (*sunt enim testes et erunt sempiterni meritorum erga me tuorum meaeque pietatis*); in 79 (VIII.3). Caelius Rufus would make an explicit request to have their friendship monumentalized in a literary work, demonstrating the awareness by other aristocrats of the value of using texts to reinforce their friendships and to store their abstract dividends as lasting rewards and resources.

[61] For instance, Mary Beard, *The Roman Triumph* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) discusses the transformation and limitation of the culture of the Triumph under Augustus—increasingly restricted to members of the imperial family, with other aristocratic generals cast as imperial legates without formal supreme command—288-330, especially 300-302.

[62] This process was only beginning in the 50s, and during this decade, aristocrats continued to compete for *honores* and the glory of military command. But Cicero recognized that this system of rewards and remembrance was no longer entirely free of dynastic influence. In fact, as we will see below in this chapter, the controversy surrounding the restoration of Ptolemy XII is itself a perfect illustration of this development. Pompey's acolytes tried to protect the post and the honorific booty it would bring for their leader (whether he wanted it or not!), and men like Cicero and Lentulus were forced to worry about the implications of inadvertently stepping on Pompey's toes.

[63] Sarah Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): chs. 4-6 discuss how both Cicero and his contemporary Catullus embodied traditional venues of public display in texts, ch. 8 discusses the process by which he hoped these textual simulacra could "return back" with practical effect on world outside their pages. The letters themselves were part of this literary effort to claim symbolic rewards through texts: Grillo, "Reading Cicero's *Ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," reminds us that both the individual letters and the letters organized as collections could serve as textual monuments, analyzing *Ad Familiares* I (which contains the Cicero-Lentulus exchange) as a "story of loyalty and obligations" (657). In terms of electoral results, the dynasts did not exert complete control, but they had demonstrated their ability to bend results in some instances: most prominently, of course, the consulship Pompey and Crassus shared in 55 (although this election was somewhat exceptional—at the height of the influence of their coalition in the wake of Lucca in 56); also, they prevented Cato's election as the praetor of 54—Plutarch, *Cato Minor* 42.1 and Cassius Dio, *Roman History* XXXIX.32.

Furthermore, it is my contention that Cicero and Lentulus were also crafting a vision of the future. Through the exchange of texts—especially through normative treatises, in which authors specifically set out to articulate how things ought to be and where the community's story should move in its future—aristocratic writers could negotiate an appropriate direction for the community as a whole and for its individual members. At least as Cicero and Lentulus framed it in their shared discourse, it was essential that *amicitia* should serve as one of the key principles steering the community's trajectory. Furthermore, Cicero and, at least to some extent, Lentulus appear to have seen it as the duty of the *principes* to guide the community, both with their exemplary acts and with their words. The citizen body, as Cicero claimed in *Ad Familares* 20 (I.9), tended to mirror the leaders of its *res publica* (*quales in re publica principes essent talis reliquos solere esse civis*).[64]

Even as we recognize that the performance of exemplarity and the cooperative pursuit of symbolic capital were central goals of the collaboration between the two *consulares*, we should not lose sight of the key role that the exchange of services played their collaboration. In fact, functional reciprocity formed a large part of the foundation of their friendship. We have seen that, rhetorically at any rate, Cicero and Lentulus took care to foreground the aspects of friendship that mapped onto a high-minded *amicitia* ideal. Nonetheless, they clearly accepted the importance of the practical in relations between ideal *amici*, but just as Cicero would in his *De Amicitia* a decade later, they kept discussion of these aspects relatively muted when compared with the other aspects of the friendship.[65] Moreover, the practical was not entirely separable from the performative and symbolic. As I have been arguing, much of their practical collaboration was designed to accomplish goals related to the acquisition and protection of reputation.

In terms of more mundane assistance, we only catch a glimpse in the *Ad Familiares*, since the editor chose to highlight other themes in book I.[66] But it seems likely that the compiler included this single letter of recommendation in the correspondence with Lentulus in *Ad Familiares* I in order to serve as a sample, representing an expansive body of private, practical correspondence between the two eminent statesmen. I treat the *commendationes* in much more detail in the Chapter 4, but it is worth discussing this letter here. The recommendation process should be viewed as an integral component of aristocratic *amicitia*, even in the idealizing form we encounter between these two *consulares*.

Cicero wrote to commend the interests of the equestrian *negotiator* A. Trebonius to Lentulus' care. He asked Lentulus to treat the man himself, as well as his extensive business concerns in Cilicia, with even more special concern than he would with someone bearing one of Cicero's usual recommendations (*non vulgarem*).[67] Such a framing indicates that the consular *amici* were accustomed to trading such personal favors. Moreover, this act of recommending a lower-level member of the

---

[64] As suggested by *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "the sort of people the principal citizens are in a commonwealth, so do the rest of the citizens tend to be" (*quales in re publica principes essent talis reliquos solere esse civis*). Cicero said he was quoting Plato, but it is in fact almost an exact quote from Xenophon's *Cyropaidaeia* 8.8.5 as Shackleton Bailey points out (cited above in this chapter).

[65] Cicero wrote that shared practical engagement with the world was appropriate to ideal *amicita*, but he had his character Laelius put it in delicate terms—*De Amicitia* IV (15): "[Scipio] was yoked to me in all cares, both public and private" (*mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit*).

[66] Book XIII of the *Ad Familiares*, however, was devoted to recommendations, which give us nuanced a picture of the regular "operational" interchange between friends that took place. Book XIII contains most of the recommendations preserved in the collection. I discuss the system of recommendation in depth in the fourth chapter, where I provide extensive references. For Book I, Grillo, "Reading Cicero's *ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," highlights the central themes of (657) "a story of loyalty and obligations" and of the comparison between the two *amici* and their respective circumstances.

[67] *Ad Familiares* 56 (I.3): "I have enjoyed the friendship of A. Trebonius, who has large business concerns in your province that are both extensive and well-ordered, for many years with a great degree of familiar affection" (*A. Trebonio, qui in tua provincia magna negotia et ampla et expedita habet, multos annos utor valde familiariter*). Shackleton Bailey points out the use of the expression *utor* to signify general friendly relations as a commonplace throughout the correspondence—I suggest that this word choice is itself a subtle indication of the inextricable connection between utility and affection in *amicitiae*. In addition, Bailey argues that the use of the expression *suo splendore* later in the letter to describe Trebonius implies that the man was an *eques*.

aristocratic community to his peer friend could have implications beyond the short-term favor. Cicero and Lentulus were acting as a team to provide assistance to Trebonius, with Cicero as a "broker" linking his lower level friend to the power resources he needed to facilitate his business interests, while Lentulus, in his role as proconsul, supplied the actual access to political and legal institutions. By working together to provide such aid to a lower-level aristocrat, the two *principes* could create social capital that would benefit both *amici*.

Most immediately, their collaboration allowed both men to store up obligation in their personal social capital accounts with a potentially useful connection such as Trebonius. But beyond this, and perhaps more important in the long run, the action would have augmented their respective reputations for influence, helping each man reinforce his reputation as a source of aid capable of helping contacts in need. I explore the function of such asymmetric friendships extensively in the second section of the dissertation, but for now, it is sufficient to note the implications of this recommendation for the peer bond. Cicero and Lentulus could each serve the other's interests by extending the reach of his personal social power, expanding his ability to offer assistance to, and thus to oblige, contacts. By extension, each could augment the other's reputation for practical efficacy and social weight. In this context, functional aid was inextricably bound together with assistance in social positioning and social capital accumulation.

We have already glimpsed the assistance the two *consulares* traded in public affairs. Cicero owed Lentulus a debt for such services at the beginning of their preserved correspondence because of the latter's assistance during his exile. Cicero sought to reciprocate during Lentulus' absence from the city, speaking on his behalf in the Senate and maneuvering for his interests via back channels. His actions focusing on acquiring an appointment for Lentulus to reinstate Ptolemy XII as king of Egypt, which other powerful actors also coveted.[68]

It is essential to note that the central interests that we see Cicero trying to advance for his friend in *res publica* were themselves fundamentally concerned with Lentulus' reputation. With the Egyptian assignment, for instance, it appears that Lentulus sought the command at least to a large degree for its symbolic rewards. In fact, when it started to appear that they might be unable to win the commission, as Cicero sought to console his friend, he placed issues of status and honor in the foreground, encouraging Lentulus to regard his reputation as a commodity seated in his own qualities, achievements, and *gravitas* (*in virtute atque in rebus gestis tuis atque in tua gravitate positam*).[69] In this instance, collective opinion would have to stand in for more concrete badges as a measure of status. Cicero's words can even be read as implying that it would be a sign of Lentulus' true virtue to disdain popular rewards—an attitude appropriate to someone so wise and high-minded (*tuae sapientiae magnitudinisque animi*).

This case reinforces one of the core theses of my project. A large portion of the activity aristocrats undertook in *res publica* revolved around the acquisition of symbolic rewards, and to a great extent, aristocrats viewed the public institutional machinery as a mechanism for augmenting their own and their family's stock of reputation. Regarding the Egyptian controversy, Cicero made

---

[68] *Ad Familiares* 15 (I.5a), 16 (I.5b), 17 (I.6), 18 (I.7), 19 (I.8), and 20 (I.9) all show Cicero active on Lentulus' behalf (although not always with effect), especially as they maneuvered to secure Lentulus the task of restoring Ptolemy XII Auletes to the throne in Egypt. The theme of the restoration recedes in 19 (I.8), and 20 (I.9), as Grillo, "Reading Cicero's *ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection," 660 points out, but Cicero nonetheless continued to offer and provide aid with other issues in *res publica*. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 191-194 furnishes an in-depth account of this affair, highlighting its complex implications for our understanding of the function of *gratia*, *fides*, and *officicum* within late Republican society. A man such as Cicero, who was known to owe so much to a friend such as Lentulus, might find his *auctoritas* undermined in such circumstances—(192) "others' knowledge of the obligations of a statesman might diminish his actual influence."

[69] *Ad Familiares* 15 (I.5a): "It is appropriate to someone like you, who is so wise and high-minded, to regard all your status and dignity as located in your own virtue and the deeds you have done, as well as in your weighty presence" (*tuae sapientiae magnitudinisque animi est omnem amplitudinem et dignitatem tuam in virtute atque in rebus gestis tuis atque in tua gravitate positam existimare*).

this priority especially explicit by arguing that it should be sufficient if the community perceived that Lentulus deserved the assignment, even if he did not actually get the chance to exercise the duties of the position. By implication, the reputational reward was (or at least ought to be) what mattered most.

In practice, of course, the symbolic pay-offs were only part of the attraction of winning such an appointment. Beyond the obvious opportunities for financial profit, a command was also a desirable objective for social reasons, since it offered extensive network-building opportunities.[70] First, the commander could create connections with contacts lower on the aristocratic ladder, offering these men subordinate military positions, and this expanded network would bolster his social weight within the aristocratic community. Meanwhile, the more junior aristocrats could acquire military knowledge; make their own connections in the provinces and among their fellow Romans in the army; and collect financial resources—sometimes through less than scrupulous channels.[71] In addition, commanders could make contacts of their own throughout their assigned arena, to communities and directly to individual members of the local elite.[72] Cicero could claim, without complete implausibility, that it was sufficient reward for Lentulus to win recognition from fellow aristocrats that he was the one who ought to have been granted the command, since, in this case, he would still receive most of the symbolic rewards. Nonetheless, without the opportunity to actually hold his position, the would-be commander was missing significant opportunities for social investment, both among fellow Roman aristocrats and in extra-urban communities.

While throughout their friendship, both Cicero and Lentulus consistently sought to advance each other's interests, the presence of the dynasts meant that, at least in public affairs, this mutual aid often had to be applied with delicacy. The consular *amici* both went out of their way to avoid challenging Pompey, Caesar, or Crassus overtly, and the two even worked to help each other navigate their individual relationships with the three dynasts—a sign, I would add, of genuine trust in their friendship. As the correspondence progressed in the mid-50s after Lucca, we see Cicero and Lentulus struggling to reconcile their growing frustration at the constraints imposed by the dominance of these three figures with the affection and obligation each of them was simultaneously cultivating with the dynasts.[73]

---

[70] James Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 68-90 provides an account of the use of provincial commands as sources of profit, with extensive references.

[71] For instance, as the quaestor of Sicily, Cicero built a range of contacts in the province—*Plutarch*, Cicero 7-8 and *In Verrem* (I and II). Cicero made a show of his determined refusal to engage in exploitation. I discuss such opportunities for junior aristocratic officers at greater length in Chapter 3.

[72] Plutarch, *Pompey* 6.1 speaks of Pompey's connections in Picenum, for instance. The various entries in Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration* explore the possibilities and the limits of such connections—on this issue, see especially, Cristina Rosillo-López, "Reconsidering Foreign *Clientelae* as a Source of Status in the City of Rome During the Late Roman Republic," 263-280.

[73] *Ad Familiares* 18 (I.7) for the reality of their ascendancy already in 56 not only "in resources, arms, and raw power" (*opibus, armis, potentia*), but also in *auctoritas*—Shackleton Bailey comments that the ascendancy in *auctoritas* was the truly unexpected part; by 55, as Cicero reported in 19 (I.8): "affairs are indeed in the certain control of our friends, and to such an extent that it seems that no change will take place during this generation" (*sunt quidem certe in amicorum nostrorum potestate, atque ita ut nullam mutationem umquam hac hominum aetate habitura res esse videatur*)—Bailey points out that at this point Lentulus had close associations with Pompey and Caesar, and Cicero was cultivating both; Cicero's reconciliation with Crassus may or may not have already taken place (for the Crassus-Cicero friendship, see the subsequent chapter). Cicero reported that, much as Lentulus had previously when advancing Cicero's interests, he was attaching himself firmly to Pompey, although he admitted "how difficult it is to put aside one's personal feelings concerning public affairs" (*quam sit difficile sensum in re publica*). Nonetheless, Cicero argued (against the aspersions of some) that his "inclination of spirit and, by Hercules, love towards Pompey" (*animi inductio et mehercule amor erga Pompeium*) was in fact potent. Cicero wrote that "I know that Pompey is very much your friend" (*Pompeium tibi valde amicum esse cognovi*); but he clearly believed that he and Lentulus shared a more open species of friendship than either man did with the dynast. Regarding Caesar, in 20 (I.9) Cicero spoke of the gratitude he nurtured towards the dynast for his generosity to himself and Quintus (Caesar had lent them money), going so far as to claim that he was as beholden to Caesar as he was to anyone but Lentulus. Cicero tried to argue that he would have been making the same choices based purely on fondness and inclination, even if the compulsion were removed, and he clearly expected Lentulus not only to

This tension was evident, for instance, during the Egyptian affair. Although Pompey's preferences remained unstated, a rumor was circulating that he wanted the commission for himself.[74] As a consequence, the matter threatened to put Cicero and Lentulus directly at cross-purposes with their powerful *amicus*. Cicero thought that it was important not to let the command get assigned to someone besides Lentulus in the teeth of opposition from their coalition (*nobis repugnantibus*).[75] Cicero feared that, if it appeared that their efforts to move a policy had been rebuffed, it might undermine the already tenuous influence of the group that was mustering in support of Lentulus' interests.[76] To a large extent, the ability to manipulate events in the community's informal system of power depended on the perception of previous effectiveness and on the attendant implication of future capacity.[77] While Cicero, Lentulus, and their long-term associates could at this point still unite their voices with some force, their influence was fragile. A perceived failure of their combined *auctoritas* could do real damage to their future influence. Before the 50s, such a rebuff would have been viewed as a setback, but the presence of the dynasts introduced another level of urgency to the threat.

The fact that the friendship between Cicero and Lentulus was an alliance designed to help both men advance their interests within the aristocratic community does not negate the real warmth and trust that they shared. This affection was even reflected when Cicero discussed the friendship with other close intimates. Writing to his brother Quintus in 56, for instance, Cicero would describe Lentulus as an excellent consul—never bettered by any in all Cicero's broad experience (*consul est egregius Lentulus…bonus ut meliorem non viderim*).[78] This kind of vigorous praise, offered in an "off-stage" context, furnishes a hint that such *amicitiae*, however "political," were nonetheless backed by sincere fondness. In fact, I propose that the affection and fidelity Cicero and Lentulus shared contributed directly to the utility and power of their bond. The affective nature of their connection allowed them to unite their action in *res publica* during the decade, even helping them trust each other enough to contemplate an agenda at cross-purposes with the dynasts.

Amicitia was a species of bond that was, at any rate, supposed to be grounded in *amor* and *caritas*. Probably most of all of the high-level friendships discussed in this section, Cicero's friendship with Lentulus seems to have been rooted in heartfelt affection built over the course of years. I suggest that in the friendship between Cicero and Lentulus, emotional content helped give vital force to a link that derived much of its structure from institutionalized practice. During years that challenged the integrity of many weaker alignments, this shared sensibility allowed them to collaborate and retain trust.

Metellus Nepos

Cicero and Lentulus already shared a history of intimate cooperation before they started constructing their "friendship of *principes*," but the reciprocal *amicitia* projects Cicero inaugurated

---

understand but also to face the same dilemmas in his own choices, noting that "you [Lentulus] have written that you do not reproach that" (*teque id non reprehendere adscribis*).

[74] Pompey's reticent ambiguity was one of his well-known characteristics. See, for instance, *Ad Atticum* 13 (I.13), 73 (IV.1), 85 (IV.9), 90 (IV.15); *Ad Quintum* 3 (I.3), 26 (III.6); and *Ad Familiares* 12 (I.1), 47 (II.3).

[75] *Ad Familiares* 15 (I.5a): "even in the face of our direct opposition" (*nobis repugnantibus*).

[76] *Ad Familiares* 15 (I.5a): he warned that they should strive to avoid an outcome where "we look like we have been rebuffed" (*repulsi esse videamur*). Shackleton Bailey comments that Cicero indirectly implied in this letter that they had better not put up a visible opposition if Pompey seemed determined, since in that case, they would lose face and gain nothing. Bailey suggests that this is not phrased more directly because it would not have been to Lentulus' liking.

[77] Matthew Roller, "To Whom Am I Speaking? The Changing Venues of Competitive Eloquence in the Early Empire," in *Von der* Militia Equestris *zur* Militia Urbana*: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im Antiken Rom* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011): 200-201 makes an analogous point for the early imperial period.

[78] *Ad Quintum* 9 (II.5): "Lentulus is an excellent consul…so good that I have not seen better" (*consul est egregius Lentulus…bonus ut meliorem non viderim*).

with his former antagonists Metellus Nepos and Appius Claudius, who were respectively the half-brother and brother of Cicero's archrival Clodius, were products of the extraordinary conditions in the 50s. Such links show how much the social climate in the aristocratic community during the decade was pushing *consulares* to put aside past enmity, as *principes* outside the dynasts' coalition fought to protect their individual and collective position and influence. They sensed that the "gentleman's agreement" that had helped keep the system of power in balance—a set of social institutions rooted in principles of fluid hierarchy and power-sharing at the top—was in danger of breaking down, under direct pressure both from the dynasts' coalition and from Clodius and his gangs.[79] In response, they leaned especially hard on the community's customary social institutions, as they looked for effective tools to confront these unfamiliar challenges.

Cicero and his consular friends made special efforts to build and strengthen their own network, hoping, as we can imagine, to drag the familiar framework of informal norms back from the brink. Analysis of each of these friendships will add significant depth to the picture that has already started to emerge. It can shed light on the nature of friendship among *principes*, both during the 50s and in more general terms, and on the function of such bonds in the late Republican system of power. These cases will reinforce my argument that these social projects were by no means one-sided. In fact, with both Metellus and Appius, it was not even Cicero who initiated the connection.

We catch only a brief glimpse of the exchange between Cicero and Metellus in two letters preserved in *Ad Familiares*: 10 (V.4) from Cicero to Metellus from the year of Metellus consulship in 57, and 11 (V.3), which Metellus sent to Cicero the next year. But a close reading of the pair of short texts proves revealing. As a tribune in the late 60s, Metellus had moved aggressively against Cicero, and his fraternal connection with Clodius kept the two statesmen apart. This wedge remained firmly in place until events during Metellus' consulship in 57 reformed his attitude.[80] In the earlier part of this year, when Lentulus and Pompey were first maneuvering to pass a bill for Cicero's recall, Metellus vigorously opposed them. I suggest that it was in deference to the usual institutional priority of the family bond that he supported his half-brother's efforts to block the motion.[81] When violence between Clodius' and Milo's thugs spread disorder throughout the city, however, Metellus shifted his position, cowed by pressure from his colleagues and unsettled by the breakdown in civic order.

In this pair of letters between Cicero and Metellus from the *Ad Familiares*, we witness the beginnings of their rapprochement. It is true that, in forging their new alignment, Metellus transgressed against his brother. But in this context, loyalty to the community as a whole trumped the individual family bond. Moreover, Metellus' behavior might even be viewed as an expression of a broader commitment to his family's organizational interests. It may be that the consul understood

---

[79] Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 167-182 provides one of the best reconstructions of these dynamics, with his account centered on the Ciceronian texts, providing extensive discussion, not only of the epistolary evidence, but also of the discussion in *Pro Sestio* and the *Post Reditum* speeches. See also, Jeffrey Tatum, *The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), especially 176-213; Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, especially 118-125; Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch*, 135-166.

[80] *Ad Familiares* 1 (V.1) and 2 (V.2) (a pair of letters exchanged with Metellus Celer) for Metellus Nepos' activity against Cicero as plebeian tribune of 62. Metellus Nepos accused Cicero before the people of executing the Catilinarians in the city illegally, and he prevented Cicero from making a speech on the final day of his consulship in collaboration with Caesar (and Bestia)—Shackleton Bailey provides detail about the events during Metellus' tribunate in his commentary on these letters; see also, Plutarch, *Cicero* 32.1-3. Although Metellus managed to ban Cicero from making the traditional speech at the end of his consulship, Cicero succeeded in turning his oath into a performance of his own virtuous conduct—Cassius Dio, *Roman History* XXXVII.42. There is some evidence that Cicero had done his part to contribute to the antipathy, at least if we take the complaints by Celer from his letters to Cicero at face value. For discussion of these letters, and their blunt rhetorical and social style, see Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, who notes that (154) the "accusations are made starkly and directly, with no attempt at mitigating facework."

[81] Cassius Dio, *Roman History* XXXIX.6 for Metellus' involvement in the events surrounding Cicero's recall. As Shackleton Bailey points out in his commentary on *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4), Cicero had worried about the effect of Metellus' election on his prospects for recall, citing *Ad Atticum* 57 (III.12); Atticus seems to have gone to work to help change Metellus' attitude—*Ad Atticum* 67 (III.22).

this action as the most expedient means to preserve their collective reputation in the face of a rogue actor who threatened to fritter away the family's ethical capital stock. Furthermore, Metellus' visible position as a magistrate, formally entrusted with the health of the community, might have highlighted the responsibility he felt towards the community and its norms.[82] If he had transgressed while occupying a post in which he was supposed to protect these principles, endorsing extra-legal violence as a competitive strategy in the competition with other aristocratic subgroups within the urban center, he would have been in a position to inflict far more damage to his family's reputational stock than he would have as a *privatus*. Clodius was willing to embrace mob violence as a tool. He even made it one of his objectives to foster a climate of controlled chaos, seeking to create conditions amenable to manipulation by a street-smart urban operator. But although Metellus was Clodius' half-brother, we can infer that he hesitated to embrace an agenda and strategy so far out of line with the aristocratic community's customary standards.

To display his change of heart after the break with Clodius, Metellus delivered a conciliatory speech in the Senate. Clearly, he expected that Cicero's allies would pass its contents on, hoping that the gesture might create an opportunity for the two former antagonists to start healing their antipathy. As anticipated, Cicero's circle took it upon themselves to convey the message, with Quintus delivering a transcript of the speech to his exiled brother (*mihi Quintus frater meus mitissimam tuam orationem, quam in senatu habuisses, perscripsit*).[83] Each of the new associates would only receive benefits from their connection, such as increased status and security from threats by competitors, to the extent that the connection was advertised, both in explicitly public contexts and through personal social channels. Moreover, whatever relationship the two *consulares* built would be far more than merely an alliance of individuals. It would implicate each man's network of close affiliates, and the new alignment might have ripple effects throughout the broader elite network.

I propose that it was at least partly because of these community-wide implications that Cicero and Metellus chose to make the process of reconciliation so strikingly public. Furthermore, Metellus called on his understanding of the community's institutional structure—both its public institutions and its personal social institutions—to accomplish his objective. On the one hand, he extended his initial "olive branch" in the aristocratic community's central performative venue, the *curia*, taking advantage of the institutional context of the Senate to give his words publicity and to reinforce the perception of his commitment. On the other, Metellus took advantage of the nature of the personal network itself, which can be viewed as one of the aristocratic community's fundamental, if subtle, social institutions. He relied on Cicero's web of individual connections to turn his initial relationship bid into actual dialogue. We should emphasize that the aristocratic personal network functioned as something of an institution in its own right within the community. It operated as a mechanism within the system, that is, facilitating action inasmuch as it could be expected to operate by known principles.

---

[82] This tension between loyalty to a family member and concern for the health of the polity recalls instances when fathers, as magistrates, were forced to punish their sons for transgressing against community norms—Ayelet Lushkov, *Magistracy and the Historiography of the Roman Republic: Politics in Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 30-60 provides cases studies of conflicts between magisterial authority and duty and familial affection: when the legendary Republican founding hero Brutus was forced to kill his own sons for plotting to restore the monarchy; as well as the instance where Manlius Torquatus had his son killed for facing and defeating a Gallic champion in single combat in blatant disregard of orders. *De Re Publica* I.XXXIII (51) for the idea of the commonwealth entrusted to magistrates chosen for virtue. We should recall, too, that the consulship was a religious role and that the consul was entrusted with preserving the *Pax Deorum*—Pina Polo, *The Consul at Rome: the Civil Functions of the Consul in the Roman Republic*, especially 21-57.

[83] *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4): "my brother Quintus has written out a transcript of the kindly speech which you delivered in the Senate for me" (*mihi Quintus frater meus mitissimam tuam orationem, quam in senatu habuisses, perscripsit*). At the beginning of the letter, Cicero reported to Metellus that both his brother Quintus and his *necessarius* T. Pomponius (Atticus) had written encouraging reports of Metellus' change of heart. Shackleton Bailey comments that the word *necessarius* usually implies a special connection, here the marriage of Cicero's brother with Atticus' sister.

As Metellus had intended, Cicero interpreted the consul's gesture as an invitation to open a channel of communication (*qua inductus ad te scribere sum conatus*), leaping at the chance, as we might suppose, at least to investigate the possibility of friendship.[84] But even though Cicero appears to have been eager to make the connection, it is worth emphasizing that he took care to deny that he was asking his fellow consular to abandon previous loyalties, especially family allegiances, for the sake of whatever new bond they might build. Cicero's consciousness that he ought to clarify that he would not presume to question the persistent strength of Metellus' fraternal bond reinforces our perception that aristocrats presupposed that family bonds should usually take priority in their community's social institutional structure. Cicero implied that he would never dare to ask Metellus to work against his half-brother's well-being. Instead, Cicero proposed that Metellus should preserve Clodius and Cicero alike rather than making attacks to serve anyone's selfish individual program (*peto quaesoque ut tuos mecum serves potius quam propter adrogantem crudelitatem tuorum me oppugnes*).[85]

Cicero was making what we should read as a somewhat tendentious case for a certain attitude towards networks. Alignments, as he argued, did not have to compel a stark zero-sum game of victories and defeats. No one should feel compelled by his loyalties to inflict social damage. Instead, friendships and family allegiances alike should perpetuate concord. In 57, with the health of the community threatened by urban violence and by the outsized might of the dynasts, Cicero articulated a need for a (re)new(ed) ethic of cooperation, which would help the *consulares* shore up their defenses against these hazards.[86] As he and Metellus both perceived, a grudge-match mentality threatened to carry the community over a precipice. Thus, Cicero praised Metellus' choice to give up his personal animus for the sake of the civic community, literally for donating his enmity as a gift to the commonweal (*tuas inimicitias ut rei publicae donares*).[87] There would be dire consequences, Cicero claimed, if they abandoned an ethic of cooperation and gave free rein to aggression and grudges. If Metellus stood by and let violence determine the outcome in Cicero's case, by the time it became obvious that the whole system was in peril, he might not be able to save anyone from the collapse (*qui servetur non erit*).[88]

Across societies, one of the fundamental purposes of any set of social institutions is to restrain aggression. Without the capacity to limit the use of violence as a tool for competition, a system begins to forfeit its legitimacy.[89] If the power players in the aristocratic community abdicated their tacit agreement to refrain from violence in internal competition, the institutional system would lose one of its fundamental justifications for existence. A new condition of reciprocity between Cicero and Metellus offered a possible antidote, at least so long as their connection was joined by a body of analogous bonds between them and their peers.

---

[84] *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4): "induced by [your speech] I venture to write to you" (*qua inductus ad te scribere sum conatus*).

[85] *Ad Failiares* 10 (V.4): "I beg and plead that you act for the benefit of your own circle of intimates and me as well instead of fighting against me because of their cruelty" (*peto quaesoque ut tuos mecum serves potius quam propter adrogantem crudelitatem tuorum me oppugnes*). Shackleton Bailey claims that *tuos* refers here to P. Clodius, commenting that Cicero wished to reassure Metellus that his own recall would not precipitate Clodius' ruin.

[86] Attempts at extraordinary action on Pompey's behalf began during the 60s, and Metellus was himself implicated when he was tribune—see Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 154 for Metellus' pro-Pompeian activity as tribune (he was Pompey's brother-in-law). We should recall, however, that the dynasts' coalition and its influence was showing signs of brittleness, which would prompt the conference at Luca in 56—Plutarch, *Caesar* 21, *Crassus* 14-15, *Pompey* 51.

[87] *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4): "you, inasmuch as you have donated your personal enmity as a gift to the commonwealth, have conquered yourself"(*tu, tuas inimicitias ut rei publicae donares, te vicisti*).

[88] *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4): "watch out lest when you want to call back the time when it was still possible to save everyone, you will not be able to, since there will be no one left to be saved" (*vide ne, cum velis revocare tempus omnium [re]servandorum, cum qui servetur non erit, non possis*). Shackleton Bailey also sees a veiled reference to Cicero's own thoughts of suicide here.

[89] Douglas North, John Wallis, Barry Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13-14 for the fundamental problem of violence and the need for some form of social institutions to restrain it; 54: "securing peace prepares the ground for beliefs to grow up in the population at large about the legitimacy of the system."

In a move uncharacteristically self-abnegating for one of the *principes*, Cicero chose to cast himself in a rhetorical pose of formal submission. If Metellus could muster the *clementia* to help him, Cicero promised that he would be entirely beholden to him—within his *potestas* (*quod si mihi tua clementia opem tuleris, omnibus in rebus me fore in tua potestate tibi confirmo*).[90] So Cicero cast their relationship in terms appropriate to a child with his father or to a civilian before a magistrate seated in judgment.[91] For Cicero, who in other contexts made much of his equality with scions of old families, this can be viewed as a real concession.[92] But in this instance, the connection was worth an act of abasement.[93] The letter as a whole was hardly humble, as Cicero equated his own fortune with the salvation of the entire community, but nonetheless, he was modeling the behavior he hoped could characterize relations between the community's most prominent actors. They needed to be willing to put aside petty vendettas and momentary pride and work together to preserve and bolster a climate of consensus. Such accommodating flexibility would better serve all their interests in the long run.

In Metellus' reply to Cicero's letter, dispatched from his proconsular posting in Hispania Citerior in the latter half of 56, he showed himself willing to reciprocate Cicero's warmth. In fact, Metellus went so far as to displace the inegalitarian rhetoric of Cicero's first approach with language that connoted fraternal affection. While in his tentative overture, Cicero had acknowledged their period of antipathy, Metellus made an effort to elide the memory, asking Cicero to preserve their "original" goodwill (*pristinam tuam erga me voluntatem*), as if six years of enmity had been nothing but an aberrant blip in a natural condition of amity.[94] Metellus was putting forth a model that was congenial to Cicero's *amicitia* project with other *consulares*. Members of the elite, especially the aristocratic community's *principes*, were presumed to exist in resting conditions of goodwill. This natural concord was only subject to interruption by extraordinary circumstances. It seems that these two correspondents made sure to scrub the traces of their difference in backgrounds from this communication. Instead, we find Metellus—a member of an old house of "insiders" in the central circles of aristocratic power in the urban core—working to include a *novus homo* in a ring of right-thinking power players.

But Metellus made a more radical move as well: he prioritized the new friendship with his fellow consular even over his bond with his genuine half-brother. Since Cicero's first letter from 57,

---

[90] *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4): "but if you dispense your influence with compassion, I make a firm promise that I will be subject to you in all things" (*quod si mihi tua clementia opem tuleris, omnibus in rebus me fore in tua potestate tibi confirmo*).

[91] Although the fact that Metellus was in fact currently consul likely softened any degradation considerably, as he did, in fact, hold formal *potestas* at the time. Once his term ended, appropriate equality among *principes* could recommence. For the *potestas* of a magistrate (additional to and distinct from the greater quality *imperium* he held outside the urban center): Fred Drogula, "*Imperium*, *Potestas*, and the *Pomerium* in the Roman Republic," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 56 (2007): 419-452 and *Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire* (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015) (both with references). For *patria potestas*, Richard Saller, *Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 102-132 is one of the classic discussions and still one of the best; Hugh Lindsay, *Adoption in the Roman World* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 97-100 also provides a useful discussion and references.

[92] We should recall, for instance, Cicero's famously expansive definition of *optimates* in *Pro Sestio* 96 (XLIV)-143 (LXVIII), for a discussion of which—Robert Kaster, *Cicero: Speech on Behalf of Publius Sestius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 31-37. Moreover, in a letter to Appius Claudius, discussed in detail below—*Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7)—Cicero made the argument that his election to the consulship should have made him equal to Appius, since they now held the same formal rank. We should recall, however, the subtle but potent influence of symbolic capital stored across the generations, so Cicero's arguments, both in the *Pro Sestio* and to Appius, were tendentious at the very least.

[93] This relative positioning may have felt more natural to Metellus, since the Caecilii Metelli were one of the oldest families of plebeian *nobiles*—one of the families with the longest traditions of office-holding and with a flush symbolic account as a result. These "old blood" prejudices come across more strongly in the friendship between Cicero and Appius examined below.

[94] *Ad Familiares* 11 (V.3): "if you are able, I would be delighted if you could preserve your original goodwill towards me" (*si poteris, velim pristinam tuam erga me voluntatem conserves*). As Shackleton Bailey points out in his commentary on Metellus' letter, Metellus' choice of the word *pristinam* harks back (however vaguely) to a period before the feud began in 63. This may or may not, I would add, be creative recasting of the past.

he had clearly been exerting himself on Metellus' behalf and representing his interests while he was away in his province. Metellus expressed his satisfaction with Cicero's *officia*, claiming that they eased the sting of the vitriolic attacks Clodius was now directing at him (*tuis erga me officiis leniuntur*).[95] Cicero had not presumed to recommend that Metellus should put aside family ties, merely asking his new friend not to allow these loyalties to create odium. But Metellus, in his new role as a senior statesman, was ready to disdain his blood connection with such a recalcitrant character. In fact, he said that he would adopt Cicero as a replacement "brother" (*commutata persona te mihi fratris loco esse duco*). Although Metellus had done his fraternal duty by saving him on two separate occasions, Clodius had forfeited his family rights through ingratitude (*de illo ne meminisse quidem volo, tametsi bis eum invitum servavi*).[96] At least in his consular incarnation, Metellus prioritized a pseudo-family, composed of men who behaved with decorum and agreed on the proper direction for *res publica*, over a member of his blood group willing to threaten the health of the system.

Cicero and Metellus were operating according to an institutional idiom in which family ties were usually supposed to come first. At the same time, the high-stakes conditions were challenging the supremacy of these alignments. The structure may have been fraying, but the two *consulares* still described their new hierarchies of affiliation in familial terms. Family remained a structuring metaphor in the system of power, even if some family bonds experienced challenges in practice. While Cicero had spoken of committing himself to Metellus' *potestas*, however, using words that we can read as a gentle evocation of the father-son relationship, Metellus opted for the more egalitarian metaphor of brotherhood. The fraternal framework must have been more palatable to both players as a structure for affable productivity in a long-term relationship.[97]

While Metellus was away from the urban center on his provincial command, Cicero offered himself, much as he would for Lentulus the next year, as a representative of his fellow consular's interests. Since *consulares* were peers in terms of formal status, Cicero was especially qualified to stand in for Metellus as a "second self" in status-dependent contexts like meetings of the Senate. Metellus noted, however, that he would write more detailed instructions to his friend Lollius, sparing Cicero and his other *amici* from bother (*ne vobis multitudine litterarum molestior essem, ad Lollium perscripsi*).[98] This comment implies that in practice Metellus did not depend on Cicero for as much fine-grained assistance as Lentulus would a few years later. A more familiar contact could take care of the details. What was far more important was that this kind of assistance formed part of the package of their friendship and that they were seen to be actively engaging in this reciprocal process of action in each other's interests. Practical assistance was useful. Especially during spells of absence, each consular

---

[95] *Ad Familiares* 11 (V.3): "the insults of an exceptionally ill-mannered individual, which he heaps on me at countless *contiones*, are softened by your friendly services to me" (*hominis importunissimi contumeliae, quibus crebris contionibus me onerat, tuis erga me officiis leniuntur*). Presumably, as Shackleton Bailey points out, these were *contiones* that Clodius called in his capacity as an aedile of 56; we do not know precisely why Clodius was attacking Metellus.

[96] *Ad Familiares* 11 (V.3): "with [your and Clodius'] parts interchanged, I willingly yoke myself to you, cast in the role of a brother. Concerning that [brother of mine], I want to make no recollection whatsoever, although I saved him twice against his will" (*libenterque commutata persona te mihi fratris loco esse duco. de illo ne meminisse quidem volo, tametsi bis eum invitum servavi*).

[97] We should note, as Cicero's relationship with Quintus demonstrates, that fraternal bonds were not wholly egalitarian in practice—they could, for instance, be influenced by relative age and career stage. But nonetheless, the differential between brothers was moderate and informal, and a younger brother would certainly never be under the formal power of his elder sibling. Thus, the fraternal metaphor provided a useful model for a friendship bond. Craig Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) discusses the use of fraternal rhetoric in Roman *amicitia*, noting that (165) "[Cicero's] language clearly plays with the overlap between fraternal love and *amicitia*,"—he cites *Pro Caelio* 32 (XIII) and also offers references to the use of such language in other authors from the late Republic and early Empire.

[98] *Ad Familiares* 11 (V.3): "so as not to be more bothersome than necessary to you and my other friends, I have written in detail to Lollius" (*ne vobis multitudine litterarum molestior essem, ad Lollium perscripsi*). This was probably L. Lollius, who served alongside Metellus as one of Pompey's legates. Shackleton Bailey notes that during the war with the pirates Lollius was in charge of the western seaboard of Asia Minor, while Metellus took care of the southern. We should add, too, that they had a chance to bond when they captured Damascus together in 65/64—Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* XIV.3 (29).

relied on formal peers to work for his interests, which might have to do with symbolic capital accumulation, finances and property, social relationships, and ethical reputation. At the same time, however, it was just as important to publicize this assistance. The perception of a robust condition of reciprocity that this performance would create can be seen as just as much of a priority. While practical reciprocity was important to these high-level *amicitiae*, the display of reciprocity may have been even more central, as the performance of connectedness lent social weight to each participant.

In sum, Cicero and Metellus were trying to defend the influence of the group of men who shared consular status. This network of *principes* already played an extraordinarily important institutional function within the aristocratic system of power. But under the conditions of the 50s, efforts to maintain the function of this network took on a new urgency. A new level of compromise began to seem worthwhile. I argue that although they might otherwise have remained at odds, Cicero and Metellus chose to invest in the health of this social structure—a web of *consulares* joined both by amity and agreement on the general trajectory of the society, as friends who could trust each other to stand in as representatives across the spectrum of private and public affairs, and to make each other's influence manifest beyond the limits of personal presence. During Metellus' consulship, both men realized that as senior statesmen in a system of power that depended on at least a baseline of cooperation—a system in mounting danger—they could not afford to indulge private rancor. Instead, they had to work to construct a visible front, composed of amity and reciprocal interchange. They had to make clear that the community's *principes* would back each other up in the face of norm-breaking threats.

Appius Claudius

Cicero's rapprochement with Clodius' full brother Appius took four more years. While Metellus proved unwilling to tolerate his half-brother's conduct and made overtures to Cicero during his consulship in 57, it took far longer for Cicero and Appius to inaugurate their *amicitia*.[99] Metellus' transgression against the family bond had been unexpected, if understandable, suggesting that in extraordinary conditions, there could be different interpretations of the appropriate hierarchy of obligation. Metellus had opted to prioritize the interest of the "family" of the whole aristocratic community. But Appius chose to remain faithful for far longer to the normal hierarchy of commitments in the aristocratic community's structure, perhaps constrained by a stricter reading of the community's social institutional guidelines. By 54, however, he appears to have switched his position, now eager to pursue an inter-consular alignment with Cicero and to participate in the networking project that his half-brother Metellus had already joined. Indeed, when Appius position first shifted, it took some time before Cicero was willing to reciprocate this unaccustomed friendliness.[100]

---

[99] Their rapprochement seems to have been brokered by Pompey—Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* IX.3.41. There is some disagreement as to whether this preceded Clodius' death by a number of months or postdated his demise—see Ralf Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft* (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1994), 20 n. 4 for the bibliography on this debate. Schuricht provides a deep study of the friendship with Cicero as presented in the letters, highlighting (as do I) the fuzzy boundary between the "political" and the other components of such friendships in what has traditionally been seen as a "purely political" friendship, as, for instance, in Peter Brunt, "*Amicitia* in the Late Roman Republic," in *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, 351-381. I take this even further, inasmuch as I hesitate to even bring the term "political" into the conversation here as a term of distinction: these aristocratic bonds had implication for the system of power that spanned *res publica* and more "private" interchange alike. I suggest that the portrait that emerges below bears out the claim that it is misleading to try to separate these spheres. While Schuricht's study passes across much of the ground touched on below, he does not pursue the implications that I aim to draw out regarding the nature of inter-consular friendships and their implications for the system of power. For the language of the exchange: Jacques-Emmanuel Bernard, "Le Langage de l'*Amicitia* dans les Lettres de Cicéron à Appius Claudius," in Perrine Galand-Hallyn (ed.), *La Société des Amis à Rome et dans la Littérature Médiévale et Humaniste* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 95-112.

[100] Appius made early overtures in 54, a short time before his brother's death, which Cicero at first treated with some skepticism—discussed at Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 79 and 139-140.

Once Cicero and Appius began their exchange, both labored to build up the perception of their connection as a full expression of ideal *amicitia*—the kind of friendship appropriate between two statesmen at the summit of the community. This process is illustrated in a long string of letters preserved in the third book of the *Ad Familiares*, exchanged between the two men as first Appius and then Cicero served as proconsular governor of Cilicia.[101] As they crafted their bond, they took care to include collaboration in public and private affairs, shared interests, and an agreement about what was virtuous and proper—both for the individual and for the community as a whole. Again, I contend that we should envision their correspondence as a performance—to the community at large and, also, to each other.

But although they used many of the same strategies and pursued many of the same goals as did Cicero and Lentulus, the connection between Cicero and Appius had mixed results. One the one hand, they discovered some real shared interests, and they may even have developed a measure of affection.[102] But on the other hand, we never sense the same level of trust that Cicero shared with Lentulus over the years, and as a result, they were never able to collaborate with the same efficacy. In spite of his ongoing efforts to paper over moral discrepancies, Cicero seems to have struggled to retain respect for Appius' character. It is telling that, when Lentulus was handing over the governance of Cilicia to Appius, Cicero consulted with Lentulus behind the scenes about the complexities of the transition. Cicero presented a not altogether flattering portrait of Appius to his more intimate consular *amicus* in the by no familiar *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9), reporting unfavorable details about how Appius was in the habit of speaking in private (*in sermonibus…dictitabat*) and making unflattering note of his *cupiditas*. As we will see, however hard Cicero and Appius worked to develop their bond, their friendship never reached the tipping point of mutual trust necessary to institute a solid association between their *domus*-based organizations and the attendant capacity to pursue consistent collective action and to accumulate and store symbolic, social, and ethical capital.

Once Cicero and Appius began their amicable exchange, both *consulares* leapt into a delicate dance of reconciliation, trading practical favors and constructing a discourse of mutual regard. More than it had even during the chaos of 57, escalating violence in 53 would have cast the need for harmony in high relief. In the first letter of the sequence, we see Cicero and Appius working to make up for what they took care to depict as merely an extended intermission in a natural and longstanding friendship, which had merely been interrupted by unfortunate circumstances (*intermissa nostra consuetudine*).[103] Cicero presented himself as eager to make good on the "interest" accrued by the long absence of the valuable commodity of the connection (*longi temporis usuram*). Again, we encounter an attempt to elide discord as much as possible, as they labored to feign a long history of abiding affection.

At the time Cicero sent this first letter of the sequence, he and Appius had already inaugurated the first stages of a cycle of reciprocity. Cicero alluded to previous services he had

---

[101] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1), 65 (III.2), 66 (III.3), 67 (III.4), 68 (III.5), 69 (III.6), 70 (III.8), 71 (III.7), 72 (III.9), 73 (III.10), 74 (III.11), 75 (III.12), and 76 (III.13). Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 139-153 offers an valuable analysis of this sequence, investigating what he describes as the strategies of "affiliative politeness" that the two *amici* employed in order to make up for a lack of genuine warmth and trust. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 253-267 offers an in-depth account of Cicero's reluctant tenure as governor, and of the complexities of the transition as Appius handed over the reins of power in the province.

[102] While Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* is certainly right to bring out the tensions and conflicts in the relationship, I am less convinced than Hall appears to be, as I will discuss further below, that their bond was woven from little more than (140) "formal cordiality." Nonetheless, Hall is right to dismiss the idea presented by Léopold Albert Constans, *Un Correspondant de Cicéron: Ap. Claudius Pulcher* (Paris: Boccard, 1921) that the language of *amor* suggests an easy, happy relationship.

[103] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "I will most certainly make good, as it were, on the 'interest' accumulated over a long period in which we remained destitute of each other, since our accustomed intimacy had been interrupted" (*perficiam profecto ut longi temporis usuram, qua caruimus intermissa nostra consuetudine*). Shackleton Bailey comments that Appius had left Cicero a number of commissions when they parted company at Puteoli. Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer politischen Freundschaft*, 25-31 for a detailed background on the conditions and practical objectives of this letter.

performed, as well as to gratitude Appius had expressed in previous correspondence—gratitude that Cicero had heard corroborated by other men's testimony (*ex tuis litteris et ex multorum sermonibus intellego omnia quae a me profecta sunt in te tibi accidisse gratissima*).[104] At the end of the letter, moreover, Cicero expressed his willingness, and even his desire, to act on further commissions (*mandata des velim*).[105] He presented himself as eager to continue proving his quality as a friend with deeds as well as with words. In addition, Cicero asked a favor of his own, commending one of his intimates (*ex meis domesticis*), the jurisconsult L. Valerius, to Appius' care (*L. Valerium iureconsultum valde tibi commendo*).[106] We should not view this merely as a selfish demand, or even as a request designed only to serve the interests of the members of Cicero's circle. Cicero was creating an opportunity for both *consulares* to acquire a deposit of social capital. The *commendatio* process would leave the more junior aristocrat obliged to the two *consulares* for their help, with Cicero as broker and Appius as the source of direct assistance. High-level aristocrats could create opportunities for each other that would allow both parties to expand and reinforce their networks and their personal social capital stocks with individual contacts. This had implications beyond their specific relationships with the beneficiary of recommendation: they were working to enlarge the community's perception of each other's social weight and practical utility as a contact. Indeed, this capacity for the friends to help each other create and maintain social capital can be viewed as one of the central purposes that the institution of high-level peer *amicitia* served for its participants.

By offering practical favors and by asking for them, Cicero worked to perpetuate a cycle of reciprocal obligation that would tie him ever more tightly to his new friend. As we have already seen in our examination of Cicero's bonds with Lentulus and Metellus, the exchange of services formed part of the substrate of friendship between high-level aristocrats. Throughout the correspondence between Cicero and Appius, this interchange of practical commissions continued to provide the underlying material of their connection. For instance, in *Ad Familiares* 68 (III.5), a letter that Cicero dispatched to Appius in July of 51, Cicero reported offhand that the bearer had arrived with Appius' letter and *mandata*, treating the request as conventional in the context of their friendship.[107] Mutual services could create a sense of salutary interdependence, and it was on a foundation of such ongoing reciprocity that Cicero and Appius could begin to construct a superstructure of ideal *amicitia*. As this back and forth of practical exchange and idealizing rhetoric progressed, the process could lead in turn to heartfelt personal warmth.

It must be stressed that an elite friendships were more than merely connections between pairs of individuals. Each was a relationship between two family organizations and a bridge between two social networks. Moreover, these associations were carried out under the watchful gaze of a community of aristocrats and sub-elites. The *amicitia* between Cicero and Appius did not begin with a grand public exhibition like the Senate speech that Metellus used to initiate dialogue. But if we return to *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1), the first of the letters preserved between Cicero and Appius, we can observe another facet of the communal character of high-level friendship: how it involved each man's network of subordinates. Trusted freedmen dashed back and forth between aristocratic

---

[104] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "from your own letter(s) and from the reports of many others I understand that all the things that I have done on your behalf strike you as exceptionally worthy of your gratitude" (*ex tuis litteris et ex multorum sermonibus intellego omnia quae a me profecta sunt in te tibi accidisse gratissima*).

[105] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "it is my desire that you give [the bearer] commissions concerning any matters you might desire that I act on or take care of" (*omnibus ei de rebus quas agi, quas curari a me voles mandata des velim*).

[106] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "I vigorously commend L. Valerius the jurisconsult to you…he is a member of my domestic circle of intimate friends" (*L. Valerium iureconsultum valde tibi commendo…est ex meis domesticis atque intimis familiaribus*); Cicero also sent a recommendation on behalf of this L. Valerius to Lentulus, as Cicero's letter to Valerius—*Ad Familiares* 21 (I.10)—testifies. The complexities of the dynamics of the *commendatio* process are the subject of Chapter 4.

[107] *Ad Familiares* 68 (III.5): "L. Lucilius was waiting with your letter and commissions" (*mihi praesto fuit LL. Lucilius cum litteris mandatisque tuis*).

correspondents, not only bearing letters but also bringing the written contents to life with their personal impressions. Cicero wrote that Appius would be able to acquaint himself with Cicero's goodwill through the agency of the Cicero's *libertus* Phanias (*de mea autem benevolentia erga te, etsi potes ex eodem Phania cognoscere*) and that Appius' freedman Cilix had brought Cicero great joy by providing a report of Appius' attitude towards Cicero and of his idle quotidian comments (*de animo tuo, de sermonibus quos de me haberes cottidie*).[108]

These *liberti* were more than emotionless cogs in the mechanism. They were expected to play an active role in the interchange and could even build their own personal connections with their patron's interlocutors.[109] When Cicero befriended Appius' freedman Cilix, for instance, (within two days, no less) he informed his fellow consular eagerly, clearly expecting Appius to welcome the news (*biduo factus est mihi familiaris*).[110] The participation of freedmen in the process of correspondence offers a glimpse into how, in practice, an individual aristocrat represented, and in turn was supported by, a personal organization. As a consular steered his course through Roman society he operated as more than an isolated individual. Thus, friendship and regular exchange between two *consulares* created interchange between the members of their respective households at the very least. Likely, it implied connection between broader subgroups made up of elites and non-elites alike. This inter-group bonding was another component of the practical machinery of an aristocratic friendship along with the exchange of services and commissions—one of the essential functions of the institution of high-level peer *amicitia*.

We have seen that family ties held particular emotional resonance and that aristocrats granted them special potency among their social institutions. As a result, it could be useful to emphasize any familial connections shared with other important power players. It is for this reason, we can imagine, that Cicero leapt at the chance to highlight marriage bonds between his other intimates and Appius' kin. Pompey was the father-in-law of Appius' daughter and Brutus was Appius' son-in-law. As, in June 51, Cicero sought links that could further reinforce his friendship with Appius, he lit eagerly on these relationships, taking note in *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4) of how they added to his increased regard for his *amicus* (*accesserunt etiam coniunctiones necessariorum tuorum*).[111] As an extension of this point, I want to advance the proposal that Cicero was interested in cultivating a loose sense that his whole group of aristocratic *amici* should view itself as a common "family," all linked by a messy network of marriage ties.[112]

This should in no way be viewed as a disinterested proposition. As a *novus homo* from an Italian *municipium*, Cicero felt his latent outsider status keenly. Throughout his career, he made

---

[108] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "you will also be able to acquaint yourself thoroughly of my goodwill towards you from this same [freedman] Phanias" (*de mea autem benevolentia erga te, etsi potes ex eodem Phania cognoscere*); "[your freedman Cilix's] speech brought me great joy when he told me about your attitude towards me and of what you say about me day to day" (*iucunda mihi eius oratio fuit cum de animo tuo, de sermonibus quos de me haberes cottidie, mihi narraret*).

[109] Nicholson, "The Delivery and Confidentiality of Cicero's Letters," treats the role of the freedmen couriers maintained by aristocrats of various levels, both senatorial and equestrian (along with various other kinds of letter carriers—e.g. slaves and military personnel). Freedmen were some of the true "clients" of Roman society, tied to their former *domini* by formal bonds of *patrocinium*. As discussed in the Introduction, I believe that there are problems with using the concept of "patronage" as a model for asymmetric bonds between aristocrats in this system. We should limit discussion of "patronage" to formal *patrocinium-clientela* bonds such as these.

[110] *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1) "within two days he had become my friend" (*biduo factus est mihi familiaris*).

[111] *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4) "I have daily thought more of you yourself from that time when you began to feel fondness for me, and my connections to your intimates have added to that also (for two of whom, of two different generations, I have a lot of regard, that is Cn. Pompeius, your daughter's father-in-law, and M. Brutus, your son-in-law)" (*nam cum te ipsum, ex quo tempore tu me diligere coepisti, cottidie pluris feci, tum accesserunt etiam coniunctiones necessariorum tuorum (duo enim duarum aetatum plurimi facio, Cn. Pompeium, filiae tuae socerum, et M. Brutum, generum tuum)*); Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft*, 77-85 for analysis of this letter, 142-150 for discussion of their "gemeinsame Fruende"—with mention of (but not extensive emphasis on) the marriage bonds.

[112] This suggestion is also bolstered, for instance, by the connections Cicero took care to build and articulate with friends' children—an example of which we glimpsed above, with Cicero's care and concern for Lentulus' son. I discuss this mentorship dynamic in Chapter 3.

creative efforts to overcome his original position, both in speech and in text.[113] As I have argued above, we should often read letters—especially inter-consular epistles—as performative devices. With *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4), Cicero appears to have been making an effort to further the impression among his fellow aristocrats that he was part of an interconnected aristocratic "family." A later letter to Appius from 50, *Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7), reinforces our perception of Cicero's insecurity regarding his place among the central aristocratic insiders. The *novus homo* defended an ethic of inclusion based on merit. Deeds—of the present generation and also of ancestors—provided the measure of nobility, instead of names or blood as such. He argued that *virtus* and its more tangible trophies (*ornamenta*) should be viewed as of greater value than "*Appietas*" or "*Lentulitas*" (neologisms he coined to describe the "quality of being an Appius" or a "Lentulus").[114] The model Cicero put forward allowed space for a new man to participate in a community of equals with Appius and his peers.[115]

Nonetheless, it is telling that in spite of his assertive claims, as Cicero sought to combat the hints of snobbish exclusion he sometimes felt from Appius, he still felt compelled to mention that Pompey and Lentulus—men of unimpeachable *nobilitas*—wholeheartedly embraced his claims about the bounds of true "nobility" (*aliter vidi existimare vel Cn. Pompeium … vel P. Lentulum*).[116] Even though the circumference of Rome's aristocratic community was expanding throughout the course of the first century BCE, Cicero's vision of a pan-Italian hegemonic collective was still at least somewhat tendentious in the discourse of the urban inner circle. This would have been especially true in a conversation with a scion of one of the oldest families of *nobiles*.

Thus, Cicero had to use every device at his disposal to bolster his status claim. As well as trumpeting his friends' family connections to Appius' kin and reporting their agreement with his theoretical frame, in *Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7) he even brought in the Greek philosopher Athenodorus to reinforce his argument about the nature of *nobilitas*. He encouraged Appius to read the philosopher in order to understand what it really meant to be "well born" (*ut quid sit* εὐγένεια *[quid sit nobilitas] intellegas*).[117] It is also essential to emphasize, however, that in spite of his evident old-blood prejudices, Appius did his part in initiating and perpetuating the cycle of reciprocity with a *novus homo*. Recall that back in 54, before Cicero was entirely ready to embrace the connection, Appius had been proactive in reaching out. Aware of the need for consensus among *consulares* in the 50s, the patrician overcame his reservations about the boundaries of his community's central clique.

From the beginning of the friendship, Cicero invested in constructing a discourse of mutual regard, affection, and admiration. In the first letter of the preserved exchange, *Ad Familiares* 64

---

113 For instance, the various strategies that Dugan, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works* and Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* explore. They discuss creative moves Cicero made to transcend his Arpinate background and ensure his fame, focusing on Cicero's innovative text-based strategies.

114 *Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7): "do you think that any 'Appiety' or 'Lentulity' has more force with me than the ornaments of personal excellence?" (*ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus quam ornamenta virtutis existimas?*); Shackleton Bailey glosses *Appietatem* as "the quality of being an Appius"—the distinctive praenomen was almost confined to the patrician Claudii. Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft*, 83-84 delineates the different connections Cicero made here to bolster his claim.

115 *Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7): "in truth after I had received and carried out the most authoritative offices, to the point that I thought that there was no further honor or glory to be acquired, although never superior, I had hoped to become equal to you and your peers" (*postea vero quam ita et cepi et gessi maxima imperia ut mihi nihil neque ad honorem neque ad gloriam acquirendum putarem, superiorem quidem numquam, sed parem vobis me speravi esse factum*). Shackleton Bailey comments that *imperia* refers specifically to his posts as praetor and then consul.

116 *Ad Familiares* 71 (III.7): "by Hercules I have never seen that either Cn. Pompey, whom I value above all men who ever lived, nor P. Lentulus, whom I array above myself, viewed the matter differently" (*nec mehercule aliter vidi existimare vel Cn. Pompeium, quem omnibus qui umquam fuerunt, vel P. Lentulum, quem mihi ipsi antepono*); "if you see the matter differently" (*tu si aliter existimas*).

117 Cicero encouraged Appius to read the Greek philosopher Athenodorus "so that you can understand what 'the quality of being well-born' [what 'nobility is]" (*ut quid sit* εὐγένεια *[quid sit nobilitas] intellegas*). Shackleton Bailey suggests that *nobilitas* can stand for 'natural' nobility as easily as can εὐγένεια, and that it does so in other authors (Petronius, Juvenal), too; he tells us that Athenodorus was a Stoic and tutor to the future Augustus. The gloss *quid sit nobilitas* is Cicero's.

(III.1), Cicero asked Appius to persuade himself (*tibi persuade*) that his new friend was very dear to him, because, in addition to the amicable behavior towards Cicero that we have already discussed, Appius possessed a character with many attractive features—natural talent, a strong ethic of dutiful obligation, and civilized refinement (*carissimum te mihi esse cum propter multas suavitates ingeni, offici, humanitatis tuae*).[118] As he had with Lentulus, so too with Appius, Cicero worked to build a discourse of mutual regard and a sense of agreement concerning virtue and proper conduct. As much as this argument was a rhetorical construct, however, we do not have to dismiss the possibility that a measure of genuine affection and regard was mixed in with the utility.[119] Although Cicero and Appius differed in the ethics of their conduct, as we will see below, they did in fact share much in common. It is far from impossible that this might have been sufficient to generate sincere warmth. The fact that we catch sight of this fondness in a letter Cicero sent in 50 to his young protégé Caelius Rufus—one of his more intimate personal connections—provides at least some evidence to support this conclusion. He reported that he held Appius in the warmest regard and implied that he often spoke of this fondness (*ego Appium, ut saepe tecum locutus sum, valde diligo*).[120]

We should not lose sight of how much Cicero was performing a normative, not merely a descriptive, act, as he selected the specific terms of praise with which he chose to address Appius. There was general agreement within the aristocratic community that engaging in *amicitia* was good, right, and important. But "proper" friendship was far from well defined, and as a consequence, there was ample latitude for "pedagogy by praise."[121] In a sense, by applying a particular rhetoric of virtue to Appius—by praising his character and his behavior as a friend with specific terminology (here using language of *ingenium*, *officium*, and *humanitas*)—Cicero was creating a precise behavioral model for Appius to fulfill. He was in effect "teaching" his friend how properly to carry out his role as *amicus*.

Furthermore, this choice of language can be seen as part of a process of definition and clarification: if they were to retain their vitality, social institutions like *amicitia* needed to be continuously fine-tuned and reconstructed. Each particular historical moment requires a structure of social institutions refined to match the unique needs of the times. Thus, we can view Cicero's choice

---

118 *Ad Familiares* 64 (III.1): "so persuade yourself, that you are exceptionally dear to me, on account of the many attractive qualities of your natural talent, your ethic of dutiful obligation, your refinement" (*sic enim tibi persuade, carissimum te mihi esse cum propter multas suavitates ingeni, offici, humanitatis tuae*).

119 Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," is skeptical that there was a lack of fellow feeling, although he claims that their very equality as high-level statesmen made Cicero and Appius natural competitors—never able, as a consequence, to build complete openness and intimacy. Brunt, "*Amicitia* in the Late Roman Republic," in *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, 351-381 also treats the relationship between Cicero and Appius throughout the chapter as an instance of sincere affection, in line with his general contention that *amicitia* amounted to more than merely a naked political bond.

120 *Ad Familiares* 93 (II.13): "I hold Appius in the warmest regard, as I have often mentioned in my conversations with you" (*ego Appium, ut saepe tecum locutus sum, valde diligo*). Of course, the very fact that he had to repeatedly tell Caelius he was fond of Appius, may suggest that there was evidence to the contrary as well. With regard to the intimacy with Caelius, Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 465 even argues that Cicero shared greater intimacy with Caelius during these years even than he did with Atticus; I discuss their warm (if complex) mentorship bond in detail in the subsequent chapter.

121 This "protreptic" function of praise has been emphasized in the study of imperial panegyric, with its roots traced to Cicero—for instance, Susanna Braund, "Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, Seneca, Pliny," in Mary Whitby (ed.), *The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity*, 53-76; Cristina López, "Praising Caesar: Towards the Construction of an Autocratic Ruler's Image Between the Roman Republic and the Empire," in Christopher Smith, Ralph Covino (eds.), *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 181-198 discusses Cicero's lost *Epistula ad Caesarem* as a forerunner to the "mirror of princes" genre, with its educative function. On the history and function of epideictic rhetoric, see Laurent Pernot, *Epideictic Rhetoric: Questioning the Stakes of Ancient Praise* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). We might also see Pliny's construction of the *civilis princeps* profile in Book 10 of his letter collection as an epistolary analog—for which see Carlos Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *American Journal of Philology* 128.2 (2007): 239-277 (although it is important to note that Pliny was constructing and laboring to create an ideal superior, whereas Cicero was working on "teaching" a friend how to be an ideal peer in his letters with Appius—as we will see in the subsequent chapter, this distinction began to blur in Cicero's "peer" friendships with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus).

of virtue-words as a creative act, designed not only to shape his individual friend's behavior but also to help update the institution's function within the community more generally.

Both Cicero and Appius also took care to cultivate shared intellectual and literary pursuits. We saw already how Cicero and Lentulus invested in the literary component of their bond, but whereas Lentulus only appears as an amiable reader and a keen critic of Cicero's works, Appius was an author and scholar in his own right. The patrician had likely been a member of the augural college for many years, and he took an active and informed part in debates about the lore and practice of the priesthood. Cicero only joined the body around 53 or 52, and Appius sent a treatise on augury dedicated to Cicero in 51, in honor of their new collegiality and the shared interests it created. Cicero took care to interpret this dedication, as he told Appius in *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4), as a sign of Appius' affection.[122] Moreover, both men clearly viewed the new priestly connection as a tie of no small importance in linking their sentiments (*non mediocre vinculum*).[123] Cicero's election to the augurate gave the new friends fodder for their budding connection—the common interests that could help them build towards an *amicitia* ideal, which as we have seen, was supposed to rely on a *consensio studiorum*.

This shared membership in the priesthood offered Appius an opportunity to invest in their friendship with a textual gift. In a manner perhaps stronger even than with Cicero's epistolary "gift" of symbolic and ethical capital to Lentulus that I discussed above, a dedication would have served to reinforce Appius' individual bond with Cicero. On the one hand, the dedication could both demonstrate Appius' special regard. On the other, it could act as a *munus* that would implicate both men further in a cycle of obligation—a more tangible token of reciprocity than words or even than a favor without a literary record.[124] In addition, by tagging a text with a dedication to a friend, an author was advertising the bond to a broader community of present readers who would read the text as it circulated.[125] Moreover, he was inscribing a monument capable of perpetuating the memory of an exceptional bond across generations, a sign of aristocratic virtue that would redound to the credit of both *amici*.[126] As much as a dedication was a "gift," then, it can also be seen as an act of self-promotion, since both author and dedicatee would benefit from the reputational rewards.

By dedicating his treatise to Cicero, Appius may also have hoped to enlist his new friend in an ongoing debate within the priestly community about whether or not augury should be considered true divination, and by extension about whether or not true divination really existed. He was involved in a debate with his colleague Claudius Marcellus about whether augural law was established from a belief in divination or for political expediency. Appius argued for a

---

122 *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4): "[I knew of your affection] from that augural treatise, which you sent dedicated so affectionately to me" (*illo libro augurali, quem ad me amantissime scriptum suavissimum misisti*). The dedication was one among a number of signs that Cicero catalogued. Shackleton Bailey clarifies that Appius' *Auguralis Disciplina* was in more than two books: the first had been dedicated to Cicero soon after his election to the college and the others were still to come. Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft*, 43 discusses the place of this connection as part of Cicero's argument for why he and Appius should be especially close.

123 *Ad Familiares* 67 (III.4): "especially now that we have been joined in the college [of augurs], an event which you gave such honorable approbation, our sentiments now seem to me to be linked by a potent chain" (*collegique coniunctio praesertim tam honorifice a te approbata non mediocre vinculum mihi quidem attulisse videtur ad voluntates nostras copulandas*).

124 Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text*, ch. 2 for the dedicated text as a *munus*—she points out that late Republican aristocratic authors sought (66) "to imbue their dedicated texts—the product of their *otium*—with a sense of obliged gratitude and expected reciprocation."

125 Yelena Baraz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) especially 150-224, discusses Cicero's own dedication practices, demonstrating the importance that both Cicero and his circle of interlocutors placed on dedications.

126 C.f. Caelius Rufus wrote in *Ad Familiares* 80 (II.8): "I am eager that some one of the these many monuments [of yours] should come into being which hands down the memory of our friendship to posterity" (*<cupio> aliquod ex tam multis tuis monumentis exstare quod nostrae amicitiae memoriam po<s>teris quoque prodat*) (cited previously); recall too, as I argued above, how Cicero used the dedication of the *De Officiis* to his son as a means of making their symbolic and ethical capital more readily heritable.

"traditionalist" view that augury was in fact an authentic craft.[127] At first, Cicero appears to have deferred to Appius' seniority, but as he gained priestly experience over the next few years, he developed his own more complex position about the debate, as well as the confidence to assert it. Appius died in 47, but if he had still been alive when Cicero published his *De Divinatione* in 44, he might have cringed at a presentation of his cherished priestly art that cast doubt on its veracity (if not its utility).

It is an open question whether an intellectual controversy, however vitriolic, would have undermined the friendship. Cicero and Brutus were engaged in an ongoing debate about oratorical method, and Cicero and Caesar sparred about writing style.[128] As these controversies both testify, aristocratic friendships could grow closer, even as intellectual battles raged hot. But at the same time, the fact that these important statesmen were willing to invest substantial and ongoing energy into these debates bears witness to their importance in their hierarchy of priorities. It makes sense that high-level statesmen in the elite community would devote so much energy to these intellectual contests and collaborations. After all, they represented activity in service of the accumulation of social, ethical, and knowledge capital, all of which, as I contend, were key goals of aristocratic action and served as indispensable currencies for the exercise of influence.

The interest in the art of augury, and the membership in the college that Cicero and Appius shared, highlight the importance of priesthoods for the aristocratic system of power, and they bring out the importance of aristocratic *amicitia* as a component of the system of civic religion. Senior statesmen were not just guiding the society in their "secular" roles. Priestly offices helped distinguish them as leaders of one of the key components of the hegemonic discourse of Roman society, as the figures responsible for mediating the relationship between the polity and the gods.[129] Furthermore,

---

[127] At *De Divinatione* XVI (29) Cicero described Appius as a particularly "able augur" (*bonus augur*), XXXVI (76) Cicero ended up agreeing with Appius' opponent in the debate—"I judge that the augural law, while in the beginning it was constituted from a belief in divination, nevertheless was conserved and retained afterwards because of its utility in public affairs [rather than from any underlying truth]" (*existimoque ius augurum, etsi divinationis opinione principio constitutum sit, tamen postea rei publicae causa conservatum ac retentum*), also XVI (30) and XLVII (105) for more discussion of Appius as augur; in *De Legibus* XIII (32), however, which was being written during the years of the correspondence between Cicero and Appius (although he kept tinkering with it until the end of his life), Cicero wrote more sympathetically about the truth of divination. See Duncan MacRae, *Legible Religion: Books, Gods, and Rituals in Roman Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), especially 59-61 on the place of such dedication in the aristocratic community's culture of textual exchange.

[128] I discuss Caesar's grammatical treatise *De Analogia* at greater length in Chapter 2 in my discussion of Cicero's friendship with Caesar, where I also provide further references—Giuseppe Pezzini, "Caesar and the Debate about the Latin Language," in Luca Grillo, Christopher Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 173-192 for analysis of the fragments of the *De Analogia*; the grammatical debate between analogists and anomalists to which it contributed (in the context of efforts at linguistic standardization in the late Republic), and discussion of the treatise as one episode in an ongoing debate between Caesar and Cicero about the nature of *elegantia*; for the debate with Brutus, Cicero's *Brutus* and *Orator* are the central sources—on the *Brutus*, see, for instance, the entries in Sophie Aubert-Baillot and Charles Guérin (eds.) *Le* Brutus *de Cicéron: Rhétorique, Politique et Histoire Culturelle* (Leiden: Brill, 2014) for recent discussion; on Brutus as an orator and oratorical scholar, see Andrea Balbo, "Marcus Junius Brutus the Orator: between Philosophy and Rhetoric," in Catherine Steel, Henriette van der Blom, (eds.), *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 315-328.

[129] While it is tempting to view their activity as senators or as *patres familias*, for instance, as "secular," I suggest that it is dangerous to draw a sharp line between "secular" and "religious" spheres in late Republican Roman society. The *pater familias* was the head of the family cult, for instance—e.g. Mary Beard, John North, and Susan Price, *Religions of Rome* (2 vols.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71; and cult was paid to his *genius*—Ittai Gradel, *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37. For senators' religious functions (though under the empire)—Zsuzsanna Várhelyi, *The Religion of Senators in the Roman Empire: Power and the Beyond* (New York: Cambridge, 2010). The conceptual distinction between "religious" and "secular" is itself problematic with regard to the ancient world in general. As Brent Nongbri, *Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept* (New Haven, Yale University Pres,, 2013) points out, for instance, "the act of distinguishing between 'religious' and 'secular' is a recent development. Ancient people simply did not carve up the world in that way" (3). Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 182-190 provides a useful summary of the role of religion in the Republic's system of power and of its tight links to the rest of the social structure; on priestly *auctoritas*, see Federico Santangelo, "Priestly *Auctoritas* in the Roman Republic," *Classical Quarterly* 63 (2013): 743-763; MacRae, *Legible Religion: Books, Gods, and Rituals in Roman Culture* provides an

the collegial nature of the priesthoods, as well as the informal and private (or at least semi-private) discussions between priests, can be viewed as a manifestation of the underlying nature of a system of power that was fundamentally communal and informal. Aristocratic priests negotiated the civic community's "spiritual direction" through back channels, and bonds of *amicitia* helped them organize this process.

Much as they worked out the other aspects of the society's trajectory, such as the direction of *res publica*, social relations, financial interests, and intellectual trends, aristocratic friends also negotiated the religious facets of the system of power in their community's quiet corridors, both physical and textual. Moreover, as also held true for public affairs, the society's guiding conversations were by no means confined to specialists. Although priests often became more expert in religious matters than their peers, the discussions about these matters was also a communal concern and not limited to the men formally holding office.

As we have seen, Cicero and Appius both took great care to weave a web of favors, mutual interests, and shared connections. But this construct came under stress on a number of occasions, impacted by both men's choices and behavior. We saw how Appius' patrician snobbery strained the relationship, but Cicero also tested the limits of the bond. In a judicial capacity, for instance, he interfered with the presentation of testimony favorable to Appius, leaving himself open, as a consequence, to accusations of double-dealing.[130] In October 51, for instance, in *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8), we find Cicero on the defensive, claiming that, since there was nothing to the accusations, he could not even understand them well enough to frame a reply (*cum sit nihil, ne quid dicatur quidem intellego*).[131] Moreover, when Cicero was slated to replace Appius as the governor of Cilicia in 51, the two men experienced significant friction during the transition. They tried and failed to meet, leading to muted mutual accusations of neglect, and when Cicero arrived in the province, he found himself confronted by ramifications of Appius' questionable military, financial, and administrative decisions that left him appalled.[132] As Cicero began to unwind some of his predecessor's policies, however, his actions inevitably clashed with Appius' arrangements and with the interests of members of his extended network who remained in the province. It seems evident that both *consulares* had to labor to repress deep annoyance. But they also both tried to mitigate the damage by blaming any friction on malicious whisperers who remained conveniently unnamed (*malevoli homines*)—men working actively to undermine the bond (*conabantur alienare a te voluntatem meam*).[133] Almost by definition, the collective action that aristocrats hoped would follow from *amicitia* was difficult if both friends pursued agendas, or even ethical styles, that were at odds.

Nevertheless, Cicero claimed that, far from repudiating the friendship, he had been praising Appius publicly and broadcasting their *familiaritas* widely (*meos multos et illustris et ex superiore et ex aequo loco sermones habitos cum tua summa laude et cum magna [sollicitudine] significatione nostrae familiaritatis ad te*),

---

exploration of the "civil theology" of late Republican society and the place of aristocrats in this system, focusing especially on the textual aspects and the boom in production of religious scholarship by first century aristocrats.

130 Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," 177 for this reading of Cicero's often ambiguous and contorted self-defense throughout the sequence of letters with Appius, citing particularly *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8).

131 Shackleton Bailey points out that Cicero is careful not to "dignify" the talk by admitting that it contained anything intelligible.

132 In *Ad Familiares* 69 (III.6) Cicero expressed satisfaction with his own efforts to facilitate a meeting with Appius, but he began to question some of his predecessor's military arrangements and the fact that the outgoing magistrate was still holding assizes after his term was up—nonetheless, Cicero tried to excuse all of the irregularities.

133 In *Ad Familiares* 69 (III.6), Cicero told Appius that "spiteful men…ignorant of my constancy, were trying to alienate my good will from you" (*malevoli homines…ignari meae constantiae conabantur alienare a te voluntatem meam*); Cicero replied to Appius' worries about the comments of slanderers in 70 (III.8): "since you have written to me with so many words about the prattle of libelous men, it seemed essential to me to respond briefly to your letter" (*cum tu tam multis verbis ad me de improborum oratione scripsisses, faciendum mihi putavi ut tuis litteris brevi responderem*). Shackleton Bailey points out that, while Cicero blamed Appius for the device in 70 (III.8), he used an analogous tactic himself in 69 (III.6).

precisely as a good aristocratic friend should.[134] He went so far as to hint that Appius deserved a measure of blame just for believing the evil talk (*non debuisti credere*) or even more reprehensibly for casting his own suspicions as other men's words (*quae tibi in mentem veniant aliis attribuas*).[135] Real *amicitia* relied on trust. If criticism was necessary, it was proper to present it with candor directly to one's *amicus* rather than to go behind his back.[136] We saw above with Lentulus that friends had to publicize their bond if they wanted to make sure the connection added to both men's perceived influence—advertising their quality as trustworthy connections and augmenting their aura of virtue. For this to happen, both friends had to collaborate in the process of staging their friendship for their fellow aristocrats. In fact, it almost seems that Cicero was claiming that the perception of the bond, and the resultant social and ethical capital, were more important than collaboration for less overtly performative results.

Cicero tried to do his part to smooth over differences, so that both he and Appius could continue to benefit from the performance of their friendship. While complaints might arise from differences in their administrative styles—Appius' openhanded *noblesse* as opposed to Cicero's careful frugality—these differences did not stem from unequal levels of virtue. Cicero suggested that they merely represented different choices about how rectitude should be expressed (*uterque nostrum recte fecerit sed non idem uterque secutus sit*).[137] In other words, Cicero claimed that disparity in practical details did not have to imply the kind of fundamental disagreement about values that would have been fatal to ideal *amicitia*. The argument he presented was clearly disingenuous, however, since here in *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8), Cicero allowed rhetoric of friendship to trump principles about proper provincial governance that he articulated with firm certitude in his letters to more intimate interlocutors.[138] He made a consistent effort, however, to maintain the fiction that he believed his friend was making his own version of virtuous choices—and not only in public and to Appius. In his contemporaneous reports of the disagreement to Caelius Rufus, Cicero maintained this euphemistic framing.[139]

Nonetheless, Cicero proved that he was willing to make practical choices that could directly endanger the friendship. For example, when he betrothed his daughter to Dolabella, who was conducting a prosecution against Appius at the time, testimony from his correspondence with Caelius shows that Cicero was aware that he might be perceived to be violating the trust of the friendship—a perception that could have harmed his reputation in the community at large,

---

134 *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8): "my many well-known utterances, both by official channels and in more casual contexts, delivered with your highest praises and with strong implication of my friendliness to you" (*meos multos et illustris et ex superiore et ex aequo loco sermones habitos cum tua summa laude et cum magna [sollicitudine] significatione nostrae familiaritatis ad te*). Shackleton Bailey clarifies that *ex aequo loco* refers to a magistrate's activities that did not take place on his elevated seat (*pro tribunali*). Cicero did admit later in the letter that he had criticized some of Appius' subordinates.

135 *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8): "you ought not to have believed it, if such a kind of talk was carried to your ears; if, however, it is your favored practice to attribute to others what comes into your own mind, you introduce a mode of conversation that does not befit a gentleman" (*tu, <si> istius modi sermones ad te delati de me sunt, non debuisti credere; si autem hoc genere delectaris, ut quae tibi in mentem veniant aliis attribuas, genus sermonis inducis in amicitiam minime liberale*).

136 Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," 177 brings out this point.

137 *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8): "each of the two of us has acted rightly, but each has not followed the same course" (*uterque nostrum recte fecerit sed non idem uterque secutus sit*).

138 For instance, in *Ad Quintum* 1 (I.1), he presented an epistolary treatise on proper governance to his brother that explicitly condemned the kind of the exploitative choices Appius had been making.

139 *Ad Familiares* 93 (II.13): "the manner of my arrangements and methods differs not a little from his administration of the province, from which some might perhaps suppose that we differ from personal dislike rather than from a difference in our opinion [about how best to govern]. But I have never done or even said anything with the intention of harming his reputation" (*genus institutorum et rationum mearum dissimilitudinem non nullam habet cum illius administratione provinciae. ex eo quidam suspicati fortasse sunt animorum contentione, non opinionum dissensione, me ab eo discrepare. nihil autem feci umquam neque dixi quod contra illius existimationem esse vellem*). Shackleton Bailey frames this as a euphemistic way of saying that Appius bled the province, whereas Cicero nursed it back to health. But I suggest that the very fact that Cicero perceived this euphemism as necessary, even in the context of exchange with such an intimate interlocutor as Caelius, is telling.

diminishing his stock of social and ethical capital.[140] Once the engagement became public knowledge, Cicero tried to claim to Appius that his family had made the decision without his knowledge (*me insciente*) while he had been off on campaign.[141] While Cicero did not repudiate the match, he maintained that he wished he could have consulted Appius before the event (*nihil sine consilio egissem tuo*).[142] In this instance, Appius was ready to take the slight in stride, and at least according to Cicero's report, he appears to have offered congratulations (*quam tu ipse om<i>nibus optimis prosequeris*).[143] The preservation of friendships in such a tangled thicket of bonds and alliances must often have required such flexibility. By this time, moreover, Appius had invested significant social and ethical capital in his relationship with Cicero, so he had a vested interest in diminishing any potential fallout. Investment in a friendship as a social capital asset would often have acted as a brake on defection, preserving harmony, and the attendant capacity for collective action, even under conditions of strain.

In spite of the threats to the friendship, their salvage efforts enjoyed remarkable success. Even through their rough patches, Cicero and Appius continued to exchange news and favors and to carry out commissions for each other. It is important to note, too, that we can see traces of their "*amicitia* process" continuing in some of the letters that are also laced with the most suspicion and veiled criticism. In *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8), in which Cicero discussed their disagreements and tensions about provincial governance, he also sent Appius news from the provinces, expressed gratitude for the update from the city, and asked for his friend's aid in preventing the extension of his command. Even in the midst of tensions, it seems, many practical aspects of friendship between high-level players could persist. Such institutional resilience was necessary in a system of power that depended on such bonds to facilitate basic functions: for instance, coordinating employment and advancement for equestrians, freedmen, and younger aristocrats; standing in for other aristocrats' practical interests during spells of absence; and managing relationships between the provinces and the decision-making community in the metropolitan core. Ethical and personal differences certainly put the bond between Cicero and Appius under strain. Perhaps this prevented the level of trusting collective action Cicero was able to undertake with Lentulus, in mundane, day-to-day affairs. But the friendship enjoyed ongoing success as a coordinating mechanism between their respective family organizations and their circles of intimates.

Conclusion: Principes *Beyond the Circle of the Dynasts in the 50s*

During the 50s, Cicero worked to make his consular friendships look like expressions of an ideal—manifestations of the kind of paradigmatic reciprocal friendship between gentlemen at the height of public affairs that he would frame with such eloquence in his *De Amicitia* a few years later (a presentation shaped, as we should emphasize, by his experience, both positive and negative in

---

[140] *Ad Familiares* 88 (VIII.6): Caelius advised Cicero not to show his hand as long as possible, although he encouraged the match. Alison Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," *Arethusa* 46 (2013): 65-85 provides in-depth analysis of the marriage and its motivations and implications.

[141] *Ad Familiares* 75 (III.12): Cicero claimed the arrangements were "made without my knowledge" (*me insciente facta*). This may have had some limited measure of truth, and in Shackleton Bailey's commentary on this and on Caelius' letter 88 (VIII.6) he allows that Cicero's claim might have been substantially true. I suggest, however, that the very presence of the letter from Caelius on the subject implicates Cicero in the process. Even if Cicero was not the leading driver of the business, he certainly accepted it and participated, if only quietly—in exactly the way, in fact, that Caelius had encouraged him to. He may not have been in control of the timing, however. Schuricht, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft*, 123-127 for discussion of this letter and references concerning Cicero's sincerity and intentions.

[142] *Ad Familiares* 75 (III.12): "[at least concerning the timing, I would have done nothing without your approval, and I would have done nothing at all without your counsel" (*de tempore nihil te invito, nihil sine consilio egissem tuo*).

[143] *Ad Familiares* 75 (III.12): "[an event] which you yourself speak of with all the best wishes you can muster" (*quam tu ipse om<i>nibus optimis prosequeris*). Cicero was claiming, as Shackleton Bailey clarifies, that it was only Appius' generous attitude that consoled him in his consciousness that the timing had been very far from fortunate.

these friendships). In a sense, this is what Cicero believed "Republican" governance was and should be: mannered and somewhat formalized, but also sincerely affectionate, collaboration between well-heeled proprietors, especially those who had reached the top of the *cursus honorum*. This was a model in which (usefully for Cicero) shared status as ex-magistrates should matter more than blood, with accumulated stocks of symbolic, social, and ethical capital granting ongoing and unqualified access to the inner decision-making circle.[144] If this permeable group could govern itself by the principles and duties of idealized *amicitia*, it could effectively and indefinitely exercise guiding influence within the community. They could serve together as a loose consortium of principal actors in *res publica*, key figures in informal networks of social power, and leaders in consequential scholarly and religious conversations. The discourse of mannered friendship provided informal guardrails, facilitating governance with a minimum of formal guidelines and directives. Their conscientious participation in the virtuous ideal of *amicitia* allowed the *consulares* to cultivate a shared (and jealously guarded!) identity as the "best" of the "best men," helping them justify and perpetuate their elevated position.[145]

I have argued that, as their familiar system of power came under pressure—most obviously, from Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus, as they distorted the aristocratic community's traditionally flexible hierarchies, and from aristocrats like Clodius and Milo who were willing to normalize urban violence as a tool in aristocratic competition—the group of *consulares* made special efforts to collaborate.[146] By reinforcing their unity, they might be able to continue to function as a leading group of equal *principes*—a circle (self-)regulated by the discourse of *amicitia*. Consular *amicitiae* had long played a central role in the system of power. But threats during the 50s gave new urgency to the coherence of the collective. Subtly, they were trying to institutea level of collaboration that was, in fact, more robust than the *status quo ante*, together committed to a "traditional" set of norms and institutional relationships, so that they could act as a collective brake on egregiously violent transgressors and balance against the overwhelming social weight of the coalition of dynasts.

As I hope to have demonstrated here, the efforts by these *consulares* to reinforce this element of the system of power show that they perceived the social institution of a community of peer *principes* as an integral element of their community's familiar system of power. But they saw its role, and maybe even its existence, as threatened.

---

144 This was an idea, as we have seen, that some more established *nobiles* like Appius struggled to embrace wholeheartedly.

145 We should note, however, that this circle was not detached in any comprehensive sense above other high-level aristocrats who were elevated by the possession of large stocks of other forms of capital—for instance financial and social (e.g. Atticus).

146 There were many other more subtle pressures, of course. Late Republican "politics" amounted to more than a clash between the "triumvirs" and a group of *consulares* who were losing their grip on power and felt threatened by urban violence. Among other factors, we should mention the massively expanded size of the aristocratic community after the integration of Italy, demands from veterans for land, and vastly expanded capital flows in an increasingly integrated Mediterranean imperial sphere. All these factors made the exercise of power very different, by necessity, from middle Republican "traditional" forms. The dynasts and the "gangsters" were just the most recent, most proximate, and most novel.

Chapter 2: Friendships with the Dynasts

Introduction

Frustrated by their inability to impose their will on the aristocratic community, in the lead-up to Caesar's consulship in 59, Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus formed a coalition designed to circumvent certain aspects of the traditional system of hegemony by community.[147] In the first of the chapters of this current section on "peer" friendships between *consulares*, I argued that Cicero felt this pressure keenly, as did many of his fellows among the community's *principes* who remained outside the dynasts' clique. It induced them to maneuver throughout the decade to retain influence. But as I noted in the previous chapter, this "triumvirate" did not embark on a wholesale campaign to refashion the system of power—a system in which *amicitia* played a fundamental role in the social institutional framework that mediated relations among the members of Rome's aristocratic community. Instead, they set themselves up as new centers of gravity, elevated to an exceptional level within the hierarchy, but still embedded in the community's social web.[148] I make the case in this chapter that Cicero and the dynasts confronted unfamiliar power relations with familiar tools. *Amicitia* offered a conceptual framework that could be stretched to accommodate the dynasts. It helped make their novel social role more legible and acceptable to a man such as Cicero, and it granted the dynasts access to a suite of social power resources. Indeed, the *amicitiae* that Cicero built with each of the three still reflected "Republican peer *amicitia*"—to such a degree, in fact, that these bonds can cast useful light on the function of the social institution of high-level friendship in the aristocratic system of power more broadly.

But even as the dynasts operated in dialogue with an existing set of institutional parameters, their actions were beginning to rewrite some key ground rules.[149] For instance, and most important of all, their new power represented a *de facto* rejection of the core "Republican" principle of peer equality at the top. The "Republic" was a system, as I propose, in which no individuals should be able to elevate themselves permanently above a circle of at least nominally equal *principes*. While a leader might stand forth to guide the community through a critical moment, for the system to remain Republican, such extraordinary preeminence could never be more than temporary.[150] In

---

147 We should note that the dynasts' goals were limited and personal at this point. Their strategy can be viewed more as a response to frustrations than as a proactive plot to upend the system. Pompey and Crassus were initially made amenable to the idea of a coalition because they were struggling to effect specific policies to serve the interests of members of their personal constituencies. In the late 60s, Pompey was struggling to acquire land for his veterans and having difficulties securing ratification of the arrangement of laws and regulations that he had set up in the east without the usual senatorial committee. Meanwhile, Crassus, who had connections with many *societates* of *publicani*, was trying to give his equestrian allies the chance to renegotiate some tax-collecting contracts that were returning unexpected losses—he was also running into recalcitrant opposition. Caesar, too, sought limited goals at the beginning of the arrangement: the highly traditional objective of the consulship (he experienced frustration when he was hindered by similar recalcitrant senatorial elements from celebrating a triumph as well as running for office) and the general desire for increased and ongoing influence within the system. For the events of this period: Matthias Gelzer, *Caesar: der Politiker und Staatsmann* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960), 23-84 is still one of the best accounts; see also Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) especially 152-181, Tom Stevenson, *Julius Caesar and the Transformation of the Roman Republic* (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 79-108.

148 It is worth noting that Crassus, who never had the chance to win the same kind of military prestige from an extended campaign, might be considered less of a true "dynast" than his two compatriots.

149 Harriet Flower, *Roman Republics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) makes the provocative, but useful, argument that the "Republican" system was already shaky after Sulla and that it was no longer "Republican" after 60 in any substantial sense. The validity of the argument is open to debate, but I suggest that we still see the aristocratic community ruling as a community during the 50s at least, with a presupposition of flexible hierarchies, rotation in office, and hegemony spread across a wide and shifting cast of actors governed by a self-regulating set of social institutions. These institutions were being challenged from many directions, but they were far from gone. In fact, even under Augustus, these institutions and norms remained guiding ideas that helped give form to the new regime, even if the community lost its hegemonic seat.

150 Indeed, as Jonathan Zarecki, *Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014) points out, the ideal of a *rector rei publicae* stood at the center of Cicero's "Republican" political theory. To Zarecki's argument, we should add that, although Cicero was perhaps the first to dress up such ideas in philosophical language, he was by no means alone in noticing that outstanding figures of this kind had played key roles at various critical junctures throughout Roman history (consider, for instance,

Cicero's interactions with the dynasts, we witness the essence of the "triumviral" transformation during the 50s: three *principes* came to stand above the rest of their supposed peers, with no sign that their exceptional influence would dissipate. This shift was a natural antecedent to the inauguration of the Principate in the decades that followed—a framework that made the elevation of one monarchic figure above the rest of the community into a lasting pillar of the institutional structure.

Nonetheless, during the 50s, Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus were still communicating in the idiom of the familiar system, and they were operating through many of its vectors. They sought to use existing structures for their own ends, but in an important sense, these goals were far from innovative. It is one of the central claims of this dissertation that within the late Republican system of power, the aristocratic protagonists sought, first and foremost, to accumulate "capital" for themselves and their families—both concrete and abstract. They labored to command stocks of the fiscal and material resources that underwrote aristocratic preeminence, as well as "symbolic," "social," "ethical," and "knowledge" capital.[151] The dynasts were playing for the same kind of stakes as were their fellow *consulares*, if on an outsized scale, seeking to accumulate the same kinds of "assets."[152] To accomplish these goals, moreover, they used many of the same community-based social institutions, however much they sometimes bent these structures to the breaking point in the process.

It is one of the key arguments of this dissertation that what I describe as the "*alter ego* dynamic" was one of the most important institutional facets of aristocratic *amicitia*. This conceit and its social implications played a central role in Cicero's relationships with other *principes*, including the dynasts. Idealized aristocratic *amicitia* implied close agreement in virtue and a partnership in private and public affairs. In bonds between fellow *consulares*, this communion, especially when combined with their formally equal status, should allow each man to use his friend as a full "embodiment" of his personal presence across a range of venues.[153] Shared membership in the "consular club" granted all of these men parity in standing. As a result, such connections were particularly useful when one of these *principes* needed a friend who could replicate the full authority of his person. In the extended polity of the imperial Republic, aristocrats faced great complexities, generated both by their public positions and by their personal business interests, and the capacity to replicate the self would have been indispensable.

The institutionalized nature of the *alter ego* dynamic highlights an important point about the nature of aristocratic influence in general: in order to exercise authority, aristocrats often needed a way to be, in effect, "on the spot." Thus, in practice they often had to use agents or surrogates to translate abstract social weight into concrete action that could to accomplish specific objectives. The

---

Fabius Maximus during the Second Punic War and Scipio Aemilianus during the Third). On the *rector* ideal, see also, Ettore Lepore, *Il Princeps Ciceroniano e Gli Ideali Politici della Tarda Repubblica* (Napoli: Istituto Italiano per Gli Studi Storici, 1954).

151 In the introduction, I define and discuss these forms of capital in detail and develop the underlying paradigm, building on and extending work by Pierre Bourdieu on the forms of capital, and in dialogue with recent work by ancient historians, on symbolic capital (e.g. Hölkeskamp and Jehne) and on the role of money in the system of power (e.g. Serrati, Ioannatou, Tan, Kay, Barlow, Harris, Nicolet, and Shatzman). On the one hand, aristocrats sought these resources as ends in themselves, and on the other hand, they can be viewed as "currencies" for the exercise of influence. Aristocratic action within this system was motivated by the desire to collect stocks of these assets and to pass this property on to heirs who could perpetuate and further elevate the family's position.

152 For example, think of Caesar's enterprise in his *Bellum Civile*, where he carefully justified his behavior to a community of readers. Erich Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) famously made a closely related case, emphasizing the persistence of the Republican institutional structure until the civil war.

153 With an aristocratic *amicus* not of the same formal status, the *alter ego* dynamic could still be important—see, for instance, *Ad Atticum* 60 (III.15), in which Cicero described Atticus in such terms (*te quasi me alterum*). The sense of "identity" between friends could facilitate powerful personal representation in many spheres of action. But this "second selfhood" would not be as comprehensively effective in the context of *res publica*, where formal status mattered most. On the other hand, the personal representation might prove more subtle, since a close familiar not of equal formal status might prove more cognizant of the particularities of the personal will being represented. As we saw in Cicero's friendship with Metellus Nepos in the previous chapter, for instance, Metellus turned to his friend Lollius to carry out some of the tasks that required fine-grained knowledge of the absent consular's preferences.

ability to stand in directly for one another, especially in public contexts, was an important practical reason that senior statesmen in this system were compelled to cultivate friendship and trust with peers among the *principes*. Perhaps this was even the key motivation for such friendships, at least when viewed in terms of their instrumental value.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Cicero built and reinforced bonds with various consular peers in the 50s, hoping to balance against the dynasts' overwhelming social weight. But although Cicero could be idealistic, he was far from blind. So even as he worked to retain influence at the summit of the system for himself and his consular associates, he mounted a proactive effort to cultivate his own individual friendships with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus. The three were still operating within a system of power given its form by the principles of community-based rule, and thus, they all clearly saw Cicero as a valuable ally, even after his exile and subsequent return left both his status and his influence diluted.[154] True reciprocity may have remained elusive with a power dynamic that was so lopsided in practice, but nonetheless, Cicero and the dynasts embraced the rhetoric of parity in their friendships, framing their bonds as reciprocal links between equals. There is little use asking whether such rhetoric should be viewed as "authentic" in any absolute sense. It was functional and desirable for all involved, and wholeheartedly embraced and performed, whatever the "real" underlying disparities.

By definition, the "second self" frame implied equality. Thus, with each of the three dynasts, Cicero actively sought opportunities to offer himself as surrogate, and he leapt at the chance to frame them as his own proxies. But as I will show, this *alter ego* dynamic was not necessarily one-sided in Cicero's bonds with the dynasts. Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus might have been distorting the egalitarianism of aristocratic *amicitia*, and they may have viewed its implications of parity with some skepticism. But each still stood to benefit from the functional implications of "second selfhood" and appreciated the capacity to extend his personal presence by using a consular *amicus* as an extension of himself.

As well as demonstrating the role of high-level friendships in the events of the 50s, Cicero's relationships with the dynasts also offer a particularly fine-grained lens through which we can examine the "Republican" social institution of aristocratic *amicitia*. The *alter ego* dynamic is central, but there is more to say. Cicero and the dynasts constructed their friendships as mirrors of an ideal—the same ideal that delineated the connections I analyzed in the previous chapter between Cicero and Lentulus Spinther, Metellus Nepos, and Appius Claudius. By examining the bonds between Cicero and the dynasts, we can add texture to our understanding of the model itself. There were consistent elements to this ideal, including the shared suite of practical and intellectual concerns and interests referred to as a *consensus studiorum*; a shared ethical sensibility and an active appreciation of one another's virtues; and an underlying sense of parity. But this ideal was no static blueprint. All the connections between high-level statesmen in the Republican aristocratic community—at least those friendships that were developed with conscientious care—contributed to a perpetual process of institutional reformation. The social institution of *amicitia* between high-level "peers" continued to evolve, as a product of the actions and words of the *amici* implicated in its perpetuation. The relationships Cicero built with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus should also be viewed in the context of this ongoing development, not only as reflections of an abiding reality but also as sites of transformation.

Sometimes, Cicero seems to have convinced even himself that his friendships with the dynasts might succeed in approximating an egalitarian ideal. This was not entirely a product of wishful fantasy. Each dynast reciprocated Cicero's rhetoric of equal *amicitia* and invested in creating

---

[154] Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 122-145 and Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch* (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969), 167-224 for the events of this period in Cicero's life.

and maintaining multifaceted ties with him. With Pompey and Caesar, although perhaps never as fully with Crassus, the relationships seem to have grown into more than mere "alliances." These bonds appear to have been characterized by attachment and affection, along with a deeply felt sense of obligation. To varying degrees all aristocratic *amicitiae* mixed emotion and function, and it is unproductive to try to disentangle "sincere" warmth from "political" utility. It is misleading to attempt to draw a sharp boundary between the "personal" and the "political" in the social context of the late Republican aristocratic community. Personal affection fed trust, and trust facilitated effective collective action. All of Cicero's aristocratic friendships had functional utility—even, and perhaps especially, his famous bond with Atticus. In this same vein, if in varying proportions, Cicero's relationships with the dynasts display ambiguity in their balance between sentiment and calculation.

As a result of the affection he had built for Caesar and Pompey, when the concord between the two one-time allies began to unravel after Crassus' death in 53, Cicero's dual loyalty and his obligations to both left him at an impasse. When civil war broke out, Cicero's sense of bifurcated obligation sent him into an agony of indecision, heightened by blandishments and veiled threats from both magnates and from other *amici* in each of the two camps. Cicero was not the only aristocrat caught in such a double bind, moreover: in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, we catch sight of Cicero's scholarly friend, the praetorian M. Terentius Varro, in a similar state of indecision, bound by *fides* and *necessitudo* to both men and putting off choosing a side as long as he could.[155] Cicero seems not to have been alone in viewing each of the antagonists with affection, however complex.

Still, even during the mid-50s, Cicero felt more than a hint of unease about his choice to cultivate these links. We see this discomfort at work in his correspondence with Lentulus Spinther, a fellow consular who, like Cicero, retained close ties to both Pompey and Caesar, but who nevertheless held onto a strong sense of attachment both to the communal system of power and to his own elevated position within that arrangement.[156] For instance, in *Ad Familiares* 19 (I.8), a letter to Lentulus from 55, Cicero went to great lengths to justify his choices. As much as possible, he sought to frame the dynasts' actions as patriotic, clinging to the idea that his friendships with these extraordinary figures did not amount to a hypocritical betrayal of the principles he and Lentulus both cherished regarding the appropriate framework of power within Roman society. While his conduct might seem like pretense to some, he made strong protests of sincerity. There was no *simulatio* (*neque id facio, ut forsitan quibusdam videar, simulatione*).[157] His behavior, as he argued, especially his support for Pompey, was driven by the promptings of his heart (*animi inductio et mehercule amor erga Pompeium apud me valet*).[158] It seems that heartfelt emotion could be put forward as a plausible

---

155 Caesar, *Bellum Civile* 2.17.1-18.2.

156 I analyzed their friendship in detail in the previous chapter, making the case that Lentulus and Cicero worked together to maintain influence independent of the dynasts by building and reinforcing a web of inter-consular friendships that could help them "balance" against the dynasts in terms of social weight (as much as this enterprise was only able to succeed to a limited degree). Andrew Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 208-209 gives an account of Lentulus' own complex relationships with the dynasts, having aided them at times, even as at times he opposed them.

157 *Ad Familiares* 19 (I.8): "and I do not act, as it might perhaps seem to some, deceitfully" (*neque id facio, ut forsitan quibusdam videar, simulatione*).

158 *Ad Familiares* 19 (I.8): "the inclination of my spirit and, by Hercules, my love towards Pompey have such force with me that such things as seem useful to him and that he wants, all these things now seem to me right and proper" (*tantum enim animi inductio et mehercule amor erga Pompeium apud me valet ut, quae illi utilia sunt et quae ille vult, ea mihi omnia iam et recta et vera videantur*). 20 (I.9) from 54 is another instance of tangled justification of why it was acceptable to cooperate with and cultivate friendship with the three. Cicero faced an even more acute incarnation of this problem in the 40s. In his *Pro Marcello*, for instance, delivered in 46 during Caesar's dictatorship, Cicero would struggle again to justify his intermittent collaboration with a regime that had suppressed the usual institutional structure of the community. We see him wrestling with these tensions in conversations with friends recorded in his correspondence from that time. For instance, in *Ad Familiares* 203 (IV.3), seeking qualities of Caesar's that might justify his actions to his friend and fellow consular Servius Sulpicius Rufus, Cicero pointed to Caesar's *magnitudo animi*—furthermore, Cicero claimed that Caesar himself was not at fault: "the fault is not the victor's—no one could be more moderate than he has been—but of the victory itself, which is always an insolent affair in civil war" (*nec id victoris vitio, quo nihil moderatius, sed ipsius victoriae, quae civilibus bellis semper est insolens*). In 211 (XII.68) to P. Servilius Isauricus, moreover, Cicero tried to create a sense of affiliation between him, Servilius, and Caesar by pointing to their

justification for questionable action—a sign of the valorization of emotion as a component of the institution of *amicitia* between high-level operators.

Both Cicero and Lentulus sought to "have their cake and eat it too." They seem to have hoped that they could discharge their obligations as *amici* to the dynasts, while at the same time, as we saw in the previous chapter, working to retain some independent voice in the process of rule for the band of consular *principes* beyond the circle of the dynasts. Cicero and Lentulus faced a quandary, however: inevitably, it was harder to "balance" against Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus if they were themselves abetting the dynasts' coalition-building. Indeed, to the extent that men such as Cicero and Lentulus contributed to the "normalization" of the dynasts' extraordinary position, we might view them as complicit in the transition away from the version of Republicanism that they were otherwise so keen to protect.

Rhetorically, at least, Cicero sought to cling to a sense of parity in his friendships with the three. As we will see, whenever he could he sought to present his own influence as equal to, and even interchangeable with that of each of the dynasts. He appears to have been delighted whenever he could present himself as an *alter ego* or "second self" for Pompey, Caesar, or Crassus, as an implicit equal capable of standing in as a full representative of the power of each dynast's personal presence. Cicero would have been even more enthusiastic, as we can imagine, to be framed as such by one of them. But nonetheless, especially in his correspondence with Quintus and Atticus, we can sense growing tension. Cicero expressed what reads as sincere fondness for the dynasts, and he showed himself willing to collaborate with them in certain forms of collective action. We can perceive Cicero's awareness increasing, however, that the three were not only constraining his personal autonomy, but they were also robbing the community's *res publica* of their essential liberty and dynamic efficacy. As Cicero carped to Quintus, they were sending the Forum into a state of senescence (*otium…senescentis*).[159] So while Cicero strove to make to his bonds with the dynasts into expressions of a recognizable "friendship of *principes*" paradigm, and even as he strove to use the familiar social institution to subtly diminish the dynasts' outsized social power, he was well aware that there was a measure of futility in the attempt.

In the sections that follow in this chapter, I treat Cicero's *amicitiae* with the three individual dynasts in turn. I show how Cicero worked to cultivate and maintain reciprocal bonds with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus, respectively, that were expressions of the institutional ideal. Each of these friendships casts light on distinct facets of the existing institution of high-level friendship in the aristocratic system of power. At the same time, they acted as sites for transformation, as the participants articulated the terms of their relationship, engaging in an ongoing process of institutional reform. In a sense, the bonds were eminently "Republican"—expressions of the one of the most important social institutions in the aristocratic system of power. But at the same time, I will propose that they can be viewed as insidious precursors to a "Principate," helping to warp the *amicitia* ideal to accommodate a monarch's unbridgeable superiority.

---

shared membership in the college of augurs and expressed hopes that "Caesar, our colleague [in the college of augurs] would begin to take care that we [the aristocratic community] should have some form of 'commonwealth'" (*Caesari, collegae nostro, fore curae et esse ut habeamus aliquam rem publicam*). Shackleton Bailey notes that we do not know when Servilius joined the college.

[159] *Ad Quintum* 18 (II.14): "there is the height of peace in the Forum, but it is the peace more of senility than of contentment" (*summum otium forense sed senescentis magis civitatis quam acquiescentis*)—Shackleton Bailey comments that the idea of Pompey as dictator was much in the air from this time forward. Among many others: 13 (II.8): Pompey and Crassus, "who hold all things in their control and want everyone to be aware that conditions stand thus" *(tenent omnia idque ita omnis intellegere volunt*), restrained even the recalcitrant M. Cato—Bailey clarifies that Cato was a candidate for the praetorship and the actions of the consuls (Pompey and Crassus) ensured his defeat; 21 (III.1) brings out the tension between dynastic pressure and a waning sense of personal independence: "Pompey is making demands of me concerning a return into favor [with a personal enemy Gabinius], but so far he has not gotten anywhere, nor will he if I hold onto even a measure of liberty" (*Pompeius a me valde contendit de reditu in gratiam, sed adhuc nihil profecit nec, si ullam partem libertatis tenebo, proficiet. Tuas litteras vehementer exspecto*); *Ad Atticum* 93 (IV.19): "come and see the empty husks of real public affairs as they ought to be" (*invisis illius nostrae rei publicae germanae putamina*).

Pompey

Cicero's friendship with Pompey blended practical calculation with a fondness and gratitude that often reads as heartfelt.[160] The connection had deep roots that may even have gone back to their younger years of military service.[161] Both their active collaboration and their affection can be traced back to the late 60s at the latest, when both men began to realize that a relationship might prove useful to them both. This is apparent, for instance, in *Ad Atticum* 16 (I.16), from July of 61, where Cicero reported that he and Pompey were linked by regular and pleasant intercourse (*multa et iucunda consuetudine coniuncti inter nos sumus*).[162] Before he linked himself to Caesar and Crassus, Pompey struggled to translate the prestige he had won in the field into practical influence in Rome, and he was groping for connections that could help him accomplish his objectives.[163] Thus, he appears to have welcomed and even encouraged the connection with Cicero, to such an extent, in fact, that, as Cicero reported to Atticus in the same letter, bearded young wags (*barbatuli iuvenes*) started calling him "Cn. Cicero."[164]

Although Pompey came from a family that had spent many more generations than Cicero's building networks in the urban center, the dynast had spent a large proportion of his career out of the city. In Cicero's case, by contrast, in the lead up to his consular campaign, he had been working full-tilt to construct his networks in the capital and to refine his knowledge about how to maximize the city's civic and social institutions. He had labored untiringly to build up his personal organization's social capital among both elites and sub-elites, as well as his stock of civic knowledge.[165] Because of the exceptional length of Pompey's military commands, a large proportion of his support base was located outside the city of Rome, to a degree that may have been unprecedented for one of the community's *principes*.[166] Moreover, he had little personal experience

---

160 Beryl Rawson, *The Politics of Friendship: Pompey and Cicero* (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 1978) discusses the progression of the relationship throughout both men's lives, minimizing the levels of sincere affection. But I suggest that she misreads the emotional content, especially on Cicero's side. Robert Rowland, "The Origins and Development of Cicero's Friendship with Pompey," *Rivista Storica dell'Antichità* VI-VII (1977): 329-341 emphasizes the lack of equality in their respective investment in the bond, arguing that Cicero's affection and effort consistently exceeded Pompey's. It is misleading to cast the relationship as entirely one-sided, but there is some truth to Ward's basic premise about the lack of perfect reciprocity.

161 It is likely that Cicero's service in the Social War under Pompey's father, with Pompey serving in the same legions, gave them a chance to connect as young men (they were the same age). Allen Ward, "The Early Relationships between Cicero and Pompey until 80 B.C.," *Phoenix* 24 (1970): 119-129 even suggests that their connection could have gone back to boyhood; his "Cicero and Pompey in 75 and 70 B.C," *Latomus* XXIX (1970): 58-71 treats the traces of their bond in the 70s.

162 This is apparent, for instance, in *Ad Atticum* 16 (I.16): "we have been linked to each other by a lot of pleasant intercourse" (*multa et iucunda consuetudine coniuncti inter nos sumus*).

163 Pompey even approached his regular antagonist Cato with the proposal that he and his son could marry Cato's nieces. Cato rejected this offer to ally his family organization with Pompey's, prioritizing his reputation for uncompromising virtue (ethical capital accumulation) over the social and financial benefits of the coalition. Plutarch, *Pompey* 44.2 and *Cato the Younger* 30.2 for Pompey's request and its rejection; for these events in Pompey's career, see Robin Seager, *Pompey: A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 2nd ed. 2002), 75-85.

164 *Ad Atticum* 16 (I.16): "our goateed young wags label him Cn. Cicero in their chit chat" (*barbatuli iuvenes, illum in sermonibus Cn. Ciceronem appellent*). In his commentary on 14 (I.14), Shackleton Bailey clarifies that the short beard was a stylish affectation at the time.

165 Whatever its provenance, the *Commentariolum Petitionis* provides a window onto what this process could entail. On the *commentariolum*: Andrew Sillett, "Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum*: a Philosophical Approach to Roman Elections," in Edmund Cueva, Javier Martínez (eds.), *Splendide Mendax*: Rethinking Fakes and Forgeries in Classical, Late Antique, and Early Christian Literature (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2016), 177-191, focusing on the provenance of the text and Michael Alexander, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis* as an Attack on Election Campaigns," *Athenaeum* 97 (2009): 31-57 for the authorial intent. I discuss the work further in the previous chapter. Jeffrey Tatum, *Quintus Cicero: A Brief Handbook on Canvassing for Office* (Commentariolum Petitionis) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2018) provides the first full-length commentary, as well as up to date references and discussion of the text, its purposes, and its provenance.

166 Kit Morrell, *Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) discusses his relationship with the provinces extensively, making an argument that Pompey (along with Cato) was putting forward a program of reform to change the dynamic between the ruling city and the empire. His activism on behalf of people outside the imperial center, as I suggest, would have been essential to the development of the massive stores of goodwill he built with various constituencies outside the Roman urban sphere; Cristina Rosillo-López, "Reconsidering Foreign *Clientelae* as a Source of Status in the City of Rome During the

translating diffuse social weight into tangible results through the formal and informal institutional structures of the system of power—at maximizing the efficacy of social networks, that is, or of navigating senatorial procedure, *contiones*, or the electoral canvass. Although Pompey had accumulated a massive stock of military know-how, we might say that he was "poor" in his capital account of civic knowledge.

As early as 62, Cicero was already introducing the "*amicitia* ideal" into the discourse of their friendship. In a parallel he would revisit over the years, he presented himself as a wise and selfless Laelius to Pompey's Africanus, acting as Pompey's intimate companion both in public affairs and in personal friendship (*et in re publica et in amicitia adiunctum*).[167] For years, Cicero consciously sought to build a friendship with Pompey that lived up to his idealized portrait of the famous bond between the exemplary military hero and his sage companion. It is telling that nearly eighteen years later, Cicero chose to cast Laelius and Scipio as the protagonists in his *De Amicitia* (as he had in his *De Re Publica* in the mid-50s).[168] For Cicero, the Laelius-Scipio bond represented the essence of friendship.

Cicero only ever managed to fulfill the project partially and intermittently, and his union with Pompey inevitably remained imperfect. But I suggest that nonetheless, for Cicero, his relationship with Pompey was inextricably tied up with the formation of a theoretical ideal of *amicitia* that he constructed over the course of his life in the context of his various friendships. When Cicero gave textual form to this model in the 40s, his articulation was likely influenced at least to a degree by the aspirations he had cherished for his friendship with Pompey. He had hoped that the bond would facilitate ongoing, open, and trusting collaboration. But more than that, as his recurring use of the Scipio-Laelius analogy implies, he had aspired to form a friendship with Pompey based on something beyond *utilitas*. Cicero appears to have longed for the kind of full-fledged *amicitia* that should at least in theory be the natural outcome of the encounter between two men who shared deep commonality in their morality and in the objects of their zeal.[169]

As it turned out, however, Atticus and his intimates among the senatorial "traditionalists" used their influence with Cicero to prevent him from offering unqualified support for his Scipio in

---

Late Roman Republic," in Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 263-280 treats the possibilities and challenges of translating such support into influence in the capital—one of the reasons, as I would emphasize, that the friendship with Cicero would have seemed so attractive to Pompey. In the same volume, Martin Jehne, "From *Patronus* to *Pater*: The Changing Role of Patronage in the Period of Transition from Pompey to Augustus," 297-320 discusses the novel character of Pompey's (and Caesar's) provincial relationships—Pompey's "unusually large number of relationships with individuals, cities, and client kings would could potentially be mobilized in case of need" (303). In spite of these extraordinary provincial connections, however, Jehne argues convincingly that, for all Pompey's success in this enterprise, although "the whole of the East looked to Pompey as its master and hero…when Pompey came home, he realized painfully that the senate did not really care" (305).

167 *Ad Familiares* 3 (V.7): "you will find that I have acted [for your benefit] with such wisdom and selflessness that I may easily be joined to you in public affairs and in personal intimacy—a not much lesser Laelius, to you, who are far greater than Africanus" (*tanto consilio tantaque animi magnitudine a me gesta esse cognosces ut tibi multo maiori quam Africanus fuit [a] me non multo minore<m> quam Laelium facile et in re publica et in amicitia adiunctum esse patiare*). Shackleton Bailey reconstructs the context, with Cicero writing in response to a letter from Pompey that had pointedly omitted the congratulations Cicero had been hoping for as a response to the long and boastful account of his exploits during the Catilinarian conspiracy that he had sent to the dynast. Cicero could have taken offense. But he valued Pompey as a potential ally and chose instead to try to win him over—he balanced injured dignity with a desire not to prejudice future relations.

168 Cicero seems to have resonated with Laelius as an *exemplum* for himself, invoking the model in a range of contexts and with a variety of interlocutors—Henriette Van Der Blom, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 185-188 provides an extensive discussion of Cicero's use of the Laelius *exemplum* throughout his career (for instance, when choosing "code names" for correspondence with Atticus and in his self-fashioning and characterization in his *Pro Murena* and *De Lege Agraria*). For his part, Pompey embraced the Scipio *exemplum* (perhaps influenced by Cicero's use of the flattering model). As Cicero reported to Quintus, Pompey made the comparison between himself and Africanus in a speech he gave in the Senate in 56—*Ad Quintum* 7 (II.3).

169 Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 152-153 argues that it is reasonable to read this comparison (especially when it first appeared) in light of Cicero's vision of ideal friendship; it would be going too far, however, to view this early letter in 62 as a prefiguration of the complete vision of the ideal statesman that he would lay out in *De Re Publica* (the other of his treatises featuring the Laelius-Scipio pair prominently).

the late 60s. Atticus and his associates worried about the effects of Pompey's policies of land redistribution and debt reform on moneyed interests, and furthermore, they were concerned both about Pompey's undue social weight and about the potentially pernicious influence of his "popular" tactics on the institutional culture of *res publica*.[170] Their restraint hindered the development of the kind of alliance and trust between Cicero and Pompey that would have allowed the two friends to maintain a joint association for sustained collective action.

But at the beginning of the 50s, the very men who had been hindering Cicero's partnership with Pompey—men whom Cicero labeled Atticus' "fish-fancier" (*piscinarios*) friends in a letter to Atticus from 60—turned out to be unreliable allies, their loyalty undermined by a cocktail of jealousy and fear.[171] Language in *Ad Quintum* 4 (I.4) from 58 can even be read to suggest that Cicero may have questioned the commitment of Atticus himself, or at least have come to doubt his capacity to overcome his trepidation (*familiarissimus quisque aut sibi pertimuit*).[172] In the event, these allies proved unwilling to stick their necks out to prevent Cicero's exile. It is true that with Pompey, Cicero did claim (referring back in a letter to Quintus from October 54 to the time before his exile) that the dynast owed him substantially (*ille mihi omnia*) for his assistance during the 60s.[173] But even though Pompey also failed to shield him against Clodius' campaign, while we can imagine that Cicero felt betrayed to some degree, the magnate's reserve can hardly have come as a shock. After all, Cicero himself had not been "all in" for Pompey in the late 60s. Cicero's own ambivalent support in the past left sufficient rhetorical space for him to sweep this particular disappointment under the rug. As I argued in the previous chapter when examining Cicero's relationship with Appius, creative reframing could allow influential actors to embrace valuable bonds even when sources of potential tension existed. High-level aristocrats evidently recognized their *amicitiae* as precious resources, and the actors involved in the community's social dramas were clearly aware that it could be important to recolor the narrative of the past to match present needs.

In the event, Pompey collaborated with Lentulus and Sestius to pass the bills for Cicero's recall. [174] As a consequence, in spite of Pompey's defection at the time of his exile, Cicero was able to cast the magnate's assistance during his return as grounds for renewed friendship and even as a source of deep obligation. This was especially true when he was looking back from the vantage point of the later 50s, as the breach between Pompey and Caesar broke out into violence. As Cicero

---

[170] Atticus' resistance to Cicero's developing a close connection to Pompey can be traced back to the equestrian's bonds with men like Hortensius (and by extension Lucullus, Cato, and Ahenobarbus) who were opposed to the idea of Pompey exercising undue weight within the aristocratic community's system of power (a system predicated, as I am arguing, on power-sharing between insiders), on the one hand and, on the other hand, to the damage that Pompey's land redistribution would do to the financial interests of Atticus and his equestrian peers. Kathryn Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 45 (1996), 460-461 brings together many of these threads, explicating the motivation behind the reluctance of Atticus and his friends to see the "great man" emerge as preeminent. Pompey's interest in land for his veterans and his increasing willingness to reintroduce what she describes as "*popularis* tactics" made Pompey a direct threat to Atticus himself, "who not only represented the financial interests of many of Pompey's enemies, but who had several irons in the fire of his own" (461).

[171] *Ad Atticum* 19 (I.19): "those well-heeled men, I call them fish-fanciers, your friends, envy us without making much of a secret of it, I have been considering that I might need to seek some greater sources of assistance and firmer protections [i.e. Pompey]" (*beatos homines, hos piscinarios dico, amicos tuos, non obscure nobis invidere, putavi mihi maiores quasdam opes et firmiora praesidia esse quaerenda*)—Shackleton Bailey draws the connection between *beatos* and material wealth, with the implication that these men cared about nothing but their luxuries. Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 458-9 for the argument that Cicero made veiled references to a sense of betrayal by Atticus in his correspondence with Quintus from the time.

[172] *Ad Quintum* 4 (I.4) from 58 contains language that appears to describe Atticus: "every one of my most intimate, near, and affectionate friends either feared for himself or envied me" (*intimus, proximus, familiarissimus quisque aut sibi pertimuit aut mihi invidit*). Atticus was presumably the fearful friend, with Hortensius the jealous one. Bailey comments that Atticus cannot be entirely excluded, but qualifies this by saying (by contrast with Welch) that Cicero would not seriously have charged his most intimate friend with treachery or selfish cowardice.

[173] *Ad Quintum* 24 (III.4): "I owed nothing to him, he owed unlimited obligations to me" (*ego illi nihil deberem, ille mihi omnia*)—Shackleton Bailey points out that Cicero did not literally mean that Pompey owed him "everything." In 4 (I.4), Cicero bemoaned "Pompey's sudden desertion" (*subita defectio Pompei*).

[174] For these events, see, for instance, Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait*, 60-88 and Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch*, 71-104.

searched for metrics that could help him order his loyalties during the conflagration, he turned to the narrative of his past association with Pompey to help him sort out his priorities.[175] It is worth emphasizing that the stories friends told, to themselves and to others, about the history of their relationships—not merely the events themselves as divorced from narrativization—had a profound effect on the impact of these bonds: on their capacity to delineate loyalties, on their power to guide the actions of the linked individuals, and on their social perception by other members of the community. This was not merely true for Cicero and Pompey, of course, but for all the participants in the aristocratic social system. Story-making played an integral role in setting the landscape of social power.

Both immediately after Cicero's consulship in the late 60s and after his return in the mid 50s, his *familiaritas* with Pompey served to bolster the perception by the rest of the community of each man's capacity to exercise effective social power. Both because of the social perception of their alliance and because of their capacity to trade aid, such a bond could increase each friend's practical influence, helping each of them advance his personal agenda as a consequence of the perceived expansion of his social capital. Cicero demonstrated his awareness of these potential benefits in the same letter to Atticus from 60 in which he mentioned the "fish-fanciers," noting that his warm connection with Pompey would put each of them on a firmer footing in his personal circumstances (*sua ratione*) and in the mêlée of *res publica*.[176] It is essential to emphasize again that participants in this system could only command access to formal power for short stretches of time, and stretches that were rarely continuous at that. As a result, influential men used amicable bonds to extend their access both to formal channels through friends currently in office. Friendships also increased their access to broader networks, both of peers and near-peers and of lower-ranked social resources linked to their high-level *amici* through more asymmetric bonds. Both factors helped nebulous authority manifest as concrete impact. Thus, for Pompey, at least for the most part, Cicero's friendship provided an uncomplicated boost to his authority, furnishing a useful instrument for channeling his influence.[177] For Cicero, however, as I will suggest below, while the bond offered benefits, it was not so simple a boon.

To make good on the potential benefits of his connection with Cicero, Pompey was ready and willing to label Cicero his *alter ego* and to make use of the practical implications of the dynamic. In September 57, for instance, with food shortages causing unrest, Cicero proposed that a law should be passed granting Pompey a special commission to salvage the situation. Cicero wrote to Atticus with delight about a subsequent Senate meeting, convened to make arrangements for the commission. Pompey had not merely named Cicero first in his list of legates—he had explicitly stated that Cicero would be his "second self" in all matters that arose (*et ad omnia me alterum se fore dixit*).[178]

---

[175] Peter Brunt, "Cicero's *Officium* in the Civil War," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 76 (1986): 12-32 offers a subtle analysis of Cicero's decision process and his performance of this process before his audience of interlocutors.

[176] *Ad Atticum* 19 (I.19): "I have joined myself in such a warm connection with this man [Pompey] that each of the two of us should be able to be firmer on his own account and in a firmer position in public affairs" (*cum hoc ego me tanta familiaritate coniunxi ut uterque nostrum in sua ratione munitior et in re publica firmior hac coniunctione esse possit*)—Shackleton Bailey explains the phrase *in sua ratione* as a reference to personal circumstances in contrast to his overt action in *res publica*.

[177] We might point to the complex question of the Campanian land in 56 as one possible complication. It appears likely, however, that, as much as Pompey turned out to disapprove of Cicero's actions, Cicero only intended to oppose Caesar, not Pompey. In a letter to Lentulus from that year, Cicero implied that he had not anticipated Pompey's consternation at his actions against the proposal—*Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) "a great stir was raised by this proposal of mine, and not only with those whom it was supposed to have an effect [Caesar] but also with those whom I would never have thought [Pompey]" (*hac a me sententia dicta magnus animorum motus est factus cum eorum quorum oportuit tum illorum etiam quorum numquam putaram*). Shackleton Bailey helps to clarify these veiled references in his commentary.

[178] *Ad Atticum* 73 (IV.1): "he asked for fifteen legates, and not only named me first but also said that I would be his second self in all matters" (*ille legatos quindecim cum postularet, me principem nominavit et ad omnia me alterum se fore dixit*). Shackleton Bailey reconstructs the

In this case, I suggest that Pompey could use an *amicus* to expand his capacity to express authority. For an aristocrat filling a complex role like that of grain commissioner, a delegate empowered as an extension of personal presence might prove invaluable. The conceit of "second selfhood" helped turn Pompey's *amicus* into an offshoot of his magisterial authority, multiplying his practical capacity to exercise personal power in his official role. This situation was not unique, of course. Although Pompey's extraordinary commands likely imposed demands that were far beyond what was usual even for a senior magistrate, we can nonetheless take this instance as indicative of the broader function of magisterial power.[179] As this case helps to show, personal representation facilitated by the *alter ego* frame might help aristocrats carry out the practical "governmental" duties mandated by their official position.[180]

While for Pompey, the friendship was essentially an unqualified asset, granting him access to a useful power resource, for Cicero, the relationship's implications were more complex. The two *amici* may have worked to frame their connections as a bond between peers, with Pompey content to grant Cicero rhetorical parity as an implicitly equal "second self." Especially after Luca, however, we often find Cicero writhing under the constraints of a friendship that was far from egalitarian in practice. Cicero often expressed the need not to confront or offend Pompey—to hold himself back (he scarcely could) so as to avoid antagonism with the dynast (*vix…teneo, vel quod nolo cum Pompeio pugnare*).[181] Although it appears that he still exercised a degree of discretion, he struggled to maintain his independence in the face of the magnate's pressure. The bond with Pompey did offer effective protection in the mid-50s, as it had failed to earlier in the decade, and Cicero may even on occasion have used Pompey to further items on his own agenda. But the connection had a chilling effect on his ability to operate as an equal and independent actor during the decade, to some extent curtailing his ability to retain a distinct agenda of his own.

Cicero may have rejoiced when Pompey labeled him his *alter ego* in the speech from 57, but the equality this implied was rarely expressed in practice. To a greater extent even than was the case with the Caesar and Crassus, Pompey's career prior to the 50s had already lifted him beyond the point where even a fellow consular could plausibly carry out a full "impersonation act" in all the relevant contexts. By contrast, Caesar needed his Gallic campaigns before he was likewise elevated to such an outsized degree, while Crassus perhaps never truly crossed such a threshold.[182] The

---

context for this speech, after the movement for Cicero's restoration had finally prevailed (with Pompey's active support and Caesar's consent); Pompey appointed both Cicero brothers among his legates in the command he had been voted.

[179] On the extraordinary commands, see Ronald Ridley, "The Extraordinary Commands of the Late Republic: A Matter of Definition," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 30 (1981), 280-297—he takes pains to note distinctions between extraordinary and ordinary magistracies and to contrast the extraordinary commands of the late Republic from middle Republican precedent; Fredrick Vervaet, *The High Command in the Roman Republic:* Summum Imperium Auspiciumque *from 509 to 19 BCE* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014) also contains extensive discussion of the evolution of such posts—see especially ch. 7. See also Benjamin Straumann, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 101-117, for a discussion of the "constitutional" implications of these positions.

[180] Indeed, one extension of the use of legates as personal representatives was Pompey's novel strategy of governing at a distance through such men—in 52, Pompey sent L. Afranius, M. Petreius, and M. Terentius Varro, to govern Hispania in his stead—Caesar, *Bellum Civile* I.37-42.

[181] For instance, *Ad Quintum* 22 (III.2): "yet I hold myself back from acting as prosecutor myself, with great difficulty by Hercules, but nevertheless I am mastering myself, since I do not want to get into a struggle with Pompey" (*ego tamen <me> teneo ab accusando, vix mehercule, sed tamen teneo, vel quod nolo cum Pompeio pugnare*). As Shackleton Bailey points out, Cicero already planned to support his close friend Milo for consul in 52—a position which Pompey did not view kindly—so he wanted no other sources of friction with the dynast and held back from prosecuting Gabinius. Cicero could make some choices at odds with the dynast's will, it appears, but he felt compelled to limit these deviations. Later, as much as he hated Gabinius, he even allowed himself to be convinced by the dynasts to plead for the man in court. He made his excuses for this hypocrisy to Lentulus in *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9).

[182] The wealth Pompey brought back from his eastern campaigns (which may even have exceeded Sulla's unprecedented fortune) played a key role in this process—David Potter, "Holding Court in Republican Rome," *The American Journal of Philology*, 132, (2011): 59-80, see especially 67 for Pompey's outsized property—property which Caesar would co-opt after the civil war, adding to his massive Gallic acquisitions. The sums that Pompey brought back allowed him to create a "private fiscal machine" (68)—a banking network which dwarfed any loosely analogous structures set up by contemporaries such as Brutus and L. Aelius Lamia.

feeling of constraint Cicero experienced was part of the reason that, as we saw in the previous chapter, he worked so hard to build a network of peer consular friends that could help him preserve a measure of *auctoritas* not entirely under Pompey's shadow. But even in that enterprise, Cicero always had to make sure that none of the actions undertaken by this coalition was perceived as a direct challenge to his friend Pompey's interests.

Nonetheless, as much as Cicero had to remain constantly circumspect, the friendship he developed with Pompey was more than a matter of tactics and maneuvering. It is important to highlight the warmth and regard that also appears to have played a role in guiding Cicero's choices and calculations. In this instance, as in many others, it would be misleading to try to disentangle the affective components of the aristocratic community's social system from the layered power games. Writing to Lentulus in 54, Cicero described his bond with Pompey as founded not only on obligation, but also on true affection and a long-lasting predilection towards his illustrious friend (*non solum beneficio sed amore etiam et perpetuo quodam iudicio*).[183] Cicero appears to have shared a greater degree of openness and a more consistent level of trust with Lentulus than he did with Pompey, so we can perhaps believe Cicero's claim with a degree more confidence. But even in the context of his interaction with Lentulus, Cicero's assertion of warmth toward Pompey still had a rhetorical purpose. Even as Cicero and Lentulus sought to balance against the dynast, neither of them had chosen to reject him. Thus, by reporting his behavior in his friendship with Pompey, Cicero could also offer proof to Lentulus of his own high quality as an *amicus*, working to reinforce Lentulus' general perception of his consistency and affection towards his connections. Moreover, Cicero was subtly affirming the prime importance of this kind of substantial friendship, working to buttress Lentulus' commitment to one of the social institutions that Cicero believed to be necessary to the healthy function of the aristocratic community's system of power. Each of the two bonds was a link based in some brand of affection, but at the same time, it was a carefully cultivated power resource.[184] The expression of affection itself was a calculated strategic act, whether or not it was "sincere."[185]

It is worth highlighting Cicero's habit of discussing his thriving friendships with others of his interlocutors. I suggest that this was a practice designed to make his network more substantial and potent. Cicero was working to amplify the perception of his quality as a virtuous *amicus* and to spread awareness of the size and depth of his network. In a system of power ruled by a collective, which organized itself largely by informal social institutions, each aristocratic actor's influence depended on the perception by his fellows of the strength and quality of his relationships to the other members of the community. Networks meant very little if no one knew about them, and an aristocrat could reinforce existing bonds by advertising the consistency and affection as a friend that he showed to other connections. In this sense, it is artificial to try to separate genuine affection and regard from practical calculation. No sharp line divided the genuine from the artificial, and intimacy, or least its performance, can be viewed as a power move. At the same time, however, part of the goal of that move was to create a discourse governed by the principles of ideal *amicitia*, in which power players, in fact, treated each other as beloved friends.

This was a framework that Cicero believed in sincerely—or, at least, that he fought for with a concerted personal and textual campaign—and he embraced Pompey as a member of this circle of

---

183 *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "I owe a lot to Pompey…and that not only because of his favor but also because of deep affection and a certain long-lasting predilection" (*Pompeio plurimum…debebam et eum non solum beneficio sed amore etiam et perpetuo quodam iudicio meo diligebam*).

184 We should note that Pompey, whatever his "true" attitude towards the friendship—and however much he was willing to label Cicero his *alter ego*—appears to have had somewhat less concern for the bond than Cicero. Jon Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 120-135 shows how Pompey had far less attention to spare for the day-to-day niceties that helped to create the affiliative tapestry of such a connection.

185 Indeed, "sincerity" itself may not be a perfect metric for evaluating either of these bonds.

affection. Moreover, in spite of the tensions that sometimes plagued their friendship, in 51 Cicero can be found telling his closest friend Atticus of an affection for the dynast that was increasing by the day (*plus plusque in dies diligo*).[186] As the decade drew to a close, much as he had back in 62, Cicero gave hints that he still longed to partake in relations of ideal *amicitia* with his powerful friend. In another letter to Atticus from this time, in fact, Cicero described his connection with Pompey as a bond between true interlocutors engaged in private διαλόγοι on the state of public affairs (*quos cum Pompeio διαλόγους de re publica habuerimus*), again casting himself and Pompey in the mold of Laelius and Scipio.[187] With this Greek expression, Cicero subtly evoked the image of philosophical dialogues—conversations between exemplary statesmen of previous generations much like those he presented in his philosophical treatise—a reference that calls to mind the impression of a system of power led by exemplary *amici* in conversation. In the bond he had built with Pompey, we can imagine that Cicero caught a whiff of that reality, however fleetingly, right before the civil war dethroned the community of *amici* for good.

Caesar

Cicero's bond with Pompey developed over a long span of years, but with Caesar, it was only in the second half of the decade that Cicero started investing in the kind of functional high-level friendship we have been discussing in this chapter and the chapter preceding and, perhaps ironically, only while Caesar was away from the city on campaign.[188] We do catch a few traces of a connection between Cicero and Caesar reaching back to Cicero's consulship in 63. An embryonic exchange of favors began to create the kind of mutual practical obligation that provided the substrate for aristocratic friendship. For instance, Cicero had protected Caesar from a malicious prosecutorial attack.[189] But any tentative new growth was likely overshadowed by Caesar's famous speech in opposition to the execution of the Catilinarians.[190] In 60, as Caesar laid the groundwork for his dominant coalition, we find him making overtures to Cicero, but Cicero demurred.[191] Thus, whereas with Pompey, the connection had a chance to take root before the "triumviral" coalition elevated the three dynasts to a position of *de facto* preeminence, Cicero's friendship with Caesar only really began to develop under conditions in which the three had already managed to separate their influence from that of their fellow aristocrats by an increasingly unbridgeable gap.

Late in 54, Cicero could stretch history enough that he could write to Lentulus of an "old" friendship (*vetus amicitia*) between Caesar, himself, and his brother Quintus.[192] Caesar could evoke vague memories of an "old affection" (*recordatio veteris amoris*), according to Cicero's report of his words, at least.[193] But in reality, Cicero appears to have only started investing attention into the bond

---

[186] *Ad Atticum* 116 (VI.2): "[Pompey] for whom, by god, I develop more and more affection day after day!" (*quem mehercule plus plusque in dies diligo*).

[187] *Ad Atticum* 98 (V.5): "such Dialogues concerning public affairs we had with Pompey" (*quos cum Pompeio διαλόγους de re publica habuerimus*); see also, 99 (V.6).

[188] On a basic level, the lack of closer connection earlier in their careers makes sense in terms of the relative ages of the two dynasts: Pompey (b. 106) was Cicero's exact contemporary, while Caesar (b. 100) was six years his junior. But beyond this, it was precisely in circumstances of absence from the city that a man such as Caesar would have had a particular need for a "second self" back in the city.

[189] Sallust, *Bellum Catalinae* 49.1-2.

[190] Sallust, *Bellum Catalinae* 51. Henriette Van Der Blom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 164-165 makes the case that the specific version in Sallust must be regarded as "literary fiction," although we need not doubt the basic veracity of the event.

[191] In *Ad Atticum* 23 (II.3) from 60, Cicero told Atticus that he had had a visit from Caesar's agent Balbus, offering alliance and intimate association, and in 39 (II.19) from 59, he reported that Caesar had offered him a position as *legatus*.

[192] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "the old friendship that my brother and I had with Caesar" (*vetus amicitia…mihi et Quinto fratri cum Caesare*).

[193] *Ad Quintum* 18 (II.14): "[Caesar'] recollection of old affection" (*recordatio veteris amoris*)—Shackleton Bailey suggests that this recollection from Caesar's letter may have referred more specifically to Quintus in this context; also, at *De Provinciis Consularibus* 40, Cicero also made reference to an intimacy stretching back to their younger years, playing up their old connection before a broader

in the middle of the decade, after the conference at Luca made Caesar's continued preeminence undeniable. For Caesar's part, as least according to Cassius Dio, the magnate had disliked Cicero before and during the exile years.[194] He only started contemplating amity when Cicero's return seemed inevitable.[195] Their "old affection" was debatable at best. In the latter half of the decade, however, both men recommitted themselves to the friendship, a dedication that comes across especially clearly in Cicero's letters to his brother from that period. For instance, when he wrote to Quintus in 54, who was then himself serving as a legate in Caesar's camp and building a friendship of his own with the dynast, Cicero assertively dismissed second thoughts about Caesar as a friend (*ego vero nullas δευτέρας φροντίδας habere possum in Caesaris rebus. Ille mihi secundum te et liberos nostros ita est ut sit paene par*).[196] With these words, Cicero was claiming that the dynast came second in his hierarchy of care right after Quintus and the children—almost an adoptive member of the family. Implicitly, then, Cicero elevated his friendship with Caesar even above his bond with Pompey.

By the beginning of 54, Cicero and Caesar had already started to build the habit of practical exchange—the bidirectional flow of recommendations and favors viewed as appropriate for high-level *amici*. In a letter Cicero sent to Caesar that year, we see evidence that they had already made such exchange their custom. The two *amici* had established the practice of replicating each other's presence as leading figures in their respective personal networks of social power. Cicero viewed Caesar as a reliable source of support for his own junior connections, referring to a past recommendation he had sent for his friend Milo and to the favor Caesar habitually showed Cicero's associates.[197] As Cicero claimed in his letter to Caesar, he had persuaded himself to think of the dynast as his *alter ego*, and not only regarding his own affairs, but also in the concerns of other members of his circle of intimates (*vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent*).[198] Here, we again catch sight of "second selfhood"—this time in a different guise than what we saw with Pompey above, but just as important to the nature and function of the institution of high-level *amicitia* (whatever the realities of the underlying emotional content).

As he reported to Caesar, Cicero marveled at the coincidence that, just as he conceived the idea of turning to Caesar for a recommendation for his juristically inclined protégé Trebatius, a letter arrived from Caesar requesting suggestions for young officers.[199] In 55, Pompey had offered to take Cicero with him to Spain as a legate, and Cicero had promised to bring Trebatius along as a member of his personal staff. This would have been a fantastic opportunity for a junior aristocrat to gain experience, expand his network, and pad his pocket book. But when Pompey delayed departure,

---

audience. It may be, too, that Caesar's family's marriage connections to the Aripinate Marius' family gave him interests in Cicero's hometown, perhaps providing an opportunity to connect with the Cicero brothers.

194 Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 39.10.1.

195 This is, to some extent, belied by the evidence of his outreach in 60-59. But in any case, his efforts did not bear fruit as a full-fledged *amicitia* bond until years later.

196 *Ad Quintum* 21 (III.1): "I can have no second thoughts about the affairs of Caesar. He comes after you and our children only, and in such a manner as to be almost equal" (*ego vero nullas δευτέρας φροντίδας habere possum in Caesaris rebus. Ille mihi secundum te et liberos nostros ita est ut sit paene par*). Cicero may have intended to implicitly diminish his connection to Pompey here, since Quintus needed to reassure Caesar that Cicero would not change his mind about remaining in Rome and go off with Pompey on campaign against Caesar's express wishes. Shackleton Bailey points out that Cicero was seeking to allay his brother's worries, who may have been concerned about Cicero's purported change of heart (the rumor was apparently news to Cicero).

197 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): Cicero wrote of the time "when I wrote to you concerning Milo [to recommend him]" (*cum ad te de Milone scripsissem*) and of the favor Caesar was wont to grant to all his associates. Shackleton Bailey suggests that, since there can hardly have been any love lost between Caesar and T. Annius Milo, this may be someone else, or the name may be a corruption.

198 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "take note of what a persuasive case I make to myself that you are my second self, and not only in my own affairs but also in the concerns of members of my circle of intimates" (*vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent*).

199 Jill Harries, *Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State* (London: Duckworth, 2006), ch. 6 for Trebatius' career under Caesar, with his advancement aided by his legal expertise.

Cicero still felt compelled to respect the promise.[200] So he asked his "peer" *amicus* Caesar to step in as a substitute mentor. Cicero's fellow consular could play the role that would have been proper for Cicero to play himself in advancing the career of a mentee (*coepi velle ea Trebatium exspectare a te quae sperasset a me*).

Cicero was framing Caesar as a "second self" who could act as an interchangeable stand-in as Trebatius' mentor. He and Caesar both stood at the head of personal networks, and each of these high-level "peers" alternately had access to positions such as provincial commands, which allowed the man who occupied them to bestow favors and advancement on junior connections. As a consequence, the aristocratic community maintained a well-developed system of recommendations, in which high-level *amici* extended each other's capacity to give personal aid in a quasi-institutionalized network of support. The more elevated members of the community would take each other's place in furthering the interests and careers of aristocrats currently (although often not permanently) occupying a lower social location, as well as providing aid to non-aristocratic connections. Through letters of recommendation, aristocrats could ask *amici* to stand in as proxy benefactors or backers for their own lower-level contacts.[201] I examine *commendationes* in detail in Chapter 4, where I also return to the Trebatius case, using it as a window onto this institutionalized system.[202] I will argue there that this was a system, which itself could play an essential role in the creation and development of future *principes*. But for now, it is sufficient to note that this system of support for friends' lower-level contacts was one of the key facets of the institution of *amicitia* between high-level "peers."

It is worth underlining the fact that, throughout his letter for Trebatius, Cicero was on the lookout for ways to bring out his "second selfhood" with Caesar. As much as Cicero was asking his fellow consular for a favor, by depicting himself as interchangeable with one of the three men dominating the aristocratic community, Cicero was also seizing an opportunity to stake a claim that he was also one of the key figures guiding the civic community. Furthermore, Cicero went out of his way to suggest that, in his relationship with Caesar, the *alter ego* dynamic was not just a one-off with Trebatius. In fact, Cicero gently implied that the dynast was habitually willing to serve in this role for his connections (*in meos conferre velis*).[203] This was a subtle but potent assertion, not only of connection, but also of rhetorical parity—an elision of the practical power differential. Even beyond this, I suggest that there was another layer to Cicero's rhetorical play. When he addressed Caesar as a "second self," Cicero was not merely stroking his own ego; he was trying to steer the behavior within the friendship. By tagging himself as equivalent to and interchangeable with the dynast,

---

[200] *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "I had been thinking that I would take C. Trebatius wherever I went, so that I would return him home enriched to an exceptional degree by every zealous effort and favor in my power. But after that, Pompey's delay was longer than I had thought it would be and a certain doubt of which you are not unaware seemed to prevent, or at least certainly to delay, my departure—look at what I have presumed: it became my desire that Trebatius should hope to attain such benefits from you as he had previously expected from me, and—by Hercules!—I have made promises to him regarding your goodwill in terms no less unstinting than I was wont to use when it came to my own" (*C. Trebatium cogitaram, quocumque exirem, mecum ducere, ut eum meis omnibus studiis beneficiis quam ornatissimum domum reducerem. sed postea quam et Pompei commoratio diuturnior erat quam putaram et mea quaedam tibi non ignota dubitatio aut impedire profectionem meam videbatur aut certe tardare, vide quid mihi sumpserim: coepi velle ea Trebatium exspectare a te quae sperasset a me, neque mehercule minus ei prolixe de tua voluntate promisi quam eram solitus de mea polliceri*).

[201] On recommendations in general, Élizabeth Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993) is the most extensive treatment of *commendatio* as it appears in the Ciceronian *corpus*. See also, Hannah Cotton, "Greek and Latin Epistolary Formulae: Some Light on Cicero's Letter Writing," *The American Journal of Philology* 105 (1984): 409-425, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," *The American Journal of Philogy* 106 (1985): 328-334, "The Role of Cicero's Letters of Recommendation: *Iustitia versus Gratia*?," *Hermes* 114 (1986): 443-460. I provide further references in the extended discussion of *commendatio*, which is the focus of Chapter 4.

[202] On this particular recommendation, see also Meike Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018), who brings special attention to the involvement of a broader network in the process, beyond the recommender, the *commendatus*, and the recipient of the recommendation.

[203] *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): Cicero referred to the kind treatment—"with all your [usual] courtesy" (*omni tua comitate*), which "you are generally willing to confer on my connections" (*in meos conferre velis*).

Cicero was encouraging Caesar to treat him as such, working to transfigure the social reality in the discourse of their friendship.

Before his brother Quintus went to join Caesar in Gaul, it appears that Cicero had not been investing attention into the process of constructing a full multifaceted friendship with Caesar.[204] Once Quintus arrived in the camp, however, the younger brother seems to have pushed his elder sibling to focus on building a stronger bond. Thus, writing to Quintus in 54, Cicero promised that he would cultivate Caesar actively and that, in response to Quintus' promptings, he would pour all the zeal he could muster into the effort (*fraterne quod me hortaris…ut omnia mea studia in istum unum conferam*).[205] It was only from this point—at least as far as we can tell from his correspondence—that Cicero first began to grant his *amicitia* with Caesar an elevated position among his various social objectives. Once Quintus' prompting initiated the project, however, Cicero leapt to it with a will. He dedicated himself to building a friendship with the dynast that expressed the varied components of the idealizing discourse. This was an ideal, as we should remember, that this network of *amici* was always in an ongoing process of articulating and delineating together, with this constructedness especially evident in highly performative bonds between "peers" among the *principes*.

By the mid-50s, Cicero and Quintus were relatively high-level players in the aristocratic community. But as they navigated a landscape of power that remained intricate and multidimensional during the decade, they were nevertheless keenly aware how important Caesar's favor could prove in a system that was increasingly beholden to the will of the dynasts. Their family group's public position—and, by extension, their ability to accomplish any and all objectives—might depend on the success of this *amicitia* project.[206] It for this reason, I suggest, that they poured attention into cultivating Caesar's friendship. They chose, as Cicero explicitly framed it, to "invest" their resources in their hopes of favor from the dynast; otherwise, as they had come to realize, all other enterprises would be meaningless (*plura ponuntur in spe quam in pecuniis; <qua relicta> reliqua ad iacturam struentur*).[207] It is telling to note the explicit language of investment—how the Cicero brothers viewed the bond in terms of capital accumulation. This points to an explicit conceptual blending between social and financial enterprises in the aristocratic community's metaphorical idiom—or, at the very least, in the semantic vernacular of these particular members of that community (we must recall, too, that these same aristocrats were caught up in real financial relations with each other, as well—their social and financial networks interpenetrated).[208] In this letter to Quintus, Cicero's choice of words implies that they envisioned a tradeoff between financial and social capital. They viewed this social investment as a more secure reserve than hard assets.

---

[204] At first perhaps, Cicero believed that his full-fledged *amicitia* with Pompey provided a sufficient connection to their dominant coalition or even that his commitments to Pompey should constrain him from cultivating Caesar too ambitiously.

[205] *Ad Quintum* 18 (II.14): Cicero promised to follow "what you have exhorted in your capacity as my brother…that I turn all my zeal to that one object [of cultivating Caesar]" (*fraterne quod me hortaris…ut omnia mea studia in istum unum conferam*); although "I had been asleep in the task of cultivating this man for so long, and even, by Hercules, with you prodding me so often" (*in isto homine colendo tam indormivi diu te mehercule saepe excitante*).

[206] *Ad Quintum* 26 (III.6): "we were seeking firm protection and goodwill towards the state of our dignity from that best and most powerful man" (*praesidium firmissimum petebamus ex optimi et potentissimi viri benevolentia ad omnem statum nostrae dignitatis*); *Ad Attticum* 89 (IV.16) where he discussed his new relations with Caesar with Atticus.

[207] *Ad Quintum* 26 (III.6): "more of our resources are invested in hope than in money; if that enterprise is abandoned, everything else we construct will be lost" (*plura ponuntur in spe quam in pecuniis; <qua relicta> reliqua ad iacturam struentur*). Shackleton Bailey comments that Caesar's good-will gave security, without which money that was made would only be lost again—Quintus may have been grumbling that he did not actually seem to be making much money by staying in Gaul. Capital was both a reality and a metaphor here.

[208] In 50, right before the war, Cicero would depend on Caesar for actual financial capital. After he was forced to leave HS 2,200,000 in his province after he returned from his province, Cicero found himself hard up. He turned to Caesar for a loan of HS 800,000, which left him with a nagging anxiety about his obligation to Caesar, even as civil war broke out. M.W. Fredrikson, "Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt," *JRS* 56 (1966): 131-132 lays out the circumstances of this debt; see *Ad Atticum* 94 (V.1) for Cicero's anxiety about repayment in May, but 126 (VII.3) shows that Cicero was still plagued by the obligation as late as December.

In spite of the steep power differential, the efforts at amity in the relationship between Caesar and the Tullii Cicerones were far from one-sided. Although the initial impetus came from Quintus, Caesar's response was prompt and eager. From the moment Quintus arrived in the camp, the magnate started investing in the bond with both siblings. Caesar took care, for instance, as Cicero reported to his brother, to write to Cicero to express his delight at Quintus' arrival. Apparently Caesar had claimed that Quintus' presence evoked memories of old affection, promising to make Cicero glad that his brother was present at Caesar's side, or at any rate, to mitigate the pains of separation (*quam suavis ei tuus adventus fuerit et recordatio veteris amoris*; *se effecturum ut ego in medio dolore ac desiderio tui te, cum a me abesses, potissimum secum esse laetarer*).[209]

Caesar and the dynasts may have been radically renovating the nature of aristocratic hierarchy. They were undermining the ideal of permeability and potential parity, even at the top, which I suggest was one of the integral principles of the "Republican" system of power. But as late as 54, their power, however inflated, still depended to a large degree on the same kinds of networks and social capital accumulation as did that of Cicero, his fellow *consulares* outside the dynast's clique, and in fact, every aristocratic actor within the system. After all, to a great extent, the very definition of power within this framework was the ability to sway enough of the community into a state of agreement, however temporary, to create the consensus sufficient for a given course of action.

In a "Republican" regime, the choices made for the society were the product of communal consensus. This consensus was organized by networks of *amici*, with the members negotiating power relations, as I have suggested, through the exchange of material and abstract capital. In the mid-50s, Caesar was playing a role that was recognizable within this structure. The interactions in his friendships with the Cicero brothers show that he was discharging this role with skill, and even with apparent decorum. At the same time, however, he, Pompey, and Crassus were beginning to transform the whole game, initiating a process that would leave the nature of power fundamentally altered by the mid-40s. Their actions were undermining the healthy function of a hegemonic process in which decision-making was accomplished by community dialogue.

While the friendship between the Tullii Cicerones and Caesar began as a product of calculation, the participants all ended up investing significant effort into constructing a relationship that was more than a mere alliance of naked interest. To a large extent, in fact, the bond came to express many of the recurring patterns of ideal *amicitia*. In our discussion of peer friendship thus far, we have seen how the mutual recognition of virtue was essential to the reciprocal links Cicero built with other high-level actors. In keeping with this priority, he went out of his way to recognize and praise Caesar's virtues. For instance, in the recommendation for Trebatius, Cicero described Caesar as outstanding, not only for his aptitude as a commander, but also for his *fides* (*et victoria et fide praestantem*).[210] Again, as I proposed in the previous chapter regarding Appius, we can view this praise as both appreciation and subtle guidance.[211] Cicero embraced Caesar's triumphant military

---

[209] *Ad Quintum* 18 (II.14): Cicero reported to Quintus that Caesar had written about "how sweet your [Quintus'] arrival was to him and the recollection of old affection" (*quam suavis ei tuus adventus fuerit et recordatio veteris amoris*) and had promised that "he would bring it about that I, even in the midst of the pain and longing I would feel with you absent from my side, I would at least be glad that you were with him rather than any other place in the world" (*se effecturum ut ego in medio dolore ac desiderio tui te, cum a me abesses, potissimum secum esse laetarer*).

[210] *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "preeminent both in victory and in fidelity" (*et victoria et fide praestantem*).

[211] As I noted in the previous chapter, this "protreptic" function of praise has been emphasized in the study of imperial panegyric, with its roots traced to Cicero—for instance, Susanna Braund, "Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, Seneca, Pliny," in Mary Whitby (ed.), *The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity*, 53-76; Cristina López, "Praising Caesar: Towards the Construction of an Autocratic Ruler's Image Between the Roman Republic and the Empire," in Christopher Smith, Ralph Covino (eds.), *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 181-198 discusses Cicero's lost *Epistula ad Caesarem* as a forerunner to the "mirror of princes" genre, with its educative function. On the history and function of epideictic rhetoric, see Laurent Pernot, *Epideictic Rhetoric: Questioning the Stakes of Ancient Praise* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). We could also see Pliny's construction of the *civilis princeps* profile in Book 10 of his letter collection as an epistolary analog—

competence. By pointing out Caesar's outstanding *fides*, however, Cicero encouraged his friend to complement his martial virtue with the trustworthy sense of obligation and reciprocity—a quality that he believed was the conceptual bedrock for the function of the system of rule by community.[212] Whether as a conscious act of manipulation, or even if he was only half-aware of the full effects of his social tactic, Cicero was working to put the conqueror back in the box, or at least to nudge him to temper his exceptionalism with communitarian values. Caesar's power may have been extraordinary, but to confront this novel challenge, Cicero called on a framework familiar from regular interactions between aristocratic *amici* in the system.

Furthermore, when Caesar's daughter Julia died in 54, Cicero can be found commenting approvingly, in a letter to his brother from that year, on the *virtus* and *gravitas* of his friend's response (*de virtute et gravitate Caesaris, quam in summo dolore adhibuisset, magnam ex epistula tua cepi voluptatem*).[213] Having chosen to embrace an amicable connection with the dynast, Cicero viewed Caesar's behavior with a critical eye, and he appears to have appreciated it when his friend lived up to the standards of *decorum*.[214] Cicero's evaluation implies that it was important to him not merely which policies his powerful friends pursued, but how they conducted themselves. Part of a gentleman's duty as a member of the system of power was to act his part as a *vir*. Caesar's ability to play this role helped Cicero validate his affection for the dynast—an *amor* that he was at pains to assert when writing to Quintus in Caesar's camp (*amore sum incensus*).[215] Caesar's *virtus* helped Cicero ease his nagging doubts about pursuing the friendship, and to justify the compromises he felt compelled to make, both to himself and to his other interlocutors.

---

for which see Carlos Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *American Journal of Philology* 128.2 (2007): 239-277. It is important to note, however, that Pliny was constructing and laboring to create an ideal superior, whereas Cicero was working on "teaching" a friend how to be an ideal peer. With Appius in the previous chapter, the frame of parity was at least an approximation of social reality. But the distinction between peer and superior began to blur in Cicero's "peer" friendships with Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus.

212 *Fides* was especially important to Cicero as both a virtue and a fundamental principle of a well-functioning system of power. Carlos Lévy, "Colloque *Pistis* et *Fides*: le *De Officiis* Cicéronien: une Refondation Philosophique de la *Fides*?" *Rendiconti* 148 (2014): 59-76 traces the semantic evolution of the concept of *fides* in Ciceronian thought, from the rhetorical and oratorical works, to the political ones, and finishing with the philosophical treatises of the last years. As a testament to this perceived importance (especially to Cicero), Cicero made the concept of *fides* one of the pillars of the structure of a well-functioning aristocratic society that he put forward in his *De Officiis*. For instance, E.M. Atkins, "*Domina et Regina Virtutum*: Justice and *Societas* in *De Officiis*," *Phronesis* 35 (1990) discusses the role the concept of *fides* plays in the text—it means "credit" simply, but also as (68) "mutual trust and trustworthiness, [*fides*] is the cement of society…the strength of relationships that enable individuals to cooperate in a common life." Atkins argues moreover (279) that Cicero, "since he articulates the details of the justice whose role is to foster *societas*, quite rightly describes it as a *fundamentum iustitiae*." J. Jackson Barlow, "Cicero on Property and the State," in Walter Nicgorski (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012) points out that Cicero was responding to a set of immediate conditions that undermined *fides*—(220) "[Caesar] rewarding political loyalty with the confiscated estates of fellow citizens undermined the trust (*fides*) that is fundamental to the polity."

213 *Ad Quintum* 26 (III.6): "I took great pleasure from your letter about the masculine virtue and gravity that Caesar exercised in the depths of his grief" (*de virtute et gravitate Caesaris, quam in summo dolore adhibuisset, magnam ex epistula tua cepi voluptatem*). Myles McDonnell, *Roman Manliness:* Virtus *and the Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) for an in depth discussion of *virtus*—McDonnell makes an argument that the ethical part of the semantic range only emerged once it started to be inflected by *arete*, fundamentally, he argues that *virtus* should be seen as the courage of the cavalryman charging bravely at his foe. McDonnell's book generated intense controversy, for which see Bob Kaster, "Review of Myles McDonnell, *Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic*," *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2007.02.08.

214 Malcolm Schofield, "The Fourth Virtue," in Walter Nicgorski (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 43-57 makes the case that *decorum*—the art of self-presentation—was part of the theory of virtue in *De Officiis*. Schofield argues that Cicero's concept was rooted in Panaetius' theory of the *prepon*. *Decorum* was the ability to behave appropriately for the context and circumstances. It makes sense that, in the 50s, we would see Cicero approving in practice that which he later took care to praise in his theoretical representation of social ideals. Indeed, I propose that we can read his idealizing portrait of social duties as the product of a string of such observations.

215 *Ad Quintum* 21 (III.1): "I am alight with affection" (*amore sum incensus*)—although we should always recall with these letters that Cicero may also have hoped Quintus would show these lines to Caesar, or at least quote them. Artificiality and sincerity can be hard to distinguish here, and there may not have been a distinct line for Cicero himself. Shackleton Bailey comments that Cicero was suggesting that a compound of feeling and self-interest would maintain his loyalty to the bond with Caesar.

We see a comparable struggle in Cicero's relationships with each of the three dynasts—the need to frame them as (at least mostly) acceptable and even laudable in familiar terms. Cicero's choice to cling to Caesar's distinguished masculine virtue as a reason for affection and connection indicates the importance of this behavioral paradigm in the late Republican aristocratic community's social framework. *Virtus* could act as an idiom of recognition, facilitating the mutual respect that served as the substrate of consensus formation and collaboration. Indeed, we should note that Caesar also seems to have retained a keen awareness of *virtus* as a model both for himself and for others (as exemplified, for instance, by his construction of barbarian enemies in his *Bellum Civile).*[216] In this regard, Caesar also engaged with the landscape of social power in the recognizable terms. Such close engagement with the aristocratic community's moral vernacular likely helped make his extraordinary behavior legible and, as a consequence, less grating.

I have proposed that influence within the aristocratic community depended, to a large extent, on mutual respect and recognition. As a consequence, such an acknowledgement of virtue by other esteemed actors can be viewed as a component of the practical mechanism of what it meant to have *auctoritas*—what Wilfred Nippel has described as a socially determined capacity, not capable of being demanded or enforced, to produce allegiance among fellow citizens.[217] In other words, Cicero had the power to offer deposits of ethical capital that could swell Caesar's account. If, as I suggest, the accumulation of ethical capital was one of the essential goals of this system of power, Cicero was well placed to use his ability to grant or withhold such moral currency to steer his powerful friend's conduct. On the one hand, using ethical rewards or penalties, Cicero could tap into the resonance of virtue-labeling as a subtle goad to guide the magnate's behavior. On the other, he could use his portrayal of Caesar's ethical quality to justify the *amicitia* project, both to himself and to an audience of understandably skeptical interlocutors, many of whom, as we should note, were wrestling with the same uncomfortable calculus.

In addition to ethical agreement, as we have seen, a *consensio studiorum* was vital to the model of ideal *amicitia* that was simultaneously followed and constructed by Cicero and his fellow aristocrats. This kind of communion was readily available with Caesar, since, as Cicero and Quintus both recognized, all three shared a passion for literature and literary production in multiple genres.[218]

---

216 See Giovane Cella, "Os Gauleses de César: a Etnografia e a *Virtus* no *Bello Gallico*," *Mare Nostrum* 6 (2015): 21-35, which shows how Caesar used ethnography to evoke images of enemies as valorous as Romans, who could nonetheless be conquered by Caesar's even greater *virtus*. That is to say Caesar's enemies matched the "manliness" of the Romans, so by implication, Caesar's *virtus* exceeded that of even this extraordinary group.

217 Wilfred Nippel, "The Roman Notion of *Auctoritas*," in Pasquale Pasquino and Pamela Harris (eds.) *The Concept of Authority: A Multidisciplinary Approach: from Epistemology to the Social Sciences* (Roma: Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, 2007), 9-30; Barbara Levick, *Augustus: Image and Substance* (Harlow/London/New York: Longman, 2010), 68-74 usefully points to the flexible boundaries between *auctoritas* and *potentia*, both under the Republic and during the Augustan transformation. Informal *auctoritas* underwrote formal *potestas* to a large extent: it is impossible to untangle these two strands of influence entirely under either regime. *Auctoritas* was of course often expressed in the interaction between aristocrats and non-elites, and perhaps more overtly than it was in interactions among aristocrats—this was seen with special clarity, for instance, in *contiones*—see Francisco Pina Polo, "Public Speaking in Rome: A Question of *Auctoritas*," in Michael Peachin (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 286-303 who discusses the *contio* as a site for the expression of aristocratic *auctoritas*—a highly uneven venue, and by no means a space for deliberative interaction.

218 Scholarship on Caesar's activity as a literary stylist has been undergoing something of a renaissance in recent years. While until the past two decades, scholars mostly mined Caesar's texts for military and political details, now, many have started to (re)discover Caesar the author—as a consummate literary stylist, orator, and scholar. Kathryn Welch, Anton Powell, *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London: Duckworth, 1998) was one of the progenitors of this new trend; also, among others: William Batstone and Cynthia Damon, *Caesar's Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Andrew Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006); and Luca Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's* Bellum Civile*: Literature, Ideology, and Community* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Luca Grillo, Christopher Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) provides a useful summary of the state of the field on Caesar's various activities as a littérateur. Recently, Dan-El Padilla Peralta, "Ecology, Epistemology, and Divination in Cicero De Divinatione 1.90–94," *Arethusa* 51 (2018): 237-267 has noted the influence of Caesar's ideas in Cicero's writings, specifically the

With Quintus again as the first mover, the brothers began a campaign to use texts to cement bonds with the dynast.[219] During his service in Caesar's army, Quintus worked on his own Greek-style tragedies, and he dragooned his elder brother into collaborating on poems glorifying the *imperator*'s adventures in Britain.[220] Cicero also sent Caesar verses he wrote alone. Although he complained that the hours he spent laboring over poems encroached on other activities, Cicero clearly became deeply invested in Caesar's responses, bemoaning Quintus' reticence and pestering him for an honest account of his commander's reactions (*heus tu! celari videor a te. quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar?*).[221] It appears that Cicero cared about Caesar's reactions and that he respected the dynast as a literary aficionado, not merely as a warrior and power broker.[222]

It may have been the Cicero brothers who initiated the exchange, but Caesar proved equally eager as a participant, both as a critic and as an author. As Suetonius famously reported, the Gallic commander penned one of his own textual contributions on the Alpine slopes during the return trip to his army from assizes in Gallia Citerior (*in transitu Alpium, cum ex citeriore Gallia conventibus peractis ad exercitum rediret*)—a treatise on pure Latinity titled *De Analogia*.[223] He dedicated its two books to Cicero.[224] Cicero seems to have appreciated the offering. When he composed his *Brutus* in 46, he used his Atticus character to shower praise on the meticulous method of Caesar's work (here I read *accuratissime* as a reference to painstaking effort rather than "accuracy" as such), even as he worked to parry some of its key arguments.[225] Cicero and Caesar may have held conflicting views regarding the

---

pervasive role of Caesar's ideas in Cicero's *De Divinatione* and the conceptions they shared regarding connections between geopolitics and religious expertise.

219 Peter Kruschwitz, "Gallic war songs (II): Marcus Cicero, Quintus Cicero, and Caesar's Invasion of Britain," *Philologus*, 158 (2014): 275-305 analyzes Quintus' initiation and Cicero's response, noting (283) that Quintus played a major role in persuading Cicero to embark on a renewed attempt to align himself with Caesar around that time, and Kruschwitz make the more particular argument that "Quintus Cicero was the driving force behind the idea to versify Caesar's deeds in the British expedition of 54." That is to say, in this instance, Quintus was the motive force, with his brother the follower.

220 *Ad Quintum* 20 (II.16) refers to the plays subtly. Kruschwitz, "Gallic war songs (II): Marcus Cicero, Quintus Cicero, and Caesar's invasion of Britain," argues that Quintus composed *fabula praetexta* and Cicero turned them into an epic.

221 *Ad Quintum* 20 (II.16): "see here, you! I see I am being kept in the dark by you. How, my brother, does Caesar [react] about my [or possibly actually 'our'] verses?" (*heus tu! celari videor a te. quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar?*). Shackleton Bailey has these verses as the *De Temporibus Suis*; see also, Stephen Harrison, "Cicero's *De Temporibus Suis*: The Evidence Reconsidered," *Hermes* 118 (1990): 455-463 and Katharina Volk, "The Genre of Cicero's *De Consulatu Suo*, *J. E. G. Zetzel anno Sexagesimo Quinto Completo*," 93-112 (especially 94).

222 Kurt Raaflaub, "Caesar, Literature, and Politics at the End of the Republic," in Grillo, Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, 13-28: positions Caesar's textual production within the late Republican literary and political context. To some extent, Caesar was a product of his times, but he was also an extraordinary innovator in various genres—a literary partner whom Cicero could deem worthy of attention and respect.

223 Suetonius, *Julius* Caesar 56: "[Caesar composed the text] during his crossing over the Alps, when he was returning to his army from Hither Gaul after holding assizes" (*in transitu Alpium, cum ex citeriore Gallia conventibus peractis ad exercitum rediret*). Alessandro Garcea, *Caesar's* De Analogia: *Edition, Translation, and Commentary* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis to date of the textual strategies and purposes of the work. Giuseppe Pezzini, "Caesar and the Debate about the Latin Language," in Grillo, Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, 173-192 for analysis of the fragments of the *De Analogia*; the grammatical debate between analogists and anomalists to which it contributed (in the context of efforts at linguistic standardization in the late Republic), and discussion of the treatise as one episode in an ongoing debate between Caesar and Cicero about the nature of *elegantia*; on the argument of the text, see also Alessandro Garcea, "La Politica Linguistica di Cesare: Origine e Funzione del *De Analogia*," in Edoardo Bona, Michele Curnis (eds.), *Linguaggi del Potere, Poteri del Linguaggio = Langages du Pouvoir, Pouvoirs du Langage* (Alessandria: Ed. dell'Orso, 2010), 289-298. On the nature of the stylistic debate, see Andreas Willi, "Campaigning for *Utilitas*: Style, Grammar and Philosophy in C. Iulius Caesar," in Eleanor Dickey, Anna Chahoud (eds.), *Colloquial and Literary Latin* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 229-242.

224 In line with a recent trend in scholarship on the text, Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*, 240-241 detects a qualified or even barbed tenor to the dedication (all part of what I suggest can be read as an intellectual culture, which was agonistic, but that often remained largely good-natured).

225 *Brutus* 253 (LXXII): "while occupied with the most important affairs he wrote to you with exceptional meticulousness about the method of speaking Latin" (*in maximis occupationibus ad te…de ratione Latine loquendi accuratissime scripsit*). Note the personal nature of the practice of dedication, described by the speaker (Atticus) as direct address. This suggests a permeable boundary between a treatise like *De Analogia* and some of Cicero's longer letters—a spectrum between "private" and "public" literary production in line with the blurry distinctions between private and public in non-literary matters in Roman aristocratic society.

scholarly issues at hand. Instead of detracting from their affection, however, their engagement with the controversy appears to have added warmth to their bond.

Our examination of this literary triangle calls attention to an important truth about the aristocratic community's system of power: the different spheres of interaction in the relationships between its members were inextricably intertwined. "Political," "personal," and "literary" concerns were not separate, or perhaps even separable. Even as Cicero, Quintus, and Caesar navigated complex power dynamics—negotiating personal connections between themselves and their associates, for instance, and articulating responses to the events of *res publica*—we see these three high-level statesmen pouring exquisite effort into literary creation and criticism. In fact, it often almost seems that they cared as much about each other's literary opinions as they did about more explicit power moves. At the very least, I suggest that there was no partition between the aristocratic community's character as a hegemonic network and its identity as an association of intellectuals and littérateurs.[226] No hard line divided "literary" from "political" rewards.

By 50, as the civil war loomed, Cicero and Caesar had developed a multifaceted and well-articulated bond. Cicero placed a premium on *amicitia* and the fidelity that it entailed. Thus, when circumstances forced the aristocratic community to divide into opposing camps, he found the obligations of their friendship difficult to shrug off. The Cicero brothers had embarked on this "*amicitia* project" before fissures appeared between Pompey and Caesar. The two dynasts had been closely aligned at the time, so there had been little to warn that strong, loyal relationships with both might be contraindicated. At that time, we should recall, the dynasts' personal networks were still linked. They were united both by the social bond instituted by the marriage between Pompey and Julia—a common commitment to accumulate and store capital stocks between their families and to pass them on to heirs—and also by common interests and objectives. Thus, Cicero allowed himself to invest in a friendship that he plainly viewed as binding. To Cicero, this represented a kind of "contract" according to the informal rules of the system he was defending, even though he recognized that Caesar now threatened to transmute the institutional parameters of the system that created the bond.

We should emphasize that Caesar himself did not make light of the obligations of friendship. Like both Cicero brothers, he also seems to have sincerely valued aristocratic *amicitia*. Even after he had won dictatorial power, for instance, as Cicero noted in a letter to his friend T. Ampius Balbus in 46, Caesar gave preference to men he perceived to be acting from motives of friendship and obligation over those he believed were spurred by self-interest (*valent tamen apud Caesarem non tam ambitiosae rogationes quam necessariae*).[227] The transformation that Caesar instituted was not an overthrow of an *amicitia*-based social paradigm—a system built on a framework of affection and *fides*. He participated in that component of aristocratic power as wholeheartedly as anyone else. But even as nominally he retained the skeleton of the system's social institutions, he transformed the essence of how they worked. Caesar unseated the network from its hegemonic position, subordinating its capacity to decide to his will. Moreover, he undermined the paradigm in which the whole aristocratic

---

[226] Sarah Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text* and Brian Krostenko, *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010) both offer portraits of this political-literary community in action, highlighting the fluidity and interpenetration between "private" and "public," as well as "political" and "artistic," in the textual activities of its members. In previous scholarship, Stroup notes (3-4) there has been a tendency (with a few exceptions) to separate the "Intellectual World" of the late Republic even from its "Poetic World," let alone from its socio-politics. An awareness of the interpenetration of spheres is essential to my understanding of the aristocratic community's dynamics. "Political culture" and "literary culture" were so tightly intertwined that they can be nearly impossible to tease apart.

[227] *Ad Familiares* 226 (VI.12): "self-interested requests carry not nearly as much weight with Caesar as those based on obligation to intimates" (*valent tamen apud Caesarem non tam ambitiosae rogationes quam necessariae*). Shackleton Bailey glosses *ambitiosae* as "self-interested." The addressee Ampius Balbus had joined the Pompeian camp during the civil war, and thus, we can take these words that reflect well on Caesar as more than merely an attempt to flatter.

community could rule as a community, with a group of peer *amici* among the *principes* acing as its central circle (we must recall that the guiding role that *consulares* played was always limited and focused on *res publica*). That is, while Caesar demonstrated intimacy in *amicitia*, he rejected true parity, with his friends or with any other actor in the system. By the time of his dictatorship at least, it was clear that no man could hope to perform a full "impersonation act" as Caesar's *alter ego*.[228]

The extraordinary duration of Caesar's Gallic campaign created an exceptional arrangement in the aristocratic community in the mid-50s.[229] To a degree that was perhaps unprecedented, Caesar was able to turn his military camp into a durable extension of the aristocratic community.[230] As many aristocrats flocked to Gaul—as younger social climbers such as Trebatius sought to jump-start illustrious careers, and mid-career statesmen such as Quintus looked to solidify already established credentials—the camp became a space for far more than mundane military activity. It became an arena for personal exchange and network building, and even for the kind of intellectual exertion usually associated with periods of *otium*. The business of the camp came to express much of the variety of the daily activity of the ruling elite, with space for high culture and urbane *amicitia* to flourish alongside the discipline and drill of the camp.

The high-ranking denizens of Caesar's camp maintained intimate links to their networks back in the capital. But at the same time, the camp developed its own power arrangement at a remove from the urban center. While commanders had always exercised an elevated form of control within their *provinciae*, the exceptional length of Caesar's campaign gave him an extraordinary opportunity to preside over a more established hierarchical "culture," removed from the leveling competitive institutions in Rome.[231] Caesar's role as *imperator* developed an extraordinary sense of permanence, as he presided over what we might view as a sort of "second city" under his command.

Cicero was connected to this Gallic community by various threads, linked to Caesar's domain by his bond with Quintus, by his ongoing relationship with his protégé Trebatius, by his *amicitia* with Caesar's intimate equestrian friend Balbus, and, not least, by his own friendship with Caesar. Because Cicero remained outside the society of the camp, he was able to treat his connection with Caesar as something like his other equal reciprocal bonds with fellow *consulares*; or at least he could preserve the fiction of parity in the rhetoric of their exchange. "Peer" connections with men back in the capital still made sense for Caesar at this stage. After all, he needed "second selves" to

---

228 If we take Lucan at his word, however, Caesar's insistence on his nonpareil status only developed over time, and it may not have been fully formed even when the war broke out. At that juncture, Lucan claimed, it was only Pompey who was unwilling to tolerate a true peer, while Caesar merely rejected the idea that any man could stand above him—Lucan, *Pharsalia* I.125-126: "at that time, Caesar could tolerate no superior, but Pompey could bear no equal" (*nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem/Pompeiusve parem*).

229 The Gallic campaigns were an exceptional opportunity for a variety of reasons, and they served Caesar's position in many ways. For instance, he could use the military victories to enhance his reputation, employing textual production to keep his glorious efforts fresh in the minds of readers back in the capital—see, Christopher Krebs, "More Than Words: The *Commentarii* in their Propagandistic Context," in Grillo, Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, 29-42 shows how Caesar communicated with Rome, delivering carefully crafted messages that effectively enhanced his position. For the chronology of the campaigns: Kurt Raaflaub and John Ramsey, "Reconstructing the Chronology of Caesar's Gallic Wars," *Histos* 11 (2017), 1-74 provides the most detailed account; Gelzer, *Caesar: der Politiker und Staatsmann*, ch. 4 remains invaluable as a narrative of the events of the campaign years.

230 The argument that follows takes inspiration from the case made in Michael Crawford, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," in Luuk de Ligt, Simon Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 631-643, which focuses on the development of alternative demographic centers as a result of the extended military adventures of Sertorius in Spain in the 70s, Pompey in the east in the 60s, and Caesar in Gaul in the 50s. Crawford makes the important suggestion that these new demographic and social arrangements weakened the power of the Roman urban center, facilitating the rise of dynasts with the capacity to act as agents of the fall of the Republican system.

231 For the nature of command, see Fred Drogula, *Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), focusing specifically in ch. 6 on the changes in the late Republic; Vervaet, *The High Command in the Roman Republic:* Summum Imperium Auspiciumque *from 509 to 19 BCE* is more concerned with the formal aspects of the authority vested in the commander, with analysis of the progressive monopolization of the high command by dynasts during the first century BCE.

represent his interests back in the city—an environment where he did not yet enjoy unique preeminence. By contrast, parity would not have harmonized well with the inegalitarian structure he was cultivating at a remove from the capital. Within Caesar's own domain, the *imperator* could ill afford to share *amicitia* on equal terms with anyone.[232]

Because of his separation, Cicero may have been able to retain an egalitarian pose. But at the same time, we should take note that he was not only witnessing the emergence of this new kind of network in the camp. He also participated in the creation of an arrangement that foreshadowed the construct Caesar would impose in the 40s over aristocratic society back in the Rome. To some degree, Cicero should be viewed as complicit in nourishing the growth of a power arrangement characterized by steeper and more rigid hierarchies than the "Republican" system he cherished. He contributed by sending his own subordinate connections to the camp and encouraging them to look to Caesar as the ultimate source of favors. Perhaps even more insidiously, by labeling Caesar his *amicus*, Cicero embossed Caesar's behavior with his seal of approval. After all, according to the model that Cicero put forward in his *De Amicitia*, ideal *amicitia* implied that friends shared a *consensio* in their pursuits, interests, and opinions (*voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*) and that they were linked in both public and private affairs (*coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata*).[233] As a consequence of Cicero's own reasoning, he not only approved, but was even party to, his friend's actions, as Caesar set up a more hierarchical model in Gaul and raised himself to extraordinary heights within this system.

One of the reasons Caesar was so successful at lifting himself above the aristocratic hegemonic community was that he built his network of connections based on recognizable principles of *amicitia*. At the same time, however, he sapped these friendships of true egalitarianism and collegiality. I have argued here that, with Cicero's only partially witting help, Caesar had already brought a substantial subset of the aristocratic community into his orbit before the civil war broke out.[234] Cicero assisted this process by recommending his own connections, and as much as he was only half-aware of the implications of his choices, he blessed the project by engaging in elite *amicitia* with its progenitor. Using the idiom of the system that was being undermined, and if only by implication, Cicero endorsed as an expression of his values an arrangement that challenged the traditional social system. Caesar's victory in the civil war allowed him to import the system he had constructed in the camp into the city. Under his dominion, elite networks remained as active as ever. But beginning with his subordinates in his Gallic army, he had normalized the idea that it was no longer the responsibility or the prerogative of the aristocratic community to exercise hegemony as a collective.

Crassus

The "*amicitia* project" that Cicero and Crassus undertook in the mid-50s was clearly the product of practical calculations, and the effort was undertaken with some reluctance on both sides.[235] Cassius Dio tells us that Crassus (like Caesar) only started to show favor to Cicero when it

---

232 Perhaps such a challenge would have emerged if Cicero had ended up going on campaign with Pompey as his legate in 55, although their pre-existing *amicitia* dynamic may have eased the friction.

233 As in *De Amicitia* IV (15), where Cicero argued that ideal *amici* should be "joined in public and private affairs" (*coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata*). Moreover, this union should not be confined to mundane practical matters. Like Scipio and Laelius, *amici* should share "that in which all the power of friendship resides, complete agreement in purposes, interests, and opinions" (*id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio*).

234 Hinnerk Bruhns, *Caesar und die Römische Oberschicht in den Jahren 49-44 v. Chr.: Unters. zur Herrschaftsetablierung im Bürgerkrieg* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978) provides a comprehensive account of the nature and extent of Caesar's support before, during, and after the war.

235 Their joint responsibility for Caelius Rufus' *tirocinium fori* in the 60s provides one suggestion that they had collaborated during the previous decade at least in some limited contexts—for which see *Pro Caelio* IV.9. I discuss Cicero's relationship with Caelius in detail in Chapter 3, in the context of my discussion of the institutional nature of asymmetric *amicitia*.

became clear that his return from exile would be successful.[236] After Cicero's return in 57, he and Crassus had managed to cultivate a friendship of sorts—mutual *gratia* based on the exchange of favors—even though, as Cicero reported to Lentulus in the by now familiar *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) from 54, Cicero only accomplished even such operational intimacy by a deliberate act of amnesia (*voluntaria quadam oblivione*).[237] He had to suppress memories of what he described to Lentulus as grave injuries (*gravissimas iniurias*). In 56, Cicero and Crassus retained their comity at least long enough to collaborate in the defense of their mutual protégé Caelius Rufus. But in 55, when Crassus not only opposed Cicero's attack on Gabinius in the Senate regarding the restoration of Ptolemy XII but also demeaned Cicero as an "exile" (φυγάς), Cicero's anger flared again. Only when Pompey pressed Cicero, and Caesar added a strongly worded letter, did Cicero relent and make peace.[238]

Both Cicero and Crassus were central players, with social networks snaking throughout the community. Since they had no overriding reason for enmity, it made sense for them to cultivate ties. Even so, they had trouble maintaining their affection, and the relationship was plagued by recurrent conflict and offense. Nevertheless, especially once Cicero chose to reinvest in the friendship in 54 after some mid-decade friction, we can see him working to construct as substantial a bond of *amicitia* as he could with the third member of the dynastic coalition. To accomplish this purpose, Cicero grounded the friendship in shared interests and the reciprocal exchange of services, and he articulated their connection in terms of the *alter ego* dynamic.

Our examination of the Cicero-Crassus bond of the mid-50s brings out another essential point about the social institution of high-level "peer" friendship. Participants in the delicate rhetorical dance did not necessarily have to believe in the affective sincerity of their partners to cultivate them as social power resources. Indeed, even to use them as "second selves" to replicate their presence, aristocrats merely needed to be able to trust that their *amici* would follow the guidelines laid down by the social institution. This was an institution grounded in affection, but to some degree, the institution could at times still function when underlying feelings were absent. Feigning could only go so far, however. It could never create the same levels of trust that underpinned even more effective *amicitia* bonds that were rooted in the emotion that rhetoric strove to replicate. Moreover, this simulation was only granted its efficacy because it mimicked something that was both so useful and so potent.

As has by now become clear, links between men of such prominence were hardly private affairs. Their social implications extended well beyond the dyad. As I discussed in the previous chapter, members of the protagonists' *familiae* and associated subordinate sub-elites all had a personal interest in these relationships. But the Cicero-Crassus bond gives us a glimpse of how much other aristocratic actors were also invested in the outcomes. We have seen that Pompey and Caesar labored to facilitate the success of the friendship between Cicero and Crassus, pushing the two men to maintain comity. But in this instance, there were also those in the aristocratic community who worked for the opposite outcome. Apparently there were those who were reluctant to see this bond persist, unhappy, as we can imagine, with its attendant ramifications for the community's social map.

---

[236] Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 39.10.1: "generally he [and Caesar] hated him" (ἄλλως…ἤχθοντο).

[237] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "there was great friendliness between me and that man [Crassus], since I had wiped away all the grave injuries he did me by a kind of voluntary oblivion for the sake of common concord" (*cum mihi cum illo magna iam gratia esset, quod eius omnis gravissimas iniurias communis concordiae causa voluntaria quadam oblivione cont<ri>eram*). There was an interesting dynamic at work here, since even to write about the "suppressed" memories is to keep them alive. Cicero was subtly underlining his own magnanimity with this rhetorical ploy.

[238] Gabinius had restored Ptolemy XII to the throne, and Cicero attacked his action. The dynasts came to Gabinius' defense, which Cicero says he could easily have stomached if Crassus had not added insult to injury—Cassius Dio 39.60.1 tells us that Crassus insulted him an "exile" (φυγάς); with additional discussion throughout *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9).

As Cicero wrote to Lentulus in 54, he had heard from his connections that certain men who had a stake in the power arrangement had been rejoicing that Cicero would be estranged not only from Crassus himself but also from the dynast's whole network (*gaudere se dicebant mihi et illum inimicum et eos qui in eadem causa essent numquam amicos futuros*) (Cicero was vague about which people precisely he was referring to—his tactful periphrasis in this particular letter makes particular sense, since *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) is a well-known example of the kind of letter designed with dissemination in mind. Cicero might have felt comfortable naming names to Lentulus in a more "private" context, but ironically, this kind of "personal" letter required heightened discretion).[239] Although we should not conceive of the webs of relationships between higher- and lower-level aristocrats as static patronage networks, nevertheless, we might say that each of the more influential members of the elite had his own "gravitational field" in the community's social system. The higher-level members of the community each presided over a dynamic cluster of more junior actors, and each was implicated in relations both of friendship and of enmity with an extensive collection of coevals. A new association between high-level statesmen such as Cicero and Crassus would have had far reaching ripple effects, and we can easily imagine why other aristocrats might feel reluctant to countenance such a potentially radical source of realignment.

It is important to note that even in the mid-50s, Cicero, and not merely Crassus, was viewed as a core player.[240] The concern by a range of external actors with this relationship underlines the ongoing importance of the various *principes* and their associated subgroups even under the "first triumvirate." While the three dynasts were undeniably the most influential protagonists, other individuals and groupings also still mattered. Moreover, even up to the end of the decade, there were other interests—in this instance the men working against the bond—which were still capable of affecting outcomes and, in fact, of creating results directly at odds with the wishes of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus.[241] However much the familiar framework was starting to warp, the system of rule by an interlocking community of subgroups was far from gone.[242]

When Cicero and Crassus reconciled, they made a grand performance of their reunion. Cicero reported to Lentulus that Crassus dined at his house (*cenavit apud <me>*) to publicize the new

---

[239] *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "they were saying that it made them rejoice that he would be my enemy himself and that those who were in his clique would never be my friends in future" (*gaudere se dicebant mihi et illum inimicum et eos qui in eadem causa essent numquam amicos futuros*). I discuss the issue of epistolary dissemination at length in the Introduction. *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9) is often cited as a prime example of a personal letter crafted with dissemination as the intention.

[240] Of course, our Ciceronian lens on the period inflates the sense of his importance to a degree, but his consular role granted him a prominent voice in the Senate and his services as an advocate were in regular demand (e.g. *Pro Plancio*, *Pro Rabirio Postumo*, and *Pro Scauro* from 54 alone, and notably *De Provinciis Consularibus* pronounced to the Senate in 56). If nothing else, Cicero's well-known competence in the judicial sphere would have granted him a level of influence, since the courts were among the most important spaces for negotiating competition between aristocratic subgroups. Moreover, the eagerness with which we have just seen that Caesar leapt into their friendship mid-decade (and how readily Caesar embraced Quintus and Trebatius) reinforces the idea that the dynasts perceived Cicero as a useful contact.

[241] For instance, Cato and the "traditionalists" organized to oppose the dynasts throughout the decade. The influence of such elements remained significant, if perhaps insufficient to outweigh the dynasts. See Plutarch, *Cato the Younger* for some of the most extensive discussion of the actions of these still-powerful elements; Henriette Van Der Blom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 204-247 provides an excellent discussion of Cato's power during this period from the perspective of his oratory—projection of a distinctive self image helped underpin his influence. She notes (204-205) that Cato's idiosyncratic character was no mere construct of Plutarch's. Cato did much to perpetuate this image, seeking to bolster his social power. As I discussed above regarding Caesar, such image projection could play an indispensible role in the creation of personal power. This was as true for the "traditionalists" as it was for the dynasts (and of course for Cicero, as well).

[242] From a certain angle, it would never disappear, even under Augustus and his successors. As Syme would have it, for instance, the "revolution" was not, in fact, the replacement of a Republic by a monarchy, but rather a radical transformation in the composition of these "interlocking subgroups." A traditional, city-of-Rome-based elite gave ground to a new, Italy-wide upper stratum—Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939). This perspective has some merit, but I suggest that, although the interests of layered pan-Italian aristocratic constituencies may have played an important role in setting the general direction of the polity under Augustus, the "Republican" system was distinguished by the hegemonic role of a community, working as a community to guide the central decision-making process.

chapter in their friendship, and in keeping with his *fides*, Cicero immediately took up Crassus' interests and defended them publicly in a meeting of the Senate (*magna illius commendatione susceptam defendi in senatu, sicut mea fides postulabat*).[243] While both men might have benefited concretely from each other's services to some extent, for the most part, in practice they both had other *amici* capable of fulfilling most specific commissions. It was the public perception of their relationship, as well as the alignments between their associates it entailed, that really mattered, both to the two *principes* themselves and to their networks.

In a letter from the time of their reconciliation in 54, Cicero wrote to Crassus that he had been acting in a way designed to make clear not only to Crassus' household but also to the whole civic community how much he had Crassus' interests at heart (*sum enim consecutus non modo ut domus tua tota sed ut cuncta civitas me tibi amicissimum esse cognosceret*).[244] It seems clear that Cicero shaped his behavior to create as potent an impression as possible on the audience of their fellow aristocrats—an impression, moreover, which he assumed Crassus' network would already have been conveying back to the dynast (*non dubito quin ad te omnes tui scripserint*).[245] Cicero relied on his knowledge that the aristocratic network would operate by a certain set of institutional parameters, aware that the dynast's associates would naturally carry report to Crassus of his friend's behavior. This case reinforces a point that I made in the previous chapter, when we saw that Metellus Nepos' consciousness of the institutional function of aristocratic news networks allowed him to assume that report of his amicable conduct would reach Cicero.[246]

In the public performance of their friendship, it was essential that Cicero and Crassus should convey an image of consistency and wholehearted mutual support, or, at any rate, they needed to be seen, both by each other and by their fellow aristocrats, to be working to create such an impression. Cicero tried to make out that he had never lacked the will to pursue the friendship. Much as we saw in the previous chapter that he laid the blame for discord in his friendship with Appius on a band of nameless slanderers, with Crassus, Cicero blamed any discord on malicious liars—*pestes hominum* eager to undermine their bond.[247] He was following the fundamental assumption that friendship should be, or at least should be described publicly as, the natural outcome of the encounter between virtuous high-level statesmen who were pursuing aligned courses in public affairs (*is enim tu vir es et eum me esse cupio ut, quoniam in eadem rei publicae tempora incidimus, coniunctionem amicitiamque nostram utrique nostrum laudi sperem fore*).[248] He could take advantage of this vision of *amicitia* to claim that their natural concord had only been hindered by the spite of lesser men. This was a performance, we should add,

---

243 *Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9): "he dined with me" (*cenavit apud <me>*)—Shackleton Bailey comments that Cicero acted as his host at his suburban villa, which was situated on the via Appia; "that cause on behalf of his affair, as you have heard, I took up and defended in the Senate at his urgent prompting, just as my good faith demanded" (*quam ob rem eius causam, quod te scribis audisse, magna illius commendatione susceptam defendi in senatu, sicut mea fides postulabat*). Bailey suggests that *causam* may refer to Vatinius' trial, although this is not necessarily the case.

244 *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "I have successfully brought it about that not only your whole household but also the entire civic community knows that I am as much your friend as it is possible to be" (*sum enim consecutus non modo ut domus tua tota sed ut cuncta civitas me tibi amicissimum esse cognosceret*). Shackleton Bailey provides the context for this letter in his commentary: Crassus was leaving for his command in Syria; he was on outwardly good terms with Cicero, although the reconciliation brokered by Pompey earlier in the year had already been marred by a previous quarrel—Cicero's "real" sentiment, Bailey believes, remained unaltered.

245 *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "I do not doubt that all your people have written to you" (*non dubito quin ad te omnes tui scripserint*).

246 Nepos had given a speech before the Senate in which he made professions of friendship towards the absent Cicero. Before that point, their sentiment had been estranged—see *Ad Familiares* 10 (V.4).

247 *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "by Hercules, I have never lacked the will to cultivate and to honor you, but certain pestilent fellows, whom it pains me to hear praised by others, alienated you from me and sometimes changed my opinion towards you" (*neque mehercule umquam mihi tui aut colendi aut ornandi voluntas defuit. sed quaedam pestes hominum laude aliena dolentium et te non numquam a me alienarunt et me aliquando immutarunt tibi*).

248 *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "for since you are the sort of man that I also desire to be, since we have reached the same positions in public affairs, I would hope our association and friendship would redound to the credit of us both" (*is enim tu vir es et eum me esse cupio ut, quoniam in eadem rei publicae tempora incidimus, coniunctionem amicitiamque nostram utrique nostrum laudi sperem fore*).

targeted both at the "internal" audience within the friendship and at the "external" audience of the surrounding community.

Such a narrative of consistency and natural friendship was useful. The community depended on such aspirational ideals as principles to guide social interchange. But furthermore, salutary fiction was also available as a mechanism to help *amici* elide past contention when they needed to display comity in the present. In a system that relied on friendship and trust to coordinate power relations, any effective participant needed to display the virtue of consistency. Cicero was framing their relationship in terms of a model in which an underlying condition of amity existed between "good" aristocrats, with the assumption (at least rhetorically) that he and Crassus were both exemplary instances of the species. By implication, it was only possible that the connection between such men could be interrupted if distorting outside forces intervened. It is important to emphasize that the participants did not necessarily need to believe in the deep affective sincerity of their partner. For "peer" *amicitia* to have its effect, they merely needed to be able to expect that their counterparts would continue to follow the guidelines laid down by the social institution.

More than any of the other relationships we have examined, Cicero's friendship with Crassus reads as highly formalized. Cicero framed his letter of reunion, for instance, as a special kind of document, bearing the force of a covenant (*has litteras velim existimes foederis habituras esse vim, non epistulae*).[249] Cicero staked his reputation as surety, pointing out that, after articulating such a commitment, it would undermine the community's perception of his constancy if he let Crassus down (*quae a me suscepta defensio est te absente dignitatis tuae, in ea iam ego non solum amicitiae nostrae sed etiam constantiae meae causa permanebo*).[250] This was a forceful expression of assurance. But the admission of the need for such a covenant represented a tacit acknowledgement of the underlying weakness of their connection and of their history of repeated rupture. Moreover, the formalized nature of Cicero's friendship with Crassus, as well as the appeal to sureties, suggests that the bond was framed in terms of *amicitia* not so much because of the affection we perceived in Cicero's friendships with Pompey and Caesar, but more because *amicitia* was the organizing principle and the dominant discourse of cooperation in aristocratic networks of power.

Cicero and Crassus realized the utility of an alliance for mutual benefit, and *amicitia* provided the rhetorical and institutional structure for any such bond between two high-level players, however heartfelt or manufactured. But the formalized links had power for the very reason that the discourse of friendship was so dominant. Since Cicero's influence depended on the community's belief in his quality as a friend, he could not afford to be seen as someone who would break the kind of covenant he had made with Crassus. We can imagine that he expected Crassus to understand that the promise held binding force because of the consequences that would follow if it were broken.

A version of the *alter ego* dynamic also featured in this last of Cicero's friendships with the dynasts, in spite of its relative lack of affection. This is an example, as was likely often the case, where the *alter ego* framework was deployed as an institutionalized tool, with "second selfhood" shoring up an otherwise shaky connection and helping grant the bond its efficacy as a social power resource. Nonetheless, the representation on offer was strikingly comprehensive. It spanned the various "public" and "private" domains of aristocratic influence—*res publica*, the courts, and even the personal business of the network of family and dependents. At least in this respect, although with Crassus Cicero used *alter ego* terminology less explicitly than he did with either Caesar or Pompey, we

---

[249] *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "I want you to consider that this letter has the force of a contractual alliance, not just of a letter" (*has litteras velim existimes foederis habituras esse vim, non epistulae*). Schackleton Bailey clarifies that Cicero was not making a distinction between *has litteras* and *epistulae*—this was merely an attempt to vary diction.

[250] *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "I will persist in that defense of your dignity which I have taken up in your absence, not only on account of our friendship but also for the sake of my own [reputation for] constancy" (*quae a me suscepta defensio est te absente dignitatis tuae, in ea iam ego non solum amicitiae nostrae sed etiam constantiae meae causa permanebo*).

might view the Crassus case as a paradigmatic instance of functional "second selfhood," showing the integral part the *alter ego* framework played in the social institution of high-level "peer" friendship.

While their breach was only recently mended when Crassus embarked for his command in Syria in 54, Cicero still offered to stand in as the agent of Crassus interests on an ongoing basis (*perpetuam propugnationem*) throughout the command.[251] He would stand in for Crassus across a wide range of enterprises and venues, not only taking up Crassus' interests in the Senate, but also offering to advocate for Crassus and his dependents in the courts and to give advice and support to Crassus' relatives. Cicero invited Crassus to make it known to his intimates and dependents that they could call on Cicero to fill Crassus' accustomed role across a range of public and private venues, in the courts, for instance, and even in the household (*tuis praecipias ut opera, consilio, auctoritate, gratia mea sic utantur in omnibus publicis privatis, forensibus domesticis, tuis, amicorum, hospitum, clientium tuorum negotiis ut, quod eius fieri possit, praesentiae tuae desiderium meo labore minuatur*).[252] Crassus' wife and sons could lean on Cicero as a source of counsel and active support (*uxor tua, et…tui Crassi meis consiliis, monitis, studiis actionibusque nituntur*).

While Cicero was keenly aware of the dynast's exceptional influence, he still presented himself as competent to act as Crassus' double while the latter was away—not only taking Crassus' place in formal institutional venues, but also with the social circle the dynast left behind in the city. Cicero would serve as a substitute *amicus* for Crassus' *amici*, a *hospes* with his *hospites*, a *patronus* for his *clientes*, and even a *pater familias* for the members of his *domus*. Each aristocratic power player occupied a variety of roles, and at least as Cicero framed it, the dynast could rest secure in the knowledge that he was embodied by a "pseudo-Crassus" in every context that required personal presence. Indeed, Cicero could even claim that Crassus' son could look to Cicero as a beloved "second parent" (*me…sicut alterum parentem et observat et diligit*).[253] "Social" and "political" representation were inextricably woven together. In spite of the dynast's outstanding position and influence, Cicero still presented himself as competent to act as Crassus' double while the latter was away on campaign. We should emphasize this offer was not altogether vain. Both in the domestic sphere and in *res publica*, a man of Cicero's station was competent to replicate the presence even of one of the dynasts.

The *alter ego* dynamic allowed Crassus to be "present" in two contexts at once: in person as a governor and commander in the provinces and also, by simulation, in the city, and in his full socio-political capacity at that. The late Republican "political" system was made up of more than merely its formal institutional venues. *Alter ego*-based representation allowed power players to cope with complexity and distance across the range of contexts that together constituted this hegemonic framework. Furthermore, we should emphasize that even in such a confected instance, an apparent lack of "sincere" affection did not prevent the personal representation from running deep, extending even to the duties a father owed to his son.

By highlighting this capacity for equivalence, as we have seen with each of the dynasts, I propose that Cicero was seeking a safe way to contain Crassus within the traditional culture of aristocratic rule, which, while profoundly hierarchical, was also characterized by collegiality and shared authority. Even as the dynasts challenged parity, that is, Cicero reasserted that parity through

---

[251] *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "ongoing agency with regard to all such affairs as redound to your distinction" (*perpetuam propugnationem pro omnibus ornamentis tuis*).

[252] *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "Enjoin your associates that they may make use of my effort, council, authority, and personal influence in all public and private matters, in the courts and in domestic business, whether these people are your friends, your guests, or your clients, so that, as far as possible, the want created by your absence might be diminished by my labor" (*tuis praecipias ut opera, consilio, auctoritate, gratia mea sic utantur in omnibus publicis privatis, forensibus domesticis, tuis, amicorum, hospitum, clientium tuorum negotiis ut, quod eius fieri possit, praesentiae tuae desiderium meo labore minuatur*); "your wife and your Crassi [sons] rely on my counsel, warnings, devotion, and actions" (*uxor tua, et…tui Crassi meis consiliis, monitis, studiis actionibusque nituntur*).

[253] *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8): "looks to me and loves me just like a second parent" (*me…sicut alterum parentem et observat et diligit*).

the rhetoric of friendship. Cicero and, by implication, other members of the circle of *consulares*, should inhabit the top rung alongside the dynasts—all of them as *patres* of extended *familiae*, mentors, and patrons, and together as the "collective parents" of the civic community.[254] The tension remained unresolved, however, between Cicero's attempts to balance against the dynasts through alignments with other *consulares* and his efforts to draw them back into the community's institutional framework with clever rhetorical ploys drawn from the domain of peer *amicitia*. Although all three dynasts were prodding at the boundaries of this framework, they still remained intimately dependent on their friendships with their high-level "peers." The equivalence may have been fictive, but the dynasts still needed friends like Cicero to replicate their personal presence and grant social substance to their influence and authority.

Conclusion: the Function of Consular Amicitiae

To bring together some of the central threads from the two chapters of the first section, I have made the case that a network of *consulares* organized bonds between themselves and their personal organizations through the idiom and practice of idealizing *amicitia*. By creating a sense of shared identity, based on agreement in virtue and the *consensio studiorum*, as well as on the discourse and reality of affection, high-level players within the system were able to fashion resilient links. This lattice of high-level *amicitiae* served a number of essential functions in the aristocratic community's social institutional framework.

Such links made consular *amici* into important power resources for one another in a variety of ways, but particularly, because of the fundamental presupposition of parity in relationships between *principes*, they were able to replicate and extend the power of personal presence for each other through acts of "impersonation." The *consulares* were personal power resources themselves—capable of embodying their *amici* in *res publica*, in the courts, in matters of business and property, and even in the personal dynamics of the household. In addition, their friendships could also allow each man to tap into the other's network as a source of assistance and support, both for himself and for the other members of his extended network. Amicable bonds between high-level aristocrats appear to have played a key role in organizating the allocation of social and fiscal power resources throughout the community of elites and sub-elites.

Friendships between *principes* could be subjects of keen concern for many members of the community besides the protagonists in the relationships. As each consular scaled the *cursus honorum*, he would have gathered a thick web of social ties. For one, as the *Commentariolum Petitionis* testifies, the process of winning election was a profoundly social enterprise, so every man who invested in a venture into *res publica* inevitably accumulated a dense network. As a consequence of this connectedness, combined with the relative eminence of *consulares* in aristocratic hierarchies, their *amicitiae* (or conversely their antagonisms) could help to coordinate the alignments both of their peers and of their subordinates. Other community members were clearly invested in the success or failure of the bonds, and onlookers were willing to work actively for their preferred outcomes—a dynamic we witnessed in the friendship between Cicero and Appius in Chapter 1, and with Cicero and Crassus in the current chapter.

The consular *amici* made notable efforts to create awareness of their bonds. They accomplished this goal in many ways—through well-publicized mutual visitation, for instance, and by disseminating their correspondence. At times, they even celebrated their links in speeches in the Senate, as when Metellus Nepos extended an "olive branch" to Cicero by means of a curial oration,

[254] This emphasis on the aristocratic community as an interconnected family may, as I noted in the previous chapter, have been a particular preoccupation of Cicero's (perhaps prompted by his background a *novus homo* and the attendant anxieties about outsider status).

looking to commence amity, or when Pompey labeled Cicero his *alter ego* as he named his legates. Such advertisement was important on multiple levels. First, it helped each of the *amici* to benefit from an elevated reputation, both for virtue and for social influence. Reputation was the foundation of influence within this system, and it served as a reward in its own right. Advertisement of the friendships was indispensable if the *amici* wished to derive the full benefit. In addition, by broadcasting their bonds, high-level *amici* could create awareness among other members of the community of the effect of the link, not only on alignments, but also on the array of opportunities and power resources available to the members of their respective networks. The latter is a dynamic that receives extensive treatment in Chapter 4, in which I discuss the role of recommendations in the social institutional landscape.

Parity was a consistent principle in the Republican aristocratic community's idealizing discourse of *amicitia*. It helped set the terms for the exchange between *amici*, especially the *consulares* I have been discussing, since they shared formally equal status. Moreover, as I will seek to demonstrate in Chapter 3, while younger aristocrats might not yet themselves have joined the circle of *principes*, status gaps were always permeable, and friendships that began with large asymmetries could mature towards equality. Rome's "Republicanism" was built on this foundation of egalitarianism, as an aspirational ideal throughout the community and as an expression of social practice among the community's top men.

For the most part, the dynasts participated in, and even embraced, the system of "peer" *amicitiae*, which linked the men who had reached the formal summit of the *cursus honorum*. But even as they showed themselves eager to take advantage of *amici* both as power resources and as partners in cultural expression and affection, they undermined the principle of parity that was so essential to the late Republican aristocratic community's institutional mechanisms. The urgency with which Cicero and his colleagues reinvested in peer *amicitia* in the face of unwonted pressures in the 50s testifies to their awareness of the importance of the institution to the function of their system of power and to their consciousness that its essence was in mortal peril. Nonetheless, the dynasts had by no means left behind the social institution of high-level "peer" *amicitia* in the 50s. They distorted the institution even as they relied on it—a transformational arc that tracks the broader revolution in the system of power during the decade. The familiar framework remained eminently recognizable, but it began to warp.

Chapter 3: Friendship Between Generations and Rungs on the Aristocratic Ladder
A Brief Introduction to Section 2: Asymmetric *Amicitia* in the System of Power

In the previous section, we saw how carefully crafted *amicitia*—"peer" bonds between men at the formal summit of *res publica*—acted as an integral social institution in Rome's aristocratic community. It channeled the dynamics of connection between some of the most influential individuals in the system and their personal organizations, helping to organize broader associations and malleable coalitions. In this section, I turn to asymmetric relationships within the community. I will use cases from the Ciceronian corpus to show how vertical bonds could facilitate a measure of coherence within a multi-generational, pan-Italian elite, allowing it to function, in its various subgroups, as an agenda-setting ruling "class" (or, more accurately an interlocking set of networks) for the imperial Republic of the mid-first century. In spite of the inevitable constraints placed on this exploration by the limitations of the evidence, we nonetheless have the opportunity, through the Ciceronian evidence, to examine a strikingly diverse range of players in action. There is enough variation, I contend, both in the actors and in their interests, to illuminate many, although certainly not all, of the dynamics of asymmetric *amicitia* within this expansive hegemonic constituency.

In chapter that follows (Chapter 3), the first of this section, I address relationships between senior statesmen and their junior successors—future colleagues following the elder aristocrats up the ladder of public affairs. I use two of Cicero's mentorship relationships to cast light on the complex facets of intergenerational aristocratic *amicitia*, focusing on his friendships with P. Sestius and M. Caelius Rufus. While each case was unique, I also propose that they indicate a broader pattern for elite recruitment, training, and vetting and, in addition, that such bonds played a constitutive role in the social power of the community's senior figures.

Most obviously, these asymmetric friendships helped the younger statesmen advance, giving them access both to the social support and to the knowledge and experience of elder statesmen. But they also served a variety of other functions. Younger aristocrats could act as agents of their senior colleagues' interests. They could help senior statesmen translate latent *auctoritas* into practical results, through their informal assistance and personal representation, and they could grant their senior colleagues access to formal levers of power only directly accessible to magistrates in office. In addition, they could carry and disseminate news and information, allowing their collection of intimates and allies to cultivate a shared narrative of the community's public affairs and backroom dealings. Amicable connections with senior colleagues also gave junior statesmen opportunities to add their voices to the formation of consensus within the aristocratic community's fluid subgroups and, by extension, to contribute to formulating the direction of the community as a whole. Because a younger aristocrat was not limited to a single mentor, moreover, asymmetric friendships also served to link the senior players in the system to one another, since they could be drawn together by shared connection with and obligation to a junior colleague. In sum, I will argue in this chapter that asymmetric friendship ties between aristocrats of different ages and at stages of advancement were essential mechanisms for the function of this system of rule, coordinating the interests and voices of players at various rungs on the ladder of advancement within and among the aristocratic community's various shifting consortia.

With the second chapter of this section (Chapter 4), I turn to the dynamics of recommendations, both between senior statesmen and their rising successors and, more generally, among elites and sub-elites throughout the aristocratic community. The chapter is divided into two parts. I begin with a deep study of the recommendation Cicero wrote to Caesar on behalf of his young protégé Trebatius. This case was in some ways exceptional, but at the same time, I suggest that it reveals many of the essential elements of the process. In the second half of the chapter, I embark on a more general exploration of the recommendation process as it appears in the Ciceronian corpus. I use a sequence of case studies to cast light on the different aspects of a

widespread and highly institutionalized system, which I propose was integral to the function of aristocratic power and, thus, to the nature of the regime.

The letters of recommendation in Cicero's correspondence give us a glimpse of the broader aristocratic community in action—of senior senators, aspiring future statesmen, and equestrians of different stripes, all in dialogue with an affiliated body of freedmen and Greek intellectuals. This was an interlocking network with legible hierarchies, to be sure. But formal status did not map perfectly onto the quantity of informal influence, and the interests, priorities, and opinions of the lower-level members could affect both the priorities of collective action for the various subgroups and even the whole community's idiom of exchange. An examination of the recommendation process reveals many of the subtleties of these power relations. In fact, I will argue that the system of *commendatio* itself played a key role, as an institutional mechanism that helped members of this community negotiate the landscape of relationships and influence between individuals occupying a wide variety of positions and of different grades of formal status.

Across both chapters, we will see how these asymmetric bonds created space for cooperation between aristocrats, while minimizing the head-to-head competition that was likely, if not inevitable, in relationships between senior statesmen who were direct peers. I propose that, as a consequence, they helped draw together the imperial Republic's expansive elite with a lattice of active reciprocity and well-articulated goodwill—a counterpoint to a thread of competitiveness that otherwise threatened to dominate.

Friendship Between Generations and Rungs on the Aristocratic Ladder

As important as were the bonds between the society's *principes* to the function of the aristocratic community's system of power, *amicitia* links between statesmen at different stages of their careers were equally critical. The social dynamics in these friendships were certainly asymmetric to a degree. Senior aristocrats provided moral and practical advice, for instance, as well as electoral support and *patrocinium* in court, and through in-person connections and letters of recommendation, they granted the younger men access to far more extensive and highly developed networks. At the same time, however, the senior statesmen also depended on their junior colleagues for various kinds of assistance and support as the younger statesmen moved up the ranks of the *cursus honorum*. Furthermore, these friendships helped the younger men's voices enter the conversation about the policy positions and priorities of the aristocratic community, and they allowed even these early-career statesmen to play a role in delineating the landscape of social power.

It is essential to emphasize that the participants in these relationships did not presume that the asymmetry would remain forever. In fact, I propose that they expected gaps in status and influence to diminish and even disappear, since one of the basic principles of the institutional structure of the system was the permeable nature of even its highest echelons. Asymmetric bonds between aristocrats of different ages and levels of seniority facilitated the flexibility of the hierarchies within the aristocratic community—a mutability which we can view as one of the essential characteristics of "rule by community."

Because of the short terms of most offices, it was frequently younger men who had direct access to the official levers of power as magistrates. As a result, *principes* often had to rely on their personal relationships with men who currently occupied civic and military postings when they wanted to transform *auctoritas* into results that required official institutional action. It is important to recall that the formal powers that *consulares* could command personally were limited. While they could seek the censorship, hold pro-magistracies, exercise priestly authority, or appear as advocates in court, they lacked the ability to carry out essential acts in the arena of *res publica* unassisted.

Without a "proxy," they could not call *contiones* or Senate meetings, for instance, or even propose legislation.[255]

If younger statesmen succeeded, they developed priorities of their own as the years passed, concerning *res publica*, alignments within social networks, and their own financial transactions, as well as with the affairs and dealings of their associates. These concerns would usually complement their senior friends' personal agendas, although we will see that on occasion they might clash. Moreover, the junior partners accumulated their own networks and reputations—personal stocks, that is, of social, ethical, and symbolic capital. As these rising aristocrats matured, their asymmetric friendships could evolve towards peer *amicitia*, especially if they proved effective in formal electoral contests, in back-room dealing, or even as intellectuals or financial operators. Over time, as mentees grew into potent allies on more equal footing, there was a chance that their relationships with elders might even begin to approximate the friendships between *principes* that we examined in the dissertation's first section.

Cicero engaged in substantial bonds of *amicitia* with a variety of young statesmen, and some of these relationships had the chance to develop across an extended span of years. In this chapter, I focus on Cicero's well-attested and highly developed friendships with the rising statesmen P. Sestius and M. Caelius Rufus—two case studies that reveal both the complexity and the importance of the amicable links between distinguished elders and members of the rising generation. While in a literal sense Cicero was the senior partner in both cases, the initial levels of asymmetry varied between the two, and in both instances, the disparity shifted over time.

Cicero's asymmetric *amicitiae* are better recorded than those of his aristocratic peers, so his are the only friendships of this kind that can be studied in any detail. But he was not alone in cultivating such links.[256] As a result, I suggest that we can use these examinations to illuminate more than merely the details of Cicero's personal history. While every individual relationship is idiosyncratic to a degree, I suggest that these asymmetric bonds can also be seen as expressions of a broader category. Cicero cultivated a wide range of such connections as his career progressed, and we can point, among a wide range of examples, to his bonds with younger aristocrats such as Curio, Brutus, Cassius, Lentulus the younger, P. Crassus, and T. Nero. A close examination of the Sestius and Caelius friendships will cast light on the function of elite networks across strata and offer insight about how higher- and lower-level aristocrats expressed power in practice.

Sestius

The friendship between Cicero and Sestius spanned at least two decades (c. 63-43). As the years passed, and as Sestius climbed the *cursus*, their bond evolved from steep asymmetry towards affectionate parity, until, by the last decade of Cicero's life, Sestius had joined Cicero's circle of core intimates. While Sestius was making his name in the sphere of *res publica* in the years after Cicero's consulship, the two friends traded aid. Through a sequence of crises, each offered whatever services his current geography, formal position, and status permitted. This asymmetric friendship allowed the senior and the junior member each to extend his capacity for influence by expanding his social presence and by multiplying his access to various institutional mechanisms.

---

[255] Even the dynasts needed to wrangle junior magistrates to pass legislative acts in the 50s. During the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 55, for instance, they still depended on the tribune Trebonius to put forward the bill that would grant them their five-year commands—Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294. Furthermore, *Ad Atticum* 126 (VII.3) shows how they struggled to get all ten tribunes to agree to Caesar's extended Gallic command.

[256] As we will see below, for instance, Caelius Rufus would also cultivate an analogous mentorship bond with Crassus, although it is not recorded in detail. In Chapter 2 and especially in Chapter 4, moreover, I discuss how Trebatius also built a friendship of this kind with Caesar. Any extrapolation must remain speculative to a degree, but the *tirocinium fori* and the *tiroconium militiae* were well established in aristocratic society. Cicero's experience can cast light on the lived experience of mentorship bonds, although we should take care not to over interpret every detail as indicative of a broader truth.

Sestius was born to a lesser senatorial family, with a father who had only made it as far as the plebeian tribunate before retiring from public life.[257] Nevertheless, while the family only commanded modest stocks of symbolic capital, their substantial business interests and their strategic marriage choices helped give Sestius a strong foundation for his foray into public life. His trajectory recalls the extent to which circumstances besides ostentatious success in public affairs—here financial status and inter-family relations—could guide outcomes in *res publica* for members of a family organization.[258] The collection of financial and social capital could make up for relative symbolic poverty in setting the terms for Sestius' engagement with the landscape of power. A term as military tribune in the early 60s gave the young man his first taste of elective office, and his time in one of the consular legions would have offered him a chance to start building connections with some of the higher-level aristocrats who served as his superior officers, as well as with his own coevals.[259] We should note that, while the context of military service created opportunities for affiliation and collaboration, it was intimately caught up with the pervasive competitiveness of aristocratic culture. This dichotomy was pervasive across a system of power that was, at the same time, both highly agonistic and entirely dependent on collaboration for its successful function.

Although Cicero was not himself involved in this early military chapter of Sestius' career, in the context of our discussion of asymmetric friendship, it is worth pausing to consider how military service provided an essential venue for intergenerational exchange. First of all, provincial commands were essential spaces for networking.[260] But in addition, they helped facilitate the intergenerational transfer of knowledge. Commanders could take junior officers under their wing in order to convey military knowledge and expertise. This can be seen as part of what we might describe as an ethic of "collective parenting," by which the community's established members bequeathed stocks of knowledge to their chosen successors in the next generation. The aristocratic community stored and transmitted knowledge of military strategy, logistics, and command between its generations. This capacity for martial leadership was part of the knowledge capital held as a possession both by individual families and by the aristocratic community as a collectivity.[261] In addition, at least in theory, commanders might have a chance to model *virtus*—the "manliness" proper especially to a soldier—to their junior officers, providing an *exemplum* of how to behave as one of the society's "best people."[262] The transfer of such "ethical knowledge" was necessary to the inheritance of

---

[257] Lawrence Richardson, "*Sestius Noster*," in Norma Goldman (ed.), *New Light from Anient Cosa* (Bern; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001), 49-55 provides a dedicated biographical study of Sestius' life and his role in the power struggles of the period.

[258] Robert Kaster, *Cicero: Speech on Behalf of Publius Sestius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14-16 for Sestius' early life: "The family's wealth would have assisted the younger Sestius not only when he began his public career but also, earlier, in attracting marriages with two senatorial families." On Sestius' family's business interests, see Richardson, "*Sestius Noster*," Elizabeth Will, "Defining the *Regna Vini* of the Sestii, in Goldman (ed.), *New Light from Ancient Cosa*, 35-47 (with discussion and further references on the finds of amphorae discovered from the Sestius family's business), and John D'Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 55-61.

[259] Jaakko Suolahti, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period: A Study on Social Structure* (Helsinki: Finnish Academy, 1955) for further information on the military tribunate and on junior officers generally—mainly a prosopographic study.

[260] We must, of course, emphasize that military service was first and foremost about conquest, revenue generation, and glory. Networking was a byproduct fundamental processes within Roman political culture.

[261] For military knowledge and education: William Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). He makes the important point (14-16) that at least until the very end of the Republican period, the vast majority of an aristocrat's educational experience (especially after the age of seventeen) would be in war and in military contexts. Under the Principate, this process of military knowledge transfer became increasingly textual, with handbooks and manuals used to transmit the tenets of generalship. This would conceivably have diminished dependence on knowledge stored as family "lore" (and possibly, by implication, of the importance of the individual aristocratic family as a vehicle for the transmission of this kind of power-granting knowledge)—for military treatises under the Principate, see Brian Campbell, "Teach Yourself to Be a General," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 77 (1987): 13-29 and Jon Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), especially 280-296.

[262] This is exemplified in the case of Cicero's own son, who would benefit from military tutelage under Brutus in the 40s; *Ad Brutum* 5 (II.5): "My good Brutus, it is my desire that you keep my son with you as much as possible. He will find no better training in the art of masculine excellence than the study and imitation of you" (*Ciceronem meum, mi Brute, velim quam plurimum tecum habeas. virtutis disciplinam*

influence and power. To retain control of Roman society, aristocratic subgroups needed to transmit the social tools of elite differentiation that allowed them to separate themselves from the rest of society. Indeed, to the limited extent that we can speak of a coherent "aristocracy," it was composed of the possessors and inheritors of such ethical and practical knowledge. "Collective parenting" by a range of senior figures facilitated the invaluable transfer of such informational assets.

Cicero possessed a notably low level of military knowledge, since he had minimized his own time with the armies. While he would later gain a very modest amount of command experience during his proconsulship in Cilicia in 51-50, during the years Sestius could have benefited from such mentorship, Cicero had very little to offer.[263] But a rising aristocrat did not need to receive all of his mentoring from a single source. Indeed, although mentorship bonds were important and often intimate, as I argue throughout this chapter, they were by no means exclusive commitments. Cicero was an ideal senior *amicus* to convey civic knowledge and civilian virtue, but he could leave Sestius' military training and his education in martial *virtus* to other guides.

In terms of social network alignments, military service was essential for the formation of the kind of asymmetric bonds that helped young men advance, even as it gave senior aristocrats the chance to build loyalty among the rising generation. This was a process, for instance, that Pompey had already exploited and that Caesar would develop to an even greater degree in the 50s. In addition to assisting with the transfer of knowledge, military service created the kind of concentrated conditions that helped relationships take shape rapidly between members of the elite at different levels. Such connections facilitated the formation of subgroups within the aristocratic community—"subgroups," we should clarify, which were informal and fluid—rooted in personal interchange between the members and common priorities and goals that developed as a product of their individual connections. Moreover, military networking helped fashion consensus within these social circles, linking the aristocratic community across family boundaries, generations, and ranks. We should be careful to qualify this picture of military action as a source of harmony, however. While martial service facilitated collaboration between generations and rungs on the ladder of status, for aristocrats closer to parity in age and rank, the search for glory often created intense contention and competition. Since the top men were forced to scrap for limited honors, military activity often created bitter fragmentation among coevals.[264]

---

meliorem reperiet nullam quam contemplationem atque imitationem tui). There is substantial debate about the meaning of the word *virtus* and whether the semantic range was expanding in the late Republic, influenced by the Greek concept of *arete*—c.f McDonnell, *Roman Manliness:* Virtus *and the Roman Republic*, which makes an argument that the ethical part of the semantic range only emerged once it started to be inflected by *arete*. He claims that, in its original meaning, *virtus* was the courage of the cavalryman charging bravely at his foe (as noted in the previous chapter, aspects of McDonnell's thesis have come in for significant criticism). Brutus would ultimately place great trust in the young Cicero, employing him as a subordinate commander in the second civil war—Plutarch, *Brutus* 26.2 for the young man's successful generalship under his auspices.

263 Cicero did serve in the Social War c. 89. He referred to his own military apprenticeship as a *tiro* under Gnaeus Pompeius in *Philippics* 12 (27): "when I was a trainee in his [Pompeius] army" (*cum essem tiro in eius exercitu*). There is no evidence that Cicero subsequently sought election as military tribune, however. Famously, he avoided military service until the campaigns during his term as governor of Cilicia nearly forty years later in 51-50, where he managed some real challenges with competent caution—*Ad Familiares* 110 (XV.4) for extended descriptions of some of his campaigns (Shackleton Bailey comments that this letter marked Cato's importance and reflected Cicero's well-grounded nervousness about the important senator's response to the news), along with further information in 86 (II.10), 104 (XV.1), 105 (XV.2), and *Ad Atticum* 113 (V.20). But these led him to seek a Triumph and granted him enough experience that Pompey was ready to entrust him with command in the civil war in 49-48 (Cicero still possessed his proconsular *imperium* because of his desire for a Triumph)—*Ad Atticum* 126 (VII.3), and 130 (VII.7) specifically treats the opportunities Pompey saw to put Cicero's official position and (limited) capacities to use.

264 Note, for instance, how bitterly men like Pompey, Crassus, and Lucullus scrapped for the symbolic rewards of victories during the 60s—among others, Nathan Rosenstein, "Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican Elite," in Paul Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 132-147; "War, Failure, and Aristocratic Competition," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 255-265; "Competition and Crisis in Mid-Republican Rome," *Pheonix* 47 (1993): 313-338; and "Sorting out the Lot in Republican Rome," *The American Journal of Philology* 116 (1995): 43-75, all emphasizing the prevalence of the competitive element (and even that competitive demands sometimes outweighed military exigency). To some extent, this was a numbers game: Sulla's expansion of the Senate exacerbated a problem that already existed, creating a bottleneck for the top military offices—there were still only two

It is in 63, during Cicero's consulship, that we catch our first glimpse of his connection with Sestius.[265] When Sestius won the quaestorship for 63, he was allotted to serve under Cicero's colleague C. Antonius. Throughout the year, however, the young man remained a participant in Cicero's councils, which suggests that they already shared some preexisting bond. When Cicero delivered his *Pro Sestio* in 56, he told a jury drawn from a mixed cross-section of the elite that, in spite of scruples about the propriety of the arrangement as a potential affront to the dignity of the office of consul (*non nullius officii…religione*), he had used his protégé as his informant (*quam multa P. Sestius, cum esset cum collega meo, senserit, ad me detulerit*).[266] We see how a relationship organized along informal "community-based" lines could outweigh the formal, public chain of command: loyalties forged "off stage," it seems, could prove superior in the event. This is a key example for my larger argument, that the informal social institutional bonds shared between aristocrats were at least as important as formal structures in channeling the dynamics of the system of power.

At the same time, however, even though Cicero claimed that Sestius had been acting as a spy for "patriotic" purposes, he still took care to emphasize not only that the young man had discharged the responsibilities created by his formal position as Antonius' quaestor dutifully but also, specifically, that he was seen to have done so by everyone whose opinion mattered (*illi quaestor bonus et bonis omnibus optimus civis videretur*).[267] Although in practice Sestius gave preeminence to his bond with Cicero, it was necessary both for his reputation and for Cicero's that the young quaestor had followed through on the responsibilities mandated by his office. We should emphasize, moreover, that it was perhaps even more important that he was perceived to have done so by the aristocratic community at large.

It is telling that while Cicero expressed hesitation, he was nonetheless willing to explicate the events before a jury drawn from a wide sample of the elite.[268] It implies that the members of his audience would have allowed that duties to personal relationships should, at least sometimes, transcend obligations created by shared service. Cicero trusted that the jurors would recognize the importance of reliable commitment to preexisting personal bonds, even in the context of *res publica*.

---

consular posts each year, and even though Sulla increased the number of praetorships from three to eight, this did little to address the increased pressure from beneath—see Catherine Steel, "The Roman Senate and the Post-Sullan *Res Publica*," *Historia* 63 (2014): 323-339 for a recent discussion with references; Keith Hopkins and Graham Burton, *Death and Renewal: Sociological Studies in Roman History Volume 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) is a classic treatment of these numerical dynamics from a quantitative perspective.

[265] We have no evidence of their specific connection before that, although their interaction may well have gone further back. Elizabeth Rawson, *Cicero: A Portrait* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 60-88 and Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero: ein Biographischer Versuch* (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969), 71-104—both provide lucid accounts of the events during this year.

[266] *Pro Sestio* 8 (IV): "by lot this man was the quaestor of my colleague C. Antonius, judges, but mine by our affiliation in counsel. Because of my respect for the office [of consul], I am more than a little bit hesitant about explaining, but nonetheless I will lay out how many things P. Sestius perceived and carried back to me, when he was with my colleague and what great foresight he displayed" (*quaestor hic C. Antoni, collegae mei, iudices, fuit sorte, sed societate consiliorum meus. Impedior non nullius officii, ut ego interpretor, religione, quo minus exponam, quam multa P. Sestius, cum esset cum collega meo, senserit, ad me detulerit, quanto ante proviserit*). For the mixed composition of these juries: Erich Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 34-35; also, Claude Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974), especially 615-632; Kaster, *Cicero: Speech on Behalf of Publius Sestius*, 21 (introduction) and 427 (glossary on 'treasury tribunes') with further references.

[267] *Pro Sestio* 8 (IV): "he was regarded as a good quaestor by that man [Antonius] and the best sort of citizen by all good men" (*illi quaestor bonus et bonis omnibus optimus civis videretur*).

[268] It is, of course, possible that Cicero tweaked how he framed the bond in the published version, but as Robert Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28 puts it, the written version of a speech will "have been expected to reflect closely the actual circumstances of delivery, including the assumptions of the orator-author as to the distinct nature, disposition, and what we would call the ideological perspective of the kind of audience to which the original was delivered." Further, Andrew Riggsby, *Crime and Community in Ciceronian Rome* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), appendixes n. 1: "It is also worthwhile to note that the audience of Cicero's published speeches had a similar make-up to that of the jury members of the original audiences; the former differs from the latter largely in the self-consciousness in its members of their role as jurors…The published speeches may also have a more senatorial audience." Thus, it is likely that we can see in the published texts of the speeches a mostly accurate reflection of how Cicero would have expected the aristocratic community to view the priorities of competing bonds, created by informal and formal institutional relationships.

At the same time, however, duties that emerged from official links should not be ignored altogether. While it was appropriate for a man to follow through on an informal bond, even if on the surface it would seem at odds with alignments that emerged from formal institutional relationships, he had to refrain from explicitly disregarding the responsibilities mandated by his public trust. This could be a fine line to walk.

Thus, even in the context of his public role, a personal and informal relationship to a mentor figure steered Sestius' behavior. But public duties and responsibilities to superior officers in the formal chain of magisterial command also appear to have informed both the choices themselves and how he and Cicero chose to represent them. As a result, Cicero justified Sestius' conduct partly by appealing to the public interest: if duty to the community required the personal to transcend the official—all well and good. The informal both could and should transcend the formal. Cicero was making what we can read as a tendentious, but nonetheless plausible, argument: that, in these specific circumstances, acts that might otherwise be seen as "transgressions" against the social structure created by formal institutional relationships should have a positive rather than a negative effect on both men's reputation in the community.

Much as we saw with the peer *amicitiae* in the previous section, it appears that this kind of asymmetric friendship was supposed to aid the participants in their quest to store up the ethical capital that would emerge if the community at large viewed the actions performed in the context of the bond as virtuous. Here, the audience's perception of this virtue depended on Cicero's ability to convince them that Sestius had acted in the deeper interest of the whole community, even if his behavior went against more superficial norms.

Once the conflict with the Catilinarians had moved outside the city and Sestius had left the urban center with the army, he continued to act as a representative of Cicero's concerns. As Cicero reported in *Pro Sestio*, when the inhabitants of Capua were saved by the young officer during the struggle, they chose Cicero as their *patronus* because he was their savior's mentor (*me unum patronum adoptavit*), and they delivered their thanks to Sestius in Cicero's house (*huic apud me P. Sestio maximas gratias egit*).[269] They recognized that their direct benefactor was himself beholden to the senior consular. In this example, an asymmetric friendship between aristocrats led to a two-tiered relationship, in which a senior consular became the defender of his protégé's own beneficiaries. Sestius acted as a "broker," connecting his immediate subordinates to the man who would officially become their *patronus*.[270] This double-layered hierarchy helped both men: it bolstered Sestius' influence, making him a more attractive representative and protector to potential members of his network, and it expanded Cicero's influence by adding a "subsidiary," augmenting his own network with little active effort on his part. Moreover, both men gained social capital, which, as I have argued throughout the dissertation, should be viewed as both a reward in itself and a currency for the exercise of influence.[271]

---

[269] *Pro Sestio* 9 (IV): "[the community at Capua] adopted me as their unique patron, delivering the most vociferous thanks to P. Sestius *chez moi*" (*me unum patronum adoptavit, huic apud me P. Sestio maximas gratias egit*). The contributions in the second section of Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 57-106 provide discussions of Italian *clientelae* under the Republic.

[270] This "brokerage" dynamic became even more prominent under the more strictly stratified hierarchies of the Principate. Even the most senior senators were always, ultimately, beneath the emperor. Richard Saller, *Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1982), 4-5 for some of the definitional questions, with examples throughout the rest of the book. It is interesting to see an analogous dynamic playing out in the fuzzier hierarchies of the late Republic.

[271] Cristina Rosillo-López, "Reconsidering Foreign *Clientelae* as a Source of Status in the City of Rome During the Late Roman Republic," in Jehne, Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration*, 263-280 offers a salutary challenge to the idea that foreign *clientelae* could provide a strong and obvious status boost in the late Republic. This is complicated in this instance, I suggest, by the fact that these were Italian *clientes* with a closer relationship to the central system and the networks in the city of Rome. It is a problematic issue what the implications would be for the *patroni* in terms of the social capital that they could call on as direct

This case has implications for the nature of the governance of the empire by the aristocratic community. Asymmetric relationships between its members could create multi-step chains, and these could bring the interests of provincials to the attention of players in the imperial center who had sufficient influence to bring about the desired results. We see a system of nested social groupings here, with the broader organizations that senior figures had constructed across the span of their careers embracing the smaller networks of rising junior colleagues. It is remarkable to note the extent to which the people of Capua understood the complexities of these dynamics, and how they were able to operate the multi-tiered mechanism to further their interests. The intergenerational aristocratic friendship helped create a channel, which allowed the concerns of the Capuans to be inserted into the aristocratic community's central discourse.

Thus, during the early stages of Sestius' career, Cicero served Sestius' interests by providing an umbrella for the young man's success. In return, Sestius furnished essential aid that redounded to Cicero's credit, acting both as a practical informant and operative and as an agent for the expansion of the senior statesman's network. But it is also essential to emphasize that the flow of functional service was never unidirectional. Just the next year in 62, for instance, when Sestius was serving as proquaestor in Macedonia, we see Cicero reciprocating the assistance Sestius had given him during the Catilinarian crisis. As Cicero mentioned in a letter to the absent Sestius, when the young officer decided he wanted to extend his tenure beyond his allotted year, he asked his *librarius* to convey a request for aid to Cicero (*ad me Decius librarius venisset egissetque mecum ut operam darem ne tibi hoc tempore succederetur*).[272] At Sestius' prompting, Cicero attended Senate meetings with particular assiduity (*adhibui diligentiam, quotienscumque senatus fuit*) and made the rounds with fellow aristocrats to convince them to help block the appointment of a successor in spite of Sestius' earlier promptings to the contrary (*plurimumque in eo negoti habui ut Q. Fufium tribunum pl. et ceteros ad quos tu scripseras cogerem mihi potius credere quam tuis litteris*).[273]

As we saw with the *principes* above, aristocrats out in the provinces required representatives in Rome. If they wanted their interests taken into account by the community as collective decisions were made in the urban center, they needed their *amici* to "impersonate" them in their absence. Such representation was essential both in the context of *res publica* and in more private discourse. It appears that Sestius' services to Cicero in 63 were already paying handsome dividends, as the junior promagistrate benefited from representation by one of the community's more influential players. After all, at least in terms of his current level of influence, Cicero could serve as more than merely a "second self" for his young friend, not only replicating, but also amplifying, the power of Sestius' personal presence.

The plebeian tribunate provided a potent lever of influence in Roman society. For his year in office, a relatively junior statesman in the position became exceptionally useful to his senior friends, as they sought to exercise power in public affairs. For this reason, when he won election as tribune in 58, it was again Sestius' turn to aid his mentor.

---

assistance when they attempted to effect results in the moment. But since social capital was itself a reward, as well as a currency for the exercise of power, these connections certainly had at least one kind of utility.

[272] *Ad Familiares* 4 (V.6): "when your secretary Decius called on me and urged me that I have a care that no successor be appointed for you at this time…I held to the diligent practice of attending whenever there was a meeting of the Senate, and I had a lot of trouble compelling the tribune of the plebs Q. Fufius and the others to whom you had written to believe me rather than your letters" (*cum ad me Decius librarius venisset egissetque mecum ut operam darem ne tibi hoc tempore succederetur… adhibui diligentiam, quotienscumque senatus fuit, ut adessem, plurimumque in eo negoti habui ut Q. Fufium tribunum pl. et ceteros ad quos tu scripseras cogerem mihi potius credere quam tuis litteris*); Shackleton Bailey comments that Decius was probably a freedman of Sestius'—this appears to be an extension of the accustomed duties of the *librarius* (a copyist or librarian).

[273] Cicero made clear in *Ad Familiares* 4 (V.6) that he had originally been surprised himself at the change of heart. He had only followed the new mandate after confirming with members of Sestius' immediate family consortium that the new injunction was in fact an accurate representation of Sestius' will (Terentia met with Sestius' wife Cornelia, and Cicero spoke directly with one Q. Cornelius). It is not entirely clear why Sestius changed his mind.

As representatives of the *plebs*, tribunes had the formal authority to convene plebeian assemblies and to propose legislation for a vote.[274] They put forward legislation on a wide range of issues, including the prorogation, creation, and transfer of commands; peace treaties; alliances; conferment of citizenship on individuals or communities; festivals; the foundation of colonies; weights, measures, and currency denominations; electoral procedures; and the creation of special courts.[275] Moreover, these bills could go through with or without the approval of the Senate. As a consequence, at least in theory, this legislative power gave the tribune, as well as the subgroup of his aristocratic associates, a chance to bypass scrutiny of their proposal by the collected *patres* in the *curia*, the community's central deliberative space.[276]

A tribune also possessed a range of other prerogatives: he had the right to furnish assistance to anyone subject to arbitrary punishment by a magistrate (*ius auxilii*); in theory, he could enforce his will against those who offered insults to his dignity or refused to obey, using fines, incarceration, or even capital punishment (*coercitio*); and he had the power to block or veto informal *senatus consulta* or even formal legislation put forward by other tribunes or magistrates—one of the most important components of tribunician authority in the competitive melee of *res publica*.[277] The tribunate had its roots in fifth century plebeian self-assertion, and even to the end of the Republic, a "revolutionary" aura still clung to the office.[278] But the magistracy was largely incorporated into the quotidian ebb and flow of *res publica*, and by the third century, tribunes were expected at Senate meetings and involved in the business conducted there.[279]

As a consequence, with Cicero languishing in exile at the beginning of Sestius' year as tribune, the young man had the opportunity to perform signal service. In a letter to Quintus from 58, when Sestius was tribune-elect, we find Cicero celebrating the quality of Sestius' friendship (*nobis amicissimum*).[280] Cicero reported in *Pro Sestio* that, after Sestius' election, but before he entered office, the young man took the extraordinary step of visiting Caesar in Gaul to canvass for his backing (*designatus iter ad C. Caesarem pro mea salute suscepit*), trading, as we might infer, on the repute granted by his eletoral campaign.[281] When Sestius returned to the city to take up his post, he collaborated with

---

[274] The *Lex Hortensia*, passed in 287, made *plebiscita* binding upon the whole *populus Romanus*—see Ernst Badian, "*Tribuni Plebis* and *Res Publica*," in Jerzy Linderski (ed.), *Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and Roman Republic* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), 189, 211-213; Kaj Sandberg, *Magistrates and Assemblies: A Study of Legislative Practice in Republican Rome* (Rome: Instititum Romanum Finlandiae, 2001); Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 121-122 also noting the *lex Publilia* of 337 as an intermediate stage.

[275] Sandberg, *Magistrates and Assemblies: A Study of Legislative Practice in Republican Rome*, for the wide variety of tribunician legislation.

[276] As Badian, "*Tribuni Plebis* and *Res Publica*," 195-196 points out, during the "classic" Republic, the tribunes often acted at the behest of the Senate and in response to its collective will, translating senatorial deliberation into law. So they could at times be agents of the will of the whole Senate, but at times they could circumvent senatorial deliberation.

[277] Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, 123-125 for these powers; Tim Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000 – 264 B.C.)* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 256-262 for the development of these powers.

[278] Amy Russell, "The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis," in Valerij Gouschin, Peter Rhodes (eds.), *Deformations and Crises of Ancient Civil Communities* (Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2015): 127-39 and "Speech, Competition and Collaboration: Tribunician Politics and the Development of Popular Ideology," in Catherine Steel, Henriette van der Blom (eds.), *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 101-115 both discuss the relationship between tribunes and "revolutionary" changes leading to crisis (arguing that their "seditious" activity did not in fact go far enough to address underlying transformations) and their popular rhetoric (which was varied and did not amount to a coherent *popularis* ideological package).

[279] The *lex Atinia*, passed in the mid-second century, made the tribunate sufficient to qualify for lifelong Senate membership—Badian, "*Tribuni Plebis* and *Res Publica*," 204-206. While in 81, Sulla attempted to undermine the efficacy and attractiveness of the position—removing the ability of tribunes to put forward laws, restricting the intercessory powers of the office, and banning former tribunes from seeking election to higher office—its prerogatives were restored in 70. The fact that Augustus chose to take on the *tribunicia potestas* as part of his formal powers bears witness to the perceived importance of the tribune's package of prerogatives during the final years before he seized control of the system.

[280] *Ad Quintum* 4 (I.4): "as much a friend as it is possible to be to us [Cicero or possibly Cicero and Quintus both here]" (*nobis amicissimum*)—this was, as Shackleton Bailey points out, when Sestius was tribune-elect.

[281] *Pro Sestio* 71 (XXXIII) "as [tribune-]elect, he undertook a journey to Caesar on behalf of my well-being" (*designatus iter ad C. Caesarem pro mea salute suscepit*).

Pompey and Lentulus to organize support for Cicero's return. Cicero reported in a letter to Atticus from that year that the tribune used his official platform to move the bill for Cicero's recall (*tuosque omnis ad nostram salutem adhortere. rogatio Sesti neque dignitatis satis habet nec cautionis*).[282]

We should note, however, that Cicero did express to Atticus that Sestius' bill in 58 would not be sufficient to protect either his dignity or security. Hence, in the same letter, the exile felt compelled to ask the influential equestrian operator to mobilize other members of their personal network to help (*tuosque omnis ad nostram salutem adhortere*).[283] Sestius' position as tribune gave their coalition access to a formal lever of power. But while such access was necessary, it was not sufficient. Without the assistance of informal networks, the tribune's official power would amount to little. Over the course of the year, Sestius collaborated with Pompey, Lentulus, and his fellow tribune Milo—in private backroom conversations and in the streets—to push through Cicero's recall, battling determined opposition from the interest group working to block the restoration. Sestius' loyalty to Cicero proved tenacious, even in the face of violent resistance. Sestius may have hoped that the sanctity of his office would protect him as he fought for his exiled friend's salvation, but he was beaten and left for dead by a gang of Clodius' toughs (*manus illa Clodiana…exclamat, incitatur, invadit…neque ulla re ab se mortem nisi opinione mortis depulit*).[284] Even after this rough treatment, however, he remained dogged in his support of his beleaguered mentor.

Informal social devices—backed by a willingness to compete in the scrum of the streets—proved necessary, in the end, as an addendum to the formal institutional access granted to their group by Sestius' magistracy. But even though a tribune's official powers were insufficient by themselves to bring about the recall in the face of such extreme opposition, we should not lose sight of the fact that aristocratic coalitions required such formal access as they sought to translate the consensus within a subgroup into public policy. As their consortium of associates sought to accomplish its objectives in *res publica*, formal and public prerogatives blended with social and personal interaction in an indissoluble mixture.[285] We should highlight how a junior statesman played an essential part in this informal coalition, with the importance of his role inflated by his access to a defined parcel of official institutional power.

A tribune could be vulnerable after he left office, especially if had been involved in moving controversial policies.[286] As a younger statesman, he probably still lacked much personal *auctoritas* to act as an informal shield, so his powerful *amici* might prove essential to his safety. When Sestius was charged with bribery in 56, for instance, Cicero got the chance to repay his junior friend's services by serving as the young man's advocate. As Cicero wrote to his brother, in spite of some recent personal annoyance with Sestius, obligation, coupled with his forgiving nature, moved him to take the case at once (*fecimus praeter hominum opinionem, qui nos ei iure suscensere putabant, ut humanissimi*

---

[282] Cicero did express some dissatisfaction with the initial draft. *Ad Atticum* 65 (III.20): "Sestius' bill will not do enough [to protect] my dignity, nor will it be sufficient as a precaution against danger" (*rogatio Sesti neque dignitatis satis habet nec cautionis)*. This was a draft law, as Shackleton Bailey explains, of which Atticus approved—see 68 (III.23).

[283] *Ad Atticum* 65 (III.20): "encourage all your people to work for my salvation" (*tuosque omnis ad nostram salutem adhortere*).

[284] *Pro Sestio* 79 (XXXVII): "that Clodian band…gives a yell, rouses itself, attacks…and nothing saved him from death except their impression of his death" (*manus illa Clodiana…exclamat, incitatur, invadit…neque ulla re ab se mortem nisi opinione mortis depulit*); see also, *Ad Quintum* 7 (II.3).

[285] Especially in the chaotic climate of the 50s, we might extend our understanding of the informal arena to include the "antisocial" alternative of muscle power—or perhaps we might introduce a separate arena of street competition as an intermittent venue for competition between subgroups. This was nothing new in the 50s, of course, although certainly out of the ordinary. We need only to think back to the infamous events surrounding the Gracchi for precedent.

[286] He lost the traditional *sacrosanctitas* of the tribunate upon leaving office. Of course, in Sestius' case, Clodius' willingness to transgress against sacred custom by attacking a tribune protected by a *lex sacrata* revealed the thin social constructedness of a tribune's inviolability; Benjamin Straumann, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 122 puts forward the argument that this sancrosanctity had been undermined in a profound manner (if unintentionally) by Tiberius Gracchus' deposition of Octavius (on the grounds that he was no longer serving the popular interest). So there was precedent both for formal attacks on a tribune during his term and for unofficial assaults.

gratissimique et ipsi et omnibus videremur).[287] This gesture was a performance addressed to Sestius himself, to be sure, and it represented an opportunity to store up more social capital in his relational account with his mentee. But we can also view both the act of taking the case and the contents of the speech were also intended to showcase virtue before a wider audience—both his protégé's virtue and his own. Cicero was making a bid to add to their joint stock of ethical capital.

As we have already seen in Cicero's correspondence with fellow senior statesmen, he placed a high priority on the virtuous nature of *amicitia* bonds, and he went out of his way to demonstrate that virtue to a broader audience within the aristocratic community.[288] The performative character of virtue-based *amicitia* also comes across in the *Pro Sestio*, here in a friendship between people of different ages and stages and presented not only to personal *amici* but also to an audience of mixed elites (both senators and equestrians). In fact, I suggest that such virtue-based *amicitia* was central to the broader case that Cicero was trying to put across with the speech—an argument that went beyond the simple defense of his client, especially in the famous digression where he presented an expanded definition of the *optimates*.[289] The case Cicero presented can be read to imply that, if the members of the aristocratic community hoped to carry out their ruling function effectively, the community needed to function by means of amicable bonds.[290] This lattice of ties should remain rooted an agreement in virtue between an expanded collectivity of "aristocrats." It is in line with this argument that, as well as highlighting his own and Sestius' virtuous participation in the friendship, Cicero also laid out the defendant's history as a worthy man (*possum multa dicere de liberalitate, de domesticis officiis*) from a good family (*natus est, iudices, homine…et sapiente et sancto et severo*).[291] With these words, Cicero was claiming that Sestius had inherited virtue as a kind of bequest from his father. The defendant had gone on adding to his family's ethical stock by embodying this inheritance both in his home life and in his friendships.

In order to lay claim to and retain position and influence in the aristocratic community, aristocrats needed their virtues to be reflected in friends' publicized opinions. By delivering his speech, Cicero protected and reinforced his young friend's moral standing in the eyes of his fellow aristocrats, reifying Sestius' ethical capital in a highly public venue. The published transcript would likewise have contributed to this process, in a manner that, while less ostentatious, could prove more lasting over time, as the text circulated among networks of associates. Each aristocrat's influence within the community depended on his fellows' ability to trust him to play his part according to normalized standards of conduct. Cicero's moral catalogue served as evidence that Sestius was the

---

[287] *Ad Quintum* 7 (II.3): "I acted contrary to the expectation of those men who thought my annoyance was justifiably kindled against him, with the result that, both to him and to everyone, I seemed exceptionally forgiving and grateful" (*fecimus praeter hominum opinionem, qui nos ei iure suscensere putabant, ut humanissimi gratissimique et ipsi et omnibus videremur*). Shackleton Bailey comments that we have no evidence of the particular reason that Cicero was annoyed at Sestius; he glosses *humanissimi* as "most forgiving." Sestius was being charged *de ambitu*, apparently in connection to his candidacy for the tribunate in 58.

[288] The performance of virtue—both one's own and one's client's—was not unique to this speech. James May, *Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988) emphasizes that, to a striking extent, Ciceronian oratory was concerned with the character of both the defendant and the advocate himself—this was, as May argues, common in Roman oratory.

[289] For discussion of the previous history of the term *optimates*, as well as Cicero's engagement with the term, see Martin Stone, "*Optimates*: An Archeology," in Kathryn Welch, Tom Hillard, Jane Bellemore (eds.), *Roman Crossings: Theory and Practice in the Roman Republic* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2005), 59-94. The actual defense was not necessarily a non-issue, however. For the debatable stakes of the case and the intentions of Cicero's argument with regard to the actual defense, see Christopher Craig, "Shifting Charge and Shifty Argument in Cicero's Speech for Sestius," in Cecil Wooten (ed.), *The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 111-122.

[290] *Pro Sestio* 96-143 for the expanded definition of *optimates*—this was a descriptive argument about the nature of the community, to a degree, but it also had a normative, pedagogical agenda; 51 for Cicero's claim that he had a right to give advice to the younger men of the rising generation.

[291] *Pro Sestio* 6 (III) "he was born of a man, judges…who was wise, venerable, and strict" (*natus est, iudices, homine…et sapiente et sancto et severo*); "I can say many thing about his gentlemanliness, about his dutiful actions in his home life" (*possum multa dicere de liberalitate, de domesticis officiis*).

right kind of man from the right kind of family. By implication, it was reasonable to suppose that the young man had behaved with propriety during his tribunate and that he would continue to display such *decorum* in future, in *res publica* and in interpersonal transactions alike.

At the same time, by participating in this cycle of reinforcement with Sestius—both by delivering and by publishing his speech—Cicero bolstered his own reputation as a virtuous and trustworthy connection, ready to come through for his friends. Moreover, the willingness he displayed to provide assistance would have further increased his ability to follow through in future cases. By portraying and defending Sestius' moral quality, Cicero was making a show of his own "good citizenship" in the aristocratic community. Since influence was rooted in the level of trust an actor could command from other players in the system, Cicero's performance was feeding into a virtuous cycle: by offering trustworthy service to Sestius, Cicero sought to expand his own capacity to exercise influence.

We should recall, too, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, that the reputational payoffs can be viewed as rewards in their own right. The friendship facilitated both men's capacity to enjoy the high opinion of their fellow aristocrats. Positive regard was as much an end within this system of power as it was a means. Indeed, I suggest that this regard was perhaps as desirable in itself as any functional increase of influence, and the asymmetric bond augmented the capacity of both the senior and the junior partner to pursue this essential prize.

We have now seen that in many ways this bond came to mirror the self-consciously constructed friendships between at least nominal "peers" treated in the previous section: the *amicitia* Cicero and Sestius shared was based on a thick web of reciprocal exchange, and it reflected the idealizing paradigm to the extent that they participated in the mutually reinforcing discourse of virtue that we have just been discussing. It is harder to pin down a *consensio studiorum* in their friendship, however, at least in its loftier sense of intellectual and literary communion (although in a more mundane sense, *consensio studiorum* can also mean "agreement in interests"). In fact, Sestius appears to have been something of a literary dunce, with a reputation for stylistic incapacity. When Pompey gave Sestius the task of writing a dispatch meant for public display, for instance, Cicero criticized the choice, claiming that Pompey was a splendid writer and should have composed the document himself (*accusavi…Pompeium qui, cum scriptor luculentus esset, tantas res atque eas quae in omnium manus venturae essent Sestio nostro scribendas dederit; itaque nihil umquam legi scriptum* Σηστιωδέστερον).[292] Cicero gently mocked the document as typically "Sestian," implying that Sestius' unfortunate style was (in)famous.

As much as some facets of Cicero's friendship with Sestius reflected aspects of the ideal, we do not see Cicero working as hard as he did in his relationships with *consulares* in the 50s to force the bond to live up to a specific paradigm. We should recall that the friendship began in Sestius' youth, before the younger man's personal profile of proclivities and capacities was fully formed and before he was sufficiently important for their relationship to merit searching scrutiny from the community. Thus, the various facets of the bond would have had the chance grow without the stricter guidelines imposed by the elevated stakes and the visibility of the high-level "peer" bonds.

---

[292] *Ad Atticum* 141 (VII.17): "I blame…Pompey who, even though he is a splendidly clear writer himself, gave matters that were so important and that would come into everyone's hands to our friend Sestius to be written; consequently, I have never read anything written in a more 'Sestian' style" (*accusavi…Pompeium qui, cum scriptor luculentus esset, tantas res atque eas quae in omnium manus venturae essent Sestio nostro scribendas dederit; itaque nihil umquam legi scriptum* Σηστιωδέστερον); Catullus made fun of Sestius' style too—*Carmina* 44.14.15: "[upon hearing Sestius' speech read aloud at a dinner party] frigid cold and a continuous cough shook me until I fled" (*me gravedo frigida et frequens tussis quassauit, dum…fugi*). There is little direct evidence about Pompey's writing style (and Cicero may merely have been flattering the dynast)—we do have substantial secondary testimony about his (uneven but not wholly unimpressive) quality as an orator, however, for which, see Henriette Van Der Blom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 113-145.

The fact that their *amicitia* did not live up to such a precise normative template did not prevent Cicero and Sestius from retaining a remarkably consistent relationship. In fact, their collaborative association was more stable and longer lasting than any of the consular bonds discussed in previous chapters.[293] Their connection displayed impressive staying power throughout the late 50s, the civil war period, and the years of Caesar's dictatorship, and it emerged firmer than ever from circumstances that strained many friendships to the breaking point, as the events of 50-49 wrenched the intricately woven fabric of *amicitiae* apart. As Sestius progressed through a sequence of influential positions—first as a Pompeian and then as a somewhat reluctant follower of Caesar after the battle of Pharsalus in 48—his friendship with Cicero became more and more like a friendship between equals.[294]

In this relationship, we have a chance to witness a mentorship bond mature into something closer to peer *amicitia*, as originally asymmetric links between aristocrats of different generations were presumably expected to develop when communal aristocratic rule was thriving. By 46, in a letter to his connection M. Rutilius, Cicero could even claim, without sounding utterly implausible, that he owed Sestius more than he owed any other man " (*ut ego illi uni plurimum debeo*).[295] They shared a peer, or at least a near-peer, friendship based on a brand of reciprocity that had emerged naturally across the years, creating a lasting alliance based on the trust that could only come from long experience. I suggest that this kind of evolutionary process was an essential mechanism in the community's system of power: it facilitated the permeability of even the highest circles to new peer members, which, as I have been arguing throughout this project, was one of the fundamental principles of the "Republican" system. This was a principle, however, that almost by definition did not survive the transition to a monarchic model without fatal damage to its essence. There was no space for parity after a single *princeps* replaced an open circle of *principes* as the *locus* of hegemony.

In letters from the late 50s and 40s in the *Ad Familares* and *Ad Atticum* collections, we consistently find Sestius among the elder statesman's central circle of regular interlocutors, often in a three-way conversation with Cicero and Atticus about public and private affairs (although we never see the younger man join their discussions of intellectual or literary culture).[296] This junction between Cicero, Sestius, and Atticus serves as a marker of important complexities of the social institutional structure of aristocratic friendship networks that were essential to the function of the aristocratic

---

293 Cicero's friendship with Lentulus perhaps comes closest.

294 Likely, Sestius held the praetorship some time between 56 and 52 (as implied by the fact that he held a promagistracy with *imperium* later, which would have required him to have occupied a curule magistracy); he was marked out as an informal successor to Cicero while formal appointments were stalled in 50; he returned to Cilicia invested with *imperium* by the Pompeian Senate in 49, with Brutus as his legate (Plutarch, *Brutus* 4).

295 *Ad Familiares* 321 (XIII.8): "since I owe the most of all to that man alone" (*ut ego illi uni plurimum debeo*). Shackleton Bailey suggests, in the notes in his translation of the *Ad Familiares*, that Rutilius was evidently a land commissioner. The area in which he operated is unknown. He may well be Caesar's former Legate, M. Sempronius Rutilus (*Bellum Gallicum* 7.90.4), as suggested by Syme.

296 For instance, in 51 in *Ad Atticum* 110 (V.17), Cicero reported to Atticus that Sestius had told him about a conversation he had had with Atticus about Tullia's marriage arrangements. The fact that Sestius passed on Atticus' words rather than the other way around is testament to his close relationship with Cicero (and with Atticus). In the midst of Caesar's dictatorship in 46, we find Cicero in close discussion with Sestius and Atticus again, this time as one of the main people with whom he is discussing relations with other *amici*—*Ad Familiares* 223 (VI.10.a): "both to Sestius and to our friend Atticus I laid out the whole situation" (*et Sestio et saepissime Attico nostro…totum me patefeci*. In July 44, after Caesar's death but before he began his campaign against Antony, we find Cicero, Atticus, and Sestius still engaged in a regular three-way exchange of letters and visits in *Ad Atticum* 406 (XV.27), and later in the year Cicero called Sestius in *Ad Atticum* 417 (XV.13a): "that best of men and exceptionally beloved by us [here the plural possibly actually referring to Cicero and Atticus]" (*optimum quidem illum virum nostrique amantissimum*). Sestius was never involved in the intellectual and literary activities Cicero and Atticus took so seriously, which suggests that he always remained one step removed from what Cicero tended to see as "full" personal intimacy—very subtly an eternal outsider (at least by the standards Cicero upheld with some of his other friends). We should not see this as a marker of his "inferiority" in terms of status and general influence, but it is plausible that Cicero and Atticus believed tacitly that this lack of literary communion stole something from the emotional value of the friendship. On the other hand, they may have felt sufficient warmth stemming from other sources to overcome this deficiency. Sestius, for his part, might have barely noticed or cared, or perhaps he was tied up in an inferiority complex about his "deficiency"—in Plutarch, *Cicero* 26.5, we do see Sestius (referred to as "Sextius") try to steal the show at his own trial by speaking at unwarranted length.

community's system of power. We witness a consular, a senatorial protégé turned near-peer, and a wealthy equestrian socialite, intellectual, and businessman, collaborating in domestic negotiations, private financial transactions, court cases, and public affairs. I suggest that this kind of bond can be viewed as a part of the substrate of aristocratic rule before the civil war. Although during Caesar's dictatorship, the activities of such groups were subordinated to Caesar's monarchic will, they nonetheless remained important, and they continued to operate even in the mad months after the dictator's death. The injection first of dynasts, and then of a monarchic figure, into the aristocratic system of power shifted the center of gravity, to be sure, but ongoing informal interchange between friends of different ages and orders remained a structuring principle within the elite community.

By the 40s, the hierarchy within the Cicero-Atticus-Sestius triad was far from clear. While Cicero was the only consular in their group, each of the three men was a significant player within the aristocratic community in his own right—each with his own particular medley of social, material, and symbolic resources. Years of collaboration had bred a familiar dialogic dynamic between them, without clear subordination or distinct asymmetry.[297] On the one hand, this brief examination of their triad helps us reject a simplistic picture of "factions" organized under unquestioned *principes*, or even of any rigid ranking within subgroups that remained static and restricted by seniority and formal status. On the other hand, it underlines the essential role that the ongoing collective action of consistent groups did, in fact, play in the aristocratic system of power. "Hard" factionalism may be profoundly misleading as a model, but the basic intuition underlying the paradigm reflects a deeper truth.

In conclusion to this discussion of the relationship between Cicero and Sestius, I propose that the bond might be viewed as something like an ideal-typical case for the evolution of an asymmetric friendship between two aristocrats at different career stages. As must have been the case for many, and perhaps most, young aristocrats, Sestius at first benefited from Cicero's support and protection. At the same time, he gave his senior friend access to the polity's formal institutional machinery—a dynamic that must have served a consistent and vital function in the granting senior figures the capacity to operate levers of power that would otherwise have proved difficult to manipulate. Over the decades, the friendship evolved towards parity. Cicero's early investment in a promising young man paid dividends, maturing into a robust alliance rooted in years of reciprocal aid and affection. Their friendship might never have encompassed all the components of the idealizing discourse of *amicitia*. But Cicero and Sestius were able to build a form of trust that was hard to replicate with the artificial construction that helped to constitute many of the strategic bonds forged between high-level peers already at the peak of their careers, no matter how much proactive care the protagonists expended in the creation of these links.

Caelius Rufus

Cicero's friendship with Sestius had a chance to evolve from mentorship towards parity, but the larger age gap in Cicero's friendship with the much younger Caelius encouraged a more explicitly asymmetric frame from the beginning.[298] Because of Caelius' premature death in 48, the disparity never had time to melt away completely. Nonetheless, there was plenty of time for the relationship to evolve into more than unidirectional pedagogy. Cicero and Caelius proved potent collaborators,

---

[297] In fact, Kathryn Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 45 (1996), 450-471 notes many moments throughout the Cicero-Atticus friendship when, if anything, Atticus acted as the senior partner (if always subtly). At any rate, Atticus often took on the role of counselor and even director for his consular *amicus*, for which see Jean-Pierre De Giorgio, and Émilia Ndiaye, "Cicéron Face aux Conseils d'Atticus," in Élisabeth Gavoille, François Guillaumont (eds.), *Conseiller, Diriger par Lettre* (Tours: Pr. Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2017), 137-153.

[298] Caelius (b. 82-d.48) was twenty-four years Cicero's junior, whereas only eleven years separated Cicero from Sestius (95-35).

providing each other crucial assistance and services across years. The *amicitia* they built displayed an intimacy, and at times a complexity, reminiscent of the link between a father and his son.[299]

Their connection began in 66, as Cicero would report a decade later in his *Pro Caelio* in 56 (more on this speech below), when Caelius' biological father entrusted his son to Cicero for his *tirocinium fori* (*qui ut huic virilem togam dedit… hunc a patre continuo ad me esse deductum*).[300] It appears that Crassus played a similar role, acting as a second mentor for Caelius' civic and moral education. During these years of youthful training, the young equestrian passed between his father's urban *domus* and those of his two senatorial mentors (*nemo hunc M. Caelium in illo aetatis flore vidit nisi aut cum patre aut mecum aut in M. Crassi castissima domo, cum artibus honestissimis erudiretur*), with "parenting" duties divided among the three households.[301] Like Cicero, Caelius had his origins outside Rome, born to an equestrian family in central Italy. Cicero would emphasize their similar background in his speech, pointing out how they had flowed from similar *fontes* into the public gaze (*ab his fontibus profluxi ad hominum famam*).[302] As a result of these extra-urban origins, the assistance of men already well acquainted with the capital's culture of *res publica* would have been invaluable, providing guidance as the young man found his feet.

It is telling that Caelius' and Cicero's fathers were both able to call on some of the foremost men of affairs to guide their sons as they embarked on careers in magisterial office and the courts. This is evidence of the social integration of equestrian families based in Italian municipalities with kinship groups active in the urban center and, specifically, in the Senate.[303] In spite of their proximity to the men active in public affairs, however, it seems that these Italians depended on the mentorship of experienced senators if they wanted to launch one of their children on the *cursus honorum*. Without such assistance, men of municipal origin (although they were wealthy aristocrats themselves) could not access the specific knowledge necessary to navigate the civic institutional space: they had their knowledge capital invested elsewhere, we might say—in information about business, finance, and property, for instance, rather than in understanding of the function of the civic institutions of *res publica*.[304]

It is important to consider why the most prominent *principes* in the aristocratic community were willing, and even eager, to take on mentees from equestrian families. First of all, as we have just seen in our examination of Cicero's relationship with Sestius, higher-level aristocrats often relied on

---

299 A "parent-child" model and a "potential future peers" model existed side by side. It appears that there was not necessarily a perceived need to resolve these two potentially contradictory conceptual schemata.

300 *Pro Caelio* 9 (IV): "this man who, when his father gave him his toga of manhood…was given over to me at once by his father" (*qui ut huic virilem togam dedit… hunc a patre continuo ad me esse deductum*).

301 *Pro Caelio* 9 (IV): "no one ever saw this M. Caelius, while he was in the flower of his youth, during the time he was being educated in the arts of a gentleman, except if it were with his father, with me, or in the irreproachable household of M. Crassus" (*nemo hunc M. Caelium in illo aetatis flore vidit nisi aut cum patre aut mecum aut in M. Crassi castissima domo, cum artibus honestissimis erudiretur*).

302 As we discover in *Pro Caelio* 72 (XXX), Caelius' father had landed interests in Africa; in 6 (III) Cicero emphasized his own similar background—"I flowed forth from these same wellsprings into the public gaze of men" (*ab his fontibus profluxi ad hominum famam*). Kathryn Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," in Jonathan Powell, Jeremy Paterson (eds.), *Cicero the Advocate* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 96-116 for a discussion of Cicero's connections with and support of a variety of younger Italians, providing detailed discussion of Caelius' Italian roots at 99-100.

303 We should recall that Crassus and his family were well-known for their particularly strong connections with equestrians, specifically with *societates* of *publicani* (one of the specialties of his personal family organization's strategy, I suggest, distinguishing his household among established *nobiles*)—Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, 158 and Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 90 for Crassus' dispute with Cato about renegotiating a tax contract, 319 for the likely connections of Crassus and his family to companies of *publicani* (although we have no hard evidence for specific investments).

304 For instance, senators might turn to equestrian "specialists" to manage their portfolios—Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," gives examples throughout the article of Atticus acting as a money-manager for his senatorial connections, arguing this was one of the major sources of his influence. Financial understanding was relevant to the whole range of players within the aristocratic system, but I suggest that we also witness a degree of specialization in terms of where the different branches of the elite community chose to invest their knowledge capital.

junior connections to translate their *auctoritas* into practical results.[305] In addition, and more specific to equestrians, senators' influence depended, at least to some extent, on broader support among propertied equestrian constituencies, although this dependence varied based on a senator's personal background.[306] We must emphasize that, in spite of the fact that these equestrians did not put themselves forward as protagonists in the theatrical events of *res publica* in the urban center, they were members of the ruling aristocratic community. Their opinions and support mattered.

The fact that Caelius' father was present in the urban center during his son's education—that his son could shuttle back and forth between his own residence and the houses of Cicero and Crassus during his early years in Rome—shows us the extent to which even an equestrian gentlemen whose interests centered in the provinces could still maintain a presence in the city, involved in daily social intercourse with senators on terms at least approaching parity.[307] In practice, as this suggests, even this Italy-wide elite was something close to a face-to-face community. Such familiarity would have facilitated the collective decision-making necessary for the community to be able to rule as a group. This is an essential point to grasp as we attempt to understand how the various interests, priorities, and opinions of the diverse members of the aristocratic community—with their centers of operation distributed across an array of *municipia* and country estates—could be integrated into a "ruling will" with even a measure of coherence.

Each of the two important senators from whom Caelius received his civic and moral education stood at the head of his own distinct personal network. It is telling that Caelius came under the tutelage of two different *consulares*. The networks associated with senior aristocrats were not sealed silos joined only at the top by the bonds of *amicitia* linking high-level statesmen, and we should emphasize that the junior partners in asymmetric aristocratic friendships were not limited to a single mentor. It is true that an elder statesman might expect assistance in the proximate future from a junior *amicus*, and he could hope for the kind of long-term collaboration, loyalty, and intimacy, that Cicero came to share with Sestius. But even if a senior statesman presided over the *tirocinium fori* of one of his potential future colleagues, he could not claim exclusive rights over the young man's allegiance. Since it appears that there was little expectation that a rising aristocrat would keep his loyalties exclusive, he might be considered ill advised if he failed to take advantage of whatever range of strategically advantageous opportunities presented itself. Beyond this, a senior *amicus* might derive benefits from a junior friend's other attachments. The young man could provide a subterranean link with the network of a high-level colleague and could potentially smooth relations between the two *principes*. Cicero and Crassus, for instance—whom, as I discussed in Chapter 2, were regularly at odds—felt compelled to collaborate to defend their protégé in court. This may have helped them build a habit of collective action and have reinforced the perception in the eyes of the community that they could and did work together in public affairs. Indeed, it is by no means impossible that their collaboration to defend Caelius in 56 might have laid groundwork for their

---

[305] Sestius was not from an equestrian family, but the point holds true for all asymmetric bonds between senior statesmen and their junior protégés.

[306] We should recall for instance, as I discussed in Chapter 1, how Cicero had to encourage the patrician Lentulus—*Ad Familiares* 20 (I.9)—to take care of his relationship with a group of *publicani* he had offended. The consul *amici* both assumed the importance of this moneyed constituency, but Cicero's equestrian background gave him a far more personal sense that this constituency was essential. Dominic Berry, "*Equester Ordo Tuus Est*: Did Cicero Win His Cases Because of His Support for the *Equites*?," *The Classical Quarterly*, 53 (2003), 222-234 on the extent to which Cicero's success was rooted in equestrian support (focused on the courts); Caillan Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 70-108 provides a detailed narrative of the relationship between the senatorial and equestrian orders during the Ciceronian period.

[307] Lisa Eberle, Enora Le Quéré, "Landed Traders, Trading Agriculturalists? Land in the Economy of the Italian Diaspora in the Greek East," *Journal of Roman Studies* 107 (2017): 27–59 provides a recent treatment of the portfolios and interests of the Italian elite, emphasizing their landed holdings.

reconciliation in 54. As this argument suggests, asymmetric bonds could facilitate the aristocratic community's horizontal, as well as its vertical, integration.[308]

By taking on a mentee, an elder aristocrat could not guarantee that perfect alignment would persist as the young man matured. Inevitably, the smooth operation of any social institution, however well established, is limited by the idiosyncrasies of individual participants. After their initial intimacy, for instance, Caelius' divergent behavior in his early adulthood led to his temporary estrangement from Cicero. In 59, seeking to make a splashy public debut as an orator, the twenty-three year old undertook a prosecution against Antonius—a prosecution, as Cicero reported in *Pro Caelio*, that brought glory to the young man and vexation to Cicero (*mihi quidem molestam, sibi tamen gloriosam victoriam*).[309] Cicero found the kind of rapacious action against provincials despicable, of which Antonius was clearly guilty. He might even have sympathized with Caelius' case. But nonetheless, he appears to have felt duty bound to represent the man who had been his colleague in the consulship of 63. It may be that, in a manner analogous to what we saw with Sestius above, shared service in magistracies was seen to create potent obligations. While other personal relationships might dictate emotional and strategic priorities, it seems that the bonds instituted by the formal office holding structure were not supposed to be explicitly disclaimed. Indeed, we can imagine that there was a loose sense that the "cohort" of magistrates who had been elected together in a given year ought to share a special sense of loyalty and solidarity. This principle was, of course, constantly broken in practice, but it still appears to have acted as a guiding aspiration.

Caelius even managed to beat his mentor. Although it is conceivable that Cicero offered only a lackluster defense of a man he believed guilty, the young man's victory would still have furnished the community with glittering evidence of his oratorical precocity. Without a doubt, Cicero would have understood Caelius' behavior, and aristocratic friendships could certainly reemerge after oratorical contests (think of Cicero and Hortensius).[310] But nonetheless, head-to-head conflict in the courts proved sufficient, at least temporarily, to drive a wedge between the friends. We can view the courts, then, at least to some extent, as a more public and formal extension of the aristocratic community's personal social dynamics. Since the advocates were not themselves the disputants in the underlying quarrel, however, and since their contest was to a large degree on behalf of others, the antagonism did not inevitably have to translate into personal antipathy. As we will see, at least in the long term, the forensic battle between Caelius and his mentor did not deal a fatal blow to their underlying affection.

But after the trial, Caelius and Cicero did drift apart for a time. The young man slid into a period of youthful rebellion, perhaps weary of the moralizing tutelage of his paternal triumvirate, and began to keep into company with the Clodian set. Whether or not we should imagine that this represented an intentional repudiation of Caelius' affiliation with his mentor, it is worth noting that this was the coalition within the aristocratic community most directly opposed to Cicero's own at

---

308 The connection between Trebatius and both Cicero and Caesar provides another example of how a shared asymmetric bond could create additional amity between senior figures. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the link helped Cicero retain a far higher degree of harmony and understanding with Caesar than would otherwise have been possible, even through the civil war.

309 *Pro Caelio* VII.18: "he had just won a victory in a public court case, vexatious indeed for me, but glorious for him" (*qui cum et ex publica causa iam esset mihi quidem molestam, sibi tamen gloriosam victoriam consecutus*); Cassius Dio XXXVIII.10 provides further details of the events of the prosecution, noting how Cicero only undertook the defense because Antonius had been his colleague. Andrew Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168 provides further details on Cicero's obligations to his colleague, potentially also including some financial ones. We should recall that, like Caelius, Cicero also used a high-profile prosecution to launch his own oratorical career (*In Verrem*). Van Der Blom, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic*, 25-33 for a discussion of early career prosecution—an attractive choice for a young man seeking to make his name quickly, but a risky one. David Epstein, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43* (London: Croom-Helm, 1987), 90-126 discusses the *inimicitiae* that could be created by such prosecutions.

310 Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 456 proposes that Atticus' intervention was required to create this bond—some external energy was needed to initiate the reunion in this instance.

the time.[311] The young man rented a house from Clodius in a fashionable neighborhood on the Palatine and even started an affair with the notorious Clodia.[312] After a quarrel splintered Caelius' relations with his paramour, however, the road suddenly cleared to reconciliation with Cicero.

Cicero and Caelius faced off once more in court, with the elder orator trouncing the young man handily this time.[313] But when Caelius found himself facing a charge *de vi* in 56, Cicero and Crassus proved ready to step in together to defend their protégé.[314] A former pupil and his mentor might cross swords as advocates for other men's cases, led by other obligations and ambitions. If the young man faced a threat himself, however, much as a father might step in to defend a wayward but loving son, deep affection could transcend superficial squabbles. We should note that both Cicero and Crassus were willing, in spite of tension in their own relations, to join forces as *patroni* for the defense of their errant mentee—their shared quasi-parental tie to their younger friend creating a moment of collaboration in an otherwise fractious period in the relations between the two *principes*.

In his *Pro Caelio*, Cicero did in fact frame his relationship with Caelius explicitly in terms of the bond between father and son.[315] I propose that the familial nature of the friendship created a particularly strong form of obligation, in which loyalty could persist even in the absence of the agreement in public and private matters characteristic of conventional *amicitia*. Furthermore, in the general shape of his trajectory, inclinations, and competencies, Caelius followed closely in Cicero's footsteps. Born into an equestrian family outside of Rome, he became a talented orator and a participant in literary and intellectual circles, and he learned to navigate the complex networks of aristocratic connection in its various theaters in the urban center, both the more public and the more private.[316] To some extent, Caelius had already begun to replicate his surrogate father's model—which is, of course, precisely the reason his biological father would have sent him to Cicero in the first place.

By the end of the decade, Cicero and Caelius had left their tensions from the early-50s far behind. In their correspondence from that period—the bulk of the letters we have preserved from their personal exchange—few effects of their previous breach remain perceptible.[317] During these years, it is clear that they shared warm regard and personal affection. Cicero often addressed Caelius in a jesting tone that reads like a fond father in conversation with a cheeky but dutiful son. Cicero

---

311 W. Jeffrey Tatum, *The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999) is the most comprehensive treatment of Clodius and his place in the landscape of power. Tatum argues that he had his own agenda but that he also had to constantly take account of the interests and concerns of other actors. This is a change of emphasis from Erich Gruen, "P. Clodius: Instrument or Independent Agent," *Phoenix* 20 (1966), 120-30 and Andrew Lintott, "P. Clodius Pulcher—Felix Catilina?," *Greece and Rome* 14 (1967), 157-69, which both emphasize Clodius' independence (themselves seeking to combat a previous conception that he had been little more than a tool). Ian Harrison, "Catiline, Clodius, and Popular Politics at Rome During the 60s and 50s," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 51 (2008): 95-118 places Clodius in the context of broader "popular" political trends.

312 This may have won him a place as the Rufus in Catullus' *Carmina* (potentially in 55, 69, 71, 77 and 100, although there is uncertainty about some of the references), in which a "Rufus" was accused of stealing the poet's lover Lesbia (Clodia). Brian Arkins, "Caelius and Rufus in Catullus," *Philologus* 127 (1983): 306-311 offers a comprehensive treatment of the uncertainties of this evidence. I suggest that we should always keep in mind that our image of Clodia and the Clodian set is slanted by Cicero's negative bias.

313 *Pro Caelio* XXXI.76 for Caelius' prosecution of L. Calpurnius Bestia and Cicero's disapproval.

314 Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, 199-201 provides further details regarding the circumstances leading to and surrounding the defense, although Lintott's passing comment that, for Crassus, the matter would have been "more a matter of business" appears misleading in light of Crassus' personal relationship with the defendant.

315 James May, "Patron and Client, Father and Son in Cicero's *Pro Caelio*," *The Classical Journal*, 90.4 (1995): 433-441 traces the recurring development of this strand throughout the speech, sometimes implicit and sometimes fairly explicit.

316 He was part of the same group of equestrian climbers, that is, whose strategies we glimpse in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*—Italian municipal elites who made the choice to embark on a career in *res publica* in the urban center, with their success rooted in social contacts, education and oratorical attainment, and business connections. Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," suggests potential strategic associations between men of Italian background.

317 Caelius, as Shackleton Bailey points out in his commentary on *Ad Familiares* 77 (VIII.1), was probably now in his late thirties—an "orator, rising politician, and man about town."

spoke wistfully of his desire to share a laugh in Caelius' company (*quam ego risum nostrum desidero*).[318] Caelius wrote extravagantly to Cicero (and perhaps with a hint of exaggeration) about how much he missed time spent in Cicero's company. Rome, he claimed, seemed devoid of human companionship (*Romae te profecto solitudo videatur facta*).[319] This is a level of warmth rarely found in Cicero's correspondence outside his letters to the closest of his intimates, such as Atticus, Quintus, and his family.[320] In fact, as I noted above, during the period Cicero addressed Caelius with more warmth than we see him using even with Atticus.[321] While Caelius was still at a relatively early stage in his career, we already see him joining his consular mentor's circle of intimates. As in Cicero's relationship with Sestius, then, early investment bred a level of intimacy and familiar trust that was hard to replicate in curated *amicitia*, however careful and attentive. That is not to say that this affectionate informality implied carelessness.[322] Indeed, the discourse of intimacy might itself be viewed as a strategy for maximizing the trusting character of a bond that served both participants well. Nonetheless, such a strategy was only available in the context of a friendship with an extended history, with the artifice concealed by the long passage of time.

At the time of the concentrated correspondence, Cicero was away from the urban center, serving as the governor of Cilicia (51-50). Caelius was fresh from a term as one of the tribunes of the plebs in 52. Over the course of the sequence, we see him canvassing for an aedileship and then filling his magistracy after his victory. While earlier in the decade, it might have seemed to Cicero that his investment had misfired, he now began to receive exactly the kind of benefits he would have hoped for when he first agreed to take the young man under his wing. We encounter an assertive and urbane Caelius in these letters, beginning to find success in *res publca* and active in the city as an informal agent for his mentor.[323]

One of the most important functions Caelius could perform for Cicero while the consular was away from the capital was to provide a window onto events and conditions in the city. Cicero appears to have placed a joking "bet" that his sometimes-wayward protégé would prove a lax correspondent. But Caelius managed to win their wager (*Estne? vici?*) by flooding his mentor with a torrent of useful correspondence.[324] At first, the young man delegated one of his own subordinate agents (*laborem alteri delegavi*) to write up a comprehensive digest on everything from *senatus consulta* to

---

318 *Ad Familiares* 93 (II.13): "how much do I crave one of our laughs" (*quam ego risum nostrum desidero*).

319 *Ad Familiares* 79 (VIII.3): "I miss that [time in Cicero's company] not just a little bit, with the result that now that you have departed, Rome seems to me to have become not only lonely but utterly devoid of human companionship" (*idque non mediocriter desidero, ut mihi non modo solus esse sed Romae te profecto solitudo videatur facta*).

320 Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 80 notes, for instance, the presence of the phrase *amabo te* in these letters—a phrase only employed with a limited set of correspondents—most frequently with Atticus and Quintus, and occasionally with a few others of his urbane young protégées such as Curio and Cassius.

321 Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," 465 points out that, in contrast with most of the rest of Cicero's career, "the period of his proconsulship in Cilicia shows him least willing to accept or seek Atticus' advice. Instead, he depended more upon Caelius."

322 On the informal tone of this sequence of letters, see Harm Pinkster, "Notes on the Language of Marcus Caelius Rufus," in Eleanor Dickey, Anna Chahoud (eds.), *Colloquial and Literary Latin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 186-202—both wrote in relatively informal (although not precisely "colloquial") language, but not without care and skill. Informality should by no means be taken to imply laziness. This was the style, we might say, of men who cared deeply about working to craft their familiar intimacy. Meike Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018) analyzes this sequence from the perspective of communication theory, exploring, for instance, the use of personal pronouns and pronominal adjectives (36-37). She also notes distinctions in their formality, with Caelius adopting a tone one degree less formal than Cicero's (37). Jon Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11 points to the "elegant *sermo cotidianus*" of the Caelius exchange as a contrast, which "throws into sharp relief the restraint of the more formal letters."

323 Alison Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," *Arethusa* 46 (2013): 65-85 discusses Caelius, alongside other young people in the period who were also interacting with the landscape of power with confidence and acumen. Relatively junior aristocrats appear to have been capable of introducing their own strategies, tactics, and priorities into the give and take of the system of social power (and both men and women, at that).

324 *Ad Familiares* 79 (VIII.3): "Is it not true? Have I won? Don't I often send you letters, as you denied I would bother to do for you when you were departing?" (*Estne? vici? et tibi saepe, quod negaras discedens curaturum tibi, litteras mitto?*).

gossip (*omnia enim sunt ibi senatus consulta, <e>dicta, fabulae, rumores*).[325] In Cicero's reply from July 51, however, he disparaged the stream of trivia. He had other informant, as he told Caelius, to feed him idle news (*scribent alii, multi nuntiabunt*).[326] He turned this rejection into a compliment, however, assuring the young man that he placed exceptional value on his keen political insight (*πολιτικώτερον enim te adhuc neminem cognovi*) and asking him to furnish farsighted projections about the future form that *res publica* would take (*futura exspecto…formam rei publicae viderim*).[327] We should note how Cicero chose to use the Greek word for "political"—πολιτικώτερον—a commentary, we might imagine, on the foreignness to the Roman idiom of the concept of something "political," as distinct from the other elements of social and cultural experience.

These compliments suggest that Cicero had developed respect for his protégé's acuity. Indeed, in a letter from April of the next year, he would even describe Caelius as his most reliable source (*ea enim certissima putabo quae ex te cognoro*).[328] Although the young man was not yet competent to stand in for Cicero in public contexts—to explicitly adopt the *alter ego* mantle in *res publica*, that is—the consular was beginning to trust Caelius as his "eyes and ears." More than that, Cicero was coming to look to his protégé as an interpreter of the subtle currents in the aristocratic community, both in public spaces and behind closed doors. We might envision this as another facet of the "second selfhood" proper to *amicitia*, if only expressed tacitly. The younger man could act as an extension of Cicero's consciousness, allowing him to stretch his physical senses and to expand his mind's capacity for deliberation and foresight.

In the examination of the friendship between Cicero and Sestius above, we saw how they struggled to cultivate shared interests beyond the practical. With Caelius, however, common passion for the orator's craft and shared literary and scholarly tastes brought a level of additional warmth to a bond that long association would likely already have made strong. When a senior statesman chose to invest in one of his juniors, he could only hope that the young man would grow to share his proclivities. Cicero was fortunate with Caelius. As it turned out, an eager and erudite *consensio studiorum* added another layer to their familiarity.

As a consequence of this suite of common interests and aptitudes, as Caelius climbed the ladder towards formal and practical parity with Cicero, the friendship showed promise that it might evolve to reflect an expansive vision of the idealizing discourse of *amicitia*. If Caelius had lived long enough to grow into a role as a senior statesman—in terms both of formal *honores* and of social and financial success—their bond might have matured naturally into the kind of multi-faceted friendship that Cicero worked so hard to construct with his fellow *principes*. Moreover, the possibilities for trusting collaboration in pursuit of shared objectives might have proved even more powerful than it

---

325 *Ad Familiares* 77 (VIII.1): "I have delegated the work to someone else" (*laborem alteri delegavi*); "I have no idea how someone could have leisure to pay attention to these things let alone write them down; everything is in there—the *senatus consulta*, the edicts, the petty dramas, the rumors" (*nescio cuius oti esset non modo perscribere haec sed omnino animadvertere; omnia enim sunt ibi senatus consulta, <e>dicta, fabulae, rumores*).

326 *Ad Familiares* 80 (II.8): "others will be writing, many people will convey messages" (*scribent alii, multi nuntiabunt*).

327 *Ad Familiares* 80 (II.8): "See here how much value I place on your discernment (and I swear that this is no unfair judgment; for I have come to know no one more 'political' than you thus far): and I do not even care if you write about things of the greatest importance in public affairs, unless it is something which pertains directly to me. Other people will write about them, many people will bring word, rumor itself will carry many of them. Thus, I expect neither past nor present from you, but, as is proper from someone who looks far into what will come, I expect a portrait of the future, so that from your letters, I may see the form the commonwealth will take" (*vide quantum tibi meo iudicio tribuam (nec mehercule iniuria; πολιτικώτερον enim te adhuc neminem cognovi): ne illa quidem curo mihi scribas quae maximis in rebus rei publicae geruntur cottidie, nisi quid ad me ipsum pertinebit. scribent alii, multi nuntiabunt, perferet multa etiam ipse rumor. qua re ego nec praeterita nec praesentia abs te sed, ut ab homine longe in posterum prospiciente, futura exspecto, ut ex tuis litteris, cum formam rei publicae viderim*). Shackleton Bailey clarifies that this letter was a direct response to 77 (VIII.1) and the attached abstract of news. In commenting on *futura expecto*, Bailey points out that Cicero used similar terms when addressing Atticus—for instance, *Ad Atticum* 105 (V.12).

328 *Ad Familiares* 90 (II.11): "I will consider those things I hear from you most certain of all" (*ea enim certissima putabo quae ex te cognoro*).

was in relationships custom-built to include specific elements. Such bonds lacked the kind of extended history that added depth and resilience to intimacy and trust.

Caelius demonstrated an aptitude for oratory from an early age. He grew into a potent speaker, and like Cicero, he used oratory as an entrée into the public sphere. We can imagine that, since Cicero was an exceptionally attentive oratorical craftsmen and critic, he would have appreciated a protégé with inclinations in that direction. Their common engagement with the oratorical art would have contributed to a sense of identity between the two friends, rooted in shared skills and career strategies. We catch a glimpse of Cicero's appreciation of this communion in his *Brutus*, perhaps tinged with nostalgia. Looking back from the vantage of the mid-40s, Cicero even placed his protégé—now dead for four years—among the notable orators he chose to highlight in his history of artful speech (*et splendida et grandis et eadem in primis faceta et perurbana commendabat oratio*).[329] Indeed, it may have been Cicero's influence that taught Caelius to see oratory not only as a pathway and a tool, but also as an art form worth pursuing in its own right.

Their *consensio studiorum* extended beyond shared engagement with the orator's craft, as both men also participated actively in the aristocratic community's vibrant literary subculture. The fact that each appeared in Catullus' works marks their membership in the network of *literati* within the aristocratic community—Cicero as the dedicatee of a laudatory poem (with sarcastic undertones) and Caelius (probably) as the traitorous former friend Rufus who had stolen Catullus' Lesbia (Clodia).[330] Literary interchange could serve as an alternate vector for elite interaction, although we should emphasize that no hard boundary divided the "literary" from the "political" or the "economic." Indeed, in correspondence between aristocratic *amici*, matters of erudition often appear right beside other concerns, woven together with little apparent effort to maintain distinction. But at the same time, the literary sphere can be viewed as a space with its own with priorities and concerns and with a sense of hierarchy not altogether tied either to success in *res publica* or to financial clout. To a large extent, the *literati* were also men concerned with *res publica*. The circles were not perfectly coterminous, however, since an aristocrat could choose freely to reject either *litterae* or *res publica*.[331] We might say that the literary culture and the hegemonic system were intimately intertwined, with the threads sometimes, but not always, distinguishable.

In a letter from 51, Caelius proposed, with a degree of forwardness, that his mentor should write a text and dedicate it to him. He left the subject of the work to Cicero's discretion but requested something didactic (*διδασκαλίαν quandam*), hoping that the steady circulation (*versetur inter manus*) of a teaching text would make into a kind of monument—a device to convey the memory of their friendship to posterity (*quod nostrae amicitiae memoriam po<s>teris quoque prodat*).[332] Literary

---

329 *Brutus* 273 (LXXIX): "a style distinguished him that was splendid and grand, and to be counted among the leading examples in its wit and sophistication" (*et splendida et grandis et eadem in primis faceta et perurbana commendabat oratio*). The awareness and appreciation of Caelius' craft was not confined to his former mentor, we should note. Caelius' speechmaking even made an impression on later oratorical tradition, discussed both in Quintillian, *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.115 (with high praise of Caelius' talent and wit) and Tacitus, *Dialogus* 21.4 (more qualified in its approval).

330 Catullus, *Carmina* 49 for Cicero, and 55, 69, 71, 77 and 100 are possible references to Caelius. As noted above, there is some debate as to the tone of Catullus' Cicero poem and the identity of his Rufus; Arkins, "Caelius and Rufus in Catullus;" Helena Dettmer, *Love By the Numbers* (New York: P. Lang 1997), 151-169; also, Julia Hedjuk, *Clodia: A Sourcebook* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 6-8 (with more recent references).

331 A man like Catullus could strike a disinterested pose with respect to *res publica*, opting for *otium* instead—Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text*, esp. ch. 1 for a discussion of Catullus' choice. Atticus struck this pose too, although as has already become clear, he was deeply interested in outcomes in *res publica* even if he disclaimed a formal role for himself. On the other side, Sestius' reticence in literary affairs reminds us that many power players climbed the *cursus honorum* without a literary sideline.

332 *Ad Familiares* 79 (VIII.3): "I have conceived a desire that some one of your textual monuments—as many as there are—should exist that would hand down the memory of our friendship to posterity. Of what sort do I want it to be, I imagine you asking. You, who know all our system of knowledge, will think up what is most fitting more quickly, let it relate nonetheless to some genre which pertains to me, and something educational, so it is passed around among many hands" (*<cupio> aliquod ex tam multis tuis monumentis*

products had power to monumentalize and disseminate, and full texts explicitly designed for "publication" served this purpose to a greater extent even than the most "public facing" letters. We have discussed repeatedly the desire among aristocratic *amici* to "perform" their virtue, and specifically their virtuous participation in the institution of idealizing *amicitia*. I propose that Caelius' request can be read as an expression of this desire to perform amicable virtue. Such a textual tribute had the power to extend that performance in space and time.[333] The work would broadcast knowledge of their bond, increasing the power of the friendship to elevate both men's position in the community as a result.

A dedication could serve the interests of both parties. It would give an author such as Cicero the opportunity to create fondness and obligation by pleasing a well-placed dedicatee. In addition, it would allow both men to advertise their closeness to the community of readers. Dedications could contribute, as we might describe it, to the creation of social capital. This took place in two ways. On the one hand, they served as deposits in the account of specific relationships. On the other, they increased community awareness of the dedicator's association with the dedicatee and the increased social weight this represented. In this instance, although both men stood to profit, such a dedication would have been of more extraordinary benefit for the younger aristocrat. Cicero had other dedicatees whose friendship it might have been even more strategically useful for him to advertise. For the junior member of an asymmetric friendship, however, it would have been a substantial coup to be monumentalized in a text that flagged his intimacy with such a well-known consular.

We should emphasize that the goal was not merely, or even mainly, an increase in the capacity to create immediate concrete results. Instead, fundamentally, the participants in the culture of dedication were seeking to accumulate various forms of reputation capital with staying power across time, even hoping that this stock might pass to their descendants after death.[334] This is part of the reason that textual production could provide at least a partial alternative to success in *res publica*. If the acquisition of status was one of the central goals of the players in the aristocratic system, as I argue throughout the dissertation, then the publication of a widely read text can be seen as a victory in itself for the author, while the dedication was a triumph for the honorand. In a sense, as we might conceive it, Cicero's generation of *literati* tried to turn the text into a replacement for an *honos*—

---

exstare quod nostrae amicitiae memoriam po<s>teris quoque prodat. cuius modi velim, puto, quaeris. tu citius, qui omnem nosti disciplinam, quod maxime convenit excogitabis, genere tamen quod et ad nos pertineat et διδασκαλίαν quandam, ut versetur inter manus, habeat). Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text* is essential on the process and culture of dedication and on transformations in the practices and goals of textual exchange in Cicero's and Catullus' generation. Yelena Baraz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) also contains subtle and useful discussion of some of the dynamics of dedication for Cicero, as situated in the literary community of the time (focusing on the philosophical works of the 40s).

[333] Thomas Habinek, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 103-121 is fundamental on the relationship between writing and social performance, discussing how aristocrats intentionally turned texts into a substitute for the personal presence that was fundamental to aristocratic power and used them to extend and multiply performative possibilities. This process began in Cicero's generation, but it continued to far greater extremes under the emperors. For the culture and process of the dissemination and consumption of literary texts in the Roman world—Raymond Starr, "The Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World," *The Classical Quarterly* 37.1 (1987): 213-223, with substantial analysis of Cicero's and Atticus' textual activity; also, Edward Kenney, "Books and Readers in the Roman World," in Edward Kenney and William Clausen (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 3-32 emphasizing (perhaps overemphasizing) the preeminence of recitations and *convivia* in textual consumption and the limit of the size of the audience to a circle of immediate friends and acquaintances, with Holt Parker, "Books and Reading Latin Poetry," in William Johnson and Holt Parker (eds.) *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 186-225 providing a salutary (if sometimes excessively polemical) corrective, which rightly highlights silent reading and broader dissemination.

[334] John Dugan, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) examines the goal in the Ciceronian corpus of gaining eternal glory through textual fixity. I believe that he goes too far in portraying Cicero's innovative activities as so extraordinary as to be "transgressive." After all, it was Caelius here, as early as 51, who was asking for the textual monument—at the very least, Cicero was not innovating alone.

capable of creating something loosely analogous, if not perfectly equivalent, to the symbolic capital usually accumulated through conspicuous deeds and victories in *res publica*.

Of the various forms of capital involved in this socio-cultural transaction, the social capital that was accumulated through this textual advertising would have the most immediate impact on power relations. The dedication would reinforce the connection between Cicero and Caelius, and also highlight their alliance to the rest of the aristocratic network, increasing the perception of each man's social weight (especially Caelius'). But the dedication also gave Cicero and Caelius the opportunity to create and hoard a deposit of this new form of quasi-symbolic capital—a form of asset derived from and "banked" in texts rather than in *imagines* and public memory. Furthermore, they could augment their respective accounts of ethical capital by trumpeting their virtuous participation in a friendship rooted in the *consensio studiorum*, which we have seen framed as a sign of personal moral quality in conversations between Cicero and his aristocratic interlocutors. In sum, through their common passion for oratory and shared literary enthusiasm, Cicero and Caelius increased their sense of identity with each other, and they sought opportunities, through textual advertising, to amplify the perception of this identity throughout the aristocratic community.[335]

This elevated literary communion should not make us lose sight of the essential role more overtly practical exchange played in their friendship. One of the most important of the services aristocratic friends could carry out for each other was the exchange of news.[336] Access to information is a crucial resource in any system of power. In this case, the exchange of details and interpretations of current events was one of the key functions of aristocratic friendships and connections, especially of the letters they traded. Since the Roman world lacked organized media organizations, an aristocrat's network served as the main means he could use to extend his awareness of events and power dynamics beyond the reach of his own senses.[337] In fact, I suggest that something could only *become* news in the aristocratic community by passing through this "news network." Indeed, the fact that one of the core duties that provincial commanders performed on behalf of the central power structure was to send news reports to the Senate and magistrates indicates the importance of individual aristocrats as news channels (one essential feature of the "system of power," it is worth noting, that did not disappear under the Principate).[338] Each aristocrat, and the elite community as a whole, depended on the individual members of its networks to construct a coherent narrative about what was going on and what merited attention.

Throughout Cicero's correspondence, we hear various correspondents refer obliquely to the news that "their people" (*sui/tui/mei*) were in the habit of passing on to them.[339] The assumption by aristocrats that their associates would keep them informed reminds us that, to take an active role in

---

335 Indeed, in many ways, their engagement in the common enterprise of correspondence might itself be viewed as an act of erudite intimacy, as the two worked together to craft a dialectic literary product. This might have been a minor (or even a non-existent) feature in Cicero's correspondence with Sestius, but with Caelius, we can view the correspondence process as a literary enterprise—Eleanor Leach, "*An Gravius Aliquid Scribam*: Roman *Seniores* Write to *Iuvenes*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 136 (2006): 247-267 makes clear the craft of such exchanges, as well as the potential performative implications.

336 For the imperial period, Carsten Drecoll, *Nachrichten in der Römischen Kaiserzeit: Untersuchungen zu den Nachrichteninhalten in Briefen* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Carsten Drecoll Verlag, 2006) describes in detail the practicalities of the exchange of news in correspondence. He touches on the Republican era, but provides only brief discussion (191-198), with his focus on the *Ad Atticum* collection.

337 Suetonius, *Julius Caesar* 20.1 tells us that Caesar went some way towards changing this during his consulship in 59 when he ordered the publication of the *acta diurna* (the proceedings of the Senate and *populus*). We must remember, however, that even these *acta* depended on aristocratic networks as "reporters." Francisco Pina Polo, "Circulation of Information in Cicero's Correspondence of the Years 59-58 BC," in Cristina Rosillo-López (ed.), *Political Communication in the Roman World* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017), 81-106 discusses the *acta* (with recent references); Barry Baldwin, "The *Acta Diurna*," *Chiron* 9 (1979): 189-203 is the classic treatment.

338 Pina Polo, "Circulation of Information in Cicero's Correspondence of the Years 59-58 BC," notes, for instance, that (81) "the Roman state always maintained regular correspondence with magistrates serving in different areas of the Mediterranean."

339 As an example, at *Ad Brutum* 5 (II.5), Cicero noted that Brutus would have heard from "your people" (*tuos*) about the business in Senate so he does not need the news from Cicero. These unnamed people were likely subordinates such as freedmen, but aristocratic *amici* were also essential links in each other's news networks.

the system of power, participants had to work to maintain awareness of a wide range events and dynamics. Non-elite connections could keep their aristocratic superiors abreast of the outcome of votes in the Senate and assemblies, election results, and verdicts from the courts. But for a practitioner's insight about the meaning of events, projections for the future, or private utterances of other important players in the system, an aristocrat required input from well-placed contacts among his fellow elites. Cicero and some of his more intimate interlocutors—Quintus and Atticus, for instance, and increasingly Sestius and Caelius—seem to have assumed that a constant news channel would remain open to as large an extent as was practicable.[340] By exchanging a consistent flow of reciprocal updates and analysis, I suggest that networks of intimates built up a shared sense of what was going on in the system of power in the Roman world. They delineated a coherent account of the interchange within and between families and among friends, and they developed a shared understanding of the living landscape of *res publica*. This news exchange contributed to an enterprise of "story-making"—the ongoing creation of a communal narrative consciousness.

At the end of the 50s, Caelius and Cicero were each well placed to fill in the gaps in the other's picture of events. While Cicero was disconnected from the urban center during his provincial command, his position as Cilicia's governor enabled him to provide his young friend with privileged access to news about military developments in the Parthian theater. For Caelius, as he pursued his own concerns and maneuvered for Cicero's, he could turn to Cicero for information about the volatile situation on an active front. Cicero's updates would have helped him work for their shared interests and the interests of their group of current associates with greater subtlety and strategy. In addition, even as Cicero furnished his junior *amicus* with a privileged account on affairs in the East, Caelius was able to reciprocate with updates about backroom dealing and *res publica*.

Caelius' perspective would have been especially helpful in the forensic arena. After all, the legal theater was one of Cicero's main "beats" as a man of affairs, and his activity and reputation as an advocate were essential to his particular brand of influence.[341] As a consequence, it was important that he keep tabs on developments in the courts. A representative such as Caelius, who was closely engaged with forensic events, would have been indispensable. Thus, Caelius acted as Cicero's eyes and ears in this venue, sending news of legal procedures and decisions to his senior *amicus*, illustrated with vivid eyewitness details. For instance, Caelius began a letter from October 51 with an extended digest of legal drama, providing the impression that Cicero might care even more about at least some of the court stories than he would about the subsequent report of senatorial deliberations and decisions (*etsi de re publica quae tibi scribam habeo, tamen nihil quod magis gavisurum te putem habeo quam hoc*).[342]

In addition to their exchange about forensic business, the two friends traded insights about events at the center of *res publica* and analysis of the actions and motives of various players. Cicero's absence from the city came during a critical period, and both men pooled insight and exchanged analysis as they worked together to navigate the storm. As a senior statesman, and especially as Pompey's *amicus*, Cicero had closer access to the dynast's disposition and intentions. As a result, in response to Caelius' prompting (*tu si Pompeium, ut volebas, offendisti, qui tibi visus sit et quam orationem*

---

340 There was also exchange of news between contacts of a degree less intimacy, as at *Ad Familiares* 70 (III.8), where Cicero expressed gratitude to Appius for the news of Rome he had passed on. News was clearly part of their regular exchange, but the specific expression of thanks implies that it was not assumed in quite the way that it would have been in the most intimate friendships.

341 Jonathan Powell, Jeremy Paterson, *Cicero the Advocate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) is useful for understanding this particular facet of Cicero's trajectory and profile.

342 *Ad Familiares* 84 (VIII.8): "although I have things that I will tell you about public affairs, nevertheless I have nothing which will make you so glad as this [story from the court]" (*etsi de re publica quae tibi scribam habeo, tamen nihil quod magis gavisurum te putem habeo quam hoc*). He went on to regale Cicero with news of the conviction of Cicero's "friend" (ironic) C. Sempronius Rufus to loud applause, as well as a catalogue of other court business. Shackleton Bailey glosses *calumniam* in this letter, of which Sempronius was accused, as "conviction on a charge of false accusation."

habuerit tecum quamque ostenderit voluntatem… fac mihi perscribas), Cicero gave his young friend a glimpse of the dynast's intimate cogitations.[343] While Cicero claimed that he hesitated to put details in writing (*quae nec possunt scribi nec scribenda sunt*), he was willing to report that, after several days immersed in conversations regarding the state of *res publica* with Pompey back in Rome (*quae nec possunt scribi nec scribenda sunt*), he could assure Caelius that the magnate was falling in line with the perspective he and Caelius shared about the proper direction for public affairs (*iam idem illi et boni et mali cives videntur qui nobis videri solent*.[344] That is to say, Cicero claimed that his discussions with Pompey had brought the magnate's narrative in line with their vision—a vision that was the product of their own exchange of news and their deliberations about the meaning of *res novae*. Thus, since Pompey appeared to be cooperating, Cicero encouraged his young friend to court the dynast's favor.

I suggested above that Cicero had developed substantial respect for his protégé's discerning perspective on public and backroom power dynamics—there was no one πολιτικώτερον, as he had declared. Since Caelius remained well situated in the center of events in the city, the consular could rely on his young friend to help him maintain an up-to-date understanding of the complexities of the landscape of power in the urban core. Caelius fed him details about elections (including Caelius' own competition for the aedileship), tense proceedings in Senate meetings, backroom maneuvering, and the shifting alignments of different players, as some became increasingly hostile to Caesar's agenda and others warmed to his position.[345] Caelius even sent transcripts of Senatorial speeches and *senatus consulta*, along with lists of the tribunes who vetoed them.[346] Each public speech, each bill, and each veto, as we should emphasize, was likely the product of quiet backroom conversations comparable to theirs.

This is an essential point to keep in mind, as we consider the nature of the Roman "political system." Not only during crisis, but also in periods of relative "normalcy," the major events in public affairs must have been the products of countless conversations much like this one. The exchange of news and insight allowed networks of aristocratic friends to develop common understandings of the nature of public affairs. For Cicero and Caelius, their dialogue allowed them to work out a shared picture of the landscape of policy choices and of the positions and alignments of the various actors. They could then negotiate an agenda of their own and write a shared "script" for the proper direction of *res publica*, which they could make manifest in wider discourse, both with their fellow

---

343 *Ad Familiares* 77 (VIII.1): "you, if as you are wont to, you run across Pompey…be sure to write to me how he looked to you to be, what kind of conversation he held with you, and what purpose he revealed" (*tu si Pompeium, ut volebas, offendisti, qui tibi visus sit et quam orationem habuerit tecum quamque ostenderit voluntatem… fac mihi perscribas).*

344 *Ad Familiares* 80 (II.8): "I spent many days with Pompey in conversations about the direction of public affairs. Things which are not able to be written and must not be written; let this be enough, Pompey is a glorious citizen and ready, in both spirit and counsel, for all the things which need to be looked to for the commonwealth. For this reason give yourself over to the man; he will embrace you, believe me. He sees good and bad citizens in the same terms we are wont to" (*cum Pompeio compluris dies nullis in aliis nisi de re publica sermonibus versatus sum. quae nec possunt scribi nec scribenda sunt; tantum habeto, civem egregium esse Pompeium et ad omnia quae providenda sunt in re publica et animo et consilio paratum. qua re da te homini; complectetur, mihi crede. iam idem illi et boni et mali cives videntur qui nobis videri solent*). Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," notes Caelius' doubts about Pompey, and argues (72-73) that that letter specifically represented an attempt to dispel some of this hesitancy and mistrust.

345 E.g. *Ad Familiares* 81 (VIII.4) news from Caelius regarding elections, including complex maneuvering about the candidate Curio whom "as I expect and wish and as he himself tells it, will prefer the 'good men' and the Senate" (*ut spero et volo et ut se fert ipse, bonos et senatum malet*) and about his own contest for aedile, debate in the Senate about pay for Pompey's troops; anticipation about the consul-elect Paullus' speech and maybe an inkling of a change of heart away from the *optimates*; 82 (VIII.9) their antagonist Hirrus' defeat, who was now playing the anti-Caesarian after losing, also other election news; 84 (VIII.8) Curio making ready for opposition to Caesar; 86 (VIII.6) Curio going over to Caesar and the populists. Caelius' own career was a paradigm case of the changeable allegiances of the period. In the end, Cicero's junior *amicus* would flip to Caesar himself, in spite of implying inclination to the Senate and the *boni* in his correspondence with Cicero in the months leading up to the conflict. He fought against Pompey in the civil war and received a praetorship in recompense. When a debt relief program he proposed was rejected, however, he turned against Caesar and died during an abortive uprising in 48 (Cassius Dio, *Roman History* XLII.25).

346 *Ad Familiares* 84 (VIII.8) for the *senatus consulta* and the record of tribunes; 91 (VIII.11) for the Senate speeches contained in the appended *commentarii*.

aristocrats and in the communicative venues that brought aristocrats into contact with non-elites.[347] Their group's consensus was set alongside, in conversation and competition with, other agendas that had also been articulated in comparable off-stage discussions—analogous scripts composed for performance in the theater of *res publica*. One subgroup might organize the consensus behind a legislative proposal, for instance, while another might counter with a tribunician veto from one of its representatives. These backstage conversations would have overlapped, at least to a degree. As we have seen, these subgroups were not closed silos. If Crassus had remained alive, perhaps pursuing an extended campaign on the eastern frontier as proconsul in Syria, Caelius might have been trading an analogous sequence of letters with his other mentor. Moreover, especially in the context of our discussion of asymmetric friendships, it is essential to highlight the extent to which a junior partner contributed to the direction of their consortium of associates. The consensus of this subgroup was not merely dictated from above. It emerged as the product of a dialectic process—not a dialogue of perfect "peers," perhaps, but also far from unilateral dictation.

Much as he did with his friends among the *consulares*, Cicero also traded commissions and services with his junior *amicus*. Cicero's role as governor was a potent perch in many respects. It granted him substantial formal power in his province, and it offered opportunities to reinforce his position with provincial communities and networks of equestrian businessmen outside the city.[348] But the fate of a commander—any decisions concerning the length of his tenure or regarding supplications or triumphs awarded for victories—depended on decisions taken in the city.[349] Aristocratic influence was the product of personal presence, or failing that, it relied on the presence

---

347 The most obvious example of such a venue is the *contio*. The bibliography on *contiones* is vast, but Robert Morstein-Marx, "Persuading the People in the Roman Participatory Context," in Dean Hammer, (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 294-309 provides a useful and current summary of scholarship along with extensive references, tracing the evolution of the scholarly debate over the past decades concerning the nature and function of the *contio*; Morstein-Marx's initial and most comprehensive statement of his arguments was his *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Among recent work, see especially Francisco Pina Polo, "*Contio*, *Auctoritas,* and Freedom of Speech in Republican Rome," in Stéphane Benoist, (ed.), *Rome, a City and its Empire in Perspective: the Impact of the Roman World through Fergus Millar's Research = Rome, une Cité Impériale en Jeu: l'Impact du Monde Romain selon Fergus Millar* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 45-58, along with many of the contributions in Catherine Steel, Henriette van der Blom (eds.), *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

348 The nature of the governor's relations with provincials is the subject of intense debate. Ernst Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 BC)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) was seminal, using a method based on provincial onomastics (in epigraphy) to reconstruct a thick web of provincial *clientelae*, which were established by aristocrats serving in provincial commands. He saw this web of patronage relations (blurring *patrocinium*, *amicitia*, and *hospitium*) as the basis of Rome's governance of its provinces. Moreover, he argued that these networks had a profound impact on internal politics back in the city of Rome and that they stood behind the influence of the great statesmen. Many of the contributions in Jehne, Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration* pick apart some of the fundamental premises of Badian's book (and the assumptions that it left as its legacy). The contributors decouple *hospitium*, *amicitia*, and *societas* from *clientela* and question the ability to readily translate foreign connections directly into influence in the capital. Claude Eilers, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) is essential on the relations between the Roman magnate and the eastern provincial city, arguing against the automatic formation of *clientelae* between a serving governor and cities under his jurisdiction—(29): "Provincial officials predominate among patrons because provincial cities were more likely to have contact with them and thus have the opportunity of pursuing a permanent relationship" (although this is not to say the a provincial governorship was not the most common vector for the creation of bonds between provincials and high-level aristocrats). Eilers argues that the bond depended on individual initiative and was not automatic. Initiative often rested with the provincials. Most recent contributors to this discussion dispute the unquestioned assumption that "patronage" could encompass the wide range of bonds and paint a far more nuanced picture of the different forms of connection between *imperatores* and provincials. With regard to relationships between Cicero (and other senators) and their equestrian connections, I discuss these below in Chapter 4 on recommendations—a governor's posting gave a senator particular utility as a connection for equestrians with investments in the provinces. Such connections depended on a combination of proximity, access to useful levers of formal power, and personal amity—a governor would often be in a position to be helpful to equestrian business interests, because of his judicial preeminence in his province and because of his connections to other provincial officials with jurisdiction over the relevant regulations and legal cases.

349 Christian Rollinger, "Ciceros *Supplicatio* und Aristokratische Konkurrenz im Senat der Späten Republik," *Klio* 99 (2017), 192-225 provides a subtle analysis of the process of negotiating for Cicero's *supplicatio* and discussion of the dynamics of aristocratic obligation (and occasionally enmity) showcased by such a process. Mary Beard, *The Roman Triumph* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), especially 187-218 treats the process of awarding a triumph and its complexities and inconsistencies.

of an agent who could act as a credible proxy in the specific circumstances. While he was away, a commander was removed from the urban center. Without assistance from representatives who were willing to follow his instructions and look out for his interests in his absence, he could not bring his influence to bear.

As his service abroad continued, Cicero became ever more desperate to return to the city. He was sick and tired of the province and missed his friends and family—especially Caelius, or at least so he told his younger friend in a letter from April of 50 (*mirum me desiderium tenet urbis, incredibile meorum atque in primis tui, satietas autem provinciae*).[350] He claimed that he could do more for the common weal back in the city, as had been his custom throughout his life (*maiora onera in re publica sustinere et possim et soleam*).[351] Cicero worried that uncertainties about Caesar's reappointment might gum up the works for other provincial transitions. Military escalation with the Parthians might find him trapped in his province and forced to undertake high-stakes military action (many of Cicero's peers, ironically, would have given an arm and a leg for such an opportunity).[352] Responding to Cicero's urgent pleas, Caelius worked against the extension of Cicero's command, recalling, as he noted in a letter to Cicero from November of 51, the *mandata* Cicero had left with him when they parted (*decedens…mandaris*).[353] He was at least able to guarantee that he could prevent prorogation of the tenure, which would allow Cicero to return to the city after appointing a deputy (*illud certe praestabo, ne amplius prorogetur*).[354]

Even Cicero, however war-averse when compared to his peers, was not immune to the temptation of a triumph and found it difficult to resist the allure of its attendant symbolic rewards.[355] Thus, when Cicero began to make plans surrounding his return, Caelius tried to help him win a *supplicatio* for his successes. In *Ad Familiares* 91 (VIII.11), a letter from April of 50, Caelius described his own role as if he were the one in charge of coordinating the effort, directing a circle of Cicero's associates in a campaign of collective action.[356] Caelius was a key agent, but he was by no means the only connection Cicero tapped to help him accomplish these two goals. Often with Caelius' aid, Cicero tried to mobilize as much of his network as possible. The matter is mentioned in most of the dozens of letters preserved from 51 and 50, and the struggle came to involve intimates such as Atticus, as well as a circle of *amici*, including Appius, Cassius, Curio, and Cato.[357] Each of Cicero's

---

350 *Ad Familiares* 90 (II.11): "a marvelous desire for the city holds me in its grip—an incredible longing for my circle of intimates and you among their foremost ranks—added to this, a surfeit of the province" (*mirum me desiderium tenet urbis, incredibile meorum atque in primis tui, satietas autem provinciae*).

351 *Ad Familiares* 90 (II.11): "I am both accustomed and able to bear greater burdens on behalf of the common weal" (*maiora onera in re publica sustinere et possim et soleam*).

352 *Ad Familiares* 90 (II.11): "fear of a great war impends, which it seems I can avoid if I depart at the appointed day" (*belli magni timor impendet, quod videmur effugere si ad constitutam diem decedemus*). Shackleton Bailey explains that a Parthian army had wintered inside the province of Syria and large-scale war seemed imminent. At 83 (VIII.5), Caelius expressed the wish that they could manage events so that there would be just enough war for a triumph but not enough for real danger.

353 *Ad Familiares* 87 (VIII.10): "it is proper to my duty to recall with what an earnest entreaty you charged me, as you were departing, not to allow it [a prorogation] to happen" (*mei offici est meminisse qua obtestatione decedens mihi ne paterer fieri mandaris*).

354 *Ad Familiares* 87 (VIII.10): "as regards your retirement from your province, I cannot promise certainly that a successor will be appointed; I will definitely make good on the promise that your tenure will not be prolonged further" (*Quod ad tuum decessum attinet, illud tibi non possum polliceri, me curaturum ut tibi succedatur; illud certe praestabo, ne amplius prorogetur*).

355 *Ad Familiares* 209 (VII.23) provides testimony to Cicero's relatively "peace-loving" reputation: he expressed his shock that anyone could imagine that he of all people would ever think to decorate his house with a statue of the war god Mars. This, he claimed, would be utterly out of character for him.

356 In *Ad Familiares* 91 (VIII.11), Caelius described his own role as if he were the one in charge of coordinating the effort: "Furnius and Lentulus canvassed and worked with us just as if it were their own affair, as was proper" (*Furnius et Lentulus, ut debuerunt, quasi eorum res esset una nobiscum circumierunt et laborarunt*); "it was reported to us that Hirrus was going to speak at great length. We got hold of him" (*renuntiatum nobis erat Hirrum diutius dicturum. prendimus eum*). Caelius was always a central and organizing figure in the "we" struggling on Cicero's behalf.

357 Including Atticus (it crops up in most of the dozens of letters written in 51 and 50) and also less intimate interlocutors like Appius—*Ad Familiares* 76 (III.13); Cassius—106 (XV.14); Curio—107 (II.7); Cato—110 (XV.4) among other letters (Cato was particularly important because of the role he could play in representing Cicero's interests in meetings of the Senate).

close associates would have had a personal interest in the symbolic elevation of a distinguished member of their extended subgroup. At the very least, the tribute would position their coalition to have greater influence when opportunities emerged for other members to win *honores* and accolades.

For a commander on campaign, the network of friends was the main vector of his influence—his means of making his personal presence manifest while he was away from the capital (and this was true for every commander, as much for Caesar on a larger scale as it was for Cicero's more modest purposes).[358] Although in 50, Caelius was still a relatively junior member of Cicero's network of friends in terms of age and formal status, he played a central and coordinating function, both in preventing the extension of Cicero's tenure and in maneuvering for the *supplicatio*. Caelius acted as a tactical core for what we might view as Cicero's "representative team"—the group of friends who replicated Cicero's presence during his absence. Indeed, we might even say that, empowered by their *amicitia*, they acted as a sort of collective "second self."

As a result of the combination of their particular intimacy and the lack of competition unique to an intergenerational relationship, Caelius was ideally situated to represent his senior *amicus*' interests in public affairs. By this point, the younger man was already a competent and well-connected operator in the aristocratic community, and the "filial" obligation he owed to his mentor made him an especially diligent agent. Beyond this, the asymmetry of their bond meant that the two men were not direct competitors for glory, which, by contrast, was an inevitable concern with peer friends.[359] It was only within an age cohort that the competition for glory only had to be zero-sum. Because of their age gap, Caelius and Cicero could not only rejoice in but also work for each other's glorification, without worrying that the other man's success would diminish opportunities for his own. Indeed, each could derive direct benefit from the other's achievements, since he would gain from the empowerment of an intimate ally.

During Cicero's tenure in Cilicia, the two friends also traded services beyond grand public affairs. Caelius called on Cicero for aid in a matter, which, while superficially routine, was nonetheless important to his own trajectory and to the advancement of his reputation as a noteworthy figure. Caelius pestered Cicero to help him acquire panthers for the games he would have to give as aedile, repeating his appeal in four of the letters preserved in the *Ad Familiares*.[360] Although the request seems prosaic, the incessant repetition points to the importance of the commission for a young aristocrat trying to establish his standing with the populace. While Cicero struggled to find the desired beasts, he appears to have recognized the importance of the matter to Caelius' future prospects. He assured Caelius that the success of his term as aedile was a matter of great concern to him (*mihi mehercule magnae curae est aedilitas tua*) and made protestations that, in spite of the surprising scarcity of panthers (*mira paucitas*), he was making every effort that he could.[361] We can note here how Caelius' personal connection to a consular with a powerful posting in the East opened up possibilities that might otherwise have remained out of reach. The young magistrate could consider bringing exotic entertainments to the city, which would have given him the opportunity to stage the kind of memorable games that would fuel his rise up the ladder of renown

---

358 As Caesar's eager desire to cultivate Cicero testifies (discussed above in the chapter on friendships with the dynasts).

359 In like manner, Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," 178 gives the lack of competition permitted by their status differential credit for Caelius' ability to offer Cicero especially candid advice, whereas with Appius, shared membership in a close age cohort created underlying conditions of competition for a limited set of honors.

360 *Ad Familiares* 78 (VIII.2), 82 (VIII.9), 84 (VIII.8), 88 (VIII.6), for Caelius' pestering about panthers. Leach, "*An Gravius Aliquid Scribam*: Roman *Seniores* Write to *Iuvenes*," 259 notes that the panther theme both helps to constitute a thread of humor and also represents a serious concern.

361 In *Ad Familiares* 90 (II.11): "concerning the panthers, there is a diligent effort underway on my orders by those who customarily hunt them. But there is an incredible scarcity…nevertheless, the affair is undertaken with painstaking attention and especially by Patiscus. Whatever the fruit of this will be, it will be yours; but what this will be I simply do not know. Your aedileship is a matter of great concern to me, by Hercules!" (*de pantheris per eos qui venari solent agitur mandatu meo diligenter. sed mira paucitas est…sed tamen sedulo fit et in primis a Patisco. quicquid erit, tibi erit; sed quid esset plane nesciebamus. mihi mehercule magnae curae est aedilitas tua*).

and influence. Whether or not Caelius' fixation bore fruit in this instance, he obsessed over his panthers with good reason.[362]

We see here how, in addition to its function in shaping policy, the aristocratic network negotiated the practical building blocks of the various public performances necessary to establish reputation and win electoral success. That is to say, this communal interchange was essential for organizing the performative mechanisms by which the will of the aristocratic network was transformed into governing power over the *populus*. Public spectacle was as much a product of the private negotiations of the aristocratic community as were more explicitly "political" legislative and electoral initiatives. It was through the social institutions of the aristocratic community that elite Romans negotiated the mechanisms of pageantry they used to dominate the non-elite population.[363]

We have seen already how court news was a regular feature of the discourse between the young advocate and his absent mentor. On one occasion, their forensic exchange went beyond news. Since Cicero was not able to be present in person to represent legal clients while abroad, he asked the young advocate to act as his patronal proxy. He requested that Caelius take on M. Fabius Gallus as a *cliens*—a friend of Cicero's who, as Cicero wrote, was distinguished for unusual modesty (*singularem modestiam*) and whom Cicero cherished as a fellow intellectual and scholar (*diligo cum propter summum ingenium eius summamque doctrinam*).[364] By implication, this was a man with whom the young advocate could identify. Cicero acknowledged that he was conscious of the pressures of a popular advocate's schedule (*novi ego vos magnos patronos; hominem occidat oportet qui vestra opera uti velit*).[365] He of all people would know. But in this case, appealing to his young friend's affection (tapping into the social capital he had stored in this relational account, as we might put it), he asked Caelius to prioritize the matter as if it were Cicero's own affair.[366] They shared a personal connection sufficiently strong that Cicero could trust an appeal to affection to add force to the efficacy of a recommendation, trading on the assumption that practical "impersonation" was a natural extension of the love shared by such long-term friends.

Cicero was asking Caelius for substantial favor, and he certainly took care to frame it as such to the young man. But the elder statesman can also be seen as contributing his own offering to the exchange, if a far subtler gift. By acknowledging Caelius' popularity as an advocate, and by asking the younger man to stand in for him in a case he would have argued himself, Cicero was generously granting Caelius' legal practice implicit parity with his own—or, at least, parity with the practice he had sustained as a rising advocate in his younger years. While the phenomenon was not nearly as explicit as we saw between *consulares* above, Cicero was introducing a version of the *alter ego* dynamic into their relationship, asking Caelius to stand in for him as his direct substitute while he was out of the city—to "impersonate" him, at least in the limited sphere of the courts. This was an early nod, I suggest, towards future parity—the beginning of the elision of asymmetry.

Cicero also called on his young friend's aid in a family matter. When he appealed to his network of *amici* for help finding an appropriate match for Tullia, Cicero brought Caelius in as a

---

362 Egon Flaig, *Ritualisierte Politik. Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom*. Historische Semantik Band 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2003), 232-260 for the essential role of these games in Roman political culture.

363 Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) provides extensive and useful discussion of what he calls "civic rituals" (throughout, but especially ch.5). See the Introduction for more discussion and references of this aspect of the aristocratic community's hegemonic system.

364 *Ad Familiares* 89 (II.14): "I feel affection for him because of his high intellectual capacity and extraordinary learning on the one hand, and on the other because of his exceptional modesty" (*tum diligo cum propter summum ingenium eius summamque doctrinam tum propter singularem modestiam*). While Cicero was away from Rome on a trip to his hometown of Arpinum in 46, for instance, he used the same Gallus whom he had asked Caelius to defend as proxy buyer at an auction—*Ad Familiares* 209 (VII.23).

365 *Ad Familiares* 89 (II.14): "I know you great legal patrons; someone has to kill a man if he wants to make use of your services (*novi ego vos magnos patronos; hominem occidat oportet qui vestra opera uti velit*).

366 *Ad Familiares* 89 (II.14): "You will leave all other affairs aside, if you love me" (*omnia relinques, si me amabis*). Shackleton Bailey points out that Cicero praised Cornificius' oratorical practice in similar terms—205 (XII.18).

leading member of the committee he delegated to search for a groom. Caelius recalled, in a letter to Cicero from 50, that as the consul left the city, he had entrusted this commission to his protégé (*quid mihi discedens mandaris memini*).[367] It was Caelius, in February of 50, who put forward the recommendation that Cicero ultimately followed, offering a strong hint that, in spite of potential repercussions for his relationship with Appius Claudius, Cicero should link his daughter to Dolabella (*illud mihi occurrit, quod inter postulationem et nominis delationem uxor a Dolabella discessit*).[368] Again, the young operator had a chance to demonstrate his precocious capacity to understand and navigate the community's informal corridors.[369] As a further sign of his understanding of the subtle ebb and flow of aristocratic social dynamics, Caelius advised Cicero that it would be wise to keep silent about the choice until Dolabella resolved his suit against Appius—a premature leak might damage Cicero's reputation (*invidiosum tibi sit si emanarit*).[370]

Marriage might have been a family affair, but in this instance, the boundaries between "public" and "private" blur. Matrimonial links provided key institutional junctions between the aristocratic community's family organizations. In a sense, it was natural for the process of organizing a marriage to become a communal project. After all, the various players might all have personal interests in the outcome. On the one hand, the bond would create a new alignment between Cicero and Dolabella, along with their respective circles. But at the same time, fresh tension between *consulares* like Cicero and Appius would influence each of these major player's networks of associates, complicating other affiliations. New marriage alliances between important families could create tectonic shifts in aristocratic networks. The effects, while subtle, could have transformative implications across the community. Rather than viewing a marriage alignment as a strictly "private" affair, it may be more useful to think of such social realignments as happening on the level of a "community sphere"—neither absolutely public nor limited to a restricted set of individuals.

As an active operator in the aristocratic community, connected by his own bonds to each of the players implicated in the marriage discussion, Caelius had a personal stake in the social rearrangement that might ensue. Later that same year, in fact, he would quarrel openly with Appius. In a letter from September, he would report to Cicero, as if with great surprise, that, in light of his earlier sentiments and behavior favorable to Appius, he was mortified to report great injuries he had received at the hands of the *homo ingratissimus* (*pudet me tibi confiteri et queri de Appi, hominis ingratissimi, iniuriis*).[371] As his relations with Appius frayed, Caelius might even have come to believe that it was in his interests to maneuver his mentor away from his friendship with the patrician. The younger man's role in the marriage negotiation demonstrates the extent to which someone still relatively low on the formal ladder of offices could take the lead in organizing realignments that would affect the shape of the broader community's social landscape. To some extent, an aristocrat's seniority and formal status dictated the weight given to his needs and interests. But this was not a system in which the exercise

---

367 *Ad Familiares* 88 (VIII.6): "I recall the commission you entrusted to me as you were going away" (*quid mihi discedens mandaris memini*). Shackleton Bailey mentions that an earlier letter from Caelius may have introduced Dolabella's name for consideration.

368 *Ad Familiares* 88 (VIII.6): "it occurred to me, in between the initial application and the laying of the charge, that Dolabella's wife had left him" (*illud mihi occurrit, quod inter postulationem et nominis delationem uxor a Dolabella discessit*).

369 Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," highlights Caelius' precocity as an operator in the contemporary landscape of power, as well as the active roles of the protagonists in the arrangement, Tullia and Dolabella. This was a network where the younger actors often played a key role in determining both options and outcomes. Jeppesen-Wigelsworth provides extensive discussion of the events surrounding the marriage negotiation and their relationship to other currents within the broader landscape of aristocratic social power.

370 *Ad Familiares* 88 (VIII.6*):* "it would be damaging to your reputation if the matter leaked out" (*invidiosum tibi sit si emanarit*); Habinek, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," 177-178 argues that it was the status differential between Cicero and Caelius that allowed the younger man to give such advice and to recommend specific courses of action with sincere candor.

371 *Ad Familiares* 98 (VIII.12): "I am abashed to confess to you, and to complain of, the injuries I received from that most ungrateful Appius" (*pudet me tibi confiteri et queri de Appi, hominis ingratissimi, iniuriis*).

of influence was purely top-down, or age and formal status created strictly enforced hierarchies, especially in personal interchange lying just beneath the surface of *res publica*.[372] Because of the position Caelius occupied in his and Cicero's network of associates, and because of the sense of trust and identity he had built with his mentor over the course of years, the younger man had access to social levers that allowed him to steer the alignments of statesmen who were substantially senior to him. The asymmetric friendship helped grant him this privileged access and the influence that followed from such entrée.

With his quarrel with Appius, Caelius introduced a wrinkle into the relations between their subgroup and other blocs within the aristocratic community. When conflict broke out between Caelius and Appius, Cicero found himself tugged in opposite directions by obligation to his two *amici*. At least according to Caelius, Appius—who appears to have been indebted to Caelius for important assistance during Dolabella's recent prosecutorial attack—tried to stealthily subvert the younger aristocrat and, even more egregiously, to blame him for the breach (*me causa<m> inimicitiarum quaerere clamitavit*).[373] Caelius could argue that his claim to *amicitia* with Cicero, emerging as it did from a pseudo-filial association cultivated over the course of years, had greater weight than Appius' more recent and artificial bond. An asymmetric friendship, that is, could plausibly outweigh a "peer" bond. Trading on this connection, Caelius asked his senior friend to take his injuries to heart and avenge them, as he claimed he habitually did for Cicero (*a te peto ut meas iniurias proinde doleas ut me existimas et dolere et ulcisci tuas solere*).[374]

Caelius appears to have been operating under the assumption that there could be different levels of *amicitia*. Since his bond with Cicero was more intimate and longer lasting than Appius', Caelius could make a case that Cicero owed him a higher degree of fidelity. Level of obligation to another aristocrat seems to have been based on more than that man's influence and power: shared tastes and interests, as well as a common vision of the direction of public affairs, played their parts in determining how much one participant in the aristocratic network owed another—all in dialogue, of course, with the vagaries of personal history. The kind of mentorship bond Caelius and Cicero shared created an especially rich history for the friendship, with all the benefits and ramifications of exceptional intimacy.

Conclusion: Function and Emotion

Amicitia was both functional and emotional. And these two factors were in no way distinct. The level of function depended, to a great extent, on the quality and history of shared affection. Indeed, it was precisely because they were rooted in emotional depth that asymmetric mentorship bonds, such as the relationships Cicero constructed over the course of years with Sestius and Caelius, could grow into such high quality social resources—resources indispensable to participants in the aristocratic community's system of power. Such mentorship bonds helped grant a level of integration to this community that would otherwise have remained impossible. They offered opportunities for junior statesmen to join established circles of power and gave established figures access to agents, as well as specific institutional functions only available in fleeting stretches to aristocrats holding the various offices on the way up the *cursus*. At the same time, these ties could

---

372 The fact that Cicero followed Atticus' priorities even against his inclination (befriending Hortensius, keeping Pompey at arm's length)—or that he allowed Brutus' business interests to dictate his actions during his time in the east (Brutus would not even reach the praetorship until 45)—testifies that other factors besides formal status could contribute to the hierarchy in particular decisions. Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," discusses both the Atticus and the Brutus cases.

373 *Ad Familiares* 98 (VIII.12) presents an extended description of the complex maneuvering both men undertook (in private conversations with other contacts) to make the blame fall on the other and discusses the suits that the two brought against each other in a battle to get retribution.

374 *Ad Familiares* 90 (VIII.12)): "I ask you to take my injuries to heart as you are well aware I am accustomed to empathize with and avenge yours" (*a te peto ut meas iniurias proinde doleas ut me existimas et dolere et ulcisci tuas solere*).

leave the younger members grateful and affectionate towards their mentors, and they could give the established generation a heartfelt sense of emotional investment in the wellbeing of their successors. Indeed, shared fondness for promising young *amici* might even militate against competitive rancor, facilitating the kind of collaboration necessary for a community to undertake the function of governance for the society.

Asymmetric friendships, such as those between Cicero and his younger protégées Sestius and Caelius, played an integral role in the late Republican aristocratic community's social institutional landscape. They facilitated elite recruitment and advancement, drawing a new generation of the "right sort" of younger aristocrats into the ranks of the powerful and helping to pass vital stocks of knowledge across generations—knowledge, for instance, about the function of civic institutions and military command, along with the knowledge about how to operate in the landscape of business and financial interchange. This kind of knowledge was an essential possession of the aristocratic community as a collective, helping to differentiate the elite stratum from the rest of the society.

Mentorship bonds could allow an older generation to build loyalty (however imperfect) among the members of the rising generation. Competition was less "zero sum" when the protagonists did not belong to the same age cohort, and senior *amici* could invest in junior colleagues with relative impunity, or at least with less worry that their younger colleagues would compete for the same social and symbolic resources that they coveted for themselves. But as much as mentorship bonds could create potent loyalty, we need to emphasize that these relationships were by no means "exclusive." Aristocratic networks were not sealed silos, joined only by friendships among the *principes* at their head. Asymmetric friendships could create interconnection across the generations of different elite families, linking the Roman aristocratic community across family boundaries, generations, and ranks—a community that, by the late Republican period, was spread across much of the Italian peninsula. Within this community, ongoing informal interchange between groups of friends of different ages and orders remained a structuring principle. The exchange of daily news, as well as more extensive and highly constructed texts, could help such "subgroups" of associates build up their own coherent common narratives—to articulate off stage the "scripts" for their engagement with *res publica*.

The discourse within these subgroups was not the dialogue of perfect peers, to be sure, but as we have seen, it was by no means a process of unilateral dictation. In the asymmetric friendships that served as case studies above, we often found the junior member introducing his own opinions and concerns into the discourse of the friendship, while the elder at times acted as the agent of his younger friends interests. While the partners in such friendships did not play the same role, I have suggested that status gaps were meant to collapse over time. The institution of asymmetric friendship served as one of the fundamental pillars of the "Republican" system—a framework in which parity and power sharing were paramount, and a wide variety of actors could at least aspire to win their way into the circle of *principes* who shared the summit.

Chapter 4: The System of Recommendations

Introductory Note

In a system of power that relied so heavily on informal and individual bonds, personal connections were essential for any action that required coordination. Young aristocrats seeking the offices and posts that would lead to advancement, military commanders gathering their staff, property owners and businessmen negotiating deals and contracts, and scholars and intellectuals looking to disseminate texts or gather information all depended on personal networks to connect them with the people who could help them realize their priorities. Here in Chapter 4, the second chapter of the section on the dynamics of asymmetry, I turn to recommendations.[375] The recommendation process was an essential mechanism for integrating a diverse and diffuse aristocratic community as a functional web, with the operation of the network lubricated by the discourse and the reality of personal affection. *Commendatio* was a dynamic that could benefit all involved, bringing both recommenders and recommended the assistance and support they needed, both to carry out specific goals and to advance their broader interests and agendas. This study has essential implications with regard to the nature of the system of power in the late Republic and the role of *amicitia* within this framework. I will argue that recommendations served as one of the aristocratic community's key social institutions, facilitating collective action and mediating the composition and unceasing transformation of the landscape of alignments.[376]

Recommendations could act as instruments of coordination among members of the elite who held different levels and varieties of power and influence. In addition, they could facilitate productive connection between aristocrats and non-elites who were closely affiliated with the community, such as Greek intellectuals and freedmen. By extension, the process led to a sort of "vertical integration," both within the aristocratic community itself and between aristocrats and members of associated sub-elite constituencies. We should not envision a clearly stratified hierarchy, however, with higher-level senators benevolently dispensing favors to unquestioned inferiors, expecting obsequious gratitude in repayment. Instead, recommenders were often anxious to cater to the interests of men who were formally their subordinates. It mattered deeply, even to the highest-level actors, that their beneficiaries recognized how much they had gained from the efforts of the recommenders. On a functional level, in fact, the more influence a man wielded in the system, the more he needed the goodwill and aid of a broad network of well-respected and well-heeled supporters to give substance to his *auctoritas*. As we must always remember, aristocratic influence did not exist in a social vacuum: the very men who were being recommended made up the body of Rome's aristocratic community. It was only as a function of the perceptions of fellow members of the community that aristocrats could acquire and retain reputation and influence in the system of

---

375 The most comprehensive study of the system of recommendations is Élizabeth Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993), providing a prosopographic study of recommendations within the Ciceronian corpus and cataloguing instances of some of the structuring dynamics. Hannah Cotton's work has also been important on this subject—see, Hannah Cotton, "Cicero, *Ad Familiares* XIII.26 and 28: Evidence for *Revocatio* or *Reiectio Romae/Romam*?," *Journal of Roman Studies* 69 (1979), "Greek and Latin Epistolary Formulae: Some Light on Cicero's Letter Writing," *The American Journal of Philology* 105 (1984): 409-42, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," *The American Journal of Philology* 106 (1985): 328-334, "The Role of Cicero's Letters of Recommendation: *Iustitia versus Gratia*?," *Hermes* 114 (1986): 443-460; more recent, and also useful is Roger Rees, "Letters of Recommendation and the Rhetoric of Praise," in Ruth Morello, Andrew Morrison (eds.), *Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 149-168. Jon Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters* explores (31-33) the conventionalized language of *commendationes*, noting, as will be important to my argument, the intentional divergences from conventional structures. Meike Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018) offers an exploration related to the analysis that follows in this chapter, examining the power dynamics between author and addressee in addition to the position of the *laudandus*. She approaches these letters from the perspective of communication theory. None of these studies pursue the implications for the nature of the aristocratic system of power and its idiosyncratic brand of "republicanism"—the goal of the chapter that follows.

376 As social institutions, *commendatio* and *amicitia* were intimately connected. *Commendatio* can be viewed, for the most part, as a more delimited institution nested within a broader umbrella institution.

power in the late Republic.[377] Moreover, recommendations served another essential purpose in the organization of aristocratic influence: because they helped grant individuals access to the influence, skills, positions, and assets of other members of the community, they facilitated a degree of "specialization," allowing aristocrats to focus on particular aspects of elite activity—office-seeking, for instance, or business and finance, legal practice, or scholarship and literary production—without sacrificing access to the range of aristocratic power resources.

By writing recommendations and following through on letters received from friends, higher-level *amici* could create and discharge the obligation that provided much of the raw material for connection—the currency, we might say, in the transactions in which social capital was made and spent. Both by providing recommendations to associates and by fulfilling recommendations they received, aristocrats were able to perform much needed practical service. They could act as brokers to connect people to resources such as social connections, formal levers of official power, and material assets that they required, or they could provide these resources themselves. Recommendations also bred personal affection and the habit of collective action between peers. In addition, they gave networks affiliated with higher-level aristocrats the chance to interact and to some extent to become enmeshed. We might envision *commendatio* as a sort of "class solidarity mechanism," facilitating the development of a loosely shared aristocratic idiom, identity, and agenda by melding the interests and affections of elite actors from various subgroups, backgrounds, and career trajectories.

The addressee of a letter of recommendation would hear a favorable report of the original benefactor when he accepted the task of helping its bearer, and both men would now possess a bond of their own rooted in their shared fondness for the beneficiary. To a degree, the recommendation process led to an exchange of connections between aristocratic subgroups. It helped lower-level elites pass regularly between circles, as well as sub-elites who participated in aristocratic subgroups, working against siloization within the aristocratic community. It hindered the development of isolated "factions" under the sole direction of single high-level *nobiles* and helped the boundaries between circles remain permeable.

This conclusion militates against the idea that "patronage" acted as a guiding institution to mediate links between members of the elite in the late Republican aristocratic community.[378] Patronage is predicated on ongoing, reciprocal benefaction between a superior and an inferior who are divided by unquestioned asymmetry, and it implies at least a degree of exclusivity in loyalty. *Patrocinium-clientela* bonds certainly structured some relations between some elites and non-elites, although they were not the broadly explanatory political force that early-twentieth century scholars claimed. But between aristocrats themselves, this movement among groups shows that loyalties were not even supposed to remain undivided. Ongoing reciprocity was a general social principle not limited to "patronage" relations, and as I have argued throughout the preceding chapters, hierarchies were often strikingly permeable and the principle of aspirational parity was key to the "Republican" system. Thus, even in the context of our discussion of recommendations, which are often viewed as important vehicles of "patronage," the language of "patronage" obscures more than it illuminates.[379]

In this chapter, as I have throughout the project, I use analysis of Cicero's letters as a window. With regard to this topic, book XIII of the *Ad Familiares* collection is key, in which the

[377] In fact, no influence exists in a vacuum. It is essential to keep in mind that power and authority in all societies are inevitably the product of recognition by the other members of one's community.
[378] I provide references in the introduction with regard to Roman patronage and its connection with *amicitia*.
[379] By contrast, Deniaux makes extensive use of this language, as does Rees, although Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 189-200 does engage with the issue with some subtlety and qualifies the reach of the term.

editor assembled the vast majority of the *commendationes*.[380] Most of the recommendations preserved in Cicero's correspondence were written to magistrates in the provinces, and their authors aimed to acquire aid for the beneficiary that relied on the official powers and position of the recipient (on his *imperium* and *potestas*). Nonetheless, the letters were appeals to the magistrate as a moral individual. The recommender would speak to personal qualities—*humanitas*, *liberalitas*, *voluntas*, *integritas*, *mansuetudo*, *clementia*, *studium*, *officium*—that did not stem directly from this formal post.[381] As much as the recommendations were designed to connect people to power resources—and as much as such letters often asked the magistrate to subvert strict standards of justice—they were framed as appeals to ethical quality.[382] It is difficult to say whether this would have appeared as ironic to the participants as it can to the modern interpreter.[383]

The recommender would appeal to a sense of identity between himself and the recipient that was rooted in the ideals of *amicitia*—in an agreement in virtue and a *consensio studiorum*.[384] Since the *commendatus* was the *amicus* of the recommender, too, he was also part of this community of identity. As a natural extension of this logic, the bearer of the recommendation ought to deserve access to the affection of the other members of this group, as well as to their power resources and practical assistance. *Amicitia* was the accepted idiom of interconnection, and it was an integral part of the institutional structure through which the aristocratic community shared resources and coordinated collective action. Thus, we should not be surprised that the letters were sometimes formulaic.[385] When a recommender wanted to lift a particular beneficiary above the common herd, he was compelled to expend extra effort.[386] We will encounter a spectrum of sincerity in the *commendationes*, ranging between superficial rhetorical window dressing and heartfelt regard, without a hard line dividing the "formulaic" from the "sincere." While I address the subtle distinctions repeatedly in my discussion below, it is never possible to be absolutely certain of the particular mix of sincerity and superficiality in each interaction. Nonetheless, I am optimistic that we can read some of the gradations with a degree of clarity.

I devote the initial portion of the chapter to the recommendation Cicero wrote to Caesar on behalf of the young jurist Trebatius. When we encountered this case in the second chapter, it furnished evidence for the "peer" friendship between Cicero and Caesar. But I return to it from a different angle here, using it to illuminate the intricacies of the extended process of aristocratic

---

380 Cotton, "Cicero, *Ad Familiares* XIII.26 and 28: Evidence for *Revocatio* or *Reiectio Romae/Romam*?," revived the theory first put forward in L. Gurlitt, *De M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulis Earumque Pristina Collectione* (Diss. Götting. 1879) that this small collection was, in fact, put together during Cicero's own lifetime. The hypothesis has seemed doubtful to many scholars, however.

381 Cotton, "The Role of Cicero's Letters of Recommendation: *Iustitia versus Gratia*?," 443. We should add, however, as Cotton does not, that while such qualities certainly did not emerge from the position, it might be unwarranted to assume that they were not seen as directly relevant to administrative service.

382 Cotton, "The Role of Cicero's Letters of Recommendation: *Iustitia versus Gratia*?," 444 points out that "most of the recommendations are written on behalf of Roman *negotiatores* and *publicani* whose interests often, if not always, clashed with those of the provincials," suggesting that "the polite language of social intercourse conceals sinister appeals to coercion and the use of brute force" and that "acts of abuse, exploitation, and oppression committed by Roman officials in the provinces were initiated and perpetuated by such seemingly innocuous letters." On such provincial exploitation, see James Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), especially 68-90.

383 Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handeln* draws comparisons throughout her section on recommendations (13-127) between the different relations involved in the more impersonal modern letter of recommendation, in which more restrained conventions often predominate.

384 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 180-183 offers a discussion of some of the most regular virtuous qualities that recommenders chose to evoke, as well as mapping what kinds of people the particular terms tended to be associated with.

385 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 44-50 discusses the almost "ritual" nature of these formulae.

386 Cotton, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation" discusses the recommendation letter "type," along with Cicero's attempts to differentiate particular recommendations; also, "Greek and Latin Epistolary Formulae: Some Light on Cicero's Letter Writing," for her discussion of the relationship between late Republican Roman recommendations and Greek manuals. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 50-53 also discusses these attempts at differentiation.

recommendation.[387] We have exceptional evidence in this instance: Cicero's initial expansive and personal letter to Caesar; months of correspondence between Cicero and his young protégé; and some additional letters Cicero wrote to Quintus and Atticus that testify to the exchange and its results. This rich case will give us a chance to examine how recommendation worked, within the kind of inter-generational mentorship relationship explored in the previous chapter, as well as between the high-level "peer" *amici* discussed in the first section of the dissertation. Beyond this, it will allow us to investigate the implications of this institutional practice for the function of the broader system.

In the second half of the chapter, I turn to a wider examination of the dynamics of recommendation as they appear in the Ciceronian corpus. I use letters written on behalf of senators, *equites*, freedmen, and Greek intellectuals as evidence to help delineate the customary nature of the practice and to explicate the diverse dimensions of an institutionalized structure that played such an important role in negotiating, and even in capitalizing on, asymmetries. *Commendatio* was a mechanism that helped elite society integrate and give voice to the interests of a far broader suite of stakeholders than would otherwise have been possible, facilitating a system in which a community could rule as a community.

Trebatius

Like Sestius and Caelius, Trebatius was a promising young aristocrat from the rising generation whom Cicero chose to take under his wing. The young juristic enthusiast was about twenty years Cicero's junior, and as Cicero recalled in a letter to Trebatius from 54, he had entrusted himself from his youth into Cicero's into *amicitia* and *fides* (*cum te ex adulescentia tua in amicitiam et fidem meam contulisses*).[388] Thus, since their relationship matured over the course of years, Cicero and Trebatius had a chance to develop intimacy and familiarity. In the letters Cicero sent to his protégé, we can perceive that the consular felt a powerful sense of responsibility, not only for Trebatius' safety and well-being, but also for his advancement and distinction.[389] The mentorship bond with Caelius developed a quasi-familial cast, as we saw in the previous chapter, and in its own way, Cicero's friendship with Trebatius also reads like a father-son relationship. On the lighter side, the two men shared a fondly mocking sense of humor, and Cicero peppered his protégé with a stream of lawyer jokes designed to needle the self-important young jurist.[390] But on a more serious level, Cicero seems to have felt some genuine affective investment in Trebatius' fate. When either external

---

[387] Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handeln*, 120-125 also brings out the extended nature of this process in her examination of the Trebatius recommendation as a long sequence of events, involving multiple actors.

[388] *Ad Familiares* 31 (VII.17): "since you entrusted yourself into my friendship and good faith from the time you were still a youth" (*cum te ex adulescentia tua in amicitiam et fidem meam contulisses*); note the contrast here with Caelius, whose father was portrayed as entrusting the young man to Cicero's care—it is hard to tell whether sometimes the agency in mentorship relationships in fact came from the junior aristocrat himself. Jill Harries, *Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State* (London: Duckworth, 2006), ch. 6 discusses Trebatius' career as a jurist. Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*, 122 adopts the language of "patronage" for this relationship, which I have suggested is misleading for such a bond.

[389] *Ad Familiares* 31 (VII.17): "I have always thought it my duty not only to protect you but also to look to your advancement and distinction" (*semper te non modo tuendum mihi sed etiam augendum atque ornandum putavi*). The correspondence with Trebatius occupies most of the seventh book of the *Ad Familiares* collection (6-22), introduced by Cicero's preliminary recommendation to Caesar 26 (VII.5). On the correspondence between these two men and the dynamics of their exchange, see Eleanor Leach, "*An Gravius Aliquid Scribam*: Roman *Seniores* Write to *Iuvenes*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 136 (2006): 247-267; Eduard Fraenkel, "Some Notes on Cicero's Letters to Trebatius," *Journal of Roman Studies* 47 (1957): 66-70 for a discussion of some of the textual and stylistic particularities of this small collection, including some of the charming and personal quirks; on this exchange, see also W. H. Alexander, "Cicero on C. Trebatius Testa," *The Classical Bulletin* (1962): 65-69.

[390] Among recent scholarship on the humor of the exchange, see Pierre Vesperini, "Cicéron, Trebatius Testa et la *Crux* de Cic., Fam. 7, 12, 1.," *Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes* 3e sér. 85 (2011): 155-173, David Shotter, "Cicero and the Treveri: New Light on an Old Pun," *Greece and Rome* 54, (2007): 106-110, Paul Dräger, "Die Trevirer und die Scharfrichter: ein Lateinischer Scherz mit dem Namen der Trevirer/Treverer," *Kurtrierisches Jahrbuch* 43 (2003): 21-25.

factors or (what he saw as) youthful errancy threatened to derail the young man's trajectory, the elder statesman betrayed his keen concern.

Aristocrats could offer junior colleagues within their care the chance to pursue advancement under their own direct purview, but the system of recommendations allowed them to expand the circle of opportunities they could make available. When Pompey received a five-year commission as governor of Spain in 55, for instance, and chose Cicero as one of his legates, Cicero anticipated the opportunity to offer staff posts to men in his own circle.[391] In his initial letter of recommendation for Trebatius to Caesar from April 54, Cicero reported that he had made plans to bring Trebatius along as a member of his retinue, hoping that his military commission would offer his young friend the chance to earn distinction directly under his command (*C. Trebatium cogitaram, quocumque exirem, mecum ducere, ut eum meis omnibus studiis beneficiis quam ornatissimum domum reducerem*).[392] When his posting under Pompey evaporated, however, with Pompey lingering in the city (*Pompei commoratio diuturnior erat quam putaram*), Cicero still appears to have felt a responsibility to give Trebatius the same kind of opportunities for advancement.[393] Seeking a solution, he looked to his network of high-level *amici* to help him make up for this lack.

This letter of reference to Caesar on Trebatius' behalf was remarkably expansive when held in comparison with many of the briefer recommendations preserved throughout the collection. In it, Cicero told the story of a painstaking discussion he had shared with his and Caesar's mutual friend Balbus about strategies for advancing Trebatius' career (*de hoc ipso Trebatio cum Balbo nostro loquerer accuratius domi meae*).[394] As Cicero related the story, at the very moment that he and Balbus were coming to the conclusion that Cicero should try recommending Trebatius to Caesar, a letter arrived from the commander in Gaul that seemed an answer to their prayers (*divinum videretur*).[395] By chance, Caesar, who reported his satisfaction with Cicero's last recommendation, had dispatched a letter inviting suggestions for another new lieutenant (*tu ad me alium mitte quem ornem*).[396] Commendations, it seems, were not always offered unasked.

This is evidence, I suggest, of the conventional practice of high-level statesmen. Established aristocrats sometimes put forward associates from the next generation who needed opportunities, while at other times, they relied on their fellow aristocrats to help fill gaps in their own circles.

---

391 *Ad Quintum* 21 (III.1) for the moment when Cicero first learned of the appointment—Shackleton Bailey tells us that Cicero wrote to inquire why Pompey had not been told that Caesar wished him to remain in Rome (Cicero was confused); see also, *Ad Atticum* 93 (IV.19), which was written a little later, when he knew more. For Pompey's commands in the 50s, see Ronald Ridley, "Pompey's Command in the 50's: How Cumulative?," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* CXXVI (1983): 136-148.

392 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "I had thought to bring C. Trebatius with me wherever I went, so that I could return him home after decorating him with every eager favor in my power to bestow" (*C. Trebatium cogitaram, quocumque exirem, mecum ducere, ut eum meis omnibus studiis beneficiis quam ornatissimum domum reducerem*).

393 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "Pompey's delay [in the city] was longer than I had expected" (*Pompei commoratio diuturnior erat quam putaram*).

394 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "I was having a painstaking discussion with our friend Balbus concerning this man Trebatius" (*de hoc ipso Trebatio cum Balbo nostro loquerer accuratius domi meae*). Shackleton Bailey comments that Trebatius no doubt carried this letter in his luggage when he went to join Caesar, probably in late April 54 (at the same time Quintus left to take up his duties as Caesar's legate). Caesar was then in Cisalpine Gaul. Balbus was a Jew of Spanish origin, with his roots in Gades in Hispania—far more of an outsider even than Cicero in a system of power centered in the city of Rome (perhaps a source of fellow feeling?). Balbus enjoyed surprising success under Caesar, aided by his close personal relationship with the dynast. For his origins and career, which have received extensive attention, see Francisco Lloris, "The *Hospitium Publicum* of Gades and Cornelius Balbus," in Martin Jehne, Francisco Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign* Clientelae *in the Roman Empire: a Reconsideration*, (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2015), 141-151, John Lamberty, "*Amicus Caesaris*: der Aufstieg des L. Cornelius Balbus aus Gades," in Heinz Heinen, Manuel Tröster, Altay Coşkun (eds.), *Roms Auswärtige Freunde in der Späten Republik und im Frühen Prinzipat* (Göttingen: Duehrkohp und Radicke, 2005), 155-173, Françoise Des Boscs, "Lucius Cornelius Balbus de Gadès: la Carrière Méconnue d'un Espagnol à l'Époque des Guerres Civiles (Ier Siècle av. J.-C.)," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 30 (1994): 7-35, Kathryn Welch, "The *Praefectura Urbis* of 45 B.C. and the Ambitions of L. Cornelius Balbus," *Antichthon* 24 (1990): 53-69.

395 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "it seemed like divine intervention" (*divinum videretur*).

396 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): quoting Caesar—"send me another man so I can confer distinction on him" (*tu ad me alium mitte quem ornem*).

Cicero and Caesar had developed a kind of symbiotic relationship. It appears that they operated under the assumption that they would both expand each other's access to human capital, and that each would provide opportunities to lower-level members of the other's subgroup of intimates, associates, and allies. We should see this system of recommendation as a fundamental social institution, which could help two such senior aristocrats share personnel resources and expand the common stock of social capital available to both of their individual organizations. Moreover, because each senior figure had the ability, at least to a degree, to use the influence and position of other established aristocrats to access opportunities for the members of his own circle, it became commensurately more attractive for lower-level members of the community to associate themselves with him. As a consequence, his circle would expand further, increasing social weight in a sort of virtuous cycle. This practice of personnel exchange was common between *principes*. But I also suggest that Caesar was consciously looking to draw promising young men into his orbit in what I described in Chapter 2 as his Gallic "second city," and men, specifically, with talents useful for building the "culture" of the camp.[397]

When recommending a man as a new member of a peer *amicus*' circle, it was important to demonstrate the bearer's moral worth as a potential *amicus*, on the one hand, and his specific utility, on the other.[398] Thus, Cicero sent off Trebatius equipped with testimony both to his character and to his particular competencies. A recommendation represented a personal, not merely a professional, testimonial. In this case at any rate, I propose that the language of *amicitia* was more than skin-deep. Trebatius, Cicero, and Caesar were all likely to move in the same high-level aristocratic circles for years to come, and Cicero was asking Caesar to welcome the younger man as a personal friend, not merely as a practical contact.

To facilitate such a frame, as we might imagine, Cicero praised Trebatius' *probitas* and *pudor* and his high quality as a *vir* in general (*probiorem hominem, meliorem virum, pudentiorem esse neminem*).[399] This was a catalog of virtues that seems designed to read as especially appropriate for a young man still near the beginning of his career but already mature and straight-laced enough to act as a trustworthy legal adviser. We have repeatedly encountered the prominence of virtue in the rhetoric of aristocratic friendship. In recommending a prospective junior *amicus* to another high-level aristocrat, it would have been important for a recommender to intimate that the new connection could live up to this component of ideal *amicitia*. A bond between Trebatius and Caesar would be facilitated by an agreement in virtue. For both of them, participation in a friendship grounded in such ethical consensus would furnish evidence of good character to the aristocratic community more broadly.

At least in theory, Caesar would step into the same role with Trebatius that Cicero himself occupied, with Caesar serving as "second self" for his consular *amicus* (*vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum*), capable of replicating Cicero's role with his intimates (*non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent*)—an affectionate senior mentor for a junior friend.[400] A version of

---

397 This has echoes of the *altera res publica* that Sallust reports Sertorius as trying to set up back in the 70s, when he tried to turn Spain into a kind of "replica" of Rome (although it appears not to have been Sertorius' goal to bring this back to Rome—his model was more "escapist" than Caesar's)—for discussion of Sallust's Sertorius and his *altera res publica*, see Jennifer Gerrish, *Sallust's Histories and Triumviral Historiography: Confronting the End of History* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). I discuss this dynamic at length in Chapter 2, where I provide further references, linking the idea to the argument presented in Michael Crawford, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," in Luuk de Ligt, Simon Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 631-643.

398 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 180-189 provides a systematic catalogue and discussion of the qualities praised across the corpus of recommendations.

399 *Ad Familiares* 26 "there is no more honest, good, or honorable man" (*probiorem hominem, meliorem virum, pudentiorem esse neminem*).

400 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "take note of what a persuasive case I make to myself that you are my second self, and not only in my own affairs but also in the concerns of members of my circle of intimates" (*vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent*). The *alter ego* framework in the Caesar bond is discussed Chapter 2—it was essential

this *alter ego* dynamic can be envisioned as part of rhetorical background for the recommendation process, whether it appeared explicitly, as in this case, or merely as an element of the implicit conceptual frame. First of all, a recommender was asking the recipient of the letter to stand in as his practical "impersonation" for the benefit of the bearer. In addition, because of the ostensible similarity in moral sentiments between *amici*, the correspondents ought to share taste in friends. Hence, at least by the conceit of the genre, the recipient of the letter should have no trouble welcoming the *commendatus* in a relationship of *vera amicitia*. In examining the process of *commendatio*, we glimpse layers of impersonation and doubling both at the surface and just beneath, both between the recommender and the recipient of the recommendation and in the potential for "second selfhood" between the *commendatus* and his new *amicus*.

In addition to providing testimony to ethical quality and facilitating the formation of a sense of identity, a recommendation had to furnish information about the subject's concrete capacities. While claims about moral worth might give indications that fondness and personal communion could develop over time, at least at the beginning of a new connection, any affection would, almost by definition, be artificial. Although the recipient of the recommendation might forecast future social value from the relationship, there would have been far less reason for a high-level aristocrat to invest in a new bond if he did not believe that it might have immediate operational utility. Cicero described Trebatius in terms that could help to underline the young man's functional value. The *commendatus*, as he told it, was preeminent in his knowledge of civil law, and distinguished by his potent memory and exceptional scholarly attainment (*accedit etiam quod familiam ducit in iure civili, singulari memoria, summa scientia*).[401]

As we saw above, when Caesar sent Cicero a request for recommendations, he had not laid out a set of specific practical requirements. Instead, he professed himself ready to bestow his favors on anyone Cicero put forward (*tu ad me alium mitte quem ornem*). Nonetheless, Caesar clearly expected his fellow consular to understand his range of needs. Cicero was recommending Trebatius to fill several particular roles, not only as a legal adviser but also as a companion in the intellectual endeavors that Caesar valued.[402] As Caesar cultivated his own separate corner of the aristocratic community in Gaul, he needed friends who would bring more to the *castra* than military capacity. By bringing cultural and legal skill into the society in the camp, an erudite and knowledgeable man like Trebatius would lend substance and legitimacy to Caesar's proprietary community.

When he recommended Trebatius to Caesar, Cicero framed the transaction not only as a recommendation but also as an act of bequeathing or handing over his responsibility—not only of *commendatio* but also of *traditio*.[403] In fact, Trebatius does truly seem to have joined Caesar's circle of

---

to the goals Cicero was himself pursuing with Caesar. In line with this argument, Meike Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*, 121 notes in passing how this metaphor played a role in the rhetoric of the conferral of responsibility and in the creation of what she describes as a double sense of obligation.

401 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "also, he leads the pack in civil law, a singular memory, and a surpassing level of learning" (*accedit etiam quod familiam ducit in iure civili, singulari memoria, summa scientia*). Shackleton Bailey gives a charming gloss for *famililiam ducit*: "is the best of the bunch."

402 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 177-179 notes that intellectual and juridical knowledge were put forward as attractive features in a variety of recommendations. On Caesar as intellectual and litterateur, see, for instance, Kathryn Welch, Anton Powell, *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (London: Duckworth, 1998), William Batstone, Cynthia Damon, *Caesar's Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Andrew Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), Luca Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's* Bellum Civile*: Literature, Ideology, and Community* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); the entries in Luca Grillo, Christopher Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) are especially useful, exploring the various facets of Caesar's intellectual engagement across genres. I provide further references on Caesar as a literary figure in Chapter 2, in the context of my discussion of the Caesar-Cicero-Quintus literary triangle.

403 *Ad Familiares* 31 (VII.17): "I both commended you to him and handed you over to his care" (*ei te commendavi et tradidi*). This language of *traditio* is somewhat rare in the *commendationes*, as noted at Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 42. It is extremely telling, however, that at *Pro Caelio* XVII.39 Cicero used such language to describe the process whereby Caelius' father

affection and loyalty, and when civil war broke out, the young jurist felt obliged to array himself among Caesar's friends. Nonetheless, we must emphasize that the relationship between the recommender and the *commendatus* by no means ended at the moment the recommendation was made. In spite of this language of transference, Cicero did not give up his bond with Trebatius when he sent him to Gaul. He continued to act to further Trebatius' interests, and he still considered the younger man a member of his own interest group and his circle of core intimates. When strategizing with Trebatius, he spoke of their goals as if they still shared an agenda (*adsequi quod volumus possumus*), which Trebatius was attempting to further by winning his way into his commander's good graces (*perfice ut sis in familiaribus Caesaris*).[404] On a basic level, Cicero seems to have retained a sense of care for the minutiae of Trebatius' life. He fretted (half in jest) about how well the urbane jurist was dealing with the cold weather (*metuo ne frigeas in hibernis*)—and his questions about the timing of Trebatius' return to the city (*quam longum istum tuum discessum a nobis futurum putes*) give the impression that he felt his young friend's absence with a measure of emotion.[405]

Trebatius did not lose his attachment to Cicero either. While he found his feet in the new environment of Caesar's camp, Trebatius turned to his old mentor for reassurance, if in the halting, half-accusatory, half-pleading manner of a proud young man confronting unfamiliar circumstances. He was becoming anxious about what he perceived as a lackluster initial response from Caesar to his presence. To minimize Trebatius' anxiety, Cicero reassured his protégé that he had made it a sort of "law" for himself to append additional commendations every time he wrote to Caesar or Balbus—and these were more than merely his "common" sort of recommendation, but ones that provided conspicuous evidence of his favor towards the young man.[406] Moreover, Cicero had commissioned both Quintus and Balbus to help, and he promised that they would lend Trebatius assistance in his efforts to gain Caesar's favor.[407]

We can see that Cicero was taking special and ongoing care with this recommendation.[408] The outcome was important to him on two levels: the recommendation was for a man he appears to have cared for deeply (Trebatius), and it was to a man of exceptional importance (Caesar)—a contact he and Quintus were courting for themselves. In addition to his initial letter commending Trebatius to Caesar—already an exceptionally expansive specimen—Cicero expended great effort trying to manage the reception of his recommendation. He sent a steady trickle of additional

---

handed over his son into Cicero's care—"his father commended and handed over this young man" (*hunc puerum parens commendavit et tradidit*). Apparently, this was terminology appropriate to the transference of a mentorship bond.

[404] *Ad Familiares* 28 (VII.7): "but if we are able to accomplish what we desire without Britain, try to bring it to pass that you make yourself one of Caesar's intimates" (*sin autem sine Britannia tamen adsequi quod volumus possumus, perfice ut sis in familiaribus Caesaris*).

[405] *Ad Familaires* 33 (VII.10): "you have written nothing to me concerning your own doings in this letter, which, by Hercules, are not less a source of concern for me than my own. Truly, I am concerned that you might freeze in winter quarters. For this reason, it is my judgment that you should make use of a stove with a good fire in it" (*tu in ista epistula nihil mihi scripsisti de tuis rebus, quae mehercule mihi non minori curae sunt quam meae. valde metuo ne frigeas in hibernis. quam ob rem camino luculento utendum censeo*)—again, there was a subtle lawyer joke (Cicero cited two fellow jurists as concurrent opinions); "how long do you think this absence of yours from us will be? For I want you to reassure yourself, that the one source of solace by which I am more easily able to bear that you are away from us, is that I know that there is emolument for you—if that is indeed the case" (*quam longum istum tuum discessum a nobis futurum putes. sic enim tibi persuadeas velim, unum mihi esse solacium qua re facilius possim pati te esse sine nobis si tibi esse id emolumento sciam*). While to some extent, this affective patter was probably part of an accepted "script" of *amicitia*, Cicero's expressions of care were sufficiently specific, and laced with enough joshing irony, to suggest something heartfelt. Shackleton Bailey also points to the double meaning of *frigeas* as a reference to "be coldly received" (by Caesar).

[406] *Ad Familiares* 27 (VII.6): "I have made it my 'law' that in all my letters which I send to Caesar or Balbus there is an addition of a recommendation of you, and not the common sort, but with some conspicuous evidence of my benevolence towards you" (*in omnibus meis epistulis quas ad Caesarem aut ad Balbum mitto legitima quaedam est accessio commendationis tuae, nec ea vulgaris sed cum aliquo insigni indicio meae erga te benevolentiae*)—note the legal pun, a sign of the jocular intimacy of their friendship. Cotton, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," 333 cites the Trebatius recommendation as an instance of Cicero working to distinguish the recommendation from a *commendatio vulgaris*.

[407] *Ad Familiares* 28 (VII.7): "my brother and Balbus will help you a lot in this" (*multum te in eo frater adiuvabit meus, multum Balbus*).

[408] In this regard, then, the recommendation was slightly out of the ordinary. But that does not mean it is impossible to generalize from it. We should simply envision this instance as the high end of a spectrum of investment and elaboration.

recommendations on the young man's behalf and called on the aid of his other friends in camp. We should note that, at least in an important case like this, the successful outcome of a recommendation might draw more of the community into the effort than merely the triad directly implicated. In this way, it appears that the recommendation process could promote social integration within the aristocratic community on multiple levels, as it encouraged broader circles to invest in the success of their friends' junior associates and left these *commendati* obliged to a wider ring of benefactors.[409]

To some extent, Cicero's attempt to assure the success of the recommendation was an effort to offer comfort and aid to his protégé, but I suggest that he also harbored deeper apprehension about the results, both on his own behalf and on behalf of his ongoing circle of connections. Anxious to hear whether his influence was having any effect, he pestered Trebatius for reports of the results of the initial recommendation (*quid proficiam ex te scire cupio*) and of his ongoing efforts to follow up (*ego te commendare non desisto*).[410] Cicero cared about the outcome of this particular recommendation, but more important in the grand scheme was the efficacy of his influence more generally, since authority within the aristocratic community depended on the responses of other influential players to a statesman's bids.[411] Thus, apprehensive about the efficacy of his *auctoritas*, Cicero kept close watch over the results of his recommendation.

As much as Cicero knew that his protégé's behavior would reflect on him, however, he could exercise only limited control from his location in the urban center. Even the intervention of Quintus and Balbus could only go so far. It was Trebatius' conduct that would inevitably play the most important role in determining the outcome. Cicero encouraged his younger friend to seize on the opportunity provided by this exceptional constellation of circumstances, putting his honorable character and discipline to good use to make himself one of Caesar's intimates (*te in eo..adiuvabit…mihi crede, tuus pudor et labor plurimum. imperatorem <habes> liberalissimum, aetatem opportunissimam, commendationem certe singularem*).[412] The only thing Trebatius had to fear, Cicero claimed, was that he might not do justice to himself (*ut tibi unum timendum sit ne ipse tibi defuisse videare*). Trebatius appears to have been conscious of his benefactor's anxieties, and aware of the importance Cicero placed on the outcome. As Cicero's responses suggest, Trebatius took care to emphasize in his letters how much Caesar was impressed with his intellectual and legal competence (*legi tuas litteras, ex quibus intellexi te Caesari nostro valde iure consultum videri*).[413]

But when Trebatius expressed reluctance to stay on in his provincial posting, Cicero voiced worries, in two letters from November 54 about Trebatius' irresponsible hankerings for the city of Rome (*levis in urbis urbanitatisque desiderio*), his desire to just take his money and go back home, and reports of the young man's arrogance (*qui istinc veniunt superbiam tuam accusant*).[414] If a *commendatus*

---

409 Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*, 122 also underlines Cicero's ongoing outreach to Quintus and Balbus, emphasizing the involvement of a broader community as a feature in the recommendation process. She does not pursue the implications of this point for the function of the aristocratic community as a social system, however.

410 *Ad* Familiares 28 (VII.7): "I never leave off commending you, but I want to know directly from you what I am accomplishing" (*ego te commendare non desisto, sed quid proficiam ex te scire cupio*).

411 As the dynasts' opinions came to matter ever more in the mid-late 50s, moreover, the boundary may have started to blur between *auctoritas* in the community at large and influence with the dynasts themselves.

412 *Ad Familiares* 28 (VII.7): "believe me, your humble virtue and hard work will help you most. You have an exceptionally generous general, you are at the opportune age, you have a uniquely strong recommendation; this is enough that the one thing you have to fear is that you seem to do yourself less than justice" (*te in eo..adiuvabit…mihi crede, tuus pudor et labor plurimum. imperatorem <habes> liberalissimum, aetatem opportunissimam, commendationem certe singularem, ut tibi unum timendum sit ne ipse tibi defuisse videare*).

413 *Ad Familiares* 33 (VII.10): "I have read your letter, from which I understand that you certainly seem to our friend Caesar to be skilled in law" (*legi tuas litteras, ex quibus intellexi te Caesari nostro valde iure consultum videri*).

414 *Ad Familiares* 31 (VII.17): "I was exceedingly disturbed by your letters from the first few months, since you seemed to me now and then (pardon me for saying it!) irresponsible in your desire for the city and urban ways" (*primorum mensum litteris tuis vehementer commovebar, quod mihi interdum (pace tua dixerim) levis in urbis urbanitatisque desiderio… videbare*)—Shackleton Bailey comments on the difference in style of this letter from the others addressed to Trebatius, suggesting that its more majestic style suggests a more seriously lecturing tone (except for the final lawyer joke, where Cicero resumed his habitual levity); "you were in such a hurry, once

whom Cicero had put forward with such warm determination made a bad impression, it would not only undermine the young man's own career prospects. It would also diminish the senior statesman's credibility as a recommender, both in Caesar's eyes and before the aristocratic community in general. Word of such events tended to get around.[415] To maintain his capacity to provide opportunities to his people, Cicero needed to retain a reputation as a reliable source. Trebatius was a representative of Cicero's influence in the Caesarian sphere, and poor results might sully Cicero's "brand."

A few months later, Cicero wrote to Trebatius to express his delight at a report from the architect Chrysippus that Trebatius was successfully solidifying his friendship with Caesar (*perlibenter audivi ex eodem Chrysippo, te esse Caesari familiarem*).[416] When it became clear that the recommendation had succeeded, Cicero must have breathed a sigh of relief, both for the sake of his protégé's career and for his own influence. At the same time, however, we can detect a hint of jealousy. As much as he was aware that he had been the agent both of Trebatius' departure and of the young man's subsequent embrace by Caesar, Cicero could not help feeling a hint of niggling resentment, whether or not such resentment might be viewed as hypocritical. It caused him pain, as he wrote, that anything could please his young friend in his absence (*angor quicquam tibi sine me esse iucundum*).[417] As Trebatius came to rely on him less and less, it appears that Cicero felt a degree of envy that an even more illustrious mentor and benefactor might be taking his place. I read this as more than merely a fiction proper to the rhetoric of friendship. After all, however much he might have asked Caesar to "impersonate" him as Trebatius' mentor, Cicero could not compete with Caesar in terms of power and influence. Rhetoric aside, even for a consular like Cicero, Caesar was starting to seem like something more than a "second self."

It is true that Trebatius embraced Caesar as a second mentor, joining his circle of affection and obligation in the 50s and fighting on his side in the civil war. But all the way up to Cicero's death, Trebatius retained a close personal connection with his long-time mentor—a more intimate bond than anything he ever appears to have constructed with Caesar. Throughout the civil war, the mentor and his former protégé remained in regular touch, and as Cicero struggled to navigate his complex dual loyalties, Trebatius kept him updated on Caesar's movements and motivations. At times, he even acted as a go-between for the two *principes* who had been his benefactors, permitting a greater level of amity between the two senior statesmen than would otherwise have been possible under the circumstances. As an instance of this dynamic, Cicero wrote to Atticus in March 49 of how Trebatius' report would help him consider how he would engage in an upcoming interview with Caesar (*ex eius nuntio…meditabor quo modo cum illo loquar*).[418] Even in May of 49, with the war well underway, Cicero still retained sufficient goodwill towards Trebatius that he listed him among the

---

you had made off with your cash, to go back home" (*sic pecunia ablata domum redire properabas*); 32 (VII.16): "people who travel there complain of your arrogance" (*qui istinc veniunt superbiam tuam accusant*)—Bailey comments that Cicero had learned that Trebatius was in winter quarters at Samarobriva (Amiens).

415 Think of Caelius' detailed news digests that I discussed in Chapter 3—*Ad Familiares* 79 (VIII.3), 80 (II.8)—news circulated among the members of the aristocratic community, along with the associated moral judgment.

416 *Ad Familiares* 38 (VII.14): "from this same Chrysippus, I have heard, and with exceptional gladness, that you are intimate with Caesar" (*perlibenter audivi ex eodem Chrysippo, te esse Caesari familiarem*); Shackleton Bailey mentions that this man (Chrysippus Vettius) was an architect, possibly engaged on plans for the Basilica Julia.

417 *Ad Familiares* 39 (VII.15): "I used to be distressed that you were not easily pleased by my recommendation, but now it causes me pain that anything can please you absent my presence" (*mea commendatione te non delectari facile patiebar et nunc angor quicquam tibi sine me esse iucundum*); Cicero was conscious of his own hypocrisy—"how capricious are those who love" (*quam sint morosi qui amant*)—as Shackleton Bailey remarks, this sounds like the beginning of a comic *senarius* (as in Plautus). Note the easy cultured banter.

418 *Ad Atticum* 186 (IX.17): "on the basis of his [Trebatius'] report and the letter from Matius I will make my plans about how I will conduct my interview with him [Caesar]" (*ex eius nuntio Matique litteris meditabor quo modo cum illo loquar*) Cicero reported to Atticus that he expected an update on Caesar's will to come through Trebatius.

boni (*vir plane et civis bonus*)—a label he was otherwise reserving for men who, with Pompey, were defending whatever was by that time still salvageable of the "Republican" status quo.[419]

In return for Caesar's extensive assistance, Trebatius owed the commander the full duties of an *amicus*—alliance and even affection—and Cicero recognized the force of this debt. But as with Caelius and Sestius, Cicero retained the kind of personal connection with his mentee that he reserved for a limited, almost familial circle of intimates. Moreover, after the civil war ended, Cicero's relationship with Trebatius continued to blossom, and the younger man stepped into a role of relative parity. Cicero even left a textual monument to their fondness. He dedicated his *Topica* to his former mentee. In the preface, he presented an image of their shared *otium* in his Tusculan villa, testament to the multifaceted *amicitia* that now bound them together with tight cords of intimacy.[420]

It is important to emphasize that, with his recommendation, Cicero had the ability to institute a bond of full-fledged *amicitia* between Trebatius and Caesar—not only shared practical interests, that is, but also a deep sense of mutual obligation, fidelity, and warmth, crowned by a loftier *consensio studiorum*.[421] It could be exceptionally useful for two senior statesmen to share this kind of bond with a common friend. Such a man could act as a go-between whom both *principes* knew they could trust. Their shared *amicitia* with Trebatius helped keep a line of communication open between Cicero and Caesar, helping their dialogue remain mannered, and often even warm, throughout the crisis. This provides a hint of how useful such bonds must have been for facilitating connection in more peaceful times. As this case study has suggested, by passing junior intimates between networks, the men at the top created vectors of communication that could link them together. Recommendations also generated a shared sense of care for individual members of the successor generation—a *consensio amicorum*, if you will. Furthermore, especially since these rising juniors were not direct competitors for the elder generation's influence and prestige, the senior aristocrats could collaborate to invest in them without the acute worry that they were nurturing rivals.

It was of course impossible, with artificially constructed *amicitia* inaugurated as the act of a moment by a recommendation, to perfectly replicate friendships and mentorship relationships grown across years, even when both participants invested eagerly in the project. But the process of *commendatio* expanded the reach of *amicitia*. It helped turn personal friendship into a coordinating force in the aristocratic community that was essential to the function and structure of the system of rule in the late Republic. As this case study shows, recommendations allowed aristocrats to share human resources and to create opportunities for each other's associates. This was a process mediated by the idealizing idiom of an *amicitia* rooted in ethical identity and the *consensio studiorum*.

A System of Friendship: Recommendations Among Aristocrats and Between Elites and Sub-elites

The process of recommendation for Trebatius was particularly careful and protracted, because of the intimacy of the bond and on account of the high stakes of success or failure for both Cicero and his protégé. But as much as the case was extraordinary in its extent and intentionality, it was an instance of a dynamic that was common. Recommendations appear frequently in Cicero's epistolary corpus, and in fact, the whole book XIII of the *Ad Familiares* collection (79 letters) is

---

419 *Ad Atticum* 202 (X.11): "Trebatius was with me, clearly a gentleman and a good citizen" (*Trebatius erat mecum, vir plane et civis bonus*).
420 Yelena Baraz, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), ch. 5 discusses the preface of the *Topica* and the different aspects of their ties of *amicitia*.
421 I believe it is necessary to take *amicitia* as it comes, as a term designating a certain kind of social bond analogous to, but not completely coterminous with the modern English "friendship." This perspective is in line with Craig Williams, *Reading Roman Friendship* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). *Amicitia*, especially here, but in general, should not be seen as "covering up" *clientela*.

composed exclusively of letters of this genre.[422] Cicero and other established members of the elite were in the habit of passing connections on to their fellows, with the purpose both of exchanging specific services between the *commendatus* and the recipient of the letter and, more generally, of expanding the network of mutual aid, protection, service, and affection in the aristocratic community—the common stock, that is, of social capital.

It is essential to note that this group of "established" aristocrats was not limited to senators. In the informal private networks that tied the aristocratic community together, equestrians could be some of the most important players (as Atticus' case reminds us with particular clarity), and they often seem to have been the recommenders themselves.[423] The men recommended did not come from one stratum, either. In fact, as I will suggest in the section that follows, the process of *commendatio* was one of the key mechanisms structuring relations between the community's senators, equestrians, freedmen, and Greek intellectuals. The institution helped link them together in a multi-tiered framework, with the resulting system mediated by the idiom of *amicitia*.[424]

Much as he invested in Trebatius' future, Cicero also supported other junior statesmen, helping them gain access to those of his higher-level colleagues who were in a position to facilitate their advancement. M. Terentius Varro was a young aristocrat of equestrian background, for instance, embarking on a career in *res publica* in the 40s. When the young man set off to join Brutus as his quaestor in Cisalpine Gaul in 46, Cicero provided a recommendation to supplement and accelerate the connection that was expected to form "naturally" between a commander and his junior officer.[425] By ancestral custom, as Cicero claimed was well known, the bond between a quaestor and his superior should come next to that of children and parents (*ab ipso more maiorum, qui, ut te non fugit, hanc quaesturae coniunctionem liberorum necessitudini proximam voluit esse*).[426] But Varro had nonetheless asked his senior *amicus* to write as careful a recommendation as possible to Brutus, convinced that a letter from Cicero would carry great weight with his future commander (*sed cum sibi ita persuasisset ipse, meas de se accurate scriptas litteras maximum apud te pondus habituras, a meque contenderet ut quam diligentissime scriberem*). While it seems that the formal relationship between aristocrats serving together was supposed to be a potent source of connection on its own, the men nevertheless needed to build a personal relationship in order to give the bond living force.[427] As Varro realized, a recommendation from one of Brutus' close friends would give the commander an affective reason to invest in his subordinate and could speed the formation of their own personal association. Of

---

422 Cotton, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," 328-329 discusses the loose coherence of book XIII, with consideration, as I noted above, of the debate as to whether this was constructed and published during Cicero's lifetime as a sort of "handbook." There are a few instances, such as the Trebatius reference, which appear outside this book as well.

423 In *Ad Atticum* 40 (II.20), for instance, we find Cicero fulfilling two of Atticus' recommendations (for Anicatus and Numestius, men who are unknown, as Shackleton Bailey notes, except from these letters), receiving the second of them specifically *in amicitiam*.

424 The prosopography at Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 387-570 furnishes a useful schematic of the whole community we see involved in these processes in the Ciceronian corpus.

425 L.A. Thompson, "The Relationship between Provincial Quaestors and Their Commanders-in-Chief," *Historia* 11 (1962): 339-355 explores the conventions and expectations for relationships between junior officers and their superiors.

426 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "I judged that he would be sufficiently commended to you by ancestral custom, which, as does not escape you, decrees that the bond to a quaestor should come next after the link of children [to their parent]. But since he has convinced himself that a carefully crafted letter about him would have the greatest possible force with you, he has been demanding of me that I write with as much care as possible" (*satis enim commendatum tibi eum arbitrabar ab ipso more maiorum, qui, ut te non fugit, hanc quaesturae coniunctionem liberorum necessitudini proximam voluit esse. sed cum sibi ita persuasisset ipse, meas de se accurate scriptas litteras maximum apud te pondus habituras, a meque contenderet ut quam diligentissime scriberem*). Shackleton Bailey comments that this man Varro had appeared with Cicero in defense of Milo's follow M. Saufeius in 52. Varro likely became tribune in 43 and was then executed at Philippi. It seems that Cicero did, indeed, make a regular practice of recommending his associates to Brutus, such as his own military tribune Q. Fufidius—279 (XIII.12). This also reinforces the idea that commanders ought to take care of their subordinate officers as *amici* in future. Cicero was practicing what he preached.

427 We saw a related dynamic with Sestius in the previous chapter: as the quaestor of Cicero's colleague Antonius, Sestius still retained a deeper personal connection with Cicero. He and Antonius had to hold up the formal bond, but real loyalties did not necessarily coincide with the official structure—*Pro Sestio* 8 (IV).

course, Brutus also stood to benefit, provided with an opportunity to place an influential figure like Cicero in his social debt.

By sending a recommendation, an aristocrat was asking a friend to transfer the personal affection he felt for this *amicus* himself on to someone the recommender held dear, trading not only on a sense of transferred obligation but also, as we will see, on the assumption that *amicitia* was built on agreement in virtue.[428] Thus, it made sense for the recommender go out of his way to explain his personal reasons for the feelings he was asking his friend to mirror—both the specific causes of his obligation to the beneficiary and why the *commendatus* was worth valuing in the general terms of his personality and character.

Cicero appears to have been conscious that he should explain the justification for his affection and care, and for his sense of duty (*ut igitur debere me facere hoc intellegas*).[429] To serve this purpose, he provided a detailed account of the multiple levels of his personal obligation to the young Varro. Like Caelius and Trebatius, Varro was of equestrian background. As he embarked on a career in the Forum, he had entrusted himself to Cicero's *amicitia* (*cum primum M. Terentius in forum venit, ad amicitiam se meam contulit*), presumably undertaking his *tirocinium fori* under the elder statesman's care.[430] Like Caelius, as well, Varro took his mentor's path as a direct model. First, Varro had followed Cicero's chosen avocation in the courts and had succeeded in demonstrating his aptitude as an orator (*versabatur in hoc studio nostro, quo etiam nunc maxime delectamur, et cum ingenio, ut nosti, nec sine industria*).[431] Cicero and Brutus shared a passion for oratory, and this was part of the reason, as Cicero's words imply, that this point might have prove especially compelling in this instance. Then, by winning a campaign for office (*petitioni sese dedit honoremque honestissimum existimavit fructum laboris sui*), Varro emulated Cicero's leap to the senatorial *cursus*.[432] In a manner that also echoed his senior friend's path, before embarking on his senatorial career, the young man had taken up with the *publicani*. As Cicero took care to note in his letter, by joining a class of persons for whom Cicero maintained high regard, and whose interests had long received his careful attention, Varro added strength to their friendship (*causa communis ordinis mihi commendatissimi fecit amicitiam nostram firmiorem*).[433] Most recently, Varro had carried a letter and an oral message to Caesar. Cicero had been impressed by the affectionate spirit his junior *amicus* had displayed as he discharged the mission (*his*

---

428 This dynamic stood behind the broad tendency to highlight virtuous qualities of *commendati*, as evidenced by the catalogue given at Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 180-183 of the most common virtue words in letters of recommendation, as well as their usual associations and implications.

429 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "so that consequently you may understand that it is an obligation that I do this" (*ut igitur debere me facere hoc intellegas*).

430 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "When M. Terentius first came into the Forum, he entrusted himself to my friendship" (*cum primum M. Terentius in forum venit, ad amicitiam se meam contulit*).

431 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "he was engaged in this favorite pursuit of ours [oratory], in which even now we take the greatest delight, and with natural talent, as you know, and not without diligence" (*versabatur in hoc studio nostro, quo etiam nunc maxime delectamur, et cum ingenio, ut nosti, nec sine industria*)—Shackleton Bailey suggests that the choice of the word *delectamur* suggests that Cicero was even now practicing his oratory, and we know that he resumed private declamation some time during that year.

432 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "he gave himself over to an electoral campaign, and he judged the office as the most fitting of rewards for his labor" (*petitioni sese dedit honoremque honestissimum existimavit fructum laboris sui*).

433 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "our shared interest in an order for which I have the highest regard made our friendship all the stronger" (*causa communis ordinis mihi commendatissimi fecit amicitiam nostram firmiorem*). Senators could be closely linked to the *publicani*, and although they appear not to have remained active participants in *societates* once they had actually become senators, they certainly could participate during the earlier stages of their career and could retain their investment and involvement quietly even after they shifted their more overt identity markers. The connections between senators and the *societates publicanorum* would have been especially strong in the post-Sullan period—Ernst Badian, *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in Service of the Roman Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 104: "the Sullan Senate, when a large number of new senators had come to the House straight from association with the companies and (we may think) were not willing to forego this source of profit altogether, just when elevation had increased their expenses;" Christian Rollinger, *Solvendi Sunt Nummi: die Schuldenkultur der Späten Römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros* (Berlin: Verlag Antike, 2009), 94-98 details some of the complexities of these inter-order relations in the late Republican era. Dominic Berry, "*Equester Ordo Tuus Est*: Did Cicero Win His Cases Because of His Support for the *Equites*?," *The Classical Quarterly*, 53 (2003), 222-234 explores Cicero's own special connections to *equites*, including the *publicani*.

autem temporibus a me Brundisio cum litteris et mandatis profectus ad Caesarem est; qua in re et amorem eius in suscipiendo negotio perspexi et in conficiendo ac renuntiando fidem).[434] Varro's case reinforces our perception of the widespread incidence of asymmetric mentorship bonds. A senior aristocrat of Cicero's eminence could call on a range of such men as agents. The practical service he could provide was part of what made him worth the attention of both the recommender and the recipient of the letter.

Cicero used his own personal history with the *commendatus* to help him paint the young man as the kind of person he, and by implication Brutus, could both approve of and identify with. Varro was an eager orator and promising statesman; he had close ties to a moneyed equestrian stratum with which both senior statesmen maintained tight bonds of their own; and he was ready and willing to provide the dutiful services proper to a junior *amicus*. As a consequence, Cicero argued, the young officer merited both immediate help and ongoing association.

Cicero implied that it was common practice in a recommendation to treat character and personality in a distinct section, although, since he had already painted a picture of Varro as a worthy friend in describing their personal bond, Cicero expressed doubt that a separate section was necessary in this case (*videor mihi, cum separatim de probitate eius et moribus dicturus fuissem si prius causam cur eum tanto opere diligerem tibi exposuissem, in ipsa causa exponenda satis etiam de probitate dixisse*).[435] Disregarding his professed reservations, however, he reserved space to highlight Varro's modesty, his good sense, his remoteness from all avarice, and his impeccable work ethic (*modestum hominem cognosces et prudentem et a cupiditate omni remotissimum, praeterea magni laboris summaeque industriae*).[436] Cicero gave his personal guarantee, moreover, that these qualities would make the quaestor a pleasant and useful associate (*promitto in meque recipio fore eum tibi et voluptati et usui*).[437] One of the goals of the process of *commendatio*, as I suggest, was to describe the subject as a man who was worthy of partaking in *amicitia*. The ability to embody standards of virtue and decorum was an essential prerequisite for acceptance. Since the *commendatus* was an unknown quantity to the recipient, the recommender's seal of approval would have played an invaluable role in marking him as the kind of individual worth embracing.

I propose that recommendations served a sorting function for elite recruitment. To gain a foothold in the central circles of power and influence, a young man needed the endorsement of higher-level aristocrats who had already established their reputations. The prominent position given to a catalogue of ethical qualities in recommendations provides evidence that claims mandated by formal relationships could only go so far. Because of the customary obligation a superior officer owed his lieutenant, the commander was subject to a degree of responsibility to form a link with his quaestor, even without additional encouragement. But Cicero and Varro hoped that the letter might give this connection a more energetic launch. First impressions mattered.[438] Thus, Cicero sought to

---

434 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "recently, moreover, he traveled with letters and commissions from me at Brundisium to Caesar; in this affair I perceived his affection both in his taking up the matter and in his fidelity in discharging it and reporting the results" (*his autem temporibus a me Brundisio cum litteris et mandatis profectus ad Caesarem est; qua in re et amorem eius in suscipiendo negotio perspexi et in conficiendo ac renuntiando fidem*). Shackleton Bailey comments that we know nothing else of this mission—perhaps it was undertaken in place of Marcus *filius*—see 167 (XIV.15).

435 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "it seems to me, although I was going to speak in a separate section about his moral and personal characteristics after I had laid out the reasons I hold him in such high regard, in explaining these reasons I have also said enough concerning his moral worth" (*videor mihi, cum separatim de probitate eius et moribus dicturus fuissem si prius causam cur eum tanto opere diligerem tibi exposuissem, in ipsa causa exponenda satis etiam de probitate dixisse*).

436 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "you will find him a modest man and prudent and far removed from all avarice, besides he is possessed of a powerful ability to exert himself and the height of diligence" (*modestum hominem cognosces et prudentem et a cupiditate omni remotissimum, praeterea magni laboris summaeque industriae*).

437 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "I promise, and I guarantee it by my own personal commitment, that he will be a source of both utility and pleasure to you" (*promitto in meque recipio fore eum tibi et voluptati et usui*).

438 *Ad Familiares* 277 (XIII.10): "in all new connections, the manner of the first approach is important, with the sort of recommendation by which, as it were, the doors of friendship are opened" (*in omnibus novis coniunctionibus interest qualis primus aditus sit et qua commendatione quasi amicitiae fores aperiantur*).

assure Brutus that Varro was exactly the kind of person they both welcomed in their social world. This was an eager, diligent man from an equestrian background, taking his first steps on the *cursus honorum*; he had a penchant and a talent for oratory; he had taken care to connect himself to influential *publicani*; he was willing to go out of his way to fulfill obligations to senior aristocrats who helped him; and he possessed the right underlying package of virtues to participate in the idealizing system of *amicitia* that held the community of aristocrats together. Cicero explicitly stated that his recommendation was designed to open the door (*quasi amicitiae fores aperiantur*) so that a full-fledged friendship, rather than merely obligatory acquaintance, could develop between his junior friend Varro and his fellow senior aristocrat Brutus. To begin the process of entering the innermost decision making circles, a young man needed an initial contact to provide an inroad to the established networks of power.[439] Recommendations from such a man, and from that man's connections, in turn, could help perpetuate the efficacy of this preliminary link. Indeed, when Cicero and Brutus were young men, they had probably both depended on such recommendations to encourage established aristocrats to welcome them into their community of influence.

Letters of recommendation served a broad range of purposes, and they were not all requests for a senior aristocrat to take a rising junior colleague under his wing. The letter Cicero provided for L. Mescinius Rufus, who had acted as his quaestor during his proconsulship in Cilicia, illustrates this complexity.[440] Cicero wrote on behalf of his ex-quaestor to his lifelong friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus, at the time when Sulpicius took up a post as proconsul of Achaea in 46.[441] As we have seen, aristocrats took care to advertise their bonds with fellow members of the community. Cicero told his fellow consular that, since Mescinius had often heard from him about the warmth of his connection with Sulpicius, the young aristocrat was aware of his old commander's influence with the new governor (*pro familiari consuetudine saepe ex me audierat quam suavis esset inter nos et quanta coniunctio*).[442] As a result, Mescinius had asked his former *imperator* to commend him for assistance, with the understanding that the *negotia* he had in the province would benefit from the attention and favor of the incoming governor. Cicero thus asked Sulpicius to furnish aid, both in his official administrative and judicial capacity and through his personal *auctoritas* and advice (*ut eius negotia quae sunt in Achaia…explices et expedias cum iure et potestate quam habes tum etiam auctoritate et consilio tuo*).[443]

In the first section of the dissertation in Chapters 1 and 2, I made the case that high-level *amici* went out of their way to perform their bonds. This case indicates that one of the vital purposes served by this advertisement was to make clear to potential junior connections what opportunities might be on offer. Mescinius only knew about the influence Cicero might be able to command with the proconsul of Achaea, and the potential access to power resources it entailed, because *consulares* like Cicero and Sulpicius took such care to trumpet their links.

---

439 This was often a family contact, both for men from equestrian and from senatorial backgrounds. Recall from Chapter 3, for instance, how Caelius' father seemed to know both Cicero and Crassus—*Pro Caelio* 9 (IV).

440 As Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 125 notes, Mescinius was one of the *novi homines* among the *commendati*. She also points out (89) that he was one of a limited number of *amicissimi*—a term often associated with "political" affiliation.

441 Thirteen commendatory letters written to Servius Sulpicius Rufus are preserved in book XIII of the *Ad Familiares* collection: 283 (XIII.17), 284 (XIII.18), 285 (XIII.19), 286 (XIII.20), 287 (XIII.21), 288 (XIII.22), 289 (XIII.23), 290 (XIII.24), 291 (XIII.25), 292 (XIII.26), 293 (XIII.27), 294 (XIII.28), 295 (XIII.28a). Sulpicius was a lifelong friend who had studied law with Cicero under Scaevola—see *Brutus* XL.150-XLII.152. Cicero's rhetorical stabs at his friend in the *Pro Murena*, especially 15-30, did not fatally undermine their friendship, which was still thriving as late as the 40s. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 120 notes the familiarity of Cicero's address to Sulpicius.

442 *Ad Familiares* 292 (XIII.25): "in the course of our familiar intercourse, he [Mescinius] has often heard from me how sweet and how great the fellowship between you [Sulpicius] and me is" (*pro familiari consuetudine saepe ex me audierat quam suavis esset inter nos et quanta coniunctio*).

443 *Ad Familiares* 292 (XIII.25): "[I ask] that you disentangle and expedite those of his business affairs which are in Achaia with the legal authority and power that you have and also with your personal influence and advice" (*ut eius negotia quae sunt in Achaia…explices et expedias cum iure et potestate quam habes tum etiam auctoritate et consilio tuo*).

This case demonstrates the complexity of a system of recommendation founded in *amicitia*. Cicero was not asking Sulpicius to take the young man on as a protégé, or in fact as an *amicus* of any kind. He merely asked the governor to provide practical services and assistance. In interpersonal terms, Cicero focused on his own bond with his fellow consular, framing the request as a favor primarily to himself, even though he implied that Sulpicius might also derive some benefit from in the form of gratitude from the young man (*scriberem quam id beneficium bene apud Mescinium positurus esses nisi et te scire confiderem et mihi peterem*).[444] Cicero was not arguing, in this instance, that Sulpicius should be motivated by the possibility that the junior aristocrat would join his personal circle as an ongoing participant, although Mescinius might owe a degree of obligation to the proconsul for any aid. Instead, Sulpicius should participate in the exchange as an investment in his relationship with Cicero. Cicero himself cared about the results on two levels. First, by writing that he had as much concern for the young man's affairs as Mescinius did himself, he implied that fellow feeling drove him to intervene (*sic enim velim existimes, non minus me de illius re laborare quam ipsum de sua*).[445] Second, Cicero's words suggest that he wanted to accumulate obligation from the young man for himself. Sulpicius should take care to underline, as Cicero requested, that Sulpicius' aid was a direct result of Cicero's intervention (*illud laboro, ut non minimum hac mea commendatione se consecutum arbitretur*). In other words, this was a complex, multi-stage social transaction, and a finely calibrated one at that. Sulpicius should care because his high-level *amicus* cared, and by helping the young senator, the scales of obligation would tip in Sulpicius' favor in the bond he shared with Cicero. Meanwhile, Cicero described his concern, while rooted in amity, as the result of a desire to oblige the young man to him—to accumulate social capital in his relationship with his junior friend, by asking Sulpicius to emphasize to the *commendatus* that it had been Cicero's recommendation that allowed him to bring his affairs to a successful conclusion.

Even though he was not asking Sulpicius to take Mescinius into his circle of intimates, nevertheless, Cicero still opted to give the reasons for his own bond with his junior associate, if in an abbreviated form. Cicero wrote that he and Mescinius were united not only by the traditional connection linking a quaestor to his proconsul but also by his respect for the young man's *virtus* and *humanitas* (*L. Mescinius ea mecum necessitudine coniunctus est quod mihi quaestor fuit; sed hanc causam, quam ego, ut a maioribus accepi, semper gravem duxi, fecit virtute et humanitate sua iustiorem*).[446] While the main purpose here was not the creation of a new amicable link, it is important to observe that a man had to be seen as the kind of person worthy of the *amicitia* of someone like Cicero, and by implication Sulpicius, for him to merit assistance.[447] *Amicitia* remained important, both as discourse and as standard, even when it was not the central aim of the social transaction. Furthermore, I suggest that Cicero was also making a performance of his own good taste in friends and his discernment as a recommender. It would redound to Cicero's credit if his *commendati* were seen as virtuous and

---

[444] *Ad Familiares* 292 (XIII.25): "I would write about how well-placed your benefaction would be with Mescinius, but I am confident that you know that, and in any case, I am asking on my own behalf" (*scriberem quam id beneficium bene apud Mescinium positurus esses nisi et te scire confiderem et mihi peterem*).

[445] *Ad Familiares* 292 (XIII.25): "it is my desire that you judge it to be the case that I have as much concern for his affair as he does himself…I am also concerned that he should believe that this matter was brought to a successful conclusion not least because of my recommendation" (*sic enim velim existimes, non minus me de illius re laborare quam ipsum de sua… illud laboro, ut non minimum hac mea commendatione se consecutum arbitretur*).

[446] *Ad Familiares* 292 (XIII.25): "L. Mescinius is joined to me by the claim that he was my quaestor; but he makes this cause for connection, which I, since I received it from our ancestors, have always held to be weighty, all the firmer by his manly virtue and his gentleman's character" (*L. Mescinius ea mecum necessitudine coniunctus est quod mihi quaestor fuit; sed hanc causam, quam ego, ut a maioribus accepi, semper gravem duxi, fecit virtute et humanitate sua iustiorem*). The veracity of this picture of virtue is undermined to some extent by a description from 50 in *Ad Atticum* 117 (VI.3) of Mescinius as "false, lustful, and given to pilfering" (*levis, libidinosus, tagax*), although Cicero's perspective might have changed over the four years since their shared service.

[447] He needed an *amicitia* "credit score," if you will, in order to be seen as worthy of benefiting from the system of *commendatio*.

grateful. In a system of power in which influence was so deeply rooted in social perception, it was vital for Cicero to cultivate such a reputation.

Recommendations from senior statesmen could serve multiple purposes for their junior colleagues on the *cursus honorum*. On the one hand, they could facilitate their advancement and position in the central decision-making landscape, and on the other, they could protect and increase their personal interests and fortunes. We should not draw a hard line, however, between these two functions for inter-generational senatorial recommendations. All the men involved were part of the same social system. Assistance in "private" and "public" matters could store up capital in the same relational accounts, augmenting an ever-thickening web of social connection between the various men who had chosen to run for office, and hence to involve themselves officially in public affairs.

A recommendation from 46-45 that Cicero wrote on behalf of the senator C. Albanius to Caesar's land commissioner M. Rutilius illustrates further dimensions of the complex social mechanism of the system of recommendations.[448] In this letter, we see the process of *commendatio* linking men involved in *res publica* in multi-tiered bonds, with personal business and public responsibilities inextricably intertwined. Cicero was bringing his influence to bear with Rutilius in the man's official capacity as land commissioner, but this was not because of Cicero's own connection to Albanius. Instead, Cicero's intervention was prompted by his intimate connection to Albanius' son-in-law Sestius, who, when he learned what attention Rutilius paid to Cicero's opinion, had asked the consular to intervene with the land commissioner on Albanius' behalf (*is cum ex aliis te mei studiosissimum esse cognosset, petivit a me ut ad te quam accuratissime scriberem de re C. Albani senatoris*).[449] Albanius had the practical stake in the matter, and Rutilius held the relevant office. But it took two intermediaries to connect the man in need to the formal lever of control. In this instance, Sestius and Cicero were involved for social reasons, fulfilling obligations to family and friends—Sestius to his father-in-law and Cicero to his longtime friend and former protégé. Of course, in other cases, Cicero and Sestius might depend on some of these same men to facilitate their own practical interests. Each individual transaction in the system of recommendations contributed to a larger tapestry of interconnection. It is my contention that, for the system of power to function, the various members of the aristocratic community had to collaborate in multi-step cascades to provide one another with access power resources. The process of *commendatio* often played a vital role.

Cicero's recommendation from 50 for T. Claudius Nero, a patrician on the brink of his first foray into *res publica*, shows the recommendation process at work for an aspiring senator at a time before he took his initial steps along the *cursus honorum*.[450] In the letter he wrote on Nero's behalf to the propraetor of Asia Minucius Thermus, Cicero expressed high regard for the young patrician, claiming that he valued no other member of the *nobilitas* more—a striking assertion about a man

---

448 *Ad Familiares* 321 (XIII.8)—beyond this letter, as Shackleton Bailey comments, nothing else is known of M. Rutilius, nor do we know the area in which he operated as one of Caesar's land commissioners. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 360 compares this with other *commendationes* that concerned lands of ill-defined title and goes on to discuss (361-366) the uncertainties regarding property in the years of Caesar's preeminence.

449 *Ad Familiares* 321 (XIII.8): "he [Sestius] when he learned from others how keenly you heed my opinion, he asked me that I write to you as expansively as possible concerning the senator C. Albanius" (*is cum ex aliis te mei studiosissimum esse cognosset, petivit a me ut ad te quam accuratissime scriberem de re C. Albani senatoris*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 358-359 suggests that Albanius was a noted money-lender—he had received lands in payment of debts owed to him. See the previous chapter for Cicero's relationship to Sestius, which as we saw, was close and long-lasting. We should envision this recommendation as part of the decades-long cycle of reciprocal service between Cicero and his younger friend.

450 Nero (who would be the father of the emperor Tiberius through his marriage to the future Livia Augusta) began his senatorial career as Caesar's quaestor in 48. Shackleton Bailey comments that Nero had been interested in marriage to Tullia. Cicero had expressed potential approbation, but Dolabella got there first. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 121 notes the great familiarity Cicero used with a man who could have become his son-in-law, and (139) mentions that he was among a select number labeled *meus*.

who had not even taken his first formal steps into *res publica*, even if somewhat hyperbolic.[451] We should note Cicero's careful selection of words, phrasing his assertion as "value no one more," rather than "value more than." Cicero was cultivating bonds with various rising *nobiles* at that time, such as Brutus, Cassius, and Curio. To avoid giving offense, Cicero had to take care not to explicitly elevate any one of these potential future *principes* above the others. Recommenders needed to make a powerful case to promote their *commendati*. But they also had to exercise discretion. Incautious praise might have awkward consequences, especially if it seemed to reflect poorly on the regard they felt towards other important connections. By providing recommendations, aristocrats sought to build their total stock of social capital. It would have been a shame to make a deposit in one interpersonal account, only by unnecessarily undermining investment in another.

At the time Cicero sent his recommendation, Minucius had already given Nero some assistance, and by testifying to the young patrician's well-developed sense of responsibility, Cicero sought to reassure the praetorian that he would receive a bounteous harvest for his past and future aid.[452] In addition, and in tacit acknowledgement that such an untried actor's *gratia* might not seem sufficient, or at least sufficiently certain, Cicero pledged his own gratitude.[453] In fact, I suggest that it was exactly the lack of "reputation credit" in the aristocratic community that Cicero was asking Minucius to help Nero address—helping him begin to build what we might envision as a reputation "credit score." The young man needed assistance in order to follow through on his social obligations, and to prove his utility as a *necessarius* and *patronus* for communities and lower-level individuals in the provinces.[454] To start to assert himself in *res publica*, the young patrician had to build amicable connections with established members of the aristocratic community, on the one hand, and with an underlying network below, on the other. In addition, he required a reputation for consistency and follow-through, both with elders who had helped him and with lower-level connections he owed assistance. Cicero's recommendation was designed to help Nero on all these fronts.

This letter shows us how a young aristocrat could start turning potential—based on family contacts and natural capacities of his own—into a tangible position of influence. Nero's family could boast of a long parade of *imagines*. But even a patrician from such a distinguished background required aid from sympathetic senior contacts in order to mobilize potential networks among different elite and non-elite strata. *Patrocinium-clientela* bonds provide the clearest example. There often seems to have been an assumption that the later generation would continue the relationship, but this did not amount to a guarantee.[455] As Cicero's recommendation demonstrates, it was well

---

[451] *Ad Familiares* 138 (XIII.64): "I value no one from all the nobility more" (*pluris enim ex omni nobilitate neminem facio*). Shackleton Bailey suggests that Cicero was thinking of the set of younger *nobiles*, among whom Cicero had a number of friends: M. Brutus, C. Cassius, and Curio, for instance.

[452] *Ad Familiares* 138 (XIII.64): "you will receive an ample harvest from this man; for no one has a better developed sense of obligation than this young man" (*magnum fructum ex ipso capies; nihil est enim illo adulescente gratius*).

[453] *Ad Familiares* 138 (XIII.64): "you have also made me as grateful as a man can be" (*mihi quoque gratissimum fecisti*).

[454] *Ad Familiares* 138 (XIII.64): "consider them [the Nyseans] as commended to your favor, so that the civic community may understand that it has the best sort of protection in Nero's patronage" (*habeas tibi commendatissimos, ut intellegat illa civitas sibi in Neronis patrocinio summum esse praesidium*); "I have often recommended the case of Strabo Servilius to you. Now in this affair I do this with a more pressing desire, since Nero has taken up his case" (*Strabonem Servilium tibi saepe commendavi. Nunc eo facio id impensius quod eius causam Nero suscepit*).

[455] Claude Eilers, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 61-83 discusses the heritability (or lack thereof) of provincial patronage bonds. Eilers' argument is in line with what I am suggesting here—continued connection relied on new social investment by each generation. It is important to note, as an addition to Eilers' account, that this investment required the aid of men already active in their own personal cycles of reciprocity. Cristina Rosillo-López, "Reconsidering Foreign *Clientelae* as a Source of Status in the City of Rome During the Late Roman Republic," in Jehne, Pina Polo (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration*, 263-280 provides a recent discussion of foreign *clientelae* as a source of status back in the urban center, questioning the extent of their efficacy, Michael Snowdon, "Beyond *Clientela*: The Instrumentality of *Amicitia* in the Greek East," 209-224 in the same volume explores the nature of these bonds in the eastern provinces, arguing based on epigraphic evidence that such relationships were far from empty rhetoric. Instead, that they entailed specific obligations between *patroni* and their *clientes*.

recognized that aspiring junior statesmen might need help from established figures as they claimed their ancestral stock of social power resources. At least for a young man who showed promise, it was likely that senior contacts would prove willing to assist him as he worked to overcome the inherent inertia of a man who was not already active in the cyclic give and take of reciprocity. Recommendations could play an essential role in this process, helping to bring living utility to inherited potential.

It was not only lower-level (and aspiring) senators who depended on recommendations. Well-connected, higher-level aristocrats often needed such assistance as well, particularly when they required access to specific power resources. In 61 or 60, for instance, we find Cicero encouraging L. Culleolus, the current proconsul in Illyricum, to deliver on a promise he had made that he would prod the people of Byllis to come through on the financial claims of the praetorian L. Lucceius.[456] Although Lucceius had support from both Cicero and Pompey, nevertheless, their group needed Culleolus' particular assistance (*vehementer opus est nobis et voluntatem et auctoritatem et imperium tuum accedere*), since he was the man on the spot with *imperium*.[457] Lucceius had gathered from his agents in the province that Cicero had the most influence with the proconsul, and, as Cicero told Culleolus, he found this exceptionally gratifying (*illudque mihi gratissimum est quod ita sciunt Luccei procuratores et ita Lucceius ipse ex litteris tuis quas ad eum misisti intellexit, hominis nullius apud te auctoritatem aut gratiam valere plus quam meam*).[458] He expressed his hope that the proconsul would help reality mirror report (*id ut re experiatur iterum et saepius te rogo*).

Lucceius—who was not only a praetorian himself, but also enjoyed the active support of two of the aristocratic community's most important figures—needed a recommendation, since he required access to assistance from the figure who commanded the precise parcel of formal powers necessary to accomplish his ends and who was present in person to exercise those powers. Even the most powerful figures in the community usually lacked first-person access to the relevant formal institutional levers. They were compelled to act as brokers, linking their connections to the men currently in possession of the relevant prerogatives. It is important to emphasize here that the transitory and labile nature of these "parcels," facilitated by rapid rotation in office, was one of the fundamental principles of the system of power during our period. Official posts were supposed to be limited in duration, and thus, the system remained in constant motion, kaleidoscope-like.[459] *Commendationes* helped in organizing the distribution of these formal powers one circle beyond than the ring of existing *amici*.

---

456 *Ad Familiares* 53 (XIII.42). Shackleton Bailey comments that this may or may not have been the Culleolus mentioned contemptuously at *Ad Atticum* 117 (VI.3). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 62 places the date in 59 (in contrast with Bailey), 81-82 lists Culleolus among *novi homines* who receive *commendationes* from Cicero, 403 for his background and position. The L. Lucceius being commended was a literary man who, as Bailey points out in his comments on 22 (V.12), was the writer of a history of the Social and Civil Wars. He had promised that he would write an account of Cicero's consulship and the surrounding events (he never did, as far as we know). On the recommendations of Lucceius, see also Erich Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 88. Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 34-41 uses this exchange as an instance of many of the politeness strategies he explores surrounding thanks and pledges of support. We should note, too, that Cicero recommended other high-level aristocrats as well: for instance, in *Ad Familiares* 313 (XIII.49) to the proconsul Curius, Cicero recommended the praetorian Q. Pompeius, who "had been in the habit of protecting his property, favor, and influence by my recommendations" (*antea meis commendationibus et rem et gratiam et auctoritatem suam tueri consuerit*).

457 *Ad Familiares* 53 (XIII.42): "we earnestly need to add your goodwill, your personal influence, and your formal power [to ours]" (*vehementer opus est nobis et voluntatem et auctoritatem et imperium tuum accedere*).

458 *Ad Familiares* 53 (XIII.42): "it is particularly gratifying to me that Lucceius' agents are aware, and that Lucceius himself knows from a letter you sent him, that the influence and favor of no man counts for you more than mine. I beg again and again that this proves to be the case in fact" (*illudque mihi gratissimum est quod ita sciunt Luccei procuratores et ita Lucceius ipse ex litteris tuis quas ad eum misisti intellexit, hominis nullius apud te auctoritatem aut gratiam valere plus quam meam. id ut re experiatur iterum et saepius te rogo*).

459 Livy II.I.7 is the *locus classicus* on this principle, linking rotation in office to *libertas*. The structural permanence of a "super parcel" of formal prerogatives was one of the essential elements of Augustus's revolution, eliminating, at least for the top man, the time-bounded nature of Republican offices.

We are fortunate that we have access to a follow-up letter in this case, in which Cicero underscored the gratitude and obligation that he, Lucceius, and Pompey all felt towards the addressee. Cicero asked, further, that Culleolus continue the favor that he had thus far shown to Lucceius. Now, through his kindness, Culleolus would not only be following through on his concern to serve the interests of his important friends, but he would also be acting to perpetuate and protect his personal reputation for consistency (*antea nostra causa, nunc iam etiam tuae constantiae gratia mansurus sis in eadem ista liberalitate*).[460]

This follow-up letter worked on multiple levels. First of all, it reassured Culleolus that he had succeeded in storing up obligation with three of his colleagues among the senior senators, and it acted as a record of the gratitude due to him. But in addition, trading on the knowledge that Culleolus needed to retain his reputation as a high-quality benefactor to maintain his influence, Cicero was asking for further favors for Lucceius, adding his own solemn promise that further reciprocal gratitude from all parties would be forthcoming in recompense (*id et Lucceio et Pompeio valde gratum fore teque apud eos praeclare positurum confirmo et spondeo*).[461] We see a complex dance of service, gratitude, and obligation between high-level statesmen here, all negotiating their relationships and the "balance of payments" with each other in shifting groupings of affiliation and alliance. In a sense, especially in the second letter, we can imagine that Lucceius, Pompey, and Cicero combined to exercise power over Culleolus, using the compulsion of their collective influence to keep the magistrate active in working for Lucceius' interests. We should always remember that (in a subtle, mannered fashion, and to varying degrees) recommendations were expressions of control as well as invitations to generosity. Perhaps under perfect conditions, generosity should be spontaneous. But in a reality that often failed to express this ideal, the process of *commendatio* was frequently necessary to create generosity. Recommenders had to exert delicate social control to elicit collaborative conduct.

The recommendation process provided an essential mechanism for negotiating relationships and interests between senators of various levels, but it also served to link the members of an aristocratic community of senators and equestrians up and down the Italian peninsula—a community which, by the mid-first century, had become strikingly integrated.[462] As the previous half century of scholarship has made clear, we should avoid the temptation to view the *equites* as a group cordoned off beneath the senatorial stratum. This lack of strict stratification between senators and equestrians would have been especially salient with respect to the kinds of influence that depended

---

460 *Ad Familiares* 54 (XIII.41): "as for the future, I have no doubt that you will continue your generosity, before motivated by our interest and now also in service of your own consistency" (*quod superest, quamquam mihi non est dubium quin, cum antea nostra causa, nunc iam etiam tuae constantiae gratia mansurus sis in eadem ista liberalitate*).

461 *Ad Familiares* 54 (XIII.41): "I affirm and pledge myself as surety that Lucceius and Pompey will be grateful to you and that you will be set up in a splendid position with them" (*id et Lucceio et Pompeio valde gratum fore teque apud eos praeclare positurum confirmo et spondeo*).

462Caillan Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) provides a diachronic account of the history of the *ordo* of *equites*, its status, and its relations with the community of senators, with a focus on the Ciceronian period at 70-108; Claude Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974) provides the most detailed portrait of the order, its fluid boundaries, and its connections to the senatorial stratum; the volumes of Örjan Wikander, Senators and *Equites* I–VIII, *Opuscula Romana* 15–26, 1985–2001 give further deep case studies, emphasizing the close links between the two major elite orders—"Senators and *Equites*: IV: The Case of the Egnatii" is especially relevant to the Ciceronian evidence; other seminal works on these orders, their relationships, and the permeable boundaries include Peter Brunt, "The *Equites* in the Late Republic," in *Deuxième Conférence Internationale d'Histoire Économique, Aix-en-Provence 1962, I: Commerce et Politique dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Mouton, 1965), 117-137, updated in *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), as well as Timothy Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) and "The Definition of *Eques Romanus* in the Late Republic and Early Empire," *Historia* XIX (1970): 67-83, along with Richard Duncan-Jones, *Power and Privilege in Roman Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), which, although focused on the subsequent period under Principate, is nonetheless useful for understanding analogous issues under the Republic. This is not to say that certain regional loyalties did not persist, as exemplified by the collective association of Cicero and some of his fellow central-Italian elites making their way in the urban center, as described by Kathryn Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," in Jonathan Powell, Jeremy Paterson (eds.), *Cicero the Advocate* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 96-116.

on social and financial capital. Equestrians did not choose to contend personally in *res publica*, so they implicitly sacrificed most claims to the symbolic rewards of the public scrum. In social and financial affairs, however, they could participate on terms that could equal, or even exceed, their senatorial fellows. Not that, in the end, we should imagine that any of these arenas was strictly distinct from the others. Equestrians may not have chosen to head the ticket in electoral campaigns, but this by no means implies that they separated themselves from the aristocratic community's system of power. *Commendationes* often proved to be important devices in the framework of social influence that mediated relations among members of these two *ordines*.

A letter from Cicero to Sulpicius—a recommendation of sorts for their mutual friend Atticus—reveals the fuzziness of the hierarchies that ordered senators and equestrians in the aristocratic community.[463] Cicero was writing to thank Sulpicius for an unexpected kindness. Without prompting, Sulpicius had written to Atticus, offering goodwill and promising assistance in his capacity as proconsul of Achaea (*ultro ad eum scripsisse eique nec opinanti voluntatem tuam tantam per litteras detulisse*).[464] It is telling that a proconsul might reach out to an equestrian without solicitation, volunteering the kind of services usually only dispensed in response to a request. Obligation from Atticus himself, as well as from Atticus' associates, appears to have held sufficient value for Sulpicius to pursue it proactively. In the letter, Cicero testified that Sulpicius' gesture left Atticus exceptionally grateful, and Cicero professed himself much obliged as well, if somewhat amazed.[465] He went on to encourage Sulpicius to increase his favor with Atticus even further, as far, in fact, as the *amcitia* he shared with Cicero could possibly prompt.[466] In recompense, Cicero promised that he would feel indebted himself for the *officia* Sulpicius was willing to provide to their mutual friend.[467] But even though, in the end, Sulpicius accrued obligation from a fellow consular, the essential point is that a proconsular governor was sufficiently aware of the importance of the goodwill of an equestrian that he went out of his way to store up extra obligation in his account with Atticus by courting it.[468] With his *commendatio*, Cicero had the capacity to reinforce and amplify the social effects of Sulpicius' initial gesture, and as a result of his intervention, he could implicate himself in a virtuous cycle of reciprocity that involved all three actors.

The ongoing support Cicero provided for L. Egnatius Rufus, an equestrian with extensive investments in the provinces, reinforces our perception that an individual knight's concerns might stand out as a high priority for a senatorial *amicus*.[469] For instance, when recommending Egnatius'

---

463 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 62 discusses it as a conventional instance of *commendatio*, without noting the somewhat extraordinary nature of the dynamic.

464 *Ad Familiares* 284 (XIII.18): "you have written to him voluntarily and with your letter you have bestowed such goodwill upon one who was not expecting it" (*ultro ad eum scripsisse eique nec opinanti voluntatem tuam tantam per litteras detulisse*).

465 *Ad Familiares* 284 (XIII.18): "for although both of us were just about equally grateful, I was nevertheless more amazed" (*nam etsi utrique nostrum prope aeque gratae erant, tamen ego admirabar magis*). Shackleton Bailey wonders why this unsolicited gesture may have surprised Cicero more than it surprised Atticus, speculating that surprise perhaps stood for gratification (although this then prompts us to ask why Cicero should have been more grateful).

466 *Ad Familiares* 284 (XIII.18): "to what you have indicated you will do for Atticus' sake, it is my desire that you add however much of an addendum as is possible on account of the affection you bear me" (*ad id quod Attici causa te ostendisti esse facturum tantum velim addas quantum ex nostro amore accessionis fieri potest*).

467 *Ad Familiares* 284 (XIII.18): "I want you to consider that, in all the good offices you perform for Atticus either in his Epirote or any other affairs, I will be obliged to you in equal part" (*teque ita existimare volo, quibuscumque officiis in Epiroticis reliquisque rebus Atticum obstrinxeris, iisdem me tibi obligatum fore*).

468 In line with this argument, Fergus Millar, "Cornelius Nepos, 'Atticus' and the Roman Revolution," *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988), 43 points out the importance of the ability to benefit equestrians as one of the primary rewards of holding a provincial governorship (in terms of the ability to confer legateships). We should add that their ability to serve equestrians in a variety of less formal capacities—by aiding them with their practical business interests, for instance—was just as important.

469 As Shackleton Bailey notes in his commentary on *Ad Familiares* 268 (XIII.43), Cicero engaged in a variety of financial relations with Egnatius from 49-44; the equestrian had interests in Cilicia, as well as in Asia—271 (XIII.45)—and probably Bithynia—274 (XIII.47). Egnatius crops up throughout the recommendations in the *Ad Familiares* and also in many letters discussing business dealings in the *Ad Atticum*—for instance, 142 (VII.18), 337 (XIII.45), and 367 (XIV.13) to take a sampling from nearly two dozen references from

affairs to Q. Gallius (who was about to head off to Cilicia as a quaestor or a legate in the winter of 47-46), Cicero described his relationship with Egnatius as uniquely familiar, reinforced by daily intercourse and by the exchange of many important services (*L. Egnati Rufi, quo ego uno equite Romano familiarissime utor et qui cum consuetudine cottidiana tum officiis plurimis maximisque mihi coniunctus est*).[470] Cicero was sufficiently invested in the outcome, in fact, that he even wrote a second time to Gallius, thanking the official for following through on the recommendation to the extent he already had, recording his own gratitude, and taking care to emphasize that he cared for Egnatius' concerns as if they were his own.[471] The first of this pair of letters is almost a duplicate of the foregoing to Q. (Marcius) Philippus, likely proconsul of Cilicia in 47-46—Cicero was taking care to address a full battery of magistrates of various levels in order to assure positive outcomes for his intimate and influential equestrian contact.[472] While the rhetoric was, of course, somewhat hyperbolic, the proliferation and insistence of such words to many connections nonetheless suggests that Cicero found it important personally that Egnatius would enjoy success.[473]

We should note, moreover, that it was not only the senator who provided services to the equestrian. In the exchange with Gallius, and also in a recommendation from the same year to a proquaestor of Asia, Appuleius, Cicero emphasized that he and Egnatius were indebted to each other for mutual services rendered (*officia magna et mutua nostra inter nos esse*).[474] As the senator, it was Cicero's task to provide connections with men who held the levers of formal power in the province where Egnatius had business interests. But we should not imagine that Cicero was offering benefaction in exchange for the support of an underling. Instead, Cicero's words imply that the equestrian was able to reciprocate fully with his own services—likely related to money-lending and financial intermediation—even if the specifics of Egnatius' actions remained unnamed in the text.[475]

Cicero appears to have cared deeply, not only that Egnatius understood and appreciated the measures he was taking to support his interests, but also that he perceived them as effective. For instance, in an earlier recommendation, Cicero told P. Silius, assigned to Bithynia in 51-50, that the most important service the governor could provide was to help Cicero display his own affection and to demonstrate to Egnatius that Silius' own care for Cicero would help translate this fondness into

---

the correspondence from 49-44. Wikander, "Senators and *Equites:* IV: The Case of the Egnatii," *Opuscula Romana* 18 (1990): 207-211 discusses the various branches of this family in the late Republic. Some were *negotiatores* on Delos, and this Delian *negotium* may have been one of the key sources of the family's initial prosperity. After one of the Egnatii reached the praetorship in the mid-second century, some of the branches were senatorial, although not the branch to which L. Egnatius Rufus belonged.

470 *Ad Familiares* 268 (XIII.43): "for L. Egnatius, the one Roman knight who alone enjoys my most affectionate friendship and who is joined to me by accustomed daily intercourse and by the most and greatest services" (*L. Egnati Rufi, quo ego uno equite Romano familiarissime utor et qui cum consuetudine cottidiana tum officiis plurimis maximisque mihi coniunctus est*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 24 notes that Egnatius was one of Cicero's especially close friends, 82 mentions that this Gallius was from a senatorial family. As Cicero mentioned in his *Brutus* LXXX.277, he had defended Gallius' father in court, which Deniaux claims to have been a source of their *necessitudo*.

471 *Ad Familiares* 270 (XIII.44): "I have such a strong connection with him [Egnatius] and my affection is so great that, if the matter were my own, I would be at no lesser pains" (*tanta mihi cum eo necessitudo est familiaritasque ut, si mea res esset, non magis laborarem*).

472 Shackleton Bailey points out this doubling with 269 (XIII.74).

473 At least to the extent that it implies a lack of "genuine" affective investment for a letter to be read as "conventionalized," this claim can be seen to push back gently against the emphasis on the "conventionalized" nature of such rhetoric in works such as Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*; Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*; Rühl, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*. This tension disappears, however, if we choose not to see conventionalized rhetoric as automatically "cheapening" emotional value.

474 *Ad Familiares* 271 (XIII.45): "there is a great and mutual exchange of services between us" (*officia magna et mutua nostra inter nos esse*). Appuleius, as Shackleton Bailey tells us, was the proquaestor of Asia in 47—he may have been any of a number of contemporary Appuleii.

475 Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 227 notes that Egnatius provided credit intermediation. Cicero and Quintus both had financial dealings with the man, and these money-lending services may have been exactly the kind of benefit such a wealthy equestrian could provide to his fellow aristocrats among the senators. Kathryn Welch, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 45 (1996), 450-471 shows how Atticus derived his well-networked social location from his action as a moneylender and money manager.

pragmatic results (*omnium tuorum officiorum, quae et multa et magna sunt, mihi gratissimum fuerit si ita tractaris Egnatium ut sentiat et se a me et me a te amari*).[476]

It is important to emphasize, however, the extent to which social and practical aims blended in this process. For Cicero, it appears that one of the biggest payoffs he could gain by sending the recommendation was an increase in social capital with his *amicus*, as would also be the case for Silius if and when he provided assistance to the *commendatus*. Meanwhile, as Egnatius sought to reinforce the relational bond he was trying to build with an official in command of formal prerogatives that were important to advancing his business interests in Bithynia, the equestrian businessman tapped into the stock of social capital he had built with Cicero in order to access his assistance. I propose, however, that this did not represent a "withdrawal" from the social account that Egnatius maintained with his consular *amicus*. It seems not to have been the case that every time an aristocrat needed support, he had to spend social resources when he put in a request to his recommender. Not every transaction in this interpersonal economy had to be entirely zero-sum.

Indeed, instead of framing his letter as a favor to Egnatius, Cicero could at least plausibly claim that he viewed the recommendation as an opportunity—a chance to prove his affection for his equestrian *amicus*. In the letters to Gallius and Appuleius, moreover, he put forward similar requests for the recipients to take care that Egnatius was made keenly aware both that Cicero was exerting diligent efforts on behalf of the *commendatus* and that he was made to understand that Cicero's influence was effective (*gratissimum mihi feceris si curaris ut is intellegat me a te tantum amari quantum ipse existimo*—Gallius; *a te peto ut cures ut intellegat me ad te satis diligenter scripsisse; nam de tua erga me voluntate non dubitabat*—Appuleius).[477] Cicero wanted to store up obligation with his wealthy equestrian connection, and beyond this, he hoped to reinforce Egnatius' perception of the utility of his influence. The preeminence of these social stakes is also evident in the fact that Cicero even implied, in the letter to Silius, that his *commendatio* was practically unnecessary—Silius already had high regard for Egnatius (*quid ego tibi commendem eum quem tu ipse diligis?*).[478] Instead, the process of *commendatio* could be framed more as an effort to implicate all the men involved in a cycle of reciprocal affection and service than as an actual introduction of an unknown actor. In this instance, at any rate, the recommendation process was acting primarily as an engine for social capital generation.

The implications are twofold of Cicero's urgent and repeated requests that the recipients of letters of recommendation should make an equestrian contact aware of the efficacy of these communications. First, even for a man as influential as Cicero, it was highly desirable to collect a reservoir of obligation from a well-resourced equestrian businessman like Egnatius and to maintain access to his services and influence for future needs. Second, the relationship was not only desirable as a stock of future favors and practical exchange: the equestrian's value judgment also mattered. Egnatius was a representative of the aristocratic community, and a prominent one, at that. He was one of the members of the body whose collective judgment constituted Cicero's status, and the equestrian's opinion was sufficiently influential and respected within this constituency for Cicero to invest repeatedly and explicitly in cultivating it. By providing recommendations for Egnatius to a

---

476 *Ad Familiares* 274 (XIII.47): "of all the services you provide, which are both numerous and great, it will be the most gratifying of all to me if you deal with Egnatius so that he feels that he is loved by me and I by you" (*omnium tuorum officiorum, quae et multa et magna sunt, mihi gratissimum fuerit si ita tractaris Egnatium ut sentiat et se a me et me a te amari*). This letter was probably written, as Shackleton Bailey notes, around the time Cicero departed for his own post in Cilicia.

477 *Ad Familiares* 270 (XIII.44): "it would be most gratifying to me if you would act so that he understands that I am loved by you as much as I estimate that I am myself" (*gratissimum mihi feceris si curaris ut is intellegat me a te tantum amari quantum ipse existimo*); 271 (XIII.45): "I ask from you that you take care that he understands that I have written with sufficient diligence to you; for concerning your goodwill towards me, he has no doubt" (*a te peto ut cures ut intellegat me ad te satis diligenter scripsisse; nam de tua erga me voluntate non dubitabat*).

478 *Ad Familiares* 274 (XIII.47): "why should I commend someone to you whom you already esteem?" (*quid ego tibi commendem eum quem tu ipse diligis?*).

sequence of senatorial provincial officials, on the one hand, Cicero was taking advantage of his own specific location and connections within the aristocratic community—as a well-connected member of the network of senators—to acquire access to specific power resources for a friend, connecting the equestrian to the officials currently occupying the positions that gave them access to formal levers of power relevant to Egnatius' provincial investments and ventures.[479] Like Atticus, Egnatius seems to have possessed an impressive network of property and business interests, creating the need for senatorial support, but also making him an attractive contact for senators. On the other hand, as was always the case, if to varying degrees, Cicero was making an investment in perception, looking to earn approval from one of the constellation of actors whose opinions together constituted his social standing. To take this logic one step further, we can view this standing itself was both power resource and reward.

To be sure, the relationship between Cicero and Egnatius was to a large extent driven by immediate utility and the quest for broader social power. But woven together with this practical motivation, we catch a whiff of affective investment. As I read it, we can often sense Cicero's personal concern on Egnatius' behalf. Occasionally, one of Cicero's recommendations for an equestrian contact, such as his brief note for Cn. Otacilius Naso to the proconsul of Sicily Acilius in 46, does seem suspiciously conventional—a letter which reads as if Cicero were going down a checklist.[480] But it would be misleading to see Cicero's relationships with his equestrian *amici* as purely, or even primarily, operational. In certain cases, although it is always impossible to be entirely certain as to the true emotional content of textual expressions of affection, his professions of fondness appear to have been more than empty words. The discourse of *amicitia* cannot be divorced from the social reality of sincere warmth or from a sense of identity rooted in shared morality and interests. This was one of the reasons, I suggest, that Cicero poured so much energy into distinguishing some of his recommendations from *commendationes vulgares*—to highlight the instances in which he wanted the recipient of the letter to understand the case as a matter of more directly personal concern.[481]

In discussing his relationships with *equites*, we should recall that Cicero grew up in an equestrian milieu. A letter of recommendation he wrote in 46 to Brutus, who was then serving as governor of Gaul, gives evidence of Cicero's ongoing connection to the community of knights in his hometown of Arpinum. Cicero began by describing the equestrian men of the *municipium* as objects of his care (*quam diligenter soleam meos municipes Arpinatis tueri*).[482] Later in the letter, however, he

---

[479] A recommendation on behalf of a company of *publicani* from Bythinia shows something more of the manner in which a provincial official's services could be useful to equestrian business interests. In this instance, a case from 54, Cicero told the quaestor Crassipes that he could provide essential services to the equestrian businessmen—*Ad Familiares* 139 (XIII.9): "I am not unaware how much power a quaestor has with regard to such an affair" (*cuius rei quantam potestatem quaestor habeat non sum ignarus*). As Shackleton Bailey comments, Furius Crassipes (who married Tullia in 56-55, but had by this time been divorced from her for a number of years) was currently the quaestor in Bithynia, likely in 51. Since a quaestor's duties were specially concerned with finance, he was well placed to serve the interests of a Bithynian company, as Cicero asked.

[480] *Ad Familiares* 304 (XIII.33) seems somewhat formulaic. It touched on what appears to have been a checklist for this kind of recommendation (e.g. Cicero was as familiar with this man as with any man of his rank, his character and manners made daily contacts agreeable, and Cicero would be much obliged if he found that the recommendation had carried weight). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 44-50 details conventional structures of *commendationes*. Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 34 locates such expressions within a broader discourse of what he describes as the "politeness of respect" deployed throughout the letters—part of "the epistolary etiquette that a young aristocrat was expected to acquire in anticipation of his role as social patron"—but notes too that the "language of recommendations, however, is relatively self-contained and restricted in its sphere of use."

[481] Cotton, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," 333-334 treats Cicero's efforts to distinguish certain letters from this template, as does Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 50-53. Hall, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, 79-108 explores the nature of "polite fictions" in the Ciceronian correspondence—their uses and their limits. As much as some of this language could be conventionalized, however, I suggest that this very conventional character might make gradations in how to read *commendationes* more readily legible.

[482] *Ad Familiares* 278 (XIII.11): "I have no doubt that you know…how diligently I am accustomed to take care of my fellow townsmen of Arpinum…we have sent these Roman knights [a list of names follows] in order to look to these properties [in Gaul] and to extract

shifted to referring to himself as one of their number, speaking of how "we" had sent the bearers as *legati* (*legatos equites Romanos misimus*). Cicero did not merely retain a bond with his fellow Arpinates, that is. He still saw himself (or at least could plausibly present himself) as a member of their social collective. The combination of his equestrian roots and his senatorial trajectory, gave Cicero a sort of dual membership, with one foot in each order. Of course, he was not alone in such bifurcation. This condition would also have obtained for other Italian equestrians who made forays into affairs in the capital such as his protégé Caelius.[483] As a result, Cicero was particularly well placed to serve as a bridge, linking *equites* and senators and connecting Arpinum and the capital. In this recommendation, we can see how Cicero could use his angle as a member of his senatorial network to connect the members of his equestrian community of origin to the levers of magisterial power they needed to access to accomplish their ends. We should stress that, even in 46, decades after he first joined the *ordo senatorius*, Cicero continued to act as a member of this communal entity, not merely as a representative of a group to which he did not himself belong.[484] We might even take this particular kind of utility into account as one compelling reason for equestrian fathers to encourage their sons to undertake careers in *res publica*—to acquire direct access to specific power resources during their terms as magistrates and, what was perhaps more important in the long run, to build a network of connections to other people who would also command official powers periodically over the course of their careers.

With a number of equestrians, Cicero's affection and connection grew from more than merely practical business ties or the quotidian affection stemming from shared municipality. In fact, some of his relationships with equestrians mirrored his senatorial friendships in terms of the variety of the attachments that linked the *amici*. As an addendum to the letter he sent Brutus on behalf of his fellow Arpinate townsmen, Cicero appended an individual, and especially warm, recommendation for Q. Fufidius, a connection linked to him by an abundant range of friendly ties (*omnes necessitudines sunt*).[485] Fufidius was the stepson of M. Caesius, one of Cicero's particularly intimate equestrian friends (*privignus est M. Caesi, mei maxime et familiaris et necessari*).[486] Probably benefiting from Cicero's desire to do a favor for his stepfather, Fufidius had accompanied Cicero to Cilicia as a military tribune, and he had acquitted himself so laudably as to make his superior officer feel that he had received a favor rather than conferring one, or, at any rate, it was plausible in this

---

the rents owed by the tenants and to examine and manage the whole property" (*non dubito quin scias…quam diligenter soleam meos municipes Arpinatis tueri… ad ea visenda pecuniasque quae a colonis debentur exigendas totamque rem et cognoscendam et administrandam legatos equites Romanos misimus*). Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14*, especially 65-70, provides a discussion of the blurry boundaries between the two orders, and also of the sporadic attempts to draw sharper distinctions. In line with the fuzziness we see in this letter, Wiseman points out (70) that what distinctions that did exist might have been viewed with far less sharpness by an "ex-equestrian *novus homo*" than by a member of an old family (either of *nobiles* or of established, city of Rome based *equites*). Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order*, 109-154 investigates the question of the status and boundaries of the equestrian order, exploring the transformations in the first century, as the boundaries of the *ordo* became more formalized and new symbols of group identity came to be adopted (Davenport nonetheless argues for a relatively higher level of continuity during this period than usually supposed).

483 Lomas, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," discusses Cicero's connection with a variety of other aristocrats active in the Roman system of power who also came from Italian municipal origins, exploring the nature of their collective action and shared identity.

484 With his recommendations, Cicero did also represent corporate bodies of equestrians of which he was not a member (even by past association). In *Ad Familiares* 134 (XIII.65), for instance, we see him putting in a good word with the propraetor Thermus on behalf of a *societas* of equestrian businessmen. The company was in his *fides* as a collective, but he also enjoyed individual *amicitia* with many of its members. Shackleton Bailey suggests that Cicero may have represented the company in court. In that case, he would explicitly have been a *patronus* for the organization.

485 *Ad Familiares* 279 (XIII.12): "here, in a separate recommendation, I diligently commend Q. Fufidius, with whom I share all sorts of friendly ties" (*hac separatim Q. Fufidium, quocum mihi omnes necessitudines sunt, diligentius commendo*).

486 *Ad Familiares* 279 (XIII.12): "he is the stepson of M. Caesius, with whom I have as intimate a connection as is possible" (*privignus est M. Caesi, mei maxime et familiaris et necessari*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 162 notes Cicero's practice of invoking the family bonds that his *commendati* shared with his other even more intimate *familiares*.

context for the commander to express such as feeling (*fuit in Cilicia mecum tribunus militum; quo in munere ita se tractavit ut accepisse ab eo beneficium viderer, non dedisse*).[487]

Here, in a manner analogous to what we saw with Cicero's recommendations for junior senators, he was also asking Brutus to help a young man to build his reputation—this time an equestrian. Brutus should expend effort to ensure that young man's industrious efforts on Cicero's behalf should serve to add distinction to his reputation (*operamque des ut in ea legatione quam suscepit contra suum commodum secutus auctoritatem meam quam maxime eius excellat industria*).[488] In this instance, it would have been Fufidius' good name as a competent and principled financial operator for the corporate economic entity that was at stake, rather than the kind of repute that underwrote, and subsequently rewarded, success in *res publica*. But reputation mattered in all of the aristocratic community's circles, even if it manifested in different forms. In fact, these social networks overlapped to a large degree, and the various forms of reputation would have been far from easy to distinguish. Each of them had to do with qualities such as trust and generosity, which played a vital role in all of the aristocratic community's venues of social interchange and social power. Much as *commendationes* could provide essential aid for aspiring senators as they sought to establish a presence in the community, it seems that they could serve a comparable purpose for early-career equestrian businessmen.

In another echo of Cicero's connections with senatorial up-and-comers, Cicero described his relationship with Fufidius as composed of a combination of practical services and shared interests—a nod to the idealizing discourse of *amicitia*. It is especially telling that Cicero took care to emphasize Fufidius' inclinations towards the literary and scholarly pursuits that he and Brutus both valued. These were qualities which he implied might make Brutus more likely to embrace the *commendatus* (*quod apud te valet plurimum, a nostris studiis non abhorrens*).[489] Cicero was pointing out his own identification with Fufifius and suggesting that Brutus would discover, or at least that he would be able to cultivate, a similar fellow feeling rooted in the *consensio studiorum*. Moreover, this emphasis on shared literary and scholarly interests was not limited to the letter for Fufidius. For instance, in a recommendation from 46 or 45, Cicero highlighted to Sulpicius—another fellow enthusiast for intellectual pursuits—that the *negotiator* T. Manlius shared their erudite interests (*a studiis nostris non abhorret*).[490] A common passion for literature and scholarship was certainly not an absolute prerequisite for functional reciprocity. But this letter demonstrates that, as much as the equestrian businessman needed access to the formal levers of power under the governor's command, Cicero's recommendation was facilitating more than merely an unadorned practical transaction.

Cicero often at least acted as if he presumed that his recommendation would join the equestrian *commendatus* in a full-fledged friendship with the recipient of the letter. This dynamic of *amicitia* creation should not be viewed as distinct from the requests to provide services to the beneficiary. While Cicero never wrote recommendations merely to start a friendship, in the absence of some more concrete purpose, he often appears to have hoped and expected that a more general

---

[487] *Ad Familiares* 279 (XIII.12): "he was in Cilicia with me as my military tribune; in this office he conducted himself so that I seemed to have received a favor from him, not to have given one" (*fuit in Cilicia mecum tribunus militum; quo in munere ita se tractavit ut accepisse ab eo beneficium viderer, non dedisse*).

[488] *Ad Familiares* 279 (XIII.12): "take care that, in an assignment that he took up only because of my influence, even though it was contrary to his own convenience, his diligence serves to distinguish him as much as possible" (*operamque des ut in ea legatione quam suscepit contra suum commodum secutus auctoritatem meam quam maxime eius excellat industria*).

[489] *Ad Familiares* 279 (XIII.12): "he is not averse to those studies of ours, which I know have such force with you" (*quod apud te valet plurimum, a nostris studiis non abhorrens*).

[490] *Ad Familiares* 288 (XIII.22): "he does not shy away from our studies" (*a studiis nostris non abhorret*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 177 notes this recommendation as an example of the importance of what she calls "le partage d'une culture commune."

sense of goodwill would develop between those of his connections that he linked.[491] In a letter in 46 on behalf of L. Titius Strabo, for example, Cicero wrote to Brutus that he would find the man entirely worthy of his *amicitia* (*tu ipse L. Titium cognosces amicitia tua dignissimum*), as if taking it for granted that the recommendation had the potential to create such a bond between the equestrian businessman and the senatorial governor.[492] After all, Titius was a particularly distinguished knight, at least as Cicero told it, and Cicero himself had an especially strong connection to the man (*L. Titio Strabone, equite Romano in primis honesto et ornato, familiarissime utor. omnia mihi cum eo intercedunt iura summae necessitudinis*).[493] With his recommendation, on the one hand, Cicero was connecting the equestrian to the man who could help him collect a debt, the adjudication of which had been remitted to Gaul (*huic in tua provincia pecuniam debet P. Cornelius. ea res a Volcacio, qui Romae ius dicit, reiecta in Galliam est*).[494] On the other hand, we must keep in mind another element of the social transaction. Cicero was introducing one of his personal friends to another. His *amicitiae* with both the senator and the equestrian mixed utility and amity, and he wrote as if he assumed that if he interceded as an agent of connection a similar bond should develop naturally between the two. It would profit all involved, as Cicero appears to have believed, if both men could benefit from and enjoy each other's company. All three aristocrats would enter a cycle of reciprocal service and affection, with ample capacity for further profit and pleasure. Amity facilitated assistance, creating further amity in turn.

Although we do not find such language in all of the equestrian recommendations, this letter is not unique in its underlying presumption that *commendatio* could create *amicitia*. In a recommendation of uncertain date for P. Messenius to P. Caesius, Cicero also emphasized his own friendship with the subject and praised the man in particularly strong language.[495] This time, Cicero seems to have been recommending one distinguished equestrian to another. He highlighted Messenius' comprehensive distinction and the quality of the bond he shared with the man (*omnibus rebus ornatum meumque perfamiliarem*), claiming further that Caesius would be linking himself to an honorable man who was worthy of his *amicitia* (*virum bonum tuaque amicitia dignum tibi adiunxeris*).[496]

Recommendations suggested asymmetries, with *commendatus* automatically cast in a subordinate position both to his recommender and to his new benefactor. But while asymmetries could sometimes be stark and permanent, as I have highlighted throughout the dissertation and especially here in the second section, they could also often be subtle and transitory. Cicero had a delicate task in this context. He had to paint Messienus as sufficiently illustrious to be worthy of his and Caesius' *amicitia* but still as a supplicant who needed their aid and guardianship in this particular moment (*ut eum in tuam fidem recipias eiusque rem famamque tueare*), as the *commendatus* worked to preserve

---

491 Although as the recommendation for the intellectual businessman Manlius shows, this request could be quite limited and general—*Ad Familiares* 288 (XIII.22): "if you aid and advance T. Manlius as much as possible, in such ways as you are able that are consistent with your honor and dignity" (*si T. Manlium quam maxime, quibuscumque rebus honeste ac pro tua dignitate poteris, iuveris atque ornaveris*).

492 *Ad Familiares* 281 (XIII.14): "you will find this man L. Titius as worthy of your friendship as it is possible to be" (*tu ipse L. Titium cognosces amicitia tua dignissimum*).

493 *Ad Familiares* 281 (XIII.14): "I enjoyed the most affectionate friendship with L. Titius Strabo, one of the most honorable and distinguished Roman knights. All the duties of the closest possible connection exist for me with him" (*L. Titio Strabone, equite Romano in primis honesto et ornato, familiarissime utor. omnia mihi cum eo intercedunt iura summae necessitudinis*).

494 *Ad Familiares* 281 (XIII.14): "P. Cornelius owes money to this man in your province. This matter has been remitted to Gaul by Volcacius, who is city praetor" (*huic in tua provincia pecuniam debet P. Cornelius. ea res a Volcacio, qui Romae ius dicit, reiecta in Galliam est*). Shackleton Bailey comments that Volcacius was Praetor Urbanus in 46 (probably governor of Cilicia thereafter). Tan, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, 68-90 provides extensive information about the institutional devices under a magistrate's command that could assist with debt collection processes in the provinces.

495 In *Ad Familiares* 61 (XIII.51), Cicero commended Messenius to Caesius and his father—Shackleton Bailey proposes that this was probably the P. Caesius mentioned in *Pro Balbo* 50 (XXII), an equestrian of Ravenna enfranchised by Cn. Pompeius. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 61 connects Messienus to the production of pottery, specifically Arretine wear.

496 *Ad Familiares* 61 (XIII.51): "I commend P. Messienus to you, a Roman knight distinguished in all ways and my particular friend…you will link a good man who is worthy of your friendship to you" (*P. Messienum, equitem Romanum omnibus rebus ornatum meumque perfamiliarem, tibi commendo …virum bonum tuaque amicitia dignum tibi adiunxeris*).

and extend his property and reputation.[497] Within the aristocratic community, asymmetries could melt rapidly, and the gap in social standing between these two *equites* appears to have been slight. As a comparison, recall from Chapter 3 how asymmetric friendships between senators could, and were even "supposed" to, develop towards greater equality. In this case, Cicero might institute a bond that began under inegalitarian conditions. The *amicitia* frame implied the potential for peer friendship, however. Thus, it was altogether relevant to the initiation of the link to cast the *commendatus* in terms that made the prospect of this kind of relationship appear both possible and attractive.

This letter reminds us that the community of equestrians had its own internal social dynamics.[498] As was the case in relationships between senators and between senators and *equites*, informal personal bonds also governed connections between knights. Within equestrian circles, too, there were subtle hierarchies. Different players had access to financial and social resources that varied both in quantity and in type. Thus, they commanded levels and kinds of influence that could vary widely. The absence of a framework based on office holding meant that these structures were less overt than they were in the parallel community of senators—based, for the *equites*, on resources and connections rather than on formal *honores*—but they were present nonetheless.[499] On a fundamental level, aristocratic influence, both senatorial and equestrian, was largely constituted by the personal relationships and interchange among individuals and groups. The hierarchies and asymmetries within these networks were constantly being renegotiated in the social and financial transactions between players.

Nested within the letters that Cicero wrote for equestrians, we often find special commendations for freedmen who were members of their households.[500] As much as these are easy to pass over, they merit our attention as we explore the nature of power within aristocratic community. They give indispensable evidence of the central, if quiet, role of such *liberti* in the function of the social system. Freedmen were not aristocrats themselves, of course, but they occupied a vital position in the Roman economy and society and, specifically, within the landscape of social power among the elites.[501]

Sometimes these appended recommendations were impersonal—part of a blanket commendation of a man's whole *domus* and its representatives—and they were sometimes no more than unadorned requests to treat the freedmen well, as favored agents of the aristocrat's property and interests in the recipient's sphere of influence.[502] In other cases, however, Cicero provided a

---

[497] *Ad Familiares* 61 (XIII.51): "[I ask] that you receive him into your circle of dutiful obligation and that you protect his property and reputation" (*ut eum in tuam fidem recipias eiusque rem famamque tueare*).

[498] Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order*, emphasizes the growth of a distinct equestrian constituency during the late Republic, at least to a degree. This group was tightly linked to the senatorial community, but it retained its own interests and priorities.

[499] Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14*, 68-70 explicates some of the relevant distinctions between men of equestrian census and *equites* proper and, further, he differentiates the strata within the formal *ordo* itself. Some of these distinctions had to do with family pedigree, as well as with the wealth, social capital, and power resource access I am highlighting (not altogether separable, of course); see also, Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order*, 109-154.

[500] Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 162 catalogues the freedmen included in recommendations.

[501] Henrik Mouritsen, *The Freedman in the Roman World* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) provides a comprehensive treatment of the practical and ideological position of freedmen in Roman society; Koenraad Verboven. "The Freedman Economy of Roman Italy," in Sinclair Bell, Teresa Ramsby (eds.), *Free at Last!: the Impact of Freed Slaves on the Roman Empire* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 88-109 underscores the importance of freedmen in the Italian economy of the late Republic and pan-Mediterranean trade, highlighting their indispensable and often strikingly independent role; and Georges Fabre, *Libertus: Recherches sur les Rapports Patron-Affranchi à la Fin de la République Romaine* (Paris: De Boccard, 1981) lays out the complexities of relations between *liberti* and their former masters—a mixture of freedman empowerment and lingering stigma.

[502] *Ad Familiares* 309 (XIII.38): "I commend his household, his [the knight L. Bruttius'] private property, and his agents to you to such an extent that there is no way I could commend them with greater zeal" (*domum eius et rem familiarem et procuratores tibi sic commendo ut maiore studio commendare non possim*); 304 (XIII.33): "he [the businessman Cn. Otacilius Naso] has business interests in your province to which his freedmen Hilarus, Antigonus, and Demostratus are attending; I commend these men and his business interests no

more personal recommendation for a friend's freedman, often appending a subordinate recommendation in letters he composed primarily on behalf of aristocratic *amici*. Writing to Sulpicius for the equestrian businessman M. Aemilius Avianianus, for instance, Cicero included a specific recommendation for the freedman M. Avianius Hammonius, who was serving as his master's agent (*maxime C. Avianium Hammonium, libertum eius, quem quidem tibi etiam suo nomine commendo*).[503] Cicero wrote that he was fond of Avianius both because the *libertus* showed conscientious fidelity towards his former master and also because he had provided aid when Cicero was in exile: in fact, Avianius had served with as much loyalty as if Cicero had been the man to free him (*mihi est probatus quod est in patronum suum officio et fide singulari, tum etiam in me ipsum magna officia contulit mihique molestissimis temporibus ita fideliter benevoleque praesto fuit ut si a me manumissus esset*).[504] Thus, Cicero asked Sulpicius to hold the *libertus* in high regard for his own sake, not merely as a proxy for his former master (*ipsum suo nomine diligas*).[505] He even expressed hope that Sulpicius would admit the man into his personal circle of care (*habeasque in numero tuorum*).

Avianus' services to Cicero, as well as the request that Sulpicius receive the man among his own intimates, provide evidence of a social reality in which relations among aristocrats and freedmen were characterized by significant complexity and fluidity. *Liberti* not only operated as agents in dealings between their superiors. In addition, as they engaged in repeated interactions with other elites and sub-elites beyond the households of their *patroni*, they developed interests of their own that were not entirely dictated by their former masters' priorities. Sometimes, Cicero even recommended freedmen in their own right, separate from any presiding aristocrat. We see this in a reference he wrote to C. Munatius for the *libertus* L. Livineius Trypho in 57. While Cicero mentioned that Livineius was the freedman of his close friend L. Regulus (*L. Livineius Trypho est omnino L. Reguli, familiarissimi mei, libertus*), Cicero took care to emphasize that he cherished Livineius on his own account (*ego libertum eius per se ipsum diligo*).[506] The letter was only intended to serve the freedman's concerns. This was appropriate recompense, as Cicero framed it, for loyal service during his period of exile, when, like Avianius, Livineius had acted as Cicero's faithful benefactor (*eum tibi ita commendo ut homines grati et memores bene meritos de se commendare debent*).[507]

In a recommendation Cicero wrote on behalf of the freedman C. Curtius Mithres to P. Servilius Isauricus, the proconsul of Asia 46-44, Cicero reported that, although Curtius was the *libertus* of Cicero's good friend Postumus, the freedman habitually served as Cicero's agent in Asia and opened his house and property to Cicero as a local base (*si quid aut mihi aut meorum cuipiam in Asia*

---

differently than if they were my own" (*habet is in provincia tua negotia quae procurant liberti, Hilarus, Antigonus, Demostratus; quos tibi negotiaque omnia Nasonis non secus commendo ac si mea essent*).

503 *Ad Familiares* 287 (XIII.21): "I especially commend C. Avianus Hammonius, his freedman, whom I also recommend in his own right" (*maxime C. Avianium Hammonium, libertum eius, quem quidem tibi etiam suo nomine commendo*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 237 notes that the equestrian was involved in the fabrication of and commerce in art pieces, making his base of operations in Sicyon. Jean Hatzfeld, *Les Trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellénique* (Paris: De Boccard, 1919), 229 for discussion of the details of this economic arrangement.

504 *Ad Familiares* 287 (XIII.21): "I approve of him both because of his extraordinarily dutiful service and fidelity to his own former master and also because he provided great services for me myself in my most difficult times and he made himself available to me with as much loyalty and goodwill as if he had been manumitted by me" (*mihi est probatus quod est in patronum suum officio et fide singulari, tum etiam in me ipsum magna officia contulit mihique molestissimis temporibus ita fideliter benevoleque praesto fuit ut si a me manumissus esset*).

505 *Ad Familiares* 287 (XIII.21): "[I ask] that you hold him in regard for his own sake and that you consider him to have become a member of your own circle of intimates" (*ipsum suo nomine diligas habeasque in numero tuorum*).

506 *Ad Familiares* 55 (XIII.60): "L. Livineius Trypho is the freedman of L. Regulus, the most intimate friend of mine…but I cherish the man on his own account" (*L. Livineius Trypho est omnino L. Reguli, familiarissimi mei, libertus…sed ego libertum eius per se ipsum diligo*).

507 *Ad Familiares* 55 (XIII.60): "I commend him to you as men ought to remember their benefactors" (*eum tibi ita commendo ut homines grati et memores bene meritos de se commendare debent*). Shackleton Bailey comments that this letter was written after Cicero's return from exile in 57—how long is not apparent. Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 167 makes clear that Livineius had acted as Cicero's primary intermediary when he was at Thessalonica during his exile.

opus est, ad hunc scribere consuevi, huius cum opera et fide tum domo et re uti tamquam mea).[508] Cicero took care to emphasize that he intended to convey more than the empty superfluities of a *commendatio vulgaris*, making the claim that he and Curtius shared real intimacy (*haec ad te eo pluribus scripsi ut intellegeres me non vulgare nec ambitiose, sed ut pro homine intimo ac mihi pernecessario scribere*).[509] Whether or not the emotion was "genuine" in this particular case, this comment at least suggests that this was a plausible circumstance. At the same time, as we should acknowledge, the fact that Cicero had to emphasize the sincerity might also hint that some other letters were highly conventional and lacked "real" feeling. If Servilius felt obligation and affection for Cicero, it was only right that he should honor his connection with his fellow consular by extending that concern to a man Cicero held in such high regard. Specifically, the proconsul should help Curtius with a lawsuit (*peto igitur a te ut in ea controversia*), and more generally, he should accept the *libertus* into his ongoing protection, welcoming him into his coterie of intimates (*ut igitur eum recipias in fidem habeasque in numero tuorum te vehementer etiam atque etiam rogo*).[510] It speaks to the importance that could be placed on individual freedmen, as we might imagine, that Cicero bothered to take care to distinguish a recommendation for a *libertus* from his common practice.

Freedmen played relatively humble roles in aristocratic networks. Nonetheless, I suggest that we should view them as vital actors, essential to the function of the aristocratic community—valued by their aristocratic superiors both practically and affectively. They carried letters, for instance, as well as acting as business agents in transactions between aristocratic households and serving as contractors on construction projects.[511] Moreover, we should emphasize that as much as *liberti* usually remained connected to their formers masters, their activities were not limited to the affairs of the household of their *patroni*.[512] We have seen that they could provide assistance to a variety of superiors and even join the personal circles of a number of different elite actors. As was the case with lower-level elite friends, moreover—such as the mentees discussed in the early sections of this chapter and in the chapter preceding—the connections freedmen built with various aristocrats strengthened bonds between their superiors. In addition, *liberti* had property and interests of their own, which might be served by the assistance of aristocrats beyond their former master. On the one hand, recommendations served to spread the services that freedmen could provide, so that a variety of aristocrats could benefit. On the other, recommendations connected the freedmen with the

---

[508] *Ad Familiares* 297 (XIII.69): "if I or any of my associates has a need in Asia, it has been my habit to write to this man, and I make use both of his labor and fidelity and of his house and property as if they were my own" (*si quid aut mihi aut meorum cuipiam in Asia opus est, ad hunc scribere consuevi, huius cum opera et fide tum domo et re uti tamquam mea*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 60 notes the involvement of Curtius and his former master in the wine trade. Cicero and Servilius maintained regular practical interchange throughout the 40s, and Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 73 lists him as one of the catalogue of the more regular recipients of Cicero's *commendationes*. At *Ad Brutum* 3 (II.2), however, written to Brutus in 43, Cicero criticized Servilius harshly, claiming that he had put up with the "madman" (*furiosus*) longer than suited his dignity. We should emphasize that regular exchange of recommendations could survive even under conditions of personal antipathy and distaste.

[509] *Ad Familiares* 297 (XIII.69): "I have written so many words to you so that you understand that I am writing not in my common manner or with undo ostentation, but that I write on behalf of a true intimate who is as closely linked to me as it is possible to be" (*haec ad te eo pluribus scripsi ut intellegeres me non vulgare nec ambitiose, sed ut pro homine intimo ac mihi pernecessario scribere*).

[510] *Ad Familiares* 297 (XIII.69): "I ask from you therefore that in a lawsuit, which he is engaged in about a certain estate in Colophon, and in other affairs, however much your duty allows and however much you are able at your convenience, you accommodate him in honor of your connection with me…I ask vigorously, again and again, therefore that you receive him into your dutiful protection and into the number of your associates" (*peto igitur a te ut in ea controversia, quam habet de fundo cum quodam Colophonio, et in ceteris rebus quantum fides tua patietur quantumque tuo commodo poteris tantum ei honoris mei causa commodes…ut igitur eum recipias in fidem habeasque in numero tuorum te vehementer etiam atque etiam rogo*).

[511] The *Ad Quintum* and *Ad Atticum* collections give an inside look at the action of freedmen as part of the staffs of their former masters—for instance, *Ad Atticum* 426 (XVI.15) shows the freedman Eros left responsible for keeping HS 25,000 earmarked so that Cicero could cover a debt for his son; *Ad Quintum* 21 (III.1) gives extensive evidence for the activity of the household staffs of both Cicero brothers.

[512] Mouritsen, *The Freedman in the Roman World*, 36-65 discusses how such relationships tended to develop between freedmen and their *patroni*.

resources and support that they needed to promote their own affairs, which, while generally far humbler than those of aristocrats, could also be far more vulnerable if they lacked support from members of the elite.

The Roman aristocratic community was not a closed system. This was true in terms of its membership, since, as I have suggested in defining the "aristocratic community," sufficient accumulation of the forms of capital underpinning elite differentiation was the key feature granting aristocratic status. But there was another form of openness, which is especially relevant here. The aristocratic community's "hegemonic conversation" was open to sub-elites such as freedmen, who, even though they were clearly not aristocrats themselves, played an active role in the functioning of this community and its social interchange. They not only served to further the interests of their superiors, but also, when they called on obligations from the men they had served, they quietly introduced concerns of their own. It is my contention that these freedmen should also be understood as speakers in the conversations that set aristocratic priorities, even if their voices were relatively muted. Although the senators and equestrians were the only men we should view as full-fledged aristocrats within the Roman community, the letters of recommendation let us glimpse some of the other figures with close enough relations to these aristocrats that they might influence the discourse of Roman society's rulers.[513]

Another group besides these freedmen whose members engaged in regular conversation with Roman aristocrats was the collection Greek intellectuals with connection to the capital. I propose that this frequent interchange provided them with opportunities to exercise a deep, if quiet, form of influence. In 51, for instance, Cicero wrote to his friend C. Memmius—a fellow *littérateur* and the dedicatee of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*—on behalf of the Epicurean philosopher Patro.[514] In this letter, we catch a glimpse of a community of Greek intellectuals, linked to Roman aristocrats by social and financial, as well as scholarly, ties.[515] Although in terms of philosophical beliefs, Cicero differed vigorously from the Epicurean, he wrote that this did not prevent the two men from sharing a variety of other attachments (*cum Patrone Epicurio mihi omnia sunt, nisi quod in philosophia vehementer ab eo dissentio*).[516] Much as we saw in relationships among aristocrats, intellectual disagreement could exist side by side with friendship, as was the case, for instance, with Cicero and Caesar and their grammatical debate, as well as Cicero and Brutus with their dispute regarding the best form of oratory. Intellectual contention could facilitate the health of the social bond. In fact, we might envision scholarly disputation as a force that helped invigorate the networked interchange that underpinned social power.

Cicero recalled how, when Patro had spent time in Rome making connections among the aristocrats—cultivating contacts with a range of players, including Memmius and his circle of friends—the philosopher had worked with particular attention to forge a bond with Cicero. Patro

---

513 Many aristocracies were far more closed in terms of membership than Rome's in the late Republic. In terms of access, however, it is important to remember that no aristocratic configuration can detach itself from the concerns of sub-elites entirely. Of course, Rome's version of this dynamic was idiosyncratic—the particular *libertus-patronus* relation was unique, for instance—but we can nonetheless view this as an expression of an inescapable truth about aristocratic systems of power in general.

514 *Ad Familiares* 63 (XIII.1)—Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 65 explicates the circumstances surrounding this this *commendatio*, situating it among the extraordinary events of the time period 51-50.

515 Memmius had been tribune of the plebs in 66. He was an accomplished orator (he preferred Greek models—*Brutus* 70) and poet (he wrote erotic poetry—Ovid, *Tristia* II.433), and he was the dedicatee of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*. Lucretius may have believed him in need of conversion to the vision of Epicureanism presented in the poem. Llewelyn Morgan, Barnaby Taylor, "Memmius the Epicurean," *Classical Quarterly* 67 (2017): 528-541 makes the case that this letter is evidence that Memmius was himself an Epicurean, but one who was less than thrilled with the authoritative structures of the school in Athens.

516 *Ad Familiares* 63 (XIII.1): "I share the whole range of ties with Patro the Epicurean, except that I vigorously disagree with him in philosophy" (*cum Patrone Epicurio mihi omnia sunt, nisi quod in philosophia vehementer ab eo dissentio*). As Shackleton Bailey clarifies, Cicero stopped in Athens on his way to Cilicia in 51—Memmius (who had been convicted *de ambitu* and exiled) had been living there, but had left for Mytilene the day before Cicero's arrival, for which see *Ad Atticum* 104 (V.11). When the letter was written, Patro was the head of the Epicurean school at Athens. Bailey glosses *mihi omnia sunt* as "I have all manner of ties with."

had taken care to keep this association fresh over the years, cultivating the consular as the first of his *defensores* and *amici*, even after he had acquired the rewards he had been seeking from his outreach among the urban aristocrats and had returned to Athens to take over leadership of the Epicurean school (*initio Romae, cum te quoque et tuos omnis observabat, me coluit in primis et nuper, cum ea quae voluit de suis commodis et praemiis consecutus est, me habuit suorum defensorum et amicorum fere principem*).[517] When Patro had been making the rounds at Rome, he had also been recommended by the philosopher Phaedrus (*iam a Phaedro, qui nobis*), who was likely something of a mentor for the younger scholar during his early years.[518] Phaedrus was the previous head of the Epicurean school, and a man for whom Cicero maintained great respect, even though Cicero and Phaedrus began to diverge in their philosophical views after Cicero encountered the Skeptic philosopher Philo of Larissa (*ante quam Philonem cognovimus, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus et suavis et officiosus probabatur, traditus mihi commendatusque est*).[519] Cicero wrote that Atticus, even though he was probably not an active adherent of the Epicurean school himself, was particularly fond of both Patro and his now-deceased champion Phaedrus (*non quo sit ex istis; est enim omni liberali doctrina politissimus, sed valde diligit Patronem, valde Phaedrum amavit*).[520] As a consequence, Cicero's equestrian intimate was pushing their case with exceptional insistence (*a me hoc contendit, homo minime ambitiosus, minime in rogando molestus, ut nihil umquam magis*). The relationship between Patro and Phaedrus might be viewed as loose analogs of the asymmetric friendships Cicero shared with younger Roman aristocrats. Greek intellectuals maintained their own networks, complete with mechanisms for intergenerational support and advancement. One of functions of these institutions, as it appears, was to help connect the rising generation of promising young Greeks to interested members of the Roman aristocratic community and to plug such men into the social networks of the Roman elite.

We encounter a range of Greek philosophers in this case, connected to an assortment of Roman aristocrats, both senatorial and equestrian. What is more, these men were linked by far more than intellectual bonds. In fact, although, as I noted above, Cicero and Patro were avowed philosophical antagonists, they were allies and friends in all else. Likewise, Cicero's relationship with Phaedrus seems not to have suffered when they diverged in terms of doctrine. Intellectual disagreement could exist side by side with amity and practical assistance. As Philo had before him, Patro spent time in Rome, seeking both to teach and to network.[521] These philosophers went out of their way to construct bonds with members of the Roman elite. They did not merely cultivate these aristocrats as students, but in a broader capacity as friends and protectors. As this recommendation

---

517 *Ad Familiares* 63 (XIII.1): "in the beginning at Rome, when he was also attending to you and all your circle of intimates, he cultivated me as one of his most important connections and recently, although he has attained all the profits and rewards he wants, he has retained me as basically the first of his protectors and friends" (*initio Romae, cum te quoque et tuos omnis observabat, me coluit in primis et nuper, cum ea quae voluit de suis commodis et praemiis consecutus est, me habuit suorum defensorum et amicorum fere principem*).

518 *Ad Familiares* 63 (XIII.1): "he was bequeathed and entrusted to my care by Phaedrus, who, when I was a boy, before I met Philo, I esteemed greatly as a philosopher, afterwards still as a noble, charming, and dutiful man" (*iam a Phaedro, qui nobis, cum pueri essemus, ante quam Philonem cognovimus, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus et suavis et officiosus probabatur, traditus mihi commendatusque est*). Deniaux, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, 42 emphasizes the language of *traditio* here, which we should recall from the Trebatius recommendation discussed above (also familiar from *Pro Caelio*)—in both instances associated with the transference of the care of a mentor or parental figure.

519 On Philo, see Charles Brittain, *Philo of Larissa: the Last of the Academic Sceptics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

520 *Ad Familiares* 63 (XIII.1): "he [Atticus] (although he is not a member of their school, as he is exceptionally well-trained in every kind of liberal doctrine, nonetheless cherishes Patro intensely and loved Phaedrus with extraordinary force) who is exceedingly unselfish and not inclined to be troublesome in making requests, demands this from me as nothing ever" (*is (non quo sit ex istis; est enim omni liberali doctrina politissimus, sed valde diligit Patronem, valde Phaedrum amavit) sic a me hoc contendit, homo minime ambitiosus, minime in rogando molestus, ut nihil umquam magis*); Nathan Gilbert, "Was Atticus an Epicurean?'," (draft) academia.edu provides a useful and subtle treatment of Atticus' disputed Epicureanism. Gilbert favors the idea that Atticus did indeed hold Epicurean views—also for further bibliography.

521 *Brutus* 89.306 for Philo's journey to Rome, fleeing Mirthridates. Cicero became his pupil at soon after Philo's arrival in Italy.

testifies, Patro had great success in winning both Cicero and Atticus as champions, and both aristocrats proved willing to exert themselves on his behalf.

We have seen repeatedly how relationships between members of the Roman elite were not one-sided, even between men at very different stages of their respective careers. The same was true of associations between Roman aristocrats and Greek intellectuals. While such bonds were asymmetric in terms of practical position, influence, and access to resources, members of the two groups were on a far more even playing field in the intellectual arena. While Roman aristocrats such as Cicero, Atticus, and Memmius, as well as many of their contemporaries, leapt actively into debates current in the Greek world, they were far from superior in this sphere.[522]

As Greek intellectuals maneuvered through the operational obstacles of life in the Roman Empire, they often found themselves in a dependent role. We might even say that in practical matters, they were in a position essentially analogous to that of the freedmen we have examined. Their interests could trigger the deployment of power by their Roman aristocratic contacts, but they had little direct influence of their own to call on. Even in the very specific circumstances where they did have the capacity to effect results, as when Phaedrus recommended Patro, this influence did not pass beyond the bounds of their own network of Greek intellectuals. At the same time, they could participate as respected experts in the formation of the idiom and ideology of the aristocratic community. They had little access to the concrete levers of magisterial or financial power, or even to social power that could be used flexibly and to bring about concrete outcomes. But their interests could influence the distribution of scarce social and fiscal resources, and their voices, ideas, and personalities could have an impact, contributing to the articulation of proper morality and conduct. To steer through the social networks of Rome's power players, and to give their words purchase in the aristocratic community's conversations, they required the recommendations of Roman aristocrats.

Conclusion: Asymmetries and Recommendations in the System of Power

Recommendations reflected asymmetries within the community, but, as I have argued, these letters also speak to the ability of lower-level actors to influence priorities and actions within broader networks**.** Insuperable boundaries maintained the asymmetries between Roman aristocrats and sub-elites like freedmen and Greek intellectuals. Although they could influence the system because of the claims of amity and obligation they had over influential actors and through their capacity to provide practical services and furnish ideas and advice, these two groups would always remain subordinate to full-fledged members of the elite, with occasional exceptions to this subordination in their arenas of specialization.

With senators and equestrians, by contrast, the dividing lines were not nearly so firm. The relative position and influence of the various aristocratic actors emerged from an ever-shifting constellation of factors. As Cicero's friendships with junior aristocrats testify, hierarchies were far from static, and recommendations could facilitate fluidity, even as they cast light on asymmetries. With Trebatius, for instance, at a time when Cicero had vastly greater access to the aristocratic network, the consular's recommendation was essential as the young man launched his career. But

[522] Cicero's intellectual enthusiasm began in his adolescence, but it was only after his consulship that he seems to have reached the point where he could participate even as an "equal" in these conversations. Throughout his life, Cicero was deeply engaged with the philosophical debate between the Skepticism of the New Academy (his preferred philosophical school and method) and Epicureanism and Stoicism—Walter Nicgorski, *Cicero's Skepticism and His Recovery of Political Thought* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) for a discussion of Cicero as both innovator and follower of the Greek intellectuals of the New Academy; Jakob Wisse, "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Works," in James May (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002), 331-374 treats Cicero's engagement with Greek predecessors and contemporaries with regard to his rhetorical thought; Elizabeth Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) is still extremely useful as a portrait of the intellectual activity of this interlocking community of Romans and Greeks during this period.

during the civil war only a few years later, in a sense it was Trebatius "commending" Cicero to Caesar. So among aristocrats, while recommendations represented power differentials in the moment, they played an important role in the leveling, and sometimes even the reordering, of hierarchies.

Obligation traveled in more than one direction in the recommendation process. In fact, the recommender, the *commendatus*, and the recipient all became implicated in a cycle of reciprocity—a cycle that could lead in time to deeper connection, and which ideally would give rise to full-fledged *amicitia*. The new connections forged by recommendations could, in turn, facilitate more cooperation, as well as a greater sense of shared interest among all parties, both among the men directly involved and among their respective circles of intimates. Furthermore, with the aid of *commendationes*, men in relatively less advantaged positions could express their interests and priorities with far more power than would otherwise have been possible. Voices that might have remained muted gained the capacity to be heard.

As a result, the aristocratic community's priorities and actions could be dictated by a far larger range of actors than would have been possible without the systematic practice of *commendatio*. This is a model, we should note, which differs both from an "oligarchic" paradigm, in which a small clique ignores voices from below, and also from a "democratic" vision of wide popular participation in the decision-making process. The system of power in the late Republic relied on asymmetries, which were eminently legible but, at the same time, highly mutable. The institution of *commendatio* helped enable rule by community—the aristocratic community, along with its associated sub-elites—with this diverse body making use of an institution that was characterized by asymmetry to amplify quieter voices instead of silencing them.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have proposed that we should view the regime in the late Roman Republic, in practice, as a system of rule by an aristocratic community, acting as a collective. The institution of *amicitia* served a central function in channeling social interchange among networks of aristocrats and their affiliates, mediating alignments and taking the edge off otherwise rampant competition. Its specific features played a key role in defining the conceptual framework of the Republican regime. As the diverse members of the aristocratic community sought to accumulate material and abstract resources, *amicitia* helped them muster these assets for the exercise of influence, both on their own behalf and in the service of their associates, and it helped them pass these stocks on to their heirs. Whatever the formal institutional structure, republican "rule," as I have tried to show, was fundamentally this: a community, seeking capital, with the process mediated by the institutional framework of *amicitia*.

In fact, to a large extent, these currencies only existed as a result of the communal framework. Social capital was, by definition, located in the community, as was the resource of an ethical reputation. Symbolic capital was won through collaboration among clusters of *amici*, in competition with other groups seeking similar goals. The rewards of the competition for *honores* existed in the hearts and minds of other Romans, both inside and outside the aristocratic community. Certain forms of information can be viewed as the communal property of the aristocratic community. This knowledge was shared across the generations within families, and between families among networks of friends. Financial prosperity was no less a function of social location in an amicable web, dependent on friends' trust, friends' credit, and friends' agency.

The rhetoric and practice of "second selfhood" permeated this social landscape. Aristocratic *amici* were empowered by the conceit that a friend should be viewed as an *alter ego* to act for each other as extensions of personal power across the extended polity. In this sense, we can imagine this aristocratic Republican regime as a "community of second selves"—a loose mesh of mutual and reciprocal representation, with each individual capable of expressing the personal presence of many of his fellows. Different aristocrats varied in how much they gave explicit articulation to this "second selfhood." But I have suggested that, at least as an implicit framework, it underpinned the expression of individual power by the aristocratic community's network of proprietors and power players, senatorial and equestrian alike. To be *amici* was, by implication of the idealizing definition, to be equal, or at least for the relationship to approximate equality, and *amici* should share passions, pursuits, and interests. At best, the dividing line might begin to blur between two commingled souls. Both rhetorically and practically, "second selfhood" helped create the collective aristocratic hegemon (however imperfect a construct it inevitably remained).

As I began to suggest throughout the dissertation, and especially in Chapter 2, *amicitia* did not simply disappear the moment Caesar crossed the Rubicon, nor did it lose its essential role in the nature and function of the ruling regime. The transformation in the landscape of social power, then—beginning in the 50s and becoming far more explicit and comprehensive in the 40s—was not a wholesale overthrow of an *amicita*-based paradigm as such.[523]

Under the Principate, not only did Rome's aristocrats continue to rely on *amicitia* to organize the landscape of social power within the elite community, but the emperor also remained a member of the aristocratic community himself. At least those emperors who tried to play up their "Republican" credentials took care to engage in *amicitia* with eminent subjects. The *princeps* title itself reminds us that the monarch was framed as "first among equals"—paradoxically, both as a superior and as a "second self," at least potentially, for the society's other *principes*. Emperors would continue

[523] We might view Augustus' reign, and especially the 20s, as the culmination of this extended process of socio-political transformation.

to build and maintain "friendships" with fellow aristocrats, and these *amicitae* between the monarch and his most eminent subjects played a vital role in the operation of the hegemonic system. Indeed, already during Augustus' reign, the emperor began to "institutionalize" his circle of *amici*. As the imperial government's structure took shape under the first emperors, this *consilium* gained increasing prominence in formulating and executing policy.[524] A governor such as Pliny could make a performance of his personal connection with Trajan, and *amicitia* appears to have helped make him far more effective as an extension of the imperial presence, empowered by his connection with the *princeps* to serve as a more personal representation of the imperial will than some other run-of-the mill bureaucrat.[525] It could be useful, too, for an emperor to be able to show himself engaged in *amicitia*, at least to the extent that the rhetoric of a "Principate" was designed to evoke Republican precedent. In brief, participation in *amicitia* with other aristocrats helped to constitute the image of a *civilis princeps*.[526]

During the Principate, in fact, social power and social institutions remained just as important to the hegemonic structure as they had under the Republic, and family and *amicitia* remained vital. Thus, the family organizations and friendships of the governing community of senators and equestrians retained importance. But most of all, the imperial household—the emperor's own "family organization"—took on a dominant position in the hegemonic structure, and an evolving suite of conventions and norms regulated the operation of the household and court far more than any kind of formally codified system.[527] In general terms, then, social institutions remained vital to the practice of hegemonic power. But even as many elements retained nominal continuity, the presence of a monarchic figure distorted the Republican structure in profound ways.

As far as Cicero was concerned, the proper regime was and ought to be defined by mannered and somewhat formalized but also sincerely affectionate collaboration between a broad collection of influential and well-heeled men, especially, but by no means exclusively, those who had reached the summit of the *cursus honorum*. If this permeable and mutable group could govern itself by the principles and duties of *amicitia*—a theoretical framework that I suggested was defined by Cicero, in an ongoing dialectic process with the other members of the aristocratic network—it could effectively maintain the guiding influence it exercised in Roman society. A discourse of mannered and moral friendship helped provide guidelines and informal "guardrails," facilitating the capacity of the community to govern as a collective. When Cicero looked back from the vantage point of the 40s, he recognized that the system of power in which he had come of age had experienced a radical alteration, and he did not welcome the change. Cicero recognized that this institution, and its role in the system of power, stood at the center of the Caesarian transformation. Hence, the repair of the social framework of *amicitia* sat at the core of the agenda for reform that he put forward in his *philosophica* in the 40s.

---

524 John Crook, Consilium Principis: *Imperial Councils and Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), Ronald Syme, "Some Friends of the Caesars," *The American Journal of Philology* 77 (1956): 264-273, Jean Gaudemet, "Note sur les *Amici Principis*," in Gerhard Wirth, Karl-Heinz Schwarte, Johannes Heinrichs (eds.) *Romanitas-Christianitas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der Römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1982), 42-60.

525 We must always keep in mind, of course, that we only have the capacity to examine this relationship through the potentially distorting lens of Pliny's editorship. Carlos Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *American Journal of Philology* 128.2 (2007): 239-277 studies Pliny's textual representation of his bond with Trajan and the utility of this bond for each man's image.

526 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "*Civilis Princeps*: Between Citizen and King," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 72 (1982): 32-48 for the ambivalent fluctuation between *civilitas*—the (33) "conduct of a citizen among citizens"—and the *superbia* of a king, the motivating ideals, and the underlying social realities.

527 Jeremy Paterson, "Friends in High Places: the Creation of the Court of the Roman Emperor," in Tony Spawforth (ed.), *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 121-156 notes, for instance, how (130) "a set of conventions or norms emerged which governed the social interaction between the emperor and those around him."

This consciousness of the centrality of *amicitia* to the power structure was not unique to Cicero, however, nor was it merely a *post facto* lament. Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus emerged as new *de facto* centers of gravity in the 50s, and their exceptional elevation bent the social institutional framework nearly to the breaking point. I suggested that this challenge drove a range of *consulares* to take special care to cultivate and articulate their bonds, investing additional attention into a social institution that was already essential to aristocratic power. In the Republican system, even the most rarified circles remained accessible to new aspirants (although they were certainly not wide open to all comers!), and some of these aspirants could at least hope that they might join a collection of preeminent "peers." The dynasts' coalition presented a challenge to this model. But Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus also all showed a keen consciousness of the value of friendships, even as their actions threatened to transfigure the essence of the institution.

Parity was central, as I have proposed, to the Republican system of power, both as a realized condition and as an aspiration. One of the defining consequences of the advent of monarchy was the disappearance of that aspiration as something attainable. In many ways, Republican society was characterized by steep hierarchies. But at least between aristocrats, disparities in status and influence were all subject to reduction and, at times, even to inversion. Cicero and a number of his fellow *consulares* beyond the circle of the dynasts went out of their way, in the 50s, to protect a particular paradigm, according to which the highest circles contained multiple peer actors and no individual could be elevated permanently to a social location above the circle of "peer" *consulares*.[528]

All of the consular figures I examined came up through this familiar communal system (with the exception of Pompey, whose career rocketed him past the conventional *cursus* and located much of his rise and much of his support base outside of networks based in the city of Rome). Although the dynasts' association was outsized in its influence, it was in many ways conventional in kind, linked by familial bonds and *amicitiae*, both within the coalition and with the rest of the community. But there was an essential difference, which represented the greatest threat that this coalition posed. However much the dynasts operated through familiar institutional channels, they were less attached to the preservation of equality at the top, and they had little interest in maintaining the permeability of the highest circles.

Every one of the *principes* within this framework, not excluding the dynasts, required *amici* to help constitute his individual influence and authority. However elevated his *dignitas* and *auctoritas*, each of the high-level actors could only exercise a limited level of influence without the aid of his network of friends. Within such a structure, each aristocrat's social capital translated into capacity to exercise influence, both formal and informal, for his own interests and on behalf of those people who looked to him for aid and support. In terms of formal institutional power, it was through connections to other aristocrats who were currently serving in official posts that each of the major players within the system retained access to the formal levers of magisterial power, whether in the assemblies in the urban center or in the assizes in the provinces. Previous scholarship has underplayed the critical role of these connections in defining the nature of the aristocratic regime: it was only as a collective of *amici* that the elite community was able to preserve its access to the formal institutional machinery and thus to operate the levers that facilitated a sort of communal hegemony.

I have noted how senior statesmen would replicate one another's person. Empowered by the *alter ego* conceit to act as "embodiments" of absent friends, aristocratic *amici* could artificially stretch personal presence to meet the demands created by interests and responsibilities spread across the extended polity, whether in personal business or in public affairs (not that these two spheres should

[528] There was space within this kind of paradigm for an individual actor to stand out more temporarily, as Cicero would have his "helmsman" (*gubernator*) figure do in, for instance, his *De Re Publica*—for which see Jonathan Zarecki, *Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).

be distinguished sharply). Moreover, often aided by the well-institutionalized practice of *commendatio*, high-level *amici* also furnished human resources for each other, and provided access for the lower-level figures to opportunities for assistance with their career advancement and financial and social interests.

The power of the *principes*, then, existed, to a large extent, through their community of "peers" and the access that this network gave them to formal powers, personal assistance, and both elite and sub-elite human resources. This was no less true for Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus than it was for Cicero, Lentulus, Metellus, and Appius. When Crassus left for the Parthian front in 54, it was not at all unreasonable, as I discussed in Chapter 2, that Cicero might perform a fairly comprehensive "impersonation act" across venues and spheres of action—not only taking Crassus' place in the Senate and the court, but also standing in as a replacement *pater familias* for the members of his family and his circle of dependants.[529]

The *alter ego* conceit played an integral part in the conceptual framing of Cicero's friendships with all three dynasts, in fact. I made the case in Chapter 2 that, because this framework implied equality, Cicero tried to use it as a means to restrain the threat that their coalition represented to the fundamental "Republican" principle of parity. Up to a point, the dynasts all proved willing to reciprocate, and they engaged in the discourse and practice of "second selfhood" with Cicero. But an examination of the distinction in what this meant to Cicero, as opposed to what it meant to the dynasts, can tell us some important things about the nature of the transformation that was beginning during the 50s and that would eventually give birth to a new framework of norms under the Principate.

With all three dynasts, and especially with Pompey and Caesar, Cicero worked hard to construct "Republican" friendships of *principes*. Indeed, I proposed that the ideal of *vera et perfecta amicitia* that Cicero developed over the course of his life likely had roots in his hopes for his friendship with Pompey. Famously, Cicero cast himself as the Laelius to Pompey's Scipio Africanus; a wise statesman and a military hero, respectively, united in unbreakable and fundamentally egalitarian concord. Scholars largely ignore, however, how Pompey also made use of his bond with Cicero, both as a stock of social capital and as a source of functional aid. When Cicero proposed that the Senate should grant Pompey a special commission to save the city from a food shortage in September 57, Pompey had not merely named Cicero first in his list of legates. He had explicitly stated that Cicero would be his *alter ego* in all matters that arose.[530] Pompey was ready to tap into the discourse of "second selfhood" to mobilize his *amicitia* with Cicero as a power resource.

For an aristocrat such as Pompey, filling a complex official role, a delegate empowered as an extension of personal presence might prove invaluable. The conceit of "second selfhood" helped turn one of Pompey's *amici* into an extension of his magisterial authority, multiplying his practical capacity to exercise personal power in his official role. This situation was not unique, of course, and we can take it as indicative of the broader function of magisterial power for all men occupying complex official positions. The representation facilitated by the *alter ego* frame gave aristocrats the bandwidth to carry out the practical duties mandated by their office. In general, "personal representation" facilitated effective "governmental" action. But Pompey's extraordinary commands likely imposed demands on his individual capacity that were beyond what was usual even for a senior magistrate. His use of Cicero as a legate empowered by the "second self" frame as an *amicitia*-fueled extension of his personal power can be viewed as a precursor of a novel strategy he would employ later in the decade. In 52, he sent his *amici* L. Afranius, M. Petreius, and M. Terentius Varro

---

529 *Ad Familiares* 25 (V.8).

530 *Ad Atticum* 73 (IV.1): "he asked for fifteen legates, and not only named me first but also said that I would be his second self in all matters" (*ille legatos quindecim cum postularet, me principem nominavit et ad omnia me alterum se fore dixit*).

to govern Hispania—a kind of recasting of the meaning of the designation *legatus*. Rather than "selected" to accompany him, they were "delegated" to go in their commander's stead.[531]

These *amici* might still be framed as "second selves," if only to a limited degree, since the *alter ego* conceit could be conceived as a matter of agreement about virtues and interests as much as it was of equal authoritative capacity. This was where the gap was located between Cicero's vision of "identity" and the version of friendship that Pompey was willing to embrace. For Cicero, "second selfhood" meant full parity. For Pompey, however, a fissure seems to have opened between "replication" and equality. The dynast could afford to maintain, and indeed even benefit from maintaining, a coterie of *amici* who could reproduce and extend his presence, but he clearly did not consider them "equals" in any comprehensive sense. Cicero might have rejoiced when Pompey labeled him as his *alter ego* in 57, but perhaps he should have mourned instead. According to the framework Cicero and his other *amici* among the *consulares* labored to protect during the 50s, *amicitia* carried an implication of parity. But for Pompey, it seems that "second selfhood" could be redefined in a manner that allowed it to describe relationships in which the parties remained separated by an unbridgeable status gap.

Under the Principate, the emperor remained a member of the empire's aristocratic community, and he continued to engage with fellow aristocrats in relationships that all parties labeled *amicitia*. In practice, almost by definition, no *amicus* could truly be a "second self" for the emperor in terms of power and influence. But I suggest that the dynamic of "embodiment" was still essential for the extension of imperial will by empowered representatives. As a result, much as Republican aristocrats had, the emperor could use *amici* as "authorized representatives"—capable of extending his "personal presence" across the vast and complex domains of his responsibility. During Pompey's appointment as grain commissioner, his position might have been complex, but the emperor's range of responsibilities of course dwarfed even this "extraordinary command."

It goes without saying that practical equality was impossible in relationships between the monarch and even the most eminent of his aristocratic subjects. But I suggest that the vestigial association between *amicitia* and "second selfhood" could still prove useful, allowing the emperor to convert friends into representatives, capable of extending his unique personal power throughout the empire. *Amicitia*, thus, could transform members of the governing bureaucracy into "direct" manifestations of the imperial person, rather than merely bearers of official power.[532]

Much as neutered versions of the Republic's formal institutional structure of offices and assemblies continued under the emperors, traces of the Republican social institution of *amicitia* proved essential for the expression of the emperor's outsized might. Without genuine "second selfhood" as a central component of the hegemonic structure, however—without the frame of parity and, indeed, of interchangeability, and not only between the society's foremost few, but between a broad and variegated assemblage of elite actors—there could be no true *res publica*. That is to say, in the absence of an egalitarian framework linking the group of actors implicated directly in hegemony, the "commonwealth" could no longer be the collective possession of a community. This is a fundamental insight, as we consider what it meant for Rome's Republic to be a "republic," and what it meant for this system of power to forfeit its functional republicanism.

Under the Principate, the layered aristocracies of the Roman world did not lose their essential role in the process of rule, and both senators and equestrians remained implicated in governance. Indeed, the *equites* took on a more active and formalized position in the new regime than they had under the Republic, joining senators as part of the formal institutional framework—

---

[531] For the use of these legates as personal representatives in 52, see Caesar, *Bellum Civile* I.37-42.

[532] Indeed, in a regime in which hegemony was vested in the imperial person, the boundary between the power of the emperor's person and official power was inevitably blurry.

no longer merely contractors or influential social and financial operators, but now also government officials.[533] *Amicitia* was still essential for organizing alignments and interchange among established players, in sharing human resources, and in channeling the advancement of new entrants into the power structure.

Pliny was born in 61 CE, ninety-eight years after Cicero's death. Although the social organization of the power structure had undergone a number of radical alterations, *amicitia* was just as integral in his generation's aristocratic community as it had been in Cicero's. As an established consular, Pliny still composed *commendationes* to other high-level friends on behalf of junior aristocratic *amici* and sub-elite dependents. Peer and asymmetric friendships served key functions in organizing advancement and the distribution of scarce resources and rewards.[534]

Indeed, although there were some notable shifts, the prizes for engagement in the aristocratic community's system of power retained a significant measure of consistency. The participants remained primarily concerned with material and reputational remuneration that could be passed across the generations to worthy heirs, and *amicitia* retained its crucial function in this unending quest for "payouts." Elite status differentiation from non-elite society, as well as status within the elite, were no less reliant on diverse stocks of both tangible and abstract assets than they had been in Republican times. Business, finance, and property remained central concerns, as aristocratic friends continued to collaborate to accumulate and safeguard riches. Social capital and moral reputation were still vested in amicable networks—their existence the product of investment in interpersonal relationships and social perception. Although the system of knowledge and education changed dramatically during the "Roman revolution," knowledge capital did not cease to be a core component of elite differentiation and communal identity formation.[535]

Symbolic capital, too, remained a vital stake. In this case, however, the nature of the resource underwent a transformation in the course of the transition from Republic to Principate, as the aristocratic community derived less and less of its prestige from engagement with people outside the elite. Under the new regime, the monarch dominated the dialog with *populus Romanus*, and aristocratic competition for prestige increasingly became an internal matter within the elite community. Electoral victories resulted from votes in the Senate, for instance, and competitive oratorical performances before select elite audiences, as well as literary production disseminated among a limited aristocratic readership, came to serve as replacements (if highly imperfect ones) for much of the competition for publicly granted *honores*.[536] To the extent that media for the generation

---

533 On the imperial senate, Richard Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984). Matthew Roller, "The Difference an Emperor Makes: Notes on the Reception of the Republican Senate in the Imperial Age," *Classical Receptions Journal* 7 (2015): 11-30 offers insights about the distinction between the role of the Republican and imperial senatorial constituencies, as well as the effect of the figure of the emperor. Caillan Davenport, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 155-370 provides an up to date treatment of the new roles *equites* took on under the Principate.

534 On letters of recommendation in Pliny's correspondence, see Roger Rees, "Letters of Recommendation and the Rhetoric of Praise," in Ruth Morello, Andrew Morrison, *Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 149-168, A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), especially 44-45, Agnès Béranger-Badel, "Les Critères de Compétence dans les Lettres de Recommandation de Fronton et de Pline le Jeune," *Revue des Études Latines* 78: 164–79.

535 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome's Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 213-314 explores the transformation in the elite system of knowledge.

536 The elections were transferred to the Senate under Tiberius, for which see Tacitus, *Annales* 1.14.4-15.1. Some elections were decided by imperial *commendatio*, while others derived their outcome from canvassing, but this canvassing was restricted to their senatorial peers—see Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome*, 11-24, as well as Fergus Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World, 31 BC* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 300-313. For the increasing prominence of competitive oratorical venues with aristocratic audiences as interchange between elite and non-elite became restrict, see Matthew Roller, "To Whom Am I Speaking? The Changing Venues of Competitive Eloquence in the Early Empire,' in Wolfgang Blösel, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp (eds.), *Von der* Militia Equestris *zur* Militia Urbana*: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im Antiken Rom* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011: 197-221. Eleanor Leach, "*Otium* as *Luxuria*: Economy of Status in the Younger Pliny's Letters," *Arethusa* 36 (2003): 147-165 notes the reinvention of the cultural production that took place during *otium* as a source of symbolic capital, along with Sarah Culpepper-Stroup, *Catullus, Cicero, and a*

of prestige became internalized within aristocratic circles, *amicitia* was more vital than ever to the accumulation of this somewhat altered form of symbolic capital. Now, friends, and friends of friends, were the audience for the creation of "public" honor, rather than a broader populace external to aristocratic society.

So *amicitia* remained vital to the aristocratic system of power under the Principate. But an insidious transformation had begun during the 50s, starting with Pompey and his extraordinary status, and developing still further in Caesar's Gallic camp. More even than Pompey had during his Eastern campaigns, Caesar established a coherent community in Gaul—an *altera res publica* that in many ways mirrored the civic community at back in Rome.[537] Caesar's Gallic "second city" was deceptively "Republican." Pompey was able to exercise unprecedented power over affairs in the East, during and after his campaigns against the pirates and Mithradates, and he had been able to operate as something very like a king in a world of kings, or even as a something like a god.[538] But this world was very far away from the city, both in terms of distance and in terms of culture. When Pompey returned to Rome in the late 60s, he ran into difficulties translating the commanding position he had wielded during his far off campaigns into influence within the social institutional framework in the city center. It is in many ways unsurprising that an urban aristocratic community long accustomed to a framework predicated on at least the rhetoric of parity might have struggled to accept a model in which a Roman leader was cast as a Hellenistic monarch or a god. So while Pompey's commands certainly served as important precedents for what Caesar would undertake during the 50s, the paradigm may have been one or two steps too far removed from established norms. Caesar's innovations, by contrast, might have seemed much more plausible as extensions of the familiar social institutional structure—stepwise modification rather than radical substitution.

Unlike Sertorius in the 70s, Caesar did not try to create a direct facsimile of Rome's *res publica*—he did not, for example, set up a second Senate, or appoint a suite of magistrates to mirror the institutional structure in the city.[539] But he transformed his Gallic camp into what I described in Chapter 2 as a durable extension of the aristocratic community, forging a culture that could complement and, to some extent, replace aristocratic society in the urban center. His camp even developed significant "state-like" capacity, with its own secretarial staff and its own mint.[540] During the years of the command, from 59-50, Caesar drew a wide range of aristocrats into his orbit, including Crassus' younger son Publius, as well as Cicero's protégé Trebatius and brother Quintus.

Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chs. 4-6 for the increasing transference of traditional public competitive venues of display into textual embodiments of that display during the late Republic—a textual "Forum" for the production of a novel brand of "symbolic" riches.

537 Michael Crawford, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," in Luuk de Ligt, Simon Northwood (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 631-643 argues that, during the first century, dynastic figures were able to develop "alternative states" in the provinces over which they exercised extraordinary military power—first Sertorius, and then Pompey and Caesar.

538 Joachim Gruber, "Cicero und das Hellenistische Herrscherideal," *Wiener Studien* 101, 243–58, Catherine Steel, *Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 132-133, and Kit Morrell, *Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 59-60 both note how Pompey's actions and his role could be described in terms customarily applied to Hellenistic monarchs. Morrell also notes (71) that there is a cult to Pompey attested on Delos, and he was accorded quasi-divine honors at Side. For discussion of the connection between Pompey and the divine in these provincial spaces, see Spencer Cole, *Cicero and the Rise of Deification at Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 41-42.

539 Sertorius' experiment perhaps evoked the image most explicitly of the institutional machinery of *res publica* translated to another space. He was the only one of these three to set up a second Senate and a set of magistrates (e.g. praetors and quaestors) designed to mirror the official structure back in Rome—see Plutarch, *Sertorius* 22.3. Jennifer Gerrish, *Sallust's Histories and Triumviral Historiography: Confronting the End of History*, New York: Routledge, forthcoming for discussion of Sertorius' *altera res publica* and how it appears in Plutarch, in Appian, and in lost passages from Sallust.

540 Josiah Osgood, *Rome and the Making of a World State, 150 BCE–20 CE* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 139 for the mint and the secretarial staff, also noting how, in a very "state-like" manner, Caesar engaged in diplomatic relations without consultation with the center. Crawford, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," 638-639 also points out the extent to which both Pompey's and Caesar's "alternate states" developed significant productive capacity.

In a sense, as Michael Crawford has pointed out, Caesar was setting up an entire career structure—a road to advancement that could serve as an alternative to the traditional *cursus*—in which service and loyalty to the *imperator*, and participation in his circle of *amici*, could to some extent replace the scramble for *honores*.[541]

Caesar's camp became a variegated social and cultural space, playing host to mannered aristocratic networking as well as literary production and scholarship: Quintus' poetry, for instance, and Trebatius' juristic studies, along with Caesar's own work as a grammarian. In many ways, and as Pompey never could claim to be, Caesar can be viewed as a consummate exemplar of the Republican elite.[542] He shared priorities, proclivities, and passions with many of his fellows. That is to say, he took pains to invest in the conscientious accumulation and enjoyment of social, ethical, and knowledge capital, in addition to the financial and symbolic resources that Pompey, too, took care to pursue. Both before the civil war and after, Caesar was not satisfied with splashy symbolic and financial payouts alone. He also seems to have been motivated by his engagement with the elite system of aristocratic knowledge, a determination to win a reputation for *virtus*, and heartfelt engagement with a web of loyal friends.[543]

As is especially important for this discussion, Caesar also invested deeply in *amicitia*. This was a brand of *amicitia*, moreover, that reflected much of the varied range of the Republican model—a social institution rooted in a combination of affection, shared interests, passions, and concerns, combined with functional reciprocity. Even after Caesar won his nonpareil status, he was known to determine his responses to petitions based on his sense of obligation to personal friends.[544] In no way was he interested in overthrowing the dominion of affection and *fides* as guiding forces, or of interrupting the function of a community of honorable *amici*.[545]

But Caesar's innovation can be considered especially insidious for the very reason that it was, in most respects, so in line with the community's norms and ideals. I have made the case throughout the dissertation that Cicero and his fellow members of the aristocratic community were engaged in an ongoing dialectic process of definition regarding the social institution of *amicitia*, both as a practice and as a guiding ideal. They were steered by the institution as it already existed, even as they constantly revised its parameters through their choices and actions. Exemplary friendships were constructed from a tissue of affection and reciprocal service, and rooted in a suite of shared interests, passions, pursuits, and goals. In these respects, Caesar's behavior was entirely in line with the idealizing model. Moreover, during the 50s at any rate, he was still willing to engage in the rhetoric of second-selfhood, and the attendant implications of parity, at least with those of his *amici* among the *principes* such as Cicero who remained in Rome.

---

[541] Crawford, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," 636 notes how the alternative states could provide a "whole career structure that was alternative to the normal *cursus*."

[542] Cicero recognized Caesar's cultural exemplarity. As Michèle Lowrie, "Cicero on Caesar or Exemplum and Inability in the *Brutus*," in Alexander Arweiler, Melanie Möller (eds.) *Vom Selbst-Verständnis in Antike und Neuzeit* (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2008), 131-154 notes (133), Cicero framed Caesar as the one figure in the *Brutus* who manages to bring together the various key strands that underpin aristocratic excellence. Nonetheless, this was an *exemplum* that needed to be acted against.

[543] In terms of his engagement with the system of knowledge, even after he won monarchic power, we can recall as an illustration his calendrical reforms and his related astrological scholarship, as well as his engagement with the debates about divination and priestly craft—see, for instance, Jörg Rüpke, "Priesthoods, Gods, and Stars," in Luca Grillo, Christopher Krebs (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, Cambridge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 58-67 and Dan-el Padilla Peralta, "Ecology, Epistemology, and Divination in Cicero *De Divinatione* 1.90–94," *Arethusa* 51 (2018): 237-267. I provide references regarding Caesar's literary activity in my discussion of the literary triangle between Caesar, Cicero, and Quintus in Chapter 2.

[544] At *Ad Familiares* 226 (VI.12), for instance, Cicero described how Caesar was more likely to respond to a request from a personal friend such as Pansa than to *ambitiosae rogationes*—requests from people trying to "bribe" him with flattery.

[545] Cicero's perception that the function of honorable *amicitia* and *officium* had gone to seed does suggest that however much Caesar may have hoped *amicitia* could continue to operate uninterrupted, his influence had a profoundly disturbing effect on the function of the institution.

Within the camp, however, the social reality was different. While the high-ranking inhabitants of Caesar's "second city" maintained intimate links to their networks back in the capital, simultaneously, outside the urban center, the Caesarian polity developed its own power arrangement. Commanders had always exercised an elevated species of control within their *provincia*. But the remarkable length of Caesar's campaign gave him an opportunity to preside over a more established hierarchical "culture" at a remove from leveling competitive institutions in the city of Rome. His role as *imperator* developed an extraordinary sense of permanence.

Pompey, at least at times, had been raised to the level of a king or deity. But this outsized elevation appears to have been one step too far outside the normative structure of the Republican aristocratic community to serve as a plausible intervention in the ongoing conversation about proper function of the social institutional structure. Caesar's model, by contrast, was both more legible and less overt in its challenge to the familiar arrangement. As a consequence, it proved more effective as a device for co-opting the existing institutional structure, deploying an institutional framework characterized by power sharing for the aggrandizement of a single individual.

The segment of the aristocratic community operating under Caesar's auspices in Gaul developed a new model for linking *amicitia* and hegemony—a model that permitted one man to stand above the multi-actor collection of *principes*. This paradigm was ready to be imported back into Rome when Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Under the Republican arrangement, the elite had certainly been stratified to a degree, and the whole of Roman society was highly conscious of relative rank and position. But the inner circle of power was always permeable, and no individual was raised permanently above the community of his peers. One man might temporarily be called to preeminence—a Scipio, a Pompey, or even a Cicero. He might even stand above his fellows as the *rector rei publicae*, temporarily steering the polity back onto the right course in the face of crisis. In fact, Cicero would argue in the 50s that such extraordinary leadership could be essential to the proper functioning of *res publica*. But it was an elemental feature of the system that such elevation could never be more than a temporary aberration. Even Sulla recognized the need to place hegemony back into the hands of the collective after his spell of dominion.

During the 50s, Caesar still played his part in this communal enterprise with consummate skill. His behavior facilitated the perception that he was not stepping all the way outside the fringes of the Republican social framework.[546] By the 40s, however, his unrivaled preeminence had become too blatant to deny. Caesar might have many friends, but his new position allowed no space for equality. The shadow of "second selfhood" may have allowed affection and some sense of concord between the dictator and his associates. Caesar's *amici* might represent his person. Up to a point, a friend such as Balbus might act to extend Caesar's presence. But Caesar would never be mistaken for a "second Balbus," or even a "second Cicero." In the 50s, Cicero may have been able to persuade himself to think of Caesar as his *alter ego*, capable of acting as his stand-in as a mentor and benefactor for Cicero's associates.[547] After the civil war, however, not even one of Caesar's "fellow" *principes* could delude himself into believing that Caesar might serve as an equal embodiment.

Under the emperors, then, *amicitia* continued to serve a central function in the process of rule. Within the governing aristocratic community, the institution continued to organize the allocation of scarce resources, channel recruitment and advancement, coordinate relations between peers, and mediate entry into the most elevated circles. But the aristocratic community was no

---

546 The comment at Lucan, *Pharsalia* I.125-126: "at that time, Caesar could tolerate no superior, but Pompey could bear no equal" (*nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem/Pompeiusve parem*) is telling, however much the poet benefited from the insight of hindsight.

547 *Ad Familiares* 26 (VII.5): "take note of what a persuasive case I make to myself that you are my second self, and not only in my own affairs but also in the concerns of members of my circle of intimates" (*vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent*).

longer the *locus* of final decision-making, and as a consequence, this familiar brand of aristocratic *amicitia* became decoupled from hegemony.

At the same time, however, Caesar's "pseudo-Republican" *amicitia* could serve as an indispensible discursive strategy, not only for mediating relations between the ruler and this subordinate governing group, but also for underwriting both the rhetoric and the practice of the "civilian" Principate. Through a broad coterie of senatorial and equestrian friends, the representation of the person and the reputation of the "first citizen" could extend throughout the aristocratic community, and out across the empire.[548]

On the level of functional utility, an emperor could use friends as agents—empowered, we might imagine, by the association between *amicitia* and "second selfhood"—spreading tendrils of his personal presence throughout his domains. Beyond this, an emperor was at risk if he opted to reject the *princeps* paradigm. Reputation mattered, as much for the emperors as it had for the members of the ruling aristocratic community under the Republic. It was a tool for the perpetuation of his legitimacy and one of the pillars of the security of his regime. By cultivating friendships with eminent subordinates, a ruler could work to offset the undeniable military and autocratic elements of imperial power.[549] *Imperium* did not play well with *res publica*—there was a reason that *imperium* had been limited within the *pomerium*.[550] Almost by definition, a *dominus* could not be an *amicus*, nor could a *deus*.[551] The violent deaths and subsequent condemnations of both Nero and Domitian came to serve as harsh reminders. It could be dangerous to treat the opinion-making aristocratic community as a pack of slaves and worshippers.

The aristocratic system of power in the late Republic was a system of hegemony by a community seeking capital, with the arrangement mediated by a particular configuration of the social institution of *amicitia*. The regime under Principate also depended on *amicitia* as part of the social and ideological fundament of rule. But this "imperial *amicitia*" should be seen as a new incarnation of the institution, with its novel particularities incubated in the Gallic camp. Caesar created space within the hegemonic framework for a *princeps* above the circle of *principes*. In the wake of this transition, *res publica* no longer had to denote parity and communal rule. Augustus' *res publica restituta* did not have to imply a renaissance of collective hegemony.

---

548 Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," 259-260 suggests that it is likely that emperors maintained friendships analogous to the bond Trajan shared with Pliny with a wide range of other aristocrats.

549 Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," 260 notes, for instance, how the correspondence between Pliny and Trajan helped to offset the military and autocratic elements in Trajan's public image. Such elements were certainly present in Trajan's self-presentation, perhaps unavoidably both given his background and the nature of the *imperator* office more generally—see Paul Roche, "Mixed Messages: Trajan and the Propaganda of Personal Status," in Carl Deroux (ed.*), Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* (Brussels: Societe d'Etudes Latines de Bruxelles–Latomus, 2003), 428-446. On the creation of the emperor's role, more generally—a process into which this dynamic can be seen to fit—see, Paul Veyne, "What Was a Roman Emperor? Emperor, Therefore a God," *Diogenes* 50: 3-21, building on Egon Flaig, *Den Kaiser Herausfordern: Die Usurpation im Römischen Reich* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1992).

550 On the *pomerium* as a boundary between civic power and *imperium*, see the discussion at Lisa Mignone, "Rome's Pomerium and the Aventine Hill: from *Auguraculum* to *Imperium Sine Fine*," *Historia* 65 (2016): 427-449, especially 428-431.

551 Pliny's use of the term *domine* as a means of direct address should not mislead us, since it had a meaning that that could glide between a positive and respectful form of address that was altogether appropriate between friends and a form with the far more pejorative connotations of the more obvious master-slave reference. On the term *dominus* in general, and specifically on the exception for direct address, see Matthew Roller, *Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 254-262, Eleanor Dickey, *Latin Forms of Address: From Plautus to Apuleius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77-99. Indeed, Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," 250-251 is perceptive to view the strategic use of the term as a device for creating the frame of personal intimacy between the senator and his emperor.

Dissertation Bibliography

Alexander, Michael, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis* as an Attack on Election Campaigns," *Athenaeum* 97 (2009): 31-57.

Alexander, W. H., "Cicero on C. Trebatius Testa," *The Classical Bulletin* (1962): 65-69.

Allen, Walter, "Cicero's House and *Libertas*," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 75 (1944): 1-9.

Allen, Walter, "The Location of Cicero's House on the Palatine Hill," *The Classical Journal* 35 (1939): 134-143.

Anderson, Greg, "The Personality of the Greek State," *The Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 129 (2009): 1-22.

Ando, Clifford, *Law, Language and Empire in the Roman Tradition*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

Andreau, Jean, "Activité Financière et Liens de Parenté en Italie Romaine," in Andreau, Jean, Bruhns, Hinnerk, *Parenté et Stratégies Familiales dans l'Antiquité Romaine*, *Actes de la Table Ronde des 2-4 Octobre 1986* (Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme) (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1990): 501-526.

Andreau, Jean, *Banking and Business in the Roman World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Andreau, Jean, *La vie Financière dans le Monde Romain: les Métiers de Manieurs d'Argent (IVe Siècle av. J.-C.-IIIe Siècle ap. J.-C.)*, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1987.

Ansell, Christopher, Bichir, Renata, Zhou, Shi, "Who Says Networks, Says Oligarchy? Oligarchies as 'Rich Club' Networks," *Connections: Official Journal of the International Network for Social Network Analysis*, 35: 20-32.

Arena, Valentina, *Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Arkins, Brian, "Caelius and Rufus in Catullus," *Philologus* 127 (1983): 306-311.

Arrow, Kenneth, *The Limits of Organization*, New York: Norton, 1974.

Asch, Ronald, *Europäischer Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit: eine Einführung*, Köln: Böhlau, 2008.

Asmis, Elizabeth, "A New Kind of Model: Cicero's Roman Constitution in *De Republica*," *The American Journal of Philology* 126.3 (2005: 377-416.

Asmis, Elizabeth, "The State as Partnership: Cicero's Definition of *Res Publica* in his Work *On the State*," *History of Political Thought* 25 (2004): 569-598.

Astin, Alan, *Cato the Censor*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Astin, Alan, *Politics and Policies in the Roman Republic: an Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the Queenś University of Belfast on 1 May 1968*, Belfast, The Queenś University, 1968.

Atkins, E.M., "*Domina et Regina Virtutum*: Justice and *Societas* in *De Officiis*," *Phronesis* 35 (1990): 258-289.

Atkins, Jed, *Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic and Laws*, Cambridge: Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Aubert, Jean-Jacques, *Business Managers in Ancient Rome: a Social and Economic Study of* Institores*, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250*, Leiden: Brill, 1994.

Aubert-Baillot, Sophie, Guérin, Charles (eds.) *Le* Brutus *de Cicéron: Rhétorique, Politique et Histoire Culturelle*, Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Badian, Ernst, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 BC)*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.

Badian, Ernst, *Publicans and Sinners: Private Enterprise in Service of the Roman Republic*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

Badian, Ernst, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Badian, Ernst, "The Consuls, 179-49 BC," *Chiron* 20 (1990), 371-414.

Badian, Ernst, "*Tribuni Plebis* and *Res Publica*,' in Linderski, Jerzy (ed.), *Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and Roman Republic*. Historia Einzelschriften 105. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996.

Bailey, Shackleton (ed.), *Epistulae ad Familiares/Cicero*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Bailey, Shackleton (ed.), *Letters to Atticus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965-1970.

Bailey, Shackleton (ed.), *Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem et M. Brutum*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Bailey, Shackleton, "*Nobiles* and *Novi* Reconsidered," *The American Journal of Philology* 107 (1986): 255-260.

Baldwin, Barry, "The *Acta Diurna*," *Chiron* 9 (1979): 189-203.

Bannon, Cynthia, *The Brothers of Romulus: Fraternal Pietas in Roman Law, Literature, and Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Baraz, Yelena, *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Barlow, Charles *Bankers, Moneylenders, and Interest Rates in the Roman Republic,* North Carolina, Univ., Diss., 1978.

Batstone, William and Damon, Cynthia, *Caesar's Civil War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Beard, Mary, "Ciceronian Correspondences: Making a Book Out of Letters," in Wiseman, Timothy (ed.), *Classics in Progress*: *Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome* (Oxford, 2002), 103-44.

Beard, Mary, *The Roman Triumph*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Beard, Mary, North, John, Price, Susan, *Religions of Rome* (2 vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Bearman, Peter, *Relations Into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993.)

Beck, Hans, *Karriere und Hierarchie: die Römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des Cursus Honorum in der Mittleren Republik*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005.

Beck, Hans, "From Poplicola to Augustus: Senatorial Houses in Roman Political Culture," *Phoenix* 63 (2009): 361-384.

Beck, Hans, Martin, Jehne, Serrati, John (eds.), *Money and Power in the Roman Republic*, Bruxelles: Editions Latomus, 2016.

Beck, Hans, "Wealth, Power, and Class Coherence. The *Ambitus* Legislation of the 180s B.C.," in *Money and Power in the Roman Republic*, Collection Latomus 355 (Brussels, 2016).

Beck, Hans, Duplá, Antonio, Jehne, Martin; Francisco, Pina Polo, Francisco (eds.), *Consuls and the* Res Publica*: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Beck, Hans, Scholz, Peter, Walter, Uwe (eds.), *Die Macht der Wenigen: Aristokratische Herrschaftspraxis, Kommunikation und 'Edler' Lebensstil in Antike und Früher Neuzeit*, München: Oldenbourg, 2008.

Berger, Adolf, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953.

Bernard, Jacques-Emmanuel, *La Sociabilité Épistolaire chez Cicéron*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 2013.

Bernard, Jacques-Emmanuel, "Le Langage de l'*Amicitia* dans les Lettres de Cicéron à Appius Claudius," in Galand-Hallyn, Perrine (ed.), *La Société des Amis à Rome et dans la Littérature Médiévale et Humaniste*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2008, 95-112.

Berlin, Isaiah "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Berlin, Isaiah, *Four Essays on Liberty*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 118-172.

Berry, Dominic, "*Equester Ordo Tuus Est*: Did Cicero Win His Cases Because of His Support for the *Equites*?," *The Classical Quarterly*, 53 (2003): 222-234.

Beutel, Frank, *Vergangenheit als Politik. Neue Aspekte im Werk des jüngeren Plinius*, Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2000.

Bevir, Mark, Rhodes, Rod, *The State as Cultural Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Bevir, Mark, Richards, David, "Decentering Policy Networks: A Theoretical Agenda," *Public Administration* 87 (2009): 3-14.

Binns, James, *Latin Literature of the Fourth Century*, London: Routledge, 1974.

Blösel, Wolfgang. "Mos maiorum: Von der Familientradition zum Nobilitätsethos," in Linke, Bernhard, Stemmler, Michael, Mos maiorum: *Untersuchungen zu den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, 25–97.

Bloomer, Martin, *Latinity and Literary Society at Rome*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015/originally 1997.

Bodel, John. "Cicero's Minerva, Penates, and the Mother of the Lares: An Outline of Roman Domestic Religion." Bodel, John, Olyan, Saul (eds.), *Household and Family Religion in Antiquity*, Malden/Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, 248–75.

Bodel, John, "Monumental Villas and Villa Monuments," *Journal of Roman Archeology* 10 (1997): 5-35.

Bodel, John, 'Status Dissonance and Status Dissidents in the Equestrian Order,' in Kuhn, Annika (ed.), *Social Status and Prestige in the Graeco-Roman World*, Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2015.

Bonnefond-Coudry, Marianne, *Le Sénat de la République Romaine de la Guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste*, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1989.

Bonner, Stanley, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny*, Berkeley: UC Press, 1977.

Bornecque, Henri, *La Prose Métrique dans la Correspondance de Cicéron*, Paris: E. Bouillon, 1898.

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Sozialer Sinn: Kritik der Theoretischen Vernunft*, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1987.

Bourdieu, Pierre, "The Forms of Capital," in Richardson, John, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (Westport: Greenwood, 1986): 241–58.

Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1990.

Bowles, Samuel, Gintis, Herbert, "Social Capital and Community Governance," *The Economic Journal* 112 (2002): 419–436.

Bradley, Keith, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Bradley, Keith, "Fictive Families: Family and Household in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius," *Phoenix* 54 (2000): 282-308.

Braddick, Michael, Walter, John, *Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Braund, Susanna "Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, Seneca, Pliny," in Mary Whitby (ed.), *The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity*, 53-76.

Brehm, John, Rahn, Wendy, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1997): 999-1023.

Brennan, T. Corey, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Brink, Charles, "Quintilian's De Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae and Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus*," *The Classical Quarterly*, 39.2 (1989), pp. 472-503

Brittain, Charles, *Philo of Larissa: the Last of the Academic Sceptics,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.

Broekaert, Wim, "Joining Forces: Commercial Partnerships or *Societates* in the Early Roman Empire," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 61 (2012): 221-253.

Broughton, Thomas, "Roman Asia Minor," in Frank, Tenney (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, Paterson: Pageant Books, 1959, 4: 499–916.

Broughton, Thomas, "Senate and Senators of the Roman Republic: The Prosopographical Approach," in Temporini, Hildegard (ed.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt. Vol. 1.1*., Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1972, 250–265.

Bruhns, Hinnerk, *Caesar und die Römische Oberschicht in den Jahren 49-44 v. Chr.: Unters. zur Herrschaftsetablierung im Bürgerkrieg*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978.

Brunt, Peter, "*Amicitia* in the Late Roman Republic," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 11 (1965): 1-20.

Brunt, Peter, "Cicero's *Officium* in the Civil War," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 76 (1986): 12-32.

Brunt, Peter, "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War," *The Journal of Roman Studies* LV (1965): 90-109.

Brunt, Peter, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 14.,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Brunt, Peter, "*Nobilitas* and *Novitas*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 72 (1982): 1–17.

Brunt, Peter, "Review of E. Badian's *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 59 (1969): 270–1.

Brunt, Peter, *Roman Imperial Themes*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Brunt, Peter, *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic,* London: Chatto & Windus, 1971.

Brunt, Peter, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," *The Journal of Roman Studies* LII (1962): 69-86.

Brunt, Peter, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

Brunt, Peter "The *Equites* in the Late Republic," in *Deuxième Conférence Internationale d'Histoire Économique, Aix-en-Provence 1962, I: Commerce et Politique dans l'Antiquité*, Paris: Mouton, 1965, 117-137.

Brunt, Peter, "The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime," *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1984), pp. 423-444 (pdf)

Brunt, Peter, "The Roman Mob," *Past and Present* 35 (1966): 3-27.

Bücher, Frank, *Verargumentierte Geschichte: Exempla Romana im Politischen Diskurs der Späten Römischen Republik*, Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2006.

Buraselis, Kostas, "Numa Pompilius und die Gens Pomponia," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 25 (1976): 378-380.

Burchell, Graham, Gordon, Colin, Miller, Peter (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Burckhardt, Leonhardt, "The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts *Nobilitas* and *Homo Novus*," *Historia* 39 (1990): 77–99.

Burton, Graham, "The Roman Imperial State, Provincial Governors and the Public Finances of Provincial Cities, 27 B.C.-A.D. 235," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 53 (2004): 311-342.

Burton, Paul, "*Amicitia* in Plautus: A Study of Roman Friendship Processes," *The American Journal of Philology* 125 (2004): 209-243.

Burton, Paul, *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Burton, Paul, "Genre and Fact in the Preface to Cicero's *De Amicitia*," *Antichthon* 41 (2007), 13–32.

Cameron, Alan, "The Fate of Pliny's Letters in the Late Empire," *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1965), 289-298.

Campbell, Brian, "Teach Yourself to Be a General," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 77 (1987): 13-29.

Catherine Chin, *Grammar and Christianity in the Late Roman World*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

Cella, Giovane "Os Gauleses de César: a Etnografia e a *Virtus* no *Bello Gallico*," *Mare Nostrum* 6 (2015): 21-35.

Cerutti, Steven, "The Location of the Houses of Cicero and Clodius and the Porticus Catuli on the Palatine Hill in Rome," *The American Journal of Philology* 118 (1997): 417-426.

Champion, Craige, *The Peace of the Gods: Elite Religious Practices in the Middle Roman Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Claassen, Jo-Marie, "Cicero's Banishment: *Tempora et Mores*," *Acta Classica* 35 (1992): 19-47.

Claassen, Jo-Marie, "Documents of a Crumbling Marriage: The Case of Cicero and Terentia," *Phoenix* 50 (1996): 208-232. (pdf but don't have yet)

Clark, Anna, *Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Clark, Patricia, "Tullia and Crassipes," *Phoenix* 45 (1991): 38-38.

Clarke, John, "*Domus*/Single Family House," in Ulrich, Roger, Quenemoen, Caroline (eds.) *A Companion to Roman Architecture*, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, 342-362.

Coleman, James, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95–120.

Connolly, Joy, *The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Conte, Gian Biagio, *Latin Literature: A History*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Conybeare, Catherine, *Self and Symbols in the Letters of Paulinus of Nola*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Conze, Werner, Meier, Christian, "Adel, Aristokratie," in Koselleck, Reinhart, Conze, Werner, Brunner, Otto, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache In Deutschland* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972), 1-48.

Corbeill, Anthony, "Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions," in Yun Lee Too, *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, 261-288.

Corbier, Mireille, "Divorce and Adoption as Roman Familial Strategies," in Rawson, Beryl (ed.), *Marriage, Divorce and Children in Ancient Rome* (1991), 47-78.

Cornell, Tim *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000 – 264 B.C.)*, London; New York: Routledge, 1995.

Cotton, Hannah, "Cicero, *Ad Familiares* XIII.26 and 28: Evidence for *Revocatio* or *Reiectio Romae/Romam*?," *Journal of Roman Studies* 69 (1979).

Cotton, Hannah, "Greek and Latin Epistolary Formulae: Some Light on Cicero's Letter Writing," *The American Journal of Philology* 105 (1984): 409-425.

Cotton, Hannah, "*Mirificum Genus Commendationis*: Cicero and the Latin Letter of Recommendation," *The American Journal of Philoogy* 106 (1985): 328-334.

Cotton, Hannah, "The Role of Cicero's Letters of Recommendation: *Iustitia versus Gratia*?," *Hermes* 114 (1986): 443-460.

Cox, Gary, McCubbins, Matthew, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1993).

Cox, Gary, McCubbins, Matthew, *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Craig, Christopher, "Shifting Charge and Shifty Argument in Cicero's Speech for Sestius," in Wooten, Cecil (ed.), *The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, 111-122.

Craver, Scott, "Urban Real Estate in Late Republican Rome," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 55 (2010): 135-158.

Crawford, Michael, "States Waiting in the Wings: Population Distribution and the End of the Roman Republic," in de Ligt, Luuk, Northwood, Simon (eds.), *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, 631-643.

Crone, Patricia, *Pre-Industrial Societies*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.

Culpepper-Stroup, Sarah, *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: the Generation of the Text*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Daniel, Ute, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte: Theorien, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2001.

D'Arms, John, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Dasen, Véronique, Späth, Thomas (eds.), *Children, Memory, and Family Identity in Roman Culture*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Daubner, Frank, Bellum Asiaticum: *der Krieg der Römer gegen Aristonikos von Pergamon und die Einrichtung der Provinz Asia*, München: Tuduv, 2003.

Davenport, Caillan, *A History of the Roman Equestrian Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

David, Jean-Michel, *The Roman Conquest of Italy*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

De Giorgio, Jean Pierre, *L'Écriture de Soi à Rome. Autour de la Correspondence de Cicéron,* Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus, 2015.

De Giorgio, Jean-Pierre, Ndiaye, Émilia. "Cicéron Face aux Conseils d'Atticus," in Gavoille, Élisabeth, Guillaumont, François (eds.), *Conseiller, Diriger par Lettre*, Tours: Pr. Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2017, 137-153.

de Haas, T.C.A., Tol, Gils (eds.), *The Economic Integration of Roman Italy Rural Communities in a Globalising World*, Leiden: Brill, 2017.

De Laet, Sigfried, *Portorium; Étude sur l'Organisation Douanière chez les Romains, Surtout à l'Époque du Haut-Empire*, Brugge: De Tempel, 1949.

de Ligt, Luuk, "Roman Manpower and Recruitment During the Middle Republic," in Erdkamp, Paul (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, 114-131.

de Ligt, Luuk, Northwood, Simon (eds.) *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC-AD 14*, Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Deniaux, Élizabeth, *Clientèles et Pouvoir à l'Époque de Cicéron*, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1993.

Des Boscs, Françoise, "Lucius Cornelius Balbus de Gadès: la Carrière Méconnue d'un Espagnol à l'Époque des Guerres Civiles (Ier Siècle av. J.-C.)," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 30 (1994): 7-35.

Dickey, Eleanor, *Latin Forms of Address: From Plautus to Apuleius*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Dilke, Oswald, "Cicero's Attitude to the Allocation of Land," *Ciceroniana* 3 (1978): 183-187.

Dixon, Suzanne, "Family Finances: Tullia and Terentia," *Antichthon* 18 (1984): 78-101.

Dixon, Suzanne, "Conflict in the Roman Family," Rawson, Beryl and Weaver, Paul (eds.), *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, 149-168.

Dixon, Suzanne, *The Roman Family*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

Dräger, Paul, "Die Trevirer und die Scharfrichter: ein Lateinischer Scherz mit dem Namen der Trevirer/Treverer," *Kurtrierisches Jahrbuch* 43 (2003): 21-25.

Drecoll, Carsten, *Nachrichten in der Römischen Kaiserzeit. Untersuchungen zu den Nachrichteninhalten in Briefen*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Carsten Drecoll Verlag, 2006.

Drogula, Fred, *Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire*. Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Drummond, Andrew, "Rome in the Fifth Century II: The Citizen Community," in Walbank, Frank et al. (eds.) *Cambridge Ancient History 7, Part 2*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Dugan, John, "Cicero and the Politics of Ambiguity: Interpreting the Pro Marcello," in Steel, Catherine, van der Blom, Henriette (eds.), *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Dugan, John, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Dugan, John. "*Non Sine Sausa sed Sine Fine*: Cicero's Compulsion to Repeat his Consulate," *The Classical Journal* 110 (2015): 9-22.

Duncan-Jones, Richard, *Power and Privilege in Roman Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Duncan-Jones, Richard, *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Dugan, John, *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Dyck, Andrew, *A Commentary on Cicero*, De Officiis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Eberle, Lisa, Le Quéré, Enora, "Landed Traders, Trading Agriculturalists? Land in the Economy of the Italian Diaspora in the Greek East," *Journal of Roman Studies* 107 (2017): 27–59.

Eck, Werner, "*Cum Dignitate Otium*. Senatorial Domus in Imperial Rome," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 16 (1997): 162-190.

Eder, Walter, "Republicans and Sinners: The Decline of the Roman Republic and the End of a Provisional Arrangement," in Wallace, Robert, Harris, Edward (eds.), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C. in Honor of E. Badian*, 439–61, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, 439-461.

Edwards, Catharine, *The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Edwards, Rebecca, "Hunting for Boars with Pliny and Tacitus," *Classical Antiquity* 27.1 (2008): 35-58.

Eilers, Claude, *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Elster, Jon, *The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Emilie, Gertrude, "Cicero and the Roman *Pietas*," *The Classical Journal* 39 (1944): 536-542.

Epstein, David, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43*, London: Croom-Helm, 1987.

Erskine, Andrew, "How to Rule the World: Polybius Book 6 Reconsidered," in Gibson, Bruce John, Harrison, Thomas (eds.), *Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 231-245.

Evans, John, *War, Women and Children in Ancient Rome*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991.

Evans, Richard (ed.), *Mass and Elite in the Greek and Roman Worlds. From Sparta to Late Antiquity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017.

Evenepoel, Willy, "Cicero's Laelius and Seneca's Letters on Friendship," *L'Antiquité Classique* 76 (2007): 177-183.

Fabre, Georges, *Libertus: Recherches sur les Rapports Patron-Affranchi à la Fin de la République Romaine*, Paris: De Boccard, 1981.

Fantham, Elaine, *The Roman World of Cicero's* De Oratore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Farney, Gary, *Ethnic Identity and Aristocratic Competition in the Roman Republic,* Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Farney, Gary, "Romans and Italians," McInerney, Jeremy (ed.) *A Companion to Ethnicity in the Ancient Mediterranean*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 2014, 437-454.

Fedeli, Paolo, *Quinto Tullio Cicerone, Manualetto di Campagna Elettorale (Commentariolum Petitionis); a Cura di Paolo Fedeli; Presentazione di Giulio Andreotti*, Roma: Salerno, 2006.

Finley, Moses, *Politics in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Finley, Moses, *The Ancient Economy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Flaig, Egon, *Den Kaiser Herausfordern: Die Usurpation im Römischen Reich*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1992.

Flaig, Egon, "Habitus, Mentalitäten und die Frage des Subjekts: Kulturelle Orientierungen Sozialen Handelns," in Jaeger, Friedrich, Liebsch, Burkhard (eds.), *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften* 3, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2011.

Flaig, Egon, *Ritualisierte Politik: Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2003.

Flower, Harriet, *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Flower, Harriet, *Roman Republics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Forsythe, Gary, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Foucault, Michel, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8 (1982): 777-795.

Frazel, Thomas, "The Composition and Circulation of Cicero's *In Verrem*," *Classical Quarterly* 54: 128–42.

Fredrikson. M.W., "Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt," *Journal of Roman Studies* 56 (1966): 128-141.

Frier, Bruce, "Cicero's Management of His Urban Properties," *The Classical Journal* 74 (1978): 1-6.

Frier, Bruce, *The Rise of the Roman Jurists: Studies in Cicero's* Pro Caecina. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Fraenkel, Eduard, "Some Notes on Cicero's Letters to Trebatius," *Journal of Roman Studies* 47 (1957): 66-70.

Fröhlich, Gerhard, "Kapital, Habitus, Feld, Symbol: Grundbegriffe der Kulturtheorie bei Pierre Bourdieu," in Mörth, Ingo, Fröhlich, Gerhard (eds.), *Das Symbolische Kapital der Lebensstile*, Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1994, 31-54.

Fuchs, Deiter, "The Political Culture Paradigm," in Dalton, Russell, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Fuhrer, Therese, Renger, Almut-Barbara (eds.), *Performanz von Wissen: Strategien der Wissensvermittlung in der Vormoderne*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2012.

Fukuyama, Francis, *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995.

Garcea, Alessandro, *Caesar's* De analogia: *Edition, Translation, and Commentary*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Garcea, Alessandro, "La Politica Linguistica di Cesare: Origine e Funzione del *De Analogia*," in Bona, Edoardo, Curnis, Michele (eds.), *Linguaggi del Potere, Poteri del Linguaggio = Langages du Pouvoir, Pouvoirs du Langage* (Alessandria: Ed. dell'Orso, 2010), 289-298.

Gardner, Jane, *Family and* Familia *in Roman Law and Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

Gardner, Jane, "The Recovery of Dowry in Roman Law," *Classical Quarterly* 35 (1985): 449-453.

Garnsey, Peter, *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Garnsey, Peter, "Urban Property Investment," in Finley, Moses (ed.) *Studies in Roman Property*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976: 123-136.

Garnsey, Peter, Saller, Richard, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, Berkeley: UC Press, 1987.

Geiger, Joseph, *Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985.

Geisthardt, Johannes, *Zwischen Princeps und Res Publica. Tacitus, Plinius und die Senatorische Selbstdarstellung in der Hohen Kaiserzeit*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2015.

Gellner, Ernest, Waterbury, John, *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, London, Duckworth and Co., 1977.

Gelzer, Matthias, *Caesar: der Politiker und Staatsmann*, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960.

Gelzer, Matthias, *Cicero: ein biographischer Versuch,* Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1969.

Gelzer, Matthias, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1912.

Gelzer, Matthias, "Review of Scullard, 1951," *Historia* 1 (1950): 634-642.

Gerrish, Jennifer, *Sallust's Histories and Triumviral Historiography: Confronting the End of History*, New York: Routledge, forthcoming.

Gibson, Roy, "On the Nature of Ancient Letter Collections," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 102 (2012): 56-78.

Gibson, Roy, Morello, Ruth (eds.), *Reading the Letters of Pliny the Younger*: *An Introduction* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Giddens, Anthony, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Gilbert, Nathan, "Was Atticus an Epicurean?'," (draft) academia.edu (pdf)

Gilcher-Holtey, Ingrid, "Kulturelle und symbolische Praktiken: das Unternehmen Pierre Bourdieu," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 16 (1996): 111-130.

Gildenhard, Ingo, *Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. (main stacks)

Goldbeck, Fabian, *Salutationes: die Morgenbegrüßungen in Rom in der Republik und der Frühen Kaiserzeit*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010.

Goldberg, Sander, "Appreciating Aper: The Defence of Modernity in Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus*," *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1999), 224-237.

Goldsworthy, Adrian, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Gradel, Ittai, *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Greene, Kevin, *The Archeology of the Roman Economy*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

Grief, Avner, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Grillo, Luca, "Reading Cicero's *ad Familiares* 1 as a Collection,? *The Classical Quarterly* 65 (2015): 655–68.

Grillo, Luca, *The Art of Caesar's* Bellum Civile*: Literature, Ideology, and Community*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Grillo, Luca, Krebs, Christopher (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Gruber, Joachim, "Cicero und das Hellenistische Herrscherideal," *Wiener Studien* 101, 243–58.

Gruen, Erich, "The Exercise of Power in Republican Rome," in Molho, Anthony, Raaflaub, Kurt, Emlen, Julia (eds.) *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991): 251-267.

Gruen, Erich, "P. Clodius: Instrument or Independent Agent," *Phoenix* 20 (1966), 120-30.

Gruen, Erich, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Gruen, Erich, "*The Last Generation of the Republic* Revisited," in Haake, Matthias, Harders, Ann-Cathrin (eds.) *Politische Kultur und Soziale Struktur der Römischen Republik*, Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2017, 553-567.

Gersmann, Gudrun, "Adel," in *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit* 1 (2005): 39-54.

Guala, Francesco, *Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Guilhembet, Jacques, "Les Résidences Aristocratiques de Rome, du Milieu du I er Siècle avant n. è. à la Fin des Antonins," *Pallas* 55 (2001): 215-241.

Guilhembet, Jacques, "Les Résidences Urbaines des Sénateurs Romains des Gracques à Auguste: la Maison dans la Ville," *L'Information Historique* 58: 185–197.

Gunderson, Erik, "The Ideology of the Arena," *Classical Antiquity* 15.1 (1996): 113-151.

Gurd, Sean, "Cicero and Editorial Revision," in *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2007): 49-80.

Habinek, Thomas, "Poetry, Patronage, and Roman Politics," in *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015: 68-80.

Habinek, Thomas, *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Habinek, Thomas, "Towards a History of Friendly Advice: The Politics of Candor in Cicero's *de Amicitia*," *Apeiron* 23: 165-185.

Hanchey, Daniel, "*Perturbatio*, *Frugalitas*, and *Bene Beateque Uiuendum*: Ciceronian Philosophy as Ciceronian Defense in Pro Rege Deiotaro," *Illinois Classical Studies*, 40.1 (2015): 63-83.

Harmand, Louis, *Un Aspect Social et Politique du Monde Romain: le Patronat sur les Collectivités Publiques des Origines au Bas-Empire*, Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957.

Hall, Jon, "Politeness and Formality in Cicero's Letter to Matius (Fam. 11.27)," *Museum Helveticum*, 62.4 (2005): 193-213.

Hall, Jon, *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Hanchey, Dan, "Cicero, Exchange, and the Epicureans," *Phoenix* 67 (2013): 119-134.

Harper, Kyle, *Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275-425*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Harries, Jill, *Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State*, London: Duckworth, 2006.

Harris, William, "A Revisionist View of Roman Money," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 96 (2006): 1-24.

Harris, William, "On Defining the Political Culture of the Roman Republic: Some Comments on Rosenstein, Williamson, and North," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 288-294.

Harris, Willia, *Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Harris, William, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

Harrison, "Catiline, Clodius, and Popular Politics at Rome During the 60s and 50s," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 51 (2008): 95-118.

Harrison, Stephen, "Cicero's *De Temporibus Suis*: The Evidence Reconsidered," *Hermes* 118 (1990): 455-463.

Hatzfeld, Jean, *Les Trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellénique*, Paris: De Boccard, 1919.

Heichelheim, Fritz, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums: vom Paläolithikum bis zur Völkerwanderung der Germanen, Slaven und Araber*, Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1938.

Hellegouarc'h, Joseph, *Le Vocabulaire Latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République*, Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1963.

Helmke, Gretchen, Levitsky, Steven, "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda," *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (2004): 725-740.

von Hesberg, Henner, "Die Häuser der Senatoren in Rom: Gesellschaftliche und Politische Funktion," in Eck, Werner, Heil, Matthäus (eds.), Senatores Populi Romani: *Realität und mediale Präsentation einer Führungsschicht* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 19-52.

Hinard, François, *Les Proscriptions de la Rome Républicaine*, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1985.

Hodgson, Geoffrey, "On Defining Institutions: Rules versus Equilibria," *Journal of Institutional Economics* 11 (2015): 497–505.

Hodgson, Geoffrey, "What Are Institutions?," *Journal of Economic Issues* 40 (1): 1–25.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, "Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the *Nobilitas*," *Historia* 42 (1993): 12-39.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, *Die Entstehung der Nobilität: Studien zur Sozialen und Politischen Geschichte der Römischen Republik im 4. Jh. v. Chr. 2.* (Stuttgart, Frank Steiner Verlag, 1987/2011).

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim*, Eine Politische Kultur (in) der Krise*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, "Fact(ions) or Fiction? Friedrich Miinzer and the Aristocracy of the Roman Republic then and now," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 8 (2001): 92-105.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, "'Prominenzrollen' und 'Karrierefelder'—Einleitnede Bemerkungen zu Thematik und Begriffen," in Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Wolfgang Blösel (eds.), *Von der Militia Equestris zur Militia Urbana: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im Antiken Rom*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2011, 9-28.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, *Senatus Populusque Romanus: die Politische Kultur der Republik : Dimensionen und Deutungen*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, "Under Roman Roofs: Family, House, and Household," in Flower, Harriet (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 113-138.

Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim, "What's in a Text? 'Reconstructing the Roman Republic'—Approaches and Aims Once Again". *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 54 (2011), 115-124.

Hutchinson, Gregory, "Ciceros Brief als Literatur (Ad Att. 1.16)," *Hermes* 121 (1993): 441-451.

Henderson, John, *Pliny's Statue: The Letters, Self-Portraiture and Classical Art*, Exeter: Liverpool University Press, 2002.

Hopkins, Keith, *Conquerors and Slaves*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Hopkins, Keith, *Death and Renewal: Sociological Studies in Roman History Volume 2*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hopkins, Keith, "From Violence to Blessing: Symbols and Rituals in Ancient Rome," in Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, Julia Emlen (eds.) *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991): 479-498.

Hutchinson, Gregory, *Cicero's Correspondence: A Literary Study*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

Ioannatou, Marina, *Affaires d'Argent dans la Correspondance de Cicéron. L'Aristocratie Sénatoriale face à ses Dettes*, Paris, De Boccard, 2006.

Ioannatou, Marina, "Liens d'Amitié et Opérations de Crédit à la Fin de la République Romaine," in *Mémoires de la Sociéte pour l'Histoire de Droit*, 62 (2006): 11-40.

Ioannatou, Marina, "Le Code de l'Honneur des Paiements. Créanciers et Débiteurs à la Fin de la République Romaine," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* (2001): 1201-1221.

Jefferson, Eleanor, "Problems and Audience in Cato's *Origines*," in Roselaar, Saskia (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic*, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012, 311-326.

Jehne, Martin, *Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der römischen Republik*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995.

Jehne, Martin, "Politische Partizipation in der Römischen Republik," in Reinau, Hansjorg, Von Ungern-sternberg, Jurgen (eds.) *Politische Partizipation. Idee und Wirklichkeit von der Antike bis in die Gegenwar*t, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013: 103-144.

Jehne, Martin, Pina Polo, Francisco (eds.), *Foreign Clientelae in the Roman Empire: A Reconsideration*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015.

Jeppesen-Wigelsworth, Alison, "Political Bedfellows: Tullia, Dolabella, and Caelius," *Arethusa* 46 (2013): 65-85.

Johnson, William, "Towards a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity," *The American Journal of Philology*, 121.4 (2000): 593-627.

Kallet-Marx, Robert, *Hegemony to Empire: the Development of the Roman* Imperium *in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Kaplow, Lauren, "Redefining *Imagines*: Ancestor Masks and Political Legitimacy in the Rhetoric of New Men," *Mouseion* 8 (2008): 409-416.

Kaser, Max, *Das Römische Privatrecht*, München: Beck, 1971.

Kaster, Robert, *Cicero: Speech on Behalf of Publius Sestius*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Kaster, Robert, *Guardians of Language*, Berkeley: UC Press, 1988.

Kay, Philip, *Rome's Economic Revolution* [Oxford Studies on the Roman Economy], Oxford: University Press, 2014.

Kautsky, John, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Keaveney, Arthur, *Rome and the Unification of Italy*, London: Croom Helm, 1987.

Kennedy, George. *Quintilian*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1969.

Kenney, Edward, "Books and Readers in the Roman World," in Kenney, Edward, Clausen, William (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 3-32.

Kharkhordin, Oleg, "Why *Res Publica* is Not a State: The Stoic Grammar and Discursive Practices in Cicero's Conception," *History of Political Thought* 31 (2010): 221-245.

Kierdorf, Wilhelm, *Laudatio Funebris: Interpretationen und Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der Römischen Leichenrede*, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980.

Konstan, David, *Friendship in the Classical World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Konstan, David, *In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Konstan, "Friendship and Patronage," in Harrison, Stephen (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Latin Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005): 345-359.

Kraup, Per, Rector Rei Publicae: *Bidrag til Fortolkningen al Ciceros* De Re Rublica, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1956.

Kries, Douglas, "On the Intention of Cicero's *De Officiis*," *The Review of Politics* 65 (2003): 375-393.

Krostenko, Brian, *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Kruschwitz, Peter, "Gallic War Songs (II): Marcus Cicero, Quintus Cicero, and Caesar's invasion of Britain," *Philologus*, 158 (2014): 275-305.

Kunst, Christiane, *Römische Adoption: Zur Strategie einer Familienorganisation*, Hennef: Clauss, 2005.

Lamberty, John. "*Amicus Caesaris*: der Aufstieg des L. Cornelius Balbus aus Gades," in Heinen, Heinz, Tröster, Manuel, Coşkun, Altay (eds.), *Roms Auswärtige Freunde in der Späten Republik und im Frühen Prinzipat*, Göttingen: Duehrkohp und Radicke, 2005, 155-173.

Laurence, Ray, Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, *Domestic Space in the Roman World: Pompeii and Beyond*, Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archeology, 1997.

Leach, Eleanor. "*An Gravius Aliquid Scribam*: Roman *Seniores* Write to *Iuvenes*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 136 (2006): 247-267.

Leach, Eleanor, "*Otium* as *Luxuria*: Economy of Status in the Younger Pliny's Letters," Arethusa 36 (2003): 147-165.

Lemoine, Fannie, "Parental Gifts: Father-Son Dedications and Dialogues in Roman Didactic Literature," *Illinois Classical Studies* 16 (1991): 337-366.

Lendon, Jon, *Empire of Honour. The Art of Government in the Roman World.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

Lepore, Ettore, *Il Princeps Ciceroniano e Gli Ideali politici della Tarda Repubblica*, Napoli: Istituto Italiano per Gli studi Storici, 1954.

Levick, Barbara, *Augustus: Image and Substance*, Harlow/London/New York: Longman, 2010.

Levick, Barbara, "Imperial Control of the Elections under the Early Principate: *Commendatio*, *Suffragatio*, and *Nominatio*," *Historia* 16 (1967): 207-230.

Lévy, Carlos, "Colloque *Pistis* et *Fides*: le *De Officiis* Cicéronien: une Refondation Philosophique de la *Fides*?" *Rendiconti* 148 (2014): 59-76.

Linderski, Jerzy (ed.), *Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and Roman Republic.* Historia Einzelschriften 105. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996.

Lindsay, Hugh, *Adoption in the Roman World*, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Lintott, Andrew, *Cicero as Evidence: a Historian's Companion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Lintott, Andrew, "Democracy in the Middle Republic," *Zeitschrift de Savigny-Stifung* 104: 34-52.

Lintott, Andrew, Imperium Romanum: *Politics and Administration*, London: Routledge, 1993.

Lintott, Andrew "P. Clodius Pulcher—Felix Catilina?," *Greece and Rome* 14 (1967), 157-69.

Lintott, Andrew, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Littlestone-Luria, Adam, Review of Grillo, Luca and Krebs, Christopher (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2018.05.34)

Lo Cascio, Elio, *Crescita e Declino: Studi di Storia dell'Economia Romana. Centro Ricerche e Documentazione sull'Antichità Classica*, Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2009.

Lomas, Kathryn, "A Volscian Mafia?: Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches," in Powell, Jonathan, Paterson, Jeremy (eds.)*, Cicero the Advocate*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 96-116.

Long, A. A., "Cicero's Politics in *De Officiis*," in Laks, André, Schofield, Malcolm (eds.), *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995: 213-240.

Lowrie, Michèle, "Cicero on Caesar or Exemplum and Inability in the *Brutus*," in Arweiler, Alexander, Möller, Melanie (eds.) *Vom Selbst-Verständnis in Antike und Neuzeit*, Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2008, 131-154.

Lloris, Francisco. "The *Hospitium Publicum* of Gades and Cornelius Balbus," in Jehne, Martin, Pina Polo, Francisco, *Foreign* Clientelae *in the Roman Empire: a Reconsideration*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2015, 141-151.

Ludolph, Matthias, *Epistolographie und Selbstdarstellung: Untersuchungen zu den "Paradebriefen" Plinius des Jüngerer. Classica Monacensia 17*, Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1997.

Lushkov, Ayelet, *Magistracy and the Historiography of the Roman Republic. Politics in Prose.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Raphael, Lutz, "Habitus und Sozialer Sinn: Der Ansatz der Praxistheorie Pierre Bourdieus," in Jaeger, Friedrich, Straub, Jürgen (eds.), *Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften* 2 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2004), 266-276.

Mattingly, David, Salmon, John (eds.), *Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

MacMullen, Ramsey, "How Many Romans Voted?," *Athenaeum* 58 (1980): 454-7.

MacRae, Duncan, *Legible Religion: Books, Gods, and Rituals in Roman Culture*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.

Malkin, Irad, Rubinsohn, Wolfgang, *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World. Studies in honor of Z. Yavetz*, Leiden: Brill, 1995.

Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power* v. 1-4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986-2012.

Manolaraki, Eleni, "Imperial and Rhetorical Hunting in Pliny's *Panegyricus*," *Illinois Classical Studies*, No. 37 (2012): 175-198.

Manuwald, Gesine, "The Speeches to the People in Cicero's Oratorical Corpora," *A Journal of the History of Rhetoric*, 30.2 (2012): 153-175.

Marchesi, I. (ed.), *Pliny the Book-Maker*: *Betting on Posterity in the Epistles,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Marchesi, I., *The Art of Pliny's Letters*: *A Poetics of Allusion in the Private Correspondence,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Marquardt, Joachim, *Das Privatleben der Römer*, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1886.

Marrou, Henri, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965, c1948.

Martelli, Francesca, "The Triumph of Letters: Rewriting Cicero in ad Fam. 15," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 107 (2017): 90-115.

Martelli, Francesca, "Une Lettre Arrive Toujours à Destination," *Arethusa* 49 (2016): 393-397.

Marzano, Annalisa, *Roman Villas in Central Italy: A Social and Economic History*, Leiden: Brill 2007.

May, James (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden: Brill, 2002.

May, James, "Patron and Client, Father and Son in Cicero's *Pro Caelio*," *The Classical Journal*, 90 (1995): 433-441.

Mayer, Emmanuel, *The Ancient Middle Classes: Urban Life and Aesthetics in the Roman Empire, 100 BCE-250 CE*., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012.

McLean, Paul, *The Art of the Network: Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2007.

McDonnell, Myles, *Roman Manliness:* Virtus *and the Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Meier, Christian, *Caesar*, Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1982.

Meier, Christian, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der Späten Römischen Republik*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966.

Melchior, Aislinn, "Twinned Fortunes and the Publication of Cicero's *Pro Milone*," *Classical Philology* 103 (2008): 282-297.

Michels, Robert, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens* (Leipzig, W. Klinkhardt, 1911. (electronic)

Mignone, Lisa, "Rome's Pomerium and the Aventine Hill: from *Auguraculum* to *Imperium Sine Fine*," *Historia* 65 (2016): 427-449.

Mitchell, Richard, *Patricians and Plebeians: The Origins of the Roman State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Mitchell, Thomas, *Cicero, the Senior Statesman*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

Millar, Fergus, "Cornelius Nepos, 'Atticus' and the Roman Revolution," *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988): 40-55.

Millar, Fergus, *The Crowd in the Late Republic*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Millar, Fergus, "Italy and the Roman Empire: Augustus to Constantine," *Phoenix* 40 (1986): 295-318.

Millar, Fergus, "Political Power in Mid-Republican Rome: *Curia* or *Comitium*?," *Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1989): 138-150.

Millar, Fergus, "Popular Politics at Rome in the Late Republic," in Malkin, Irad, Rubinsohn, Wolfgang, *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World. Studies in Honor of Z. Yavetz* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 91-113.

Millar, Fergus, "Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 B.C.)," *Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1986): 1-11.

Millar, Fergus, *The Emperor in the Roman World, 31 BC*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.

Millar, Fergus, "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C.," *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984): 1-19.

Millar, Fergus, *The Roman Republic in Political Thought*. Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2002.

Mitchell, Thomas, *Cicero: the Ascending Years*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

Mitchell, Thomas, *Cicero: the Senior Statesman*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Moatti, Claude, *La Raison de Rome: Naissance de l'Esprit Critique à la Fin de la République*, Paris: Seuil, 1997.

Morchillo, Marta, "Staging Power and Authority at Roman Auctions," *Ancient Society* 38 (2008): 153-181.

Morgan, Llewelyn, Taylor, Barnaby, "Memmius the Epicurean," *Classical Quarterly* 67 (2017): 528-541.

Mommsen, Theodore, "Das Römische Gastrecht und die Römische Clientele," in *Römische Forschungen* 1 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1864), 319-90.

Mommsen, Theodore, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1871-1888.

Morelli, Alfredo Mario, "*Invenustus Amator*: una Analisi di Catull. 69 e 71," in Morelli, Alfredo (ed.), Lepos *e* Mores*: una Giornata su Catullo,* Cassino: Università degli Studi di Cassino, 2012, 99-135.

Morrell, Kit, *Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Morstein-Marx, Robert, "'Cultural Hegemony' and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite,' in Steel, Catherine, van der Blom, Henriette (eds.), *Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 29-47.

Morstein-Marx, Robert, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Morstein-Marx, Robert, "Persuading the People in the Roman Participatory Context," in Hammer, Dean, (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic,* Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015, 294-309.

Mörth, Ingo, Fröhlich, Gerhard (eds.), *Das Symbolische Kapital der Lebensstile*, Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1994.

Mouritsen, Henrik, *Italian Unification: A Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 70*, 1998.

Mouritsen, Henrik*, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Mouritsen, Henrik, *Politics in the Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Mouritsen, Henrik, "The *Civitas Sine Suffragio*: Ancient Concepts and Modern Ideology," *Historia* 56 (2007): 141-158.

Mouritsen, Henrik, *The Freedman in the Roman World*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Mouritsen, Henrik, "The Incongruence of Power: the Roman Constitution in Theory and Practice," in Hammer, Dean (ed.), *A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Wiley, 2015): 146-163.

Münzer, Friedrich, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1920.

Murphy, Trevor, "Cicero's First Readers: Epistolary Evidence for the Dissemination of his Works," *The Classical Quarterly* 48.2 (1998): 492-505.

Mustakallio, Katariina & Christian Krötzl, *De Amicitia: Friendship and Social Networks in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, (Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae, 36), Institutum Romanům Finlandiae, Rome, 2009.

Münzer, Friedrich, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1920.

Näf, Beat, "*Nobilitas*," in *Der Neue Pauly* 15/1: 1070-1084.

Narducci, Emanuele, *Cicerone e l'Eloquenza Romana: Rhetorica e Progetto Culturale*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1997.

Nicgorski, Walter (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

Nicgorski, Walter, *Cicero's Skepticism and His Recovery of Political Thought*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.

Nicholson, John, "The Delivery and Confidentiality of Cicero's Letters," *The Classical Journal* 90 (1994): 33-63.

Nicolet, Claude, *L'Ordre Équestre à l'Époque Républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C.)*, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1966-1974.

Nicolet, Claude, *Censeurs et Publicains: Économie et Fiscalité dans la Rome Antique*, Paris: Fayard, 2000.

Nicols, John, *Civic Patronage in the Roman Empire. Mnemosyne Supplements. History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity, 365*, Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Nippel, Wilfred, *Aufruhr und "Polizei" in der Römischen Republik*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988.

Nippel, Wilfred, "The Roman Notion of *Auctoritas*," in Pasquino, Pasquale, Harris, Pamela (eds.) *The Concept of Authority: A Multidisciplinary Approach: from Epistemology to the Social Sciences*, Roma. Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, 2007.

Nippel, Wilfried, Seidensticker, Bernd (eds.), *Theodor Mommsens Langer Schatten: das Römische Staatsrecht als Bleibende Herausforderung für die Forschung*, Hildesheim; New York: Olms, 2005.

Noreña, Carlos, *Imperial Ideals in the Roman West: Representation, Circulation, Power*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Noreña, Carlos, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *American Journal of Philology* 128.2 (2007): 239-277.

North, Douglass, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

North, Douglass, Wallis, John, Weingast, Barry, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

North, Douglas, Weingast Barry, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49 (1989): 803–32. (pdf)

North, John, 'The Constitution of the Roman Republic,' in Rosenstein, Nathan, Morstein-Marx, Robert (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006): 256-277.

North, John, "Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 277-287.

North, John, "These He Cannot Take," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 73 (1983): 169-174.

Oakley, Stephen, "The Roman Conquest of Italy," in Rich, John, Shipley, Graham (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*, London: Routledge, 1993, 9-37.

Ober, Josiah, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Ober, Josiah, *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Oexle, Otto, "Aspekte der Geschichte des Adels im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (1990): 19-56.

Oexle, Otto, Paravicini, Werner (eds.), *Nobilitas: Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997.

Oppermann, Irene, *Zur Funktion historischer Beispiele in Ciceros Briefen*, Leipzig: K.G. Sauer, 2000.

Osgood, Josiah, *Rome and the Making of a World State, 150 BCE–20 CE*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

O'Sullivan, Timothy, *Walking in Roman Culture*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Östenberg, Ida, Malmberg, Simon, Bjørnebye, Jonas (eds.), *The Moving City: Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome*, London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.

Padgett, John, Ansell, Christopher, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 98 (1993): 1259-1319.

Padilla Peralta, Dan-el, "Ecology, Epistemology, and Divination in Cicero *De Divinatione* 1.90–94," Arethusa 51 (2018): 237-267.

Pagán, Victoria, *A Companion to Tacitus*, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.

Papi, Emaneule, "*Domus est quae nulli villarum mearum cedat* (Cic., Fam. 6,18,5). Osservazione sulle residenze del Palatino alla met à del I secolo a.C.," in *Horti romani. Ideologia e autorappresentazione. Atti del Convegno internazionale*, Rome: Bretschneider, 1998.

Parker, Holt, "Books and Reading Latin Poetry," in Johnson, William, and Parker, Holt (eds.) *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 186-225.

Paterson, Jeremy, "Friends in High Places: the Creation of the Court of the Roman Emperor," in Spawforth, Tony (ed.), *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 121-156.

Patterson, John, "Politics in the Late Republic," in Wiseman, Timothy (ed.), *Roman Political Life, 90 B.C.-A.D. 69*, Exeter: University of Exeter, 1985.

Patterson, John, "Elite Networks in pre-Social War Italy," in Aberson, Michel, Biella, Maria Cristina, Di Fazio, Massimiliano, Sánchez, Pierre, Wullschleger, Manuela (eds.) *E Pluribus Unum?: l'Italie, de la Diversité Préromaine à l'Unité Augustéenne*, Bern; Berlin: Lang, 2016, 43-55.

Patterson, John, "The Relationship of the Italian Ruling Classes with Rome: Friendship, Family Relations and Their Consequences," in Jehne, Martin, Pfeilschifter, Rene (eds.), *Herrschaft ohne Integration? Rom und Italien in Republikanischer Zeit*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Alte Geschichte, 2006, 139-153.

Peachin, Michael (ed.), *Aspects of Friendship in the Graeco-Roman World* (JRA Supplementary Series 43), Portsmouth: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2001.

Peachin, Michael, *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Pernot, Laurent, *Epideictic Rhetoric: Questioning the Stakes of Ancient Praise*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015.

Pettit, Philip, "Republican Freedom: Three Axioms, Four Theories," in Laborde, Cecile, Maynor, John (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory*, Malden: Blackwell, 2008, 102–30.

Pierson, Paul, "Goodbye to Pluralism? Studying Power in Contemporary American Politics," Prepared for presentation at the Wildavsky Forum for Public Policy, Goldman School of Public Policy, April 2015.

Pina Polo, Francisco, "Circulation of Information in Cicero's Correspondence of the Years 59-58 BC," in Rosillo-López, Cristina (ed.), *Political Communication in the Roman World*. Impact of Empire, 27, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017, 81-106.

Pina Polo, Francisco, "*Contio*, *Auctoritas,* and Freedom of Speech in Republican Rome," in Benoist, Stéphane (ed.), *Rome, a City and its Empire in Perspective: the Impact of the Roman World through Fergus Millar's Research = Rome, une Cité Impériale en Jeu: l'Impact du Monde Romain selon Fergus Millar*, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012, 45-58.

Pina Polo, Francisco, "Public Speaking in Rome: A Question of *Auctoritas*," in Peachin, Michael (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 286-303.

Pina Polo, Francisco, *The Consul at Rome: the Civil Functions of the Consul in the Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Pinkster, Harm, "Notes on the Language of Marcus Caelius Rufus," in Dickey, Eleanor, Chahoud, Anna (eds.), *Colloquial and Literary Latin*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 186-202.

Pollard, Nigel, *Soldiers, Cities, and Civilians in Roman Syria*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.

Polverini, Leandro. "Democrazia a Roma?: La Costituzione Repubblicana Secondo Polibio," in Urso, Gianpaolo (ed.), *Popolo e Potere nel Mondo Antico: Atti del Convegno Internazionale : Cividale del Friuli, 23-25 Settembre 2004*, Pisa: ETS, 2005, 85-96.

Poster, Carol, Mitchell, Linda (eds.), *Letter-Writing Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present*, Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2007.

Potter, David, "Holding Court in Republican Rome," *The American Journal of Philology*, 132, (2011): 59-80.

Powell, Jonathan, "Cicero's *De Re Publica* and the Virtues of the Statesman," in Nicgorski, Walter (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*,Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012: 14-42.

Powell, Jonathan and Paterson, Jeremy, *Cicero the Advocate*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Powis, Jonathan, *Aristocracy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.

Prost, Francois, "*Amor* et *Amicitia* dans la Correspondance d'exil de Cicéron," *Vita Latina* 191-2 (2015): 7-35.

Pulliam, Roscoe, 'Taxation in the Roman State,' *The Classical Journal* 19 (1924): 545-553.

Putnam, Robert, "Bowling Alone: Americas' Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995): 65–78.

Putnam, Robert, *Making Democracies Work*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Raaflaub, Kurt, Ramsey, John, "Reconstructing the Chronology of Caesar's Gallic Wars," *Histos* 11 (2017), 1-74.

Rainier, J. Michael, "Public Building Contracts in the Roman Republic," in McGinn, Thomas, *Obligations in Roman Law: Past, Present, and Future*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013, 174-188.

Rathbone, Dominic, Temin, Peter, "Financial Intermediation in First-Century AD Rome and Eighteenth-Century England," in Verboven, Koenraad, Vandorpe, Katelijn, Chankowski, Véronique, (eds.), *Pistoi dia tèn Technèn: Bankers, Loans, and Archives in the Ancient World: Studies in Honour of Raymond Bogaert. Studia Hellenistica 44*, Leuven: Peeters, 2008, 371-420.

Raskolnikoff. Michael, "La Richesse et les Riches chez Cicéron" *Ktema* 2 (1977): 357-362.

Rauh, Nicholas, "Cicero's Business Friendships: Economics and Politics in the Late Roman Republic," *Aevum* 60 (1986): 3-30.

Rauh, Nicholas, "Finance and Estate Sales in Republican Rome," *Aevum* 63 (1989): 45-76.

Rawson, Beryl, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Rawson, Beryl, (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Rawson, Beryl, *The Politics of Friendship: Pompey and Cicero*, Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 1978.

Rawson, Beryl and Weaver, Paul (eds.), *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

Rawson, Elizabeth, *Cicero: A Portrait*, London: Allen Lane, 1975.

Rawson, Elizabeth, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

Rawson, Elizabeth, "The Ciceronian Aristocracy and its Properties," in Finley, Moses (ed.) *Studies in Roman Property*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976: 85-102.

Rees, Roger, "Letters of Recommendation and the Rhetoric of Praise," in Morello, Ruth, Morrison, Andrew, *Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 149-168.

Reichardt, Sven, "Bourdieu für Historiker? Ein Kultursoziologisches Angeebot an die Sozialgeschichte," in Mergel, Thomas, Welskopp, Thomas (eds.), *Geschichte Zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte*, Munich: Beck, 1997, 71– 93.

Reinau, Hansjorg, Von Ungern-Sternberg, Jurgen (eds.) *Politische Partizipation. Idee und Wirklichkeit von der Antike bis in die Gegenwar*t, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Remer, Gary, *Ethics and the Orator*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017.

Richardson, Lawrence, "*Sestius Noster*," in Goldman, Norma (ed.), *New Light from Anient Cosa*, Bern; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001, 49-55.

Ridley, Ronald, "Pompey's Command in the 50's: How Cumulative?," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* CXXVI (1983): 136-148.

Riggsby, Andrew, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Riggsby, Andrew, "Pliny on Cicero and Oratory: Self-Fashioning in the Public Eye," *The American Journal of Philology* 116 (1995): 123-135.

Riggsby, Andrew, "'Public' and 'Private' in Roman Culture: the Case of the *Cubiculum*," *JRA* 10 (1997): 38-56.

Rilinger, Rolf, "*Domus* und *Res Publica*: Die politisch-soziale Bedeutung des Aristokratischen 'Hauses' in der Späten Römischen Republik," in *Zwischen "Haus" und "Staat:" Antike Höfe im Vergleich*, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997.

Roche, Paul, "Mixed Messages: Trajan and the Propaganda of Personal Status," in Deroux, Carl (ed.*), Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, Brussels: Societe d'Etudes Latines de Bruxelles–Latomus, 2003, 428-446.

Roche, Paul (ed.), *Pliny's Praise: the Panegyricus in the Roman World*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Roller, Matthew, *Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Emperors in Julio-Claudian Rome*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Roller, Matthew, "Demolished Houses, Monumentality, and Memory in Roman Culture," *Classical Antiquity* 29 (2010): 117-180.

Roller, Matthew, *Models from the Past in Roman Culture: A World of Exempla*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Roller, Matthew, "To Whom Am I Speaking? The Changing Venues of Competitive Eloquence in the Early Empire," in *Von der* Militia Equestris *zur* Militia Urbana*: Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im Antiken Rom*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag (2011): 197-221.

Roselaar, Saskia, (ed.), *Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic. Mnemosyne Supplements. History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity, 342*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012.

Rollinger, Christian, *Amicitia Sanctissime Colenda: Freundschaft Und Soziale Netzwerke in Der Spaten Republik*, Heidelberg: Verlag Antike 2014.

Rollinger, Christian, "Beyond Laelius: The Orthopraxy of Friendship in the Late Republic," *Ciceroniana on Line* I, 2 (2017): 343-367.

Rollinger, Christian, "Ciceros *Supplicatio* und Aristokratische Konkurrenz im Senat der Späten Republik," *Klio* 99 (2017), 192-225.

Rollinger, Christian, *Solvendi Sunt Nummi: die Schuldenkultur der Späten Römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros*, Berlin: Verlag Antike, 2009.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "Aristocrats and Agriculture in the Middle and Late Republic," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 98 (2008): 1-26.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "Competition and Crisis in Mid-Republican Rome," *Pheonix* 47 (1993): 313-338.

Rosenstein, Nathan, *Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic*. Berkeley: UC Press, 1990.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "Military Command, Political Power, and the Republican Elite," in Erdkamp, Paul (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, 132-147.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "Review of Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*," *Classical World* 105 (2012): 276–7.

Rosenstein, Nathan, 'Sorting out the Lot in Republican Rome,' *The American Journal of Philology* 116 (1995): 43-75.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "*Tributum* in the Middle Republic," in Armstrong, Jeremy (ed.), *Circum Mare: Themes in Ancient Warfare*, Leiden: Brill, 2016, 80-97.

Rosenstein, Nathan, "War, Failure, and Aristocratic Competition," *Classical Philology* 85 (1990): 255-265.

Rosillo-López, Cristina, "La Gestion des Profits Illégaux par les Magistrats Pendant la République Romaine (IIe-Ier siècle av. J.-C.),' *Latomus* 69 (2010): 981–999.

Rosillo-López, Cristina, (ed.), *Political Communication in the Roman World*. Impact of Empire, 27, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017.

Roth, Ulrike, *Thinking Tools: Agricultural Slavery between Evidence and Models*, London: ICS, 2007.

Rowe, Greg, *Princes and Political Cultures: the New Tiberian Senatorial Decrees*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Rowe, Greg, review of Corey Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic. 2 Vols*., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. *BCMR* 8/21/2001.

Rowland, Robert, "The Origins and Development of Cicero's Friendship with Pompey," *Rivista Storica dell'Antichità* VI-VII (1977): 329-341.

Rühl, Meike, *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium Literarischen und Gesellschaftlichen Handelns*, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018.

Russell, Amy, *The Politics of Public Space in Republican Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Russell, Amy, "The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis," in Gouschin, Valerij, Rhodes, Peter (ed.), *Deformations and Crises of Ancient Civil Communities*, Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2015: 127-39.

Russell, Amy, "Speech, Competition and Collaboration: Tribunician Politics and the Development of Popular Ideology," in *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome*, Steel, Catherine, van der Blom, Henriette, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 101-115.

Ryan, Francis, *Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998.

Sailor, Dylan, *Writing and Empire in Tacitus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Saller, Richard, "*Familia*, *Domus,* and the Roman Conception of Family," *Phoenix* 38 (1984): 336-355.

Saller, Richard, "*Patria potestas* and the Stereotype of the Roman Family," *Continuity and Change* 1(1) (1986), 7-22.

Saller, Richard, *Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Saller, Richard, "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew (ed.), *Patronage in Ancient Society*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

Saller, Richard, *Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Saller, Richard, "*Pietas*, Obligation and Authority in the Roman Family," in Kneissl, Peter, Losemann, Volker (eds.), *Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Festscrift für Karl Christ zum 65. Geburtstag*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988, 393-410.

Salzman, Michele, Roberts, Michael, *The letters of Symmachus. Book 1*, Atlanta: Society for Biblical Literature, 2011.

Santangelo, Federico, "A Survey of Recent Scholarship on the Age of the Gracchi (1985–2005)," *Topoi* 15: 465–510.

Santangelo, Federico, "Priestly *Auctoritas* in the Roman Republic," *Classical Quarterly* 63 (2013): 743-763.

Sauer, Jochen, "Der Romische Staat und seine Staatsmänner', *Der Altsphrachliche Unterricht Latein*, 59.6 (2016): 32-40.

Scheid, John, *The Gods, the State, and the Individual: Reflections on Civic Religion in Rome. Translated and with a Foreward by Clifford Ando; First published in French 2013. Empire and After*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

Scheidel, Walter (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Scheidel, Walter, (ed.), *State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Schmidt, Otto, *Der Briefwechsel des M. Tullius Cicero von seinem Prokonsulat in Cicilien bis zu Caesars Ermordung, nebst einem Neudrucke des XII. und XIII. Buches der Briefe an Atticus*, Leipzig, B.G. Teubner, 1893.

Shatzman, Israël, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, Bruxelles: Latomus, 1975.

Schnurbusch, Dirk, Convivium: *Form und Bedeutung aristokratischer Geselligkeit in der Römischen Antike*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011.

Schofield, Malcolm, "Cicero's Definition of *Res Publica*," in Powell, Jonathon (ed.), *Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Schofield, Malcolm, "The Fourth Virtue," in Nicgorski, Walter (ed.), *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012: 43-57.

Schofield, Malcolm, *Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms*, New York: Routledge, 1999.

Scullard, Howard, *A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BC*, London, Methuen, 1935.

Schulz, Raimund, *Herrschaft und Regierung: Roms Regiment in den Provinzen in der Zeit der Republik*, Paderborn: Schöning, 1997.

Schuricht, Ralf, *Cicero an Appius (Cic. Fam. III): Umgangsformen in einer Politischen Freundschaft*, Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1994.

Seager, Robin, *Pompey: A Political Biography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 2nd ed. 2002.

Shaw, Brent, "Debt in Sallust," in *Latomus* 34 (1975): 187-196.

Seager, Robin, "*Factio*: Some Observations," *Journal of Roman Studies* 62 (1972): 53-58.

Severy, Beth, *Augustus and the Family at the Birth of the Roman Empire*, New York: Routledge, 2003.

Shotter, David, "Cicero and the Treveri: New Light on an Old Pun," *Greece and Rome* 54, (2007): 106-110.

Sigmund, Christian, *"Königtum" in der Politischen Kultur des Spätrepublikanischen Rom* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.

Sillett, Andrew, "Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum*: a Philosophical Approach to Roman Elections," in Edmund Cueva, Javier Martínez (eds.), *Splendide Mendax*: Rethinking Fakes and Forgeries in Classical, Late Antique, and Early Christian Literature (Groningen: Barkhuis, 2016), 177-191.

Skinner, Quentin, "A Genealogy of the Modern State," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 162 (2009): 325-370.

Skinner, Quentin, "Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power," in Laborde, Cecile, Maynor, John (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory*, Malden: Blackwell, 2008.

Slater, Niall (ed.), *Voice and Voices in Antiquity. Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, 11; Mnemosyne supplements. Monographs on Greek and Latin language and literature*, 396. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2017.

Smay, Gregory, *When Kings Become Philosophers: The Late Republican Origins of Cicero's Political Philosophy*, Dissertation: UC Berkeley, 2016.

Smith, Christopher, *The Roman Clan: The Gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Smith, Christopher, Covino, Ralph (eds.), *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric*, Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010.

Spielvogel, Jörg, *Amicitia und Res Publica: Ciceros Maxime Während der Innenpolitischen Auseinandersetztugen der Jahre 59-50*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993.

Starr, Raymond, "The Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World," *The Classical Quarterly* 37.1 (1987): 213-223.

Steel, Catherine, "Cicero's *Brutus*: The End of Oratory and the Beginning of History?," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 46, (2002-03): 195-211.

Steel, Catherine, *Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Steel, Catherine, van der Blom, Henriette (eds.), *Community and Communication. Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Stein-Hölkeskamp, Elke, *Das Römische Gastmahl: eine Kulturgeschichte*, München: Beck, 2005.

Stein-Hölkeskamp, Elke, "Das römische Haus—die Memoria der Mauern," in Stein-Hölkeskamp, Elke, Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim (eds.), *Erinnerungsorte der Antike: die Römische Welt*, Munich: Beck, 2006.

Stevenson, Tom, "Acceptance of the Title *Pater Patriae* in 2 BC," *Antichthon* 43 (2009) 97-108.

Stevenson, Tom, "Andreas Alföldi on the Roman Emperor as *Pater Patriae*," in Richardson, James, Santangelo, Federico, *Andreas Alföldi in the Twenty-First Century*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2014.

Stevenson, Tom, *Julius Caesar and the Transformation of the Roman Republic*, London; New York: Routledge, 2015.

Stevenson, Tom, "The Ideal Benefactor and the Father Analogy in Greek and Roman Thought," *The Classical Quarterly* 42 (1992): 421-436.

Stockton, David, *Cicero: A Political Biography*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Stolle, Deitlind, "Social Capital," in Dalton, Russell, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Staveley, E.S. *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections*, London: Thames & Hudson, 1972.

Stone, Martin, "*Optimates*: An Archeology," in Welch, Kathryn, Hillard, Tom, Bellemore, Jane, *Roman Crossings: Theory and Practice in the Roman Republic*, Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2005, 59-94.

Strachan-Davidson, James, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912.

Straumann, Benjamin, *Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution.* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Strauß, Simon, *Von Mommsen zu Gelzer?: die Konzeption Römisch-Republikanischer Gesellschaft in "Staatsrecht" und "Nobilität,"* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017.

Suolahti, Jaakko, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period: A Study on Social Structure*, Helsinki: Finnish Academy, 1955.

Syme, Ronald, "Oligarchy at Rome: A Paradigm for Political Science," 1988.

Syme, Ronald, *Tacitus*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.

Syme, Ronald, *The Roman Revoution*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.

Sullivan, John, *Literature and Politics in the Age of Nero*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Talbert, Richard, *The Senate of Imperial Rome*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984.

Tan, James, *Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. Oxford Studies in Early Empires*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Tatum, Jeffrey, *Quintus Cicero: A Brief Handbook on Canvassing for Office* (Commentariolum Petitionis), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2018.

Tatum, W. Jeffrey, *The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher.* Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

Taylor, Lily Ross, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*, Berkeley: UC Press, 1949.

Taylor, Lily Ross, *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966.

Temin, Peter, "Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire," *The Journal of Economic History* 64 (2004): 705-733.

Tempest, Kathryn, *Brutus: The Noble Conspirator*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

Tempest, Kathryn, *Cicero: Politics and Persuasion in Ancient Rome*, London: Continuum, 2011.

Tempest, Kathryn. "Combating the Odium of Self-praise: Cicero's *Diuinatio in Caecilium*," in Smith, Christopher, Covino, Ralph (eds.) *Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric* (Swansea: Classical Pr. of Wales, 2011), 145-163.

Thompson, L.A., "The Relationship between Provincial Quaestors and Their Commanders-in-Chief," *Historia* 11 (1962): 339-355.

Trapp, Michael, *Greek and Latin Letters: An Anthology with Translation. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Treggiari, Susan, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian*. Oxford: Oxford University Place, 1991.

Treggiari, Susan, *Servilia and Her Family*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Treggiari, Susan, *Terentia, Tullia and Publilia: The Women of Cicero's Family*, London/New York: Routledge, 2007.

Unsworth, Sue, *An Upside Down View of Governance*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2010.

Van Der Blom, Henriette, *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Van Der Blom, Henriette, *Oratory and Political Career in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Vanderbroeck, Paul, *Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior in the Late Roman Republic (ca. 80–50 B.C.)*, Amsterdam: Gieben, 1987.

Várhelyi, Zsuzsanna, *The Religion of Senators in the Roman Empire: Power and the Beyond*, New York: Cambridge, 2010.

Verboven, Koenraad, *The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*, Bruxelles: Latomus, 2002.

Verboven, Koenraad, "The Freedman Economy of Roman Italy," In Bell, Sinclair, Ramsby, Teresa Rene (eds.), *Free at Last!: the Impact of Freed Slaves on the Roman Empire*, London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012, 88-109.

Vervaet, Fredrick, *The High Command in the Roman Republic:* Summum Imperium Auspiciumque *from 509 to 19 BCE*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014.

Vesperini, Pierre, "Cicéron, Trebatius Testa et la *Crux* de Cic., Fam. 7, 12, 1.," *Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes* 3e sér. 85 (2011): 155-173.

Veyne, Paul, "What Was a Roman Emperor? Emperor, Therefore a God," *Diogenes* 50: 3-21.

Volk, Katharina, "The Genre of Cicero's *De Consulatu Suo*," *J. E. G. Zetzel Anno Sexagesimo Quinto Completo*: 93-112.

Von Hesberg, Henner, "Die Häuser der Senatoren in Rom: Gesellschaftliche und Politische Funktion," in Eck, Werner, Heil, Matthäus (eds.), *Senatores Populi Romani: Realität und Mediale Präsentation einer Führungsschicht*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005, 19-46.

Ward, Allen, "Cicero and Pompey in 75 and 70 B.C," *Latomus* XXIX (1970): 58-71.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, "*Civilis Princeps*: Between Citizen and King," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 72 (1982): 32-48.

Ward, Allen, "The Early Relationships between Cicero and Pompey until 80 B.C.," *Phoenix* 24 (1970): 119-129.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, *Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, *Rome's Cultural Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, *Suetonius: The Scholar and his Caesars*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew, "The Social Structure of the Roman House," *Papers of the British School at Rome* 56 (1988): 43-97.

Uwe Walter, "Aristokratische Existenz in der Antike und der Frühen Neuzeit: einige Unabgeschlossene Überlegungen," in Beck, Hans, Scholz, Peter, Walter, Uwe (eds.), *Die Macht der Wenigen: Aristokratische Herrschaftspraxis, Kommunikation und 'Edler' Lebensstil in Antike und Früher Neuzeit*, München: Oldenbourg, 2008, 367-394.

Watson, Alan, *Roman Private Law around 200 B.C.*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1971.

Webb, Lewis, "Gendering the Roman *Imago*," *Eugesta* 7 (2017): 140-183.

Weinstock, Stefan, *Divus Julius*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Welch, Kathryn, Powell, Anton, *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, London: Duckworth, 1998.

Welch, Kathryn, "T. Pomponius Atticus: A Banker in Politics?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 45 (1996): 450-471.

Welch, Kathryn, "The *Praefectura Urbis* of 45 B.C. and the Ambitions of L. Cornelius Balbus," *Antichthon* 24 (1990): 53-69.

Wikander, Örjan, *Senators and Equites I–VIII*, *Opuscula Romana* 15–26, 1985–2001.

Wilcox, Amanda, *The Gift of Correspondence in Classical Rome: Friendship in Cicero's 'Ad Familiares' and Seneca's 'Moral Epistles'. Wisconsin Studies in Classics*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.

Will, Elizabeth, "Defining the *Regna Vini* of the Sestii, in Goldman, Norma (ed.), *New Light from Anient Cosa*, Bern; Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001, 35-47.

Willi, Andreas, "Campaigning for *Utilitas*: Style, Grammar and Philosophy in C. Iulius Caesar," in Dickey, Eleanor, Chahoud, Anna (eds.), *Colloquial and Literary Latin*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 229-242.

Williams, Beverley, Woodby, Lesa, Drentea, Patricia, "Ethical Capital: 'What's a poor man Got to Leave?'," *Sociology of Health & Illness* 32 (2010): 880–897.

Williams, Craig, *Reading Roman Friendship*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Wiseman, Timothy, *Cinna the Poet and Other Essays*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1974.

Wiseman, Timothy, "*Conspicui postes tectaque digna deo*: The Public Image of Aristocratic Houses in the Late Republic and Early Empire," in Thébert, Yvon, *L'Urbs: Espace urbain et histoire (1er siècle av. J.C.-IIIe siècle ap. J.C.)*, Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1987, 393-413.

Wiseman, Timothy, "Democracy *Alla Romana*," *Journal of Roman Archeology* 12 (2000): 537-540.

Wiseman, Timothy, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. - A.D. 14*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Wiseman, Timothy, *Remembering the Roman People: Essays on Late-Republican Politics and Literature*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Wiseman, Timothy, "Roman History and the Ideological Vacuum," in Wiseman, Timothy (ed.), *Classics in Progress*: *Essays on Ancient Greece and Rome,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 285-310.

Wiseman, Timothy (ed.), *Roman Political Life: 90 B.C.-A.D. 69*, Exeter: University of Exeter, 1985.

Wiseman, Timothy, "The Definition of *Eques Romanus* in the Late Republic and Early Empire," *Historia* XIX (1970): 67-83.

Wisse, Jakob, "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Works," in May, James (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002, 331-374.

Wiseman, Timothy, *The Roman Audience: Classical Literature as Social History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

White, Peter, *Cicero in Letters*: *Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

White, Peter, *Promised Verse: Poets in the Society of Augustan Rome*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

White, Peter, "*Amicitia* and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 68 (1978): 74-92.

Whitton, Christopher, "Pliny, Epistles 8.14: Senate, Slavery and the Agricola," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 100 (2010): 118-139.

Wood, Neal, *Cicero's Social and Political Thought*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Wood, Neal, "The Economic Dimension of Cicero's Political Thought: Property and State," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* (1983): 739-756.

Woodman, Anthony, Powell, Jonathan, *Author and Audience in Latin Literature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Yakobson, Alexander, *Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999.

Yakobson, Alexander, "*Petitio Et Largitio*: Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic," *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992): 32–52.

Yakobson, Alexander, "Popular Power in the Roman Republic," in Nathan Rosenstein, Robert Morstein-Marx (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 383-400.

Yakobson, Alexander, "Secret Ballot and Its Effects in the Late Roman Republic," *Hermes* 123 (1995): 426-442.

Yavetz, Zvi, "The Failure of Catiline's Conspiracy," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 12 (1963): 485-499.

Zanker, Paul, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988 (original German 1987).

Zarecki, Jonathan, *Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice*, London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.