UC San Diego

The dissertation adopts a network approach to explore the New Policy reforms during the late Qing dynasty. It covers the period from 1900 to 1911 and focuses on how provincial officials, with Manchu statesman Duanfang as the central figure, used favors, symbols, personal bonds, and resource exchanges to command the political economy of the reform era. Chapter one elaborates the composition of the upper echelon of the Qing government (Duanfang's major political arena) and how the 1900 Boxer debacle drastically reshaped this arena and facilitated the fast rise to power of a particular group of officials (including Duanfang). Chapter two examines the general mindset of high officials about reform and introduces the scale and structure of Duanfang's networks. The next two chapters focus on the funding and expenses of the new policy projects. Chapter three uses a case study to illustrate the universal "squeeze" system through which the revenues were levied during the late Qing, as well as the tussle over financial resources between the court and an alliance of provincial governors. Chapter four looks into Duanfang's spending choices during a critical turn of the New Policy Reform, and how he arrived at the cold logic of keeping peasants at a bare subsistence level while prioritizing resources for soldiers, students, and factories. Chapter five demonstrates how Duanfang, being aware of the time- consuming nature of constitutional reform, maneuvered the cultural aspect of his networks to bolster faith in the Qing government. Chapter six begins with Duanfang's abrupt dismissal in 1909, and ends with his tragic death amidst the chaos in 1911. Throughout these two cases, I scrutinize the changing variables in Duanfang's networks and how they were related to the fate of the dynasty