Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Many real-life decisions, such as booking a vacation or selecting a partner, involve relatively cost-free sampling of options up to a terminal decision point, beyond which the choice becomes costly to reverse. Such problems can be formulated as optimal stopping problems (OSPs), such as the famous secretary problem. Although human behavior on optimal stopping problems has been studied extensively, much of the literature has focused on the behavior of individual decision-makers operating using a binary payoff function. In this study, we use an OSP with a continuous payoff function to study how individuals’ decisions differ from the collective decision of groups of three members working together. An independent threshold model offered the best explanation for the behavior of both individuals and groups. We found groups performed significantly better than individuals, with individuals consistently waiting too long to make a choice relative to the optimal strategy. Groups are also more decisive in following their internal thresholds, which are also different than a simple average of member thresholds. Finally, we also found a lack of long-term learning in OSPs for groups, a trend previously documented in individuals.