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THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC AT ONE HUNDRED

Richard Herr & Antonio Costa Pinto, Editors



The Portuguese Republic
at One Hundred

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EDITED BY
Richard Herr and
António Costa Pinto

PORTUGUESE STUDIES PROGRAM
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Republican Portugal: The Long Road to Democracy

ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO

I

The “age of the masses” was inaugurated in Portugal without the upheavals of democratic regime crisis and overthrow affecting interwar Europe. On the eve of the twentieth century, Portugal, an old nation-state with political frontiers unchanged since the late middle ages, was the “ideal type” of the state envisioned by liberal nationalists. State and nation coincided in conditions of cultural homogeneity. There were no national or ethno-cultural minorities in Portugal, or Portuguese populations in neighboring countries; similarly, Portugal had no religious or ethno-linguistic minorities. Dialects were rare, found only in some areas near the Spanish border. Portugal had no territorial claims in Europe; thus the historical and cultural variables so markedly present in other countries were either negligible or absent in Portugal.

Portugal’s imperial and colonial past, however, is vital to understanding the country’s twentieth-century history. From the seventeenth century on, Portugal was both an imperial power and a political and economic dependency of Britain; indeed, Britain protected the country’s vast colonial empire. Africa had been the stronghold of Portuguese colonialism since Brazilian independence in 1822, but at the end of the nineteenth century Portugal’s “historic rights” in Africa were threatened by other European powers.

Tensions with Britain increased dramatically in the 1880s, culminating in the Ultimatum of 1890, which foiled Portuguese aspirations to

rule what is now Zimbabwe. By threatening to invade Portugal, Britain forced it to abandon its project to unite Angola and Mozambique. This episode gave rise to modern Portuguese nationalism and provoked the first wave of anti-British sentiment, cementing what was to become the mainstay of Portuguese foreign policy until the 1970s: the defense of the colonial empire.

When the Portuguese republicans overthrew the constitutional monarchy in October 1910 and began to implement their political program, Portuguese society did not entirely fulfill the economic, social, and cultural requirements for “the formation of a civic political culture.”¹ The republican elites adopted a program of universal suffrage, anticlericalism, and anti-British nationalism in defense of the colonial empire. Secularizing legislation was passed as early as 1910, accompanied by the emergence of a strong urban anticlerical movement. These measures were modeled on those undertaken by the Third French Republic five years earlier, and they had a profound impact on the Catholic hierarchy. The extension of universal suffrage, however, was not decreed as promised, having as a pretext the dangerous monarchical revolts that were organized in Spain.

The Democratic Party, under the leadership of Afonso Costa, successor to the Republican Party after the defection of key leaders in the wake of the revolution, inherited the electoral machine of the liberal monarchy and became the ruling party.² The establishment of a parliamentary regime with the approval of the 1911 Constitution was undertaken by a parliament dominated almost entirely by the Republican Party. According to the new constitution, the president was elected by a parliament that he had no powers to dissolve. The republicans still did not implement universal suffrage, arguing that clientelism in the countryside made such a policy impossible. As Manuela Aguiar argues in chapter 11, “1910: Portuguese Republican Women out of the Shadows,” the denial of universal suffrage was a major disillusion for feminists. In a way, they started their suffragist campaign hand in hand with their male associates, and “they gave up the aim of immediate and full equality to help strengthen the new regime until it could be self-confident enough to be able to satisfy their demands.” Indeed, pressures for universal suffrage were very limited, if not entirely absent, at the Republican Constitutional Assembly of 1911. Pressure “from below” was also very weak, both because of the “absence” of the rural world from the political arena and the antiparticipatory tendencies of the “active minorities” among the urban working classes. Universal suf-

frage was nevertheless rare among the democratic regimes at the beginning of the twentieth century. In response, social rights became the center of women's movements activism, as Deolinda M. Adão underlines in chapter 12, "Portuguese Women Writers." At the forefront of this activism was Ana de Castro Osório, one of the most prominent women in the Portuguese Republican movement and one of the founders of the Liga Republicana de Mulheres Portuguesas (Republican League of Portuguese Women), "which provided a venue for open discussion of important social issues such as divorce and women raising children alone."

As in other cases in this "first wave" of democratization, Stanley G. Payne writes in chapter 1, "Portugal's First Republic in Comparative Perspective of Its Era,"

the emphasis was not, however, on economic modernization per se but on cultural and institutional change, the "Jacobin" cultural revolution of the nineteenth century that would produce progressive modern secular institutions, from which all other benefits would supposedly follow. The Republic was directed by lawyers and intellectuals, common leaders in this era, who sometimes seemed more interested in elite education than in primary education. Eventually this would produce a narrowing, rather than a democratization, of the suffrage. Thus it is tempting to see the First Republic as a kind of continuation of the nineteenth century in its liberal nationalism, its limited suffrage, and its apotheosis of positivism and scientific or pseudo-scientific elitism, which was already being questioned in other parts of Europe.

Electoral stability and cabinet instability characterized the Republican era. Between 1910 and 1926, forty-five cabinets were formed. Of these, seventeen were single-party cabinets, three were military, and twenty-one resulted from coalition governments.³ In Parliament, as Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, and Marta Carvalho dos Santos underline in chapter 3, "The Deputies of the First Portuguese Republic," "the dominant features of parliamentary careers in the First Republic were their instability and short duration: almost two-thirds of the deputies were elected for a single term of office." Although the Democratic Party dominated cabinets between 1912 and 1917, the conservative republican parties gained a foothold in some.

The first post-1910 cleavage was religious. Secularization had been a central republican propaganda theme, and during the first days of the revolution an anticlerical movement swept Lisbon. Convents were closed down and religious orders, such as the Jesuits, were expelled

from the country. On November 3, 1910, a divorce law was decreed; a month later, a law was passed that made marriage “exclusively civil.” Strict limitations were imposed on non-Church religious ceremonies. All state religious rites in the courts, the universities, and the armed forces were abolished. When the Church hierarchy reacted to the new restrictions, the government prohibited the reading of the pastoral letter; this led to the severance of Portuguese relations with the Vatican and of ties between bishops and the state.

This religious-secular cleavage became a focal point of Portuguese political life that lasted, despite subsequent pacification measures, until 1926. From this conflict emerged a new Catholic movement that was closely linked to the hierarchy, as Susana Goulart Costa illustrates in chapter 4, “Politics and the Azorean Church under the First Republic.” The Catholic Center Party (CCP) naturally filled the “space” for a Christian-Democratic or “popular” party. Though initially social-Catholic, the CCP became corporatist and authoritarian and supported the Pais dictatorship in 1917.

The second cleavage of this period was the republican-monarchical split, also known as the “regime question,” which emerged in resistance to the republican regime of a small but relatively strong nucleus of monarchists, who desired the return of Manuel II but were not connected with the liberal parties dissolved in 1910. In 1911 and 1912, two monarchist incursions, launched from Galicia, were led by a former officer of caesarist leanings, Henrique Mitchell de Paiva Couceiro, who had led the African occupation campaigns at the turn of the century. Paiva Couceiro was accompanied by a number of young men who on their return from exile in 1914 would create the Integralismo Lusitano (IL) movement, which was based on the Maurrasian ideology that had guided *Action Française*. From their reading of Le Bon, Barrès, and Maurras these Integralists came to know the main proponents of fin-de-siècle nationalism.

Participation in World War I had an immediate destabilizing impact on Portugal. The republicans had unanimously supported participation in the Great War, in the belief that it would guarantee the safety of the African colonies. But because Britain seemed prepared to “give” Germany some of those colonies, the Democratic Party concluded that neutrality was dangerous, and became the greatest champion of military participation on the European front. The Democrats believed, furthermore, that Portuguese participation in the eventual peace negotiations would consolidate the country’s international position.

In supporting participation, however, the Democratic Party also pursued its own internal political objectives. Ensuring the safety of the African colonies did not justify action on the European front *per se*. Great Britain did not demand intervention on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and intervention in Africa alone, an option defended by conservative republicans, would have been sufficient. As Richard Herr stresses in chapter 2, “What Was Meant by a Republic in 1910,” “the tension between the two Frances that marked the Third Republic was calmed by the experience of the First World War, when both sides worked together to defend the French *patrie*. No such experience smoothed the tension in Portugal and Spain, where large sectors of the population did not look on the republic as their *patria*.” The Democratic Party took it for granted that the rest of the republican parties would want to participate in its *union sacré*, but the Evolutionists, initially willing, soon abandoned the coalition. The Unionist Party, on the other hand, was opposed to intervention in Europe from the start. The Unionist and Evolutionist parties were both led by centrist or right-wing parliamentary factions that had left the Republican Party in 1912. Both parties feared the social and political effects of participation, which had already led to riots in Lisbon and raids on shops because of food shortages and had incited more strikes led by revolutionary syndicalist unions opposed to the war.

2

The most appropriate way to analyze the fall of the republican regime is to examine civil-military relations. Appeals to the military were a constant feature of postwar politics. By definition, the republican political system did not have a “loyal opposition.” It was obvious to political actors that the possibility of achieving power through elections was virtually nonexistent. The military coup of 1926 co-opted part of the liberal regime’s political elite who, like many in the military, aimed for the establishment of a reformed constitutional order. The coup was also supported by what Juan J. Linz calls the “disloyal opposition,” which aimed to remove the dominant party from power.⁴

The military dictatorship rapidly eliminated the republicans from the ranks of the regime, but it was unable to institutionalize itself. The small, pugnacious workers’ movement, under anarcho-syndicalist hegemony, frightened the ruling classes, who recalled the notorious failure of the republican regime to incorporate workers into the political system.

The role of the Portuguese *bienio rosso* (1918–1919) in the overthrow of liberalism should not be exaggerated, however.

If the processes of democratic overthrow and the rise of fascism are indeed characterized by “the takeover of power by a well-organized disloyal opposition with a mass base in society, committed to the creation of a new political and social order, and unwilling to share its power with members of the political class of the past regime, except as minor partners in a transition phase,”⁵ then Portugal is notable for the absence of a fascist movement. The crisis of Portuguese liberalism was a product of the complex relationship between fascism and the different political “families” that made up the conservative bloc during the first half of the twentieth century.

The secularization cleavage was perhaps the most important one caused by the First Republic. The Portuguese case shows how, culturally speaking, the emergence of a “fascist intelligentsia” becomes very difficult when “the hostile response to modern society and the concomitant rejection of liberalism and democratization remain embedded in traditional religious forms, and reactionary or conservative politics is linked to the defense of the position of the Church.”⁶ The Church and the CCP constituted a powerful obstacle to the “fascitization” of the university and intellectual elites, playing a key political role in the anti-democratic reaction.

Another enduring cleavage, the monarchy-republic cleavage or “regime question,” also had an influence. “Restorationism” inhibited the development of fascism; it curbed fascist tendencies within the Integralist movement and Sidonism’s attempts at populist mobilization. The “regime question” also highlighted the understanding between Integralists and social-Catholics, as both groups defended authoritarian corporatism as an alternative to liberalism.

Following the mobilization of the urban working- and middle-classes—both increasingly distant from the Democratic Party—all traces of populist mobilization in the conservative countryside disappeared. The republic had not shaken the traditional structures of domination in the north, where clientelistic pacts with local notables had been established. In the *latifundia*-dominated south, after brief periods of activity in 1910 and 1912 the rural unions had almost disappeared. They were not part of the *bienio rosso* of 1918–1919, and the social conflict that characterized the rise of rural fascism in Italy did not occur in Portugal. The nature of conservative political and social representation in the 1920s (mass parties had not yet emerged) and the existence

of clientelistic relationships in the political system were decisive elements in the transition to authoritarianism.

As soon as the republican regime was overthrown, the military dictatorship found punitive solutions for some of the problems worrying the conservative bloc. The Democratic Party was ousted from power and its leaders exiled, the working class lost its right to strike, and the unions were legally restricted. The republicans dominated revolutionary action against the military dictatorship, the only exception being the failed general strike of 1934, the year Salazar established the corporatist system. The Catholic Church blessed the 1926 coup and, while suspicious of republican officers and civilians in the regime, immediately volunteered secular supporters for ministerial positions.

Salazarism was born out of a military dictatorship beset by a succession of conspiracies, palace coups, and revolutionary attempts, signs of the battle for leadership within the vast, pro-dictatorial conservative coalition. The consolidation of the authoritarian regime met with difficulties because of the political diversity of the conservative bloc and its ability to penetrate the armed forces. Curiously, it was under the military dictatorship that the fascists gained some influence through the young officer class. They attempted to create autonomous organizations and played a role in driving out republicans from the ranks of the military. This military-mediated, “limited and self-devouring pluralism” was overcome only by Salazar.

In the wake of a major financial crisis, António de Oliveira Salazar was named finance minister, subsequently gaining ample powers over the other ministries. The institutionalization of Salazar’s *Estado Novo* (New State) was done “from above.” It was a process that depended more on generals and colonels than on lieutenants, and more on the Ministry of the Interior than on “the mob.” By 1934 liberalism had been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced. The great republican figures were forgotten in exile after the brief optimism generated by the Spanish Popular Front of 1936. One by one, anarcho-syndicalist leaders went to prison or to exile, leaving the leadership of the clandestine opposition in the hands of the small and youthful Communist Party.

As Douglas L. Wheeler points out in chapter 5, “The Changing Historiography of the First Portuguese Republic”: “Under the *Estado Novo* dictatorship’s educational system, the history of the First Republic had no place in school or university curricula, and any official reference to the Republic’s past demonized the Republican as well as the late

constitutional monarchy's politicians. A major thesis of the Salazarist regime was that the post-1926 *ditadura* saved Portugal from the dastardly 'demo-liberal' Republic and that the dictatorship dominated by Salazar was a providential but rational response to the Republican catastrophe."

The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by many on the fringes of the European radical right, but above all, given its cultural origin, by those of Maurrasian and traditional Catholic extraction. Its cultural identity was based on more than just an "order-promoting" program, but it did not have the "totalitarian," "pagan" elements of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Salazarism was based on radical right-wing and antiliberal social-Catholicism.⁷

3

As chapter 7, "Coping with the Double Legacy of Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy," stresses, Portugal, with its neighbor Spain, experienced one of the longest right-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century. Institutionalized under the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar during the 1930s, the *Estado Novo* was close to the Linzian ideal type of authoritarian regime.⁸ In 1968, Salazar had a stroke and was replaced by Marcelo Caetano, who initiated a limited liberalization that was brought to an abrupt halt by the worsening colonial war that the regime had been waging in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau since 1961. The inability of Salazar's successor to resolve the dilemmas caused by the war provoked the collapse of the dictatorship.

As Inacia Rezola argues in chapter 6, "The Portuguese Transition to Democracy," compared with the other southern European "third wave" democracies, the most conspicuous characteristic of Portugal's democratization during the 1970s was the nature of its rupture from the previous authoritarian regime. The singularity of the collapse of the dictatorship resides in the nature of military intervention by the captains, a rare if not unique case in the twentieth century. The war on three fronts that was being waged by the regime made them protagonists in the country's political transformation. The April 25, 1974 military coup paved the way for the institutionalization of Portuguese democracy. Portugal's transition occurred at the height of the Cold War, at a time when there were few international pressures for democratization. The rupture provoked by the Portuguese military resulted in an accentuated crisis of

the state, fueled by the concurrence of democratization with the decolonization of the final European colonial empire.⁹ The consolidation of Portuguese democracy was a complex process in which the prospect of membership in the European Union was to play an important role.

The “revolutionary period” of 1974–1975 was the most complex phase of the transition. In these two years powerful tensions emerged within Portuguese society that began to subside in 1976, when a new constitution was approved and the first legislative and presidential elections were held. The disagreements concerning the nature of decolonization—which was the initial driving force behind the conflict between General Spínola and other conservative generals and the captains who had led the coup—led to the emergence of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) as a political force.¹⁰ This subsequently opened a space for social and political mobilization that exacerbated the crisis of the state, and which can perhaps explain why the moderate elites were incapable of directing, “from above,” the rapid institutionalization of democracy. Many analyses of the transition rightly emphasize the powerful “revitalization of civil society” as a factor leading to the process of radicalization. It is important to note, however, that this mobilization developed in parallel with and in the presence of this protective cover; indeed, it is difficult to imagine this mobilization developing otherwise.

Initiatives of symbolic rupture with the past began to evolve soon after April 1974, culminating in the rapid and multidirectional purges (*saneamentos*) analyzed in chapter 7, “Coping with the Double Legacy of Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy.” Following a quick decision to remove the more visible members of the dictatorial political elite and some conservative military officers, the purge movement began to affect the civil service and the private sector. It became increasingly radical, affecting the lower ranks of the regime bureaucracy, albeit unevenly. This triggered immediate calls for the agents of the political police and of other repressive bodies to be brought to justice.

The parties that were to represent the right and center-right, the Social Democratic Centre (CDS—Centro Democrático Social) and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD—Partido Popular Democrático) were formed during this period.¹¹ A great effort was made to exclude from these parties any persons associated with the *Estado Novo* and to find leaders with democratic credentials. Indeed, the CDS, which integrated sectors of Portuguese society that espoused conservative authoritarian

values, was on the verge of being declared illegal until the first elections for the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975.

Supported by parties of the left, but largely on its own initiative, the MFA moved away from Spínola both over colonial policy and because of his attempts to be the effective leader in the process of institutionalizing democracy. With the appointment of the second Provisional Government, the MFA launched its independent organization. It was by its hand that Spínola promulgated Law 7/74, which gave the colonies the right to independence, determined the legal framework that would allow decolonization, and defined the organizations that would be involved in the process.¹² From that moment, the negotiations moved quickly. In the summer of 1974 Spínola persisted with his call for a referendum, seeking an alternative to the liberation movements and raising the hopes of the white population in the colonies, especially in Angola and Mozambique, much against the dominant view within the new party system and the MFA, which were calling for a swift transition to independence. Spínola's alternative would only be possible had the colonial administration been strong and had there been a negotiating strategy anchored in military strength, but neither of these conditions was present. Then came what one scholar has described as "a dramatic compression in the timing of the end of the empire."¹³

In Portugal, the overthrow of General Spínola, along with the MFA's shift to the left and the implementation of agrarian reforms and nationalization of large economic groups, were symbols and motors of an ever-worsening state crisis that was sustaining powerful social movements. The MFA's decision to respect the electoral calendar was a significant factor in the founding legitimization of the democratic regime, and the realization of these elections as scheduled greatly enhanced the position of the moderate political parties.

Portuguese society began to polarize, with the emergence of an anti-revolutionary (and anti-Communist) movement in the north of the country. The Socialist Party (PS—Partido Socialista) and the PPD backed the moderates, leading to mobilizations in Lisbon and Porto. In the provinces to the north of the River Tejo, the hierarchy of the Catholic church and local notables supported parish-level mobilizations, with the local military authorities either remaining neutral or being complicit in the activities. Officers organized a successful counter coup that toppled the radicals.

Understanding the nature of the transition, and especially the state crisis that this unleashed, is essential for fully comprehending some of

its more radical characteristics, as well as some of the attitudes with respect to the country's authoritarian past during this period. Both flowed together into a double legacy for the consolidation of democracy. Although, as Rui Feijó stresses in chapter 9, "Broken Promises, Postponed Commitments," "the pursuit of the 'quality of democracy' calls for an unending process of adjustment and improvement," and some of its dimensions "contribute to the emergence of a perception of an aristocratic, if not oligarchic, elite, and undermine the political legitimacy of the Republic."

With the prospect of accession to the European Community—and in the wake of it—new identity problems were to arise, the most important of which was the nature of Portugal's relationship with neighboring Spain. During—and particularly after—Portugal's attempts to negotiate accession separately, Spain regularly appeared in public opinion as the powerful neighbor that had "invaded" Portugal's economy. Having rapidly transformed itself into Portugal's major trading partner, Spain, and the "Spanish menace," stood as a threat to the liberalization of the Portuguese market. As Luís Campos e Cunha develops in chapter 8, "Portugal: An Island Comes Ashore," an "island syndrome has to be fading away as Spain has taken its natural position in relation to Portugal. While neighboring countries naturally have greater trading and cultural exchange, this was not the case for Spain and Portugal throughout most of the twentieth century. Spain is now the major trading partner and is a major destination for Portuguese to work and study. The surprise is that it took so long for Spain to reach this important role."

The Portuguese case provides a good illustration of the thesis that regards the European Community as a reference for Portugal's development. It also acts as a "ready symbol" the democratic elites could use to legitimate the new domestic order following the contested transition and the end of the colonial empire that had been so dear to the *Estado Novo*. On the other hand—and as it had in Spain—the European Union led to the successful consolidation of a "democratic tradition" that was based on the "synchronization and homogenization of [national] cultures and institutions with those of Europe," the social and economic components of which had been changing since the 1960s.¹⁴ This movement was consolidated during the 1980s by accelerated social change, economic growth, and the influx of Community funds.

During the 1980s, Portugal experienced a second cycle of growth and social change. The development of a pro-European outlook was

essentially a consequence of decolonization and the institutionalization of democracy. Following a complex transition process, the integration of Portugal into the EC became a strategic objective. It was the consequence of significant changes in domestic policy and had political as well as economic overtones. Democratic consolidation and Portugal's insertion into the European economic space were to become inseparable. In the context of a polarized transition in Portugal's case, as in that of the other southern European democratizing regimes—particularly Spain—the idea that accession to the European Community would help to guarantee liberal democracy was more overtly voiced and was central to the strategy of the political elites during this period.

The first ten years of Portugal's membership in the European Union were a “golden era” during which there was a large degree of pro-European consensus within the party system; there was economic growth and rising incomes and there was also real social change. Internationally, Portugal used its stronger position as a member of the EU to resolve the tensions existing between it and its former colonies in Africa. The Expo '98 in Lisbon is a symbol of that remarkable decade. As Pedro Pinto, Kristen Podolak, and Mathias Kondolf state in chapter 13, “Water and Environment in Portugal,” “the Lisbon Expo site is only one manifestation of a growing phenomenon: urban waterways as designed landscapes of leisure and consumption in developed countries, reflecting a transition from utilitarian to recreational, from spaces of industry to spaces of leisure and entertainment.”

The optimism of the 1990s was also marked by Portugal's meeting the convergence criteria for adhesion to the European single currency, the Euro, and joining it in 1999–2000; this contrasted with the situation at the beginning of the following decade. With the EU's movement toward institutional reform, enlargement, and the eventual reduction of EU fiscal transfers, there is some evidence of a fear that Portugal could be returning to the periphery. As Dana Redford argues in chapter 14, “Entrepreneurship and Public Policy in Tomorrow's Portuguese Republic,” citing the Eurobarometer, in 2008 “Portugal had the worst entrepreneurial climate index out of the twenty-five countries surveyed, as well as the highest percentage of people who agreed that there is a lack of financial support, that there are complex administrative procedures and that it was difficult to get information about starting up a business.” Nevertheless, “despite continuing high rates of poverty, inequality, and challenges in educational performance,” Miguel Glatzer stresses in chapter 10, “Welfare State Growth in the Portuguese Second

Republic,” “it is important to remember how far Portugal has come in the past thirty-eight years of democracy. High-quality healthcare; protection against the risks of old age, disability, sickness and unemployment; and access to education have been made broadly and in many cases universally available. Citizens have come to expect more from their state; the degree to which they will be able to continue to do so in the future is now an open question.”

NOTES

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5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, 164.

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The First Republic

Portugal's First Republic in Comparative Perspective of Its Era

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In comparative perspective, the broader significance of the Republican takeover in Portugal in 1910 is that it was the only example of regime change in Western Europe during the so-called “first wave of democratization” in the twentieth-century world, which took place between 1905 and 1911. This wave featured the first Russian Revolution (1905), the Iranian Revolution (1906), the great Romanian Peasants’ Revolt (1907), the Young Turk Revolution in Istanbul (1908), the imposition of a much more liberal government in Greece by military coup (1909), and the beginning of the Mexican Revolution (1910) and of the Chinese Revolution (1911). The designation “first wave of democratization” is generic and not specific, because the immediate goal of political democracy was not necessarily the primary objective in each case, though democracy was frequently mentioned and in most, at least, of these cases was a fundamental objective, if sometimes honored in the breach.¹

All the cases in this “first wave” had to do with countries peripheral to the major modernization of the nineteenth century, all of which had recently suffered significant military or diplomatic defeat or frustration at the hands of more modern or stronger powers. The attempted breakthroughs were in varying ways responses to the challenges of modernization and, in some cases, of the status of inferiority in which these countries found themselves. The second and third waves of democratization affected a very large part of Europe after 1918 and much of Western Europe after 1945. Only the fourth wave, following 1975, was

somewhat more peripheral once more, but was also very extensive, concentrated in southern Europe, Latin America, and then Eastern Europe. Portugal had the distinction of leading this fourth wave, with the revolution of 1974, which overcame its initial praetorian and revolutionary tendencies, issuing into democracy.

The first wave was an initial expression of the radical political changes that would be introduced in Europe and in other parts of the world during the era of world wars and violent revolution, roughly from 1905 to 1950. The mutations of this era were, in broader perspective, phenomena—and also to a considerable degree products—of the “axial age” of the classically modern, roughly from 1890 to 1930, when the major technological innovations appeared and when the consequences of the rapid social, cultural, and economic changes brought about by modernization, industrialization, and urbanization achieved their most dramatic impact.

Only in the case of Portugal did the new regime survive for some time, despite (or possibly because of) the fact that its progressivism failed to introduce democracy. Though it set a European record for instability, the relative duration of the First Republic had partly to do with the fact that it was the only Western European example in this wave, and also with the fact that its geographic location and continued alliance with Great Britain provided partial shelter from the tempests of the era of World War I, even though the country was significantly impacted by these storms.

As in the other cases, the First Republic represented an attempt to accelerate history and make up for the slow pace of modernization during the preceding century. As the first new republic of the century, it represented the latest in the long string of “firsts” in Portuguese history, all of them resulting from the determined leadership of innovative elites who found it easier to direct the affairs of a small, less complex land than was the case in Spain or some other larger countries.² As in most (not all) of the other cases in this wave, the emphasis was not, however, on economic modernization per se but on cultural and institutional change, the “Jacobin” cultural revolution of the nineteenth century that would produce progressive modern secular institutions, from which all other benefits would supposedly follow. The Republic was directed by lawyers and intellectuals, common leaders in this era, who sometimes seemed more interested in elite education than in primary education. Eventually this would produce a narrowing, rather than a democratization, of the suffrage. Thus it is tempting to see the First Republic as

a kind of continuation of the nineteenth century in its liberal nationalism, its limited suffrage, and its apotheosis of positivism and scientific or pseudo-scientific elitism, which was already being questioned in other parts of Europe.

But it reflected only the last part of that century, for it was a prime expression of the concept of a “radical republic,” a common objective of the progressive intelligentsia of that era in southern Europe and in parts of Latin America. Its doctrinairism demanded a predemocratic regime to maintain control in the hands of radical progressives, founded on the concept of the “hyperlegitimacy” of one group. Thus it was something of a forerunner of the Second Republic in Spain, and in both countries radical republicans maintained that the underdevelopment and conservatism of the greater society required that the political system remain exclusionary, despite the introduction of democratic suffrage in Spain.

There was some irony in this, because the great model for radical republicans was the Third Republic in France, whose initial political stance had been directly opposite—democratic and counterrevolutionary. The founding act of the Third Republic had been the violent suppression of the Paris Commune, drowned in blood with thousands of summary executions. Its first leaders, in fact, were monarchists, but the initial French republican chieftains were also clear that the regime had to maintain universal male suffrage and a system of law and order. Only after these things had been instituted and consolidated could the regime move to more progressive (and also more divisive) reforms. The argument of Portuguese and Spanish republicans seemed to be that France had a much larger and more democratic middle class that demanded first stability and responsibility, but that the less-developed Iberian countries required the shock effect of a radical and sectarian approach, though in fact such tactics guaranteed that in the long run neither Iberian republic could know success, becoming transitory regimes replaced by more stable systems.

The First Republic did have the advantage that the country's underdeveloped structure and largely conservative rural society precluded major challenges from organized labor. When the first limited threat appeared in 1912 it was rigorously repressed. So narrow a system made it possible for the main faction of republicans to form a well-organized party capable of dominating an exclusionary system, but the restriction of politics to small sectors failed to produce stability, resulting in elite rivalries like no other. In this era, the result of change and moderniza-

tion was fragmentation, among elites as much as or more than among society as a whole.

It quickly became an unpopular regime abroad, with scant prestige. As only the third republic in Europe, founded on regicide, it was an affront to the monarchist systems of the early twentieth century, and even the British ambassador referred to it in his dispatches as “this detestable regime,” but London decided to hold its nose and accept the Republic as the best that Portugal could do. British support helped to save the regime from potential intervention on the part of Spain or Germany.

Such concerns motivated the greatest mistake of the Republic’s leaders: their totally gratuitous participation in World War I. The Portuguese decision was absolutely unique in the case of any neutral country, insofar as Portugal was under no direct pressure or coercion and was offered no significant bribes. By contrast, Greece, Portugal’s nearest southern European counterpart, was physically forced into the war by the Allies under the most direct coercion. (To carry the Greek comparison further, that country had enjoyed universal male suffrage since 1864—democratic suffrage being a feature of Balkan nationalism—as well as a genuine two-party system. But this brought no salvation, and the country was as divided as Portugal, though not so politically fragmented.)

The Great War fundamentally destabilized the country’s finances and momentarily threw the republican radicals out of power by armed insurrection, yet the Republic survived, thanks to the strength of party organization and the continuation of restricted suffrage. The wave of postwar radicalism largely passed Portugal by, due to its conservative rural substratum, even though it was reflected in a modest upsurge of urban revolutionism. The main result seems to have been further restriction of the suffrage, so that by the 1920s Portugal resembled a nineteenth-century country more than any other in Europe, with the exception of Horthy’s Hungary. There was eventually a limited evolution of parliamentary alternatives by the early 1920s, but true political development was unknown.

The First Republic was a regime of remarkable and continuing policy failures, without equal in its time, but the stranglehold of the misnamed Democrats was affected comparatively little in Europe’s most static political and social system. Such failures would have elicited decisive opposition almost anywhere else, but the worker left was the weakest to be found, short of Latin America, and for a long time there was no force

capable of developing a hegemonic opposition—with the exception of the abortive breakthrough of the charismatic Sidónio Pais in 1917.

The Portuguese counterrevolution would thus constitute arguably the most torturous process found among such phenomena in Europe at that time. It went through six phases: the Paiva Couceiro guerrilla incursions of 1911–1912 (which the Spanish government hesitated to reinforce), the brief Pimenta de Castro ministry of 1915 (overthrown by force), the only attempt at an alternate regime, Pais's “República Nova” of 1917–1918 (instituted by insurrection and ended by assassination), one genuine if feeble monarchist revolt that produced a mini-civil war (the “Monarchy of the North” of January–February 1919), the attempt to organize a major parliamentary alternative in the form of the National Party, and finally the successful military pronunciamiento of 1926 (though at first the military had no idea with what to replace the parliamentary system). This was the era of the most radical, violent, and confused politics in contemporary European history, but in some ways Portugal lapped all the competition.

Nationalism was stronger and more coherent in Portugal than in Spain, since it existed on both left and right, yet the only hegemonic function it exercised was that expressed within the original republican movement itself. All the other manifestations were too divided. Fascism was an impossibility, basically for structural reasons, as António Costa Pinto and others have explained. Portugal was on the winning side in the war and still had a premobilized, predemocratic society, a largely conservative rural social base (though without the significant new political development in that sector seen in Greece and Bulgaria), and no Red menace.

One result of World War I was, however, the revival of the Portuguese army, which, for political and other reasons, had been in a very sorry state in 1914. This raised the specter of praetorianism in the postwar years, yet for some time the army did not become a major political actor, as the radical republicans—in typical nineteenth-century style—temporarily created their own form of praetorianism in the expanded Republican National Guard.

The Republic, with its peculiar combination of limited radicalism and political exclusivism, inaugurated the era of the greatest political violence in the recent history of Portugal, with the sole exception of the civil war of 1832–1834. Violence was intermittent, though persistent, yet also “typically Portuguese” in observing certain limits. Several hundred people were killed in each of the various insurrections, yet

no Portuguese group exhibited the bloodlust found in many other European countries of that time. Portugal had not really entered the era of modern European revolutionary violence, something happily it would never fully experience, and so never had to go through the total dehumanization of the adversary, with the concomitant goal of his annihilation, found among both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries elsewhere. Reprisals in Republican Portugal were surprisingly limited. It is a matter of speculation whether this reflected a peculiar (if fortunate) Portuguese proclivity for largely “symbolic” violence. In Europe as a whole, there were four choke points in postwar political crises: the immediate postwar years, the mid-1920s (mainly 1926), the Depression crisis, and the subsequent crisis of the mid-1930s. The republican system survived the first, thanks to the strength of party organization and the country’s low political mobilization, but finally succumbed in the second crisis year of 1926, when the Greek system temporarily failed and those of Poland and Lithuania, like Portugal, underwent more permanent changes. If the end depended almost exclusively on the initiative of a military pronunciamiento, the latter could be bloodless because the republican parliamentary system by that time had become widely discredited, even among many liberals and leftists. In a predemocratic society, this was a dramatically different situation compared with that of Spain a decade later. The First Republic had been more than a mere continuationist regime of the preceding era, but it had also been much less than a democracy, despite some elements of popular participation.

As the only Western European participant in the first wave of twentieth-century democratization, Portugal might have offered an instructive example for Spain when the latter introduced a republic in 1931, five years after the parliamentary system had succumbed in Portugal. The new Spanish leaders, however, showed no capacity for learning anything from anybody, concentrating on their *idée fixe* that the principal reason for the earlier failures of the Spanish left was that it had been inadequately radical, intransigent, and exclusivistic, and too prone to compromise (even though the exact opposite was more nearly true). Given the fact of mass mobilization in Spain and the existence of powerful revolutionary movements, the effects of republican radicalism in that country would be more far-reaching and disastrous. One result of republicanism, however, was that whereas it had been the Spanish right that was interested in intervention to overthrow the Portuguese left between 1911 and 1913, under the new regime it was the Spanish

left that sought to intervene to help to overthrow the Portuguese right in 1932–1933, with equivalent ineffectuality.

The only Spanish sector interested in following a Portuguese example was the moderate right, which to some degree began to adopt the model of the “second Portuguese republic,” the *Estado Novo*, as a goal, though without clear internal (or for that matter, official) agreement. The Portuguese model was the basis for political planning by the military insurrectionists in 1936, and in August, after the civil war had begun, was on one occasion publicly invoked by Franco himself. By the time he had been elevated to the dictatorship, however, at the end of September, the Clausewitzian *Wechselwirkung* of reciprocal interaction and radicalization produced by a revolutionary civil war (something far beyond the minor Portuguese scuffle of 1919) induced him to seek a more drastic alternative, and to adopt more of an Italian than a Portuguese alternative.

A final reflection regarding Portuguese republicanism in comparative perspective concerns the issue of monarchism, which made a comeback in Spain but not in Portugal. Why was this? In both countries, monarchist political leadership and support had grown progressively weaker during the last years of the monarchy itself. Yet, if anything, monarchism was slightly stronger in Portugal in 1912 than, say, in Spain in 1933, and the Spanish military leaders were completely united in excluding monarchism as a banner in 1936.

The difference has to do, probably, with the great chasm produced by the Spanish Civil War, fortunately without counterpart in the neighboring country, and the creation of a radically authoritarian and united opposition to a republic in Spain, which had eventually become identified with the revolutionary left. The division was both deeper and more fully polarized than in Portugal, and, after World War II, with the catastrophic end of fascism, the radical alternatives of left and right had both failed. The only real alternative for the future of the Franco regime was to move nearer monarchism. That the Spanish monarchy has thus far survived into the twenty-first century is due to the political judgment and courage of King Juan Carlos in promoting democratization, and to the somewhat chastened cooperation of the Spanish political elites, most of whom have had an understandable reluctance to return to the republican holocaust of the 1930s, which was a good deal more traumatic than the continued messiness, conflict, and failures of the First Republic in Portugal.

NOTES

1. The only full comparative study dedicated to the “first wave” is Charles Kurzman, *Democracy Denied, 1905–1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

2. I have compiled a list and a brief discussion of these Portuguese breakthroughs in the Portuguese chapter in my *Spain: A Unique History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).

What Was Meant by a Republic in 1910

RICHARD HERR

At 9 a.m. on October 5, 1910, the Republic was proclaimed from the Câmara Municipal in Lisbon, replacing the constitutional monarchy. On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama, Democrat, was sworn in as president of the United States, replacing George W. Bush, Republican. Obama promised to create a new political world. So did the Portuguese Republic. Can we say that the Portuguese transfer from monarchy to republic can be understood as a transfer from one political party to another, or was there something about a republic that made people look on it as fundamentally different from a monarchy, even a constitutional monarchy?

Republics existed in early modern Europe: Venice, Switzerland, the Dutch republic. It was not these examples, however, that gave birth to the modern meaning of a republic, but rather the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. Since Machiavelli and the Renaissance there was a fascination with them, but it gained momentum during the Enlightenment, when persons unhappy with their current monarchies looked to them for inspiration. Readers in France, England, and the British colonies were brought up on classical authors and absorbed the romanticized view of the early times of Sparta, Athens, and Rome found in Livy, Cicero, Tacitus, and Plutarch. It was less their form of government that attracted the Enlightenment, however, than the virtue of their heroes and their peoples, a simple life of frugality, industry, temperance, integrity, and justice, so different from the corruption the readers found in their own day.

Montesquieu picked up this view in his famous work, *The Spirit of the Laws*. He concluded that what distinguished a republic from a monarchy was the absence of social ranks and the dedication of its citizens to serving the community. Montesquieu called this spirit “virtue”; it involved morality, equality, frugality, love of country. The spirit involved the subordination of the individual to the well-being of his fellow citizens. Rousseau would reformulate it as the “general will.”

The first republic to come out of the spirit of the Enlightenment was the United States. The British colonists were also caught in reverence for the republics of antiquity, but the colonists saw themselves in the shoes of the ancients, convinced they were a new kind of society, better than the Old World, destined to set up a model country, a republic where public virtue would displace the corruption and social pretensions of the British monarchy.¹

What was most significant of the American example, as Robert Palmer has argued, was the inauguration of the people as constituent power. The republic embodied the sovereignty of the people, expressed in a convention elected by the citizens of the states, to draw up a constitution that then had to be ratified by the vote of the people. This was a radically new procedure that made real the idea of John Locke and others of an original contract made by people who come together to create a society.² However, the “people” did not yet mean all adults, not even all male adults. It would take the French revolutionary republic to add that element. The American constitution left it to the states to decide the nature of elections. Gradually the states would adopt universal suffrage of free adult white males, with two Southern states holding out until after 1850, but women did not get the vote nationally until 1920.

In the United States, and for the future, the first characteristic of a republic is that it is a state without a monarch, whether king or emperor. The constitution included a declaration of citizens’ rights. Two would be most significant for the meaning of a republic. The constitution states that individuals may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The protection of property is emphasized, for private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitution also provided for religious freedom and a separation of church and state, the basis for what liberals would come to call “a free church in a free state.” How far future republics would guarantee the right of property and religious freedom would remain a critical question.

The example of the United States was clearly on the minds of the

members of the French Third Estate whom Louis XVI brought together in the Estates General in May 1789. Hardly a month later, now calling themselves the National Assembly, they challenged the crown in the famous Tennis Court Oath, stating they had been called upon to draft a constitution for the kingdom, by inference not appointed by the king but by the French people. They began by producing a “Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen.” Sovereignty, it says, resides in the nation (thus removing it from the monarch). Men are free and equal in rights, which include liberty, property, and freedom of religion. In a separate law, the Assembly abolished hereditary nobility and titles. The future legislature would have one house.

Within two years the Assembly had finished the constitution. It would seem they had established a republic, but they were maintaining a king. From the very beginning we find that there is a difficulty in distinguishing between a republic and a constitutional monarchy. Louis XVI posed a problem, because he refused to take an oath to the constitution. Instead, in June 1791 he attempted to flee to Germany with his family. When he was brought back to Paris, the radicals of Paris demanded a republic. Brought up to the Assembly, the proposal was rejected. A leading moderate deputy explained why:

I propose to you the true question. Are we going to end the Revolution or are we going to begin it again? . . . One more step will be fatal and criminal.

The next step along the road to liberty is the destruction of royalty. Along the line of equality it is the destruction of property.³

Fear that a republic would include a social revolution that could abolish private property kept the king on the throne for a year, during which war began with Austria and Prussia. The foreign threat to Paris caused the people to overthrow the king in August 1792. The Assembly called for the election by universal male suffrage of a Convention (using the American term) to write a new constitution. The first act of the Convention in September 1792 was to proclaim a republic, “one and indivisible.”

The republic would become famous for the guillotine and the Terror, but how did it differ from a constitutional monarchy? Its constitution was not very different from that objected to by Louis XVI. It kept the usual rights, including property. (The republic would have various constitutions, including one drafted for General Bonaparte, but they all protected property. The fear of social revolution proved unfounded.)

In one major way the French Revolution differed from the American

one. Establishing a republic in the United States did not involve overthrowing a monarch, but simply breaking away from his dominion. The Latin American republics would follow this example. Eliminating the king by execution or later by exile, rather than simply throwing off allegiance to a distant ruler, would make the transformation from monarchy to republic far more contentious in Europe than America, presenting a threat to the existing social order.

By eliminating the king, the French republic left the nation, the *patrie*, as the focus of people's loyalty and almost religious faith. The war that the republic would wage against the monarchs of Europe aroused the devotion and energy of the majority of the people. Raw recruits fought successfully against trained armies, singing the battle hymn of the *Marseillaise*: "*Allons enfants de la patrie, le jour de gloire est arrivé.*" Montesquieu had defined "*l'amour de la patrie*" as an essential feature of a republic, and the first French republic put it into action. The new spirit represented a profound difference from the constitutional monarchy.

The republic limped on after the end of the Terror and the fall of the Jacobins, until Bonaparte took it over, changed it to an empire, and created the modern French state. Unlike the American republic, it did not have a good press, with the Terror as its most notorious feature. One thinks of Dickens's *Tale of Two Cities*. Liberal opponents of the Holy Alliance that dominated Europe looked across the Atlantic to the American republic. In 1824 Lafayette, the "Hero of Two Worlds" returned to the United States to celebrate fifty years of American independence. In Europe the news of Lafayette's triumphal progress inspired the opponents of the established order.⁴ During the constitutional crisis brought on by the French king Charles X in July 1830, the workers and students of Paris put up barricades and demanded a republic. A republic might be safe in America, but for many in France it still recalled 1793. One who felt this way was Lafayette; instead of supporting a republic, he gave his blessing to the Duke of Orléans on the balcony of the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. Orléans became Louis Philippe, king of what became known as the July Monarchy.

Under the July Monarchy a republic remained the goal of the working classes, joined in the 1840s by middle class liberals who wanted a genuinely free parliamentary government. In 1848, with much more formidable barricades, the workers of Paris gained their objective: the proclamation of a republic from the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. With the country in a crisis of unemployment, a provisional government estab-

lished National Workshops to provide work for the unemployed. Most members of the provisional government were liberal bourgeois, but the socialist Louis Blanc was in the cabinet, and to the peasants and bourgeois whose taxes would pay for the workshops, they sounded like socialism. In the election for a constituent assembly by universal manhood suffrage, rural and bourgeois France upset the republicans by electing a conservative majority. In June the Assembly decreed the closure of the workshops to save money. For the workers, loss of the workshops violated what they called the “right to work.” In response they raised barricades anew and were crushed by the army only after three days of ferocious fighting, which became famous as the June Days. In December the voters chose the nephew of Napoleon to be president of the Republic.

In November of the same year, a popular rising in Rome drove Pope Pius IX out of the city. The revolutionaries—with Giuseppe Mazzini, the inspirer of Italian nationalism, a leading figure—proclaimed a Roman Republic. It lasted five months until Louis Napoleon, who astutely sought the approval of French Catholics, arranged for a French army to restore the pope. Two years later he would overthrow the French republic and set up the Second Empire.

The experience of 1848 reinforced the common image that a republic entailed a social revolution. By the time of Napoleon III, except for Switzerland, republics existed only in America, and those in Spanish America—unstable, often in the hands of military *caudillos*—were not such as to recommend the form. Torn by the question of slavery that would bring on civil war, the United States was losing its luster as a republican ideal. Brazil, with its traditional ties to Portugal, had an emperor. The reputation of the republic as a form of government reached a low point after 1850. One has to ask why Portugal would choose to adopt a republic in 1910.

Developments in France hold the key. Radical republicans did not accept the Second Empire, and the liberal republicans who wanted a liberal representative government in 1848 reappeared by the 1860s in opposition to Napoleon III’s authoritarian government. When Napoleon III unwisely challenged Prussia to war in 1870 and was captured by the Prussian army, a republic was again proclaimed at the Paris Hôtel de Ville. This one seemed to follow the pattern of 1848. With the Prussian army advancing through France and laying a tight siege to Paris, an armistice allowed France to elect an assembly to make peace. The French provinces filled it with monarchists. Its members suspicious

of Paris, the Assembly met in Versailles. Paris, suffering the effect of four months of blockade, became a stronghold of working class republicans. The city fell under the control of a new municipal government known as the Commune. Dominated by radical republicans and a few socialists, who were violent anticlericals, the Commune entreated other French cities to join it in a federation. Rejecting the authority of the Assembly, the Communard forces, men and women, fought the armies of the Assembly bitterly and bravely until they were crushed. In their death throes, the Communards resorted to acts of violence, burning public buildings and executing numerous hostages, including the archbishop of Paris. In the aftermath the government executed and deported thousands of Communards and built the horrendous Sacré Coeur church to atone for their acts. For moderates and conservatives throughout Europe the terror of the Commune again brought discredit on the concept of a republic.

Events in Spain added to its discredit. In 1873 the Spanish Cortes proclaimed a republic, having failed to find a monarch who could replace Isabel II, exiled by the Revolution of 1868. Spain's republicans were committed to a federation along United States lines, but the left wing took over many municipalities and declared them independent communes, following the pattern of the Paris Commune and refusing obedience to the central government. Meanwhile a growing anarchist movement among the workers and a Carlist rising in the north left Madrid with little control over the country. Military commanders took charge and within a year brought back Isabel's son Alfonso as king. A republic seemed more than ever a regime aimed at social revolution and anarchy.

Yet the idea of a republic would soon appeal to the peasantry and bourgeoisie of France and, gradually, of other countries as well. The Assembly of 1871 had only a minority of republicans, and it would have restored the monarchy had the monarchists agreed on a reasonable candidate, but the legitimist candidate made himself unacceptable by insisting that France give up the tricolor flag while his supporters blocked the Orléanist pretender. Under the sensible leadership of the one-time Orléanist minister Adolph Thiers, the Assembly eventually accepted a republican constitution that could appeal to peasants and bourgeois desirous of stable government and the protection of their property. The Third French Republic would steer a careful course resisting the currents of a romantic monarchist Catholic right, a Bonapartist search for a strong leader, and, after 1890, the threat of direct action from proletarian movements on the left. With the Third Republic the

image of a republic as a threat to the social order became a thing of the past.

Something else was happening that would also make a republic acceptable to people of moderate outlook. Chastened by the experiences of the French Revolutionary period, since 1815 the Catholic hierarchies had regularly supported monarchs against the proponents of liberal constitutions, whereas liberal regimes had weakened or closed the monastic orders and sold off many of the properties of the Church to pay national debts. After the middle of the century new developments fueled the antagonism, turning the conflict from one of real estate into one of ideology. Recent history had made European rulers aware that, for military as well as economic reasons, it was important to have a citizen body that could read and write. The leaders of the Church found in education, where it could bring up young people within the faith, a means to recover its social and religious position. In 1850 the conservative assembly of the Second French Republic, seeing in religion a guarantee of social peace, passed the Falloux Law, which permitted the Church to open secondary schools and gave the clergy authority over primary education.

For the liberal heirs of the Enlightenment, who trusted in reason rather than faith to solve human problems, the clerical control of the education of French youth was anathema. In the 1830s Auguste Comte published the *Course of Positive Philosophy*, which taught that only knowledge acquired through scientific experiment would achieve the harmony and well-being of humanity. Positivism brought the ideological clash with the Church up to date and spread widely among liberal intellectual sectors. In 1864 Pius IX added fuel to the fire by issuing the Syllabus of Errors, a catalog of modern ideas that the Church had condemned. Among these errors were that one could discover truth without reference to God, and that the Pope should come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.

The cause was now joined between liberals and the Church hierarchy and compromise ruled out. In Catholic countries Freemasons had been active among liberal groups since the days of Napoleon. In 1865 Pius IX revived the Catholic ban on freemasonry, and Masonic anticlericalism, which had been lukewarm before, now turned militant. In the next decades positivism became the ideology of the Masonic order, who found it compatible with their traditional deism. After 1870, Masons were becoming leaders of the French Republic.

The clash came inevitably over education. In 1882 the French

Republic adopted laws authored by Jules Ferry, minister of public education, that established free compulsory primary education. The schools would be secular, prohibited from teaching any religious cult but required to provide “moral and civic education.” Students would be taught to use the French language properly, to appreciate the national culture, and to love their country. The worship of the *patrie* would replace the worship of God. The clergy responded that a school that did not teach the catechism was teaching “required irreligion.” French society split into two Frances, the France of the priests and the France of the *maîtres d’école*. In 1905 the republic drew an iron curtain between the two sides by legislating the separation of church and state. Priests lost the state salaries they had received since Napoleon, and they would fall into poverty. The concept “republic” had come to mean laic, positivist, and nationalist.

Among the independent countries of America, Brazil was the only one that had not become a republic. In 1890 that would change. The positivist message found a wide audience in Latin America, but nowhere more than in Brazil, where it was championed by the Freemasons. Republicanism found its most active support among military officers. In 1890 a military coup expelled the emperor and declared a republic. It promptly drew up a constitution that separated church and state, recognized civil marriage, and provided for freedom of religion. Inspired by the French Ferry laws, the Brazilian republic made public education secular. News of these events in Portugal provided an image of a republic that had ceased to be socially revolutionary and had become strongly positivist and anticlerical.

In Portugal, as in Spain, anticlericalism had a unique concern. Both countries had been the butt of enlightened authors, who pictured them as lands condemned by the Catholic Church to ignorance and backwardness. Remember *Candide* and the Inquisitors of Lisbon. Stung by this scorn, many Portuguese and Spanish liberals blamed the power of the Church for the failure of their country to modernize. This was a major lesson of Portugal’s generation of 1870; witness the novel of Eça de Queirós, *O Crime do Padre Amaro*.

In Portugal, as in France, the clergy were turning to the education of the young as the means to recover their influence within the constitutional monarchy. Liberals found a response in the positivism of Auguste Comte. The leading Portuguese positivist was Teófilo Braga, professor of literature at Coimbra. In his writings and in his influence on other writers he strove to transform Portugal into a positivist community, a

secular *patria*, venerating its past leaders and pressing for economic advances.⁵ In the 1870s the example of the French and Spanish republics inspired a growing republican movement in Portugal. Porto elected a republican deputy in 1878. Teófilo Braga became convinced that only a republic could achieve a national resurrection. (In October 1910 he would become president of the provisional republican government.)

What gave a boost to the republican movement was the Mapa-corde-rosa crisis of 1890, when a British ultimatum forced Portugal to withdraw its claim to central Africa, lands pictured in rose color on its school maps. This was the time of the “scramble for Africa” inspired by the belief that the greatness of a modern nation depended on the size of its colonial empire. Loss of empire confirmed national backwardness. The Spanish monarchy would be discredited in 1898 by the loss of its last American and Asian colonies. The Japanese victory over the armies and navy of Russia in 1904, with the ensuing losses of territory to Japan, allowed the democratic opposition to force the czar to establish a parliament, a first step toward his overthrow in 1917. In Portugal the humiliation of 1890 would hang over the head of the young King Carlos. For liberals and positivists, Portugal’s weakness reflected its intellectual subservience to Catholic teachings.

The republicans stepped in as the defenders of the Portuguese *patria*. The republican cult of the *patrie* takes us back to the eighteenth century and Rousseau. It had not died out; witness the French education system after the Ferry laws. Like the liberal monarchists the Portuguese republicans believed in the freedom of the individual, but the republicans believed the free citizen should put dedication to the community above everything else. For the republicans, separation of church and state meant more than religious freedom and better education. It meant ending the hypocrisy of the clergy and inspiring virtuous citizens, the creation of a new kind of community based on honesty and simplicity. Teófilo Braga said the republic must turn Portugal from “a melancholy mass of poor people” into a nation.⁶

Just as Portuguese republicanism revived the virtuous republic of the Enlightenment, one aspect of it reflected the proletarian movement of 1848. After 1900 republicanism spread among the working class, especially in Lisbon. A radical group called the Carbonária combined republican objectives with socialist and anarchist doctrines and engaged in direct action.

The cause of the proletariat was not central to Portuguese republicanism, however. In their ideological crusade, the Portuguese republicans

were led by the Freemasons. Masons had been around since the 1820s, and many liberal monarchists were Masons, from the shopkeeper class up to the aristocracy. By 1890 their opposition to the Church was turning them into republicans, as it had in France and Brazil. There is no better evidence of the transformation of republicanism—from a revolutionary cause of the lower classes to a respectable bourgeois movement—than its adoption by the Masons.

What was meant by a republic in 1910 can be looked at in two ways. One way sees certain features that remained constant since its origin in the eighteenth century: the sovereignty of the people, a virtuous citizenry equal in rights, the dedication of the citizens to the *patria*, and the belief that religion and the state should be independent spheres. The other way of looking at the meaning of a republic is to note the alternating strength of these features. Equal rights included the right of property. The American and French revolutions protected it, but in Europe until after the Franco-Prussian War a republic seemed a threat to the established social order and the property of individuals. By the end of the century republics would become again defenders of property against threats from socialism and anarchism.

The other feature that evolved sharply was the doctrine of separation of church and state, which became a source of bitter conflict as countries expanded education of the young. The United States, deeply religious and largely Protestant, did not find religion in the schools a threat to freedom. In Catholic countries, however, the elimination of religious instruction in public schools became central to the republican ideology. The clash with papal infallibility and the inspiration of positivism had made a secular progressive *patria* the cardinal identity of a republic. Monarchy was accused of failing to defend the *patria*, but was opposed also because of its association with the Church. In 1910 all republics were Catholic except Switzerland and the United States. For Catholic countries, the uncompromising opposition to the Church provided the fundamental difference between a republic and a constitutional monarchy, and in Europe only Catholic countries had meaningful republican movements.

The legislation that followed the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic in October 1910 reveals the hierarchy of the Republican objectives. The republic paid lip service to the ideal of political and social equality, so long as it did not threaten social order. Following republican ideology it provided universal male suffrage but, wary of the influence of the Church, it established a literacy requirement that eliminated large

number of voters. The Provisional Government legalized strikes, but soon the government of the republic bowed to pressure from employers and landowners and used force to break up workers' actions.⁷

From the outset, the Republic focused its attention on the Church. Three days after the revolution, the Provisional Government expelled the Jesuits. It ordered other religious orders closed; their members could either leave the country or don civilian clothes. Catholicism would no longer be the religion of the state. In April 1911, before a constitution was enacted, the Provisional Government declared the separation of church and state. The state took over the properties of the Church and lent them to the clergy for religious services. Marriage became a civil contract and divorce was made legal. This was not the "free church in a free state" championed by liberals, but rather an extension of regal policies of the Old Regime. Portugal enacted the most severe anticlerical legislation in Europe prior to the Russian revolution.

The corollary of the religious policy was a drive to create a republican education. The republic banned the teaching of Christianity in all schools, and priests and former members of the religious orders were prohibited from teaching. Every school got the new republican flag and teachers were to exalt its significance. The objective was not just to be a literate population but the creation of "*homens novos*." Under the monarchy public education had already in theory been made free, universal, and obligatory, but illiteracy rates remained at nearly 80 percent. By 1925, although the level of illiteracy remained at around 70 percent, the campaign for education was having an effect on the new generation: half the inductees in the army knew how to read.⁸

The anticlerical campaign of the Portuguese Republic proved counterproductive. While it responded to the idealistic republican vision of a patriotic society, freed from the prejudices and errors inculcated by religion, in practice it had the negative effect of heightening the tensions within the country, rousing sympathy for the clergy and awakening new loyalty to the Church in conservative and rural sectors of society. The treatment of the Church was a major cause of the ultimate failure of the Portuguese Republic to establish itself in the country. The Second Spanish Republic of 1931 came with a similar attitude toward the Catholic church. Its anticlerical policy also aroused critical opposition among the sectors of society that remained loyal to the Church. A defense of religion was a strong motive behind the rising that led to the Civil War and the overthrow of the Spanish Republic.

Both republics suffered from the heritage of the ideological passions

that marked the nineteenth century. Until well past the mid-nineteenth century a republic was feared as a threat to social order and private property. By the end of the century it had lost this image, thanks to the Third French Republic, but on the other hand its espousal of a patriotic lay society, while winning over urban workers and the liberal middle class, produced a new threat to the social order of those sectors that accepted the Catholic church: devout Catholics, conservative sectors, and the independent peasantry. The tension between the two Frances that marked the Third Republic was calmed by the experience of the First World War, when both sides worked together to defend the French *patrie*. No such experience smoothed the tension in Portugal and Spain, where large sectors of the population did not look on the republic as their *patria*. Since the mid-twentieth century the experience of dictatorships and the coming of new generations has largely made ideological tension over religion a thing of the past, so that in Portugal the restored democratic republic can today be the *patria* of the broad majority of the Portuguese people.

NOTES

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2. R. R. Palmer, *The Challenge*, vol. 1 of *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 214–17.

3. Joseph Barnave, quoted in Albert Mathiez, *La Révolution Française* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1946), 1: 175.

4. Louis Gottschalk, *The United States and Lafayette*, Augustana Library Publications, Occasional Paper No. 3 (Rock Island, IL: Augustana College Library, 1958), 8; Andrew Burstein, *America's Jubilee: How in 1826 a Generation Remembered Fifty Years of Independence* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 2001), 8–33.

5. Rui Ramos, *A Segunda Fundação (1890–1926)*, vol. 6 of *História de Portugal*, ed. José Mattoso (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, n.d.), 64–65, 401.

6. “Uma melancólica massa de gente pobre,” quoted in Ramos, 65.

7. Douglas L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History, 1910–1926* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 78, 64–67.

8. *Ibid.*, 62, 173.

The Deputies of the First Portuguese Republic, 1911–1926: A Prosopographic Study

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This paper presents the results of the first prosopographic study¹ concerning the *deputados* of the Lower Chamber of the First Portuguese Republic, carried within the scope of a much larger research project concerning parliamentary recruitment in liberal Portugal.² The main source used here was the publication *Parliamentarians and Ministers of the First Republic (1910–1926)*, edited by A.H. de Oliveira Marques,³ information from which was checked against and supplemented with further data from other biographical sources. The study involved the 751 individuals elected as deputies, in both general elections and by-elections, between 1911 and 1926. Data regarding the socio-demographic background and political experience of the deputies have been grouped according to legislature and the period. In the latter case, and when dealing with features changing over time, the criterion for selection was the moment marking the parliamentary debut of each deputy. Since the initial composition of the Lower Chamber arose directly from the Constituent Assembly,⁴ the members of the latter and those who were elected during the first legislature, specifically in the partial elections of 1913, will be analyzed together here.

REGIME CHANGE AND ELITE CIRCULATION

The abrupt change of regime that took place in 1910, with the final collapse of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic, led

TABLE 3.1 LEGISLATURES AND NUMBER OF DEPUTIES

General Election Year	Legislatures	Total No. of Deputies	
1911	C.A.* + 1st	1911–1915	270
1915	2nd	1915–1917	155
1918	3rd	1918–1919	153
1919	4th	1919–1921	165
1921	5th	1921	157
1922	6th	1922–1925	164
1925	7th	1925–1926	144
Total		1911–1926	751†

*The Constituent Assembly met between June 15 and August 25, 1911.

†Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats.

to a profound removal and substitution of the “political class,” especially at the parliamentary level, along with other changes of greater or lesser importance. Overall, only forty-eight deputies (6.4 percent of total) in the Republic had held places of power in the former regime—most, in fact, as representatives of the Republican opposition. It was only in the Sidonist legislature (1918–1919), where the Monarchists and Catholics held more than a quarter of the seats in the parliament,⁵ that one could observe the return of a significant number of politicians from the ousted regime, with the proportion of those who had held political offices before 1910 reaching 17 percent.

Regardless of the actual extent of the “adhesiveness” of former monarchists to the new regime, a phenomenon reported at the time and glossed over by contemporary historiography, the truth is that the level of renewal of the political elite was indeed profound. Although we do not as of yet have a systematic, detailed prosopographic study of the deputies of the constitutional monarchy, certain comparisons suggest that the wide circulation of the parliamentary elite also had significant repercussions in terms of its social profile.

The noticeable discontinuity of parliamentary members caused by the advent of the Republic in Portugal stands out even more when compared to the impact of regime changes in the circulation of the political elite in Germany, where two-fifths of the members of the Constituent Assembly in Weimar (1919) had parliamentary experience in the imperial Reichstag,⁶ and in Spain, where around 12 percent of the legislators of the Second Republic had held office in the final Cortes of the Restauración.⁷

TABLE 3.2 DEPUTIES OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC WHO HELD POLITICAL POSTS PRIOR TO 1910*

Political Posts	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total (1911-26)	
	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%†	No.	%‡
Deputy	17	6.3	7	4.5	14	9.2	5	3.0	4	2.6	3	1.8	4	2.8	42	5.6
Peer of the Realm	4	1.5	0	0.0	1	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	0.7
Civil governor§	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	2.6	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.5
Colonial governor	1	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1
Minister	2	0.7	0	0.0	2	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.7	4	0.5
Mayor/Local councillor	14	5.2	2	1.3	5	3.3	2	1.2	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.7	18	2.4
Total no. of individuals	27	10.0	9	5.8	16	17.0	8	4.8	4	2.6	4	2.4	5	3.5	48	6.4

* Multiple coding has been used as some deputies carried out two or more of the political posts listed, therefore percentages may not total 100.

† Percentage calculated based on the total number of deputies elected each legislature.

‡ Percentage calculated based on the total number of deputies (751).

§ Equivalent to the French prefect.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEPUTIES

If the center of gravity for the social and political support for the First Republic was located in the main cities, and the capital in particular, most of its “political class,” at the ministerial and parliamentary level, was born in the provincial areas of Portugal in small cities, towns, and villages. In this period 56.5 percent of the deputies came from these areas; if we note that information concerning place of birth is only known with regard to 682 deputies, the proportion rises to 62.2 percent.

This dominant pattern of geographical selection became only more balanced in the Third Legislature (of Sidónio Pais), which had a greater equilibrium of parliamentarians from provincial areas (44.4 percent) with those of urban origin (41.8 percent). The cities of Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra supplied the largest number of individuals. A combination of two factors may help explain the more urban profile of the Sidonist deputies: first, coming from a higher social class, and second, as we shall see later, having a younger age profile.

Examining the specific role of the capital, the stronghold of “republicanism,” it is interesting to note that members from Lisbon had a more significant presence in the parliamentary elite of the monarchy than in the First Republic.⁸ A study of the geographical origins of a sample of 231 deputies elected between 1851 and 1890 showed a marked overrepresentation of those born in the nation’s capital (21.2 percent).⁹ A similar phenomenon occurred in Spain, at least toward the end of the Restauración: 24.3 percent of the deputies elected between 1914 and 1923 came from Madrid.¹⁰

Most of the deputies of the First Republic made their parliamentary debut when younger than 41 years of age (54.8 percent), with the most popular age group being the 31–40 category (38.1 percent). The average age of newcomers throughout this period was 36.

Diachronic analysis of the data shows that in the period between 1911 and 1921 more than half of the deputies in each legislature were under 41, and these legislatures also recorded the lowest average ages. In turn, the last three legislatures (1921–1926) showed an aging profile, as reflected in both the relative prevalence of those in their forties and the rise in average age. The Third Legislature (1918–1919) was clearly the youngest of all, indicating that Sidonism was associated with a generational renewal.¹¹ It is noteworthy that one-fourth of the dep-

TABLE 3.3 PLACE OF BIRTH OF DEPUTIES

Place of Birth	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total† (1911-26)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Lisbon	30	11.1	23	14.8	24	15.6	15	9.1	10	6.4	19	11.6	16	11.1	91	12.1
Porto	15	5.5	9	5.8	14	9.2	7	4.2	6	3.8	4	2.4	12	8.3	45	6.0
Coimbra	4	1.5	3	1.9	4	2.6	2	1.2	1	0.6	3	1.8	1	0.7	11	1.4
Other cities*	30	11.1	14	9.0	22	14.4	19	11.5	18	11.5	20	12.2	18	12.5	85	11.3
Rest of country	163	60.4	90	58.1	68	44.4	109	66.1	96	61.1	111	67.7	87	60.4	424	56.5
Colonies	8	3.0	9	5.8	3	2.0	3	1.8	2	1.3	4	2.4	3	2.1	18	2.4
Abroad	3	1.1	1	0.6	3	2.0	1	0.6	1	0.6	0	0.0	3	2.1	8	1.1
No info	17	6.3	6	3.9	15	9.8	9	5.5	23	14.6	3	1.8	4	2.8	69	9.2
Total	270	100.0	155	100.0	153	100.0	165	100.0	157	100.0	164	100.0	144	100.0	751	100.0

* Including the other district capitals.

† Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats.

TABLE 3-4 AGE OF DEPUTIES

Age Groups	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total* (1911-26)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
21-30	39	14.5	12	7.7	39	25.6	20	12.1	9	5.7	16	9.8	7	4.9	125	16.6
31-40	101	37.4	72	46.5	55	35.9	64	38.8	46	29.3	60	36.6	48	33.3	286	38.2
41-50	66	24.4	47	30.3	35	22.9	52	31.5	54	34.4	65	39.6	59	41.0	189	25.0
51-60	37	13.7	15	9.7	8	5.2	20	12.1	24	15.3	20	12.2	23	16.0	72	9.6
>60	16	5.9	3	1.9	4	2.6	2	1.2	4	2.5	0	0.0	5	3.5	23	3.1
No info	11	4.1	6	3.9	12	7.8	7	4.2	20	12.7	3	1.8	2	1.4	56	7.5
Total	270	100.0	155	100.0	153	100.0	165	100.0	157	100.0	164	100.0	144	100.0	751	100.0

*Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats. The deputies' ages used here are the ages when elected for the first time.




FIGURE 3.1. Average age of the deputies of the First Republic

uties came from the lowest age group (21–30). Conversely, the Fifth Legislature—the only one in which the Republican conservatives, then grouped into the Liberal Party, were the largest political force—was the one with the highest average age (43), showing a greater seniority. If we single out the oldest category by including in it those in their sixties and in their seventies, the highest percentage for this group (5.9 percent) was recorded in the Constituent Assembly.

In average terms, the young ages involved in parliamentary recruitment in the First Republic can be shown more clearly when compared to some European examples. At that time, both in the United Kingdom¹² and in the Netherlands,¹³ the average age of first-time deputies was around 50. In the Third French Republic the age at which a parliamentary career in the lower chamber was embarked upon was on average between 45 and 47.¹⁴ In the Dutch case, and indeed as in other countries,¹⁵ the impact of legal restrictions concerning eligibility to stand for office should not be forgotten: between 1848 and 1963 a candidate for the post of member of parliament had to be at least 30 years of age. But in the three examples cited, the decisive factor that explains this delayed parliamentary recruitment is the importance that solid experience in the institutions of local government had in the political itinerary of those aspiring to be deputies. In Portugal—as indeed was the case in Spain—to enter parliament was not so much a point of arrival but rather the starting point for a political career that could lead to higher positions (minister, for example).

The overwhelming majority of deputies had a high level of educational study, as demonstrated by a university, or equivalent, degree. Out of the total of 751 deputies, a little over three quarters had carried out university-level educational studies, although for a considerable number of cases the educational background is unknown. If, as a result, we consider the 637 deputies known to have academic qualifications, the proportion who had a college degree and/or other higher-educational institutional qualification was around 90 percent. This is a value similar to that found in a sample of deputies elected between 1851 and 1890,¹⁶ which suggests that there was a pattern of continuity with regard to education of the parliamentary elite in both the monarchist and the republican regimes. As far as places of study are concerned, the information we have for 471 deputies shows that 60.5 percent attended the University of Coimbra, 30.8 percent attended higher educational institutions in Lisbon (with an emphasis on the military school), and 7.6 percent attended the same in Porto. There were a further five deputies (1.1 percent) who had carried out their studies abroad. Although the century-long monopoly of the University of Coimbra had been broken in 1911 with the establishment of two new university centers, one in the capital and the other in Porto, throughout the First Republic the role played by either the Faculty of Law at Lisbon or the Technical College in the academic training and socialization of the political elite was a secondary one.

In European parliaments of the time the weighting of university graduates varied. In Spain, according to a sample of deputies between 1914 and 1923, this figure was almost 90 percent.¹⁷ In the Third French Republic the prevalence was less pronounced and declined over time (81 percent between 1893 and 1919, 70.9 percent between 1919 and 1940)¹⁸; in the Netherlands in the interwar period, the percentage of deputies with university studies stabilized at between 40 and 50 percent¹⁹; finally, in Germany, during the sunset of the Weimar Republic, it fell to around 30 percent.²⁰

Turning now to the Portuguese case and examining the data regarding the academic area chosen by the deputy with higher educational studies, three main areas can be detected, with the traditional and indisputable supremacy of legal training and a significant presence concerning military and medical training. In a study sample of 581 deputies, 41.1 percent had an Ordinary or Honors degree in law, while those from the military (21.5 percent) and medical schools (20.5 percent) occupied an almost identical relative position.

The weighting of jurists was greater than two-fifths in each legislature, with the exception of the Constituent Assembly, where it showed its lowest level (31.5 percent); the highest ratio was recorded in the Seventh Legislature (50.4 percent). The presence of members of the armed forces with higher educational studies remained constant until the Third Legislature and then oscillated; the highest parliamentary presence of this category occurred during the Sixth Legislature (25.7 percent) and the lowest in the seventh and final legislature (12.4 percent). Graduates in medicine had an unusually high level of involvement (28.8 percent) in the Constituent Assembly/First Legislature, thus threatening the traditional hegemony of the jurists, and recorded their lowest presence during the Sixth Legislature (12.4 percent).

The academic background framework was not simply and mechanically projected onto the occupational framework of a group (for example, there were graduates in law or in medicine who were rural landowners and civil servants) but, obviously, there tended to be a strong congruence between scholarly path and professional opportunities and careers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the legal (lawyers, notaries, and judges), military, and medical professions were the principal sources of recruitment for deputies for the First Republic.

Over time, the “men of law”—in particular, the lawyers—have been ubiquitous in parliamentary life in many countries. Their natural vocation (in terms of their technical competencies, rhetorical abilities, negotiation skills, and availability of time) for political activity, and in particular to carry out representational and legislative functions, was long ago diagnosed by Max Weber and is a subject widely described in the literature on elites. In Portugal during the First Republic, the deputies originating from the world of the legal professions (in which one could also include some professors of law who were eminent lawyers) slightly exceeded one-fifth of the total, and only in the Constituent Assembly/First Legislature and in the Third Legislature (Sidonist) were they not the most represented single category. The highest percentage, around 30 percent, was obtained in the last two legislatures of the Republican regime.

The dominance of law professionals, especially lawyers, was much more pronounced in the parliaments of other countries. In France, between 1885 and 1936, 27 percent of the deputies came from advocacy²¹; in Spain, they were the professional group most represented in parliament, both in the final stages of the Restauración²² as well as in the Second Republic²³ (more than one-third of the deputies); it was the

TABLE 3.5 ACADEMIC AREA OF DEPUTIES WITH HIGHER EDUCATIONAL STUDIES

Area of Academic Training	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total* (1911-26)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agronomy/ Veterinary	4	1.8	3	2.3	4	3.2	2	1.5	1	0.9	2	1.5	4	3.5	11	1.9
Law	69	31.5	54	41.8	58	46.8	59	44.4	50	42.7	64	47.1	57	50.4	239	41.1
Engineering	7	3.2	3	2.3	6	4.8	7	5.3	8	6.8	4	2.9	5	4.4	24	4.1
Pharmacy	7	3.2	2	1.5	0	0.0	5	3.7	3	2.6	2	1.5	0	0.0	11	1.9
Humanities†	8	3.7	6	4.7	4	3.2	4	3.0	4	3.4	4	2.9	3	2.7	18	3.1
Mathematics/ Nat. Sciences	5	2.3	2	1.5	3	2.4	8	6.0	7	6.0	7	5.1	9	8.0	23	4.0
Medicine	63	28.8	27	20.9	18	14.5	21	15.8	22	18.8	17	12.5	18	15.9	119	20.5
Military‡	52	23.7	30	23.3	29	23.4	22	16.5	21	17.9	35	25.7	14	12.4	125	21.5
Other	1	0.5	1	0.8	2	1.6	1	0.8	1	0.9	1	0.7	1	0.9	4	0.7
No info	3	1.3	1	0.8	0	0.0	4	3.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	1.8	7	1.2
Total	219	100.0	129	100.0	124	100.0	133	100.0	117	100.0	136	100.0	113	100.0	581	100.0

* Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats.

† Including graduates from the Curso Superior de Letras at Lisbon and the Faculty of Theology at the University of Coimbra.

‡ Including members of the armed forces possessing a degree in medicine.

TABLE 3.6 MAIN PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATION OF DEPUTIES

Professional Category	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total* (1911-26)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Lawyer/Notary	41	15.2	36	23.1	33	21.5	40	24.2	26	16.6	37	22.6	34	23.6	142	18.9
Writer/Journalist	14	5.2	5	3.2	6	3.8	3	1.8	2	1.3	1	0.6	4	2.8	25	3.3
Senior civil servant†	7	2.6	9	5.8	2	1.3	11	6.7	5	3.2	3	1.8	5	3.5	18	2.4
Mid-ranking civil servant	13	4.8	10	6.4	7	4.5	19	11.5	11	7.0	11	6.7	12	8.3	49	6.5
Judge	9	3.3	7	4.5	3	2.0	6	3.6	8	5.1	12	7.3	9	6.3	26	3.5
Doctor/Pharmacist	50	18.5	23	14.7	9	5.9	18	10.9	14	8.9	10	6.1	10	6.9	88	11.7
Military doctor	7	2.6	2	1.3	6	3.9	4	2.4	7	4.5	5	3.0	5	3.5	21	2.8
Military/Navy	21	7.8	9	5.8	4	2.6	4	2.4	6	3.8	7	4.3	4	2.8	37	4.9
Military/Army	36	13.3	21	13.5	28	18.3	17	10.3	18	11.5	31	18.9	15	10.4	105	14.0
Businessman	8	3.0	2	1.3	5	3.3	6	3.6	6	3.8	7	4.3	9	6.3	28	3.7
Priest	1	0.4	4	2.6	2	1.3	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.7	6	0.8
Teacher‡	15	5.6	12	7.7	6	3.9	13	7.9	10	6.5	9	5.5	14	9.7	46	6.1
Professor§	16	5.9	2	1.3	9	5.9	8	4.7	8	5.1	11	6.7	4	2.7	36	4.8
<i>Law</i>	2	0.7	1	0.6	4	2.6	1	0.6	1	0.6	5	3.0	2	1.4	12	1.6
<i>Medicine</i>	6	2.2	0	0.0	1	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.6	0	0.0	7	0.9
Rural landowner	13	4.8	5	3.3	17	11.1	4	2.4	12	7.6	9	5.5	11	7.6	49	6.5
Other	10	3.7	3	1.9	3	2.1	8	4.9	5	3.2	4	2.4	4	2.9	21	2.8
No info	9	3.3	6	3.8	13	8.6	3	1.9	19	12.0	7	4.3	3	2.1	54	7.2
Total	270	100.0	156	100.0	153	100.0	165	100.0	157	100.0	164	100.0	144	100.0	751	100.0

* Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats.

† In addition to the Director-Generals and other administrative heads of ministries, including a diplomat in the 3rd legislature.

‡ Primary and secondary education teachers.

§ University Professor. The two most representative subcategories are listed in italics.

same in Italy, with the percentage in the last two liberal parliaments being around 45 percent.²⁴ A contrasting example was provided by the Reichstag, in which, as Weber had already noted and recent empirical studies have confirmed, “the poor representation of lawyers [. . .] was a permanent trait of German political life.”²⁵ Less common on the European scene, however, was the number of members of the armed forces,²⁶ along with doctors who settled into the Lower Chamber of the First Portuguese Republic. The former, irrespective of their branch or speciality, made up about 22 percent of the total number of representatives, thus being the most numerous professional group in the Constituent Assembly/First Legislature and in the Third Legislature (Sidonist). However, it was in the Sixth Legislature (1922–1925) that its percentage was highest (26.2 percent).²⁷ The active role of the members of the armed forces, both in parliament and especially in government (45 percent of the ministers),²⁸ provides evidence of their close involvement in the founding of the Republican regime and the successive political crises that shook it. The high number of doctors (and some pharmacists) who were deputies, especially between 1911 and 1918, was a relative national peculiarity in comparison with other Western European parliaments, with there being perhaps a parallel only in France.²⁹ Though this was not an entirely new phenomenon (in 1890, for example, doctors had made up 12.5 percent of the total of those elected),³⁰ they reached an unusual number during the initial stages of the Republican regime (constituting almost one-fifth of the deputies).³¹ It should also be noted that most doctors were elected on the lists of the Democratic Party outside the major urban centers.

With regard to the parliamentary representation of the other professional groups, we would stress the relative importance of teachers as a whole (about 11 percent of all deputies) and the low weighting of the civil service, rural landowners, and businessmen (merchants and industrialists). The latter gained a reasonable size (6.3 percent) only in the final legislature, following the 1925 general election, in which the União dos Interesses Económicos carried out their own electoral campaign, electing six members. In turn, rural landowners had their greatest parliamentary presence (11.1 percent) during the Sidonist legislature.

The overwhelming majority of the deputies of the First Republic (approx. 80 percent) made their parliamentary debut without any experience in other arenas of institutional power. Unlike the situation in most other European countries,³² the holding of political office at local

and regional levels was not in any way an important requirement in the selection and recruitment of parliamentarians. Of the 751 deputies, only a small minority had served in municipalities (7.7 percent) or as civil governor (8.3 percent) when first taking their seat in the São Bento Parliament. In the final phase of the Republican regime it is, however, possible to observe a tendency toward the recovery of this “political capital” in the *cursus honorum* of the parliamentarians, which had its highest expression in the final legislature, where 19.4 percent of the deputies had previously governed a district and 18.1 percent had been involved in a municipal governing body.

If it was the case that rare indeed were those who had already been in the government when entering the Lower Chamber for the first time (3.7 percent for the whole period), conversely a parliamentary apprenticeship formed part of the career path of most ministers (60 percent),³³ and in particular those who were civilians. It should also be emphasized that the proportion of deputies who had had ministerial experience tended to increase in the postwar period, reaching levels of 21 percent and 26 percent, respectively, in the last two legislatures.

The Constituent Assembly and the Sidonist legislature, both associated with moments of “rupture” and a profound renewal of parliamentary individuals, were naturally the two lower chambers with representatives possessing a greater level of political inexperience among their members.

The dominant features of parliamentary careers in the First Republic were their instability and short duration: almost two-thirds of the deputies were elected for a single term of office. Although some of these later joined the Senate, the proportion of members of the bicameral Congress who held office for only one elected term, whether as deputy or senator, totaled 56 percent. Conversely, the “veteran” deputies who served three or more terms of office (whether consecutive or not) made up only 14 percent of the total number of members. This contrasts sharply with the pattern of stability observed in the monarchic regime between 1851 and 1890, when only around one-third of the deputies were elected for a single term, with 46 percent being elected three or more times.³⁴ It is also noteworthy that during the First Republic no deputy served in all seven legislatures.

In a brief international comparison, we can call on two well-documented examples that illustrate different situations. Thus, in the Third French Republic 46 percent of its deputies served only one term of office and 33 percent served three or more,³⁵ while in the fleeting

TABLE 3-7 POLITICAL POSTS PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT BY THE DEPUTIES*

Political Offices	C.A. + 1st Leg. (1911-15)		2nd Leg. (1915-17)		3rd Leg. (1918-19)		4th Leg. (1919-21)		5th Leg. (1921)		6th Leg. (1922-25)		7th Leg. (1925-26)		Total† (1911-26)	
	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡	No.	%‡
Deputy	-	-	79	51.0	14	9.2	73	44.8	88	56.1	114	67.9	89	61.8	-	-
Senator	-	-	3	1.9	2	1.3	5	3.0	3	1.9	4	2.4	5	3.5	7	0.9
Civil governor	15	5.6	17	11.0	8	5.2	25	15.8	14	8.9	25	15.2	28	19.4	62	8.3
Colonial governor	1	0.4	3	1.9	1	0.7	4	2.4	1	0.6	3	1.8	2	1.4	7	0.9
Minister	9	3.3	11	7.1	5	3.3	19	12.1	33	21.0	43	26.1	39	27.1	28	3.7
Mayor/Councillor	12	4.4	10	6.5	7	4.6	13	7.9	13	8.3	13	7.9	26	18.1	58	7.7
<i>Held political office:</i>																
Yes	38	14.1	95	61.3	31	20.3	99	60.0	102	65.0	133	81.1	110	76.4	151	20.1
No	232	85.9	60	38.7	122	79.7	66	40.0	55	35.0	31	18.9	34	23.6	600	79.9
TOTAL	270	100.0	155	100.0	153	100.0	165	100.0	157	100.0	164	100.0	144	100.0	751	100.0

* Considering only political offices held in the First Republic. Multiple coding has been applied whenever a deputy has held several political positions, therefore percentages may not total 100.

† Percentages always calculated relative to the total of members elected per legislature.

‡ Number of real individuals, regardless of accumulated parliamentary seats. Previous experience as deputy is considered from the date of first election.

TABLE 3.8 LENGTH OF PARLIAMENTARY CAREERS IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC

No. of Terms of Office	In the Lower Chamber		In the Senate		In Congress	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1	488	65.0	205	69.1	520	56.1
2	158	21.0	48	16.2	230	24.8
3	46	6.1	21	7.1	82	8.8
4	35	4.7	9	3.0	52	5.6
5	19	2.5	8	2.7	25	2.7
6	5	0.7	5	1.7	15	1.6
7	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.4
Total	751	100.0	296	100.0	928	100.0

Second Spanish Republic just over two-thirds of the deputies (68 percent) served in only one of the three legislatures.³⁶ As Juan Linz has emphasized with regard to the Spanish experience, a high level of coming and going of deputies, and—aggravated by the early dissolution of parliaments—the instability and brevity of their careers, are factors that would have inhibited the institutionalization and professionalization of parliamentary functions, thus negatively influencing the effectiveness of the law-making process and the political ability to form stable governments and coalitions.³⁷ This fact also helps to explain the parliamentary and political dynamics of the First Portuguese Republic.

Aside from the Constituent Assembly, the Third Legislature (that of Sidónio Pais) had the highest parliamentary turnover; 90.8 percent of the deputies took their seats for the first time. In the Fourth Legislature the ratio of new deputies was still more than half (55.2 percent). Conversely, the Sixth and Seventh Legislatures had the lowest number of deputies making their debut (30.9 percent and 37.8 percent, respectively). Moreover, it should be emphasized that in interwar Europe, plagued by social and political upheavals, the circulation of parliamentary elites was intense. For example, in France in only one legislature was the percentage of deputies entering as newcomers less than 40 percent,³⁸ and in the United Kingdom, in the six elections held between 1922 and 1935, turnover in the House of Commons averaged 44 percent.³⁹

During the First Republic parliamentary careers were generally short and unstable, but the spatial analysis of political representation of that

TABLE 3.9 FIRST-TIME DEPUTIES PER LEGISLATURE

Legislatures	Total of	First-Time Deputies [†]	
	Deputies*	No.	%
C.A. + 1st	270	270	100.0
2nd	155	76	49.0
3rd	153	139	90.8
4th	165	91	55.2
5th	157	70	44.6
6th	165	51	30.9
7th	143	54	37.8

* Total number of elected deputies in each legislature.

[†] Parliamentary experience during the Monarchy not included.

period shows a high degree of stability and solidity with regard to the geographical linkage of the deputies.

Firstly, as shown by the data collected for two legislatures, a large majority of the members had a connection (for multiple reasons: birth, family ties, place of study, and occupation) to the electoral district for which they had been elected. Thus, in the Second and Seventh Legislatures, they made up two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively, of the deputies, with the dominant tie being place of birth. In opposition to these “sons of the land” there was a large minority, but in apparent decline, of “parachutist” deputies (to use present-day terminology), who had no consistent connection linking them to the constituencies to which they had been elected. At the time, both in Spain⁴⁰ as in France,⁴¹ political representation had strong local and regional roots; conversely, the United Kingdom, despite the general practice of small single-member constituencies, had a low percentage of deputies with a direct link to their constituency during this same period (around 30 percent, both in 1900 and in 1918).⁴²

Moreover, in the First Republic the spatial mobility in parliamentary careers was relatively weak. Of the 262 deputies who were reelected, we have complete information for 234: of these, over half (53.8 percent) always represented the same constituency and two-fifths (39.7 percent) represented two constituencies, generally located in the same regional area. True “migrant” deputies, whose parliamentary career did not have a stable geographical base, formed a small minority.

NOTES

1. As regards the relevance of prosopographic studies, see, among others, the summary by Bernard Lacroix, “Six observations sur l’intérêt de la démarche prosopographique dans le travail historiographique,” in *Les Parlementaires de la Troisième République*, eds. Jean-Marie Mayeur, Jean-Pierre Chaline, and Alain Corbin (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003), 27–42.

2. O Recrutamento Parlamentar em Portugal, 1834–1926, research project coordinated by Pedro Tavares de Almeida with the financial support of the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (POCTI/HAR/58007/2004).

3. *Parlamentares e Ministros da 1ª República, 1910–1926* (Lisbon: Assembleia da República e Edições Afrontamento, 2000).

4. In accord with the Constitution ratified on August 21, 1911, establishing a bicameral parliamentary system, Congress was made up of 163 deputies and 71 senators. The 234 members elected the future senators from among themselves, with the others moving to the Lower Chamber.

5. See A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *A Primeira República Portuguesa: Alguns Aspectos Estruturais*, 2nd ed. (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1975), 137.

6. See Heinrich Best, Christopher Hausmann, and Karl Schmitt, “Challenges, Failures, and Final Success: The Winding Path of German Parliamentary Leadership Groups Towards a Structurally Integrated Elite, 1848–1999,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, eds. Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 184.

7. See Juan J. Linz, Pilar Gangas, and Miguel Jerez Mir, “Spanish Diputados: From the 1876 Restoration to Consolidated Democracy,” *ibid.*, 401.

8. This fact is consistent with the results obtained from the study of the geographical origins of the ministers of the constitutional monarchy and of the First Republic: those born in Lisbon made up 29.8 percent and 19.7 percent, respectively (see Pedro Tavares de Almeida and António Costa Pinto, “Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power,” in *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000*, eds. Pedro Tavares de Almeida, António Costa Pinto, and Nancy Bermeo (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 20–21.

9. See Pedro Tavares de Almeida, “A Construção do Estado Liberal” (PhD thesis, FCSH-UNL, 1995), 146.

10. See José Luis Gómez Navarro, Javier Moreno Luzón, and Fernando del Rey Reguillo, “La elite parlamentaria entre 1914 y 1923,” in *Con Luz y Taquígrafos: El Parlamento en la Restauración (1913–1923)*, ed. Mercedes Cabrera (Madrid: Taurus, 1998), 111. Commenting on this fact, the authors state that Madrid “had clearly shown itself to be a city exporting political professionals.” See also Linz et al., “Spanish Diputados,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 389 (note 6 above).

11. In this regard, it should be noted that the Ministry headed by Sidónio Pais was also the youngest of the First Republic (see A. H. de Oliveira Marques, “Estudos sobre Portugal no século XX: aspectos do poder executivo,” *O Tempo e o Modo*, nos. 54–55 (1967), 775–88.

12. See Michael Rush and Valerie Cromwell, “Continuity and Change: Legislative Recruitment in the United Kingdom, 1868–1999,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 487 (see note 6 above).

13. See Ineke Secker, “Representatives of the Dutch People: The Smooth Transformation of the Parliamentary Elite in a Consociational Democracy, 1849–1998,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 290 (see note 6 above).

14. See Sylvie Guillaume and Bernard Lachaise, “Essai de synthèse régionale,” in *Les Parlementaires de la Troisième République*, 81 (see note 1 above).

15. For example, in liberal Italy the minimum age to be elected to parliament was fixed at thirty years of age, and in Spain of the Restauración at twenty-five years of age. In Portugal the legal limit was twenty-one years of age.

16. See Tavares de Almeida, “A Construção do Estado Liberal,” 152 (see note 9 above).

17. See Gómez Navarro et al., “La elite parlamentaria,” *Con Luz y Taquígrafos*, 115–16 (see note 10 above). The study by Juan J. Linz et al., cited in note 7 above, does not provide specific information about deputies with higher educational studies in the Second Republic.

18. See Éric Anceau, “Les écoles du Parlement: Les types de formation des parlementaires,” in *Les parlementaires de la Troisième République*, 194 (see note 1 above).

19. See Secker, “Representatives of the Dutch People,” 292, in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 290 (see note 6 above).

20. See Best et al., “Challenges, Failures, and Final Success,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 173 (see note 6 above).

21. See Heinrich Best and Daniel Gaxie, “Detours to Modernity: Long-Term Trends of Parliamentary Recruitment in Republican France, 1848–1999,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 107 (see note 6 above).

22. See Gómez Navarro et al., “La elite parlamentaria,” in *Con Luz y Taquígrafos*, 115–20 (see note 10 above).

23. See Linz et al., “Spanish Diputados,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 412–417 (see note 6 above).

24. See Fulvio Cammarano, “‘Une Occupation Agréable et Rentable’: Recherche sur les Deputes de L’Italie Libérale,” in *Les Parlementaires de la Troisième République*, 410 (see note 1 above); see also Maurizio Cotta, Alfio Mastropaolo, and Luca Verzichelli, “Parliamentary Elite Transformations Along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy, 1861–1999,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 236–39 and 244–45 (see note 6 above).

25. Best et al., “Challenges, Failures, and Final Success,” 166 (see note 6 above).

26. See Paulo Guinote, “Os militares no Parlamento da 1 República,” in Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, *IX Colóquio: Os Militares na Sociedade Portuguesa* (Lisbon: 1999), 395–435.

27. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 have quite significant discrepancies concerning data relating to the Armed Forces. The reason is that table 3.5 contains only members of the Armed Forces for whom higher educational studies were confirmed, whether carried out at the Army School or the Navy School, or at university.

Whenever the sources consulted did not allow clarification or provide documentation concerning the level of academic studies of the members of the Armed Forces, these were classified in our database in the “no information” category.

28. See Tavares de Almeida and Costa Pinto, “Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999,” in *Who Governs Southern Europe?*, 41 (see note 8 above).

29. Between 1877 and 1914 representation by doctors stabilized at 10–12 percent (see, in particular, Jack D. Ellis, *The Physician-Legislators of France: Medicine and Politics in the Early Third Republic, 1870–1914* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 4). In Spain, doctors were also significantly present in parliament in the Second Republic, above all in the first (10.3 percent) and final legislatures (8.9 percent) (see Linz et al., “Spanish Diputados,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 417 [see note 6 above]).

30. See Pedro Tavares de Almeida, *Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista* (Lisbon: Difel, 1991), 185.

31. See “Médicos nas Constituintes,” *A Medicina Contemporânea*, vol. 29, no. 24 (1911), 131. Of note is the fact that more than fifty doctors ran for office in the 1915 General Election (see “Variedades,” *A Medicina Contemporânea*, vol. 33, no. 24 [1915], 97).

32. See, namely, Best and Cotta, eds., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe* (see note 6 above). In neighboring Spain, the study of the parliamentary elite between 1914 and 1923 also showed that most had a “*cursus honorum alejado de las instituciones locales*,” but this non-linking was not as pronounced as in Portugal: a little over one-quarter of the deputies of the Restauración had started out in the *ayuntamientos* and *diputaciones provinciales* with regard to their upward political path (see Gómez Navarro et al., “La Elite Parlamentaria,” in *Con Luz y Taquígrafos*, 122 [see note 10 above]).

33. See Tavares de Almeida and Costa Pinto, “Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999,” 48 (see note 8 above).

34. See Tavares de Almeida, “A Construção do Estado Liberal,” 143 (see note 9 above). In the United Kingdom, where the average parliamentary career for MPs was high, between 1868 and 1899 only 8 percent of conservative deputies and only 15 percent of liberal deputies were elected for just one term of office; between 1900 and 1917, the equivalent percentages were 6.5 percent and 20 percent, respectively, albeit that from the beginning of the twentieth century onward opportunities for the reelection of liberal deputies were hampered due to the direct competition from candidates running for office for the recently established Labour Party. See Michael Rush, *The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 132.

35. See Mattei Dogan, “La Stabilité du personnel parlementaire sous la Troisième République,” *Revue Française de Science Politique* 3 (1953), 323.

36. See Linz et al., “Spanish Diputados,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 431 (see note 6 above).

37. *Ibid.*, 432.

38. See Best and Gaxie, “Detours to Modernity,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 111 (see note 6 above).

39. See Rush, *Role of the Member of Parliament*, 79 (see note 34 above). A revealing contrast is provided to us through the average amount of the turnover

in the fifteen elections held for the House of Commons between 1945 and 1997: 27.1 percent.

40. See Gómez Navarro et al., “La Elite Parlamentaria,” in *Con Luz y Taquígrafos*, 122–130 (see note 10 above).

41. See, in particular, Guillaume and Lachaise, “Essai de Synthèse Régionale,” in *Les Parlementaires de la Troisième République*, 65–85 (see note 1 above).

42. See Rush, *Role of the Member of Parliament*, 204 (see note 34 above). For a wider comparative analysis and conceptualization of the relations between territory and political representation, see Mogens N. Pederson, Ulrik Kjaer, and Kjell A. Eliassen, “The Geographical Dimension of Parliamentary Recruitment: Among Native Sons and Parachutists,” in *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe*, 160–90 (see note 6 above).

Politics and the Azorean Church under the First Portuguese Republic

SUSANA GOULART COSTA

In order to analyze the establishment of the Portuguese Republic in 1910 and its subsequent political trajectories, we must study the relationship between the Church and the new political regime. Indeed, Portugal has been a Catholic country since its foundation in the twelfth century. The Republican experience in relation to the Church, moreover, represented a third phase of antagonism between the two, after the secular legislation introduced during the reign of King José I (in the person of Marquis de Pombal) and the initial phase of the liberal movement in the nineteenth century. A close look at this relationship is further warranted by the fact that the Church (along with the municipalities) is the only institution in Portugal to have outlived all the political regimes—absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, First Republic, *Estado Novo*, and Second Republic. The situation in the Azores is the focus of this paper, especially in terms of how the Diocese of Angra adapted to the upheaval brought by the First Republic.

Ten years before the establishment of the First Republic on October 5, 1910, the census of 1900 indicated that 99.8 percent of the Azorean population professed the Catholic faith and were under the leadership of the Bishop of Angra and the clergy appointed to give spiritual guidance on the nine islands. The three districts of the Azores had a total of 314 pastors: Angra averaged one priest per 700 inhabitants, Horta one per 603 inhabitants, and Ponta Delgada one per 935. The ecclesiastic geography of the archipelago was similar to that of the north of the

mainland, where Braga, for example, had one priest per 425 inhabitants, Bragança one per 653, and Viseu one per 716.¹

These figures indicate how liberal criticism against the Church, which had generated the legal framework of the 1830s, had lost much of its initial vigor. Indeed, after civil unrest ended and especially with the Concordat of 1848, the constitutional monarchy reinforced the alliance between the political and religious spheres, while the change from the absolutist to the liberal regime was more formal than real.² The heir to the crown, the president, and members of the Assembly and their royal counterparts, as well as university students, were all obliged to profess the Catholic religion. The faithful were required to marry in the Church and divorce was prohibited. Bishops were chosen by the state, had a seat in the parliament, and, along with the dioceses, were financially supported by the national budget. In addition, all ecclesiastic benefits were assigned by the state and priests were entitled to publicly funded retirement.

Given the status of the Church in liberalized Portugal, criticism of the clergy declined and organisms that promoted the faith, particularly the congregations, were reactivated. After the 1860s, religious orders reappeared in the archipelago, as they did in the mainland. By the end of the century, however, the movement against congregations was on the rise and the Diocese of Angra reacted. In 1907, the *Ecclesiastic Bulletin of the Azores* published Pope Pius X's encyclical on the errors of the modernist doctrines. In 1909, the bishop of Angra, Manuel Damasceno, pointed to the dangers of *Espiritismo*, which led some Azoreans to consult "gyrating tables, the plague imported from America," and "spirits through mediums."³ In truth, the Church of the Azores acknowledged that many members no longer fully identified with Christian dogma, while the appearance of new values filled a void that the Church either would not or could not fill. As Manuel Clemente aptly stated, from 1820 to 1910 Catholicism in Portugal became more and more a religion of the state and less and less a religion of the society.⁴ On the eve of the Republic, therefore, the political situation was particularly noxious for the Church. The institutional connection between the Catholic religion and the state, which had been fundamental to the survival of the Church during the liberal period, was particularly detrimental, as the moribund monarchy dragged the Catholic Church down along with itself.

The crippling of the Catholic Church occurred between October 1910 and April 1911. During this period Republicans expelled religious orders from Portugal and nationalized their property; in addi-

tion, they secularized religious holidays; permitted divorce; abolished the teaching of Christian doctrine in primary schools; mandated the civil registry of births, marriages, and deaths; enforced legislation prohibiting church burials; and banned the wearing of religious vestments outside church buildings. This move toward secularization would culminate in legislation, passed on April 20, 1911, mandating the separation of church and state; Catholicism ceased to be the religion of the state, religious freedom was guaranteed to all, and other religions were accepted in Portugal. This law went further, however. The administration of churches and chapels, once under local parishes, became dependent on *Cultuais*, lay associations without members of the Church that oversaw all religious services and property. Bishops and priests were no longer dependent on the state for their upkeep but relied directly upon the generosity of the faithful, although the Republic was willing to award a lifelong pension to all clergy who submitted a written request. This would lead to a breach between priests receiving pensions, who sympathized with the Republican regime, and more traditional clergy, who remained faithful to the monarchy.⁵

The first formal reaction of the Diocese of Angra occurred about a year and a half after the Republic had been established. This delay was not due to the lack of a bishop, for the diocese was under the competent leadership of Canon António Maria Ferreira. Indeed, José Augusto Pereira attributed this “religious phobia,” which was particularly felt in Terceira, to the strong attachment this island had to the liberal cause, to the fact that Angra was the seat of the Bishopric, and to the hostilities against the congregations that pitted religious agents against the laity.

From the spring of 1911 to 1915, the Azorean diocese launched a strong attack against the young Republic. On May 15, 1911, one month after the law of separation, the clergy of Angra and the educators of the Angra Seminary drafted a protest against the April 20 law, which they considered “offensive to the rights of the Church and the freedom of Catholics.”⁶ The following months led to the support of the clergy in São Miguel, Faial, Pico, São Jorge, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Flores, and Corvo.⁷ In sum, 297 priests signed the motion, which corresponded to 94.5 percent of the islands’ clergy.

The enforcement of the law of separation after July 1, 1911, brought renewed protests from the diocese, namely because the newly created local commissions of Church property began to take inventory of the holdings. Furthermore, the *Cultuais* began to appear in Terceira

(Serreta, Raminho, and Angra).⁸ On July 11, Canon António Maria Ferreira directed a complaint to the president of the Angra Commission⁹ protesting against the confiscation of the Seminary and the bishop's official residence; although the bishop did not live there, it was the ecclesiastic headquarters.¹⁰ Despite this protest, the Seminary and official residence came under state jurisdiction and an inventory of Church property began in the summer of 1911. Letters and telegrams attest to the involvement of civil authorities in this dispute, both regionally (governor and municipal administrators) and nationally (Minister of Justice), a clear illustration that opposition to the Church was, indeed, one of the pillars of the new regime. The persistent confiscation of religious property and collection of "mandatory" pensions¹¹ amounted to a Republican strategy to weaken the Church financially, thereby forcing it to accept the benefits offered by Republican legislation.¹²

Financially speaking, the law of separation meant that, for the first time since 1534, the Diocese of Angra was no longer economically dependent on the political power.¹³ As a result, in 1912 the newly elected vicar, Dean José dos Reis Fisher,¹⁴ organized a Diocesan Council to Aid Worship and Clergy in order to guarantee the livelihood of the Church in the Azores through the monetary and food donations of the faithful.¹⁵ Similar to the rest of the country, this measure was meant not only to maintain religious services, but also to guarantee the livelihood of priests without pensions and of diocesan agents through the application of 10 percent of the donations of the community's Catholics.

Popular criticism and support of Republican measures were divulged in the press. When, three months after the Fifth of October, a speech against the monarchy caused turmoil in the town of Ribeira Grande, a local newspaper justified the unrest by affirming that, although the townspeople accepted the new regime, they would not allow "ill to be spoken of the monarchy."¹⁶ Innovations in the religious realm were part of the debate, obviously. When, on April 1, 1911, a procession filed in an orderly manner through the streets of Ponta Delgada, the same paper, *Açoriano Oriental*, deemed this popular manifestation to be "a formal affront to those who alleged that religious faith was waning."¹⁷ When the governor of the district of Ponta Delgada asked the government to clarify its position in terms of religious manifestations in public, the response was that these were authorized as long as public order was maintained. For conservatives, the problem was exactly the opposite: public disorder would result if traditional processions were not held.¹⁸

Many other matters related to the new regime shook local society. Legislation permitting divorce, for example, was especially attacked by the traditional press. This is apparent when the *Açoriano Oriental* of February 11, 1911, lamented the position taken by Teófilo Braga—who, as a philosopher, had criticized divorce but, as a politician, had legalized it—and questioned how “the two Teófilos” could live together.¹⁹ Ecclesiastic dress, which the Church had required in religious and civil contexts over the centuries, was another bone of contention. On July 1, 1911, the women of the village of Santa Bárbara, Terceira, prevented the priest from going outside without wearing his religious garb, which prompted the civil authorities to intervene and take the cleric prisoner.²⁰ In September of that same year, the governor of Angra asked the vicar general to take action against priests who continued to appear in public wearing their cassock, a clear breach of the Law of Separation.²¹

Church bells, symbols of the secular power of Catholicism, also generated conflict. As tension mounted, in São Miguel, for example, the administrator of Vila Franca do Campo ordered that local church bells were to be painted green and their clappers painted red, which caused a general uproar.²² Meanwhile, during a funeral that took place on June 9, 1911, in Ribeirinha, Terceira, the women, outraged with the absence of the “death knell,” leveled the church doors and proceeded to toll the bells themselves.²³

Meanwhile, in the village of Topo, São Jorge, a priest who supported the monarchy was prevented from assuming his new office, while in Urzelina hostility toward the pastor led to his imprisonment. In the village of Achadinha, São Miguel, the priest was accused of wrongdoing and sent to Lisbon for trial. In Feteira, Faial, the vicar was found guilty of promoting episcopal resistance and was forced to pay a fine. Whether strange or isolated, these situations illustrate the convulsions brought by the Republic. The social environment was volatile, the relative influence of public figures and popular forces varied, and Freemasonry had a role that must not be neglected.²⁴

In 1913, after two tumultuous years, political and religious agitation subsided and the Church fared well. Despite the weakened position of the clergy, the division of the diocese between Terceira and São Miguel, and the deactivation of the seminary, the Catholic Church in the Azores had endured. In 1915 there were only five *Cultuais*, some of which lasted a mere two or three months, all located in the district of Angra.²⁵ That same year, the inventory of church property had been concluded in only the forty parishes of the district of Horta (similar to the situa-

tion in Castelo Branco, Guarda, and Leiria in the mainland). The process was slow in the other two districts of the Azores, where only seven of Angra's forty-one parishes and four of Horta's forty-five parishes had been completed.²⁶ Similarly, the Civil Registry Association in the archipelago had one member in São Miguel and one in Terceira, while in Funchal, Madeira, there were thirty-six. In other parts of the country, however, the Association had equally weak adherence.²⁷ Still, the situation in the Diocese of Angra was paradoxical: while the establishment of the Republic was commemorated in 1911, 1912, and 1913, and the faithful were urged to consult foreign mediums for their horoscopes, religious processions were held annually, as if the Fifth of October of 1910 had never happened.

The outbreak of World War I helped revitalize the Church in Portugal. The government decision to mobilize priests who were less than forty years of age, along with their military inspection in the summer of 1917 as Portugal entered the conflict, lent an aura of victimization to the clergy. Some Azorean priests left to attend military school in Lisbon, while others awaited inspection or transport to the mainland. Although the end of the war in 1918 prevented Azorean clergy from participating in combat, the involvement of priests from the mainland as chaplains was beneficial to the Church. These would play a role in the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1926.²⁸

The government of Sidónio Pais contributed to the renewal of the Church after 1918. The decree of February 23, 1918, impeded the institutionalization of other *Cultuais* and allowed for the participation of the clergy in administration activities, returned the seminaries confiscated in 1911 to the Church, and authorized the teaching of theology. The clergy assumed renewed importance in religious activities, although their political influence remained reduced.

The reinforcement of the connections between Church and state, which was particularly evident during the Pimentismo and Sidonismo periods, corroborates the fact that, as the Catholic hierarchy was forced to adapt to the Republican regime, the Church proved to be agile rather than immobile. In the Azores, this became especially evident after 1915, when the Catholic Union movement was promoted by Bishop Manuel Damasceno da Costa (1915–1922),²⁹ who urged the clergy to perform pastoral service according to the “Social Question” outlined in the *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII.³⁰ Bishop Manuel wrote that “the social, religious, economic, and political phenomenon we observe all

around cannot be resolved by a clergy that is either totally unaware or only superficially aware of the social question.”³¹ He went on to say that this task was not meant only for clerics, but that the participation of the laity was the basis of social regeneration. Clearly, this is a call for a lay apostolate, a pillar of Catholicism since the middle of the nineteenth century.

As noted, the message transmitted by the religious hierarchy deemed the time to be one of social decadence. The difficulties posed by the war and its aftermath were felt by all (as the increase in Azorean emigration corroborated),³² including the clergy. Because monetary devaluation and inflation were recurrent during the 1920s, the Diocese had to augment its support of Azorean churches.³³ Bishop Manuel observed in 1919 that, with the end of the struggle in Europe, another war had begun, as the Church was pitted against “money and pleasure,” the only ideals of the time.³⁴

In 1923, Dean José dos Reis Fisher contributed to the negative appraisal of Azorean society, referring to difficulties in implementing a Christian revival and insisting upon the idea that, although the First World War had ended five years earlier, “the desired peace” had not yet arrived. He named two causes: first, the proliferation of modern ills (unbridled luxury, greed, female depravity, the horror of work . . .) and, second, pride and lack of humility. He went on to criticize contemporary behavior, saying that “no one wants to obey and everyone wants to be in charge,” and that all want to defend their “alleged rights” through protests and strikes.³⁵ According to this diocesan figure, “the fraudulent equality touted by Liberalism is no more than an unattainable utopia. That which characterizes the Universe is not equality, but inequality. No two men are equal.”³⁶

Given their appraisal of contemporary society, diocesan authorities not only diagnosed the situation but also proposed the remedy, which was based on the Catholic Action movement, a single spiritual organism composed of various bodies. To perform its mission of caring for the well-being of Catholicism, this movement relied upon Brotherhoods of the Holy Sacrament, the Prayer Apostolate, the Daughters of Mary Congregation, the Christian Doctrine Congregation, the Saint Vincent de Paul Society, other orders, youth associations, parochial schools, study groups, unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid societies.

Along with the Catholic Action movement, the Angra diocese focused on promoting the rights of full citizenship (for those who were eligible), as it called attention to the political duties of Catholics. This was politi-

cal pedagogy calling for Catholic action or, better still, it was Catholic pedagogy calling for political action. In July of 1917, the Portuguese episcopate decreed that political participation was one of the social obligations of Catholics. Many Azorean Republicans, however, looked askance at the interference of the Church in political matters. The more radical sectors felt that the Church should be restricted to spiritual, liturgical, and ritual matters, as advocated in 1910 and 1911.³⁷ The breakdown of the Republican Party and the situation of Portugal, however, had allowed the Church to reenter the political arena.

This was the context when, in March 1918, Bishop Manuel Damasceno sent a pastoral letter entitled *Catholic and Social Organization: A Civic Obligation*, where he expounded on the political duties of Catholics and expressed approval of their having begun to break through “the apathy where they had been hiding.” Catholics who were registered to vote, therefore, should not only vote but also “vote well.” The appointment of Bishop António Augusto de Castro Meireles (1924–1928) was a clear indication that the Azores were included in the national project to revive Catholicism. Having been the prime deputy of the Catholic Center, once in the archipelago, Bishop António created a diocesan commission of the Portuguese Catholic Center in Angra in 1925.³⁸ The first objective of the new bishop was to achieve a trustworthy political representation in the 1925 elections.³⁹ Clearly, the ecclesiastic hierarchy did not long for the return of the monarchy, but accepted the Republic and utilized every opportunity made available by the regime. On the eve of the 1925 elections, for example, the “good” candidates were defended thus: “Because all the candidates are Republicans, all defend the same ideal and deserve to have a seat in Parliament.”⁴⁰

Not many Azoreans adhered to the Catholic Center, however. In fact, Catholics did not constitute a homogeneous group, but tended to separate into two large and increasingly disparate tendencies. The distance between the two became especially notorious after the second national congress of the Portuguese Catholic Center in 1922, when the words spoken by Oliveira Salazar already expressed the political ideology of the future dictator. On the one hand were those who saw political activity as a means of defending the interests of the Church and Catholicism and considered the political regime secondary, as long as the fundamental principles of morality and honesty were defended. Opposed to these were the Catholics who thought the monarchy was the best regime to uphold the interests of the Church and, consequently, wanted nothing to do with the republican regime.⁴¹ In reality, the issue was not that a

Catholic had to defend the monarchy, but just the opposite: a supporter of the monarchy had to be a Catholic.

These two currents would fade after the military coup of 1926. The Estado Novo regime, formally instituted by the Constitution of 1933, and the increasing impact of Oliveira Salazar, who was deeply connected to the Church and the Catholic Action movement, would prompt the Church in the Azores to react in other ways.

NOTES

1. Strikingly different were the numbers in the districts in the center and south of Portugal, where Lisbon had one priest per 2,048 inhabitants, for example, and Faro had one per 2,273 (A.H. de Oliveira Marques, “A Igreja Católica,” in *Nova História de Portugal* [Lisbon: Presença, 2002], vol. 11, 480).

2. António Matos Ferreira, “A Constitucionalização da Religião,” in *História Religiosa de Portugal* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2002), vol. 3, 37–60.

3. Boletim Eclesiástico dos Açores (BEA), no. 440, 7.

4. Manuel Clemente, “A vitalidade religiosa do catolicismo português: do Liberalismo à República,” in *História Religiosa de Portugal* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2002), vol. 3, 65–127.

5. Maria Lúcia de Brito Moura, *A Guerra Religiosa na Primeira República* (Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, 2004), 149–218.

6. BEA, no. 469, 82–83.

7. Each island followed its own pace. The clergy of Faial da Terra protested at a different time from the rest of São Miguel since they only became familiar with the situation in mid-July. The clergy of Corvo, on the other hand, only adhered on August 2.

8. José Augusto Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra na História dos seus Prelados*, vol. 2 (Angra do Heroísmo: Livraria Editora Andrade, 1954), 40.

9. The presidents of the commissions were administrators of the municipalities.

10. Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 25 (see note 8 above).

11. Moura, *A Guerra Religiosa*, 150–54 (see note 5 above).

12. This becomes clear in a letter dated September 23, 1911, to the Governor of Angra, Francisco de Assis Coelho Borges, when the diocesan spokesman affirms: “Perhaps your Excellency will reiterate what is now said: ‘If Priests are in need, it is because they so desire, for they have been offered pensions.’” (Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 29 [see note 8 above].)

13. Maria Fernanda Eanes, “Angra do Heroísmo, Diocese de,” in *Dicionário de História Religiosa de Portugal* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2000), vol. 1, 67–69.

14. On December 6, 1911, Canon António Maria Ferreira renounced the title of vicar for medical reasons. The next day, Dean José dos Reis Fisher was elected vicar (Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 34–35 [see note 9 above]).

15. *Ibid.*, 43–44.

16. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 3950, January 14, 1911.

17. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 3961, April 1, 1911.

18. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 3960, March 25, 1911.
19. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 3954, February 11, 1911.
20. Canon José Augusto Pereira called this “The Santa Bárbara Incident.”
21. BEA, no. 472, 129–33.
22. Canon José Augusto Pereira observed that this administrator became known as “Mr. Bell-Painter” (cf. Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 47 [see note 8 above]).
23. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 3977, July 2, 1911.
24. In 1909, the Masons had six lodges in the Azores: three in the district of Ponta Delgada, two in Angra do Heroísmo, and one in Horta.
25. Moura, *A Guerra Religiosa*, 193 (see note 5 above); Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 40.
26. The most blatant case occurred in Braga, where the ecclesiastic inventory had been done in only 4 of the 517 parishes (Moura, *A Guerra Religiosa*, 313 [see note 5 above]).
27. *Ibid.*, 247–249.
28. H. A. de Oliveira Marques, “A Igreja Católica,” *Nova História de Portugal* (Lisbon: Presença, 1991), vol. 11, 502.
29. Octávio de Medeiros, *A Igreja nos Açores no primeiro quartel do século XX* (Povoação: Santa Casa da Misericórdia da Povoação, 1997).
30. Francisco Carmo and Octávio de Medeiros eds., *Centenário Rerum Novarum do Papa Leão XIII* (Ponta Delgada: F. Carmo, OHR Medeiros, 1991).
31. BEA, no. 515, 80.
32. From 1910 to 1919, the districts of Ponta Delgada and Angra do Heroísmo had the highest rates of emigration, as 20 percent of the population left, while Horta had a rate of 12.6 percent. In the mainland, only the district of Bragança rivaled the islands, with an 18.1 percent emigration rate, while the remaining districts had lower rates: Leiria (7 percent) and Viana do Castelo (5.9 percent), whereas Beja, Castelo Branco, Évora, Faro, Lisbon, Portalegre, and Porto varied from 1–2 percent. Between 1920 and 1929, emigration rates in the three districts of the Azores fell to 7 percent. Nevertheless, the archipelago continued to have one of the highest rates of emigration, only surpassed by districts such as Aveiro (11.8 percent), Viseu (10.2 percent), and Castelo Branco (8.1 percent). Given the restrictions in North America, Azoreans turned once again to Brazil.
33. Carlos Cordeiro, *Insularidade e continentalidade: Os Açores e as contradições da Regeneração (1851–1870)* (Coimbra: Livraria Minerva, 1992), 186–200.
34. BEA, no. 560, 3–11.
35. BEA, no. 618, 158.
36. *Ibid.*, 161.
37. Pereira, *A Diocese de Angra*, 116–17 (see note 8 above).
38. Cordeiro, *Insularidade e Continentalidade*, 130–49 (see note 33 above).
39. For a closer look at the political activity of the Catholic Center of Angra, see Cordeiro, *Insularidade e Continentalidade*, 164–76 (see note 33 above).
40. *Açoriano Oriental*, no. 4709, November 7, 1925.
41. Cordeiro, *Insularidade e continentalidade*, 153–63 (see note 33 above).

The Changing Historiography of the First Portuguese Republic: A Brief Essay

DOUGLAS L. WHEELER

The historiography of the first Portuguese Republic (1910–1926) has undergone a fascinating renaissance since the 1974–1975 Revolution. Not only has there been a good deal of new historical research on “The Republic,” but there has been important, new historical analysis with substantive answers for many key historical problems of the First Republic. It is an interesting rebirth, too, since the roots of this changing historiography actually precede the Carnations Revolution and since not all the historical puzzles have been pieced together. If the quality of the work varies, in general a good portion of the historical research published has been more professional than much of the work before the late 1960s.

As Richard Robinson aptly suggested in a 1994 review article, however, one key element of this new research preceded the political changes of 1974–1975 and came during the *Caetanato*, 1968–1974, when Portugal was directed if not ruled by Dr. Salazar’s successor, Dr. Marcelo Caetano (1906–1974). After forty years of a polarized, politicized, and largely amateurish journalism and historiography on the First Republic, the pioneering historical analysis of Professor A.H. de Oliveira Marques set the stage for a fresh, more professional, more objective interpretation of the Republic’s disputed history. Though a medievalist by training who was born in the early 1930s, after the Estado Novo was established, Oliveira Marques, in important books, articles, and reviews after 1968, helped rescue the historiography of the First Republic from both

neglect as well as extremist schools of thought. He argued it was the duty of historians to attempt to be objective, to use rational analysis supported by a variety of valid evidence. In the resulting polarized historiography, most ideologues found nothing to admire in Portugal's first genuine effort to establish a more open society and a version of democracy. During the dictatorship, publications on the First Republic served not as scholarship but largely as either a reflection of the dictates of the Estado Novo or as muted, symbolic opposition to that authoritarian regime. Until the late 1960s the most complete study of the history of the Republic was not by a Portuguese but by a Spanish writer, whose 1940s account was later translated into Portuguese. Jesus Pabón's book, *A Revolução Portuguesa*, was little more than a list of catastrophic events, sad trends, and incompetent or malevolent leaders.¹ Certainly the raw statistics of the Republic's travails could not be ignored, even by former Republican stalwarts. One celebrated Portuguese poet, Guerra Junqueira, described that Republic as a "heroic march to the sewer." Not to be outdone, another writer claimed the Republic was merely "a bacchanalia of bedbugs in a rotten mattress."

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF A. H. DE OLIVEIRA MARQUES TO HISTORIOGRAPHY OF 1910–1926

Oliveira Marques's analysis and interpretation of this subject influenced several generations of students, faculty, and readers, beginning especially with his pioneering short survey, *A Primeira República Portuguesa: Alguns aspectos estruturais*.² On a personal note, when that Portuguese historian's pathbreaking book was published in 1971, I was just embarking on my study of the history of Portugal's first genuine attempt at democracy, the First Republic, and I recall how Oliveira Marques's brief book provided much encouragement to me as a novice scholar in this field. His work provided both new material and a new interpretation of the Republic. In a field of history that had been neglected or manipulated, this 1971 volume generated new interest in the 1910–1926 period and encouraged other scholars to enter the field. Open debate on this subject, like many others, had been directly or indirectly discouraged and even penalized by the censorship system as well as by the rigid educational curricula enforced by the Estado Novo dictatorship for more than forty years. Oliveira Marques's work was both a resource and a catalyst of debate on the First Republic during the last phase of the dictatorship.

The historiography in Portugal of the First Republic, or what passed for it, was until the late 1960s characterized by extremes. In terms of the quantity of works available, it was either feast or famine. Few scholars tackled the still largely taboo topic, and most of the writing on it was by amateurs, including journalists, who had ideological agendas, or official “historians” of the dictatorship who either set or followed the regime’s ideological biases regarding the disputed Republic’s history. On the left, a handful of Marxist-Leninist ideologues viewed the Republic as simply a conspiracy of the upper and middle classes against the working classes. Their analysis of the hapless Republic was set in a rigid framework of class struggle, and they faulted Republican leaders in social and economic policies for doing too little and too late to relieve the struggle of the working classes. On the political right, monarchists, integralists, nationalists, fascists, and pseudo-fascists berated the Republic and its discredited leaders both for destroying the country’s economy and finances and for being followers of degenerate ideas derived from the terrible French Revolution, Masonry, and democratic liberalism. They viewed the Republic as the epitome of disorder and the cause of nearly losing Portugal’s overseas empire in Africa and Asia. For religious and moral reasons, Catholic writers denigrated the Republic’s harsh anticlerical laws and actions against the Church and saw the Republic as simply an anticlerical conspiracy that by 1917 had come close to destroying the Catholic Church. Estado Novo ideologues, such as João Ameal, branded “the Republic”—to number it would be lending it too much respectability—simply a conspiracy of the worst elements of Portuguese society, the Masons, radical sailors, and street mobs.³

Under the Estado Novo dictatorship’s educational system, the history of the First Republic had no place in school or university curricula, and any official reference to the Republic’s past demonized the Republican as well as the late constitutional monarchy’s politicians. A major thesis of the Salazarist regime was that the post-1926 *ditadura* saved Portugal from the dastardly “demo-liberal” Republic and that the dictatorship dominated by Salazar was a providential but rational response to the Republican catastrophe. That tragic experience, the thesis suggested, brought only disorder to the Portuguese, a people whose national character, tradition, and pre-1910 history were ill-suited to the imported ideas of individualism, democracy, and liberalism but were well-suited to “organic democracy,” which featured authoritarian rule.

New directions in the Republic’s historiography began before the Carnations Revolution of 1974–1975. They appeared toward the end

of the last phase of the Estado Novo dictatorship, the years 1968 to 1974, when Professor Marcelo Caetano (1906–1980), like Salazar a career university academic, was prime minister. During the so-called *Caetanato* there was a certain relaxation of the control of discussion and discourse, of the censorship of media and books. In Lisbon, for example, many bookstores now carried elements of Marxist-Leninist literature, as long as this material did not discuss Portuguese politics. Of particular note was the publication of the four-volume *Dicionário de História de Portugal*, edited by the career historian and professor Dr. Joel Serrão.⁴ While this work covered all of Portuguese history, it significantly included fresh, objective entries on the history of the First Republic.

One of the contributors on medieval Portugal was António Henriques de Oliveira Marques (1933–2007), who soon turned his attention to the history of the First Republic, when he was abroad teaching Portuguese history in the United States and after his return to Portugal following the replacement of Salazar by Caetano. A career historian, a graduate student primarily in medieval history at the University of Lisbon, Oliveira Marques, whatever his early specialization, became the principal historian of the First Republic during the remainder of his long academic career. His contribution was to encourage teaching and research about the years 1910 to 1926 and to take an objective, rational approach, in the style of the French *Annales* school. In journal articles in the late 1960s and in the key monograph of 1971, cited above, Oliveira Marques presented a concise, factual account of all aspects of the Republic's history, a narrative that emphasized social and economic history without neglecting the demographic, cultural, and political history of both Portugal and its empire.

As Oliveira Marques recorded in the preface of the second edition (1975) of his *A Primeira República Portuguesa*, when his first edition appeared in 1971 it was attacked by ideologues on both the left and the right. His explanation for such attacks was as disarmingly simple, forthright, and clear as was his stated philosophy of writing the 1971 classic: surrounded by a rising sea of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary rhetoric, his book featured “impartiality,” a virtue all too rare in the *guerras historiográficas* of Portugal.

His 1971 monograph was followed in 1972 and 1973 by his magisterial general study, *História de Portugal*, and by a number of monographs, biographies, and collections of documents on the First Republic's history. This work contained three themes: what the First Republic was

and was not; why it failed to accomplish early goals and to survive as a system; and which facets of the history of the Republic still required much more research. His writings on the once-forbidden topic influenced generations of history students and teachers alike.

After the *golpe* of April 25, 1974, and the subsequent Revolution, the system of censorship and repression was ended and new generations of historians now in a functioning democracy had the academic freedom to choose many previously taboo topics. Studying the Republic's past was no longer simply a symbolic act of defiance of the dictatorship, but an attempt to rescue the Republic's contested historiography from the amateurs, the ideologues, and the propagandists so as to write truly professional studies.

The new cohorts, for the most part born in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, included scholars such as César Oliveira, Vasco Pulido Valente, Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Maria Filomena Mónica, Aniceto Afonso, José Medeiros Ferreira, Miriam Halpern Pereira, José Pacheco Pereira, Maria Carrilho, Jaime Reis, António Costa Pinto, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Antonio José Telo, Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Rui Ramos, Fernando Rosas, Maria Fernanda Rollo, João Bonifácio Serra, David Pereira, Vítor Neto, Pedro Lains, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, Maria Alice Samara, Luís Farinha, Ernesto Castro Leal, Ana Catarina, Sílvia Correia, Ana Paula Pires, Joana Dias Pereira, Isabel Pestana Marques, Maria Cândida Proença, Maria Eugénia Mata, and António Reis. Foreign scholars on the subject include Kathleen Schwartzman, Richard A.H. Robinson, J. Derou, Horst Bahro, Stewart Lloyd-Jones, Hipolito de la Torre Gomez, and Douglas Wheeler.

POST-1974-1975 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC (1910-1926): GENERAL TRENDS

A brief survey of some fundamental facts about Portugal's First Republic will serve as introduction to a survey of post-1974 historiography. As Portugal now celebrates the hundredth anniversary of the historic event of October 5, 1910, when the Bragança monarchy was overthrown and the Republic founded, a perspective on its significance in Europe is appropriate. Portugal's was only the third republic in a Europe still dominated by monarchies, preceded only by republics in Switzerland and France.

The new, untried Republic inherited a truly deadly legacy from the late monarchy headed by the young King Manuel II: widespread, deep poverty; a population largely made up of illiterate, rural peasants; a population with 79 percent illiteracy; a very backward agrarian economy with only a slight industrial element; large internal and external (foreign) debts and a history of recent bankruptcies; increasing public violence in late monarchy politics; government instability; and an inert bureaucracy. For two decades before the 1910 revolution had been the so-called Republican Propaganda era, when a growing number of Republicans railed against the troubled monarchy and promised that a republic would feature universal male franchise, full civil and political rights, the legalization of trade unions and the right to strike, and an end to government corruption.

The Republican leadership that emerged after October 5, 1910, promised much but could deliver relatively little. With the exception of some reduction in the national illiteracy rate, educational reforms, a reform and build-up of a declining navy, and some progress in agriculture, administration, and education in the colonies, the Republic's reform schemes largely existed only on paper, despite a plethora of laws and statutes passed by this ineffective parliament. (I will discuss this more later on.) The hysterical euphoria following October 5, 1910, especially in Lisbon and the few large towns, quickly dissipated. The hopes for radical change of initially Republican groups—primarily the urban lower-middle and intermediate-middle classes and elements of the still small but growing working classes—were not fulfilled. (Republicanism had never been strong in the agrarian rural areas of much of the country's interior.) The era did see some advances; citizens who cared to participate enjoyed a larger measure of the freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly than had been the case before 1910. But Republican politicians' windy promises of an expansion of male suffrage were not kept and, despite the formal legalization of unions and the right to strike, most workers suffered from worsening economic conditions, as well as repressive management practices and police action.

By the 1920s, this troubled Republic had become Western Europe's most unstable parliamentary regime, as chaotic and discredited as the besieged monarchy in Spain and the ill-fated Weimar Republic in Germany. The average life of a government in republican Portugal was but four months. There were frequent military *golpes* and attempts at insurrection and increasing public violence—including riots, bomb-

ings, and assassinations—against a backdrop of disastrous economic and financial conditions. The reputation of this bizarre Republic had become a sick political joke, to the extent that the French coined a new word: *portugaliser*, “to bring political chaos to any situation.” Portugal’s national image had reached its lowest point. On May 28, 1926, a *golpe* supported by much of the career army and navy officer corps overthrew the parliamentary Republic and installed a military dictatorship, founded in part to repair the tattered national image. The dictatorship of 1926 to 1933 metamorphosed into the civilian-dominated Estado Novo (“The New State”), controlled by a former university professor of economics and finance, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, who was prime minister from 1932 to 1968.

Until the scholarly publications of Oliveira Marques and Joel Serrão and of Vasco Pulido Valente in 1974–1975—when Valente published the useful book *O Poder e o Povo*,⁵ an edited version of his Oxford University doctoral dissertation on the origins and early years of the Republic—there had been a dearth of serious work on the Republic. But in the 1980s, 1990s, and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, scores of scholars in Portugal published their master’s theses and doctoral dissertations or other research, and the historiographical scene began to look quite different. The sources they utilized, too, reflected a revolution: instead of using only printed works scholars now drew on government records archives, mainly but not exclusively in the Torre do Tombo National Archives (ANTT), the military archives (Arquivo Historico Militar—AHM), and the Foreign Ministry archives and library (Biblioteca e Arquivo do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros—BAMNE). Rules and regulations in such archives, too, were liberalized, and more records were catalogued, declassified, and made accessible to the public.

A second trend of the new historiography of the First Republic was an expanded scope of interest. Though some *estudiosos* were still guided by the *Annales* school of history from north of the Pyrenees, many now pursued a more eclectic selection of topics. Using municipal records, scholars carried out studies of events of the Republic in certain villages and towns. Others produced detailed works on diplomatic, military, political-ideological, social, economic and financial, cultural, and colonial history.

But the fact that substantial research and publication carried out

since the revolution had produced an accurate, detailed portrait of the Republic did not solve all the contentious problems of the Republic's history. I list here several thorny analytical issues. In the years immediately preceding the Fifth of October 1910 there remained questions regarding the regicide's authors and sponsors, as well as the fact that no official report on the tragedy was ever completed. The significance of the regicide in the decline of the monarchy and the coming of the First Republic was also an issue. Especially disputed has been the controversy over the relative importance of the religious question in undermining the Republic—not to mention the not unrelated social question. Historians still need to study not only the extent to which Republican leaders held reformist ideas to address the country's severe economic and financial problems, many inherited from a failing monarchy, but also find a credible explanation of why promised reforms did not take place by 1926. And historians will again debate the extent to which the Salazarist regime itself lacked original reform ideas and instead merely adapted certain Republican ones.

An additional dispute concerned the rationale behind Portugal's decision in 1916, in World War I, to join the Entente or Allied powers and to intervene directly in the European theater fighting. We have also not yet fully explored vigilantism under the Republic, what historian Vasco Pulido Valente described as the Republican "terror." And how important was local bossism (*caciquismo*) in manipulating the relatively large number of elections during this era? This calls into question the extent to which the Republic's elections were free, honest exercises. To these should be added a consideration Oliveira Marques addressed in his prolific writings: whether the First Republic was the end of a political process that began with 1820s constitutional *liberalismo*, or was it rather the beginning of something new, a premature conflicted Portuguese version of a new mass democracy. And, finally, we lack a definitive study of the complex history of the various factional conspiracies in May 1926 to overthrow the Republican regime.

To follow I expand upon three of these still-controversial quandaries, crediting scholars who have added to each history: the 1908 regicide; the Republic's abortive efforts to reform the economy and finances; and the actual motives behind Portugal's disputed intervention in World War I on the Allied side.

First, the case of the regicide of 1908. On February first, in the Terreiro do Paço (now Praça do Comércio), both the reigning King Carlos I and his heir apparent, Prince Luís, were murdered in broad

daylight by Republican assassins. Several curious facts about the aftermath of the tragedy only add to the mysterious, troubled political aura of that time. Instead of a normal, public reaction to the tragedy, wherein the party in office would benefit from a wave of natural sympathy after the outrage, the party was shunned, blamed, and turned out. Further there followed a public cult of reverence for the assassins, complete with pilgrimages to their graves in Lisbon. Though questions remain about this seminal episode, recent research by Rui Ramos has cleared away some of the mythology surrounding the event and has demonstrated that prominent members of the Republican leadership were more implicated in the murder conspiracy than was previously known.⁶

Secondly, the heated question of the failure of the Republic to carry out viable economic and financial reforms. A deadly legacy of the late monarchy was heavy internal and external (foreign) debt, an unbalanced budget, and a weak industrial sector and chronically weak agrarian sector. In an attempt to address these issues, in May 1911 the young Republic passed a legislative package of economic reforms, but this remained largely on paper only. Its execution was postponed for a number of reasons, including government instability and administrative chaos as well as the impact of World War I and Portugal's later participation (1916–1918). It was not until 1922 that the reform measures concerning balancing the budget, consolidating the serious debts, and devaluating the currency were even addressed, but there was little time or opportunity to fully act on them until after the military overthrew the republican regime on May 28, 1926. When by 1931 the subsequent dictatorship tackled these issues, the basic measures they took were not reforms as such, but merely adaptations masterminded by Professor António de Oliveira Salazar, the dictator/prime minister from 1932 to 1968. Substantial clarification of this complex question has come from the research of Professor Maria Fernanda Rollo, who utilized government records as well as publications of the leading economists and financial experts of the day.⁷

And what of the government's motives behind Portugal's intervention in World War I on the Allied side? Significant, pathbreaking research on this topic has been done by several Portuguese scholars, including Nuno Severiano Teixeira and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses.⁸ Recent work by Dr. Teixeira—who has also served in several high-level government posts, including as minister of defense in the prime minister's cabinet—produced a full, credible explanation of the Democrats' rationale for

Portugal entering into combat in the European theater. According to Teixeira, there were three principal motives for Portugal's foreign policy decision in 1916 to join the Allies against the Central Powers. The first was the colonial question: safeguarding Portugal's overseas colonies following German-armed attacks on Angola and Mozambique. These resulted from notorious Anglo-German diplomatic agreements to partition Portugal's African colonies when Portugal was unable to meet all foreign loan payments. Lisbon also had great concern about Portugal's negative international image in Europe, as highlighted by bad British press regarding Portugal's colonial scandals, such as continuing African forced labor and other abuses.

The second motive was the so-called peninsular European thesis or motive, which affected an important faction of the Democrats (the Portuguese Republican Party or PRP). Because of both real and apparent threats against Portugal's national sovereignty from neighboring, larger Spain, Portugal's leading politicians were determined to secure a more respected place for Portugal in Europe and to neutralize the Spanish threat of invasion or annexation. And the third main motive for entering the war: consolidation of the Portuguese Republic, the objective of elements of the Democratic party led by Afonso Costa. Britain pressured Portugal in February 1916 to confiscate all German shipping in Portugal's neutral ports, thereby triggering a German declaration of war against Portugal. In response Portugal's troubled Republic could then both bolster national legitimacy and gain foreign support by joining the Allies, which notably included the French Republic, a kind of political model for the Portuguese Republic's elite. Teixeira's fully documented interpretation of this important foreign policy question, like much in any historiography, is disputable and, depending on the discovery someday of new evidence, could be revised.

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

Although today the long, bitter war of words between monarchists and republicans in Portugal is largely a thing of the past, in 2008, on the occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the 1908 regicide, several publications by declared monarchists—including books, articles, and other media—generated some heated public discussions. Again a few writers demonized the Republic and defended the monarchy, and some of the arguments seemed to echo familiar propaganda of the Estado

Novo era. Such views aroused further debate in the run-up to the 2010 commemorations of the founding of the First Republic.⁹

As for speculation as to how the historiography of the First Republic will develop in the future, undoubtedly the topic will continue to fascinate historians despite the fact that “the question of the regime,” that is, whether Portugal will be a republic or a monarchy, is no longer a realistic political issue. In terms of the immediacy of historical precedent, unlike the case during 1926 to 1974, the First Republic is not the predecessor of the current system—the long-lasting *Estado Novo* is. Therefore the question of the First Republic is a more remote topic for current generations. But since “History” is an unending debate about notable questions, and since all the mysteries of the First Republic have not yet been solved, as long as there are historians and history students in what is now, in effect, the third Portuguese Republic, there will be debates about that sixteen-year episode in contemporary Portuguese history.

NOTES

1. Jesus Pabón, *A Revolução Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Editorial Aster, 1961).
2. Lisbon: Livros Horizontes, 1971.
3. Key verbal attacks of the right on the First Republic, embodied by Ameal’s writings, are found in João Ameal, *História de Portugal* (Porto: Tavares Martins, 1942), and in his essay “Breve resumo da história de Portugal” in *Portugal: Breviário da Patria para os Portugueses ausentes* (Lisbon: Edições SNI, 1946), 139–141; see his brief portrait, etched in vitriol, of the First Republic. A view from the left or left-center by a defender of the “Republic” during the dictatorship’s middle and late years is by journalist Carlos Ferrão, *História da República* (Lisbon: Editorial “O Século,” 1961).
4. *Dicionário de História de Portugal* (Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1963–1971, with later editions).
5. Lisbon: Grádiva, 1974–1975.
6. Rui Ramos, *D. Carlos I: 1863–1908* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2006).
7. Maria Fernanda Rollo, “Paradigmas frustrados: perseguição e fuga da modernidade e do progresso,” in *História da Primeira República Portuguesa*, eds. Fernando Rosas and Maria Fernanda Rollo (Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2009), 232–35.
8. For recent research on this still-significant question, see Nuno Severiano Teixeira, *O Poder e a Guerra 1914–1918: Objectivos Nacionais e Estratégias Políticas na Entrada de Portugal na Grande Guerra* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1996); and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *União Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra (1916–1918)* (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos, 2000).
9. Fernando Rosas and Maria Fernanda Rollo, “Introdução,” in *Historia da Primeira República*, 9–10 (see note 7 above).

FURTHER READING ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF THE FIRST PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

Richard A.H. Robinson's excellent review essay on historiography is "Portugal: The 'New State' and After," *European History Quarterly* 24 (1994), 395-402.

Among the major works of A.H. de Oliveira Marques on the history of the First Republic are *A Primeira Republica Portuguesa: Alguns Aspectos Estruturais* (Lisbon: Livros Horizontes, 1971); his *História de Portugal*, vols. 1-2 (Lisbon: Palas Editores, 1981), cited above; and also his biography of the Republican politician and *enfant terrible* of the first decade of the Republic, *Afonso Costa* (Lisbon: Arcádia, 1975), as well as the sections devoted to the Republic's disputed history in the series he edited and coedited, *Nova Historia da Expansão Portuguesa*, eds. Joel Serrao and A.H. de Oliveira Marques, especially vol. 11, *O Imperio Africano 1890-1930* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2001).

My memorial tribute to the scholarly contributions of historian Oliveira Marques was published as Douglas L. Wheeler, "Tribute to a Historian's Historian: Memories of A.H. de Oliveira Marques (1933-2007)," in *Portuguese Studies Review*, vol. 13, nos. 1-2 (2005-2007), i-viii, and was reprinted in the online Portuguese History journal sponsored by Brown University's Department of Portuguese Studies and the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, *Revista de Historia Portuguesa*.

A superior collection of new studies of various aspects of the First Republic's history is found in Fernando Rosas and Maria Fernanda Rollo, eds., *História da Primeira República Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2009), a work of 614 pages with thirty-three essays by Portuguese historians. All essays are documented, though the level of documentation varies as well as the extent to which each historian draws on government records from archives. Relatively few of these essayists draw on scholarly contributions by foreign scholars, oddly enough, and even though no one in authority during the First Republic has survived, there seems to have been no effort to use the testimony of survivors as to living conditions before 1926. A major theme of this important collection is the many-faceted role of World War I and of Portugal's participation in that conflict in weakening and undermining the Republic and in laying the basis for a dictatorship. Two subjects in this substantial volume are not as fully covered as is warranted: colonial history, and the inner politics of the military and their intervention in politics. The reader is referred to several other books that make important contributions to the study of these subjects: Aniceto Afonso

and Carlos de Matos Gomes, eds., *Portugal na Grande Guerra* (Lisbon: Diário de Notícias, 2003); and Aniceto Afonso's *Portugal e a Grande Guerra, 1914-1918* (Lisbon: Edição do "Diário de Notícias," 2006); Maria Carrilho, *Forças Armadas e a Mudança Política em Portugal no Século XX* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1985); José Medeiros Ferreira, *O Comportamento Político dos Militares: Forças Armadas e Regimes Políticos no Século X* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1992); and A.H. de Oliveira Marques, ed., *O Império Africano 1890-1930*, vol. II in *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, eds. Joel Serrão and A.H. de Oliveira Marques (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2001).

For a general survey history of the First Republic, with special attention to the development of political parties and the military and military intervention in politics, see Douglas L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History, 1910-1926* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978 and 1998). This work is also available in a Portuguese-language edition as *História Política de Portugal, 1910-1926* (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1985 and 2010).

The Second Republic

The Portuguese Transition to Democracy

MARIA INÁCIA REZOLA

On April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—*Movimento das Forças Armadas*) rose against the dictatorial regime that had ruled Portugal for forty-eight years. Nevertheless, the downfall of the dictatorship did not provide for the immediate advent of democracy, and the coup d'état led Portugal into a long revolutionary process of almost two years.

According to Kenneth Maxwell, one of the most important features to emphasize when studying the Portuguese revolution is its international impact, because “the events of the mid 1970s in Portugal also played a significant and precocious part in the great ideological conflict of the twentieth century.”¹ This thesis has been developed by other authors, such as António Telo, Bernardino Gomes, Moreira de Sá, and Nuno Simas, whose studies have disclosed not only the significance of the international context for the course of events in Portugal but also the powerful effect of the revolution in the global balance.²

In fact, it is extremely important to notice that the downfall of the Portuguese dictatorship took place at a turning point in the Cold War after a period during which the decrease of the two superpowers' capacity to exercise their worldwide hegemony became obvious due to several factors: the particular weakness of the United States under the impact of the Vietnam War and Watergate crisis, the strengthening of the European Economic Community, and, finally, the shift in Soviet Union strategy in Europe determined by the *Détente*. In short, the uprising on April 25

came at a time of transition between stages of the international system, and would provide a laboratory for international actors to explore new formulas. Portugal would appear as a kind of lab, but also as a negative example for all subsequent democratic revolutions. We must notice that, since the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Português) was strongly Stalinist and Moscow-oriented, Portugal was the last country in Europe where an apparent attempt was made to put into practice a Communist regime, moreover with a model seemingly based on the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

In conclusion, notes Maxwell, “the chain of events set in motion by the April 1974 coup” had “widespread and long-lasting international ramifications.” At the end, “the triumph for anticommunist democrats” in the Portuguese revolution, on the one hand, “together with the initial victory of the communist-backed forces in Angola in the same period on the other, set in motion many of the forces which would help bring about the end of the Cold War in Europe, by reinvigorating democracy at the grassroots and by escalating the costs of proxy conflicts in the third world.”³

Even though one must emphasize the international context and impact of the Portuguese transition to democracy, in my opinion external factors played a subordinate role. Many political scientists and historians have noticed the original and unexpected nature of this transition, which made it difficult for international actors to take a broad role in it. Without claiming to be exhaustive, I shall point out some of these aspects.

1. The downfall of the Portuguese dictatorship took the international community by surprise. It is usually accepted that when the revolution took place in Portugal the United States had “gone out to lunch.”⁴ As Thomas Bruneau noticed, “relying on stereotypical views of Portuguese society and most of the relevant theoretical literature on state and society in developing countries, no one could have anticipated it.”⁵

2. The Carnations Revolution was the beginning of the “third wave” of democratic transitions in southern Europe, which was followed by transitions in Greece, Spain, Latin America, and, at the end of the 1980s, in Eastern Europe.⁶ As “the first ‘surfer’” on this wave of democratization, as Philippe Schmitter has called it, “it had no one to imitate or learn from” and so “Portugal unavoidably had an unusual transition.”⁷

3. In Spain and in some Latin America countries democracy developed from a plan or negotiation pacts between the old and the new elites. The Portuguese case is rather different; the definition of the new

regime took place amid tensions and battles that almost led to civil war. The coup d'état resulted in the collapse of authority, a breach of the system, and the outbreak of a revolutionary process. The period of 1974–1976 was the most complex phase of the country's transition.

4. While it is impossible to ignore the importance of the military dimension in the Portuguese transition, nevertheless the role of the military is rather unique. Contrary to what normally happens on such occasions, Portugal was a revolution unleashed after a nonhierarchical military coup in which the military presented a political program that led to a dramatic rupture with the previous regime and the beginning of a process of decolonization and democratization. Even more, the military, or more particularly, the moderate officers of the MFA, were essential in the establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal. In this context we can more easily understand Vasco Lourenço, one of main delegates of the “Captains’ Movement,”⁸ when trying to clarify the role played by the army in the revolution:

The armed forces, in any country of the world, are, or tend to be, conservative, because their main mission is to defend, to preserve. However, they can and must be progressive, because our greatest aim is the exaltation of the *patria* [fatherland], and the *patria* is the people. It is for this reason that the regime, any regime that takes power, wants its armed forces to be conservative. We in Portugal have to (and we want to) be progressive.⁹

Although no one seems to ignore the importance of the MFA in the Portuguese revolution, there are very many different interpretations of the roles played by each of the actors in the process: the armed forces, the political parties or movements, and the social forces. Some historians, such as José Medeiros Ferreira or Josep Sánchez Cervelló, tend to attribute to the military a hegemonic and leading position. According to them, the revolutionary process “opened the doors to the military control over society” and this “was so obvious that none of the three powers in which the democratic state is based was free from military interference.”¹⁰ According to José Medeiros Ferreira, “the strategic thinking” in the revolution belonged to the military institution, and the launching of the democratic regime, in 1976, was possible because of the armed forces’ strategic capacity to negotiate with the political parties.¹¹ Ultimately, this interpretative line is a return to the revolutionary military’s own thesis, of the MFA as the engine of the revolution.

A different position is taken by those authors who, without denying the importance of either the military or the social forces, place their

emphasis on the role played by the political elite and, above all, by the parties and political movements. For instance, António Reis gives us the image of a process that “apparently has the military as its main actors,” but, in fact, will be decisively conditioned “by the positions of the different party forces and by the popular support that each of them can attract.”¹² Despite acknowledging the leadership of the MFA during the early moments, Reis gives special emphasis to the moment at which, following the elections to the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975, the parties assume “a new role in politics,” leading to questioning the military vanguard.¹³

Outside of the strictly historiographical stream, other authors concentrate on the role of the popular forces through their street demonstrations and collective action. The sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, for instance, believes that the popular masses were the true creators of the revolution.¹⁴

The radicalization of social movements in 1974–1975 is also the main subject of a large number of studies carried out by mainly foreign political scientists, sociologists, and historians. It is therefore essential to consider works such as those of Nancy Bermeo on the agrarian reform or John Hammond’s studies on urban social movements.¹⁵ From the perspective of this paper, one must refer especially to Durán Muñoz’s analysis of the dynamics of the state crisis under pressure from social movements and to his conclusion that the emergence of the MFA as a political actor is the most important factor in the state crisis during the period 1974–1975.

Because this is one of the central questions to understanding the Portuguese transition to democracy, my aim is to clarify the importance of each of its actors through an examination of the main events of the revolution.

THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (MFA)

The coup of April 25, 1974, was brought about by a strictly military movement of middle-ranking officers—all of them influenced by their wide experience in the colonial war—without the involvement of political parties or organizations. The origins of the Armed Forces Movement are well-known and both authors and protagonists are unanimous in this respect: the meeting that took place in Monte Sobral, Alcáçovas, on September 9, 1973, signals the symbolic beginning of the conspiracy and the birth of the Captains’ Movement. Even though the initial mobiliza-

tion responded to professional matters,¹⁶ the corporate concerns were quickly abandoned. From December 1973 onward, the main concern of the Captains' Movement was the colonial question, which would lead to the decision to overthrow the Salazarist regime as the only way to end the war and to promote a democratic transition. The need to ensure that the process would lead to the instauration of a democratic regime brought the Captains to develop a minimum political program based in three fundamental ideas: decolonization, democratization, and development.¹⁷ At the same time, they identified the sovereign bodies to install in order to guarantee the transition.

No place was provided for the MFA in the new provisional constitutional scheme promoted in the movement's program. Its idea was to delegate the power, which was to be shared by military and civil bodies (both nominated by the MFA). In this context, it mandated the creation of a National Salvation Junta (JSN—Junta de Salvação Nacional), which was to supervise the process until the complete establishment of not only a democratic regime but also a provisional government, responsible for the "day-to-day management" until legislative elections could be held and a legitimate government formed.

Their sense of authority also led the captains to decide beforehand who would be assigned as president and as armed forces chief of staff (CEMGFA) after the downfall of the dictatorship. They intended for the first position to go to General Francisco Costa Gomes, former CEMGFA, and the command of the military forces was assigned to the army's second-in-command and former commander of Portuguese forces in Guinea-Bissau, General António de Spínola. However, as Philippe Schmitter notes, a change of regime always involves its promoters in necessary risks.¹⁸ Despite all of the precautions, the MFA's officers could not guarantee a smooth transition. The situation was complicated by the emergence of a set of unforeseen factors that changed their initial plans. One of the most important elements in this context was social agitation: after the coup "hundreds of labour conflicts erupted throughout the country . . . the scale of popular response to the coup, the mobilization of workers, and the chanting crowds in the streets took the military by surprise."¹⁹ One must also take into account the impact of a collapse of discipline within the armed forces and, above all, the position taken by António de Spínola.²⁰

Even before the coup, heated debates with Spínola forced the captains to make some changes in their program.²¹ Its final version was not finished until the evening of April 25, when, to the surprise of the MFA,

Spínola made new demands. In the end, the program was a precarious compromise between two different visions of the road to follow. Other factors conditioned the captains' decision not to abandon the political process, above all, the way in which the JSN was constituted and the fact that Spínola assumed its presidency (and as a result would be named president of the Republic). Aware of his ideas of how the transition ought to be carried out, the captains decided to remain active.

ANTÓNIO DE SPÍNOLA VERSUS THE MFA
(APRIL–SEPTEMBER 1974)

Spínola had his own political project that was well-known after the publication of his book *Portugal and the Future*. He called for a presidential regime, an emasculated and gradual transition that would take place in an atmosphere of social order, and a federal solution for the colonies (following a referendum). These proposals clearly contradicted the principles of the MFA's program, which called for elections to a constituent assembly within one year, and for the "people's right to self-determination."

In this context, the captains' initial idea of handing over the power after the coup was abandoned. Its early confrontations with Spínola established the ground for the MFA to progressively transform itself into a political agent. Initially the hegemonic strength of Spínola was clear and his attacks and attempts to dissolve the MFA's Coordinating Committee seemed almost successful. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the summer of 1974 the committee gradually took control, forcing Spínola to recognize the people's right to self-determination and independence.²² This process culminated in the events of September 28²³ and in Spínola's subsequent resignation. In conclusion, it is impossible to describe the first months of the Carnations Revolution without making a special reference to the role played by the armed forces, as they were dominated by the struggle between António de Spínola and the MFA.

During this time, the weakness of the political forces was obvious. Decolonization was not only the first great challenge for the new regime but also one of the main issues that gave way to the dispute between the president and the MFA's Coordinating Committee. Nevertheless, the colonial question was just a small part of a much larger political project. Judging by Spínola's first proposals for changing the MFA Program, in which he called for the formation of a military government during the

TABLE 6.1 COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS

	1st Provisional Government		2nd Provisional Government	
	Ministers	%	Ministers	%
Military	1	7	8	47
PS (Socialist Party)	3	20	3	18
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party)	2	13	1	6
PPD (Popular Democratic Party)	2	13	1	6
Independent	6	40	4	24
MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Election Committees)	1	7	-	-

transition, the possibility of a regime that was not just presidentialist but also militarist remained present. Thus Spínola's position led to the MFA becoming more interventionist and taking a strong military tutelage over the civilian authorities. The second Provisional Government was a reflection of this, revealing not only the predominance of the military, but also the significant ground won by the MFA.

MFA'S STRATEGY TO CONSOLIDATE ITS LEADING POSITION (SEPTEMBER 1974–MARCH 1975)

António de Spínola's resignation introduced a new phase in the revolution. He was replaced by Costa Gomes, who had been the MFA's original choice and whose political flexibility was reflected in his nickname "The Cork." As the decolonization problem was already resolved, the MFA promoted the creation of a commission led by one of its most prominent representatives, Ernesto Melo Antunes, to prepare and present a Social and Economic Policy Program. At the same time, the MFA's policy was to bring the revolution "out of Lisbon," by promoting the *campanhas de dinamização cultural*²⁴ in order to explain the revolution's aims. Some of these "missionaries" encouraged the rural workers to take control of the lands and traditional power structures. Finally, MFA's strategy concerning the political power was to not take further chances; after the confrontations with Spínola MFA's main concern was now its institutionalization. It became urgent to clarify

the reach of military power and the effective attributes of the other political power centers.

The first step toward the MFA's institutionalization was the creation of an informal structure—the Committee of Twenty (Conselho dos Vinte, October 1974), all military officers with political and military responsibilities²⁵—whose main goal was to coordinate and supervise MFA's activities. This Committee assumed the position of supreme manager of politico-military life. A little later, the creation of the MFA Assembly (Assembleia do MFA, November 1974), with two hundred representatives from the three branches of the armed forces, sought to give the process a greater stamp of “democratization,” emphasizing the tendency toward the “collegialization” of military authority.

It is often said that the institutionalization of the MFA was part of a wider process of growth of the *gonçalvistas*²⁶ in the military apparatus and in the state structure. This thesis, however, needs to be questioned. Our understanding is that the institutionalization of the MFA through the creation of the Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução) was the result of a metamorphosis of the movement caused by the revolution's development. What were decisive were not the *gonçalvist's* pretensions, but rather the political parties' weakness and the perception of the need for a period of transition that was guided by the military, which could guarantee compliance with the MFA program and avoid the sacrifice of the revolutionary process.

In fact, the institutionalization of the MFA was quite consensual. The debate was started by the political parties, and generically led to the conclusion that it was necessary to guarantee the MFA a place in the future constitutional settlement. With the exception of some extreme-left organizations and the Portuguese Communist Party, which hesitated over the convenience of immediate elections, the belief that it was necessary to join revolutionary and electoral legitimacies, as soon as possible, was then almost unanimous. The leaders of the main political forces, from the PCP to the Social Democratic Centre (CDS), openly defended the celebration of a preconstitutional agreement that ensured the MFA's presence in the political structure. There was also an agreement on the weakness of the political parties (which even they recognized) and, therefore, on the need for a period of transition guided by the military.

On December 31, after almost three months of debate, the decision to institutionalize the MFA was announced. The MFA was to continue as the supervisor of Portugal's democracy after the adoption of the new constitution. This decision aroused a debate within the movement con-

cerning the shape of the institutionalization. In the meantime, a number of conversations aimed at reaching a preconstitutional agreement between the MFA and the political parties took place during the first months of 1975.

THE REVOLUTION IN CRISIS (MARCH–NOVEMBER 1975)

The Spínolists' attempt to regain power, on March 11,²⁷ was used to speed the already anticipated institutionalisation of the MFA and the celebration of the MFA-Party pact, which clarified matters of authority and of military intervention in national life. This was the beginning of the last and most complex stage of the revolution.

The main measures taken after the March 11 events, revealing the new political moment, were the creation of the Council of the Revolution (CR), the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies, the government's reorganization,²⁸ the celebration of a Constitutional Agreement Platform (April 11, 1975), and the first free elections.

As the body representing the MFA, the CR was placed in the top spot of the revolutionary constitutional structure. Conceived as an instrument for intensifying the MFA's participation in political and military life, the CR inherited the competences that were previously attributed to the JSN, the Council of State, and the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Law 5/75, dated March 14). Its extensive constitutional, military, and supervisory powers consolidated the institutionalization of the MFA's political leadership that no one at that moment would publicly challenge. If any doubts remained concerning the actual reach of the CR's authority the position was soon clarified, as one of its first measures was to decree the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies.

The CR's presence in national life and its powers were both recognized and consecrated in the Constitutional Agreement Platform of April 11, 1975.²⁹ Despite the polemic surrounding the real motivations of some political leaders at the moment the pact was signed, the truth is that it consolidated the military supremacy and provided a guarantee that, independent of the election results, the CR would keep its leadership during the transition and that it would be consecrated as a sovereign body in the future constitution. The idea behind this new political moment was that of a different military regime. It was not a military dictatorship, but rather it was a regime in which the military took an active

part as conductors and agents of change. The MFA assumed, openly and clearly, its vanguard mission as the “driving force of the revolution.”

THE BREAKUP OF THE MFA’S COHESION

With the CR’s role defined as the “driving force of the revolution,” it became urgent to determine its political project: the prosecution of the “revolution” demanded new clarifications concerning the road to take. By May 1975 the word “democracy,” present in the MFA program, had already been replaced by “socialist path,” an expression that from March 11 onward came to dominate the national political lexicon. The main problem was how to define this term, mainly since *socialism* is a political expression that incorporates many possibilities. Then, it was rather difficult to clarify the role of the political parties—one of the main topics after the elections to the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975, and the following confrontations between supporters of the revolutionary and the electoral path (particularly in relation to the May Day celebrations³⁰ and the *Caso República*³¹). In fact, the elections, which had one of the highest turnouts recorded, were an event of huge political importance that provided the apologists for the electoral path with new perspectives, which apparently pointed toward the creation of a pluralist democracy. The main question then being posed was up to what point was the MFA’s presence in political life compatible with this model of democracy. This question and the many suggestions for the definition of the Portuguese socialist path dominated almost every major political debate that took place in May 1975.

Despite the agreement on the necessity of establishing an MFA-People’s Alliance (MFA–Aliança Povo), which was conceived as a central and structural element of the “path” to be taken, the boundaries and parameters of this alliance were not yet defined. The June 1975 Political Action Programme (PAP—Programa de Ação Política) represented an attempt to reach an understanding, as it was sufficiently vague so as to embrace all of the tendencies defined. Nevertheless it was a weak and precarious agreement that could not provide a satisfactory solution for all of the problems in defining the authority and areas of competence of the different agents in the transition—the MFA, the political parties, and popular power. So the PAP was very quickly left behind. From the beginning of July onward, Portugal witnessed the proliferation of political projects. These gave the illusion of Portugal as a kaleidoscopic theater of politics. In fact, this “epidemic of plans” was

the practical translation of the ruptures taking place within the MFA (as well as among the political forces).

At the risk of oversimplifying the MFA spectrum, one can say that the rupture produced three factions. (1) The first one, presenting a plan for an MFA-People's alliance in which the political parties were completely marginalized,³² brought together the followers of Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves. In political terms they are often considered close to the Communist Party, and their sympathies lay with Soviet-style communism. (2) Originally associated with this first group, the *copconistas*, or *otelistas*, was the group that supported the commander of Continental Operations Command (COPCON), Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. They supported calls for popular power and direct democracy,³³ and undertook some joint initiatives with the extreme-left political parties. (3) Finally, those who defended a gradual transition through political democracy to a socialist society,³⁴ known as the moderates (*moderados*) or "Group of Nine" (Nove), whose main leader was Melo Antunes.³⁵ They were in favor of a rapprochement with the political parties and worked toward the establishment of a democratic system in which the armed forces could play an important role.

By August 1975 the MFA had become deeply divided and its authority was weakened. The creation of the Directorate (*Directório* or *Troika*, which included Costa Gomes, Vasco Gonçalves, and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho) was no more than an indication of the deep crisis within both the MFA and the CR. This state of crisis was a unique opportunity for the political parties, which during this "Hot Summer" of 1975 had already organized a civil front (led by the Socialist Party) that took to the streets to demand greater respect for electoral legitimacy and pluralist democracy.

THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTY FORCES AND THEIR DEMANDS

The political parties had been in a very weak position during the first moments of the transition. Some, such as the PCP, which had long experience of clandestinity, had to adapt themselves to the new circumstances of legality. Others, like the PS, had to overcome the internal problems that were to lead to the first schisms. Yet others, such as the Popular Democratic Party (PPD—Partido Popular Democrático) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDS—Centro Democrático Social), which were not formed until after the coup, faced difficulties caused

by their youth. All of these parties, and the many others that emerged at this time, suffered from organizational and financial deficiencies, staff shortages, and weak party machines. After decades of dictatorship, these challenges proved to be far from easy. The turning point came in the elections for Constituent Assembly in April 1975. Although the creation of the CR represented an important gain of power for the military, after the elections the behavior of the political parties changed substantially. The image of them as subordinate to the military authorities, which had been typical during the early months of the revolution, disappeared. Gradually some parties such as the PS, or even the PPD, emphasized their individuality and demanded an active role in the transition process. It was clear that the CR could no longer ignore the political parties' growing strength.

The removal of Prime Minister Gonçalves and the restructuring of the CR in September 1975 provided an important pause for clarification that catapulted the moderates into leading positions within the military and state apparatus. However, in this process we cannot underestimate the intervention of the Socialists after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, nor can we neglect the role of the civil front making its voice heard with public demonstrations demanding electoral legitimacy and pluralist democracy. This "street pressure" associated with the increasing dissatisfaction of some groups within the MFA and the armed forces was ultimately decisive not only in ensuring Vasco Gonçalves's vertiginous fall but also in assigning a new role for political parties in the revolution. When the sixth Provisional Government was established, in September of 1975,³⁶ the moderates took into account the importance of the mechanisms of representative democracy, and the composition of the new government reflects the result of the April 1975 elections. The political parties' strength could no longer be ignored.

Nevertheless, we must notice that the removal of the *gonçalvistas* from the main centers of power did not mean the end of their intervention. Seeking new alliances with the military and civilian left-wing radicals, they promoted insurrection in the streets and within the barracks. From that time on, and until November 25, no one seemed to be able to control "the streets"—daily street incidents and political quarrels (mainly in Lisbon). The specter of civil strife became real. One of the most dangerous episodes of the period was the attack and destruction of the Spanish embassy in Lisbon, on September 27. Then, on November 12, construction workers surrounded the São Bento Palace (National Parliament), taking hostage the Constituent Assembly deputies and the

TABLE 6.2 COMPOSITION OF THE SIXTH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

	Ministers	%
Military	6	40
PS (Socialist Party)	4	27
PPD (Popular Democratic Party)	2	13
Independent	2	13
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party)	1	7

prime minister inside the building. A few days later (November 20), Pinheiro de Azevedo's government (the sixth Provisional Government) announced it would suspend its activities due to the lack of necessary security conditions.³⁷ This tension leads us to November 25, 1975—the last armed confrontation of the revolution.

THE END OF THE CARNATIONS REVOLUTION

Despite all of the unknowns that exist, even to this day, November 25 represents a fundamental moment in the transition to democracy, enabling the clarification of some aspects of the revolutionary process. It represented the moment of clarification within the MFA, which resulted in not only the definitive defeat of the radicals, but also the progressive weakening of military authority and its subordination to civilian rule. In conclusion, the events of November 25 open the final stage of the transition process, which was consolidated with the creation of the conditions needed for the complete “bestowal” of authority upon the party political forces. In fact, after these events the defeat of the pro-Gonçalves and pro-COPCON forces was undeniable. Not only did they lose what remaining positions they had within the state structure and the military, but they also lost any chance of pushing through their political projects. This was a particularly delicate phenomenon, since it led to a certain degree of right-wing triumphalism. Aware of the dangers inherent in the situation, the moderates managed to prevent the countercoup that would have banned the PCP. Adopting this position may have brought them some inconvenience at a time when, despite the progress they had made, the politico-military situation was not yet entirely clear.

Melo Antunes's proposal for a “viable left-wing project,” which reasserted the leading role of the military and proposed a national reconciliation that would allow all parties to be involved, met with a great deal

of resistance—even from some of those who, such as the PS, had been on the side of the moderates against the *gonçalvistas*, especially during the “Hot Summer” of 1975. The debate intensified until the moment the terms of the constitutional agreement were reviewed. Increasingly strengthened and aware of their electoral legitimacy, the PS, PPD, and CDS openly questioned the compatibility of political democracy and military power. The negotiations were difficult, making obvious not only the resistance of the CR to leaving the political scene but also the increasing authority and negotiating ability of the political parties. Nevertheless in the second pact, signed in February 1976, the CR managed to remain one of the organs of sovereignty, functioning as the president’s council—guaranteeing compliance with the constitution and fidelity with the spirit of the 25th of April—and as a political and legislative body in military matters.

With the approval of the new constitution and the realization of legislative elections on April 25, 1976, and presidential elections on July 27, 1976, the new institutions were defined. The phase of uncertainty as to the nature of the political regime ended and with it, the transition to democracy. The period between 1976 and 1982 was no longer one of transition, but one of democratic consolidation.

NOTES

1. Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 180.

2. António José Telo, “De Marcelo Caetano ao Portugal democrático: as relações internacionais da transição,” in *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, series V, *Historia Contemporánea*, 19 (2007), 247–85; Bernardino Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolução portuguesa* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2008); Nuno Simas, *Portugal Classificado: Documentos Secretos Norte-Americanos 1974–1975* (Lisbon: Aletheia, 2008).

3. Maxwell, *Making*, 180 (see note 1 above).

4. See Gomes and Moreira de Sá, *Carlucci vs. Kissinger* (see note 2 above).

5. Thomas Bruneau, “Portugal’s Unexpected Transition,” in *Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy*, eds. Kenneth Marwell and Michael H. Haltzel (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1989), 9.

6. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

7. Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Democratization of Portugal in Its Comparative Perspective,” in *Portugal e a transição para a democracia (1974–1976)*, ed. Fernando Rosas (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1999), 337.

8. First designation of the of MFA.

9. Diário de Notícias, January 23, 1976.
10. Josep Sánchez Cervelló, *A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua influência na transição espanhola (1961-1976)* (Lisbon: Assírio & Alvim, 1992), 430-31.
11. José Medeiros Ferreira, *Ensaio histórico sobre a revolução do 25 de Abril: O período pré-constitucional* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 1983), 212-14.
12. Antonio Reis, "O processo de democratização," in *Portugal: Vinte anos de democracia*, ed. Antonio Reis (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1994), 19.
13. Reis, *Portugal*, 31 (see note 12 above).
14. For this author, the relationship between the armed forces and society was a "revolutionary relationship: the popular classes were called to participate collectively in the improvement of their living conditions and to do so in collaboration with the politico-military forces at their side against the previously dominant classes" (Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *O Estado e a sociedade em Portugal [1974-1988]* 3rd ed. [Porto: Afrontamento, 1998], 64).
15. Nancy G. Bermeo, *The Revolution within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); John L. Hammond, *Building Popular Power: Workers' and Neighborhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988).
16. The MFA originated in response to professional grievances and concerns with status and privilege.
17. To define which parts of the transformation process to carry out, the program stipulated the dismantling of the organs and institutions of the overthrown regime, amnesty for all political prisoners, the reestablishment of basic freedoms, the launch of a new economic and social policy that would take into account the need to defend the interests of the working class, the call "within twelve months of a national constituent assembly, elected by direct and secret universal suffrage," and, finally, determined the "launching of a colonial policy that will lead to peace." We must note that the final version of the program was the result of a long negotiation process that culminated, on the night of the coup, in a heated argument between the captains and some members of the newly appointed JSN.
18. Philippe C. Schmitter, *Portugal: Do autoritarismo à democracia* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1999), 232.
19. Maxwell, *Making*, 61 (see note 1 above).
20. See Maria Inácia Rezola, *António de Spínola* (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2002), 117.
21. The Program has been published in several places. English version in the electronic archive *Centro do Documentação 25 de Abril*, www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka=programaingles.
- For Spínola's amendments see also Diniz de Almeida, *Ascensão, apogeu e queda do MFA* (Lisbon: Edições Sociais, 1976), 306-370.
22. Law 7/74 of July 27 declaring that Portugal would begin an immediate transfer of power in its colonies.
23. Spínola and his supporters planned a mass demonstration in order to reinforce the president's powers. Nevertheless, the MFA aborted the demonstration on the night of September 27.

24. Cultural campaigns, carried out by MFA's members (Fifth Division), throughout the country. The campaign's aim was to "fulfil the MFA program" and "place the Armed Forces at the service of the Portuguese People's development."

25. This included the seven members of the JSN, seven from the Coordinating Committee, and five members of the MFA who, until then, had performed political duties (e.g., as a minister or High Commissioner), and the COPCON's commander (Continental Operations Command).

26. The name by which the military wing close to Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves was known. Vasco Gonçalves was head of the second, third, fourth, and fifth provisional governments (June 1974–September 1975).

27. Attempted coup, carried out by right-wing sectors of the armed forces, who wanted to change the course of the revolutionary process. On the morning of March 11, there are several military moves, such as an attack on the Light Artillery Regiment (RAL1) in Lisbon, the assault on the issuer's Portuguese Radio Club, in Porto Alto, and an attempted uprising of the Republican National Guard (GNR). The coup failed and António de Spínola and another eighteen officers were obliged to escape to Spain.

28. Fourth Provisional Government in which the radicals gained positions in a clear demonstration of the sharp left turn that was going on.

29. See *Plataforma de Acordo Constitucional com os partidos*, IAN/TT, CR, no. 84, folder "Pacto MFA–Partidos parte I," doc. 16.

30. The incidents took place in Lisbon during the May Day celebrations of 1975. The differences were clear from the outset and were expressed in the divergences over aspects of the event's organization, such as the disagreements over who should lead the march, who should address the crowd, etc. However, the moment of greatest tension occurred when, at the height of the event, the socialist leader, Mário Soares, was prevented from accessing the podium at the May Day stadium where the prime minister, president, and leaders of other left-wing parties were. The socialists interpreted this as an attempt to exclude them from the revolutionary process at the very moment at which their power had been strengthened by their victory in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The tension between the supporters of electoral legality and the supporters of revolutionary legitimacy was increased a few days later as a consequence of the *Caso República* (the *República* Case; see note to follow).

31. The *República* was a newspaper founded in 1911. From its earliest days, and especially during the dictatorship, *República* had adopted a moderate-left position. The crisis surrounding the newspaper that became known as the "*Caso República*" began on May 19, 1975, when the newspaper's typesetters dismissed the editor, the socialist Raul Rego. The occupation of the newspaper's offices by members of extreme left-wing groups, an occupation tolerated by the Council of the Revolution, provoked a strong reaction from the PS, which accused the PCP of being behind the actions and suspended its participation in government. The later reopening of the newspaper by COPCON without the administration's presence led to the PS withdrawing from the fourth Provisional Government on July 10, 1975. The *Caso República* soon assumed a significance that transcended national borders. Was it a labor conflict? Was it an ideological prob-

lem? Or was it a labor problem that assumed political contours? This is without doubt a complex question that soon transcended its narrow aspects and was transformed into an ideological confrontation.

32. The MFA–People’s Alliance Guide (*Documento guia de aliança povo-MFA*), dated July 8, 1975.

33. COPCON’s revolutionary self-critique (*Autocrítica Revolucionária do COPCON*), dated August 13, 1975.

34. The Document of the Nine (*Documento dos Nove*), dated August 7, 1975.

35. The “Group of Nine” were Major Ernesto Melo Antunes, Captain Vasco Lourenço, Brigadier Pedro Pezerat Correia, Brigadier Franco Charais, Air Force Major Canto e Castro, Air Force Major Costa Neves, Captain Rodrigo de Sousa e Castro, Major Vítor Alves, and Commander Vítor Crespo.

36. This last Provisional Government is headed by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo (September 19, 1975, to June 23, 1976).

37. See Maria Inácia Rezola, *Os militares na revolução de Abril: O Conselho da Revolução e a Transição para a democracia em Portugal* (Lisbon: Campo da Comunicação, 2006). The November 25, 1975, armed confrontation is probably one of the more obscure episodes of the Portuguese revolution. There is an agreement that the military operations were triggered by the paratroopers (who seized a number of airbases and the national radio and television station). Nevertheless there is no consensus in interpreting their motivations. Were these actions purely defensive? Were they trying to seize power? Who led the coup: the radicals or the moderates? Was it a revolutionary or a counterrevolutionary coup?

Although the left-wing military and political parties deny it, one of the most consensual theses maintains that November 25 was a radical leftist putsch easily neutralized because of its lack of organization and the last-minute retreat of the PCP. The fact is that, at the end, the moderate forces won this last “battle” and, by neutralizing the radicals, succeeded in putting an end to the revolution.

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Coping with the Double Legacy of Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy

ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO

Portugal, with its neighbor Spain, experienced one of the longest right-wing dictatorships of the twentieth century. Institutionalized under the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar during the 1930s, the *Estado Novo* was close to the Linzian ideal type of authoritarian regime.¹ In 1968 Salazar was replaced by Marcelo Caetano, who initiated a limited liberalization that was brought to an abrupt halt by the worsening colonial war the regime had been waging in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau since 1961. The inability of Salazar's successor to resolve the dilemmas caused by the war provoked the collapse of the dictatorship.

Compared with the other southern European “third wave” democracies, the most conspicuous characteristic of Portugal's democratization during the 1970s was the nature of its rupture with the previous authoritarian regime.² With a transition marked by an attempt at the radical elimination of the legacies of authoritarianism, the process of regime change resulted in a significant state crisis in the wake of the April 25, 1974, military coup. The simultaneity of the processes of democratization and of decolonization was one factor in the crisis. The latter was the main reason for the conflict, which broke out in the immediate wake of the regime's collapse, between some conservative generals and the Armed Forces Movement (MFA—*Movimento das Forças Armadas*) that had planned and executed the coup. This conflict was at the root

of the military's intervention in political life following the overthrow of the dictatorship.³

Portugal's democratization was characterized by an intensive break with the past, facilitated by the state crisis and political radicalization in which the new political elite pushed for punishment and accountability. The process of transitional justice that developed during the two years following the coup affected the institutions, the elite, the collaborators, and civil servants and extended to the private sector.⁴ Many of the measures adopted during this period were based on a "revolutionary legitimacy" and therefore stood outside normal and democratic legal procedures. Most of the punitive measures taken against the more visible and better-known collaborators took place prior to the establishment of the democratic institutions, and with the judiciary playing a minor role. These included the criminalization of the repressive apparatus—particularly the political police, a strong public denunciation of the dictatorship, purges, including "wildcat" purges, the dissolution of institutions, and the dismissal of managers in private firms—these last two being symbols of a powerful anticapitalist wave. The entire process represented a milestone in civil society activism that counted on the participation of the trade unions and workers' commissions, small political parties of various left-wing and extreme-left ideologies, and segments of the MFA.⁵

The "revolutionary period" of 1974–1975 was the most complex phase of the transition, and was characterized by a heightened degree of uncertainty and the conflictual nature of the regime change. During this period powerful tensions emerged within Portuguese society, tensions that began to subside only after the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 1976. Sections of the military elite, the leaders of some interest groups, and the moderate parties represented in the first Provisional Government sought the swift establishment of a democratic regime; however, the institutionalization of the MFA had transformed it into the dominant force behind the provisional governments. The main point of disagreement during this period was between General António de Spínola, Portugal's first postauthoritarian president, and the MFA, with the former seeking to delay the decolonization process and the latter calling for the colonies to be given their independence as quickly as possible. The subsequent overthrow of General Spínola, the MFA's shift to the left, the implementation of agrarian reform, and nationalization of large economic groups were both symbols and motors of an ever-worsening state crisis sustained by powerful social movements.⁶

In 1974 the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Português) emerged as a legal organization with a powerful political structure and very quickly exerted significant influence over the government, civil society, and, most importantly at this time, the military. The PCP's initial success faced in no small measure a growing challenge from Mário Soares's recently formed Socialist Party (PS—Partido Socialista). It was also at this critical juncture that the parties representing the right and center-right—the Social Democratic Centre (CDS—Centro Democrático Social) and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD-PSD—Partido Popular Democrático-Partido Social Democrata)—were formed. Much effort was made to exclude from these parties anyone who had been associated with the *Estado Novo* and to find leaders with democratic credentials. Indeed, the CDS was on the verge of being declared illegal up until the April 25, 1975, elections to the Constituent Assembly.

At this time the manifestos of all the political parties exhibited a shift to the left, with the CDS declaring itself to be a party of the center and the PSD with a program that placed it on the center-left. As has been noted elsewhere, “the Portuguese revolution constrained political elites, particularly those of the right . . . to present themselves during the first elections as parties much further to the left than their subsequent behaviour would justify.”⁷

The MFA's decision to respect the electoral calendar and the realization of elections for a constitutional assembly as scheduled greatly enhanced the position of the moderate political parties, since the PCP, which was increasingly powerful within the state apparatus, the armed forces, and the social movements, received only 12 percent of the votes cast in the April 1975 election. The attempt by the PCP and its military allies to ignore this result led to the outbreak of political conflict between them and the moderate parties. Portuguese society began to polarize, with the emergence of an anticommunist movement in the north of the country. It was in this context of increasing radicalization that on November 25, 1975, moderate MFA officers organized a successful counter coup that toppled the radicals. This anticommunist and antileft mobilization, which was led mainly by the socialists and moderate military officers in coalition with the parties of the right, represented a decisive shift in Portugal's transition.

As comparative research on democratization suggests, political space for the immediate punishment of previous dictatorships depends on the type of transition and the correlative power-sharing and veto capacity

of the political actors and institutions.⁸ It will be argued below that the type and diversity of transitional justice in Portugal's democratization must be correlated not only with the absence of any veto capability by the former authoritarian elites and institutions due to their collapse but mainly with the postauthoritarian cleavages opened by democratization and the military intervention in politics. It is also argued that the nature of the transition is superimposed on the nature of the authoritarian regime and the extent of its legacy in the type of transitional justice, and that the transition's powerful dynamic served to constitute another legacy for the consolidation of democracy, strongly counterbalancing those of the authoritarian regime.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PORTUGAL

The first laws promulgated by the National Salvation Junta (JSN—Junta da Salvação Nacional), a group of senior military officials who assumed power after the April coup, legitimized the dismissal of the regime's president, cabinet, civil governors, and the leaders of the single party. By offering senior regime officials the option of external exile, the new government avoided the consequences of any popular demand for criminal trials that would have arisen had they remained in Portugal. The military sent the president of the Estado Novo, Américo Tomás, to Madeira on April 26, from where he and his family soon thereafter went to exile in Brazil for the next four years. Similarly, the prime minister and Salazar's successor, Marcelo Caetano, was put on a plane to Madeira, and from there to Brazil.

During the first days following the overthrow of the dictatorship, the regime's most important political and repressive institutions were closed down. These included the National Assembly, the Corporatist Chamber, the single party, the militia organizations (the Portuguese Legion [LP—Legião Portuguesa] and Portuguese Youth [MP—Mocidade Portuguesa]), the censor, and the political tribunals. In some cases the legislation was preceded by political action, for example, in the case of the regime's official trade unions (*sindicatos nacionais*) and the censor, through the occupation of their headquarters.

One of the landmarks of Portuguese criminal transitional justice was the removal of collaborators with the political police (PIDE/DGS—Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direcção Geral de Segurança) from the state apparatus and from within the private sec-

tor.⁹ In 1975 legislation criminalizing both officers of and collaborators with the political police was approved. This law stated that all members of the political police from 1945 onward would be prosecuted and tried according to their position within the hierarchy, declaring “the political police to be an organization of political and social terrorism” that committed acts of which “no officer or collaborator can claim to have been unaware.” The law’s preamble also declared that the political police had committed “systematic crimes against the Portuguese people by using arbitrary and inhumane practices that were nationally and internationally condemned by public opinion.” The law declared itself to be based on a “revolutionary legitimacy . . . in order to punish those accountable.” The authors of the law promoted it as a response to “the overwhelming demand coming from the collective consciousness of the Portuguese people for the punishment of those responsible for fascist repression. This is the only way to redress the historic injustice their criminal actions produced” (Law 8/75).

The imprisonment and punishment of former PIDE/DGS officials and informants was one of the main popular demands, the pursuit of which became in some cases a “PIDE-hunt.” The arrests were made by the military through the Continental Operations Command (COPCON—Comando Operacional do Continente) led by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who was soon to become the main leader of the populist left-wing faction within the MFA. In order to proceed with the dismantling of the political police structures and bring its members before a judge, in June 1974 the military created the Commission for the Abolition of the PIDE and LP (CEPL—Comissão de Extinção da PIDE/DGS e LP). While many former PIDE agents remained prisoners, many others fled the country within days of the coup. In July 1975, Constitutional Law 8/75 used “revolutionary legitimacy” to provide for the trial in special military courts of members of PIDE and government officials who were considered directly responsible for repression. The law also provided sentences of two to twelve years, with no statute of limitations; however, the lack of coordination and the existence of more urgent matters resulted in the postponement of the trials.¹⁰ Finally, controversy grew around the PIDE’s archives and its alleged appropriation by left-wing parties in the immediate aftermath of the coup.

One of the first institutions to be purged was the armed forces. Immediately after the coup, the MFA handed General Spínola the names of the sixty generals who had pledged their allegiance to the authori-

tarian regime and who were subsequently placed on the reserve by the JSN. The purge of the armed forces was part of the MFA's political program and, against General Spínola's wishes, the process was extended to affect an increasing number of officers. In the months following the 1974 coup, special military commissions administered the purges demanded by the MFA. Incompetence became the official criteria for removal, as it became impossible to sustain political criteria such as "collaboration with the old regime," given that the whole defense establishment had collaborated with the *Estado Novo* during the colonial war.

Civil servants were probably the most affected by the radicalization of popular action. Unfortunately, reliable figures are not available in the majority of cases, and the figures that do exist do not always match. The minimum punishment was to be transferred to another post, while the maximum was immediate and compulsory dismissal. All former officials of the political police were to be dismissed. Maximum penalties were applied according to priorities defined a little later by the government: membership of the dictatorship's governing elite; PIDE collaborators; leading members of the MP, LP, or the single party; and the heads of the regime's censorship board. The law also determined the creation of an interministerial purge and reclassification commission (CISR—*Comissão Interministerial de Saneamento e Reclassificação*) to undertake this mission. This commission was linked directly to the council of ministers and was charged with coordinating the purge commissions in each of the ministries.

Following an attempted coup by right-wing military forces loyal to the ousted president, General Spínola, on March 11, 1975—the failure of which forced the general to flee into exile—the military was granted greater autonomy (first from the JSN, and after March 1975, from the Council of the Revolution) and the authority to open or reopen any case and to apply any measures deemed necessary in any particular situation. From the first version of the law (June 1974) to the second (March 1975), "revolutionary legitimacy" was reinforced and the process of purging civil servants made easier.¹¹ This law defined the previous dictatorship as a "fascist regime" and determined that purges could be administered on the basis of an individual's political behavior prior to the fall of the authoritarian regime.

By the end of 1974 about 4,300 civil servants had been subjected to a purge process (see table 7.1). In February 1975 official reports on the purge process stated that approximately 12,000 people had been either permanently removed from their posts or suspended,¹² while it is esti-

TABLE 7.1 NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS INSTITUTED BY THE MINISTERIAL PURGE COMMISSIONS (MAY 1–DECEMBER 31, 1974)

	Number of Prosecutions			Number Implicated
	Number of Civil Servants*	On the Initiative of the Purge Commissions	Total	
Presidency of the council of ministers	1,470	6	37	43
Interterritorial coordination	2,000	205	278	278
Internal affairs	7,000	—	737	737
Justice	5,000	59	59	59
Economy	8,000 [†]	—	891	891
Finance	12,000	—	191	191
Foreign affairs	523 [‡]	—	87	87
Environment	80,000	10	303	303
Education and culture	65,000	25	1,029	1,029
Labor	5,270	237	317	317
Social affairs	27,171	—	219	329
Information	610	12	29	29
Total	208,044	954	4,177	4,293

Source: A. Maurício and Gonçalo Castelo Branco, *Saneamento na Função Pública* (Lisbon: Diabril, 1975), 90.

* Approximate numbers.

[†] Estimated numbers from CIR, with possible errors or omissions.

[‡] Does not include salaried employees and locally hired staff.

mated that between March and November 1975 the number of removals and suspensions increased significantly.¹³

The action of the various ministerial purge commissions was very uneven and depended upon the party to which the minister belonged and the shape of public opinion and extent of trade union pressure. In the ministries of labor and education removals were frequent, while one of the least affected ministries was that of justice, with magistrates of the regime's political courts largely being left untouched. Institutional factors, the moderation of the Socialist minister of justice, and the strong culture of judicial independence were important factors counteracting the drive to purge the legal profession and the ministry of justice.¹⁴ Nevertheless, of a body of 500 magistrates, forty-two judges were submitted to a purge process in 1974–1975—most for participating in

political courts or for holding government posts or positions within censorship.¹⁵ While most of those purged had occupied senior positions within the administration, in some cases lower ranking civil servants were also affected, particularly for collaborating with the PIDE. However, long delays in the proceedings reduced the overall scope of the process.

Portugal's democracy inherited a complex "para-state" system of economic regulation that was associated with the corporatist apparatus, the dissolution and purging of which will not be analyzed here. However, the overall process of nationalization, state intervention, land occupation, and agrarian reform had a very significant impact in important sectors of the Portuguese social and economic elite. It is estimated that around 244 private enterprises were directly nationalized in 1975 and another 300 small- to medium-sized enterprises came under public management as the government "intervened" to rescue them from bankruptcy following their takeover by workers or their abandonment by management.¹⁶

The economic elite was hit hard by the process of nationalization and state intervention, as well as by the flight of industrialists and entrepreneurs from the country. Strike movements and a strong drive toward state intervention led to the first wave of self-exiles. Some of the most important illegal purge processes were also initiated against members of the economic elite. The purge of the boards of public and private companies was rapidly transformed into a component of collective action that increasingly assumed anticapitalist traits. These wildcat purges were concentrated mainly in large enterprises in the industrial area around Lisbon and in the recently nationalized banking and insurance sectors.

It is not always easy to disentangle purges from workers' occupation of factories and the self-exile of owners and managers. According to Harry Makler's follow-up surveys of 306 enterprises, conducted in July 1976 and again in June 1977, only 15 percent of the industrialists in small enterprises had quit compared with 43 percent in larger enterprises, while more than half of those in the largest firms had quit. Makler's calculations show that the higher the socioeconomic class origin, the greater the likelihood the industrialist had left the firm in 1975. He also notes that "the more upwardly mobile also were more likely to have quit than those who were downwardly socially mobile." Significantly, a much larger percentage of professional managers (52 percent) compared with owners of production (i.e., founders—18 per-

cent, heirs—21 percent, and owner-managers—32 percent) had left their enterprises.¹⁷

Portugal did not experience the establishment of any truth-seeking type mechanisms as a component of transitional justice, but it is worth mentioning the existence of two state initiatives established with the goal of denouncing the authoritarian past: the cultural action campaigns (*acções de dinamização cultural*), and the publications by the Commission for the Black Books on Fascism.

The cultural action campaigns were developed by the MFA in collaboration with left-wing civilians and parts of the Student Civic Service (SCE—Serviço Cívico Estudantil). One of the goals of the program was to “put the military closer to the population, in the belief their presence will allow for the clarification of the reasons leading this country to the regretful condition in which we find it”.¹⁸ The main goal was to democratize the rural world through cultural initiatives dedicated to denouncing the repressive past and promoting civic participation. Faced with strong reactions in the rural north fueled by conservative priests and local elites, the cultural action campaigns were brought to an end in 1975.

The state body that came closest to the classical “truth commission” was the Commission for the Black Books on Fascism. Created in April 1977, it appeared after the purges and criminal proceedings, at a time when Portugal was seeking reconciliation with the past and overcoming its legacies. This was a government body established to denounce the abuses of the authoritarian regime. The commission, which comprised socialist and left-republican politicians and intellectuals, was responsible to the presidency of the council of ministers. Using the dictatorship’s archives as its source, the commission published twenty-two books containing primary documentation that, among other issues, denounced the regime’s repression, the treatment of political prisoners, censorship, and the collaboration between economic groups and the PIDE.

As we have seen above, the military, political, administrative, and economic elite were all deeply affected—albeit to different extents—by the measures introduced during the first two years of the transition as a means of punishing them for collaborating with the previous regime. It is also worth noting that the two main parties legitimized by the first democratic elections, the PS and the PSD, maintained moderate positions and did not offer particular support to the purges, despite officially being in favor of the process.¹⁹ When at the end of November 1975 the radical-left within the military and their allies were removed

from the political scene, the ensuing process of democratic consolidation marked the end of the period of purges that soon became associated with a “period of exception” dominated by Communists and the populist left. However, the main legacies of the transition had in the meantime been written in the constitution.

THE DUAL LEGACY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

The military intervention of November 25, 1975, marked the beginning of the process of democratic consolidation, although one that was still under the tutelage of the Council of the Revolution until 1982. Following the counter coup that neutralized the radical left-wing military, a new settlement between the parties and the military followed: the so-called Second Pact. This included the direct election of the president of the republic by universal suffrage, but under stringent conditions imposed by the moderate military that had now gained control of the reins of power. Among those conditions was the imposition upon the major parties to endorse a particular candidate (General Ramalho Eanes) in the first presidential elections (held in 1976). In the economic sphere, a heavily nationalized sector and extensive state interventionism, along with the introduction of severe austerity measures following the first Portuguese agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became symbols of recession.

During the years of democratic consolidation, Portugal could be characterized as having a multiparty system with endemic cabinet instability. There were minority PS governments, coalitions with the PS and the right-wing CDS, independent governments appointed by the president, and center-right-wing coalitions of the PSD and CDS. In 1976, by imposition of the moderates within the military and with the acceptance of the main political parties, General Ramalho Eanes was elected president. From that moment the two main parties, both separately and together, governed under the tutelage of both the military and the president. Meanwhile, the parties of the right and center-right, followed with some hesitancy by the PS, refocused their political programs and immediately placed on the political agenda the need to eliminate some of the “socialist” legacies of the transition contained in the constitution and in the pacts with the military. The Communists, meanwhile out of government, became the only party defending the “socialist” legacies of the transition.

The Portuguese case is an illustration of the dominant process of democratic consolidation in southern Europe: “consolidation through parties.”²⁰ The legacy of the cleavages introduced by the transition was visible in two dimensions: the exclusion of the PCP, which was now perceived to be an antisystem party; and the cooperation between the PS, PSD, and CDS, “forming an implicit democratic coalition with the aim of establishing a liberal democracy.”²¹

The official position of the first two constitutional governments led by the Socialist prime minister, Mário Soares, and of the first democratically elected president, Ramalho Eanes, favored reconciliation and pacification. According to the official position of Mário Soares’s PS and that of the center-right democratic parties, Portuguese democracy was shaped by a double legacy: the authoritarianism of the right under the Estado Novo and the authoritarian threat of the extreme left in 1975—which they officially considered to be an attempt by the Communists to seize power. Through this position, they sought to establish a particular “institutional memory” on the origins of contemporary Portuguese democracy that has survived the consolidation of democracy, albeit with minor differences, within both the PS and the PSD.

The purges were soon brought to an end and their role reevaluated in light of the claim they were an excess of the early transitional period. At the same time, a number of Communists and extreme left-wing civilians and military figures were removed from their positions within the civil service and state-owned companies in a kind of counterpurge that was particularly evident within the armed forces. However, a climate of political reconciliation predominated during the last years of the 1970s, shaping the way in which the government dealt with the legacy of the dictatorship. This was particularly true with the trial of members of the PIDE/DGS. Their trials were conducted according to the new postrevolutionary political ethos, and as a result those who had not taken advantage of their bail to flee the country received only light sentences from the military courts (normally they were sentenced to time already served). Those who had good military active service reports from the colonial war period received especially benevolent treatment.²² Although there were public demonstrations against and criticism of the sentences meted out, they did serve as notice that judicial legality and the rule of law had been reestablished following the “excesses” of the turbulence of 1974–1975.

Between 1976 and the early 1980s, steps were taken to reintegrate those who had been victims of the purges. New legislation was passed

and measures were quickly adopted to normalize the situation in the economic arena in which the wildcat purges had been most severe. The government followed this up with a series of measures designed to facilitate the return of exiles (mainly business managers and entrepreneurs) who had been forced out of the country by the radicalization of the social movements. The purge commissions in the ministries ceased to operate in 1976 and the Council of the Revolution, which took on the role of these commissions as well as the leadership of the CEPL, reinforced legal mechanisms to ensure a process of rehabilitation took place. A moderate member of the Council of the Revolution, Captain Sousa e Castro, was given responsibility for the entire process.²³ The Commission for the Assessment of Purge Appeals and Reclassifications (CARSR—Comissão de Análise de Recursos de Saneamentos e de Reclassificação) was then created under the auspices of the Council of the Revolution and continued in operation until the mid-1980s, rehabilitating the vast majority of appellants who came before it. This commission was composed of legally qualified military officers and civilians who had no links with the dictatorship. According to a report into its activities, the commission expressed the view that “it is necessary to repair the damage that was done” during the 1974–1975 period when many of the purges were “merely arbitrary.”²⁴ Most of those who had been dismissed during the purges had their punishment changed to compulsory retirement.

In the case of PIDE/DGS agents, the CARSR followed the precedent established by the military tribunals. These courts had heard the cases against political police agents and had decided “the fact that those being tried were former agents of the PIDE/DGS is irrelevant because it was not illegal in the past to be a member of the political police.” This principle restored to them their rights as public employees, but only if they had not “taken part in illegal activities.”²⁵

It was during this period that the “historical memory” of the political parties that was to dominate Portugal’s democracy was fixed and developed in the official discourses for the ritual commemoration of the anniversary of April 25, 1974. Throughout these years there was a common denominator for the CDS, PSD, and PS, albeit with some minor differences between them—the first democratic elections of 1975 as the founding event of Portuguese democracy and its role in the resistance to “the totalitarian perversion” of the Communists. The PS stressed the idea that the events of November 25 represented “democracy’s reconciliation with itself” and not the anticommunist revanchism that some on the populist right would have desired.²⁶

As noted above, the CDS—which was the most right-wing of the democratic political parties, and which had been subjected to several violent attacks during the early years of the transition—embarked on a difficult process in order to establish itself legally. Its political legitimacy eventually came about through the celebration of the defeat of the Communists in 1975 and by its being the only party that refused to approve the 1976 constitution. The CDS also sought to symbolically equate the events of November 25, 1975 (the defeat of the radical left) with those of April 25, 1974.

Created by reformist-dissident elements within the dictatorship and led by Francisco Sá Carneiro, the PSD—which initially attempted to become a member of the socialist family—established itself as the main center-right party. For the PSD, the elections of 1975 and the “popular resistance” to communism were an element of its celebration speeches on the foundation of Portuguese democracy. Despite this, and particularly during the early years of democratic consolidation, the record of resistance to the dictatorship of some of its leaders was an important element in separating the PSD from the CDS. Throughout the entire democratic consolidation period, the PSD also differentiated itself from the PS by speaking out against the military and economic legacy of the transition.

Heir to the political culture of anti-Salazarist republicanism and formed in 1973, the PS almost immediately used the strong antiauthoritarian record of its leaders against the parties of the right. However, the PS was also the key party in the struggle against the Communists in 1975, transforming it during the early years of Portugal’s democracy into a party that was very close to the center of the political spectrum. The role of the PS in the anticommunist struggle of 1975 has been a central element of its political identity, and it was not until thirty years after the fall of the dictatorship that it began to show signs it was abandoning that “double legacy” approach in its official discourse.

The PCP, the only party to refer systematically to Salazarism as a “fascist dictatorship,” became the only supporter of the legacy of the April revolution contained in the 1976 constitution—particularly the agrarian reform and the nationalizations the first constitutional governments set about reversing.²⁷

By 1985, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the heritage of the double legacy was practically extinct in institutional terms. There was no party of the right of parliamentary or electoral significance that represented the old elite or that

acted as a carrier of the authoritarian values inherited from Salazarism, while the legacy of military tutelage and state socialism had also disappeared following the constitutional reforms of 1982 and 1989.

THE “POLITICS OF THE PAST” IN DEMOCRATIC PORTUGAL

Research on the impact of transitional justice on the quality of democracy, both in theoretical terms and, to a lesser extent, in empirical findings, underlines its association with the break with the past that benefits democracy by ending impunity, celebrating regime change, and fostering a new sense of democratic community.²⁸ At the elite level, Portuguese political institutions developed a strong antiauthoritarian “politics of the past,” associating themselves with the legacy of political opposition to the dictatorship.

The semipresidential nature of the political system and the fact that the first two civilian presidents (Mário Soares and Jorge Sampaio) had been active members of opposition movements during the dictatorship were important symbolically. During the first thirty years of democracy successive presidents have posthumously rehabilitated many of the dictatorship’s victims and awarded members of the anti-Salazar opposition awards such as the Order of Freedom. Streets and other public places were renamed after famous opposition figures—republicans, communists, and socialist alike—while Salazar’s name was removed from all public monuments and squares and from the bridge over the Tejo, which was swiftly renamed Ponte 25 de Abril (25 April Bridge).

Another aspect of the attempt to symbolically delegitimize the authoritarian past was the alteration of national holidays. The date of the republican revolution, October 5, 1910 (the republic had never been abolished by the dictatorship), assumed greater significance, while the May 28 holiday, which celebrated the military coup of 1926, was replaced with a new holiday on April 25, celebrating the foundation of the new democratic regime. Another dimension of the legacy of the transition concerns the presence of a strong program in civic, or citizenship, education in public schools. Although changing the more ideological left-wing orientation of the manuals written during the transition, in this respect “Portugal seems to follow, albeit at a distance, the example of the Europe’s prime post-revolutionary republican democracy—France, the world leader in citizenship education.”²⁹

Attempts to compensate those activists who had struggled against the

dictatorship were also made from the 1970s onward, although some of the proposals did not initially receive parliamentary approval. Members of the opposition to the dictatorship had to wait until 1997 for the introduction of the PS government's legislation enabling them to seek compensation, in terms of social security and retirement pension entitlements, for the years they remained clandestine or in exile.³⁰

At the political elite level the "double legacy" was still very much present right up until the turn of the century. An example of this was the official exhibition—sponsored by the office of President Jorge Sampaio and the Socialist government of António Guterres and directed toward both students and the general public—that celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Portuguese democracy. In this exhibit thousands of visitors traveled through the dark passages of Salazarism; through the torture chambers of the political police and corridors lined with photographs of political prisoners, while opposition figures and the prodemocratic press were celebrated. There was a threatening corridor dedicated to the colonial war that ended in a well-lit area celebrating the fall of the dictatorship. Significantly, the exhibition ended where democracy began. The turbulent period of the first years of the transition were omitted, represented symbolically by thematic panels that portrayed the process of social and political change that had taken place during the twenty-five years since the fall of the Salazar regime. It would have been very hard for an official exhibition to deal with the transitional period given the complex legacy of the first two years of the transition.

How does contemporary Portuguese society perceive both the authoritarian past and the transition to democracy? Scholars Hite and Morlino recognize the difficulties in making the legacy of the previous dictatorships operationalized as an independent variable in the analysis of attitudes concerning the new democratic regimes.³¹ In Portugal, although there are very few surveys to support it, the coexistence of the assessment of April 25, 1974, as a positive break with the past and the distrust of democratic institutions seem to be very much present.

As part of the celebrations for the thirtieth anniversary of democracy in 2004, several opinion polls were commissioned seeking the views of the Portuguese concerning the nature of the country's transition. Of those questioned in one survey, 77 percent stated they were proud of the manner in which the transition took place,³² while the majority of Portuguese (52 percent) believe the April 25, 1974, coup was the most important event in the country's history. Some disagreement is evident when the responses are broken down by party support, with those on

TABLE 7.2 ATTITUDES IN 2004 TOWARD THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND APRIL 25, 1974 (PERCENTAGES)

Characterization	Estado Novo	25 April 1974
More positive than negative	17	58
As positive as negative	26	23
More negative than positive	50	14
Don't know/no reply	7	5
Total	100	100

Source: Portuguese Catholic University Opinion Poll, Commission for the Commemoration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of April 25, 1974.

the political right more likely to believe membership of the European Union (EU) or achieving independence from Spain in the seventeenth century were more significant events. The Estado Novo is negatively perceived, while April 25 is viewed positively, with a minority of 17–14 percent believing the dictatorship was a good thing and April 25 a bad thing (see table 7.2).

Are the cleavages of 1975 still present in Portuguese society after more than thirty years of democracy? With the partial exception of PCP supporters, the response is that they are not. If the 1976 constitution is perceived to have reflected the left's overwhelming domination of the transition process, subsequent revisions of the constitution have reflected the influence of the right. The end of empire, democratic consolidation, and accession to membership of the European Union (EU) have all served to seal many of the cleavages caused by the transition.

Democracy appears to be the preferred regime type for 72 percent of Portuguese, independent of their age or political beliefs. The events of April 25 are positively associated with improvements in the population's general standard of living, with 68 percent of Portuguese believing Portugal is a better place because of the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, these same polls indicate the Portuguese have a low opinion of the operation and "quality" of their democracy. Comparative studies show that of all European nations, the Portuguese have one of the lowest levels of confidence in their system of government.

Portuguese society has had little more than sporadic public debates, parliamentary initiatives, and "eruptions of memory" within civil society related with the authoritarian past. A few episodes have brought the past back to the public sphere—a secret interview in Lisbon with the former head of PIDE who had been tried and convicted in absentia; a

pension awarded to a former official of the political police for “services to the nation”; and a television show in which the former dictator was named as the greatest Portuguese of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, it remains true that none of these episodes has been particularly divisive within Portuguese society.

CONCLUSION

Transitional justice encapsulates a variety of measures adopted during a democratization process that extend beyond the simple criminalization of the authoritarian elite, its collaborators, and repressive agents and involve a wide range of extrajudicial efforts to eradicate the legacy of the previous repressive rule—including official investigations of the authoritarian repressive record, purges, reparations, and the dissolution of institutions.³³ In southern Europe in the 1970s, as in Latin America in the 1980s and Central and Eastern Europe in 1990s, the pressures for the criminalization of the authoritarian elites and repressive bodies were present from the very earliest moments of the transitions, but only in transitions by rupture did the opportunity for this to happen actually arise. Other forms of transitional justice, such as reparations or truth commissions, were the only options available in democratizations in which the former elites exercised direct or indirect veto power in the process of regime change.³⁴

Portugal and Spain are paradigmatic cases of democratic transition. In the former there was a sweeping policy of purges intended to cleanse the state and society of the authoritarian past, while in the latter, by contrast, “letting bygones be bygones became a foundation for democratic consolidation.”³⁵ However, the variety of transitional justice in Portugal must be correlated not only with the absence of the veto capacity of former authoritarian elites and institutions but is mainly due to the process of state crisis and to military intervention in politics after the breakdown of the dictatorship. If, for example, the dissolutions and punishment of the repressive bodies of the dictatorship—mainly the political police—was, as in Greece, an immediate consequence of the nature of the transition, the dissolution of the antiriot unit of the police, the occupations of the headquarters of many of the official unions, or the quasi-immediate process of purge before any legal framework had been developed are precocious symbols of a different pattern.

Another characteristic of the attempt to make a radical break with

the past during Portuguese democratization—one that is visibly associated with the radicalization of social movements—was the strong anti-capitalist overtone that existed during 1975. Nationalizations, urban and rural property occupations, and purges in private companies were in many cases legitimized by a political language stressing the need to eradicate the legacy of the economic and social elite power that had been associated with the previous regime, in a kind of “collective socio-economic dimension of authoritarian abuse,”³⁶ making Portugal the only example of “redistributive” transitional justice in southern Europe.

The main political actors of this process were the extreme-left parties and the Communists, under the umbrella of the MFA, while the moderate parties were still undergoing a process of institutionalization and their political priority was the realization of elections. To a large extent these parties complemented the radicalization of social movements, which simultaneously helps explain its diffuse nature and lack of use for the judicial system. Furthermore, I have also illustrated above how in Portugal the more radical dimensions of transitional justice were never on the agenda of the main political parties: as soon as they gained legitimacy in the 1975 elections, they quickly dropped the theme in favor of a global appeal for a return to order and the rule of law.

The new political cleavages opened by what many analysts characterized as the “revolutionary juncture” of 1975 were so overarching—to the extent that consolidation of democracy was much more concerned with coping with the legacies of transition and much less with the previous authoritarian regime.³⁷ In this way, while it was mainly concerned with overcoming the legacy of the transition, a language of “reconciliation” also marked this first phase of Portuguese democracy. The nature of the first governments was also propitious, based on both formal and informal anticommunist coalitions of socialists with parties of the right and center-right. Nevertheless, even when the first right-wing coalition took power, the PS never considered the possibility of making electoral or political gains by bringing the past to the political agenda at a time when the right included a small number of people who had been members of the authoritarian elite. The consolidation of Portuguese democracy thus represented, in terms of the “politics of the past,” the institutionalization of a discourse and of a praxis regarding the origins of Portuguese democracy as a result of success in coping with the legacy of authoritarianism and revolution.

NOTES

1. Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); António Costa Pinto, “Twentieth-Century Portugal: An Introduction,” in *Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture*, ed. António Costa Pinto (New York: SSM/Columbia University Press, 2011), 1–46.

2. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); António Costa Pinto and Leonardo Morlino, *Dealing with the Legacy of Authoritarianism: The “Politics of the Past” in Southern European Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2011).

3. Nancy Bermeo, “War and Democratisation: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience,” *Democratisation* 13 (2007), 338–406.

4. António Costa Pinto, “Authoritarian Legacies: Transitional Justice and State Crisis in Portugal’s Democratisation,” *Democratisation* 13 (2006), 173–204.

5. In May 1974, the purge was the third demand of a group of 149 labor conflicts, and it remained on the top of the list of demands made by workers and strikers throughout the following year (Fátima Patriarca, “A revolução e a questão social: que justiça social?” in *Portugal e a transição para a democracia 1974–1976*, ed. Fernando Rosas [Lisbon: Colibri, 1999], 141). See also Philippe C. Schmitter, “The democratisation of Portugal in its comparative perspective,” in *ibid.*, 337–63.

6. Rafael Durán Muñoz, *Acciones colectivas y transiciones a la democracia: España y Portugal, 1974–77* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 1997); Diego Palacios Cerzales, *O poder caiu na rua: crise de estado e acções colectivas na revolução portuguesa, 1974–75* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003).

7. Richard Gunther and José R. Montero, “The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies,” in *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, eds. P. Nikiforos Diamanduros and Richard Gunther (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 142–43.

8. Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

9. Officially PIDE from 1945 to 1968 and DGS from 1968 to 1974; however, following the 1974 coup the regime’s political police has commonly been referred to as PIDE/DGS. The anti-riot division of the police, known as Policia de Choque, was also dissolved (Diego Palacios Cerezales, “‘Fascist lackeys’? Dealing with the Police’s Past during Portugal’s Transition to Democracy [1974–80],” *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 6 [2007], 155–69).

10. Filipa Alves Raimundo, “The Double Face of Heroes: Motivations and Constraints in Dealing with the Past: The Case of PIDE/DGS” (master’s thesis, University of Lisbon, Institute of Social Sciences, 2007).

11. Decree-Law 123/75, March 11, 1975.

12. *O Século*, February 27, 1975.

13. Numbers obtained from different media sources. The exact figures remain unknown.

14. Pedro Magalhães, “Justicia y política en la democracia portuguesa,” in *Portugal: Democracia y sistema político*, eds. Antonio Barreto, Braulio Gómez Fortes, and Pedro Magalhães (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 2003), 205–29.
15. Maria Inácia Rezola, “Legislar, avançar e aprofundar,” in Fernando Rosas, ed., *Tribunais Políticos* (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 2009), 258.
16. Maria Belmira Martins, *Sociedades e grupos em Portugal* (Lisbon: Estampa, 1975).
17. Harry M. Makler, “The Consequences of the Survival and Revival of the Industrial Bourgeoisie,” in *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequences*, eds. Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 251–83.
18. Sónia Vespeira de Almeida, “Vítimas do fascismo: os camponeses e a dinamização cultural do Movimento das Forças Armadas (1974–75),” *Análise Social* 43 (2008), 821.
19. Filipa Alves Raimundo, “The Double Face of Heroes” (see note 10 above).
20. Leonardo Morlino, *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 249.
21. Carlos Jalali, *Partidos e Democracia em Portugal, 1974–2005* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2007), 76.
22. Raimundo, “The Double Face of Heroes” (see note 9 above).
23. Coronel Sousa e Castro, *Capitão de abril, capitão de novembro* (Lisbon: Guerra e Paz, 2009).
24. CARSR (Comissão de Análise de Recursos de Saneamentos e de Reclasseificação) (1976–78), *Relatório de actividades, 1976–1977–1978* (Lisbon: Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, 1976–1978), 1.
25. Ibid.
26. Vasco Campilho, “Le poing et la fleche: Études comparatives des mémoires historiques de la Revolution des Oeillets au sein du Parti Socialiste et du Parti Social Democrate” (master’s thesis, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 2002), 71.
27. Anna Bosco, *Comunisti: trasformazioni di partito in Italia, Spagna e Portogallo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000).
28. Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds., *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research* (New York: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).
29. Robert M. Fishman, “Legacies of Democratizing Reform and Revolution: Portugal and Spain Compared,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, September 2, 2004).
30. Law 20/97, June 19, 1997.
31. Katherine Hite and Leonardo Morlino, “Problematizing the Links between Authoritarian Legacies and ‘Good’ Democracy,” in *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe*, eds. Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 73.
32. Data from the opinion poll carried out by the Portuguese Catholic Uni-

versity and the Commission for the Commemoration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of April 25, 1974, April 25, 2004.

33. Paola Cesarini, "Transitional Justice," in *The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (London: SAGE, 2009), 498–99.

34. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); L. Stan, ed., *Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, 2009).

35. Omar G. Encarnación, *Justice in Times of Transition: Lessons from the Iberian Experience* (Cambridge MA: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Working Paper Series, No. 173, 2009).

36. Cesarini, "Transitional Justice," 509 (see note 33 above).

37. It is interesting to note that until the 1980s many areas of international social science research on Portuguese democratization, including the non-Marxist oriented ones, used the concept of revolution to describe it. See, for example, Lawrence C. Graham and Harry M. Makler, eds., *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), and Robert M. Fishman, "Legacies of Democratizing Reform and Revolution" (see note 29 above) on the economic and social legacies of reform in Spain and revolution in Portugal for the contemporary Iberian democracies.

Portugal: An Island Comes Ashore

LUÍS CAMPOS E CUNHA

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twentieth century, the social values of the Portuguese population have remained similar to those of other European countries.¹ The culture, art, music, and tastes of the Portuguese were shaped in earlier periods in France, Germany, and England. Their ethics are based on the same widely shared Christian values that have prevailed throughout Europe during this period. Most of the differences found have to do with different levels of education and income rather than intrinsic differences in views of the world and life. In this respect, the best example of this apparent difference is the fatalistic and nostalgic sentiments that still remain important in the Portuguese psyche.

Nevertheless, the Portuguese are proud of leading the trend to abolish the death penalty and to end life sentences, although they lagged behind others for some time in governing the country liberally and democratically. In fact, today it is widely asserted that the monarchy after the mid-nineteenth century was more liberal than the First Republic (1910) and certainly more than the Salazar regime (1926), which together encompass most of the twentieth century. As Rui Ramos observes, “If the public freedoms had been a central issue for the republican left, the Republic never would have come into being in Portugal, because the constitutional monarchy guaranteed freedom even to its open enemies, as some republicans later came to recognize.” And Ramos adds, “Parliamentarism thus ended up as a pseudonym for the political monopoly of the Republican Party.”²

In any case, since the 1920s, as nationalism became rampant and widespread, all European countries started a trend toward more closed societies.³ That said, the nationalism of the Salazar regime was no exception, nor should it come as a surprise. But the extreme lack of openness of Spain had important effects on Portugal. In Spain, after a long period of instability and being on the verge of a revolution, a bloody civil war took place in the 1930s and the country remained a very closed society until, basically, the 1980s, when Spain started to prepare its accession to the European Community in 1986. And “very closed” means much more closed than other European countries, including Portugal, at the time.

Unlike Spain, and given the historical European context of the time, Portugal remained much more open to the world. Even the often-quoted expression of “*orgulhosamente sós*” (“proudly alone”) had to do with the Portuguese presence in Africa. Unlike the leaders of other European colonial powers, Salazar was determined not to “abandon” Africa to its fate and, unlike France and England, Portugal remained in Africa until 1975. The idea of abandoning Africans was seen as a sign of giving in to the imperialism of the United States (and later the Soviet Union), and Salazar decided to remain “proudly alone” in Africa. Given the African history since then, one may say that history did not prove Salazar wrong, only highly unrealistic. But all that did not prevent Portugal from participating in world developments, nor did it prevent the flow of people and ideas.

This paper concentrates on the consequences of the Portuguese island syndrome behavior—itsself the spinoff of Spain’s absurd lack of openness throughout most of the last century. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the degree of openness of Portugal and Spain is compared using the indicators available. After that the paper addresses the consequences of the island syndrome. Before the concluding remarks, I emphasize that in the last two decades Spain has opened to the world and Portugal has become an “island coming ashore.”

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

The relative openness of Portugal and the very closed nature of Spain have to be illustrated. This idea that Spain remained more inward looking than Portugal can be revealed by membership year of international organizations of different sorts. (See table 8.1.)

In all cases Portugal joined before Spain. With one exception—in the

TABLE 8.1 YEAR OF MEMBERSHIP

	UN	OECD	EFTA	WTO	NATO	IMF
Portugal	1955	1947*	1959*	1962	1949*	1960
Spain	1955	1959	1980	1963	1982	1985

* Founding member.




FIGURE 8.1. Exports plus imports (percent of GDP)

case of the United Nations they joined in the same year, 1955—often Portugal joined many years before Spain. These were the cases regarding the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). And in several circumstances, Portugal was even a founding member of international bodies—OECD, EFTA, and NATO—which was never the case for Spain.

Spain's lack of openness was reinforced by the distance that Salazar always kept from Franco. The fear of an invasion by Spain was at its peak in the early 1940s, as the Falange had a Nazi-Fascist wing seeking to annex Portugal. This permanent suspicion dates back many centuries but was particularly important during the mid-twentieth century. Naturally this only compounded Spain's exclusion.⁴

In 1970, the openness of each economy was drastically different. Measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to gross domestic product (GDP), Portugal's ratio was 45 percent, while that of Spain reached




FIGURE 8.2. Index of exports plus imports (percent of GDP; 1971=100)

only 22 percent (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). The two Iberian countries were worlds apart in terms of internationalization until the 1980s.

PORTUGAL WAS AN ISLAND

Spain's overshadowing lack of openness isolated Portugal from the rest of Europe, making the country an "island." Spain was a passage by which to reach "Europe," and that means that Spain was only that: a passage to France or England and Germany, in the same way that for islanders the sea is something that must be crossed in order to reach the continent. In this sense the Portuguese were islanders, or grew up as such.

I do not mean to say the Portuguese felt or were closed to the world, much to the contrary. But in rather the same way that the British do not feel isolated per se, but nevertheless think and feel like islanders, the Portuguese experienced something akin to this island mentality. It is important to note that if Portugal had closed itself the effects would have been rather different and independent of the Spanish political stance. Following John Edward Terrell, "it is not a good idea to think of islands as isolated places." But furthermore, "various social, mental, and physical factors can influence the degrees of interaction and isola-

tion that occur through time and which influence how societies operate.”⁵ There is a vast literature on the island syndrome in biology and, to some extent, in anthropology. However, I have been unable to find relevant studies in psychology or sociology. Exploring that literature, I find the studies in biology remarkably interesting.⁶

This paper does not intend to portray a mechanical or deterministic view of the social behavior of the Portuguese, but rather to see the “island” condition as a drive that feeds into social values, which are in turn reinforced through social behavior.

THE ISLAND SYNDROME

As Eric Smith explains clearly, “environment can shape cultures” and “culture comes from culture,” in the sense that cultures do tend to perpetuate themselves.⁷ This paper does not follow a deterministic view of the environment, that is, it does not claim that this “*directly determines* features of human behavior.” Nor does it rest on the view of “possibilism.” The “essence of the ‘possibilist’ view is that the environment may *limit*, but not directly *cause*” the human social and cultural behavior. Instead, this paper follows the approach of “cultural ecology.” In this approach, “cultures *interact* with their environment settings via a process of *adaptation*.” Environment presents “*adaptive problems and opportunities* not just limits or simple determinants”; cultural ecology argues “that adaptive process shapes cultures to achieve patterns that are *best* suited to a given environment.”

The first trace of this island syndrome, borrowed from biology, is related to degree of sedentary behavior. Islanders tend either to be very sedentary or they move away from the island: they are either settled or great travelers. In Portugal we find an inclination for low degrees of internal geographical mobility coupled with very high levels of international mobility. Throughout the twentieth century the only internal mobility was due to seasonal labor employment, which rapidly faded away, and to urbanization, which took place everywhere. However, once located in a major city, people tend to be rather immobile. In contrast, emigration was a major phenomenon—until the early 1960s mainly to Brazil, but also to Argentina, Venezuela, and the United States. During the 1960s emigration toward France and Africa became more important. A worker from the north of the country is more likely to relocate to Paris than move with his family to the Algarve. This characteristic certainly remains true until the present day: low inter-

nal mobility coupled with easy international mobility, whenever it is necessary.

Another trace of island syndrome is that islanders have wider ecological amplitude when compared with their continental counterparts. That is, they are forced by nature and by relative isolation to be more adaptive to conditions and new circumstances. They cannot afford to be choosy. Interestingly enough, this is one of the few positive traces the Portuguese claim for their behavior: the capacity to adapt and improvise in new and unplanned circumstances. Mario Bunge also claims that the Portuguese are pragmatic. Though he did not think much of it, one could trace this pragmatism, as well, to the island syndrome due to the need to adapt to changing circumstances within the island.⁸

Moreover, there are two features of the behavior of the Portuguese people—a high degree of hospitality to foreigners and the marriage of emigrants to spouses outside the Portuguese community—that seem unrelated to typical islander behavior but can be linked to it. Anyone visiting Portugal remarks upon the sense of hospitality to visitors, and this lack of xenophobic sentiment is in large degree extended to immigrants. At the same time one observes that after some time Portuguese emigrants quite often marry outside the community. In Africa and Brazil and more recently in France, Portuguese emigrants tend to fade away. After one or two generations the Portuguese mix with locals, whether African or French, building mixed communities integrated into the local societies, an outcome not seen in other histories of colonization or migration inside Europe.

In fact, in Paris there are no Portuguese quarters and the Portuguese immigrants are difficult to identify, despite having been the largest foreign group in that city just thirty years ago. And the political participation of Portuguese descendents is very high, not only in the Paris region but throughout the country as well. This illustrates the high level of assimilation in France. Furthermore, this intermarriage is also well seen, if not praised, inside Portugal, where foreign family names are proudly exhibited.

These tendencies for hospitality and for intermarriage can be rationalized or understood as a consequence of the island syndrome. Islanders face the issue of inbreeding, and the openness to foreigners and intermarriage outside the community is fundamental in preventing the problem of consanguinity.

A last important trace of islanders is lack of aggressiveness. More pre-

cisely, aggressiveness is ritualized and rarely actually realized. This certainly is reminiscent of the contrast between Portugal and Spain in terms of domestic aggressiveness throughout the last century. More interestingly, in the period following the April Revolution of 1974 Portugal became a lawless country. But for the eighteen months that followed, the political violence was essentially ritualized and rarely materialized.

Moreover, the large inflow of refugees from Africa after the independence of the colonies during 1975 never led to violence, unlike similar (but less important in terms of numbers) developments in France, for instance. The return of refugees from African colonies—then called *retornados*—increased the local population by around 8 percent, almost overnight. After a decade had passed no sign of *retornados* remained—not even the expression survives in today’s speech. This is in sharp contrast with the *pied-noirs* in France from the late 1950s, who are until today easily identified and ostracized by the local communities. All these examples show a lack of effective aggressiveness, something that is also characteristic of islanders.

Again, I am not proposing that social behavior is determined by biology, but only that biology creates conditions to adapt social behavior to the actual circumstance of islanders. The adapted social behavior feeds into social values of the islanders and is reinforced by these values over time.

PORTUGAL COMES ASHORE

This sense of isolation or, perhaps better, a sense of “equal distance” from Lisbon to Brazil, or France, or the United States, is now fading away. The cause of this change resides mainly, once again, in Spain. In the early 1980s Spain started to open itself not only to Europe, but also to the rest of the world. Along with this trend, it has opened to Portugal as well.

For lack of other indicators, one can measure the increasing degree of openness by the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP since 1970. In 1986 both Portugal and Spain became European Union members; the resulting increasing globalization of foreign trade had to play a more important role in each country’s openness (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). However, since 1970 Portuguese foreign trade has increased by 60 percent, that of Spain by more than 100 percent. Note that for contemporary Spain the importance of foreign trade is similar




FIGURE 8.3. Portuguese external trade (percent of total imports plus exports)

to that for Portugal in 1970 (see figure 8.2). In any case, the relevance of Portuguese trade with Spain was insignificant in the 1970s, while today Spain is Portugal's major trading partner, as should be expected from the only neighboring country. This shows that, at least from the economic viewpoint, Portugal is no longer an island (see figure 8.3).

Another indicator that shows the “island coming ashore” is the importance Spain has gained as a destination of doctoral students and postdocs (see figure 8.4). It was not possible to obtain data for the years prior to 1994, but even from the figures thereafter it is abundantly clear that Spain has become a major partner for post-graduate studies among Portuguese scholars. If in 1994 the weight was very small, it is easy to claim that in 1970 it was even lower. Furthermore, Portuguese students have become eligible in recent years for Spanish fellowships. Therefore that evolution is certainly stronger, and Spain becoming a destination for graduate students is much greater than what appears in figure 8.4.

In short, the influence of accession to the European Union by the Iberian countries was very important for Portugal, but the era of openness with Spain that it ushered in was of major impact, reinforcing the effect of decolonization in the mid-1970s—an impact worthy of being singled out for attention. Portugal ceased to be an island and became a Continental country once again.




FIGURE 8.4. Portuguese Fellowships to Spain (Index of percent of total students with Portuguese fellowships to study abroad. [1994=100]) *Source:* Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia

CONCLUSIONS

Portugal was a relatively open country for most of the twentieth century and participated regularly in several international organizations, since their inception. This openness has to be assessed within the international historical context, where countries had been devastated by a tsunami of nationalism since the beginning of the century. Only during the 1950s, and at a slow pace, has internationalism become more important. Unlike Portugal, Spain remained throughout the century and until the mid-1980s a remarkably closed and isolated region. Spain's lack of openness had a huge impact on Portugal, making it something of an island in the international arena. This island effect, or "island syndrome," created conditions that favored certain types of behavior among the Portuguese people: lowered aggressiveness, greater pragmatism, higher adaptability, low internal mobility, and high international mobility.

This paper follows an approach in line with the Cultural Ecology, where environment does not determine culture but creates an adaptive behavior of its people best suited for the actual environment—in this case the "island" of Portugal.⁹ This island syndrome has to be fading away as Spain has taken its natural position in relation to Portugal. While neighboring countries naturally have greater trading and cultural exchange, this was not the case for Spain and Portugal throughout most of the twentieth century. Spain is now the major trading partner and is a major destination for Portuguese to work and study. The surprise is that it took so long for Spain to reach this important role.

NOTES

1. This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of Luís Vicente, Universidade de Lisboa. Special thanks are also due to Paula Ravara and Teresa Mónica. Any remaining shortcomings are my sole responsibility.
2. Rui Ramos, “O Fim da República,” *Análise Social* 34 (2000), 153.
3. Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
4. For more details see António Telo, *Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico* (Porto, Editora Asa, 1993).
5. John Edward Terrell, “Island and the Average Joe,” *The Journal of Island and Coastal Archeology* 3 (2008), 1.
6. For a survey on this issue see Luís Vicente, “Evolutionary Strategies in Insular Environments,” *Natura Croatica* 8 (1999), no. 3.
7. Eric A. Smith, “Development of Ecological Anthropology” (2009), <http://courses.washington.edu/anth457/hist-lec.htm>.
8. Mário Bunge, *Ciência e Desenvolvimento* (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1980).
9. See Smith, “Development of Ecological Anthropology” (see note 7 above).

The Republic and Its Citizens

Broken Promises, Postponed Commitments

The Political Elite's Contempt for Popular Democratic
Participation in the Portuguese First and Second Republics

RUI GRAÇA FEIJÓ

To the memory of Teresa B
Mother of my daughters

Portugal, an ongoing discussion with myself
my regret
my regret of us all
—Alexandre O'Neill¹

I

The feats and achievements of the Portuguese First Republic are numerous, far-reaching, and enduring. They more than deserve this volume's centennial celebrations, which combine academic scrutiny, rigorous and dispassionate analysis, and civic jubilation. As the grandson of a foot soldier who fought with the insurgents of 1910 and was a volunteer in Flanders in 1918, an active low-ranking officer against the monarchist insurrection of 1919 and a lifelong Republican who opposed the authoritarian regimes, I am proud to be associated with this celebration.²

The Provisional Government's creation of the universities of Lisbon and Porto in March 1911 can be singled out as an example of a myriad of reforming acts that together composed what Hermínio Martins calls the "Great Culture War," acts that have since been challenged, criticized, sometimes put on hold, nearly overruled in later regimes, but fortunately never completely reversed. The Republic itself would be shelved for forty-eight long years without giving way to a restoration of the monarchy, only to resurface, reinvigorated, in

. . . the dawn I waited for
 The new day clean and whole
 When we emerge from night and silence
 To freely inhabit the substance of time
 —Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen³

Attempts have been made to dissociate the experience of the First Republic from its symbolism as a herald of a new century. My generation and the previous one witnessed attacks on the memory of those sixteen years, grounded in currents of opinion that find their roots in the ideological combat against modernity.

João Ameal is credited with the utterance “In the last century, the History of Portugal was not done, but undone.” This implies that the Republic was the last phase of what was a national disgrace that began with the French invasions or the 1820 liberal revolution, only to end in 1926. In the opposite ideological camp, a well-known public figure wittingly countered: “The nineteenth century in Portugal ended in 1926—and was followed by nothing” (Cutileiro).

These are nice sound bites, no doubt—but wrong ideas. In my view, the Republic—be it considered as dating from the Fifth of October 1910 or from the day that Porto proudly celebrates every year as the first proclamation of the Republic (January 31, 1891)⁴—represents the fresh, early light of the new century’s dawn. As such, I shall concentrate on the Republic’s branching forward to its later years. I will take up the recurrent theme of political legitimization and the resilient attitude of contempt that I sense in political elites, an Ariadne’s thread that runs from the First well into the mature Second Republic of our day, an attitude that diminishes the importance of popular participation and shows contempt for it as a means of acquiring political legitimacy.

2

The political regime to which we attribute the responsibility for a bold reforming program that had considerable implications in the shaping of our twentieth century lasted a mere sixteen years and, paradoxically, was a fragile political entity. The catalog of shortcomings, difficulties, and incapacities bears comparison to Leporello’s aria in Mozart’s *Don Giovanni*: seven parliaments, nine presidents, forty-five governments, countless coups, political violence on a significant scale, almost endemic civil unrest. The First Republic was no “brief shining moment,” no Camelot.

Why then did the Republic, armed with a strong reforming agenda

that found such a deep echo in the flesh of the nation that has endured beyond the Republic's breakdown, fail to stabilize and, in the end, to survive? I shall pick one critical aspect from among the many that I cannot review here: once it had become the power of the land, the Republican leadership recanted on its promise—going as far back as the Republican program of January 11, 1891, if not before—to adopt “universal suffrage,” whatever meaning this expression might have at that particular historical juncture, a progressive measure that would seem fit for what was then only the third republic in all of Europe.

The history of electoral rights in Portugal in the liberal period, as Pedro Tavares de Almeida has noted, is “complex and contradictory, not following a linear path of more or less regular movement toward universal suffrage.”⁵ Along this winding road, mapped in table 9.1, two milestones are to be pointed out: in 1878 the censitary male suffrage in force since the first formal elections was extended to so many men that the Republican press claimed that “the 1878 Law introduced universal suffrage under another name”⁶—although only 68.2 percent of all men aged 21 or older were given voting rights. This was, however, one of the highest proportions ever achieved under this form of suffrage. But in 1895 the *Regenerador* government redressed the situation restricting voting rights once again, and the number of voters fell from more than 900,000 to fewer than half a million, slightly less than 40 percent of the adult male population.

As a result of this brutal change, “universal suffrage” became a political banner for the Socialists and, mainly, for the Republican Party, which had fared quite well under the 1878 law. When they took power, however, the Republicans lowered the suffrage banner and dropped the claim. With an electoral code slightly adjusted for the 1911 elections for the Constituent Assembly the number of voters rose from 696,171 in the last election under the monarchy to 846,801 (an increase of about 20 percent but still short of the number of voters eligible under the 1878 legislation). However, Afonso Costa's Electoral Code of 1913, destined to live a long life, disenfranchised voters on a large scale and sealed off the loophole that allowed one woman, Carolina Beatriz Ângelo, to vote in 1911. Women were explicitly excluded from suffrage, and the eligibility of male voters was severely reduced. The electoral register again dropped below 400,000 voters, in line with what it had been back in 1869, even though the population had grown from 4.3 million to more than 6 million. In 1915 the proportion of population allowed to vote had reached the level of . . . 1861!

One brief exception came in 1918: Sidónio Pais decreed that presidential elections would be held by direct voting and suffrage extended

TABLE 9.1 EVOLUTION OF POPULATION AND REGISTERED VOTERS

Year	Population	Adult Males	Registered Voters	Percentage of Registered Voters in Population	Percentage of Registered Voters among Adult Males
1864	4,188,410		350,145	8.35%	
1877	(4,550,699)		478,509	10.51%	
1878	4,550,699	1,208,266	824,726	18.12%	68.25%
1890	5,049,729	1,315,473	951,490	18.84%	72.33%
1894	5,131,205		986,233	19.22%	
1895	5,237,280		493,869	9.42%	
1910	(5,960,056)	(1,472,908)	696,171	11.68%	47.47%
1911	5,960,056	1,472,908	846,801	14.21%	57.49%
1913	(6,130,892)	(1,494,558)	397,038	6.47%	26.57%
1915	6,130,892	1,494,558	471,557	7.69%	31.55%
1918	(6,130,892)	(1,494,558)	900,000	14.67%	60.22%
1925	6,032,991	1,535,651	574,260	9.52%	37.40%
1928	6,634,300		1,092,591	16.48%	
1933	7,057,400		1,238,224	17.55%	
1934	7,147,000		588,957	8.24%	
1942	7,830,026		772,578	9.87%	
1945	8,045,774		992,723	12.34%	
1949	8,333,400		1,128,198	13.54%	
1958	8,926,400		1,294,779	14.50%	
1965	9,122,000		1,357,495	14.88%	
1969	9,074,700		1,794,239	19.77%	
1973	8,978,200		2,096,020	23.35%	
1974	9,218,000		6,231,372	67.60%	

Sources: Philippe C. Schmitter, "The 'Régime d'Exception' That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Dominance in Portugal," in *Contemporary Portugal*, eds. Lawrence C. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 3–46, at 36; Manuel Braga da Cruz, *O Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo* (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1988), 196, 204; José Manuel Quintas, "Eleições para a Assembleia Nacional," in *Dicionário de História do Estado Novo*, eds. Fernando Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1996), 1:290; Pedro Tavares de Almeida, *Legislação Eleitoral Portuguesa, 1820–1926* (Lisbon: Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1998), 233; Teresa Rodrigues, ed., *História da População Portuguesa* (Porto: CEPESE/Afrontamento, 2008), 329, 340; Luciano Amaral, "New Series for GDP per Capita, per Worker and per Work-Hour in Portugal, 1950–2007" (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa Working Paper Series 540, 2009), 31.

to all males aged 21 and older, regardless of literacy status. The electoral register jumped to more than 900,000, allowing 513,958 electors to cast their vote—a figure higher than the electoral register of 1915.

With the assassination of the “President-King” (Fernando Pessoa’s famous sobriquet), this legislation was repealed in favor of the 1913 Code. By 1925 there were 574,260 electors, less than 10 percent of the entire population, barely more than one-third of all adult males.⁷

This short survey suggests that the majority of the Republican elite that dominated between 1910 and 1926 held a conservative, aristocratic conception of the nature of their regime, downplaying the importance of involving citizens in public life and opening their political organizations to the emerging pattern of mass parties. Let us honor the minority within the Republican movement that kept alive the flame of universal suffrage in the face of mounting difficulties.⁸

The reliance on “revolutionary legitimacy” was a prominent feature of mainstream Republican thinking (the most radical measures were adopted *before* the elections for the Constituent Assembly). But “revolutionary legitimacy” tends not to be eternal and to wear thin if not refreshed or supplemented by other forms of political legitimization. Recent literature on changes of regime, namely, on the processes of transitions to democracy, emphasizes the importance of regular, free, and fair elections, with wide franchise as a key element in the consolidation of the new political landscape. I suggest that we might find a parallel in this situation.

The motive that has often been put forward as an explanation for the Republican leaders’ recanting of their earlier positions, that is, that they feared the conservative rural vote as having been influenced by the clergy and as being opposed to the reformist, secular republic, can be considered only a half-truth. The field was open for Portuguese Republicans to follow known examples. For instance, the promotion of schooling and literacy—so high on their agenda—and the ensuing emergence of the village schoolmaster as a counterpoint to the priest, could have resulted in a kind of *République au village* along the lines of what had happened in France.⁹ Excuses and short-sighted views do not replace the consideration of the full scope of opportunities.

To disenfranchise one’s opponents, whatever the argument—be it the need to have a “Republican Republic” or because “universal suffrage cannot be adopted in Portugal at present not only because of the threat to the stability of the current institutions but also because of the very autonomy of the country itself”¹⁰—is both a quick way to win elections and an expedient way to turn opponents into enemies of the regime. By recanting their promises, Afonso Costa and his followers were compro-

mising the legitimacy of their republic and hastening its end. Keeping the promise of universal suffrage might not have brought stable government, but it would have likely produced a regime with a more solid base.

Of course, extended voting rights do not always go hand in hand with democratic rights, which the Republic generally upheld, as the events following the demise of the First Republic were to demonstrate. Without public liberties and basic political rights, and with censorship and administrative or political manipulation of the census and voting procedures, the meaning of elections and formal voting rights takes on a different light. The consideration that “it is good policy to interest as many Portuguese as possible in the affairs of public business”¹¹ exhibits the post-Republican authorities’ understanding that a wider electorate was a powerful means of political legitimization; and the authorities acted accordingly. First, on the question of women’s voting rights, the Ditadura Nacional would grant women the right to vote, provided they were “heads of family” and had obtained secondary or university degrees,¹² a limited right later broadened twice under the Estado Novo: once in 1946,¹³ and again under Marcello Caetano. Law 2137, dated December 26, 1968, proclaimed the equality of men and women for electoral purposes, except for Juntas de Freguesia. Second, the electoral census could be enlarged by altering legislation or manipulating the registration process. The history of the authoritarian period was one of meandering back and forth according to the circumstances: for the plebiscite of 1933, the register was enlarged; it was then severely curtailed until after World War II, when it was gradually enlarged. However, the peak that had been achieved in 1933 would be surpassed, in terms of the percentage of the population registered, only under Caetano in 1969—that is, when a new leader sought to establish the basis of his power by combining the legitimacy of his old career inside the regime with a personal triumph at the polls.

After the First Republic, in the periods of Ditadura Nacional and Estado Novo, changes of power inside the regime were associated with a tendency to enlarge the electoral census and to call elections (in 1928, 1933, and 1969)—if only again to limit the census or other progressive measures once the new leader had been installed. This indicates that the authoritarian elite saw a link between voting rights and an expected consolidation of their power, which we may consider as an expression of some sort of populism, or Caesarism,¹⁴ but which seems to have eluded most Republican, democratic leaders after 1910.

3

The dawn of the Second Republic would be marked by the political will to match the new institutional solutions with the stances and proclamations of the opposition to the authoritarian regime. In this light we might recall the insistence on having direct, popular elections for the President of the Republic (a key point since Salazar changed the Constitution of 1933 in the wake of the popular mobilization that surrounded General Delgado's 1958 campaign); the reluctance to enshrine the referendum in the Constitution of the Second Republic (for fear of the antidemocratic use it had suffered in the 1933 constitutional plebiscite, the referendum was inscribed in the Constitution only in 1989); and, of course, the outright defense of modern universal suffrage.

In the wake of Law 3/74, issued by the Junta de Salvação Nacional in early May 1974, a committee was established to prepare a new electoral framework. This resulted in approval of two diplomas by the Third Provisional Government in November 1974, which established universal suffrage in its modern sense in Portugal. As a result, the number of registered voters grew nearly threefold, from 2,096,020 in the 1973 legislative elections to 6,231,372 in the 1975 constituent election. This sudden increase ranks among the highest rises in the electoral body between two successive elections in Europe in the twentieth century.

The importance of this bold decision became evident when the path of the Carnations Revolution brought face-to-face those who claimed "revolutionary legitimacy" and those who claimed "democratic, popular legitimacy," based on the results at the polls. Any electoral arrangement based on restricted voting rights could not have produced the tremendous impact that the adoption of universal suffrage had in 1975.

After the confrontation of November 25, 1975, the demise of the radical left-wing camp paved the way for finalizing the transition and later for consolidating the Second Republic in Portugal as a democratic regime. However, the question of universal suffrage was no longer the central issue in the construction of a democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth century.¹⁵ New challenges had surfaced, and the Portuguese revolution brought to the fore the issue of public participation in civic and political life. Many observers and scholars who have analyzed the Portuguese experience have noted the high degree of popular mobilization that marked the "hot years."¹⁶ In a way, the presidential candidacy of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in 1976 (who earned 16.5 percent of the national vote and won in the district of Setubal) was the swan song of

the grassroots popular movement that had erupted in the form of worker's committees or neighborhood commissions, among others.

The members of the Constituent Assembly were well aware of that genuine drive at the grassroots level and made room for the survival of those forms of political expression.¹⁷ Their aim, however, was to subordinate those bodies to the macrostructure of the state, which preferred more classical forms of organization and representation. The new political-administrative landscape designed to meet the requirements of Article 48 ("All citizens have the right to take part in political life and in the direction of public affairs of the country, either directly or through freely elected representatives") adopted a new mix of institutions: it created from scratch two autonomous regions in the archipelagoes of Azores and Madeira (Title VII), borrowed from historical tradition the local political level of municipalities and parishes, and passed on from the technocratic inheritance of Caetano's more progressive advisors the promise of a regional level of political administration (Title VIII).

The Constituent Assembly's general purpose was, thus, to consolidate and enhance the quality of Portuguese democracy by facilitating public participation and creating a multilevel system in line with the principle of *subsidiarity*. The Council of Europe defines the term as meaning that "the responsibility for carrying out tasks should be held at the lowest level of government competent to undertake them, and where necessary higher authorities should give support to enable them to fulfill the responsibilities that are appropriately theirs."

4

I would like to provide a view from below, as it were, gained in my time as *vereador* in Porto's Câmara Municipal (1994–1998) to emphasize the importance of subnational levels and forms of government. The eagerness with which the early constitutional authorities faced the question of municipal power can be grasped from this anecdote. The first municipal elections were held on December 12, 1976, in accordance with a bill passed in September. However, the bill defining the competences of those municipal bodies was passed only in October 1977 (Law 79/77); and the one that fixes the terms and limits for local finances would not be published until 1979 (Law 1/79). The local government born in this peculiar way owed a great deal to the "municipalist tradition," whose roots historians trace to preindependence times and whose modern form was crafted in the revolutionary 1830s.¹⁸ Apart from the

rhetoric of “municipalism,” the new municipal government represented a substantial break with the past once it became fully inserted into the world of democratic representation through universal suffrage. In this sense, it can rightly be claimed that “Portuguese local government . . . in its modern form, has been built up from scratch.”¹⁹

Much hope was placed on these new authorities, deemed to invert the Salazar inheritance of “a system that actively encouraged the population’s political apathy”²⁰ where local authorities “essentially played a role as units of administration of the [central] state.”²¹ These hopes were grounded on the apparent adoption of the most commonly accepted principle of local government in continental Europe: “general competence.” In 2003 the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe issued a statement in which it “welcome[d] the fact that the Portuguese municipalities have general competence to undertake activities affecting the interests of their citizens in accordance with each municipality’s own decisions.”²² In precise terms, “the general competence that municipalities possess in most European countries [consists of] the right to intervene and take initiatives with respect to any matter relating to the local community in so far as the law does not explicitly provide otherwise. . . . It bolsters the conception of the municipality as a general political authority which acts in its own right.”²³ The other side of the coin, alas, comes in the form of a much narrower definition of legal functions and the fact that resources are made available in close relation to the legally defined functions. The Portuguese system of local government comes close to the British alternative principle of *ultra vires*, “whereby local authorities may only carry out such responsibilities as are specifically assigned to them by parliament.”²⁴

Although it has been generally agreed that “Portugal is one of the European countries which follows a more neutral policy regarding the financial transfers from the center to the local authorities,” having set up a model of “relative autonomy,”²⁵ and thus assuring “the preservation of local independence in decision-making with respect to budgetary considerations and spending . . . [and] . . . reducing central government’s margin for manoeuvre and manipulation,”²⁶ the amount of resources channeled to municipal authorities is quite poor in comparative European terms. These conflicting realities are the source of a great deal of tension between the expectations placed on the shoulders of local mayors and the municipalities’ capacity to deliver and respond effectively to its electors.²⁷

The idea that Portugal has decided, since the revolution, to follow so-called European patterns in most political domains has long been established. It is therefore relevant to assess how the adoption of a European

model has affected subnational structures of government and their participation in public spending.

5

The trend in post–World War II Europe is to diversify and increase the complexity of territorial administration in response to public pressures toward self-government.²⁸ We can grasp the extent to which the trend to adopt a variety of subnational forms of government has encompassed Europe from table 9.2, which refers to the current 27 member countries of the European Union (EU 27).

This table shows that the mix of three subnational levels of government enshrined in the Constitution of the Second Republic is not actually in place: Portugal instead appears as a two-tier system. The second tier consists of the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira; the parish level has insufficient power or resources to be considered an independent level. As a matter of fact, the implementation of a form of regional level of government was defeated in a national referendum held in November 1998, but it was not removed from the Constitution. For most practical purposes, however, Portugal should be compared with countries that have only one subnational level of government, because the two autonomous regions comprise only 3.4 percent of the nation's territory and only 4.6 percent of its population.

With this in mind, we may now compare the percentage of public spending channeled through subnational governments in the EU 27 (see table 9.3). This exercise offers a glimpse of the extent to which subnational governments have resources (and indirectly, competences) that allow them to respond to their citizens' requirements. The first conclusion we can draw from table 9.3 is that Portugal is among the poorest EU nations in spending for subnational government. EU nations spend an average of 33.5 percent of their total budget, but Portugal spends only 13 percent. Only Greece, Malta, and Cyprus allocate smaller shares of their budget. And our closest neighbors—Mediterranean, Catholic, Napoleonic, centralist, statist, bureaucratic, patrimonial (to use a variety of attributes often applied to this group of countries deemed to bear structural historical similarities)—are much more generous: France, 20.2 percent; Italy, 31.2 percent; Spain, 54.1 percent.

If one splits the €9.3 billion that Portugal allocated in 2007 to all subnational forms of government, the two autonomous regions absorbed about 20 percent of that sum (Madeira, 11.1 percent; Azores, 8.3 percent), leaving 80.6 percent to the other level.²⁹ Broadly speaking, the

TABLE 9.2 LEVELS OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(AS APPLIED TO THE 27 EU MEMBER NATIONS, 2007)

	Member Countries	Number of Countries
Countries with one level	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia	8
Countries with two levels	Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden	12
Countries with three levels	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom	7

Source: Dominique Hoorens, ed., *Sub-National Governments in the European Union: Organization, Responsibilities and Finances* (La Défense, France: Dexia, 2008), 37–39.

autonomous regions receive 2.6 percent of national public spending (20 percent of 13 percent), and the local authorities receive 10.4 percent of the grand total. The “transfers to local authorities” are of two kinds: 92.4 percent of these transfers go to municipalities, and 7.6 percent go to parishes (State Budget for 2009). Thus, parishes receive less than 0.8 percent of the nation’s public spending, and municipalities grab some 9.6 percent. Converting these rates to euro amounts per capita in 2005, we see that the average EU expenditure through local governments is €3,337 per capita, compared to Portugal’s €656 (less than one-fifth of the EU average). Figures for total subnational public spending per capita are €4,114 for the EU nations and €885 for Portugal (that is, 21.5 percent of the EU 27 average).

What may appear as a picture of Portugal consistently channeling fewer than average resources to local government or to the subnational system does not, however, hold true for the two autonomous regions. Let us compare the average per capita expenditure for the subnational system across the EU with what happens in Azores and Madeira. The EU’s spending of €4,114 for the subnational system in 2005 would compare to about €3,300 in Portugal for the autonomous regions alone: Madeira, €3,806; Azores, €2,885. Dominique Hoorens shows that those countries with the highest “regional” spending (including federated states) are all below the level for Madeira. Spain spends €3,100; Germany, €3,150. Even the Azores receive more than Austria’s regions, €2,800, or Belgium’s €2,500.³⁰ Clearly, Portugal remains a very centralized state, limiting the resources it makes available to local self-government, though it exhibits advanced forms of political devolution to the two autonomous regions. We can conclude that Portugal combines a

TABLE 9.3 SUB-NATIONAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE EU 27 (2007)

Country	Percent of GDP	Percent of Public Expenditure
Austria	17.3	35.1
Belgium	21.0	42.9
Germany	19.6	43.2
Bulgaria	6.8	18.3
Cyprus	2.1	4.7
Czech Republic	12.0	27.4
Denmark	33.4	64.7
Estonia	8.4	25.4
Finland	19.6	40.2
France	11.1	20.8
Greece	3.1	6.7
Hungary	12.9	24.9
Ireland	6.8	19.9
Italy	15.6	31.2
Latvia	10.2	27.4
Lithuania	8.5	25.1
Luxembourg	5.2	13.2
Malta	0.6	1.5
Netherlands	15.4	33.3
Poland	13.5	30.8
<i>Portugal</i>	6.0	13.0
Romania	8.4	24.0
Slovakia	6.6	17.6
Slovenia	8.8	19.5
Spain	20.9	54.1
Sweden	25.0	45.0
United Kingdom	12.9	29.0
Total EU 27	15.7	33.5

Source: Hoorens, *Sub-National Governments in the European Union*, 31 and 77.

very generous treatment of the autonomous regions with a very parsimonious, even stingy attitude toward the vast majority of the territory and its inhabitants.

A fundamental question remains: Does this imbalance of resources and competences affect the well-being of the population? To cut short a long discussion, let me present table 9.4, which shows the evolution of

TABLE 9.4 EVOLUTION OF PORTUGUESE REGIONAL GDP PER CAPITA IN PURCHASING POWER PARITIES (EU 27 = 100)

	Portugal	North	Center	Lisbon	Alentejo	Algarve	Azores	Madeira
1995	75	64	64	104	70	79	60	67
2007	76	61	65	106	73	80	68	97
	+1	-3	+1	+2	+3	+1	+8	+30

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Contas Regionais, 2008—Preliminar, 9, www.ine.pt.

regional wealth, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Parities from 1995 to 2007.³¹

In those twelve years, the country as a whole progressed from 75 percent of the EU 27 average to 76 percent. At the regional level, the North lost 3 percent its purchasing power. Other regions made modest gains: the Center and the Algarve, 1 percent; Lisbon and Alentejo, 2 and 3 percent, respectively. But the autonomous regions gained 8 percent (Azores) and 30 percent (Madeira). This very substantial difference casts doubts on the putative efficiency of centralization in the creation of wealth and promotion of development, and it points to the need for both further inquiry and discussion of the underlying prejudices that have militated against the process of creating constitutional regions in continental Portugal.

6

Many academics and politicians stress the imminent failure of the Portuguese Second Republic. Talk of impending doom tends to catch the audience's attention. Although I do not believe that such a breakdown is imminent, it is impossible to ignore the evidence of a severe decline in public approval of the current form of democracy in Portugal. The question of democratic legitimacy looms on the horizon once again.

Figure 9.1, borrowed from André Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas, shows a rapid decline in the rate of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the current regime, from nearly 80 percent satisfaction less than two decades ago to about 30 percent in 2010. This puts Portugal at odds with most of its partners in the European Union and elsewhere in the developed democratic world.³² Compared with a group of solid democratic countries, whose inhabitants' rate of satisfaction was around 65 percent from 2002 through 2006, Portugal in 2005 exhibited a rate of 47.6 percent. Scandinavian countries had rates above 70 percent (reaching 93.4 percent in Denmark); our neighbor Spain

rated 77.7 percent; and the United States 78.4 percent. Having fallen faster than the rate of satisfaction with democracy in other nations, the rate in Portugal is at a worrisome level today. These bare figures from opinion polls match a diffuse *fin de partie* atmosphere that has been captured by this line of graffiti seen on a Porto wall: “*Queremos mentiras novas*” (We want new lies).

The current republic and the last years of the First Republic are both plagued by the frailty of their legitimacy, but our contemporaries seem to combine a critique of the current state of affairs with a defense of the principle of democracy; they are very far from espousing an ontological critique of democracy itself, as was common in the 1920s. Indeed, the main thrust of complaints in our time is the limited scope of political participation.³³ This reaction can be understood both by the overwhelming presence of political parties that suffocate the popular voice and also by the limited scope for subnational organs of power, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

However, political regimes evolve and change. The pursuit of the “quality of democracy” calls for an unending process of adjustment and improvement. The scope of changes can be of different magnitudes and may or may not imply a change of regime. The Portuguese Second Republic may survive for decades, or a more or less peaceful, substantial revision of the Constitution may bring a Third Republic. Much depends on how the Second Republic confronts the shortcomings it has so far exhibited. Among those is what I regard as an Ariadne’s thread that runs from the First Republic’s curtailing of voting rights rather than fulfilling its promise of universal suffrage, to the Second Republic’s vague and insufficient moves toward developing the conditions and institutional instruments for the people to exert their constitutional right to participate in the political process in ways other than mere regular voting for national organs of power or impoverished, weak municipalities. Both processes contribute to the emergence of a perception of an aristocratic, if not oligarchic, elite, and they undermine the political legitimacy of the Republic. Some of the First Republic’s acknowledged “errors” were aptly overcome later in the century, but the persistence of a conservative intellectual attitude that tends to downplay and disregard political participation at the grassroots and the contribution of the many, in countercurrent to recent developments in democracy in Europe and elsewhere, is particularly disturbing. Manifestations of contempt or disdain for what is closer to the bottom of the political and administrative ladder, or farther away from the capital, are so abundant as to make a choice of examples




FIGURE 9.1. Rate of satisfaction with the performance of democracy. *Source:* André Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas, *Representação Política—O caso português em perspectiva comparada* (Lisbon: Sextante, 2010).

quite difficult; and conservative intellectuals sing in chorus Salazar’s tune of the people’s “unpreparedness” for democracy.

In the pressing quest for solutions to shrinking political legitimacy, it is worth listening to some voices that echo in our memory, voices of some of our egregious ancestors that may bring surprising contributions, addressing in a fresh and inspiring way the models of territorial administration and self-government that pertain to the broader issue of the “quality of democracy.” I refer to a minority current within the Republican movement: Federalism.

Hermínio Martins distinguishes three branches of Federalism: “imperial and postimperial,” of which Spínola’s program contained in *Portugal e o Futuro* was perhaps the last example; “Iberian and European Federalism,” partly overcome by the process of European integration but quite alive in this very context; and “Federalism at home”—precisely the one that may be useful insofar as it covers what is perhaps wrongly termed “regionalism.”³⁴ Alves da Veiga, the veteran republican leader of the 1891 uprising in Porto, proposed in 1911 a federal constitution modeled on his book *Política Nova*. That constitutional document suffered the same fate as the constitutional draft later prepared by Sebastião de Magalhães Lima and a committee of assembly members, which has been labeled “a Republic of Municipalities,” for the extended decentralized powers it offered to local organs of self-government. This occurred long before Fernando Venâncio’s writing of the political-fiction novel *El Rei no Porto* (2001), an ironic story about the power of municipalities in the northern, monarchical part of a divided Portugal. The legacy of those leading early Republicans was later taken up, among many other examples, by the *Nucleo*

Republicano Regionalista do Norte led by Eduardo Santos Silva in Porto in 1924.³⁵

My point is not to demonstrate the existence of this current in the Republican tradition before and after 1910. Rather, I would stress the emphasis that federalists of all currents always placed on decentralized self-government for the territorial units, which would join together in the formation of the nation in a non-unitarian state. The suggestion I present to you is that republican federalism and regionalism offer pertinent thoughts and merge with the cause of those who call for the fulfillment of yet unrealized constitutional principles of popular participation and enlarged self-government as part of the quest for a better democracy; they are increasingly resentful of the ways the Second Republic has performed in this regard.

Some, like Fernando Marques da Costa, have openly argued that Portugal requires a Third Republic.³⁶ This new polity would replace the unitarian character of the state, a core defining value of the current constitution (whose pertinence is under dispute due to the strength of the autonomous regions and the notion of “progressing” or “evolving” autonomy), embracing a federalist-inspired new model that would not change the substance of present-day arrangements but would instead call, as we say in colloquial Portuguese, “the oxen by their names.” This, however, could entail other constitutional changes such as the acceptance of regional states and political parties, a bicameral parliament, and a redefinition of the status and role of the president of the Republic.

Portugal may, and most likely will, stay short of becoming an open federalist state. Spain is a model to bear in mind, having broken away from the very same mold of centralist tradition to achieve levels of development and political responsiveness that have no parallel in Portugal. Although Spain has not established an openly federalist state, its structure is quite close to that model, which three of our European partners have adopted (Austria, Belgium, Germany) and which is hotly discussed elsewhere (for example, in Italy).

The core political elite that has dominated the Second Republic may still be persuaded that what its members wrote in the 1976 Constitution (and have found no reason or no strength to change in the years since), what they have been so critical of in the “European example,” if actually implemented, is indeed compatible with the Second Republic and the Republican tradition and need not remain a postponed commitment. Their stubborn attitude in keeping Portugal one of the most centralized states in the European Union, their reluctance to implement a regional level of government, their preference to keep the scope of competences

of municipalities at the current low level, on the fallacious argument that the country cannot afford the financial lack of discipline that those reforms would entail (as if centralism would spare us the costs of financial irresponsibility . . .), is no less patronizing than nor substantially different from Afonso Costa's recanting on the promise to grant open suffrage to illiterate men on the basis that they were "people without any clear idea about anything whatsoever"—just to be reminded that the Republican leadership had not asked for proof of literacy from those who fought and died in Rua de Santo António or in the Rotunda.³⁷

The evolutionary capacity of the Second Republic—an idea that the experience of constitutional adaptation to new realities since 1975 seems to support—is currently under observation. Should it persist with the current trend of megalomaniac investments in the Lisbon area, the much-delayed process of institutional creation and political devolution to the regions, the restraints it places on the competences of local government, the semipermanent state of conflict with the autonomous regions, in a clear challenge to the respect due to the principles of equality and participation enshrined in the core values of modern democracy—then either Jose Mattoso's bitter remark that Portugal "is becoming a country of bits and pieces that nothing holds together"³⁸ imposes itself, or a Third Republic may actually be in the making.

FINALE

A final word on the future seems in order. The future, as Sir Karl Popper would say, is open³⁹—and I have no greater insight than anyone else about what will actually happen in the days ahead. However, because this paper is presented in the San Francisco Bay Area, on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley, I cannot escape the resonating echo of words by two illustrious men of the twentieth century who walked these very same streets and pathways, heard the Campanile bell toll, sat in the tranquility of these libraries or under these trees, and were inspired with eloquence to reveal fundamental aspects of their, and our, society, writing words I have carried in my memory for years and repeat now with great respect.

Allen Ginsberg, who is said to "see with the eyes of angels" (William Carlos Williams), perhaps further than most of us, opened his epic poem "Howl"⁴⁰ with this stanza:

I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving
hysterical naked,

dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking for an angry
fix

Ginsberg's lines brutally remind us all that rational behavior is far from being the only door opening up to the future. Other considerations do shape the agency of men. Among those, even if only as a worst-case scenario, one can recall Carlo Maria Cipolla's Third (and Golden) Rule on Human Stupidity: "A person is stupid if they cause damage to another person or group of people without experiencing personal gain, or even worse, causing damage to themselves in the process."⁴¹

History, therefore, is about contingency, largely shaped by our beliefs, our choices, our actual deeds, more or less rational, more or less impulsive. In other words, history is shaped by the use we give to our rights of citizenship, so intimately related to the very essence of the Republic as a field of combined liberties that in my daily life I endeavor to preserve, but whose fate I am unable to predict.

NOTES

1. Translated by Richard Zenith. The poem "Portugal" appeared in Alexandre O'Neill, *Feira Cabisbaixa* (Lisbon: Ulisseia, 1965). I am grateful to Richard for providing translations of Portuguese poems used in this text and to Teresa Almeida for having introduced us to one another.

2. This essay originated when I became involved in translating and editing Hermínio Martins's forthcoming book *As Mudanças de Regime em Portugal no Século XX* and preparing a sister volume on federalism in Portugal. These projects have been carried out in very close, friendly, and comprehensive contact with Hermínio, whose intellectual generosity and inspiration I am pleased to acknowledge, while retaining full responsibility for inaccuracies or errors that may have made their way into these pages. David B. Goldey generously read and critiqued earlier drafts, and his pertinent suggestions substantially contributed to the shaping of the final version. Hermínio and David would deserve this to be a better essay.

I wish to thank the organizers, and Professor Herr in particular, for their kind invitation to participate in the conference at which I first presented this content, and to FLAD for the material support provided.

3. Translated by Richard Zenith. The poem "25 de Abril" first appeared in Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen, *O Nome das Coisas*, Part 2 (1974-75) (Lisbon: Editorial Caminho, 1977), 76.

4. Pedro Baptista, "O lugar do 31 de Janeiro na História," *Tripeiro* 29 (2010) 7th series: 6-9.

5. Pedro Tavares de Almeida, *Legislação Eleitoral Portuguesa 1820-1926* (Lisbon: Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1998), xxi.

6. Ibid.
7. Besides Tavares de Almeida's extended bibliography, see Maria Namorado and Alexandre Sousa Pinheiro, *Legislação Eleitoral Portuguesa. Textos Históricos. 1820–1974*, 2 vols. (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 1998).
8. Fernando Farello Lopes, *A 1ª República Portuguesa: questões eleitorais e deslegitimação*, 2 vols. (PhD diss., ISCTE, Lisbon, 1988).
9. Maurice Agulhon, *La République au village* (Paris: Plon, 1970).
10. Words of Deputy Sá Pereira in Parliament (1913), quoted in Tavares de Almeida, *Legislação Eleitoral Portuguesa*, xxiv.
11. Decree-Law 14802, December 29, 1927.
12. Decree-Law 19694, May 5, 1931.
13. Decree-Law 2015, May 28, 1946.
14. José Adelino Maltez, "Para uma caracterização do Portugal Contemporâneo—das eleições condicionadas à revolta do sufrágio universal" (paper presented at the symposium "Discussão Pública do Anteprojecto de Lei Eleitoral para a Assembleia da República," University of Coimbra, 1998).
15. The central issue is now the age at which voting rights are granted, with several countries having lowered the age to 16. In 1975 Portugal lowered the legal voting age from 21 to 18, where it remains in 2012.
16. For a good analysis and updated bibliography, see Diego Palacios Cereales, *O Poder Caíu na Rua: Crise de Estado e Ações Colectivas na Revolução Portuguesa, 1974–1975* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003).
17. The *Comissões de Trabalhadores* appeared then in articles 55 and 56, the *Comissões de Moradores* in articles 264 to 266; they are still present in the Constitution after several amendments.
18. José Mattoso, *Identificação de um País: Ensaio sobre as Origens de Portugal, 1096–1325* (Lisbon: Estampa, 1985); Rui Graça Feijó, *Liberal Revolution, Social Change and Economic Development* (New York: Garland, 1993).
19. Armando Pereira, "The System of Local Government in Portugal," in *Local Government in Europe: Trends and Developments*, ed. Richard Batley and Gerry Stoker, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 139.
20. Joyce F. Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Politics in Salazar's Portugal: The Corporate State and Village 'Non-Politics,'" in *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*, ed. Lawrence C. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 167–90.
21. Walter C. Opello, "Administração Local e Cultura Política num concelho rural," *Análise Social*, 15 (1979), 655–762.
22. Council of Europe Resolution 127, 2003, www.coe.int, Point 6.b.
23. Philip Blair, "Trends in Local Autonomy and Democracy," in Batley and Stoker, *Local Government in Europe*, 41–57, at 51.
24. Ibid., 50.
25. Gerry Stoker, introduction to Batley and Stoker, *Local Government in Europe*, 6.
26. Pereira, "System of Local Government," 139 (see note 19 above).
27. I have addressed this issue in "Robin Hood and the Sheriff of *Terreiro do Paço*," a paper presented at the Oxford Workshop on Portuguese Politics, Society and History, May 2009.

28. For recent trends, see Michael Keating, “Territorial Politics and the New Regionalism,” in *Developments in Western European Politics 2*, ed. Paul Heywood, Erik Jones, and Martin Rhodes (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

29. Paulo Trigo Pereira, António Afonso, Manuela Arcanj, and J.C. Gomes Santos, eds., *Economia e Finanças Públicas* (Lisbon: Escolar Editora, 2007). Percentages were calculated on figures for 2002.

30. Dominique Hoorens, ed., *Sub-National Governments in the European Union: Organization, Responsibilities and Finances* (La Défense, France: Dexia, 2008), 80.

31. “Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) are currency conversion rates that both convert to a common currency and equalise the purchasing power of different currencies. In other words, they eliminate the differences in price levels between countries in the process of conversion.” See the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) website at <http://www.oecd.org/std/ppp>.

32. André Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas, *Representação Política: o Caso Português em Perspectiva Comparada* (Lisbon: Sextante, 2010), 352–56.

33. *Ibid.*, 356–61.

34. Hermínio Martins, “Portugal and Europe: The Federal Idea in Portuguese Thought,” in Occasional Papers of the Watson International Studies Centre, Brown University, 1997; and “O Federalismo no Pensamento Político Português,” *Penélope*, 18 (1998): 13–49.

35. António José Queirós, *Um Projecto Descentralizador: o Nucleo Republicano Regionalista do Norte (1920–1924)* (Porto: O Progresso da Foz, 2010). The leader of this movement, Eduardo Santos Silva, a doctor, professor, and sometime president of the Municipal Senate in Porto, was the grandfather of Artur Santos Silva, the current chairman of the commission for the Centennial Celebrations of the Republic—a clear example of continuity of our political elites.

36. See Fernando Marques da Costa, “Portugal: uma República Federativa,” *Expresso*, Jan. 6, 2009; and “‘Tomorrow Never Dies’: The Rise of the IV Republic” (paper presented at the Oxford Workshop on Portuguese Politics, Society and History, June 2003).

37. Vasco Pulido Valente, *O Poder e o Povo* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1976), 108.

38. José Mattoso, “Uma Ideia para Portugal,” *Público*, March 6, 2010.

39. Karl Popper and Conrad Lorenz, *O Futuro está Aberto* (Lisbon: Editoriais Fragmentos, n.d.).

40. Allen Ginsberg, *Howl and Other Poems* (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1956), 9. The William Carlos Williams quote is taken from the book’s introduction, page 8.

41. Carlo M. Cipolla, *Allegro ma non troppo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988). Let us not forget that the First Rule says, “Always and inevitably each of us underestimates the number of stupid individuals in circulation.”

Welfare State Growth in the Second Portuguese Republic: Social Spending and Its Challenges

MIGUEL GLATZER

A central consequence of Portugal's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is a massive transformation in both the size and scope of the Portuguese state. Despite much lower GDP per capita, the Portuguese state has levels of public spending that frequently rival or exceed those of the more developed states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or of the European Union (EU). As in the wealthier countries, the bulk of this spending consists of social transfers, education, and health. Concerned with social protection, access to education, and the right to healthcare, the Portuguese state is primarily a welfare state. These efforts are extraordinary, on several levels. The vast majority of the growth in expenditure occurred post-1974, a period marked initially by high levels of economic volatility, both domestically and internationally, but above all by a slowing of average economic growth rates. This is a welfare state built after the golden age of postwar European growth. Following the deep divisions and policy reversals of the revolutionary period, it reflects a relatively strong consensus among the major political parties concerning the functions of the state. Finally, it represents a substantial organizational and technocratic achievement. The state was able to erect institutional structures with wide scope and universal coverage that have been broadly popular. Democracy, in other words, was not only a formal achievement, but also changed the expectations citizens had of their state.

Nonetheless, outcomes have been decidedly mixed. While improve-

ments in health have been dramatic, success has been only partial in the education sector. Poverty and economic inequality also remain high. More broadly, the growth of the state is in part a reflection of the uneven performance of the economy and of the private sector labor market. This is particularly the case when the measures used are expenditure relative to GDP (gross domestic product) or the creation of public sector jobs relative to private sector ones. The last decade has been in many ways a lost one, where economic convergence with rich countries' GDP per capita has actually reversed. Despite very substantial increases in taxation since 1974, budget deficits and the inability to control expenditure have been a chronic problem. Of greater concern, tools used to paper over or temporarily close these deficits have steadily vanished, leaving few options. The current crisis is thus long in the making. Even if the sovereign debt crisis gets resolved, low economic growth, problems of competitiveness, and population aging are likely to place continual pressure on the major achievement of Portuguese democracy: its welfare state.

This chapter proceeds in several sections. After providing a broad overview of changes in the Portuguese state, the paper examines the growth of social transfers and public involvement in health and education. Middle sections focus on employment and labor market change and the continuing problems of poverty and inequality. The chapter concludes with a discussion of taxes, budget deficits, and current challenges.

THE CHANGING SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE STATE: 1974 TO THE START OF THE CURRENT CRISIS

On the eve of the Portuguese revolution, Portugal was fighting three wars in its African colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. It is thus not surprising that its military expenditure was large. At 6 percent of GDP, it was the largest single item in the government budget. Today, military expenditure has declined to 1 percent of GDP. But the state budget overall has grown tremendously, from 23 percent of GDP in 1974 to 46 percent in 2008.¹

Four areas account for the bulk of the growth of the Portuguese state: social transfers, education, health, and public employment (principally in the areas of education and health). In 1972, health expenditure was only 0.2 percent of GDP; by 2008 it was 5.6 percent. Education expenditure was 1.4 percent of GDP in 1972; by 2008 it was 4.4 percent.² Separate from the state budget but still part of public spending,

the social security system accounted for 5.6 percent of GDP in 1974 but 16.1 percent in 2008.³ Education, health, and social security thus increase from about 7.2 percent of GDP on the eve of the revolution to 26.1 percent of GDP in 2008.

Another way of looking at the growth of the state is through the number of people it employs. In 1974 200,000 people were on the public payroll. Today it is about 800,000.⁴ This increase far outstrips the rise in population, which grew by 25 percent, from 8.5 million residents in 1973 (low because of emigration) to 10.6 million (higher recently because of immigration) in 2008.⁵ Health care and education are labor-intensive activities and it is these two sectors that account for most of the growth in public employment. Because teachers, university professors, doctors, and nurses have higher than average levels of education, the share of government employment that is highly skilled has grown quickly. As a result, the government wage bill has grown faster than the already substantial increase in public employment.

Democracy has brought with it a tremendous transformation in the state, both doubling its size and massively expanding its scope while greatly reducing the proportion of national resources devoted to the military. From a budgetary perspective at least, the principal function of the state is social protection and social services. The welfare state has replaced the warfare state.

The tax increases required to finance this state have been considerable, and only on rare occasions have these met with public protest. In fact cuts in expenditure are much more likely to elicit protests than increases in taxation, suggesting at least at one level that the increase in the social protection function of the state has been met with broad approval. The two principal political parties have each overseen expansions of social expenditure, and polls suggest the Portuguese broadly agree that the state has important responsibilities in health, education, pensions, and the struggle against social exclusion.⁶ For many of these areas there is broad consensus that they should be viewed as social rights.

SOCIAL TRANSFERS

One way to measure the growth of the welfare state is to look at the growth in the number of people receiving social transfers. The number of beneficiaries of the social security system has expanded by more than fifty times since 1960.⁷ The number rose from a mere 56,000 in

1960 to 800,000 by 1975, 2 million by 1985, 2.5 million by 2000, and is approaching 3 million today.⁸ Notable in these data is the fact that social transfers start during the Salazar dictatorship, though they grow at only a moderate pace during the early to mid-1960s, accelerating in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The low numbers reflect a variety of factors. As late as 1970, life expectancy was 67.⁹ There were thus relatively few elderly as a proportion of the population. The proportion of the elderly who met eligibility requirements was low, both because the system was relatively new and thus few qualified for benefits, and because large segments of the working population remained uncovered. This explains why disability pensions constitute the largest proportion of pensions in the early 1960s.

The rapid rise in the number of people receiving transfers in the democratic period reflects political decisions to both increase the number of risks covered as well as decisions to extend the pension system to previously unprotected segments of the population such as rural workers or domestics. Expansion of the system of social transfers predated the call in the 1976 Constitution for the establishment of a comprehensive social security system. The year 1974 saw the introduction of a social pension for elderly or disabled who had not contributed to the system; 1975 saw the introduction of unemployment assistance. Sickness, old age, and disability insurance for the self-employed would follow. As a result, the Law on Social Security (*Lei de Bases da Segurança Social*) of 1984 is as much about reorganizing an existing system as about establishing a new one from scratch. Nonetheless coverage of new risks continued to be added to the system of social transfers. In the mid-1990s, for example, two programs designed to combat deep poverty, the *Rendimento Mínimo Garantido* and the *Rendimento Social de Inserção*, were added. A broad range of risks is thus now covered by the Portuguese welfare state. These include old age, survivors, disability, sickness, child, and poverty transfers. Although the monthly social pension remains small, the noncontributory scheme ensures virtually universal access to pensions by the elderly.

With the establishment of a comprehensive social protection system, the number of recipients increases virtually automatically as a result of demographic change associated with the aging of the population, longer life expectancy, or deterioration in the labor market. Steep drops in fertility rates (now below replacement level) combined with increased life expectancy have led to an ever greater proportion of the population that is elderly and thus eligible for a pension. Population aging places

great pressure on pay-as-you-go systems where outlays come largely from current revenues, not from savings. In 1974, the ratio of pensioners to the labor force (employed and unemployed) was 1:5. Today each pensioner is supported by only 1.7 people in the labor force.¹⁰

The cost of providing these benefits is large. From 1995 to 2008, social transfers increased from 11.2 percent of GDP to 15.6 percent.¹¹ By contrast, the weight of social transfers in the Euro Area 12 declined during this period from 16.9 percent to 16.1 percent of GDP. Portugal, the poorest country in the Euro Area 12, devotes a comparable share of its wealth to social transfers.¹² Recent reforms have discouraged early retirement, altered indexation to inflation, and changed the benefits formula to reduce the weight of the more recent (usually high-earning) years of contribution and to better take into account longer life expectancy. These changes will reduce benefit amounts compared to the earlier calculus.

HEALTH

Democratic Portugal has also seen very substantial increases in state-funded health care. As noted above, public spending on health increased from 0.2 percent of GDP in 1972 to 5.6 percent in 2008 (some analysts place it at over 7 percent).¹³ The National Health Service, created in 1979, is dominant. Although Portugal has a private-public mix, with private insurance available and with doctors able to practice in the private system, the overwhelming majority of visits to the doctor take place in the public system. This is especially true for primary care and general practitioner visits. Doctor's visits per person per year have increased fivefold since 1960, from 0.9 then to 4.4 in 2008.¹⁴ A similar level of increase is found in the number of doctors in this period, which rose from 7,000 (most of them not on the public payroll then) to 39,000, and in the number of people per doctor, which fell from 1,253 per doctor to 273. Similar trends apply to nurses. Budgetary outlays are not restricted to medical personnel. New hospitals and health centers have been built and diagnostic equipment purchased. In addition, the state pays for the vast bulk of pharmaceutical prescriptions. Health expenditures account for about 15 percent of public expenditure, which is higher than the EU 15 average. This percentage has been relatively stable since 2000, but some of this is illusory and cost pressures are likely to rise for several reasons. First, demographic pressures, again in the form of population aging and longer life expectancy, will inevitably

translate into greater demand for services. Second, technological innovation in the health sector can increase costs quickly. (It should be noted that these first two sources of pressure are shared with other developed societies.) Third, the Portuguese state already runs large deficits in the medical sector, most famously with respect to pharmacies but also to other providers. This means that expenditure hasn't kept up with costs. Finally, low economic growth and pressure on the budget will exacerbate the need to control costs.

Nonetheless, the outcomes have been very substantial indeed. These large investments in health correlate with large increases in life expectancy, from 67 in 1970 to 79 in 2008.¹⁵ Infant mortality has fallen from 51 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 3 per 1,000 in 2008, among the lowest in the world. Deaths in childbirth have also fallen dramatically, from 116 per 100,000 births in 1960 to 4 in 2008. A number of reasons beyond public investments in health are cited for this tremendous success in health outcomes. These range from greater level of education and knowledge among the population at large, health seen as a right (as stated in the Portuguese constitution), and improved material conditions in housing, diet, water, and sanitation. Luciano Amaral notes the important point that the Salazar dictatorship saw major improvements in these indicators without corresponding public investments in health. Life expectancy increased from 38 in 1930 to 67 in 1970 and infant mortality declined from 144 per 1,000 live births to 51, for example.¹⁶ This raises the interesting question of how much health indicators would have improved as a result of economic growth and improved living standards, irrespective of public investments in health. Perhaps it is fair to say that the low-hanging fruit of better diet, warmer homes, and improved sanitation systems are likely to have already made their impact. Improvements in health are certainly the result of a multiplicity of factors, but it is likely that the availability of modern health care at very low cost to the user plays an increasingly important role in recent improvements. Nonetheless, the point remains that large investments in a publicly provided health care system have been accompanied by major improvements in health outcomes.

EDUCATION

Education is another area in which massive investment by the state has taken place. Public spending on education rose from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1972 to 4.4 percent in 2008,¹⁷ though some analysts place public

spending on education currently at over 6 percent. This considerable expenditure, amounting to about 12 percent of public outlays, is visible in a number of indicators that demonstrate much greater access to education under democratic rule.

The Salazar regime had made steady progress against illiteracy. In 1930 illiteracy was 60 percent; forty years later in 1970 it was still 26 percent.¹⁸ Compulsory education had increased during the last ten years of the dictatorship, to 6 years in 1964 and 8 in 1973, but enrollment lagged. In 1974 only 20 percent of children were enrolled in middle school. In 2007 that number was 87 percent. Under democracy years of compulsory education increased further, to 9 years in 1986 and to 12 in 2009, but enrollment lags continued to be a problem. High school enrollment rose from a paltry 9 percent in 1974 to a much improved but still unsatisfactory 60 percent in 2007.

Improvements have been most dramatic at the beginning and the end of the education spectrum. Children enrolled in preschool increased from 6,000 in 1960 to 266,000 in 2008.¹⁹ University degrees, once the sole purview of a small elite, were conferred on 19,000 people in 1995. By 2008, the number of students receiving university diplomas stood at 84,000. For the last two decades, a sizeable majority of degrees have been conferred on women. Since 1994, women have received 60 percent to 68 percent of the yearly total of degrees.²⁰ While the large increase in university enrollment and graduations are a major achievement, the labor force remains undereducated in comparison to the more developed societies of the OECD. This is so for two principal reasons. First, older workers have much lower levels of educational attainment compared to workers in these other countries. Using data from 2006 and with the exception of Mexico, Portugal ranks lowest or very close to the bottom among OECD countries in the percentage of its population aged 25–64 who have completed upper secondary or tertiary education. The same ranking applies for the population aged 25–34, indicating that even in the 1990s virtually all other OECD countries, with the exception of Mexico, continued to surpass Portugal. By 2006, however, entry rates to and graduation rates from university had climbed. They were still below the midpoint of the range, but they were no longer at the bottom.²¹

Second, and of greater concern, is the problem of educational failure, or *insucesso escolar*.²² This takes several forms. One is the large number of students who not only fail to complete high school on time, as we have seen, but who also fail to return to the educational system. One-

third of young people aged 18–24 is not in school and has not completed high school.²³ This is more than double the rate for the European Union as a whole. Another way in which *insucesso escolar* manifests itself is in the poor performance of Portuguese students in international tests. In the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, for example, Portugal ranked fourth from the bottom, doing better than Mexico and only slightly better than Greece and Italy.²⁴ This poor result is all the more problematic given that Portugal has the OECD's highest ratio of teachers to students and above-average spending on education relative to GDP.

Social and demographic factors are often mentioned as causes of this comparatively poor performance. Teachers complain of a lack of student engagement. A large cohort of parents with low levels of educational attainment is perhaps less able to promote their children's education or perhaps values it less than parents with higher levels of education. Because education through high school is free and because the wage premium to education is high, expanding access to education and clear market signals of the opportunity cost of forgoing education don't seem enough by themselves to solve the problem of low educational attainment.²⁵ Despite very large investments in education and improvements in average years of education attained, the results are decidedly mixed. High dropout rates and low performance on international tests continue to plague the Portuguese educational system.

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MARKET CHANGE

The growth of the education and health sectors brought with it a large expansion of public employment. Although the size of the public sector is high on the public agenda today, it was long in the making. Local and central administration accounted for 196,000 jobs in 1968. This number had risen to 516,000 by 1983 and to 716,000 by 2001.²⁶ Between 1980 and 2002 the public employment share rose from 9.7 percent to 17 percent, the steepest rise in the EU 15.²⁷ In a comparison that includes the United States, Japan, Poland, and the Czech Republic as well as the EU 15,²⁸ Portugal's ranking in public employment share increased from fourteenth in 1980 to seventh in 2001 and was exceeded only by Sweden, Finland, Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom. Looking at a more recent period, the OECD estimates government employment growth in Portugal between 2000 and 2005 at over 4 percent.²⁹ Until the mid-2000s when Portugal's unemployment rate started to climb, the

positive employment performance was in large measure the result of major increases in public employment.

Under democracy the state has become a significant source of jobs, accounting for about 20 percent of employment. This is particularly the case for university graduates, about half of whom find employment in the public sector.³⁰ The weight of public employment is clearly visible in government expenditure data. The government wage bill consumed 12.9 percent of GDP in 2008, which is substantially higher than the Euro Area 12 average of 10.1 percent.³¹

The state's role in the labor market has not been restricted to public employment, however. Of equal importance are changes in employment regulations and labor market policy. Although the upsurge in worker movements following the revolution was substantial and at its peak included the dramatic takeovers of farms and factories, this was relatively short-lived.³² More long-lasting were actions taken by the state. Unions became legal and free. Membership expanded quickly during the upsurge of worker movements but—with the exception of the public sector and a few areas of the private sector, such as banking—has declined since. Outside such areas, unions today are relatively weak. Member dues are opaque. Indicators of labor market protest actions such as the number of strikes or the number of days of work lost to strikes are low.³³

However, low rates of unionization outside the public sector have been partially compensated by regulations that extend agreement between unions and employers to nonunionized workers.³⁴ In addition, tripartite bargaining between the state, employers' associations, and the union confederations was institutionalized, though the success and impact of these economic and social accords has varied over time.³⁵

Employment protection legislation in the early years of the democracy was tightened, giving workers substantial protection from job loss but making it hard for employers to fire workers. The OECD ranks Portugal as having one of the highest degrees of employment protection legislation.³⁶ Critics of employment protection legislation argue that it stifles hiring as much as it does firing. In so doing it reduces the ability of the labor market to react to changed circumstances. It is a drag on efficiency and is thought to increase unemployment.³⁷ Recommendations that Portugal weaken its employment protection legislation are frequent.³⁸

However, unemployment for most of the democratic period has been quite low. The ability of the labor market to absorb the return of the

Portuguese settler population from Africa and the demobilization of a large part of the military in the mid- to late 1970s, when economic conditions were unfavorable, is remarkable and well known.³⁹ This has been partly attributed to wage flexibility, in turn facilitated by inflation and by currency devaluation. Four other factors have also been put forward to explain Portugal's low unemployment rate for most of this period. First, although a system for unemployment compensation was established early in the democracy, eligibility rules have remained tight by European standards. As a result the incentives faced by the unemployed to find a job quickly are quite high.

Second, employment protection legislation applies only to a protected class of employees, those with indefinite contracts. Finding it initially difficult to weaken the protections head-on, Portugal, like many other southern European states, liberalized the use of short-term and fixed-term contracts.⁴⁰ A further change was the substitution of service contracts, known informally as *recibos verdes*, for employment contracts. These new types of contracts bypassed the otherwise rigid firing rules and had the practical effect of reducing employment protection legislation.

Third, the state was eventually successful in weakening the employment protection rules directly. Reducing personnel due to economic or technological reasons is permitted, for example, and collective dismissal can be used for smaller numbers of workers than was previously the case. In comparison to other European countries, Portugal's employment regulation ranking remains high but no longer extraordinarily so.

Finally, employment growth in the public sector has masked weak employment growth in the private sector. In the absence of government employment, unemployment numbers would likely have crept up sooner. One irony is that the government itself resorted to fixed-term contracts and the use of *recibo verde* service contracts. In recent years, and particularly with the economic crisis, unemployment has grown quickly.

The evidence on the effects of employment protection legislation in Portugal is mixed. The creation and loss of jobs is relatively high, but job-switching is low and a high proportion of the unemployed are long-term.⁴¹ Unemployment remained relatively low for much of the democratic period primarily because of the growth of employment in the public sector and the use of temporary and atypical contracts.

Although employment protection legislation in Portugal failed to be reflected in a high unemployment rate, it was not without negative con-

sequences. The use of atypical and temporary contracts creates deeply inequitable divisions between protected and unprotected workers. Protected workers have indefinite contracts, job stability, and participate fully in the protections offered by the welfare state. Unprotected workers are much more likely to have interrupted work histories and greater levels of financial volatility and instability, making long-term planning difficult. In addition, they often fall between the cracks of social protection systems. They are at much greater risk of being ineligible for unemployment compensation, have less access to paid vacations, and their spottier work histories will be reflected in lower retirement benefits. Young workers are much more likely to be unprotected, which creates a sense of frustration and disillusionment. This said, it is important to strike a comparative note. Portugal is not alone in these problems and by some indicators has done comparatively well. Many European countries have had overall and youth unemployment rates well above the Portuguese average for much of the democratic period.

It is also important to note the huge structural changes that have taken place in the labor market. Women have entered the labor force in very large numbers. Unlike other southern European and most continental European countries, Portugal's female employment rate is high. By 2007, the Portuguese female employment rate had reached 61.9 percent.⁴² Employment rates of older workers, both male and female, in Portugal are higher than the EU average. Male employment rates used to be higher than the EU 15 average but have been declining since 2001, and by 2007, at 73.8 percent, had reached the EU 15 midpoint.

In 1974, the primary sector (mostly agriculture but also fishing) accounted for 34 percent of employment.⁴³ By 2008, this had declined to 11 percent. As A. Barreto notes, this movement out of agriculture resulted in internal population shifts toward the coasts and urban centers.⁴⁴ In 1974 industry accounted for 33 percent of employment. This rose to 37.9 percent in 1991 but by 2008 had fallen to 28.9 percent. The service sector grew significantly during this period, from 33 percent of employment in 1974 to 61 percent in 2009. Despite the two-thirds drop in primary sector employment, Portugal remains the Western European country with the highest percentage of employment in agriculture.

The entry of women into the workforce and the rise of the service sector were the result of processes of economic development and social change, but they were also influenced by state action, including the expansion of the health and education sectors. Labor market regulations shifted substantially with the turn to democracy even as the

commitment to economic openness, started in the dictatorship, deepened, with profound implications for the nature of employment. As seen above, the state itself became a major employer, accounting for one in five jobs. Finally, the rise of social transfers expanded the role of the state even further. By 2010, more than one in three Portuguese received transfers from the state. The role of the state as a provider of income—either through social transfers or directly as an employer—had grown to levels that by several measures exceed the European average.

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

Despite a significant state effort in income support, high employment rates, and, with the exception of recent years, comparatively low unemployment, Portugal continues to have among the highest poverty rates in Western Europe and among the highest levels of inequality in the European Union.⁴⁵ In 2007, with an 80/20 income quintile ratio of 6.5 in Portugal, only Romania and Bulgaria had worse levels of income inequality.⁴⁶ In 2000, 19.1 percent of the Portuguese population lived in poverty (defined as below 60 percent of median income).⁴⁷

Several factors explain the apparent paradox of convergence to European norms in terms of substantial welfare state effort and a high level of direct state employment but continued high poverty rates. The first set of factors has to do with the labor market and with the problem of low wages and high wage inequality. The distribution of income is highly unequal and correlates closely with the high inequality in educational attainment. Income among agricultural workers is also low, contributing to significant regional differences in income and poverty rates. This can be seen in the high poverty rates of 50.4 percent for people working in agriculture and of 48.3 percent for people with less than a primary education.⁴⁸

There is considerable debate about the degree to which the Portuguese tax system and social spending reduce or help replicate income inequality. Many analysts argue that evasion, tax shifting, deductions, reductions in the number of tax brackets, and the differential treatment of wage income from capital gains reduce the progressivity of the Portuguese tax system.⁴⁹ Writing in 2001, the OECD found that Portuguese “income taxation achieves little in the way of income redistribution.”⁵⁰ Two years later, the OECD had become more pessimistic, writing that “the fiscal system probably exacerbates the inequality of income distribution.”⁵¹ The Portuguese welfare state, like many

of the welfare states in southern Europe, privileges pension spending. Although a social pension scheme covers individuals who did not contribute enough during their working lives to qualify for the regular state pension system, the bulk of spending occurs in the latter system and this system is Bismarckian, replicating differences in earned income.

However, other analysts find that state taxes and transfers are indeed redistributive and became substantially more so during the 1990s.⁵² Improvements in tax collection and the development of substantial antipoverty programs such as the *Rendimento Mínimo Garantido* (Minimum Guaranteed Income) were effective in compensating for widening market inequalities of income. It is this greater redistributive effort of the state, countervailing ever wider wage inequality, which accounts for the relative stability of the Gini index.

Because the Portuguese welfare state is pension-heavy, it underprovides community social services such as day centers and long-term care for the elderly, the disabled, or the chronically ill.⁵³ In response, the Portuguese state has developed tax incentives for charitable giving to social service nonprofits and has also contracted out with these groups to provide services.⁵⁴ The relative paucity of services in this area led some analysts to argue that Portugal was a welfare society.⁵⁵ In the absence of state provision, society—either through the extended family or through the community—met needs. This concept has been challenged by findings that supportive social networks are richer and more prevalent at the higher end of the socioeconomic and educational distribution. As a result, informally provided welfare seems to “reinforce existing social inequalities and to offer less support for those who most need support.”⁵⁶

TAXES, BUDGET DEFICITS, AND CURRENT CHALLENGES

The very large increases in public expenditure required large increases in taxation, and this Portugal has achieved, although concerns about equity and tax evasion persist. A large number of firms report annual losses, many professionals and self-employed fail to accurately report income, and tax shifting—in which income is declared as a business expense, for example, and taxed at a lower rate—is common. Nonetheless, the tax take of the government is substantial and has increased steadily over the democratic period. Notable is the convergence toward the average of the EU 12, a group of countries that on average are much wealthier than

Portugal. In 1995, the total tax burden in Portugal amounted to 31.9 percent of GDP, still substantially less than the EU 12 average of 40.4 percent.⁵⁷ By 2008 the tax gap had narrowed considerably. Portugal's tax burden had grown to 37.5 percent, only 3 points below the EU 12 average, which had barely increased to 40.5 percent. Relative to its GDP per capita, Portugal is a high-tax state. However, the tax take is not by itself enough to cover expenditure. Expenditure in 1995 was 43.4 percent and 45.9 percent in 2008 (the latter figure is just 0.8 percent of GDP shy of average expenditure in the EU 12).

In stark contrast to the dictatorship, democratic Portugal has had great difficulty balancing its budget. Because budgetary problems have been so persistent, Portugal has engaged multiple times in episodes of budgetary consolidation to reduce deficits. These have frequently relied as much on tax increases as they have on expenditure cuts, even when done under IMF supervision. Balanced budgets are not, of course, a sign of virtue, and budget deficits and debt play an important role in smoothing business cycles, in paying for investment, and in meeting social needs. The Maastricht criteria, for example, don't call for the elimination of budget deficits but rather limit them to no more than 3 percent of GDP, a limit that nonetheless has been frequently violated by many in the euro area. Crucial to an evaluation of debts and deficits and their sustainability are the rate of economic growth, inflation, and the interest rate. High growth makes it much easier to manage deficits.

The principal problem facing Portugal, and a fundamental cause of its inability to borrow from the financial markets at an affordable cost, is its low growth prospects. Unlike Greece, Portugal was accurate in its budgetary reporting and did not engage in fraud. Unlike Ireland and Spain, Portugal did not experience the collapse of a massive housing boom. But since 2000, growth in Portugal has been anemic, averaging just 0.7 percent per year.⁵⁸ Convergence in GDP per capita toward the richer countries in Europe reversed. Triggered by the global recession and the Greek crisis, the lack of confidence among buyers of Portuguese debt came quickly. High interest rates are unsustainable for long, and Portugal was forced to seek a bailout, the third since the transition to democracy, but this time with no recourse to a competitive devaluation. What happened to growth in the democratic period? How did Portugal reduce its budget deficits in the past? And what does this mean for the future of the Portuguese welfare state?

Unlike the postwar period of the dictatorship, when productivity (measured as GDP per hour worked) grew faster than in the most-

advanced countries, in democratic Portugal productivity has mainly grown at only the same rate as in the most-developed countries.⁵⁹ Portugal has been unable to close the gap, which since 1980 has ranged from 50 percent to 55 percent of the average productivity of these countries. Economic growth above productivity and the ability of the government to paper over budget deficits are explained by a number of factors, but these have either run their course or are otherwise no longer available. One is the growth of the labor force, principally fueled by the entry of women into the labor market. Given high current participation rates of women, this engine of growth has run its course. Fertility rates below replacement level suggest that the labor force will start to shrink, unless there is a compensating increase in immigration. As a result of these demographic shifts, high school enrollments have already peaked.

Declines in interest rates, partly stemming from anticipation of entry into the Euro and then as result of the common currency, provided the government with breathing room to consolidate debt as well as to run an expansionary policy. Declines in interest rates freed up several points of GDP from debt service to other uses. In 1995, for example, public expenditure on interest consumed 5.8 percent of GDP. As late as 2008, as a result of extraordinarily low rates set by the European Central Bank and after a series of budgetary consolidations earlier in the decade, interest consumed only 3 percent of GDP.⁶⁰ Even if a return to low pre-crisis rates were possible, it will be a long time before interest payments again consume such a small percentage of GDP.

Another consequence of adopting the Euro was of course the elimination of exchange rate policy as an economic tool. Currency devaluations such as the crawling peg system that Portugal adopted to ensure economic competitiveness were no longer available. The calculation was that the elimination of exchange rate risk, the firmer anchoring of inflation in a Bundesbank-inspired European Central Bank, and the elimination of transaction fees would elicit both higher cross-border investment as well as trade, leading to deeper economic integration. American economists in particular voiced concerns about asymmetric shocks and warned that Europe did not meet the criteria of an optimal currency area. Despite these debates, adopting the Euro was a political project as much as an economic one and was successfully introduced. Nonetheless, the lack of an exchange rate policy constrains the actions of the Portuguese state. It is unable to restore competitiveness and promote exports through devaluation, one way in which Portugal's classic wage flexibility used to be achieved (inflation was the other means).

Nominal cuts in wages are much harder to make, and especially so if the context is one of deflation.

Transfers from Brussels in the form of cohesion or structural funds were another way in which budget deficits could be closed and economic growth stimulated, but this route too is largely over. Portugal is wealthier, so some regions that had previously qualified for funds no longer do. New accession members have asked for funds, and the growth of both government expenditure as well as the economy imply that even had the funds remained at their original levels, they would represent a smaller percentage of GDP.

Finally, for a number of years privatization was an important way in which governments could close budget gaps. Because so many firms have already been sold, fully or in part, this strategy is also starting to run up against limits. The measures to deal with the current crisis do involve privatization of a number of remaining state-owned enterprises, but the list is a dwindling one.

The result is to some extent paradoxical. A larger state, with greater responsibilities for social well-being, has lost an important set of tools that allowed it to manage the economy as well as to paper over chronic budget deficits. These tools help explain how Portugal could run an expansionary budgetary policy so frequently and how budgetary consolidation, even if temporary, could be achieved without drastic cuts in expenditure.

Now, however, the options are stark. Tax increases and cuts in spending while the economy is so weak are not only painful but also will throw the economy deeper into recession. In the absence of credible prospects for higher growth, debt rollovers will require unsustainably high interest payments. Deflation and continued high unemployment look likely. Exiting from the Euro, which would be very hard to manage and was until recently unthinkable, is now advocated as potentially the best option among unpalatable choices⁶¹ though it is strenuously ruled out by government. And the considerably less draconian possibility of a haircut on the debt, increasingly seen as both likely and necessary by many independent analysts, is also continually disavowed by the government.

THE CURRENT CRISIS: FROM STIMULUS TO AUSTERITY TO STRUCTURAL REFORMS

The financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 led to rapid increases in both budget deficits and government debt. Up to and includ-

ing 2007, Portugal had made steady progress in correcting a high budget deficit of 5.9 percent of GDP in 2005. The deficit had been reduced to 4.1 percent in 2006 and to 3.1 percent in 2007, but it soared to 10.1 percent in 2009. This was the result of not only an 11 percent drop in tax receipts and increased spending as a result of the welfare state's automatic stabilizers, but also of stimulus actions undertaken by the government, which included easing the rules on unemployment benefits. Efforts to shore up the labor market introduced in 2007–2008 included targeted reductions in nonwage costs and expansions in job-search and short-time working opportunities, as well as training and income support for the unemployed.⁶² By 2009–2010, the Socialist government of Prime Minister Socrates decided to reverse course. Most of the labor market support measures introduced a year or two earlier were withdrawn as budgetary containment became the order of the day. The austerity measures implemented up to June 2011, when the new PSD-led government of Prime Minister Coelho took office, included a mix of increases in taxes, cuts in public sector pay, and reductions or freezing of social benefits. Listed in a research note,⁶³ the mix of austerity measures tracked to investigate changes in household income included the following:

Increases in Direct Taxes

- Tax rates were increased by 1 and 1.5 percentage points depending on income level.
- A new bracket for incomes above €153,300 was introduced, raising the highest tax rate from 42 percent to 46.5 percent.

Increases in Indirect Taxes

- In January 2011, the standard VAT rate was increased from 20 percent to 23 percent.
- At the same time the reduced VAT rate was increased from 12 percent to 13 percent and the base rate from 5 percent to 6 percent.

Reductions in Tax Credits and Tax Allowances

- The reference indicator for tax credits was reduced by replacing the 2011 minimum wage of €485 with the 2010 minimum wage of €475 or the 2011 social benefit index of €419.22.
- The pension tax allowance was reduced.

Reductions in Social Benefits

- The nominal value of the social benefit index used for most social benefits was frozen at the 2009 level.
- The nominal value of benefits not linked the social benefit index (such as pensions) was frozen from 2010 to 2011.

- The social assistance benefit was frozen from 2010 to 2011.
- Family benefit was frozen and eligibility conditions were tightened.

Public Sector Pay

- Public sector pay was cut by 10 percent.

When compared to Spain, Greece, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, simulations of the effects of Portugal's austerity measures led to the second-highest increase in the risk of poverty, defined as household income below 60 percent of the precrisis median. Ireland had the highest increase in the risk of poverty among the countries studied but the size of its austerity cuts (8.1 percent of total household disposable income) was more than 2.5 times the size of the austerity cuts in Portugal (3 percent of total household disposable income). As a point of comparison, Spain and Greece's austerity measures during this period amounted to 2.7 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, of total household disposable income. If the poverty threshold is changed to 60 percent of the median of the new post-austerity distribution of income, the risk of poverty increased the most in Portugal.⁶⁴

The study also simulated the distributional effects of the austerity measures on household incomes and found that Portugal was the only one of the countries studied where the distribution was clearly regressive. About this information a number of caveats need to be kept in mind. First, as mentioned by the authors of this study, the analysis focuses solely on the distributional effects of the austerity measures listed above. It excludes the very large distributional effects of the crisis itself (through increases in unemployment, for example, which were significantly larger in Spain and Greece than in Portugal). It also excludes cuts to public services that are not easily tracked in terms of the distribution of household income but which might have significant effects. Finally, the study looks only at what might be called the first wave of austerity measures implemented by June 2011. Nonetheless, the study raises important questions about not only the different sizes but also different designs—and impacts—of austerity measures across countries.

The shift from initial stimulus to austerity, as well as the shifting European economic outlook, led to significant variation in Portuguese GDP growth rates during the crisis. Growth of 2.7 percent in 2007 on the eve of the crisis shifted to contractions of 0.35 percent in 2008 and 2.1 percent in 2009. GDP grew by 0.91 percent in 2010 but contracted

by 1.6 percent in 2011 and is expected to contract by 3.2 percent in 2012. Difficulties in many of Portugal's most important European export markets, most notably Spain, the deleveraging of debt at home, difficulty accessing credit, increasing unemployment, and the effects of new austerity measures agreed with the troika all play significant roles in explaining the contraction.

In May 2011, the Socialist caretaker government agreed to the terms of a €78 billion bailout package with the troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The package required Portugal not only to implement additional austerity measures but also to engage in structural reforms. These included privatization of state-owned enterprises as well as reform of its labor market and justice system. The PSD government of Prime Minister Coelho that took office in June 2011 has vowed to fully implement the troika's prescriptions and, indeed, to make even faster progress in reducing the budget deficits than is envisioned in the plan. In contrast to Greece, where both political will and the track record of implementation have been questioned, Portugal has been cast as the "good student" of Europe, embracing and implementing the policy prescriptions it is being asked to carry out. Nonetheless, it is increasingly doubtful that austerity and structural reform will by themselves place Portugal back on a track of sustainable debt, economic growth, and international competitiveness. Many think not only that a return to the financial markets by 2013 or 2014 is unlikely but that a haircut on the debt will also be needed. The debt-to-GDP ratio was 107 percent at the time of the May 2011 bailout but is likely to reach 113 percent over the next two years due to the shrinking economy as well as the poorly controlled debts of regional governments and a number of some state-owned enterprises.⁶⁵

In order to reduce Portugal's budget deficit from 5.9 percent in 2011 to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012 and to comply with the troika's terms, the new PSD government implemented its first set of austerity measures in November 2011. These include both cuts in pension spending and reductions in welfare spending and the health budget. Further cuts to public sector pay have also been implemented. Proposals have included a reduction in the number of holidays and the elimination of holiday pay (an extra two months' pay, called the "thirteenth and fourteenth months' pay," traditionally paid in August and December) for the next two years. Combined with earlier public sector wage cuts and increases in income tax, the take-home pay of many public sector workers is

declining by over 22 percent. And by reducing lunch to half an hour, the government has proposed increasing working hours in the public sector.

In the wake of the 2007 onset of the crisis, a number of structural reforms were implemented by the Socialist government. More are envisaged under the troika agreement and planned or carried out by the current government. These include privatization of state-owned enterprises, reductions in the public administration workforce through adoption of a rule specifying a 2:1 ratio of job leavers to job hires, reduced administrative burdens on business, including the lifting of licensing for some services, and the liberalization of regulated professions.⁶⁶ Actions have also been taken to simplify the tax system and to broaden the tax base in consumption and income taxes while reducing tax expenditures.

Labor market reform is one of the troika's priority areas for structural reform, and a number of steps have already been taken. With respect to regular contracts, notice periods for individual dismissals were shortened and administrative procedures were streamlined in 2009. The year 2011 saw the introduction of lower severance payments for new hires; 2012 is likely to see the definition of "fair dismissal" expanded. Unemployment benefits will become less generous but eligibility will be extended. Both the OECD and the troika recommend that Portugal reduce labor market dualism by better covering the young while easing job protection in regular contracts and reducing the duration and replacement rates of unemployment benefits for older workers.⁶⁷ These reforms are being undertaken during particularly difficult labor market conditions. Overall unemployment stood at 14 percent in 2011 and continues to grow. Youth unemployment, as in so many European societies, is much higher, and young university graduates are not immune—close to 10 percent of them are currently unemployed.⁶⁸

Other priority areas include developing a more efficient court system, long one of the most deficient areas of governance; liberalizing the housing rental market; and promoting competition and reducing rents in the energy and telecoms markets.⁶⁹

If budget cuts, liberalization, and a turn to the market have characterized most measures of the government, education has stood out as distinct. Special attention has been paid to addressing chronic problems of students repeating years in secondary school, increasing opportunities for vocational education and training, and implementing a contested national evaluation system for teacher performance.⁷⁰

In marked contrast to Greece, protests in Portugal against austerity have been few and never violent. Although the CGTP (Confederação

Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) union has protested the cuts, the UGT (União Geral dos Trabalhadores) union has conceded that cuts are necessary and inevitable. Mirroring the division in the labor movement, a February 2012 poll revealed that although 48.4 percent of the population thinks austerity is the wrong solution for the crisis, a sizeable minority of 40.3 percent believes austerity is needed. A sizeable increase in emigration, to 120,000 in 2011, principally to the fast-growing economies of Brazil and Angola, shows that many people have found and are exercising an exit option, reducing pressure on the government. The government, a stable PSD coalition with the People's Party, controls a safe 132 seats in the 230-member parliament, and the principal opposition party, the Socialists, control only 74 seats, their weakest number in more than two decades. Portugal enjoys considerable international support from the troika.⁷¹ Nonetheless, many of the newest austerity cuts have yet to bite, and 2012 will be a year of deep recession: social indicators will worsen further.

CONCLUSION

To what extent then do the combination of spending cuts and tax increases that make up the austerity packages and the structural reforms—rolled out both by the Socialist government (in the last two years of its term) and by the new PSD-led government under supervision of the troika—amount to a rescaling and reorganization of the Portuguese welfare state? To what extent will this recalibration of social policy and social protection alter the distribution of income or the distribution of opportunity in Portuguese society?

It is too early to answer these questions definitively, but some points are already clear. Older ad-hoc solutions to long-standing problems are no longer tenable. Employment growth in Portugal was disproportionately concentrated in the public sector and masked anemic employment growth in the private sector. This route of state-supported income is now largely closed off. Inequalities in employment protection and access to unemployment compensation stemming from the dualism of the labor market are being reduced. While there are grounds to support this from the perspective of equity, in the absence of robust job creation this creates a serious danger of increasing precariousness and risk. Although rigid labor laws have prevented hiring of young people on regular contracts, those same rigid labor laws have often ensured job stability and access to generous unemployment benefits for at least one

parent in the household. Removing such protections during a recession with no end in sight is likely to increase the number of zero-employment households at a time when social benefits are being cut or frozen. Studies that suggest that Portugal's austerity packages are distinctively regressive are worrying though in many ways are sadly not surprising— income inequality has long been high in Portugal, despite and sometimes because of its welfare state. Household and private sector deleveraging of debt will take time, particularly in a context of low growth.

These ominous developments notwithstanding, there are some reasons for hope. Continued investments in education, a well-functioning and well-regarded health system, wage flexibility, and structural reforms may provide the basis for productivity increases and resumed growth, when and if Europe—and Spain, Portugal's main trading partner— emerge from recession, particularly if support from the troika or a managed restructuring reduces the burden of public debt.

However the debt crisis may end, in the medium to long-term, population aging will place increasing pressure on health care and the pension system, making the resumption of growth, through increases in productivity, all the more important.

Higher educational attainment should help in this regard, particularly if the tradeable sector can attract a larger percentage of university graduates. Despite continuing high rates of poverty, inequality, and challenges in educational performance detailed above, it is important to remember how far Portugal has come in the past thirty-eight years of democracy. High-quality healthcare; protection against the risks of old age, disability, sickness, and unemployment; and access to education have been made broadly and in many cases universally available. Citizens have come to expect more from their state; the degree to which they will be able to continue to do so in the future is now an open question.

NOTES

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6. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, André Freire, and Jorge Vala, *Desigualdades Sociais e Percepções de Justiça, Atitudes Sociais dos Portugueses III* (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003).
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8. This number reflects both beneficiaries of the social security system as well as the Caixa Geral de Aposentações, the separate system for many state employees.
9. Amaral, *Economia Portuguesa*, 15 (see note 1 above).
10. Rosa and Chitas, *Portugal*, 54 (see note 2 above).
11. Banco de Portugal, *The Portuguese Economy in the Context of Economic, Financial and Monetary Integration* (Lisbon: Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department, 2009), 350.
12. The Euro Area 12 consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
13. Research at the OECD estimated public social spending on health in 2005 to be 7.2 percent of GDP (Willem Adema and Maxime Ladaïque, "How Expensive Is the Welfare State? Gross and Net Indicators in the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)," *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, no. 92, OECD Publishing, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/220615515052>. Variation in definitions, categorizations, and data sources explain the variation in figures. For a discussion of definitions see "The Social Expenditure Database: An Interpretive Guide," http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStatDownloadFiles/OECD-SOCX2007InterpretativeGuide_En.pdf. Rosa and Chitas use data compiled by PORDATA (www.pordata.pt). For alternative data series of Portuguese social spending, see Daniel Fernando Carolo and José António Pereirinha, "The Development of the Welfare State in Portugal: Trends in Social Expenditure Between 1938 and 2003," *Revista de Historia Económica/Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History* (Second Series), vol. 28, no. 3 (2010), 469-501.
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15. Amaral, *Economia Portuguesa*, 15 (see note 1 above).
16. *Ibid.*, 24.
17. Rosa and Chitas, *Portugal*, 24 (see note 2 above).
18. Amaral, *Economia Portuguesa*, 23-24 (see note 1 above).
19. Rosa and Chitas, *Portugal*, 31 (see note 2 above).
20. *Ibid.*, 35.
21. Banco de Portugal, *The Portuguese Economy*, 386 (see note 11 above).
22. Antonio Goucha Soares, "The Europeanization of Portugal," *European Societies* 12 (2010), 317-37.
23. Rosa and Chitas, *Portugal*, 32 (see note 2 above).
24. Banco de Portugal, *The Portuguese Economy*, 387-88 (see note 11 above).
25. Amaral, *Economia Portuguesa*, 78 (see note 1 above).
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The Republic and Women

1910: Portuguese Republican Women out of the Shadows

MARIA MANUELA AGUIAR

In the beginning of the twentieth century a feminist and republican movement made history in Portugal. In a country where there was no tradition of feminine participation in public life, an elite of highly cultured, courageous, and strong-minded women came suddenly “out of the shadows,” with the support of republican leaders, in defense of democratic ideals and righteous causes, like education for all, equal civil laws, and universal suffrage.

That universal suffrage was a promise never fulfilled was the cause of immediate dissent among the heads of the feminist movement—some more feminists than republicans, and others definitely more republicans than suffragists, even if they all remained faithful to the new regime. Did their natural moderation and their innate republican complicity with their male partners—husbands, family, and friends—play against them? In the end, they won their main battle through the efforts of future generations of women and they are alive in the memory of the Republic, today and forever.

I

Feminist movements were in rapid development in Europe from the mid-nineteenth century on, with their main focus on women’s suffrage. Portugal was no exception. However, the first initiatives that started by the end the nineteenth century were restricted to a limited circle of believ-

ers in sexual equality. And the circle did not expand much until 1907–8, on the verge of the change of regime, and, when it did, it was by direct interference by prominent republican leaders—all men, of course. This particularity would, in my opinion, give historical feminism in Portugal its unique features and destiny, because it was supposed to become an asset to the republican cause, as well as to the cause of the emancipation of women. It was for this reason that the accomplishments of feminism in Portugal would stand apart. As in other southern European societies there was no tradition of women playing a role in public life. We know that throughout the centuries our historians portrayed a few outstanding women, monarchs, heads of state or acting as such, very influential and powerful queens of Portugal, ruling side by side with their husbands or offspring, unexpected fighters in heroic battles in faraway lands of the empire—in the Portuguese half of the world as divided by a pope—and a few remarkable writers, poets, artists, and even leaders or participants in mass uprisings, the last one alive in the memory of the people being the legendary Maria da Fonte, who inspired one the hymns of the Republic, still sung in official ceremonies. They were accepted and admired by their contemporaries as exceptions—our own “iron ladies.”

However, European ideas, tendencies, and social movements, sooner or later, had their effects among us, and, later than sooner, “feminism” would also. By 1902, a leading intellectual and feminist, Carolina Michaelis de Vasconcelos—German born, Portuguese by marriage, and the first woman to belong to the Academy of Sciences and to become professor of the University of Coimbra—wrote that there was no women’s organization at all in the country and that from her point of view, that of someone born and brought up abroad, women’s political participation was unthinkable, seen as unnatural by Portuguese standards.¹ At the time, French and British feminists were already promoting huge protest marches against discrimination through the avenues of Paris and London. In 1903, Mrs. Pankhurst was engaged in setting up the Women’s Social and Political Union. In 1910, the so-called suffragettes, her potent and radical movement, organized a march that extended for several miles along the streets of London on the way to the Parliament on the very day a proposal on feminine suffrage was defeated. Over two hundred MPs had supported it—many, but not enough. In similar circumstances, every time an electoral law denied them the right to vote, the Portuguese put all their indignation in a carefully and beautifully written paper or asked for an audience to express their disillusion to a

sympathetic but ineffective high dignitary—the president of the Republic himself, or the prime minister, or the president of the Assembly.²

In this domain, accomplishments or lack thereof have more to do with a “north-south” cultural gap than with the nature of the regime. Stable Nordic monarchies like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden did not need to envisage a change of system in order to improve women’s status, and they set an example of good laws and good practices much earlier than the two revolutionary Republics—France and Portugal—and many other countries in the world.³ In Denmark women were on the way to the right to vote at the local level by 1908, even if they had to wait until 1915 for an unrestricted vote in all elections and until 1921 for access to all careers, the army excepted. In Norway, Camilla Collet had been a pioneer activist since 1884, followed in the beginning of the new century by Gina Krog, a founder of the Norwegian Association for Women. Norwegian women advanced step by step, first as full members of school councils (1889), social security councils (1890), and municipal councils (1901). In 1907 they were recognized as citizens with the right to vote at both the local and national levels. In 1911 the first Norwegian woman was elected to parliament. By 1912 most of the careers in the public sector were open to women. In Sweden clever support of the “cause” in the literary domain and religious ideals of fraternity seem to have played a more important role in gaining these rights than legal arguments or the involvement of political personalities, mainly through the writings and action of Fredrika Bremer, contemporary of feminist writers like Henrik Ibsen or Ellen Key and herself an acknowledged writer and literary critic and a great speaker and campaigner as well. Sweden was the last northern country to approve legislation on women’s vote and eligibility for the parliament in 1919, three years later than Iceland did the same. Finland had been the earliest adopter, where in 1906 a women’s suffrage law was passed and in 1907 the first female parliamentarian was elected. Southern Europe pursued the trend much later. In fact, in that geographical and cultural area only Spain was ahead of Portugal.⁴

In view of the dominant mentality about women’s participation in politics, the Portuguese feminist movement never got much visibility and wide-ranging recognition. Even historians nowadays tend to underestimate the influence it had in the birth of the new era. The history of Portuguese women is still in waiting, unwritten to the full extent of its worth, as Elina Guimarães, the last survivor of that dazzling generation,

appropriately asserted.⁵ But facts are available for research. Women were there as the living proof that the feminine half of the Republic was capable of living up to the social and cultural revolutionary ideals of gender equality, along with the principles of a new order in state and society. In fact, Portuguese feminism was never a vast mass movement, and although it grew gradually with a significant number of strong-willed, well-learned women, it was not to be as successful as it should have been, for several reasons. None had to do with their own capacity to have made things work out better, in another time, another place. When you observe their culture or political savoir faire as expressed in so many speeches and writings, you find no “gap” at all compared with feminist leaders all over Europe. Among them, before and after the revolution, there are illustrious medical doctors, like Adelaide Cabete or Carolina Ângelo; writers like Ana de Castro Osório, Sara Beirão, or Maria Lamas; teachers like Maria Veleda, Clara Correia Alves, or Alice Pestana; journalists like Albertina Paraíso or Virgínia Quaresma; and lawyers like Regina Quintanilha or Elina Guimarães (then a young law graduate). A distinguished elite, in the company of a minority of a few thousands of female citizens, unfortunately more and more divided, like republican politicians themselves, yet not for the same reasons, rather because some of the feminists, as the revolution went on and left them behind, took it better than others. Regrettably, they had a late appearance in the campaign for women’s rights. They occupied their political and civic space for more or less twenty years, and then their lessons or patterns of civic intervention were practically forgotten after the collapse of the Republic and the advent of a long and misogynous dictatorship. Portugal has not yet regained the same human dimension and radiance.

We will briefly look into these two decades from 1906 to 1926. Initiatives undertaken in the end of the nineteenth century, interesting as they were—such as the first Feminist Congress in 1892, or the first feminist newspaper (*La Fronde*) in 1897—had such limited impact that Carolina Michaelis in her essays on feminine enterprises does not take them into due consideration. In 1904, a few brave women did participate in the first Freethought Congress, names that would be part of the history of the Republic, like Adelaide Cabete and Maria Veleda, among others. Congresses, huge political meetings, as well as daily activities in republican centers played an important role in mobilizing public support that made the impossible revolution possible. Women

suddenly became partners accepted and welcomed, sharing the intense and clever effort of republican propaganda. Many of them got drawn into the daily life of Mason organizations, in journalism, in associations providing all kinds of social help to children and needy girls or women, including educational and vocational training. By the turn of the century, republican centers and clubs were being set up all over the country—promoting social and cultural activities, publishing papers and leaflets—in an attempt to spread the Republican party line, the promises of an era of freedom, prosperity, democracy, and equal participation for all. Women gained access to such clubs, mainly in Lisbon and minor cosmopolitan urban areas. It was the proper way to prepare them for future leadership and political commitment, even if, as we cannot ignore, they were given the opportunity to work for the victory of the republican cause rather than for the advance of their suffragist agenda, as they would soon find out. In 1908, influential personalities, like Ana de Castro Osório and Adelaide Cabete, were invited by António José de Almeida and other leading members of the party to join the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) in an organization of their own, the Republican League of Portuguese Women. In 1909, the League became a formal structure of the party. In 1911, the denial of women's suffrage in the legislation approved in March and April produced discontent that would lead to the coming apart of the League. Mrs. Osório and Dr. Carolina Ângelo set up the Association on Feminine Propaganda (*Associação de Propaganda Feminista*) that became a member of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance. In 1913, a new electoral law unequivocally excluded female citizens. In 1914, another founder of the League, Dr. Cabete, formed the National Council of Portuguese Women (*Conselho Nacional das Mulheres Portuguesas*), which was admitted to the International Council of Women, another international suffragist organization.⁶

In 1918 the electoral law-decree of March 30 did not open suffrage to women; the same happened in the 1919 decrees of March 1 and April 11. By then, no major founder remained in the League. They went their separate ways, divided by their different sets of priorities. From 1914 to 1918, they were once again reunited in defense of Portugal participating in the World War. The Committee “Pro Pátria” was founded in 1914 and the Portuguese Women's Crusade (*Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas*) in 1916, headed by Ana de Castro Osório. The latter was Osório's last civic crusade, a last display of great dynamism and courage, not only

in the diffusion of opinions but also in the direct help of wounded soldiers through “committees” of nurses regulated and supported by the government.⁷ In 1924, the First Congress on Feminism and Education (I Congresso Feminista e da Educação) was held. President Teixeira Lopes and future President Bernardino Machado were both there. In 1928, already under dictatorship, without any kind of official support, a second and last congress took place. Women’s suffrage came three years later, ironically by the hand of Salazar, the quintessence of antifeminism—a restricted vote proposed and defeated many a time during the sixteen agitated years of the First Republic.⁸

2

Portuguese feminists gained very important battles, like education for women, coeducation, more or less egalitarian civil laws, such as family laws and divorce, and more opportunity for professional work and involvement in politics, in journalism, in sciences and arts. They got the moral certainty of their remarkable contribution to the change of customs, mentalities, and laws on the line of democracy. However, they were never full citizens in the new Republic, as they never acquired the right to vote. None of them would ever have the option of running for parliament, as Emmeline Pankhurst had, or of being elected as a member of Parliament, as Lady Astor was, soon after the end of the first war, both in England. But on March 8, 1988, more than eight decades after the commencement of their long struggle for emancipation and of the setting up of the Group of Women’s Studies (joining Cabete, Osório, and followers) a tribute was paid to them in the Assembly.⁹ Some of these early feminist activists were, at last, “given the floor” through the voices of women of our generation. The proposal had been made by poet Natália Correia, then a member of the Assembly, a figure to be compared to the best of the 1910 generation.¹⁰

Let me repeat some of the citations of the early Portuguese feminists chosen for that memorable occasion, as the words sound surprisingly meaningful, significant, and up-to-date, even if something gets lost in my translation. They spoke then as we would today, and their statements identify many challenges still to be met in our own time.

Angelina Vidal: “For us the emancipation of women is the founding stone of public morality. We recognize many difficulties to reach such a fair scope, but we cannot forget that all the great ideals of what is fair

or beautiful or lawful, worked out through sacrifices and merit of successive generations, were formerly considered as utopias.” And in two other very interesting remarks she concluded: “We cannot separate our emancipation from men’s emancipation.” “Freedom does not tolerate any kind of slavery, only freed women may bring into being free, strong, moral and healthy societies.”¹¹

Emmeline Pankhurst—who once said, “if civilization is to advance at all, it must be through the help of women, freed of their political shackles, women with full power to work their will in society”—would agree.

Maria Veleda: “We want a new world, without discrimination based on race, caste, without discouraging laws, without slavery of any kind, without mistrust between sexes . . . men and women united to reach the same goal, to share the same possessions, rights and ideals . . . women have to walk side by side with men, calm, spirited and self-possessed.” She defends education and the need of professional training for women and equal participation—topics still in our agenda. And she calls attention to the fact that lack of direct participation may induce evil forms of compensation: “If a woman can’t elect she may conspire, she has done so in different ages, or fought with arms in her hands like those sturdy peasants who followed Maria da Fonte.”¹²

Alice Pestana: Pestana (her pseudonym “Caiel”) is considered more a pacifist than a conventional feminist, but in fact I think she was both. (She was president of the Portuguese League for Peace after 1889.) A synthesis of her beliefs was presented in the parliamentary session referred to earlier:

“The Portuguese Nation must give women modern learning, mobilize them to get an interest in social reality they now think about much more with their heart than with adequate comprehension, instruction and intellectual capacity.” She is above all a “peace fighter” engaged in a “war against war”: “We ask for the creation of committees for the cause of peace in each country, so that in the twentieth century we may live in harmony, meaning peace, freedom, and justice.” Nonetheless, she makes an exception, not seen as a contradiction, for what she designates the battle for a noble cause, stating that women “have been on the side of justice, democracy and peace throughout the ages, even when written history does not mention it. In classical armies she usually finds no place, but in guerilla resistance or liberation armies, in mass movements she is present.” Pestana specifically refers to mass movements as those

contributing to the independence and the foundation of national identity in Portugal.¹³

Ana de Castro Osório: Mrs. Osório was the most famous of the feminists of her time. She also seems to have been the first to fear the incapacity of the Republic to carry out the promise of feminine suffrage, as she said: “If a Republic does exclude us from its civic laws, we cannot consider ours the country where we have no rights, where we do not have a voice to protest.” Suffrage is her priority, a target always pursued and never attained, yet she does not minimize progress where it really happened, as in social and cultural spheres—education, more family rights, opportunities for revealing unexpected competence in social and civic activities or in professional work. She stresses that events were already moving fast: “One who would defend the idea of feminine subjection or inferiority in a public statement would be compared to those who would have the perverse courage of being in favor of slavery.”

She also said, “To be feminist does not scare anyone today, because the advancements brought by feminism are so many and so revealing of the high principles that guide intelligent women, that opponents do not dare speak against it—even if they wanted to—because their opinion would be considered as outrageous.” Many times she addresses “true feminism” in precisely that logic: “to be feminist is a duty of all parents.” It has to do with “the aim of educating women in a practical and useful way,” to turn them into “sensible and able human beings free from dependence, that denies human dignity.” According to her, true feminism is to be shared by men and women. It is not to be seen simply as part of the social problems of class struggle or poverty. The rights of poor or wealthy women, commoners or aristocrats are to be granted the same level of importance. On the other side, states Mrs. Osório, true feminism is not “a defense of the egotism of one sex against the other.” It is about altruism and women’s will to take their share in collective life, to improve the situation for all, for a better society. And as a true democrat as well, she adds: “Good and practical ideas as they come from private initiative should be supported and followed by governments that respect public opinion.”¹⁴

Carolina Beatriz Ângelo: Last in the short list of the Assembly members in that historic 1988 session, Dr. Ângelo was especially remembered for her celebrated solitary act of voting, as a woman citizen, in

the earliest election after the proclamation of the Republic—on May 28, 1911. She became the first southern European woman to exercise the right to vote. It was news all over Europe! In fact, she skillfully took advantage of the text of the electoral law that admitted to suffrage all citizens who were over twenty-one, “heads of a family,” and literate. As a thirty-three-year-old widow, the mother of a child, and a doctor by profession, she formally satisfied all the conditions required to vote. Nevertheless, as she was a woman, her registration was denied by the authorities, because no electoral laws in the country had ever mentioned sex, to be either included or excluded, but women had always being implicitly barred. She went to court and won her case against the authorities. The judge—who, by the way, was a liberal republican and the father of Ana de Castro Osório (a true “feminist,” by his own daughter’s definition)—decided in her favor. If the legislature intended to leave out the feminine sex, it should say so, unambiguously, ruled the judge. In 1913 that is exactly what the lawmakers did say. Women had to wait for another twenty years to be integrated in a limited circle of officially registered participants in elections.¹⁵

I cited above the favorable press Dr. Ângelo’s vote immediately obtained at national and international levels. I must also mention the enthusiastic standing ovation she got from all men who had the privilege of witnessing the historical moment of her ballot vote. In the Portuguese parliament in 1988 her daring act was once again given a round of applause.

Not only these few women cited here but others who were at their side a hundred years ago appear like our contemporaries, as if they could be our sisters rather than our grandmothers. I think the main explanation for this kind of “anachronism” is the fact that their feminism was more “feminine” by contrast with other concepts of their epoch than of our own, at least in Portugal. A feminism inspired by the concept of gender equilibrium and cooperation, of “gender parity,” as we call it nowadays, rather than that of “gender war,” refusing rage or hatred between sexes and preaching acceptance and tolerance between them. The opinion uttered of Ana de Castro Osório: “We never witnessed violent fights as in foreign countries where the feminist question turned out to be a true sex war.”

Gender parity is still what Portuguese legislators are seeking today, in our constitution and in our laws, along with the majority of women and men engaged in the fight for equality, even if some of them may disagree with the existing regulation imposing the “quota system.” The

reasons why the early feminists seem ahead of their times are certainly due to their own merit, to their own awareness of the social problems involved and the best possible solutions, but it is also partly explained by their position in family and society. They were a select few educated women linked by ideological as well as family ties with their republican counterparts. They came suddenly “out of the shadows” by their own free will, but with the help and complicity of men with whom they shared beliefs and aims, destiny, and global political projects for a future in which they had a role to play. They were ready to engage in the same revolution, to accept the same duties, to undergo the same risks as their fellow men. They believed that a Republic would mean general progress and would treat them as equal citizens with full civil, family, and political rights. They were part of the cosmopolitan assertive leadership emerging in the Republican Party, conspiring side by side with parents, husbands, brothers, and friends. In 1910 no Portuguese feminist could foresee that the laws on suffrage would remain unchanged. Their long fight had started in full hope and amiable complicity with men, who were seen as allies, not foes. For them laws concerning women’s rights were far behind social practices, because at least in their own upper class of cultured people they were treated as equals. The Republic, they felt sure, would instantly fill the space between law and life. We know how wrong they were.

3

A feminist and republican movement—as it was “two in one” in 1910. It makes a difference when you distinguish the Portuguese example from others, even if links of feminists groups with political parties existed elsewhere. In Portugal the advent of the Republic was truly seen by the suffragists as a “prerequisite” for the achievement of their goal. On behalf of the Republic many of them would, in fact, in later years confirm a no-nonsense approach to politics, including the sacrifice of the vital issue of women’s right to vote. They gave up equal suffrage, limiting their claim to a small circle of highly educated ladies. The “lady-like way of behaving” inside the political world of these exceptional women—carefully staying away from foreign examples of extremism in their individual outward appearance in public life, and sometimes even in their manner of demanding equality and justice—did probably work against them.¹⁶ Very often it does not pay off to be too much ahead of

one's time! Theirs was or is, as I see it, the right attitude for us in the new century, but then and there it was premature. Now we can afford reconciliation and harmony, or "synthesis." A century ago was a time for "antithesis," for unbending and hard opposition.

Lack of harshness was, in my opinion, only one the main reasons for (partial) failure: a kind of contradiction between their consistent and often brilliant writing or speeches, even if they were more or less temperate, and their way of political intervention, much too "soft" to have the necessary impact. Another cause was dissent among them: dispute on priorities, the priority of many of them being education, employment, and massive civic intervention initially, and suffrage only later—obviously, a very convenient order of precedence for the republican leaders. The movement did split into several smaller circles because some of them were republicans above all—like Maria Veleda, the unconditional supporter of Afonso Costa and his radical Democratic Party—and others were more feminists than republicans—like Cabete and Osório, who never gave up the fundamental battle for suffrage, along with other more consensual issues, like education. Education was, as they all agreed, an indispensable basis of the emancipation of the feminine sex. Radical, revolutionary, and law-abiding feminists, and even a more conservative nonfeminist wing, shared that conviction.¹⁷ Education for women, a very limited number, of course, was already under way before the Republic was established, but from then on the focus was on equal public instruction for both sexes, from primary to high school and to university, and it became an irreversible process that lasted during the *Estado Novo*.¹⁸ The expansion that started in 1910 with the help of the feminist movements may be considered the most important contribution of the Republic to the emancipation of women.

The refusal of universal suffrage was a major disillusion for the feminists. In a way, their suffragist campaign started hand in hand with their male associates, and they gave up the aim of immediate and full equality to help strengthen the new regime until it could be self-confident enough to be able to satisfy their demands. Unlike suffragists in England and almost everywhere else, Portuguese feminists seemed as afraid as men proved to be of the consequences of universal suffrage. It is well-known that "leftist" parties feared the "conservative" vote of women, and the conservative parties, sure to gain by their voting, were simply against it. In Portugal, ruling republicans also feared a conservative male vote,

and artificially reduced the electoral universe to a very small percentage of the adult population. The hostile rural Catholic and monarchist vote was largely reduced by the prerequisites of literacy and tax-paying.¹⁹ Electoral laws introduced a few changes but never eliminated these two very useful discriminations. Republican women were themselves aware of the risk of endangering the future of the regime by adopting a system of liberal and open voting. This explains their approval of the manipulation and cutback of the electoral universe. They never asked for the ballot for all women, just for the much-reduced number of those who were educated and considered more republican than the others. That is why they went as far as accepting an unequal suffrage for women. Looking back, we must conclude that republics like France and Portugal delayed fair treatment of female citizens for as long as they could, and as a result many of the countries where women first got equal civil and political rights were—and remained until now!—constitutional democratic monarchies. In Portugal, really, feminists had no alternative but to trust republicans, because there was no place for them in any of the monarchist parties, as the very few monarchists who were in favor of women's emancipation acknowledged.²⁰ The truth is, there was no proper place for them in the Republican public institutions either. They worked hard for the revolution, they remained faithful to the republican principles, and I believe their participation inside public institutions could have made a difference.

The incapacity of the republican politicians and parties to play fair with these feminist advocates was a sign of the inevitable decline of the regime, harmed by dissension and instability, centralist and authoritarian urges, and growing lack of public support. This is past history. Feminist thoughts and ideals, as the parliamentarians of 1988 wanted to stress, are very much alive. The feminists of the First Republic, their hopes and dreams, did have more future than present—which was the opposite for the regime. Many Portuguese of my generation still look at them as inspiring and amazing fighters, so gentle and strong, setting good examples and making us think that in 1910 we, too, would have been republicans and feminists. In 2010, we are simply democrats, and feminists—“true feminists,” according to Osório's definition.

NOTES

1. In *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, September 11, 1902.
2. João Esteves, “Mulheres e Republicanismo (1908–1928),” Series “O Fio

de Ariana” (Lisbon: Comissão para a Cidadania e Igualdade de Género, 2008), 9–22.

3. For detailed comments see one of the best books written in Portuguese on the situation of women around the world: Maria Lamas, *As Mulheres no Mundo* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora da Casa do Estudante do Brasil, 1952).

4. There was a tremendous gap “north-south” on what concerns suffrage legislation and access to seats in parliament, as a simple chronology clearly reveals: Spain 1924, 1927; Portugal 1931, 1935; France 1944, 1946; Italy 1945, 1946; Malta 1947, 1947; Greece 1952, 1952; in Maria Reynolds de Sousa, *A Concessão do Voto às Portuguesas*, Series “O Fio de Ariana,” (Lisbon: Comissão para a Igualdade e os Direitos das Mulheres, 2006), 81–89.

5. In 1926 the lawyer Elina Guimarães and writer Maria Lamas were in their twenties. They, along with a few others, continued the fight during Salazar’s regime and lived long enough to spend their last years in democracy. Public tribute to the highest degree was then paid to them.

6. The CNMP resisted for years, under the Estado Novo along with the paper *Alma Feminina*, where many of the texts and some of the reports on international congresses made by Adelaide Cabete were published. The CNMP was closed by Salazar’s government in 1947, its last president being Maria Lamas.

7. To Ana de Castro Osório the campaign was an opportunity for many Portuguese women: “Women prisoners of stereotypes, deprived of ideals, aims, and initiatives will now be in contact with the grand, romantic, and valiant soul of the people, alive in our soldiers,” in *Em tempo de Guerra, aos soldados e mulheres do meu país* (Lisbon: Editores Ventura, 1918), 22.

8. Maria Reynolds de Sousa, *A Concessão do Voto às Portuguesas* (Lisbon: Comissão Igualdade Direitos das Mulheres, 2006), 37.

9. In *Diário da Assembleia da República*, Sessão Plenária, March 8, 1988.

10. *Ibid.*, 2081–82.

11. *Ibid.*, 2082–84.

12. *Ibid.*, 2084–85.

13. *Ibid.*, 2085–88. Mrs Osório’s *As Mulheres Portuguesas*, published in 1905, is considered the first book written in favor of a feminist movement, as it would develop in the immediate future.

14. *Ibid.*, 2088. See the letter from Dr. Ângelo on the immediate effect of her vote in *A Capital*, May 29, 1911.

15. “Iniciativas para a Igualdade de Género,” in *Mulher Migrante, Associação de Estudo, Cooperação e Solidariedade*, ed. Maria Manuela Aguiar (Vila Nova de Gaia: Rocha Artes Gráficas, 2006), 90–97.

16. Two statements by Cabete on education and on feminism show what we are trying to convey, that is, the mixing of high principles with a certain kind of conventionality: “It is necessary that the educated man take care of the education of his companion, that the free man take her as a free woman.” “Feminism is not what it’s supposed to be by so many people—women eager to mimic men by smoking, by using white collars and ties and other ridiculous imitations.”

17. Among the antifeminists, Maria Amália Vaz de Carvalho was one of the voices supporting education for girls; a Lisbon high school is named after her.

18. It enables Portugal to be, right now, at the top of the ranking worldwide

in the percentage of women graduates in almost any area, from law to medical studies, where women are well over 60 percent.

19. The program of the Republican Party by the end of the nineteenth century was definitely in favor of universal suffrage as well as a single constituency system throughout the country in the name of real decentralization of power. Nothing was to be achieved. Portugal had at the time a population of five million people and only one million could read and write, among them not much more than 300,000 women. According to successive laws only about 700,000 in the total population could register to vote.

20. Dom Antonio da Costa, one of the few monarchists to support the rights of women, praised the program of the Republican Party for the defense of equality of gender in a famous book published in 1892, *A Mulher em Portugal*.

Portuguese Women Writers: Controlled, Silenced, or Otherwise Ignored Voices

DEOLINDA M. ADÃO

The main aim of this paper is to establish a possible link between artistic production and socially accepted aesthetics, and particularly the gendering of both. To this end, one must start by questioning the parameters that guide both the construction of socially and culturally accepted aesthetics and the artistic production that either adopts or rejects those aesthetics. Without entering into the discussion of aesthetics that has kept philosophers fully engaged since Socrates, there are a few notions that I intend to address in this paper. One is the notion introduced by Plato that the production of art is threatening to society—so much so that he would have preferred not to allow poets and playwrights in his Republic. Since banning them would be impossible, he advocated heavy censoring of the artistic production, not only of poets and playwrights but also of musicians and painters. In sum, according to Plato the arts have the power to influence humans and mold character; as such, art producers must be strictly controlled. This concept, which seems to provide justification for censorship as a whole and in any form, can also be viewed as a considerable driving force in canon construction. The intrinsic connection developed by the founders of Western thought linking beauty and goodness and, in opposition, ugliness and evil has been fundamental to the construction of Western aesthetics and hence art production. Since, as Socrates defended,¹ beauty is relative, we must logically infer that, as such, each society is able to construct its own notion of goodness through the construction of a socially endorsed notion of beauty.

This process is amply found throughout the history of the Western world and goes well beyond the realm of art production. In any event, for my purposes I will only concern myself with literary production and, more specifically, how these arbitrarily constructed aesthetic parameters impact feminine literary production, particularly that of Portuguese women writers in the last one hundred years. Of the hundreds of women who have written and published in Portugal since 1910, many of whom remain unknown to this day, I will focus only on Ana de Castro Osório, Florbela Espanca, Maria Lamas, Judith Teixeira, and Natália Correia. The work of these five women, published both during their respective lives and posthumously, is known to varying degrees in Portuguese academic and literary circles. However, several questions remain: Are any of these women considered canonical Portuguese writers? Does their writing correspond to the accepted aesthetic parameters of their time? How are they represented, or are they even included, in histories of Portuguese literature? How is present-day academia reading these authors and their texts? This paper aims to address some of these questions and to attempt to include the writing of Portuguese female authors in the wider discussion of aesthetic values and canon construction in all areas of art. To some extent I will also address that which is perhaps the most significant question when discussing the artistic production of women: Were these simply writers who happened to be women, or is there something that sets these writers apart in such a way that they should be grouped in a subdivision of literary producers identified as “women writers”?

Ana de Castro Osório, born in 1882, was one of the most prominent women in the Portuguese Republican movement, an activist and avid defender of women’s rights in Portugal. In 1909 she was one of the founders of the Liga Republicana de Mulheres Portuguesas (Republican League of Portuguese Women) which provided a venue for open discussion of important social issues such as divorce and women raising children alone. Between 1898 and 1931 she published at least twenty-four books, several on the subject of motherhood: *A Boa Mãe* (1908), *A Verdadeira Mãe* (1925), and *O Direito da Mãe* (1930). She is also considered to be the first Portuguese writer of literature for children. Although she was a prolific writer, she is better known for her pro-republican and pro-women’s rights activism than for her literary accomplishments. In the *History of Portuguese Literature* of A. J. Saraiva and Oscar Lopes she is only briefly mentioned: “First writer of children’s lit-

erature, writer of fiction and drama actively connected with the struggle for feminine emancipation.”² Likewise, the *History of Portuguese Literature* published by Alfa Editors mentions Ana de Castro Osório three times in connection to her friendship with Camilo Pessanha and once in reference to the neo-romantic reconstruction of realism and naturalism in her novels *Ambições* (1903) and *Quatro Novelas* (1908).³ Other than that, references to her work are limited to texts such as the *Dictionary of Portuguese Women Writers*,⁴ where the title and date of publication of each of her texts is listed, but no further reference or additional information is given in regard to any of those texts. From her social and political activity we can gather that most likely her texts did not in any way conform to the aesthetic values of that time, at least in theme if not in form. The latter seems to be substantiated by the above-mentioned source where she is identified as a neoromantic while many of her male contemporaries were singing the praises of realism and naturalism.⁵ In 1997, in celebration of the 125th anniversary of Osório’s birth, the book *A Grande Aliança*, which gathers the speeches made during her visit to Brazil, was reprinted under the organization and foreword of Fernando Vale.

Florbela Espanca, born in Vila Viçosa in 1894, is widely known. Her *Sonetos* have had innumerable editions, and she is regularly included in anthologies of Portuguese poetry. She is also well-known outside of literary circles, and several of her sonnets have been set to music and are included in the repertoire of many well-known Portuguese singers, particularly fado singers. Nonetheless, she remains a controversial figure in Portuguese academia, which consistently labels her as a lesser poet and mostly ignores her prose. Usually the argument presented is that her poetry should be included in the Parnassian movement, albeit she is writing during the period of Portuguese Modernism. If we were to agree with this argument, then we must note that she, as had been the case with Osório, is writing outside the accepted aesthetic norms. However, her illegitimacy goes well beyond the aesthetic nonconformity. Actually her entire life is nothing but a long list of illegitimacies. Her birth certificate states she is the child of an “unknown father.” However, she was raised by her father and his second wife (who was also her godmother). Nonetheless, he never recognized his paternity until 1949, nineteen years after Espanca’s death. She married three times (1913, 1922, and 1925) and divorced twice (1921 and 1922). In 1930, on her thirty-sixth birthday, she died of an overdose of barbiturates, although

her death certificate lists the cause as a pulmonary edema. Thus, according to the norms of Portuguese society, Florbela Espanca leaves life as illegitimately as she had entered it.

The fundamental themes of Espanca's writing—death, love, and the multiplicity of the self—can be somewhat responsible for the literary critics' distaste for her work. As such, the qualification of her as a Parnassian is justified by the constant presence of death and love in her poetry and prose. On the other hand, the notion of multiplicity of self developed in her work, which would put her in dialogue with her contemporaries, the Portuguese Modernists, is either ignored or dismissed as a symptom of her neurosis. Nonetheless, the argument can and has been made that in Florbela Espanca these three themes are intrinsically connected and addressed in a form that distances her from the Parnassians, although she shares their taste for the sonnet. As stated by Maria Lúcia Dal Farra in her text *Afinado Desconcerto*, for Espanca both death and absolute love are the sublime, that which links the poet to the divine. Furthermore, Dal Farra states that for Espanca, life is but an interlude between two spaces of transcendence—that which precedes birth and follows death.⁶ As such, as is clearly evidenced in the poem "Loucura," the multiplicity of self, or lack of self-recognition, is but one of the torments endured by the poet during her captivity within the realm of the living:

Ó pavoroso mal de ser sozinha	Oh fearful ill of being alone
Ó pavoroso e atroz mal de trazer	Oh fearful and cruel ill of having
Tantas almas a rir dentro da minha ⁷	so many souls laughing within my own ⁸

Thus, to say that Florbela Espanca diverged from the aesthetic norms of her time would be somewhat of an understatement, and perhaps much of the discomfort still evidenced by Portuguese academics in regard to her and her work lies precisely in that nonconformity. Neither she nor her poetry is simple and clear, for both are at once traditional and radical, submissive and uncontrollable, untamable and blasphemous. For Espanca is not the priestess of love; she is, as woman, the representation of the divine, the embodiment of love itself that becomes consecrated through death. It is through death that the rite of passage from the human into the divine is completed and all the souls trapped within the poet's own are finally freed. Espanca's exuberant and painfully bewitching poetry established the link between the female body and the divine, and this process increasingly strayed from the socially

and politically constructed notions of femininity. This shift is most likely the main cause for the marginalization of her texts by the literary circles of her time, and I would argue is still the basis for the Portuguese academics' systematic dismissal of her work.

Judith Teixeira was one of the most controversial Portuguese women writers of the twentieth century. She was born in 1880 and is considered to have been one of the few women, if not the only woman, who participated in the Portuguese Modernism movement. She married and was divorced under the accusation of adultery and home abandonment. She later remarried, and little more is known about her private life. She published in several literary magazines, including the *Contemporânea*, and published five books: *Decadência*, *De Mim*, *Nua*, *Satânia*, and *Poemas*, which, by the way, is four more than the emblematic Fernando Pessoa ever published in life. However, both she and her poetry were scandalous, mostly due to the openly homoerotic nature of many of her poems, such as the poem "Statue":

Ó Vénus sensual!	O sensual Venus
Pecado mortal	Mortal sin
Dos meus pensamentos!	of my thoughts!
Tens nos seios de bicos acerados	At the pointed tips of your breasts
Num tormento,	in a torment,
a singular razão dos meus	lies the singular reason of my
cuidados! ⁹	sorrows! ¹⁰

Another controversial aspect of her poetry is the frequent reference to drug use, namely morphine-induced orgies. Indeed, she was one of the few poets (the only female) to openly admit to drug use. In Teixeira, morphine provided much more than poetic inspiration; it was indeed her muse, as is well exemplified in the poem "A Minha Amante" ("My Lover"):

Dizem que eu tenho amores contigo!	People say you are my lover!
Deixa-os dizer! . . .	Let them . . .
Eles sabem lá o que há de sublime	How could they know how sublime
Nos meus sonhos de prazer . . . ¹¹	Are my dreams of pleasure . . . ¹²

Most likely even now her poetry would continue to cause some discomfort, and it is most definitely not within the aesthetic norms of her time. Perhaps consequently, she continues to be consistently ignored, hardly ever being represented in anthologies of Portuguese poetry. This even includes the *Anthology of Erotic Portuguese Poetry*¹³ compiled by

Natália Correia, which has no mention of her. Likewise she is barely mentioned in the *Dictionary of Portuguese Literature* organized by Álvaro Manuel Machado,¹⁴ and not at all in the *History of Portuguese Literature* authored by António José Saraiva and Óscar Lopes.¹⁵ She is mentioned in the *Diccionario de Escritoras Portuguesas*,¹⁶ according to which she is also included in the *Diccionario Cronológico de Autores Portugueses*¹⁷ edited by Eugénio Lisboa and in the *Diccionario de Literatura*¹⁸ by Jacinto do Prado Coelho. The above-mentioned *Diccionario de Escritoras Portuguesas* further states that Teixeira's book *Decadência* is also mentioned in Cecília Barreira's book *História das Nossas Avós: Retratos da Burguesa em Lisboa 1890–1930*.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the authors of the *Diccionario de Escritoras Portuguesas* confirm the marginalization of her work in the less than two-thirds of a page dedicated to Judith Teixeira: "Even now her poems cannot be found in most anthologies."²⁰

The argument can be made that Judith was not the best poet of her time. However, that argument is weakened by the observation that her poetry was at least on a par with that of several of her male counterparts who are widely known and consistently included in literary dictionaries as well as most anthologies. Likewise, she was not the only poet who exposed drug dependence in their poems—Camilo Pessanha is another. However, she was the first Portuguese woman to write lesbian homoerotic poetry. And it seems it was precisely that particularity that caused her book *Decadência* to be confiscated in 1923 by order of the governor of Lisbon, who further ordered that all copies be burned in the public square and prohibited its republication. In that same year Judith Teixeira published a lecture with the title *De Mim* in which she defends her poetry and lays out her position regarding life as a whole, as well as regarding aesthetics and morality. It seems unquestionable that Judith Teixeira was writing well outside the aesthetic parameters of her time, and perhaps even of our time. The price she paid was ostracism, and the handful of literature students and scholars who study her poetry are mostly those focusing on either gender studies or noncanonical twentieth-century literature.

Born in 1893, Maria Lamas has the particularity of having lived in all three moments of the Portuguese republic. She was born under monarchic rule, and died in 1983 almost a decade after the 1974 revolution that put an end to state-run censorship. Besides writing novels and essays, she also worked as a translator and as a journalist. For twenty

years she was the chief editor of the popular women's magazine *Modas e Bordados* (*Fashion and Embroidery*); she was also the Portuguese version of Dear Abby, publishing an advice column under the pseudonym of Tia Filomena (Aunt Filomena). She was also politically engaged and an activist for women's rights. In 1945 she was elected president of the National Council of Portuguese Women, an association founded during the First Republic but that would be outlawed by the Estado Novo in 1947. The closing down of the National Council of Portuguese Women is directly linked to an exhibit organized by Maria Lamas in the Sociedade Nacional de Belas Artes in Lisbon. This exhibit, *Exposição de Livros Escritos por Mulheres*, was held from January 4–12, 1947, and gathered close to three thousand books written by fifteen hundred authors from twenty-eight countries. Besides being a great success in establishing a worldwide dialogue among women writers, the exhibit's catalogue provides precious information regarding the number of women writing and publishing in so many different countries. Lamas's speech closed the exhibit. It is believed that the content of her speech was unacceptable to the Estado Novo and caused the full force of the PIDE²¹ to be unleashed on the Council of Portuguese Women.

On June 4 of that same year, less than six months after the exhibit, the women's council was closed and, a few weeks after that, on June 25, Lamas was fired from *Modas e Bordados*, never again to find steady work in Portugal. After surviving on several temporary and odd jobs, and being arrested several times, in 1961 she sought exile in Paris where she remained until 1970.

In the preface of the 2002 publication of Lamas's novel *Para além do Amor*, Eugenia Vasques states: "The case of Maria Lamas as a novelist is an example of the type of cultural crime perpetrated by dictatorships that is not talked about, because it goes unseen, but that is as lethal and devastating as the cold walls of solitary confinement. I refer to the crime of asphyxiation and gagging of the artist. And in this particular case of the total annihilation of the budding novelist."²²

Thus, in the case of Maria Lamas it is clear that as long as she restricted her activities to the socially and politically accepted limits, as in the case of the women's magazine she directed, state control was limited to the common levels of state-run censorship. However, when the writer began to expand her area of intervention and took a position regarding any social or political issues she was immediately constrained and punished. In the case of Maria Lamas, as for all the writers considered up to this point, that punishment was the removal of any type of interlocutor with

whom these women could be dialoguing, or in other words the erasure or silencing of their voices that for all intents and purposes eliminated the ability of women to attain agency over their lives and bodies.

The last writer I would like to address is Natália Correia, who was born in 1923 in Fajã de Baixo, near the city of Ponta Delgada, Island of São Miguel, Azores. Correia was a very prolific writer who between 1946 and 1993 published poetry, novels, essays, drama, and even a cantata. She was also politically engaged. In 1944 she participated in the Democratic Unity movement, in 1958 she supported the candidacy of Humberto Delgado, in 1969 she enlisted in the electoral committee of Democratic Unity, and in 1979 and 1987 she was elected as a member of the Assembly. In both her literary and her political life, Natália directly addresses the construction and definition of the feminine in parallel to that of the masculine, rather than in contrast or opposition, thus bypassing the then in-vogue male-female binary. In Natália the construction of the feminine is based on the female body and female sexuality. Writing from within a sexist and moralist society that legislated and controlled the female body, and under the scrutiny of the Estado Novo's censorship that oversaw all artistic production, Natália dared to construct a mythology of the feminine that rejects previously established markers of feminine identity. In other words the woman arising from Natália's work is neither the virgin nor the sinner; she is the merger of the two, a woman of flesh and blood who defines herself by taking ownership of her own body and of her sexuality, as is evidenced in the following poem:

Há Dias e Dias . . .	There are Days and Days . . .
Há dias em que sou monja	There are days when I am a nun
Há outros em que sou fêmea	Others when I am a female
E, embruxada, na fogueira	And, bewitched, in the bonfire
Do amor ponho mais lenha.	Of love I fuel the flames.
Nos dias em que sou monja	On the days that I am a nun
Ardo nos claustros da lua.	I burn in the moon's cloisters
Nos dias em que sou fêmea	On the days that I am female
No sol arrefeço, pudica. ²³	Pudic, I shiver in the blazing sun. ²⁴

As it was to be expected, several of Natália's texts, such as *O Encoberto*, were seized by the censorship, and in 1970 she was tried for the publication of the *Antologia de Poesia Portuguesa Erótica e Satírica*, receiving a sentence of three years in jail, although her sentence was later suspended.

As had been the case in all the writers I mention, although Correia is by far the best known and is widely read, at least until April 25, 1974, both Natália herself and her work were clearly controlled and silenced by the governmental²⁵ and social power structures of the Portuguese society of her time. It also seems rather clear that all of these women were writing outside of the socially accepted aesthetic norms of their time, and that fact to some extent contributed to the poor acceptance of their work at the time of publication, as well as to the overall lack of canonic recognition of their work. In fact, several studies regarding feminine literary production in Portugal suggest that until the end of the Estado Novo, female authorship was rather limited, or at least not encouraged by the conservative structure of the regime.

This is not to say that Portuguese women were not actively engaged in art production, particularly as it pertains to literary production. In the anthology *A Urgência de Contar: Contos de Mulheres dos Anos 40*, Ana Paula Ferreira looks at the literary production of Portuguese female writers during the 1940s. In the preface entitled “A ‘literature feminine’ nos anos quarenta: uma história de exclusão” (“Feminine Literature” in the Forties: A History of Exclusion), Ferreira states: “Taking into account that perspectives centered on women writers or gender related politics have been practically ignored by Portuguese literature studies, it should not be surprising that the literary production of women not identified with the hegemony of some ‘ism’ has been ignored.”²⁶ I would argue that this phenomenon is not exclusive to the literary production of Portuguese women of the forties, but of the greater part of the twentieth century, if not of the entire history of Portuguese literary production. In the post-1974 Portugal many things have changed, and some would argue that women were the great victors of the April twenty-fifth revolution. Today there is an abundance of women writers in Portugal, several of whom enjoy both favorable critical appraisal and financial success. However, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, in one of the exhibit rooms of the Cadeia da Relação in the city of Porto, visitors can find a plaque that lists several famous or infamous individuals who at one time or another were incarcerated in that institution. This informative plaque includes the Portuguese writer Camilo Castelo Branco and his lover and subsequent wife, Ana Plácido,²⁷ who is simply described as: “*escritora sem talento*” (writer without talent). This particular entry leads me to conclude that the dismissal and erasure of Portuguese feminine voices in print is still alive and well in today’s fully democratic Portugal.

NOTES

1. Plato, *Hippias Major* and *Symposium*.
2. António José Saraiva and Óscar Lopes, *História da Literatura Portuguesa* (Porto: Porto Editora, 2000), 1029.
3. Francisco Lyon de Castro, ed., *História da Literatura Portuguesa*, vol. 6 (Lisbon: Alfa, 2001), 49, 52–53, 411.
4. Conceição Flores, Constância Lima Duarte, and Zenóbia Collares Moreira, *Dicionário de Escritoras Portuguesas das Origens à Atualidade* (Florianópolis: Editora Mulheres, 2009), 27–28.
5. Ana de Castro Osório published continually between 1898 and 1931: *Infelizes* (1898), *O Esparto e outras Histórias* (1899), *Ambições* (1904), *As Mulheres Portuguesas* (1905), *A Mulher no Casamento e no Divórcio* (1911), *A Minha Pátria* (1906), *A Boa Mãe* (1908), *Os Nossos Amigos* (1908), *O Príncipe Luís e Outras Histórias* (1909), *Últimas Histórias Maravilhosas da Tradição Popular* (1910), *Contos, Fábulas, Facécias e Exemplos da Tradição Popular Portuguesa* (1910), *Uma Lição de História* (1912), *Lendo e Aprendendo* (1913), *Viagens Aventurosas de Felício e Felizarda ao Brasil* (1917), *Em Tempo de Guerra: aos Homens e às Mulheres do Meu País* (1917), *De como Portugal Foi Chamada à Guerra* (1918), *O Livrinho Encantador* (school reading book adopted in Portugal and in Brazil, 1923), *A Grande Aliança* (1924), *Em Tempo de Guerra* (1925), *A Verdadeira Mãe* (1925), *Quatro Novelas* (1926), *A Capela de Rosas* (1926), *O Direito da Mãe* (1930), *Branca Flor e Outras Histórias* (1931), *Dias de Festa* (n.d.), *Mundo Novo* (n.d.).
6. Maria Lúcia Dal Farra, *Afinado Desconcerto* (São Paulo: Iluminuras, 2002), 35–36.
7. Florbela Espanca, *Sonetos* (Mem Martins: Publicacoes Europa-America, 1998), 386.
8. My translation.
9. The poem “Statue” was included in the book *Decadência* published in 1923. However, shortly after its publication, according to Antonio Manuel Couto Viana in the text *Coração Arquivista*, it was most likely included in a list of books deemed by Lisbon’s students’ representatives as inappropriate and as such confiscated and subsequently destroyed by the municipal authorities.
10. My translation.
11. Published in the publication *Poente*, June 1922.
12. My translation.
13. Natália Correia, *Antologia de Poesia Portuguesa Erótica e Satírica* (Lisbon: Antígona, 2005). This anthology, first published in 1965, with a preface by David Mourão-Ferreira, includes Portuguese poetry ranging from medieval to contemporary. Ninety-five poets are included—eighty-five males, six anonymous, and four females (Leonor de Almeida, Natália Correia, Ana Hatherly, and Maria Teresa Horta).
14. Álvaro Manuel Machado, *Dicionário de Literatura Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Presença, 1996).
15. See note 2 above.
16. Conceição Flores, Constância Lima Duarte, and Zenóbia Collares

Moreira, *Dicionário de Escritoras Portuguesas das Origens à Atualidade* (Florianópolis: Editora Mulheres, 2009).

17. This publication was organized by the Instituto Português do Livro, under the editorship of Eugénio Lisboa (Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1990).

18. Jacinto do Prado Coelho, *Dicionário de Literatura: Literatura Portuguesa, Literatura Brasileira, Literatura Galega, Estilística Literária*, 3rd ed. (Porto: Figueirinhas, 1978).

19. Cecília Barreira, *História das Nossas Avós: Retrato da Burguesa em Lisboa 1890-1930*. (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1994), 164-65.

20. Page 149.

21. The Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), was responsible for identifying and eliminating all opposition to the Estado Novo.

22. Maria Lamas, *Para Além do Amor*, Eugenia Vasques, ed. (Lisbon: A. M. Pereira, 2003), 7.

23. Natália Correia, “Há Dias e Dias . . .”, *Poesia Completa* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2000), 55.

24. My translation.

25. All artistic production in Portugal was subjected to the approval of the state censors.

26. Ana Paula Ferreira, *A Urgência de Contar: Contos de Mulheres dos Anos 40* (Lisbon: Caminho, 2000), 18.

27. Ana Augusta Vieira Plácido (1831-1895). Poet, fictionist, and translator, she published both books and shorter pieces in literary journals, and also collaborated in various works in newspapers and literary magazines in Portugal and Brazil. Often she wrote under male pen names, such as Gastão Vidal de Negreiros and Lopo de Souza. Her first book, *Luz Coada por Ferros*, was published in 1863, followed in 1864 by the drama *Aurora*, published in the *Jornal Vimarense*. Next came *Regina* (1868) in the *Gazeta litterária do Porto* (this work was never completed due to the demise of the *Gazeta*). In 1871 she published *Herança de Lágrimas* under the pseudonym Lopo de Souza. Publication of her work continued after her death: *Núcleo de agonias* in the first decade of the twentieth century, and in 1995, on the hundredth anniversary of her death, *Herança de Lágrimas* was reissued under her own name.

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Toward a Better Society

Water and Environment in Portugal: The Dammed and the Reborn

PEDRO PINTO, KRISTEN PODOLAK, AND MATHIAS KONDOLF

INTRODUCTION

Tourists and residents alike flock to the restored waterfront at the 1998 Expo site in Lisbon. They walk along the corniche, dine in restaurants, attend concerts; a few live in the new condominiums that rank among the most expensive properties in the city. What in the 1980s was a contaminated industrial site astride the foul Trancão River as it discharged its load of contaminants into the Tejo Estuary, the Expo site was utterly transformed—a remarkably successful example of urban renewal. It is probably no accident that it was located along the estuary (“river”) banks, with open views across the water and within sight of the graceful Vasco da Gama Bridge, also completed in 1998. The Expo project transformed a derelict urban area into an appealing leisure, cultural, and residential location by reestablishing the city’s relationship with the river.¹ The Expo site spans a 5,000-meter-long and 800-meter-wide strip along the Tejo, with features including a new metro station, a 140-meter tower, bars, restaurants, shopping, an aquarium, and apartment and office buildings—all oriented toward the riverfront. A riverside promenade follows the river, and further inland the “Water Way” path parallels the promenade (see figure 13.1); canals and fountains were constructed along the Water Way. Following the Expo the new urban district became the Parque das Nações (Park of Nations) and is one of the largest urban redevelopment projects in Europe.



FIGURE 13.1. The Lisbon Expo along the Tejo River at night (photo by Kristen Podolak).

The Lisbon Expo site is only one manifestation of a growing phenomenon: urban waterways as designed landscapes of leisure and consumption in developed countries, reflecting a transition from utilitarian to recreational, from spaces of industry to spaces of leisure and entertainment. In Europe and North America, formerly important industrial city centers have been widely redeveloped as tourist districts, often including riverside trails to link city centers with other neighborhoods.² Whereas the urban riverbank was formerly seen from the practical consideration of how deep draft of ship can moor along a dock, whether the flow and drop of the river suffice to drive a water mill, or whether the river's flow is enough to absorb a given quantity of effluent, new criteria (largely aesthetic) emerge for the river's transformed but still-central role.

The evolution of urban rivers can be seen to illustrate the progression from industrial (the first circuit of capital, identified by Karl Marx), through real estate (the second circuit of capital, identified by Henri Lefebvre), the third circuit (investment in new areas of scientific and professional reproduction of work force, identified by David Harvey), and ultimately to the fourth circuit of capital, that of consumption.³ These changes are especially well expressed along waterfronts, the "con-

tact zones” of M.L. Pratt,⁴ boundaries where cultures meet and across which multiple transactions occur.

Lisbon occupies the banks of the Tejo River estuary much as San Francisco occupies hills along the margins of San Francisco Bay (the estuary of the Sacramento River). While “The River” (the estuary) figures importantly in local sense of place, smaller drainages that flow into the estuary have been largely forgotten: they were put into underground pipes or confined to narrow channels in areas with dense population or infrastructure, fenced off from human contact, and face the backs of buildings. Even sizable streams such as the Ribeira de Alcântara, which flowed underneath the famous aqueduct along the valley bottom, were relegated to underground culverts early on in the city’s development. Poor water quality has historically been a motivation for such treatment, but with improvements in both wastewater treatment and water quality, we observe an explosion of river and stream restoration efforts, including revitalization of urban waterfronts. Even smaller urban rivers and streams increasingly benefit from restoration projects motivated by social goals and supported by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) requirements of good ecological conditions.⁵

BRIEF HISTORY OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN PORTUGAL

Water management and human development went hand in hand throughout the history of Portugal. Even before it became a country, this territory was settled by Mediterranean civilizations that attributed a primordial importance to the control of water and waterways, for agricultural and human consumption as well as for transport routes. In fact, except for a few military strongholds set on remote hilltops, most of today’s Portuguese cities are located on, or near, rivers and streams.

The Romans created an urban system that relied as much on the well-known road network as on the several river routes connecting the hinterland to the major urban centers, and these cities to the larger empire, through major navigation routes. In the Mediterranean climate the protection of water and its management throughout the year led to the construction of aqueducts and dams (the ruins of a Roman dam are still visible near Lisbon, in Belas). Urban centers traditionally could grow only as much as their water supply would allow, and these waterworks permitted an unprecedented growth of urban centers.

After the fall of the highly developed Roman Empire, a collapse of




FIGURE 13.2. The Toledo region during Islamic domination, with the urban and economic systems anchored on the Tejo and its tributaries.⁶

the urban network and water management infrastructure ensued. In the south of the country, however, the Moorish domination of the territory (eighth to twelfth centuries) quickly recovered—and deepened this connection to water and revitalized the urban system. The urban network of each region consisted of a hierarchy of smaller villages, located along the tributaries of major rivers and connected to the major city through these waterways (see figure 13.2). The hinterland of each city provided for agricultural products and minerals, while the city transformed these raw materials into exportable goods and traded them with the other major urban centers.⁷ This was an early example of the process of urban revival that would only fully blossom in Central Europe from the eleventh century onward.⁸

The Kingdom of Portugal was created in 1143; for the first few centuries, the territory was settled and developed in strict connection to the river system. During this period, trade relied almost exclusively on waterways, and the hierarchy of the urban system closely mimicked that of both the rivers and their tributaries.⁹ Major urban centers were set on the intersections of roads (mainly used for short-distance connection between neighboring watersheds) and rivers. Long distance trade was carried via near-shore sea navigation.

As a result, most of Portugal's present urban system is the direct result of a succession of settlement waves deeply connected to the river system. Although the ascension and decadence of several of the country's urban centers depends on several other factors, the basic urban structure of present-day Portugal has remained surprisingly stable since the late Middle Ages.

TRANSFORMATION OF LAND AND WATER

Although historical information on the condition of rivers in Portugal is scarce, there are indications that the countryside and its ecology had been heavily modified by the Middle Ages. For example, the brown bear (*Ursus arctos*) is considered to have been extinct from most of the territory since the seventeenth century, probably due to a combination of direct hunting and the transformation of natural forests into agricultural land and pastures.¹⁰ These changes in the land cover of river basins likely contribute to severe flooding problems downstream. For instance, the Mondego River is known to have flooded the lower areas of the city of Coimbra with increasing intensity, due to both heavy siltation in this lower stretch of the river and, most likely, increased peak flows. In one of the country's first recorded projects of river management (1791), Coimbra implemented a two-kilometer bank reforestation project that effectively created an artificial floodplain.¹¹ Whenever the river flooded, it would spill over to a poplar-dominated terrace that included several temporary side channels, trapping sediment and reducing peak flow immediately downstream. The impacts of inundation in the city's center were thus reduced.

The city of Porto kept the riverside section of its medieval city walls in place until 1821, long after they had become obsolete as medieval defenses. This was likely because they still played an important role in protecting the Ribeira quarter from the Douro River's floods.

The capital city of Lisbon, due in part to its excellent natural harbor on the Tejo Estuary, experienced explosive growth during the Age of Discovery (1415–1542). As the city grew to a population of close to 200,000 inhabitants in the seventeenth century,¹² the provision of drinking water became a serious challenge and a limitation to Lisbon's growth. This was solved through the building of a monumental aqueduct, opened in 1747, that brought water from the same sources at Belas the Romans had dammed a millennium and a half before. Supported by sixty-five-meter-high stone arches, the aqueduct's span over the

Alcântara Valley remains one of the most iconic feats of European engineering of the time.

The country's fortunes would wane in the following century and, as England and Germany were ushering in the industrial era, Portugal was still a mostly agrarian society.¹³ Although economically this would prove to be disastrous for the country, it also meant that most of the widespread annihilation of river systems that characterized industrialization was averted. Some attempts to develop a more productive agro-industrial sector led to the modification of entire landscapes (the Douro Valley), but these practices appear to be the epitome of sustainability when compared to the heavy, coal-driven industries dominating central England or Germany's Ruhr region.¹⁴

There were a few instances where the combination of a productive agro-industrial activity was implemented without complete disruption of the natural systems. In the Tejo Estuary, a company was created in 1836 to manage the vast expanses of *Lezíria*, a type of man-made low-lying agricultural land regulated through a system of canals and low sustaining walls. Although sustainability was probably not a major concern initially, the management has proven to achieve a sustainable agricultural practice ever since. The river is allowed to flood the land during the occasional floods, and significant areas of salt marshes and mudflats are preserved. The Regional Plan of 1964 excluded most of the best habitat from areas of potential urban development and, although this may not have been an express objective of that plan, the result is that the northeastern part of the estuary was kept in a very good condition until the first natural parks were created, after the revolution of 1974, and the Tejo Estuary was included in the first group of natural reserves created in 1976.¹⁵

THE CORRECTIONS

The two major threats to river ecology were, in the case of Portugal, rectification (“correction”) and damming. Both practices had the double intent of promoting irrigation and managing flows to reduce floods. River correction was mostly related to the attempt to enhance agricultural productivity along the fertile floodplains; the need for protection derived from the slow but steady growth of the urban centers. The urban population increased fourfold between 1864 and 1991, leading to widespread encroachment of urban development onto floodplains, riverbanks, and, in some extreme situations, even over river channels

themselves, as these were interred below ground. In urbanized areas, the paving of upland catchments resulted in less infiltration of rain, more runoff, and intensified floods, increasing demand for hard flood protection infrastructure and producing a greater influx of pollutants from urban wastewater. From the initial protection provided by armored banks and riverside walls, a few cities went on to “correct” rivers by straightening and deepening channels and armoring banks, as is visible immediately upstream and downstream of most cities.

Of the 130 cities in continental Portugal, 75 (58 percent) are located on rivers.¹⁶ In total, forty-seven rivers cross one or more cities, and most of them have experienced heavy modification in these urban sections. The biggest challenges to the river’s ecosystem were the occasional break in longitudinal connectivity and, more dramatically, the aforementioned spilling of raw sewage that persisted until recently. While highly visible, the engineering of river channels in densely urbanized regions affected less overall river length than did rectification of channels in agricultural areas. As cultivation expanded across floodplains to the riverbank, wetland habitats were lost, and widespread construction of flood dykes eliminated lateral connectivity between the channel and floodplain. Along many rivers, the riparian corridor, if there was one, was reduced to a narrow strip of vegetation along a steep bank.

THE DAMMED

The construction of large dams was initiated in the 1940s with a national program centered on power generation,¹⁷ but the scope of the program quickly expanded in defining dams also as mainstays of flood control, especially in the north, as well as water storage for human consumption and agriculture, which is very relevant in the Mediterranean climate of the south. The Mondego River, for instance, is dammed by hydro-power dams (such as Aguieira, 1981), urban flood management weirs and dams (Coimbra’s Açude-Ponte, also from 1981), as well as several smaller weirs, diverters, and canals that feed the Lower Mondego irrigation project (a relatively recent irrigation scheme, started in 1979). The Cávado, another heavily modified river, is blocked at eight large dams, built between 1951 and 1972. The Douro River and its tributaries contain close to fifty dams and weirs, installed between 1965 and 2005, with a strong emphasis on electrical generation and flood control in the basin.

Today, there are more than 230 large dams (reservoirs >1 hm³) in



FIGURE 13.3. Penha Garcia Dam, concluded in 1979, on a gorge of the Ponsul River (photo by Pedro Pinto).

Portugal.¹⁸ These dams are likely to produce the most dramatic and irreversible impacts on the fluvial ecosystems. Most of these large dams do not include fish passages and have severely disrupted longitudinal connectivity of the river corridors (see figure 13.3). Virtually all anadromous fish species have either gone extinct (the sturgeon, *Acipenser sturio*) or face extinction (anadromous brown trout, *Salmo trutta morpha trutta*; Atlantic salmon, *Salmo salar*; allis shad, *Alosa alosa*; European eel, *Anguilla anguilla*; and European river lamprey, *Lampretta fluviatilis*).¹⁹ The extent of these dams' impacts over the environment is yet to be fully acknowledged or valued, as the government only recently announced the construction of an additional ten large dams,²⁰ some affecting virtually pristine river valleys (Tua and Sabor). Fortunately, recent decades have been equally characterized by a growing environmental consciousness; quite a few of these more recent dams have been fiercely contested by environmental organizations (Alqueva, which created the largest reservoir in Western Europe, Baixo Sabor, Foz do Tua), and some projects have even been abandoned or halted (Padroselos, which would threaten one of the last populations of the protected fresh water pearl mussel, and the Foz Côa dam, stopped to prevent loss of Paleolithic rock engravings, is now designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site).

THE REBORN

More important, though, there is now a widespread awareness of past damage done to river systems, and the idea that bodies of water need to be protected from the direct and indirect impacts of human activity is now commonly accepted. Starting with a degraded river system, especially in the more urbanized coastal plains, multiple actions have been taken to try and reverse past damage. From the utilitarian perspective of rivers and riverfronts being viewed as mere economic resources to be explored, the rivers are now increasingly looked upon as essential elements in the structuring of the country's cultural and environmental values. Especially since the country's admission to the European Union (EU) in 1985, Portugal has made a strong and sustained effort to improve water quality and, more recently, also to increase the ecological condition of the river corridor.

This is visible especially in the enforcement of new laws and regulations concerning water quality and the treatment of sewage. Since the original Environmental Law (*Lei de Bases do Ambiente*, 11/1987), the country has produced a set of subsidiary legislation regulating the protection of the river corridor and floodplains under the National Ecological Network (REN), and transposing the several directives produced by the EU. These European-wide directives required all the national governments to adopt specific legislation and policies to address a set of environmental concerns, starting with clean Bathing Waters (1976); Drinking Water (1980); Sewage Sludge management (1986); Urban Wastewater Treatment (1991); control of Nitrate Pollution (1991); Integrated Pollution Control and Prevention, organizing several of the previous directives (1996); the paramount Water Framework Directive (2000), transposed into the Water Law (*Lei da Água*, 58/2005), with the long-term goal of improving water and habitat quality; and, finally, the Floods Directive (2007).

The first few initiatives, based on the earlier directives, addressed specifically the heavily impaired chemical quality of the bodies of water by controlling emissions and treating effluents from industry and agriculture (point and nonpoint source) and urban sewage. Before these actions, most urban centers in the country lacked proper, if any, treatment of urban wastewater, and raw sewage was regularly spilled into the rivers. This led to a severe degradation of most waterways. Several rivers garnered ungainly nicknames, such as the “Rio Lixo” (“Garbage River”), a play on words with the name of Leiria's Lis River, or the

Trancão's unofficial designation as an "open-air sewer." As a direct consequence, and with the help of European funding, Portugal has already made a colossal investment in building new water treatment plants (1,035 were built between 2000 and 2007)²¹ and expanding and modernizing sewage pipes networks. The target of this ongoing process is to provide at least secondary treatment to wastewater for all urban centers above 2,000 inhabitants by 2013, when the second Strategic Plan for Water Provision and Wastewater Treatment (PEAASAR) is expected to be fully implemented. In the period between 2000 and 2013, more than €5.5 billion will be spent on wastewater treatment infrastructure alone.

The water quality of quite a few waterbodies is already showing clear signs of improvement. The Tejo Estuary, for instance, had experienced severe impacts from agricultural, industrial, and urban discharges of pollutants. According to Ramiro Neves, a Portuguese hydrologist, only the high turbidity has prevented major algal blooms from occurring.²² A few major disasters, such as the 1966 accidental spill of 700 tons of sulphuric acid from the CUF plant, led to the elimination of a few iconic species, such as the Portuguese oyster. With the progressive treatment of sewage, the estuary is finally showing some signs of recovery, as a multidecade plan to collect and treat all sewerage around the Tejo Estuary, included in the PEAASAR II, is nearing completion. Even before the final section of the major sewage collector started diverting the last remaining untreated outlets within the city of Lisbon to a newly expanded treatment plant, the improvements to water quality were already visible and reflected in the growing abundance of fish species.²³

In accordance with the specifications of the Water Framework Directive, the recently created River Basin Administrations (Administrações de Região Hidrográfica) were mandated with the elaboration of Basin Plans. These plans exhaustively characterize all waterbodies and specify management practices aimed at achieving a good ecological status by 2015. Although this target date now seems unrealistic, these entities should eventually be able to gather enough momentum to actually propose new land-use policies (such as changes to agricultural practices, replanting of native forests, and replacement of hard flood protection with restored floodplains) that could, in time, improve the ecological condition of most rivers. As proposed over ten years ago by the WFD, good ecological status now includes not only the (obviously essential) improvement of water quality, but equally the effort to reestablish the river's hydromorphic and biological condition. This is likely to include

more passive and environmentally friendly solutions for flood-risk management, as recommended by the Floods Directive.

The Expo '98, mentioned in the introduction, set forward a new model of waterfront redevelopment that subverted the century-long trend toward the detachment of city and river. Since the late 1800s, the modest but steady modernization of the country's economy was reflected in the placement of heavy infrastructure (railways, highways, ports) in the urban waterfront. Cities like Setúbal, Barreiro, Matosinhos, to name only a few of the most obvious examples, saw vast stretches of their waterfronts annexed to industrial and port uses, and the associated heavy transport infrastructure, linear and parallel to the river, created a virtually unsurpassable barrier. In recent decades, the industrial sector is in crisis, with the relocation of the production centers to the developing world, and a few of the former heavy-industrial parks have become brownfields. One such brownfield, located in the eastern part of Lisbon, was selected as the site for the World Expo, and the urban renewal project that ensued redeveloped the site into a multifunctional and dense new neighborhood, with ample provision of public open spaces along the Tejo riverfront, including several social facilities and a large riverfront park, among other amenities.

POLIS URBAN RIVER PROJECTS

Largely inspired by the success of the Expo '98 site, Portugal initiated in May 2000 the Polis Program for the Urban Regeneration and Environmental Enhancement of Cities, a nationwide project to improve urban environments by revitalizing downtown areas. The main objective of the program was to improve the quality of urban life through integrated approaches to environmental improvement. Revitalizing urban rivers was seen as a way to contribute to people's improved quality of life by increasing green areas, promoting pedestrian travel, and providing public spaces for recreation, social gathering, children's spontaneous use, and cultural activities. River projects would also improve a city's attractiveness and competitiveness in the larger urban network. Twenty-eight cities were initially selected for the Polis Program based on eight criteria, one being the potential for riverfront improvement (see figure 13.4). Another criterion that favored selection of cities along rivers was the revitalization of derelict industrial zones. In the first phase of the program, eighteen of the cities' revitalization plans include interventions to the river and riverbanks.²⁴ We describe four river Polis proj-




FIGURE 13.4. The twenty-eight initial Polis sites.²⁵

ects based on observations we made in the parks during the summers of 2008 and 2010: Coimbra, Leiria, Bragança, and Cacém.

In the historic town of Coimbra life revolves around the university at the top of the hill. The Polis site is within walking distance at the bottom of the hill along the Rio Mondego. The river is wide, about 710 meters in the park, and deep in some places. It is the largest river that lies entirely in Portugal. The Açude-Ponte, a dam built immediately downstream from the city's center, blocks the flow so the water level is maintained at a constant level in the summer. Historically, the river level fluctuated with winter floods and had a low-flow, dry appearance in the summer. People would wade and swim in the river during warm



FIGURE 13.5. (*top*) People wade and swim in the Rio Mondego prior to construction of the dam downstream (image from an old postcard). (*bottom*) A view of the cafes and restaurants along the bank following the Polis Project (photo by Kristen Podolak).



FIGURE 13.6. One of the themed pedestrian bridges over the Rio Lis in Leiria (photo by Kristen Podolak).

summer months. Today, the flow is imperceptible during the summer and the Rio Mondego seems more like a lake within the park (see figure 13.5). It is common to see sailboats on the river drifting past the café along the riverbank. The Polis project was completed in 2007 and included a pedestrian walkway linking the two sides of the river. On the right bank a café, soccer field, piers, and a children's playground represent the main design elements. On the left bank there are several boat-houses for sailboats, kayaks, and crew boats and a special events area. The park is a popular place and is busy with people in the summertime.

In Leiria, the River Lis winds through the downtown and the river park is completely surrounded by the city. In downtown Leiria, a castle atop a nearby hill is visible from the river trail and illuminated with lights at night. The river is straightened in a box channel in this section and there is no perceptible flow during the summer due to a dam downstream. The Polis project was completed in 2007 and dealt with roughly 7,500 meters of riverbank. It includes thirteen pedestrian bridges with themes like the “sofa bridge,” “bar bridge,” and “modern bridge” (see figure 13.6). One bridge has a children's playground suspended over the river. There is a café and a larger children's playground in the park on



FIGURE 13.7. The mirror water effect and hillside park in Bragança (photo by Kristen Podolak).

the right bank. The river is 18 meters wide in the downtown end and about 2.5 meters wide at the upstream end of the park before the back-water from the dam. In the upstream reach of the park the bed and banks of the river are natural, and the flow moves through pool and riffle. There is a large skate park and flat field on the left bank in the upstream end.

The Bragança River park, built in 2003, is located in a steep ravine and borders the old historic center of town, but it does not touch the new center of town. Bragança is the only example where the historic and current centers of town are not in the same place. At the upstream end of the River Fervença is a skate park and path along the river. Four pedestrian bridges were constructed, three in the downtown area and one downstream in the residential area. At the center of the park is a wide pool of water formed by weirs. On the right bank adjacent to the pool is an extensive plaza with a fountain at the base of a hillside park (see figure 13.7). As you walk downstream of the plaza on the left bank, you pass a large science education building built overtop the creek, and the trail continues downstream on an elevated boardwalk trail in a canyon lined by residences. The river here goes through pools and drops and is narrow, about 1.2 meters wide. At the end of the boardwalk is a trail that leads up to a castle on a hill.

In 2008 a park along the Ribeira das Jardas in the city of Cacém was completed (*Jardas* is the name used for the upstream reaches of the Ribeira Barcarena, which flows southward through the Sintra and Oeiras municipalities to debouch into the Tejo Estuary along the Estoril coast). The goals for the 1.6-hectare Ribeira Jardas Park were to provide flood protection, regenerate aquatic and riparian habitat, enhance scenic and aesthetic qualities, provide space for leisure and recreation, and create connections between the urban community and the river.²⁶ Prior to the project, the stream was inaccessible and largely invisible behind floodwalls, fences, and riparian vegetation. The park design included pedestrian bridges across the channel, a café, a grassy field along the riverbank, and exercise equipment along a riverside trail (see figure 13.8). The river itself is now visible, and fish and eels can be seen in the water. Following the park completion, a survey of park users found that 77 percent feel positively about the intervention.²⁷ Interestingly, respondents' perceptions of water quality declined postproject compared to preproject. Several pointed to sewer outfalls as the main source of pollution, noting that they wished to see further water quality improvement. One explanation for this response is that prior to the park, there was no access to the stream, so residents could not see the water and thus could not judge its quality.

These four Polis projects have commonalities in the way they approached riverfront redevelopment. All of the projects included pedestrian bridges spanning the river and linking communities on opposite banks. There are riverside trails in each project that allow people to stroll leisurely or exercise by running and biking along the river. The projects made the river more visible by either increasing the water volume during the summer, when it would normally appear dry, or by removing infrastructure or vegetation that blocked sightlines to the water. The projects included children's playgrounds, cafés, and unique features such as the children's science museum, skate parks, and themed bridges.

During the Polis planning and construction there were efforts to monitor the success pre- and postproject. The Fifth European Framework Program developed the Urban River Basin Enhancement Methods (URBEM) in 2005. URBEM established three categories of success indicators: ecological, social, and economic.²⁸ The URBEM approach was tested at the Bragança Polis site where the River Fervença rehabilitation took place.²⁹ The social indicators showed the most success, with the river becoming a "recognized and used space."³⁰ However, the deci-



FIGURE 13.8. (top) The view of the river trail in the Cacém Polis Project (photo by Rachel Kraai). (bottom) The popular new exercise equipment along the river (photo by Kristen Podolak).

sion to dam the river to maintain a constant water level with a mirror-like reflective quality and the use of hard concrete materials on the riverbank limited the ecological success of the project. In the process of applying the indicators the researchers identified gaps in URBEM, concluded that fewer indicators could be used, and developed a revised set of indicators under the RiProCity project.³¹

BEYOND CACÉM:

RESTORING THE BARCARENA AS A LINEAR PARK

A collaborative planning and design workshop involving nearly twenty students from the University of California, Berkeley, Instituto Superior Técnico, and Universidade Lusófona collected data on the Barcarena stream in summer 2009 and made recommendations for the future of the stream based on an understanding of the history of watershed impacts and current needs. The goal was to improve human access and optimize ecological restoration opportunities along the length of the stream. The Barcarena stream is located fifteen kilometers west of the city of Lisbon in the greater Lisbon metropolitan region. It drains a thirty-five-kilometer-square catchment, which is forested at the upstream end, urban and agricultural in its middle and lower reaches.

The population of the Lisbon metropolitan region has grown rapidly since 1970, much of this growth in the region west of Lisbon where the Barcarena stream is located. Clustered high-rise apartment blocks, largely unplanned, did not provide for sewage treatment and lacked adequate mass transit and parks. The main transport axes in the region run east to west, connecting these settlements with the city center, but there are few north-to-south transport connections. As a result, it is difficult for residents of these apartment blocks to go the relatively short distance from population centers to the coast, where there are ample recreational opportunities (only ten kilometers from the city of Cacém).³²

The Barcarena stream (known as the Jardas in its upper reaches) flows roughly fourteen kilometers north to south through deeply incised valleys to the coast. With urbanization, the catchments experienced increased peak runoff from impervious surfaces, sewage from illegal housing settlements, and canalization of streams within concrete walls. However, construction has occurred mostly on uplands, leaving the bottomlands of the incised stream valleys in many reaches surprisingly unaltered. Neglected for decades, the water quality in these drainages has been improved with the expansion of sewage treatment (largely




FIGURE 13.9. Proposed cross section typologies based on the streambank slope: steep (A top) and gradual (B bottom) (illustrations by Andrea Gaffney).

to preserve the water quality of the beaches downstream). This opens up a unique opportunity for the Bacarena stream, by virtue of its linear nature, to connect pedestrians and bicyclists to the coastal beaches and trail, providing badly needed recreation while revitalizing the riparian and aquatic ecology.³³

Seven individual studies were synthesized into a vision for the future of the Bacarena stream. The students identified opportunities for restoration of aquatic and riparian habitat and recommended placement of instream structures to create complex riffle-pool habitats for the endangered Portuguese nase (*Iberochondrostoma lusitanicum*) and removal



FIGURE 13.10. Two views of the trail along the Bacarena Stream: (*top*) the undeveloped floodplain, and (*bottom*) the proposed expanded trail (illustration by Andrea Gaffney).

of invasive riparian reeds and replanting with native vegetation in specific stream reaches. By mapping human use of the Polis project on the Ribeira Jardas (Barcarena) in Cacém and talking with people in the park, the students found the park is not only a success in terms of heavy use, but also a component of the transportation network and recreational space in the city. A pedestrian and bicycle trail along the stream could connect with the current trail in the Polis project and extend downstream along 10.4 kilometers of the stream, linking underserved population centers in the middle and upper reaches of the stream to

coastal beaches. Various trail designs were developed based upon the slope of the streambank and the conditions of the edge between the water and land. These design solutions offer a variety of user experiences, visible and audible, in the walled or steep slope settings and opportunities to access the stream physically in places where the streambank slope is more gradual (see figure 13.9). The vision for the Bacarena stream builds on the successful urban Polis project and takes advantage of the still largely undeveloped floodplain for enhanced aquatic and riparian habitat, recreation, transportation, and connectivity throughout the basin (see figure 13.10).

CONCLUSION

From their role as Roman and medieval transport and communication network, Portuguese rivers were transformed into hard-edged industrial channels and dammed to drive turbines and irrigate rice fields. The last decade has seen the rebirth of rivers in Portugal, thanks to improved water quality and the example of the Expo '98 development along the Tejo. While Portugal's already large inventory of dams is slated to be increased by new dams, the twentieth-century attitudes of damming, rectifying, and even burying rivers have given way to widespread appreciation for rivers as living elements in the landscape. Within cities, flowing rivers provide a source of life and dynamism, meeting some fundamental needs of city dwellers for nature in their lives. As water quality has improved and formerly utilitarian river spaces are freed up to provide ecological habitats and recreational opportunities for humans, we can say that Portuguese rivers are being reborn.

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Entrepreneurship and Public Policy in Tomorrow's Portuguese Republic

DANA T. REDFORD

The aim of this paper is to advocate for an informed and concerted effort in developing and supporting public policy for entrepreneurship, with specific emphasis on the need to develop initiatives in education and training, in today's and tomorrow's Portugal. The development of entrepreneurship is viewed as a means to further a more pluralistic, democratic, participatory Portuguese Republic as well as a source for improving the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the country's economic and social system as the Republic continues. Explicitly, this is a call to academic and civil society organizations to assist in the development of country-specific knowledge on Portugal that will provide the information needed by policymakers and the public-at-large to make informed decisions. Many in Portugal are concerned with fostering a more entrepreneurial and innovative environment, a country in which young people have the mindset and skills necessary to create opportunities for themselves as well as for society. Coordinated, sustained and focused public policy in entrepreneurship education and vocational education and training (VET) can provide one of the keys to unleashing this potential.

In addition, promoting entrepreneurship is a powerful means for facilitating the rapid growth of innovative Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which is increasingly recognized by governments as an effective means for creating jobs, increasing productivity, fostering competitiveness, and alleviating unemployment and poverty.¹ "The

challenge for the European Union is to identify the key factors for building a climate in which entrepreneurial initiative and business activities can thrive. Policy measures should seek to boost the Union's levels of entrepreneurship, adopting the most appropriate approach for producing more entrepreneurs and for getting more firms to grow."²

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

In defining *entrepreneurship* the European Commission states: "Entrepreneurship refers to an individual's ability to turn ideas into action. It includes creativity, innovation, and risk taking, as well as the ability to plan and manage projects in order to achieve objectives. This supports everyone in day-to-day life at home and in society, makes employees more aware of the context of their work and better able to seize opportunities, and provides a foundation for entrepreneurs establishing a social or commercial activity."³ In a recent Commission report, "The important role of education in promoting more entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviors, starting even at primary school, is now widely recognized."⁴ This paper assumes that entrepreneurship can be taught. And that "universities and technical institutes should integrate entrepreneurship as an important part of the curriculum, spread across different subjects, and require or encourage students to take entrepreneurship courses."⁵ In the words of the late management guru Peter Drucker: "The entrepreneurial mystique? It's not magic, it's not mysterious, and it has nothing to do with the genes. It's a discipline. And, like any discipline, it can be learned."⁶ Stated another way, it is generally now accepted that, "the question of whether entrepreneurship can be taught is *obsolete*."⁷

PUBLIC POLICY COMPLEXITY

The term *policy* generally refers to a purposive course of action that an individual or group consistently pursues to deal with a given issue. "Public policy is what public officials within government, and by extension the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about public problems. Public problems refer to conditions the public widely perceives to be unacceptable, . . . therefore requiring intervention."⁸ Many in Portugal feel that lack of creativity, innovation, and risk-taking are among the societal and economic factors that are unacceptable and need to be changed.⁹ Indeed, working toward the development of

public/private partnerships can be an aid in fostering a better connection between universities, industry, and government.¹⁰

Politics, Harold Lasswell famously stated, is about “who gets what, when, and how.”¹¹ Politics refers to the practice through which public policies are devised and adopted, by an elected official, organized interest groups, and political parties. As Thomas Dye affirmed, “the focus of political science is shifting to public policy—to the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity.”¹² Developing public policy can also be viewed as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve.”¹³

Elusiveness may also be “a fundamental defining element” of public policy.¹⁴ The *complexity* associated with a systematic examination of elusive phenomena has been elaborated by many. As in other areas of scholarly study, entrepreneurship lacks a “grand theory.” Issues tend to be interlocked and it is difficult to isolate the problem(s) that hold back entrepreneurship, as it is in the scholarly investigation to understand what causes impoverished inner cities or environmental pollution. The expertise and experience necessary to fill knowledge gaps related to complex problems may not be easily obtainable. This fact may in turn lead to the need for lengthy pilot programs and/or evaluation periods. It is also true that a bias toward excessive caution and risk avoidance may lead to an emphasis on process rather than action. Couple this with the reality that frequently in government an issue will involve many different ministries, agencies, and departments and that these entities are limited in their ability to respond because of legal constraints, limited resources, and an overly bureaucratic decision-making process, and action and outcome become even further delayed.

SETTING THE AGENDA

An *agenda* is conceived as a “list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time. . . . Apart from the set of subjects or problems that are on the agenda, a set of *alternatives* for governmental action is seriously considered by government officials and those closely associated with them.”¹⁵ One of the bases for the development of entrepreneurship policy in the

European Union, and in member state Portugal, is the Lisbon Agenda (or Lisbon Strategy) that has set developing entrepreneurship as a priority.

As the nature of entrepreneurship is complex, so too is the development of policy related to it. There are many ways entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs interact with the system. To better understand how this complexity is dealt with in the area of entrepreneurship policymaking, it is important to use a framework and to look to experienced transnational entities to assist in defining it—and to incorporate best practices that have been developed by different nations. Thus, this paper refers to European Union and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) frameworks and policy papers in placing the Portuguese experience in a larger context. To better understand why policy development is needed it is necessary to understand the importance of entrepreneurship in terms of employment and economic forces.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND PROMOTION POLICY

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper and as elaborated by IAPMEI, the Portuguese Institute for the Support of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Innovation Promotion, in 2003 SMEs represented 99.6 percent of the 275,000 companies operating in Portugal. These companies were responsible for 76 percent of employment and 58 percent of annual turnover. From 2000 to 2003, the number of SMEs increased at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent, with real term employment growth of 5.6 percent per year and sales growth of 4.3 percent.¹⁶ Other European Union countries also demonstrated similar patterns. As Günter Verheugen, vice president of the European Commission, stated, “SMEs represent the backbone of the European Economy and the largest potential source of employment and growth.” This is why the European Commission gave a new stimulus to the policy on SMEs by focusing its action on tackling SMEs’ “needs and improving their financial and regulatory environment.”¹⁷ Research has shown that increases in the rate of business ownership as a percentage of the labor force have led to lower unemployment rates¹⁸ and are correlated to higher economic growth.¹⁹

Some of the various ways in which the European Commission encourages the promotion of SMEs with member states are: developing initiatives that help encourage the promotion of the entrepreneurial spirit;

reducing government red tape; introducing improved ways of investing; encouraging the involvement of economically disadvantaged groups (such as women and ethnic minorities); and fostering social entrepreneurship. These, among others, are supported within the European Union framework.”²⁰ In 2006, Vice President Verheugen stated that the Union needed “to create a more favorable societal climate for entrepreneurship, in particular to encourage young Europeans to become the entrepreneurs of tomorrow. We need a systematic approach to entrepreneurship education at all levels, from the primary school to university.” It is the Commission’s conviction that “combining entrepreneurial mindsets and competences with excellences in scientific and technical studies should enable students and researchers to better commercialize their ideas and new technologies developed.”²¹

SMALL BUSINESS POLICY VERSUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY

The main thrust of government small business policy at its inception in the early twentieth century was to ensure that the significant market power of large companies was constrained and that monopolies (and even public companies that were not monopolies) would not have an unfair advantage over their smaller brethren. In contrast, in developing entrepreneurship policy multiple levels of analysis must be made, in particular at the individual—entrepreneur—level. This implies that entrepreneurship policy is not as static as small business policy, which focuses primarily on existing firms and organizational analysis consisting of issues related to running a company in the larger business environment. Entrepreneurship policy looks at the decision-making process of the entrepreneur and is concerned with the larger framework in which knowledge transfer is facilitated, technology commercialization occurs, networks are formed, and even a cultural environment is established that is favorable to taking risks and developing new ideas.

In developing entrepreneurship policies a wide variety of areas need to be considered, including broader tax incentives, education, and immigration, as well as specific measures such as special financing or training to promote entrepreneurship.²² In most countries there exists no government structure that is directly responsible for the development and promotion of entrepreneurship. Usually, entrepreneurship is developed across a variety of ministries or agencies that ranges from economy to education to immigration,²³ whereas small business policies are usu-

ally focused on one entity. Such is the case in modern Portugal. IAPMEI is responsible for the development and implementation of small and medium-sized business policy. But whereas IAPMEI is also responsible for part of entrepreneurship policy, it is joined by as many as five other ministries and agencies in the development and implementation of only one aspect of entrepreneurship policy.

DEFINING THE ESSENTIALS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY

Lundström and Stevenson defined entrepreneurship policy as measures taken to stimulate entrepreneurship that can focus on the pre-start, start-up and/or post-start-up phases of the entrepreneurial process. Policies should be “designed and delivered” to tackle the areas of motivation, opportunity, and skill development. The primary objective of these policies is to encourage more people to start their own businesses.²⁴ Details are presented in the table below, which has been adapted from Lundström and Stevenson’s work *Entrepreneurship Policy for the Future*:

It is noteworthy that in this table Lundström and Stevenson refer specifically to the focus of entrepreneurship policy as “[to] *promote entrepreneurship*.”²⁵ The main difficulty, as they note, is identifying the areas that need to be proactively pursued to create a sustained cultural change. As part of improving the business infrastructure for “nascent entrepreneurs,” education and counseling are necessary to achieve long-term policy objectives. Small and medium-sized businesses and individual entrepreneurs typically do not have sufficient resources to directly lobby a government. Furthermore, forums, seminars, and conferences often do not exist where policymakers can sit down with this group for consultation.

Lundström and Stevenson emphasize the pre-start-up and start-up phases of business ownership because “. . . these are the targets for entrepreneurship policy measures and we propose that entrepreneurship policy measures are taken to stimulate individuals to behave more entrepreneurially. It is our position that this can be done by influencing motivation, opportunity and skill factors. Therefore, our aim is to see what types of policy actions are taken towards individuals in the pre- and early stages of idea and business development.”²⁶

Simon Bridge et al. identify various types of entrepreneurship promotional activities and interventions in accordance with the particu-

TABLE 14.1 SUMMARY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY

Feature	Entrepreneurship Policy
Objective	Motivate more new entrepreneurs
Target	Nascent entrepreneurs/new business starters; i.e., individuals (people)
Targeting	General population/subsets (i.e., women, youth)
Client group	Difficult to identify “nascents”
Levers	Nonfinancial, business support (networks, education, counseling)
Focus	Entrepreneurial culture/climate (i.e., promote entrepreneurship)
Delivery system	Lots of new players (need orientation)
Approach	Proactive outreach
Results orientation	More long-term (results can take longer)
Consultation	Forums do not generally exist

lar stages of business development that a policy aims to support. This includes a wide range of policies that can focus on the founding and development of a new business as well as on its eventual decline.²⁷

In the case of Portugal, all of the types of interventions mentioned above were present in the country in some form or another by 2005 except for one area—entrepreneurship education and training. Entrepreneurship education is a relatively new area for Portuguese higher education and an even more recent addition to primary and secondary schools. As late as 2002, the European Commission reported that Portugal was the only EU country where no program in entrepreneurship education existed at the primary and secondary school levels,²⁸ and further research found that the first programs in this area started in only 2005.²⁹

INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND REPUBLICS

In terms of explaining why the liberal ideals of democracy failed during the Portuguese First Republic, historian Edward Makefakis suggests that “the key was to be found in the ‘intermediacy’ of Southern Europe in terms of the stage at which it found itself in the transition toward an industrial society—between the Western European model and the rural societies of the East.” Makefakis explains how Southern European nations did not follow Western European patterns. Powerful institu-

TABLE 14.2 TYPE OF INTERVENTIONS

Stage of Business	Policy Field or Need	Intervention/Instrument
<i>Culture</i>	An encouraging and supportive environment	Community programs, entrepreneurship education
<i>Prestart</i>	Ideas	Spin-off ideas, technology transfer, idea-generation workshops
	Small business know-how	Small business skills training Networking, access points
	Know-who networks Counseling	Prestart counseling
<i>Start-up (external)</i>	Customers	Purchasing initiatives
	Suppliers	Sourcing initiatives and directories
	Advice/consultancy	Business expertise provision, training, counseling, research
	Business plan information Premises	Databases/business planning Incubators, science parks
<i>Start-up (internal)</i>	Finance	Grants, loans, business angels
	Market/admin. expertise	Training services
	Financial management	Advice/counseling, mentoring
<i>Established</i>	New ideas	Idea-generation workshops, spin-off ideas, technology transfer
	Specialist guidance and investments	Guidance services, including banks, accountants, solicitors
<i>Growth</i>	Market opportunities/exports	Trade missions, export advisers Market/technical information
	Product development	Development courses
	Strategic approach	Salary support, subsidies, grants
	Management skills, finance	
<i>Decline</i>	Confidence, customers, money	Mentors
	Strategic review and planning	Advice and guidance
<i>Termination</i>	Legal/other advice	Advice and counseling
<i>Other dimensions</i>	Business sector	Sectorial initiatives/training
	Business support environment	Information and education
<i>All</i>	Information on small business needs	Research coordination, research databases

tions, such as the Church and the armed forces, as well as associations and interest groups linked to sectors of the oligarchy, were instrumental in destabilizing modern (republican) political movements that occurred earlier, but were unable to establish their hegemony. “[This is] the problem of societies which have experienced an ‘early parliamentarianism and late industrialization.’ Even though ‘capitalism was accepted as the primary mode of economic organization . . . its legitimacy was always questioned.’ It was this ‘economic dualism,’ which left a harsh imprint on Southern Europe’s social and political reality.”³⁰

Probably the most profound piece of legislation to affect the structure of Portuguese industry was the Industrial Regulation Law (*Lei do Condicionamento Industrial*) created during the *Estado Novo*. It required that any project for new industrial facilities (or the substitution or updating of equipment) that represented a means of increasing productive capacity needed to be first approved by the government. This also applied to the transfer of industrial licenses or sale of businesses to foreign companies.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Small business policy typically targets the existing array of small enterprises and their viability, especially in light of the cost disadvantages they must overcome due to their intrinsic size disadvantage when compared to large firms. This policy approach was needed to combat the oligopolies of the First Republic and *Estado Novo*. Currently, international investors believe the lack of an entrepreneurial culture to be one of the least attractive aspects in their perception of investing in Portugal.³¹

David Audretsch states, “the mandate for entrepreneurship policy emanates from regions and even countries that . . . more recently [have] been adversely affected by globalization and loss of competitiveness in traditional industries, resulting in adverse economic performance.”³² Since 2002 Portugal has had lower economic growth than the majority of other European member states, and this has hit small and medium-sized companies especially hard. Nevertheless, according to IAPMEI, in 2004 there were 290,000 SMEs that generated more than half of the economic activity in Portugal. Approximately €163.5 billion (this represents more than half of the Portuguese economy) and 2 million jobs are attributed to SMEs in Portugal.³³

Similar to other parts of Europe and North America, Portugal’s man-

ufacturing sector has suffered a sustained shift in competitive advantage to developing countries characterized by cheaper unskilled and semi-skilled labor. The north of Portugal, traditionally seen as the manufacturing heartland of the country, is often referenced as being more entrepreneurial than the rest of the country. In the entrepreneurial north as well as throughout the country there is now a strong desire for increased entrepreneurship.

According to a Eurobarometer study made in September of 2003, 47 percent of the working-age population of the EU 15 wanted to be self-employed. The Portuguese, at 67 percent, had the strongest desire to be self-employed.³⁴ This desire to be entrepreneurs makes promoting entrepreneurship not only a major economic imperative but also demonstrates the necessity for policy-makers and organizations to address the issue in the context of social cohesion and satisfying the populace.

In the most recent Eurobarometer study, Portugal had the worst entrepreneurial climate index out of the twenty-five countries surveyed, as well as the highest percentage of people who agreed that there is a lack of financial support, that there are complex administrative procedures, and that it was difficult to receive information about starting up a business. In addition, the Portuguese were three times more likely than their European counterparts to believe that their school education could help them develop the skills and interest in becoming entrepreneurs.³⁵

As much as 30 percent of the differences in GDP growth rates among EU member states is attributed to varied levels of entrepreneurial activity.³⁶ The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an annual comparative assessment of national entrepreneurial activity levels. In 2004, the GEM project conducted research in thirty-nine countries. The report from that study concluded that “Portugal has one of the lowest rates of entrepreneurial activity in the EU and among the GEM 2004 countries globally. Portugal only has 4 entrepreneurs for every 100 people aged 18–64 years. This ranks Portugal in 13th place of the 16 EU countries included in GEM.”³⁷

CONCLUSION

Throughout the Portuguese Republic entrepreneurs have played an important role that has sometimes been suppressed by public policies that served only a select few. Modern policymaking in the area of entrepreneurship is complex and transversal, cutting across various government ministries as well as different parts of society. In light of

the European Commission's recommendations it might be useful for Portugal to develop an articulated agenda or strategy for entrepreneurship, especially entrepreneurship education and training to help aid the development of the entrepreneur at the individual level.

Portugal's nascent entrepreneurship education system at the post-secondary level aims to address several areas within the European Union policy context. One of the driving forces behind the European Commission push for entrepreneurship education is the employment opportunities it offers young people. The findings also show that Portuguese educators have a desire to promote entrepreneurship as a career choice for their students.

One of the greatest challenges for a government is to stimulate and support economic growth through policy initiatives. However, transforming a society's aspiration for increased levels of entrepreneurship is a relatively new area of policymaking, and indeed many in government have trouble articulating the meaning and substance of entrepreneurship policy.³⁸

In regard to entrepreneurship, public policy institutions have a duty to assist when market failures occur—be they regulatory, educational, or societal—and to foster their countries and regions in economic growth. To move this development forward in the Second Republic, entrepreneurial policies need to evolve and continue to gain importance and impact in the overall portfolio of economic policy instruments for Portuguese development.

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