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    <title>Recent ucsbecon_dwp items</title>
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    <description>Recent eScholarship items from Departmental Working Papers</description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 22:25:08 +0000</pubDate>
    <item>
      <title>Reconsidering Causation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/12q3t2vd</link>
      <description>Recent applied work in economics has displayed renewed interest in the problem of characterizing the causal relations that link economic variables. However, many discussions avoid explicit specification ofwhat has to be true about a formal model to justify an assertion that one variable in it causes another. Such specification is supplied here. Related topics, such as determining whether correlation implies causation, or vice-versa, and when causal coefficients can be estimated using ordinary least squares or instrumental variables regressions, are discussed.</description>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>LeRoy, Stephen F</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LAW OF ONE PRICE, BORDERS AND PURCHASING POWER PARITY</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5b17d1dr</link>
      <description>Conventional wisdom claims that the Law of One Price (LOP) fails in commodity markets, commodity borders are wide and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) fails. But the evidence supporting those claims comes primarily from retail markets where price differentials do not represent risk-free profits. As we show, prices from a wide range of auction markets strongly support the LOP, reject wide borders and do not reject PPP. In addition, recognizing the difference between retail and auction markets helps explain several puzzles associated with exchange rates. The Keynesian paradigm dominates macroeconomics. We question that dominance for two reasons: (1) by reviving PPP we reject Liquidity Preference and support Loanable funds and (2) we reject the standard Keynesian assumption that commodity markets clear slowly and asset markets clear rapidly. Whether commodity or asset, retail markets clear slowly. Whether commodity or asset, auction markets clear rapidly.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5b17d1dr</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Living Supply and Demand Curves</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9wp245m2</link>
      <description>Living Supply and Demand Curves</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9wp245m2</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 27 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Vespa, Emanuel</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stem Cell Donor Matching for Patients of Mixed Race</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22w466q9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The plight of multiracial leukemia patients who are unable to find matching stem cell donors has received much media attention. These news stories, while dramatic, are short on statistical information and long on misconceptions. We apply simple probability theory, the genetics of sexual diploid reproduction, and the theory of public goods  to produce estimates of the probabilities that multiracial patients will find matching donors in the existing registry.  We then compute  the benefits and costs of registering more potential donors of single and mixed races. c&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22w466q9</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 14 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted C</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rod</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sheehan-Connor, Damien</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LAW OF ONE PRICE, PURCHASING POWER PARITY AND EXCHANGE RATES: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2n8899rp</link>
      <description>Exchange-rate economics is filled with puzzles.  The asset approach has failed and without it most open-economy models are built on sand.  Conventional wisdom rejects the Law of One Price and views Purchasing Power Parity as useful at best in the long run.  We show for the first time how recognizing differences between retail, wholesale and auction markets, and recognizing that trade involves time in transit, helps solve the puzzles and provides a theory of exchange rates using auction markets for assets &lt;em&gt;and&lt;/em&gt; commodities.  We also restore the Law of One Price and Purchasing Power Parity to the status of “not rejected”.    </description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2n8899rp</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Housing Dynamics over the Business Cycle</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7bn5k73m</link>
      <description>Over the U.S. business cycle, fluctuations in residential investment are well known to systematically lead GDP. These dynamics are documented here to be specific to the U.S. and Canada. In other developed economies residential investment is broadly coincident with GDP. Nonresidential investment has the opposite dynamics, being coincident with or lagging GDP. These observations are in sharp contrast with the properties of nearly all business cycle models with disaggregated investment. Including mortgages and interest rate dynamics aligns the theory more closely with U.S. observations. Longer time to build in housing construction makes residential investment coincident with output.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7bn5k73m</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 9 Oct 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kydland, Finn</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rupert, Peter</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sustek, Roman</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Frequency and Accuracy in Proactive Testing for COVID-19</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8nf4c0jd</link>
      <description>Frequency and Accuracy in Proactive Testing for COVID-19</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8nf4c0jd</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 6 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Carl</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Li, Haoran</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LAW OF ONE PRICE, PURCHASING POWER PARITY AND EXCHANGE RATES</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8x04p85k</link>
      <description>Exchange-rate economics is filled with puzzles. The asset approach has failed. Purchasing Power Parity is useful at best in the long run. There is no clear link between exchange rates and fundamentals. With no empirically supported theory for exchange rates, open-economy macro models are built on sand. This paper shows for the first time how recognizing differences between retail, wholesale and auction markets helps solve the puzzles, provides a theory of exchange rates based on auction markets for assets and commodities, and suggests a link between fundamentals and exchange rates.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8x04p85k</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Causal Inference</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pc1x9r6</link>
      <description>Causal Inference</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6pc1x9r6</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jul 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>LeRoy, Stephen F.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Looking under the COUNTER for overcounted downloads</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vf2k2p0</link>
      <description>Looking under the COUNTER for overcounted downloads</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0vf2k2p0</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Uhrig, Richard</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Antelman, Kristin</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FORWARD BIAS, UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY AND RELATED PUZZLES</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1778z416</link>
      <description>Uncovered interest parity is widely used in open economy macroeconomics.  But the evidence rejects UIP and implies forward bias.  There are many suggested explanations for the failure of UIP and forward bias, but none are widely accepted, at least partially because none appear to explain the related puzzles discussed below.  This paper shows how sterilized “leaning against the wind” and a combination of inflationary and liquidity effects of open market operations can explain forward bias and the failure of UIP even when expectations are rational.  They also appear to be able to explain the related puzzles.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1778z416</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Do download reports reliably measure journal usage?  Trusting the fox to count your Hens?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1f221007</link>
      <description>Download rates of academic journals have joined citation rates as commonly used measures of research influence. But in what ways and to what extent do the two measures differ? This paper examines six years of download data for more than five thousand journals subscribed to by the University of California system. While down- load rates of journals are highly correlated with citation rates, the average ratio of downloads to citations varies substantially among academic disciplines. We find that, typically, the ratio of a journal’s downloads to citations depends positively on its im- pact factor. Surprisingly, we find that, controlling for citation rates, number of articles, academic discipline and year of download, there remains a “publisher effect,” with some publishers recording significantly more downloads than would be predicted from char- acteristics of their journals. Download statistics are recorded and supplied to libraries by journal publishers, often subject to confidentiality...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1f221007</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Wood-Doughty, Alex</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Efficient Ethical Rules for Volunteer's Dilemma</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9nt2h1tn</link>
      <description>Efficient Ethical Rules for Volunteer's Dilemma</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9nt2h1tn</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Sep 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When was Coase right?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6136k9kh</link>
      <description>This paper explores the conditions under which there is "Coasian independence" between the assignment of property right and efficient allocation of resources.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6136k9kh</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jun 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FORWARD BIAS, THE FAILURE OF UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY AND RELATED PUZZLES</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2ff194s2</link>
      <description>Uncovered interest parity is widely used in open economy macroeconomics.  But the evidence rejects UIP and implies forward bias.  There are many suggested explanations for the failure of UIP and forward bias, but none are widely accepted, at least partially because none explain the related puzzles discussed below.  This paper shows how the liquidity effects of open market operations and sterilized “leaning against the wind” can explain the failure of UIP and forward bias even when expectations are rational.  They also appear to be able to explain the related puzzles better than any of the alternatives.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2ff194s2</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jun 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bitcoin 1, Bitcoin 2, ... : An experiment in privately issued outside monies</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/91c7x1js</link>
      <description>The value of Bitcoin depends upon self-fulfilling beliefs that are hard to pin down. We demonstrate this for the case where Bitcoin is the only form of money in the economy and then generalize the message to the case of multiple Bitcoin clones and/or a competing sovereign currency. Some aspects of the indeterminacy we describe would no longer hold if Bitcoin were an interesting-bearing object.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/91c7x1js</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Wallace, Neil</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Centralized netting in financial networks</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/79t1q6cg</link>
      <description>We consider how the introduction of centralized netting in financial networks affects total netted exposures between counterparties. In some cases there is a trade-off: centralized netting increases the expectation of net exposures, but reduces the variance. We show that the set of networks for which expected net exposures decreases is a strict subset of those for which the variance decreases, so the trade-off can only be in one direction. For some network structures, introducing centralized netting is never beneficial to dealers unless sufficient weight is placed on reductions in variance. This may explain why, in the absence of regulation, traders in a derivatives network do not develop central clearing. Our results can be used to estimate margin requirements and counterparty risk in financial networks.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/79t1q6cg</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Let me, or Let George? Motives of competing altruists</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/48m9547q</link>
      <description>Let me, or Let George? Motives of competing altruists</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/48m9547q</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 4 Dec 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rod</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Leo, Greg</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Arbitrage and the Law of One Price: Setting the Record Straight</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/27t4q265</link>
      <description>Using retail commodity prices, most research finds positive Border Effects and rejects effective arbitrage and the Law of One Price. On the other hand, using auction prices, the finance literature and a few articles using commodities support effective arbitrage and the LOP. Using longer intervals and a wider variety of commodity auction prices than ever before, I find strong support for effective arbitrage and the LOP. In addition, for the first time, I use auction prices to look for Border Effects. Both half lives and standard deviations reject positive Border Effects.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/27t4q265</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 4 Dec 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Forward Bias, Uncovered Interest Parity and Related Puzzles</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2cm6p186</link>
      <description>Teh Forward-Bias Puzzle, failure of uncovered interest parity and related puzzles suggest that there is a fundamental failure in internatonal financial markets.  Many theories attempt to explain this bias and failure.  But none of them has been widely accepted; at least partly because they are not consistent with the related puzzles.  The model of monetary policy in Table 6 explains the Forward-Bias Puzzle and the UIP failure without appealing to risk premia or information failures.  It also explains, or is at least consistent with, the related puzzles.  Finally it suggests that we need to change the way we think about UIP.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2cm6p186</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Silence is Golden:  Communication Costs and Team Problem Solving</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3n25b620</link>
      <description>Numerous studies have compared the performance of individuals and teams at solving intellective problems.  The ubiquitous finding in the economics literature is that teams out-perform individuals.  This result is intuitively appealing, as teams can benefit from sharing insights.  We analyze experiments comparing the performance of teams and individuals at solving a series of challenging logic puzzles.  Contrary to the existing literature, individuals meet or exceed the performance of teams on all measures.  If we impose a small cost of communication on teams, the performance of teams improves to closely resemble the performance of individuals.  Underlying these results is a definite negative relationship between frequency of communication and team performance.  We also document a strong gender effect.  Teams with more women perform considerably better even though men slightly outperform women when solving the puzzles individually.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3n25b620</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cooper, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why ‘Optimal’ Payment for Healthcare Providers Can Never Be Optimal Under Community Rating</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/37b9q0k3</link>
      <description>This article extends the received literature on optimal provider payment by accounting for consumer heterogeneity in preferences for health insurance and health care. This heterogeneity breaks down the separation of the relationship between providers and the health insurer and the relationship between consumers and the insurer. Both experimental and market evidence for a high degree of heterogeneity are presented. Given heterogeneity, a uniform policy fails to effectively control moral hazard, while incentives for risk selection created by community rating cannot be neutralized through risk adjustment. Consumer heterogeneity spills over into relationships with providers, such that a uniform contract with providers cannot be optimal either. The decisive condition for ensuring optimality of provider payment is to replace community rating (which violates the principle of marginal cost pricing) by risk-rating of contributions combined with subsidization targeted at high risks with...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/37b9q0k3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Frech, Ted E</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zweifel, Peter</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Market Socialism and Community Rating in the Affordable Care Act</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/96c02193</link>
      <description>Market Socialism and Community Rating in the Affordable Care Act</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/96c02193</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Frech, Ted</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND THE AREEDA-TURNER RULE</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7vq8v499</link>
      <description>The Areeda-Turner rule in U.S. antitrust jurisprudence limits successful predatory pricing cases to circumstances where prices can be shown to have been set below marginal costs. While not cast so, the rule reflects the view that predatory pricing is rarely attempted; and even where attempted is rarely successful; and even where attempted and successful, is difficult to identify. In this paper, we examine the theoretical and empirical foundations of this rule, and conclude that it is time to demote the Areeda-Turner &lt;em&gt;analysis&lt;/em&gt; from the status of a rule to that of a potentially useful form of inquiry in predatory pricing litigation, but one which is neither necessary nor dispositive.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7vq8v499</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Comanor, William S</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Frech, Ted E</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Anatomy of a Slow-Motion Health Insurance Death Spiral</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0w64d54d</link>
      <description>Adverse selection death spirals in health insurance are dramatic, and so far, exotic economic events. The possibility of death spirals has garnered recent policy and popular attention because the pricing regulations in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 make health plans more vulnerable to them (though some other aspects of the ACA limit them). Most death spirals tracked in the literature have involved selection against a group health plan that was dropped quickly by the employer. In this paper, we empirically document a death spiral in individual health insurance that was apparently triggered by a block closure in 1981 and developed slowly because the insurer partially subsidized the block. Indeed, we show that premiums rose dramatically from around the time of the block closure to at least 2009 (the last year of available data). By 2009, some, but very few policyholders remained in the block and premiums were roughly seven times that of a yardstick we developed. The history of...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0w64d54d</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Frech, Ted E</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Smith, Michael P</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Test of Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4tm617f7</link>
      <description>Previous economic experiments on dual-process reasoning in altruistic decisions have yielded inconclusive results. However, these studies do not create a conflict between affective and cognitive motives, resulting in imperfect identification. We interact standard cognitive and affective manipulations in a giving task, and hypothesize that the affective manipulation has stronger effects when we simultaneously put the cognitive system under load. In line with earlier results, we find little evidence for dual-process reasoning in giving. Our independent treatment checks cast doubt on the effectiveness of standard treatment manipulations and show that both cognitive and affective manipulations consistently have opposite effects on the two sexes. We discuss the implications of our findings for economic experiments in this nascent research field.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4tm617f7</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>van der Weele, Joël</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Andrijevik, Ana</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Saving lives with stem cell transplants</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/57w7r9s8</link>
      <description>Saving lives with stem cell transplants</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/57w7r9s8</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 4 Feb 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sheehan-Connor, Damien</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney J</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Social comparisons in wage delegation: Experimental evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8j55h1xj</link>
      <description>Social comparisons in wage delegation: Experimental evidence</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8j55h1xj</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cobo-Reyes, Ramon</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lacomba, Juan A</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lagos, Francisco</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Perez, Jose M</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior andEquilibrium Selection</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m0584qv</link>
      <description>Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior andEquilibrium Selection</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m0584qv</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Feri, Francesco</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sutter, Matthias</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Social and Moral Norms in Allocation Choices in the Laboratory</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0t39x0pt</link>
      <description>Social and Moral Norms in Allocation Choices in the Laboratory</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0t39x0pt</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schram, Arthur</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Second-chance offers</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j75b943</link>
      <description>Second-chance offers</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j75b943</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 2 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney J.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Troger, Thomas</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE FAILURE OF UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY, FORWARD BIAS AND RELATED PUZZLES</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/50n5p8bv</link>
      <description>Three puzzles are closely related to the forward-bias puzzle and the failure of uncovered interest parity: (1) UIP failure is greater for short than long maturities, (2) forward bias is larger between developed than between developing countries and (3) there is no systematic forward bias in commodity markets. A convincing explanation for these puzzles should also explain two other 'facts': (a) the time dependency of the forward bias and failure of UIP and (b) that UIP holds better under a gold standard than under flexible rates. A combination of covered interest parity and monetary policy provides the best available explanation.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/50n5p8bv</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0bp6z29t</link>
      <description>Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, orstrategic ignorance, is an important source of corruption, anti-social behavior and even atrocities. We model an agent who cares about self-image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action.  The trade-off between self-image concerns and material payoffs can lead the agent to use ignorance as an excuse, even if it is deliberately chosen. Two experiments, modeled after Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007), show that a) many people will reveal relevant information about others' payoffs after making an ethical decision, but not before, and b)  some people are willing to pay for ignorance. These results corroborate the idea that Bayesian self-signaling drives people to avoid inconvenient facts in moral decisions.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0bp6z29t</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 3 Apr 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>van der Weele, Joël</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Individual Creativity, Ex-ante Goals and Financial Incentives</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mr6p1d5</link>
      <description>Creativity is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon that has hardly been considered byeconomists, despite a great deal of economic importance. This paper presents a series ofexperiments where subjects face creativity tasks where, in one case, ex-ante goals and constraintsare imposed on their answers, and in the other case no restrictions apply. The effects of financialincentives in stimulating creativity in both types of tasks is then tested, together with the impactof personal features like risk and ambiguity aversion. Our findings show that, in general,financial incentives affect “in-box” (constrained) creativity, but do not facilitate “blue sky”(unconstrained) creativity. However, in the latter case incentives do play a role for ambiguityaverseagents, who tend to be significantly less creative and seem to need extrinsic motivation toexert effort in a task whose odds of success they don’t know. We do find that measures ofcreative style, sensation-seeking preferences, and...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mr6p1d5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Mar 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Grieco, Daniela</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Dark Side of Competition for Status</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3858888w</link>
      <description>Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentallythe role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’sperformance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher whenindividuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback alsofavors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve theirrank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducingsabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, rankingincentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peersbut increases in-group rivalry.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3858888w</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Mar 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Masclet, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Villeval, Marie Claire</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Obtaining Critical Values for Test of Markov Regime Switching</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3685g3qr</link>
      <description>For Markov regime-switching models, testing for the possible presence ofmore than one regime requires the use of a non-standard test statistic. Carterand Steigerwald (forthcoming, Journal of Econometric Methods) derive in detailthe analytic steps needed to implement the test ofMarkov regime-switchingproposed by Cho and White (2007, Econometrica). We summarize the implementationsteps and address the computational issues that arise. A newcommand to compute regime-switching critical values, rscv, is introduced andpresented in the context of empirical research.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3685g3qr</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 2 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas G</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bostwick, Valerie K</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Letting Down the Team? Social Effects of Team Incentives</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93n646db</link>
      <description>This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two fieldexperiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated socialinteractions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. The teamcompensation system induced agents to choose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar ofcompensation for their teammate from two-thirds as much (in one study) to twice as much asthey valued a dollar of their own compensation (in the other study). We conclude that socialeffects of monetary team incentives exist and can induce effort at lower cost than through directindividual payment.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/93n646db</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Babcock, Philip</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bedard, Kelly</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hartman, John</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Royer, Heather</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nonexponential Discounting: A Direct Test And Perhaps A New Puzzle</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8pw4h6vk</link>
      <description>Standard models of intertemporal utility maximization assume that agents discount future utility flows at a constant rate—exponential discounting. Euler equations estimated over different time horizons should have equal discount rates but they do not. Rising term yield premia imply discount rates that rise with longer horizons since uncertainty is much too small to account for the difference in interest rates. Such deviations from exponential discounting are large enough to make a significant difference in consumption choices over long horizons. Our results can be viewed as providing estimates of horizon-specific discounts, or as a further puzzle concerning intertemporal substitution and uncertainty.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8pw4h6vk</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Startz, Richard</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Tsang, Kwok Ping</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Let’s talk: How communication affects contract design</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6z24s6rv</link>
      <description>We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency andeffectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers canadjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyertransfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent andlead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication,flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers andsellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communicationthan rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normalfeature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused byconflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6z24s6rv</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Brandts, Jordi</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Ellman, Matthew</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Social and Moral Norms in the Laboratory</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6rv7x0tf</link>
      <description>Social norms involve observation by others and external sanctions for violations,while moral norms involve introspection and internal sanctions. We develop a simple model ofindividual preferences that incorporates moral and social norms. We then examine dictatorchoices, where we create a shared understanding by providing advice from peers with nofinancial payoff at stake. We vary whether advice is given, as well as whether choices are madepublic. This design allows us to explicitly separate the effects of moral and social norms. Wefind that choices are in fact affected by a combination of observability and the sharedunderstanding.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6rv7x0tf</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schram, Arthur</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bayesian Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/69c4x8m9</link>
      <description>Use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors has become common in frequentist regressions. I offer here a Bayesian analog. The Bayesian version is derived by first focusing on the likelihood function for the sample values of the identifying moment conditions of least squares and then formulating a convenient prior for the variances of the error terms. The first step introduces a sandwich estimator into the posterior calculations, while the second step allows the investigator to set the sandwich for either heteroskedastic or homoskedastic error variances. If desired, the Bayesian estimator can be made to look very similar to the usual heteroskedasticity-robust frequentist estimator. Bayesian estimation is easily accomplished by a standard MCMC procedure.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/69c4x8m9</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Startz, Richard</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Comprehension and Risk Elicitation in the Field: Evidence from Rural Senegal</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5512d150</link>
      <description>In the past decade, it has become increasingly common to use simple laboratorygames and decision tasks as a device for measuring both the preferences and understanding ofrural populations in the developing world. In this paper, we report the results observed with threedistinct risk elicitation mechanisms, using samples drawn from the rural population in Senegal,West Africa. We test the understanding of and the level of meaningful responses to the typicalHolt-Laury task, to an adaptation of a simple binary mechanism pioneered by Gneezy andPotters in 1997, and to a non-incentivized willingness-to-risk scale. We find a low level ofunderstanding with the Holt-Laury task and an unlikely-to-be-accurate pattern with thewillingness-to-risk question. Our analysis indicates that the simple binary mechanism hassubstantially more predictive power than does the Holt-Laury mechanism. Our study is acautionary note regarding utilizing either relatively sophisticated risk-elicitation mechanisms...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5512d150</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Viceisza, Angelino</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Continuous Time and Communication in a Public-goods Experiment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5404914p</link>
      <description>We investigate the nature of continuous-time strategic interactions in public-goodsgames. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous timewhile in another they make them only at discrete points of time. The effect of continuous timeis muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas; the data suggest thatwidespread coordination problems are to blame. With a rich communication protocol, thesecoordination problems disappear and the median subject contributes fully to the public good,with no time decay. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half aseffective in discrete time.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5404914p</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Oprea, Ryan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Friedman, Dan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/51v6w9hd</link>
      <description>We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental network games. We varytwo important factors: (a) actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and(b) subjects have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a randomnetwork. Play conforms strongly to the theoretical predictions, providing an impressivebehavioral confirmation of the Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010)model. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, even with incomplete information. We findthat under complete information, subjects typically play the stochastically-stable (inefficient)equilibrium when the game involves strategic substitutes, but play the efficient one with strategiccomplements. Our results suggest that equilibrium multiplicity may not be a major concern.Subjects’ actions and realized outcomes under incomplete information depend strongly on boththe degree and the connectivity. When there are multiple equilibria, subjects...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/51v6w9hd</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Feri, Francesco</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Sutter, Matthias</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bayesian IV: the normal case with multiple endogenous variables</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/40v0x246</link>
      <description>We set out a Gibbs sampler for the linear instrumental-variable model withnormal errors and normal priors, and we show how to compute the marginallikelihood.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/40v0x246</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cogley, Timothy</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Startz, Richard</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Efficiency, Team building, and Spillover in a Public-goods Game</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2np178xh</link>
      <description>The notions of one’s social identity, group membership, and homophily have recentlybecome topics for economic theory and experiments. Yet, since people are members of manygroups (e.g., race, gender, handedness) what determines which identity or identities are the mostsalient in different environments? Further, how do these factors trade off against one’s financialinterest? We conduct public-goods experiments in which we permit endogenous group-formationand vary whether there is a team-building exercise and whether some people receive anendowment twice as much as others receive. We do see evidence that team identity affectsendogenous networks when there is only one endowment type; however, when both identities arepresent, high-endowment participants are strongly attracted to linking up with each other. Oneinteresting result is that the team-building exercise greatly increases the level of contributionwithout respect to whether one is linked to people from one’s team-building exercise.Apparently...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2np178xh</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Dark Side of Competition for Status</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vr4g446</link>
      <description>Unethical behavior within companies is not rare. We investigate experimentally therole of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’sperformance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher whenindividuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback alsofavors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve theirrank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducingsabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, rankingincentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peersbut increases in-group rivalry.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vr4g446</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Masclet, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Villeval, Marie Claire</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Robust Estimation of ARMA Models with Near Root Cancellation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cw056qz</link>
      <description>Standard estimation of ARMA models in which the AR and MA roots nearly cancel, so that individual coefficients are only weakly identified, often produces inferential ranges for individual coefficients that give a spurious appearance of accuracy. We remedy this problem with a model that mixes inferential ranges from the estimated model with those of a more parsimonious model. The mixing probability is derived using Bayesian methods, but we show that the method works well in both Bayesian and frequentist setups. In particular, we show that our mixture procedure weights standard results heavily when given data from a well-identified ARMA model (which does not exhibit near root cancellation) and weights heavily an uninformative inferential region when given data from a weakly-identified ARMA model (with near root cancellation). When our procedure is applied to a well-identified process the investigator gets the “usual results,” so there is no important statistical cost to using our...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cw056qz</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cogley, Timothy</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Startz, Richard</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Revisiting wage, earnings, and hours profiles</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/61f2f1hv</link>
      <description>We document empirical life cycle profiles of wages, earnings, and hours of work for pay from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, following the same workers for up to four decades along the intensive margin of labor supply. For six of the eight cohorts we analyze the wage profile does not decline with age, while the earnings profile always does. The discrepancy is explained by a sharp drop of the hours profile beginning shortly after age 50, when many workers start a smooth transition into retirement by working progressively fewer hours. This pattern is not an artifact of staggered abrupt retirement, and is robust to attrition- and selection correction (i.e., to taking into account that the composition of our sample, for a given cohort, changes over time). We explore the nontrivial restrictions on dynamic models of the aggregate economy that this evidence suggests, and we provide numerical profiles that can be readily used in quantitative macroeconomic analysis.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/61f2f1hv</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Aug 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Rupert, Peter</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zanella, Giulio</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Fragility of Overshooting</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4rd5j98c</link>
      <description>Using VAR, a large literature claims to find evidence of some form of Dornbuschovershooting. But the evidence is fragile in the sense of Leamer. The literature uses the wrong test for overshooting, unusually narrow confidence intervals and questionable shocks. In addition, it is difficult to reconcile overshooting with the fact that daily and weekly exchangerates are approximately martingales.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4rd5j98c</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Jun 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What Covered Interest Parity Implies about the Theory of Uncovered Interest Parity.</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0zk6t2hj</link>
      <description>The literature assumes that the theory of uncovered interest parity fails because investing without cover is risky and investors are risk adverse. But covered interest parity implies that the theory can fail even when investors are risk neutral and hold when investors are risk adverse and there is a risk premium. The failure to fully appreciate the relation between uncovered interest parity and risk premiums has probably contributed to our failure to understand why UIP fails empirically.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0zk6t2hj</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Jun 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Control Premium:  A Preference for Payoff Autonomy</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5bg845s1</link>
      <description>We document a lower bound for thecontrol premium: agents' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Participants choose between an asset that will pay only if they later answer a particular quiz question correctly and one that pays only if their partner answers a different question correctly.  However, they first estimate the likelihood that each asset will pay off.  Participants are 20% more likely to choose to control their payoff than a group of payoff-maximizers with accurate beliefs.  While some of this deviation is explained by overconfidence, 34% of it can only be explained by the control premium.  The average participant expresses a control premium equivalent to 8% to 15% of the expected asset-earnings.  Our results show that even agents with accurate beliefs may incur costs to avoid delegating and suggest that to correctly infer beliefs from choices, one should account for the control premium.</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5bg845s1</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 4 Apr 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Owens, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Fackler, Ryan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The contagious capacity of the international banking network: 1985-2009</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0r89f16p</link>
      <description>Systemic risk among the network of international banking groups arises when financial stress threatens to crisscross many national boundaries and expose imperfect international coordination. To assess this risk, we use Rosvall and Bergstrom’s (PNAS, 2008, 1118-1123) information theoretic map equation to partition banking groups from 21 countries into modules. We consider a quarter of a century of data on the cross-border interbank market. We show that in the late 1980s four important financial centres formed one large super cluster that was highly contagious in terms of transmission of stress within its ranks, but less contagious on a global scale. But the expansion leading to the 2008 crisis left more transmitting hubs sharing the same total influence as a few large modules had previously. We show that this greater entanglement meant the network was more broadly contagious, and not that risk was more shared. Thus, our analysis contributes to our understanding as to why defaults...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0r89f16p</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Dec 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Mahadeva, Lavan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Svirydzenka, Katsiaryna</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7p07k0zr</link>
      <description>Fake antivirus (AV) programs have been utilized to defraud millions ofcomputer users into paying as much as one hundred dollars for a phony softwarelicense. As a result, fake AV software has evolved into one of the most lucrativecriminal operations on the Internet. In this paper, we examine the operations of threelarge-scale fake AV businesses, lasting from three months to more than two years.More precisely, we present the results of our analysis on a trove of data obtainedfrom several backend servers that the cybercriminals used to drive their scam operations.Our investigations reveal that these three fake AV businesses had earned acombined revenue of more than $130 million dollars. A particular focus of our analysisis on the financial and economic aspects of the scam, which involves legitimatecredit card networks as well as more dubious payment processors. In particular, wepresent an economic model that demonstrates that fake AV companies are activelymonitoring the refunds (chargebacks)...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7p07k0zr</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Vigna, Giovanni</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Kruegel, Christopher</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Kemmerer, Richard</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Abman, Ryan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Stone-Gross, Brett</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Markov Regime-Switching Tests: Asymptotic Critical Values</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5rn986z6</link>
      <description>Markov Regime-Switching Tests: Asymptotic Critical Values</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5rn986z6</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Carter, Andrew</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Delegating to a Powerless Intermediary:  Does It Reduce Punishment?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0119d201</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Beyond the classical reasons of efficiency, commitment, the distribution of information, or incentive provision, a person may also delegate decision rights so as to avoid blame for an unpopular or immoral decision.  We show that by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift moral responsibility onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome.  Dictators who choose selfishly via an intermediary are punished less and earn greater profits than those who directly choose a selfish outcome, while the intermediary is punished more.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0119d201</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Sep 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Oexl, Regine</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Global Warming and the Population Externality</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/82z9c3p6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We calculate the harm a birth imposes on others when greenhouse gas emissions are a problem and a cap limits emissions damage. This negative population externality, which equals the corrective Pigovian tax on having a child, is substantial in calibrations. In our base case, the Pigovian tax is 21 percent of a parent's lifetime income in steady state and 5 percent of lifetime income immediately after imposition of a cap, per child. The optimal population in steady state, which maximizes utility taking account of the externality, is about one quarter of the population households would choose voluntarily&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/82z9c3p6</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 May 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Stuart, Charles</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bohn, Henning</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Unlucky Feeling: Persistent Overestimation of Absolute Performance with Noisy Feedback</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dh5s03j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;How does overconfidence arise and persist in the face of experience and feedback?  We examine experimentally how individuals' beliefs about their absolute, as opposed to relative, performance on a quiz react to noisy, but unbiased, feedback.  Participants believe themselves to have received `unlucky' feedback and they overestimate their own scores, but they exhibit no overconfidence in non-ego-relevant beliefs---in this case, about others' scores.  Unlike previous studies of relative performance estimates, we find this to be driven by overconfident priors, as opposed to biased updating, which suggests that social comparisons contribute to biased information processing.  While feedback improves performance estimates, this learning does not translate into improved estimates of subsequent performances.  This suggests that people use performance feedback to update their beliefs about their ability differently than they do to update their beliefs about their performance, contributing...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dh5s03j</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Owens, David</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE FORWARD-BIAS PUZZLE</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5gq9z4j0</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A complete solution to the forward-bias puzzle should provide an econometric solution and an economic explanation for that solution. A complete solution should also explain the closely related failure of uncovered interest parity. In addition it should explain some related anomalies. One such anomaly is that variances for changes in exchange rates are over 100 times larger than variances for interest rate differentials and forward premiums. My econometric solution is that the relevant test equations omit two variables that covered interest parity implies should be included. For my data, the missing variables explain the failure of uncovered interest parity and the forward-bias puzzle. The missing variables also explain why the variance for changes in exchange rates is over 100 times larger than the variance for both interest rate differentials and forward premiums. My economic explanation is that, in general, forward rates do not equal expected future spot rates.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5gq9z4j0</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Testing for Regime Switching: A Comment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5079q9dc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In Cho and White (2007) "Testing for Regime Switching" the authors obtain the asymptotic null distribution of a quasi-likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic.  The statistic is designed to test the null hypothesis of one regime against the alternative of Markov switching between two regimes.  Likelihood ratio statistics are used because the test involves nuisance parameters that are not identified under the null hypothesis, together with other nonstandard features.  Cho and White focus on a quasi-likelihood, which ignores certain serial correlation properties but allows for a tractable factorization of the likelihood.  While the majority of their paper focuses on asymptotic behavior under the null hypothesis, Theorem 1(b) states that the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) is consistent under the alternative hypothesis.  Consistency of the QMLE requires that the expected quasi-log-likelihood attain a global maximum at the population parameter values.  This requirement holds...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5079q9dc</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Carter, Andrew V</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas G</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Unlucky Feeling:  Overconfidence and Noisy Feedback</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13r2f3gt</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;How does overconfidence arise and how does it persist in the face of experience and feedback? In an experimental setting, we examine how individuals’ beliefs about their own performance on a quiz react to noisy, but unbiased feedback. In a control treatment, each participant expresses her beliefs about another participant’s performance, rather than her own. On average, they express accurate posteriors about others’ scores, but they overestimate their own score, believing themselves to have received ‘unlucky’ feedback. However, this driven by overconfident priors, as opposed to biased information processing. We also find that, while feedback improves estimates about the performance on which it is based, this learning does not translate into improved estimates of related performances. This suggests that people use performance feedback to update their beliefs about their ability differently than they do to update their beliefs about their performance, which may contribute to the...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13r2f3gt</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Owens, David</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7320x2cp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I investigate the relative importance of social-signaling versus self-signaling in driving giving.  I derive specific qualitative predictions about how the response of an image-motivated dictator to a change in the probability that her choice will be implemented depends crucially on the information available to the relevant observer.  A probabilistic dictator-game experiment tests the joint, relative, and independent effects of self-signaling and social-signaling.  The results provide little evidence of self-signaling, but stronger evidence of social-signaling, particularly in a large subsample that excludes likely `selfish types'.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7320x2cp</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 4 Nov 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Economic Consequences of Rising U.S. Government Debt: Privileges at Risk</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7kz6v3zs</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The rapidly growing federal government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. Yet the U.S. government has seemingly unbounded access to credit at low interest rates. Historically, Treasury yields have been below the growth rate of the economy. The paper examines the ramifications of debt financing at low interest rates. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt – over $2.5 trillion maturing in 2010 – investor expectations are critical. Excessive debts justify reasonable doubts about solvency and monetary stability and thus undermine a financing strategy built on the perception that U.S. debt is safe.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7kz6v3zs</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bohn, Henning</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Should Public Retirement Plans be Fully Funded?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1cw6c8qg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most state and local retirement plans strive for full funding, at least by actuarial standards. Funding measured at market values fluctuates and often falls short. A common argument for full funding is that pensions are a form of deferred compensation that does not justify a debt. The paper examines public finance, political economy, and financial market issues that bear on optimal funding, broadly and in a series of models.  In a model where most taxpayers hold debt and face intermediation costs, returns on pension assets are less than taxpayers’ cost of borrowing. Pension funding is costly and hence zero funding is optimal. The model also implies that unfunded pension promises are properly discounted at a rate strictly greater than the government’s borrowing rate. If pension funds serve as collateral, funding can be warranted despite the cost. This is shown in a model with legal ambiguity and default risk. Except in special cases, the optimal funding ratio is less than full...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1cw6c8qg</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bohn, Henning</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/60b93868</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;How robust are social preferences to variations in the environment in which a decision is made?  By varying the elicitation method and default choice in the `moral wiggle-room' game of Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007), I examine the robustness and nature of the pattern of information avoidance in which many dictators in experiments-- if initially uncertain-- avoid learning whether their choice will help or hurt another person and choose selfishly.  When ignorance is not the default choice, participants choose it much less frequently.  However, when dictators express their outcome choice using the strategy method, most are willing to overcome the default choice and reveal the payoff state ex post.  I conclude that people will employ strategic ignorance to avoid a morally-fraught decision if they can do so passively, but having to actively choose ignorance betrays its usefulness and leads to behavior largely consistent with models of preferences over outcomes.  Thus while opportunities...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/60b93868</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Second-Best Mechanism for Land Assembly</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1dn8g6vk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Land can be inefficiently allocated when attempts to assemble separately-owned pieces of land into large parcels are frustrated by holdout landowners.  The existing land-assembly institution of eminent domain can be used neither to gauge efficiency nor to determine how to compensate displaced owners adequately.  We take a mechanism-design approach to the assembly problem, formalizing it as a multilateral trade environment with perfectly complementary goods.  We characterize the least-inefficient direct mechanism that is incentive compatible, self-financing, protects the property-rights of participants, and does not assume that participants have useful information about the subjective valuations of others.  The second-best mechanism, which we call the Strong Pareto (SP) mechanism, utilizes a second-price auction among interested buyers, with a reserve sufficient to compensate fully all potential sellers, who are paid according to fixed and exhaustive shares of the winning buyer's...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1dn8g6vk</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grossman, Zachary</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Pincus, Jonathan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Shapiro, Perry</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Falling Time Cost of College: Evidence from Half a Century of Time Use Data</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rc9d7vz</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Using multiple datasets from different time periods, we document declines in academic time investment by full-time college students in the United States between 1961 and 2003. Full-time students allocated 40 hours per week toward class and studying in 1961, whereas by 2003 they were investing about 27 hours per week. Declines were extremely broad-based, and are not easily accounted for by framing effects, work or major choices, or compositional changes in students or schools. We conclude that there have been substantial changes over time in the quantity or manner of human capital production on college campuses.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rc9d7vz</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Babcock, Phillip</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Marks, Mindy</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From Ties to Gains? Evidence on Connectedness and Human Capital Acquisition</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fw1m0x0</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper uses micro-level data on social networks in middle and secondary schools to estimate effects of connectedness on education attainment outcomes. The analysis addresses concerns about unobserved neighborhood and school-level heterogeneity by using within-school variation between grade cohorts to identify effects of connectedness. Main findings include that being part of a more connected cohort within a given secondary or middle school is associated with significantly higher years of schooling attained and higher probability of having attended college, 7 years later.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fw1m0x0</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Babcock, Phillip</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Real Costs of Nominal Grade Inflation? New Evidence from Student Course Evaluations</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4823c3jx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;College GPAs in the United States rose substantially between the 1960’s and the 2000’s. Over the same period, study time declined by almost a half. This paper uses a 12-quarter panel of course evaluations from the University of California, San Diego to discern whether a link between grades and effort investment holds up in a micro setting. Results indicate that average study time would be about 50% lower in a class in which the average expected grade was an “A” than in the same course taught by the same instructor in which students expected a “C.” Simultaneity suggests estimates are biased toward zero. Findings do not appear to be driven primarily by the individual student’s expected grade, but by the average expected grade of others in the class. Class-specific characteristics that generate low expected grades appear to produce higher effort choices—evidence that nominal changes in grades may lead to real changes in effort investment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4823c3jx</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Babcock, Phillip</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LEISURE COLLEGE, USA</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zd0q0vn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1961, the average full-time student at a 4-year college in the U.S. studied about 24 hours per week, while his modern counterpart puts in only 14 hours a week. Students now study less than half as much as universities claim to require. This dramatic decline in study times occurred for students from all demographic subgroups, overall and within every major, for students who worked and those who did not, and at 4-year colleges of every type, degree structure and level of selectivity. Most of the decline predates the innovations in technology that would be most relevant to education production, and thus was not driven by such changes. The most plausible explanation for these findings, we conclude, is that standards have fallen at post-secondary institutions in the United States.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zd0q0vn</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Babcock, Phillip</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Marks, Mindy</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ideal Bootstrapping and Exact Recombination: Applications to Auction Experiments</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4xb7454q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We provide simple formulas that can be used to calculate ideal bootstrap or exact recombination estimates of group statistics from experimental data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4xb7454q</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 May 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Carl T.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Bergstrom, Ted C</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rod</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Solution to the Forward-Bias and Related Puzzles</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6br3599r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The forward-bias puzzle is probably the most important puzzle in international finance.   But there is a simple solution.  Covered interest parity implies that the forward-bias puzzle is the result of two omitted variables: (1) the future change in the forward exchange rate and (2) the future interest rate differential.  As Table 3 shows, at least for my data, the downward bias produced by those two omitted variables completely explains the forward-bias puzzle.  Covered interest parity also solves three related puzzles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6br3599r</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John E</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8hq7j89k</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every abstract type of a belief-closed type space corresponds to an infinite belief hierarchy. But only finite order of beliefs is necessary for most applications. As we demonstrate, many important insights from recent development in the theory of Bayesian games with higher-order uncertainty involve belief hierarchies of order 2.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We start with characterizing order 2 "consistent priors" and show that they form a convex set and contain the convex hull of both the naïve and complete-information type spaces. We establish conditions for private-value heterogeneous naïve priors to be embedded in order-2 consistent priors, so as to retro-fit the Harsanyi doctrine of having nature generate all fundamental uncertainties in a game at the very beginning.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We then extend the notion of consistent priors to arbitrary finite order k. We define an abstract belief-closed space to be of order k if it can be mapped via a type morphism into the "canonical representation" of an order-k...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8hq7j89k</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 6 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Qin, Cheng-Zhong</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Yang, Chun-Lei</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dornbusch Was Wrong: There is no Convincing Evidence of Overshooting, Delayed or Otherwise</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/78k0b5zw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Several articles claim that Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) shows that nominal exchange rates experience a delayed version of Dornbusch overshooting.  These same articles usually claim that impulse responses similar to those in Eichenbaum and Evans are evidence of such overshooting.  But Eichenbaum and Evans never claim that their evidence implies overshooting, delayed or otherwise.  More importantly, impulse response functions like those in Eichenbaum and Evans do not support overshooting.  Three recent articles repeat this misinterpretation of the evidence.  My objective is to use those articles to illustrate how the evidence about overshooting is widely misinterpreted.  What is interpreted as supporting overshooting is at least as consistent with an efficient market as it is with overshooting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/78k0b5zw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 6 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On Pairwise Stability and Anti-Competitiveness of Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08m3q5dw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings. A notion of pairwise stability is applied to analyze firms' incentives for cross-holdings. Under certain conditions and Cournot competition on the output market, it is shown that monopoly is the only outcome of pairwise stable cross-holdings when there are two firms; a wide range of outcomes is possible when there are three firms, including as special cases the triopoly and the duopoly Cournot equilibria without any cross-holding; and the Cournot equilibrium is an outcome of pairwise stable cross-holdings when there are four or more firms. Competitive implications of the results are also briefly discussed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08m3q5dw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 6 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Qin, Cheng-Zhong</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Shengping, zsp@gsm.pku.edu.cn</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Zhu, Dandan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Forward-Bias Puzzle: A Solution Based on Covered Interest Parity</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4dd1075r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When covered interest parity holds, as appears to be the case, the forward exchange rate is not the expected future spot rate. As a result: (1) in general covered and uncovered interest parity are mutually inconsistent; (2) the standard equation that produces the forward-bias puzzle is miss-specified. When covered interest parity is used to correct that miss-specification, the puzzle disappears. Forward premiums are unbiased estimates of future changes in exchange rates. This solution for the forward-bias puzzle holds whether or not there is a risk premium. It also solves two subsidiary puzzles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4dd1075r</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Commuting, Wages and Bargaining Power</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1wf7x3rg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A search model of the labor market is augmented to include commuting time to work.  The theory posits that wages are positively related to commute distance, by a factor itself depending negatively on the bargaining power of workers.  Since not all combinations of distance and wages are accepted, there is non-random selection of accepted job offers.  We build on these ingredients to explore in the data the relationship between wages and commute time.  We find that neglecting to account for this selection will bias downward the wage impact of commuting, and marginally affect the coefficients on education, age and gender.  The correlation between the residuals of the selectivity equation and the distance equation is -0.70, showing the large impact of commute time on job acceptance decisions.  We also use the theory to calculate the bargaining power of workers which largely varies depending on demographic groups: it appears to be much larger for men than that for women and that...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1wf7x3rg</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Rupert, Peter</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Stancanelli, Elena G F</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Wasmer, Etienne</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Housing and the Labor Market: Time to Move and Aggregate Unemployment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1bv529kn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Mortensen-Pissarides model with unemployment benefits and taxes has been able to account for the variation in unemployment rates across countries but does not explain why geographical mobility is very low in some countries (on average, three times lower in Europe than in the U.S.).  We build a model in which both unemployment and mobility rates are endogenous.  Our findings indicate that an increase in unemployment benefits and in taxes does not generate a strong decline in mobility and accounts for only half to two-thirds of the difference in unemployment from the U.S. to Europe.  We find that with higher commuting costs the effect of housing frictions plays a large role and can generate a substantial decline in mobility.  We show that such frictions can account for the differences in unemployment and mobility between the U.S. and Europe.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1bv529kn</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Dec 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Rupert, Peter</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Wasmer, Etienne</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Note on the Consumption Function</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/86d7g7p0</link>
      <description>A Note on the Consumption Function</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/86d7g7p0</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas G</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Private Information and High-Frequency Stochastic Volatility</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/00n4h4mw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We study the e®ect of privately informed traders on measured high frequency price changes and trades in asset markets.  We use a standard market microstructure framework where exogenous news is captured by signals that informed agents receive.  We show that the entry and exit of informed traders following the arrival of news accounts for high-frequency serial correlation in squared price changes (stochastic volatility) and grades.  Because the bid-ask spread of the market specialist tends to shrink as individuals trade and reveal their information, the model also accounts for the empirical observation that high-frequency serial correlation is more pronounced in trades than in squared price changes.  A calibration test of the model shows that the features of the market microstructure, without serially correlated news, accounts qualitatively for the serial correlation in the data, but predicts less persistence than is present in the data.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/00n4h4mw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kelly, David L.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas G</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Noise Reduced Realized Volatility: A Kalman Filter Approach</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4n80536m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Microstructure noise contaminates high-frequency estimates of asset price volatility. Recent work has determined a preferred sampling frequency under the assumption that the properties of noise are constant. Given the sampling frequency, the high-frequency observations are given equal weight. While convenient, constant weights are not necessarily efficient. We use the Kalman filter to derive more efficient weights, for any given sampling frequency. We demonstrate the efficacy of the procedure through an extensive simulation exercise, showing that our filter compares favorably to more traditional methods.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4n80536m</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 8 Jun 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Owens, John</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Steigerwald, Douglas G</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Forward-Bias Puzzle: A Solution Based on Covered Interest Parity</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05d0t24b</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The forward-bias puzzle is probably the most important puzzle in international macroeconomics.  After more than 20 years, there is no accepted solution.  My solution is based on covered interest parity (CIP).  CIP implies: (1) Forward rates are not rational expectations of future spot rates.  Those expectations depend on future spot rates and interest rate differentials.  (2) The forward bias is the result of a specification error, replacing future forward exchange rates with current forward exchange rates.  That misspecification is the direct result of (1).  Implication (1) has the further implication that, in general, covered and uncovered interest parity are inconsistent.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05d0t24b</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Pippenger, John E</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The State Street Mile: Age and Gender Differences in Competition-Aversion in the Field</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m74v818</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gender differences in “competitiveness,” previously documented in laboratory experiments, are hypothesized to play a role in a wide array of economic outcomes. The current paper provides evidence of competition-aversion in a natural setting somewhere between the simplicity of a laboratory experiment and the full complexity and ambiguity of a labor market. The “State Street Mile” race offers both male and female participants a choice between two different levels of competition. Large, systematic age and gender differences are observed in the relationship between true ability and the decision to enter the more competitive race. Overall, qualified women and older runners are far less likely than qualified young men to enter a competitive race with cash prizes. However, the fastest young women unanimously enter the competitive race. Therefore, while we confirm age and gender differences in competitiveness in our field setting, the economic consequences to capable young women are...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6m74v818</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rodney</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Weinberger, Catherine</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Johnson, Nicholas</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The State Street Mile: Age and Gender Differences in Competition-Aversion in the Field</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68b2q5p4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gender differences in "competitiveness," previously documented in laboratory experiments, are hypothesized to play a role  in a wide array of economic outcomes. The current paper provides evidence of competition-aversion in a natural setting somewhere between the simplicity of a laboratory experiment and the full complexity and ambiguity of a labor market. The "State Street Mile" race offers both male and female participants a choice between two different levels of competition. Large, systematic age and gender differences are observed in the relationship between true ability and the decision to enter the more competitive race. Overall, qualified women and older runners are far less likely than qualified young men to enter a competitive race with cash prizes. However, the fastest young women unanimously enter the competitive race. Therefore, while we confirm age and gender differences in competitiveness in our field setting, the economic consequences to capable young women are...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68b2q5p4</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Garratt, Rod</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Weinberger, Catherine J</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Johnson, Nicholas</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The economics of mutualisms: optimal utiliztion of mycorrhizal mutualistic partners by plants</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14b5d950</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Abstract. Can choice of mutualistic partners and the degree of their utilization determine (1) mutualistic partner coexistence, (2) relative abundance of mutualistic partners, and (3) environment-dependent changes in relative abundance? We investigate these questions in the context of the plant–mycorrhizal fungal mutualism by building a biological market model potentially applicable to other mutualisms as well. We examine the situation where a single plant selectively utilizes member(s) of a group of ectomycorrhizal potential trading partners. Under biologically realistic circumstances, the plant may simultaneously utilize multiple partners, its degree of utilization determining the community structure of the fungi. If utilization of multiple partners is optimal, the marginal cost of acquiring additional nitrogen from every trading partner must be equal while the marginal cost of acquiring it from any unutilized partner must be larger. Because the plant’s nitrogen demand is...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14b5d950</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Salant, Stephen W.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WHEN IS EMPLOYEE RETALIATION ACCEPTABLE AT WORK? EVIDENCE FROM QUASI-EXPERIMENTS</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7c02b3mv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When is employee retaliation acceptable in the workplace? We  use a quasi-experimental design to study the acceptability of several forms of retaliatory behavior at work, gathering data in this untested area. Consistent with hypotheses from theories of fairness, we find that employee retaliation in the workplace is perceived to be more acceptable if it is an act of omission instead of an act of commission. We do not find that a more damaging retaliatory act is significantly less acceptable than a less damaging one, suggesting a qualitative rather than a quantitative relationship. We also found individual differences:  Respondents who are older, female, politically conservative, and  managers typically show less tolerance for retaliation, while union members are a bit more accepting than average.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7c02b3mv</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Levine, David I. I.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Broken Promises: An Experiment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6836m74q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We test whether promises per se are effective in enhancing cooperative behavior in a form of trust game. In a new treatment, rather than permitting free-form messages, we instead allow only a bare promise-only message to be sent (or not). We find that bare promises are much less effective in achieving good social outcomes than free-form messages; in fact, bare promise-only messages lead to behavior that is much the same as when no messages are feasible. Our design also permits us to test the predictions of guilt aversion against the predictions of lying aversion. Our experimental results provide evidence that mainly supports the guilt-aversion predictions, but we also find some support for the presence of lying aversion.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6836m74q</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Dufwenberg, Martin</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4kx7d5pv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze  whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our 'hot' treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our 'cold' treatment we follow the 'strategy method' and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a  response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4kx7d5pv</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Brandts, Jordi</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/428481s8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Are men more willing to take financial risks than women? The answer to this question has immediate relevance for many economic issues. We propose a novel approach in which we assemble the data from 10 sets of experiments with one simple underlying investment game. Most of these experiments were not designed to investigate gender differences and were conducted by different researchers in different countries, with different instructions, durations, payments, subject pools, etc. The fact that all data come from the same basic investment game allows us to test the robustness of the findings. We find a very consistent result that women invest less, and thus appear to be more financially risk averse than men.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/428481s8</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gneezy, Uri</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Incentives to Exercise</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3tc3j5x7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Can incentives be effective when trying to encourage the development of good habits? We investigate the effect of paying people a non-trivial amount of money to attend an exercise facility a number of times during a one-month period. In two separate studies, we find that doing so leads to a large and significant increase in the average post-intervention attendance level relative to the control group. This result is entirely driven by the impact on people who did not previously attend the gym on a regular basis, as the average attendance rates for people who had already been using the gym regularly are either unchanged or diminished. In our second study, we also obtain biometric evidence that this intervention improves important health indicators such as weight, waist size, and pulse rate. Thus, even though personal incentives to exercise are already in place, it appears that providing financial incentive to attend the gym regularly for a month serves as a catalyst to get some...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3tc3j5x7</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gneezy, Uri</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COMPETITION, HIDDEN INFORMATION, AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENT</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3kp5v19m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how these different degrees of competition affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies remain. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3kp5v19m</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cabrales, Antonio</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OPTIMAL CONTRACTS WITH TEAM PRODUCTION AND HIDDEN INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3bb3p3t3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social forces in mechanism design and contract theory. We devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in a hidden information context. A principal offers one of three possible contract menus to a team of two agents of unknown types. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable menus is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. The consensus menu differs across treatments that vary the payoffs resulting from a rejection. We find that an agent is more likely to reject a contract menu if her teammate rejected a contract menu in the previous period, suggesting that agents may be learning social norms; in addition, low-ability agents have a particularly adverse reaction to reduced...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3bb3p3t3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cabrales, Antonio</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2dn4t727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Kahneman and Tversky (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that reported by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises from two to three. These findings cast serious doubts about the importance and robustness of such violations for the understanding of real-life economic decisions.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2dn4t727</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Levin, Dan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Karni, Edi</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision: Exclusion, Exit, Mergers, and Redemption</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0hx472pn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously, through the use of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where there are economies of scale: in two treatments the social value of an incremental contribution to the group account increases with the size of the group, but in the second treatment, the social value is capped once a certain group size is reached. Societies of nine people are initially formed randomly into three groups of three people who play the game for three periods. Individuals then learn about the average contribution of each individual (by ID number) in one’s current own group, as well as the average contribution in other groups, and can decide whether to exit the group. Remaining group members choose whether to exclude any current members from the group; the new groups and ‘free agents’ then choose whether to merge with other existing groups and/or other free agents. We find a great degree of success for this mechanism. The average...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0hx472pn</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 9 Feb 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Yang, Chun-Lei</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BARGAINING EFFICIENCY AND SCREENING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/86r0x2tf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper investigates whether information about generosity  or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial for  these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/86r0x2tf</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFORT IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKET</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7x98w91h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchange experiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity (higher effort) when wages are determined by a random process than when assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slight shift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can change behavior. Responsibility-alleviation can be a factor in economic environments featuring substantial personal interaction.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7x98w91h</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>REPUTATION AND HONESTY IN A MARKET FOR INFORMATION</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fh8v64g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tend to focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fh8v64g</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Garoupa, Nuno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WHEN ARE LAYOFFS ACCEPTABLE? EVIDENCE FROM A QUASI-EXPERIMENT</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vs7h4hh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor  markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract,  characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We performed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. and Canada feel that layoffs are fair. Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companies should not punish employees for their efforts),  rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also  considered a justification for layoffs. Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly....</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4vs7h4hh</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Levine, David I. I.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SELF-SERVING BIASES: EVIDENCE FROM A SIMULATED LABOUR RELATIONSHIP</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vs8w2k7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A self-serving bias occurs when people subconsciously alter their perceptions about what is fair or right in a manner that serves their own interests. Perceptions of what is “a fair day’s work for a fair wage” may well vary according to one’s role in the employment relationship. While it is clear that employee satisfaction affects job performance, and that wage affects employee satisfaction, it is not only the wage per se that determines morale, but also the perceived fairness of the received wage. Thus, it is useful to have agreement between the views of employers and employees. Some evidence from a laboratory experiment indicates these views differ significantly between participant “employers” and participant “employees.” We compare choices (hypothetical in the case of employers) for the amount of costly “effort” to provide in response to a wage that has been determined outside the employment relationship. In the field, managers must be aware of the relationship between fairness...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vs8w2k7</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Haruvy, Ernan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATIONS AND CREDIBILITY: A TEST OF AUMANN'S CONJECTURE</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/01j786tj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving  efficient outcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments, cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumann conjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal for efficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an agreement to play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what the players will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as an illustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin (1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk will nonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-way communication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then an action, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for the potentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficient play. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency were unsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/01j786tj</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Charness, Gary B</name>
      </author>
    </item>
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