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    <title>Recent blewp items</title>
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    <description>Recent eScholarship items from Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series</description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 03:10:25 +0000</pubDate>
    <item>
      <title>From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6p72d6zz</link>
      <description>From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6p72d6zz</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gadinis, Stavros</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Doctor Frankenstein's International Organization</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9tb831rs</link>
      <description>Doctor Frankenstein's International Organization</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9tb831rs</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Case Against Consent in International Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11p1v5fw</link>
      <description>The Case Against Consent in International Law</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11p1v5fw</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Understanding the Democratic Transition in South Africa</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mp5t4ff</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy stands as one of the past century’s&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;most important political events. The transition has been successful to this point because the&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;new constitution adopted a form of federal governance that has been able to provide&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;protection for the economic elite from maximal redistributive taxation. Appropriately&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;structured, federal governance creates a “hostage game” in which the majority central&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;government controls the tax rate but elite run province(s) control the provision of important&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;redistributive services to a significant fraction of lower income households. At least to&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;today, the political economy of South Africa has found a stable equilibrium with less than&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;maximal redistributive taxation. Moreover, the move to a democratic federalist system has&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;improved the economic welfare of both the white minority and the black majority. Whether&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;the federal structure can continue...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mp5t4ff</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jan 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Inman, Robert P.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Emissions Trading and Social Justice</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z66c05g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cap and trade is controversial in part because of claims that it is unjust, an issue that was highlighted by recent litigation against California’s proposed carbon market.  This essay considers an array of fairness issues relating to cap and trade.  In terms of fairness to industry, the conclusion is that distributing free allowances overcompensates firms for the cost of compliance, assuming any compensation is warranted. Industry should not receive, in effect, ownership of the atmosphere at the expense of the public. Environmental justice advocates argue that cap-and-trade systems promote hotspots and encourage dirtier, older plants to continue operating to the detriment of some communities. Designers of cap-and-trade systems should be alert to possible hotspots, particularly in disadvantaged communities.  Little reason exists, however, to believe that any such hotspots are systematically linked with disadvantage. Finally, any regulation of emissions raises costs, with a disproportionate...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z66c05g</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Farber, Daniel A</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Law, Sustainability, and the Pursuit of Happiness</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6289107q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Environmental law focuses on regulating the production of energy and goods. Less attention has been given to reducing the environmental footprint of consumption. This Article brings together several strands of research, including psychological and economic research on subjective wellbeing; research on energy efficiency; writings by urban planners on sustainable communities; and recent work on individual behavior and sustainability. The conclusion, in a nutshell, is that changes in consumption of goods and energy, assisted by improvements in urban design and transportation infrastructure, can significantly reduce energy use and environmental harm. A variety of legal tools are available to promote these changes. Remarkably, many of the steps needed for sustainability can actually improve quality of life, adding to individual satisfaction. Thus, sustainability for society and the pursuit of individual happiness need not be at odds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6289107q</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Aug 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Farber, Daniel A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d73t21v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We propose a novel solution for states that wish to tax interstate e-commerce based on fully and adequately compensating remote vendors for all tax compliance costs.  We argue that our proposed solution is compatible with the Quill framework for when states can constitutionally impose burdens on remote vendors.  We argue that unlike our proposed solution, the recent state attempts to tax interstate e-commerce through so-called “Amazon laws” are unconstitutional, ineffective, or both.  We thus urge the states to adopt our proposed approach as the best way forward for state taxation of interstate e-commerce.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9d73t21v</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gamage, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Heckman, Devin</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2dg9t3x9</link>
      <description>Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2dg9t3x9</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hornuf, Lars</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Voigt, Stefan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Model of Optimal Government Bailouts</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8wv4p90c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second, the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare. Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social externalities are large and subsidies small; eliminate incumbent owners and managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in the future.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8wv4p90c</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 5 May 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bernardo, Antonio</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Talley, Eric</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Welch, Ivo</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Law and Growth Economics: A Framework for Research</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/50t4d0kt</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many law and economics models concern static efficiency and redistribution.  The standard analysis of dynamic industries requires lawmakers to balance faster innovation against lower consumer prices.  Sustained growth dominates these effects, so law and growth economics should focus on maximizing it.  Law can increase the growth rate by making innovation more profitable.  We distinguish innovation into phases -- discovering ideas, developing them with capital and labor, and marketing innovations.  Strengthening intellectual property law and weakening antitrust law increases the costs of developing ideas, and also increases the revenues from marketing innovations.  To maximize the profitability of innovation, law should balance these two effects.  We use these ideas to develop a framework for law and growth economics.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/50t4d0kt</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Apr 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2zj750jr</link>
      <description>Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2zj750jr</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Spitzer, Matthew L</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Talley, Eric</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Consent Problem in International Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/04x8x174</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;International law is built on the foundation of state consent.  A state’s legal obligations are overwhelmingly – some would say exclusively – based on its consent to be bound.  This focus on consent offers maximal protection to individual states.  If a country feels that a proposed change to international law does not serve its interests, it can avoid that change by withholding its agreement.  This commitment to consent preserves the power of states, but it also creates a serious problem for the international system.  Because any state can object to any proposed rule of international law, only changes that benefit every single affected state can be adopted.  This creates a cumbersome status quo bias.  Though legal reforms that would lead to a loss of well-being are avoided, so are reforms that would increase well-being for most but not all states.  This Article challenges the conventional view of consent.  It argues that our existing commitment to consent is excessive and that...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/04x8x174</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/99f758qd</link>
      <description>Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/99f758qd</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Yoo, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Century of American Economic Review</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h59v4m6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Using information collected from American Economic Review publications of the last 100 years, we try to provide answers to various questions: Which are the top AER publishing institutions and countries? Which are the top AER papers based on citation success? How frequently is someone able to publish in AER? How equally is citation success distributed? Who are the top AER publishing authors? What is the level of cooperation among the authors? What drives the alphabetical name ordering? What are the individual characteristics of the AER authors, editors, editorial board members, and referees? How frequently do women publish in AER? What is the relationship between academic age, publication performance, and citation success? What are the paper characteristics? What influences the level of technique used in articles? Do connections have an influence on citation success? Who receives awards? Can awards increase the probability of publishing in AER at a later stage?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h59v4m6</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Mar 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Piatti, Marco</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Negligent Misrepresentation as Contract</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vc0j5x5</link>
      <description>Negligent Misrepresentation as Contract</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vc0j5x5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gergen, Mark P</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Three Essays On Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8gf0b1cj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This Article analyzes the behavioral economics literatures on how individuals understand taxation (i.e., tax salience).  We evaluate how taxpayers respond to different presentations of tax prices both in their roles as market participants and as voters.  We aim to combat several naïve notions about tax salience that currently exert a pernicious influence on tax lawmaking.  In particular, we argue that it is normatively desirable for governments to reduce tax salience with respect to market decision making, and that there is nothing normatively objectionable about governments also reducing tax salience with respect to political decision making.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8gf0b1cj</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gamage, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Shanske, Darien</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0xg2h885</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0xg2h885</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Feb 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Farrell, Joseph</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Antitrust in two-sided markets: Is competition always desirable?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dp3q033</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The main objective of antitrust interventions is to assure competition in markets to benefit consumers. This paper challenges this common approach by examining the case of a satellite broadcasting network with monopoly power. First, satellite TV is identified as a two-sided market. It is then analyzed in the framework of the canonical model for two-sided markets developed by Rochet &amp;amp; Tirole (2004). The main finding is that the satellite network maximizes his profits by choosing a price formation which maximizes the overall welfare of all market participants. Even if the satellite network uses his monopoly power to introduce a fee to receive satellite TV, it would do so only until the semi-elasticity of the amount of consumers in regard to the per-interaction-price equals the one of the TV stations – exactly the point where welfare is maximized. It is therefore concluded that antitrust cases have to take a more in-depth look at two-sided markets before deciding that competition...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5dp3q033</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fiedler, Ingo C</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3636t264</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Prior to the emergence of peer-to-peer technology, the Copyright Act’s distribution right was largely dormant.  Most enforcement actions were premised upon violations of the reproduction right.  The relatively few cases invoking the distribution right involved arcane scenarios.  During the past several years, direct enforcement of the Copyright Act against file sharers has brought the scope of the distribution right to center stage.  Whereas the 1909 Act expressly protected the rights to “publish” and “vend,” the 1976 Act speaks of a right to “distribute.”  Interpreting “distribute” narrowly, some courts have held that copyright owners must prove that a sound recording placed in a peer-to-peer share folder was actually downloaded to establish violation of the distribution right.  Other courts hold that merely making a sound recording available violates the distribution right.  The ramifications for copyright enforcement in the Internet age are substantial.  Under the narrow...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3636t264</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Menell, Peter S</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Experimental Evidence of Tax Framing  Effects on the Work/Leisure Decision</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rk4j0nk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The choice between a set of alternatives often depends on how those alternatives are described, as well as their actual economic costs and benefits.  We report  results from an experiment designed to evaluate the impact of different  descriptions of the after-tax wage on both (1) subjects’ willingness to perform a  work task rather than an alternative leisure option, and (2) the amount of work  performed by those subjects selecting the work task.  Utilizing an experimental  design that facilitates both within and between-subject comparisons, we find that  that subjects’ willingness to work varies with the framing of the after-tax wage  and that, in particular, subjects are much less willing to work when the returns to  work are framed as a low wage plus a bonus than when the returns are described  as a high wage minus a tax.  Along the intensive margin we find suggestive  evidence that subjects stop working just before their wage becomes subject to a  significantly higher marginal...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rk4j0nk</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 1 Sep 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Gamage, David</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hayashi, Andrew</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Nakamura, Brent K</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9h8845nh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;From its earliest manifestations, copyright law has struggled to deal with the equitable and efficient division of value and control between creators and the enterprises that distribute their works.  And for almost as long as copyright has existed, there has been concern about creators getting the short end of the stick in their dealings with distributors.   Since 1909, Congress has sought to protect authors and their families by allowing them to grant their copyrights for exploitation and then, decades later, to recapture those same rights.  After judicial interpretation of the 1909 Act frustrated this intent by upholding advance assignments of renewal terms, Congress spoke unambiguously in 1976:  “Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary . . . .”  Yet recent decisions in the Ninth and Second Circuits have eviscerated that clear Congressional command by permitting a grantee to renegotiate the terms of the grant so as to frustrate...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9h8845nh</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Menell, Peter</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Nimmer, David</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket:  A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4g06p3vm</link>
      <description>Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket:  A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4g06p3vm</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bartlett, Robert P., III</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fixing Failed States</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2174x6x7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Failed states pose one of the deepest challenges to American national security and international peace and stability. Finding a comprehensive and effective solution to the challenges of terrorism, human rights violations, or poverty and economic development requires some understanding of how to restore failed states. The response of the United States and its allies has remained the same: to rebuild the institutions of state control, and, if lucky, to plant a working democracy and a market economy within existing state borders. But many international law scholars remain openly dubious about the ability of states to rebuild – the problem is not failed states but the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations. This paper argues that both American and U.N policy on the one hand, and the conventional academic wisdom on the other hand, are mistaken. Building a normal nation-state with full sovereignty on every territory in the world, without changing any borders,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2174x6x7</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Yoo, John</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Law and Economics from a Moderate Islamic perspective (LEMI)</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/73b274rn</link>
      <description>Law and Economics from a Moderate Islamic perspective (LEMI)</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/73b274rn</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Dadgar, Yadollah</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gh1r30h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Using administrative, longitudinal data on felony arrests in Florida, we exploit the discontinuous increase in the punitiveness of criminal sanctions at 18 to estimate the deterrence effect of incarceration. Our analysis suggests a 2 percent decline in the log-odds of offending at 18, with standard errors ruling out declines of 11 percent or more. We interpret these magnitudes using a stochastic dynamic extension of Becker's (1968) model of criminal behavior. Calibrating the model to match key empirical moments, we conclude that deterrence elasticities with respect to sentence lengths are no more negative than -0.13 for young offenders.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gh1r30h</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McCrary, Justin</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lee, David S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Federalism and South Africa's Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6239g0gb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy stands as one of the past century’s most important political events. The major hurdle to the transition was for the poor majority ANC to provide a credible promise not to exploit the full economic resources of the then ruling economic elite. The new constitution adopted a form of federal governance that has the potential to provide such protections by specifying an annual policy game where the new majority and the minority elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. Provided the majority is sufficiently patient and not “too demanding” in their preferences for redistribution the game has a stable equilibrium with less than maximal redistributive taxation. Our analysis makes these restrictions on preferences precise. The new, more radical ANC and the Zuma presidency challenge this equilibrium.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6239g0gb</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 8 Jun 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Inman, Robert P.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05s924dk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount and cash - a coupon-cash remedy - is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05s924dk</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Polinsky, A. Mitchell</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Risk Taking and Gender in Hierarchies</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9gn734nz</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I de…fine promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers will have lower average ability whenever they have a higher survival rate. Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy, that will be reversed over time. The risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher ability. As a consequence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot simultaneously be satisfi…ed. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to maximize profit, the standards will reflect gender in ways that are difficult to distinguish from...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9gn734nz</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 May 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Scotchmer, Suzanne</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Scarcity of Ideas and R&amp;amp;D Options: Use it, Lose it, or Bank it</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/74c709qr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We investigate optimal rewards in an R&amp;amp;D model where substitute ideas for innovation arrive to random recipients at random times. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We investigate the optimal policy when the social planner learns over time about the arrival rate of ideas, and when private recipients of ideas can bank their ideas for future use. We argue that private incentives to create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are scarce."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/74c709qr</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 May 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Erkal, Nisvan</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Scotchmer, Suzanne</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Surviving the Titantic Disaster: Economic, Natural and Social Determinants</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h24b1vt</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The sinking of the Titanic in April 1912 took the lives of 68 percent of the people aboard. Who survived? It was women and children who had a higher probability of being saved, not men. Likewise, people traveling in first class had a better chance of survival than those in second and third class. British passengers were more likely to perish than members of other nations. This extreme event represents a rare case of a well-documented life and death situation where social norms were enforced. This paper shows that economic analysis can account for human behavior in such situations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h24b1vt</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 May 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Frey, Bruno S</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Savage, David A</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Environmental Participation and Environmental Motivation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5hx0f0c2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We explore whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior by focusing on volunteering. The paper first introduces a theoretical model of volunteering in environmental organizations. In a next step, it tests the hypothesis working a large micro data set covering 32 countries from both Western and Eastern Europe using several different proxies to measure environmental motivation. As a robustness test we also explore the relationship at the macro level extending the number of countries investigated. Our results indicate a strong positive relationship between environmental motivation and individuals’ voluntary engagement in environmental organizations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5hx0f0c2</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 May 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>García-Valiñas, María A.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Macintyre, Alison</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Explaining Soft Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7796m4sc</link>
      <description>Explaining Soft Law</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7796m4sc</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Meyer, Timothy L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate Change &amp;amp; U.S. Interests</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/33s1x1jz</link>
      <description>Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate Change &amp;amp; U.S. Interests</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/33s1x1jz</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Freeman, Jody</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hope and Despair in the Magic Kingdom: In Re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j44n7wf</link>
      <description>Hope and Despair in the Magic Kingdom: In Re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j44n7wf</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 2 May 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cox, James D.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Talley, Eric</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Independent Directors and Board Control in Venture Finance</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w966114</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The financial contracting literature treats control as an indivisible right held either by a firm’s entrepreneurs or by its investors. In contrast, data from VC-backed firms shows that board control is typically shared, with a third-party independent director holding the tie-breaking board seat (‘ID-arbitration’). In this article I use a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration to model a firm’s choice of action under ID-arbitration. I show that ID-arbitration can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position. Consequently, ID-arbitration can lead to the efficient outcome in circumstances where alternative governance arrangements – entrepreneur control, investor control, or state-contingent control – are either unavailable or likely to lead to suboptimal results. This project has implications for the literature on financial contracting and the theory of the firm.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9w966114</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 1 May 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Broughman, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Myth of International Delegation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/77j316zw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;There is a growing and misinformed sense in some quarters that the United States and other countries have engaged (and continue to engage) in delegations to international institution that involve a significant threat to domestic sovereignty. Concerns about such delegations come from academics (John Yoo: “Novel forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to international organizations”), prominent politicians (Bob Barr: “Nary a thought is given when international organizations, like the UN, attempt to enforce their myopic vision of a one-world government upon America, while trumping our Constitution in the process. Moreover, many in our own government willfully or ignorantly cede constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms to the international community;” Jesse Helms: “The American people see the UN aspiring to establish itself as the central authority of a new international order of global laws and global government.”);...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/77j316zw</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Landsidle, Jennifer</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6g74z9p5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In well-functioning domestic legal systems, courts provide a mechanism through which commitments and obligations are enforced.  A party that fails to honor its obligations can be hauled before a court and sanctioned through seizure of person or property.  The international arena also has courts or, to expand the category somewhat, tribunals.  These institutions, however, lack the enforcement powers of domestic courts.  How, then, do they work, and how might they work better or worse?  The first objective of this Article is to establish that the role of the tribunal is to promote compliance with some underlying substantive legal rule.  This simple yet often overlooked point provides a metric by which to measure the effectiveness of tribunals.  But a tribunal does not operate in isolation.  The use of a tribunal is one way to resolve a dispute, but reliance on diplomacy and other traditional tools of international relations is another.  Furthermore, even if a case is filed with...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6g74z9p5</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5m48w44j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The benefits of overseas outsourcing have come at a cost.  Americans enjoy unprecedented levels of safety and security in the domestically-produced goods they use, food and drugs they ingest, and services they employ.  Yet as U.S. firms increase the efficiency of their production, become more competitive globally, and offer better price-quality combinations to their customers by contracting with foreign companies for the production of goods and the provision of services, the mix of economic, legal, and societal forces that serve to protect consumers changes.  Widespread revelations of Chinese-manufactured toxic toys and  toothpaste, tainted food and drugs from abroad, and the failure of foreign call centers to protect the privacy of U.S. consumer data all illustrate the challenge for domestic governance.  Though international trade in goods and services provides clear economic benefits, it can also frustrate consumer protection efforts.    This paper provides a conceptual framework...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5m48w44j</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Bamberger, Kenneth a.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Guzman, Andrew T.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Christmas Warning</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3t30h66q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Microsoft continues to profit at its users expense by creating incompatibilities. Think twice before asking Santa for a new Windows machine with Vista and Office 2007.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3t30h66q</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Voting as a Rational Choice</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0x3780rb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;For voters with ‘social’ preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections; (2) to show that rational socially motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g.,50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially motivated vote choice.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0x3780rb</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gelman, Andrew</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Kaplan, Noah</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trans-border Bank Insolvency: A Generation Later</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3hg7323f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hans-Jochem Lüer’s single most noted participation in the field of international transactions was his role in the Herstatt Bank litigation.  Therefore, it seems fitting to honor him with a contribution to the subject of cross-border bank insolvency, especially considering that recent developments in the European Union and in the United States now implicate issues of federal-state relations that were not yet on the horizon a generation ago.  This paper will focus in particular on the US side of the issue, even if it is clear that no purely national discussion can or should ignore the EU Directives in the field.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3hg7323f</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Buxbaum, Richard M.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Choice between Income and Consumption Taxes: A Primer</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9q85f6qz</link>
      <description>The Choice between Income and Consumption Taxes: A Primer</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9q85f6qz</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>New Estimates of the Budget Outlook: Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est la Meme Chose</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4650s8nz</link>
      <description>New Estimates of the Budget Outlook: Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est la Meme Chose</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4650s8nz</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gale, William G.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Orszag, Peter R.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tax Reform in the 21st Century</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/444479wh</link>
      <description>Tax Reform in the 21st Century</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/444479wh</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New Evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2nt4k6vj</link>
      <description>Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New Evidence</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2nt4k6vj</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hassett, Kevin A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective: A Review of the 2006 Economic Report of the Presidentís Tax Chapter</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23b9n6bp</link>
      <description>The U.S. Tax System in International Perspective: A Review of the 2006 Economic Report of the Presidentís Tax Chapter</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23b9n6bp</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Future of Capital Income Taxation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/90v90406</link>
      <description>The Future of Capital Income Taxation</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/90v90406</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6w372076</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The relative constancy of nonfinancial corporate tax revenues as a share of U.S. GDP masks offsetting trends in the ratio of corporate profits to GDP (declining) and the average tax rate  (increasing).  The average tax rate rose steadily between 1996 and 2003, an increase largely attributable to the importance of tax losses.  This rise casts some doubt on the role of tax planning activities in reducing corporate taxes.  So, too, does the relative stability of the rate of profit (relative to net assets), which might be expected to have declined had the  understatement of profits for tax purposes been increasing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6w372076</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerback, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Notional Defined Contribution Pension Systems in a Stochastic Context: Design and Stability</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/37k785qq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Around the world, Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) public pension programs face serious long-term fiscal problems due primarily to actual and projected population aging, and most appear unsustainable as currently structured.  Some have proposed the replacement of such plans with systems of fully funded private or personal Defined Contribution (DC) accounts, but the difficulties of transition to funded systems have limited their implementation.  Recently, a new variety of public pension program known as ìNotional Defined Contributionî or ìNon-financial Defined Contributionî (NDC) has been created, with the objectives of addressing the fiscal  instability of traditional plans and mimicking the haracteristics of funded DC plans while retaining PAYGO finance.     Using different versions of the system recently adopted in Sweden, calibrated to US demographic and economic parameters, we evaluate the success of the NDC approach in achieving fiscal stability in a stochastic context.  (In...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/37k785qq</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Auerbach, Alan J.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Lee, Ronald D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6331x6vz</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach: decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems and give them a direct political say. This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. We use two different data sets on tax morale at the individual level (World Values Survey and International Social  Survey Programme), and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the effects of institutions in Switzerland, a country where participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across different cantons. The findings suggest that direct democratic rights and local autonomy, have a significantly positive effect on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6331x6vz</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schneider, Friedrich</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schaltegger, Christoph A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Social Captial and Relative Income Concerns: Evidence from 26 Countries</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8sv0k59c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Research evidence on the impact of relative income position on individuals’ attitudes and behaviour is sorely lacking. Therefore, using the International Social Survey Programme 1998 data from 26 countries this paper investigates the impact of relative income on 14 measurements of social capital. We find support for a considerable deleterious positional concern effect of persons below the reference income. This effect is more sizeable by far than the beneficial impact of a relative income  advantage. Most of the results indicate that such an effect is non-linear. Lastly, changing the reference group (regional versus national) produces no significant differences in the results.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8sv0k59c</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fischer, Justina A. V.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8dz4q3vd</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 2003. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russia’s democratic transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputies’ behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic  parameters. We observe that energy resource factors have a considerable effect on deputies’ voting behavior. On the other hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences  are constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8dz4q3vd</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Grigoriadis, Theocharis N</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3qr87655</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper provides a comparison of tax morale between inhabitants of East and West Germany in its post-reunification period, using three World Values Survey/European Values Survey waves between 1990 and 1999. German reunification is particularly interesting for the analysis of tax morale as it is close to a natural experiment. Many factors can be controlled because they are similar, as, e.g., a common language, similar education systems and a shared cultural and political history prior to the separation after the Second World War. As a consequence, an East-West comparison has a methodological advantage compared to cross-country studies. Our findings show higher tax morale in East than in West Germany. However, in only 9 years after reunification, tax morale values strongly converged, especially due to a strong change in the level of tax morale in the East. We suggest that this convergence in tax morale between East and West Germany, despite efforts of the federal government...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3qr87655</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Feld, Lars P.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/26s710z8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This paper analyses how governance or institutional quality and tax morale affect the shadow economy, using an international country panel and also within country data. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors to understand the level and changes of shadow economy. However, the limited number of investigations use cross-sectional country data with a relatively small number of observations, and hardly any paper has investigated tax morale and provides evidence  using within country data. Using more than 25 proxies that measure governance and institutional quality we find strong support that its increase leads to a smaller shadow economy. Moreover, an increase in tax morale reduces the size of the shadow economy.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/26s710z8</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schneider, Friedrich</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Power and Payouts in the Sale of Startups</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6sm713kb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Researchers have extensively analyzed VCs’ cash flow rights in venture-backed startups, including the right to be paid liquidation preferences ahead of common shareholders when the startup is sold.  However, common shareholders have various  ways of impeding these preference-triggering transactions, and may use their holdup power to capture part of the VCs’ preferences.  Little is known about VCs’ cash flow outcomes: whether VCs receive their full liquidation preferences when startups are sold. Using a hand-collected dataset of VC-backed startups, we find that VCs frequently “carve out” part of their preferences for common shareholders.  We also find that the  expected value of these carveouts is larger when the common have more holdup power. For example, carveouts are more likely to occur and larger when VCs do not control the board and when the corporate law governing the firm gives common more leverage over  the VCs.  Our study highlights the distinct role of common shareholders...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6sm713kb</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fried, Jesse</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Broughman, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Accident Externality from Driving</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6179d3nw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;We estimate auto accident externalities (more specifically insurance externalities) using panel data on state-average insurance premiums and loss costs. Externalities appear to be substantial in traffic-dense states: in California, for example, we find that the increase in traffic density from a typical additional driver increases total statewide insurance costs of other drivers by $1,725–$3,239 per year, depending on the model. High–traffic density states have large economically and statistically significant externalities in all specifications we check. In contrast, the accident externality per driver in low-traffic states appears quite small. On balance, accident externalities are so large that a correcting Pigouvian tax could raise $66 billion annually in California alone, more than all existing California state taxes during our study period, and over $220 billion per year nationally.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6179d3nw</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Karaca-Mandic, Pinar</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8x6082cn</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Public companies in the United States and elsewhere increasingly use open market stock buybacks, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to shareholders. Academic commentators have emphasized the possible benefits of such repurchases for  shareholders. However, little attention has been paid to their potential drawbacks. This Article explains that managers currently are able to use open market repurchases and misleading repurchase announcements to enrich themselves at public  shareholders’ expense.  Managers, aware their stock is underpriced, frequently use repurchases to indirectly buy stock for themselves at a bargain price. Managers have also been able  to boost stock prices by announcing repurchase programs they did not intend to execute, perhaps to unload their own shares at a high price. Such bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales systematically transfer significant amounts of value from one set of shareholders (public investors) to another (managers).  Low-price...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8x6082cn</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fried, Jesse M.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5rz3w67b</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Venture capitalists investing in U.S. startups typically receive preferred stock and extensive control rights. Various explanations for each of these arrangements have been offered. However, scholars have failed to notice that these arrangements,  when combined, often lead to a highly unusual corporate governance structure: one where preferred shareholders, rather than common shareholders, control the board and therefore the firm itself. The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to  highlight the unusual governance structure of these VC-backed startups; (2) to show that preferred shareholder control can give rise to potentially large agency costs; and (3) to suggest legal reforms that may help VCs and entrepreneurs reduce these  agency costs and improve corporate governance in startups.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5rz3w67b</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fried, Jesse M.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Ganor, Mira</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4441r9r1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4441r9r1</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kirstein, Roland</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Misperception of Norms: The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0t6420jb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Our perceptions of what other people do often affect what we do.  In these situations, perceptual biases can affect what everyone does. By combing the psychology of bias and the economics of equilibrium, we construct a model to predict how individual biases affect aggregate behavior. Psychologists have found at least two systematic biases in the perception of social and legal norms.  Empirical studies often find a general tendency to over-estimate how much other people violate social norms – a bias toward moral pessimism. We show that persistence of this bias causes more people to violate the norm than if the bias were corrected.  In addition, this bias increases the probability that behavior will settle into a "bad" equilibrium with many wrongdoers, instead of settling into a “good” one with few wrongdoers.   Empirical studies also find that a person often over-estimates how many other people act the same as he does – a bias towards social projection. We show that persistence...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0t6420jb</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Feldman, Michael</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Feldman, Yuval</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/07z8m8wm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may  improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production  function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/07z8m8wm</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Jan 2007 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Kirstein, Roland</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6943s2kd</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Consumers injured by price overcharges often are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated. Coupon remedies cause a deadweight loss by inducing excessive consumption by consumers with relatively low demand during the remedy period. The magnitude of the loss can be comparable to that caused by the price overcharge. As demand variability goes to zero, the deadweight loss from coupon remedies goes to zero. Eliminating the expiration date for the use of coupons does not eliminate the loss.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6943s2kd</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Polinsky, A. Mitchell</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/15d402t1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between coupons to purchase units of the defendant’s product at a discount and cash — a coupon-cash remedy — is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/15d402t1</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Polinsky, A. Mitchell</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Pricing of Academic Journals</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13d1h835</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In this paper we investigate the claim that academic journals are too expensive. We estimate library demand for academic journals and ask if short run profit maximization by publishers can explain observed prices. Libraries purchase a portfolio of journals so to estimate demand we extend the standard discrete choice model, and estimation methods, to allow for a choice consisting of a subset of a larger set of journals. Unlike the discrete choice model, the model allows for both positive and negative cross-price effects. We estimate the model using library holdings data and find that on average prices in the industry are lower than what static pricing models predict. Furthermore, we simulate the effects of mergers and find that the likely unilateral effect of a merger is to lower prices.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13d1h835</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>McCabe, Mark J.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Nevo, Aviv</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance:  Experimental and Survey Evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8sh2w9fp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;There is considerable evidence that enforcement efforts can increase tax compliance.  However, there must be other forces at work because observed compliance levels cannot be fully explained by the level of enforcement actions typical of most tax authorities.  Further, there are observed differences, not related to enforcement effort, in the levels of compliance across countries and cultures.  To fully understand differences in compliance behavior across cultures one needs to understand differences in tax administration and citizen attitudes toward governments.  The working hypothesis is that cross-cultural  differences in behavior have foundations in these institutions.  Tax compliance is a complex behavioral issue and its investigation requires the use of a variety of methods and data sources.  Results from laboratory experiments conducted in different countries demonstrate that observed differences in tax  compliance levels can be explained by differences in the fairness...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8sh2w9fp</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cummings, Ronald G.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>McKee, Michael</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Public Attitudes toward Corruption and Tax Evasion: Investigating the role of gender over time</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3983136n</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In recent years the topics of illegal activities such as corruption or tax evasion have attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of compliance. The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically whether women are more willing to be compliant than men and whether we observe (among women and in general) differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods (cohort effect) or changing attitudes of the same cohorts over time (age effect) using data from eight Western European countries from the World  Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999. The results reveal higher willingness to comply among women and an age rather than a cohort effect.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3983136n</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Valev, Neven T</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Determinants of Political Discussion: How important are audit courts and local autonomy?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/34v756hb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The intention of this paper is to analyse how audit courts and local autonomy affect political discussion, controlling in a multivariate analysis for a broad variety of potential factors focusing on Switzerland, due to its variety of audit court competences and its strong decentralised structure. With  data from the World Values Survey 1995-1997 (Swiss data 1996) evidence has been found that a higher audit court competence and a lower level of centralization is correlated with a higher level of political discussion. Thus, the results in Switzerland suggest that such institutions help improve citizens’ willingness to acquire information costs and discuss political matters.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/34v756hb</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schaltegger, Christoph A</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Charity, Publicity, and the Donation Registry</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9cm5h0qr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many Americans donate little or nothing to charity.  Our social environment is the cause, not human nature.  Experiments show that people are generous when their contributions are observable by others. Taking advantage of this fact, we propose a small policy change to increase transparency and elicit generosity.  Specifically, we propose that the IRS establish a voluntary donation registry to publicize the proportion of income that individuals donate to charity.  Although participation would be voluntary, it would be subject to social pressure.  The disclosure created by the registry should significantly increase funds for social goods without increasing taxes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9cm5h0qr</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Broughman, Brian</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Participation in Environmental Organizations: An Empirical Analysis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h51g5xv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The literature on volunteering has strongly increased over the last few years. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence on the determinants of environmental participation. This empirical study analyses a cross-section of individuals using micro-data from the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997), which covers 38 countries, to investigate this question. The results suggest that individuals’ active participation in environmental organizations is influenced not only by socio-demographic and socio-economic factors, but also  by political attitudes. Furthermore, we observe regional differences. Interestingly, environmental participation  seems to be a more important channel for action in developing countries, where weak and dysfunctional states make people pursue their goals through non-governmental sector activities. We also find that a higher level of perceived corruption promotes participation in environmental organizations, which shows that individuals...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6h51g5xv</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>García-Valiñas, Maria A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What Shapes Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5q14k3wr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance several researchers have argued that citizens’ attitudes toward paying taxes defined as tax morale helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box without discussing  which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical  research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Thus, this paper is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using datasets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5q14k3wr</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schneider, Friedrich G.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rd3f982</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo economicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional  cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between  institutional quality and tax morale.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rd3f982</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Frey, Bruno S.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Intrinsic Value of Obeying a Law: Economic Analysis of the Internal Viewpoint</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2kc0f6mq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Economic theory distinguishes sharply between what a person wants and what he can have. “Preferences” describe what a person wants, and “constraints” describe the limits of what he can have. The collision of preferences and constraints yields the choices that economists study. The meaning of both terms is broad and flexible. Preferences and constraints help to distinguish between the internal and external viewpoints that H. L. A. Hart made famous. The internal viewpoint concerns preferences to perform legal obligations. A person who prefers to obey a law is willing to give up something to perform his legal obligation. The preference is intrinsic, not an instrument for securing something else of value. Conversely, a person who is indifferent to a legal obligation takes a purely instrumental approach towards obedience—he obeys only when doing so secures something else of value. What explains the distribution of preferences among people to obey a law? I will sketch part of the...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2kc0f6mq</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Power of Positional Concerns: A Panel Analysis</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1z14v7zt</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many studies have established that people care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely, as standard economic theory assumes, about their absolute economic position. However, behavioral evidence is rare. This paper provides an empirical analysis on how individuals’ relative income position affects their performance. Using a unique data set for 1040 soccer players over a period of eight seasons, our analysis suggests that if a player’s salary is below the average and this difference increases, his performance worsens and the productivity decreasing effects of positional concerns are stronger. Moreover, the larger the income differences within a team, the stronger positional concern effects are observable. We also find that the more the players are integrated in a particular social environment (their team), the more evident a relative income effect is. Finally, we find that positional effects are stronger among high performing teams.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1z14v7zt</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 4 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Schmidt, Sascha L</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Frey, Bruno S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Adapt or Optimize? The Psychology and Economics of Rules of Evidence</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5mq9x0rs</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In civil disputes, the plaintiff must prove his case by the preponderance of the evidence. To reach this standard, the plaintiff accumulates evidence by combining facts.  I compare two models of this process.  Decision makers can adapt their behavior for improved results, as assumed in some psychological models. Adaptive models predict that court practice will allow the plaintiff to combine facts according to relatively simple rules. Alternatively, decision makers can optimize their behavior for best results, as assumed in most economic models. Optimization models predict that court practice will require the plaintiff to combine facts in ways that conform to the laws of probability theory.  The two predictions contradict each other when simple, adaptive rules violate the laws of probability theory.  I show that actual practice in a California court allows the plaintiff to combine facts according to relatively simple rules that sometimes violate the laws of probability theory....</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5mq9x0rs</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Government Accountability and Fiscal Discipline: A panel analysis using Swiss data</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1jc275p2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Government accountability through electoral engagement, involvement and participation in the political debate can affect government performance. Using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981–2001 period, this paper provides empirical evidence that government accountability is crucial for fiscal discipline. Specifically, in cantons with high levels of government accountability, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower, indicating that accountability supports fiscal discipline. To obtain a useful approximation for government accountability between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation in political decisions (initiatives and public referenda) in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of accountability in a real world setting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1jc275p2</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Dec 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Schaltegger, Christoph</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Torgler, Benno</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chaos, Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9xm920bv</link>
      <description>Chaos, Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9xm920bv</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Gilbert, Michael D.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Demand for Currency Approach and the Size of the Shadow Economy: A Critical Assessment</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6zn9p98b</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A commonly used approach to measure the size of the shadow economy, known as "the monetary method", is based on econometric estimates of the demand for currency. These estimates are used to get the currency held by economic agents in excess of the amount they need to finance registered transactions. This excess of currency multiplied by the income-velocity of circulation (assumed to be equal in the registered and shadow economies) gives a measure of the hidden GDP. This paper shows that the monetary method only produces coherent estimates if the income-elasticity of the demand for currency is one and suggests a way to correct the estimated size of the shadow economy when such elasticity is not one. The correction is applied to existent measures for different countries.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6zn9p98b</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 2 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Ahumada, Hildegart</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Alvaredo, Facundo</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Canavese, Alfredo J.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Corporate Law's Current-Owner Bias</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5st0133z</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Academics studying public firms' choice of governance arrangements have largely assumed that stock prices accurately reflect the effect of these arrange¬ments on firm value. As a result, firms going public generally have an incentive to seek arrangements that maximize shareholder value, and states seeking incor¬porations have an incentive to offer such arrangements. Oddly, this literature has ignored the considerable evidence that stock prices are frequently "noisy" ¬deviating significantly from fundamental value. This Article systematically ana¬lyzes the effect of noisy stock prices on firms' choice of governance arrangements. It demonstrates that stock price noisiness leads firms to seek - and states to of¬fer - arrangements with a current-owner bias - that is, arrangements favoring both insiders and current public shareholders at the expense of future public shareholders and long-term corporate value. Current-owner bias can explain many features of (and gaps in) state corporate...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5st0133z</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 2 Jun 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Fried, Jesse M.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Legal Options Approach to EC Company Law</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nf0n65z</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In recent years, legal options (ex ante and ex post choices created by law) have gained acceptance in the European Union. Notwithstanding the move toward soft law measures, the EC’s appetite for options or pro-choice company law provisions remains unclear. There are significant barriers to the EC’s ability to promote efficient regulatory choice due to interest group pressures, diffuse control over the agenda-setting process, and a limited capacity to anticipate and meet a wide range of Member State demands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This article shows that bringing options to the forefront of company law reform can reduce costs for small and medium-sized firms and provide clear benefits to companies that differ in their ownership and control structure from most large public corporations. Switching to a company law regime with different sorts of options can have a good effect on stakeholders as well. As a regulatory strategy, we advocate a step-by-step change, beginning with the adoption of a limited...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nf0n65z</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 7 Feb 2006 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Hertig, Gerard</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>McCahery, Joseph A.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Choose-Your-Charity Tax: A Way to Incentivize Greater Giving</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2xs8t7wg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Why don't people give more to charity?  One reason is that the problems will be there whether individuals give or not.  Here is a policy - inspired by the matching grants that charities use so effectively - that could actually make a real difference.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2xs8t7wg</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Nov 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Merger Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4437v1xw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Life is uncertain.  So is merger analysis.  There is a well-developed set of tools to deal with decision making under uncertainty.  Experience suggests that the federal antitrust agencies and the courts have yet to take full advantage of those tools.  This chapter suggests ways that decision theory could be applied to merger analysis to improve enforcement and its impacts on consumer welfare.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4437v1xw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Oct 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Shelanski, Howard A</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Katz, Michael L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Total Liability for Excessive Harm</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98x711qg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The harm that each individual causes others is unverifiable in some circumstances where the total harm caused by everyone is verifiable. For example, the environmental agency can often measure the total harm caused by pollution much easier than it can measure the harm caused by each individual polluter. In these circumstances, implementing the usual liability rules or externality taxes is impossible. We propose a novel solution: Hold each participant in the activity responsible for all of the excessive harm that everyone causes. By “excessive harm” we mean the difference between the total harm caused by all injurers and the optimal total harm. We call this rule “total liability for excessive harm.” We show that total liability for excessive harm creates incentives for efficient precaution and activity level. Consequently, actual harm is not excessive and actual liability is nil. For example, the environmental agency can set a target for clean air and announce that each factory...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98x711qg</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Porat, Ariel</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Law, Information, and the Poverty of Nations</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4hd374nq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Sustained growth occurs in developing nations through improvements in markets and organizations. These entrepreneurial innovation resembles a biological mutation that is unpredictable before it occurs and understandable afterwards. It is unpredictable because it begins with the innovator possessing private information by which he earns extraordinary profits. It is understandable because its ends with the public figuring out the innovation and profits approaching the ordinary rate of return. These characteristics of innovation have important consequences for law and policy to foster economic growth. Specifically, government officials who rely on public information cannot predict which firms or industries will experience rapid growth. Consequently, industrial policies that promote growth are unlikely to succeed. Proponents of industrial policy today make the same mistake as the mercantilists whose interventions Adam Smith attacked as a cause of national poverty. In contrast,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4hd374nq</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9sz547bd</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Sustained growth occurs in developing nations through improvements in markets and organizations.  Entrepreneurial innovation resembles biological mutation that is unpredictable before it occurs and understandable afterwards.  It is unpredictable because it begins with an innovator who acquires private information and earns extraordinary profits.  It is understandable because its ends with the public figuring out the innovation and all investors earning ordinary profits.  These characteristics of innovation have important consequences for law and policy to foster economic growth.  Government officials who rely on public information cannot predict which firms or industries will experience rapid growth.  Consequently, industrial policies that promote growth are unlikely to succeed.  Proponents of industrial policy today make the same mistake as the mercantilists whose interventions Adam Smith attacked as a cause of national poverty.  In contrast, secure property and contract rights,...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9sz547bd</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Apr 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Cooter, Robert D</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Controlling Organized Crime and Corruption in the Public Sector</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08s076vr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Organized crime and corruption are shaped by the lack of strength of the control mechanisms of the State and civil society. The results presented in the present article attest to the links between the growth of organized crime and that of corruption in the public sector in a large number of countries. The two types of complex crime reinforce each other. To identify and isolate the influential factors behind the growth of corruption in the public sector and organized crime, the present article presents and analyses qualitative and quantitative information on a large sample of countries and territories representing worldwide diversity stratified by level of socio-economic development.** The study reported here aimed at identifying the institutional patterns that determine a country’s vulnerability to complex crimes. Being policy-oriented, the report includes a set of evidence-based policy recommendations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08s076vr</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Apr 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Buscaglia, Edgardo</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>van Dijk, Jan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Implementing the First Best in an Agency Relationship with Renegotiation: A Corregendum</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7vw694sk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The insect antennal lobe is the first brain structure to process olfactory information. Like the vertebrate olfactory bulb the antennal lobe is substructured in olfactory glomeruli. In insects, glomeruli can be morphologically identified, and have characteristic olfactory response profiles. Local neurons interconnect glomeruli, and output (projection) neurons project to higher-order brain centres. The relationship between their elaborate morphology and their physiology is not understood. We recorded electrophysiologically from antennal lobe neurons, and iontophoretically injected a calcium-sensitive dye. We then measured their spatio-temporal calcium responses to a variety of odours. Finally, we confocally reconstructed the neurons, and identified the innervated glomeruli. An increase or decrease in spiking frequency corresponded to an intracellular calcium increase or decrease in the cell. While intracellular recordings generally lasted between 10 and 30 min, calcium imaging...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7vw694sk</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 1 Mar 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Hermalin, Benjamin E.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Welfare Losses from Price-Matching Policies</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/43b7w47c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Several recent papers argue that price-matching policies raise equilibrium prices.  We add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses, which have two sources: Harberger triangles from high prices and Posner rectangles from over-entry.  We compare price-matching markets with entry to monopoly and price-matching markets without entry, and find that price matching with entry creates greater welfare losses than monopoly in markets with a low ratio of fixed to marginal cost.  We illustrate this result using parameters from the US wholesale gasoline and air travel markets and relate our model to price matching among NASDAQ market makers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/43b7w47c</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 1 Mar 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Emch, Eric R.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/92s8h65w</link>
      <description>Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/92s8h65w</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2wc1p9pw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The bias of forward exchange rates as a predictor of future spot rates is typically explained or decomposed as (1) a risk premium and (2) a convexity term which accounts for the fact that, when there is stochastic inflation, nominal gains from forward currency speculation are higher than real ones and correspondingly losses are smaller.  We use Nalebuff's envelope puzzle to explain a third source of bias which involves real profits from foreign exchange speculation.  Both the "real profit" bias and stochastic inflation bias arise from convexity of g(s)=1/s and so derive from Jensen's inequality as observed by Siegel (1972).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2wc1p9pw</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Optimal Penalties in Contracts</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2w81s277</link>
      <description>Optimal Penalties in Contracts</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2w81s277</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ht651hk</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ht651hk</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Jan 2005 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Echenique, Federico</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Exclusion or Efficient Pricing?  The "Big Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9hc6n6ds</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Not available&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9hc6n6ds</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Oct 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Edlin, Aaron S.</name>
      </author>
      <author>
        <name>Rubinfeld, Daniel L.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Proposal to Restrict Manipulative Strategy in Auction IPO's</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4sg5191h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Book-building, the prevailing method for IPO's, is widely considered flawed, because it results in stock under-pricing.  Auction-IPO, on the other hand, is considered, by conventional wisdon, an alternative method that will eliminate the under-pricing.  This paper shows how, contrary to customary belief, auction-IPO's may well result in under-pricing.  In auction-IPO's, the under-pricing of the stock price is induced by undetected investors' manipulative strategic behavior.  I analyze the requirements for such strategic behavior in a linear model.  To reduce investors' incentive to manipulate their bid in the auction, this paper proposes to restrict auction participants from trading in the aftermarket immediately following the IPO.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4sg5191h</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Ganor, Mira</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Improving the Legal Environment for Start-Up Financing by Rationalizing Rule 144</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1467f53t</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Private Equity is a crucial form of financing for start-ups and, therefore, important for economic innovation and growth.  The securities laws have an enormous impact on the ability of start-ups to obtain private equity investment.  One of the most important of these laws is the SEC's Rule 144.  Surprisingly, there has been little academic analysis on the efficacy of this rule.  This paper shows that Rule 144 is likely to impair and distort the financing of start-ups.  The paper also explains how Rule 144 can be modified to reduce these costs without interfering with any of the functions for which it was designed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1467f53t</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Ganor, Mira</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5hk0k89w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Personal privacy is studied in the context of a competitive product (or labor) market. Firms initially post prices (or wages) they promise to charge (or pay) individuals whose applications are ultimately approved. Contracts are incomplete because the amount of information firms acquire about applicants cannot be observed. When information acquisition corresponds to searching for bad news, firms search too hard in equilibrium. Consumers can ameliorate this by demanding inefficiently small levels of output. If economic characteristics differ across groups of applicants and price discrimination is prohibited, then members of the high-risk group are subjected to more scrutiny and suffer disproportionately high rejection rates. When information acquisition corresponds to searching for good news, firms acquire too little information about their applicants in equilibrium. Finally, if rejected applicants remain in the market and continue to apply to dfferent firms, then the resulting...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5hk0k89w</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Taylor, Curt</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What Statutes Mean: Positive Political Theory Perspectives on Legislation and its Interpretation</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5272236p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;None&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5272236p</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Rodriguez, Daniel B</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, Evidence &amp;amp; Policy</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6rn0f1gb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;At approximately the same time that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased the costs associated with being a public company, important Delaware case law created a difference in the standard of judicial review for the two basic methods of freezing out minority shareholders. While a freeze-out executed as a statutory merger is subject to stringent "entire fairness" review, the Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Siliconix Shareholders' Litigation that a freeze-out executed as a tender offer is not. This paper presents the first systematic empirical evidence on post-Siliconix freeze-outs. Using a new database of all freeze-outs executed during the current doctrinal regime, I find that a controlling shareholder pays less to the minority shareholders, on average, when it uses a tender offer compared to a merger. This difference between tender offers and mergers seems to increase with the size of the controller's pre-deal stake. These findings introduce a puzzle as to why more than two-thirds...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6rn0f1gb</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 May 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Subramanian, Guhan</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Institutional Innovations, Theories of the Firm, and the Formation of the East India Company</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2216c263</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;None&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2216c263</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 May 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Harris, Ron</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13d8s2qs</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;None&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/13d8s2qs</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 May 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>Coffee, John C.</name>
      </author>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards a Theory of Adjudicatory Decisions in Public Administration</title>
      <link>https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9zc280fb</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In many countries administrative procedures have been identified as a major obstacle to private investments and economic growth. Without overtly questioning the substantive aspects of government regulations, critics of the current state of administrative procedure challenge its complicated details and the time that applications and their decisions consume. Some of the literature dealing with administration as the agent of politics picks up the question of how public administrations and administered individuals interact strategically in the administrative process. Most often this line of research concentrates on regulated utilities and government procurement. However, there is hardly any theoretical economic basis for the study of one of the most important, if not the most important, aspects of administrative procedure: the adjudication in bulk of applications for permissions or similar (very often dichotomous) government decisions. Such decisions en masse often are not made...</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9zc280fb</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Apr 2004 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>
        <name>von Wangenheim, georg</name>
      </author>
    </item>
  </channel>
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