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Did Manufacturing Matter?

The experience of yesterday's second generation: a reassessment*

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Abstract

Research on the "new second generation" takes the success of the earlier second generation of southern and eastern Europeans as its point departure, but with little empirical basis. The hypothesis of "segmented assimilation" asserts that the children of the 1880-1920 immigration moved ahead due to the availability of well-paying, relatively low-skilled jobs in manufacturing. By contrast, defenders of the conventional approach to assimilation accent diffusionary processes, while conceding that the specific means by which the children of immigrants improved on their parents' condition remains a matter about which relatively little is known. This paper returns to the world of the last second generation, just before it disappeared, to inquire into the extent and nature of the economic differences separating the adult immigrant offspring of the time from their 3rd generation-plus counterparts. Using data from the 1970 Census of Population, the paper shows that manufacturing mattered, but in ways neither expected nor consistent with either of today's prevailing, theoretical approaches.

Did Manufacturing Matter?

The experience of yesterday's second generation: a reassessment

The descendants of the last great migration to the United States had but a brief moment in the sun. Social scientists and social reformers of the early 20th century worried about a "second generation problem" in ways eerily reminiscent of the formulations popular today (Smith, 1939). But history soon took care of the matter: immigration was controlled; the nation found new sources of social solidarity in the struggle against the depression and various enemies abroad; and the cleavages produced by the earlier allergy to immigration were eclipsed after conflicts over race moved to the fore (Gerstle, 2001). While a "white ethnic" movement suddenly emerged when the civil rights battleground headed to the north, the moment proved evanescent. The neighborhoods and organizations formed out of the earlier immigrant experience were still there but fast dissolving, as they couldn't hold on to their own (Alba, 1990). Once the third generation headed out to suburbia -- where social scientists proclaimed ethnicity to be strictly optional (Waters, 1990) -- the world of the so-called white ethnics largely disappeared.

So too, did serious sociological interest in their experience. To be sure, the descendants of the last great migration play a role in today's growing scholarship on the burgeoning "new" second generation, but only that of foil. The most influential view, associated with the hypothesis of "segmented hypothesis," notes the similarities between the offspring of today's and yesterday's labor migrants, but insists that the obstacles

traversed by the latter were of a significantly lesser sort. The last second generation shared a common European heritage with the then-dominant WASPs, blunting discrimination's edge. As argued by Portes and Rumbaut, the old factory-based economy further allowed for a multi-generational move up the totem pole:

> The availability of industrial jobs and the existence of a ladder of occupations within industrial employment created the possibility of gradual upward mobility for the European second generation without the need for an advanced education. This continuing labor demand was behind the rise of stable working-class communities in northeastern and Midwestern cities where supervisory and other preferred industrial jobs afforded a reasonable living standard for European ethnics... (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001: 56).

While manufacturing could not the shelter the European ethnics from the vicissitudes of the depression, Portes and Rumbaut contend that the New Deal and "renewed demand for manufacturing goods during World War II reopened the industrial labor market, creating new opportunity for second- and third-generation workers (2001: 56)."

By contrast, the advocates of the conventional assimilation approach look at the same past and conclude that it serves as a reliable guide to the route ahead. True, there is an embarrassing silence at the heart of the standard assimilation story. Asking the question of "how did assimilation happen for the descendants of the turn-century immigration, focusing on historically contingent circumstances,?" Richard Alba and Victor Nee concede that "we don't know for sure ...and that we can only speculate about how the bulk of the group got from there to here." (Alba and Nee, 2003: 102). In this view, the critical period involved the years between 1930 and 1970; During this time, a

"far-reaching transformation of the American workforce," involving "a sharp contraction at the lower end of the occupational spectrum" and a "corresponding expansion" at the middle and above created opportunities for the descendants of the turn of the century labor migrants (Alba and Nee, 104-5). Alba and Nee never tell us whether it was the children or the grandchildren of the immigrants who benefited from this change; likewise, they do not specify just how the children of the labor migrants got ahead, whether via diffusion from ethnic niches and job concentrations, as their account generally emphasizes, or through collective advancement. However, they do largely concede the historical importance of manufacturing:

> The assimilation of Americans of European and Asian ancestry was linked to opportunities for social mobility that, within a brief historical period, brought about a rough parity of average life chances among many ethnic groups...These opportunities were in turn based on historically contingent periods of economic expansion that allowed immigrants of peasant origin with few work skills of relevance in an urban, industrial economy nevertheless to gain a foothold through steady employment, often in manufacturing sectors to start with (Alba and Nee, 2003: 134-5)

Thus whether optimistic or pessimistic, today's contrasting interpretations of second generation prospects build on similar understandings of the past. While each accents somewhat different themes, both treat history as relevant insofar as it is useful; neither tells us how yesterday's second generation moved ahead. Moreover, the latter question is likely to prove more complicated than either approach allows. After all, the peasant migrants of the turn of the 20th century started out at the very bottom, with few

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skills and little tolerance by their betters. While their offspring certainly did better,

attention to the historical context suggests that progress may have been modest and not

that easily achieved. Though Portes and Rumbaut insist the children of the racialized

peasant migrants became "indistinguishable from the rest of the mainstream population

(2001: 55)," the historical record points to stigmatization of a deeper and far more

enduring sort (see Ware, 1935; Whyte 1943; Covello, 1967 [1943] for earlier

sociological accounts; see Alba and Nee, 2003: 131-4, for a contemporary reappraisal).

Moreover, the "ethnic" resistance to the changing racial order in the north, during the

1950s and 1960s, surely also sends a signal, to which the proponents of assimilation,

whether segmented or conventional, need attend. That racism impelled the "ethnics" of

the last second generation is beyond question, but it does seem likely that there was

something more: namely, the insecurities of a group of blue-collar working-men and -

women, anxious that competition with a new group of outsiders would erode the limited

gains they had attained (McGreevey, 1996; Formisano, 1991). Unlike the confident

academics who studied them, the adults of the last second generation were not convinced

that they had "made it." Given the depth of their uncertainties, is it possible that they

were entirely wrong?

Thus, neither standard nor segmented assimilation approaches are likely to

convey an accurate picture of the trajectory by which the last second generation moved

ahead. In its favor, segmented assimilation provides us with a positive account: the

ethnics owe their success to their concentration in manufacturing, at just the time when

the wages for U.S. manufacturing workers were at their height. If so, this is a lesson in

path dependency, and the positive consequences of an ethnic distinction -- as opposed to

the assimilationist story of progress driven by growing exposure probabilities to out-group members. On the other hand, manufacturing's centrality is a new theme, introduced by proponents of segmented assimilation, but not previously noted by historically-oriented scholars.

This paper returns to the world of the last second generation, just before it disappeared, to inquire into the extent and nature of the economic differences separating the adult immigrant offspring of the time from their 3rd generation-plus counterparts. While part of an ongoing critique of assimilation, whether in conventional or segmented form (see Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Waldinger, 2003), the paper seeks an empirical engagement with today's debate. Responding to the concerns of the contemporary literature, which is preoccupied by the vulnerabilities of the children of the least skilled immigrants, I focus on their closest counterparts from the past: the descendants of the stigmatized, poorly educated peasant migrants from Italy and Poland. Responding to themes both old and new in the literature of ethnic progress, I add a contrast to northern-born African-Americans. Full background on the groups, and explanation of the comparison follow shortly.

The source is the 1970 Census of Population, the very last to ask questions about parents' place of birth. As it was also the only census, during the period when the relevant immigrant offspring were of adult age, to ask a mother tongue question of all persons (as opposed to only the foreign-born), it also allows us to distinguish among distinctive ethnic groups with common national origins in the multi-ethnic lands of eastern and southern Europe (and thereby separate the sociologically distinctive Jews and Slavs, both of whom identified Poland as their place of birth).[1]   Conducted roughly forty-five years

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after the end of the last great migration, the 1970 Census captured America's foreign-born population at its nadir. But for the same reason, it highlighted the sizeable presence of that second generation of Americans originating in south, central, and eastern Europe. Given the timing of their parents' move to the United States, this was a group that had been mainly born between 1906 and 1935. Though members of the earliest birth cohorts had already left the labor force as of 1970, over 90 percent of the adult immigrant offspring were still of working-age. I now return to the broader intellectual issues in play, subsequently providing details on group definitions and variables, and last, presenting the analysis.

Assimilation in question

We can only approach the past from the present, which is why the path often leads one astray. Presentism afflicts today's debate over second generation trajectories, which projects a pattern of inexorable change, at variance, not simply with the lived experience of yesterday's immigrant offspring, but also with the contingencies that always affect the process of historical change. However, sensitivity to concerns of the present is not simply a vice, as it also provokes us to revisit the past with questions that earlier students hadn't asked. The hypothesis of segmented assimilation has done just that, drawing our attention to the centrality of economic mobility, and its causes and consequences, and provoking the defenders of conventional assimilation to address an issue that an earlier literature had simply overlooked.

Assimilation -- traditional or segmented? The hypothesis of segmented assimilation doesn't clearly tell us how or why the children of peasant migrants managed to move beyond their parents' station, but one can easily imagine how to fill in the blanks

in ways that are consistent with the underlying approach. Theoretically, the story

emphasizes social capital and path dependency, concepts, which when applied to the case

of the immigrants from southern and central Europe (SCE), suggest why the descendants

of unskilled peasant migrants "made it" within the course of three, or at most, four

generations. The parents had little going for them, other than the luck of convergence on

the nation's industrial heartland -- arriving just when the American economy was about to

soar. The children's options were largely circumscribed by the ties of the neighborhood

and the ethnic network -- which meant that the boys headed to the local factories, where

they took up jobs only slightly better than those of their parents. But their timing was

exceptionally good: the American economy entered a golden age of rapid growth and

high manufacturing wages. The industrial heartland remained vibrant, with only the

slightest hint of the rustbelt to come. The local networks, therefore, turned out to connect

the second generation to an opportunity structure that proved favorable, relative to

options in other locations. Armed with more money in the pocket, the SCE second

generation could leave the ethnic neighborhood in search of the good life in newer urban

or even suburban neighborhoods, where lower ethnic densities produced greater ethnic

mixing, and better schools would send the immigrants' grandchildren on to college.

Taken apart, this narrative generates the following hypotheses:

H1: due to historical accident and the channelizing effects of immigrant networks,
the descendants of SCE immigrants were significantly over-represented in
manufacturing.

Manufacturing mattered, in the segmented assimilation framework, because of its

consequences for wage determination. Therein lies another, usually unremarked,

difference between segmented and traditional approaches to assimilation. For the latter, assimilation entails convergence with a "mainstream" understood in undifferentiated terms (Alba and Nee, 2003); for segmented assimilation, by contrast, difference – in this case, of a sectoral sort – is a constitutive aspect of social structure. But segmented assimilation doesn't tell us why and how would manufacturing have exercised such positive effects, though it's probably not reasonable to expect researchers concerned with ethnicity to offer a theory of inter-industry wage differentials. For the purposes at hand, it is enough to assert a linkage between the market structure of American manufacturing at the time and the ways it paid its production workers. In general, market leadership is associated with above normal levels of profitability; indeed, such was the pattern during the post-war golden age, when the market power of the largest manufacturers, and the dominance of the U.S. producers over the domestic market, made for reduced price competition (Gordon et al, 1982; Levy, 1998). Enjoying higher levels of profits and reduced risks of failure, U.S. manufacturers could therefore respond to pressure from unions and pay high wages to relatively low skilled workers, without much fear of losing market share to lower cost producers. Consequently:

H2: the more an SCE group's employment was concentrated in manufacturing, the smaller the earnings disparity relative to native whites of native parentage.

The multiple dimensions of assimilation: In a relatively open, capitalist society, where income buys access and participation, money matters most. But other forms of reward still count, most notably occupational status, in part because of its effect on one's broader social standing, in part, because of its effect on the types of interactions available at work, and the types of social capital that those encounters generate. Considerations of

these sorts apply with particular force to the groups in question here, since the original attractions of both the peasant migrants from southern and eastern Europe and the displaced sharecroppers from America's rural south lay precisely in the fact that they comprised the "right" set of workers for the "wrong" set of jobs. That unacceptable work proved acceptable was just a sign of the migrants' racial inferiority; moreover, the people who took "dago jobs" and did "hunky work" found that the stigma attached to their occupations added significantly to the disrepute they suffered on grounds of ethnic and national origins alone (Roediger, 1991). From all accounts, we know that the second generation moved above the bottom-level positions occupied by the migrant generation – but it may not have gone far enough to escape the shadow cast by the stigma associated with the lowly pursuits of the migrant generation (Barrett and Roediger, 1997; Morawska, 1985). Thus, while employment in manufacturing may have boosted wages for Euro-Americans of SCE background, it may have also kept social standing depressed. Rephrased in operational terms:

H3: the more an SCE group's employment was concentrated in manufacturing, the greater the disparity in occupational status relative to native whites of native parentage.

Gender: As applied to the last second generation, the hypothesis of segmented assimilation has a muscularly proletarian feel: in effect, it was the broad shoulders of the factory worker in heavy industry that brought the ethnic America of old into the mainstream. Questions about the attraction and rewards of heavy industry aside, this is clearly a story that only refers to men. Steel mills and auto factories had little use for female labor, the World War II years excepted (Milkman 1987). Rather, the gendered

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nature of the labor market connected women to other activities: the "light" manufacturing industries of clothing and textile; the services; various branches of retail trade; the burgeoning market for clerical labor; the schools (Cohen, 1993).

So segmented assimilation seems unlikely to provide a fully reliable guide to the past – at least if we want to understand the ways in which female immigrant offspring advanced, and the impact of women's work on the overall pattern of second generation progress. Conventional assimilation is unlikely to serve us better – as its view of an undifferentiated mainstream begs the questions of why gender disparities might either persist or get transformed. Unfortunately, consideration of gender adds layers of complication that extend beyond the confines of a single paper. Consequently we will address this matter in separate work, at which time we will examine additional questions related to labor force participation, the impact of women's earnings on differences in household income, and the degree to which these differences were correlated with differences in ethnic exogamy, if at all. For the moment, we will focus exclusively on men.

Groups

Unlike today, when the foreign-born population is distinguished by its social class diversity, at the early part of the 20th century, immigrants were a relatively homogenous population of persons narrowly concentrated at the bottom of the occupational scale. In particular, Italians, Poles, and other Eastern and Southern Europeans disproportionately fell into jobs at the very bottom of the occupational ladder. Low levels of literacy also distinguished these groups from the newcomers from western and northern Europe (Lieberson, 1980; Perlmann, 1988).

The descendants of the peasant migrants from eastern and southern Europe comprise the groups whose fates we need to understand.[2] However, these same migrations stemmed from multi-ethnic empires, in which nationality and ethnicity rarely converged. Consequently, the classification system used to sort immigrants and their descendants involves a basic anachronism, as many of the countries of origin identified in the Census didn't actually exist at the time of migration. Moreover, the post-World War I states were themselves multi-ethnic conglomerations, assembling populations differing in ethnic loyalties and related socio-economic characteristics.

In this respect, the Italians represent the exception, as Italy was unified prior to the beginning of the great migration, and its boundaries changed only modestly after World War I. Although pre-migration regional and linguistic differences were such that the migrants became "Italian" only after movement to the United States, socio-economic and sub-ethnic differences were rarely correlated, apart from the relatively few northern Italians. Among the southerners, moreover, the experience of strangeness produced a sense of common identity by the advent of the second generation (Gabaccia, 2000). Consequently, it seems reasonable to identify "Italians" as persons with parents born in Italy.

The greater difficulty involves persons originating from the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian multi-ethnic empires, and their multi-ethnic successors. At the sub-national level, ethnic differences – as among Czechs and Slovaks, or Serbs or Croats – often took a deeper form than among the Italians. But the most vexing issue confronting the contemporary analyst is that the sources of Slavic, peasant migration also sent large

numbers of Jews, with the result that ethnic and socio-economic differences were often strongly correlated, but in ways that are difficult to pull apart.

In this paper, I focus on the Poles, for reasons related to the size of the group and their historical role as labor migrants starting out at the very bottom of the occupational ladder. But therefore, I don't mean "Polish" by geographic origin as so much "Polish" by religion and ethnicity, which puts me in the odd business of separating out Slavs from Jews.

Researchers have adopted a variety of techniques for "isolating" Jews in the U.S. censuses, of which the most precise uses the responses to the mother tongue question, as first or second generation persons who answered Yiddish or Hebrew can be reasonably assumed to have been Jews. Of course, a significant proportion of the immigrant generation shifted to English; among Jews in this category, many gave "Russia" as the country of origin. Previous analyses, such as Lieberson and Waters' work on the 1980 ancestry questions, suggest that persons claiming Russian ancestry provide a reasonably good proxy population for Jews (Lieberson and Waters, 1988). On the other hand, Slavs (of ether Russian or Polish ethnicity) who had switched to English were also likely to give Russia as country of origin, a matter that would only be important were we interested in identifying Jews in order to study them – which is not the intention here.

Following the procedure established by Joel Perlmann (2001), I employ the data on mother tongue to separate Slavs from Jews of Polish origin. As used here, Poles refer only to persons with (a) parents born in Poland and (b) who grew up in a household where (i) Polish was spoken or (ii) English was spoken or (iii) no response was provided to the mother tongue question. Persons who reported that their parents who were born in

Poland but that Yiddish was used in the parental household were categorized as Jews, and are not of interest for the purpose of this paper.[3]

Notwithstanding the problems entailed in identifying the Poles – our solution, I'll note later, is less than perfect – studying the other Eastern European groups is more complicated still, largely because national origins can't be made to converge with a mono-ethnic population. While one can use mother tongue to identify the children of Serbs or Slovaks or Russians, this excludes all those who grew up in households where the process of assimilation had already led to a shift to English.

The Generations

Though this paper is animated by the concerns raised over the *contemporary* second generation, considerations related both to history and to the nature of the available data lead us to define the generational groupings in somewhat distinctive ways.

The prevailing definition in the contemporary literature construes the phenomenon broadly, defining a "new second generation" as that "formed by children of immigrants born in the United States or brought at an early age from abroad (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996: 232)" Convenience as well as theoretical considerations argue for making place of *childhood*, as opposed to place of *birth*, the central classificational criterion. On the other hand, the social significance associated with the brute fact of nativity highlights the importance of distinguishing between the native-born children of foreign-born parents, and their comparably aged, foreign-born counterparts who arrived at some point in childhood, now often referred to as the 1.5 generation. Further disaggregation is probably warranted, as the working definition adopted by the contemporary literature groups the descendants of two foreign-born parents in the same

category as those with one parent born abroad and one parent born in the United States. Since there is ample reason to suspect that the children of mixed as opposed to foreign-born parentage undergo fundamentally different experiences, a second intermediate generational category – call it the 2.5 generation – can be identified. Consequently, the ideal analysis would involve comparisons across each of these generational groupings -- first, 1.5, second, and 2.5.

For a variety of factors, neither the first nor the 1.5 generation proved useful categories for analysis conducted in this paper. Defined as persons who came after the age of 12, by 1970, the relevant first generation was simply too old. While there was then a sizeable group of prime-age persons born in Italy, these immigrants were the product of a post-World War II migration, and thus not appropriate as a benchmark for comparisons against later generations. The same held true for the 1.5 generation, especially given our focus on the prime age population, aged 25-64, and our concern with comparability, which would require narrowing the scope to those immigrants who moved to the United States as children no later than 1935 and were 64 years or younger as 1970. That specification reduced sample numbers to just over 1,300 persons born in Italy, and almost 600 born in Poland, of whom only some were employed, and therefore not available for analyses of occupational attainment or earnings, and of whom an even smaller fraction were Poles of Slavic background. Furthermore, the peculiar construction of the 1970 public use sample is such that information on language is *not* available for those persons for whom one has information about year of migration, making it impossible, among members of the 1.5 generation, to distinguish Slavs from others.

By contrast, a large proportion of those conventionally categorized as second generation turn out to be the children of mixed parentage: almost a third of the Italians and just over a quarter of the Poles. This pattern, as Perlmann (2001) has noted, reflects the degree to which migration from southern and eastern Europe was compressed into a narrow time span, with almost 70 percent of the group arriving in the United States between 1901 and 1915. Similar compression occurred in the next generation: half of all children with at least one SCE-origin parent were born in the twenty year time span between 1906 and 1925. But as Perlmann shows, the nativity of composition of this "second generation" population shifted significantly during these same years, with those of mixed foreign/native parentage accounting for a growing proportion of SCE offspring born after 1920, and a majority of children born after 1935.[4]

Moreover, the categories of mixed and foreign parentage Italians and Poles appear to correspond to two distinct populations, as shown in the top panel of Figure 1, a box and whiskers plot showing the median, interquartile range, the 10th to 25th and 75th and 90th percentiles, and outside values lying above or below that range. Most persons with two foreign born parents were born within a very short span of time: half of the Poles were born in the eleven years between 1914 and 1925; the similar peak among the Italians extended slightly longer, from 1913 to 1929. The distribution of age among persons of mixed parentage takes a much more dispersed form, such that the inter-quartile distributions are largely (the Poles), if not completely (the Italians) distinct, with most of the overlap occurring at the extremes. Moreover, the mixed parentage group has an age distribution that resembles that of native whites of native parentage, increasing the comparability of the two groups.[5]

Figure 1 about here

The case for considering the children of mixed parentage as a distinctive, intermediate generational grouping also rests on substantive grounds. Should the presence of a native born parent matter, one would anticipate that it would do so by diminishing access to some significant aspect of the ancestral cultural code. As the 1970 Census reports data on mother tongue, we can assess that possibility by examining differences in the linguistic characteristics of the households in which respondents grew up, in this case focusing only on the Italians, as mother tongue was *not* used to identify the parentage of this group. The probability of reporting Italian as a mother tongue was significantly lower among persons of mixed v. foreign parentage; moreover, the same pattern holds after controlling for age.

Consequently, this paper contrasts two groups of third generation plus Americans – native-born whites of native parentage (NWNP) and northern-born blacks of native parentage (NBNP) -- to Poles and Italians of separate 2nd (FP – foreign parentage) and 2.5 (MP – mixed parentage) generations. As such, the paper moves beyond previous analyses of ethnic change among the descendants of the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, which have largely relied on the ancestry data that first became available with the 1980 census of population (e.g. Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Alba and Nee, 2003). As the advent of the ancestry data coincided with disappearance of the parentage question, the relevant studies largely treated the U.S.-born population of European ancestry as undifferentiated whole. While that procedure may have been relevant for the

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Scotch, Irish, or the Germans, the data on foreign and mixed parentage, displayed above, suggest that it obscured significant inter-generational differences among the descendants of the 1880-1920 migrations. Given the 1970 age structure of the Polish and Italian second and third generations, it seems reasonable to assume that the adult populations remained dominated by persons with at least one foreign-born parent until some time in the 1990s. [6] If indeed that is the case, then the procedure adopted here should shed new light on the time frames in which the initial ethnic disadvantage faded.

I note that numerically the white and black third generation groups greatly overshadow the Poles and Italians, a contrast that is heightened by breaking the group of immigrant offspring into two separate categories (as can be seen in Table 1). The difference is diminished when considering persons aged 25-64 only, and even more so, if one only focuses on the northeast, where the bulk of the Polish and Italian ancestry lived. To make the analysis tractable, and to reduce the raw effects of size, we have included only a 10 percent sample of native whites of native parentage. Sample size for each of the groups studied can be found in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

Data and variables

The data for this paper derive from the 1/15, 1 percent sample of the 1970 Census of Population. As the data have been downloaded from the IPUMS website, I have used the IPUMS coding scheme, which reclassifies occupations and industries to the 1950

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basis. I have also limited the sample to men, aged 25 to 64, a span which captures almost all of the 2nd generation and much of the 2.5 group. I exclude younger adults for reasons relevant to the issues in question: on the one hand, the segmented assimilation hypothesis emphasizes the importance of stable, manufacturing jobs; on the other hand, the literature on the youth labor market indicates that the transition into jobs of that sort is often protracted, extending through young adulthood (Osterman, 1980; Wial, 1991). Given the emphasis placed on employment in manufacturing, I also exclude all self-employed persons.

In light of the hypotheses specified above, the analysis falls into three different parts, each with a separate dependent variable: (1) *employment in manufacturing*, a binary variable, coded 1 if sector is manufacturing, 0 for all other sectors; (2) *annual income*, which is logged to reduce skewness; and (3) *SEI*. The nature of the dependent variable makes for differences in the definition of the population: when estimating sector or SEI, the population includes men in the age category employed at the time of the Census; when estimating earnings, the population includes men in the age category with non-zero earnings in 1969.

I use logistic regression in the analysis of employment in manufacturing; OLS is employed in the analyses of earnings and occupational attainment. In general, I work with a simple model of occupational or earnings attainment, which implies that outcome disparities reflect differences in background characteristics. Based on this model, I use a standard set of independent variables, including group; experience (age-years of schooling-6), experience squared; education; region; sector; location in an SMSA. The groups are coded as dummy variables (1=group, 0=other); native whites of native

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parentage comprise the omitted category in all of the analyses. Education is represented by the four dummy variables of elementary schooling, some high school, some college, college; high school completion is the omitted category. Sector, used as an independent variable only in the analyses of earnings and occupational attainment, is represented by dummy variables for manufacturing, construction, and trade; all other sectors comprise the omitted category. Two dummy variables for weeks worked in the previous year (worked 50 to 52 weeks; worked 40 to 49 weeks) are used in the analyses of earnings. In addition, I also test to determine whether group specific coefficients are statistically different from one another, using the Wald statistics (Stata 2003). Results are reported along with regression results.

The analysis departs from previous approaches by proceeding at three levels of geographic scale: first, the entire United States; second, the north (including the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and East North Central regions); third, metropolitan areas in the north (as just defined). As I have noted, the settlement pattern of SCE immigrants and their descendants took on a particular geography; the characteristics of the places on which they converged were also distinctive, precisely because they increased access to high wage jobs. For that reason, ethnic disparities at the national scale will be heavily influenced by regional factors. More importantly perhaps, the best gauge of assimilation – if understood as a "decline in an ethnic difference" – is to be found by looking at disparities in the places where immigrants and their descendants principally lived (Ellis, 2001). Consequently, outcomes in the metropolitan areas of the northeast are central for the issues at stake in this paper.

Appendix table 1 presents means and standard deviations for all employed men, by group; Appendix table 2 present means and standard deviations for all men with non-zero earnings in 1969, again by group. As differences between the two populations are very slight, the patterns can be described in the following, single summary: relatively older than the other groups, second generation Italian and Poles possessed higher levels of experience than any of the others. On the other hand, more than half of the Italian and Pole second generation members had not completed high school, a characteristic true for NBNPs, but not for either NWNPs nor either 2.5 generation group. With the exception of the third generation plus whites, all groups were mainly concentrated in the northeast, although Poles and Italians of both generations were more likely to cluster in that region than NBNPs. Within the northeast, Poles of both generation were more likely to live in the midwest than were Italians, whether of foreign or mixed parentage. Consistent with this regional difference, Poles of both generations had the highest levels of employment in manufacturing. Similarly, the means for the dummies interacting education and manufacturing that less skilled Poles of the second, and to a lesser extent, the 2.5 generation, were particularly likely to work in manufacturing.

Findings

Employment in manufacturing: I begin the empirical analysis by assessing the degree to which clustering in manufacturing is an ethnic phenomenon, independent of the geography of the groups in question, and their distinctive background characteristics. Towards that end, I have run a series of logistic regressions, predicting the probability of

employment in manufacturing, as contrasted to a residual category including all other

sectors. For ease of interpretation, I have converted the coefficients to odds ratios.

Tables 2 and 3 about here

Nationwide, as Tables 2 and 3 show, a manufacturing concentration characterized

some groups, *but not all*. Compared to third generation whites, the odds of holding a

manufacturing job were twice as high among Polish second generation men, and fifty

percent higher among Polish 2.5ers. By contrast, Italian second generation men were no

different in this respect from NWNPs, who were more likely to work in manufacturing

than either northern-born blacks or Italian 2.5ers. As one might expect, the odds of

holding a manufacturing job were related to the regional factors affecting the distribution

of manufacturing employment – then far more abundant in the northeast than anywhere

else. As indicated by Model 2, residence in any one of the three northeastern regions

significantly increased the odds of manufacturing employment, though the largest effect

was associated with the midwest, a region with a pronounced Polish, but weak Italian,

concentration. These effects notwithstanding, controls for region and metropolitan

location left Poles of both generations significantly more likely to hold industrial jobs

than NWNPs; by contrast, the two Italian groupings were significantly less likely, than

were third generation whites, to work in manufacturing, as was also true for northern

born blacks. As shown in Model 3, lower levels of schooling also increased the

likelihood that men would hold an industrial job. Nonetheless, application of controls for

background characteristics had only a very modest impact on ethnic differences, and without in any way altering the pattern.

Ethnic effects remain significant in the regressions for the Northeast as for the United States, even if not as quite as strong as the effects generated by the equations run for the total sample. That the regional controls reduce the ethnic effects for both Polish generational groups at the national level testifies to the relevance of path dependence and the continuing impact of first generation channelization on the industrial heartland where 60 percent of *all* industrial jobs were then found. Within the northeast, by contrast, application of regional controls yields the opposite effect on second generation Poles, and has no impact on Polish 2.5ers, suggesting that within the industrial belt of the times, Polish employment in goods production was an ethnic phenomenon, little affected by local variations in manufacturing employment.

The Italian pattern was of a totally different sort. Within the northeast, Italians of both generations were much less likely than NWNPs to work in manufacturing. Further controls slightly increased odds ratios, indicating the relatively unfavorable impact of the Italian local opportunity structure (in the mid-Atlantic and New England states), while once again demonstrating the continuing effect of the original immigrant locational pattern. The coefficients for the education variables are again relevant, as they highlight the propensity of men with skills similar to those of the Italians to work in manufacturing, a tendency that the Italians nonetheless escaped. Moving to a lower level of geographic scale – that of northeastern metropolitan regions – yields results that so closely track those found for the northeast as a whole that no further commentary is needed.

For the purposes of this paper, the findings for northern-born blacks are mainly relevant for what they suggest about the influence of birth-ascribed characteristics on sorting among industries. In all specifications, and at all levels of scale, black men are less likely than NWNP males to work in manufacturing. While group membership affects the propensity of black men to work in manufacturing sectors, the impact is no greater, in fact usually smaller, than that observed among the other groups.

In sum, the regressions show that virtually each group turns out to differ from NWNPs in the propensity (positive or negative) for employment in manufacturing. But the key finding involves differences *among* the European-origin groups: distinctiveness is both most pronounced and most persistent among the Poles; only the Poles turn out to be over-represented in manufacturing; that pattern persists at all levels of geographic scale, and is detected both before and after controls for region, place, and background characteristics. More Polish over-representation in manufacturing characterizes not only the second, but the second-and-a-half generation, indicating that, for this group, ethnic differences faded far more slowly than conventional accounts suggest.

For these reasons, the generalization implied by H1 – that the descendants of SCE immigrants were significantly over-represented in manufacturing – *cannot* be supported. At the same time, the findings in this section underscore the theoretical significance of H2, since if manufacturing propelled progress among the last second generation, the Polish concentration in goods production should have worked to their advantage. This is the question that I will now explore, by examining the nature and determinants of earnings differences.

Analysis of earnings: I begin by discussing the results for all employed men. By 1969, as shown in column 1 of Table 4, the European ethnics had surpassed NWNPs, and by a considerable degree: in logged terms, 2nd generation Italians made almost 8 percent, and Italians 2.5ers 14 percent more than NWNPs. Italians of both generations also enjoyed higher earnings than their counterparts among the Poles. By contrast, NBNP earnings fell very considerably behind NWNP levels. Application of the first extensive block of controls had little effect on the black earnings gap; left all SCE groups but second generation Poles with a diminished, but still significant earnings advantage relative to NWNPs; and eliminated the gap between 2nd and 2.5 generation Italians, while retaining the gap between 2nd and 2.5 generation Poles. Though employment in manufacturing also had a positive effect, boosting earnings by almost 8.5 percent, its impact paled beside that of construction. Location in the northeast was also advantageous, though workers in the midwest had significantly higher earnings than their counterparts in either New England or the Mid-Atlantic.

Tables 4 and 5 about here

A somewhat different pattern emerges from the regressions limited to the northeast – an approach that focuses the comparison on the area where most of the groups in question lived, and one that excludes the possibility that regional factors interacted with the key variables used in estimating in the equations for the nationwide sample.[7] At this level of geographic scale, evidence of catch up is not quite as compelling, with the Polish second generation lagging significantly behind NWNPs, and the Italian 2.5ers the

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only group to do significantly better. While the deficit is greatest among the NBNPs, it is hardly trivial among the immigrant offspring, with wage and salary income among the Polish second generation 5 percent below the level enjoyed by third-plus generation whites. Much of the lag is related to background characteristics and sectoral and regional distributions: upon application of this block, the Polish 2nd generation disadvantage disappears, while second and second-and-a-half generation Italians continue to enjoy a significant lead over NWNPs. Manufacturing has a strongly positive effect on wages, though again, its impact is eclipsed by construction's. Whereas location in the Midwest, with its concentration of heavy industry, exercises a strong effect on wages, workers in New England do no better than their counterparts in the mid-Atlantic.

Yet another picture comes into view when the scope is narrowed to northeastern metropolitan areas. Both second generation groups earn significantly less than NWNPs, in the Polish case by almost 9 percent. Moreover, neither of the 2.5 groupings enjoy any advantage. Controls for background characteristics, industry, and region reduce ethnic disparities, though the Polish second generation remains at a slight disadvantage. Note also the negative coefficient for the New England dummy, and, by comparison to the Northeast sample, the relatively strong effect associated with the Midwest: both underscore the disadvantages of the locational pattern established by the Italians.

From the standpoint of conventional assimilation, the crucial comparison involves the contrast to NWNPs: in this respect, the contrast between the nationwide and the regional results reveals the enduring importance of the original regional and sectoral concentrations established by the European immigrants, and the persisting advantages associated with those starting positions. That the size of the ethnic coefficients

diminishes as one moves from the largest level of scale to the smallest – switching from positive to negative in the regressions on the sample of workers in the northeastern metropolitan areas -- implies a positional effect extending beyond that captured by the sectoral or regional coefficients pure and simple. The northeast, and their metropolitan areas in particular, offered a distinctively advantageous opportunity structure, which redounded to the principal benefit of those groups who lived in those areas. On the other hand, assimilation surely has a relative dimension, with the most relevant comparison involving those places where members of a group actually live. From this perspective, the second generation never quite caught up with third generation whites, an achievement only attained by those immigrant descendants who also had a native-born parent.

From the standpoint of segmented assimilation, the more relevant contrast concerns the comparisons *among* the European ethnics, among whom advantage should go to the groups with the highest concentration in manufacturing. But, as shown in Table 5, the opposite proves to be the case: at both national and regional levels, second generation Italians have significantly higher earnings than second generation Poles, as appears in the first model run without any controls at all, and then in virtually all further specifications. Were position in the economic structure decisive, one would expect a net gap in favor of the Poles at the zero-order level, to be partialed out after the application of geographic and sectoral controls. But the pattern takes a different form, as the Polish geographic spread is more similar to that of NWNPs than that of the Italians. Thus, in the final models, earnings among 2nd generation Italians surpass, not only that of NWNPs, but of their generational counterparts among the Poles; the same holds true for

comparison among the 2.5ers, though the difference did not attain conventional levels of statistical significance.

Consequently, *I cannot accept H2*, which contends that the higher the concentration in manufacturing the lower the disparity in earnings, relative to NWNPs. On the contrary, manufacturing *didn't* matter, as the group with the significantly lower probability of employment in goods production was the one more likely to catch up with or surpass NWNPs. Put somewhat differently, among men, Polish ethnicity exacted some type of penalty, which the Italians somehow escaped. Just why the fates of these Catholic urban offspring of stigmatized peasant migrants diverged is a question to which the relevant literature hasn't even begun to address.

Occupational status: Shifting to an analysis of occupational status produces a pattern that is at once similar to, yet substantively different, from the findings from income just reviewed above. Nationwide, the average male of NWNP background had an SEI score of just over 41. As shown in Table 6, NBNPs averaged almost 15 SEI points lower; by contrast, the typical Polish second generation man lagged 6 prestige points below NWNPs; though his Italian counterpart was doing a little better, disparity, relative to NWNPs, was statistically significant in both cases. Polish 2.5ers stood at parity with NWNPs; Italian 2.5ers stood almost 2.5 points above NWNPs.

Table 6 and 7 about here

Application of controls for background characteristics, sector, and region produce a different pattern, reducing (though not eliminating) the disparities experienced by blacks and second generation Poles, and pushing Italian 2.5ers ahead of NWNPs by a slight, but statistically significant margin. The sectoral and regional variables, however, yield effects quite different from those observed in the analysis of earnings: employment in manufacturing *depresses* SEI by almost three points; workers living in the midwest *lose* almost half an SEI point for their location.

We see roughly, though not quite the same, pattern when the comparison is restricted to the Northeast, a region in which average NWNP SEI stands slightly above the average nationwide.[8] At the zero order level, the second generation/NWNP disparity is slightly greater; Polish 2.5ers now fall behind NWNPs by a statistically significant degree. Application of controls for background characteristics, sector, and region, however, produce generally the same effects as seen in the nationwide sample, though the size of the (still negative) coefficients for manufacturing and the midwest increase. A slightly different variant appears in the regression conducted at the level of the northeastern SMSA, where SEI among third-generation-plus whites stands two points higher than in the rest of the United States. At this level, none of the groups does better than NWNPs; all but Italian 2.5ers do significantly worse; the gap separating second generation Poles from NWNPs is more than half the disparity experienced by northern-born blacks.

As before, the relevance of the contrasts varies with the theory. Conventional assimilation theory emphasizes the comparison to the dominant group: in this light, the data tell us that occupational standing proved more resistant to catch-up by the European-

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origin groups than was true for income. Moreover, as one moves down the geographic scale, toward the area where most SCE immigrant offspring lived, convergence gives way to disparity, with Polish 2.5ers lagging well behind NWNPs.

In part, segmented assimilation is concerned with same comparison to NWNPs, though the results just reviewed clash with the expectation linking high manufacturing densities with reduced out/in-group disparities. In addition, segmented assimilation yields predictions regarding differences among the European-origin groups: concretely, that the Poles should benefit from their concentration in manufacturing. But the opposite again turns out to be true, most consistently in the northeast, where both groups are concentrated. As shown in Table 7, second generation Italians *always* have higher scores than second generation Poles, and similarly, Italian 2.5ers always do better than their counterparts among the Poles. While the regressions once again yield evidence of a "Polish" effect, they also highlight the distinctively depressing impact of manufacturing employment as such. Consequently, *I find support for H3*, which contends that the greater the concentration in manufacturing, the greater the disparity in occupational status, relative to NWNPs.

Language -- and ethnic categorizations revisited

As noted earlier, using national origins to identify ethnicity is a hazardous venture, given the origins of the SCE immigrants in the multi-ethnic empires of the pre-World War I era, and their no less multi-ethnic, nation-state successors. Persons with origins in "Poland" were not only unlikely to be of the same ethnicity; those same ethnic differences were often correlated with class, with only Slavs, and not Jews, originating in the peasant backgrounds of relevance here.

Thus far, we have identified Poles of likely Slavic origin by excluding all persons with parents born in Poland, but who grew up in households where Yiddish was spoken. In doing so, we also classify as Poles, persons with at least one parent born in Poland *and* who grew up in a household where English was spoken – a category which is likely to include at least some Polish-origin Jews. Misclassification among persons of two foreign born parents is likely to be slight, as 90 percent of the Polish second generation grew up in households where Polish was spoken. But the probability of misclassification is a good deal higher among the second and a half generation, among whom 37 percent of the "Poles" grew up in English-speaking households.

A look at the geography of the group points to possible misclassification among those "Poles" of mixed parentage who grew up in English-speaking households: a birthplace in New York (where the concentration of Jews was particularly high) was half as common among those Polish 2.5ers reporting a Polish-speaking childhood home, as opposed to those Polish 2.5ers who grew up hearing English. Residence as of 1970 was also distinct, with far more of the former living in the Midwest, and far more of the latter living in the Mid-Atlantic. A similar comparison among the Italians reveals only minimal difference in origins or residence among the 2.5ers of varying linguistic backgrounds.

But if Jews comprised a sizeable proportion of the "Poles" reporting origins in an English-speaking household, the same category undoubtedly included a good many Slavs. Once again, geography provides a telling hint. Among the Polish/Polish 2.5ers, a New York residence bears no relationship to either educational or occupational attainment. Among those with origins in an English-speaking household, by contrast, the

New Yorkers were significantly more likely to be employed in white-collar occupations, or to have higher levels of education.

In the end, therefore, it seems prudent to conclude that the goal of clearly and cleanly distinguishing Poles of Slavic, as opposed to Jewish, origin will prove elusive. Defining Poles in such a way as to include persons reporting a national origin in Poland, but a childhood linguistic environment in which no Polish was spoken biases results upwards; however, excluding the same people yields the opposite effect, restricting the Poles to the most ethnic members of the group. The least problematic alternative might simply be to focus the analysis on the midwest, picking up the region with the highest Slavic concentration, and the smallest number of Jews. On the other hand, as the midwest had a more compressed wage structure than the other northeastern regions, a focus on this area alone runs the risks of confounding regional and ethnic effects

How then, does, the picture when we alter the classification schema? Confining the contrast to those Poles of mixed parentage who grew up in Polish speaking households has little effect on wage disparities relative to Italian 2.5ers; the impact on both occupational status as well as manufacturing densities is a good deal greater. Restricting the analysis to the midwest, where Slavs greatly outnumbered Jews among persons with parents born in Poland, similarly increases the Polish/Italian gap in occupational status and manufacturing densities, though by a smaller margin. Though in all cases the differences are slight, they reinforce a central finding of the paper: that the Euro-American group with the higher concentration in manufacturing did less well than the group which mainly clustered in other sectors. Insofar as these more restrictive

definitions highlight a disparity that continued up to the 2.5 generation, they also underscore the persistence of the original, immigrant disadvantage.

Table 8 about here

Conclusion

The results of this paper provide little support for either of the prevailing approaches to assimilation. In particular, yesterday turns out to look quite different from the portrait of the past drawn by the advocates of segmented assimilation and that most contemporary scholars have taken for granted. Manufacturing may have mattered, but it was far from all-important. While the sons of Slavic peasant migrants converged on manufacturing, their more numerous Italian counterparts made a living in other ways, showing no propensity for industrial work whatsoever.

Insofar as manufacturing made a difference, it did so in ways not anticipated by our literature. Wages in manufacturing were certainly high, a factor that redounded to the benefit of those groups that garnered more than their share of industrial jobs. But, as the literature tells us (Goldin and Margo, 1992), manufacturing jobs were good for the earnings of low-skilled workers for reasons that went beyond the market power of American manufacturers, whose golden age has since been ended by the impact of foreign competition and a sharp acceleration in the product life cycle. In particular, manufacturing workers benefited from this sector's compressed wage structure, an institutional feature produced by the broader social forces that transformed American

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society by making it more egalitarian, during the very years when the last second generation came of age.

Along with the positive features of manufacturing also came its negative aspects. Not only did manufacturing yield a directly depressing effect on occupational prestige: the industrial jobs accessible to Poles and, to a lesser extent, Italians were even further down the hierarchy than those available to their counterparts in other sectors. So what?, one might argue, prestige can't be eaten. On the other hand, it would not be imprudent to suggest that the low prestige attached to factory work got passed on to the groups that congregated in those types of jobs. Remembering, both that "hard-working but dumb" pretty much sums up the Polish joke, and that jokes of this sort lasted long after the immigrant generation disappeared (Bukowczyk, 1998), one might not view the world of the ethnic factory worker with the nostalgic lens used by today's sociologists.

Thus, this look at the past does little for the claims of segmented assimilation, which has consistently projected a view of the past strongly at variance with the historical record (see Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997 and Waldinger and Perlmann, 1998). That manufacturing didn't matter as today's wisdom insists is a matter of uncertain implication for the contemporary second generation. Today's children of working-class immigrant parents *may* suffer as the result of the erosion of well paid, manufacturing jobs; but they may also take a trajectory similar to the Italians, who moved ahead without relying on the factory sector. To be sure, we need to understand how the transformations of the past hundred years have altered patterns of immigrant incorporation, as Portes and his collaborators have recently reminded us (Portes et al, 2005). But attaining that end

requires an accurate reckoning with the earlier period, as opposed to the conjectures on which this literature has so often depended.

As for conventional assimilation, this approach does not fare much better. On the face of it, one could think otherwise. At the national scale, the children of immigrants, so bitterly despised not much long before, generally surpassed the economic achievements of third generation-plus native whites. On the other hand, second generation success, such as it was, had little to do with the diffusionary processes central to the assimilation perspective. On the contrary, the distinctive geographic and industrial social structures established by the immigrant generation turned out to be persistent. Therein lay a significant source of advantage, as the northeast was a source of high wage employment, rewarding workers of all sorts and backgrounds more handsomely than their counterparts in other regions. Moreover, once one restricts the view to the places where most immigrant offspring resided, evidence of the lingering importance of ethnic origins, and ill-effects, moves into sharper relief. In particular, Polish concentrations and disadvantages proved especially persistent, affecting not just the second, but the second and a half generation.

Furthermore, assimilation necessarily entails a contrast between outsiders of foreign origins, and a bounded, integrated society – call it the "mainstream," as the most eloquent contemporary advocates of assimilation have suggested (Alba and Nee, 2003). But as the results of this paper underscore, the societal imagery bound up with the concept of assimilation is largely illusion: what helped the immigrant offspring of the past were regional and sectoral sources of national *dis*-integration, factors which bore no relationship to ethnicity as such.

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In the end, the past turns out to be more complicated, and less certain than any of the prevailing approaches would suggest. The theory of segmented assimilation insists that multiple pathways upward is a novelty in American society, but as this paper makes clear, the children of yesterday's peasant migrants moved ahead in a variety of ways. Moreover, they weren't alone in this respect. No accurate reading of the earlier experience would suggest that second generation Jews got ahead, either via manufacturing or through the "mainstream economy", as it's euphemistically called today. And the same could be said for the Irish, and even for the Germans, both of whom still figured prominently among the second generation that came of age in the years after the last great migration came to an end.

Nor is there warrant for a deterministic view of industrial structure. Yesterday's second generation did benefit from the compressed wage structure that characterized the manufacturing sector at the end of the post-war boom. However, it wasn't always so: the relatively equal America encountered by the offspring of the immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe during their worklives was quite different from the more unequal America they had known in their childhood. High levels of inequality are likewise an impressive feature of the America that greets the contemporary second generation. But this history lesson does seem to teach that bad things do not necessarily last forever.

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Endnotes

[1] In 1910, 1920, and 1960, a mother tongue question was asked only of foreign-born persons. In 1940, the question was asked of all "sample line persons", whereas in 1970 it was asked of all sampled persons. In 1910, 1920, and 1960, mother tongue meant the language spoken in the home prior to immigration. In 1940 and 1970, mother tongue meant the language spoken in the home as a child. For further details, see:

http://www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/pethnicity/mtonguea.html

[2] This particular choice of groups is consistent with the preoccupations of the contemporary debate. Portes and Rumbaut focus on the "offspring of working-class immigrants," about whose "future…and…chances for successful adaptation" they evince "concern" (2001: 59). In asking why concern is warranted now, when the offspring of the last group of labor group migrants moved nicely ahead, Portes and Rumbaut invariably refer to the Italians, and often to the Poles. The same comparison emerges among the proponents of the conventional view. Asking how economic restructuring might affect differences among first and second generations past and present, Alba and Nee explicitly see the issue as involving "the 'labor migrant' groups such as the Mexicans" and then immediately focus on the contrast to "the experiences of comparable European groups, such as the southern Italians…" (139-40). As the contemporary argument hinges on the experience of the labor migrant groups, consideration of the Jews – a sizeable component among yesterday's second generation – is not appropriate.

[3] See Joel Perlmann, "Toward a Population History of The Second Generation: Birth Cohorts of Southern-, Central- And Eastern- European Origins, 1871-1970," Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper 333, 2001, Table 3 and related text.

[4] For a fuller account, see Joel Perlmann, "Toward a Population History of The Second Generation: Birth Cohorts of Southern-, Central- And Eastern- European Origins, 1871-1970," Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper 333, 2001. To my knowledge, Perlmann is the first to identify both the shift from foreign to mixed parentage, as well as its possible significance; I am indebted to him for these insights. Perlmann also spoke of a "2.5 generation," though in passing, and identified this population as "the children of child immigrants." In this paper, the concept of a "second-and-a-half-generation" refers to all persons born of one foreign and one native parent, regardless of parent's age at time of migration to the United States.

[5] As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1, the differences are not quite so stark when the focus is restricted to the working-age population, as in the analyses to follow. Though the two second generation groups have a distinctively older age profile than do NWNPs, the interquartile distribution of the 2.5 generation groups is entirely encompassed by that of NWNPs. Compared to NWNPs, median age is one years lower among the Italian 2.5ers and three years higher among the Polish 2.5ers.

[6] Indeed, tabulations from the 1979 Current Population Survey, which included questions both about ancestry *and* parentage, show that 55 percent of the 25 year and older Italian ancestry population was either born abroad or had at least one foreign-born parent. Among those of pure Italian ancestry in the same age group, less than a third were born in the U.S. to U.S-born parents.

[7] Separate analyses, not fully reported here for purposes of simplicity, show interactions, at conventional levels of significance, between region and *all* of the ethnic, schooling, and industrial variables. Adding these interactions to a model including the groups, the

experience variables, the educational variables, the industrial variables, and a dummy for the northeast, significantly improves the fit of the model. F tests contrasting the original variable with the interactive term prove significant in *every* case. Most importantly for the concerns of this paper, the returns to all levels of education, except college, were likely to be significantly higher in the northeast than elsewhere in the country.

[8] Once again, I have run separate analyses, not fully reported here for purposes of simplicity, searching for differences in the impact of region on the key variables in the analysis. As with earnings, adding interactive terms for the ethnic, schooling, and industrial variables to a model including the groups, the experience variables, the educational variables, the industrial variables, and a dummy for the northeast, significantly improves the fit of the model. Unlike the case of earnings, however, F tests contrasting the original variable with the interactive term showed that the difference was not significant for the Polish second generation, the Polish second and a half generation, and for trade. The impact on SEI of all levels of education, except some high school, was likely to be significantly higher in the northeast than elsewhere in the country.

(a) Year of birth by group: all ages

(b): Year of birth by group: 25 to 64 years old only

Figure 1: Year of birth by group: (a) all ages; (b) 25 to 64 years old only

Table 1: Sample Size: Males only

	Total pop	Prime-age	Employed
NWNP	68,393	28,555	25,636
NBNP	37,289	10,294	7,999
ItNBFP	10,479	8,963	8,129
PolNBFP	5,723	4,886	4,343
ItNBMP	4,818	3,187	2,975
PolNBMP	2,227	1,633	1,503
Total	128,929	57,518	50,585

	Total pop	Prime-age	Employed
NWNP	53%	50%	51%
NBNP	29%	18%	16%
ItNBFP	8%	16%	16%
PolNBFP	4%	8%	9%
ItNBMP	4%	6%	6%
PolNBMP	2%	3%	3%

Note: NWNP is 1/10 sample; prime age=25-64

NWNP=native white, native parentage
NBNP=native black, native parentage
ItNBFP=Italian American native born, both parents born abroad
PolNBFP=Polish American native born, both parents born abroad
ItNBMP=Italian American native born, one parent born abroad, one parent born U.S.
PolNBMP=Italian American native born, one parent born abroad, one parent born U.S.

Table 2: Regression on employment in manufacturing

	United States			Northeast			Northeast Metros		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
NBNP	0.94 [2.18]*	0.845 (5.58)**	0.761 [8.86]**	0.778 [6.75]**	0.828 (4.92)**	0.74 [7.67]**	0.798 [5.74]**	0.816 (5.12)**	0.725 [7.85]**
ITNBFP	0.98 [0.68]	0.904 (3.12)**	0.85 [4.87]**	0.757 [7.66]**	0.898 (2.82)**	0.798 [5.64]**	0.779 [6.30]**	0.908 (2.36)*	0.801 [5.14]**
PNBFP	2.092 [20.96]**	1.761 (15.23)**	1.65 [12.97]**	1.637 [11.69]**	1.748 (13.02)**	1.531 [9.42]**	1.677 [11.25]**	1.718 (11.68)**	1.496 [8.25]**
ITNBMP	0.879 [2.88]**	0.817 (4.32)**	0.811 [4.47]**	0.667 [7.55]**	0.781 (4.53)**	0.764 [4.87]**	0.666 [7.01]**	0.763 (4.60)**	0.739 [5.09]**
PNBMP	1.551 [7.69]**	1.307 (4.58)**	1.295 [4.38]**	1.247 [3.30]**	1.292 (3.80)**	1.25 [3.27]**	1.228 [2.85]**	1.211 (2.64)**	1.168 [2.11]*
New England		1.631 (11.50)**	1.637 [11.52]**		1.255 (5.37)**	1.281 [5.81]**		1.21 (4.08)**	1.23 [4.39]**
Mid-Atlantic		1.298 (9.46)**	1.278 [8.82]**		1.644 (16.82)**	1.642 [16.66]**		1.692 (16.69)**	1.692 [16.56]**
Midwest		2.139 (27.31)**	2.114 [26.70]**						
metropolitan area		0.896 (4.56)**	0.938 [2.64]**		0.901 (2.90)**	0.919 [2.34]*			
experience			1 [0.00]			1.009 [1.65]			1.007 [1.25]
experience squared			1 [0.84]			1 [1.43]			1 [1.04]
elementary			1.218 [6.21]**			1.213 [4.59]**			1.203 [4.09]**
some high school			1.151 [5.05]**			1.138 [3.66]**			1.125 [3.10]**
some college			0.814 [5.64]**			0.833 [3.66]**			0.802 [4.10]**
college degree or more			0.57 [15.23]**			0.551 [11.91]**			0.554 [10.79]**
Observations	43574	43479	43479	24450	24450	24450	21394	21394	21394

Wald tests: Prob< chi2 for:

comparison to last model

	United States	Northeast	Northeast Metros
	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00

Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; coefficients displayed as odds ratios

Table 3: Regression on employment in manufacturing - inter-ethnic & inter-regional comparisons

F-Tests: Prob<F for inter-ethnic comparisons:

	United States			Northeast			Northeast Metros		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
ItNBFP v. ItNBMP	0.03	0.04	0.35	0.02	0.01	0.45	0.01	0.00	0.19
ItNBFP v. PoINBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ItNBFP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ItNBMP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. ItNBFP	0.23	0.06	0.21	0.52	0.05	0.09	0.56	0.01	0.03
NBNP v. ItNBMP	0.17	0.51	0.00	0.01	0.31	0.59	0.00	0.27	0.76
NBNP v. PoINBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PoINBFP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PoINBFP v PoINBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
regional effects									
New Eng v. Mid-Atl		0	0		0	0	0	0	
New Eng v. Midwest		0	0						
Mid-Atl v. Midwest		0	0						

Table 4: Regression on log of annual wage

	United States		Northeast		Northeast metros	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
NBNP	-0.36	-0.291	-0.385	-0.255	-0.425	-0.27
	[40.60]**	(36.00)**	[33.87]**	[24.51]**	[34.35]**	[23.98]**
ITNBNP	0.082	0.048	-0.011	0.044	-0.055	0.024
	[8.76]**	(5.41)**	[0.97]	[4.10]**	[4.42]**	[2.01]*
PNBNP	0.048	0.014	-0.053	0.003	-0.086	-0.016
	[4.08]**	-1.27	[3.96]**	[0.24]	[5.83]**	[1.18]
ITNBMP	0.141	0.046	0.038	0.04	-0.009	0.024
	[9.92]**	(3.72)**	[2.36]*	[2.81]**	[0.50]	[1.54]
PNBMP	0.134	0.041	0.032	0.023	0.001	0.004
	[7.06]**	(2.50)*	[1.49]	[1.27]	[0.06]	[0.21]
experience		0.029		0.025		0.025
		(27.71)**		[18.36]**		[16.09]**
experience squared		0		0		0
		(26.05)**		[17.39]**		[14.85]**
elementary only		-0.251		-0.2		-0.202
		(29.08)**		[17.66]**		[16.09]**
some high		-0.132		-0.108		-0.104
		(17.51)**		[11.38]**		[9.97]**
some college		0.123		0.147		0.155
		(12.77)**		[11.07]**		[10.62]**
college		0.406		0.404		0.399
		(43.03)**		[31.50]**		[28.07]**
manufacturing		0.085		0.07		0.065
		(13.18)**		[8.50]**		[7.18]**
construction		0.143		0.167		0.167
		(14.05)**		[11.92]**		[10.60]**
trade		-0.018		-0.016		-0.014
		(2.21)*		[1.45]		[1.13]
worked all year		1.024		0.994		0.984
		(100.07)**		[71.27]**		[62.68]**
worked 40-49 weeks		0.826		0.807		0.801
		(68.72)**		[50.48]**		[45.03]**
New England		0.057		-0.004		-0.029
		(4.85)**		[0.34]		[2.24]*
Mid-Atlantic		0.061				
		(8.39)**				
Midwest		0.123		0.057		0.064
		(15.99)**		[7.19]**		[7.26]**
metropolitan area		0.144		0.086		
		(22.16)**		[8.84]**		
Constant	8.931	7.517	9.033	7.671	9.081	7.778
	[1958.24]**	(451.60)**	[1257.48]**	[323.52]**	[1080.42]**	[304.70]**
Observations	46103	46006	25703	25703	21394	21394
R-squared	0.05	0.32	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.28

F-Tests: Prob<F for: comparison to last model

		0.00		0.00		0.00

Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 5: Regression on log of annual wage - interethnic comparisons
F-Tests: Prob<F for inter-ethnic comparisons

	United States		Northeast		Northeast metros	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
ItNBFP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.88	0.00	0.84	0.01	0.97
ItNBFP v. PolNBFP	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00
ItNBFP v. PolNBMP	0.01	0.67	0.05	0.29	0.02	0.36
ItNBMP v. PolNBMP	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.43	0.70	0.40
NBNP v. ItNBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. PolNBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. PolNBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PolNBFP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.36
PolNBFP v PolNBMP	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.36

Table 6: Regression on SEI

	United States		Northeast		Northeast metros	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
NBNP	-14.568	-9.692	-14.289	-8.658	-15.741	-9.127
	[48.03]**	[37.29]**	[35.86]**	[25.94]**	[36.52]**	[25.52]**
ITNBNP	-3.356	-0.014	-4.604	0.114	-5.948	-0.227
	[10.70]**	[0.05]	[11.88]**	[0.33]	[13.89]**	[0.61]
PNBNP	-6.39	-1.386	-7.894	-1.308	-9.295	-1.809
	[16.24]**	[4.07]**	[17.13]**	[3.34]**	[18.34]**	[4.21]**
ITNBMP	2.428	0.995	1.222	0.9	-0.67	0.354
	[5.13]**	[2.54]*	[2.18]*	[1.96]*	[1.10]	[0.71]
PNBMP	-0.809	-0.647	-1.8	-0.457	-2.847	-0.901
	[1.27]	[1.25]	[2.46]*	[0.77]	[3.57]**	[1.39]
experience		0.207		0.086		0.075
		[6.25]**		[1.92]		[1.53]
experience squared		-0.003		-0.001		-0.001
		[4.58]**		[1.05]		[0.75]
elementary		-14.012		-13.542		-13.593
		[50.90]**		[37.24]**		[34.11]**
some high school		-7.991		-8.163		-8.248
		[33.24]**		[26.80]**		[24.88]**
some college		13.215		14.451		14.304
		[43.16]**		[34.21]**		[31.13]**
college		29.273		29.815		29.414
		[98.44]**		[73.34]**		[65.85]**
manufacturing		-2.886		-3.064		-2.866
		[14.15]**		[11.64]**		[9.99]**
construction		-4.957		-5.777		-5.385
		[15.02]**		[12.59]**		[10.54]**
trade		0.901		0.864		0.891
		[3.40]**		[2.44]*		[2.33]*
New England		0.553		0.451		-0.107
		[1.49]		[1.24]		[0.26]
MidAtlantic		0.108				
		[0.46]				
Midwest		-0.468		-0.682		-0.551
		[1.91]		[2.66]**		[1.97]*
metropolitan area		2.573		1.671		
		[12.41]**		[5.36]**		
Constant	41.348	35.703	41.861	37.834	43.389	39.946
	[269.85]**	[77.48]**	[168.54]**	[56.99]**	[150.23]**	[58.15]**
Observations	43574	43479	24450	24450	20396	20396
R-squared	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.39	0.07	0.4

F-Tests: Prob<F for:

comparison to last model 0.00   0.00   0.00

Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 7: Regression on SEI - inter-ethnic comparisons

	United States		Northeast		Northeast metros	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
F-Tests: Prob<F for inter-ethnic comparisons:						
ItNBFP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.26
ItNBFP v. PoINBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ItNBFP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.35	0.00	0.31
ItNBMP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.09
NBNP v. ItNBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. PoINBFP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NBNP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PoINBFP v. ItNBMP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PoINBFP v. PoINBMP	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.19

Table 8: Comparison of 2.5 generation groups to NWNPs -- effect of alternative definitions of "Poles"

	Northeast			Northeast Metros			Midwest		
	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios
Italian 2.5	103%	104%	0.67	98%	99%	1.23	103%	116%	0.89
Polish 2.5 (non-yiddish-speaking MT)	96%	103%	1.25	93%	100%	0.67	92%	103%	1.11
Polish 2.5 (polish-speaking MT only)	88%	101%	1.44	86%	98%	1.46			
Significance of difference	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios	SEI	Wages	Mfg: odds ratios
from NWNPs									
Polish 2.5 (non-yiddish-speaking MT)	0.05	0.14	0.00	0.05	0.95	0.00	0.04	0.40	0.27
Polish 2.5 (polish-speaking MT only)	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.00			
from Italians									
Polish 2.5 (non-yiddish-speaking MT)	0.00	0.78	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.11
Polish 2.5 (polish-speaking MT only)	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.73	0.00			
Sample size									
Italian 2.5	1,922	1,986	1,922	1,661	1,986	1,661	354	364	354
Polish 2.5 (non-yiddish-speaking MT)	1,017	1,064	1,017	860	895	860	480	513	480
Polish 2.5 (polish-speaking MT only)	727	762	727	612	762	612	371	397	371

Note: comparisons of SEI and employment in manufacturing includes employed persons only; comparison of wages includes persons with non-zero wage and salary income.

Appendix table 1: Employed men -- means and standard deviations by group

	NWNP		NBNP		ItFP		PoINBFP		ItNBMP		PoINBMP	
	Means	StDev	Means	StDev	Means	StDev	Means	StDev	Means	StDev	Means	StDev
exp	24.22	11.98	24.39	11.99	31.80	9.73	33.78	8.79	22.82	10.38	25.73	10.84
expsq	730.29	630.16	738.91	660.36	1105.73	601.66	1218.34	569.03	628.30	515.93	779.36	576.51
elem	0.18	0.38	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43	0.30	0.46	0.11	0.31	0.15	0.36
somehigh	0.18	0.39	0.30	0.46	0.28	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.42
hs	0.34	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.26	0.44	0.38	0.48	0.35	0.48
somecoll	0.13	0.34	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.26	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.32
col	0.17	0.37	0.06	0.23	0.09	0.29	0.09	0.28	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37
neweng	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.17	0.15	0.36	0.12	0.33	0.12	0.33	0.06	0.23
midat	0.14	0.34	0.35	0.48	0.53	0.50	0.39	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.35	0.48
midwest	0.17	0.38	0.29	0.45	0.12	0.32	0.31	0.46	0.14	0.34	0.36	0.48
otherus	0.65	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.20	0.40	0.17	0.38	0.25	0.43	0.24	0.43
sma	0.56	0.50	0.88	0.32	0.84	0.37	0.80	0.40	0.83	0.38	0.80	0.40
mfg	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.28	0.45	0.41	0.49
construc	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.30	0.07	0.25	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.25
trade	0.16	0.37	0.14	0.35	0.20	0.40	0.14	0.35	0.20	0.40	0.16	0.37

Appendix table 2: Men with annual earnings in 1969 -- means and standard deviations by group

	NWNP Means	StDev	NBNP Means	StDev	ItFP Means	StDev	PoINBFP Means	StDev	ItNBMP Means	StDev	PoINBMP Means	StDev
employed	0.90	0.30	0.77	0.42	0.90	0.29	0.89	0.31	0.93	0.25	0.92	0.27
exp	23.95	12.08	24.20	12.03	31.80	9.86	33.83	8.92	22.66	10.44	25.82	11.14
expsq	719.33	633.36	730.45	659.65	1108.58	611.25	1224.31	577.46	622.59	516.60	790.59	595.10
elem	0.18	0.38	0.26	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.30	0.46	0.11	0.31	0.16	0.37
somehigh	0.19	0.39	0.30	0.46	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.45	0.22	0.42	0.23	0.42
hs	0.34	0.47	0.29	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.26	0.44	0.37	0.48	0.34	0.47
somecoll	0.13	0.34	0.09	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.13	0.34	0.12	0.32
col	0.16	0.37	0.05	0.22	0.09	0.28	0.08	0.27	0.16	0.36	0.15	0.36
neweng	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.17	0.15	0.36	0.13	0.33	0.12	0.33	0.06	0.23
midat	0.14	0.35	0.34	0.47	0.53	0.50	0.38	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.34	0.47
midwest	0.18	0.38	0.29	0.45	0.12	0.32	0.32	0.47	0.14	0.34	0.37	0.48
otherus	0.64	0.48	0.34	0.47	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38	0.24	0.43	0.23	0.42
sma	0.57	0.49	0.88	0.33	0.85	0.36	0.81	0.39	0.83	0.38	0.80	0.40
allyear	0.80	0.40	0.67	0.47	0.80	0.40	0.80	0.40	0.81	0.39	0.81	0.39
wks40to4	0.12	0.33	0.21	0.41	0.13	0.34	0.13	0.34	0.13	0.33	0.13	0.33
mfg	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.51	0.50	0.31	0.46	0.44	0.50
construc	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.28	0.10	0.30	0.06	0.25	0.09	0.28	0.07	0.26
trade	0.16	0.36	0.14	0.35	0.17	0.38	0.13	0.33	0.19	0.39	0.15	0.36
blmfg	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: means and standard deviations for employed include all men, 25-64