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The Machine and its Parts: Political and Aesthetic Value in Early Greek Epic

By

John Andrew Wein

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University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Leslie Kurke, Chair

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Professor Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi

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ABSTRACT

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Doctor of Philosophy in Classics

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Professor Leslie Kurke, Chair

This dissertation is a study of the early meaning and epic discourse of the word κόσμος. I argue that the traditional semantics of the word is flawed and make the case that this error has obscured a great deal of the work which the word does for the epic tradition, being the one by which it conceives the whole of its diegetic world. After an introduction in which I contextualize this study as the first step in a larger genealogy of *order* as a political and aesthetic value in the Greco-Roman world, I proceed to make the argument in three chapters, a conclusion, and a fairly technical appendix.

The first of these chapters takes aim at the consensus view according to which κόσμος, by the time of its first appearance in Homer, has already as its basic meaning something so abstract and universal as our own notion of *order*. My basic claim is that this view retrojects a way of thinking that, while deeply familiar to us today, does not find clear expression in the Greek world before Plato and Aristotle. I argue that the linguistic context in which the word most often appears, the adverbial phrase κατὰ κόσμον, is falsely accommodating of an abstraction like *order*, and show how scholars, to account for the handful of cases in which the inadequacy of this translation is clearest, the cases, that is, in which the word refers unmistakably to something particular and concrete, import a secondary sense which has no more place in Homer than *order*: on the supposition that the Greeks have always thought that order is the cause of a thing's beauty, they claim that κόσμος comes to be the word for an *ornament* of one kind or another.

I argue in the second chapter that κόσμος, so far from naming anything ideal, is just the word for a concrete tool or instrument of some complexity, the word for a machine, device, or apparatus which one or more people assemble and put to use pursuant to some end. In that majority of the word's cases, the adverbial ones in which the conduct of characters is said either to accord or not accord with κόσμος, the instrument in question, I argue, is none other than the world that Zeus has made, the great political machine by which he, as lord of all gods and men, goes about the work of accomplishing his cosmic will.

With the third chapter, I provide a picture of the structure and working of this politico-cosmic machine, and try to show how it grounds all value in epic: one either does one's part in the functioning of the world and is virtuous, or fails to do so and is vicious; there is no system of values

transcending this instrumental principle. Sketching out this picture and arguing this point requires me to involve myself in one of the oldest and thorniest of Homeric controversies, the issue of his conception of fate, which he and his characters speak of using words like μοῖρα, μέρος, and αἴσα, each of which should mean *portion*, as in a portion of something concrete. Building on the work of R. B. Onians, I argue that these portions are the portions of a mystical thread by which Zeus is imagined to bind and yoke his subjects to perform their respective roles in his κόσμος; there exists in epic, in other words, no fate beyond the inevitability of Zeus's will. This sketch of the world complete, I conclude the chapter by arguing briefly, taking as my case study an aphorism of Heraclitus, that the Presocratic philosophers, contrary to the consensus of historians of philosophy, were not the first to speak of the world as a κόσμος, and do not even conceive of it as such; rather, when they use this word, they are referring back to the Homeric world-concept and tinkering with it in order to articulate their own novel theories of reality.

I then consider in the conclusion what surviving epic has to say about the nature of epic. If, as I maintain, this is a poetic tradition which admits of no values beyond the instrumental ones that make the world cohere as a κόσμος, what good can there be in epic song? I argue that singers, working under the Muses, are the part of the κόσμος whose job it is to celebrate the κόσμος; the songs that they sing, these κόσμοι of words, are instruments of praise which perform their celebratory function by recording the past operations of Zeus's κόσμος; these songs have value and are beautiful to the extent that they do this.

Finally, the appendix offers support on verse-technical grounds for a claim I make in the third chapter, namely, that the *portion* words usually regarded as terms for fate are in fact part of the discourse of κόσμος. I demonstrate that εἶ / οὐ κατὰ κόσμον and the very similar set of phrases built around the *portion* words (κατὰ μοῖραν, κατ' αἴσαν, ὑπὲρ μέρος, etc.) form a single system of metrically diverse phrases which the poet can reach for and use interchangeably according to convenience.

For my mother, Karen Wein-Gordon

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is the start of a genealogy of *order* as a political and aesthetic value. It is an attempt to explain from where and in what form there arose the now familiar homology, usually associated with Plato and Aristotle, that the just community and the successful work of art are each a *whole of well-ordered parts*. My claim, to put it first in as few words as possible, is that the origin of this thinking predates the emergence of the notion of *order* as a kind of abstract entity; and that philologists and philosophers alike, by the anachronism of attributing a reified and ideal *order* to our earliest sources, have inadvertently obscured the logic by which political and aesthetic value come to exhibit this curious isomorphism. Underpinning our political and aesthetic wholes, I will argue, is the logic of a certain discourse which goes back to the epic tradition of Homer and Hesiod, by which the practitioners of this tradition sought to naturalize and police the culturally dominant and decidedly authoritarian ideology of archaic Greece. The somewhat paradoxical thing is this: the very discourse from which these political and aesthetic wholes emerge is one that works by denying any distinction between political and aesthetic value. How could this be?

Here what we need is a brief outline of the discourse and the work that it does. The key term in it is κόσμος, and this is the one which scholars agree means something like *order*. We will see that its meaning comes closer to *machine* or *apparatus*, being a word for a concrete tool or instrument of some complexity, like a bridle or a bow and arrow, to name two conventional ones; but what is important is what the epic tradition does with the word: it conceives the entire world of its diegesis, which will turn out to be a fundamentally *social* world consisting of mortal and immortal persons, as a single κόσμος, the great political apparatus by which Zeus, the father of gods and men, having long ago assembled it, goes about the work of accomplishing his cosmic will. Every other whole of parts within this (social) world, whether it be the community under its king, the household under its patriarch, or even the meal that a household slave prepares for her charge, is conceived as a further *kosmos* nested within, and ultimately serving the larger purpose of, the world-constituting *kosmos* of Zeus. Every one of these wholes is an instrument which one or more agents assemble and operate in the act of performing (not always wittingly) their respective roles under the great god Zeus. Ruler and ruled alike thus find themselves serving the same *instrumental* role, distinguished only by the level at which they serve it, as the members of a single κόσμος. This, in sum, is the part we would call *political*.

Now for the part we would describe as *aesthetic*.¹ The epic tradition authorizes itself as a cultural production by claiming to be a further part of Zeus's global instrument: its songs are the κόσμοι of words by which Zeus, working through the Muses and the poets they teach, celebrates his own machine and memorializes the past occasions on which he has used it to carry out his will.² An epic song, by this logic, is an "instrument of words" (κόσμος ἐπέων) assembled to serve a particular function; it is a tool which has value only to the extent that it serves this function, accurately representing this cosmic instrument in operation on a specific occasion, with every player, from god to mortal, and king to commoner, receiving a portion of representation proportionate to the particular role they play in the mechanism.³ This is the representational logic

¹ It should be clear from what I have said so far that I am not, in my use of the word *aesthetic*, taking it for granted that the early Greeks had any such word or concept at their disposal; on the issue of which, see Porter 2010: 25-69.

² On praise (and blame) as the basic function of early Greek poetry, see Detienne 1999 and Nagy 1979: 211-75.

³ The phrase κόσμος ἐπέων comes from Solon (fr. 1.2 West; cf. 4.9-10, 32-33, and 13.11-13 for his further uses of κόσμος language), who uses it in relation to one of his own songs, but we will see below that he is far from the first

of epic—it is the logic of a politico-cosmic machine translated mimetically into an aesthetic one, with the latter serving to naturalize the former, such that, wherever one looks, there appears to be nothing beyond the κόσμος of Zeus and its perpetual operation.⁴

The question then becomes, if you will grant me this much for just a moment, how the logic of a poetic discourse which effectively denies a distinction between political and aesthetic value comes nevertheless, as it were, by a kind of mitosis, to be inscribed at the center of our own, apparently autonomous domains of political and aesthetic value. This is a question that lies regrettably beyond the scope of the present study, and it is for this reason that I called it above *the start* to a genealogy of the well-ordered whole. I manage in the chapters that follow just to put down the foundation for an answer to that larger question, and so it will be appropriate to say something here by way of forecast, before returning to the substance of the dissertation.

The thing to keep in mind, pursuant to that forecast, is the central place of Homer and Hesiod in the culture of archaic and classical Greece. The tendency nowadays is to think of these names as poetic personas, as characters which the earliest practitioners of epic would play in their performances, but the Greeks of recorded history always took them for the names of historical persons: these *personae* become for them the fathers and face of the entire tradition, the pair behind the oldest and greatest of its crystalized productions, the poems that did so much to construct for the Greeks both a Panhellenic identity and a coherent vision of the world they inhabited.⁵ This is how Xenophanes, who seems to have spent his sixth and fifth-century life traveling from one Greek city to the next, working as a professional bard, can say that “all men from the beginning have learned according to Homer” (ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ Ὀμηρον...μεμαθήκασι πάντες, B 10); and likewise how Heraclitus, a generation or so later, can say that “Hesiod is the teacher of most men” (διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος, B 57).⁶

But it is with the fifth-century Herodotus, in a famous discussion from the second book of his *Histories*, that the major contribution of these educators is first unpacked for us. He tells us that the earliest Greeks did not yet know the names of the different gods, and so could only address them corporately, calling them θεοί—something like *the Arrangers*—from what was most obvious and most important about them: “that they, having *arranged* in a *cosmic* way all of the doings and all distributions, were holding them that way” (ὅτι κόσμῳ θέντες τὰ πάντα πρήγματα καὶ πάσας νομὰς εἶχον, 2.52).⁷ It was clear to these earliest Greeks, in other words, that there existed some

of our sources to call a song a κόσμος. Homer, for instance, does this already at *Od.* 8.492; on which, see the conclusion to this dissertation.

⁴ My focus on the aesthetic side of things is accordingly fairly narrow. Being concerned here only with the logic of epic representation, I will not, for instance, have much to say about the beauty of this kind of song, or about the pleasures of experiencing it sung. On these issues, see Peponi 2012.

⁵ On Homer and Hesiod as Panhellenic, see Nagy 1990a: 36-82 and 1990b: 52-81. On the idea of Homer as a person, see West 1999, Graziosi 2002, Lefkowitz 2012: 14-29, and Porter 2021. For the ancient reception of the two monumental epics, see Hunter 2018.

⁶ For the fragments of Xenophanes, with detailed commentary, see Lesher 1992. Fragments B 11 and 12 make it plain that the context for what he says above was critique; but see also B 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, and 26, where, despite the poets not being named, he is clearly responding to views about the gods represented by them. For the fragments of Heraclitus, also with detailed commentary, see Kahn 1979 and Robinson 1987. He makes the above claim, like Xenophanes, in the service of a critique: he goes on to say that Hesiod, despite being the person whom most agree knew the most, nevertheless errs in distinguishing night from day, since these are in fact one thing. For other fragments like this, see A 22, B 40, 42, 56, 104, and 105.

⁷ Note that the collocation of τίθεσθαι with adverbial κόσμῳ is *not* a common one. I have not encountered it outside of Herodotus, and he elsewhere uses it just once, though in a very telling context: his procedural description of the manufacture of the Persian pontoon bridges, that marvel of an apparatus by which Xerxes led his immense army across the Hellespont (7.35). For another ancient etymology of θεός, this time from θέειν, meaning “to run,” see Plato, *Cra.*

other and superhuman persons, individuals who had long ago come to some agreement about what things needed doing and who it was that would do each thing; and they believed this *kosmic* arrangement explained the world of their daily experience, but knew nothing more about it. And things went on like this for a long time, until eventually they learned from the Egyptians the names of the gods, a big thing because it allowed them to single each of them out for prayer and sacrifice; but they were still in the dark about the nature of the gods and the specifics of their working arrangement. This, the story goes, was the dim situation of the Greeks prior to the arrival of Homer and Hesiod (2.53):

ἔνθεν δὲ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὅκοῖοί τε τινες τὰ εἶδεα, οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἠλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μεν πρεσβυτέρους καὶ οὐ πλέοσι. οὗτοι δὲ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἑλλησι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἶδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.

But from where each of the gods came to exist, or whether they were all always existing, and what they were like with respect to their forms, the Greeks did not know until yesterday or the day before it, so to speak. For I believe that Hesiod and Homer are older than me in age by four-hundred years and no more. And it was these who made a theogony for the Greeks, gave to the gods their titles, distributed [to them] their honors and crafts, and gave description to their forms.

It was Homer and Hesiod, then, which is to say, the poetic tradition they were made to represent, who finally gave definition to the world and its ways; they put faces to the names of the gods, and they explained what it is that each of them does, the particular role that each of them plays, in the cooperative work of creating and maintaining an environment that is hospitable (or at the very least life-sustaining) to us mortals.

I have already provided a basic sketch of the nature and structure of this social world above, and I will have much more to say about it later; I go through all of this now just to underscore the point that the world of epic, this social world of gods and men structured as a political machine, is for the Greeks the orthodox conception of reality; it is the view of the dominant culture. And so anything that is new in the world, anything that is heterodox, will naturally take some position, critical or otherwise, relative to this picture and its established, widely understood language and categories. This goes for Xenophanes and Heraclitus above, who refer to Homer and Hesiod invariably to critique, each in his own way, some aspect of the traditional worldview; and it likewise goes for Plato and Aristotle, who have a rather more complicated relationship with epic, being the philosophers with whom that mitotic split would seem to take place.⁸ The long and the

397c4-d7; and for the modern view, see Beekes 2010: 540 s.v. θεός. Finally, I recognize that “in a *kosmic* way” is a somewhat clumsy and only partial translation of κόσμῳ, but it avoids the complication of a linguistic issue that would only derail us here at the start of things. The short of it is that translations like “with order” or “in order” make it seem as though a reified and ideal kind of entity is being invoked.

⁸ I come close here in several respects to the now-classic work of Havelock 1969, from whom I have learned a great deal. He argues that epic poetry, despite being an entirely oral medium, served the early Greeks as a kind of “social encyclopedia” (31) and “compendium of inherited lore” (66), taking this to be the reason why Plato, in the work of introducing a new and revolutionary mode of thought called philosophy, is so critical of Homer and the traditional technology of epic. The similarities, I take it, will be obvious enough from what follows, but a couple of the differences are important and worth stressing here. The first of them is that Havelock emphasizes the break between what he calls

short of it is that the pair adopt the instrumental core of the traditional picture, insofar as their worlds remain thoroughly *organic* in structure—the Socrates of the *Republic* can say, for example, that “the excellence (ἀρετή), beauty (κάλλος), and correctness (ὀρθότης) of every implement, living thing, and action has nothing to do with anything other than the use (τὴν χρείαν) for which each has been made or grown” (601d); and Aristotle will take it for granted at the outset of his *Nicomachean Ethics* that human beings *qua* human beings, like every other natural thing, have a particular function in the world (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 1097b24), a single job, like lyre playing for the lyre player, by the virtuous execution of which we thrive as human beings—but they repackage this instrumental outlook in new and far more abstract and analytical terms, ones that are no longer overtly political.

Of the pair, it is Plato who remains more faithful to the terms of the epic discourse. The world of our experience is for him still a κόσμος, but it is no longer a fundamentally *political* instrument, one by the operation of which a supreme god executes his policy and plans as king, showing little concern for the situation and suffering of most mortals. It is now instead a *mimetic* κόσμος: it is the product—an intelligent and living thing with a body and soul, but no less an artifact—of a divine craftsman, the δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός who at some point endeavored to produce from chaotic and recalcitrant matter the image of another reality beyond time and space: an altogether abstract reality of essences like Justice, Beauty, and Good, the very *things* behind these words, to which we are always referring whenever we speak of persons or things or actions as being just or beautiful or good.⁹ In other words, to give the instrumental world a non-political principle, to make it something that is structured, not according to the expedience, advantage, and will of an operator, but according to what is *really* and *truly* to the benefit of everyone, Plato demotes it to the status of a representation: the world becomes the physical image, an εἰκὼν, of another and perfect non-physical world; it becomes a κόσμος that works, not at all unlike the poet’s κόσμος ἐπέων, only to the extent that it manages to capture in its medium the lineaments of the world it has been made to imitate.¹⁰

“the image-thinking of poetry and the abstract thinking of philosophy” (266), which amounts essentially to a move from a world conceived as consisting only of concrete and visible particulars that are imitated in song to one in which there exist invisible and universal essences behind what we see, things which are the causes of all that we see, whereas I am primarily interested in the ideological continuity that survives this break and comes to be naturalized by it. The second is that Havelock would like to see the break between poetry and philosophy as a development that is teleological in nature: he tends to speak of Platonism as something which was inevitable, a “historical necessity” (267) for the Greek mind making its way down the path that leads toward the scientific thought of modernity. I struggle to see this progress, finding instead only the mystification of a worldview that was, for all its brutality, comparatively and refreshingly honest about power, politics, and the nature of value. For the further development of his view, see especially Havelock 1978.

⁹ We hear the most about the craftsman and the nature of his work in the *Timaeus*, of which see especially 27d5-29d6, the prologue to the discourse of *Timaeus*, along with the commentary of Cornford 1937 and Zeyl 2000; it is concluded there that the craftsman must be good and that his work, this κόσμος, is therefore an image of true being. There is (*pace* Owen 1953, and in agreement with Robinson 2004: 7-22) no reason not to take Plato seriously here, and this fact about the nature of our reality should, in turn, make it clear enough that Plato is not opposed to μίμησις *per se*, as it is sometimes claimed; his issue is rather with the traditional forms of imitation practiced by his culture. The important thing for him is always the nature of the imitated object and the medium in which it is imitated. Thus he consistently approves of choral dance and makes a place for it in his utopias; on which, see especially Kurke 2013: 123-70 and Peponi 2013: 212-39. On the subject of μίμησις more generally, see, *inter alia*, Havelock 1963: 20-35, Lucas 1968: 258-72, Nagy 1990b: 42-47 (*et passim*) and 1996: 6-103, and Halliwell 1988: 109-37 and 2002.

¹⁰ Note that the singer of epic, according to epic, *is* a kind of demiurge, sharing the title with seers, doctors, heralds, and carpenters, that is, specialists or technicians of one form or another. For the list, see *Od.* 17.383-85 and 19.135 with the comments of Finley 1957: 156 n. 4.

But this revised conception of the world as a κόσμος undermines for obvious reasons the poet's claim to a unique form of wisdom. The songs that he sings, which are supposed to explain mimetically the nature and workings of reality, are just the image of an image.¹¹ It is the philosopher alone who understands the models behind these images, and his access to them uniquely qualifies him to rule over others without the fortune of their familiarity: he becomes by his association with these ideal things as similar as humanly possible to them, and then, like the cosmic craftsman but on a local level, sets about the demiurgic activity of molding the other members of his community, giving to each of them an appropriate role to play to the single end of the city's operation, so that they be made to resemble as well, to the extent that it is possible for them, the perfection of these entities.¹² The traditional logic of a cosmico-political instrument is thus retained, but made to serve, not the political purpose of a king, but a quasi-naturalized good and the system of values it anchors, all of the things which it is the work of this κόσμος to imitate in matter.

Things change in important ways with Aristotle. The world for him is not the political instrument of epic, nor the mimetic instrument of Plato, nor any other sort of κόσμος you might imagine: this is not even a word which he likes to use with reference to the world, except when he is discussing the views of others who do.¹³ His reasons are clear enough: his world, which has no beginning, is not something that was ever made or assembled; and its constituent parts do not, by their relative arrangement and respective activity, cooperate to perform any one particular function.¹⁴ And yet, though his world be no artifactual instrument, it is nevertheless, as I have already remarked above, still pervaded by the instrumental logic of a κόσμος. How is this?

The answer has much to do with the manner in which Aristotle adapts the Platonic picture for his own. Forms no longer enjoy an independent kind of existence, and so there is no need for the world to work as the concrete expression of their abstract existence. They do still exist though, and they are still the reason (or most of the reason) that all things are what they respectively are; it is just that these forms are now inseparable (except in thought) from the discrete portions of matter they inform, the hylomorphic compounds that are for Aristotle the basic bearers of being, so-called primary substances.¹⁵ And while there is for Aristotle no craftsman god who ever made the world, it is nonetheless a god who has always made the world what it is. The god himself, this prime unmoved mover, does nothing but the most excellent and blissful thing there is for him to do, which is to contemplate the excellence of his own existence.¹⁶ This is the thing he has always done and what he will continue to do forever; and it is by the example he constantly sets that he *indirectly* makes the rest of the world what it is. He inspires by his activity all other natural entities

¹¹ For the point, see *Resp.* 10.595a-602b.

¹² This all comes, of course, from the *Republic*, but the passage I have in mind is 6.499d10-502c8. The philosopher king is there called “a demiurge of self-control, justice, and the whole of the popular virtue” (δημιουργόν... σωφροσύνης τε και δικαιοσύνης και συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς), also “a painter of constitutions” (πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος), and the class of them are “the painters who use the divine model” (διαγράφειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι).

¹³ On this point about Aristotle's use of the word, see Johnson 2019.

¹⁴ On the eternity of motion in the world, see *Ph.* 8.1. So far as I know, the closest that Aristotle ever comes to claiming that there is a single, unifying purpose to the arrangement of natural things is *Met.* 12.10.1075a11-25. But observe that the analogies he reaches for there are two Homeric κόσμοι (the first being an army under its commander, the second a household under its master), the instrumental logic of which he works hard in the moment to downplay, using throughout, for instance, the more neutral τάξις instead of κόσμος. The reason that he has to twist things is that his god, as I explain shortly, does not actually do anything with the world.

¹⁵ See, for instance, *Ph.* 2.1 and *Met.* 7.10-11.

¹⁶ On the need for a prime mover and the nature of his activity, see *Ph.* 8.6 and *Met.* 12.6-10.

to imitate him—each of them to the extent that it is able, from the planets and stars, who are closest to him, on down to the lowliest of terrestrial beings—by actualizing their own forms, which is to say, by performing the particular functions they each have by virtue of their respective forms. In short, the world is the way it is, it exhibits the rational structure that it always has, because it consists of beings, mortal and immortal alike, which have always yearned to be like this mind contemplating mind.

This is how we get a world that is not itself a machine, having never been assembled to serve any particular purpose, but which is nevertheless filled with entities that do have, by virtue of their form-determined natures, some particular function in the world, some particular job to perform, by the excellent performance of which they are themselves excellent and godlike versions of themselves. The instrumental logic of a κόσμος, in other words, which first appears at the center of a thoroughly political account of existence, finds itself fully naturalized in Aristotle's system of reality. And this explains why he continues to see a clear parallel between natural things and artifacts, such that he can and regularly does reach for one to explain some aspect of the other—the only major distinction between them being the one which he himself introduces: that natural things have, by virtue of their forms, an internal source of motion, whereas artifacts require external agents to actualize their forms and execute their functions.¹⁷

This brings us finally to the role of μίμησις in the thought of Aristotle. It is not, as it had been for epic, where it was strictly policed by the Muses, an instrument for the celebration of the κόσμος and its members. Nor is it, as it was for Plato, the sad fact of our fleshly existence, on the one hand, and on the other, a harmful set of cultural productions, ones which actively mislead people about the nature of reality and our places within it. Aristotle does nothing so lofty or metaphysical with it, but this, as anyone familiar with his *Poetics* will know, is certainly not to suggest that he has nothing to say on the subject. Human beings, he thinks, are naturally mimetic animals: we do our earliest learning in this way, and we continue throughout life to derive pleasure from the contemplation of mimetic objects. Indeed, the very same cultural forms which Plato had dismissed, pitting himself and philosophy against them as rivals in a contested field of cultural authority, Aristotle now regards as things which draw people, by the contemplation of meaning and structure, towards a fairly philosophical mode of thought.¹⁸

The important thing for our purpose is that these mimetic objects, freed now from their traditional function, and recuperated as objects of philosophical reflection, nevertheless retain the old organic logic of κόσμοι, though it is here expressed in new and rather more abstract terminology. Like every other artifact which human beings make and use, the different kinds of mimetic object have their own forms, these being distinguished by the media used, the objects represented, and the different modes in which they are represented. And in every one of these objects, by virtue of its form, there exists some *capacity, power, or potential* to work in a certain way, some δύναμις that provides it with a proper *function*, the ἔργον of the thing, the performance of which is the *end* or *goal* of the object, its τέλος.¹⁹ What matters most of all—what makes it possible for a mimetic object to actualize its potential, perform its function, and accordingly serve the purpose for which it was made—is, first, that the object have all of its mimetic parts, whatever

¹⁷ For this distinction between natural things and artifacts, see the first two chapters of *Ph.* 2 with the commentary of Ross 1936: 24-26 and Charlton 1970: xvi-xvii.

¹⁸ These points are made at *Poet.* 4.1448b4-19, but see also 9.1451a38-51b11.

¹⁹ Aristotle uses these words in relation to tragedy, other types of poetry, and mimesis in general throughout the *Poetics*, but see, for instance, 9.1451b38 (ἡ...τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις), 13.1452b29-30 (τὸ τῆς τραγωδίας ἔργον), and 6.1450a22-23 (τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας).

they happen to be, and second, that these parts be arranged in the right way, such that they form what Aristotle calls a *system* (σύστασις) or *synthesis* (σύνθεσις). With tragic drama, which is his focus, but also with epic—both of which work, he says, as a representation of an action that is complete and whole—the form of the artifact is its *story* (μῦθος), or more precisely, *the system of its events* (σύστασις πραγμάτων).²⁰ The arrangement of these parts is what gives the representations of the poet and dramatist the capacity to work; and when they actualize this power in their poetry, making good work of the plot, they produce a product that functions, a tool that serves its purpose; which is, at least in the case of tragic drama, perhaps also epic, famously, the goal of “effecting through pity and fear the catharsis of such emotions” (δι’ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν, 1449b27-28).²¹ It matters not, then, that Aristotle, in his ranking of the various elements of a tragic production, relegates κόσμος—by which he means, not *ornament* or *embellishment*, but the entire staging *apparatus*, that is, all of the costumes, masks, props, etc. that are needed to put on the production—to the penultimate position on his list: he has already embedded the logic of a κόσμος in his conception of the μῦθος as a kind of *organic whole*, which he puts at the top of his list.²²

This is just a brief and partial sketch of the discourse’s afterlife, one that sidesteps more than a few points of controversy in the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, and one that also ignores, by its focus on these two philosophers, a whole host of other engagements with the discourse. I offer it here, not with the expectation that it will be enough to persuade anyone, but just to give a sense of the direction I see myself heading with this genealogy. Enough then about what is not in the dissertation; let me say something now about the argument and structure of what is.

The key thing is that the presentation reflects rather faithfully the order in which I asked and answered questions for myself. In other words, I did not arrive at all or even most of my conclusions and then start to write. My tendency, rather, is to think and write inductively. There are positives and negatives to this procedure. On the bad side, you will have to follow me as I work word by word through some stretch of text; you will have to endure me collecting and sorting through all the Homer instances of one word or another; and you will have to hang in there when I jump around from one book of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* to another, tracking the moves of a character or the development of some plot point. The read is doubtless a little laborious in this way, and the big conclusions come slow (I do not, for instance, give a proper definition of κόσμος until the second chapter, and it is not before the third that I describe in any detail the structure of the cosmic machine). But on the good side of the split, you do get to see my work and the train of my thought every step of the way, if only the better to help me find what holes there are in it. I say all of this in part as defense, in part because I want to provide here, as an offset to some of the labor, a rather more concise statement of the argument.

²⁰ For these points and terms, see especially *Poet.* 6-8.

²¹ I do not mean here to wade into the vexed issue of Aristotle’s use of κάθαρσις, but just to say that this, whatever we take it to mean, is what tragedies, if they are well constructed with respect to their plots, produce by function in their audiences. For an introduction to the issue and an overview of the interpretations offered, see Halliwell 1988: 168-201, 350-56 and Munteanu 2012.

²² Cf. *Poet.* 21.1457b1-3, where κόσμος appears as the name for a class of words that are usually regarded by commentators as *ornamental* in function; we might do better, however, to describe them as *fitting out* or *equipping* other words. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s discussion of this word class appears to have dropped out of the text, but see *Rh.* 3.1.1404a29-35, 3.2.1404b5-12, and 3.7.1408a10-15, where the idea would seem to be much the same; and cf. *Rh.* 3.2.1405a13-22, where Aristotle draws a distinction between *kosmifying* and blaming by way of metaphor.

The first chapter is a record of my struggle with the long-standing consensus about the early semantics of κόσμος. This is the view that the word, which has no clear etymology, and so must be explained on the evidence of Homer and Hesiod, in whose poetry it first appears to us, has by then already two distinct meanings, the first and basic of the pair being *order*, the second and derivative being *ornament*. To start with *order*, the problem I have is that the word, in the way we tend to use it today, names an essence that is abstract, universal, and very often ideal; and it would seem that Homer, to judge from the kind of language he uses, takes no thought of anything so weirdly metaphysical as this. What other words in the poems are supposed to work in this way? It is far from clear, for instance, that any of his moral or political terms do. Δίκη, for one, never signifies anything approaching *ideal* justice, but always the particular justice of Zeus, that is, the judgements and commands by which he and the mortal kings who serve him *make manifest* his will (δίκη deriving from δεικνύναι). And the closely related θέμις, for another, does not mean *law* or *right* in some absolute sense, but refers instead to one or more of the specific ordinances which Zeus has *set down* for gods and men to follow (θέμις probably deriving from τιθέναι). And the same, I think, could be shown for the rest of the words of this kind, both on the positive side and the negative: they are all used always with reference to particulars, and all have normative force with reference to the particular political arrangement of Zeus and the gods.

As for the *ornament* meaning, the basic problem I have with it is its alleged derivation, which takes for granted precisely this anachronistic notion of *order* as an abstract and universal ideal. Indeed, the derivation is supposed to be strong evidence that the Greeks have always been an order-obsessed people: because even the earliest of them thought that a thing was beautiful when it exhibited order, they came at some point well before written record to use the word for *order* in signification of that quintessentially beautiful item, the one that lends its own beauty to embellish some other person or thing. I argue against the early advent of an *ornamental* meaning that something like it comes to exist *after* Homer and Hesiod, through the later interpretation of the word's use in a traditional context of epic, that is, the divine toilette, such as Hera's in *Iliad* 14 (187) or Pandora's in both the *Theogony* (573-87) and *Works and Days* (72-76). The κόσμος the goddess assembles about herself, and the one which Athena and her divine attendants fasten about the manufactured maiden, is an *apparatus* for seduction, the one to be aimed at Zeus, the other at humankind. It is incidental to the meaning of the word that the apparatuses in question are ones that work by way of ornamenting the persons who use them.²³

But the major consequence of the meaning's retrojection is that it has armed philologists with a work-around whenever they encounter an instance of κόσμος for which the abstractness of order makes it an impossible translation. They say each time, with varying degrees of plausibility, that the word just means *ornament* instead of *order* and move on. On the surface of things, then, there has seemed to be little reason to suspect that any significant interpretive error has occurred. And yet the error is reflected clearly enough in the curious distribution of the *order* and *ornament* meanings in Homer. Κόσμος only ever has its primary sense when it is used effectively as an adverb, either on its own in the dative, κόσμῳ (*with* or *by order*), or in the phrase κατὰ κόσμον (*in accord with order*). This adverbial use accounts for fifteen of the word's eighteen total instances. Only in the remaining three cases does the word act straightforwardly as a noun, and in each of

²³ Hera's case is nevertheless interesting in a way that Pandora's is not. On the one hand, it is by a plan of Zeus that Pandora is fabricated, and she is kosmified with all the gear she wears in order to accomplish *his* purpose. But Hera is a different story: she *kosmifies* herself pursuant to her own plan, hoping by her κόσμος to distract Zeus and undermine his plan (or what she mistakenly thinks is his plan) for the outcome of the Trojan war. This is one of the rare occasions in which a nested κόσμος is assembled and operated with an eye to the disruption of the larger κόσμος.

these it is supposed to have its derivative sense of *ornament*. What could explain this distribution? Why should the poet never invoke order, given the apparent frequency of this meaning and its alleged importance as a value to the Greeks, except adverbially? And is it just a coincidence that the word, on each of the three occasions that it steps forward and works in a straightforwardly nominal way, invariably has another sense?

Perhaps there is a way to explain the perfect correlation of meaning and grammatical context, but I would argue instead that it stems from the basic error of making abstract *order* the semantic foundation of κόσμος. In the overwhelming majority of the word's occurrences, the adverbial phrase makes it easy to get away with the mistranslation of *order*: there is nothing which loudly condemns the reading, it makes a fair enough sense in the context, and we ourselves already tend to use *order* in similar-sounding adverbial phrases, for instance when we say, in so many different situations, that something is *in order*, or that a person has acted *out of order*. But the other three instances are a different case entirely. With the word now operating as the subject or object of a verb, and each time unmistakably designating something concrete, the abstract *order* will no longer work, and so philologists, being confident about the word's basic meaning, are forced to posit a secondary one that can account for these apparently marginal cases. That this meaning should be something so conveniently bland and inoffensive as *ornament* is then rationalized by the just-so story sketched out above. All it requires is that we be willing to retroject onto pre-Homeric peoples the kind of aesthetic formalism we find first articulated in the works of Plato and Aristotle, the very same philosophers who got us talking interminably about the *forms* of things as their causes.

This critique clears the way for my second chapter, where I draw a distinction (painted over by the semantics of *order* and *ornament*) between the conventional meaning of κόσμος and the particular role which the word plays in the epic discourse: the difference, that is, between a word which means something like *device, machine, contraption, apparatus* and a poetic tradition which happens to conceive and speak of the world as one great political machine. In all those adverbial cases of the word, the ones in which it is easy to get away with *order*, the κόσμος in question is the great instrument of Zeus, the single apparatus in which we all have a place and role. On the three occasions that the word functions in a nominal way, making *order* an impossible translation, the κόσμος in question is some nested instrument by the assembly and operation of which one or more members of the larger κόσμος work to perform (or, in one of the three cases, undermine) their respective roles in the world.²⁴

This distinction drawn at the start, and all of the old ground of the first chapter retread in this new light, the rest of the second chapter is organized around two case studies. I take as my first a remarkable moment from *Iliad* 17, when Hector has managed to take for himself from the body of Patroclus the armor of Achilles, and Zeus himself declares that the man has done this οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (205). I demonstrate against the usual explanation, which holds that Hector, by taking the armor of a man who is his better, commits some infraction against *order*, that he instead manages, by a contingency of mortal planning, to do something which had been no part of the *Iliadic* plan of Zeus, the end to which he has been operating his κόσμος. The basic facts are these: it is contrived by Zeus, in the second half of the poem, that Hector push the Greeks back to their ships and threaten these with fire, scripted by Zeus that Patroclus then repel Hector but ultimately fall to him, and scripted by Zeus finally that Achilles then give up his anger at Agamemnon, return to the fight, and avenge the death of his companion, thereby depriving Troy of its great champion and final defense. But he does not contrive that Patroclus, when he fights off the Trojans from the

²⁴ See the preceding note for the exception.

ships, attempt to impersonate Achilles by wearing his armor. This mortal plan originates with Nestor, and it runs for obvious reasons counter to the god's purpose and the working of his machine: Achilles will need his armor, or as it turns out, a whole new set of armor, if he is going to execute the part he has now to play in working of the world. Hector will still die, and his part in the κόσμος come to its long-scheduled end, but Zeus concedes to him the unscripted privilege of wearing to his death (at the hands of Achilles) the immortal panoply of Achilles.

My second case study, by far the longer of the two, is one of the most notorious of Homer's extended similes, the one for the wounded Menelaus at *Iliad* 4.141-47, in which the hero is likened to a precious part of a king's bridle, the apparatus which our poet calls, in one of the three nominal cases of the word, the κόσμος for a horse. But commentators usually make little of this fact, for they tend to think that, by this point in the simile, there is no longer anything that is really analogical going on. The simile begins from a simple color analogy: the blood that flows from the man's wound and coats his skin is like purple dye staining ivory. But then, as everyone agrees, the simile starts to wander; we get detail after detail about the piece of ivory: what it will be used for, where it will be stored away, who will use it, who will not be allowed to use it. There are those who dislike what they see here, and say that the poet has nodded, and there are those who regard it as a feature more than a bug, who say that Homeric similes can take on lives of their own. But both sides agree that the analogical core of the simile is more or less exhausted by the color analogy that gets it started. I argue that the digression does not really exist, being instead an artifact of the misconstrual of κόσμος. We misunderstand the word here, thinking it means *ornament*; we accordingly misidentify the nature of the object it refers to, concluding that it is something *merely* ornamental; and then, as a result, we manage to pick out only the initial point of contact which the simile makes with the world of its tenor. I show instead that the simile, beginning from this color analogy, develops into an image of the local operation of Zeus's κόσμος, unfolding as a piece of reassuring commentary in a suspenseful moment of the diegesis.

As with the scenario of my first case study, here too a contingency of mortal planning is threatening to obstruct the working of Zeus's world. Just as the two armies are marshaled and about to fight for the first time in the poem (very much according to plan), it is decided by mortal actors on the ground (not at all according to plan) that the war for Helen be settled by a duel between Paris and Menelaus, the two principals in the dispute. Aphrodite steps in to spirit Paris away when he is about to be killed, thereby seeing to it that the duel ends inconclusively, but it remains for a moment a real question how Zeus will right the ship and put the war back on course. He ultimately hands the work over to Athena, telling her to make the Trojans the first to break the truce, but otherwise giving her free rein to execute her own plan—a plan which turns out to be this wounding of Menelaus. She first locates a Trojan by the name of Pandarus, a man famous for his archery, and by filling his head with empty thoughts of personal glory, goads him into taking a shot at the unsuspecting Menelaus; at which point she darts across the field to intercept the arrow, diverting it to a protected place about the groin, where it will cause a scare but no serious damage. The blood starts flowing and we get our simile, which puts these events in their *kosmic* perspective. The message of which, to put it here without any of the drama in which it plays out, amounts to this: you need not worry about Menelaus; no one is going to kill him before it is his time to die; for he is an essential part in the *kosmos* of Zeus; and his precious blood is being used in a sparing way, to serve a *kosmically* important end.

The exegesis of these two episodes provides a general sense of the pyramidal structure of the cosmic machine, but it is the work of the third chapter to fill out the picture. I begin by introducing another family of words (μοῖρα, μέρος, and αἶσα) which should all signify a *portion*

or *share* of something, but appear in epic more often than not, at least according to most scholars, to be the words by which Homer speaks of *fate*. There is and always has been, however, a great deal of disagreement about the nature of this fate. Some regard it as a fairly abstract power or principle within the world of the poem; others say that it amounts to the requirements of the story tradition; still others identify it with the will of Zeus. I take a position with this third group, concluding that there is no fate in play beyond the inevitability of Zeus's will; and then adopt the view of Onians that the *portions* in question, the ones we translate with *fate*, are in fact the portions of a mystical but no less concrete thread, one which Zeus and his agents spin and use to bind us to our fates, that is, the things that are *θέσφατα* for each of us to do and suffer.²⁵ I go further than Onians, however, in arguing that what the gods bind us to do, and what Zeus has in turn bound them to do, is play all our various roles in his *κόσμος*. This, I demonstrate, is why the poet can, and frequently does, use phrases like *κατὰ μοῖραν* and *κατ' αἴσαν* interchangeably with *κατὰ κόσμον*: they are related terms in a single discourse, referring to a single conception of the world from the different angles of part and whole (the Appendix to this dissertation will also argue for the rough equivalence of these phrases on verse-technical grounds: although it is not immediately clear on the surface, they are all metrically diverse and appear at different points in the line, forming together a single system of phrases that facilitate the poet's expression).

From there, with the portion words explained, and their relation to the *κόσμος* demonstrated, I start to sketch out the corporate-style command hierarchy that defines this cosmic machine. We look at a few of its major branches and the descending ranks of authority that pertain within them; and I try to tease out along the way the major entailment of a world conceived as a society of mortal and immortal beings: it is a system of reality without any notion of a universal nature to guarantee its coherence and set clear and non-transgressible limits to the realm of what is possible; a reality whose past, present, and future coherence depends entirely on the regular activity of persons with egos, wills, and interests, also families, friendships, and enmities; it is a world, then, in which all *order*—if I can use here a word and concept the equivalent of which Homer does not—is fundamentally political in nature, being about the particular set of relations that hold between particular mortal and immortal people. This picture sketched, I take a closer look at a handful of passages from several different contexts in which we find the *κόσμος* and *portion* phrases used, showing how in each of them the phrase functions to police behavior and speech according to one's role in the world. I then conclude the chapter by critiquing another sedimented consensus, the view that the Presocratic philosophers were the first, not only to conceive reality as a rationally structured whole, but also to call it a *kosmos*: taking as my primary example a riddling aphorism of Heraclitus (B 30), I argue by its interpretation that when these thinkers refer to the world in this way, they are always looking back to the traditional world-view of epic, their common cultural inheritance, and tinkering with it in the work of articulating their own theories of reality.

With the political world as a *κόσμος* thus laid out, my conclusion considers the place of song within it, explaining its nature and value. This involves a close look at the two passages from epic in which the most is said about epic. The first of these, which occurs in *Odyssey* 8, is one in which an anonymous Odysseus requests of Demodocus, the Phaeacian bard, that he “sing the *κόσμος* of the wooden horse” (492-93), where I argue the word refers at once to the *machine* that was the wooden horse and the song *machine* about the horse, the two machines being regarded as crucially isomorphic to one another. The second passage occurs in *Odyssey* 1, being a moment in which Telemachus rebukes his mother for interrupting the performance of the local bard Phemius,

²⁵ See Onians 1951: 303-466.

whose song about the return of the Achaeans from Troy has caused his mother distress. I argue that the criticism makes it clear that the goal of song is not the pleasure of its mortal listeners, but the praise of Zeus's κόσμος and all the things he does with it.

CHAPTER ONE

The Confusion about Κόσμος

The philologist learns to view a word's earliest instances as a kind of semantic foundation. A basic meaning is established on the evidence of these, and an attempt is made to explain any and all divergent use in terms of semantic change—however many steps removed—from this basic meaning. Why? A sensible account of how a word has come to have its various meanings is reckoned to be confirmation precisely that it has these meanings. And yet it must be stressed that the diachronic story of a word's semantics is built up as a structure wholly dependent on the basic meaning which has been attributed to the word. It is in relation to this meaning that all *other* meaning is perceived; it is from this meaning, ultimately, that the existence of any other meaning must be explained. What could remain of a story like this, should it be shown to begin from a false start? How comfortable should we be in this case, not just with the lines of derivation understood to connect a word's different meanings, but with our very perception of different meaning, since this has been judged to exist in distinction to a basic meaning that is false? Every instance of every apparent meaning in a word's diachrony must be reviewed, and then the lines of derivation redrawn from the word's reconsidered, earliest sense—new lines that will account both for any signification which survives the review and any further signification which might appear as a result of it. We must, in short, start again from scratch, observe with new eyes the word's meaning and use both *in* and *through* time.

The contention of this chapter is that a restart of this kind is necessary in the case of κόσμος. For I will show that a certain conceptual anachronism has badly confused our understanding of the word's early meaning and use. This anachronism has gone unnoticed, I will further show, because the false meaning it generates makes a certain intuitive sense in a majority of the word's earliest instances, the ones we find in Homer and Hesiod; and because it has always been possible for philologists to construct lines of derivation, sometimes rather elegant ones, from this false meaning to the word's other attested meanings.¹ This is to say: the basic meaning attributed to the word by the consideration of its early epic instances gives the appearance of being well founded; and this appearance has always been reinforced by a further appearance, that this meaning accounts well for the other meanings of κόσμος. On the surface of things, then, there has been little reason to suspect that any error has occurred. All the same, we shall see in due course that this is an error of great consequence. For we have not simply gotten a word's meaning wrong. Rather, in getting this word's meaning wrong, we have all but effaced the ideological role which this word, *precisely because of its basic meaning*, has been made to play in this poetry.

But I stress again: the contention of *this* chapter is just that we have erred in our thinking about κόσμος, and, by erring further, managed to cover this fact up. Its basic aim is to clear the board of the consensus that has settled around the word. This turns out to be no small task; and for this reason, there will be occasion to defend here only a preliminary definition, one that will have to be reverse engineered from the false signification usually attributed to κόσμος. With the

¹ To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these lines of derivation are *always* the same, nor that they are all equally elegant. What I mean is that philologists, beginning from the same false start, have always found ways of accounting for what they have understood to be this word's derivational senses. One of these stories, however, is commoner than the others, and it is this one that I shall take on here. This is the best account of the word's development from the consensus meaning, but we shall see that it still has serious problems.

consensus about this word in epic out of the way, we may proceed more confidently in the chapters that follow. For now, let us begin to refine the charges against the consensus by recalling what is usually said about the early history of κόσμος.

The Consensus, its Problems, and a Preliminary Definition

There is today a strong consensus that κόσμος, from its first attestations in the Homeric poems, has already two established meanings. Its earlier meaning, we are told, corresponds to our notion of *order*, both in the physical sense, for instance, of troops standing in *order* on a battlefield, and in the political and moral sense of *good* or *proper order*. In its second, apparently derivative meaning, the word signifies something *ornamental*, a beautiful object that adds its beauty to some person or thing, but has no practical purpose. On the one hand, then, κόσμος signifies a certain kind of relationship that entities or parts of an entity can have to one another, on the other, a particular kind of entity.² As to the path by which this derivation of *ornament* from *order* proceeded, here too there appears to be a standing consensus: on the grounds that a thing is beautiful because it exhibits an excellent *order*, κόσμος came eventually over time, but at some

² To get a sense of this consensus, we need only compare the word's treatment in a few different lexica. First, Chantraine's *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*: "'ordre, bon ordre' au sens matériel ou moral, 'forme' (*Il.* ion. -att., etc.), 'ornement' (déjà *Il.* 4,145 et 14,187, ion. -att., etc.), 'organisation, constitution' (Hdt., etc.), 'gloire, honneur' (Pi., etc.); en Crète nom d'un magistrat (qui maintient l'ordre)." Second, Schmidt's entry for the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*: "*Ordnung, Norm, Anstand* (1), *Schmuck, Zier, Glanz* (2), *Kunstwerk* (3) – 'Ordnung' sowohl auf aktuellen Zweck e. Handlg. Bzgl. als auch allgemein auf Status in Welt und Gesellschaft; oft, besonders Negiert, moralisch verstanden. Teilweise auch in (1) ästhet. Aspekt, der in (2) Priorität hat (das Wohlgeordnete als das Schöne), und in (3) z. Betong. Des Ornamentalen, nicht mehr des Funktionalen, verselbständigt ist." And finally, Beekes's *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*: "'order, propriety, good behavior; ornament' (*Il.*), 'world-order, world' (Pythag. or Parm.; ...), 'government' (IA); name of the highest officials in Crete." Chantraine has his peculiar *forme* and Schmidt his *Kunstwerk*, but all three lexicographers recognize that Homeric κόσμος can express some idea of *order* or even *good order*, whether in a physical or politico-moral sense; and then it can also signify an *ornament*. *Forme* and *Kunstwerk* are the respective attempts of these lexicographers to account for the single Homeric instance of κόσμος for which this dual semantics has sometimes been felt insufficient, though apparently not by Beekes. This is the ἵππου κόσμον...δουρατέου (*Od.* 8.492-93) that Odysseus bids Demodocus sing for him, on which see the conclusion to this dissertation. Schmidt, as he goes on to explain, wants the wooden horse or else the song about the horse, as an *ordered* and therefore *beautiful* whole, to be construed as a *work of art*, while Chantraine seems to bend *order* into the *shape* or perhaps *design* of the horse. (That *forme* is included to accommodate this instance of κόσμος may be safely inferred: all but three of the Homeric instances of κόσμος are formulaic, and in these formulaic cases the word is always thought to mean *order*; of the three remaining instances, Chantraine cites two as meaning *ornament*, such that *Od.* 8.492 is the only instance left to mean *forme*.) This dual semantics of *order* and *ornament* is ubiquitous in discussions of epic κόσμος, though there is occasionally minor disagreement about how to unpack the latter meaning, that is, whether *ornament* is to be understood in a concrete sense, as most would seem to have it, or taken to signify something more abstract like *ornamentation*. It should be noted, furthermore, that many of the discussions about the meaning of κόσμος in epic, particularly the earlier and fuller ones, are motivated by a primary interest in the word's subsequent and *apparently* novel use among philosophers, as a word for the *universe* or else the particular *order* that it manifests. For statements of this consensus, see Kirk 1954: 311-12, Kranz 1955: 8-11, Kahn 1960: 219-22, Kerschensneider 1962: 4-10, Adkins 1972: 15, Puhvel 1976: 154-57, Kahn 1979: 132-33, Ford 1992: 122-24, Cartledge 1998: 3, Finkelberg 1998: 104-5, Ford 2002: 116-17, Vlastos 2005: 3-4, Elmer 2010: 290-92, Elmer 2013: 51, Du Sablon 2014: 59-63. This semantics is assumed, if not clearly stated, by many others. Diller 1956 is the only scholar I have encountered who questions this orthodoxy. He argues, just as I will in what follows, that κόσμος in Homer does not yet have *ornament* as an ancillary meaning. He fails, however, to account for the word's actual meaning in those instances it is usually taken to have this ornamental sense. For his interpretation of the word at *Il.* 14.187, see n. 27 below.

point well before written record, to signify concretely the beautiful entity in addition to the reason for this entity's beauty.³

There is an elegance to this derivation that is deceptive and which seems to have masked a couple of issues. The first is that this account does not take us the full way from *order* to *ornament*—on its own, a not insurmountable problem. An entity that is beautiful because of the order it exhibits is not thereby also an ornament, though it of course could be. For an ornament, at least as we tend to use the word today, is a decorative accessory. It is an item that has a specific function, that is, to make beautiful whatever it modifies; but it is also one that is strictly speaking inessential. As a result, if we are sure that *ornament* is a match for the derivative sense of κόσμος, then we must posit some further stage of semantic change whereby *thing-beautiful-qua-order* comes to mean *decorative accessory*. This amendment alone does no serious damage to the plausibility of the consensus derivation. Provided that κόσμος by the time of Homer has the meanings *order* and *ornament*, it remains the straightest line one could draw between the two termini. It just bears mentioning that this line is not quite as straight as it is usually made to seem.

More troubling about this derivation is the formalistic theorization of beauty that it implicitly attributes to certain unknown linguistic predecessors of Homer. For order in this context amounts to *form*, and the notion that an entity's beauty is primarily determined by its *form* (as opposed to the matter that constitutes it) cannot be taken for granted in this early period. Homer can of course say that someone is beautiful *with respect to their form*, by which he means the particular look of the person, but this is in no way to assert as a theory that beauty is somehow *always and universally a matter of form*. This kind of formalism, at least in the Greek world, has been shown to have a genealogy that, far from preceding Homer, very certainly postdates him by several centuries. It is arguably not until Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century that we find such a view first articulated, and even then, it is enmeshed in a sophisticated and decidedly idiosyncratic conception of the world.⁴ And yet this derivation of *ornament* from *order* would have us believe

³ Thus, we find in Kahn 1960: 220: “from this meaning of ‘neat arrangement’ the transfer is an easy one to the wider decorative sense of κόσμος as ‘finery, rich adornment,’ which is so frequent in classic Greek”; in Cartledge 2002: 3, citing Van Straten 1992: 268-9: “since order was considered beautiful, *kosmos* came next to mean adornment, as in our ‘cosmetics’”; and in Elmer 2013: 51, citing Jose Ramon 1992: 45: “the word comes to mean first ‘order,’ then what is ‘beautiful’ or an ‘ornament’ because it is well ordered.” On the obscure etymology of this word, see n. 5 below.

⁴ See, for example, Plato, *Phlb.* 64e (“the qualities of measure and proportion invariably, I imagine, constitute beauty and excellence”) and Aristotle, *Poet.* 7.1450b34-37 (a beautiful thing, whether an animal or anything else which is a composition of parts, ought to have not only these parts arranged but also an appropriate size, for beauty consists in size and arrangement.) On the genealogy of this tendency towards formalism in Greek thought and the hold that this formalism still has over us today, see Porter 2010, especially chapters 2 and 3. A version of the basic story is stated concisely in Dewey's *Art as Experience*: “Early in the history of philosophic thought the value of shape in making possible the definition and classification of objects was noted and was seized upon as a basis for a metaphysical theory of the nature of forms... It is by form—in the sense of adapted shape—that we both identify and distinguish things in perception: chairs from tables, a maple from an oak. Since we note—or ‘know’ them—in this way, and, since knowledge was believed to be a revelation of the true nature of things, it was concluded that things are what they are in virtue of having, intrinsically, certain forms. Moreover, since things are rendered knowable by these forms, it was concluded that form is the rational, the intelligible, element in the objects and events of the world. Then it was set over against ‘matter,’ the latter being the irrational, the inherently chaotic and fluctuating, stuff upon which form was impressed. It was as eternal as the latter was shifting. This metaphysical distinction of matter and form was embodied in the philosophy that ruled European thought for centuries. Because of this fact it still affects the esthetic philosophy of form in relation to matter. It is the source of the bias in favor of their separation, especially when that takes the shape of assuming that form has a dignity and stability lacking to matter. Indeed, were it not for this background of tradition, it may be doubted whether it would occur to anyone that there is a problem in their relation, so clear would it be that the only distinction important in art is that between matter inadequately formed and material completely and coherently formed” (2005: 120-21). If it is deeply intuitive in our day to conceive of *form* in distinction to *matter*, and

that this way of thinking not only cropped up among hypothetical intellectuals in the early history of Greek-speaking peoples, but that it became so widespread as to plant the seed for the first stage of this bipartite semantic change, whereby the word for *order* came to signify also an object that is beautiful because of the *order* it exhibits; from which point, by some unrelated semantic shift, as we have just seen, this derivative sense of κόσμος then came to signify rather more narrowly a *decorative accessory*.

And yet one might respond that there is nothing *per se* impossible about a popular formalism of this kind existing at some point before Homer. Perhaps, but to be clear, this is not all we must assume. We must assume furthermore that this way of thinking was subsequently lost, that it left no trace of its existence save for that which is discernible in the dual semantics of κόσμος, and that this dual semantics was preserved in the word's use for centuries, despite its users' being entirely innocent of the theorization of beauty that undergirds it. I am not certain I could disprove any one of these assumptions; but at this point, does any of the account's former elegance remain? Is it not now more plausible that scholars, when faced with the problem of bridging the gap between *order* and *ornament*, have opted for a solution that is deeply intuitive to our own, post-Platonic way of thinking, but hopelessly anachronistic in a pre-Homeric context?

It must be underscored that the consensus derivation is offered always as a likely story meant to account for the presence of a dual semantics of κόσμος *already in Homer*. All that may be adduced in support of this story or any like it is, first, the evidence of the word's use in Homer that establishes the early availability of these two meanings and, second, the plausibility with which the story manages to explain how the word came to have them.⁵ We have seen so far that

likewise natural to suppose that beauty has primarily to do with the former rather than the latter, then this is because we have internalized a way of thinking whose genealogy postdates Homer. Given all that occurred for us to be such intuitive formalists, we should, to say the least, be wary of hastily attributing this bias in thinking to a people we cannot name with any more specificity than *pre-Homeric*.

⁵ The etymology of κόσμος remains a serious puzzle, as most everyone admits (often before attempting to solve it): Hofmann 1949: 156 (“unklar”), Frisk 1960: 929 (“trotz wiederholter Bemühungen nicht befriedigend erklärt”), Haebler 1967: 102 (“die vorgeschichte des Wortes, d.h. seine Etymologie, [ist] nach wie vor in Dunkel gehüllt”), Chantraine 1968-80: 570-71 (“obscure”), Schmidt 1991: 1500 (“strittig”), Horkey 2019b: 9 (“nobody is actually sure exactly what the etymology of *kosmos* and related words is”), etc. And no fewer than seven different reconstructions of the word's prehistory have been put forward—no one of them without certain problems, and no one of them satisfying everyone. The history of this dispute has been recorded, and the different options weighed, most recently in Neumann 1995; but, among those cited, see especially Puhvel 1976 and Garcia Ramon 1992 for criticism of the different possibilities. Kahn 1960: 220 draws the relevant conclusion from the obscurity of this word's origins: “κόσμος has no etymology worthy of the name, and the original meaning of the word must be extracted from its use in the texts.” Accordingly, statements of the consensus derivation are not usually invested deeply in any particular etymology: *order* is reckoned to be the earlier meaning because it is the commoner; because we find it, unlike *ornament*, fixed as a formulaic part of epic language (in the phrases εὖ and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον); and because, quite frankly, this direction of derivation makes more intuitive sense to our way of thinking—how could *order* come from *ornament*? An influential exception to this tendency is Elmer 2013, who puts a certain etymology of κόσμος at the center of his book's argument. He endorses the reconstruction defended most recently by Garcia Ramon 1992, according to which κόσμος, the Latin root *cens-*, and the Sanskrit root *śams-* have a common origin in Indo-European **kens-*, a root which is supposed to have designated a speech act by which *order* is created and maintained. This is perhaps the most elegant of the etymologies currently on offer (according to Chantraine 1968-80: 571), “le moins improbable”). And a major part of this elegance results from this etymology's accommodation of the consensus derivation outlined above: it is “by a process of progressive semantic displacement” (Elmer 2013: 51) that κόσμος, as the word for an *order*-creating verbal act, first comes to signify *order* and then, because *order* is beautiful, an *ornament*. We have already seen, however, that there is serious anachronism entailed in the pre-Homeric derivation of *ornament* from *order*; and still we must hypothesize a further phase of semantic change, one which occurred so early that the word's most basic sense, *order*-creating speech act, has dropped out of use by the time of Homer. Indeed,

the account, whatever its *prima facie* elegance, assumes much that is implausible. But I stress this implausibility not because I want to offer another, competing derivation that will fare better under scrutiny. Again, if Homer’s κόσμος already has two meanings, and they are *order* and *ornament*, then I can see no better course to chart between the two senses. And this is just my point: if epic κόσμος has this dual semantics, then we have no good way of accounting for this fact.

This point is stressed because it will be a basic contention in what follows that κόσμος has been wrongly strapped with this dual semantics. The word in this poetry has just one meaning, which we shall see has nothing to do with decorative accessories, and is only very distortedly captured by *order*. This brings us finally to the conceptual anachronism alleged above; for it consists in this misfit between *order* and κόσμος. Indeed, the major weakness of the consensus derivation, which we have just been considering, may be viewed as a symptom of this misfit: the derivation smuggles in so quietly an anachronistic account of beauty as *order* only because it has already taken for granted an anachronistic conception of *order* as one half of the dual semantics it seeks to explain. So, let us take our start from *order* and work towards a preliminary definition of epic κόσμος.

We tend to think, or at the very least tend to speak, of *order* as a thing which really exists in the world. This is the case whenever anyone attributes to it causal power in the production of beauty, for instance, or when the demands of *law and order* are invoked in a political context. We do certain things and do not do certain other things for the sake of *order*. But this *order* is also something which, if it exists, does so *immaterially*: we find it inhering between an entity’s parts or in an arrangement of discrete entities, but are unable to point it out in isolation of these. Even so, this *order* feels intuitively prior to any of its instantiations. This, so far as I can tell, is because the word today signifies a certain relational property of parts or entities to one another that has been abstracted from those *concrete* parts and those *concrete* entities, only then to be quasi-hypostatized, given a vaguely independent, yet immaterial existence.⁶ It has become a thing which seems almost to come from without and manifest itself within its many and various hosts.

This matters because it is not at all clear that Homer would have been in the conceptual position to conceive anything approaching what we mean by *order*, much less have a word for it whose meaning could be readily understood by all who heard it. For even when *order* is not made to be a synonym of *form*—as it is in the consensus derivation above—it no less takes for granted a clear-cut conceptual distinction between the *material* and *immaterial* that was arguably ‘discovered’ only in the Platonic distinction between *form* and *matter*.⁷ In other words, Homer’s

it is important for Elmer that κόσμος have had this unattested meaning because he wants to claim (again, following Garcia Ramon 1992) that it has not *actually* dropped out, but that αἴνος and related words, which are the focus of his book, have become the bearers of this original meaning: they are “the true inheritors of the semantics of this root” (56). But this, like any etymology of κόσμος, stands or falls according to whether it has properly construed the basic meaning of this word *within* attested history. It may well be that κόσμος is related to Latin *cens-* and Sanskrit *śams-*. I have no reason to doubt it. But it is a *further* conclusion that their common ancestor, the hypothetical **kens-*, designated a speech act which creates *order*. This meaning reflects nothing more than an attempt to isolate, from among the meanings attributed to the root’s apparent reflexes, some semantic kernel that might reasonably explain those reflexes. Accordingly, if attested κόσμος, as one of the three reflexes of **kens-*, turns out not to mean *order*, there is good reason to be suspicious of any etymology, like this one, which has been constructed to explain how it came to have this as its basic meaning.

⁶ I do not mean to suggest that we have any of this in mind when we casually use the word *order*. What matters is that the abstractness of *order* is encoded in the very way we are able to use this word. Our resulting inability to deploy the word in situations where κόσμος can only be understood to signify concrete entities is in part responsible for our attributing a secondary meaning to Homeric κόσμος.

⁷ On the genealogy of the distinction between the material and immaterial, see Renehan 1980 and Porter 2010.

κόσμος is unlikely to mean what *we* mean by *order* or *form* simply because these words tend to signify quasi-reified abstractions; and our poet, for whom the gods and even the soul are intuitively material, seems to have had no conception of such metaphysically curious entities, however familiar they may be to us downstream from Plato.⁸

This is in no way to suggest that Homer could not engage in the act of abstraction. Of course he could. We have already seen above one way in which he frequently does, that is, in commenting on the appearance of his various characters. What he does not do, and what I am suggesting he *cannot* clearly do, is speak or think of an abstraction itself. Abstract words like δέμας, εἶδος, and φύη are for him always tethered, usually as accusatives of respect, to particular phenomenal entities: we are told that Tydeus, despite being *small in his build* (μικρὸς δέμας, *Il.* 5.801), was a real fighter; that of all the daughters of Priam, Laodike is *best with respect to her form* (εἶδος ἀρίστην, *Il.* 3.124); and that poor Odysseus, at the very least, is *not ugly in his physique* (φυὴν...οὐ κακός, *Od.* 8.134). In each of these cases, we find a word by which the poet isolates an aspect of some particular person; and to this extent we can say that he engages in the act of abstraction. But this seems to be the full extent: these words in Homer are never the names of some singular and constant essence that may be spoken of sensibly in the absence of a phenomenal particular.

By contrast with our *order*, which I am suggesting signifies a quasi-reified, abstract relationship, we shall see that early κόσμος always signifies a set of concrete entities *qua* a certain relationship that obtains between them—or rather, the word signifies entities in what *we* would identify as a certain relationship; it does not signify the relationship *itself*. For Homer, we are beginning to see, there is no such thing as a relationship, or any other abstraction, *itself*. An example will clarify the distinction and point us toward the consequence: were someone today to tidy up a room, putting each thing back in its proper place, they might say to themselves afterward: *the room*—by which they would mean everything in the room—*is in order*. And yet this person would not have been able to say: *the room is an order*.⁹ The reason is that *order* here signifies the relationship abstracted from the concrete entities that together constitute it: there is *order* and then there are the entities which find themselves *in* it or the object that somehow *has* it. But when Odysseus bids his son and faithful herdsmen to have the disloyal and doomed of his slave women “thoroughly *kosmify* the whole house” (πάντα δόμον διακοσμήσθε, 22.440), we shall see that he means these women to make the house *into* a κόσμος.¹⁰ The house so arranged is itself a κόσμος; it is not *in* κόσμος, nor could it be said to *have* or *exhibit* κόσμος — not in epic, anyway. For this word does, at least in certain mouths, eventually come to signify an abstract thing and be spoken of in these terms; but note that this occurs precisely when it is being argued entities of this kind become clearly thinkable, that is, with Plato.

⁸ I am here following Renehan 1980: 108: “Homer provides a reasonably clear picture of the early Greek view of reality. To the extent that any conscious reflection on the question occurred, to the extent indeed that such a *Denkkategorie* was possible (no word for ‘matter’ yet existing), the world and all that was in it was more or less material. There are no immaterial beings. The gods themselves are corporeal and normally anthropomorphic, indeed severely so; they can even be wounded by humans. The souls of the dead are so literally material that an infusion of blood will restore temporarily their wits and vitality.”

⁹ In modern usage, we seem only to conceive *order* as entity-inclusive in cases where a certain formal organization of people is meant, such as the Masonic order. This was the earlier sense of the word.

¹⁰ Quite so, in fact: by having the slaves who were disloyal to him return his literal home to the state of a κόσμος, they also reinstate the larger κόσμος of Odysseus’s *household* more broadly, to which these slave women belong, but from their positions in which they have wandered in Odysseus’s absence. This is a subject for later chapters. For a parallel for the household as a κόσμος in the classical period, see Xen. *Oec.* 8.11-19.

Let me be clear: this is not to suggest that Plato *regularly* uses κόσμος in signification of an abstraction; nor again to suggest that, in his wake, κόσμος suddenly comes to signify in all mouths an entity of this kind. The opposite is true. There are just three passages, in as many dialogues (the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*), in which the word is made to name an abstraction; and in each case, we are confronted with the unmistakably idiosyncratic use of a philosopher, the very one with whom we find abstract entities like *this* κόσμος first clearly articulated.¹¹ And while other philosophers, no doubt, soon began to use the word to name entities of this sort, it is not as though this use quickly becomes the common one. If it is well represented in the record which survives of antiquity — and it is probably not so well represented as is conventionally thought — then this is because the discourse of philosophers, as well as those peripheral to or influenced by philosophers, has been privileged in the tradition. In any case, for the purpose of this argument, it will be enough to establish that the notion of an *abstract* κόσμος is something novel in Plato.

To this end, we might consider for now just the *Philebus* passage; for when Socrates comes here to use κόσμος of a certain abstraction, he flags clearly the novelty in his doing so. The basic concern of the dialogue is the good life for a human being; and it is agreed rather early on, after

¹¹ For these three passages, see *Grg.* 505c1-507a3 (in which the word occurs seven times), *Resp.* 430e4, and *Phlb.* 64b7. This is not to claim that Plato's innovative use is unrelated to the word's traditional use. He is, in his relation to the ideology of κόσμος, perhaps the most Homeric figure of the classical period; and it is the adaptation of epic ideology to his own philosophical system which requires *abstraction* in these three cases. His use of the word is otherwise fairly conventional. Setting aside what we find in the spuria, there are sixty-seven further instances of κόσμος in the Platonic corpus. We find the basic (i.e. Homeric) sense, which we have only now just begun to define, nineteen times: *Phlb.* 66c9; *Sym.* 223b6; *Lys.* 205e2; *Prt.* 315b6, 322c3; *Menex.* 236d7-e2 (twice); *Laws* 717e3, 736e6, 751a4, 759a3-8 (twice), 761d4, 764b2-d1 (twice), 769e1, 846d6, 898b7; *Resp.* 500c5. The ornamental sense (for the post-Homeric origin of which, see below) occurs fourteen times: *Phd.* 114e2-5 (twice); *Pol.* 274d6, 289b6; *Sym.* 197e2; *Phdr.* 239d1; *Alc.* 123c2-6 (thrice); *Grg.* 523e6; *Tim.* 40a6; *Criti.* 117a3; *Laws* 800e6; *Resp.* 373c1. In each of the remaining thirty-four instances of the word, Plato uses it in signification of *the world*, just as we use English *cosmos* today: *Pol.* 269d8-74d6 (nine times), *Phlb.* 28e4, 29e1, 59a3; *Phdr.* 246c2; *Grg.* 508a3; *Tim.* 24c.1, 27a6-32c6 (ten times), 42e9, 48a1, 55c8, 62d4, 92c6; *Crit.* 121c3; *Laws* 821a2, 897c8, 967c5. It is a matter of consensus that this last sense of κόσμος is the innovation of a philosopher in the sixth or early fifth centuries. It remains, however, a matter of burning debate, first, which philosopher was the first to use the word in this way; and, second, whether the word in this sense means *world-order* or names the world as an *ordered-whole*. I do not believe that there will ever be satisfying answers to these questions because the questions themselves proceed from the fundamental misapprehension that we find here among the early philosophers a *truly novel* meaning. According to this misapprehension, some philosopher, recognizing (for the first time?) that there is a certain *order* to the world, began using the usual word for *order* in relation to the world, either as a name for it or for the specific order it possesses. The problem with this story, if the argument of this chapter holds water, is that κόσμος is not traditionally a word for an abstraction like *order*. Κόσμος as *world*, we shall see in time, is but another application of what has already become, through the discourse of the poetic tradition, a universally applicable word, but, again, one which does not name an abstraction. The way in which these early philosophers use the word appears so novel to us only because we have misunderstood the word's meaning and discourse in epic, and must, accordingly, explain how these early philosophers get from *order* to *world*. Had we not misunderstood this much, we are likely not to have been so misled by Plato, who is the ultimate source for this story: "the wise men say, Callicles, that communion (κοινωνίαν), friendship (φιλίαν), orderliness (κοσμιότητα), temperance (σωφροσύνην), and justice (δικαιοσύνην) hold together the heaven, earth, gods, and men; and they call the whole thing (τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο), on account of these things, *order* (κόσμον), my friend, not *disorder* (ἀκοσμίαν) nor *intemperance* (ἀκολασίαν)" (*Grg.* 507e6- 508a4). This is not a moment of serious intellectual history. The remark follows what I have noted above as one of only three occasions in which Plato uses κόσμος to name an abstraction like *order*. This is, rather, a clever and no doubt *playful* attempt to rewrite intellectual history in accord with his own innovative use of κόσμος in this passage, a use which we have erred in confusing with the traditional one. We will see at the end of the third chapter that, much like Plato, the earlier philosophers are actively tinkering with the epic discourse of κόσμος; but the tweaks made, along with their significance, are only visible once we have come to understand the place of this word in the tradition these individuals inherit, to which they are directly responding.

considering a life devoted exclusively to pleasure, and another exclusively to reason, that human thriving must consist in a σύγκρασις or *mixture* of both (20c-22c). From here, the situation is complicated by several digressions. There turn out to be various (and, in Platonic fashion, *ranked*) forms of pleasure and reason, such that it must first be decided, from among these, which will be included in the mixture—and Socrates, whether playfully or not, will insist in the end that *truth* be added as a further ingredient. But it is not enough to list the necessary components of the good life: the good life is a mixture, and the virtue of any mixture, we are told, resides in its being *well-mixed* (59c-61c). It is thus the *recipe* for the good life that is being sought: that universal and unchanging *how much of which ingredient* and *when to add it* that, if followed as a guiding rule by any particular person, will yield a life that is excellent every time. This is just to say that Socrates is looking here for the *form* of the good life in the mixture of its component parts; is looking here to isolate an abstract constant, the mixture itself.¹² I stress the issue of this mixture because it is precisely this which Socrates goes on to call a κόσμος. With it mixed to his satisfaction, he confirms no ingredient has been overlooked (64b5-8):

ἀλλ' εἴ τινοσ ἔτι προσδεῖ τῆ συγκράσει ταύτη, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶσ ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

But if there is still need of anything in this mixture, do tell me, Philebus. Because, to me, the present account [of this mixture] appears to have resulted, as it were, in a kind of bodiless *kosmos* that will rule beautifully over the ensouled body.

Now, if κόσμος has always named an abstraction like *order*, then why on this particular occasion, in which the word unquestionably does name something abstract, has Socrates felt the need to further specify this by the adjective ἀσώματος? And why, furthermore, has he had to apologize, even to the extent of καθαπερεὶ...τις, for speaking of this redundantly ἀσώματος κόσμος? Do not the adjective and the hedging it requires indicate rather clearly, instead, that Socrates sees some novelty in the notion of an *abstract* κόσμος? It remains to be stressed that this novelty is not *merely* lexical. It is not just that Socrates has used κόσμος to name an abstract relationship, when this word conventionally picks out concrete entities (in a certain relationship). What we find here and throughout the works of Plato is an early articulation of the very notion of an abstraction which is meaningful in the absence of particulars, what is today called his *theory of forms*. For surely it is not the case that Greeks had long since been able to speak about *virtue* or *justice* or *order* in the abstract, only to have Plato burden these inoffensive concepts, so similar already to our own, with gratuitous metaphysical baggage. Rather, it is *as forms*, with their host of commitments, that meaningful abstractions are first theorized and come to exist as more or less clear objects of discourse and thought.¹³ Thus, we observe that ἀσώματος, the word by which Socrates puts before

¹² On the nature of this mixture, see Hackforth 1972: 122-24 (“And by saying that we may hope to find this in what is well-mixed, Socrates means that it must be not any ingredient of the mixture, but the *form* of the mixture”) and Harte 2002: 177-212.

¹³ Indeed, Aristotle offers an account of the emergence of abstract entities as *forms* at *Met.* A.6, 987a29-88a17 and again at M.4, 1078b7-79a4. The context in A is a history of earlier thinking about causation told, somewhat misleadingly, in the terms of Aristotle’s own philosophical system. To follow the story, it must be recalled that, for Aristotle, knowledge of a thing consists in an understanding of its *causes* (*An. post.* 1.2, 71b9-16), and that four distinct kinds of cause are recognized, which are, in combination, sufficient to explain *why* a thing exists as it does (*Ph.* 2.3, 194b16-95b30). There is a material, moving, formal, and final cause. Aristotle seems to claim the discovery of the

our minds the (novel) notion of an abstract κόσμος, is almost certainly a Platonic coinage. It does not occur before his dialogues, where it is elsewhere *always* used in connection with forms; and after Plato, the word is never found except as a technical term of philosophers—all of them, no doubt, well acquainted with the dialogues.¹⁴ This is just to say that our adjective is one of several

final cause for himself (A.6, 988b6-16), but admits that the other three have been anticipated, if only dimly, by earlier poets and philosophers: it had been grasped, in other words, first, that the *stuff* of which a thing is composed is to some extent determinative of the sort of thing it can be; second, that nothing comes to exist, ceases to exist, or otherwise changes without some *motive force* effecting this; and, third, that we must look to an entity's *form* in order to understand its basic nature. It is, of course, the anticipation of the third cause, the formal, which concerns us here; he gives credit to Plato with an important assist from Socrates. The latter, as a historical person, “had concerned himself with ethical matters, but not at all with nature as a whole” (Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθεν). And yet he has contributed to the discovery of the formal cause, one of the most fundamental aspects of nature according to Aristotle, because, in his approach to ethics, he had been “searching for the universal” (τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος), and was, moreover, “the first to take seriously the issue of definitions” (περὶ ὀρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν). What does this mean? To begin with, the historical Socrates seems to have gone around, rather like his literary counterpart, asking τί ἐστὶ questions about the moral language of his day: *What is* ὁσιότης?, *What is* ἀνδρεία?, *What is* δικαιοσύνη?, and so forth. It is in connection with this practice that Aristotle credits him for his innovative focus on definitions. But let us be clear about what these definitions are meant to be definitions of; for herein lies the real novelty in this kind of questioning. He is not asking about the meaning of these words. He has instead come to believe, rather bizarrely in the eyes of all those he encounters, that each one of these words picks out some singular *thing*; that each names an *essence* whose nature can only be known through definition; and indeed, must be known thus, if one hopes to be ὁσιος or ἀνδρεῖος or δίκαιος. He is asking, in a perfectly literal way, *what thing* (τί) each virtue is: thus do abstract words become meaningful in the abstract at the very moment that they are reckoned to name some (abstract) *entity*. This brings us to the claim that the historical Socrates had been searching for τὸ καθόλου. It cannot be meant that Socrates took himself to be pursuing *the universal*; for this is an Aristotelian coinage, the term for his own, later theorization of the meaningful abstraction as entity (a *universal* is any multiply predicable property, such as *health*, *yellow* or *equal*; and a *form*, for Aristotle, is a universal which happens to define a particular kind of substance, such as *table*, *dog*, or *human*). Aristotle means, rather, that Socrates has darkly anticipated this kind of *universal* entity in his pursuit of the virtues *themselves*. He had been right to suppose that all talk of *courage*, for instance, is talk of some one thing, and right again to believe that, in every act of courage, we see this same thing somehow manifested over and over. And yet, if abstract entities emerge thus through the definitional investigations of Socrates, he seems himself never to have claimed any specific knowledge of them, or to have further fleshed out their basic nature, or even to have posited their existence beyond the sphere of ethics. It seems, in other words, that Socrates failed to recognize the full implication of his own method of inquiry: that the same τί ἐστὶ question which he had often asked of moral vocabulary, and which had yielded the virtues themselves, could be asked of *any* multiply predicable word, and would yield each time, by precisely the same logic, some new abstract entity that we should then look to for knowledge. This implication was not lost on Plato, whose Socrates has no trouble saying, at least in good company, that “we are accustomed to posit some single form (εἶδος...τι ἐν ἑκάστων) in relation to each of the many particulars (ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ) to which we apply the same name” (*Resp.* 596a6-8): the τί ἐστὶ question thus becomes an industrial-strength entity generator. It is here, in other words, that we first encounter the idea, never once doubted by Aristotle, that abstract entities, whatever we call them and whatever kind of metaphysics we attribute to them, are a basic fact of our world, which must be constantly appealed to in our attempts to understand it and the *concrete* things that populate it. For further discussion of *Metaphysics A*, see the essays in Steel 2012a; and for Aristotle's treatment of Socrates and Plato in A.6, see Ross 1924: xxxiii-lxxvi, 157-77 and Steel 2012b. On Aristotle's belief in the reality, if not the *substantial* reality, of universals and (his own conception of) forms, see Irwin 1988: 78-80 and Barnes 1995b: 97-98.

¹⁴ Beyond the instance at *Phlb.* 64b7, ἀσώματος occurs just four times in Plato. We find the word used on three of these occasions by the Eleatic Stranger in connection with forms: “certain thinkable and bodiless forms are true being” (νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ σώματα εἶδη...τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, *Soph.* 246b7-8); “for, if they [materialists] are willing to admit that even some small part of existing things is bodiless, it is enough” (εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματος, ἐξαρκεῖ, *Soph.* 247c9-d1); and, “the bodiless things, that which is finest and greatest, are shown clearly only by discourse and by no other means” (τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα, λόγῳ μόνον ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυται, *Pol.* 286a5-7). The fourth occurrence follows the so-called *Affinity Argument* in the *Phaedo* (78b4-84b8), in which Socrates argues that the soul is likely to be immortal because of its similarity to the *eternal*

terms which Plato has devised to better articulate for his reader those entities which he believes himself to have discovered beyond space and time, and a word which subsequent philosophers found useful in articulating their own theorizations of bodiless being. It is not a descriptor lightly or casually used. And so, we may conclude, if this *Phileban* κόσμος is abstract, and further qualified by ἀσώματος, then this is because there is a Platonic form lurking behind it. It seems to me, accordingly, unlikely that we should find any such abstraction invoked each time Homer uses this word.

If, as I have been maintaining, *order* signifies an abstract relationship and κόσμος a set of entities in (what we would conceive as) a certain abstract relationship, then we would expect there to be instances of the latter that could not be translated by the former, instances where the poet calls some complex of entities a κόσμος, which we would have difficulty calling an *order*. And these do exist. The trouble is that the instances in which the abstraction of *order* makes it an impossible translation of κόσμος are the very ones in which the word is customarily thought to have its *other* meaning, to signify an *ornament* or some such thing. Consider the apparent distribution of the word's meanings in Homer: κόσμος only ever has its primary sense of *order* when it is used effectively as an adverb, either on its own in the dative, κόσμῳ (*with* or *by order*), or in the phrase κατὰ κόσμον (*in accord with order*). This adverbial use accounts for fifteen of the word's eighteen total instances between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; in just the three remaining instances does κόσμος operate straightforwardly as a noun in its sentence, and in each of these cases the word is thought today to have some shade of its derivative sense. To repeat: if we follow the consensus, then κόσμος in Homer always and only signifies *order* in contexts where it is used adverbially; it always and only signifies an *ornament* or the like when it acts as a noun. And yet this strangely complementary distribution is easily accounted for. Whenever κόσμος is used in these adverbial contexts, contexts in which we find it easy to substitute in translation the rather more abstract *order*, we conclude that the word has this meaning.¹⁵ In those contexts where the word functions as a noun and seems to signify some concrete thing(s) in the world, *because we do not conceive order as including the entities whose relation to one another constitutes it*, we abandon the idea that the word could mean *order*; we then have recourse—with varying degrees of satisfaction—to the *ornament* meaning so familiar in the Greek of a later period.¹⁶

forms. Simmias raises the worry that the soul, given Socrates's description of it as invisible and incorporeal, may be more like the harmony of a lyre than the forms, and thus likely to die with the body that sustains it. He begins: "Thus someone could make the same argument in relation to harmony, the lyre, and the strings: that the harmony is an invisible, bodiless, and divine thing (ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν) in the tuned lyre, and that the lyre and strings are bodies, corporeal, composite, earthy, and related to the mortal (σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ)" (85e3-86a3). For the Platonic coinage of ἀσώματος, see Renehan 1980: 119-32, responding to the view of Gomperz 1932 that the word (and, indeed, a qualified notion of incorporeality) dates back to the philosophers of the sixth century.

¹⁵ To put this point in different terms, both κατὰ κόσμον and κόσμῳ create the appearance, at least for the philologist today, that the κόσμος in question is some one thing, an abstract constant, which exists above and beyond the particulars that happen to instantiate it in a given instance. This understanding makes a certain sense of the phrases as we find them used in Homer, to be sure. Nevertheless, in each case we understand some abstraction like *order* to have been invoked, we recast these phrases anachronistically in our own terms and, while preserving something which might pass as *the gist*, efface much about the phrases' meaning and use in the context of epic. We cannot do full justice to these phrases in the contexts of their use until we have discovered the proper meaning of κόσμος and begun to consider, in the second and third chapters, the discursive role this word plays in epic: we shall find that they belong to a larger system of phrases by which the poet and his characters police human action of all kinds, but do so, importantly, without appeal to any abstraction.

¹⁶ With some hesitation, I use the expression *some thing(s)* since a κόσμος is always at once both a single thing and a set of distinct things assembled together.

In this case, it must be explained, first, how κόσμος eventually does come to mean something like ornament, and second, if the word does not yet have this meaning in Homer, why so many scholars have thought it clearly does. It will be argued here that κόσμος develops some sense approaching our *ornament* precisely when and because instances of its use in a particular context of epic, the divine toilette, were eventually understood to have it by later hexameter poets, who then used it thus in their own toilettes; and that from the boudoir of epic, this secondary meaning spread to other contexts and poetic forms, such that by the fifth century Bacchylides could have king Minos refer to a ring he wears as “this splendid golden ornament of my hand” (τόνδε χρύσειον χειρὸς ἀγλαὸν...κόσμον, 17.60-2). It is this later, decontextualized sense of κόσμος as *ornament* that modern scholars retroject on the three Homeric κόσμοι for which the abstract *order* will not do. And for at least one of these three, the *ornament* meaning seems to fit quite nicely; but here the reason is clear. This is the instance from Hera’s famous toilette in *Iliad* 14, to which we shall turn in the second half of this chapter. It is one of the Ur-κόσμοι whose (mis)interpretation as *ornament* by later poets, I suggest, set in motion the development of this new meaning. Here, then, the consensus interpretation is at least in good company; but the same, we shall see in the next chapter, cannot be said about the other two instances, for which *ornament* makes only a very pale sense, but nevertheless just enough sense that we have never had to confront squarely the inadequacy of *order* to translate epic κόσμος.¹⁷

Were it only the abstractness of *order* that made it a poor match for κόσμος, we might have been able to do with a slight amendment from *order* to *arrangement*, insofar as we can speak concretely, for instance, of an *arrangement*, but not an *order*, of flowers.¹⁸ But the inadequacy that remains applies equally to *order* and *arrangement*; so we may abandon the former and continue from here with the latter. In its everyday use, *arrangement* is at once too general in its meaning and too inconsistent in its application. On the one hand, without the addition or implication of some modifier, *arrangement* may be used of any number of different distributions of entities: the bare word communicates just that certain things have been brought with some intention into some relationship, but does not further characterize that relationship’s nature. On the other hand, there are complexes of distinct entities which we could certainly say have been arranged or put together, but which we would have difficulty calling *arrangements*.¹⁹ By contrast, we shall see that epic κόσμος always signifies an arrangement of a particular kind, and—so far as the evidence attests—can be used of any arrangement of entities that is reckoned to be of this kind. Entities that together constitute by their arrangement a κόσμος are always conceived as the indispensable parts of a functioning whole; at the same time, this is a perfectly general notion: we shall see that κόσμος is the logic by which anyone or anything in epic becomes a proper part of something else.

This last claim, that κόσμος is the conceptual apparatus by which discrete entities are construed as the parts of an efficacious whole, may seem implausible on evidentiary standards alone. How can it be that a noun used on only three occasions in a non-formulaic way between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is so central to the Homeric representation of reality? What must be understood is that our poet, as an oral poet, does not privilege nouns in the manner that our discourse sometimes does. There are perhaps several reasons for this, but the most basic one is that they do

¹⁷ See *Il.* 4.145 and *Od.* 8.492 for these two κόσμοι. For their discussion, see my second chapter and the conclusion, respectively.

¹⁸ As we shall see, *arrangement* is also an improvement on *order* since the former entails an *arranger*. This is also true of κόσμος, which in Homer is always assembled by some individual external to it, its κοσμητήρ.

¹⁹ Again, everything I am saying applies equally to *order*, which can likewise signify any number of distinct relations that obtain between a set of entities.

not offer him a great deal of metrical flexibility.²⁰ The noun κόσμος can only ever have two shapes; but we find, by contrast, that the verb κοσμεῖν and its several compounds together yield a rather larger variety.

There are certain *Iliadic* contexts in which the verb's use appears to be deeply conventional. On seven occasions, for instance, the bare verb is used of the marshaling of a battlefield κόσμος, the process by which a confusion of men and horses become articulated into distinct but coordinated units, each positioned and ready to perform its own tactical role to the same end as the others: victory in war.²¹ And on a further three occasions, all within the Great Catalogue of *Iliad* 2, we find the verb used to signify the integration of distinct communities under a single ruler, as the coordinated parts of his single dominion, that is, his κόσμος. But *kosmopoietic* acts are not restricted to the operations of war and statecraft alone. In the *Odyssey*, by contrast, we find rather more domestic κόσμοι constituted. It is by κοσμεῖν that Eurymedousa, the chambermaid of Nausicaa, prepares for her charge an evening meal, that is, brings disparate edibles into the coherent whole that is a *meal* (δόρπον ἐκόσμηι, 7.13); and, a little later on, it is by ἀποκοσμεῖν that we glimpse, in the moment of its dismantling, the κόσμος of dinnerware and furniture that had been arranged in facilitation of a feast held in the home of king Alcinous. After his guests, the host of lesser Phaeacian kings, have retired for the evening, the high king sits with queen Arete and an anonymous Odysseus, while the slaves go about the work of cleaning up (7.229-32):

οἱ μὲν κακκείοντες ἔβαν οἰκόνδε ἕκαστος,
 αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐν μεγάρῳ ὑπελείπετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, (230)
 παρ δέ οἱ Ἀρήτη τε καὶ Ἀλκίνοος θεοειδῆς
 ἦσθην· ἀμφίπολοι δ' ἀπεκόσμεον ἔντεα δαιτός.

And so they [the lesser kings] went each homeward to sleep; but remaining behind in the great hall was shining Odysseus, and beside him Arete and godlike Alkinoos sat; but the attendants were *dekosmifying* the implements of the feast.

This is the only compound that alters in any significant way the meaning of the bare verb; the others, that is, δια-, ἐν-, ἐπι-, and κατα-κοσμεῖν, can be shown to serve the poet straightforwardly as metrical allomorphs. Thus, we find διακοσμεῖν used on the *Iliadic* battlefield just as the bare verb, though in a slightly different metrical context; and in the final stretch of the *Odyssey*, δια- and κατα-κοσμεῖν are used indiscriminately of the same operations by which Odysseus's home, now the scene of a massacre, is reconstituted as a κόσμος, a whole whose many and various parts have once again been returned to their proper places.²²

²⁰ In his study of epic μῆνις, Muellner 1996: 9 makes a strong case against this tendency to privilege nouns over their denominative forms.

²¹ See *Il.* 2.554, 806, 3.1, 11.51, 12.87, 14.379, and 388.

²² It is odd that we should find both δια- and κατα-κοσμεῖν used as allomorphs for the bare verb, since the two compounds are themselves isometric; nevertheless, the pair seems to be in free variation. Note that at *Od.* 22.440 some manuscripts read διακοσμήσησθε at line's end, rather than κατακοσμήσησθε, the reading of Allen's OCT, which I have followed. That the choice between either of these isometric compounds and the bare verb is primarily a matter of versification may be briefly demonstrated. With one innovative exception at *Od.* 7.13, whenever the poet uses a third-person, imperfect, active form of κοσμεῖν or any of its compounds, he positions the verb to fill the metrical space between a third-foot caesura and the bucolic diarsis. In this position, we may observe that the choice between singular ἐκόσμηι and διε-/κατεκόσμηι, on the one hand, and plural ἐκόσμεον and διε-/κατεκόσμεον, on the other, is determined by whether the third-foot caesura of the line is strong or weak. If there should be a weak caesura, then there is only enough room for singular ἐκόσμηι (*Il.* 14.388) or plural ἐκόσμεον (*Il.* 14.379); but if the caesura should be strong, then

It must be emphasized that these verbs signify actions only insofar as they are *kosmopoietic*. Each time they are used, in other words, we know that some action or series of actions either has been undertaken (aorist) or is being undertaken (imperfect) with the end of *kosmopoiesis*. But these verbs do not also tell us what has been undertaken to this end. It is true that we see in the second *Iliad* all that is involved in the construction of a battlefield κόσμος, the work for which the sons of Atreus have earned the joint title κοσμήτορε λαῶν; and we doubtless imagine for ourselves some vague procedural that has terminated in the domestic κόσμοι of Eurymedousa and her Ithacan counterparts. But this diversity of action is only ever entailed by the verb's use in particular contexts, not at all characterized by the verb itself. Κοσμεῖν is thus a kind of *pro-verb* for any action or series of actions that share the same *kosmopoietic* logic, which the poet uses in precisely those moments that he wishes to highlight this otherwise latent logic.

That κοσμεῖν acts thus as a kind of *pro-verb* is clearest in those instances in which the poet has incorporated the verb into an apparently novel context; for in these contexts, the poet must improvise, from among his traditional resources for narrating a particular kind of scene, some economical means of bringing to the surface the *kosmopoiesis* involved in a particular action or series of actions. Consider, for example, the single Homeric instance of ἐγκοσμεῖν. It is used in *Odyssey* 15 by Telemachus as an imperative for the crew of his ship to ready its running gear for shove off, this being construed as the state in which a ship becomes a functioning κόσμος (217-21):

Τηλέμαχος δ' ἐτάροισιν ἐποτρύνων ἐκέλευσεν·
 “ἐγκοσμεῖτε τὰ τεύχε’, ἐταῖροι, νηῖ μελαίνῃ,
 αὐτοί τ’ ἀμβαίνωμεν, ἵνα πρήσσωμεν ὁδοῖο.”
 ὧς ἔφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ’ ἐπίθοντο, (220)
 αἴψα δ’ ἄρ’ εἴσβαινον καὶ ἐπὶ κληῖσι καθίζον.

And Telemachus, urging on his companions, bade them: “*kosmify* the (running) gear on the black ship, companions, and let us embark so that we may accomplish this voyage.” So he spoke, and him they dutifully heeded and obeyed; and then straightaway they boarded and sat down at their oarlocks.

The actions entailed by ἐγκοσμεῖτε τὰ τεύχεα are bound to be somewhat obscure until we recognize that the poet has adapted for line 218 another line in which he makes clear the particular actions involved in making a ship a κόσμος.²³ It is the line by which Odysseus recounts for the Phaeacians the rigging of his ship before his voyage to the land of the dead in *Odyssey* 11: ἐν δ’ ἰστὸν τιθέμεσθα καὶ ἰστία νηῖ μελαίνῃ (“and we put the mast and the sails on the black ship,” 3).²⁴ The

the metrical space to be filled by the κοσμεῖν verb is made longer by a single, word-initial, short syllable; in this case, we find that the poet uses διε-/κατεκοσμεῖ (*Il.* 4.118) for the singular, or διε-/κατεκόσμεον (*Il.* 2.476) for the plural. Unless prepared to say that the poet's preference for either κοσμεῖν or δια-/κατακοσμεῖν is determinative of these lines' caesurae and basic metrical structure, then we must conclude from this distribution that the bare verb and this pair of compounds are allomorphs: they cooperate to facilitate the poet's signification of *kosmopoiesis* (in the third person of the imperfect active) under different metrical circumstances; and, therefore, mean essentially the same thing. Note, finally, that ἀπεκόσμεον at *Od.* 7.232 also appears, just as we would expect it to, between the third-foot, masculine caesura and the bucolic dieresis.

²³ Some, as I do, take the phrase to indicate the gearing of a ship, but others think it refers to the storing of all the gifts that Telemachus has accumulated in his coming-of-age travels. The other opinion is potentially influenced by *Odyssey* 4.784, where τεύχεα does seem to be used of the personal equipment carried by servants boarding a ship. But this is not an argument that the word must always have this sense when a ship is involved.

²⁴ The same line, with the form of the verb adapted for the context, appears at *Od.* 8.52.

line-initial adverb ἐν becomes, in our line, a prefix modifying κοσμεῖν, but otherwise operates in precisely the same way with νηὶ μελαίνῃ at line's end. These two lines, then, share the same frame. But consider what substitutions have been made within this frame: we find the mast (ἰστὸν) and sails (ἰστίαι) replaced by the generic gear (τεύχεα), and the descriptive τιθέμεσθα substituted by the narrowly teleological -κοσμεῖτε. The poet, in other words, has incorporated the verb into a typical rigging scene in order to make explicit the logic of *kosmopoiesis* that is always already tacitly involved in that work; but he has brought out this logic at the cost of actually articulating the specific acts that are entailed by the work, which we are left to infer from context.²⁵

For the moment, then, let us say provisionally that κόσμος in epic may be used of any set of discrete and often dissimilar entities which cooperate by virtue of their arrangement as the parts of a whole to some particular end; and that the verb may signify any act or series of acts by which a κόσμος, so defined, is constituted. This is the kernel I suggest remains after the incidentals of any particular κόσμος have been stripped away. But it must be stressed, lest we slide back into anachronism, that κόσμος would not have been conceived at this level of abstraction. It is by an analogical mode of reasoning that we shall find Homer's world filled with so many and diverse κόσμοι, a reasoning that proceeds horizontally from concrete arrangement to concrete arrangement, identifying in each case some qualitative sameness answering to the word κόσμος, without going on to isolate, as I have just done, this *what-it-is-by-virtue-of-which* each arrangement thus constitutes a κόσμος. We do not even encounter the sort of questioning that would prompt such an abstract definition as this before Plato's Socrates; and if asked by his Socrates about the nature of κόσμος, there can be little doubt how Homer would respond. He would respond just as Meno does when asked about the nature of ἀρετή (71e1-72a5):

ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, ῥάδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σφίζουσαν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὔσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετὴ, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς περὶ ὅτι ἐστίν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

But it's not hard to say, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, easy—this is the virtue of a man: that he be able to do for his city, by his actions benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and take care lest he suffer any such harm. But if you want the virtue of a woman, there's no difficulty in going through this: she should tend to the house well, preserving all that's inside of it and heeding her husband. And there is another virtue for a child, one for the female and one for the male; and another for the old man, both for one that is free, if you like, and, if you prefer, one

²⁵ On the first leg of Telemachus's trip, at *Od.* 2.389-90, it is Athena herself who carries out the operations here designated by ἐγκοσμεῖτε τὰ τεύχεα: "And then she drew the swift ship to the sea, and was putting on it all the implements (πάντα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ / ὅπλ' ἐτίθει) which well-benched ships carry." See also *Od.* 6.268-69, where νηῶν ὄπλα μελαινάων are appositionally revealed to be πείσματα καὶ σπεῖρα καὶ... ἐρετμά. All of this is customarily taken off of the ship when not in use and stored elsewhere, as at *Od.* 10.404 and 424.

that's a slave. And there are other, very numerous virtues, such that there's no difficulty in saying about virtue what it is; for in connection with each action and age, for each deed of each of us, there is a virtue, and likewise I suppose, Socrates, also a vice.

Socrates will suggest that Meno has not understood his question. He had been inquiring about a singular thing, the essence of virtue: “some one form, which is the same, that all virtues have, on account of which they are virtues, and to which it is well for one to have looked when asked to make clear that thing which virtue happens really to be.” Meno has instead provided him, famously, with a “swarm of virtues” (72a7)—which is to say, has only listed instances of the singular ἀρετή that Socrates is seeking. But there has been no real misunderstanding. It is just that Meno does not intuitively believe ἀρετή to be the name of some thing in the world whose singular nature may be defined. This is the word that he uses to describe what he takes to be the proper functioning of different sorts of people engaged in their respective sorts of activity; and so, asked about ἀρετή, he confidently responds the only way he can, by cataloguing analogous instances of embodied virtue, that of a man, a woman, a boy, and a girl. His thinking is not thereby somehow confused or inconsistent; but it is a mode of thought which is evidently innocent of the kind of abstract constant that Socrates is pushing him to recognize behind the word ἀρετή. Indeed, what must be understood is that the push towards abstract definition is but Socrates's usual way of luring his interlocutors into countenancing abstract entities. The tacit logic is always: a definition must be the definition, not just of a word, but of a thing that exists in the world and is named by this word. Consider the definition of *shape* (σχῆμα) that Socrates offers as an example for Meno after the latter fails once more to isolate the essence of virtue (75b8-c1):²⁶

φέρε δὴ, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστὶν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχη αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἐπόμενον. ἰκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπήην εἶ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

Come on then, let's attempt to say for you what shape is. See if you think it's this; let shape be: *the only thing of all the things that exist which happens always to follow upon color*. This work for you? Or maybe you're looking for something else? Because I'd be satisfied if you talk about virtue this way for me.

We may assume, following his remarks on ἀρετή, that σχῆμα for Meno is intuitively always the shape *of something*; it is a word he uses to isolate a certain aspect of phenomenal entities. And yet in Socrates's model definition, we observe that *shape* is quietly elevated to the status of an entity in and of itself: it is now “one of the things that exist” (ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων), and, as such, has some

²⁶ The second failure of Meno to give Socrates what he wants further demonstrates my point. Unable to abstract from his catalogue of virtues some constant which undergirds each and every one of them, he simply picks the one activity that seems to him most excellent: “What else other than to be able to rule over people? – if, at any rate, you are looking for some one thing in accord with them all” (73c9-10). With this, Meno has reverted to what is a deeply traditional account of virtue. Indeed, Thucydides has his Athenians appeal to the naturalness of desiring to rule over others, not in order just to defend the fact of their empire, but to claim that they, given this fact, deserve praise for the moderation with which they claim to have wielded it: ἐπαινεῖσθαι τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἐτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γέγονται (1.76.3).

peculiar nature of its own, which this definition is meant to access. It is unclear whether Meno has noticed the hypostatization of *shape*. At the very least, he does not bring it up in his response: Meno's complaint, what makes Socrates's definition silly (εὔηθεε) to him, is just that it explains one unknown, σχῆμα, in terms of another, χρῶμα. But whether knowingly or not, from here on out, Meno will assume with Socrates that in pursuing definitions, they are attempting to understand, not just the essence of each word's *meaning*, but the respective *thing*, the essence, that each word names.

This is all to say that κόσμος for Homer, like ἀρετή for Meno, at least *before* his conversation with the novel-minded Socrates, is a word whose meaning and use is always tethered to phenomenal entities; it is not the name of some abstract thing like *order*. For our poet, there is no κόσμος that is not a particular κόσμος consisting of concrete entities arranged to some end. This is true even in cases of the word's adverbial use: despite the ease with which we are able to render κόσμῳ and κατὰ κόσμον abstractly as *in order* or *orderly*, the κόσμος in question is always one consisting of phenomenal entities viewed as the parts of a functional whole. The component parts of these κόσμοι, it is true, are not usually specified, but they do not need to be. As we shall see, these constituents are always contextually self-evident.

Hera's Ensemble

The claim so far is that the existence of an *ornament* meaning in post-Homeric antiquity, together with our own, more abstract notion of *order*, has led to our wrongly attributing a dual semantics of κόσμος to Homer. The claim still needs demonstration. We may do this most elegantly by turning now to the κόσμος whose reception I have suggested played a part in the development of the *ornament* meaning, the instance from Hera's toilette in *Iliad* 14. For here we may at once see the inadequacy of *order* to translate Homeric κόσμος and begin to reconstruct the path by which the *ornament* meaning eventually came to occlude this fact. We pick up the scene *in medias res*, just after the goddess has washed her body with ambrosia, anointed it with oil, and done her hair up (178-88):

ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἀμβρόσιον ἐάνον ἔσαθ', ὃν οἱ Ἀθήνη
 ἔξυσ' ἀσκήσασα, τίθει δ' ἐνὶ δαίδαλα πολλά·
 χρυσεῖης δ' ἐνετῆσι κατὰ στήθος περονᾶτο. (180)

ζώσατο δὲ ζώνη ἑκατὸν θυσάνοις ἀραρυῖη,
 ἐν δ' ἄρα ἔρματα ἤκεν εὐτρήτοισι λοβοῖσι
 τρίγληνα μορόεντα· χάρις δ' ἀπελάμπετο πολλή.
 κρηδέμνω δ' ἐφύπερθε καλύψατο δῖα θεάων
 καλῶ νηγατέφ· λευκὸν δ' ἦν ἠέλιος ὤς· (185)
 ποσσὶ δ' ὑπὸ λιπαροῖσιν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα.
 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ **πάντα** περὶ χροῖ θήκατο **κόσμον**
 βῆ ῥ' ἴμεν ἐκ θαλάμοιο...

And then she put around herself an ambrosial robe, which Athena worked from raw materials and smoothed out, and on which she put many ornaments; and with golden pins she fastened it together down along her chest. She then girt about her waist a belt fitted with one-hundred tassels, and in her well-pierced lobes hung

earrings in the shape of berry clusters; much charm was shining forth. Then, splendid among goddesses, she shrouded her face from above with a veil, newly-made and lovely; its white was like the sun; and under her smooth feet she bound beautiful sandals. But when she had put about her body **all this loveliness**, she went to go from her chamber. . .

But for three words, this translation is my own. I have taken *all this loveliness* as a rendering of πάντα . . . κόσμον (187) from Lattimore's *Iliad*, as he conveniently dodges the crux involved in construing this bit of Greek. The κόσμος that Hera here dons περί χροῖ, that is, *about her physical body*, cannot except by way of a very bold metaphor be construed to mean something so abstract as *order*.²⁷ On the other hand, it is undeniable that the items which Hera puts on are meant to *adorn* or *ornament* the goddess. This is her explicit hope. Recall that Hera is a great partisan of the Achaeans, and that Zeus has recently forbidden her, along with every other Olympian, from further intervening in the war. And yet Hera is not content to stand by: she will seduce her husband and thereby secure an interval of time in which divine aid might be given unnoticed to the Achaean side. She believes the outfit we have just seen her so dexterously assemble will serve well this

²⁷ This is nevertheless the suggestion of Diller 1956: 48-49. He was mentioned above in n. 2 as the only scholar to have argued that κόσμος in early epic has no secondary *ornamental* signification. About this instance of the word, he writes: "Es ist eine lange Reihe von Zurüstungen, denen sie sich unterzieht; sie reinigt und salbt sich mit göttlichen Mitteln; sie kämmt ihr Haar; sie zieht ein von Athena gewebtes Kleid an, das sie mit goldenen Spangen schließt; sie legt Ohrringe, einen Schleier und Sandalen an. Als das alles geschehen ist, heißt es: „Aber als sie den *ganzen* κόσμος ihrem Leibe angelegt hatte“, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα περί χροῖ θήκατο κόσμον. Die ganze Reihe von Zurüstungen, die Hera an sich vornimmt, wird also mit dem Wort κόσμος umfaßt; sie sind ein unteilbares Ganzes, das Hera zur Durchführung ihres Plans qualifizieren soll ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἴδην εὖ ἐντόνασαν ἔ αὐτήν, / εἶ (scil. Ζεὺς) πῶς ἰμείραττο παραδραθέειν φιλόττητι / ἧ χροῖῃ (162ff.). Die Teile dieses Ganzen stehen in bestimmten räumlichen, zeitlichen und sachlichen Relationen zueinander, aber auch zu Hera. Die richtige Abstimmung dieses Beziehungssystems soll die Göttin tauglich machen, ihre Absicht zu verwirklichen. Man verzeihe diese humorlose Abstraktion aus der anmutigen Szene, aber nur durch sie konnte klargemacht werden, daß κόσμος an dieser Stelle in sehr charakteristischer Weise eine bestimmte Ordnungsvorstellung ausdrückt. Was wir mit „Schmuck“ wiedergeben würden, kommt erst sekundär in den Vorstellungskomplex hinein. Einen Reiz übt der κόσμος aus, weil von seinen Teilen ein solcher ausgeht; die Wirkung eines κόσμος aus anderen Teilen könnte eine andere sein. Und wenn wir in Heras κόσμος neben seiner Wirksamkeit die ästhetische Schönheit empfinden, so müssen wir uns fragen, ob wir berechtigt sind, in Homers Vorstellungswelt das Wirksame und wesentlich Qualifizierende vom Schönen zu trennen." For Diller, then, this is a typical instance of κόσμος: the word signifies, as it always does, "a certain idea of order," which happens here to encompass "the whole series of preparations" by which Hera will beautify herself. It is the "particular spatial, temporal, and factual relations [of each of her preparatory acts] to one another" that make these acts the parts of an entire beauty regimen; and it is this system of relations that he takes κόσμος to signify. It is accordingly this system of relations which the goddess must be understood, somewhat bizarrely, to have physically *put about her body* (περί χροῖ θήκατο, 187). Diller does not appear to have convinced many by this argument. But there is much that is right with it. We shall see that he is right to draw our attention to the significance of πάντα, that is, whether Homer means *every* or *whole* κόσμος; right to conclude the latter; and right, finally, to understand this as an instance of the word's basic meaning used in a context where ornamentation happens to be the goal. He is only wrong to think that this basic meaning is anything so abstract as "eine bestimmte Ordnungsvorstellung." In questioning one half of the dual semantics usually attributed to Homeric κόσμος, in other words, Diller has recourse only to the other half of this same semantics, and so must find some way to make this instance of the word accommodate the *order* meaning. It should be noted, furthermore, that in doing this, Diller opens the door for his own argument to be used to make the opposite point, provided one construes the ornamental meaning of κόσμος rather abstractly, as Kerschensteiner 1962: 6-8 does, to mean *ornamentation* rather than a concrete *ornament*. This instance becomes one where the theorization of *beauty* as *order* which purportedly connects the two meanings of κόσμος is made perfectly clear: *order*, as the basic cause of *beauty*, just is *ornamentation* when it is manifested in certain cosmetic contexts.

tactical seduction.²⁸ The poet tells us as much in the lines that precede and motivate the toilette (159-66):

μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη
ὄππως ἐξαπάφοιτο Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο· (160)

ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή
ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἴδην εὖ ἐντύνασαν ἔαυτήν,
εἴ πως ἰμείραιτο παραδραθέειν φιλότιτι
ἦ χροῖῃ, τῷ δ' ὕπνον ἀπήμονά τε λιαρόν τε
χεύη ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἰδὲ φρεσὶ πευκαλίμησι. (165)
βῆ δ' ἴμεν ἐς θάλαμον...

But then the cow-eyed queen Hera wondered how she might dupe the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus. This plan was seeming to her heart best: that she go to Ida all gussied up, to see if perhaps Zeus might desire to lie with her in love, and she could then pour warm and gentle sleep over his eyelids and wise mind. And she went to go to her chamber...

And so, faced with this instance of κόσμος, the philologist who believes this word may mean *order* or otherwise *ornament* concludes not unreasonably that this is an instance of the latter meaning. But what is to be done with πάντα? Are we told that Hera put on *every* ornament or that she put on an *entire* or *whole* ornament? It is often difficult to tell which a translator has understood, as is the case with Lattimore above; and I have yet to find any commentator who dwells at any length on this distinction. It is nevertheless a consequential one. If *every* is meant, then each item the goddess wears becomes a κόσμος unto itself, and our poet is perhaps being a little playful. He has first shown us every step in this elaborate bedecking and has then summed it up by saying that the goddess has *pulled out all the stops* in her bid to draw Zeus's eye. She has deployed about her body *every ornament*. This construal makes a certain intuitive sense and there is nothing in the immediate context that loudly condemns it, but it is an interpretive dead end. So, let us consider the other possibility, that in πάντα κόσμον we should hear *whole ornament*. The major consequence of this construal is that no single item Hera wears is itself called a κόσμος. They are each instead *the constituent parts of a complex, structured ornament*. To the extent that one is disposed to think of a κόσμος as a concrete item whose function is to adorn some person or thing, *every ornament* is the obvious reading: Hera's earrings are ornaments, they are not ornament parts. But consider now just how close *whole ornament* comes to the definition of κόσμος I offered above. This construal already entails it: a complex of entities arranged to cooperate as the parts of a whole to some end. We need at this point only to make a small tweak in the precise signification of κόσμος, by distinguishing between an end and a means to it. The ornamentation or beautification of Hera is the end of this whole κόσμος; the κόσμος itself, however, is the means by which this end is to be achieved. This is just to say that πάντα κόσμον is the *whole ensemble* of disparate items by which Hera hopes to make herself more attractive to Zeus. Each item has been

²⁸ Hera takes no chances: she will supplement this outfit in the lines that follow (188-223) with a powerful love charm, a leather strap borrowed under false pretenses from Aphrodite.

deliberately put in its proper place and there plays its proper role in sync with all the others, as the component pieces of an immaculate ensemble.²⁹

And yet it must be admitted that, within a toilette like Hera's, κόσμος seems to accommodate *ornament* remarkably well. This fact is key to how I will suggest the word eventually did come to have some such a meaning. But the problem with finding it in Hera's instance comes into focus if one lingers for a moment on all that must here be counted as ornaments. The scholiast on this line provides us with a telling catalogue:

οὐδὲν παρέλιπε τῶν γυναικείων κοσμημάτων, οὐ τὰ νίπτρα, οὐ τὴν τῶν ἀλειμμάτων περιεργίαν, οὐ τὴν ἐμπλοκὴν, οὐ τὴν ἐσθῆτα, οὐ τὸν ἔξωθεν κόσμον περὶ τὰ ὄτα, περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, περὶ τοὺς πόδας. τῷ οὖν φυσικῷ κάλλει καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης ἠθέλησεν εὐπρέπειαν προσάψαι.³⁰

²⁹ We have already seen above how κοσμεῖν and its compounds act as *pro-verbs*: the poet may use them in place of any verb whose action entails *kosmopoiesis*. We have also already seen that, when the poet uses these verb forms, and particularly when he uses them in a novel context, he tends to adapt a traditional line or traditional line parts: in this way, the basic action communicated by the swapped-out verb may still be contextually understood beneath the narrowly teleological κόσμος verb. I rehearse these points here because we are now in a position to see that the same procedure undergirds the poet's use of the noun κόσμος in *Iliad* 14.187-88: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα περὶ χροῖ θήκατο κόσμον / βῆ ῥ' ἴμεν ἐκ θαλάμοιο. The prepositional phrase περὶ χροῖ has just one position in Homer; it is always positioned after the trochaic caesura. From time to time, as in line 187, the poet combines περὶ χροῖ with line-initial αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ to form the skeleton structure of a line-long transition from an arming scene. These two elements leave open the following metrical space in the line: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ (~ ~ ³ - ~) περὶ χροῖ (⁵ - ~ ~ ⁶ - ~), wherein the poet must fit a verb of *putting on* and then signify in some way the armor that is to be put on. He does this with remarkable economy. On the three occasions that the subject of the verb is plural (*Il.* 14.383; *Od.* 24.467, 24.500), we find: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ (ῥ' ἔσσαντο) περὶ χροῖ (νόροπα χαλκόν). On the one occasion that the subject is singular (*Il.* 7.207), we find: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ (δὴ πάντα) περὶ χροῖ (ἔσσατο τεύχεα). Note first that because the singular and plural forms of ἐννυσθαι have different metrical shapes, they must be accommodated at different points in the available line space – the plural ἔσσαντο positioned this side of the caesura, the singular ἔσσατο occupying the fifth foot. Accordingly, to fill the different line segments left by the different verb forms, the poet must signify the armor in metrically distinct ways. The terminal adonic left open by the plural verb is elegantly filled by *gleaming bronze* (ῥ' νόροπα χαλκόν); in the pair of spaces left by the singular verb fits a *whole suit of armor* (δὴ πάντα . . . τεύχεα). It is this latter, single-subject allomorph which the poet has adapted for *Il.* 14.187: he substitutes θήκατο κόσμον for ἔσσατο τεύχεα at the terminal adonic. Now, as Janko 1992:173-74 well observes, Homer has cast Hera's toilette as a warrior's arming scene. He has done this by incorporating certain traditional elements of that scene type into this sequence. The putting on of sandals in line 186, for instance, is not paralleled in other toilettes, but the same line is a standard feature of the male arming scene (e.g., *Il.* 2.44, 10.22; *Od.* 2.4, 4.309). The transitional line 187 is another such instance. But since τεύχεα as *gear* in Homer always means *war gear* or *armor*, the word transposed into the context of a toilette would have been too jarring, I suspect, and thus too heavy handed for the poet's rather more subtle effect of blending the two scene types. By substituting this word for κόσμον, he nevertheless makes the same point; for a suit of armor and an ensemble of clothes are each a kind of κόσμος. Just as the pieces of a warrior's armor cooperate to a single end, that is, the protection of their wearer; so too do the items which make up Hera's ensemble. Why exactly the poet has chosen to draw our attention to this fact at this moment in the poem is a matter that must be postponed until we have considered the larger role of κόσμος in the epic tradition. See the following chapter.

³⁰ This b-T *scholion* continues in a direction that is irrelevant to our purposes. The commentator observes that whereas the best painters and sculptors sink to the level of showing women nude, the poet has shown us Hera done-up elaborately in order to keep his listeners' minds from the gutter: καίτοι δὲ τῶν περὶ ταῦτα δεινῶν γυμνὰς γραφόντων ἢ πλασσόντων τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην, ὁ ποιητὴς παραλιπὼν γυμνουμένην αὐτὴν δεῖξαι, ἵνα μὴ εἰς αἰσχρὰν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τῶν ἀκροωμένων διάνοιαν προκαλέσῃται, κοσμηθεῖσαν ἐνεφάνισε καὶ λόγοις πλέον χρωμάτων αὐτὴν διετύπωσεν.

She has neglected not a one of the cosmetics that women use (οὐδὲν τῶν γυναικείων κοσμημάτων): not the bath, the immoderate use of oils, the hairdo, the clothing, nor, finally, the ornament (κόσμον) for the ears, the one for the head, the one for the feet. To her native beauty, then, she wished also to add by craft comeliness.

The first thing to note about this *scholion* is that it is offered in explanation of the phrase πάντα κόσμον; there must then be something about Homer's meaning which the scholiast believes needs explanation. The second is that he is clearly not explaining that κόσμος can mean something like *ornament*: he takes some such meaning for granted in the course of his own explanation. What must be explained, rather, seems to follow from his taking πάντα with κόσμον to mean *every ornament* in this particular context. Now, it is clear that line 187 serves as a transition from the toilette to the next scene in Hera's plot; and it is clear that the words πάντα κόσμον are in some sense a summation of what has preceded. The question is their scope. I have assumed so far that πάντα κόσμον encompasses all and only the *worn* items that Hera has literally *placed* (θήκατο) *about her body* (περὶ χροῖ); the scholiast, however, extends the scope of this phrase to include all that has transpired in the scene, that is, also the bathing, the oiling, and the hairdressing of lines 170-77. Each of these beautifying procedures, in other words, he understands Homer to be calling a κόσμος; and this gets us to what he thinks needs explaining. The poet here apparently uses κόσμος to mean *ornament* in a way that the scholiast, who knows full well this meaning, finds odd.

It would seem that for the scholiast κόσμος as *ornament* means something like *accessory item*; his trouble is that he finds Homer using the word here also of cosmetic *procedures* and *non-accessory* items. This may be inferred from when, in recounting all he takes Homer to be calling κόσμοι, the scholiast himself begins to use the word in this way. It is precisely when he comes to the accessories: the earrings, veil, and sandals.³¹ Now, the scholiast is wrong to think that πάντα κόσμον encompasses the preliminary procedures; but the phrase surely *does* include what he calls *the clothing* (τὴν ἐσθῆτα), that is, the robe as well as perhaps the pins and belt that constitute Hera's basic outfit. That he cannot call these items κόσμοι but takes Homer—rather confusingly—to have done just this is significant. It is conceivable, perhaps, that κόσμος as *ornament* underwent some change in meaning by the time of our likely late-antique commentator, such that while Homer could call basic clothing items *ornaments*, he could not. But it is also possible, as I have been claiming, that Homer simply knew nothing of this later meaning; and that our scholiast, no doubt under the influence of later toilettes in which κόσμος *is* used exclusively of accessory items, and seems accordingly to mean something like *ornament*, has erred very understandably in trying to locate this meaning here. To this extent, he is in the same position as the philologist today. The edge he has over us is a more intuitive sense of this secondary meaning, such that he recognizes what is fundamentally odd about Homer's *apparent* use of it here. Basic clothing, though it may be ornamented and thus worn to the end of beautification, is nevertheless not intuitively construed

³¹ It may seem odd that the scholiast calls Hera's sandals a κόσμος περὶ τοὺς πόδας. Footwear would likely not have been thought of as a necessity in the way it is in some parts of the world today, where one finds on shop-front signs *no shirt, no shoes, no service*; and they would almost certainly have not been worn in the home; but, rather, donned along with the veil on the likely infrequent occasion that a woman would venture into the public world. But more to the point, it seems likely that the scholiast himself has managed to construe sandals as an accessory like jewelry by the sheer momentum of his periphrastic series. In any case, here again, the scholiast points us in a helpful direction: the putting on of sandals is *not* a conventional element of the toilette, and so would not normally have to be construed as part of the πάντα κόσμον by which the poet transitions from this scene type. Of course, since κόσμος does not mean *ornament* here, the inclusion of sandals is not a real problem for the interpretation of the word I am offering. It is just a problem for anyone, like our scholiast, who wants to say πάντα κόσμον means *every ornament*.

ἀργυφὴ ἐσθῆτι· κατὰ κρηῖθεν δὲ καλύπτρην
δαιδαλέην χεῖρεςσι κατέσχεθε, θαῦμα ιδέσθαι· (575)

ἀμφὶ δὲ οἱ στεφάνους νεοθηλέας, ἄνθεα ποίης,
ἱμερτοὺς περίθηκε καρῆατι Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·
ἀμφὶ δὲ οἱ στεφάνην χρυσέην κεφαλῆφιν ἔθηκε,
τὴν αὐτὸς ποίησε περικλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις
ἀσκήσας παλάμησι, χαριζόμενος Διὶ πατρί· (580)

τῇ δ' ἐνὶ δαίδαλα πολλὰ τετεύχατο, θαῦμα ιδέσθαι,
κνώδαλ' ὅσ' ἤπειρος δεινὰ τρέφει ἠδὲ θάλασσα·
τῶν ὅ γε πόλλ' ἐνέθηκε, χάρις δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄητο,
θαυμάσια, ζωοῖσιν εὐκότα φωνήεσσιν.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεῦξε καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῖο, (585)
ἐξάγαγ' ἐνθά περ ἄλλοι ἔσαν θεοὶ ἠδ' ἄνθρωποι,
κόσμῳ ἀγαλλομένην γλαυκῶπιδος Ὀβριμοπάτρης·
θαῦμα δ' ἔχ' ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητοὺς τ' ἀνθρώπους,
ὥς εἶδον δόλον αἰπὺν, ἀμήχανον ἀνθρώποισιν.

And straightaway Zeus conceived an evil for men in exchange for fire: the famous lame one molded from earth a thing in the likeness of a modest maiden, following through on the designs of Kronos's son; Athena, the grey-eyed goddess, belted and *kosmified* [her] with silvery clothing, and with her hands placed above an ornamented veil, a wonder to look on; about the head, Pallas Athena put charming, newly-blossomed garlands, the flowers of a meadow; and around the head, she placed a golden crown, one which the famous lame one made himself, working it with his own hands, thereby delighting Zeus, his father; and on this crown he fashioned many ornaments, a wonder to look on: of all the terrible beasts that the earth and sea nourish, he put many of them on it, and grace was breathing on all of them, wondrous, like to sound-producing animals. But when he had fashioned this lovely bad thing in exchange for a good one, he led her out, as the latter delighted in the *kosmos* of the heavy father's grey-eyed daughter; and wonder was holding both the immortal gods and mortal men, as they looked on this steep contrivance, unworkable by men.

αὐτίκα δ' ἐκ γαίης πλάσσε κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις (70)

παρθένῳ αἰδοίῃ ἵκελον Κρονίδεω διὰ βουλᾶς·
ζῶσε δὲ καὶ **κόσμησε** θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
ἀμφὶ δὲ οἱ Χάριτές τε θεαὶ καὶ πότνια Πειθῶ
ὄρμους χρυσεῖους ἔθεσαν χροῖ· ἀμφὶ δὲ τὴν γε
Ἔραι καλλίκομοι στέφον ἄνθεσι εἰαρινοῖσιν· (75)
πάντα δὲ οἱ χροῖ **κόσμον** ἐφήρμοσε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·

And straightaway the famous lame one molded from earth a thing in the likeness of a modest maiden, following through on the designs of Kronos's son; Athena, the grey-eyed goddess, belted and *kosmified* [her]; the Graces, who are goddesses, and queenly Desire placed on her body golden necklaces; and the lovely-haired Seasons

were crowning her with spring-time flowers; and Pallas Athena arranged the **whole kosmos** about her body.

Note first that κοσμεῖν in both passages appears in an identical line: *Athena, the grey-eyed goddess, belted and kosmified [Pandora]*. The verb in both versions is always taken to have an ornamental significance. Athena *adorned* or *ornamented* Pandora. But in neither case can Athena be understood to have *applied ornaments*. We see in both that the ornaments are applied after this action by Athena. Rather, as the enjambment of *Theogony* 574 spells out, this verb involves functional clothing: the goddess *kosmified her / with silvery clothing*. But what action has the poet here effaced by this verb in order to make explicit the *kosmopoietic* logic involved in it? We saw above in Hera's toilette the two basic steps involved in securing a robe about a woman's body: it must be belted at the waist and must be pinned at the chest. Now, it is clear that our line, in both of its instances, conveys the basic proposition *Athena dressed Pandora*; and since one of the two actions involved in securing the robe, that is, *belting* (ζῶσε), is stated explicitly, I suggest that it is *pinning* that has been elided by κοσμεῖν: the act by which a great piece of cloth and a few pins are made to cooperate (along with the belt) as the basic outfit for a body. With this initial *whole* constituted, in both passages, we proceed to the ornaments. These are conceived as supplementing the initial whole, whereby they produce a new and more complex whole, which is signified by the noun κόσμος at the end of both passages. The Pandora of the *Theogony* rejoices in the κόσμος of clothing and accessories assembled by Athena (κόσμῳ ἀγαλλομένην γλαυκώπιδος Ὀβριμοπάτρης, 587); and in the *Works and Days* variant, wherein the Graces and Persuasion are introduced to apply the ornaments, Athena comes back into frame to arrange them all just right, such that the clothes and jewelry cooperate as a *whole kosmos on her body* (πάντα οἱ χροῖ κόσμον, 76).

In the toilettes of later archaic epic, those which figure in the so-called *Homeric Hymns*, the situation is different. The language of κόσμος seems no longer to be used in connection with clothing items, nor even of clothes in combination with accessories, as we have seen it used in both Homer and Hesiod. Now the noun is used specifically of *gold accessories*, and the verb only of their application. In the longer *Hymn to Aphrodite*, for instance, ahead of the goddess's affair with the mortal Anchises, we see her engaged in the following toilette (58-67):

ἔς Κύπρον δ' ἔλθοῦσα θυώδεα νηὸν ἔδυνεν,
ἔς Πάφον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ τέμενος βωμός τε θυώδης·
ἔνθ' ἦ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαεινάς, (60)

ἔνθα δέ μιν Χάριτες λοῦσαν καὶ χρίσαν ἐλαίῳ
ἀμβρότῳ, οἷα θεοῦς ἐπενήνοθεν αἰὲν ἐόντας,
ἀμβροσίῳ ἐδανῶι, τό ρά οἱ τεθυωμένον ἦεν.
ἔσσαμένη δ' εὖ πάντα περὶ χροῖ εἵματα καλά,
χρυσῶι κοσμηθεῖσα φιλομμειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη (65)
σεύατ' ἐπὶ Τροίης, προλιποῦσ' εὐώδεα Κύπρον,
ὑπι μετὰ νέφεσιν ῥίμφα πρήσσουσα κέλευθον.

And having come to Cyprus, she went in her fragrant temple, to Paphos; where there belonged to her a sacred precinct and fragrant altar; and having gone in, she shut the shining doors; and there the Graces bathed and anointed her with oil that was ambrosial, such as blooms on the gods that are forever, ambrosial oil that was redolent about her. **And when she had put about her body all her lovely clothing,**

and was adorned with gold, smile-loving Aphrodite darted off to Troy, having left behind fragrant Cyprus, traversing her path lightly, lofty amid the clouds.

This toilette is much condensed, but it retains the same two-stage picture of dressing we have seen above in the earlier iterations of this scene type: first go on the basic clothing items, then the ornaments. But note that all the lovely clothing the goddess wears, she is said to have *put well about her body* (έσσαμένη... εὖ περι χροῖ, 64); it is only by the accessory jewelry which comes afterward, what the poet here calls *gold*, that she is *kosmified* (χρυσῶι κοσμηθεῖσα, 65). And this is no fluke: a little later, we see Anchises undo what we have just seen done (161-166):

οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν λεχέων εὐποιήτων ἐπέβησαν,
κόσμον μὲν οἱ πρῶτον ἀπὸ χροῶς εἴλε **φαεινόν**,
πόρπας τε γναμπτάς θ' ἔλικας κάλυκας τε καὶ ὄρμους,
λῦσε δέ οἱ ζώνην, ἰδὲ **εἴματα σιγαλόεντα**
ἔκδυε καὶ κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ θρόνου ἀργυροήλου (165)
Ἀγχίσης: ...

And when they had mounted the well-built bed, Anchises first removed from her body the **gleaming kosmos**: the brooches, twisted bracelets, earrings, and necklaces; and he loosened her girdle, and her **splendid clothing** he took off and placed up on a silver-studded chair.

Second on, first off: the *gold* of line 65, by which Pandora had been *kosmified*, is now the *gleaming kosmos* (κόσμον...φαεινόν, 162) that Anchises removes *first* (πρῶτον, 162) before taking off the goddess's *glossy clothing* (εἴματα σιγαλόεντα, 164). We even linger with line 163 on all that is here regarded as *κόσμος*, *the brooches, twisted bracelets, earrings, and necklaces*.³⁴

Perhaps some sense of the cooperation between these discrete items of jewelry has been retained; it is hard to say. But what is clear is that the language of *κόσμος* stands here in stark contrast to basic clothing, as its natural complement. And this development entails that at least *some* change has occurred within this context. Jewelry has come to be viewed as a *κόσμος* unto itself, an array of gleaming gold items that are clearly distinguished from the clothing items which the goddess wears. Here, in other words, we have something like a genuinely *ornamental* meaning emerging.

This recognized, it is at once clear how this came to be so: it comes down to the scope one attributes to the noun *κόσμος* when it is used, and as it is traditionally used, at the end of an epic toilette. We saw above that the scholiast took Hera's πάντα κόσμον to be a summation of all that had been done and donned since the goddess entered her chamber, and that he had to stretch his own native understanding of an ornamental *κόσμος* to do so. By contrast, I have suggested that when *κόσμος* is used in this way, it signifies the whole ensemble of worn items: clothing and ornaments alike. But there is yet another way of construing the word's scope in this traditional

³⁴ The is very likely the earliest of the *Hymns* in which we find *κόσμος* and *κοσμεῖν* used in the context of a toilette. I discuss the shorter *Hymn to Aphrodite* below; the other *Hymns* in which we find the words used in an arguably *ornamental* way are those to Artemis, in which the goddess exchanges her bow and arrow (which we will see in the next chapter form another important *κόσμος*) for the *χαρίεντα*...κόσμον she will wear to the work of “assembling” (ἀρτυνέουσα) and “leading” (ἐξάρχουσα) a chorus of the Graces and Muses (6.11-18); and Selene, whose brightness, being imagined as jewelry that shines forth from her body, stirs up πολὺς...κόσμος (32. 4; cf. *Od.* 8.380, which provides the model for the second half of this verse, with *κόσμος* appearing in place of *κόμπος*).

context, a way that is unfortunately obscured by Hera's somewhat anomalous toilette. As a rule in these scenes, as evident in the other instances considered above, it is jewelry which is last to be put on.³⁵ My claim, simply enough, is that κόσμος came to have this secondary *ornamental* signification because at some point in the century-or-more gap between Homer and this, the likely earliest of the *Homeric Hymns*, the word was encountered at the end of a toilette and understood to refer back narrowly to the jewelry that had *last* been put on; from which point, as we have just seen, the word could be used at other points within toilettes to signify ornamental accessories.³⁶ The verb κοσμεῖν, it seems, by its close association with the noun in this context, came around the same time to mean contextually something like *bedeck with ornaments* or *adorn*.

Now, it would have been news to these post-Homeric poets that they had given κόσμος and its verb a secondary sense in this context; they did so unwittingly, in the very act of interpreting their predecessors. The important upshot of this particular genesis, as we have been seeing, is that there is remarkably little on the surface which suggests that a new meaning has come to be contextually associated with the language of κόσμος. And yet, by attending to these words' changing relationship to clothing, we have been able to mark out the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* as a *terminus a quo* for the availability of something like a secondary, ornamental meaning. I want to note now as confirmation of this genesis that even clothing is of little avail as an index on the one occasion that a *Hymnic* poet uses the noun in the traditional way at the end of his toilette. For here we find ourselves confronted with the same ambiguous interpretive situation that led to this semantic change. This is the toilette which features as the centerpiece of the shorter, and almost certainly later, *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Just after the foam-born goddess washes ashore on Cyprus (5-15):

... τὴν δὲ χρυσάμπυκες Ἵρραι (5)

δέξαντ' ἀσπασίως, περὶ δ' ἄμβροτα εἵματα ἔσσαν,
κρατὶ δ' ἔπ' ἀθανάτῳ στεφάνην εὐτυκτον ἔθηκαν
καλὴν χρυσεῖην, ἐν δὲ τρητοῖσι λοβοῖσιν
ἄνθεμ' ὀρειχάλκου χρυσοῖό τε τιμήεντος,
δειρήϊ δ' ἄμφ' ἀπαλῆι καὶ στήθεσιν ἀργυφέοισιν (10)

ὄρμοισι χρυσεῖοισιν ἐκόσμεον, οἷσί περ αὐταὶ
Ἵρραι κοσμεῖσθην χρυσάμπυκες, ὅππότε ἴοιεν
ἐς χορὸν ἱμερόεντα θεῶν καὶ δώματα πατρός.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα περὶ χροῖ κόσμον ἔθηκαν,
ἦγον ἐς ἀθανάτους: ... (15)

... the Horai who wear golden diadems received her gladly, and about her put ambrosial clothing; and on her head, they set a well-made crown, one that was lovely and golden; and in her pierced lobes [set] flowers of orichalcum and precious gold; and around her delicate neck and white breast they were *kosmifying* her with golden necklaces, the very necklaces by which they themselves would be *kosmified*, whenever they go to the lovely dance floor of the gods in the home of

³⁵ It was observed above in n. 29 that Homer has introduced into Hera's toilette elements that are traditional to the male arming scene, and that one of those elements is line 186, by which the goddess straps sandals to her feet. Sandals are traditionally the last thing to be put on in the arming scene; and so, the poet, in adapting this line to Hera's toilette, has the goddess likewise put her sandals on last, after the jewelry which would have otherwise been last.

³⁶ On the relative dating of this poem, see Janko 1982: 150-80, 188-200 and West 2003: 14-16.

their father. But when they had put about her body **the whole/every kosmos**, they led her among the immortals.

Note first that line 14 of this poem is essentially the same as *Iliad* 14.187 (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα περὶ χροῖ θήκατο κόσμον), having been minimally adapted for a plural subject and active verb.³⁷ It serves the same basic function as that line too. It looks back in summation as a transition out of the toilette. And again, the major question is the scope of πάντα κόσμον. If these words are taken to extend back to the clothing put on in the second hemistich of line 6, then we have an instance of the word's traditional meaning: the Horai have put about Aphrodite's body a *whole* κόσμος or *ensemble* of items. But maybe the words do not extend quite that far back. Maybe they are now meant only to encompass the gold that is subsequently put on in lines 7-13. In this case, the Horai would be understood to have put about Aphrodite's body *every ornament*, or better, *every item of jewelry*. Either construal could be accommodated by the text; but we have reason to suspect, given the time of this song's composition, that κόσμον here has its ornamental sense. And there are several suggestions that it does. We have already noted that the clothing is dealt with minimally, in an almost perfunctory way, at the start of the scene. After this hemistich, a line and a half on the *gold* crown; another line and a half on the *gold* (and *orichalcum*) earrings; then two final lines on the multiple *gold* necklaces that the goddess will wear: the poet has evidently undertaken to show us why Aphrodite is conventionally χρυσέη.³⁸ It is reasonable to suppose, accordingly, that this πάντα κόσμον signifies the baubles alone, rather than these and the clothing conceived together as a cooperative whole; and, furthermore, that the verb, used here twice in relation to the gold necklaces (ἐκόσμεον, 11; κοσμείσθην, 12), signifies simply the application of such things. But I stress again that there is nothing in this passage which loudly announces that κόσμος and κοσμεῖν have taken on new meanings within this context; likewise, looking back from the perspective of the philologist today, there is remarkably little to suggest that these words, at least in this context, did not always—or at least since the time of Homer and Hesiod—have these secondary, ornamental meanings: so well has the ambiguity which gave rise to these meanings succeeded in camouflaging the very point at which they came to exist.³⁹

We have seen now that κόσμος came to have a secondary meaning in the moment it was contextually interpreted to have one; and that the stage for this interpretation had been set by the word's ambiguous scope when traditionally used at the end of an epic toilette. In concluding this argument, two points must be stressed. First, it is only as a likely story, stitched together from the

³⁷ On the structure of *Iliad* 14.187, see n. 29 above.

³⁸ That the ornamental meaning is restricted in post-Homeric epic to the scene type of the divine toilette, but may appear in lyric poetry in virtually any context suggests that lyric picked up the new meaning from epic, but felt none of its conservatism about when and where it should be used; had it been the other way around, we would expect freer use in epic.

³⁹ I have withheld from discussing till now an instance of κόσμος in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* which might seem at first to pose a problem for the preceding account. The poet says of the daughters of Porthaon that “they were early in the day treading [...] dew / searching for flowers, [the fragrant] *kosmos* [for their heads]” (ἤερίαι στειβο[v... ἐέρ[σ]ην / ἄνθεα μιὰ[ό]μεν[αι κεφαλῆς εὐώ]δεα κόσμον, 26.20-21 Merkelbach-West). An ornamental κόσμος in Hesiod, no less one found beyond the boudoir, would be difficult to explain. But this instance is no more or less ornamental than Hera's or Pandora's: individual flowers become garlands by being tied together into a certain *functional whole of parts*. That this functional whole is worn to the end of ornamentation is, again, incidental to the meaning of κόσμος. For a similar use of the noun in lyric, see Sappho, fr. 98a.3 and, for κοσμεῖν used in the same context, see Pindar, fr. 94b.48. The latter also twice uses κόσμος in this sense of the olive crown won at the Olympic games: it is called a “gray-colored *kosmos* of olive” (γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας, O.3.12) and an “oil-shining *kosmos*” (λιπαρόν / κόσμον, O.8.82-83).

sources which happen to have survived, that I suggest *hexameter* poets were the first to construe the word to mean *ornament*. I have no way of conclusively proving this, and it is entirely possible that lyric poets also understood and used the word in this way early on, perhaps even first, before we have any textual attestation of their work. My claim is just that whoever it was after Homer and Hesiod that first understood and used κόσμος to mean *ornament*, be they lyric or hexameter poet, did so as a result of how they construed the word in this traditional *epic* context.⁴⁰ The second thing is that this ornamental sense, because it is an innovation motivated by no intention, would have spread in an unpredictable way. We are unable to judge from the evidence of the longer *Hymn to Aphrodite* whether its poet was among the first to use κόσμος in signification of *ornaments*, or whether, by his time, this meaning had become conventional. The hymn just marks for us, in an entirely relative way, the earliest point at which this meaning can be shown to exist.

Conclusions

It was alleged at the outset of this chapter that a certain conceptual anachronism has badly confused the consensus understanding of the semantics of κόσμος. We have since located this anachronism in the belief that the word, from its first attestations in Homer, has always had as its basic signification what we mean by *order* today. For this *order* of ours names a kind of abstract entity; and entities of this kind, we have seen, have no place in the thought of the archaic period. It is, rather, in the classical period, in the works of Plato and Aristotle, that we find these entities first articulated as objects of discourse; and it is, in turn, the historical influence of these philosophers that has made it natural for us to speak today of *order* as an abstract constant, one which comes to exist in entities or between them, and which may be construed as the cause of their beauty or goodness or both. This notion of *order*, accordingly, cannot be what Homer's κόσμος signifies. But this is not to claim that κόσμος never comes to have some such meaning. We have seen (so far, only briefly) that it does; but that this use marks an innovation which has gone unnoticed for what it is. It is an innovation of the very philosophers with whom entities like *order* become thinkable; and it is one that could only have spread through their influence. Κόσμος cannot signify an abstract entity in the mouths of those who have no notion of such things.

The conceptual anachronism involved in the retrojection of *order* has been largely effaced by a further retrojection, that of this word's derivative sense of *ornament*, whose early availability alongside *order* is usually explained, in turn, by a story of derivation that involves us in still further anachronism. It must be granted that a kind of popular formalism thrived among pre-Homeric speakers of Greek, such that the word for *order* came to signify also the quintessentially beautiful object. But the origin of this secondary sense is not to be found in the early, unattested history of the Greek language; it first appears to us in the wake of Homer and Hesiod, in the epic of the later archaic period. This meaning is the result of later poets misconstruing the ambiguous scope of κόσμος when used traditionally at the end of an epic toilette. Hera's κόσμος in Homer and those of Pandora in Hesiod are thus antecedents of this *ornamental* sense; and they have been understandably confused by philologists with proper instances of this meaning. The result of this confusion has been the apparent continuity of *ornamental* κόσμος from Homer onward. And it is this apparent continuity which has, in turn, both obscured the true origin of *ornament*, and—what

⁴⁰ I want to stress that I do not, as a general rule, believe that lyric use is derivative of epic use. It could be, as Nagy 1974 argues, that epic is the younger tradition of poetry, which grows out of lyric, but happens to be earlier preserved in our record. In the present case, my point is just that this confusion seems to *require* the epic context.

is more consequential, but has not yet been demonstrated—granted philologists the confidence to identify this use of the word elsewhere in early epic. We shall see in the next chapter that they, being so certain on the basis of Hera’s κόσμος that the *ornamental* meaning was available to Homer, have always reached for it in order to account for the two other instances of κόσμος which function straightforwardly as nouns in his poetry: the two other instances, which, because they unmistakably name phenomenal things in the world, cannot be translated by the abstract *order*.⁴¹ In so doing, these philologists will be shown to have elegantly, if anachronistically, effaced the fundamental problem which these instances might otherwise have presented to our understanding of this word. In any case, for now, since we have not yet had occasion to consider these two κόσμοι, let it suffice that the misfit of *order* is already implicitly granted in the usual attribution of the *ornament* meaning, impossibly, to this pair.

At this point, one might grant that there is some confusion about the early meaning of κόσμος, and yet think it to be a confusion of little consequence: *Is it not the case that this word will come to name an abstraction like order? Is it not the case that it will come to name an ornament also? Haven’t we only had to reconsider when this word comes to have the meanings we previously thought it always had? And what difference should it make, ultimately, if early κόσμος is not a word for order, but one for entities in what we might describe today as a certain order? In the vast majority of the word’s Homeric instances, the adverbial ones, is this distinction not, at best, academic? Achilles’s men skin and process a goat κατὰ κόσμον (Il. 24.622); charioteers on the Achaean side are twice instructed by their passengers, upon taxiing them to the battlefield, to restrain the horses κατὰ κόσμον by the ditch dug about their camp (Il. 11.48, 12.85); and the crew of Phaeacian sailors tasked with returning Odysseus home, we see board their ship and take their seats κόσμῳ at the oarlocks (Od. 13.77). If order is not what κόσμος properly signifies in adverbially functioning instances like these, their translation by such phrases as in order or in an orderly way must nevertheless capture the basic sense, right? And of the noun’s three, nominally functioning instances, we have so far considered just one; for which, if ornament does not work, it nevertheless almost does. What difference would it make if we continue to treat Hera’s κόσμος as an ornament rather than a functional whole whose end is ornamentation? At this point, in other words, it might seem that the preceding argument has been marshaled to make meaningfully new sense of just two instances of κόσμος in Homer — and this, thus far, only *allegedly*, since we have yet actually to consider this pair.*

Perhaps this would be the case, were the definition I offered above not a preliminary one, and one which, it must be stressed again, is fundamentally anachronistic in its terms. It captures well enough the logic of the word’s use in epic, as we have begun to see; but it should not be thought that κόσμος signifies, *sensu stricto*, the *functional whole* as a generic type. We shall see in the next chapter that while κόσμος *is* the word for a *functional whole* in epic—the word, that is, by which epic conceives every functional whole that it represents—this is not at all what the word basically means: epic use has been confused with basic meaning. And in this confusion, there has

⁴¹ Recall that of the eighteen total instances of κόσμος in Homer, there are fifteen which function effectively as adverbs, either as datives of manner or in the phrase κατὰ κόσμον; and just three (including Hera’s) which function nominally. Recall, furthermore, that the adverbial context is one in which the misfit of abstract *order* cannot be readily discerned. Although we have seen that Homeric κόσμος cannot mean *order* because abstract entities like *order* do not exist before the classical period, we have also seen that there is nothing which loudly denounces our using *order* to translate the noun when used to an adverbial end in Homer: it seems to make perfectly acceptable sense. It nevertheless remains a conceptually anachronistic act of interpretation that we shall see ultimately obscures much of the word’s sense and use.

been effaced what we might now call *the discourse of κόσμος*: the reason why, the end to which, the epic tradition has adopted this word as the one by which it construes all functioning wholes.

CHAPTER TWO

The Meaning and Discourse of Κόσμος

My focus to this point has been the consensus about the early semantics of κόσμος: the view that this word, by the time of its first attestations in the Homeric poems, already has two distinct senses; signifying in the first a universal that approximates *order*, and in the second, by derivation from the first, an *ornament*. I have tried to demonstrate that this consensus is entirely ill-founded; that the semantics which it posits involves us in a tangle of anachronism, whereby we conclude from Homer's frequent adverbial use of κόσμος (κατὰ κόσμον / κόσμῳ) that the word denotes a universal *long before such things become thinkable*; and then account for the other instances—the three times that κόσμος functions as a noun and unmistakably refers to something concrete—by *retrojecting into Homer a secondary meaning which only later comes to exist through the (mis)interpretation of Homer*.

To facilitate this critique of the consensus, I offered in the last chapter just a preliminary definition of κόσμος. Taking my start and working backwards from the conceptual misfit of *order*, an essence which we find multiply instantiated in and between various corporeal particulars, I argued that κόσμος was instead a word by which Homer picks out sets of concrete entities exhibiting what *we today* would identify as a certain *order*; that it was the universal word for any particular *whole* consisting of discrete parts.¹ We have tested this definition against just one instance of the word in Homer, the one from Hera's toilette (*Il.* 14.187), where I argued it denotes the *ensemble* of clothing items which the goddess has, in the preceding lines, so deftly put about herself. These discrete items have not by their arrangement come to *possess* κόσμος or to *exhibit* it; rather, as the component parts of a single, efficacious whole, they have *become* a κόσμος. The same, I said, goes for the various objects of κοσμεῖν and its system of compounds, verbs which do not signify the putting of persons or things into some conception of an abstract *order*, but function instead, in the way that I described them in the last chapter, as *pro-verbs* for any act or series of acts which transform discrete entities into a κόσμος; whether this be the marshaling of soldiers and horses on the battlefield, the organizing of a household, a community, a kingdom, the rigging of a ship, or the preparation of a meal.

We are now in a position to reconsider this definition. The basic trouble with it, and what made it so useful last chapter, is that it proceeds from the same assumption undergirding the usual semantics of κόσμος. This is the assumption that Homer, with whom the history of κόσμος happens to begin, uses the word in a more or less innocent way. Thus the usual procedure has been to collect together every instance of the word in the Homeric poems and then posit as few meanings as necessary to account for them all. The consensus does this by positing two meanings; I have argued so far that you can do it with one. But this *whole of parts*, every bit as much as *order* and *ornament*, paints over a distinction we must now begin to draw between the *conventional meaning* of κόσμος and the *particular discourse* which the epic tradition has built up from this word, because of its meaning; by which it has structured and polices the entire (social) world of its diegesis.²

¹ I stressed already in the last chapter that this distinction (between a word which names a single, universal entity and a single word which has a kind of universal application, designating ordered sets of concrete particulars) is a modest one and itself anachronistic.

² What I mean by the parenthesis is that the entire world of epic is nothing more than a community of mortal and immortal beings; it is by the cooperation of so many persons that something with the coherence of a world is constituted. This is a claim that I will defend in the next chapter.

What κόσμος conventionally signifies, we can now say, is a *tool or instrument of some complexity*. This is the word for a concrete contrivance of any sort which consists of multiple parts, each with a particular function of its own, and together working to the single end for which the whole has been devised and assembled. It holds as its own in epic the broad semantic domain which we today, according to such factors as the size and sophistication of the tool, the number of its parts, the way in which they cohere, and the sort of end which they together serve, divide up between words like *device, machine, contraption, and apparatus*.³ We can get an initial sense of this domain from the three occasions on which Homer uses κόσμος in a non-adverbial way. First, if we may revisit and quickly amend our discussion in the last chapter of the instance from Hera's toilette, the different items she dons do not simply become the parts of an ensemble; they are instead here conceived as the essential parts of a single instrument: Hera leaves her boudoir having assembled about herself an *entire apparatus* (πάντα κόσμον, *Il.* 14.187) for seduction, one which she will shortly put to use against Zeus. In one of the other two instances, the one at *Iliad* 4.145, to be considered closely in this chapter, the phrase κόσμος ἵππῳ will turn out to designate a bridle: the *apparatus for a horse*, consisting of bit and toggles, headstall and reins, by the use of which a human being harnesses the strength of a horse to this or that end. And in the third and final instance, at *Odyssey* 8.492, which I will consider in the conclusion to this dissertation, the phrase ἵππου κόσμον δουρατέου will designate the famous Trojan Horse: the ingenious and rather more ad-hoc *machine which was the wooden horse*, devised by Odysseus as an instrument to harness the strength of the Trojans in the service of breaching their own city wall: “the Trojans themselves drew it up to the height of their city” (*Od.* 8.504).⁴

Now, if this is what κόσμος basically means, how is it that we have been able to get this far pretending that it signifies, without any further qualification, an *efficacious whole of parts*? What makes the pretense possible, and at the same time obscures the true sense of the word, is the fact that Homer, in accordance with what we shall see is the traditional discourse of epic, *conceives every whole of parts that he represents as a complex instrument*. So, the many and various persons and things which κοσμεῖν and its compounds take as objects, we can now say, in revision of the claim made in the last chapter, do not become the parts of generically efficacious wholes; *kosmified*, rather, these persons and things become, in each case, the assembled parts of a particular *machine or apparatus*. Because we relied so heavily on this system of verbs to establish the

³ The language of κόσμος, so far from invoking an abstract essence, accordingly comes closer to, and is sometimes interchangeable with, Homeric terms like μῆχος (e.g., *Il.* 2.342 and *Od.* 14.238) and (περι)μηχανάομαι (*Il.* 8.177, 11.695, and *Od.* 7.200), which are used in relation to particular devices and contrivances deployed to some particular end; or terms like ὄπλον (*Il.* 10.254, *Od.* 2.390, and 3.433) and ὀπλίζω (*Il.* 8.55, 11.86, 23.301, *Od.* 17.288, and 23.143), or τεύχεα (*Il.* 4.432, 6.32, *Od.* 15.218, and 22.109) and τεύχω (*Il.* 5.61, 6.314, 18.373 and *Od.* 15.77), or ἔντεα (*Il.* 6.418 and *Od.* 7.232) and ἐντό(ν)ω (*Il.* 9.203, 14.162, 24.124, *Od.* 12.183, and 23.289), all of which relate to concrete tools, appliances, and gear of various sorts; or even a term like δόλος (*Il.* 6.187, 15.14, *Od.* 8.494, and 12.252), which can be used of any device or tool that works by way of a trick. As you might expect, given their metrical shapes, Homer uses neither μηχανή nor μηχανήμα, which do much the same work as κόσμος in later literature, though we do find the hexameter friendly ἀμήχανος (*Od.* 19.363), ἀμηχανίη (*Od.* 9.295), πολυμήχανος (*Od.* 1.205), and πολυμηχανία (*Od.* 23.321). The other important word which I would argue comes fairly close to the meaning of κόσμος is ὄργανον, being something by which you accomplish some ἔργον, but the word is not attested before Pindar (107b), where it refers to a musical instrument of some kind.

⁴ This phrase, which Odysseus speaks in the context of requesting a song from the Phaeacian singer Demodocus, is in fact a kind of zeugma that we will consider closely in the fourth and final chapter. As I construe the phrase above, Odysseus asks that Demodocus sing about the *kosmos* which was the *wooden horse*, but he also means for the man to sing the *kosmos* about the wooden horse, that is, the song machine which recounts this final episode of the war.

preliminary definition of κόσμος, it will be worth our time, in light of the meaning just proposed, to make here another survey of the instances.

There are in the first place a couple of these verbally constituted κόσμοι which we ourselves conceive as *machines*; they accordingly cause us little difficulty. In a case we considered closely in the last chapter, when Telemachus, intending to sail back to Ithaca, bids his companions to *kosmify* the gear on the ship (ἐγκοσμεῖτε τὰ τεύχε', ἑταῖροι, νηὶ μελαίνῃ, *Od.* 15.218), he means for them, by rigging the ship, to make it into an operational tool for his use, the κόσμος that will carry him home. And in the other case, one which I neglected to mention in the last chapter, anticipating our discussion of it a little later in this one, the poet, some twenty lines before using the phrase κόσμος ἵππῳ to speak of a bridle, will use the compound κατακοσμεῖν (*Il.* 4.118) to narrate the nocking of an arrow to a bow string—this being conceived as the moment that a staff, string, and arrow become the ready parts of a single κόσμος: one needs now just to pull back the string, find a target, and release.

There are then a further four cases where the κόσμος assembled, while not something which we would call a *machine*, nevertheless makes an easy sense to us construed as such. They are all from the *Odyssey* and all related to domestic activity.⁵ When after the massacre of Book 22, Odysseus instructs Telemachus and the loyal of his herdsmen to have the doomed and disloyal of his slave women carry outside the mass of corpses and clean up all the gore inside; and again, when the poet narrates the men having the women do this, the verbs used to summarize the activity are, respectively, κατακοσμήσησθε (440) and διεκοσμήσαντο (457), the first taking as its object the *whole house* (πάντα δόμον), the second the *whole hall* (πάν μέγαρον). With everything that does not belong removed, and everything which does belong cleaned up and put back in its proper place, the house of Odysseus is reconstituted as a tidy κόσμος: this τάξις σκευῶν, to borrow a later phrase, renders the home a single tool for living which Odysseus, his family, and all his loyal dependents will in the future use. The other two domestic cases come from the seventh book. Early on, when Nausicaa has returned home from her encounter with the anonymous Odysseus, and her nurse, Eurymedousa, prepares for the girl an evening meal, the woman is said to *kosmify* it (δόρπον ἐκόσμηι, 13). And later on, when the feast which Odysseus crashes in the hall of Alcinous has ended, and all of the high king's guests, who are the lesser kings of Phaeacia, have returned to their respective homes, the servant women of Alcinous, we are told, were busy *dekosmifying the gear of the feast* (ἀμφίπολοι δ' ἀπεκόσμεον ἔντευα δαιτός, 232). For our purposes, the two cases are not dissimilar. There is an obvious difference in scale, and there is the fact that the first shows *assembling*, the second *disassembling*; but we have in each case what amounts to a *culinary* κόσμος: an array of all that is required for dining—whatever the number of diners and the specifics of the occasion—conceived as a single *instrument* or *apparatus* that stands ready for use.⁶

⁵ There are, in addition to the basic noun, the various forms of the κοσμεῖν verb, and the agent noun κοσμήτωρ, two further words in the κόσμος family that appear in Homer, but they are marginal and both used in a domestic context. The first is the adjective κοσμητός, which appears just once, in Odysseus's tour through the extraordinary garden of Alcinous, where it is used of the grow beds (κοσμηταὶ πρασιαί, *Od.* 7.127), which by their arrangement constitute the single tool that is the king's green garden. The second is the adverb εὐκόσμως, which also appears just once, being used in relation to the work by which Telemachus rigs out his hall for the fateful shooting contest in *Odyssey* 21: “amazement seized all [the suitors] as they watched how εὐκόσμως he stood up [the row of axes to be shot through], despite having never once seen them before” (123).

⁶ The more usual verbs for preparing a meal in epic, that is, ὀπλιζῶ (e.g., *Il.* 11.86 and *Od.* 2.20), τεύχω (*Il.* 1.467 and *Od.* 15.77), and ἐντύνω (*Il.* 24.124 and *Od.* 3.33), are no less instrumental, meaning in effect “to tool up” a meal. A couple passages from Pindar are relevant here. At *Nem.* 1.21-22, the poet adds some detail to the Homeric image, saying ἀρμόδιον δεῖπνον κεκόσμηται: whatever exactly the parts imagined here, they have been *kosmified* into a *harmonious* meal, a meal whose parts will, by virtue of the fact that they fit together, serve the purpose for which they

With the remaining thirteen cases, which I should stress are a majority of the total, the κόσμος assembled consists, no longer of *things*, but of *persons*. This is trouble for us because *we* do not usually speak of *human-parted* machines, except perhaps metaphorically: for instance, when we say of someone, because of the monotonous, perhaps even dehumanizing work which the person performs, that he or she is, as it were, a *gear* or *cog* in some industrial-era machine. This metaphor, it almost goes without saying, has no place in the discourse of κόσμος. An *instrument* here, as for the later Greeks, is anything whatever which one uses in an effort to achieve some end; and a κόσμος, I am claiming, is just a complex one of these: an instrument of multiple and discrete parts, be these parts persons, animals, things, or a mixture of these.

The battlefield provides the context for all but three of the occasions in which people are *kosmified*; and it would be a little ponderous to give all ten of them here; so here is just one as an example: when in the *Catalogue of Ships* the poet says of Menestheus, the king of the Athenians, that no one on earth was his equal at “*kosmifying* horses and shield-bearing men” (κοσμηῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας, 2.554), what distinguishes this man from every other, the poet means, is his skill at articulating a confusion of men and horses into discrete units, and then fitting these units together into a single but composite instrument for war.⁷

As for the three other people-machines, each of these is of a different sort. Closest in kind to the battlefield κόσμος is the *hunting* machine which Odysseus assembles in *Odyssey* 9. He and his men, aboard their twelve ships, are led by a god to an island which neighbors that of Polyphemus, the Cyclops; the nymphs of the island, called here the daughters of Aegis-bearing Zeus, stir up for them a vast tribe of wild goats; and Odysseus quickly organizes a hunt (156-58):

αὐτίκα καμπύλα τόξα καὶ αἰγανέας δολιχαύλους
εἰλόμεθ' ἐκ νηῶν, διὰ δὲ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες
βάλλομεν· αἴψα δὲ δῶκε θεὸς μενοεικέα θήρην.

At once we took from the ships the curved bows and long-socketed goat-spears, and having been thoroughly *kosmified* into three groups, we were casting; and straightaway the god gave a spirit-satisfying hunt.

Like the bows which some of the men reach for, the men themselves, before they can begin to take their shots, are assembled into a single, tripartite *instrument*. We are to imagine the men falling into three groups, taking three different positions from which to engage, and coordinating all of their shots, such that they manage to drop in short order a great number of goats: enough that nine are allotted to the men of *each* of the twelve ships, and Odysseus, as the king and operator of the κόσμος which has yielded the game, can receive ten for himself.

In one of the other two cases, we can see that, just as the *implements of a feast* (ἔντευ δαιτῶς) constitute a κόσμος, so too do the *feasters* who make use of them. The scene comes a bit before the aforementioned *Catalogue of Ships*. While addressing the assembled army, as a test of morale, Agamemnon feigns a sense of despair about the war; and at one point complains, because

were assembled. And at *Isth.* 1.19-20, we hear that Castor and Iolaus, by virtue of their many athletic victories, have regular occasion to “*kosmify* their homes with tripods, cauldrons, and bowls of gold” (τριπόδεσσιν ἐκόσμησαν δόμον / καὶ λεβήτεσσιν φιάλαισι τε χρυσοῦ), thereby rigging out their domestic spaces for celebratory feasting.

⁷ The poet undercuts this point somewhat in the next line, when he says that at least one person compares to Menestheus, namely Nestor, owing to the experience which comes with years. As for the other nine cases where the κόσμος assembled is one of soldiers, they all come from the *Iliad*, and five of them from, or in close proximity to, the *Catalogues* of Book 2. See *Il.* 2.476, 2.704, 2.727, 2.806, 3.1, 11.51, 12.87, 14.379, and 14.388.

the Greeks so vastly outnumber the Trojans, that their loss will be a shame to future generations. To give a sense of the difference in numbers, he then offers this remarkable hypothetical (2.123-30):

εἴ περ γάρ κ' ἐθέλοιμεν Ἀχαιοὶ τε Τρῳῆς τε
 ὄρκια πιστὰ ταμόντες ἀριθμηθῆμεναι ἄμφω,
 Τρῳᾶς μὲν λέξασθαι ἐφέστιοι ὅσσοι ἔασιν, (125)

ἡμεῖς δ' ἐς δεκάδας διακοσμηθεῖμεν Ἀχαιοί,
 Τρῳῶν δ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστοι ἐλοίμεθα οἰνοχοεῦειν,
 πολλαὶ κεν δεκάδες δευοῖατο οἰνοχόοιο.
 τόσσον ἐγὼ φημι πλέας ἔμμεναι υἴας Ἀχαιῶν
 Τρῳῶν, οἱ ναίουσι κατὰ πτόλιν... (130)

For if we, Achaeans and Trojans alike, were both willing, having cut faithful oaths, to be numbered, and of the Trojans only as many as have hearths [in the city] were to collect themselves, and we Achaeans were to be thoroughly *kosmified* into groups of ten, and [in these groups of ten] were each to take one man of the Trojans to pour wine, there would be many groups of ten lacking a wine-pourer. By so much do I say that the sons of the Achaeans are more than the Trojans who live in the city...

Agamemnon invites the thousands of men who make up his battlefield κόσμος, noble and base alike, to imagine themselves momentarily, for the purpose of illustration, as the parts of this other sort of people machine which kings regularly assemble and operate: they are to imagine themselves, seated ten to a group, as the guests at an impossibly large, impossibly inclusive *feast* (this being the regular occasion in epic for wine-pourers). And then they are to think of the collected Trojan men as their pool of potential wine-pourers, persons with a subordinate but no less essential role to play in the conduct of this feast. The problem in the hypothetical is that there would be nowhere near the number of wine-pourers needed to facilitate the Greek army's feasting. The problem in reality is that this same group of Trojans, who could not properly *serve* the Greek host for a lack of numbers (as a subsidiary part within the same feasting κόσμος), has managed nevertheless to *frustrate* the efforts of these men year after year (as a martial κόσμος opposing the superior Greek one).

What I want to stress about the third and final of our people-machines is that this one, unlike the others, is not a *short-term* κόσμος; it is instead the *enduring* apparatus which a king assembles of all the people he rules at home. The king in question is Tlepolemos, the colonizer of the island of Rhodes. We get his story and the instance of κοσμεῖν (the same διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες from the hunting scene above) in the Rhodian *Catalogue* entry (2.653-70):

Τληπόλεμος δ' Ἡρακλεΐδης ἠϋς τε μέγας τε
 ἐκ Ῥόδου ἐννέα νῆας ἄγεν Ῥοδίων ἀγερώχων,
 οἱ Ῥόδον ἀμφενέμοντο διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες (655)
 Λίνδον Ἰηλυσόν τε καὶ ἀργινόεντα Κάμειρον.
 τῶν μὲν Τληπόλεμος δουρὶ κλυτὸς ἠγεμόνευεν,
 ὃν τέκεν Ἀστυόχεια βίη Ἡρακλεΐη,
 τὴν ἄγει' ἐξ Ἐφύρης ποταμοῦ ἄπο Σελλήεντος

πέρσας ἄστεα πολλὰ διοτρεφέων αἰζηῶν. (660)

Τληπόλεμος δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν τράφ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ εὐπήκτῳ,
αὐτίκα πατρὸς ἐοῖο φίλον μήτρῳα κατέκτα
ἤδη γηράσκοντα Λικύμνιον ὄζον Ἴαρος·
αἶψα δὲ νῆας ἔπηξε, πολὺν δ' ὅ γε λαὸν ἀγείρας
βῆ φεύγων ἐπὶ πόντον· ἀπείλησαν γάρ οἱ ἄλλοι (665)

υἱέες υἰωνοὶ τε βίης Ἡρακληείης.
αὐτὰρ ὅ γ' ἐς Ῥόδον ἴξεν ἀλώμενος ἄλγεα πάσχων·
τριχθὰ δὲ ὤκηθεν καταφυλαδόν, ἠδὲ φίληθεν
ἐκ Διός, ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει,
καὶ σφιν θεσπέσιον πλοῦτον κατέχευε Κρονίων. (670)

And Tlepolemos, the son of Heracles, noble and tall, led from Rhodes nine ships of lordly Rhodians, those who were dwelling about [the island of] Rhodes, having been thoroughly *kosmified* [there] in three parts: Lindos, Ielusos, and chalk-white Kameiros. These are the men Tlepolemos, famous for his spear, was commanding, he whom Astuocheia bore to the Heracleian strength, she whom he [Heracles] led out of Ephura from the river Selleis, having sacked many cities of strong, Zeus-nourished men. And then when Tlepolemos had grown up in the well-constructed hall, he at once killed his father's dear maternal uncle, already grown old, Likymnios, a scion of Ares. And straightaway he constructed ships, and having gathered a great host of people, he went fleeing into the sea; for the other sons and the grandsons of the Heracleian strength threatened him. But he came to Rhodes a-wandering, having suffered pains; and they were settled there in three parts according to tribe, and they were loved by Zeus, who rules over gods and men; and for them an abundant wealth he was pouring down, the son of Kronos.

Tlepolemos grows up in one kind of κόσμος, *the well-constructed hall* of his family (ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ εὐπήκτῳ, 661). When as a young man he kills an uncle and needs to flee from angry relatives, he makes use of another sort of κόσμος, *the ships he straightaway constructed* (αἶψα νῆας ἔπηξε, 664) for his flight. And with his wandering at sea finally over, having discovered the island of Rhodes, he sets about constructing, from the great host of people he had gathered and brought with him on the ships, yet another sort of κόσμος, this one tripartite. He founds three cities on the island (Lindos, Ielusos, and Kameiros, 656); settles his people in them according to tribe (τριχθὰ ὤκηθεν καταφυλαδόν, 668), that is, on the easiest interpretation, gives one city to each of the apparently three tribes which make up his population (λαόν, 664); and then unites the three communities under himself, as the three parts of the single apparatus (διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες, 655) by which he will hold sway over the island.⁸

⁸ Kirk (1985:225 *ad* 655-56) takes διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες to mean that the Rhodian troops were marshaled into three groups at Troy, but this confuses what seems a fairly simple sequence of thought. Our phrase comes in the second half of its line, following *those who dwell about Rhodes* in the first half, and further specifies the number of communities which the Rhodians have *on their island*; after which, in the next line, the poet gives us the names of the communities. I would guess that Kirk has been influenced by the several instances of κοσμεῖν occurring in proximity to this one which *do* take soldiers on the battlefield as their objects (see n. 7 above for a list of these instances). There is a further argument against Kirk's reading. The story of Tlepolemos and his colonization of Rhodes has a fairly typical ring structure, and it happens that this structure is nicely framed by διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες and τριχθὰ...ὤκηθεν (668),

This concludes our (second) survey of the κοσμεῖν verb and its compounds. In summation, these are still very much *pro-verbs*, in the sense that they regularly appear *in the place of* other, more graphically descriptive verbs; but the actions entailed in each context, we can now say definitively, are not ones conceived as constituting anything so universal or quasi-philosophical as last chapter's *efficacious whole of parts*: in every case, rather, the verb signifies the assembling (or with the ἀπο- prefix, the disassembling) of a particular machine or apparatus of one form or another. Nor is there anything special *qua* κόσμος about these cases: every arrow-nocked bow and fully rigged ship, every tidy home and ready meal, every formation of soldiers or hunters or feasters, and every kingdom under its king; they are all, through the lens of epic discourse, machines and apparatuses; and it is the poet's wish to make this fact explicit in certain moments of assembling and disassembling which determines his use of the verbs. For here in this world, as I am claiming, and take the κοσμεῖν system to show at least in part, every association of persons and things, if it is not confusion or chaos, appears as a κόσμος—with all that this word, construed as *machine*, would seem to entail about both the nature and functioning of the entities in association (*machines serve the interest and purpose of their operators*), as well as the conditions under which they may be associated (*the would-be parts of a machine cannot assemble themselves, requiring in each case an assembler*).

I need to explain at this point just why it is that Homer and his characters speak and think this way; why it is that they are always speaking and thinking *about machines*. In the simplest terms, this is because of the particular conception of the *world* which they all share. The poet, in keeping with the same traditional discourse by which he conceives all associated entities as κόσμοι, conceives the entire world of his diegesis, which we shall see with time is a fundamentally *social world* of mortal and immortal persons, as a single κόσμος, the great political apparatus of the highest immortal, king Zeus. Every other set of associated entities appearing in this world is then a further, nested κόσμος which one or more agents assemble and operate in the act of ever performing their respective roles in the great κόσμος of Zeus.⁹ We will consider the lineaments of the apparatus more closely in the next chapter. Suffice it to say for now that *this* is the κόσμος in question on every occasion that the speech or action of characters is reported, judged, or commanded to be εἶ or οὐ κατὰ κόσμον: these phrases always mean *well according to* or *not according to the machine* of the great god Zeus.¹⁰ I want now to give an example of the phrase from Book 17 of the *Iliad*. It is an instance worth considering in some detail, as the *cosmic* stakes of its use are made in this case abundantly clear.

which must accordingly be roughly equivalent to one another. On the poetics of colonization in early Greek literature, Dougherty 1993a and 1993b.

⁹ The individual persons who constitute the great social κόσμος are principally distinguished from one another by the different roles which they play in it, and it is one's role in this κόσμος which determines the different kinds of κόσμοι which different persons spend their lives assembling and operating. I will touch on this dynamic at several points in this chapter, but see the next one for a fuller account.

¹⁰ I argue in the next chapter, and demonstrate on verse-technical grounds in the appendix, that these κόσμος phrases are part of a fairly large system of metrically variant phrases (including, for instance, κατὰ μοῖραν and κατ' αἴσαν) that are all used in more or less the same way.

Hector's Tragedy and the Arms of Achilles

The immediate context for the phrase is this: Patroclus has just fallen, and there follows a protracted fight over his corpse and the suit of armor he had been wearing, the famous and magical armor of Achilles. Hector manages to secure the armor early on, and initially orders men to carry it back to the city, where it would remain as a κλέος for him, a trophy that people would hear about (17.130-31); but he soon decides instead to *wear* the arms of Achilles (184-87); he will himself *use* these divine implements to rally his troops and renew their push for the body of Patroclus. But just when Hector begins to put them on—and this is the part we are interested in—the poet cuts away from the battlefield to a far-off Zeus, who has nevertheless spotted Hector in the moment of his arming (198-214):

Τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἀπάνευθεν ἴδεν νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς
τεύχεσι Πηλεΐδαο κορυσσόμενον θείοιο,
κινήσας ῥα κάρη προτὶ ὄν μωθήσατο θυμόν· (200)

ἃ δεῖλ' οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν
ὃς δὴ τοι σχεδὸν εἶσι· σὺ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνεις
ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος, τόν τε τρομέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι·
τοῦ δὴ ἐταῖρον ἔπεφνες ἐνηέα τε κρατερόν τε,
τεύχεα δ' οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων (205)
εἴλευ· ἀτάρ τοι νῦν γε μέγα κράτος ἐγγυαλίξω,
τῶν ποινήν ὃ τοι οὐ τι μάχης ἐκνοστήσαντι
δέξεται Ἀνδρομάχη κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος.

Ἥ καὶ κυανέησιν ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε Κρονίων.
Ἔκτορι δ' ἤρμωσε τεύχε' ἐπὶ χροῖ, δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης (210)
δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλησθεν δ' ἄρα οἱ μέλε' ἐντὸς
ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος· μετὰ δὲ κλειτοὺς ἐπικούρους
βῆ ῥα μέγα ἰάχων· ἰνδάλλετο δέ σφισι πᾶσι
τεύχεσι λαμπόμενος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.

When Zeus cloud-gatherer saw this man [Hector] far off, arming himself in the gear of the divine son of Peleus, he shook his head and spoke to his spirit: 'Ah, poor man! Not at all does Death weigh upon your spirit, who is now coming in close to you, as you put on the immortal gear of the best man, at whom the rest also tremble; whose strong and gentle companion you killed, and took the gear, **not according to (the) kosmos**, from his head and shoulders. But for now at least, I shall grant you great strength, as the recompense for these things: that Andromache will not receive from you, when you return home, the famous gear of the son of Peleus.' He spoke and with his dark brows nodded, the son of Kronos. And the gear fit to the body of Hector, and Ares entered him, terrible Enyalios, and straightaway filled his limbs with strength and vigor; and he [Hector] went shouting loudly among his famous allies; and he appeared to them all, shining in the gear of the great-spirited son of Peleus.

The question is this: in what sense exactly has Hector, according to Zeus, taken the arms of Achilles οὐ κατὰ κόσμον? The consensus would have it that Hector has acted in an unseemly

or presumptuous way, and that Zeus here calls him out for it: his conduct is *not according to order*.¹¹ But there being in this world nothing *per se* objectionable about stripping a corpse, every commentator has to find something in the particulars of the situation which makes Hector's conduct objectionable. There is some disagreement here, but the most prevalent view today holds that Hector lacks the status to wear the panoply of Achilles.¹² These are the arms of a demigod, forged by Hephaestus himself, and given by the gods as a gift to Peleus on the day he married Thetis, a goddess; and here we have Hector, a son of merely mortal parents, preparing to wear them into battle; Zeus naturally chafes at the sight, condemns the act as οὐ κατὰ κόσμον.

No doubt this reading makes fairly quick and easy sense of the phrase, but there are a number of problems with it. First, while it is both true and important that Hector dons the arms of a superior man, if it is this to which Zeus here objects, why has Patroclus been able to wear the same arms without provoking similar outrage?¹³ Is the son of Menoitius so much the superior in status to Hector, the son of Priam, king of wide Troy? Second, if it is specifically the *donning* of the arms, and not the *taking* of them, that offends against propriety, why has Zeus not said this? Why has the poet had him say clearly and prominently, by the enjambment of εἴλεϋ in verse 206, that Hector's *getting hold* of the arms is οὐ κατὰ κόσμον? Third and most fundamentally, if we set aside the evidence which commentators make of οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, is there anything in this scene which suggests that Hector's conduct is at all indecent? Or that Zeus takes offense to it on such grounds? Is this not rather a thoroughly *pathetic* scene, and, as it turns out, one of a fairly familiar

¹¹ Lattimore 1951: 359 translates the phrase “as you should not have done”; Whitman 1958: 243 renders it “not in good season”; Redfield 1975: 150 and Taplin 1992: 185 “wrongly”; Willcock 1984: 257-58 *ad loc.* and Edwards 1991: 82 *ad* 205-6 “improperly”; and Elmer 2013: 133 “in violation of order.” Allan (2005: 7-8) offers two translations: “in no way rightly” and then “not according to order.” Bassett (1923) credits the phrase with making it clear “that Hector violated some rule of conduct” (117), and then adds: “Whatever the precise meaning of οὐ κατὰ κόσμον may be, it certainly implies the failure to act *comme il faut*” (118).

¹² Edwards 1991:82 *ad* 205-6 is a good example of the status interpretation: “Normally there is nothing wrong in stripping the armour from a dead enemy..., but Zeus considers Hektor's donning of armour presented by the gods to be presumptuous, just as he later refuses to let him capture the immortal horses.” Willcock 1984: 257-58 *ad loc.* is another: “There is no impropriety in taking the armour of a dead foe. What Zeus means is that Hektor does not have the status to wear the immortal arms of Achilleus.” See also Pucci 2018:69 n. 99. This is one of two explanations which go back to the *scholia*. The wording we find there is this: οὐ κατὰ κόσμον “because it is appropriate for Peleus and those in the line of Peleus to wear the arms, to whom the gods gave them” (Πηλεΐ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς Πηλέως ἐπέβαλεν αὐτὰ φορεῖν, οἷς ἔδωκεν οἱ θεοί, T). The other of the two explanations has it that Hector does not really kill Patroclus (striking him third after Apollo and Euphorbus), so that he has no business taking and wearing the armor as though he had: οὐ κατὰ κόσμον “because, having not killed Patroclus, he wears the gear” (ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀνελὼν τὸν Πάτροκλον τὰ ὄπλα φορεῖ, A). This is the interpretation which Reinhardt 1961: 337 adopts. According to Allan 2005, in what amounts to a tweak to the second of the *scholia* readings, the impropriety is not that Hector fails to kill Patroclus on his own, but that he takes from Patroclus, having killed him, the arms of another man, Achilles, whom he of course has not killed: “Hector's actions are οὐ κατὰ κόσμον because the person whose corpse he has stripped is not the rightful owner of the armour” (7-8). Bassett 1923: 118, following the lead of Eustathius, contorts the Greek by taking οὐ, not with κατὰ κόσμον, but with εἴλεϋ in the next line. This allows him to locate the offense in the fact that Hector does not personally remove the armor he is donning from the corpse of Patroclus (Apollo having already done this). His paraphrase: “you did not, as you ought to have done if you were to appropriate the *spolia opima*, take the armor from the head and shoulders of Patroclus.” And that of Eustathius: “having not despoiled, as one ought to, but with Phoebus having disarmed Patroclus, you took them [the arms] as a gift or even as a bit of good luck” (οὐκ ἐσκόλευσας, ὡς ἐχρήν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Φοῖβου τὸν Πάτροκλον ἀφοπλίσαντος, σὺ δῶρον εἴλου αὐτὰ ἢ καὶ ὡς εὐρημα, *ad. Hom. Il.* 4.39.14-16).

¹³ When Patroclus, wearing the very same armor of Achilles, makes his assault against the walls of Troy and is turned away by Apollo, the god compares him negatively to Achilles but at no point expresses any outrage about the armor (16.707-9).

sort, wherein Zeus looks piteously on a beloved mortal whose death is near, and grants or at least contemplates some concession?¹⁴

Some further context is needed at this point. This has been a day of great and unprecedented success for Hector and his men. Under his leadership, carrying out, for once, his plan, they have been able to breach the ditch and huge wall that protect the camp and ships of the Achaeans (Hector in fact single-handedly smashes through the wall's gates).¹⁵ On the other side of these fortifications, they have further managed, after a difficult fight, to set fire to one of the Greek ships, that of the long dead Protesilaos.¹⁶ And, while they are thereupon routed and pushed back to the city wall by Patroclus, leading the rested Myrmidons back to war, Hector thinks himself well on the way to recuperating the loss.¹⁷ He has in fact just killed Patroclus, who appears to be the only uninjured Greek leader in action; and, in what is perhaps the most remarkable twist of all, he has retrieved from the man's corpse the famous arms of Achilles: the suit of armor which Achilles would seem to need, should he ever choose to rejoin the war.¹⁸

These are all great accomplishments, each of them a credit to Hector; but the last is nevertheless unlike the rest in one important respect. Whereas the rest are achievements which we know Zeus to have orchestrated in the work of implementing a much larger plan of his own, the Διὸς βουλή (the implementation of which is the story of the *Iliad*, from start to finish, just as the story of the *Odyssey* is the implementation of a further plan of Zeus), the last is something which Zeus, at least before a certain point in the action, has neither planned on nor anticipated.¹⁹ What is

¹⁴ I have in mind moments like *Il.* 15.4-12, 16.431-38, 17.648-50, 19.340-41, and 22.167-76. At *Il.* 17.441-55, Zeus again looks on in pity, not for a mortal this time, but for the immortal horses of Achilles. On *pathos* as a motif in Homer, see Griffin 1976.

¹⁵ Hector makes it clear in a speech at 15.718-25, calling on his men to bring him a torch with which to set fire to the ship of Protesilaos, that he has long wanted to make an assault like this on the ships, but that the elders of Troy have hitherto forbidden him. He breaches the wall at 12.430-71.

¹⁶ Hector and his army come close to the ships at the end of Book 12, when they cross the ditch and breach the wall of the Achaeans, but they do not manage to reach them until the end of Book 15, which concludes with Hector clinging to the ship of Protesilaos, calling for fire. The ship is finally set ablaze in the sequel at 112-23.

¹⁷ Patroclus enters the fight moments after the ship is torched (16.257-77) and immediately routs the Trojans, pushing them back in confusion across the ditch (278-418).

¹⁸ The death of Patroclus, discussed in more detail below, comes as the final episode of Book 16 (777-867).

¹⁹ The *Iliadic* Διὸς βουλή is first referred to in the fifth line of the poem's first book, where we are told that it was being accomplished from the moment that Agamemnon and Achilles first had their falling out. There has always been a controversy about the exact nature and scope of the plan. There are four basic positions. The first and perhaps most popular today has it that the plan is the promise which Zeus makes to Thetis, according to which he will honor Achilles by causing the Greeks to lose without the hero's help on the battlefield. This is the view, among modern commentators, of Bassett 1922, Schadewaldt 1966: 146, and Kirk 1985: 53, but it goes back to Aristophanes and Aristarchus. The obvious problem with this view, which Redfield 1979: 106 points out, is that the plan is evidently being accomplished *before* Zeus makes this promise. The second position, which also goes back to antiquity, has it that the *Iliadic* plan is the same one referred to in the proem of the *Cypria*, according to which Zeus contrives the Trojan War in order to kill off mortals and thereby relieve Gaia of their burdensome weight. Among modern commentators, this is most notably the view of Kullmann 1955. The third position has it that the plan being accomplished is more narrowly the fated destruction of Troy, a thing which Zeus achieves through the μῆνις of Achilles. This is the view of Pagliaro 1955 and Redfield 1979. The fourth and final position is that the plan is not in fact a particular plan at all, but rather a fairly general statement of divine will; for which, see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920: 245-46. Of the four, this view is the weakest, since βουλή in Homer, as Kullmann 1955: 168 makes clear, is always a particular and concrete plan for action. But Clay 1999 is surely right to push back against the idea that the Διὸς βουλή must be one or another of the other three options, for these are not really discrete plans at all, but rather plans within plans. The largest of them is the plan to lighten the burden of Gaia, which starts with the judgement of Paris and ends with the fall of Troy; the second, being nested within the first, is the one involving the wrath of Achilles, that is, the story of our *Iliad*, by which Zeus, contriving the death of Hector at the hands of Achilles, brings Troy to the brink of destruction in the final year

more: it is a feat which *prima facie* threatens to throw a wrench in the very plan for which Zeus has contrived all the earlier achievements of Hector.

So it is really Zeus who drives Hector and the Trojans with such force against the Greeks, Zeus who gives Hector the means to break through the Greek wall, and Zeus who beats back Ajax, who is another Greek wall, when he alone stands between the Trojans and the ship of Protesilaos; he contrives all of this with the expectation that Achilles, recognizing the desperate situation of the Greeks, but still unwilling to give up his anger at Agamemnon, will send out Patroclus to fight the Trojans back from the ships and camp.²⁰ And after this, when, like clockwork, Patroclus has re-entered the fight and repelled the Trojans, it is again Zeus, working through his agent Apollo, who contrives that Hector kill Patroclus; intending by this ploy to redirect the anger of Achilles against Hector, and at last draw him back into the fighting.²¹

Beyond these, Zeus has planned from the start no further success for Hector. Indeed, the next and final step in his plan, working this time through Athena, is to have Achilles *kill* Hector; whose death, as the great hero and defender of Troy, will in turn set the stage for the final episode of the war: the sack of the city (another job which Zeus will farm out to Athena).²² The death of Hector at the hands of Achilles is what completes the *Iliadic* plan of Zeus, and brings Troy to the

of the war; and the smallest of the three, being but a part of the *Iliadic* story, is the particular ploy by which Zeus, promising to honor Achilles by momentarily aiding Hector, draws the latter out to be a victim of the former. I agree with Allan 2008 to the extent that there is always some plan of Zeus being accomplished, but insist with Kullmann that the referent of βουλή is always some specific plan. See the conclusion to this dissertation for more on the execution of a Διὸς βουλή as the basic plot of epic poetry.

²⁰ The poet makes it abundantly clear, on a number of occasions, across several books, that Zeus is behind the success of Hector's assault. What follows is a catalogue of those moments: a little way into Book 11, with the two sides fighting about the ditch, the gods are angry with the son of Kronos "because he was then planning to hold out *kudos* to the Trojans" (οὐνεκ' ἄρα Τρώεσσιν ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι, 79). A bit later, he gets word to Hector through his messenger Iris that "[he] will hand him the power to kill until he reaches the well-benched ships" (192-93). When Hector then makes his move against the Greeks, the poet asks at 299-300: "Whom first and whom last did he kill, Hector, son of Priam, when Zeus gave him *kudos* (ὅτε οἱ Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν)?" By the start of the next book, "the Argives, having been mastered by the whip of Zeus (Διὸς μάστιγι δαμέντες), were being held back, penned in with their hollow ships, fearing Hector, the bold deviser of their flight" (37-39). Soon after this, when Asios, a Trojan ally, is facing off against Polypoites and Leonteus, who alone guard the gates of the Achaean wall, he prays to Zeus for aid, but is unable to persuade the god, "for his heart was planning to hold out *kudos* to Hector" (Ἐκτορι γὰρ οἱ θυμὸς ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι, 174). The battle before the wall accordingly hangs in the balance "until the time when Zeus gave greater *kudos* to Hector (Ζεὺς κῦδος ὑπέρτερον Ἐκτορι δῶκε), son of Priam, who was the first to spring at the wall of the Achaeans" (437-38). He is then able to wield easily the huge rock with which he busts open the gates because "the child of crooked-minded Kronos made it light for him" (τόν οἱ ἐλαφρὸν ἔθηκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω, 450). The next book begins some twenty lines later with the poet saying: "And when Zeus had conducted Hector and the Trojans to the ships..." (Ζεὺς δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν Τρῳάς τε καὶ Ἐκτορα νηυσὶ πέλασσε 13.1). And near the middle of the same book, he reminds the audience that "Zeus was then planning victory for the Trojans and Hector" (Ζεὺς μὲν ῥα Τρώεσσι καὶ Ἐκτορι βούλετο νίκην, 347). When Zeus, following his deception by Hera, wakes up at the start of Book 15 and refocuses his attention on the execution of his βουλή, he sends Apollo to the aid of Hector, who has been wounded in the interval, and loans his son his famous *aegis*, by which to terrify the Achaeans and push them back at last upon their ships (229-35); we then watch this play out over the rest of the book, as the Trojans "bring to completion the commands of Zeus" (Διὸς δ' ἐτέλειον ἐφετιμάς, 593). And at the height of the action, Zeus himself takes an active role in the fighting. Working from the aither, he becomes the personal defender of Hector (αὐτὸς...οἱ ἅπ' αἰθέρος ἦεν ἀμύντωρ / Ζεὺς, 610-11); "he stirs Hector against the hollow ships" (νήεσσιν ἐπιγλαφυρῆσιν ἐγειρεν / Ἐκτορα, 603-4); he "drives him from behind with his immensely large hand, and stirs on the host together with him" (τὸν δὲ Ζεὺς ὥσεν ὀπισθε / χειρὶ μάλα μεγάλῃ, ὄτρυνε δὲ λαὸν ἅμ' αὐτῷ, 694-95).

²¹ Zeus himself reveals that this is his plan on several occasions, most notably at *Il.* 8.470-83 and 15.49-77.

²² When Zeus, following Hera's famous deception, reveals to his wife a fair portion of his *Iliadic* βουλή, he makes it clear that the Achaeans will eventually take Troy "through the plans of Athena" (Ἀθηναίης διὰ βουλᾶς, *Il.* 15.70).

doorstep of its Zeus-plotted doom. So it is not difficult to see how the latest deed of Hector, his taking the armor of Achilles, runs counter to the plan of Zeus, and at a critical moment no less: how will Achilles now avenge Patroclus by killing Hector, when Hector has the armor that Achilles needs in order to fight?

This hiccup in the plan of Zeus stems from a contingency of mortal planning. While Zeus, by helping the Trojans and baffling the Greeks, angles for Achilles to send Patroclus out; it is no part of *his* plan that Patroclus impersonate Achilles by wearing his armor. This is an idea which originates with Nestor back in *Iliad* 11.²³ Achilles is watching the fight from the stern of his beached ship, spots Nestor driving a wounded man back to safety, and sends Patroclus to confirm if, as he suspects, this man is Machaon, the famous healer. When Patroclus arrives at the tent of Nestor, discovers a wounded Machaon, and is about to return, Nestor detains him and urges him, as the man closest to the heart of Achilles, to try to reason with his companion; to see whether, in this ever-worsening situation, he might now give up his anger and rejoin the fight, or else, by way of a compromise, allow Patroclus to go in his place, leading the Myrmidons. So far so good; but note what Nestor tacks onto the compromise option (798-801):

καί τοι τεύχεα καλὰ δότω πόλεμόνδε φέρεσθαι,
αἶ κέ σε τῷ εἴσκοντες ἀπόσχονται πολέμοιο
Τρῶες, ἀναπνεύσωσι δ' ἀρήϊοι υἴες Ἀχαιῶν
τειρόμενοι· ὀλίγη δέ τ' ἀνάπνευσις πολέμοιο. (800)

And let him give you his fine gear to carry into the fight, if perhaps the Trojans, taking you for him, would hold back from the fight, and the war-like sons of the Achaeans could catch their breath, worn out as they are now; for there is little room for breathing in the fight.

And when, at the start of *Iliad* 16, Patroclus finally returns to the tent of Achilles and makes his appeal, he does not just follow the advice of Nestor, he ends up delivering the very script which Nestor has earlier modelled for him; and so again tacks onto the compromise option this further idea of disguise (40-43):

δὸς δέ μοι ὤμουιν τὰ σὰ τεύχεα θωρηχθῆναι,
αἶ κ' ἐμὲ σοὶ ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχονται πολέμοιο
Τρῶες, ἀναπνεύσωσι δ' Ἀρήϊοι υἴες Ἀχαιῶν
τειρόμενοι· ὀλίγη δέ τ' ἀνάπνευσις πολέμοιο. (40)

And give to me your gear to wear on my shoulders, if perhaps the Trojans, taking me for you, would hold back from the fight, and the war-like sons of the Achaeans could catch their breath, worn out as they are now; for there is little room for breathing in the fight.

²³ Janko 1992: 310-11 rightly observes that Patroclus wearing the armor of Achilles “is an innovation which the poet has not fully harmonized with the tradition. At the end of the *Iliad* Akhilleus owns *two* divine panoplies, one each for Aias and Odysseus; the story of their strife over his armour must be older, and betrays the innovation.”

This is how it happens that Achilles, by now agreeing to the compromise, advances the plan of Zeus in the moment, for he will put Patroclus in the field, but also sets up a possible obstruction to it down the line, because he may not have the armor he will need to avenge the fallen Patroclus.

The poet puts off having Zeus speak directly to the issue of the armor until the climactic moment from which we started out, and to which we will shortly return: when Hector already has the gear in his hands and sets about harnessing himself with it. But this is not to say that the poet, prior to this point, has left us entirely in the dark about the thinking of Zeus. There are two references to the armor which prepare us for the god's dramatic address. The first reveals the kernel of Zeus's intention, but leaves us perplexed and in need of further information. It comes at *Iliad* 16.644-55, just after Patroclus, performing an unenviable part in the plan of Zeus, has killed a mortal son of Zeus, Sarpedon. As the two sides fight terribly over his body, the Olympian, who in his grief has staged this horrible scene, looks on it intently, wondering whether or not this is the right time to see through the next step in his plan:

...οὐδέ ποτε Ζεὺς
τρέψεν ἀπὸ κρατερῆς ὑσμίνης ὅσσε φαινώ, (645)
ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς αἰὲν ὄρα καὶ φράζετο θυμῷ,
πολλὰ μάλ' ἀμφὶ φόνῳ Πατρόκλου μερμηρίζων,
ἢ ἤδη καὶ κεῖνον ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ
αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἀντιθέῳ Σαρπηδόνι φαίδιμος Ἴκτωρ
χαλκῷ δηώσῃ, ἀπὸ τ' ὤμων τεύχε' ἔληται, (650)
ἢ ἔτι καὶ πλεόνεσσιν ὀφέλλειεν πόνον αἰπύν.
ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι
ὄφρ' ἠὺς θεράπων Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
ἐξαυτίς Τρῳάς τε καὶ Ἴκτορα χαλκοκορυστήν
ᾧσαιτο προτὶ ἄστρ, πολέων δ' ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἔλοιτο. (655)

Nor did Zeus ever turn his shining eyes away from the hard fighting, but he kept looking down upon the men always, and kept reflecting with his heart, pondering very much about the slaughter of Patroclus, whether now also in the hard fighting, there over godlike Sarpedon, shining Hector should cut him [Patroclus] down with the bronze, and take the gear from his shoulders, or whether he [Patroclus] should further increase for even more men the steep toil [of war]. And to him [Zeus], thinking in this way, it seemed to be more profitable that the good retainer of Achilles, son of Peleus, drive the Trojans and bronze-helmed Hector back to the city, and seize the spirit from many.

We enter the mind of Zeus as he considers, not *whether*, but *when* to have Hector kill Patroclus; for, now that he has entered the fight, repelled the Trojans, and killed all the many men, Sarpedon being the last of these, whom Zeus has long since planned for him to kill, all that remains for Patroclus in the Διὸς βουλή is to die his death at the hands of Hector. This second option just buys Patroclus a little time. Zeus now grants him an unscripted and ultimately ineffectual last hurrah; after which, per the first option, he will have Hector *cut him down with the bronze* (χαλκῷ δηώσῃ, 650) and—what comes to us now as new and perplexing information—*take the gear from his shoulders* (ἀπὸ τ' ὤμων τεύχε' ἔληται). If the entire point of having Hector kill Patroclus is to draw Achilles back to the fighting, as we know it is, why is Zeus here resolved to hand the armor of

Achilles over to Hector? Why not instead just have the Greeks recover the armor together with the body of Patroclus? And will Achilles now borrow the armor of another? Whose will happen to fit him? Will he instead enter the fight γυμνός, and fight with no armor at all? There is no way to tell; the death and stripping of Patroclus are deferred, and the poet now focuses with Zeus on the hero's charge against the city.

The second reference to the armor comes just after this charge, when Apollo, at last executing the next step in the plan of Zeus, works to bring about the death of Patroclus. He approaches, invisible to all because covered in a mist, and stands behind his victim; slaps him once where the back meets the shoulders, stunning him; and then, there in the thick of the fighting, violently divests him of his arms and armor. The first piece to go is the crested helmet. The god strikes it from his head, and as it rolls and clangs on the ground, its plume now fouled with blood and dirt, the poet comments (796-800):

...πάρος γε μὲν οὐ θέμις ἦεν
 ἰππόκομον πῆληκα μαιίνεσθαι κονίησιν,
 ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς θείοιο κάρη χαρίεν τε μέτωπον
 ῥύετ' Ἀχιλλῆος· τότε δὲ Ζεὺς Ἴεκτορι δῶκεν
 ἧ κεφαλῇ φορέειν, σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦεν ὄλεθρος. (800)

Formerly it was not a thing established [sc. by Zeus] that the horse-hair helmet be stained with dirt, but that is when it was protecting the lovely head and brow of a godly man, Achilles; and at this point Zeus gave it to Hector to wear on his head, for close to him was his own destruction.

The poet here concedes that Zeus has had to change things up. It was not all along a θέμις, something which Zeus has *set in place* (τίθημι) as a matter of his policy, that the helmet of Achilles be befouled now: so long as Achilles had it and was wearing it, there was no cause for this. But now that Achilles has given it to Patroclus to wear, and Zeus needs Patroclus dead, this befouling of the helmet most certainly is a θέμις: it is not as though Apollo goes rogue in the moment he sends it rolling in the dirt. Zeus has decided to give the helmet over to Hector in just this way; and further decided, we hear now for the first time, that Hector will presently wear the thing on his own head. But this change will not substantially alter the plan of Zeus, nor even delay its execution. As the last hemistich of the poet's comment states rather starkly, death is still close to Hector.

Two questions remain at this point. First, why does Zeus, despite the obvious complication it causes him, want Hector to have and wear the armor of Achilles? Second, how will Achilles manage to kill Hector without it? We do not get an answer to the second question until Book 18, when, very famously, Thetis calls in a favor with Hephaestus, and the smith forges an altogether new suit of armor for Achilles.²⁴ The answer to the second question, it will now be obvious, comes in the passage we started from, the address of Zeus to Hector in Book 17. Let us now return to it.

The address makes clear that the death of Hector, while an essential part in the plan of Zeus, is not something which the god is looking forward to; it is not a step that he, as one who genuinely cares for Hector, will execute lightly. What is more, we gather from the address that Zeus is not at all insensitive to the false expectation he has raised in Hector: in this moment, following these successes, death is not even a thought in the mind of Hector, and yet it is just now

²⁴ On this scene, and the parallel dynamic between Thetis and Achilles, on the one hand, and Eos and Memnon, who also has Hephaestean armor, on the other, see Slatkin 2011: 31-51.

closing in on him. As Zeus puts it right at the start of his address: ἄ δειλ' οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν, ὅς δὴ τοι σχεδὸν εἴσι (17.201). Here in what he is contriving to be the final hours of Hector's life, and the last days of his people, Zeus has made the doomed man think, perhaps for the first time in ten years of constant struggle and loss, that this war might not end in disaster. Unaware of the larger plan and his part to play within it, Hector recognizes from the ground, as success follows upon success, only that Zeus now aids his efforts, and so he moves to capitalize on this welcome turn of events, supposing in error that it is the Διὸς βουλή that he take the Greek ships: so does it happen that Hector eagerly but unwittingly takes every step which leads to his death.²⁵ All of this is just to say that the *Iliadic* plan of Zeus creates, as one of its byproducts, the tragedy of Hector; and that in our scene (and there are a couple others like it) the poet allows us to see Zeus as he struggles with this fact.²⁶

It is in his pity for the man that Zeus, having decided to do it earlier, now officially confers upon Hector the armor of Achilles to wear. Although it had not been a part of his plan from the start, and, indeed, would seem at least *prima facie* to be a hindrance to it, Zeus here, with a nod of his head, throws Hector a bone: coloring within the lines of the larger plan that now requires the death of Hector, Zeus has turned a minor inconvenience of mortal planning (the impersonation of Achilles by Patroclus wearing his armor) into a way of honoring Hector, now at the end of his line, for a life of dutiful service. These ἄμβροτα τεύχεα (202) and the μέγα κράτος (206) to wield them are a *recompense* (ποινήν, 207) for the fact that, as Zeus puts it here euphemistically, *Andromache will not receive from you, when you have returned home, the famous gear of the son of Peleus* (τοῖ οὐ τι μάχης ἐκ νοστήσαντι / δέξεται Ἀνδρομάχη κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος, 207-8). We of course know by now what Zeus cannot quite bring himself to say: it is not as though Hector will lose the

²⁵ Hector is made to give expression to his error at *Il.* 12. 241-43, when he is about to lead the Trojans across the Greek ditch and Polydamas advises him against it, having just observed what he correctly takes to be a bird of bad omen sent from Zeus; Hector rebukes him and responds: “let us trust in the plan of great Zeus (ἡμεῖς δὲ μέγαλοιο Διὸς πειθόμεθα βουλῆ), who rules over all mortals and immortals; one bird sign is best: to defend the fatherland.” For more on this scene, see the next chapter.

²⁶ The classic study of Hector's tragedy is that of Redfield 1975. My issue with the reading is the particular world in which Redfield situates the tragedy. It is, as his title attests, an anachronistically dyadic world of *nature* and *culture*. The problem is that this conception of a world allows him to minimize the extent to which Hector's tragedy is a thing divinely orchestrated. “The gods of the *Iliad*,” according to Redfield, “are generally frivolous, unsteady creatures, whose friendship or enmity has little to do with human justice. They do not appear in the narrative as guarantors of human norms or as the sources of natural process. These *Iliadic* gods may use the means of nature—thunderbolt and earthquake—but they do not guarantee a cosmos; their interventions are erratic and personal. Most important, the gods of the *Iliad* are lacking in *numen*; they are in fact the chief source of comedy in the poem” (76). Having thus written the gods out of any real role in the world, Redfield posits as a power over and above them an impossibly abstract conception of *fate*, which he then identifies with the *nature* of his title: “fate is nature, is the order of the world. The Homeric gods did not create this world. They too have a *genos*, a ‘breeding,’ a nature and a place in nature. Not having made the world, the gods are not responsible for it and have no special obligations toward it” (135). The identification of *fate* with *nature* allows him to carve out within this sphere of apparently immutable facts and forces a further sphere of so-called *culture*, the other element of his title, wherein human beings, in their various ways, confront the problem of nature and learn to deal with the constraints it imposes. Finally, within this dyadic model of *fate-cum-nature* and *culture*, he claims that literary tragedies like Hector's play out squarely within the sphere of culture, in those extreme moments when “the limitations and self-contradictions” (91) of a culture are laid bare, and its system of rules and values no longer provide clear guidance about proper action, so that otherwise virtuous men make disastrous errors. For Redfield, in other words, tragedy is a means by which the poet “imaginatively tests the limits of his culture's capacity to function” (80). On the subject of Hector, see also Schein 1984: 168-95. On the genealogy of the distinction between nature and culture, see Descola 2013.

armor in the field and manage to make his way back home without it; he will lose his life with the armor, and never see any homecoming.

So much for the basic thrust of the address and the context in which Zeus makes it. It remains now to consider what exactly he means by the phrase οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. We have seen so far that it would make little sense for him to mean that Hector has committed some offense against *propriety*, as though he has done something which crosses a very vague and very abstract line, across which an act is *not according to order*. It is Zeus himself, we know when we hear him speak these words, who has decided to give the armor to Hector as a gift.

My contention, to restate it now in three parts, is, first, that κόσμος means here what it always means in epic: it is the word by which the poet speaks of a *machine, device, or apparatus* of one form or another. Second, that the apparatus in question, the one with which Hector has done something out of whack, is the great one to which he and every other mortal and immortal person alike, save for Zeus, who is its assembler and operator, belong as parts. They are all the parts of the single κόσμος by which Zeus, as the father of gods and men, *governs* all others and brings to completion the various plans to which he sets his mind. In this case, it had been no part of the *Iliadic* plan of Zeus that Hector get the armor of Achilles; this is not something, before a certain point, which he had been working to achieve by the manipulation of his political apparatus. This is the sense in which Hector has taken the armor οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, *not in agreement with the apparatus*. Third and finally, there is my claim that epic conceives every other whole of parts that it gives representation to as a further κόσμος, by the assembling and/or operating of which one or more agents execute their particular parts within the κόσμος of Zeus. Our scene takes this mechanism as its focus: this is precisely the moment in which Zeus authorizes Hector to assemble about himself and use, pursuant to his part in the great κόσμος, the κόσμος that is the paternal armor of Achilles.

Hector has been arming himself since before the start of Zeus's address; and he has no doubt kept at it since our attention has turned away from him towards Zeus; but it is not until, and emphatically just after, the sanctioning nod of the father that all the different pieces of gear are finally said to fit to the body of Hector: after νεῦσε Κρονίων at the end of line 209, comes in the sequel Ἐκτορι δ' ἤρμοσε τεύχε' ἐπὶ χροῖ. It is only here, then, with the formal consent of Zeus, that the gear *harmonizes* as a κόσμος on the body of Hector. There is, in fact, a wonderful ambiguity in this pair of verses which underscores my point. On the one hand, taking ἤρμοσε *intransitively* with τεύχεα as subject, Hector has been arming himself with the gear, and now we hear, in simple summation, and perhaps with some surprise, seeing as how the suit has not been fitted for him, that it now fits his body well.²⁷ All the while we know, on the other hand, taking ἤρμοσε as a *transitive* verb, with Κρονίων from the previous line as subject, that it is really Zeus, the son of Kronos, who has, in a show of pity for Hector, strapped him with the gear.²⁸ The suit becomes on Hector's body one of the unspeakably numerous nested κόσμοι by which the great political κόσμος of Zeus operates; and now Ares enters the man, filling his limbs with the power that Zeus has promised him (δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης / δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλῆσθεν δ' ἄρα οἱ μέλε' ἐντὸς /

²⁷ The intransitive reading is required on the other occasion that this verb is used in this way, when Paris, being an archer who does not usually wear a corselet, has to borrow one from his cousin ahead of his duel with Menelaus (*Il.* 3.332-33).

²⁸ Pucci 2018: 68, who takes Zeus as the subject of ἤρμοσε, understands Zeus to act nefariously here. He thinks that Zeus, in harmonizing the armor to the body of Hector, has made sure to leave a place about the neck of Hector unprotected, to which place Achilles, in his duel with Hector, will strike with his spear and so kill the man. This seems to me a fanciful reading with no textual support, but I must say, as will be obvious by now, that I am sympathetic to his belief in a conspiratorial Zeus.

ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος, 210-12); whereupon this super-charged Hector returns among his men, shouting loudly to them, and showing himself to them as a beacon in the struggle over the corpse of Patroclus. His intention here, as the lines which follow our excerpt develop in detail, is to get the attention of the allied leaders, through whom, with each of them marshaling their own men, he plans to assemble, from their combined stock of man-power, yet another κόσμος for himself to wield by the authority of Zeus; by the use of which he will make the effort, but only by god's will succeed, at taking hold of the corpse of Patroclus.

Now, this is of course just one of the thirteen occasions on which the poet uses the phrase εὔ/οὐ κατὰ κόσμον; and perhaps it will seem like an example which has been conveniently chosen, one that is uniquely able to accommodate what is really for epic an all-too-sophisticated conception of reality. The doubt is not unreasonable! I have not as yet even demonstrated that κόσμος means *apparatus*, but now insist, with an admittedly great leap, that the apparatus in this phrase is, by the conception of epic, nothing other than *the world*. Worry not—with this instance of the phrase now explained, and a rough sketch of the model now given, let us here make a new start, and begin again from a thorough-going demonstration of the meaning of κόσμος, taking as our example the instance at *Iliad* 4.145.

Κόσμος as Apparatus: The Case of a Bridle

I have observed several times now that there are just three instances of κόσμος in Homer which act straightforwardly as nouns, which clearly pick out some particular in the world of the poem and cannot, therefore, be translated by an abstraction like *order*. I have observed as many times that philologists, in dealing with these cases of the word, usually reach for some shade of the *ornament* meaning. So far, we have had occasion to consider closely just one of these three, the one from Hera's toilette in *Iliad* 14. We saw there that, while Hera's κόσμος is not itself an instance of the *ornamental* meaning, it is nevertheless by the interpretation of the word's use in this context that this meaning *later* comes to exist. I rehearse all of this now because our demonstration brings us to another of these nominal κόσμοι, and I want to stress from the start: if the word in Homer does not yet have the *ornamental* sense in its ordinary context, we have *a priori* reason to doubt any attribution of this meaning to an instance found beyond the boudoir. It will nevertheless be convenient to take our start from the consensus that at *Iliad* 4.145 the phrase κόσμος ἵππῳ should be construed as an *ornament for a horse*. The critique of this consensus will yield the first hints that we have here named, not an *ornament*, but an *apparatus for a horse*, that is, the *bridle apparatus*. I stress *first hints* because there is then a further obstacle: the poet happens in this case to have construed, by way of a rhetorical figure, a certain *part* of the bridle, which he assumes will be familiar and so neglects to describe in functional terms, as the fully constituted apparatus. We must accordingly identify this part and show how it comes to stand here synecdochically for the whole.

The immediate context for the word is a notorious simile. We find it memorializing the occasion that Pandarus, a Trojan-allied leader and notable archer, breaks a moments-old truce to take a shot at Menelaus, but manages only to wound the man superficially. Just before the arrow reaches its mark, Athena, having come suddenly to stand before Menelaus, swats the thing from its course, diverting it to a place about his groin, where there are a number of defensive layers. The arrow passes through each of these, but retains thereafter only enough energy to scratch the

outermost layer of Menelaus's skin. As blood then begins to flow from the wound, down along his uncovered thighs, the contrast in color is likened to purple dye staining an ivory artifact (140-147):

αὐτίκα δ' ἔρρεεν αἷμα κελαινεφές ἐξ ὠτειλῆς. (140)

ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἐλέφαντα γυνή φοίνικι μήνη
Μηονίς ἢ Κάειρα παρήϊον ἔμμεναι ἵππων·
κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολέες τέ μιν ἠρήσαντο
ἵππηες φορέειν· βασιλῆϊ δὲ κεῖται ἄγαλμα,
ἀμφότερον κόσμος θ' ἵππῳ ἐλατῆρι τε κῦδος· (145)
τοῖοι τοι Μενέλαε μίανθην αἵματι μηροῖ
εὐφυέες κνήμαί τε ἰδὲ σφυρὰ κάλ' ὑπένερθε.

Straightaway cloud-dark blood was flowing from the wound. And as when someone, a woman, stains ivory—a Maeonian woman or a Carian—to be a cheekpiece for horses; but it lies in an inner chamber, and many horsemen have desired to use it; but in a king's possession it lies, his delight, both the *kosmos* for the horse, and the *kudos* for the driver; so, Menelaus, were your shapely thighs stained with blood, and your calves, and your beautiful ankles below them.

The first two lines of the simile (141-42) show us the final stage in a manufacturing process that has rendered a piece of ivory into what we are told is a *cheekpiece for horses* (παρήϊον ἔμμεναι ἵππων). But what sort of cheekpiece? The noun παρήϊον offers us no help: when it appears elsewhere in Homer, it invariably signifies the cheeks or jaws of a face. Since the noun can here only denote an artifact, the most we are warranted to glean from it is the pale *cheekpiece*.²⁹ Still, being made of one costly substance and stained by another, we are clearly to imagine a *precious* object; one which will, in fact, become the treasure of a king in the simile's second movement (143-45). On this basis, and the object's further characterization as a κόσμος (145), it is concluded that this must be some manner of *ornamental* attachment for the bridle of a horse.³⁰ It must be stressed, then, that it is this object's being called a κόσμος which gets us from the notion of a *precious object* to one that is specifically *ornamental* in its nature: except for the evidence that is

²⁹ See *Il.* 16.159, 23.690; *Od.* 19.208, 22.404.

³⁰ It is a minority of commentators who attempt to connect this παρήϊον with preserved *realia*. I would guess that this is because, for most who encounter the passage, the artifact's being called a κόσμος leaves little doubt about its nature. When the attempt is made to identify the piece, it is usually concluded to be a blinker ornament; see, for example, Lorimer 1950: 508, followed by Kirk 1985: 346. Found in contexts from the ninth century and later at various sites in the Near East and eastern Aegean islands, *although never in mainland Greece*, these pieces were fastened to the cheek strap of the bridle under the eye on each side of the horse's face and seem to have often been worn together with a snout ornament, for the representation of which see the horse head from Zincirli included in Barnett 1957: 100 as fig. 37a and b. These ornaments are made of different materials, variously sized, shaped, and decorated; for our purposes, however, we need only note that many made of ivory have been found at the site of Nimrud in modern-day Iraq—and in an all too appropriate context, the storeroom of a ninth-century Assyrian king. At least a few of these pieces, furthermore, show signs of having been darkly stained. For a catalogue and images of the the Nimrud ornaments, see Orchard 1967. That no blinkers have been found in mainland Greece is treated by Carter 1985: 12 as support for the identification on the grounds that Homer would have recognized such things from the Near East but had no technical name for it other than to call it a παρήϊον. While the piece comes from a distant land, this in no way entails that the object is foreign *in nature* to the poet or his audience. This is a conclusion that follows entirely from the view that the poet is talking about a kind of ornament which we do not find in mainland Greece. We are about to see, as already stated, that the kind of object identified here as a παρήϊον is an essential, functioning component of the bridle. Its foreign manufacture, in Maeonia or Caria, distinguishes it as a piece fit for a king's bridle.

usually made of this word, why could this cheekpiece not be at once an object of great value *and*, as we shall see, an essential, functioning component of the bridle? But if it is the interpretation of κόσμος as *ornament* which determines the nature of this otherwise obscure cheekpiece, then there is an unfortunate circularity in our viewing this instance of the word as one which confirms the early availability of the *ornament* meaning, for we make sense of the object in light of the meaning we attribute to this word, only to turn around and cite this κόσμος as a clear instance of the *ornamental* meaning, as if there had been a preponderance of contextual evidence to support the attribution of this sense here.³¹

In our haste to conclude, because it is called a κόσμος, that this artifact is an *ornament* or in some sense *ornamental*, we have ignored what is clear contextual evidence that no such thing is being talked about. We might begin from Kirk's paraphrase of the simile's second movement: "The cheek-piece lies in a storeroom, many horsemen have coveted it but it lies there to delight a king, to adorn his horse and bring glory to its owner."³² Certain nouns have been rendered as verbs; but, on the whole, Kirk tracks the Greek closely.³³ And yet, for exactly this reason, two moments where he deviates are all the more glaring. To begin with, the infinitive φορέειν in verse 144 has dropped out completely: Kirk's horsemen only *desire* or, to use his word, *covet* this cheekpiece; they do not, as Homer's do, *desire to bear it*. And one can see, however it came to fall out here, why this infinitive would be a problem for anyone who regards the piece as an *ornament*: when the verb is elsewhere used of human action in a literal way, it entails the carrying of an item *on one's person*, or else, more specifically, *in one's hands*, where it comes close to meaning *wield*. Thus, we are told that "Thyestes left his scepter for Agamemnon *to bear*" (Θυέστ' Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι, *Il.* 2.107); and the bow which the suitors fail to string was one that Odysseus, before going to war, "*used to carry* in his native land" (φέρει δέ μιν ἦς ἐπὶ γαίης, *Od.* 21.4). How are we to construe an *ornament*, one that is to be strapped to the face of another animal, as something which many horsemen might desire to carry *in their hands* or otherwise *on their persons*?

A second departure points us to a further weakness of the *ornament* interpretation: whereas the poet says that this cheekpiece is ἐλατῆρι κῦδος (145), that is, glory for a *driver*, Kirk says that it "bring[s] glory to its *owner*." We find the same fudging in Ford's paraphrase, which better unpacks the logic of the substitution: "the cheek-piece radiates the authority (*kudos*) of its noble possessor."³⁴ If one regards this παρήϊον as an *ornament* for the horse of a king, as Kirk and Ford do, then any distinction which the piece garners would naturally redound on the king himself; and do so regardless of whether he happens to be driving the chariot or riding as a passenger. So, the question becomes: why has Homer chosen to add this irrelevant detail in so prominent a place; chosen, at the climax of his simile, to underscore that the κῦδος of this ornament redounds on the king acting *as a driver*?

³¹ And yet we find that this instance of κόσμος is consistently translated *ornamentally*: rendered by "ornament" (Kahn 1960: 221, Mitchell 2011: 58, Oliensis 2019: 36), by "adornment" (Owen 1947: 42, Ford 2002: 116), by "beauty" (Lattimore 1951: 117), by "Schmuck" (Philipp 1968: 9, Latacz 2017a: 11); said to designate "une pièce d'équipement ornementale d'un cheval" (du Sablon 2014: 59). And it is because of the interpretation of κόσμος that this otherwise obscure cheekpiece is confidently identified as the "decorative element of a horse's harness" (Elmer 2010: 292), an "ornament" (Foltiny 1967: 12; Macé 2019: 44n15), an "ornamental artifact" (Oliensis 2019: 40), a "piece of art" (de Jong 2004: 125), a "Schmuckstück" (Danek 1997:95).

³² Kirk 1985: 346.

³³ He has rendered ἄγαλμα, κόσμος, and κῦδος, respectively, as "to delight," "to adorn," and "bring glory." This does no damage to the Greek.

³⁴ Ford 2002: 117.

The response might be that the poet has in mind some competitive occasion, one like the chariot race held at the funeral games for Patroclus in *Iliad* 23, where three of the five contestants were kings. Further describing the βασιλῆϊ as ἐλατῆρι, then, adds a touch of circumstantial detail to the moment this ornament is imagined to emanate κῦδος. But this added detail, which does seem to be the implication of the Greek, serves only to bring into focus what has always been the fundamental problem in construing this cheekpiece as an ornament: κῦδος in Homer is never the sort of distinction that comes from the trappings of wealth. It is a divine aura, at one point identified with the “strength of Zeus” (Διὸς ἀλκή, *Il.* 8.140), which is conferred on a hero in a moment of potential greatness, be it on the battlefield, in council, or in competition, radically augmenting his native prowess, so as to ensure his success in the undertaking.³⁵ To take as our example the chariot race just mentioned, recall that it is Eumelus, king of Pherae and other communities in Thessaly, who first takes a clear lead, followed closely by Diomedes in second place; and that, just as the two would have changed positions, Apollo, bearing a grudge against Diomedes, suddenly dashes the whip from his hands, and all hope of victory from his mind.³⁶ Noting the interference, Athena proceeds to hand the race to her favorite. His whip is first returned, the chariot of Eumelus next sabotaged, and then we are told, turning away from the wreckage (398-400):

Τυδεΐδης δὲ παρατρέψας ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους
πολλὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐξάλμενος· ἐν γὰρ Ἀθήνῃ
ἵπποις ἦκε μένος καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ κῦδος ἔθηκε

(400)

But the son of Tydeus, having turned to pass [the wrecked Eumelus], continued to control his single-hoofed horses, after leaping out far ahead of the others, for Athena had cast spirit into his horses and put *kudos* on him.

The poet does not hereby give us privileged information. It must have been clear to all those competing, both from the sudden speed of his horses, and the preternatural skill with which he, despite this, continues to manage them, that Athena, the usual benefactor of Diomedes, has taken a stake in the race. Thus does Antilochus, promoted by the wreck of Eumelus to third place behind Menelaus, advise his team of the developments (403-7):

ἔμβητον καὶ σφῶϊ· τιταίνετον ὅτι τάχιστα.
ἦτοι μὲν κείνοισιν ἐρίζεμεν οὐ τι κελεύω
Τυδεΐδεω ἵπποισι δαΐφρονος, οἷσιν Ἀθήνῃ
νῦν ὄρεξε τάχος καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ κῦδος ἔθηκεν·
ἵππους δ’ Ἀτρεΐδαο κιχάνετε, μὴ δὲ λίπησθον

(405)

Step on, you two! Bend into it as fast as you can! Although with those I do not command you compete, the horses of the skilled son of Tydeus, on which Athena has just now bestowed speed and, on him, put *kudos*; nevertheless, catch up to the horses of the son of Atreus! And don’t be left behind!

³⁵ On the nature of κῦδος in Homer, see Benveniste 2016: 349-359. For the word’s later use in the context of the victory ode, see Kurke 1993.

³⁶ On the character of Eumelus, see *Il.* 2.711-15.


The gift of κῦδος, then, has made Diomedes a superhuman *driver* of horses, such that a second-place finish becomes, in the eyes of his competitors, the new and merely mortal first. But if *this* is κῦδος in the context of a chariot race, returning now to our simile, then it is difficult to see why our poet should be calling a piece of horse jewelry the κῦδος *for a driver*. We have just observed that this distinction comes always from a favoring god; he cannot then mean that the driver's κῦδος is ultimately derived from the cheekpiece. Nor would it make more sense, taking this phrase the only other way that I can think to, for the poet to say that his king, in competing as a driver, will somehow *manifest* this god-granted κῦδος through an ornament his horses wear.

We have managed so far only to defend a thesis of the preceding chapter: there is little in the simile which suggests that κόσμος signifies an *ornament*, and much to suggest that it does not. The cheekpiece is something which many horsemen have desired *to use* or *to wield* (φορέειν), yet never will, because it is reserved for the use of a certain king. It is the κόσμος for his horse by which he, as a driver, manifests the κῦδος that a god grants him. We are left, then, with a sort of riddle. What is the nature of this ivory cheekpiece, and in what sense does it come to be a κόσμος?

If the piece is not an ornamental attachment for the bridle, then it must be a proper part of it; and, of the parts of the bridle, there is just one which could answer the description of an ivory cheekpiece, the *bit toggle*. These have been found at sites across the Near East, as well as Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, in contexts that span the Bronze and Iron Ages; are often made of organic materials, horn or bone usually, but in the case of at least one pair, ivory; and, although the toggles discovered to date show no traces of dye, they are often ornamented with elaborate molding and etched surface designs.³⁷ A bridle requires a pair of these toggles, one to be situated at each end of the bit. Together they serve as the part which unites the otherwise discrete parts of the bridle into a complex whole. Incidental to this function are the specific size, shape, and material of the toggle; what is important is that there be a number of holes or deep grooves to which several straps may be securely fastened. Take for example the substantial fragment found recently at the Mycenaean site of Mitrou in central Greece.³⁸

³⁷ On bit toggles made from organic materials, and for the pair of ivory ones found at Megiddo, see Foltiny 1967, and for the later and metallic equivalent, see Anderson 1961: 40-78, who calls this part of the bridle “the cheekpiece” of the bit.

³⁸ For the image below and more on the toggle and its context, see Maran and Van de Moortel 2014. The drawing is by T. Ross and the photograph by S. Turner. Both are reproduced here courtesy of the Mitrou Archaeological Project.



We have here an elaborately ornamented section of deer antler. At seven and a quarter centimeters in length, it represents roughly half of the original toggle. Of this we may be relatively certain because of the distribution of holes in the fragment: the two large holes bored side by side (one of them still clearly visible, the other just an edge) are usually positioned near the middle of the toggle. Between this pair and the intact extremity, we can still see a further, smaller hole drilled crosswise to the others, and there would have been another to match it on the missing extremity. To the larger, central pair of holes fasten both one end of the bit and one of the driver's reins; to the smaller pair fastens the bifurcated end of the headstall's cheek strap.

The toggle thus acts as the glue of the bridle apparatus. If we are right to conclude that it is this piece which Homer calls a παρήϊον, it still needs to be shown that the toggle comes within this simile to stand *pars pro toto* for the fully-constituted bridle; and that it is this, the bridle, which is properly called a κόσμος. To this end, we turn now for a brief moment to Pindar's *Second Pythian*, an ode in honor of the tyrant Hieron's victory in a four-horse chariot race. It begins:

Μεγαλοπόλιες ὦ Συράκοσαι, βαθυπολέμου
 τέμενος Ἄρεος, ἀνδρῶν ἵπων τε σιδαροχαρμῶν δαιμόνιαι τροφοί,
 ὕμμιν τόδε τᾶν λιπαρῶν ἀπὸ Θηβῶν φέρων
 μέλος ἔρχομαι ἀγγελίαν τετραορίας ἐλελίχθονος,
 εὐάρματος Ἰέρων ἐν ᾧ κρατέων (5)
 τηλαυγέσιν ἀνέδησεν Ὀρτυγίαν στεφάνοις,
 ποταμίας ἔδος Ἀρτέμιδος, ἅς οὐκ ἄτερ
 κείνας ἀγαναῖσιν ἐν χερσὶ ποικιλανίους ἐδάμασσε πώλους.

ἐπὶ γὰρ ἰοχέαιρα παρθένος χερὶ διδύμα
 ὃ τ' ἐναγόνιος Ἑρμᾶς **αἰγλάεντα** τίθησι **κόσμον**, ξεστὸν ὅταν δίφρον (10)
 ἐν θ' ἄρματα πεισιχάλινα καταζευγνύη
 σθένος ἵππιον, ὀρσοτρίαιναν εὐρυβίαν καλέων θεόν...

Great city of Syracuse, holy ground of Ares who is deep in battle, daemonic nurse of men and iron-clad horses, to you I come from glistening Thebes bearing this song, the message of the earth-shaking four-horse chariot, the one in which Hieron, who has a way with chariots, was victorious, and in which he wreathed with far-gleaming crowns the island of Ortygia, seat of the river-goddess Artemis, not without whom did he master, yet with gentle hands, those young fillies wearing their dappled reins.

Because it is the archer maiden, using both her hands, and Hermes, conductor of contests, who put the **splendid kosmos** on, whenever [Hieron] yokes his horse power to the hewn car and bit-obeying chariot, calling on the trident-wielding god of wide strength.

Our narrow concern is to understand what is meant by *αἰγλάεντα κόσμον* in the tenth verse. It is a question about which there happens to be *telling* disagreement. On the one hand, there are those who supply as the object of ἐπὶ in the ninth verse either Hieron or his chariot, and conclude that

κόσμον has the usual ornamental sense.³⁹ And, as it almost always does, this construal makes a certain *prima facie* sense: each time that Hieron races his horses, because Artemis and Hermes favor him, they apply to his person or else to his chariot an ornament of some kind. The problem with the reading is that the application of the κόσμος is supposed to explain (γάρ, 9) why Hieron has managed, not only to master his young and spirited horses (ἐδάμασσε πόλους, 8), but to have done this while holding their reins *in gentle hands* (ἀγαναῖσιν ἐν χερσὶ, 8): but how should the gods' regular gifting of an ornament, to whomever or whatever the case may be, explain any of this?

It is no doubt for this reason that others (and they are perhaps a majority) supply as the object of ἐπί, not Hieron, nor his chariot, but his horses; and conclude that Pindar here uses κόσμος, in an apparently *ad hoc* way, to mean *bridle* or, slightly worse, to signify a part of the bridle, such as the reins; or, still worse, to name the bridle along with its various ornaments.⁴⁰ To put it another way: this is a conclusion which the context itself effectively demands, and it does so, moreover, in spite of the word's consensus semantics.⁴¹ The horses of Hieron are so willing to obey him, at least in Pindar's fiction, because it is the gods who have come down to apply the *bridle* by which he controls them; they give their blessing to these horses' subjugation, after which Hieron himself steps in to yoke, now literally, the team to the chariot. The gods, then, have made the work of this race easy for Hieron, by taking it upon themselves to apply the κόσμος, but it is no less by the operation of this bridle *apparatus* that he is here represented as a victorious driver.⁴²

³⁹ The ambiguity caused by the elided object of ἐπί is noted already in the *scholia*: ἐπὶ γὰρ ἰοχέαιρα: τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ τίθησι συναπτέον. Διδύμα δὲ ἡ Ἄρτεμις καλεῖται. ὁ δὲ νοῦς· ἡ δὲ παρθένος Ἄρτεμις ἀμφοτέρας αὐτῆς ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ ὁ ἐναγώνιος Ἑρμῆς τὸν λαμπρὸν ἐπιτίθησι κόσμον τῷ ἄρματι (P. 2.16a-b). If we assume, as seems likely, that the scholiast means something *ornamental* by his own use of κόσμος, then he concludes that this is a “shining ornament,” which Artemis and Hermes “place on the chariot.” Lefkowitz 1976: 14 agrees that κόσμος has its ornamental sense but understands the gods to place it on Hieron himself: “the archer maiden (Artemis) with both hands and Hermes god of contests place (on him) bright adornment.” Lattimore 1947: 47 likewise supplies Hieron as the object of ἐπί but opts for *glory* in translation of κόσμος: “the lady of arrows, in both hands bestowing, and Hermes of the contests set the gleam of glory on his head.” Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1922: 285, whom Von der Mühl 1958: 220 follows, makes the best sense of this interpretation: “Artemis, die in Syrakus ihr Heim hat (N.1.3), und Hermes, der sich um jeden Agon bemüht, reichen ihm Schmuck (Tänien und Kränze), so oft er seinen Wagen anschirrt und Poseidon anruft.” For him, then, the *Schmuck* is explicitly the crown of victory, as at O.3.12 and O.8.82-83 (on which, see Chapter 1, footnote 42), such that the poet is saying, as a general condition, that, whenever Hieron yokes his horses for a contest, the gods themselves hand him the crown. Nicholson 2005: 223n10, who is cautiously unwilling to decide whether the object of ἐπί is the chariot or Hieron, is nevertheless certain that it cannot be the horses: “κόσμον must refer to the glory cast either on Hieron or on the chariot, rather than to a harness.”

⁴⁰ Thus we find “glittering harness” in the translation of Farnell 1930 vol. 1:86, “shining harness” in that of Race 1997: 230 and “gleaming tackle” in that of Morgan 2015: 167; “reins” in Carey 1981: 27, who notes the similar ἡνία σγαλόεντα of Homer (e.g. *Il.* 5.226, 327); *ornamenta, fraena, phaleras* in Boeckh 1811-22: 244; *frena et phaleras* in Dissen 1830: 185, citing χρυσεῖων φαλάρων πολυτεχνέα κόσμον (587) from the late-antique *Orphic Argonautica*, and observing that αἴγλη is used *de splendore metallorum, nunc auri, ut Pyth.* 4.231; “reins and trappings” in Gildersleeve 1885: 257; and, in Slater 1969 s.v. κόσμος and subheading “adornment,” we find “trappings” and “harness” to account for this instance. It could be rationalized that κόσμος comes on this occasion to signify the *bridle* by association with the shiny metallic *ornaments* worn along with it. And this would make good sense were κόσμος as *bridle* an *ad hoc* innovation of Pindar, used here of these famously *metal-clad* (σιδαροχαρμῶν, 2) Syracusan horses. We are beginning to see, however, that this is a deeply traditional use of κόσμος, one which we find already in Homer, whose horses do not seem to have worn such elaborate trappings.

⁴¹ It is for this reason that the instance is, so far as I have been able to tell, *never* associated by scholars with the instance at *Iliad* 4.145.

⁴² It is likely that κόσμος also refers to a bridle in a lyric fragment of Alcaeus (259a). Very little of any one line has been preserved, but we find in the fifteenth κόσμω κῦδος εχ[. If the reading of κόσμος in the genitive can be trusted, then the poet would seem to be speaking about the κῦδος which the operator of some κόσμος has been granted. The

If we return now to the simile from *Iliad* 4, we can see that it is Homer's choice to have the bit toggle (παρήϊον ἵππων, 142) stand synecdochically for the bridle (κόσμος ἵππῳ, 145) which has made his meaning, unlike Pindar's, difficult to grasp from the context alone; and has, in the same moment, made it easier than it should be, upon encountering this instance of κόσμος, to conclude that the poet is talking about horse jewelry. The bridle, to give a final paraphrase of verse 145, is the κόσμος or *apparatus* for the king's horse, by the uncanny use of which he, granted κῦδος by a god, makes his gift manifest to all who are present.

The Significance of the Simile and a Further Kosmic Tragedy

We have identified the artifact at the heart of the simile, and we have seen how it comes to be called a κόσμος. We might now, in light of these findings, attempt a new reading of the simile. My contention, to introduce just the negative part of it here, is this: a fundamental confusion about the semantics of κόσμος, a further confusion about the nature of this particular κόσμος, and a general cluelessness about the epic discourse of κόσμος, here conspire to render much about the simile and its context incomprehensible. It has seemed as a result that the simile amounts to little more than an elaborate color analogy: that the analogical core of the simile is quickly stated in the first two lines, which show us the final stage in the manufacture of our king's cheekpiece (141-42), and that the three subsequent lines (143-45), which transport us to a king's storeroom and complete the simile, add only inessential details to the picture, though these be variously construed and estimated. Thus we find in the standard English-language commentary:

Menelaos' thighs and legs become stained with blood as an ivory cheekpiece for a horse is stained with purple by an Asiatic craftswoman: one of the most striking and unusual of Iliadic similes. The bare facts of the comparison are briefly stated in the first two verses, then the next three expand on the desirability of the finished royal possession. This is partly development of the simile-situation for its own sake, but partly, too, it reflects on the subject of the comparison, here by implying the unique value of Menelaos to the Achaeans.⁴³

And in a more recent study of the Homeric simile:

Let us consider the simile (Il. 4.141–45) through which the poet describes the dark blood which flowed from Menelaos' wound when Pandaros' arrow pierced his corselet (134–40). Here the poet claims that his intention is to compare the visual impact of Menelaos' blood on the pale skin of his thighs and legs to a vivid purple dye with which a woman from Asia Minor paints an ivory piece, which is destined to be a cheekpiece for a horse (141–42). If that is so, then the remaining narrative elements of the simile (143–45) are, strictly speaking, pointless.⁴⁴

pair of words preserved in line 13 would then seem to identify the apparatus in question: ἵπποις ἤχεες ("you were holding the horses"). Voigt 1971: 371, who is uncertain whether the fragment is Alcaeus, astutely observes the connection with *Iliad* 4.145.

⁴³ Kirk 1985: 345-46. For further comment on his reading, see the following footnote.

⁴⁴ Minchin 2001: 45-46. She goes on to criticize the already minimal reading of Kirk, quoted above, on the grounds that he sees *too much* analogical contact with the surrounding diegesis: "Kirk suggests that the extension of the simile (143–45) implies the unique value of Menelaos to the Achaeans. Such a reading would be hard to justify, since it is

But we should not confuse the color analogy with the comparative substance of the simile. The analogy is just an initial point of comparative contact, whereby the poet transitions from the world of his usual narrative to that of the simile, only there to pursue further and rather more consequential points of connection.⁴⁵ Let us take the simile in isolation first, consider its logic as a chain of statements. Charting this path from cheekpiece to κόσμος will suffice to confirm all that I have argued above. From there we can turn to the context which precedes and occasions the simile, to consider how exactly it fits in.

The simile trades on the fact that our cheekpiece, as a bit toggle, is an object that *could* be used; but is also, by virtue of its being the treasured object of a king, one that is not available for use by just anyone. Drawing on the poet's own words, we might call this a distinction between the toggle's potential *kosmetic* value (as a functional part of the bridle) and its current *agalmic* value (as a safe and secure status object). The poet articulates this distinction only gradually, in the full course of the simile. But we can see it in its embryonic state already in the simile's first movement; just consider how the poet fits his color analogy to the space of this couplet. We begin line 141 and continue through the first half of its sequel hearing only details that pertain to the object's value as a precious object, to its *agalmic* value. This thing is made of ivory (ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἔλεφαντα), has been stained with Punic purple (γυνή φοίνικι μήνη), is an import from a foreign land (Μηονίς ἢ Κάειρα). And yet we have not heard the first word about what this thing is, what purpose it serves. This information, which ultimately bears on the object's *kosmetic* value, is withheld until the second hemistich of 142, cordoned off from the other details by a strong break at the caesura that had been missing from the preceding line: *to be a cheekpiece for horses* (παρήϊον ἔμμεναι ἵππων), what we have seen can only be the bit toggle.

The second movement proceeds by a similar oil-and-water logic, whereby the object's *agalmic* and *kosmetic* values are considered only in isolation of one another. It consists of a sequence of paratactic clauses which oscillate back and forth in their focus between these two sorts of value. With each oscillation, the poet adds further detail to one side or the other of his distinction, working up to the definitive statement of verse 145, which cuts across the distinction he has been developing. There is a very calculated interplay between this procession of paratactic clauses and the way in which the poet has situated them in this sequence of three hexameters; so let us track the development of the distinction hemistich by hemistich.

The first hemistich of the second movement comes as though in answer to a question raised by the surprise identification, in the preceding hemistich, of this precious object as a functional one—that question being: will such a toggle be used?⁴⁶ *It lies in an inner chamber* (κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ). If the question is thereby answered, the poet nevertheless goes on to add, filling out the

the relationship between the brothers which is brought to the fore in the following lines (148–82). I suggest that the poet has been seduced by his image of the craftswoman and her fine work (141–42) and has allowed the story of the fate of the ivory piece to distract him. The further development of the comparison, which keeps our attention on the cheekpiece, weakens its original point and, through its inclusion of superfluous material, is confusing" (46).

⁴⁵ This universal misconstrual of this simile has regrettably led several commentators to suppose that non-analogical development is a typical feature of the Homeric simile. This, it seems to me, could not be further from the truth. See, for instance, Owen 1947: 42–43 and Lattimore 1951: 41–42.

⁴⁶ Indeed, Foltiny 1967: 15 assumed that the ivory toggles from Megiddo had not been finished, for they do not appear to have all of the necessary holes drilled in them for use. But we might think, instead, not that they were never finished, but that they were never drilled because there was never any intention of actually using them. Perhaps from the start they were functional items intended as ornaments. There is today, of course, a large market for such non-use items: how many commemorative plates with a president's face on them have been sold? What is important in the case of this toggle is that it remains a *potentially* usable object.

second half of this line and continuing through the first half of the next, that there are many horsemen who would use this toggle, had they been in possession of it. This point, the *potential* use of a toggle that is not *actually* available for use, is underscored by the enjambment of line 144. The poet has completed the second half of the preceding line (πολέεις τέ μιν ἠρήσαντο) in such a way that we know something must be missing, since ἠρήσαντο cannot govern the accusative μιν; and yet we are left momentarily with the sense *many have desired . . . it*, a statement that is perfectly neutral as to whether these *many* would use the toggle or, in keeping with its current owner, store it away. As we start the next line, however, we hear immediately both that these *many* (πολέεις) are specifically *horsemen* (ἱππῆες) and that what they have desired (ἠρήσαντο) is *to use* (φορέειν) this toggle.⁴⁷

Once we have heard the first hemistich of verse 143, the *kosmetic* side of the distinction has received more elaboration than the *agalmic* side: whereas, on the former side, we know that there are many horsemen who want to use but do not have the toggle, we know on the latter side only that it belongs to some so far uncharacterized person, and that this person has stored it away. With the second hemistich of 143, accordingly, the poet oscillates back to the storeroom in which the toggle sits idly: “but in a king’s possession it lies, his delight” (βασιλῆϊ δὲ κεῖται ἄγαλμα). By building this clause on the same verb as the preceding line’s first hemistich (κεῖται), the poet here effectively amends his earlier statement, adding to it certain details that will further elaborate the *agalmic* side of his distinction. The first word of this second hemistich, βασιλῆϊ, immediately balances with the opening word of the line’s first hemistich, ἱππῆες. The second words of each half balance, too: a verb of *use* (φορέειν) after ἱππῆες in the first; a verb of *nonuse* (κεῖται) after βασιλῆϊ in the second. With one more word to go in the second hemistich, both sides of the distinction are now leveled out: there are *many horsemen* who desire *to use* this toggle, but they almost certainly never will have the opportunity: the toggle *is stored* not just in any *inner room* (ἐν θαλάμῳ); it is locked away in a *king’s storeroom*, inaccessible to all those *horsemen* who would use it. The toggle’s subsequent characterization at the end of the line as an ἄγαλμα—the word, according to Apollonius the Sophist, for *anything in which someone takes delight* (πᾶν ἐφ’ ᾧ τις ἀγάλλεται, 6.30)—only confirms this interpretation: the king delights himself in this toggle as a precious artifact, one that sits idly in his storeroom, altogether inaccessible except perhaps through some transaction of ξενία.⁴⁸

But this concluding word, which so succinctly captures both the king’s relationship to this toggle, as well as the thing’s unavailability to the many horsemen, has brought into sharper focus the *agalmic* side of the poet’s distinction. The final line of the simile accordingly brings with it a final oscillation; once again we see this object as a use item, the part of a κόσμος ἵππῳ. This time, however, something is clearly different. With this swing, the *many horsemen*, who have to this point been aspirationally coordinated with the *kosmetic* value of this item, are suddenly written out of the picture; and the toggle, hitherto the passive object of some king’s delight, appears now as

⁴⁷ This is the same verb that describes Odysseus’s habitual *carrying* and, therefore, *use* of his great bow on Ithaca before the Trojan war, the one which the suitors attempt to string and use, and by which soon after die. The verb is thus a further problem for the standard κόσμος-*as-adornment* reading, since it needs to be explained how these many horsemen could be said to have *desired to carry* a decorative ornament that would not be in a horseman’s hands. As for ἵππεύς, in Homer this word is always associated with the chariot, being used of either the charioteer proper or the warrior who fights from the vehicle. I think here we must understand the charioteer proper, but this is perhaps not entirely clear until we reach ἐλατήρ in 145. If this is the case, then the movement from ἵππεύς to ἐλατήρ is part of the poet’s gradual articulation of the *kosmetic* / *agalmic* distinction.

⁴⁸ On the value and economy of ἀγάλματα, see Gernet 1981: 73-111.

an active part of the bridle which this king uses on his own horse, the apparatus by the use of which he displays in contests his god-granted κῦδος.

And so we return to a line on which we have already spent considerable time. But we can see now the logic of oscillating articulation that connects it and every other of the four lines which precede it together. The question remains: to what analogical end has the poet deployed this elaborate structure? If we do not have here what amounts to a straightforward color analogy—one which has perhaps even gotten away from our poet—what possible connection could this simile, being a little drama about the part of a horse’s κόσμος, have to the wounding of Menelaus? A satisfying answer will require more than the meagre context I offered above. This is because the simile, finding its beginning in the image of blood on skin, develops into an elegant piece of commentary on the larger diegetic situation of the poem. The situation understood, it is easy work mapping the actors and drama of the simile onto the surrounding world.

We need to start back with the truce that Pandarus breaks, having been called in the preceding book. The idea was that the war, now in its tenth year, could be finally decided in single combat. The two principals in the dispute over Helen would fight it out.⁴⁹ Should Paris prevail, he will keep Helen and all of the possessions he took with her. Should it go the other way, and Menelaus wind up the winner, the Trojans will return to him his wife and property, and pay to the Greeks a further price in wealth as compensation. But whatever the outcome of the duel, so long as its terms are respected, the war will be over, and the lives of many men spared on both sides. The trouble facing this consequential duel is that it, being an entirely mortal arrangement, happens to run counter to the purpose of Zeus, who at this moment, having just agreed to help Thetis and honor Achilles, has it in mind to kill many more men.⁵⁰ This is just to say that the duel, like the ploy of Patroclus donning the arms of Achilles, is another contingency of mortal planning, a human initiative which threatens to spoil the plan of Zeus.

This particular hiccup stems from the peacocking of Paris. With the two armies *kosmified* and advancing to fight for the first time in the poem, he leaps out before the Trojan line, brandishing two spears and calling on all the best Achaeans to fight him. But he quickly falls back after spotting Menelaus, eager for the opportunity, coming forward. It happens that Hector has seen this play out and now scolds his brother, who subsequently recommits himself to the duel, adding to it the consequential, war-ending terms (67-75).⁵¹ It remains from here just to call the truce and cut an oath to the conditions of the duel. Now, I suspect an audience familiar with the

⁴⁹ The poet has contrived that the duel between Menelaus and Paris, together with the treachery of Pandarus a little later, replay the act of treachery which had years before led to this war. As Whitman 1958: 268 explains: “The whole narrative from III.395-IV.219—that is, the scenes of Aphrodite, Paris, and Helen, Menelaus in mad frustration hunting for a vanished Paris, and finally Pandarus shooting Menelaus—form a kind of compressed reënactment of the original treachery which caused the war. Pandarus, a garrulous and irresponsible archer, is not entirely different from Paris, and his target is, significantly, Menelaus; the armies move into battle as a result of his act as the Achaean host mobilized at the act of Paris. Aphrodite is revealed as an inward compelling force, and Menelaus is shown, empty-handed, wounded, and raging with humiliation. In opposition to all this are Hector and Andromache, the noble sufferers on the offending side, to whom the war brings unjustified destruction. More than the typology of stock scenes is involved here; Homer has created a montage of the motivating crime under the guise of continuous narrative, and opposed to it a foreshadowing of its ultimate results.” On this sequence of scenes, their place in the *Iliad*, and their relation to those events which were the cause of the Trojan war, see also Owen 1947: 27-48. On the unmanning of Menelaus (again), and the psycho-analytic underpinning of this episode, see Oliensis 2019.

⁵⁰ This is not at all to say that Zeus is acting selflessly in helping Thetis and son. It is by indulging the μῆνις of Achilles that Zeus accomplishes his *Iliadic* purpose.

⁵¹ The condition that the Trojans, in the event that they lose the duel, pay a price over and above the return of Helen and her things is something which Agamemnon later adds (276-91) to the original, Paris-proposed terms.

tradition would know all along that the duel is going nowhere: Paris cannot die yet, Menelaus will not die at all, and there is a lot which still has to happen before the war, by the will of Zeus, can end. But the poet himself does not make this explicit until the men, gathered at the oath-cutting, have made their prayers to Zeus, calling on him to witness and guard the terms of the duel. Capping off these prayers for an end to the war, he comments, as if responding to them on behalf of Zeus: “not yet for them was the son of Kronos bringing this to pass” (οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶ σφιν ἐπεκράϊαινε Κρονίων, 3.302). And so we watch the duel knowing that it will end inconclusively, but waiting to see how and at what point the gods will undermine it. It makes satisfying sense when it is Aphrodite who intervenes, coming to the aid of Paris in the last possible moment, when his death at the hands of Menelaus had seemed all but certain. This is so natural, of course, because the goddess has a special affection for the man, a fondness that goes back to his famous judgement in her favor; she accordingly looks out for him, does for him what she can when she can, coloring always within the lines of her father’s plan.⁵² Here this has meant snatching Paris up, cloaked in a thick mist of invisibility, and carrying him from the battlefield to the safety of his private chamber, another θάλαμος (382); where the goddess will arrange an amorous visit from Helen, the great and destructive gift of the goddess to the man, in order to occupy him.

This intervention of Aphrodite thus forestalls the most immediate damage which the duel could have done: Paris has not died before his Zeus-determined time. But she has left things on the ground in a confused way. Menelaus is still stalking through the throng, searching for the vanished Paris (449-50); Agamemnon, despite this, is quick to claim victory on behalf of his brother (456-60); and a delivered Paris privately admits defeat to Helen (3.438-40). But what happens now? Will the Trojans, with Paris still alive but beaten, now move to surrender Helen, pay their fine, and end the war? This is the uncertainty in which Book 3 of the *Iliad* ends; it will be the business of Book 4 to put the war back on track.

The sequel begins with a sudden cut from the Trojan plain to the heights of Olympus, where we discover that the gods have been sitting in council, watching the duel from on high. Zeus is pleased with the work of Aphrodite. And he does not miss the opportunity to jibe Hera and Athena, the two goddesses whom Paris slighted in judging Aphrodite best, for not showing such initiative on behalf of the men they watch over. And it is no doubt in continuation of this ribbing that Zeus, turning next to address the limbo in which Aphrodite has left the situation, suggests that the terms of the duel might still be respected, given the virtual victory of Menelaus, that the long-settled question of Troy’s close-approaching doom might yet be reconsidered in accordance with the terms of this mortal oath.⁵³ But anything short of the city’s utter destruction, Hera responds, provoked by the suggestion, would be an insult, and not just to her own labor, but to all that she and the other gods have dutifully done over the years to bring about this Zeus-sanctioned outcome. A reversal at this point would, in short, be grounds for seditious action, as Hera all but says in concluding: “Do it! But all us other gods do not approve” (ἔρδ’ ἄτὰρ οὐ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν

⁵² She has not always been the obedient daughter. See Clay 1989: 152-201.

⁵³ Zeus, whatever his fondness for the people of Troy, which appears to be genuine, cannot be serious about respecting the terms of the duel, according to which Agamemnon’s campaign would immediately end as a success. As I observed above, Zeus has only just promised Thetis, the goddess mother of Achilles, that he would give success to the Trojans until such time as Agamemnon and the rest of the Achaeans come around to honor Achilles as they should, that is, according to his proper status; after which, and *only* after which, will he allow, as previously determined, the obliteration of Troy. This is what Zeus says openly, but we know differently. What appears to gods like Hera and Athena, who favor the Greeks, as a delay to the Zeus-ordained destruction of Troy is really just the next step in the plan which Zeus has devised to this end.

θεοὶ ἄλλοι, 4.29).⁵⁴ Never letting on that he had never seriously entertained the terms of the duel, Zeus secures by the ‘concession’ of Troy’s doom the right to sack as he likes the three cities most dear to Hera. Offering up Argos, Sparta, and Mycenae—communities which she admits, ingratiating herself to Zeus, were always his to destroy—she suggests the following plan: that he at once send Athena to contrive some means by which the Trojans break the truce and put the war back on track. Zeus gives the order, and Athena is off, darting down from heaven with the look of a portentous meteor, a clear sign to the grounded mortals that Zeus is now up to something (79-85):

θάμβος δ’ ἔχεν εἰσορόωντας
 Τρῳᾶς θ’ ἵπποδάμους καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς· (80)
 ὧδε δέ τις εἶπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·
 ἦ ῥ’ αὖτις πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ
 ἔσσεται, ἢ φιλότητα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι τίθησι
 Ζεὺς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται.
 Ὡς ἄρα τις εἶπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρῳῶν τε. (85)

Wonder was holding the men as they looked on, both the horse-breaking Trojans and the well-greaved Achaeans; and thus would someone say to another nearby: “surely then once again there will be terrible war and dread fighting, or else he is setting friendship between the men of both sides—Zeus, who is made dispenser of the war of men.” Thus would someone say, whether one of the Achaeans or the Trojans.

This brings us at last back to Pandarus. He and his bow are the means by which Athena now carries out the command of her father. It will be his role in the κόσμος of Zeus to violate, by the operation of his own κόσμος, the terms of this unsanctioned armistice.⁵⁵ It almost goes without saying that the man’s role will be an unpleasant one: with an agreeable end to the war very nearly reached, Pandarus will be the one to spoil it for all by an awful act of treachery. But this being so, how exactly will Athena get the man to play the role? How will she get him to take a shot so clearly opposed to his own self-interest and the welfare of his compatriots? The answer is deception. Athena will lead Pandarus to believe that he, in performing this work, is playing an altogether *different* role in the κόσμος of Zeus. In particular, she will make him think that the gods want Menelaus dead, and that they have chosen him for this job, so that all he needs to do is dare to take

⁵⁴ For a very different reading of this scene, focussing on Hera’s use of an ἔπαινος word, and emphasizing the limit of Zeus’s ability to act without the consensus of the other gods, see Elmer 2012: 25-48 and 2013:146-150.

⁵⁵ To judge from the few treatments of Pandarus that I have been able to find, it is perhaps a majority of commentators who miss this dynamic, namely that Pandarus, in the moment he commits his act of treachery, is in fact doing the work of Zeus, the very god who, when Agamemnon implored him to safeguard the terms of the duel and truce back in Book 3, declined to do so. Thus, for example, Griffin 1980: 1 will speak of “the sin of Pandarus” as something “which outrages the gods and dooms Troy again,” and Combellack 1982, in the good company the scholasticists, wrestles with why Homer would call “blameless” (ἀμύμονα, 4.89) a man “whose character seems not to be above criticism” (369). These commentators are too harsh in their criticism of Pandarus: he may be a fool, insofar as he is manipulated into undertaking an action that will result in his death, but who is not a fool when a god is deceiving him? Nor should we think, as I will try to argue in the next chapter, that there exists in the social world of epic anything like a moral imperative not to break truces: you make them with the hope that Zeus will back them. Thus will even Agamemnon say that the shot, despite the treachery of it, is κλέος for Pandarus but πένθος for the Greeks (4.193-97).

the shot, and they will give him—like the king of the simile we have almost circled back to—the κῦδος to use his κόσμος successfully.

Touching down on the plain, she makes her way quickly to the middle of the throng, looking now like a man by the name of Laodocus, son of Antenor, about whom we hear only that he is a mighty spearman, but quickly recognize must have some connection to Pandarus; for it is he, we now learn, for whom Athena is searching. She finds him standing where he has been standing since Paris vanished moments ago. Coming in close, she speaks to him these winged words:⁵⁶

“ἢ ῥά νύ μοί τι πίθοιο Λυκάονος υἱὲ δαΐφρον.
τλαίης κεν Μενελάω ἐπιπροέμεν ταχὺν ἰόν,
πᾶσι δέ κε Τρώεσσι χάριν καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο, (95)

ἐκ πάντων δὲ μάλιστα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βασιλῆϊ.
τοῦ κεν δὴ πάμπρωτα παρ’ ἀγλαὰ δῶρα φέροιο,
αἶ κεν ἴδη Μενέλαον ἀρήϊον Ἀτρείος υἱὸν
σῶ βέλει δμηθέντα πυρῆς ἐπιβάντ’ ἀλεγεινῆς.
ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ὅϊστευσον Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο, (100)
εὔχεο δ’ Ἀπόλλωνι Λυκηγενεῖ κλυτοτόξῳ
ἀρνῶν πρωτογόνων ῥέξιεν κλειτὴν ἑκατόμβην
οἴκαδε νοστήσας ἱερῆς εἰς ἄστν Ζελεΐης.”
ὣς φάτ’ Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφροني πεῖθεν.

“Were you now to be persuaded by me, wise son of Lycaon, you would dare to send forth a swift arrow at Menelaus, and you would win favor and glory before the eyes of all the Trojans, and, most of all, before Alexander, the king. From whom, truly before all others, you would take for yourself splendid gifts, if only he should see Menelaus, the warlike son of Atreus, mastered by your arrow, mounting his own grievous pyre. But come on! Shoot at glorious Menelaus, and pray to wolf-born Apollo, famous with his bow, that you will sacrifice a proper hecatomb of first-born sheep, once you have returned homeward to the city of holy Zeleia.” So spoke Athena, and she persuaded the mind of a man without one.

We are reminded by the final line of Athena’s speech (103) that Pandarus is a local. The city of Zeleia, as the poet tells us in the Trojan *Catalogue* of *Iliad* 2 (824-827), lies below the foot of Mount Ida, nearby the river Aisepus—close enough to Troy that Pandarus, the hereditary leader of this community’s high house and commander of its fighting men, had been able to walk to war (πεζὸς ἐς Ἴλιον εἰλήλουθα, 5.204), and close enough that the residents of his community are emphatically described as Trojans (Τρῶες, 826) in the same catalogue entry. We are perhaps, then, to think of Pandarus as the lord of a minor ruling house under the regional hegemony of Troy (the κόσμος of a king within the κόσμος of a greater king). At least this might explain why, in later speaking of his own contingent of men, Pandarus himself calls them Trojans (Ἴλιον εἰς ἐρατεινὴν / ἠγεόμην Τρώεσσι), and then explains leading them to Troy as a matter of personal service to

⁵⁶ On “winged words” (ἔπεα πτερόεντα), a phrase used of utterances, like this one, which function as directives, see Martin 1989: 30-37.

Hector (φέρων χάριν Ἐκτορι δίω, 5.210-11).⁵⁷ And yet, despite his proximity to home, it is now the tenth year which he has spent from it, all in the effort to see this obligation through. It is before such a man as this that Athena, playing the trusty companion, dangles the prospect of finally making good this commitment, and with just a single further shot from his bow. She shows a remarkable subtlety here. Her first conditional, the protasis of which is verse 94, its apodoses 95 and 96, very conveniently effaces the possibility that the gods might not wish Menelaus dead, might not, therefore, give him the κῦδος by which to kill him and earn the χάρις he desires.⁵⁸ She says, in effect, *just loose one and it's yours*. That Pandarus must with his shot actually kill Menelaus is addressed only in her second conditional of lines 97-99, buried at the dead center of her speech and stated in a decidedly oblique manner.⁵⁹ Nor does she allow him the time for any of this to sink in: she quickly distracts with a rousing, full-line imperative (ἀλλ' ἄγ' ὄστυσον Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο, 100) followed up by yet another, this time three-line, imperative (εὖχεο δ' . . ., 101-3). And with this, the fool Pandarus, certain of great things coming his way, immediately sets about stringing his bow, the κόσμος by which he will *unwittingly* perform his part in the κόσμος of Zeus.

Unfolding here, in other words, is another *kosmic* tragedy like that of Hector. Only this time it plays out in miniature, as befits a relatively minor and so relatively dispensable player like Pandarus. Whereas Hector gets to fight on, enjoying the delusion that he might succeed for a majority of the poem, our man has just this moment, the time it takes him to take the shot and

⁵⁷ I do not mean by *service* to oversimplify the crucially *reciprocal* semantics of χάρις, or to rob the word of its basic *splendor* and *charm*; rather, just to draw out the usual sense of the noun when used as object with the verb φέρειν. Activity among the Homeric elite which is transactional or obligatory in nature is often masked by a certain discourse of χάρις, according to which Homer's heroes, and likewise his gods, seem simply to do 'favors' for one another in nominal reciprocity. Within this discourse, however, the phrase φέρειν χάριν always signifies the performance of a 'favor' to the benefit of another; I speak specifically of *service*, and might better yet have said *work* or *toil*, because the phrase is elsewhere always used by a speaker who means to underscore that the performance of a particular 'favor,' by oneself or another, has come at serious personal cost or is being viewed as personally demeaning. In the Embassy of *Iliad* 9, in response to Phoenix, who has made an emotional appeal to Achilles, the latter responds: "Do not confuse my heart by causing it to lament, by causing it sorrow—all for the heroic son of Atreus, doing his bidding" (μὴ μοι σύγγει θυμὸν ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεῦων / Ἀτρεΐδῃ ἥρωϊ φέρων χάριν, 9.611-12). And Odysseus, on his way to Phaeacia, fearing once again that he shall die a most miserable death at sea, reckons "thrice and four-times blessed, those Danaans who perished then in wide Troy, while in the service of the sons of Atreus" (τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἱ τότ' ὄλοντο / Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ, χάριν Ἀτρεΐδῃσι φέροντες, *Od.* 5.306-7). The other two times we find the phrase in Homer, it is used by a god of the 'favors' which he or another god performs for mortals. Wounded by Diomedes, who has been given super-human strength by Athena, Ares complains: "It's always the worst things which we gods suffer by our hatred for one another, as we do service to men" (αἰεὶ τοι ῥίγιστα θεοὶ τετληότες εἰμὲν ἀλλήλων ἰότητι, χάριν ἄνδρεςσι φέροντες, *Il.* 5.873-74). And, in the Battle of the Gods, Poseidon expresses his bewilderment that Apollo, given the pair's history of service as lowly θῆτες to Laomedon, Priam's father, can nevertheless "now act in the service of his people" (τοῦ δὴ νῦν λαοῖσι φέρεις χάριν, *Il.* 21.458). On the meaning and use of this word in early Greek poetry more generally, see MacLachlan 1993 and Kurke 1991: 66-68 with references *et passim*.

⁵⁸ It is occasionally understood, as by Benveniste 2016: 354, that the datives πᾶσι . . . Τρώεσσι and Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βασιλῆϊ act as indirect objects of the verb ἄροιο, such that Pandarus would win χάρις (and κῦδος) *for* all the Trojans and especially *for* Alexander. But I do not think this can be right. The idea, as I translate above, is that he would win these things for himself *in view of* these people.

⁵⁹ I say *oblique* because Athena could have said something to the effect of *kill this man and you will be rewarded*, but has instead chosen to say that a grateful Paris will give you gifts "if he should see Menelaos laid low by an arrow of yours mounting his funeral pyre." We know, in fact, that Paris is busy with Helen indoors at this moment and will *not* see Pandarus take his shot. But there might also be something strange in the phrase πυρῆς ἐπιβάντ' ἀλεγεινῆς of line 99. On the only other instance of these words' collocation, again in this line position, ἐπιβαίνεiv is used causally, of a boar that has *sent* many men to their funeral pyres. But here we have an apparent dead man mounting his own pyre. Her statement, then, is at best oblique, but perhaps it verges on nonsense.

recognize the truth.⁶⁰ The poet accordingly goes to some trouble to make the moment a special one. He constructs for the occasion an extraordinary set piece:

αὐτίκ' ἐσύλα τόξον ἐϋξοον ἰξάλου αἰγὸς (105)

ἀγρίου, ὃν ῥά ποτ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ στέρνοιο τυχήσας
πέτρης ἐκβαίνοντα δεδεγμένος ἐν προδοκῆσι
βεβλήκει πρὸς στήθος· ὃ δ' ὕπτιος ἔμπεσε πέτρη.
τοῦ κέρα ἐκ κεφαλῆς ἐκκαϊδεκάδωρα πεφύκει·
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσας κεραοξόος ἤραρε τέκτων, (110)

πᾶν δ' εὖ λειήνας χρυσέην ἐπέθηκε κορώνην.
καὶ τὸ μὲν εὖ κατέθηκε τανυσσάμενος ποτὶ γαίῃ
ἀγκλίνας· πρόσθεν δὲ σάκεα σχέθον ἐσθλοὶ ἑταῖροι
μὴ πρὶν ἀναΐξειαν ἀρήϊοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν
πρὶν βληῖσθαι Μενέλαον ἀρήϊον Ἀτρέος υἱόν. (115)

αὐτὰρ ὁ σύλα πῶμα φαρέτρης, ἐκ δ' ἔλετ' ἰὸν
ἀβλήητα πτερόεντα μελαινέων ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων·
αἶψα δ' ἐπὶ νευρῇ κατεκόσμη πικρὸν ὄϊστόν,
εὗχετο δ' Ἀπόλλωνι Λυκηγενεῖ κλυτοτόξῳ
ἀρνῶν πρωτογόνων ῥέξειν κλειτὴν ἑκατόμβην (120)

οἴκαδε νοστήσας ἱερῆς εἰς ἄστν Ζελεΐης.
ἔλκε δ' ὀμοῦ γλυφίδας τε λαβῶν καὶ νεῦρα βόεια·
νευρὴν μὲν μαζῶ πέλασεν, τόξῳ δὲ σίδηρον.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ κυκλοτερὲς μέγα τόξον ἔτεινε,
λίγξε βίος, νευρὴ δὲ μέγ' ἴαχεν, ἄλτο δ' ὄϊστός (125)

Straightaway he stripped the bow of a full-grown goat, a wild one, which he himself once, having struck it in the chest, as it was coming down from a rock, with him lying in wait for it, hit in the chest; and it fell belly up on the rock. Its horns had grown from its head sixteen palms in length; and having processed these, a craftsman who works with horn fit them together; and having smoothed well the whole thing, he put on it a gold hook. And this he positioned well, stretched it to the ground, bent it back up on itself; and before him his good companions held their shields, lest the warlike sons of the Achaeans rush up on him before Menelaus, the warlike son of Atreus, be struck. Then he stripped the lid from his quiver, and took out an arrow, an unshot winged one, a facilitator of black pains; and straightaway he was *kosmifying* the bitter arrow down on the string, and was praying to wolf-born Apollo, famous with his bow, that he would sacrifice a famous hecatomb of first-born sheep, having returned homeward to the city of holy Zeleia. And he was drawing back, holding at once the nocks [of the arrow] and the cow-sinew string;

⁶⁰ The poet, however, puts off until the next book the reaction of Pandarus to his situation, when the man is made to say that “it was with a *bad portion* (κακῆ αἴση) that I took my curved bow from its peg on the day when I was leading my Trojans to lovely Ilium, bearing favor to divine Hector.” I will argue in the next chapter that this word, and a few others which also mean *portion*, refer in contexts like this to portions of thread by which Zeus is conceived as binding persons to play particular roles within his κόσμος. Pandarus recognizes in this moment that he has been played by Zeus, made to perform by means of his own κόσμος a regrettable job within the larger κόσμος.

he drew the string back to his breast and the iron [head] to the bow. Then when he had stretched the great bow into a circle, the bow twanged, the string shouted loudly, and the arrow leaped—sharp-tipped, eager to fly down into the throng.

The asyndetic first hemistich of line 105 would appear at first to set us on a direct course for Pandarus's big shot: *straightaway he stripped his bow* (αὐτίκ' ἐσύλα τόξον). And yet, as we hear these words, it is not at all clear what Pandarus has done with his bow. This is because, apart from its aberrant use in this passage, both here and again in line 116, the verb *σῦλᾶν* is only ever used of a warrior stripping the arms from an enemy's corpse.⁶¹ This is to say, since the verb never elsewhere signifies any act which one does in relation to one's self, there is no way to be certain in the moment we hear this verb what action it denotes.⁶² Has Pandarus taken from his shoulder an already strung bow, as we see gods and men do elsewhere in the poem, or has he removed some kind of covering from an unstrung stave, as Penelope does from Odysseus's bow before the suitors attempt to string it (*Od.* 21.53-56)? There is no way to tell: the word that evokes Pandarus performing this act also obscures it. The picture is accordingly fuzzy for a moment; but, as I say, there is a definite sense of momentum building.

But this sense is something of a trick, to which the vagueness of the verb *σῦλᾶν* itself ultimately contributes. For just as things begin to pick up in the diegetic world of the poem, our experience of that world's time passing first comes to a stop, then accelerates to a crawl. We will not hear what Pandarus does next until line 112, after a digression on his bow's manufacture (this is the *stop*).⁶³ When we do hear what he does next, we discover that *σῦλᾶν* must have meant the removal of some cover from an unstrung bow: the first hemistich of 105 turns out to have been the first step in an elaborate procedural that picks back up in line 112, and will delay still further Pandarus's consequential shot (this is the *crawl*). For we now observe every step Pandarus takes towards this shot: having already removed from his stave its cover, he now positions it for stringing, strings it, sets it down on the ground, takes in hand his quiver and removes its lid, takes out a fresh arrow, nocks the arrow to the bow, thereby completing the *κόσμος* (*κατεκόσμη*, 118), prays to Apollo for assistance, and only then draws the string to shoot the arrow. The poet's complex retardation of diegetic time in advance of an event that will reignite war creates considerable suspense, of course; but suspense alone does not exhaust the power of these lines.⁶⁴ The passage is no mere drum roll.

In the digressive approach to this shot, the shot by which Pandarus will play the role of his lifetime, the poet has contrived that we see from scratch the piece-by-piece construction of the man's *κόσμος*. The removal of the cover from an unstrung bow (*ἐσύλα τόξον*, 105) triggers a whole history of the artifact that proceeds by way of a temporal ring, from the sourcing of its constituent materials (the hunting scene of 106-9), to their being worked into a stave (the bowyer's scene of 110-11); and terminates seamlessly with this stave's stringing and then nocking *on this particular occasion*. It seems, as a result, as though this bow had been made from scratch *ad hoc*,

⁶¹ See, for example, *Il.* 4.466, 6.71, and 10.343.

⁶² The oddness of *σῦλᾶν* in this context is often noted, but an attempt is usually made to see *through* the fuzzy picture that Homer presents, to the precise action this verb has been made to designate. Why the poet might have used such an odd verb twice in the same passage is rarely addressed. The assumption seems to be that he has again nodded. The interpretation offered here suggests that the blurriness of this verb is part of the poet's strategy.

⁶³ The Catalogue of Ships preserves an alternative aetiology for Pandarus's bow (*Il.* 2.824-27), according to which it was a gift from Apollo. The possibility of this digression being an *ad hoc* construction of the poet would seem to support the idea that it has a close relationship to the cheekpiece simile that follows it.

⁶⁴ For the suspense reading, see Owen 1947: 41 and Kozak 2017: 41.

purpose built for this one shot. Consider those standard details which our poet has here suppressed, lest they distract from our dogged pursuit of this κόσμος becoming. To begin with, after the boldly marked leap to the past in line 106 (ὄν ῥά ποτ'), the poet neglects to mark either of the subsequent transitions forward in time. Our progress in the gap between this past scene and a future we so eagerly await, as a result, may only be measured by the substantive steps taken along the path that leads from a living goat to an artifactual κόσμος. Of course, similarly unmarked go the necessary changes of place concomitant with those of time, first to the wilderness outside of what we can only assume is Zeleia in 106-9 and then, presumably, to the bowyer's workshop in 110-11. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it will be noted that, while there is an explicit change of subject between the two past scenes, from Pandarus (αὐτός, 106) to the bowyer (κεραοξόος . . . τέκτων, 110), there is no such marker of the change from the bowyer back to Pandarus in the diegetic present, between lines 111 and 112. Our focus is held tight on the operations which construct the κόσμος; whose hands carry them out is for a moment secondary and left to implication.

There is a good deal more to say about this set piece—about its being what I would call a *kosmopoietic* procedural.⁶⁵ To say it here, however, would take us too far afield this late in the chapter; and what I have said already should be enough to make clear that our simile, coming just fifteen lines later, and taking as its subject the manufacture and use of another κόσμος, cannot be coincidence, cannot be something which the poet has stumbled into by chance, having lost the track of a simple color analogy. But why has Homer answered a set piece about a κόσμος with a simile about another one? And how exactly do the different elements of the simile map onto the diegetic world of the poem?

The simile comes as a kind of correction to the false hope of Pandarus: a correction to the delusion that he will kill Menelaus with his κόσμος, and so play a glorious role in the great κόσμος that Zeus governs: it provides an analogical picture of the way things actually stand in the world of the poem. As for the points of contact between tenor and vehicle, let me put them first somewhat schematically: Menelaus is the toggle, the precious part of a king's bridle; his blood the costly dye used here so sparingly by Athena, our Maeonian or Carian craftswoman; Pandarus is the many horsemen who desire to possess and to use the toggle; and Zeus the king who has it locked away in his storeroom, where it will sit until such time that *he* has a mind to use it. *Yes, but what then of the κόσμος which Zeus should wield with κῦδος, like the king of the simile?*⁶⁶ *I mean the apparatus to which Menelaus ought to belong as a part, like the toggle to the bridle?* An ancient audience would recognize at once: that great political machine which is the world of epic.

Allow me to elaborate now by picking up the story where we left it. An arrow from the bow of Pandarus is flying at Menelaus; and while we know from tradition that he will not be allowed to die, it is still far from obvious in the final moment just how it is that he will, in fact, be saved. The poet lets us know here at last. He takes the entire next line to announce, speaking in direct address to Menelaus, that the blessed gods had not forgotten him: οὐδὲ σέθεν, Μενέλαε, θεοὶ μάκαρες λελάθοντο (127). The next thing we hear, Athena has taken a position in front of Menelaus, between him and the arrow she has just made an accomplished marksman shoot at him; now she is defending him from it. And when it comes, she swats it from his exposed flesh in the

⁶⁵ This procedural, like the one in which Hera assembles her own κόσμος, is an expansion that lays out in detail all that is entailed in the poet's use of a κοσμεῖν verb. Indeed, at the highest level, the poet's art, every word he speaks, is an act of *kosmopoiesis*, for which reason the Homer of the *Contest* identifies himself, in the epitaph that he writes for himself, as the ἀνδρῶν ἠρώων κόσμητορα (338; cf. 309-14). For more on this, see the conclusion to this dissertation.

⁶⁶ The king holds κῦδος contingently; Zeus is its permanent possessor, it being something like his personal strength, which he occasionally lends to others. See Benveniste 2016: 349-59.

effortless way that a mother shoos a fly from her sleeping child. And yet she does not spare Menelaus entirely. Her swat does not entirely deflect the arrow; it sets it instead on a new and less fatal course towards him. I have described this passage above, but we might consider it here in closer detail, to see how it sets up the simile that follows it.

αὐτὴ δ' αὖτ' ἴθυνεν ὄθι ζωστῆρος ὀχῆες
 χρύσειοι σύνεχον καὶ διπλός ἦντετο θώρηξ.
 ἐν δ' ἔπεσε ζωστῆρι ἀρηρότι πικρὸς δῖστος·
 διὰ μὲν ἄρ' ζωστῆρος ἐλήλατο δαιδαλέοιο, (135)
 καὶ διὰ θώρηκος πολυδαιδάλου ἠρήρειστο
 μίτρης θ', ἣν ἐφόρει ἔρυμα χροὸς ἔρκος ἀκόντων,
 ἣ οἱ πλεῖστον ἔρυτο· διὰ πρὸ δὲ εἶσατο καὶ τῆς.

ἀκρότατον δ' ἄρ' δῖστος ἐπέγραψε χροά φωτός·
 αὐτίκα δ' ἔρρεεν αἶμα κελαινεφές ἐξ ὠτειλῆς. (140)
 ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τ' ἐλέφαντα γυνὴ φοίνικι μίηνῃ
 Μηονίς ἠὲ Κάειρα παρήϊον ἔμμεναι ἵππων·

κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολέες τέ μιν ἠρήσαντο
 ἵππῆες φορέειν· βασιλῆϊ δὲ κεῖται ἄγαλμα,
 ἀμφοτέρων κόσμος θ' ἵππῳ ἐλατῆρί τε κῦδος· (145)
 τοῖοι τοι Μενέλαε μίανθην αἵματι μηροῖ
 εὐφυέες κνήμαί τε ἰδὲ σφυρὰ κάλ' ὑπένερθε.

And she then set it going straight for where the gold fastenings of his belt joined, and the two plates of his corselet met; and it fell upon his belt all fitted together, the bitter arrow; and then it was driven through his belt fabulously wrought, and it was forced through the corselet still more fabulously wrought, and also [through] his under-girdle, which he was wearing as a defense for his flesh, as a wall against darts, the thing which was protecting him most; and yet it shot right through even this. And then the arrow scratched into the outermost layer of the man's flesh; and straightaway cloud-dark blood was flowing from the wound. And as when someone, a woman, stains ivory—a Maeonian woman or a Carian—to be a cheekpiece for horses; but it lies in an inner chamber, and many horsemen have desired to use it; but in a king's possession it lies, his delight, both the *kosmos* for a horse, and the *kudos* for a driver; so, Menelaus, were your shapely thighs stained with blood, and your calves, and your beautiful ankles below them.

Hearing in verses 133-34 that Athena has redirected the arrow to a place in the man's defensive κόσμος where multiple layers meet and overlap, we quickly infer her purpose: she must think a whiff would fail to get the job done. She has planned accordingly to let the shot land, and now makes sure, by diverting it, that it does no harm. And yet then we listen, in the next pair of lines, as the arrow pierces first through the buckle of his belt and then through the overlapping plates of his corselet. And now, when there would seem to be nothing between Menelaus and the tip of this arrow, we suddenly hear for the first time, with the beginning of line 137, about a further defensive layer, a girdle which Menelaus has been wearing beneath the other layers: a final defense for his skin, a wall against darts, the piece that protects him more than all the others before it. But this girdle offers a sense of relief only for as long as it takes the poet to talk it up, for the arrow

darts right on through it. Appearing now like Athena has made a serious miscalculation, we hear in the next line (139) that the arrow, after all this penetration, has the drive left only to scratch into the surface of Menelaus's skin.

No miscalculation then: Athena draws some blood to help sell her scheme. Keep in mind what she is up against and the parameters she has to work within. The basic problem she faces is a mortal consensus about a plan of action which runs counter to the plan of Zeus: every mortal on the ground, be they Greek, Trojan, or ally, is desperate for an end to the war; they all approve of the duel and eagerly await the resolution it promises; for win or lose, with the death of one more man, there will be no further loss of life, and many men on both sides will at last be able to return to their homes. If Athena is now going to spoil this consensus, and put the trajectory of mortal events back in line with her father's plan, she will have to arouse in the war-fatigued Greeks the kind of anger and resentment which led them to fight this war in the first place.⁶⁷ *Enter Pandarus*. But the trick for Athena, what really constrains her in this moment, is the fact that she has to outrage the Greeks without causing them any real harm. She needs the treachery of Pandarus, which she could never allow to be anything but harmless, to put a real and reanimating scare into the Greek leaders. A complete whiff on the part of Pandarus might not do the trick; a glancing blow might not do it either; but a little blood, she calculates, is sure to get the job done.

We gather this much from the action as we listen to it unfold, but the simile that now comes affixed to the blood of Menelaus—attached, that is, to the first visible sign that a wound exists—spells everything out for us in terms that are explicit albeit analogical. Athena acts here like a woman from the east, a dyer who uses a costly purple pigment to stain a precious artifact: she lets the arrow of Pandarus draw a very sparing amount of blood from Menelaus; no more than she needs to paint his legs down to the ankle. But she has no intention of letting anyone hurt him. He can stand here exposed before an enemy host, apparently vulnerable to the arrow and the treachery of Pandarus, but because the gods are on his side and watch over him, he is as safe as this toggle, which now sits under lock and key in a storeroom. It is as though there were walls between Menelaus and anyone who should like to get to him. And there are, of course, many men who would. They and Pandarus, the man who has come the closest to Menelaus, now enter the picture as the many horsemen who covet this toggle, wishing it were an object in their possession, something they could each take and do with as they like. But the enemies of Menelaus have no shot at him. Like this toggle, he is the cherished property of a king, and the part of a κόσμος which he alone wields. For here is a man whom Zeus has fostered in the art of ruling, who serves as his personal retainer, a θεράπων Διός. He has from Zeus the honor and responsibility of policing his laws in Sparta, and he is the interfacing part of the κόσμος by which the god directs that population—at least, that is, before the war. For the last ten years that it has raged on, Menelaus has played a still greater part in the κόσμος, serving with his brother as κοσμήτορε λαῶν, the two kings by the manipulation of whom Zeus steers the pan-Hellenic host at Troy.⁶⁸ Nobody—not Athena, and certainly not a man the likes of a Pandarus—is going to seize this *kosmic* part and use him counter to the purpose of Zeus, the highest and mightiest king, who wields with κῦδος, as the permanent possessor and ultimate source of this awesome power, the great κόσμος that is the world.

⁶⁷ Remember that this is a host which has earlier in the day demonstrated an unambiguous desire to give up the war effort and return home. I have in mind the bungled test of morale which Agamemnon administers ahead of the *Catalogue of Ships*, which we touched on above because of the king's use of the word διακοσμηθεῖμεν (2.126) in a falsely defeatist hypothetical.

⁶⁸ Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 40-44 and 109-12.

The climax of verse 145 reached, the status of Menelaus relative to Zeus, Athena, and Pandarus made clear, the simile is complete, and we transition back to the diegesis: “So, Menelaus, were your shapely thighs stained with blood, and your calves, and your beautiful ankles below them” (146-57). The poet allows us to enjoy the distress his arrow causes comfortably: we watch the rest of Athena’s plan play out from a safe emotional distance. Agamemnon is the first to see the blood and he shudders at the sight of it. Menelaus is the next, and he too shudders; but he at least is quickly relieved to find, when he inspects the arrow sticking out of him, that its barbs have not penetrated his skin. But he has no time to make known the superficiality of his wound. Agamemnon has already broken into a deep-groaning fit, backed up in this lament by a chorus of anonymous comrades; and just now, having taken Menelaus by the hand, he addresses him with a panicked and fearful monologue that goes on for nearly thirty lines (155-82), the gist of which is this: I have killed you by the oath I cut with the Trojans; yet your death and the oath will not have been a waste; for this deception is something which Zeus will not brook; it is now just a matter of time before he comes in anger over this offense to obliterate Priam, his people, and their city; and yet I will be in great pain if you die, and I would return to Argos a thing of reproach; for the troops would all want to go home; but your bones will rot here; and I will be a joke among the Trojans for my spectacular failure; would that I die then.

Agamemnon totters between his faith that Zeus, whom he calls “the high-yoking son of Kronos” (Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, 166), will avenge the outrage of an apparently fatal trick, and the fear that his own army, with the death of Menelaus, will think the war over and begin to remember their distant homes.⁶⁹ When after this speech Menelaus manages to get a word in, he assures his brother that he will be fine, advising him to calm down lest he scare the host and cause a real problem. The protective older brother is perhaps not satisfied with a self-diagnosis, and so he takes a moment to look after his brother, calling on Machaon, the famous healer, to come and dress the wound. But this done, he immediately sets about doing what Athena has counted on: he starts to power the Greek κόσμος up again, showing now a real enthusiasm for the work of war, eager again for the day that Zeus will make him the agent of Troy’s obliteration—the day when he grants him the κῦδος to wield his κόσμος successfully.

The poet makes a lot of the moment. We will spend most of the rest of the book following Agamemnon around, watching as he makes his way through the ranks of his army, praising and blaming his regiment commanders accordingly, driving each of them to drive their own men forward against the Trojans (223-421). And just after this extended episode, when Agamemnon has at last got his κόσμος up and running again, we are treated to a remarkable image of its complex and immaculate operation, which the poet contrasts with the inferior working of its Trojan counterpart (422-38):

Ὦς δ’ ὅτ’ ἐν αἰγιαλῷ πολυηχεῖ κῦμα θαλάσσης
 ὄρνυτ’ ἐπασσύτερον Ζεφύρου ὑπο κινήσαντος·
 πόντῳ μὲν τε πρῶτα κορύσσεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
 χέρσῳ ῥηγνύμενον μεγάλα βρέμει, ἀμφὶ δέ τ’ ἄκρας (425)

κυρτὸν ἐὸν κορυφοῦται, ἀποπτύει δ’ ἄλδος ἄχνην·
 ὥς τότε ἐπασσύτεραι Δαναῶν κίνυντο φάλαγγες
 νωλεμέως πόλεμόνδε· κέλευε δὲ οἷσιν ἕκαστος
 ἡγεμόνων· οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ἀκὴν ἴσαν, οὐδέ κε φαίης
 τόσσον λαὸν ἔπεσθαι ἔχοντ’ ἐν στήθεσιν αὐδὴν, (430)

⁶⁹ For more on the epithet, see n. 41 in the third chapter.

σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας· ἀμφὶ δὲ πᾶσι
 τεύχεα ποικίλ' ἔλαμπε, τὰ εἰμένοι ἐστιχόωντο.
 Τρῶες δ', ὡς τ' ὄϊες πολυπάμονος ἀνδρὸς ἐν αὐλῇ
 μυρίαὶ ἐστήκασιν ἀμελγόμεναι γάλα λευκὸν
 ἀζηχῆς μεμακυῖαι ἀκούουσαι ὅπα ἀρνῶν, (435)
 ὡς Τρῶων ἀλαλητὸς ἀνὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν ὀρώρει·
 οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦεν ὁμὸς θρόος οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς,
 ἀλλὰ γλῶσσα μέμικτο, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες.

And as when on a beach that echoes much, the surge of the sea is stirred up in quick succession under Zephyr, having set it in motion; and first out in the sea does it raise its head, but thereafter, smashing against land, it roars loudly, and about the headlands, being now arched over, it comes to a head, and spits back the foam of the sea; so then in quick succession were the ranks of Danaans being set in motion, to go steadily into battle; and each of the leaders was commanding their own men; and these others went on in silence, nor would you say that a host so large was following along now [or] that they all had a voice in their chests—in silence because they were fearing their commanders; and about all of them, the cunningly wrought gear was shining, the gear they wore as they were marching. But as for the Trojans, like sheep in the pen of a wealthy man, which stand about in their multitude waiting to be milked for their white milk, bleating continuously as they hear the voice of their lambs; in this way had the shouting of the Trojans been stirred up throughout the wide army; for there was no speech common to them all, nor a single voice, but the tongue was mixed, for the men had been called on from many places.

The immense war machine which Agamemnon assembled earlier in the day, giving an occasion for the *Catalogue of Ships* way back in the second book, he has finally powered up here in the fourth; and now we get to watch the thing as it moves steadily forward, a marvel to behold: if you had been unable at first to see the men marching, but could only hear them, you would surely doubt they were so many; and if you could then get a look at them, you would think this to be a host of voiceless men. So quietly does the machine now operate, as the men who compose it march on in lockstep, one column coming in quick succession after the next, like a series of Zephyr-driven waves breaking on a beach. I give the passage in full because it gives, in relatively few lines, a pretty good sense of the command hierarchy that defines Agamemnon's κόσμος. There are on the one hand his commanders, the group of nobles who act as the interfacing parts of the machine: these are the men whom Agamemnon has just wound up on his long tour of inspection; and now they perform very much the same sort of work that he does, but do it on a smaller scale, winding up the men of their respective regiments. And then of course, on the other hand, there are the rank-and-file men of these regiments; the multitudes who form the nested κόσμοι which Agamemnon's commanders wield in service to him; men who, being of little or no distinction, serve Agamemnon only by the operation of the lifeless κόσμοι they wear and carry about their bodies—the gear that shines so brightly as they march in a disciplined silence, heeding in fear the men who give their marching orders. The Greek army is an excellently crafted, well-oiled machine, and it puts to shame the Trojan competition: an army cobbled together from far-flung, foreign-tongued allies, which runs something like a jalopy on its last leg, producing the loudest racket as it lumbers

forward: the lack of a common language, and the confusion it causes, is something like sand in the gears of a war κόσμος.⁷⁰

With the two armies once again advancing, the plan which Athena has devised and executed in the service of her father is complete; and we find in the next line that she has returned to work which is, by now, fairly routine for her. She is doing her part to stir the Greeks to action, whipping them up for the battle, while Ares does the same on the Trojan side (and the dreadful cohort of Terror, Rout, and Strife do it indifferently of sides). The armies next meet, the clamor of men killing and dying starts up, and soon enough the ground beneath them is a river of blood. Mortal events are back on track. The book then ends with the poet recounting the notable deaths of the first few minutes of fighting.

But what about Pandarus? Is he not a loose end? Athena lets him live on a little way into the next book, when she finally circles back to him, meaning to make him pay a price for the treachery that she has put him up to. Recall that she starts off the fifth book by supercharging Diomedes. She gives him strength and courage, so that he be conspicuous among all the Greeks and win good fame for himself; and then, for good measure, sets him all ablaze with fire, before driving him on, beacon that he is, into the middle of the fighting, to the place where there is the thickest confusion of men. Pandarus cannot help but notice Diomedes on the rampage that ensues; and being nothing else if not eager to make up for his failure a few moments ago, he immediately takes a shot at the man. The arrow hits at the shoulder, pierces the armor, and again draws blood, perhaps more this time than the last. At the very least, Pandarus thinks, as he goes on to reveal in his boast, that he has probably killed Diomedes, and he takes it for a sign that the gods are now, if they had not been moments before, standing behind him.

But the arrow has not broken Diomedes. He only retreats to have a companion pull it out, then prays to Athena that she let him kill Pandarus—a wish the goddess is now very happy to grant. She gives him another dose of strength, removes from his vision the mist that normally prevents mortals from distinguishing gods, so that he may maneuver the battlefield in safety, and then sends him on his way again, back into the fighting. A few moments later and Pandarus is making his second attempt on the man. He has traded his bow for a spear and approaches in a chariot driven by Aeneas, from which he now throws his spear and, for the third time in a few minutes, manages to hit his mark but fails to cause serious injury: the spear strikes Diomedes in the shield, penetrates this, but retains thereafter the power only to touch against the corselet beneath.

Once again Pandarus believes that he has downed Diomedes, and once again he starts to boast prematurely. The difference this time is that the famous son of Tydeus does not need to retreat from the encounter. He responds first with a few threatening words and then hurls his spear at the chariot, hoping to hit one of the two men in it. And as the spear flies at the chariot, Athena pops up suddenly, in the second half of a line, to redirect once again the course of a projectile (βέλος δ' ἴθυεν Ἀθηνη, 290). In the earlier case, of course, she had redirected an arrow which Pandarus shot, depriving him of a great honor she herself had dangled before him. Now she steps in to redirect a spear which is meant for him, to see for certain that it hits its mark and takes his

⁷⁰ The poet has his explanation of the language problem enact what it explains. We have three clauses in quick succession, all of them with the same propositional content – that the Trojan army does not share a common language – but each of them expressing this content in different language, almost as though it were a single message translated for the benefit of the different Trojan contingents. Indeed, θρόος, γῆρυς, and γλῶσσα, words which would seem to serve the tradition, at least in part, as metrical variants by which the poet speaks of *language*, appear together in such close proximity rather like the word for *language* in three different languages.

life, thereby giving quick and convenient answer to the prayer of Diomedes. She sets the spear going straight for the man's unprotected face; and with the same precision that we tracked the redirected arrow piercing through the layers of Menelaus's armor, now we follow the redirected spear as it makes its way through the head of Pandarus. He falls at once from the speeding chariot; the splendid armor he wears glitters and clatters as it strikes the ground; and then he dies on the spot, his soul and his strength let loose. And so ends the inglorious role of Pandarus in the κόσμος of Zeus.

Conclusions

The basic work of this chapter, pushing at last beyond the usual semantics of *order* and *ornament*, has been to draw a clear distinction between the meaning of κόσμος and its discourse in epic: a distinction between a word which *means* something like *machine*, and a poetic tradition which conceives the world of its diegesis *as a machine*. Of the two sides, I think the first, the issue of the word's basic meaning, is now more or less settled. We have gone again through all the cases of κοσμεῖν and its compounds, amending the discussion we had of them in the first chapter: these are verbs which signify, not simply the ordering of persons or things, but the creation of a complex tool. We have also accounted for all three of the allegedly *ornamental* instances of the noun, the non-adverbial ones, having spent considerable time, between this chapter and the last, on two of them. And, finally, I have argued in the case of all the others, the fifteen adverbial instances supposed to mean *order*, taking so far just one of these as my example, that the machine referred to in each is the world according to epic, the vast and complex political κόσμος which Zeus himself has assembled and wields in the work of accomplishing his sovereign will.

This brings us back around to the other side of my distinction; and here, by contrast, we have only scratched the surface. I have so far concerned myself with a few passages and episodes in which the language of κόσμος figures prominently, and have, in the work of making sense of these, tried to say about the world-machine only what I thought exegetically necessary. The result of all this, I hope, is clarity about particular moments in which the poet shows us particular parts of the machine at work; but we have not yet found the right occasion to zoom out and behold this instrument, in all of its size and complexity, as a single whole. So I expect there remain, for even my most sympathetic reader, serious questions and perhaps even doubts about this second horn.

One worry might go like this: *You speak of an epic discourse, of a unified and coherent system of language use, one by which you claim the practitioners of this tradition have come to articulate a certain conception of reality; and yet all we have done so far is look at a single family of words, the various members of which (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverb) appear in total only forty-four times between the two monumental poems. How does this amount to a discourse?*

And a related question might be: *How is this particular family of words, assuming they serve the tradition the way you argue, supposed to relate to the host of other terms which self-evidently play some role in the epic Weltanschauung? I mean, for instance, words like μοῖρα and αἴσα, which both mean portion, but come in epic, according to most every commentator, to designate a certain conception of fate; or again a word like δίκη or θέμις, usually translated justice and law, respectively, which the poet and his characters so often use when they speak to the issue of propriety; or, to give here just one more example, a crucial word like τιμή, designating a kind of honor or distinction possessed by most of the gods and a smaller portion of mortals, by virtue of which they are each entitled to the respect and deference of others, not to mention certain*

material benefits and privileges in the world.⁷¹ You have said next to nothing about any of these; so even if you are right about κόσμος and all that it does in epic, you still need to explain how these and a number of further terms fit into the discourse.

And the student of the early history of philosophy will want to ask one like this: *You are claiming, in effect, that the epic tradition has developed a certain conception of reality as a rationally structured whole of parts, and that it moreover calls this world a κόσμος. But what then of the overwhelming consensus, going back some way now, and ultimately, in fact, back to Plato and Aristotle, that it was the post-Homeric but pre-Socratic philosophers who were the first to have a concept like this, and likewise the first to call it κόσμος (albeit for different reasons than you argue epic does)? How do you explain the confusion of so many historians of philosophy, not to mention the first couple of post-Socratic philosophers?*

And that last question raises a final concern: *You claimed back near the start of this chapter that the world of epic, which is a rationally structured world, is also an essentially social world that consists of a community of mortal and immortal persons; by which you seemed to mean that there is nothing that encompasses this social world, no further world in which this community exists. You have now given some reason to believe that this community exists and is structured as a machine, but it is still far from clear that this political κόσμος and the world of epic diegesis are one and the same thing.*

I will be addressing these questions in the following chapter, where we will at last have the occasion to take a careful look at the cosmic machine. But I do not want to undersell what this chapter has already revealed about it. Allow me to review three points before stopping. The first thing is that our machine has the structure of a command hierarchy, though we have dealt so far with just a single branch of it: the branch by which Zeus directs mortal beings. He first decides on a course of action, then sends a god down from Olympus to get the ball rolling; the dispatched god finds a high king and sets him in motion; he in turn directs the lesser kings beneath him; and these finally direct the common folk at the bottom of the chain.

The second thing observed is that the mortal members of his κόσμος require regular correction; for they are prone, when left to their own devices for even a short period of time, to deviation from the plans of Zeus. Patroclus was not supposed to wear the divine armor of Achilles; Hector was not supposed to take it from the man's corpse and wear it himself. Nor had it been a part of the plan that Paris face off against Menelaus in a consequential, war-ending duel. These are deviations which result from human contingency; complications which the gods must address, lest the will of Zeus go unaccomplished. In the case of the armor, we saw that Zeus decides to honor Hector by allowing him to wear it; but this in turn means that Achilles, if he is still going to be the one who presently kills Hector, will need an altogether new set forged and delivered on the double:

⁷¹ These are the words, together with κόσμος, which Du Sablon 2014 calls, in an impossibly abstract way, *les principales notions d'ordre* in epic (18). For him, these are notions of order which all relate à *l'ordre universel* (56), to the complex order that defines the epic universe, to cosmic order. And he goes on to give a theoretical model of their relationship, the way that they combine to constitute a universal order, that is far too abstract and analytic to be of any use in making sense of the epic world. He imagines these different kinds of *order* forming concentric spheres of the complex, world-defining *order*. The model is something you might expect to find in Plotinus, but I think pretty clearly has no place in making sense of the world-conception put forward by a poetic tradition like epic (Du Sablon admits himself that the Greeks did not relate these different types of order as schematically as he does, but he does seem to think that these words still correspond to abstract notions of an *order-like* sort (69). The problem I see with this work should be clear already from the first chapter. Whether you are speaking of κόσμος as a word for *order*, or distinguishing multiple sorts of *order*, which together constitute *l'ordre du monde*, you are on the wrong track. You are still speaking about words which “connote an idea of order” (69).

a job his mother and Hephaestus will collaborate on. And as for the unsanctioned duel, we have just seen that Zeus sets this right in two steps: he first has Aphrodite intervene in the duel, in order to save Paris from a premature death, then has Athena spoil the truce, instructing her to put the blame for this on the Trojan side. This just to say that the world is a machine you have to keep your eye on: it can quickly get away from you.

The third and final thing to say in review is that this machine, by the fact of the fundamentally deceptive way in which it operates, produces as its byproduct the phenomenon we call tragedy. Hector plays his role in the *Iliadic* plan so dutifully because he is in error about the plan and the nature of his role in it. He has been made to think, with Zeus granting him one success after another, that the god, if formerly hostile, has now got his back. He thinks that Zeus is now using him, and using by extension the army that he leads, to drive the Greeks at long last from Troy. So he really leans into the work, and unwittingly works to bring about his own death and the fall of his city. And it is much the same story with Pandarus, despite the great difference in particulars, the comparative unseemliness of his job. Athena leads the fool to think that his shot will serve a glorious purpose; that the gods have reserved for him the great honor of killing Menelaus, and would now give him the rein to do it, if only he would seize the opportunity. So he takes his shot, only to find in the aftermath that he and his κόσμος have played a very different role. The only thing he has managed to do with it is stir up a hornet's nest, reanimating a war-tired enemy with fresh outrage.

CHAPTER THREE

The Parts of His Machine and The World They Form

It is time to provide a fuller picture of the nature and functioning of the κόσμος of Zeus. We take our start here from the system of metrically variant words by which the poet, I will argue, can speak of a person's role within the great machine. While this is the natural place from which to start, it happens also to be a particularly hazardous one. This is because the words we are about to discuss are among the most controversial in Homer. There is agreement about their basic sense and etymology; and every commentator will say, in one way or another, that these are terms which are central to the expression of the Homeric *Weltanschauung*; but there is, as we are about to see, very little beyond this which one could call a broad consensus.

To begin with the basic nouns of our system, from which derive most of the other words in the system, they are μοῖρα, μέρος, and αἶσα; and they should each mean something like *part* or *portion*, as in a part or portion of something. We are told, on the one hand, that μοῖρα and μέρος are related to μείρομαι, a verb which means *to receive a share* of some larger whole, and that αἶσα, on the other hand, comes from the same root as αἰνυμαι, a verb which means *to take hold of*, so that this would be the share which a person receives and *takes* as their personal allotment. I can see no problem with these derivations, and I endorse the basic sense attributed to the words, but this alone does not take us very far. It allows us to account with ease for just a small percentage of the many instances of μοῖρα (19/108) and αἶσα (6/41) in Homer, and not one of the sixteen instances of μέρος.

These are the relatively few instances in which the poet, either by the context he supplies or the inclusion of a defining genitive, gives some sense of the whole to which the μοῖρα or αἶσα in question belongs. Of these instances, a significant majority are shares of loot (6/26) and meat (12/26).¹ Another three of them are apparently portions of a certain *feeling*: the disguised Odysseus

¹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the loot in question is always the loot which comes from Troy. On three occasions in the final two feet of a line, we find the phrase λιηῖδος αἶσαν: Achilles laments the promise he made to Menoetius, the father of Patroclus, that he would return to him a son who had sacked Troy and been allotted his portion of the loot (*Il.* 18.327); Zeus declares that the Phaeacians will honor Odysseus with gifts more numerous than the share of booty he was allotted at Troy and subsequently lost at sea (*Od.* 5.40); and later on, when the Phaeacians have done just this, Poseidon goes and complains about it to Zeus, using the same lines which the latter had used in the previous instance (13.138). The other three cases are all one-offs. Achilles, in the famous embassy of *Iliad* 9, complains at one point that, at least under the rule of Agamemnon, “there is an equal portion [of spoils] for one who remains behind and for another who really fights” (ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι, καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι, 318). Standing by the entrance to the underworld in the other poem, Odysseus informs the spirit of Achilles that his son, Neoptolemus, following the fall of Troy, boarded his ship to return home unscathed, “having in his possession a portion [of the booty] and a good prize of honor” (μοῖραν καὶ γέρας ἐσθλὸν ἔχων, *Od.* 11.534). And Menelaus, overhearing a remark by Telemachus about the brilliant wealth of his home, makes a point of saying that he “would rather dwell in the house, having in it just a third share” (ὄφελον τριτάτην περ ἔχων ἐν δώμασι μοῖραν / ναίειν, *Od.* 4.97-8) of the many and good things he brought back with him from Troy, if it could mean that the many who died there under his command were still alive and well. The *portions* of meat all come from the *Odyssey*, and they are all cases of μοῖρα. See 3.66 = 20.280, 8.470, 14.448, 15.140, 17.335, 19.423, 20.281, and 20.293, where there is no partitive genitive; 3.40 and 20.260 for σπλάγγων μοίρας, and 17.258 for κρειῶν μοῖραν. There is a politics to the distribution of these portions and shares which I cannot discuss here in any detail. Suffice it to say that the share received is supposed to be proportional to the individual's position relative to the other members of his community: it is a representation and negotiation of one's social value. The important word for this value, as I will discuss below, is τιμή. There is an immense literature on the subject of sacrificial feasting in Homer and after; see especially the edited volumes of Detienne and Vernant 1989 and Faraone

twice says, first to his son and then to his wife, that there is still an ἐλπίδος αἶσα that he will return home; then later, speaking with Eumaeus, says that the suitors, to judge from what they have done in his home, have no αἰδοῦς μοῖραν.² A further two, occurring in a single line, refer to segments of the great body of Night, as she passes overhead with the stars according to their usual rhythm. It happens here again that Odysseus is our speaker; he has been recruited by Diomedes for the night raid of *Iliad* 10, and, noting the late hour, urges that they not dawdle (251-53):

ἀλλ' ἴομεν· μάλα γὰρ νύξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς,
 ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παροίχωκεν δὲ πλέων νύξ
 τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται.

But let us go; for night is very much coming to an end, and dawn is close, and the stars advance, and the full night has passed—or more than two parts of it, and a third part is still left.

This leaves us with just three more of the easily dealt with instances, and they are all one-offs which appear in the *Iliad*: Achilles, in his anger, reckons the value of Agamemnon at just a portion of an already worthless clipping (τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ, 9.378); Poseidon, blustering because Zeus, his elder brother, has just banished him from the battlefield, proclaims *let him stay in his third portion* (μενέτω τριτάτη ἐνὶ μοίρῃ, 15.195), by which he means his brother's share of their patrimony, the heavenly sphere; and finally, in the speech which sends Patroclus out to fight, Achilles at one point says of the Greeks that they were *still holding onto a small part of the field* (χώρης ὀλίγην ἔτι μοῖραν ἔχοντες, 16.68).

With all the other instances of μοῖρα and αἶσα, which are again the significant majority of them (124/149), and every single instance of μέρος (16), it is far from obvious that these words refer to the parts or portions of anything at all. The work here is to make sense of *portions* which correspond to no obvious wholes, either by identifying the missing wholes, or showing that the words, in all these cases, have something other than their humdrum, etymologically clear sense. And here of course is where the controversy begins. In order to give a serviceable overview of the major disputes, it will be convenient to sort the remaining instances—rather artificially, we will see by the end—into three groups, and to introduce these groups one after the other.

and Naiden 2012, but also Burkert 1983, Nagy 1979: 118-41; 1990: 269-75, Bakker 2013, Ekroth 2008, and Stocking 2017.

² I say apparently because I suspect that these three cases are not to be construed, as they usually are, as partitive genitives, where the meaning would be something like, as we might say, “he does not have a sliver of decency.” I suspect instead, with Onians, that these cases are closely related to the more mysterious majority of instances explained below, where it is far from immediately clear what the portion is a portion of. I will argue, following Onians 1951, that these portions are portions of a mystical thread, by the use which the gods bind us to do and suffer particular events in our lives. The same, it would seem, goes for our individual characters: to say that a person has no portion of shame is to say that no thread from the gods has bound the individual to experience the feeling of shame. In the other case, that of the ἐλπίδος αἶσα: when everything is going poorly, and all that we have is the hope for a good outcome, the idea is that a portion of thread has bound us to this role of hoping. This is my view, but I am not yet prepared to argue the point in full, and so include the three cases here with the easily identified portions.

First Group: Portion as Fate

There are in our first group the sixty-one times in which a character refers, in an entirely natural way, and without ever causing any confusion, to some shadowy μοῖρα or μόρος or αἴσα that would seem somehow to determine the course of their own or another's life.³ It is, for example, a certain portion of his which demands that Achilles live so short a life. His mother, Thetis, in a single utterance in *Iliad* 1, tells him that there is “a portion for him [to live] for only a brief time, not at all for long” (416); calls him, in a word, “swift-portioned” (ὠκύμορος, 417); and then laments that it was by her own “wicked portion” (κακῆ αἴσῃ, 418) that she, a goddess, gave birth to so unfortunate a man.⁴ It is likewise the matter of a certain portion that Sarpedon die at the hands of Patroclus. Just before his death in *Iliad* 16, Zeus bemoans “the portion [which requires] that Sarpedon, the dearest of men, be overcome by Patroclus, the son of Menoitius” (Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν / μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλειο Μενoitιάδαο δαμῆναι. 433-34), and even considers for a moment whether he should save this man, who is a mortal son of his, from his appointed doom; to which Hera will respond that his death here and now is something to which “the man, being mortal, has long been bound by a portion” (ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ, 441). A little later on in the same book, to give one final example, Patroclus learns late that there is no portion for him, nor even for Achilles, to sack Troy: when the man, making the most of his last hurrah, has already three times attempted to scale the walls of Troy, and now makes his fourth attempt, Apollo, who has in fact been standing atop the wall, and has now three times beat Patroclus back from it, finally shouts down to him (707-9):

χάζεο διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες· οὐ νύ τοι αἴσα
σῶ ὑπὸ δουρὶ πόλιν πέρθαι Τρώων ἀγερώχων,
οὐδ' ὑπ' Ἀχιλλῆος, ὅς περ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων.

Get back, Zeus-born Patroclus! Really there is no portion for you that the city of the noble Trojans be sacked by your spear, nor by Achilles, who is very much better than you.

To account for the cases in this first group, almost every commentator will reach for the word *fate*; but there is then remarkably little agreement about the nature of this fate, its specifically epic conception. There are perhaps three basic camps. There are those, to start with, who take this fate for a *fact* of epic reality. They usually say that μοῖρα is the *fixed order* of the world, or some obscure, order-enforcing *power* within it; and then posit a relationship of one form or another between the familiar gods and this *fate*: for some, for instance, μοῖρα is a thing to which the gods themselves are subordinated, and have no power to change; for others, the gods *can* overstep μοῖρα,

³ Of the sixty-one instances collected in this group, there are twenty-six cases of μοῖρα: *Il.* 3.101, 5.83, 6.488, 7.52, 15.117, 16.434, 17.421, 18.120, 23.80, *Od.* 2.100, 3.238, 269, 4.475, 5.41, 114, 345, 9.532, 11.292, 560, 17.326, 19.145, 592, 20.76, 21.24, 22.413, and 24.135; twenty-four cases of αἴσα: *Il.* 1.416, 418, 5.209, 9.608, 15.209, 16.441, 707, 22.61, 179, 477, 24.224, 428, 750, *Od.* 5.113, 206, 288, 8.511, 9.52, 11.61, 13.306, 14.359, 15.276, 19.259, 23.315; and eleven cases of μόρος: *Il.* 6.357, 19.421, 21.133, 22.280, 24.85, *Od.* 1.166, 9.61, 11.409, 618, 16.421, and 20.241.

⁴ Pandarus, whose tragic case we considered in the second chapter, uses the same expression when, after a further series of failures, he finally realizes the nature of his *cosmic* role: “So it was by a wicked portion (κακῆ αἴσῃ) that I took from its peg the curved bow on the day when I was leading my Trojans to lovely Ilium, doing service to shining Hector” (*Il.* 5.209-11).

but regularly decide against it for one reason or another.⁵ In the second camp, there are those who, finding no place for so abstract a principle in the worldview of epic, claim that this fate, in its origin, is nothing more than the *pull* of a sedimented story tradition: after so many tellings, the major events of a story like the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* become so fixed, that this fixedness bleeds over, in a more or less organic way, into the diegetic world of the poetry, where it appears as fate, as something which keeps people and events proceeding along their *traditional* paths.⁶ Finally, in the third camp, there are those who regard this fate, rather more straightforwardly, as an expression of the will of Zeus: a person's *portion* is, by one conception or another, the life which Zeus has given them to live.⁷

⁵ There are very many examples of this sort of thinking. According to Greene 1944: 13-24, “there stands behind the gods a shadowy reality, a fixed order rather than a power, a divine conscience, at times gathering moral grandeur, at times dreadful and oppressive to man, the reality known as *Moirā*” (13-14). Guthrie 1955: 130 claims that we find in Homer “the belief in an awful power of Fate or Destiny (*Moirā*), against which even the gods cannot stand.” Cornford 1957: vii-viii, 12-39 writes a few years later that “in Homer the gods are subordinate to a remote power, which is both primary—older than the gods themselves—and moral. It is called *Moirā*, *Destiny*” (12). Adkins 1960: 17-29 says of “the world under the influence of *moira*” that it “is not so much like a piece of clockwork as it is like a game of celestial snakes and ladders. Most moves are free; but should one alight at the foot of one’s own particular ladder, or at the head of one’s own personal snake, the next move is determined” (19). The all-too-metaphysically-minded Schadewaldt 1965: 310-11 speaks of μοῖρα thus: “Als eine Grundverfassung alles Seins und Lebens ist sie dann göttlich und bindet die Götter, die als die ‘Stärksten und Besten’ doch an das Sein gebunden bleiben, und ist in ihrer allumfassenden Allgemeinheit doch auch wieder keine Gottheit von fest umrissener Gestalt und Würden, die ‘über’ Zeus und den Göttern stünde.” Clay 1983: 148-57, wishing to distinguish between the μοῖρα of a god and that of a mortal, says of the former that it is “his eternally allotted sphere of influence,” of the latter that it is “his allotted share of life defined temporally as the interval between birth and death” (154), and then adds a little later that “the *moira* of an individual forms the particular shape of his life” (156). And as Burkert 1985: 129-30 sees it, “*moira*, *aisa* is not a person, not a god or a power, but a fact: the word means portion, and proclaims that the world is apportioned, that boundaries are drawn in space and time. For man, the most important and most painful boundary is death: this is his limited portion. It is not impossible to overstep these bounds, but the consequences are dire; Zeus would have the power to act differently, but the other gods do not applaud this, and therefore he does not do so, just as a good and wise ruler does not use his real power to encroach on the limits set by custom.” See also Nilsson 1949: 167-72,

⁶ Fränkel 1973:53-75 gives the finest statement of this view, and the crucial bit of it is well worth quoting in full: “To the Homeric singer the events which he reported were not saga but reality. The main outlines of the course of events were fixed, and in particular the catastrophes; but within the framework which limited him the rhapsode might be guided by his own inspiration. The freer his scope inside the frame, the more tangible was the rigidity of its outer limitations. Again and again conflict must have arisen between the outcome of an episode as the tradition laid it down and the outcome the poet wished—out of preference for one party, out of sympathy for a man condemned to die, or because in his view, only his own outcome commended itself as right, natural, and artistic. The actual outcome, he felt, was other than it might have been or should have been; and so for him the tradition which had predetermined the outcome took on the form of a predestined fate. As a rule he could regard this power as ‘the fate of the gods.’ For his intuitive interpretation of history could so manipulate the gods that they wished and caused what eventually happened. But many times, as he knew, the gods were split into warring parts; often they were not pleased with the turn events actually took; hence fate had eventually to be understood as a power to which even the gods must bow. It is inherent in this conception that fate is absolute, that is to say, it stands in no organic relationship to other powers in the world, and that its decisions are willful, that is to say, not based on logic or capable of being understood. For this reason any attempt on our part to rationalize the power of fate in Homer, and fit it meaningfully into the Homeric world system, is doomed in advance. It represents the hard residue of fact which is insoluble by analysis of history and to which everything else must somehow accommodate itself. It is a strange and self-willed *must* which the poet can only accept as a datum and which his gods like his heroes must accept as premises” (57-58). See also Kullmann 1956, Whitman 1958: 228, Reinhardt 1961: 107-20, Redfield 1975: 133-36, Nagy 1979: 40-41 *et passim*, Schein 1984: 62-64, Elmer 2013:151-52, and Scodel 2017.

⁷ Onians 1951: 303-466 is the great champion of this view in our time, but since I will have occasion to discuss his work in some detail just below, I pass it over for now. See also Duffy 1947, who gathers together in one place many of the relevant passages in order to show that “fate and the will of Zeus are identical” (478); and Lloyd-Jones 1971:

For what it is worth, you can count me among this last group, for I believe that it is Zeus who is behind these portions. This much should be clear, I would think, from the numerous occasions in which the poet specifies the origin of a portion by supplementing it with a genitive. Achilles knows that he “is honored by a portion *from Zeus*” (τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ, *Il.* 9.608).⁸ Fuming for a moment over the death of Askalaphos, a mortal son of his, Ares says that he will disobey an order of Zeus by avenging his death, “even if there be for me a portion *from Zeus*, when I have been struck by his thunderbolt (εἴ μὲρ μοι καὶ μοῖρα Διὸς πληγέντι κεραυνῷ), to lie together with the corpses amid the blood and the dirt” (*Il.* 15.117-18). When the Greeks rally after the death of Patroclus, and manage even to put the Trojans to flight, the poet comments that “the Argives would have seized *kudos* even beyond the portion *from Zeus*” (Ἀργεῖοι δὲ κε κῦδος ἔλον καὶ ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἴσαν, *Il.* 17.321), were it not for the intervention of Apollo, who comes to the aid of the Trojans.⁹ Odysseus says of the day that he and his men fought the Kikonians that “a wicked portion *from Zeus* was then surely upon us, being dread-portioned men (τότε δὴ ῥα κακὴ Διὸς αἴσα παρέστη / ἡμῖν αἰνομόροισιν), so that we suffered many pains” (*Od.* 9.52-3). When the seer Melampos, to win for his brother the hand of princess Pero in marriage, attempts to retrieve the stolen cattle of her father, the famous king Neleus, we are told that “a difficult portion *from god* fettered him down” (χαλεπὴ δὲ θεοῦ κατὰ μοῖρα πέδησε, *Od.* 11.292), so that he becomes the prisoner of the rustler, a man by the name of Iphicles.¹⁰ A year and a few lines later, when

4-5, who writes of the *Iliadic* Zeus: “He exercises a vague general control over events, and since his thought is identical with future happenings, the future can be known by him or by whoever knows his mind. *Moirai*, one’s ‘portion,’ is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus; when Hera reminds him that he cannot save his son Sarpedon she is only warning him that he cannot sacrifice to a sudden whim his own settled policy.” I should note as well that Eustathius belongs in this third camp, saying at one point in his *Commentary to the Odyssey*: ἔστι δὲ ταυτὸν Διὸς βουλὴν εἰπεῖν καὶ θεοῦ μοῖραν (1.417.9-10). And the Stoics as well, being by my estimation the keenest of Homer’s ancient exegetes, make the same identification, and even adopt it as part of their own philosophical system. Plutarch makes this abundantly clear in his *De Stoicorum repugnantibus*, both at 1050b3-5, where Chrysippus is reported to have said that “Homer spoke correctly [by saying that] ‘the plan of Zeus was being accomplished,’ referring [by this phrase] to fate (τὴν εἰμαρμένην) and the nature of the whole, in accordance with which all things are administered;” and later at 1056c1-4, where he says, in reference to *Il.* 15.109 and *Eur. Supp.* 734-36, that “[Chrysippus] himself says many things in agreement with these, and says finally that nothing is held in any state or moved, not even the smallest thing, other than in accordance with the reason of Zeus (κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον), who is the same as fate (τῇ εἰμαρμένη).” See also Aulus Gellius 7.2.11-14.

⁸ Achilles, having a god for a mother, is privileged among mortals to get information from her about what Zeus has planned for him. Of course, neither he nor his mother anticipates the tragedy that Zeus has in store for him in the *Iliad*. They know just that he has two options, and Zeus will make sure, by the Patroclus gambit, that he chooses to stay and die at Troy.

⁹ The way that Apollo helps the Trojans out in this moment is by stirring up Aeneas (322-32), who then stirs up the men under him (333-43). Apollo first takes on the appearance of Periphas, who served as a herald to Anchises, the father of Aeneas, so as to make it clear to the man, without revealing his identity, that a god is addressing him, and then says to him: “Aeneas! How could you be the men to protect steep Ilium, even beyond god (καὶ ὑπὲρ θεὸν), as I have seen other men do, trusting in their own power and strength and manliness, and also their host, despite having too few people? For Zeus is willing victory much more for us than the Danaans, but you of your own accord retreat unspeakably and do not fight” (327-32). In other words, if the Trojans cannot beat back the Greeks when Zeus is handing them victory, how do they expect to hold them off when Zeus no longer favors them; when they have no choice but to defend their city *beyond the will of god*? All of this just to say that ὑπὲρ θεὸν (327) is yet another way of saying ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἴσαν (321), which I take to be nothing more than an expanded way of saying ὑπὲρ αἴσαν (*Il.* 3.59, 6.333, 6.487, 16.780) or ὑπὲρ μοῖραν (*Il.* 20.336) or ὑπὲρ μόρον (*Il.* 21.517, *Od.* 1.34, 1.35, 5.436) or ὑπέρμωρα (*Il.* 2.155, 20.30).

¹⁰ The poet does not actually put a name to Melampos in this passage, identifying him only as a “blameless seer” (μάντις ἀμύμων, 291); this and several other of the story’s details included above come from later in the *Odyssey*, when at 15.223-55 we are introduced to a descendent of this Melampos, a fugitive seer by the name of Theoklumenos,

Melampus secures his release and the return of the cattle by revealing to his captor “all the things that were god-spoken” (θέσφατα πάντ’ εἰπόντα), we hear, in identification of the anonymous θεός, that “the plan of Zeus was being accomplished” (Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή, 297).¹¹

But let me say that I am really very hesitant to speak at all about *fate* in this context. For without referencing a particular religious or philosophical system’s use of the word, *fate* can have only a very vague sense: it gestures imprecisely in the direction of something deterministic. To reach for it in the attempt to comprehend these instances of μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος is thus a clear case of *obscurum per obscurius*. And what is more, if one looks back for that moment in etymological time when *fate* had a fairly transparent sense, that is, with the Latin *fatum*, one discovers an expression obviously very different from our *portion* words: something *fated* to happen is something which a god has *declared* will happen.¹² This is importantly not to say that the expression is one whose sentiment is foreign to Homer: he has in θέσφατος, which we have just encountered above, an expression very much like this *fatum*. And, I might add, the fact that he will use this compound in contexts where he might otherwise have spoken of a person’s *portion* is a further bit of evidence that there exists in his world no sovereignty superior to Zeus and the gods he rules over.¹³ But how far does this get us? Even if it is Zeus, as I am claiming, who is behind these *portions*, there is much that is still unclear about them. Are they nothing more than a *figure of speech*, and not so very different from the way in which we speak today of a person’s *lot in life*? Or are these *portions* quite literally the portions of something? If so, what could this *something* be? And what good are these *portions of something* to Zeus, as he goes about the work of accomplishing his will?

Second Group: Portion as Agent

We can begin to give an answer if we set to the side for a moment the instances of this first group, and turn now to those of the second. These are the twenty-six times that μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος appears as the name of an *agent* or, in just a single case of μοῖρα, when the plural is used, a *cohort*

who says by chance, in another of these *fate-as-portion* cases, that he is on the run “because there is now a portion for me to wander among men” (ἐπεὶ νῦ μοι αἴσα κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλῃσθαι, 276).

¹¹ There are three further occasions on which the poet specifies with a genitive the origin of a portion. The shade of Elpenor explains to Odysseus that “a wicked portion from the *daimon* and an ungodly amount of wine made me reckless” (ἄσέ με δαίμονος αἴσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος, *Od.* 11.61), so that he fell from the roof of Circe’s hall and died. I take it that the anonymous δαίμονος, like the anonymous θεοῦ later in same the book (292), is Zeus. With the other two cases, the portion is said to come, not from Zeus alone, but the gods viewed as a corporation under Zeus. The singer in whose charge Agamemnon left his wife Clytemnestra, when he was heading to Troy, kept watch over her until “a portion from the gods fettered him to be overcome” (μιν μοῖρα θεῶν ἐπέδησε δαμῆναι, *Od.* 3.269), so that Aegisthus took him and marooned him on a desert island. And Odysseus, standing over the suitors he has just massacred, proclaims that “a portion from the gods and their own cruel deeds subdued these men” (τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ’ ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, *Od.* 22.413). One could point out as well, as further evidence that Zeus is behind these portions, the fact that he alone appears to have full knowledge of them: Penelope will claim, for instance, that Zeus “knows well all things” (ὁ γὰρ τ’ εὖ οἶδεν ἅπαντα, 19.75), and then unpack this by saying, in a difficult and unparalleled expression, that he knows μοῖράν τ’ ἀμμορίην τε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων (76), which I take to mean “both the portion there is and the portion there is not for mortal men.”

¹² See, for instance, the phrase *fata deum* at *Aeneid* 2.54, which Servius in his commentary glosses *quae dii loquuntur*.

¹³ For θέσφατος in Homer, see *Il.* 5.64, 8.477; *Od.* 4.561, 7.143, 9.507, 10.473, 11.151, 297, 12.155, and 13.172.

of agents.¹⁴ It is uncontroversial to say that these agents named *Portion* have something to do with the personal *portions* of mortals. On three occasions, by a single formulaic line, one of these agents is said by a character to have *spun* for a mortal, at the time of that mortal's birth, something which he either will suffer or has already suffered. The first comes when Achilles finally returns to battle, and Zeus allows the gods to take part in the fighting. Hera descends to ensure that Achilles suffer no harm that day, but admits, in speaking with Poseidon on the field, that she will not be able to help him afterwards (*Il.* 20.127-28):

...ὕστερον αὖτε τὰ πείσεται ἄσά οἱ Αἴσα
 γιγνομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ.

Later on he will suffer whatever things Aisa spun for him with flax at the time of his birth, when his mother bore him.

The second comes from the mouth of Hecuba. She speaks to dissuade Priam from attempting to ransom the body of their son from Achilles (*Il.* 24.208-12):

...νῦν δὲ κλαίωμεν ἄνευθεν
 ἦμενοι ἐν μεγάρῳ· τῷ δ' ὥς ποθι Μοῖρα κραταιή
 γιγνομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκον αὐτή, (210)
 ἀργίποδας κύνας ἄσαι ἐῶν ἀπάνευθε τοκίων
 ἀνδρὶ πάρα κρατερῷ...

But now let us weep apart [from him], as we sit in our hall; but as for him, it would seem that strong Moira spun it thus with flax at the time of his birth, when I myself bore him, that the swift-footed dogs would have their fill of him, far off from his parents, by the side of a more powerful man.

And the third is from the *Odyssey*, the moment after Odysseus, as an anonymous castaway, shows up in the court of Alcinous, king of the Phaeacians. The king announces his intention to see the stranger conveyed safely back home, but adds that his responsibility for the man will end there (*Od.* 7.196-98):

...ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτα
 πείσεται, ἄσσα οἱ Αἴσα κατὰ Κλωθῆς τε βαρεῖται
 γεινομένῳ νήσαντο λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ.

And there [in his fatherland] thereafter he will suffer whatever things Aisa and the heavy Spinners spun out for him with flax at the time of his birth, when his mother bore him.

In all the other cases, the agent named by the portion word appears, not as a spinner, but as a kind of *enforcer*: one who sees to it that mortals do and suffer what they are supposed to. The

¹⁴ Of the twenty-six instances collected in this group, there are twenty-three cases of μοῖρα: *Il.* 4.517, 5.613, 629, 12.116, 13.602, 16.334, 849, 853, 17.478, 672, 18.119, 19.87, 410, 20.477, 21.83, 110, 22.5, 303, 436, 24.49, 132, 209, and *Od.* 24.29; two cases of αἴσα: *Il.* 20.127 and *Od.* 7.197; and one case of μόρος: *Il.* 18.465.

poet himself usually shows us one of these agents as they are working to bring about the death of a mortal. Here are a few examples. When Tlepolemos, the king and colonist of Rhodes, faces off against Sarpedon in the first battle of the poem, it comes as no surprise that he will die in the encounter; for the poet has introduced the episode by saying: “And as for Tlepolemos, the son of Heracles, a man both noble and great, powerful Portion spurred him on against god-like Sarpedon” (Τληπόλεμον δ’ Ἡρακλεΐδην, ἧῦν τε μέγαν τε, / ὄρσεν ἐπ’ ἀντιθέω Σαρπηδόνι Μοῖρα κραταιή, *Il.* 5.628-29).¹⁵ When the Trojans have later fought their way down to the defensive ditch of the Greeks, and Poulydamas advises that the commanders all dismount from their chariots to cross over and continue on foot, the only person not to follow his advice is Asios, who drives his team onward, thinking evidently that his speed will keep him safe; but the poet comments (*Il.* 12.113-17):

νήπιος, οὐδ’ ἄρ’ ἔμελλε κακὰς ὑπὸ κῆρας ἀλύξας
 ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν ἀγαλλόμενος παρὰ νηῶν
 ἄψ ἀπονοστήσειν προτὶ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν· (115)
 πρόσθεν γάρ μιν Μοῖρα δυσώνυμος ἀμφεκάλυπεν
 ἔγχεϊ Ἰδομενῆος ἀγανοῦ Δευκαλίδαιο.

The fool! Nor was he bound, having escaped from under wicked dooms, while delighting in his horses and his chariot by the ships [of the Greeks], to make his return back to windy Ilium; for before this, hard-named Moira shrouded him all over with the spear of Idomeneus, the noble son of Deucalion.

And finally, a little later on, when the Trojans have crossed the Greek ditch, broken through the Greek wall, made it down to the Greek ships, and are now fighting the Greeks about these, the poet introduces us to an otherwise unknown Trojan by the name of Peisander, whom he has fight and die in an extended duel with Menelaus, introducing him with the following lines (*Il.* 13.601-3):

Πείσανδρος δ’ ἰθὺς Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο
 ἦϊε· τὸν δ’ ἄγε Μοῖρα κακῆ θανάτοιο τέλοσδε
 σοὶ Μενέλαε δαμῆναι ἐν αἰνῇ δηϊοτήτι.

And Peisander darted straight for glorious Menelaus; and wicked Moira was leading him toward the end of death, to be overcome by you, Menelaus, in dread battle.

But the poet is not the only one to speak about this Portion in her enforcement capacity; his mortal characters, who are invariably the victims of this agent, do as well; but here there is a clear difference: as a rule, these mortals only recognize her hand in some event after the fact, at a point when her work is done or it is otherwise too late to escape her. As he lies dying under Hector's spear, Patroclus says first that it was really “destructive Moira and the son of Leto who killed me”

¹⁵ For Μοῖρα, not always in the voice of the poet, as κραταιή, see *Il.* 5.83, 629, 16.334, 853, 20.477, 21.110, 24.132, and 209. The collocation only ever appears at the end of a line, and is usually preceded by Θάνατος καί, filling up the second hemistich. Note that the text of Allen 1912, except in a few cases, like the spinning examples above, where it is undeniable that a portion word names a god, does not capitalize them; in this I depart from his text.

(ἀλλά με Μοῖρ' ὅλοῃ καὶ Λητοῦς ἔκτανεν υἱός, *Il.*16.849), and then a few lines later, enjoying the moment of prophetic power which dying somehow brings, informs Hector that he is next, saying (852-54):

οὐ θην οὐδ' αὐτὸς δηρὸν βέη, ἀλλὰ τοι ἦδη
ἄγχι παρέστηκεν Θάνατος καὶ Μοῖρα κραταιή
χερσὶ δαμέντ' Ἀχιλλῆος ἀμύμονος Αἰακίδαο.

Nor in truth will you yourself live for long, but already near you stand Death and powerful Moira, to see that you are overcome by the hands of blameless Achilles, the scion of Aiakos.¹⁶

Books later, when Achilles has driven all of the other Trojans back within the gates of their city, we know the prophecy of Patroclus is being fulfilled, for we hear from the poet that “wicked Portion bound Hector to stay there before Ilium and the Scaian gates” (“Ἐκτορα δ’ αὐτοῦ μείναι ὅλοῃ Μοῖρα πέδησεν, / Ἴλιου προπάροίθε πυλάων τε Σκαιάων, 22.5-6); but the man himself will not recognize this until he is already facing off against his killer, and already thrown at this man in vain the one spear that he had. He says to himself at this point, putting at last all the pieces of his tragedy together, that wicked Death and Moira are now at hand (297-305):

ὦ πόποι ἦ μάλα δὴ με θεοὶ θάνατόνδε κάλεσσαν·
Δηϊφობον γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἐφάμην ἦρωα παρεῖναι·
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν τείχει, ἐμὲ δ' ἐξαπάτησεν Ἀθήνη.
νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι Θάνατος κακός, οὐδ' ἔτ' ἄνευθεν, (300)
οὐδ' ἀλέη· ἦ γὰρ ῥα πάλαι τό γε φίλτερον ἦεν
Ζηνί τε καὶ Διὸς υἱὶ ἐκηβόλω, οἷ μὲν πάρος γε
πρόφρονες εἰρύατο· νῦν αὐτὲ με Μοῖρα κιχάνει.
μὴ μὰν ἀσπουδί γε καὶ ἀκλειῶς ἀπολοίμην,
ἀλλὰ μέγα ῥέξας τι καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι. (305)

Ah well, then it is true that the gods have called me forth to death; for I thought that Deiphobos the hero stood by me, but he is within the wall, and Athena has tricked me. And now indeed wicked Death stands right by me, no longer far off, and there is no way to escape; for surely this was long ago pleasing to Zeus and the far-shooting son of Zeus, who before now earnestly protected me; but now Portion has caught up with me. Yet may I at least not die without a struggle and in an inglorious way, but having [first] done some great thing to be known by even to future men.¹⁷

And finally, for good measure, lest the reader think that death is always directly involved in the work of our Portion agent, let me add here that king Agamemnon, delivering the speech by which

¹⁶ It should be clear that Moira is an agent of Zeus from the fact that the two names can be substituted: just a few lines before saying that destructive Moira and the son of Leto killed him (*Il.* 16.849), Patroclus says that it was Zeus and Apollo who did it (843-46).

¹⁷ The speech is so revealing because it only makes sense if we understand that Μοῖρα, whatever her ontological status, is an agent of Zeus. There is no power beyond him which requires the death of Hector—and this despite the fact that we, unlike Hector, have seen Zeus think for a moment about walking back his decision that Hector die in this moment.

he finally reconciles with Achilles, claims that he himself was not the cause of their feud (*Il.* 19.87-90):

ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς,
οἳ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἔμβalon ἄγριον ἄτην,
ἦματι τῷ ὅτ' Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.
ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ. (90)

but rather [it was] Zeus and Moira and mist-walking Erinys, who in the assembly cast wild delusion into my mind, on the day when I took from Achilles his prize. But what could I have done? God thoroughly accomplishes all things.

About the instances in this second group, the basic disagreement has to do with the status of the agents named. Are these divine *persons*, that is to say, card-carrying members of the epic pantheon? Or are they rather momentary, *ad hoc personifications*, that is to say, no more than a poetic device, by which to make vivid the otherwise shadowy power which a *portion* has (whatever exactly one takes this *portion* to be)? Or perhaps as a third option there is some middle ground: perhaps in some of these instances, say, for example, the ones in which *Portion* spins for men all that they will do and suffer in life, our agents are genuine gods, with a family and lives of their own, but in all the other scenes, the enforcement ones, they are not.

In my own view, we would do well to avoid as much as possible this distinction between genuine gods and lesser personifications, for it is a distinction which is irredeemably foreign to Homer. Whether one regards this as a basic explanatory convention of the epic tradition, or a more general fact about an earlier people's mode of thought—it makes no difference for the moment—the only sort of *cause* which Homer pictures are *persons* of one sort or another. There are for him, on the one hand, *mortal* persons and all that they do and effect by will in the world, and then there are, on the other hand, *immortal* persons, which is to say *gods*, the referents of θεοί, δαίμονες, etc., whose existence and collective activity explains all the rest of what there is and happens in the world. Put a little differently: because the epic picture of reality is one which already takes for granted what I would call an *ontology of persons*—a notion that I shall elaborate on shortly—the practitioners of this tradition have little call for throw-away personifications: one cannot decide to personify momentarily for mere poetic effect what is already, if represented as an autonomous *causal power* in epic, conceived as a personal agent.¹⁸

¹⁸ I am of course far from the first to make a point like this. Let me give here just a couple well-known examples. In the introduction to his *Theogony*, speaking about the gods that “we should call abstractions,” and giving as examples of these “Death, Sleep, Deceit, Sex, Strife, Battles, Lies, Victory, Power, etc.,” West 1966: 33 claims: “In Hesiod’s time it was not understood what abstractions are—no more was it in Plato’s. They must be something; they are invisible, imperishable, and have great influence over human affairs; they must be gods”; and then offers, as an excellent example of this sort of reasoning, the closing lines of the *Erga*: “And avoid the dread talk of mortals (δεινὴν δὲ βροτῶν ὑπαλεύεο φήμη); for talk is wicked: light to pick up, very easy in fact, but difficult to carry, and hard to put down. And no talk is ever really dead which many people will talk: now even she is some god (θεός νύ τις ἔστι καὶ ἀπτή)” (760-64). Maine 1986: 3 makes the same claim at the start of his famous work on ancient law: “It is now clearly seen by all trustworthy observers of the primitive condition of mankind that, in the infancy of the race, men could only account for sustained or periodically recurring action by supposing a personal agent. Thus, the wind blowing was a person and of course a divine person; the earth yielding her increase was a person and divine.” And finally, lest this kind of *personal* thinking seem like something peculiar to the early Greeks, we find Frankfort and Frankfort 1973: 14 saying much the same thing in their introduction to a classic study of Egyptian and Mesopotamian mythological thought. They take their start from a quote of Crawley 1909: 43 that “Primitive man has only one mode

Take for example the famous *delusion* or *blindness* of Agamemnon, mentioned just above. The high king of course recognizes that he has erred in taking for himself the prize of Achilles, and he is more than willing to make restitution for this. But he also claims that he is not the ultimate cause of his own misbehavior: he would not willfully—we might say *in his right mind*—have entered into so calamitous a quarrel with the man he knows to be his best warrior. At the time that he did, he had been suffering from a *delusion* which he knows himself not to have engendered, a delusion which he feels is beyond his own personal power to control. But, and here is the important point, if Agamemnon has not caused his own delusion, and has no power to snap himself out of it, then, by the logic of epic, there must be one or more *persons* who have caused it; persons who are stronger than Agamemnon, and who have a desire to see him so deluded. In short, certain *immortal* persons must be responsible for this. He first says, as we saw above, that Zeus, Moira, and the Erinyes are the ones responsible, having cast the delusion which he experiences into his mind: “But what could I do? God accomplishes all things” (*Il.*19.90). In the next breath, however, and apparently without causing any confusion or surprise in his audience, Agamemnon begins to speak at length of this delusion as yet another immortal person, Delusion. No longer a thing to be thrown by Zeus and other divinities, she appears now as “the eldest daughter of Zeus” (πρέσβα Διὸς θυγάτηρ), the one “who deludes all” (ἡ πάντα ἀἴται, 19.91) on his behalf; who “treads upon the heads of men, bringing harm to human beings” (κατ’ ἀνδρῶν κράατα βαίνει / βλάπτουσ’ ἀνθρώπους, 93-94).¹⁹ In other words, as Zeus and the others, who have moments ago been said to hurl this affliction into Agamemnon’s mind, recede into our memory, and our focus remains on the affliction, this affliction, insofar as it is viewed as a causal power existing beyond human control, becomes another god, who by her activity causes the harm.

Our *Portion* agents are really no different from Delusion in their status. They are not the portions of mortals momentarily personified for the sake of ἐνάργεια; they are rather gods from

of thought, one mode of expression, one part of speech—the personal,” commenting on it thus: “This does not mean (as is so often thought) that primitive man, in order to explain natural phenomena, imparts human characteristics to an inanimate world. Primitive man simply does not know an inanimate world. For this very reason he does not ‘personify’ inanimate phenomena nor does he fill an empty world with the ghosts of the dead, as ‘animism’ would have us believe. The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life; and life has individuality, in man and beast and plant, and in every phenomenon which confronts man—the thunderclap, the sudden shadow, the eerie and unknown clearing in the wood, the stone which suddenly hurts him when he stumbles while on a hunting trip. Any phenomenon may at any time face him, not as ‘It’, but as ‘Thou’. In this confrontation, ‘Thou’ reveals its individuality, its qualities, its will.” Or as they put it later more schematically: “when there is change, there is a cause; and a cause, as we have seen, is a will” (33). Cf. the attempt of Fränkel 1973: 59-64 to posit a spectrum between things and gods.

¹⁹ This god Ἄτη has already made a prominent appearance in the famous speech of Phoenix during the embassy of *Iliad* 9, at 496-514. His treatment of the god there, like Agamemnon’s here, is usually explained away by commentators as a case of *ad hoc* allegory, despite this being, as some of the same commentators are even willing to admit, an exceedingly rare figure in epic. Going a little further, I would say that this figure has no place at all in epic. Phoenix has not personified what he knows to be nothing more than a kind of impersonal affliction; nor has he insincerely called this personification a god, making it interact with real gods in a fanciful story that has a deeper moral or political message. He is honestly and frankly describing for Achilles a very real feature of the social world they both inhabit, in which the Prayers and Delusion are gods with histories and specific jobs to perform; gods which he is pleading with Achilles not to run afoul of by spurning the conciliatory gifts of Agamemnon. The same goes for Agamemnon in the later passage: he has not invented a god on the spot (91-94), and then spun for her a false story of deluding even Zeus (94-133), so as to exculpate himself *a fortiori*. He rather states what he now knows to be true, that Zeus sent his daughter Delusion after him; and goes on to explain how she long ago came, after once deluding Zeus, to have this job of deluding mortals *in the service of* Zeus. Of course, none of this is to deny that the epics were allegorized by later interpreters; on the early history of which, see Pfeiffer 1968: 9-11, Whitman 1987: 14-57, Lamberton 1986, and Lamberton and Keaney 1992.

the start, and their business under Zeus, we are beginning to see, is the *portions* of mortals. But the crucial thing is that they only appear when and to the extent that a referent of μοῖρα, αἴσα, or μῶρος is represented as exhibiting some autonomous causal power. When it is said, for example, in a few instances which I include in my first group, and will discuss below, that Zeus or else the gods have “placed a portion on” one or more persons (ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν), thereby ensuring that they do or suffer what they are supposed to, we are pretty clearly talking about a portion of a kind of *thing* (though as yet unidentified) by the use of which Zeus and the gods go about accomplishing his will.²⁰ But when, in a couple of further cases, which I include in the second group, our portion word becomes the subject of the same verb, and by this verb carries out some bit of Zeus’s policy, we are talking about a god and henchman of Zeus.²¹ Or again, when the dying Patroclus says, as we saw above, that “destructive Μοῖρα and the son of Leto killed him” (*Il.* 16.849), it should be clear from the conjunction that he means it is two *gods*, Portion and Apollo, who have done this to him. But when Odysseus, standing over the suitors he has just massacred, proclaims that “a μοῖρα from the gods and [their own] cruel deeds subdued these men” (*Od.* 22.413), the genitive θεῶν and the conjunction with σχέτλια ἔργα point the other way: he means that the gods have used a portion of this as-yet-unknown something to doom the suitors, so that they pay at last, and by his own hand, for the years of outrageous conduct in his home. The distinction is an important one generally, and it explains for us the fundamental relationship between the occurrences of μοῖρα, μῶρος, and αἴσα collected in the first two groups; but let me say in concluding this point that we should not make too much of it interpretively. What I mean is that Portion as *god* and portion as *thing* are always just two ways of saying what amounts to the same thing. As with ἄτη, which is alternately an object flung by Zeus and a god who serves him, so too with μοῖρα, μῶρος, and αἴσα: they are in one moment a kind of thing which Zeus and other gods place on individuals, but appear in the next as gods who serve as further agents of Zeus.²²

Portions of Thread

It remains now to identify the *things* referred to in the first group of instances. This can be inferred from two key facts, already touched on above, about the portion gods: the first is that they are said to *spin with flax* at the time of every mortal’s birth the different events which they will suffer; the second is that these gods, when appearing as the enforcers of an event which they have in some sense already spun, are regularly said, in the most vividly described cases, to *bind* and *fetter* the mortals they act upon.²³ What is the relationship between these two activities? Onians

²⁰ See *Il.* 6.357, *Od.* 11.559-60, and 19.592-93.

²¹ See *Il.* 21.83 and 24.89. Moros and the Moirai appear in the *Theogony*. The latter have two births, one early on (217-20), together with Moros (211), as children of Night, the second as daughters of Zeus (904-6), children he has with Themis in a series of marriages and births by which he first establishes his regime.

²² This practice causes no trouble for the audience who understands it, and it clearly provides the oral poet a degree of flexibility in his expression: not only is he able to choose between the metrically variant portion words, he can have each of them serve as the subject or object of a verb without compromising the fundamental information: that the will of Zeus is being accomplished.

²³ I do not mean to suggest that these are the *only* gods who spin for mortals and bind them; for it is both true and important for my argument that others do this as well. What I mean is that spinning and binding are the characteristic activities of our Portion gods, that these are the two jobs which define their existence as gods. I have already introduced above the three occasions in which one or more of the Portions are said to spin, but let me add here that there are six places where the corporate θεοί are said to do this (*Il.* 24.525, *Od.* 1.17, 3.208, 8.579, 11.139, and 20.196), one case where an anonymous *daimon* is (*Od.* 16.64), and a final case where Zeus himself is said to be the spinner (*Od.* 4.208).

gave the answer many years ago. He demonstrated that what they spin for mortals is a quantum of *thread* or *cord*, as much of it as they will need in order to *bind* a given mortal, throughout the full course of their life, to do and suffer all the good and bad which Zeus has planned for them; all of the good and bad, that is, which happens to be *θέσφατον* for them. Those *portions* in our first group of instances, the ones which appear not to be the portions of anything in particular, but have seemed to most instead to approximate some sense of *fate*, are in fact just these Zeus-prescribed *portions of thread*, portions of the so-called *thread of destiny*.²⁴ Once more: these are not instances in which some singular, abstract, and vague *portion-as-fate* is invoked; nor is it the case that for every individual there exists some unique and personal, but no less vague and abstract, *portion* in life; rather, in each and every case that a person, be they mortal or immortal, speaks about their own

The verb in each of these cases is not (ἐπι)νέω, as it is in the formulaic line by which the Portion gods are said to spin, but ἐπεκλώθω, which of course means much the same thing, serving the poet merely as a metrical variant. Onians 1951: 303-9 has shown that the strange phrase “these things lie on the knees of the gods” (ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται), which mortals use when they are uncertain what the outcome of some consequential issue will be (*Il.* 17.514, 20.435, *Od.* 1.267, 1.400, and 16.129), refers to the same image of the gods spinning. His description of the process: “The instruments used [in spinning] were a basket and a spindle. Under such conditions there are certain essential details which may be accepted from known practices. Since there was no distaff to hold it up, the unspun wool was apparently in the basket to one’s left. In any case some of it would be taken by the left hand and with the spindle attached would be spun by the right hand either over the knees or hanging down past the right knee” (306).

²⁴ See Onians 1951: 303-466 for the full account. He makes the case that the portion words are not the only ones by which the poet speaks of this mystical thread; there are a few others as well, but they have been confused for rather vague abstractions by philologists. The first of these is *πεῖρα* (310-42), and it is usually thought first to mean *end* or *limit* and then, moving from the abstract to the concrete, to signify a *knot* or *bond* of rope; Onians has only to argue that the movement proceeds in the opposite direction, with the concrete sense being the basic one (but cf. Bergren 1975, who attempts a critique of Onians (170-79), concluding that the word’s basic sense is indeed something remarkably abstract, namely, “that which limits the outward extension of anything” (163)). Another word is *τέλος* (426-66), which, like *πεῖρα*, is supposed to have as its primary sense something so abstract and colorless as *end* or *consummation*; but he argues that this too should first mean *band* or *bond* of rope, from which the abstract sense in turn derives. A third of these words is *ἀνάγκη* (331-32); it is usually rendered in a bland way by *necessity*, but its likely relation to the verb ἄγχειν, which means *to strangle* or *throttle*, still attests to the concrete conception of this necessity: it is the kind of compulsion which comes from a rope fastened around one’s neck. (Incidentally, while English *necessity* is colorless, note that Latin *nesesse*, coming from the verb *necto*, meaning *to bind* or *fetter*, is most certainly not, and shows that the Romans, at least early on, had a similarly concrete conception of necessity. In fact, there are several more words which further attest to this: words like *religio* and *obligio*, derived from *ligare*, meaning *to tie* or *bind*, or again a word like our *destiny*, derived from Latin *destinare*, which also means *to bind*.) There are as well two famous images, thought by scholars to be *sui generis*, which Onians convincingly relates back to the use of this mystical thread. First there are the famous jars of good and bad, drawing from which Zeus is said by Achilles, in consolation of Priam, to distribute to mortals their fortunes in life (*Il.* 24.527-33). The gifts drawn from the jars are precisely these portions of god-spun thread, as the couple of lines which introduce this image, the lines, in fact, which this image is supposed to unpack (γάρ, 527), make abundantly clear: “There is no accomplishment at all in cold lamentation; for in this way the gods have spun for wretched mortals to live in a sorry state (ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι / ζῶειν ἀχνυμένοις); but they themselves are without troubles” (524-26). The second image, appearing several times in Homer (*Il.* 8.69-75, 16.657-58, 19.223-24, and 22.209-14; cf. also *Il.* 11.509 and 14.99), is that of the scales of Zeus (397-410). The image comes up when “there has been an impasse, equality or balance between two contending parties. The *τάλαντα* are used and a decision follows, produced (or, at least, accompanied) by the accession or withdrawal of divine support” (397). What Zeus weighs in the balance, as “the steward of the wars of men” (ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο, *Il.*, 19.224), are the contending parties’ respective portions of thread: “thus Zeus could demonstrate to others or remind himself to which he had assigned the heavier portion” (410). Finally, it is worth noting that this last argument of Onians requires and demonstrates that the word *κῆρ*, which is frequent in Homer and usually translated *fate*, *doom*, or *death*, is closely connected with *μοῖρα* and the other *portion* words: *κῆρες* are two times said to be what Zeus places on his scales (*Il.* 8.70 and 22.210). For a further take on the spinning of fate in Homer, see Dietrich 1962.

μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος or that of another, the portion in question is always a particular portion of this purpose-made thread, by the use of which Zeus, whether working personally or through one or more of his divine agents, binds, fetters, and yokes persons to do and suffer all that he has planned for them.²⁵

Having said this much, we can make easy sense of those cases, referred to above, in which Zeus or else the gods are said to “place a portion on” one or more mortals.²⁶ When in *Iliad* 6 Hector has returned to the city and goes looking for his brother, who has been absent from the fighting since Aphrodite saved him a few books earlier, he finds him with Helen in their home. Hector rebukes Paris; Paris agrees to rejoin the fight; and as Paris begins to rearm himself, Helen invites Hector to rest for a moment from the work of war, saying in part (354-58):

ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν εἴσελθε καὶ ἔζεο τῷδ' ἐπὶ δίφρω
 δᾶερ, ἐπεὶ σε μάλιστα πόνος φρένας ἀμφιβέβηκεν (355)
 εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης,
οἷσιν ἐπὶ Ζεὺς θῆκε κακὸν μόρον, ὥς καὶ ὀπίσσω
 ἀνθρώποισι πελώμεθ' ἀοίδιμοι ἔσσομένοισι.

But come now, enter and sit down in this chair, brother-in-law, since the toil encompasses you in your heart most of all, [the toil that is] on account of me, bitch

²⁵ It makes little difference in most cases which god is doing the binding; the bondage is either done on behalf of Zeus, or else it colors within the lines of his plan. We have already seen that the Portion gods regularly bind, but there are many examples of others, including Zeus himself, doing it. Shipwrecked on Pharos, Menelaus asks the nymph Eidothea (*Od.* 4.380), and then her father, the Old Man of the sea (469), “who of the immortals has fettered (πεδάα) and bound (ἔδησε) me from my journey”; cf. 4.351-52, where he says *less vividly* that the gods held (ἔσχον) him there. It is much the same story with Odysseus: he says to Alcinoos that Poseidon, having stirred up the winds against him, “bound me down from my journey” (κατέδησε κελεύθου, *Od.* 7.272); he says to Penelope that Zeus and the other gods “kept fettering me from my fatherland” (πεδάασκον ἐμῆς ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης, 23.353); and then Eumaeus, speaking both about his master and unwittingly to him, says that “the gods bound his return down” (κατὰ νόστον ἔδησεν, 14.61); cf. 1.95, where a disguised Athena says to Telemachus, again *less vividly*, that Odysseus lives, but that “the gods are now hindering (βλάπτουσι) him from his journey.” When the Phaeacian ship which finally takes Odysseus home has all but completed its return voyage, Poseidon, carrying out an order of Zeus, strikes it with his hand, turning it to stone just off the coast, and the disconcerted Phaeacians are left to wonder “who bound (ἔπεδησ’) the swift ship in the sea” (13.168). Ahead of his slaughter of the suitors, the disguised Odysseus advises Amphinomos, the most decent of that lot, to get out of the house before it is too late, but the man is unable to escape his doom, for “Athena bound (πέδησε) him to be overcome forcefully by the hands and spear of Telemachus” (18.155-56). And Penelope manages to sleep her way through the massacre because, as she puts it, Sleep, having covered her eyelids, bound them shut (ἔπεδησε, 23.17; cf. *Od.* 19.589-97, discussed just below). In the other poem, Agamemnon twice complains that Zeus, when he promised the man that he would return home having sacked Troy, “bound [him] greatly with heavy delusion” (μέγα ... ἄτη ἐνέδησε βαρείη, 2.111 and 9.18); and later observes, at a point when Zeus is still backing the Trojans, that the god “has bound the strength and hands of the Greeks” (ἡμέτερον δὲ μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἔδησεν, 14.73). Finally, at the start of Book 13, when Zeus looks away from the fight for a moment, and Poseidon takes the opportunity to do what little he can for the Greeks, he at one point comes to work through the Cretan king Idomeneus: by his agency the god is said to overcome the Trojan Alkathoos (τὸν τότε ὑπ’ Ἰδομενεῖ Πουσειδάων ἐδάμασσε, 434), a thing which he does by dazzling the victim’s eyes and binding his limbs (πέδησε δὲ φαίδιμα γυῖα), rendering him defenseless before Idomeneus. I focus here on the portions of mortals, the threads which Zeus and the other gods are said to spin and use in binding; but as some of the examples adduced above make abundantly clear, the gods beneath Zeus all have their portions as well: these are the threads which he himself has spun and uses to bind the gods to do and suffer what he likes. We will have occasion to discuss them in more detail below. I only want to observe here that in the early days of his regime, when the gods beneath him attempted to overthrow him, their plan was to turn the tables on Zeus and bind *him* to their will (*Il.* 1.396-406). For an overview of the major challenges to the rule of Zeus, see Yasumura 2011.

²⁶ Onians 1951 discusses the expression on pages 378-82.

that I am, and on account of the blindness of Alexander, [we] **upon whom Zeus placed a wicked portion**, so that even hereafter we may be for men to come a subject for song.

Helen recognizes that she and Paris are responsible for the war and the years of toil which it has meant for Hector: she is ashamed of her own conduct (εἴνεκ' ἑμεῖο κυνός), and she can see now that Paris was blind to think he would steal, apparently without any serious consequence, the wife of a man like Menelaus (καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης). And yet she also understands that her own father Zeus, whatever his reasons may have been, must have wanted things to play out in just this way; for she and Paris were *bound* to run off together: “Zeus put upon them a wicked portion” (οἷσιν ἐπὶ Ζεὺς θῆκε κακὸν μόνον), that portion of *thread* which *bound* them to this course of action.²⁷ Another example comes from *Odyssey* 11 and the edge of the underworld, when Odysseus, attempting reconciliation with the shade of Ajax, says (553-62):

Αἴαν, παῖ Τελαμῶνος ἀμύμονος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες
οὐδὲ θανῶν λήσεσθαι ἔμοι χόλου εἴνεκα τευχέων
οὐλομένων; τὰ δὲ πῆμα θεοὶ θέσαν Ἀργείοισι· (555)

τοῖος γάρ σφιν πύργος ἀπώλεο· σείο δ' Ἀχαιοὶ
ἴσον Ἀχιλλῆος κεφαλῇ Πηληϊάδαο
ἀχνύμεθα φθιμένοιο διαμπερές· οὐδέ τις ἄλλος
αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς Δαναῶν στρατὸν αἰχμητῶν
ἐκπάγλως ἤχθηρε, **τεῖν δ' ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν.** (560)
ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, ἄναξ, ἴν' ἔπος καὶ μῦθον ἀκούσης
ἡμέτερον· δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν.

Ajax, child of blameless Telamon, were you never, not even in death, going to forget your anger with me over the arms, those destructive ones [of Achilles]? But the gods set them down [as a prize] to be a bane for the Argives; for you, being like a bulwark for these men, perished; and when you died, we Achaeans were grieving over you incessantly, every bit as much as we had for the head of Achilles, the son of Peleus; and there is not another person to blame, but Zeus hated the army of Danaan spearmen terribly, **and he placed on you a portion.** But come here, lord, so that you may hear my word and speech; but do rein in your strength and manly spirit.

Looking back now on his dispute with Ajax, Odysseus can see things clearly. The arms of Achilles turned out to be *destructive* (τευχέων / οὐλομένων, 555-56) in the way that their owner's famous anger was (μῆνιν... / οὐλόμενην, *Il.* 1.1-2): both, it was learned by everyone all too tragically late, were at the center of schemes, βουλαί, by which Zeus brought death and despair to mortal men. In other words, Odysseus recognizes now that it was Zeus behind Thetis and the idea of a contest for her son's armor; Zeus behind the decision of Athena and her tribunal of Trojan youths; and Zeus

²⁷ We will consider in the conclusion to this dissertation what exactly it means for Helen to say that Zeus bound her and Paris in order to make them the subject of song for future generations; for the same sentiment, see *Od.* 8. 579-80, where Alcinous, on the subject of the fall of Troy, says that “the gods fashioned this, and they spun destruction for men, in order that there be a song even for men to come (ὄν δὲ θεοὶ μὲν τεύξαν, ἐπεκλώσαντο δ' ὄλεθρον / ἀνθρώποις, ἵνα ἦσι καὶ ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδή).

behind the subsequent suicide of Ajax. The god had evidently been standing ready with the thread that would bind him to his doom, and when the time was right, *placed the portion upon him* (τεῖν δ' ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἔθηκεν, 560).²⁸ This is the sense in which, despite the other players in this tragedy—Ajax, Odysseus, Thetis, Athena, the Trojan youths—there is just one person who is truly its cause, one person who is αἴτιος (559) for it, king Zeus.

And one final case. Penelope brings *Odyssey* 19 to a close by bidding goodnight to her disguised husband, saying in part (589-97):

εἴ κ' ἐθέλοις μοι, ξεῖνε, παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισι
τέρπειν, οὐδέ μοι ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι χυθείη. (590)

ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ πως ἔστιν ἀύπνους ἔμμεναι αἰὲν
ἀνθρώπους· ἐπὶ γάρ τοι ἐκάστῳ μοῖραν ἔθηκας
ἀθάνατοι θνητοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζεῖδωρον ἄρουραν.
ἀλλ' ἦ τοι μὲν ἐγὼν ὑπερώϊον εἰσαναβᾶσα
λέξομαι εἰς εὐνήν, ἦ μοι στονόεσσα τέτυκται, (595)
αἰεὶ δάκρυσ' ἑμοῖσι πεφυρμένη, ἐξ οὗ Ὀδυσσεὺς
ᾄχετ' ἐποψόμενος Κακοῖλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν.

Were you willing, stranger, while sitting beside me in the hall, to delight me [with talk], sleep would not be poured upon my eyelids. But this cannot be because it is not for human beings to be always sleepless; because of course on each [of them] they have put a portion—the immortals [have, on] the mortals [who live] upon the life-giving earth. And so it is then that I, having gone up to my upper chamber, will lay myself down to a bed which has been made woeful to me, a thing always sullied by my tears, from the time when Odysseus left to go look upon Wicked-Ilium, not to be named.

Penelope has worked into her polite withdrawal an account of the mortal need for sleep. She has been enjoying the company of her guest, and she would like to stay up conversing with him (she may even by now suspect that he is her husband); but were she to do this, she would lose sleep, and it is impossible for human beings to go without this.²⁹ But why should this be? Because there is a portion of thread which the gods have placed upon each of us mortals, a portion which has bound us all to the necessity of sufficient sleep.³⁰ And so, despite what she wants to do, she must now retire to her chamber and the unhappy bed within it.

²⁸ The details that I take for granted about the nature and circumstance of the contest—that Thetis proposed it and set down as the prize her son's armor, that Athena and a tribunal of Trojan youths ultimately had to decide it—are mentioned by Odysseus in the stretch of text that immediately precedes his address to Ajax (541-552).

²⁹ On Penelope and the question of the stranger's identity, see Winkler 1990: 129-61.

³⁰ It should be clear from my translation that I take ἐκάστῳ as a masculine: Penelope has just spoken of ἀνθρώπους at the beginning of the line, and must mean by the pronoun *each of us human beings*, which she then unpacks in the sequel with the appositional θνητοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζεῖδωρον ἄρουραν. I say this because the commentators I have consulted all take ἐκάστῳ as a neuter, and put undue distance between its phrase (ἐπὶ... ἐκάστῳ) and the verb ἔθηκας. Stanford 1964-65: 339-40 *ad loc.* accordingly translates: "For the immortals have assigned a proper portion to everything, for the benefit of mortals on the grain-giving earth." And Rutherford 1992: 199 *ad loc.*: "The immortals have laid down a place (or proper portion, quantity) for everything for mortals upon the grain-bearing earth." The decision to read the sentence in this way reduces Penelope's point to a "banal generalization," as Stanford himself puts it (*ad* 589-90); but it also ignores the fact that, in the other two examples of this kind of statement, the object of ἐπὶ is a *person* on whom the portion is physically placed.

Third Group: The Portion Phrases

This is the full extent to which something like fate can be said to exist in the Homeric worldview. There is only the will of Zeus and the portions of thread by which we are bound to accomplish it. But what then of the κόσμος I made so much of in the last chapter? How is this supposed to fit in? The answer is with our third and final group of instances. These are the fifty-four times that one of our three words appears in one of several phrases eerily similar to εὖ and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον: on the positive side, there is κατ' αἴσαν (four times), κατὰ μοῖραν (thirty-five times), and ἐν μοίρῃ (twice); on the negative, ὑπὲρ αἴσαν (five times), ὑπὲρ as well as παρὰ μοῖραν (each once), and ὑπὲρ μόρον (four times).³¹ There are a few of these instances for which there is broad agreement that μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος has the *part-as-fate* meaning, most of them instances, incidentally, in which the preposition ὑπὲρ governs the noun: as when, for example, Hector, leaving Troy for the last time, reassures Andromache that he will not die ὑπὲρ αἴσαν (*Il.* 6.487); or Apollo informs Aeneas, should he face off against Achilles, that he will die ὑπὲρ μοῖραν (*Il.* 20.36); or when the poet himself tells us, as Odysseus struggles in the breakers off the coast of Phaeacia, that he would have died there ὑπὲρ μόρον, had not Athena then given him the acumen to work out a safe path to shore (*Od.* 5.436). Cases like this are no trouble for us. In the first, Hector means that the gods will not allow him to die until they themselves have put the thread of death upon him; in the other two, we see Apollo and Athena take the necessary steps to prevent Aeneas and Odysseus from dying deaths which have not been spun for them.

About the remaining majority of instances in this last group, there is consensus to a point. Most agree, first, that the phrases appear in contexts where talk of *fate* would be inapposite, and so conclude that the poet, in these cases, must mean something altogether different by μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος. Second, because several of these contexts are ones in which we also find the similar εὖ and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον used, most agree that our *part* phrases mean more or less the same thing: words which everywhere else mean *portion* now very conveniently come to approximate the consensus meaning of κόσμος, signifying an abstraction like *order*.³² It should be clear at once from the things I said in the first chapter why I do not think this can be: abstract entities like our conception of *order* (and *virtue* and *justice* etc.) do not exist in Homer—to say nothing of how bizarre the semantic shift from a *portion* of something concrete to abstract *quasi-order* would be.

And yet there is no escaping the fact that the poet tends, in a number of different contexts, to use the *portion* and κόσμος phrases interchangeably. Here is a heap of quick examples to which we will return below. When Achilles slaughters a sheep in the last book of the *Iliad*, his companions step in to skin and process it εὖ κατὰ κόσμον (24.622); but early on in the other poem, when Peisistratus, a son of Nestor, has slaughtered a cow, and his brothers proceed to dismember it and cut out the thigh bones for sacrifice, they do this κατὰ μοῖραν (3.457). When, on his big day of success, Hector and his army are fixing to cross the Greek ditch, and Zeus sends what Polydamas rightly regards as a bad omen, the latter warns Hector that if they cross over, they will come back along the same path οὐ κόσμῳ (12.225); and sure enough, when Patroclus has re-entered the fight

³¹ Of the fifty-four instances collected in this group, there are thirty-nine cases of μοῖρα: *Il.* 1.286, 8.146, 9.59, 10.169, 15.206, 16.367, 19.186, 256, 20.336, 23.626, 24.379, *Od.* 2.251, 3.331, 457, 4.266, 783, 7.227, 8.54, 141, 397, 496, 9.245, 309, 342, 352, 10.16, 12.35, 13.48, 385, 14.509, 15.170, 203, 16.385, 17.580, 18.170, 20.37, 21.278, 22.54, and 486; nine cases of αἴσα: *Il.* 3.59 (2), 6.333 (2), 487, 10.445, 16.780, 17.321, and 716; and six cases of μόρος: *Il.* 2.155, 20.30, 21.517, *Od.* 1.34, 35, and 5.436.

³² Onians 1951 has next to nothing to say about these instances (but see p. 390) and I wonder if his silence about them means that he saw them as a problem for his view. They are no trouble for him, nor for me, as I will try to demonstrate shortly.

and the Trojans are put to flight, the poet says of them that they were retreating not at all *κατὰ μοῖραν* (16.367). When Alcinous, the high king of the Phaeacians, first agrees to give conveyance to Odysseus, he orders fifty-two of his best sailors to prepare a ship; and they obediently drag a hull down to the water, set up the mast, stretch out the sails, and fasten their oars to the oarlocks, doing all of this *κατὰ μοῖραν* (8.54); but when on the following day it is time for Odysseus to depart, and the same sailors board and take their respective seats at the benches, they perform these steps *κόσμῳ* (13.78). The night before this, when Odysseus, still anonymous and being entertained in the court of Alcinous, is insulted by Euryalus, a local noble, he responds in part by saying that the man has spoken *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον* (8.179); and a little later in the night, when Alcinous, having gotten a better sense of his guest, orders Euryalus to apologize, the king describes the man's error as having spoken not at all *κατὰ μοῖραν* (8.397).

A final example, pulled from the same night of Phaeacian entertainment, is worth lingering over for a moment. At this point in the evening, Demodocus has already sung two songs, and now Odysseus would like to hear a third; he makes his request by saying:

Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἀπάντων·
 ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων·
λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον αἰεΐεις,
 ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί, (490)
 ὡς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον
 δουρατέου, τὸν Ἐπειὸς ἐποίησεν σὺν Ἀθήνῃ,
 ὃν ποτ' ἐς ἀκρόπολιν δόλον ἤγαγε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς
 ἀνδρῶν ἐμπλήσας, οἳ Ἴλιον ἐξαλάπαξαν. (495)
αἶ κεν δὴ μοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν καταλέξεις,
 αὐτίκα καὶ πᾶσιν μυθήσομαι ἀνθρώποισιν,
 ὡς ἄρα τοι πρόφρων θεὸς ὄπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδίην.

Demodocus, I praise you far beyond all mortals; it must have been the Muse, the child of Zeus, that taught you, or else it was Apollo; for exceedingly *κατὰ κόσμον* do you sing the doom of the Achaeans, all that the Achaeans did and suffered and all that they toiled at, as though you yourself had been present or heard it from another who was. But come on: change the theme and sing of the *machine* that was the wooden horse, the one which Epeios made with the help of Athena, which divine Odysseus once led as a trick up to the acropolis, having filled it with the men who sacked Troy. If indeed you catalogue for me these events *κατὰ μοῖραν*, straightaway I shall declare to all men how upon you the god willingly bestowed divine song.

It is here that we find our third and final instance of non-adverbial *κόσμος* (492) in Homer; and we are still on track to take a close look at the passage in the conclusion which follows this chapter. I introduce it here because it happens to be the only place in either poem where the two phrases appear together in a single utterance; and the very logic of the utterance would seem to require their functional equivalence. Odysseus begins by praising the first song of Demodocus, in which

the singer recounted an otherwise unknown dispute between Odysseus and Achilles at Troy.³³ What in particular he likes about that song is that it was sung *λίην κατὰ κόσμον* (489); and this must have something to do, as the following pair of lines make abundantly clear (490-91), with the excellent way in which Demodocus has handled all the events that occurred in connection with the quarrel. After this praise comes the actual request, which takes the form of a *quid pro quo*: if you now go on to sing of the Trojan Horse and in particular relate all the events of that story in a fashion that is *κατὰ μοῖραν*, I shall praise you as an inspired singer to all the world. Would it not tax unduly the rather straightforward sense of this utterance to draw a sharp distinction between the sense of our two phrases? Surely what Demodocus has done in the first song to so impress Odysseus, that is, present the events *κατὰ κόσμον*, is exactly what he would like to see him do with this new subject matter, and what he now describes in only slightly different terms as “cataloguing” (*καταλέξις*, 496) the events *κατὰ μοῖραν*.³⁴

So how is it then, if it is not because *κόσμος* and *μοῖρα* name two closely related abstract entities, that the *κόσμος* and *μοῖρα* phrases come to be used thus interchangeably and in so many different contexts? I have already given part of the answer in the last chapter, and so we can start from that. I took as my example the moment when Zeus himself declares that Hector, by taking the armor of Achilles, has managed to do something *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον*. Zeus, we saw, is not outraged at the impropriety of Hector’s deed: Hector is rather a fine horse who in his strength has for a moment gotten out of hand; he has inadvertently acted at variance with the great apparatus to which he and the rest of us are *yoked*. The new bit is this: the *μοῖρα-αἴσα-μόρος* phrases of the third group (both the *portion-as-fate* cases, as I said above, and the *portion-as-quasi-order* cases) are just the same portions of thread to which the first group of instances refers; and these portions of thread are in turn nothing more than the basic *ὄπλα* by which Zeus yokes the other immortals and all us mortals to play our different roles as the members of his *κόσμος*.³⁵ This is why it makes little difference whether the poet uses one or the other kind of phrase in a given moment: they all amount to the same thing. And in fact, as I demonstrate in the appendix to this dissertation, the poet reaches for one or the other according to metrical convenience: the phrases form a single system of metrically diverse ways of saying that one or more persons either have or have not acted in concert with the world as epic conceives it.

³³ We are given only a bare-bones précis of the first song of Demodocus (72-82), on the subject of which see Nagy 1979: 42-58.

³⁴ For an attempt to make such a distinction here, see Walsh 1984: 3-21. According to him, who takes *λίην* negatively, Odysseus is saying that Demodocus sang his first song “too much according to order” (8), and asking that he sing this next one, by contrast, in a way that is *κατὰ μοῖραν*, which Walsh takes to mean “giving the part its due” (17). For criticism of this reading, see Goldhill 1991: 57-59 and Peponi 2012: 49n.35. Another attempt is Deichgräber 1972, but see the critique of Hainsworth 1976. There are many others who recognize the rough equivalence of the phrases in this passage, e.g., Garvie 1994: *ad* 8.496-8, Adkins 1972: 16-17, and Halliwell 2011: 84-88. For further discussion of the different interpretations of the phrases in this passage, see n. 64 below.

³⁵ Onians 1951: 371 on the use of thread in antiquity: “A piece of string was one of the most useful and precious possessions of uncivilized man no less than of the modern boy. With it he did countless things for which the advancing arts of woodwork and metalwork, etc., have found better methods. It is *ὄπλον*, the ‘instrument’ *par excellence*. In the *Odyssey* and occasionally later, *ὄπλον* is used without further qualification in the sense of ‘rope, cord’. If two things had to be joined together or fixed relatively to each other, binding was the obvious means. Of how true this still was there are abundant examples, e.g. locking a door (*Od.* 21.241), locking a chest (*Od.* 8.443), fastening its body (*πεῖρινς*) on a wagon, also the yoke to the yoke pole (*Il.* 24.266-74). In such a world binding was almost coextensive with fixation or fastening, and, when better methods were devised, the term would naturally be extended to cover them, e.g. *δεσμός* of a rivet or union in metal work (*Il.* 23.379) and the similar use of the verb for nailing, pinning, e.g. *δήσεν ἄλοισ* (Pind. *Pyth.* 4.71).”

The Social World of Epic

Having said this much about the phrases, let me now take a step back and come at them again from another angle, starting out this time by elaborating upon what I mean by epic's *social world*. It will be clear by now that I am not using the phrase in the customary way. It does not here isolate a *human sphere* in the way we sometimes speak of *culture* or *society* in distinction to *nature*: the latter conceived as encompassing the former and setting the boundaries of its possible permutations. Indeed, we should avoid this sense of the phrase in the interpretation of epic.³⁶ There are two reasons.

The first and obvious one is that the social world of epic extends beyond the human sphere: it also includes what we tend to separate off as a *divine sphere*. Zeus rules from his home on Olympus as the father of gods and men alike, and there is no categorical distinction drawn between the status these two kinds of person enjoy: every mortal and immortal alike lives the life allotted them as a subject of Zeus's world-wide regime, *bound* day in and day out to perform our respective roles in the κόσμος he steers. It is the nature of the part one is bound to play which makes all of the difference.³⁷ There are those, on the one hand, whom Zeus honors with significant parts in his κόσμος, upon whom he accordingly bestows a certain degree of privilege and authority in the world—this being reckoned in each case in a way both proportionate to the specific part played, and relative to all the other parts distributed. In the language of epic, the favored recipients of these parts, the persons bound by portions of *this* kind, claim from Zeus a particular τιμή or *honored status*, of which they are each at all times fiercely protective. This esteemed group includes, among immortals, the members of Zeus's family and all the many elder gods who long ago allied with him against his father, Kronos, when he was ruling in heaven.³⁸ Among mortals, it includes

³⁶ I have in mind here the study of James Redfield 1975, who relies heavily on this dyad of “nature and culture.” For a critique of his framework, see n. 26 in the preceding chapter.

³⁷ This is importantly not to say that mortals and immortals do not have it differently under Zeus—of course they do. My point is just that the two tribes are differently privileged parts of the same social world, the one over which Zeus rules.

³⁸ As Hesiod explains at *Theogony* 390-96, Zeus was able to secure the allegiance of so many elder gods by striking a deal with them ahead of his war with the Titans: “The Olympian lightningier called the immortal gods to blessed Olympus and said that whoever of the gods would fight with him against the Titans, he would not strike down from their privileges (γεράων), but that each would hold onto the honor (τιμήν) which they had before among the immortal gods. And he said that whoever has been dishonored (ἀτιμος) and unprivileged (ἀγέραστος) by Kronos, he would bring up to honor (τιμῆς) and privileges (γεράων), which is right (θέμις).” This is evidently how Hesiod's Aphrodite has been able to retain her allotted portion and the honor that comes with it from the time of her birth, well before the reign of Zeus: “And she holds this honor from the beginning (ταύτην δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς τιμήν) and has been allotted this portion (μοῖραν) among men and immortal gods: the whispers of maidens, smiles, deceits, sweet delight, love, and softness” (203-6). Hecate is similarly said, in a passage rich with *portion* and *honor* language (411-52), to have retained the τιμαί she enjoyed under the Titan regime. Here is just a piece of it: “The son of Kronos neither caused her any harm nor deprived her of the things she was allotted (ὄσσο' ἔλαχον) among the Titans, the earlier gods, but she still possesses these in the way the distribution was first made from the beginning (ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔπλετο δασμός). Nor is it the case, because she is an only child, that the goddess has been apportioned less of honor and privileges (ἦσσαν θεὰ ἔμμορε τιμῆς / καὶ γεράων)...but rather she has much more, since Zeus honors (τίεται) her” (423-28). When a portion from Zeus binds one to a job which is an honor within his society, the job is regularly called a τιμή; as when Zeus, after winning his war against the Titans, which was itself a dispute over τιμαί (882), becomes king of the immortals, and is said to have “portioned out well the honors among them” (ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐν διεδάσσατο τιμάς, 885); or earlier in the poem, when the Muses, as they make their way to Olympus, sing of Zeus (71-74): “he is ruling in heaven, holding himself the thunder and the blazing lightning bolt, having overcome by strength his father Kronos; and well with respect to each thing did he arrange laws for the immortals and devise their honors (εὖ δὲ ἕκαστα / ἀθανάτοις διέταξε νόμους καὶ ἐπέφραδε τιμάς).” That there is a job-binding *portion* of thread behind these τιμαί is

principally the members of those great households whose heads, generation after generation, Zeus has fostered as his terrestrial agents, so-called *scepter-bearing* kings, and to a lesser extent also singers like Demodocus, and seers like Calchas. But then there are all the other members of this social world. They are the vast multitude of mortals for whom Zeus has no personal fondness, and gods like Atlas and Prometheus, who ran afoul of Zeus in the early days of his regime; the people who, deriving no particular distinction, except sometimes cautionary, from the particular parts Zeus allots them, have no part in the economy of *τιμῆ*.³⁹

The second reason is that this tradition posits no enduring sphere of nature beyond its social world. Somewhat differently put: there is not this society of gods and men and then some further *world*, conceived as an impersonal thing with a given and unalterable order of its own, which these persons inhabit, and to whose conditions their society has had to adapt. As I said earlier in this chapter, all that we might now attribute to nature—all, in other words, which seems to exist and to occur apart from human agency, epic explains in terms of divine persons and their superhuman agency. The heaven and the earth, as well as the mountains, forests, and bodies of water scattered between them, are each conceived as an autonomous god or else a cohort thereof.⁴⁰ The same is true of night and day, of dusk and dawn, the four seasons, and every other of the regularly occurring phenomena which structure human experience: each appears in this poetry as an individual person born into the same tribe of immortals to which the more familiar Olympians belong. It is accordingly the regular cooperation of all these many gods, each of them performing, just as every mortal does, their particular part in Zeus's *κόσμος*, which constitutes and sustains the coherent environment in which humanity has managed to secure an enduring mode of existence. So we should not say, when Demeter hides the seeds of a year's crop in the soil (*Hom. Dem.* 306-7), that she intervenes in anything like a *natural process*; or when Helios threatens to shine daylight for the dead alone (*Od.* 12.383), that he would somehow do the same. In both cases, it is precisely the *usual activity* of the god, doing the work that is in keeping with the *μοῖρα* of each, which produces the *usual phenomenon*. What she does, what he threatens to do, is act out against the parts they

clear from the theogony which Hermes sings in his *Hymn*; its content is summarized: “how [the gods] first came to exist and each was allotted a portion” (ὡς τὰ πρῶτα γένοντο καὶ ὡς λάχε μοῖραν ἕκαστος, 428)—and the poet adds, not unrelatedly, that the infant god tells every word of the story *κατὰ κόσμον* (433).

³⁹ Hesiod says of Atlas that he “holds broad heaven by strong necessity, standing at the limits of Earth before the high-voiced Hesperides, [doing this] with his head and his untiring hands; for this is the portion which Zeus the deviser apportioned him” (ταύτην γὰρ οἱ μοῖραν ἐδάσσατο μητίετα Ζεὺς, *Theog.* 517-20). What the poet means is that Zeus, using a portion (of thread), has *bound* Atlas to hold up Heaven; this portion of thread is the “strong necessity” upon him. This is abundantly clear from the lines which follow these, in which Zeus is said to bind Prometheus, who is another son of Iapetus, to his own form of daily torment: “And [Zeus] bound with ineluctable bonds (δῆσε δ’ ἀλκτοπέδησι) complex-planning Prometheus, with bonds that were painful (δεσμοῖς ἀργαλέοισι), having driven them through the center of a pillar; and upon him he stirred a long-winged eagle; and this man's immortal liver the eagle would eat, but this would grow back alike in every way at night, as much as the long-winged bird would eat throughout the whole day” (521-525).

⁴⁰ When Zeus, for instance, who is a grandson of Heaven and Earth, has Themis call together an assembly of the gods at the start of *Iliad* 20, “neither anyone of the rivers, except for Oceanus, was absent, nor anyone of the Nymphs, who hold as their part the lovely groves and the springs of rivers, and the grassy meadows” (7-9). Achilles fights the river Scamander in *Iliad* 21, on which see Holmes 2015; Odysseus prays to another river at *Od.* 5.444-53, asking that it slow down its course so that he may navigate it; the West Wind at *Od.* 7.117-21 is an attendant to the garden of Alcinoos, king of the Phaeacians, by his blowing making each crop give fruit throughout the year; olive trees are sentient in the *Hymn to Demeter* (22-23); and the many locations in the *Hymn to Apollo* which Leto visits, looking for a place to give birth to her son, are all persons who, before she reaches Delos, deny her, fearing the power of the god she bears (30-49). Many more examples could be cited.

respectively hold in the regular functioning of Zeus’s *world-constituting community*.⁴¹ The long story leading up to the institution of this regime is, of course, the familiar subject of Hesiod’s *Theogony*; but it would be wildly anachronistic to describe it as one in which, one after another, Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus come to occupy “the throne of *the universe*”; as though the generational strife had been about dominion over some pre-existing, independently structured world.⁴² Rather, it is this sequence of regimes, and the host of gods born and allotted portion-bound roles under each of them, which accounts for the structured and dynamic environment we might today, though in terms utterly foreign to this poetry, call a *world of nature*, and posit in distinction to a *social world*. The important difference is this: here in epic there is only something with the coherence of a world insofar as the members of this community continue to cooperate as the parts of the apparatus whereby Zeus accomplishes his will.⁴³ Should any person, at any station, for any reason, ever fail to speak or act according to their portion-bound role, this machine and the social world it structures, to the extent of that failure, breaks down.⁴⁴

This pair of preliminary points about the social world of epic now made, it is time at last to take a closer look at the structure of this politico-cosmic machine. The first thing to say, a thing which by now should almost go without saying, is that Zeus does not manipulate all the parts of his κόσμος *directly*. He does not go around telling each and every person what they should be doing for him at every moment. In fact, he hardly has to go anywhere, hardly has to do anything, apart from speaking his mind and nodding his head.⁴⁵ This is because he has put in place, by his distribution of portions—once and for all among immortals, with every subsequent generation

⁴¹ In both cases it is an insult to the god’s τιμή, that is, to the political and social privilege guaranteed by the god’s place in the κόσμος of Zeus, which creates the problem. With Helios, it is an insult from below: the crew of Odysseus slaughter and kill his livestock. With Demeter, the insult comes from above: Zeus himself conspires to seize and marry off their daughter, Persephone, to Hades. Despite the catastrophe which Demeter’s protest causes, even she in the end must admit that “the yoke lies upon every neck” (ἐπι γὰρ ζυγὸς ἀνθένι κεῖται, *Hom. Dem.* 217): Zeus, who is ὑψίζυγος (*Il.* 4.166, etc.), “the one who yokes on high,” always gets his way; cf. Pindar, *N.* 5-6: “and we do not all draw breath to equal ends; but different things constrain each of us, having been yoked by destiny” (ἀναπνέομεν δ’ οὐχ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ ἴσα· / εἶργει δὲ πότιμω ζυγένοθ’ ἕτερον ἕτερα). For a different but no less congenial interpretation of the epithet, see Fraenkel 1950: 108-11 *ad* 182f).

⁴² For the phrase, see Lloyd-Jones 1983: 35; the emphasis is mine.

⁴³ The early Greeks were not alone in conceiving the world as a fundamentally social world, that is, as a state with an order that is fundamentally political. To give here just one parallel, the ancient Mesopotamians did as well, as Thorkild Jacobsen 1973: 139-40 explains, bringing out well the inevitable contingency of a world so conceived: “[The Mesopotamian] was in no way blind to the great rhythms of the cosmos; he saw the cosmos as order, not as anarchy. But to him that order was not nearly so safe and reassuring as it was to the Egyptian. Through and under it he sensed a multitude of powerful individual wills, potentially divergent, potentially conflicting, fraught with a possibility of anarchy. He confronted in Nature gigantic and wilful individual powers. To the Mesopotamian, accordingly, cosmic *order* did not appear as something given; rather it became something achieved—achieved through a continual integration of the many individual cosmic wills, each so powerful, so frightening. His understanding of the cosmos tended therefore to express itself in terms of integration of wills, that is, in terms of social orders such as the family, the community, and, most particularly, the state. To put it succinctly, he saw the cosmic order as an order of wills—as a state.”

⁴⁴ There is one important caveat: sometimes the operation of the great κόσμος of Zeus requires the dissolution of one of its inset κόσμοι, or else requires, in the pursuit of its larger purpose, that one or more of the parts of a nested κόσμοι act up. We encountered this phenomenon already in the last chapter, when Pandarus, goaded on by Athena, who is on a mission from Zeus, acts out as a rogue agent within the Trojan military κόσμοι, breaking an oath its κοσμήτωρ had sworn by Zeus to abide by. I will have more to say about this complication below, when it becomes relevant to the exegesis of a couple passages.

⁴⁵ It is only in his capacity as “steward of the wars of men” (ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο, *Il.* 4.84 = 19.224) that we see Zeus take an active role in the world, as when he whips and drives the Trojans down to the Greek ships, or sends them running in panic back to their city’s walls.

among mortals—what amounts to a kind of corporate command hierarchy, extending from himself at the top on down to the lowliest of beings. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, but in any case beside the point, to lay out in a systematic fashion all the different branches in this hierarchy; what is important for the poetry is that we recognize that the hierarchy pertains, and understand that we have our places, as mortals, in the lower orders of it. That said, a few of the branches will be familiar to anyone, as they, pertaining in particular to mortal affairs, figure prominently in the κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

You will know, for instance, that Zeus has put his daughters, the Muses, in charge of celebrating himself and all the honored members of his regime. This is their portion-bound line of work; the work for which they enjoy great honor and privileges, the work pursuant to which they have developed this remarkable kind of song called epic. They perform this song personally at functions for the gods on Olympus, as Hesiod tells us, recounting “the things that are, will be, and were before” (*Theog.* 38); but they recruit for themselves mortal *retainers* (θεράποντες) to perform the song in all the scattered communities of earth, the so-called *tribe of singers* (φῦλον ἀοιδῶν, *Od.* 8.481), who in turn derive from their own subordinate function a certain share of τιμή relative to all others.⁴⁶ And you will likewise know the branch which Apollo heads up: Zeus put him in charge of the major prophetic channels by which he makes known his will to mortals; and he too, pursuant to his job under Zeus, has been granted the authority to enlist mortal *retainers*, servants through whom he “prophesies to men the unerring will of Zeus” (χρήσω τ’ ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλὴν, *Hom. Apol.* 132), to whom he grants in recompense, just as the Muses do their servants, a degree of τιμή proportionate to the work they perform.⁴⁷ Apollo and the Muses, we can say, act κατὰ μοῖραν and εὖ κατὰ κόσμον whenever they perform the respective functions Zeus would have them perform; the mortal seer and singer do this whenever they follow the lead of their respective branch heads.

So far, this is a fairly simple chain of command. But most mortals do not have the pleasure of serving a god directly. They answer instead to a mortal king, and this king answers to Zeus. Like seers to Apollo and singers to the Muses, kings are the *retainers* of Zeus, and they form a

⁴⁶ By singing “the things that are, will be, and were before,” as Hesiod explains a few verses later, the Muses celebrate the long history of the ‘world’ from the time the first gods came to exist: “Hurling forth an undying voice, they first make famous with their song the revered race of gods—all the way from the beginning: those whom Earth and broad Heaven bore, and those who came from these, the gods who are givers of good things; second then Zeus, the father of gods and men, how much he is the best of the gods and in his strength the greatest; and then, singing the race of men and that of the giants, they delight the mind of Zeus on Olympus, the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus” (43-52). The mortal singer is called a servant of the muses at *Theog.* 99-100, but see also Arch. fr.1.1, *Theog.* 768, and *Hom. Lun.* 20.

⁴⁷ How Apollo acquired his Delphic retainers is told as the final episode of his *Hymn*, which begins: “And then Phoebus Apollo started to consider in his heart what men he should introduce as ministers (ὀργιόνας) who would serve him as retainers (θεραπεύσονται) in rocky Pytho” (388-90). That Apollo dutifully prophesies the will of his father is clear from a moment in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus where Apollo, testifying at the murder trial, swears that he has never said a word from his mantic throne which Zeus had not commanded him to say—the implication being: it was really Zeus who devised the murder of Clytemnestra through Orestes, and the jury would do well to put their trust in his plan, whatever it is, and so acquit the defendant (614-21). Apollo, however, does not have exclusive rights to prophecy. He remains the official channel for the communication of Zeus’s will, but he trades an inferior prophetic form, prophecy by certain Parnassian bee-maidens, to his little brother Hermes, who offers in exchange for this his tortoise-shell lyre (*Hom. Herm.* 528-68). And Zeus retains for himself, as a backchannel for communication with mortals, the messaging power of dreams, which, as Penelope famously observes, are not always true (*Od.* 19.559-69): sometimes, as notably with Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.1-47), it is by a false dream that Zeus has his way.

third branch in his command hierarchy.⁴⁸ He loves every one of them, and he has given to each a scepter to wield and his laws—what epic calls his θέμιστες—to protect among the tribes of men.⁴⁹ And as a general rule, when a king administers the justice of Zeus in his community; when he performs his particular part, and his people, by obeying him, do the same, then all the immortal gods organized under Zeus cooperatively perform their own parts. Differently put: the consequence of good kingship is an environment (a *social* environment in the sense introduced above) that is life-sustaining for the king and his people. Odysseus sketches a fair picture of this command branch in a simile from *Odyssey* 19. He is disguised and speaking to his wife, Penelope, whose fame he compares to that of a good king like himself (107-14):

ὦ γύναι, οὐκ ἄν τις σε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
 νεικέοι· ἦ γάρ σευ κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἰκάνει,
 ὡς τέ τευ ἦ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅς τε θεουδῆς
 ἀνδράσιν ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισιν ἀνάσσων
 εὐδικίας ἀνέχησι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
 πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθησι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,
 τίκτη δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχη ἰχθῦς
 ἐξ εὐηγεσίης, ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. (110)

Lady, no one of mortals on boundless Earth would reproach you; for your fame reaches wide Heaven, like that of a blameless king, who, as a god-fearing man ruling over many and strong men, upholds good justice, and black earth bears wheat and barley, and trees are heavy with fruit, and sheep steadily bear young, and sea supplies fish, because of [the king's] good leadership, and his people do excellently under him.

We are told here that it is the *god-fearing* king (θεουδῆς, 109) who *upholds good justice* (εὐδικίας ἀνέχησι, 111). This of course does not mean that the king, because he fears god, governs his people according to some *ideal* justice. The justice in question is that which Zeus has established for mortals, and it is the king's fear of god which ensures that he will administer it.⁵⁰ When he does, and there is what Odysseus calls *good leadership* (εὐηγεσίη, 114), not only does the race of gods cooperate to provide all that is necessary to sustain life locally; the people who serve under this king are also the best versions of themselves (ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, 114). They thrive to the extent and in the way that Zeus allows them when they heed the man he has put in charge of them, and this man, as king, in turn heeds Zeus.

⁴⁸ Thus, the brothers Pelias and Neleus, sons of Tyro by Poseidon, and onetime kings of Iolkos and Pylos, respectively, are said to have “become mighty retainers of great Zeus, the both of them” (τῶ κρατερῶ θεράποντε Διὸς μεγάλοιο γενέσθην / ἀμφοτέρῳ, *Od.* 11.255-56).

⁴⁹ See *Il.* 2.204-6 and 9.97-99; note also that σκητοῦχος is a frequent epithet of kings, for instance at *Il.* 1.279, where we are told that “the scepter-bearing king” is a person “to whom Zeus has given *kudos*” (σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεὺς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν). The context of the *Iliad*, as I will have occasion to observe a little later on, being one in which there is a confederation of high kings banded together under a single king, complicates matters a bit, by creating a further level of subordination than there normally would be. This of course is what produces so much of the drama of the *Iliad*.

⁵⁰ The word comes from δείκνυμι and would seem to be connected with the path that is *shown* for persons to follow. See *Odyssey* 19.31-43 for a moment in which the δίκη θεῶν is Athena quite literally lighting a path for Odysseus and Telemachus. See also the Athenian's use of this line in the *Laws* of Plato (904e3). For the same connection between justice and fearing god, see the repeated couplet of *Od.* 9.175-76 (also at *Od.* 6.120-21, 8.575-76, 13.201-2).

It will be clear at once how precarious the situation of the *λάος* is: their thriving requires submission to a king, but this alone does not guarantee that they thrive.⁵¹ They must also have the good fortune of serving a king who governs them *the right way*: in a way that accords with *the laws that come from Zeus* (θέμιστας πρὸς Διός, *Il.* 1.238-39). For the king who no longer fears the gods, and so wields the power which they have allotted him in service to himself, brings great and unnecessary suffering upon himself and his people. This is the lesson of another simile. After the Patroclus-led rout of his army in *Iliad* 16, Hector flees in his chariot, driving his horses to the point that they groan like torrents of rain water in a terrible storm (384-93):

ὡς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθῶν
 ἦματ' ὀπωρινῶ, ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ (385)
 Ζεὺς, ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἄνδρεςσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνη,
 οἱ βίη εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιάς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
 ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες·
 τῶν δέ τε πάντες μὲν ποταμοὶ πλήθουσι ῥέοντες,
 πολλὰς δὲ κλιτῦς τότ' ἀποτμήγουσι χαράδραι, (390)
 ἐς δ' ἄλα πορφυρέην μεγάλα στενάχουσι ῥέουσαι
 ἐξ ὀρέων ἐπικάρ, μινύθει δέ τε ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων·
 ὡς ἵπποι Τρωαὶ μεγάλα στενάχοντο θεούσαι.

And as the whole of black Earth is weighed down under a storm on a late-summer day, when Zeus pours water most violently; when in fact he is difficult because enraged with men who by force in the assembly decide laws that are crooked, and drive out the justice of the gods, concerned not at all with the vengeful watch they keep; and all their rivers fill up as they flow, and the torrents cut up many hillsides, and into a disturbed sea rushing headlong from the mountains, they [the torrents] groan greatly, and the works of men are destroyed; so greatly were the Trojan horses groaning as they sped on.

This cataclysm is clearly no act of nature; nor would it seem that Zeus has momentarily commandeered “the means of nature,” so that his storming marks a personal and *ad hoc* intervention within an otherwise autonomous weather system.⁵² The scenario of this simile is just the flipside of the other. Here we encounter kings who decide on laws inconsistent with those of Zeus, laws which are accordingly *crooked* (σκολιάς θέμιστας, 387). In so deciding, these kings drive out from their communities the justice of the gods (ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι θεῶν), forgetting in their folly that divinity keeps no blind watch over their deeds (θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, 388).⁵³ This storm is the angry response of Zeus to the insubordination of his mortal retainers, but the flooding it causes does not target them exclusively for punishment. It targets, together with the renegade kings, all those who live under *their* rule; all those who—whatever they happen to think of their situation—belong to a local community which no longer functions as a part of Zeus’s cosmic community. Thus it is no coincidence that Zeus comes a-storming *on a late-summer day*

⁵¹ On the precarity of the *λάος* within the world of epic, see Haubold 2000.

⁵² Redfield 1975: 76.

⁵³ I take the word θεῶν, positioned as it is between the penthemimeral and hepthimimeral caesurae, to operate *apo koinou*, that is, with *both* halves of the line. In the first hemistich, these kings drive out the justice *of the gods*; in the second, they show no regard for the watch *of the gods*.

(ἤματ' ὀπωρινῷ, 385). He comes to devastate the fields in the season of harvest, after the labor of plowing and planting has been completed, when the crop stands ripe and promises to sustain the community for the next year; so that all alike suffer for the bad leadership of their king.⁵⁴

The relationship between a βασιλεύς and his λαός is accordingly one of straightforward domination. We might say, flirting with anachronism, that the king gives form to the matter of his people; and that both thrive to the extent that the former imprints the *right* form: the gods are good neighbors to such a sector of the cosmic community. But this remains a simplified picture of the ruling branch of Zeus's command hierarchy. To complicate things slightly: while it is always a βασιλεύς who rules over the rest of his community, there is never just one of these within a given community. In this respect, *king* is an unfortunate gloss.⁵⁵ A βασιλεύς is properly the head of a *noble* household; he is a patriarch to whom Zeus has granted the authority and means to dominate others *beyond* the members of his immediate family. There is nothing in the notion which prevents one βασιλεύς from being subordinated to another, more powerful one. This is in fact the usual situation. Being a *king* in epic—if we are going to hold on to the traditional translation—admits of degrees: in every community, one king is kinglier (βασιλεύτερος) than the rest, whom all the rest obey.⁵⁶

The picture is perhaps clearest among the Phaeacians.⁵⁷ Alcinous is the preeminent βασιλεύς of the community: “on him depend the strength and power of the Phaeacian people” (τοῦ δ' ἐκ Φαιήκων ἔχεται κάρτος τε βίη τε, *Od.* 6.197), and he “rules over them” as one who “knows the plans that come from the gods” (Ἀλκίνοος δὲ τότε ἦρχε, θεῶν ἄπο μήδεα εἰδώς, *Od.* 6.12).⁵⁸ So far so good. But there are also twelve other βασιλῆες in his community; twelve other “scepter-bearing” (σχηπτοῦχοι, *Od.* 8.41 & 47) heads of houses who, just like Alcinous, “get things done as rulers” of the people (δώδεκα ... βασιλῆες / ἄρχοι κραίνουσι, *Od.* 8.390-91).⁵⁹ We are to imagine each of these kings, all thirteen of them, ruling with fairly wide discretion over a λαός in the vicinity of their respective households, and each of these households, in turn, united under the greatest of them, that of Alcinous. Thus do the twelve other kings serve by day as the members of Alcinous's council, and have seats of honor in *his* hall, where they spend their evenings together occupied with feasting and song.⁶⁰ In short, these twelve serve with Alcinous in the same branch

⁵⁴ This simile and the one discussed before it bear an obvious similarity to remarks made by Hesiod in the *Works and Days* (9-10, 34-41, 213-85, etc.), and this fact has led some scholars to conclude that the similes are Hesiodic interpolations. But similarity of sentiment is no grounds for this conclusion: both Homer and Hesiod are working within the same poetic tradition and share its single world concept; the difference is that they represent this world at different but complementary points in its history. On this point, see Clay 1989, 2003 and Allan 2006.

⁵⁵ For others who takes issue with the usual translation, of whom there are many, see, for example, Taplin 1992: 47-49 and Rose 1992: 64-77, 102-6.

⁵⁶ For the comparative, see *Il.* 9.160, 392, 10.239, and *Od.* 15.533; for the one instance of the superlative, applied unsurprisingly to Agamemnon, see *Il.* 9.69.

⁵⁷ The situations at Pylos and Sparta in the early books of the *Odyssey* would serve as good models as well; as it happens, we will get a taste of how Nestor runs the Pylian community below.

⁵⁸ For the preeminence of Alcinous among the Phaeacians, see also *Od.* 6.297-303, 7.10-11, and 22-23.

⁵⁹ Alcinous himself says that the twelve minor kings are *scepter-bearing* (σχηπτοῦχοι) at *Od.* 8.41-41. The poet then does this in his own voice a few lines later, at 46-47.

⁶⁰ In *Odyssey* 6, when we first meet Alcinous on the morning his daughter, Nausicaa, asks him for permission to do the family's laundry, he is on his way out the door and “going to join the famous kings, [going] towards the place of council, where the noble Phaeacians call him” (ἐρχομένω...μετὰ κλειτοῦς βασιλῆας / ἐς βουλήν, ἵνα μιν κάλειον Φαίηκες ἀγαυοί, 54-55); where, as Nausicaa puts it a few lines later, “being among the first men, he plans his plans” (μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἐόντα / βουλὰς βουλευεῖν, 60-61). We next encounter Alcinous on the evening of the same day, in Book 7, when a mist-shrouded Odysseus enters his hall and finds him, together with the other kings, rounding off their evening feast with a libation to Hermes (133-38). We have in fact been prepared for this scene by Athena, who has

of Zeus's command hierarchy, but do so at a lower station. They are to Alcinous what he and all the other high kings of earth are to Zeus.

This is the structure of the ruling class which the situation on the *Odyssey's* Ithaca and the war-time setting of the *Iliad* complicate in different ways. In the first case, by the will of Zeus, the high king has been missing for decades; and in the absence of his *kosmic* operation, the other noble houses have ceased to cooperate: the assembly which Athena inspires Telemachus to call is the first since Odysseus left (*Od.* 2.25-34).⁶¹ In the other case, again by the will of Zeus, a Panhellenic campaign against Troy has put kings who would otherwise be *high* kings in a subordinate position to Agamemnon and Menelaus: they act now as the interfacing parts of the machine by which the two brothers, as κοσμήτορε λαῶν, wage this war.

To sum up this discussion of structure: the politico-cosmic machine which Zeus has assembled is a corporation of operationally defined departments and descending orders of authority, in which the question of propriety, the question, that is, of whether we are to praise or blame someone for their conduct, will always be a function of the particular role which that person is bound by Zeus to play. The person who knows their own role, who knows, in the language of epic, the things that are αἴσιμα for him to know, and attends to these duties conscientiously, is conducting himself κατὰ μοῖραν, κατ'αἴσαν, εὖ κατὰ κόσμον, and the like.⁶² On the flip side, anyone who, for any reason at all, intentional or otherwise, fails to be the part he is supposed to be, conducts himself ὑπὲρ αἴσαν, ὑπὲρ μόρον, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, and the like. There are no abstractions in play here, no ideals, only the parts of a single instrument, parts which at any given moment are either working or malfunctioning. It is accordingly the particulars of a given situation—whose part in the machine is being talked about, who exactly is talking about it and why—which make the phrases meaningful.

Sorting through the Heap of Phrases

There are too many cases to go through them all one by one, but that heap of paired κόσμος and portion phrases, which I introduced above to establish the rough equivalence of the phrases, happens by chance to give a decent impression of the range of different contexts in which they

earlier, in the disguise of a local girl, led Odysseus to the home of Alcinous. When they reach “the very famous home of the king” (βασιλῆος ἀγακλυτὰ δῶμαθ', 46), Athena says: “this here, foreign father, is the house which you command me point out; and you will find the Zeus-nourished kings [inside it], feasting on a feast” (οὗτος δὴ τοι, ξεῖνε πάτερ, δόμος, ὃν με κελεύεις / πεφραδέμεν. δῆεις δὲ διοτρεφέας βασιλῆας / δαίτην δαινυμένους, 48-50). We learn that the lesser kings have seats in the hall of Alcinous, and that they all feast there regularly, in a description of the hall at 7.95-99: “Inside there were seats (θρόνοι) set against the wall on both sides of the room, extending all the way from the threshold to the inner room of the house; whereon delicate, finely-spun covers were set, the works of women; where the leaders of the Phaeacians (Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες) used to sit as they drank and ate; for they were doing this constantly (ἐπηετανὸν γὰρ ἔχεσκον).”

⁶¹ That there has not been an assembly in the last twenty years does not mean “that the poet regarded the institution as peripheral to the political organization of Ithaca” (West 1988: 131 *ad* 26-27); it means, rather, that the community, without its assembler and operator, has been in a state of confused dysfunction for this period of years.

⁶² Iris, for example, according to Poseidon, and despite the fact that she is delivering some bad news, speaks in a way that is κατὰ μοῖραν (*Il.* 15.206); which demonstrates, as Poseidon says in the next line, that she knows the things befitting a messenger: ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὄτ' ἄγγελος αἴσιμα εἶδη (207). See also *Od.* 15.170, where Menelaus, asked by his guests about a portent from Zeus, has to think for a moment how to respond in a way that is κατὰ μοῖραν; and *Od.* 15.203, where Peisistratus, the son of Nestor, while serving as the chaperone of Telemachus, has to consider how he can accomplish κατὰ μοῖραν a sensitive request of his charge: he has to find a polite way of breaking it to his father that Telemachus, returning home from Sparta, will not stop off and visit him in Pylos.

appear; so let us work to sort through it. Recall that there were five pairs of phrases and five different contexts. Recall that one of those contexts had been the singing of songs. The as-yet-anonymous Odysseus was praising Demodocus for singing one song *λίην κατὰ κόσμον* (*Od.* 8.489), and requesting that he sing another *κατὰ μοῖραν* (496); by which we can now say he meant: you have performed your job as a member of this *κόσμος* exceedingly well, singing the song to your lyre just as you ought to have, being a trained agent of Apollo and the Muses; so come now and sing this other song about the Trojan Horse in just the same way, dutifully cataloguing, as your *μοῖρα*-bound function requires, the operation which finally brought an end to Troy.⁶³ Here is a case, then, in which a service member in one branch (the ruling branch, which Zeus heads up) applauds and then requests the service of a comrade in another branch (we can call it, for reasons to be developed in the conclusion to this dissertation, the propaganda branch, headed up by the Muses in cooperation with Apollo).⁶⁴

Next from the pile is a pair of cases which might seem at first to be a problem for my account. Hector has led his army down to the Greek wall, and he is about to lead them through it, when Polydamas, making good sense of a bad omen from Zeus, advises Hector, to no avail, against going any further, saying that if they do, they will return from the ships *οὐ κόσμῳ* (*Il.* 12.225). When the rout eventually happens, the result of the reentry of Patroclus, the poet tells us, just as Polydamas predicted, that the Trojans start crossing back over the plain *οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν*. The apparent trouble is this: I argued in the last chapter that the Trojan rout, being an important part of the *Iliadic* plan of Zeus, was to be viewed as an operation of his *κόσμος*, but if this is true, why should Polydamas, who knows full well from the fact of the eagle—called here “the portent of aegis-bearing Zeus” (*Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο*, 209)—that the rout is the will of Zeus, nevertheless say that the Trojan retreat is *οὐ κόσμῳ*? And why should the poet, when the rout is occurring, say in confirmation of his character’s reading that it is occurring *οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν*? Here you have to keep in mind the relationship which pertains between a βασιλεύς—or in this case the son of a βασιλεύς acting as his military commander—and the *λαός* he commands, as I explained it above. It is the *μοῖρα*-bound job of the men who serve in Hector’s army to heed and obey him. Whenever they do this, and act accordingly as the members of his *κόσμος*, they conduct themselves according to the

⁶³ Odysseus has moments ago offered a *geras* of meat to the singer in honor of his performance. There he makes clear the logic of the singer’s job: in exchange for the work he performs for the gods, he is entitled among mortals to a certain portion of honor, here a special portion of meat (*Od.* 8.469-83). For further use of the phrases in the context of singing songs, see *Hom. Herm.* 433 and 479.

⁶⁴ I observed above that most commentators take this pair of *κόσμος* and *μοῖρα* phrases in a roughly synonymous way, with only a small minority attempting to draw some distinction between their meaning. I would like to add here that a further majority, consisting of people on both sides of the earlier issue, understand the phrases to apply, in a quasi-formalist way, to the songs and their structuring of parts (whether these parts be construed as the events narrated or the words used), often with an emphasis on the truth that this structuring conveys. See, for example, Webster 1939: 175, Diller 1956: 57, Lanata 1963: 12-13, Murray 1981: 93-94, Verdenius 1983: 53 (cf. 16-20), Thalmann 1984: 128-29, Hainsworth 1988: 378 *ad* 489, Goldhill 1991: 56-59, Grandolini 1996: 140-41, Finkelberg 1998, Scodel 2002: 65-66, Halliwell 2011: 84-88, and Peponi 2012: 48-51 and 66-69. Others come closer to the view I am arguing above, namely, that the phrases do not speak directly to anything internal to the songs, but rather to the singer’s own role in the world, which I would nevertheless argue requires him to sing the song in a certain way. For this view, see Svenbro 1976: 21-35 as well as Ford 1992: 122-24 and 2002: 35. Still others try to have it both ways at once, for instance, Walsh 1984: 8-9 and Garvie 1994: 332-33 *ad* 489-90 and 496-98. Let me be clear, finally, that I am not, like Ford, denying that there is anything which speaks to the internal structure of the song in this passage—very far from it, in fact. It is rather just that the element of this passage which speaks to structure is the crucial identification of the song itself, which the singer sings according to his role in the larger *κόσμος*, as a further and inset *κόσμος*, one with all its parts rightly arranged to do the work it is supposed to do. I discuss this element of the scene in the conclusion to this dissertation.

larger κόσμος; whenever they do not do this, and fail to be his instrument of war, they fail as well to conduct themselves in accordance with the world and their parts within it. It makes no difference, then, to the question of what they should be doing, down in the lower orders of the command hierarchy, what Zeus is orchestrating back up at the top of it; that is business well above their pay grade. Zeus has contrived the rout; it is an operation of his κόσμος; but this does not diminish the fact that the Trojan rank-and-file, in the moment their fear gets the best of them, and they cease in their flight to cooperate as the members of Hector's κόσμος, conduct themselves in a way that is οὐ κόσμῳ and οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν. In this moment, in other words, they are, by the will of Zeus, the malfunctioning machine of Hector.⁶⁵

Third from the pile comes the pair which has to do with the rigging and operation of the ship that carries Odysseus home from Phaeacia. The high king Alcinous gets things started as the local prime κοσμήτωρ. He calls an assembly of the community, and there, addressing the leaders and counselors of the Phaeacians, introduces the stranger and then lays out the plans for his return and entertainment (*Od.* 8.34-45):

ἀλλ' ἄγε νῆα μέλαιναν ἐρύσσομεν εἰς ἄλα δῖαν
πρωτόπλοον, κούρω δὲ δύω καὶ πεντήκοντα (35)

κρινάσθων κατὰ δῆμον, ὅσοι πάρος εἰσὶν ἄριστοι.
δησάμενοι δ' εὖ πάντες ἐπὶ κληῖσιν ἐρετμὰ
ἔκβητ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα θοὴν ἀλεγύνετε δαῖτα
ἡμέτερόνδ' ἐλθόντες· ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι παρέξω.
κούροισιν μὲν ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλομαι· αὐτὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι (40)

σκηπτουχοὶ βασιλῆες ἐμὰ πρὸς δώματα καλὰ
ἔρχεσθ', ὄφρα ξεῖνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι φιλέωμεν·
μηδέ τις ἀρνεῖσθω. καλέσασθε δὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν,
Δημόδοκον· τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς περὶ δῶκεν ἀοιδὴν
τέρπειν, ὄππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀεΐδειν.” (45)

But come, let us draw a black ship down to the shining sea, one that will be sailing for the first time; and let there be chosen from among the *dēmos* fifty-two young men who have before been the best. And when you [the young men selected] have all bound well your oars to the oar-locks, disembark; but then take thought of the swift feast, having come to my place; and I will provide well for all of you. These are commands I lay upon the young men; but you others, scepter-bearing kings, come to my beautiful home, so that we may entertain the stranger in its halls. Let not a one of you refuse. And call the divine singer, Demodocus; for to him the god gave the song which delights so extraordinarily, in whatever way his spirit stirs him to sing.

With this the crowd disperses and those with instructions execute them: the other kings follow Alcinous back to his court for the feast; the herald fetches the divine singer; and the fifty-two young men selected from the δῆμος set about launching and rigging a ship (48-56):

⁶⁵ Hector's men fail him as a κόσμος here in much the same way that Teucer, the half-brother of Telamonian Ajax, is failed by his bow, when he attempts in *Iliad* 15 to kill Hector with it: it serves him well until he comes to Hector and the point at which the instrument, by its use, would no longer serve the purpose of Zeus, at which point the god snaps the bowstring, disabling the man's κόσμος (458-70).

κούρω δὲ κρινθέντε δύω καὶ πενήκοντα
 βήτην, ὡς ἐκέλευσ', ἐπὶ θῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτιο.
 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥ' ἐπὶ νῆα κατήλυθον ἠδὲ θάλασσαν, (50)
 νῆα μὲν οἷ γε μέλαιναν ἀλὸς βένθοσδε ἔρυσσαν,
 ἐν δ' ἰστόν τ' ἐτίθεντο καὶ ἰστία νῆϊ μελαίνῃ,
 ἠρτύναντο δ' ἔρετμὰ τροποῖσ' ἐν δερματίνοισι
πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν· παρὰ δ' ἰστία λευκὰ τάνυσσαν.
 ὕψοῦ δ' ἐν νοτίῳ τήν γ' ὄρμισαν· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα (55)
 βάν ῥ' ἴμεν Ἀλκινόοιο δαΐφρονος ἐς μέγα δῶμα.

And the fifty-two youths, having been selected, went down, just as [Alcinous] commanded, to the shore of the barren sea. But when they came down to the ship and the sea, they drew the black ship down to the deep part of the sea, and they placed the mast and the sails on the black ship, and they positioned their oars in the leather oarlocks, [doing] **all things according to their portion**; and to the side they unfurled the white sails. And they anchored her off shore in the water; but then they went to go to the great home of wise Alcinous.

The poet takes the time to walk us through the steps by which the young men—in a fashion that will be familiar from the preceding chapters—*kosmify* a ship: they take a bare hull and turn it into a fully operational instrument of conveyance. What makes the performance of every step of this procedural *κατὰ μοῖραν* for the youths is an additional fact: that the high king Alcinous, whom it is their *μοῖρα*-bound job in this world to serve, has just ordered them to perform on his behalf these acts of *kosmopoiesis*. The *κόσμος* assembled, their job for now complete, these fifty-two young men of the *δῆμος* make their way to the home of their king, where they have been promised the presumably rare privilege of partaking, in at least some peripheral way, in a king's sacrificial feast; at which event they disappear into the background, only to reappear again when, at the end of the next day, it is finally time for them to perform the rest of their job. Odysseus is led down to the beach by the king's herald, and accompanied by numerous house-women carrying all manner of gifts. Our sailing youths, called here "proud conveyors" (*πομπῆες ἀγαυοί*, 13.71), next take and store these gifts below the deck of the ship, lay out a bed for Odysseus atop it, and only then "sit down at the oarlocks, each at his own, in agreement with the *kosmos*" (*τοὶ δὲ καθίζον ἐπὶ κληῖσιν ἕκαστοι / κόσμῳ*, 76-77). Here again what makes the conduct of the youths *κόσμῳ* is the fact that their king has commanded it of them; here they are at last, sitting at their places aboard the *κόσμος*, just as they are bound to do, ready to perform the rest of their service for the king. They release the moorings and lean into the labor of stirring up sea with oar (*εὖθ' οἱ ἀνακλινθέντες ἀνερρίπτου ἄλα πηδῶ*, 78).⁶⁶

⁶⁶ The story of the sailors, and probably also the entire Phaeacian community, ends in another *kosmic* tragedy (13.125-87). On their return, just offshore from Phaeacia, these men of the *dēmos*, in a deal which Zeus greenlights, are turned to stone by Poseidon, who is venting his rage over Odysseus on the people who have very properly carried him home. It remains an open question whether the god reins his anger in at this point, or continues to rage against the rest of the community. The Phaeacians recognize in the marvel offshore the partial fulfilment of an ancient prophecy that ends with Poseidon annihilating their community, covering it on all sides with a giant rock; and so they immediately set about propitiating the god with prayer and sacrifices. But we never get to hear what happens next; we are left with a cliffhanger: the poet, in the middle of a line, suddenly cuts back to Odysseus on Ithaca. The fundamental issue, I think, is whether or not Poseidon has the permission to kill off the Phaeacians; and this, in turn, comes down to a textual

Fourth from the pile is the pair which had to do with butchery. One of the pair occurs in the course of preparations for a feast held by Nestor for Athena in *Odyssey* 3. Telemachus has come to Pylos seeking news about his father, Athena has revealed herself to be the young man's guide, and now Nestor wants to propitiate the goddess with a sacrifice. He gives orders to his six sons and sends them off: one out to the fields to bring back a cow (421-22); another down to the shore to bring back the companions of Telemachus, the men who serve as his crew (423-24); still another son to fetch Laerkes, the local blacksmith, who will gild the horns of the victim (425-26); and the other three into the house, to command the slave-women there to make the necessary arrangements for conducting a feast—that is, by arranging chairs about the altar, setting beside it enough firewood for the cooking, and bringing in a supply of lustral water, to *kosmify* the hall into a ready apparatus for sacrifice (427-29). The hall prepared, the other three sons back from their respective errands, the sacrifice is underway: Nestor provides the gold (436-37), the blacksmith applies it to the cow's horns (437-38); two sons lead the animal to the altar by its horns (439); a third holds lustral water in one hand, barley for scattering in the other (440-42); a fourth stands by with an axe, ready to strike (442-43); a fifth holds forth a dish in which to receive the cow's blood (444); and the sixth, when the ceremony is complete and the cow now slain, will, with his brothers lifting the animal up from the ground, start the work of slaughtering it, by cutting its throat (453-54).⁶⁷ Whereupon the other brothers take up knives and join in (456-63):

αἴψ' ἄρα μιν διέχευαν, ἄφαρ δ' ἐκ μηρία τάμνον
πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν, κατὰ τε κνίσῃ ἐκάλυψαν,
 δίπτυχα ποιήσαντες, ἐπ' αὐτῶν δ' ὠμοθέτησαν.
 καῖε δ' ἐπὶ σχίζῃσ' ὁ γέρων, ἐπὶ δ' αἶθοπα οἶνον
 λειῖβε· νέοι δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἔχον πεμπώβολα χερσίν. (460)
 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μῆρ' ἐκάη καὶ σπλάγχνα πάσαντο,
 μίστυλλον τ' ἄρα τᾶλλα καὶ ἀμφ' ὀβελοῖσιν ἔπειρον,
 ὄπτων δ' ἀκροπόρους ὀβελούς ἐν χερσίν ἔχοντες.

And straightaway they dismembered it, and quickly cut out the thighs, **[doing] all things according to their portion**, and they covered these with fat, having made it into a double fold, and they placed cuts of raw flesh on them [the fat-encased thighs]. And the old man started to burn these on the split wood, and was pouring bright wine on them; and beside him the young men were holding forks in their hands. And when the thighs were burnt up and they had tasted the guts, they were cutting up the rest of the meat and piercing the pieces with spits, and they were roasting them, holding with their hands the spits over the fire.

issue. In laying out his βουλή (127) on the matter, does Zeus say “and shroud their city all around with a giant rock” (μέγα δέ σφιν ὄρος πόλει ἀμφικαλύψαι, 158), which is the vulgate reading, or does he say, as Aristophanes would have it, “do not shroud their city all around with a rock” (emending μέγα to μή). Bassett 1933 makes a good case for the vulgate reading, but see also Bowie 2013: 124-26 *ad* 13.165-87 for further discussion.

⁶⁷ My focus here is on the work which the brothers perform in subservience to their father; I have skipped over several of the steps which Nestor himself, as the master of this ceremony, performs. The same goes for the contribution of the women of the household, who perform for the occasion a ritual cry. For a full accounting of the steps of the sacrifice, see Burkert 1985: 55-59.

The poet has chosen the moment after they joint the cow and cut out its thighs to tell us that the sons of Nestor are doing πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν, but there is really nothing special about the moment. Everything which they do in this entire scene, both before and after this particular moment, is something which they do κατὰ μοῖραν; for it is their μοῖρα-bound work in the world to be the obedient sons of a great king, and just now the man has ordered them to help him conduct, in service to the goddess Athena, who has involved the old man in her plans, a sacrificial feast in his hall. His sons are his team; they are the interfacing parts of the domestic apparatus by which he conducts the elaborate service.

The context for the other of the butchery pair is a smaller and more intimate occasion in the last book of the *Iliad*. Zeus is tying up the loose ends of his plan by seeing to it that Hector's corpse is returned to his family. He sends Iris first down to summon Thetis, so that he can instruct her to instruct Achilles to give up his abuse of the body and accept a ransom for it; then sends Iris down to Priam, to instruct him to gather together an appropriate ransom and make his way, attended by a single herald of his, but with Hermes looking out for him, down to the Achaean camp and tent of Achilles. He arrives, the exchange is made, and then Achilles, playing the good host, proposes and prepares a meal for his god-sent guest (*Il.* 24.621-27):

Ἦ καὶ ἀναΐξας οἶν ἄργυρον ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς
 σφάξ'· ἔταροι δ' ἔδερόν τε καὶ ἄμφεπον εὖ κατὰ κόσμον,
 μίστυλλον τ' ἄρ' ἐπισταμένως πειρὰν τ' ὀβελοῖσιν,
 ὄπτησάν τε περιφραδέως, ἐρύσαντό τε πάντα.
 Αὐτομέδων δ' ἄρα σῖτον ἔλων ἐπένειμε τραπέζῃ (625)
 καλοῖς ἐν κανέοισιν· ἀτὰρ κρέα νείμεν Ἀχιλλεύς.
 οἱ δ' ἐπ' ὀνειάθ' ἐτοῖμα προκείμενα χεῖρας ἴαλλον.

Swift Achilles spoke and, having darted up [from his seat], cut the neck of a white sheep; and his companions were skinning it and processing it **well according to the *kosmos***, and then they were cutting it up expertly, and they pierced [the pieces] with spits, and they roasted them carefully, and drew them all back [from the fire]. And then Automedon, having picked up the bread, distributed it on the table in fine baskets; and the meat Achilles distributed. And they put forth their hands to the good things lying ready before them.

Achilles is assisted here by two companions who are called his *retainers* a little earlier in the scene (δύω θεράποντες, 573). They are Automedon, who is named above, and Alkimedon, who is not; and while they have long served as captains and squires for Achilles on the battlefield, the duty of helping the half-god with meals is an altogether new line of work for the pair; it is a duty they have taken over from Patroclus since his death, as the two men Achilles valued most after the other. And just like the sons of Nestor in the passage above, who in executing the will of their father, by doing each his part in the preparation and operation of his sacrificial feast, conduct themselves κατὰ μοῖραν, so do these two henchmen, in all that they do here for Achilles, conduct themselves εὖ κατὰ κόσμον: by skinning and processing the sheep, cutting and piercing the pieces of meat, and then roasting these, doing all of it excellently, just as they ought to do, they are doing their own small part in the working of the cosmic apparatus.

The fifth and final pair of phrases brings us round at last to the most common context for their use: the praising and blaming of speech. As a basic rule, one speaks in a praiseworthy way,

and can be lauded with one of the positive phrases, whenever he, by virtue of the particular role he plays in the cosmic machine, has, on the one hand, some right or obligation to speak, and, on the other, says only what he believes to be pursuant to the execution of his role. And *vice versa*: one speaks in a blameworthy way, and may be called out for it with one of the negative phrases, whenever he, in some particular situation, either has no right to speak at all, or does, but speaks in a way that either misrepresents or hinders the workings of the cosmic machine.⁶⁸ It is as simple as this in most cases, but, as it happens, the situation of our two cases brings with it an important complication: Euryalus, a minor Phaeacian noble and the offending speaker, has no clue that he is speaking to Odysseus, the very familiar subject of two of that evening's three songs, there in the flesh. And what is worse: he begins to speak abusively to Odysseus in the moment that he infers, very unwisely, that the stranger before him, so far from being the one and only Odysseus, does not even number among the τιμή-claiming elite.

The particulars are as follows. Part of the entertainment which Alcinous puts on for the nameless Odysseus is a series of athletic contests. They are meant to be a show of Phaeacian virtue, something the stranger will marvel at and then go away and spread the news about. When all the young nobles have had their turn, one of the victors, Laodamas, who happens also to be a son of the high king, proposes that they invite the stranger to take part. He makes the proposal, as he explains to his companions, because he reckons from the look of the man's body that he must be one of their own, which is to say, one of the ἄριστοι; the sort of man who has the god-granted leisure and the god-granted prowess to know at least something about athletics.⁶⁹ This is where Euryalus, riding high from his own victory in one of the contests, speaks up for the first time; he affirms the judgement of his companion, telling him that he “spoke this word very much according to his portion” (μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 8.141), and then urges him to go on and address the stranger; which Laodamas proceeds to do, showing all of the tact and courtesy which one would expect of the high king's son. But the stranger declines to take part, citing the many troubles that weigh on his mind and a desire to avoid further delaying his return. And this is where Euryalus makes his big error; he changes his mind about the stranger, inferring from the man's unwillingness, and despite his looks, that he is altogether beneath athletics; and so he starts to speak to this effect (159-64):

οὐ γάρ σ' οὐδέ, ξεῖνε, δαήμονι φωτὶ εἴσκω
ἄθλων, οἷά τε πολλὰ μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλονται, (160)

⁶⁸ The Thersites episode (*Il.* 2.211-393), which is just a part of a much larger *kosmopoietic* procedural spanning the entirety of the second book, is *locus classicus* for speech which is obstructive of the cosmic machine. Here is a hideous man (217-19) who knows in his heart many things out of whack with the κόσμος (ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ἦισιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλὰ τε εἶδη, 213); who even says these things out loud, and does it all in a vain effort to vie with his betters, working to cause a minor *kosmic* disruption for laughs (μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλευῶσιν / ἀλλ' ὅ τί οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοῖον Ἀργείοισιν / ἔμμεναι, 214-16). On this character, his place in the poem, and his scholarly reception, see Rose 1988, Thalmann 1988, and Ford 1992: 86-87. At the other end of the spectrum is the speech of the oldest and wisest of the Greeks, Nestor, who knows like no other, from long experience, what, in any given situation, he should say or do in order to make things run smoothly; this is why he is the greatest adviser of the Greeks. On his speech and role among the Greeks at Troy, see Martin 1989: 59-61. There are other and obviously related expressions by which the poet and his characters can praise or blame speech according to whether it serves the κόσμος; one of these, for instance, is ἄρτια βάζειν (*Od.* 8.240), which means to make an utterance whose words *cohere* as a working κόσμος, as a verbal instrument which serves its purpose within the larger κόσμος.

⁶⁹ Laodamas speaks at length about the body of Odysseus, making an analysis of it at *Od.* 8.133-39; I simplify his findings in what I say above. He certainly does conclude that the man is noble, though he sees in the look of his body the effects of a long period of difficulty.

ἀλλὰ τῷ, ὅς θ' ἅμα νηὶ πολυκλήϊδι θαμίζων,
ἀρχὸς ναυτῶν, οἳ τε πρηκτῆρες ἔασι,
φόρτου τε μνήμων καὶ ἐπίσκοπος ἦσιν ὁδαίων
κερδέων θ' ἀρπαλέων· οὐδ' ἀθλητῆρι ἔοικας.

No, stranger, not at all do I liken you to a man experienced in contests, any of the sort which exist in great number among men; but rather [I liken you] to the man who plies his trade on a ship with many oarlocks, a leader of sailors who go about as traders; and [like] a man mindful of his cargo, who keeps an eye out for his return freight, and for his greedy profit; you are not like an athlete.

Here is abuse which is intolerable to Odysseus. If he is not quite ready to identify himself, he is nevertheless goaded enough to make it clear, here and now, before all the Phaeacian nobles, just how wrong the young man is. First comes the indignant response: he begins it by giving tit for tat, likening Euryalus to a reckless man, the sort to whom the gods grant good looks but no sense (166-77), and then he concludes (178-85):

ᾧρινάς μοι θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν
εἰπὼν οὐ κατὰ κόσμον· ἐγὼ δ' οὐ νῆϊς ἀέθλων,
ὡς σύ γε μυθεῖαι, ἀλλ' ἐν πρώτοισιν ὄϊω
ἔμμεναι, ὄφρ' ἦβη τε πεποίθεα χερσὶ τ' ἐμῆσι.
νῦν δ' ἔχομαι κακότητι καὶ ἄλγεσι· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔτλην,
ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε κύματα πείρων.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧς, κακὰ πολλὰ παθὼν, πειρήσομ' ἀέθλων·
θυμοδακῆς γὰρ μῦθος· ἐπώτρυνας δέ με εἰπὼν. (185)

You have stirred the spirit in my chest **by speaking not according to the *kosmos***; but I am not without knowledge of contests, as you declare [I am], but among the first I deem I was, when I still had faith in my hands and the vigor of youth. But now I am held in the grip of trouble and pains; for many are the things I have endured, cleaving my way through the wars of men and the grievous waves. But even in this way, having suffered many bad things, I will give the contests a try; for your talk is spirit-biting; and you have spurred me by speaking.

The stranger does not mean by the phrase just that Euryalus has spoken impolitely; his offense is not the breach of some vaguely defined but universal dictate of decorum, some law which says: be always nice to your guests.⁷⁰ The charge against Euryalus is more specific than this. He is wrong about the stranger and his place in the cosmic machine; he has taken for his inferior a man who is far and away his superior, and has, by the error of this judgement, come to address the man in an insubordinate manner, in a way that denies the stranger the deference which his position in the

⁷⁰ To be clear, I am not suggesting that there exist no laws of hospitality in this world. They do exist, and moreover play an important role in the epic world, but they are specific regulations handed down from on high, along with all the other laws, to the kings who act as the mortal retainers of Zeus. On this topic, see Finley 1977: 99-103 and Benveniste 2016: 61-73, among others; for a list and discussion of the major scenes of hospitality in Homer, see Finkelberg 2011 s.v. “hospitality.”

κόσμος demands. It is speech which, by confusing the proper conduct of this festive day, serves only to gum up the local works of the world, creating a problem which king Alcinous, as κοσμήτωρ of these people and this day of entertainments, must shortly work to correct.

Once the stranger has made his statement, he proceeds immediately to its demonstration. He darts up from his seat and, without so much as bothering first to take off his cloak, grabs a discus much larger than the one thrown by the other contenders; he spins round with it, lets it go, sets it flying well beyond the pegs which mark the earlier throws. It lands and Athena is suddenly there, appearing in the guise of a local, to mark the prodigious throw and declare the new winner by a mile. But the Phaeacians did not need the announcement to know the outcome: every one of them had cowered down to the ground under the incredible whir of the stone's flight (190-92). If it is not yet clear to them who the man is, there is no longer any doubt about his place in the world; for any mortal who exhibits prowess like this is indisputably near and dear to the gods.

The stranger has now made his point and is ready for more when Alcinous finally steps in to right the ship. His first move is to defuse the tension of the moment; this he does by deftly directing the party away from athletic competition and onto the spectacle of song and dance; after which, with the temperature lowered, he circles back to the issue of the stranger's status and the bad talk of Euryalus.⁷¹ He first proposes, in addition to the minimal service of conveyance already promised, to collect for their distinguished stranger a ξεινήϊον, something like a *guest-package* for VIPs, to which the local kings will each contribute a cloak, tunic, and talent of gold. This first, community-wide order made, the high king singles out the offender, whose bad talk has occasioned the reevaluation of the stranger, with another order (396-97):

Εὐρύαλος δέ ἐ αὐτὸν ἀρεσσάσθω ἐπέεσσι
καὶ δῶρω, ἐπεὶ οὐ τι ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπεν.

And let Euryalus make amends to him [the stranger] personally with words and with a gift, since he spoke his utterance not at all according to his portion.

The king hereby formally and publicly sides with the stranger against Euryalus. He affirms the former's judgement that the latter spoke out of step with the κόσμος, saying himself much the same thing, that the young man spoke out of step with his μοῖρα; and sets the penalty for the error at a personal apology and gift. The apology is just the sort of thing you would expect: "if any word [of mine] was spoken too strong, would that the winds snatch it up and carry it away; and may the gods grant that you see your wife and reach your fatherland" (408-11). The gift, on the other hand, is something special; for Euryalus, given by his king the freedom to decide what the gift will be, decides to hand over to the stranger a magnificent sword, and so implicitly to negate his earlier allegation: what use would a merchant sailor have for a fine tool of war? The stranger graciously accepts the gift and words of Euryalus, and the day of entertainments conducted by king Alcinous is back on track.

The last thing to say about this final pair of phrases and the blameworthy speech of Euryalus is this: the young man's conduct is a local disruption to the cosmic machine, affecting as it does the smooth conduct of the day's events; but it is also, at a higher level, something which happens very much according to the cosmic machine. The speech is οὐ κατὰ κόσμον in the way that Hector's army, in the moment of its Zeus-plotted rout, falls to pieces and retreats οὐ κόσμω.

⁷¹ On this spectacle and its reception, see Olsen 2017.

The whole drama of Odysseus among the Phaeacians has been scripted by Athena, whom Zeus has put in charge of arranging the return of Odysseus. Thus we have known since Book 5 that the Phaeacians would give Odysseus many gifts of clothing and gold, when Zeus himself declares that this will happen in the course of the man's *μοῖρα*-bound return (29-42). And we have known since the beginning of Book 8 that the Phaeacians would be testing the status of the stranger with athletic contests: Athena pours a magical grace over his head and shoulders, and makes him taller and thicker to look upon, so that he appear as a marvelous specimen for the Phaeacians to puzzle over, and "complete the many contests by which the Phaeacians make trial of him" (18-23). This is all part of the plan by which Athena pushes Odysseus to reclaim his former identity; she is rehabilitating the hero in preparation for the work that awaits him on Ithaca.

One Final Consensus

I have broken in this work, so far only implicitly, with two intimately connected points of long-standing consensus among historians of philosophy. The first holds that there is effectively no concept of the world as a rationally structured whole of parts before the 6th century BC, when the earliest of the Presocratic philosophers begin to theorize it, each in his own way, as a *naturally* structured whole of parts; as a whole whose parts are conceived in terms of impersonal stuffs involved in a system of regular, *physical* processes. The second holds that it was one of these novel-minded persons who, in attempting to give expression to this newly-discovered world of nature, decided to call it the *κόσμος*: so that what had been in epic a universal word for *order*, but which had nevertheless *never* been applied to *τὰ πάντα*, comes in the hands of these thinkers to be the Ur-term for the universe. Here are a couple examples of how these two points of consensus interact. The first comes from Vlastos, who assumes both in setting the question for his still-influential study:

I want to recapture the original sense of the word *kosmos* and try to explain how it happened that a word with just that sense [sc. the sense of *order*] came to epitomize the intellectual revolution that began with the cosmogonies of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes in the sixth century B.C. and culminated a century later in the atomic system of Leucippus and Democritus. When these men glimpsed with wild surmise on their Ionian Darrens a new physical universe, why did they pick *kosmos* to name what they saw?⁷²

The second comes from Kahn, summing up the Ionian legacy:

Despite a wide range of mythic and poetic antecedents, the Ionian conception of the world as a *kosmos* was something new, and its novelty is identical with the emergence of western science and philosophy as such. What we find in sixth-century Miletus is a scientific revolution in Kuhn's sense, the creation of a new paradigm of theoretical explanation, with the peculiar distinction that this world view is the first one to be recognizably scientific, so that the innovation in this case

⁷² Vlastos 2005: xxiv.

is not so much a revolution *within* science as a revolution *into* science for the first time.⁷³

But we have already seen in the preceding chapter that this story begins from a false start. Epic κόσμος does not in the first place signify an abstraction like *order*, such that the word could unproblematically be applied to the world once this finally comes to be construed as something exhibiting an *order*.⁷⁴ Indeed, it is this false start, the idea that κόσμος should mean *order*, which has created the appearance of a substantially novel use among the early philosophers, and thereby abetted the assumption that there is no notion of a *structured world* before the advent of a *naturally structured* one. Far from emblemizing the great intellectual break with the tradition these philosophers inherit, the moments in which they speak of the world as a κόσμος are the moments they *gesture back* to epic, and to its conception of a (social) world structured as the political *apparatus* of Zeus.

To see this, we turn now to what is arguably the earliest attestation of the word's apparently new, philosophical sense.⁷⁵ It occurs in an aphorism of Heraclitus (fr. B 30):

κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται—πῦρ ἀεὶζῶον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.⁷⁶

⁷³ Kahn 1979: 16.

⁷⁴ This is the reason that, while almost everyone agrees it was one of these philosophers who first used κόσμος in signification of the *world*, there has never been any consensus about *which* philosopher it was. Kahn 1960: 188, for example, argues that it was Anaximander: “No ancient author, it is true, tells us that Anaximander spoke of the world as a κόσμος. But the new philosophic sense of this term is as familiar to Heraclitus and Parmenides as it is to Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Diogenes. It is difficult to see where such a widespread notion could have arisen, if not in sixth-century Miletus—the mother city from which, like so many colonies, all the philosophic schools of early Greece are sprung”; Horky 2019b that it was Pythagoras, though he admits to having found no “smoking gun” (41) to this effect; Macé 2019: 42 that it was Parmenides: “My hypothesis is that Parmenides, who chose to express himself in the verse, vocabulary, and images of Homer, can be chiefly credited with making the categories of Archaic poetry available for cosmology, so that the universe could start to openly be described as another κόσμος...”; and Kirk 1970: 314 that it was someone of the later Presocratics: “There is one probable conclusion from all this: that κόσμος means ‘order’ (in various senses) until well on in the fifth century, when its use for ‘world-order’ by Empedocles, Diogenes and perhaps Philolaus led to a derived meaning, ‘world.’” (There is further debate about whether the sense *world* becomes available all at once, or instead emerges over time, as Kirk here maintains, so that one philosopher innovates in speaking of a *world-order*, and then another further innovates in speaking of an *ordered-world*.) Finkelberg 1998 is the only scholar I have found who denies that some one of the Presocratics is responsible for κόσμος as *world*; he argues, however, that the meaning emerges just a bit later, in the works of Plato, our first *Postsocratic* philosopher. But again: the entire debate proceeds from the fundamental error of thinking that the conventional sense of κόσμος is *order*; for it is this which creates the *false appearance* among the philosophers of a truly novel meaning in the moments they call *all things* a κόσμος.

⁷⁵ I say *arguably*, of course, because those like Kirk 1970: 311-14 and Finkelberg 1998: 115-17, who think the new sense becomes available *after* Heraclitus, need to deny that it already occurs here. They each argue in their own way, while acknowledging the cosmological context of the aphorism, that the word still means *order*.

⁷⁶ Following Reinhardt 1916: 170n1 and Kirk 1970: 307-10, I omit the phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων (which most editors insert between τόνδε and οὔτε: “This *kosmos*, *the same for all*, neither...”) as the interpolation of Clement, the *only* one of the three sources for this part of the aphorism who includes it. (Importantly, he is also the *only* source not to include τόνδε.) Their arguments for the omission are cogent, *pace* Vlastos 1993b: 133n18, who addresses none of their substance. From the context, it is clear that Clement's source is Stoic: this school claimed Heraclitus as a forerunner to its own philosophy and its members tended to read their own doctrine into his sayings; and here we find Clement, who is himself no Stoic, attributing to the Ephesian the familiar Stoic idea that the living κόσμος is periodically consumed and reconstituted by the intelligent cosmic fire that is to be identified with its soul; the two processes being called ἐκπύρωσις (conflagration) and διακόσμησις (thorough-*kosmifying*). Now, this particular

This *kosmos* neither anyone of gods nor of men made, but it was always and is and will be—fire always-living, kindling [itself] in measures and quenching [itself] in measures.

Given the assumption that κόσμος conventionally means *order*, the logic by which it comes here to mean *world* is fairly elegant. The conventional sense is first rejected on the grounds that *this kosmos* will turn out to be an *always-living fire*: if this fire has a certain order to it, as it clearly does, always igniting and burning out *in measures*, it is itself, nevertheless, not *simply* an order. Next, because all agree that this fire is for Heraclitus the basic stuff of existence, through the regular quenching of which everything else that is constitutive of the world comes to be, and through its regular kindling ceases to be; it is concluded that Heraclitus, in calling this fire a κόσμος, can only mean to say that it is the *world*.⁷⁷ The final step is then to explain how a word which has always meant *order* can now mean *world*. It is here that we supply the likely story touched on above: it must have been one of these philosophers, either Heraclitus himself or one of his predecessors, who first reached for the word in the work of articulating their own vision of a “new physical universe”; at which point, other philosophers began to use κόσμος thus, so that the

aphorism is a *prima facie* problem for anyone who would attribute this view to Heraclitus: it appears to entail that the Heraclitean κόσμος has always existed and will continue to do so forever; that it is *not* something which is regularly destroyed and reproduced. The way to reconcile the aphorism with the Stoic picture, as Kirk explains it, is to claim that κόσμος “here means not the particular world we see and live in, which is subject to conflagration, but the all-embracing world, or pattern of existence, within which phases of διακόσμησις and ἐκπόρωσις take place” (308). This move is possible because the Stoics themselves used κόσμος rather casually, in three related but importantly distinct ways: it could be used, first, of the different worlds which cosmic fire fashions for itself and then destroys; second, for the cosmic fire itself, the soul which lives on disembodied until it fashions for itself another world-body; and third, for the composite of fiery world-soul and -body (D.L. 7.137 [SVF 2.526]). If we grant, as the Stoics were more than willing to do, that Heraclitus uses κόσμος in the same three ways in which they later did, then there is little difficulty in squaring the aphorism with Stoic doctrine: Heraclitus is using κόσμος here in the second way, as he makes perfectly clear when he later calls it an *always-living fire*. A problem fragment thus becomes strong evidence for the Stoic Heraclitus. And it is precisely for this reason that Clement cites it (*Strom.* 5.14.104):

Heraclitus the Ephesian was most clearly of this opinion [sc. that there will at some point be a change into the being of fire], having thought that there is one κόσμος that is eternal, and another that is perishing; knowing that the one [that comes about] in accordance with διακόσμησις [i.e. the world-body] is no different from that [other] one [i.e. the world-soul] holding in a certain way. But that he knew an everlasting κόσμος, one that is of a unique sort, constituted of all being, he makes clear in speaking this way: “*kosmos*” (the one that is the same of all) “neither anyone of the gods nor of men made, but...”; and that he posited a generated and perishing one, the following reveals: (fr. B 31).

This brings us back, at last, to the phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἅπαντων, which appears, not after, but *in place of* τόνδε in Clement’s text, so as to immediately follow the word κόσμον. This substitution would suggest that the phrase is a gloss of τόνδε, which Clement has inserted to make clear from the start of the fragment, when the word in question is used, that *this kosmos* is the *always-living fire*, and not one of the periodically destroyed world-body *kosmoi* this fire fashions both for and from itself. To use Clement’s gloss, this κόσμος is the one that remains “the same for all [the *kosmoi* that are, in turn, generated from it and perish into it].” (To be clear: I think the Stoics are better interpreters of Heraclitus than they are today usually given credited for being, but I can see no grounds for their attributing to him the specific doctrine that all things are periodically consumed in cosmic conflagration.)

⁷⁷ Burnet 1920: 134n3 claims, for example, that “*kosmos* must mean ‘world’ here, not merely ‘order’; for only the world could be identified with fire”; and Vlastos 1993b: 133-34, following him, asserts that “this very fragment (B30) is evidence that *kosmos*, though it implies, does not just mean ‘order,’ for what is in question here is not merely that nobody made the *order* of the world, but that nobody made this orderly *world*; this world is fire, and nobody made the fire, for it is ‘ever-living.’”

word becomes a *generic term* for the common object of all their study, this *world* whose *order* each sets out to explain.⁷⁸

But there are a couple of problems with handling the aphorism in this way. To begin with, if κόσμος here means *world* and Heraclitus posits just one of these, an *always-living fire*, then why has he decided to say τόνδε κόσμον, that is, *this world*, as though there were another or even several other worlds somewhere else? Moreover, if κόσμος as *world* is a technical sense developed and used by a handful of philosophers engaged in a more or less common project, it stands to reason that Heraclitus, in declaring that *no one of gods or men made this κόσμος*, is sparring with a fellow “believer in the cosmos.”⁷⁹ But which of his predecessors could this have been? I am aware of no fragment nor any piece of testimony that would suggest a single one of these persons ever claimed that the world was *made* (ἐποίησεν), as by a demiurge; and it is almost unthinkable that one of them would have entertained the further idea that its maker was *some one of men* (τις...ἀνθρώπων).

Now, let us take up the aphorism a second time with fresh eyes. Grant me just that the first words, τόνδε κόσμον, mean *this apparatus*, and we can begin to see how the rest unfolds as a kind of riddle for the reader to solve. The deictic τόνδε leaves no doubt that Heraclitus has a *particular* apparatus in mind; but having as yet no context, we are unable to identify *which* apparatus *this* is. So, we read on with the expectation that the referent of κόσμον will become clear in time. This expectation, however, is not quickly met: the proposition to which τόνδε κόσμον belongs turns out to be a negative description of the apparatus in question: *neither any one of gods nor of men made it*. An ambiguity of reference thus quickly morphs into a paradox. How could there ever exist an apparatus—whatever we suspect *this apparatus* to be—which no person ever made? What machine, in other words, is not also an *artifact*? So, for the second time, we read on, hoping perhaps that the next proposition will provide some path from *aporia*: this apparatus was never manufactured, he now adds, because *it has always existed, exists at present, and will continue to exist*. A still deeper sense of puzzlement sets in.

But we note now what cannot have been coincidence. Heraclitus has articulated both his propositions in terms unmistakably adapted from epic. There is, in the first proposition, the familiar dyad of *gods and men*; as when Homer calls Zeus, already noted above, πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (*Il.* 4.68) or, again, claims that he “lords over gods and men” (τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει, *Il.* 2.669). The second proposition recalls the way that epic characterizes the sort of knowledge which its gods uniquely possess and selectively share, in the forms of song and prophecy, with privileged mortals. Thus, the Muses of the *Theogony* are themselves able to “speak the things that are, the things that will be, and the things that were before” (εἴρουσαι τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, 38); and, by breathing their divine voice into Hesiod, enable him, likewise, to “make famous the things that will be and the things that were before” (κλείοιμι τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, 32). So too with the seer Calchas in *Iliad* 1: “because of the mantic art which Phoebus Apollo granted him” (ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τὴν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, 72), he is one among mortals “who knows the things that are, the things that will be, and the things that were before” (ὅς ἤδη τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, 70).⁸⁰

⁷⁸ For the phrase, see Vlastos 2005: xxiv.

⁷⁹ For the phrase, see Vlastos 2005: 10.

⁸⁰ Heraclitus has changed the participles to finite verb forms and, obviously, changed the order, with past time coming first in the aphorism, followed by present and then future. I think it is self-evident that a contemporary Greek would have heard the echo despite these changes, which are all necessary for the surprise twist, discussed below, where the verb forms wind up being predicative, as they never are in epic.

To what end has Heraclitus adapted these traditional phrases? It is with the recognition that his claims are epic adaptations that we may, at last, identify the apparatus in question. But this identification will come at the cost of having to reconstrue all that we have read so far. *This* κόσμος must be the world-constituting apparatus of Zeus, as it was conceived by the epic tradition; and what Heraclitus goes on to say about it—that it was never put together, that it has always existed, and so on—should not be taken as further description of this κόσμος, but as critique cast cleverly in the language of epic; critique of this tradition’s conceptualization of reality on the model of an apparatus, which must be *made* and so have some *beginning*.

But the aphorism does not end here; we transition from the critical mode with the next two words, *fire always-living*, which cause us, once again, to return to and reconstrue what we have just read. On our first reading of the second proposition, we had every reason to interpret the *was-is-will be* formula *existentially* rather than *predicatively*: Heraclitus has taken the formula from epic, and there it *always* functions in just this way: Calchas, in the example above, knows the things that were, are, and will be, not the things that were, are, and will be *x* or *y* or *z*. And yet, confronted now with this *fire always-living*, the reader has no choice but to construe the phrase as the surprise predicate of this verb series; such that the final element of the critique is immediately repurposed as the first element of the positive statement to follow.⁸¹ This paradoxical apparatus, which was never made yet always existed, turns out to have always been an eternal, living fire. What exists, then, is not a cast of mortal and immortal persons who, by their regular cooperation in the manner of a machine, constitute the world as we know it. What exists fundamentally is this single living being; this fire—to conclude the aphorism—which produces from itself, by its own measured kindling and quenching, the regular and dynamic reality of our experience. And so, we end up roughly where the historians of philosophy would like us to be. Heraclitus is indeed talking about his own conception of reality; but he has not boldly heralded this new vision in the aphorism’s first words—a move which would, in any case, be most uncharacteristic.

To put the cap on this argument and the chapter: the early philosophers did not ‘discover’ the κόσμος, and no one of them first gave it this name; this is their common cultural inheritance, the long-established epic conception of reality as a structured whole of parts; it is what they are all tinkering with in the work of articulating their own, novel accounts of reality.

⁸¹ Kirk 1970: 310 argues against the predicative reading that “it would be surprising if Heraclitus altered the application of such a solemn, almost hieratic phrase by abandoning its existential sense, true though it is that distinctions between different usages of ‘to be’ were not yet properly recognized.” Just so: it *is* surprising that Heraclitus would abandon the usual sense of the phrase. To avoid taking *fire* as the inevitable predicate of these verbs, Kirk inserts (as others do, though apparently not always for the same reason) a semicolon between ἔσται and πῦρ, and takes the latter to stand in a subtler apposition to τόνδε κόσμον.

CONCLUSION

The Κόσμος of Song

I expect that readers who have made it this far will have many questions, possibly also doubts, about what I am calling the epic discourse of κόσμος. You will want to know, for example, whether and how the other major moral and political terms of the poetry are supposed to fit into the discourse, and perhaps particularly those on the negative side of the split, by which I mean words like ὕβρις, νέμεσις, and ἀτασθαλίη; about these I have said next to nothing. And you might also wonder, given my tendency, to the extent that I am able, to explain Homer through Homer, whether and to what extent this discourse and its world concept are to be found, in one form or another, in the lyric and elegiac poetry of the later archaic period, before the major transformations it undergoes with the philosophers of the classical period.

These, alas, while of great importance, are a pair of issues too big to take up in a conclusion; let me say this much then as a stopgap. On the first question, that of the remainder of Homer's moral and political language, yes, I take it that each of these words, like the other evaluative words in Homer, is wrapped up in the discourse: they are used here always with reference to particulars, not to any ideal or abstract principles; and what is particular in the world, this κόσμος that Zeus has made, is nothing more than the specific roles which he means for each of us to play in it. It is from these *political* and *instrumental* roles, in other words, that value and normativity derive.¹ As for the second issue, that of the relationship of the discourse to later lyric and elegiac poetry, suffice it to say here that these poetic forms, which are likely as ancient if not in fact older than epic, all participate in the discourse, but with an important twist: in the move from epic, being a fundamentally mimetic sort of poetry which purports to show a world of the distant past, to a kind of poetry that is inherently occasional, that is to say, tethered in its subject and relevance to the immediate (if sometimes imagined) context of its performance, we see clearly that the discourse of κόσμος is not something unique to the mythic world of epic diegesis, but a very real conception of the world at work in a historical past, where its function is importantly no less political.

Having said this much, I would like to table the issues of *kosmic* vice and the role of the discourse in the other branches of ποίησις ἢ κατὰ μουσικήν. I hope to have the opportunity to give them proper treatment in a later study. In any case, there is another and more urgent matter that needs discussing now. It is the issue of my subtitle, which reads *Political and Aesthetic Value in*

¹ The passage in which we can see this most clearly is *Odyssey* 1.28-43, where ἀτασθαλίη is a matter of willfully disobeying a command of the gods, and so bringing on oneself pains that are ὑπὲρ μόνον, that is, beyond the good and bad which the gods had planned for an individual from the start: the gods send Hermes down to Aegisthus to order him not to murder Agamemnon nor woo his wife, even telling him that if he does, he will accordingly pay the price of death at the hands of Orestes, and yet he does these things anyway; cf. *Od.* 3.263-72. This passage is one on the basis of which a number of commentators, misconstruing what Zeus says and reading into it a theodicy, draw a major distinction between the moral and theological worlds of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Lloyd-Jones 1983: 28, for instance, puts it thus: "This speech of Zeus implies a belief radically different from that found in the *Iliad*. There the god puts evil ideas, no less than good ideas, into men's minds; that is how men's *moira*, the portion assigned them by the gods, comes to be fulfilled. When the god wishes to destroy a man he sends Ate to take away his wits. But now Zeus denies that the gods put evil ideas into the minds of men, and even claims that they warn men against the evil ideas they themselves have thought of." But Zeus says nothing of the sort here: he is not denying that he is responsible for bad things (what of the suitors and all that Odysseus endures?), but saying rather that mortals suffer these in greater number than planned when they resist or act in defiance of his plan. For other statements of the theodicean view, see Jaeger: 1966: 83-84, Fränkel 1973: 85-93, and Kullmann 1985: 5-6. Against this view, see Allan 2006.

Early Greek Epic. While I have gone on now at great length about the special nature of political value in epic, arguing that political matters, by virtue of the discourse, cannot really be distinguished from cosmic matters, I nevertheless have not, except in the introduction and in scattered moments thereafter, spoken to the nature of aesthetic value according to epic. This is not an oversight, and it is not, of course, because there is nothing much to say on the subject. It is just that the value of the sort of thing which we would identify and evaluate as an aesthetic object, a thing like an epic song, as the case happens to be, has its basic value in epic, like every other assemblage of persons and things, according to whether it performs the particular function it has as a nested κόσμος in the larger politico-cosmic machine. I want to conclude by arguing this point directly; it will mean taking a look at the two passages from epic, both of them from the *Odyssey*, in which we hear the most about the nature and function of epic song.

The first of them we have already encountered and partially explained above; it happens to be the third and final case in which the word κόσμος functions in a nominal way. We are in the eighth book and the context, you will recall, is this: Odysseus is an as yet anonymous guest in the court of Alcinous, the Phaeacian king; the court bard Demodocus, as part of the entertainment being put on, has earlier sung excellently about an episode from the Trojan war; and now our hero speaks up to praise that performance, promising yet more and wider praise, if he should go on and sing another song, this time about the final episode of the war:

Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δὴ σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἀπάντων·
 ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων·
 λήην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἴτον αἰεΐεις,
 ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί, (490)
 ὧς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεῶν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον
 δουρατέου, τὸν Ἐπειὸς ἐποίησεν σὺν Ἀθήνῃ,
 ὃν ποτ' ἐς ἀκρόπολιν δόλον ἤγαγε δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
 ἀνδρῶν ἐμπλήσας, οἳ Ἴλιον ἐξαλάπαξαν. (495)
 αἶ κεν δὴ μοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν καταλέξῃς,
 αὐτίκα καὶ πᾶσιν μυθήσομαι ἀνθρώποισιν,
 ὧς ἄρα τοι πρόφρων θεὸς ὅπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδήν.

Demodocus, I praise you well beyond all mortals; it must have been the Muse, the child of Zeus, that taught you, or else it was Apollo; for exceedingly according to *kosmos* do you sing the doom of the Achaeans, all that the Achaeans did and suffered and all that they toiled at, as though you yourself had been present or heard it from another who was. But come on: change the theme and sing the *kosmos* of the wooden horse, the one which Epeios made with the help of Athena, which divine Odysseus once led as a trick up to the acropolis, having filled it with the men who sacked Troy. If indeed you catalogue for me these events according to your portion [of thread], straightaway I shall declare to all men how willingly the god bestowed divine song upon you.

We have already seen what it means for Demodocus to sing a song κατὰ κόσμον (489) and κατὰ μοῖραν. He is a henchman of the Muses: they have taught him a divine craft and given him an

honored job within his community, the members of which he accordingly serves as a δημοεργός.² When he does his job right, singing the songs he should in the way that he should, he conducts himself according to the κόσμος of Zeus and his own role within it. Our focus now is the κόσμος of the wooden horse (492-93), about which the first and fundamental question is this: does our noun work verb-internally, designating the song that is *about* the horse, or is it rather external to the verb, so that the physical structure of the Trojan Horse is in some sense a κόσμος?

You will find defenders of both readings, and a number who claim it works in both ways at once. Count me among this last group, but only to this extent, for the usual semantics of *order* and *ornament* fails to make satisfying sense of *either* construal. If we were to go with the song option, it is only by the boldest of metaphors that *order* could work: Odysseus would have to mean that the requested song, because of the structure he wants it to exhibit, is order incarnate. And so we have to go with some shade of the *ornament* meaning, which is just plain puzzling: how exactly is a song like this, having the subject we know it will have, supposed to be something ornamental? Is it literally or metaphorically so? And who or what should we think it ornaments? But if, on the other hand, we decide to go the other way, and so take κόσμον externally with the wooden horse, then we have to accept either that the request, against every indication, is for a song about the structure and physical dimensions of the horse, its *order*, or else that Odysseus, the very person who devised and deployed this fatal artifact, nevertheless regards it as being principally an ornament.³

How do I claim to do better? Half of my answer I have already given back in the second chapter. To repeat myself here: the κόσμος that *is* the wooden horse is an immense *machine* of war, an ingenious and crafty *device* from the man of many such contrivances (πολυμήχανος, πολύμητις, etc.), by the deceitful use of which he manages to harness the strength of the Trojans in the service of breaching their own city wall: this is how Odysseus *leads* the horse up to the heights of the city (*Od.* 8.494), despite it being the Trojans themselves who *drag* it there (504). I take it that this much will not be too controversial.⁴ After all, we are talking about *the* engineering

² The singer shares this title with seers, doctors, heralds, and carpenters, that is, specialists or technicians of one form or another who work closely under a god. For the list, see *Od.* 17.383-85 and 19.135 with the comments of Finley 1957: 156 n. 4.

³ The best you can do is say that he is speaking ironically, that is, from the unknowing perspective of the Trojans who take the horse and deposit it as a gift to Athena. This seems to me an unlikely way of speaking, given the state of Odysseus in this scene, his reaction to the first song of Demodocus, and the reaction he will momentarily have to this third one.

⁴ There are a number of scholars, going back to antiquity, who have nevertheless sensed some confusion in Homer's account, and there have been quite a few different explanations of what the horse *really* was. Servius, commenting on Virgil's treatment of it, records a number of the ancient theories: that it was a fairly conventional *machinamentum bellicum* named, like the *aries* and *testudo*, after an animal; that it was a gate with a horse painted on it, the one which the traitor Antenor opened for the Greeks; that a horse had been painted on the doors of the homes of Trojans who had defected and were to be spared by the Greeks; that Troy was defeated in a cavalry battle; that the Greeks hid behind and then attacked from a mountain called Hippius; or, finally, that the horse was just as Virgil narrates (*In Verg. Aen. ad* 2.15). Servius, who opts for the siege engine, citing Hyginus and Tubero, finds himself in the good company also of Pliny (*NH* 7.202) and Pausanias (1.23.8). This view has found its share of modern defenders as well, for instance Anderson 1970, who claims that the horse, while inspired by the siege engines of the Near East, has been adapted to the Greek tradition in such a way that it no longer retains its original function. But there are other and still more creative theories on offer today. See, for instance, Knight 1933, who claims that the horse did not originally sneak a band of soliders into Troy, being instead just an offering which, by virtue of its massive size, required the Trojans to destroy a section of their city wall to haul it in, thereby allegedly dispelling a defensive magic that had protected the city; or Jones 1970, who argues that the horse was not at first even of a large size, but rather a gift which Odysseus was able to wheel up to the gates of Troy on his own, whereupon he managed to talk his way inside; or even Burkert

marvel of Greek myth, the thing that Virgil, in his own account of its use, will three times call *machina*; and the thing which Arctinus, in his lost *Iliou Persis*, even represented with mechanical parts: one report says that his horse was a hundred feet long, fifty feet wide, and had “a tail and knees that were mobile” (*cuius causam et genua mobilia*), while another report, messing around with the dimensions a bit, puts the length at a hundred and twenty feet, the width at thirty feet, and says that “its tail, knees, and eyes could move” (*cuius cauda genua oculi moverentur*).⁵

It is the other half of my answer that is likely to be the more controversial. How is it that songs come to be viewed as complex instruments? What function do they perform? How do they perform it? For whom?⁶ Pindar appears to have laid out the answers to these questions in the once famous but now fragmentary *First Hymn*.⁷ The part we are concerned with is preserved in paraphrases: not long after Zeus had finished *kosmifying* everything (τὸ πᾶν ἄρτι κοσμήσαντα), as Choricus puts it, the supreme god decides to get married (it is unclear to whom) and invites to the ceremony all the gods and goddesses of good standing in his regime. And at one point in the event he asks the other gods, now his honored subjects, whether they are lacking anything under his rule. They answer yes and no: everyone is evidently happy with the part they have in the new world, but they request of Zeus that he get for himself some gods who will, in the words of Aristides, “*kosmify* in words and music all those great works and the entire arrangement of his” (τὰ μέγала ταῦτ’ ἔργα καὶ πᾶσάν γε τὴν ἐκείνου κατασκευὴν κοσμήσουσι λόγοις καὶ μουσικῇ).⁸ In other

1983: 158-61, who sees in the story of the Trojan Horse the garbled image of a horse sacrifice, linking it up to the Equus October ritual practiced by the Romans. For further theories, see Austin 1959: 23 and 1964: 34-35 *ad* 15. For visual representations of the Trojan Horse, see Sparkes 1971.

⁵ Virgil first has Laocoon claim, among several options which strike in different ways at the truth, that the horse “has been fabricated as a machine against our walls” (*haec in nostros fabricata est machina muros*, *Aen.* 2.46); then has Priam ask, among several attempts to identify the nature of the horse, “what machine of war” (*quae machina belli*, 2.151) it is; and finally has Aeneas, who has narrated the entire story of the fall of Troy, describe how “the fatal machine climbed the walls [of Troy], pregnant with arms” (*scandit fatalis machina muros / feta armis*, 2.37-38). The first report about the horse of Arctinus comes from the *Aeneid* scholia *ad* 2.15, the second from Servius, *In Verg. Aen. ad* 2.150.

⁶ It is worth observing in support of the claim, even before answering these questions, that we find other terms of instrumental assembly used in relation to epic song, though only once in Homer: when Odysseus and his crew sail within hearing distance of the Sirens, these singers “started rigging out a sweet song” (λιγυρήν δ’ ἔντυνον αἰοιδήν, *Od.* 12. 183), the tool by which they seek to enchant the sailors and draw them over to their island. But see also *Hom. Aphr.* 6.20 (ἐμὴν δ’ ἔντυνον αἰοιδήν), *Hom. Apol.* 164 (οὕτω σφιν καλῆ συνάρηρεν αἰοιδή), and especially *Hom. Dion.* 7.59 (γλυκερὴν κοσμήσαι αἰοιδην). See n. 8 below for Pindar’s use of κόσμος language in relation to song, but add to these those cases in which he uses (ἐν)αρμόζω: *I.* 1.15-16 (ἐθέλω / ἢ Καστορεῖῳ ἢ Ἰολάοι’ ἐναρμόζει νιν ὕμνῳ), *O.* 3.4-6 (Μοῖσα δ’ οὕτω ποι παρέστα μοι νεοσίγαλον εὐρόντι τρόπον / Δωρίῳ φωνᾶν ἐναρμόζει πεδίλῳ / ἀγλαόκομον), *P.* 3.113-14 (ἐξ ἐπέων κελαδεννῶν, τέκτονες οἷα σοφοί / ἄρμωσαν); and also those in which he uses ζεύγνυμι: *I.* 1.6-7 (ἀμφοτερᾶν τοι χαρίτων σὺν θεοῖς ζεύξω τέλος), 7.18-19 (ὄ τι μὴ σοφίας ἄωτον ἄκρον / κλυταῖς ἐπέων ῥοαῖσιν ἐξίκτηται ζυγόν), *N.* 1.7 (ἔργμασιν νικαφόροις ἐγκόμιον ζεύξαι μέλος), *P.* 10.64-65 (ὅσπερ ἐμὸν ποιπνύων χάριν / τόδ’ ἔξευξεν ἄρμα Πιερίδων τετράορον; cf. *O.* 6.22). For other lyric and elegiac cases of κόσμος used with reference to song, see Solon, fr. 1.2 (West), Theognis 241-43 (West), Simonides 11.23 (West) and 531.9 (PMG), and Corinna 655.10-13 (PMG). This use of κόσμος can also be found among the Presocratics, who are hearkening back to Homer; thus, Democritus will say that Ὀμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτῆνατο παντοίων (fr. B 21), and Parmenides will call the *doxa* portion of his poem the κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν (fr. B 8.52).

⁷ The song has traditionally been regarded as a hymn to Zeus, this being what Snell 1953: 71-89, who reconstructed it, took it to be, but I find convincing the argument of D’Alessio 2009 that it is a hymn to Apollo.

⁸ The bit of Choricus comes from *Or.* 13.1, that of Aristides from *Or.* 2.142. It remains a big question to what extent our paraphrasers have followed Pindar’s own language. I think it likely, but of course cannot prove, that the verb in Aristides is genuinely Pindaric, as the poet uses κόσμος language in relation to song with some regularity (e.g., *N.* 3.31-32, 6.45-46, *O.* 11.13-14, and fr. 194; cf. *I.* 6.69, *N.* 2.8), but the comparatively prosaic κατασκευή strikes me as a gloss. On the one hand, Pindar never uses the compound in what survives of his poetry, and only once uses σκευή

words: the κόσμος that Zeus has made is perfect in the eyes of all the gods who have privileged roles in it, save for the single fact that there is no part of this instrument whose part it is to celebrate its own perfection and all that Zeus accomplishes with it. The request is an appealing one, and Zeus sets about engendering the gods who will perform this work, gods who turn out to be none other than the Muses, whose songs accordingly serve a particular *function* in the world: they are the nested κόσμοι by which the larger κόσμος celebrates itself, being the commemorative images of its past operations. The song works, and the singer who sings it succeeds at his work, to the extent that the image produced is a faithful one, is an image that puts all the players, big and small alike, in their respective places, and shows them performing each their respective parts in the execution of Zeus’s βουλή, whatever this happens to be in the moment.

I hope to have already shown, by way of the readings that feature in this dissertation, just how true this claim is. In the ordeal over Hector and the arms of Achilles, in the treachery of Pandarus, and in all those passages in which the poet uses one or another of the *portion* phrases, what we are witnessing is the action of characters executing—in different branches, at different ranks, sometimes unwittingly, sometimes unwillingly, and sometimes after considerable pushback—their several and often tragic parts within the κόσμος of Zeus. Every word in every line of this poetry coheres in order to serve this memorial function, and I take it that the poet, by the double referent of κόσμος in the passage above, is drawing our attention to this fact. There is, in other words, a kind of isomorphism posited here between the κόσμος that was the wooden horse, being the nested machine by which Zeus brings an end to the Trojan war, and the κόσμος of song that takes this operation of the larger κόσμος as its subject.⁹ The fall of Troy was a job that Zeus delegated to Athena, she decided on the wooden horse, had Epeios make it, and then got Odysseus, leading a band of men inside it, to work the contraption; these are the basic facts of the *kosmic* operation, and the poet is bound by his own role in the κόσμος to represent them in just this way; his doing so is what makes the song a good one.

To confirm all of this, I would like now to turn to the second of my song passages, which comes from the first book of the *Odyssey*. The year has arrived “in which the gods have spun it that Odysseus will have his homeward return” (τῷ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἴκόνδε νέεσθαι, 1.17)—this being the *kosmic* operation that our poem recounts—and it has fallen on Hermes and Athena to get the ball rolling. The former is sent off to the island of Ogygia, where he will see to it that the nymph Calypso releases Odysseus, while the latter pays a visit to Telemachus back on Ithaca, her purpose being to give the young man some direction and encouragement, so that he will stand up to the suitors and go looking abroad for news about his missing father. She appears to him in the disguise of an old friend of his father, lets him know what he ought to do, gives him the strength and courage he will need to do it, and then morphs into a bird and flies off, making it clear to him

(*P.* 2.80), where it refers appropriately enough to gear or tackle. On the other hand, κατασκευή is a regular gloss for κόσμος: it appears, for instance, as one of three glosses (the other two being οικονομία and ὑπόθεσις) for ἵππου κόσμον in a scholion to *Od.* 8.492, the very instance of κόσμος we started out from above; see also Apollod., *Epit.* 5.14. There is a further issue: the Homeric tendency is to make the things *kosmified* (in this case, the words and music) the accusative object of the verb, but it seems very much like Pindar to switch the accusative and dative around; for something similar, see *Pa.* 9.39-40 (fr. 52k) with the commentary of Rutherford 2001: 196 n. 21.

⁹ There is nothing new in the claim that the traditional subject of epic song is the execution of a plan of Zeus; for different statements of the view, see, *inter alia*, Schadewaldt 1965: 48, Nagy 1979: 81 (§25n2) and 2010: 121-25, Murnaghan 1995 and 1997, Marks 2001 and 2008, Allan 2008, and Elmer 2013: 155. What I take to be novel is the relationship I am positing between the technology by which Zeus accomplishes his plans, that is, the larger κόσμος that is his world, and the κόσμοι of song, being a nested part of it, by which the particulars of its operation are recorded and celebrated.

that the friendly advice he has gotten is really divine directive. Telemachus is thereupon given, in the passage that concerns us now, an initial and fairly safe opportunity to test his hand at claiming some authority.

The suitors have all been present in the hall for the duration of the interview with Athena, but they have been preoccupied with the singing of Phemius, the local bard of the island, who has—with some irony, given what we know is now happening—taken as his subject “the return of the Achaeans, the sad one from Troy which Athena inflicted” (Ἀχαιῶν νόστον... / λυγρόν, ὄν ἐκ Τροίης ἐπετείλατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, 326-27). Telemachus now joins them, and at about the same time his mother, Penelope, comes down from her room to lodge a complaint. She can hear the song from up there and its subject matter is causing her a great deal of distress; she would like for Phemius to sing something else (337-44):

Φήμιε, πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα βροτῶν θελκτήρια οἶδας
 ἔργ’ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τά τε κλείουσιν ἀοιδοί·
 τῶν ἐν γέ σφιν ἄειδε παρήμενος, οἱ δὲ σιωπῇ
 οἶνον πινόντων· ταύτης δ’ ἀποπαύε’ ἀοιδῆς (340)
 λυγρῆς, ἣ τέ μοι αἰὲν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον κῆρ
 τείρει, ἐπεὶ με μάλιστα καθίκετο πένθος ἄλαστον.
 τοίην γὰρ κεφαλὴν ποθέω μεμνημένη αἰεὶ
 ἀνδρός, τοῦ κλέος εὐρὺ καθ’ Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος.

Phemius, seeing as how you know many other charms for mortals, those deeds of men and gods, the things singers make famous, sing one of these at least for the men you sit among, and let them in silence go on drinking their wine, but give up this song, a sad one which wears out the dear heart in my chest, since an unforgettable grief seizes me most of all. For I long for the dear head of that man, being reminded always of him, whose fame is wide throughout Greece and Argos at the center of it.

To this Telemachus immediately responds:

μητέρα ἐμή, τί τ’ ἄρα φθονέεις ἐρίηρον ἀοιδὸν
 τέρπειν ὄπη οἱ νόος ὄρνυται; οὐ νύ τ’ ἀοιδοὶ
 αἴτιοι, ἀλλὰ ποθὶ Ζεὺς αἴτιος, ὅς τε δίδωσιν
 ἀνδράσιν ἀλφειστῆσιν ὅπως ἐθέλησιν ἐκάστω.
 τούτῳ δ’ οὐ νέμεσις Δαναῶν κακὸν οἶτον ἀείδειν· (350)
 τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ’ ἄνθρωποι,
 ἣ τις αἰόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.
 σοὶ δ’ ἐπιτολμάτω κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀκούειν·
 οὐ γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς οἷος ἀπάλεσε νόστιμον ἦμαρ
 ἐν Τροίῃ, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι φῶτες ὄλοντο. (355)
 ἀλλ’ εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ’ αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε,
 ἰστόν τ’ ἠλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε
 ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· μῦθος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
 πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

My mother, why then do you begrudge the obliging singer to delight in whatever way his mind is stirred? You know it is not the singers who are responsible, but Zeus is somehow responsible, who gives to men who live by grain just as he likes to each. And there is no resentment for the man to sing the bad fortune of the Danaans; for men applaud that song more, whichever one is the latest to circulate among the listeners. But let your heart and spirit endure to listen; for it was not Odysseus alone who lost his day of return at Troy, and many were the other men lost. But go up into the residence and tend to your own work, the loom and distaff, and command your servants to get to their work; but talk will be a concern for men, for all of them, but most of all for me; for the power is mine in the house.

The trouble with what Penelope says—the thing that opens her up to the easy rebuke of her son—is the suggestion that songs work primarily as charms for mortals, that their basic function is the enchantment of the mortals who listen to them. The song that Phemius was singing was working its magic on the rowdy suitors—they were sitting quietly, captivated by the song—but it was not having the same effect on her. Being herself too close to the events that gave the song its sorry subject, it has no power to enchant her, but only to cause her grief by reminding her of the husband she has lost.¹⁰ This being the case, and this being her home, she decides to interrupt the singer’s performance and orders him to sing on another subject, one that will charm the others no less, but save her own heart some torment.

In her pain, in other words, she has ignored the fact that songs do not exist just to charm their mortal listeners, though of course this is something that they usually do, provided there is enough distance from the events narrated.¹¹ Songs exist because singers do, singers exist because the Muses do, and the Muses exist because, as we have just seen, Zeus desired an organ of his world that would celebrate the structure and workings of it.¹² This is what singers are doing when they make famous the deeds of gods and men (338), which are not just any old deeds, but the ones they perform under Zeus, by his will; epic is the record and the explanation of them. The newest song, then, the one that audiences applaud more than the older ones (351-53), is not so much the latest hit as it is the latest revelation, a product that delivers the news of the world, putting all that we do and suffer under the yoke of Zeus in its larger *kosmic* context.

¹⁰ Bakker 2002: 142 suggests that what upsets Penelope is the fact that the song “departs from ascertained fact and established poetic tradition,” but I can see no grounds for this interpretation.

¹¹ This aspect of song, its ability to please and charm, is nowhere more clearly expressed than in the so-called Hymn to the Muses at the beginning of Hesiod’s *Theogony* (1-115). There we learn that their mother, Mnemosyne, whose name means *memory*, gave birth to them, somewhat paradoxically, to be “a forgetfulness of bad things and a break from cares” (λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν ἄπανμά τε μερμηράων, 55; cf. 98-103), but even here it is principally the great mind of their father Zeus which they work to please (36-37), beginning and ending their song with him (47-49), and singing between these bookends “the things that are, will be, and were before” (38), which does not mean that they sing in a generic way about everything, but rather that they sing the long road that has led up to the establishment of their father’s regime, the way things are now because of it, and the way they will continue to be under him. What is more, providing pleasure is only part of “the holy gift of the Muses to mortals” (Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν, 93); they as a group and Kalliope in particular, being the greatest of them, attend upon Zeus-nourished mortal kings, endowing them with the charisma that allows them to rule over others without force, using instead only mild words (75-92). See also *Od.* 9.1-11, where Odysseus, just before he reveals his identity to the court of Alcinous and begins to relate his own story in the expert manner of a singer (as Alcinous puts it at *Od.* 11.368; cf. *Od.* 21.401-11), speaks at length to the pleasure of attending to song in the context of a feast. On the need for, and the dynamics of, aesthetic distance, see Peponi 2012: 33-69. On the power of epic song to enchant, see Walsh 1984: 3-36.

¹² Or, as Schadewaldt 1965: 82 puts it, “der Dichter is nur das Organ des Weltgeschehens, das des Gottes ist.”

The personal displeasure of Penelope is accordingly no grounds for cutting off a “divine singer” (θεῖον αἰοιδόν, 336) in the middle of his “god-spoken song” (θέσπιν αἰοιδήν, 328).¹³ The man has been obligingly performing his portion-bound job in the world, and there can be no resentment (νέμεσις, 350) in this: it was Zeus behind the sad return of the Achaeans, and it is the singer’s brief to sing about it. It is his own mother, rather, as Telemachus will go on to say, who is flirting here with scandal.¹⁴ She has abandoned in this moment her own work upstairs, leaving her loom and the women she commands unattended, all in order to come down among the men and tell a fellow mechanical how he ought to be performing his part. She, as the woman of a great household, would do well to attend to her own and privileged role in the κόσμος, leaving the singing to Phemius and the ruling of the house to Telemachus, who is now—by the work of Athena, executing the will of Zeus—well on his way to claiming this authority: a stunned Penelope returns immediately to her quarters, and her son turns his attention to the other and greater disturbance in his home, the suitors who have infested it for years.

To sum up this discussion and conclude: there is no distinctively aesthetic system of values in epic, no autonomous and universal principles of beauty. Songs and the singers who sing them, mortal and immortal alike, have merit to the extent that they do the work they are obliged to do within the larger workings of Zeus’s κόσμος, work which, we have now seen, happens to be celebratory in nature: these singers *kosmify* discrete words and sounds into mimetic instruments of praise, instruments that commemorate by representing in miraculous detail the past operations of the κόσμος, thereby revealing to us mortals how and why things happen in the way that they do, and at the same time providing models for our own conduct. The singer is but another part of the κόσμος, an important and honored part, it is true, but no less mechanical for this; he is a technician and the products of his technique, the nested κόσμοι he assembles, are beautiful to the extent that they serve him in the performance of his work.¹⁵

¹³ It is worth observing that Phemius, as the poet tells us a little before this scene, sings for the suitors “by force” (ἀνάγκη, *Od.* 1.154), being bound reluctantly to this work by the gods who have, till this point at least, allowed the suitors to have their way in the house of Odysseus. He will himself raise this point and stress his role as an agent of the gods during the massacre of Book 22, when he, with the help of Telemachus, successfully beseeches Odysseus to spare his life (330-80); the herald Medon is spared for similar reasons in the same passage, being another δημοεργός who works for a god. The singer in whose care Agamemnon leaves Clytemnestra when he sets off to war is not so fortunate (*Od.* 3.269-72); on which lines, see especially Scully 1981, who says much about the role of the singer in the Homeric world that is congenial to my own view, and also Pucci 1987: 228-35.

¹⁴ On the subject of νέμεσις and the closely related sense of αἰδώς, see Redfield 1975: 113-19.

¹⁵ Although it is admittedly not a song being talked about, note how Odysseus, in responding to the abusive speech of Euryalus (discussed above in the third chapter), will first remark that the young man has spoken in a way that is οὐ καλόν (*Od.* 8.166), and then a few lines later, meaning much the same thing, say that he has spoken οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (179).

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APPENDIX

A System of Metrically Diverse, Functionally Equivalent Phrases

We saw in the third chapter that Homer uses *κατὰ κόσμον* and the various *portion* phrases interchangeably. I want here to explain why, or at least one of the reasons why, the poet should reach for one phrase in one place and another in another. The short of it is that the phrases, because they are all metrically unique, provide the oral poet, with a variety of shapes to work with when he wants to speak, or have one of his characters speak, to the virtue or vice of conduct or speech. The problem and reason for the appendix is that this, the fact that the phrases form a single system, is far from obvious on the face of it, and may in fact appear to be obviously wrong: do not *κατὰ κόσμον* and *κατὰ μοῖραν*, for instance, being the two most frequent phrases in the system, nevertheless have the same metrical value (˘˘ - ˘)?

We can start to reconstruct the system by distinguishing this important pair. The *μοῖρα* phrase occurs thirty-five times between the two epics, always in one of the four following places in the line:

- (A) ἤρτύναντο δ' ἔρετμὰ τροποῖς' ἐν δερματίνοισι
πάντα **κατὰ μοῖραν**· παρὰ δ' ἰστία λευκὰ τάνυσσαν. (Od. 8.53-54)
- (B) ... τοῖ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπ' αὐτόφιν εἶατο σιγῇ
Ἄργεῖοι **κατὰ μοῖραν** ἀκούοντες βασιλῆος. (Il. 19.255-6)
- (C) αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ τῇ πάντα **κατὰ μοῖραν** κατέλεξα. (Od. 12.35)
- (D) ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα γέρον **κατὰ μοῖραν** ἔειπες. (Il. 8.146).

This makes *κατὰ μοῖραν* both more flexible and more frequent than *κατὰ κόσμον*, which we will see occurs just thirteen times and in two positions. The relative flexibility and frequency of the former phrase owes to the fact that it has two possible metrical values. Its first is the value we would expect the phrase to have, ˘˘ - ˘, but which we only find when it occurs in positions (B) and (D). The second value, found in positions (A) and (C), is a holdover from an earlier period in the language, when the phrase would have been either *κατὰ *σμοῖραν* or, after the assimilation of the word-initial sigma, *κατὰ *μμοῖραν*. Here the final syllable of *κατά* is made long by position such that the phrase's value is ˘ - - -.¹ There is also the difference in the final syllable of the phrase's two values. Both phrases *always* precede a word that begins with a short syllable, but *κατὰ *μμοῖραν* only ever precedes consonant-initial words that make the phrase's final syllable long by position in order to avoid the metrically impossible value ˘ - - ˘; *κατὰ μοῖραν*, by contrast, is always followed by a vowel-initial word so that its final syllable may be short and avoid the similarly impossible shape of ˘˘ - - before a short syllable. Here we have, then, two metrically diverse four-syllable phrases in one.

¹ The second value, in order to avoid having a sequence of syllables that is - ˘ -, must be followed by a noun beginning with a consonant, which makes the final syllable of *μοῖραν*, being short by nature, long by position.

Now, it is the first of *κατὰ μοῖραν*'s values (˘˘ - ˘) that would appear to be the same as that of *κατὰ κόσμον* (˘˘ - ˘) and thereby in breach of economy (the tendency of the oral poet to have just one way of saying the same thing under the same metrical conditions). The latter phrase, however, *never* occurs on its own. It is always preceded by a monosyllabic adverb that, with one exception, directly modifies it. In eight of the phrase's thirteen instances this adverb is οὐ; in four it is εὖ; and in the single instance in which the preceding adverb does not directly modify the phrase we find γάρ. This exceptional instance, which I considered above in the third chapter, occurs at *Odyssey* 8.489, and is readily explained as *ad-hoc* innovation. We have then in *κατὰ κόσμον* two polar phrases, οὐ and εὖ *κατὰ κόσμον*, whose shared metrical value (- ˘˘ - ˘) is always a syllable longer than *κατὰ μοῖραν*'s otherwise identical first value. The two positions in which we find the *κόσμος* phrases are the following:

- (E1) ἠνιόχῳ μὲν ἔπειτα ἐῶ ἐπέτελλεν ἕκαστος
ἵππους εὖ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἐρυκέμεν αὐθ' ἐπὶ τάφρῳ (Il. 12.84-5)
- (E2) τεύχεα δ' οὐ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων
εἴλεν ... (Il. 17.205-6)
- (F1) ἦ καὶ ἀναΐξας οἶν ἄργυρον ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς
σφάξ' ἔταροι δ' ἔδερον τε καὶ ἄμφεπον εὖ **κατὰ κόσμον** (Il. 24. 621-2)
- (F2) πάντως οὐκέτι νῶϊ διακρινέεσθαι οἴῳ
πρὶν χειρῶν γεύσασθαι, ἐπεὶ σὺ περ οὐ **κατὰ κόσμον**
αἰτίεις ... (Od. 20.180-2).

It is accordingly wrong to think of *κατὰ κόσμον* and *κατὰ μοῖραν* as *two* phrases. From a verse-technical perspective, they are four, three of them positive expressions and one of them negative. We get a clear sense of their complementary distribution by comparing the different conditions under which the poet uses them:

κατὰ *μοῖραν	κατὰ μοῖραν	εὖ / οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
A: ˘ ² - - ³ - C (7 times)	B: ˘˘ ³ - ˘ V (5 times)	E: ˘ ² - ˘˘ ³ - ˘ V (10 times)
C: ˘ ⁴ - - ⁵ - C (4 times)	D: ˘˘ ⁵ - ˘ V (19 times)	F: ˘ ⁵ - ˘˘ ⁶ - * (3 times)

The first thing to observe is that no two of the positive phrases have the same metrical shape or occupy exactly the same line position. What is more, each phrase has one position in the first half of the line (A, B, & E), and another in the second (C, D, & F). In its first-hemistich position, each phrase serves to fill out a unique line segment up to a line's major metrical boundary. Thus, both (B) and (E) serve under slightly different metrical contexts to complete the first hemistich of a line at the trochaic caesura of the third foot, and (A) does the same at the penthemimeral caesura. In their second-hemistich positions, we find that εὖ and οὐ *κατὰ κόσμον* conveniently fill the space between the bucolic diæresis and the end of a line, and that our two *κατὰ μοῖραν* phrases are each part of larger, formulaic phrases that entirely fill a unique hemistich: in position (C), *κατὰ*

*μοῖραν is invariably followed by κατέλεξα(ς), which formulaically fills the second hemistich after the trochaic caesura; and in position (D), we see that that, with a single innovative exception, ἔειπε(ς) follows κατὰ μοῖραν to fill the space of a line after the hepthimimeral caesura.²

Within our partially constituted system of phrases, positions (B) and (E) warrant still further consideration, as they confirm the distinction between the first value of κατὰ μοῖραν (~~ - ~) and the pair of phrases built up from the isomorphic κατὰ κόσμον. This is because the only difference here in the position and shape of the three phrases is the additional longum of (E) that extends back to the second-foot princeps and is always occupied by one of our two monosyllabic adverbs, εἶ or οὐ. The consequence of this is that κατὰ μοῖραν and κατὰ κόσμον would be metrically interchangeable here, and so in breach of economy, if οὐ and εἶ were not regarded by the poet as formulaic parts of κατὰ κόσμον. The distribution of the three phrases, even when positioned before the same caesura, is, however, entirely predictable. Whenever the line-initial material extends into the second-foot *princeps*, as Ἀργεῖοι does in the example of position (B) above, we find that the poet uses κατὰ μοῖραν to fill the line up to the trochaic caesura. If, however, the same caesura is sought, but the line-initial material only occupies the first foot, as ἵππους does in (E1) above, the poet will substitute εἶ κατὰ κόσμον for κατὰ μοῖραν in order to fill the extra half-foot. That we see neither εἶ κατὰ μοῖραν nor the bare κατὰ κόσμον, despite their being every bit as metrically possible here, confirms that εἶ formulaically precedes κατὰ κόσμον as a five-syllable variant of κατὰ μοῖραν.³

As for οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, we find that the phrase occurs in position (E) a total of seven times. By contrast, we *never* find οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν here; indeed, of the five instances of this phrase in position (B), not a single one is ever negated in any way. That οὐ preceding the same metrical space should invariably determine the selection of κατὰ κόσμον over κατὰ μοῖραν can mean only one thing: the poet regards the latter phrase as formulaically positive with a value of ~ - ~, the former as formulaically negative with a value of - ~ - ~.

It is, then, a straightforward matter of economy that we should find in Homer neither the bare κατὰ κόσμον, nor κατὰ μοῖραν formulaically preceded by either εἶ or οὐ. That these phrases *do* appear in early hexameter poetry other than the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* should only underscore the strict economy of the phrasal system as we find it in Homer. Thus, despite our poet's consistent practice, Hesiod shows us that it is perfectly possible to substitute εἶ κατὰ μοῖραν for εἶ κατὰ κόσμον in position (F) (765-7):

Ἥματα δ' ἐκ Διόθεν πεφυλαγμένος εἶ κατὰ μοῖραν (765)
 πεφραδέμεν δμώεσσι τριηκάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην
 ἔργα τ' ἐποπτεύειν ἠδ' ἀρμαλιῆν δατέασθαι.

² There is a single innovative exception at *Od.* 9.352, where we find after the adverbial phrase not ἔειπε(ς), but the isomorphic ἔρεξας.

³ I am not counting the single innovative instance of κατὰ κόσμον at *Od.* 8.489, which occurs in this position before the trochaic caesura and is, considered on its own, strictly isomorphic with κατὰ μοῖραν in position (B). In this case, the post-positive γάρ occupies the position that should be held by εἶ, and a different supporting adverb (λίην) fills the first. The poet has non-metrical reasons for sticking with κατὰ κόσμον here: Odysseus is using the phrase to praise the singing of Demodocus and will three lines later request that he sing the κόσμος of the Trojan Horse (492-93), stipulating further that he sing it κατὰ μοῖραν (496). On this passage, see my third chapter and the conclusion to this dissertation.

And this kind of substitution can also go the other way, as the second fragment of the *Little Iliad* demonstrates:

Αἴας μὲν γὰρ ἄειρε καὶ ἔκφερε δηϊοτήτος
 ἦρω Πηλεΐδην, οὐδ' ἤθελε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.
 τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν ἀντειπεῖν Ἀθηναῖς προνοίαι·
 πῶς ἐπεφωνήσω; πῶς οὐ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἔειπες;

Here *κατὰ κόσμον* appears in position (D) preceding *ἔειπε(ς)* just as *κατὰ μοῖραν* frequently and formulaically does in Homer; and does so *even* when the poet happens to position the negative pronoun *οὐ* before it: *εἰ πλεόνεσσι μάχοιτο· σὺ δ' οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες. (Od. 2.251).*⁴

But slight formulaic variation of this kind between compositions need not mean that one is more traditional in its language than another; what is important is that, for each composition, there be an economy of phrases for the expression of this idea, something that cannot be judged from works or fragments of works, like the two above, in which we find only a single instance of a phrase belonging to this system. The composer of the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, for instance, would appear to have a phrasal system that differs slightly from what we find in Homer but is nevertheless internally economical. He twice uses *εὖ / οὐ κατὰ κόσμον* just as we would expect, once in position (E) before the trochaic caesura and once in (F) after the bucolic caesura, but also once uses the bare *κατὰ κόσμον* in position (B) before the trochaic caesura, under which condition our poet invariably uses *κατὰ μοῖραν*:

εὐμόλπει μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχων λιγύφωνον ἑταίρην
 καλὰ καὶ εὖ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἐπιστάμενος ἀγορεύειν. (478-9)

Ἦ παῖ ὄς ἐν λίκνῳ κατάκειαι, μήνυέ μοι βοῦς
 θάπτον· ἐπεὶ τάχα νῶϊ διοισόμεθ' οὐ **κατὰ κόσμον**. (254-5)

τοὺς δὲ κατὰ πρέσβιν τε καὶ ὡς γεγάασιν ἕκαστος
 ἀθανάτους ἐγέραιρε θεοὺς Διὸς ἀγλαὸς υἱὸς
 πάντ' ἐνέπων **κατὰ κόσμον**, ἐπωλένιον κιθαρίζων. (431-3).

If, however, we consider the hexameter poetry of the Hellenistic period, its composers certainly took note of the phrases, but would seem not to have understood their verse-technical function as allomorphs. Thus, although Apollonius follows Homeric practice in positioning both *εὖ* and *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον* before the trochaic caesura in position (F):

Ἄλλα μὲν, ὅσσα τε νηὶ ἐφοπλίσσασθα ἔοικεν,
 πάντα μάλ' εὖ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἐπαρτέα κείται ἰοῦσιν,
 τῷ οὐκ ἂν δηναῖον ἐχοίμεθα τοῖο ἔκητι
 ναυτιλίας, ὅτε μοῦνον ἐπιπνεύσουσιν ἀῆται· (1.332-335)

⁴ This is the only instance of *κατὰ μοῖραν* that is directly preceded by *οὐ*, making the phrase isomorphic with *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον*, but this is not a place in the line where we would ever expect to find *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον*. The only position in which the two phrases overlap is before the trochaic caesura of the third foot, where the poet can reach for one or the other phrase depending on whether he needs something with four or five syllables. In other words, it would only be a problem for the system if we were to find *οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν* in *this* position.

ἦς ἐγὼ οὐ **κατὰ κόσμον** ἀναιδήτω ἰότητι
 πατρην τε κλέα τε μεγάρων αὐτούς τε τοκῆας
 νοσφισάμην. . . (4.360-362),

he also breaches economy by having both *κατὰ μοῖραν* and the bare *κατὰ κόσμον* appear before the same caesura in position (B):

ὡς φάτ' ἄριστῆες δὲ συνηβολίη κεχάροντο,
 καὶ σφεας ἀμφίεπον περιθαμβέες. αὐτὰρ Ἴησων
 ἐξαυτίς **κατὰ μοῖραν** ἀμείψατο τοῖσδ' ἐπέεσσιν· (2.1157-59)

εἶμι δ' ὑπότροπος αὖτις ἀνὰ πτόλιν, εὖτ' ἂν ἕκαστα
 ἐξεῖπω **κατὰ κόσμον**. ἀνακτορὴ δὲ μελέσθω
 σοί γ' αὐτῇ καὶ νῆσος. . . (1.838-40).

Having said this much, we might now take stock of the progress made. We started out from the appearance that *κατὰ κόσμον* and *κατὰ μοῖραν* were two phrases with a single metrical value. We have discovered that *κατὰ μοῖραν* refers indistinctly to two metrically distinct phrases; that *κατὰ κόσμον* encompasses only the shared part of two further phrases; and, finally, that all four of these phrases are in complementary distribution with one another. This can only be because the different phrases are allomorphs within a single phrasal system, the obvious purpose of which is to facilitate the poet's expression under a number of distinct metrical conditions. In *κατὰ μοῖραν*, *κατὰ *μμοῖραν*, and *εὖ κατὰ κόσμον*, we have our first three metrical variants for the positive expression of this idea; in *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον* we have our first phrase for its negative expression.

Our sustained focus up to this point on the phrases effaced by *κατὰ μοῖραν* and *κατὰ κόσμον* has resulted in a rather unbalanced picture of the larger phrasal system to which they belong. We may level out our reconstruction by now observing that *εὖ κατὰ κόσμον* is not the only positive phrase for which Homer has a metrically equivalent negative phrase; both values of *κατὰ μοῖραν* have them too. Be it noted first, however, that since *κατὰ *μμοῖραν* and *κατὰ μοῖραν* appear in positions (C) and (D), respectively, always as fixed parts of a larger formula, it is only (A) and (B), their respective first-hemistich positions, that they share with their isomorphic negatives. Paired with the positive *κατὰ *μμοῖραν* (~ - - -) in position (A) at the penthemimeral caesura, we find just once the negative *ὑπὲρ μοῖραν* (~ - - -):

ἠρτύναντο δ' ἔρετμὰ τροποῖσ' ἐν δερματίνοισι
 πάντα **κατὰ μοῖραν**· παρὰ δ' ἰστία λευκὰ τάνυσσαν. (Od. 8.53-4)

ἀλλ' ἀναχωρῆσαι ὅτε κεν συμβλήσεται αὐτῶ,
 μὴ καὶ **ὑπὲρ μοῖραν** δόμον Ἄϊδος εἰσαφίκηαι. (Il. 20.335-6).

Occupying position (B) with *κατὰ μοῖραν* (~ ~ - ~), we find two negative phrases that are, despite their isomorphy, appropriate to complementary circumstances; they are *παρὰ μοῖραν* and *ὑπὲρ αἴσαν*. The latter phrase is the commoner, occurring twice here before the trochaic caesura and twice at line-end as part of a full-line formula, whereas we find *παρὰ μοῖραν* just once, here in position (B). That the choice in this position of one negative phrase over the other is a matter of

prosodic calculation may be judged from a comparison of the respective conditions under which they occur here:

οὐ γάρ τις μ' **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν** ἀνήρ Ἄϊδι προΐαπει (Il. 6.487)

καὶ τότε δὴ ῥ' **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν** Ἀχαιοὶ φέρτεροι ἦσαν (Il. 16.780)

οὐδέ τί πω **παρὰ μοῖραν** ἔπος νηκερδὲς ἔειπες (Od. 14.509).

Both phrases begin with a pyrrhus (˘˘) and so must always follow a long syllable. But before **ὑπὲρ μοῖραν**, this syllable must never consist of an open long vowel: its resulting hiatus with **ὑπὲρ** would lead to the correption of our necessarily long syllable. In this situation, however, the poet has recourse to **παρὰ μοῖραν**, as *Od.* 14.509 attests. At the same time, **παρὰ μοῖραν** could not replace **ὑπὲρ μοῖραν** in either of its instances. For we find in both that **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν** is preceded by a monosyllabic word that is both short and open, such that our phrase causes its elision. This elision is prosodically critical to both lines: in *Il.* 6.487, it is the elided pronoun **με** before **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν** that renders **τις** long; and in *Il.* 16.780, the elided enclitic **ῥα** that blocks the correption of **δὴ** before **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν**. Were **παρὰ μοῖραν** substituted for **ὑπὲρ αἴσαν** in either of these lines, there would be no cause for the necessary elision of these monosyllables, and the result would be a line that is a syllable too long.

Our reconstruction now consists of one five-syllable shape and two four-syllable shapes, each of them with paired positive and negative expressions. To these we can add one further shape for which the poet has paired positive and negative expressions. The shape is a sequence of three long syllables, its positive forms **ἐν μοίρῃ** and **εὐκόσμως**, its negative **οὐ κόσμῳ**. We find **ἐν μοίρῃ** used twice, once at the beginning of the hexameter, and once positioned this side of the penthemimeral caesura.⁵ It is in the former position that we find our single instance of **οὐ κόσμῳ**:

ἐν μοίρῃ γὰρ πάντα δίκεο καὶ κατέλεξας (Il. 19.186)

νῦν δ' ὁ μὲν **ἐν μοίρῃ** πέφαιται, σὺ δὲ φεῖδες λαῶν
σῶν (Od. 22.54-55)

οὐ κόσμῳ παρὰ ναῦφιν ἐλευσόμεθ' αὐτὰ κέλευθα (Il. 12. 225).

The one Homeric instance of **εὐκόσμως** occurs just one step back from this line-initial position (**ὡς εὐκόσμως** στήσε· πάρος δ' οὐ πώ ποτ' ὀπώπει, *Od.* 21.123); but it may be that the adverb more often appeared at the start of the line, as it does on the one occasion that Hesiod uses it, in the *Works and Days*, where it serves conveniently as a consonant-final alternative to **ἐν μοίρῃ**: **εὐκόσμως** στολίσας νηὸς πτερὰ ποντοπόροιο (628).

The few shapes which remain of the system do not have paired, positive and negative expressions, but instead just one or the other. The first shape is ˘ - ˘ - ˘ and the phrase **ὑπὲρ μόρον**, positioned always in the space between the weak, third-foot caesura and the bucolic dieresis: **μῆ Δαναοὶ πέρσειαν ὑπὲρ μόρον** ἤματι κείνῳ (*Il.* 21.517). The only thing to note about this shape is that the poet, on the one occasion that he needs to accommodate after it a consonant-initial word,

⁵ Cf. *Il.* 15.195, where we find **καὶ κρατερός περ ἐὼν μενέτω** τριτάτη ἐνὶ μοίρῃ.

swaps out ὑπὲρ μόρον for ὑπέρμορα, treating the prepositional phrase as an adjective with adverbial force in the neuter accusative plural: Ἐνθά κεν Ἀργεῖοισιν ὑπέρμορα νόστος ἐτύχθη (*Il.* 2.155). The second of the shapes is √ - √, which is filled by κατ' αἴσαν and has two positions. In the first of these, the phrase terminates in a weak, third-foot caesura, appearing both times with ὑπὲρ αἴσαν in a line-long formula, the one by which Paris responds to the justified rebukes from his brother: Ἐκτορ ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἴσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἴσαν (*Il.* 3.59 and 6.333). In its second position, the phrase starts as the second short syllable in a first-foot dactyl, and is likewise again an element in a larger formulaic construction, this time a hemistich:

πάντα κατ' αἴσαν ἔειπες ἀγακλεὲς ὦ Μενέλαε (*Il.* 17.716)

ἠὲ κατ' αἴσαν ἔειπον ἐν ὑμῖν ἦε καὶ οὐκί (*Il.* 10.445).

The third and final of the unpaired shapes occurs just once and happens also to be the shortest in the system, consisting of two long syllables positioned at the start of the line and occupied by κόσμῳ, a so-called comitative dative:

... τοὶ δὲ καθίζον ἐπὶ κληῖσιν ἕκαστοι
κόσμῳ, πείσμα δ' ἔλυσαν ἀπὸ τρητοῦ λίθοιο (*Od.* 13.76-77).

This completes the phrasal system as it is known to me—there may be a few terms which I have missed, built up from other but related words, or other phrases that are not represented in our poems—and so the only work which remains is to provide a synoptic sense of the system. I would like to do this by way of two tables. The first of these lays out all of the different shapes and the corresponding phrases which the poet has in his toolbox:

Metrical Shapes	Positive Phrases	Negative Phrases
(- √ √ - √)	εὖ κατὰ κόσμον	οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
(√ - - -)	κατὰ *μοῖραν	ὑπὲρ μοῖραν
(√ - √ √)	X	ὑπὲρ μορον / ὑπέρμορα
(√ √ - √)	κατὰ μοῖραν	ὑπὲρ αἴσαν / παρὰ μοῖραν
(- - -)	ἐν μοίρῃ / εὐκόσμως	οὐ κόσμῳ
(√ - √)	κατ' αἴσαν	X
(- -)	κόσμῳ	X.

The second table charts out along the length of a hexameter, for both the positive phrases and the negative, the remarkable range of different positions in which they can appear:

Hexameter Positions	Positive Phrases
(1) - - (2)	κόσμῳ
(1) - - (2) -	ἐν μοίρῃ
- (2) - -	εὐκόσμως
√ (2) - √	κατ' αἴσαν
√ (2) - - (3) -	κατὰ μοῖραν
(2) - - (3) -	ἐν μοίρῃ

(2) - ~ (3) - ~
 ~ (3) - ~
 ~ (3) - ~
 ~ (4) - - (5) -
 ~ (5) - ~
 (5) - ~ (6) - *

εὖ κατὰ κόσμον
 κατὰ μοῖραν
 κατ' αἴσαν
 κατὰ μοῖραν
 κατὰ μοῖραν
 εὖ κατὰ κόσμον

Hexameter Positions

(1) - - (2) -
 ~ (2) - - (3) -
 (2) - ~ (3) - ~
 ~ (3) - ~
 ~ (4) - ~ (5)
 (5) - ~ (6) - *
 ~ (6) - *

Negative Phrases

οὐ κόσμῳ
 ὑπὲρ μοῖραν
 οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
 ὑπὲρ αἴσαν/ παρὰ μοῖραν
 ὑπὲρ μόρον/ ὑπέρμορα
 οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
 ὑπὲρ αἴσαν.