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The Social Value of Political Tolerance

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements  
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Chanita Intawan

Committee in charge:

Professor Stephen Nicholson, Chair

Professor Thomas Hansford

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2018

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2018

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## Abstract

Political tolerance, which is the willingness to extend civil liberties, is a core principle in a democracy. In the study of tolerance, scholars use some variation of the tolerance scale, which gives us individual and aggregated willingness to extend civil liberties, such as free speech to disliked groups. There are potential issues with the way tolerance is measured, particularly with regard to different social groups. Through a series of experimental studies using student and internet samples, I examine whether political tolerance is susceptible to social concerns. Given that the measure of tolerance may be susceptible to social concerns, estimates of political tolerance may not fully capture actual tolerance.

## Introduction

How committed are individuals to political tolerance? Political tolerance has been studied by many disciplines including political science, psychology, and sociology. It spans about sixty years beginning with Stouffer's important work, "Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties" in 1955. Over many decades, scholars have examined what proportion of citizens are tolerant, what groups citizens are tolerant of, what influences tolerance, and whether tolerance has changed over time. According to the General Social Survey (GSS) in 2016, a large percentage of respondents reported they would allow individuals such as communists and racists to make a speech. The average percentage that would allow speech across the group categories (anti-religionist, communist, homosexual, militarist, Muslim clergymen, racist) is 69%.<sup>1</sup> To answer the question of whether people are politically tolerant, scholars have based their conclusions on these types of questions. Perhaps there is more to these questions and the construct of political tolerance that has not been previously explored.

The question of whether people are committed to political tolerance is highly relevant, especially considering recent events in the United States. In August of 2017, a rally called "Unite the Right" in Charlottesville, Virginia generated great controversy. The rally resulted in violence between protestors and counter-protestors (Fausset and Feuer 2017). This event and others ignited debates on whether groups and individuals that hold certain beliefs should be allowed to publicly speak and organize. Individuals who are committed to political tolerance are willing to extend civil liberties, even to groups which promote ideas and beliefs that are considered widely detestable. Other individuals less committed to political tolerance believe that civil liberties should not be extended to groups that have disagreeable views. For instance, Mark Bray, a scholar with expertise on Antifa, the anti-fascist movement, stated, "The anti-fascist argument is, if you allow neo-Nazis the ability to organize, the ability to mobilize, they become normalized" (Bray 2017). Events such as these highlight issues of how committed people are to the ideals of democracy in situations where these ideals conflict with other values and beliefs.

In this dissertation, I explore how political tolerance is affected by social concerns. The most general question I address is how social value and social desirability affects tolerance and the expression of tolerance. I outline three broad questions about social desirability and its effect on tolerance. Each of these questions corresponds to studies in three empirical chapters.

- I. Are people managing impressions of their own tolerance? Are their statements being changed by the social value of the questions about tolerance towards groups?
- II. Are people tolerant or intolerant in their behavior? To what extent does people's behavior correspond to their own expressed tolerance?
- III. Can values be manipulated to change people's stated tolerance, their actual behavior, or both?

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<sup>1</sup> The breakdown is 79% for an anti-religionist, 69% for a communist, 89% for a homosexual, 72% for a militarist, 43% for an anti-American Muslim clergymen, and 60% for a racist.

In the first empirical chapter, I examine how impression management influences tolerance judgments. I also examine the differences between explicit and implicit attitudes and their relation to tolerance judgments. In the second chapter, I create and test a measure of tolerance behavior. In the final empirical chapter, I examine how priming different values influence tolerance judgments and behavior. The potential contribution of this work is an expanded understanding of the social context of tolerance, a new measure of tolerance behavior, information about the relationship between tolerance judgments and behavior, and whether tolerance judgments and behaviors can be influenced by priming different values.

### The Meaning and Measurement of Social Desirability

What is social desirability, and why should it matter for political tolerance? Social desirability is concern about presenting yourself in a socially acceptable way to others. “The concept of social desirability rests on the notions that there are social norms governing some behaviors and attitudes and that people may misrepresent themselves to appear to comply with these norms” (Kreuter, Presser, Tourangeau 2008, 848). I want to highlight the importance of *misrepresentation* in this definition. Social desirability specifically refers to the case where an individual has a true attitude or behavior that conflicts with social norms and are representing themselves in such a way to avoid negative judgment for their attitude or behavior. The tendency to conform to socially desirable norms can be thought of as a personality characteristic (Paulhus 2002) though this is still a matter of debate.

One of the manifestations of social desirability is social desirability bias, which is a bias in survey responses to appear more compliant to norms. Basically, social desirability bias<sup>2</sup> is the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed positively by others. Social desirability is usually measured with some type of scale. These scales measure individual differences in the tendency to answer questions in socially desirable ways. In psychology, these scales are the Edwards social desirability scale (Edwards 1957), Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe 1960), and Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting (Paulhus 1991). There are other related scales, such as the self-monitoring scale (Snyder 1974).

While the self-monitoring scale is commonly used in political science as a measure of social desirability, I argue the self-monitoring scale is better suited to measure self-presentation ability rather than social desirability. Self-monitoring refers to an individual’s concern about and ability to manage their self-presentation to others. Social desirability refers to an individual’s tendency to misrepresent themselves to appear to conform with social norms. These are related, but different constructs. Self-monitoring is the ability and motivation to present oneself in a certain manner, but there is no necessary relationship between that and misrepresentation. According to Snyder, the creator of the self-monitoring scale, “seeking social approval need not be accompanied by the ability to

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<sup>2</sup> The psychology literature sometimes uses the terms social desirability and social desirability bias interchangeably. “Social desirability” refers to the concept and “social desirability bias” refers to the survey response behavior.

control one's expressive behavior and self-presentations" (Snyder 1987, 25). For example, an individual who is low in self-monitoring may still misrepresent themselves to conform to social norms. For a comparison of the two measures (self-monitoring and Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting) as applied to political science, see Berinsky (2004).

Out of the scales mentioned, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting (BIDR) is the most suitable scale that is used to assess social desirability. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting (BIDR) has two subscales, which are impression management (IM) and self-deceptive enhancement (SDE). These subscales correspond to the underlying components of socially desirable responding. Self-deceptive enhancement is "where the respondent actually believes his or her positive self-reports" whereas in impression management "the respondent consciously dissembles" (Paulhus 1984, 599).

There are also other methods to examine social desirability. A common method is to examine the differences between explicit and implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes are conscious, self-reported evaluations, while implicit attitudes<sup>3</sup> are associations outside of conscious awareness (Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Explicit attitudes are measured with survey questions, and implicit attitudes are measured with implicit tasks. There are many implicit tasks, and one of the most common implicit measures is the Implicit Association Test, known as the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). Implicit measures generally involve some type of reaction time task to indirectly measure an individual's implicit attitude. These tasks, in contrast to self-reported survey items, are difficult to manipulate for social desirability purposes. Researchers typically measure both explicit and implicit attitudes and examine the correspondence between these attitudes. Explicit and implicit attitudes may have high or low correspondence. Using gender as an example, an individual may express positive, explicit attitudes towards women, but their implicit attitude may be negative. In this example, there is an incongruity between the implicit and explicit attitude. If an individual has a positive (negative) explicit attitude towards women and a positive (negative) implicit attitude, then there is congruency between the explicit and implicit attitude. Implicit attitudes have been shown to predict other attitudes and behavior in a variety of contexts (see Greenwald et al. 2009 for a meta-analysis of predictive validity). In the case of social desirability, there is expected to be a incongruity between explicit and implicit attitudes. For example, implicit tasks are often used to measure racial attitudes because it is believed individuals will not answer explicit survey questions about race honestly due to social desirability concerns.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The precise definition of implicit attitudes is "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects" (Greenwald and Banaji 1995, 8).

<sup>4</sup> Incongruity between implicit and explicit attitudes can be evidence of a social desirability bias, but this is not always the case. For example, two different people can have the same incongruity between their implicit and explicit attitude, but the incongruity is due to different reasons. One person could be dishonest about their explicit response (social desirability bias), so their implicit attitude does not match their explicit response. The other person could be honest about their explicit response, but their implicit attitude does not match their explicit response (lack of awareness).

The examination of both implicit and explicit attitudes helps us understand various phenomena. A related area of research is the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Similar to the possible congruency or incongruency between implicit and explicit attitudes, behavior can correspond or not correspond to an attitude. There are different types of consistency depending on the objects in the relationship. First, there is behavioral intention, which is stated intention to carry out a specific behavior (e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). When the behavioral intention does not correspond to the behavior, this is called a literal inconsistency (Schuman and Johnson 1976). As described earlier, an explicit attitude is a conscious evaluation of an object. When an explicit attitude does not correspond to behavior, this is called an evaluative inconsistency (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). To summarize, there are implicit attitudes, explicit attitudes, behavioral intention (a type of attitude), and behavior. These constructs may or may not be congruent depending on the situation. Not only is it useful to examine these constructs by themselves, but it is also important to examine the relationships between them.

Social desirability bias potentially has a great effect on tolerance judgments as individuals may not want to appear intolerant. Like judgments involving topics such as race, tolerance judgments can be sensitive in nature. The previous literature on political tolerance has not thoroughly examined the potential social influences on tolerance judgments. Only one study by Mondak and Sanders (2003) mentioned the potential effect of social desirability in the context of challenges to longitudinal analyses of political tolerance. They described a scenario in which individuals may misrepresent their opinions by responding with tolerant answers, which poses problems if social desirability had varying intensities at different points in time.

Before explaining how tolerance judgments can be affected by social desirability, I first explain how tolerance is commonly measured in the literature. The field has been dominated by two major approaches, fixed-group and content-controlled (least-liked), which are the basis for most work on tolerance.

## Measurement of Tolerance

### *Fixed-group Methods*

The fixed-group method, introduced by Stouffer (1955) in his major work, “Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties,” involves asking individuals to make political tolerance judgments toward pre-selected groups. For example, “Should a book written by a [communist] be removed from the library?” Stouffer was interested in tolerance towards *nonconformists* (Stouffer’s term), which at the time included groups like communists and atheists. The important distinction in his measurement is that groups are pre-selected for the respondent. Stouffer's interest was the tolerance and attitudes towards a few specific groups that were very unpopular at the time, not tolerance in general, and his measure reflects this. A few scholars also use the tolerance measure from the General Social Survey (GSS),<sup>5</sup> which is based on Stouffer's fixed-group method. The difference between Stouffer's fixed-group method and the GSS is that the GSS includes

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<sup>5</sup> The General Social Survey (GSS) uses dichotomous response options.

groups from both the left and right side of the political spectrum whereas Stouffer's method only includes groups from the left.

Both the GSS and Stouffer's methods are considered fixed-group methods where participants are asked about pre-selected groups rather than being allowed to pick groups themselves. The benefit of the fixed-group method is measuring tolerance without the potential for the participant's choice of group in any way biasing your assessment. The disadvantage of the fixed-group method is that groups must be chosen for the participants with the assumption that participants truly dislike these groups and have some opinion about them. This is not always true and can lead to problems if groups are not carefully selected. The GSS has also been popular because it includes a range of political and social groups and has continued to use the same questions over many years allowing study of changes in tolerance over time. The fixed-group method was also very important in Stouffer's original work and all later replications of it. Since then, the fixed-group method has been used sporadically over many decades mostly in the context of the GSS (Beatty and Walter 1984; Bobo and Licari 1989; Cigler and Joslyn 2002; Golebiowska 1995; Mondak and Sanders 2003; Wilcox and Jelen 1990; Wilson 1994).

#### *Content-Controlled (Least-liked) Method*

The second major approach is the content-controlled method, also known as the least-liked method, which was introduced by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979). In the content-controlled method, the groups are not pre-selected. Rather, respondents can choose the group they like the least from a list of groups provided. In the list of groups provided, there is a diverse range of groups from the left and right of the political spectrum. In the original study, the list of groups included socialists, fascists, communists, Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, Black Panthers, Symbionese Liberation Army, atheists, pro-abortionists, and anti-abortionists. If respondents most disliked group is not in the list provided, respondents can name a group of their own. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993) believed Stouffer's measure was inadequate because it is time bound and includes a narrow range of groups. They state that the salience of groups has changed since Stouffer's time. For example, communists were no longer as politically salient as they were in the 1950's. They wanted to create a general measure of tolerance that was not bound to a particular time or set of groups. They believed Stouffer's methods were inadequate for this purpose. Their solution to the problem is the content-controlled method, a self-anchoring measure. They state that individuals dislike different groups, and even though the groups selected are different for different respondents, the groups selected have equal meaning among all respondents. That is, they believe, in terms of tolerance, the least-liked group for any given person is equivalent to the least-liked group for any other person. Therefore, a measure of tolerance which is independent of any given context can be derived from people's attitudes towards their least-liked groups. Many scholars have adopted the content-controlled method (Barnum and Sullivan 1989; Chanley 1994; Davis 1995; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Eisenstein 2006; Gibson 1986; Gibson 2006; Golebiowska 1999; Hutchison and Gibley 2007; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; Mather and Tranby 2014; Oskarsson and



Widmalm 2014; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Rohrschneider 1996; Shamir and Sullivan 1983; Sullivan et al. 1981; Sullivan et al. 1993).

There are a few benefits of the content-controlled method. The participants are given a choice to select their own least-liked group. Ideally, this results in participants selecting the group that most truly represents their greatest dislike without bias from time period or researcher judgment. The other benefit is that this is a general measure of tolerance which contrasts with Stouffer's method which only sought to assess tolerance towards a set of nonconformist groups that were politically important in his time. The content-controlled method has become the main measure of tolerance that is used in political science. The problems with the content-controlled method involve bias in group selection and response as I will discuss shortly.

#### *Other Methods*

There have been a handful of studies that use slightly altered approaches than the fixed-group or content-controlled methods. Some scholars have used a modified version of the content-controlled method (Gibson 1989b, 2002, 2008). For example, Gibson (2008) asked respondents to select three disliked groups instead of just one. Other scholars have used both the content-controlled and the fixed-group methods in their research (Halperin et al. 2009; Hurwitz and Mondak 2002). There are also a few studies that use pre-selected groups and randomly assign one of these groups to the respondent (Crawford 2014; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; Petersen et al. 2011; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004).

### Social Concern and Tolerance Judgments

Now that I have described how tolerance is measured, I explain how tolerance judgments are likely influenced by social concerns. There are several ways that social desirability can interact with measures of tolerance to give an inaccurate picture of people's attitudes and behavior. Before describing the different issues, I want to clarify what is meant by the phrases "socially acceptable to dislike" and "socially unacceptable to dislike." The former means that a person's dislike of a group will be met with perceived social approval (positive outcome), while the latter means that a person's dislike of a group will result in perceived social disapproval (negative outcome). Specifically, I am considering the social acceptability of disliking a group. Recall, political tolerance is defined as the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups. There must be some amount of dislike for individuals to politically tolerate a group. I conceptualize social acceptability of dislike on a continuum, but use these general categories (socially acceptable to dislike and socially unacceptable to dislike) for the purposes of creating conditions for the experimental studies.

Below, I describe three possible response biases: not selecting the group you actually dislike, understating intolerance of groups that are socially unacceptable to dislike, and exaggerating intolerance of groups that are socially acceptable to dislike.

### *Not Selecting a Group you Actually Dislike*

The first issue, which is not selecting a group you actually dislike, is relevant only to the content-controlled method. Recall that in the content-controlled method participants are asked to select the group they like the least from a list of groups provided (when not listed they may name a group of their own). One way people could avoid negative social judgment in this task is to select a different group than the one they truly dislike the most. For instance, if the list of groups included a Black rights organization and a political group such as socialists, a respondent might choose the political group even if the participant truly disliked the Black rights organization the most. The participant could reasonably expect to be judged negatively for their true opinion (disliking a Black rights group). The respondent could avoid this judgment by choosing a more acceptable target such as the socialists in this example and answering questions about them instead.

### *Understating Intolerance of Groups that are Socially Unacceptable to Dislike*

Understating intolerance of groups that are socially unacceptable to dislike is relevant to both the fixed-group and content-controlled method but is likely more common in the fixed-group method since other ways of avoiding negative judgment (group selection) are not available. Understatement of intolerance would mean answering the questions about extending civil liberties untruthfully. For example, one of the tolerance questions asks participants to rate their agreement with the statement “Muslims should be banned from running for public office.” The participant’s true opinion might be to agree and say that the group should be banned from running for public office, but they would respond with “disagree” to avoid negative judgment.

### *Exaggerating Intolerance of Groups that are Socially Acceptable to Dislike*

The third issue is overstating intolerance of groups that are socially acceptable to dislike. This could equally be an issue for the fixed-group and content-controlled method as participants might reasonably pick and exaggerate their intolerance for a socially acceptable target. An example of this might be someone who picks or is given White power as a group and exaggerates how intolerant they feel towards White power because they know this group is commonly disliked and seek social approval.

These different issues could potentially result in overestimating or underestimating tolerance. I argue that we are most likely overestimating tolerance. While it is possible that people exaggerate intolerance towards groups that are socially acceptable to dislike, it seems more likely that individuals will make choices or state opinions to avoid negative judgment. It may also be the case that the social norms that prohibit intolerance towards groups are stronger norms than ones which promote intolerance towards groups.

## Implications: Tolerance and Democracy

One of the earliest codifications of tolerance in American democracy is the United States Constitution which protects expression of religious views, speech, and peaceful assembly. Specifically, the first amendment protects these actions from interference by the government with some exceptions. It is also held that political tolerance among the public is healthy for a functioning democracy. Scholars have found that more stable and long-standing democracies tend to have greater political tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). The adherence to political values, like political tolerance, should be important to a democracy in practice. If people are claiming to adhere to these principles of political tolerance, but do not behave according to these principles, this undermines the foundation of a democratic society. Perhaps those that do not adhere to these principles are more complicit or even supportive in cases where the government is restricting civil liberties. It is possible that we are overestimating tolerance, especially for certain groups that are socially unacceptable to dislike. Moreover, we have no idea how well tolerance judgments correspond to actual behavior. Not only are we possibly overestimating tolerance, but perhaps tolerance behavior has a low correspondence with tolerance judgments. But, the broader question is whether tolerance judgments and behavior among the mass public has any real impact on policy. Scholars have tried to answer the question of whether tolerance attitudes among the mass public influence policy. Some research indicates that tolerance among the mass public does have an influence. For example, Gibson and Anderson (1985) found that tolerance of the mass public influences public policy under certain conditions. Other research, however, comes to a different conclusion. Gibson (1989a) found that mass public tolerance was not related to repressive public policy. The impact of tolerance is not well understood. Whether or not the mass public has an influence on policy, perhaps individuals should strive to live up to the ideal principles in a democracy. Regardless, a clearer understanding of tolerance can only help answer these questions.

### Pretest Study

I ran a pretest study to determine what groups are generally unacceptable or acceptable to express dislike for. The goal was to narrow down a reasonable selection of groups for the experiments. Participants were given a list of 32 groups and asked how unacceptable it is to dislike each group and how disliked they are in general (see appendix A for specific question wording). The list of groups was compiled from previous stimuli for tolerance studies and contemporary groups. The list includes political, religious, social, and issue groups. While the list is comprehensive, it is by no means exhaustive. Participants are first asked whether *other* people generally like or dislike each group. If a participant did not know the group, they could select the “don’t know group” option. This is to gauge whether the groups are generally recognized. Then, they are asked how unacceptable it is in society to express dislike for the group. Since the question is phrased in a way that asks about other people’s expressions of dislike, individuals are expected to be more likely to answer honestly. I conducted the pretest study using a student sample and an internet sample through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk

(MTurk). Data from the student sample<sup>6</sup> was collected from April-May 2016. The data from MTurk was collected during July 2016.

252 participants completed the study. The Turk sample had a gender breakdown of 57% male and 43% female. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 71 with a mean age of 33.58 (SD=10.18). For ideology, 55% identified as liberal, 23% identified as conservative, and 22% said moderate. For party identification, 57% identified as Democrats, 25% identified as Republicans (including Independent leaners), and 16% responded Independent. 76% of the sample reported White for race/ethnicity. 48% completed a bachelor's degree or higher.<sup>7</sup> The tables below display the results of the group ratings separated by broad categories, which are political, religious, social, and issue groups. Group attitude is coded from 1-7 with higher numbers indicating dislike of the group. Acceptability is also coded from 1-7 with higher numbers indicating that it is socially unacceptable to dislike the group (negative social outcome). Very few participants reported they did not know the groups.<sup>8</sup> The only exception was for Muslims, in which only 78% responded they knew about the group.<sup>9</sup>

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike (Mean)</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike (Mean)</b>
Anarchists	5.86	2.48
Capitalists	3.88	3.44
Communists	6.13	2.32
Fascists	6.07	2.27
Nationalists	4.82	3.62
Libertarians	4.07	3.54
Socialists	4.69	3.09
Radical Liberals	5.06	3.01
Radical Conservatives	5.62	2.66

Table 1. Ratings for Political Groups

<sup>6</sup> Student data tables are provided in appendix B.

<sup>7</sup> Demographic tables for race/ethnicity and education are provided in appendix B.

<sup>8</sup> Group knowledge tables provided in appendix B.

<sup>9</sup> This result was surprising given Muslims are a well-known group.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike (Mean)</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike (Mean)</b>
Atheists	4.77	3.52
Christians	3.10	4.69
Anti-Christians	5.46	3.30
Jews	3.65	5.49
Anti-Jews	5.83	3.11
Mormons	4.40	4.04
Anti-Mormons	4.57	3.51
Muslims	5.37	4.23
Anti-Muslims	4.46	3.19
Scientologists	5.70	2.52

Table 2. Ratings for Religious and Anti-Religious Groups

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike (Mean)</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike (Mean)</b>
Black rights	4.44	4.58
Black power	5.43	3.66
Feminists	4.63	4.21
Anti-feminists	4.98	3.36
Gay rights	3.73	5.16
Anti-gay rights	5.37	3.24
Immigrant	4.38	4.13
Anti-immigrant	4.63	3.32
White power	6.32	2.04

Table 3. Ratings for Social Groups

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike (Mean)</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike (Mean)</b>
Pro-life	4.17	3.46
Pro-choice	3.95	3.73
Radical environmentalists	5.28	2.98
Anti-war	3.84	3.58
Pro-war	5.27	2.93

Table 4. Ratings for Issue Groups

Among the political groups, fascists were the most disliked. For religious groups, anti-Jews were the most disliked. For social groups, White power was most disliked. Lastly, for issue groups, radical environmentalists were the most disliked. From the groups that are at least somewhat disliked (means higher than 4) based on the Turk sample (recall tolerance is defined as extending civil liberties to disliked groups), I chose groups based on the following criteria. Groups rated between 1 and 3 on unacceptability were categorized in the acceptable to dislike condition. Between the unacceptability values of 3.01 and 4.99, groups were categorized in the neutral<sup>10</sup> acceptability condition. Groups rated between 5 and 7 were categorized in the unacceptable to dislike condition. While the original intention was to create three different conditions, there were no groups that fit the criteria for the unacceptable to dislike condition and were measured as disliked. It is possible that there are groups that fit these criteria, but perhaps individuals were unwilling to state dislike of the groups that are unacceptable to dislike. The group categorizations are shown in the table below with the bolded groups indicating they were chosen for the studies. For ideology, four groups were chosen. There was only one religious group in the acceptable to dislike category, so one of the religious neutral groups was chosen.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, there was only one social group that was acceptable to dislike, so the corresponding social group was chosen for the neutral category. No groups were chosen from the issue category, since there were no directly comparable groups.

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<sup>10</sup> Neutral acceptability is conceptualized as being neither favorable nor unfavorable to dislike the group though it could be thought of as being “more acceptable to dislike” compared to the “unacceptable to dislike” group.

<sup>11</sup> I chose Mormons instead of Muslims for the neutral group because a noticeable proportion of participants refused to respond to questions about Muslims (21.8%). It is possible that many people did not want to negatively rate this group, which would indicate that this group is considered socially unacceptable to dislike.

Group Type	Acceptable to Dislike	Neutral Acceptability
Ideology	Anarchists <b>Communists</b> <b>Fascists</b> Radical conservatives	Socialists <b>Nationalists</b> <b>Libertarians</b> Radical liberals
Religion	<b>Scientologists</b>	Atheists Anti-Christians Anti-Jews <b>Mormons</b> Anti-Mormons Muslims Anti-Muslims
Social	<b>White power</b>	<b>Black power</b> Black rights Feminists Anti-feminists Anti-gay rights Immigrants Anti-immigrant
Issue	Radical environmentalists Pro-war	Pro-life

Table 5. Groups Selected for Conditions

To summarize, the groups chosen for the acceptable to dislike condition are Communists, Fascists, Scientologists, and White power. For the neutral acceptability condition, the chosen groups are Nationalists, Libertarians, Mormons, and Black power.

### Experiment 1: Social Desirability and Political Tolerance

Tolerance judgments may be affected by social concerns. As described earlier, social desirability bias is the tendency to respond to questions in a way that may be viewed positively by others. There are three ways in which I examine the influence of social desirability on tolerance. The first way is by examining the differences in tolerance judgments between groups that vary in their social acceptability to dislike. This corresponds to the first test where I examine whether tolerance judgments differ between groups that are acceptable to dislike or neutral acceptability. The second way is by looking at the differences between implicit and explicit attitudes towards the group. Here, I am examining whether implicit attitudes differ from explicit attitudes towards these groups. As mentioned earlier, explicit attitudes are subject to social desirability concerns. The measurement of implicit attitudes is indirect and less subject to social desirability concerns. If individuals are actively misrepresenting their attitudes, then implicit and explicit attitudes should be different from each other. Finally, I examine individual level differences in socially desirable responding. The relevant construct is impression

management, which is a component of social desirability. I look at individual levels of impression management to determine how it affects their expressed tolerance, implicit attitude, explicit attitude, and any divergence between the three. I test the three following hypotheses.

### Hypotheses

H1: Expressed tolerance will be lower in the acceptable to dislike condition compared to the neutral condition.

H2: Individuals higher in impression management (a component of social desirability) will have a lower expressed tolerance in the acceptable to dislike condition relative to those lower in impression management.

H3: Individuals higher in impression management will have a larger divergence between their implicit attitude and explicit attitude towards a group.

### Experiment Design and Measures

In the study, participants are randomly assigned to one of two conditions, acceptable to dislike or neutral. Each participant evaluated a single group. For example, a participant randomly assigned to the acceptable to dislike condition might be given “White power” and would then complete all tasks in the study for this group. The survey includes measures of explicit attitude, implicit attitude, tolerance judgments towards the group, and a social desirability scale. The survey also includes demographic questions and other measures related to tolerance, which are described in greater detail below.

#### *Measure of Explicit Attitude*

Explicit attitude towards the group is measured on a seven-point scale. Even though the groups are pre-determined to be widely disliked, it is possible that any given individual may like the group.

#### *Measure of Implicit Attitude*

Implicit attitude towards a group is measured using a variant of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). The IAT task is the Single Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT) with good/bad words (Wigboldus, Holland, and van Knippenberg 2004), which is appropriate since I am interested in examining like/dislike for single groups. The IAT is a categorization task where individuals rapidly sort stimuli into categories. In the IAT task, there are two types of categories, targets and attributes. Targets are the attitude objects, while the attributes are related to the attitude objects in an affective or cognitive manner. The attributes can be valenced (positive/negative) items assessing affect, such as good/bad, but can also take the form of other descriptors (for example, adjectives for stereotypes). Using the well-known race IAT as an example, the targets are White and Black (which are represented either by stereotypical names or faces in the task), and the attributes are good/bad (which are represented by synonyms of good/bad in the task). The categorization task has blocks



with a particular target and attribute pairing (White/good + Black/bad) and blocks with the opposite pairing (White/bad + Black/good). Individuals must sort stimuli quickly into these paired categories. In the ST-IAT, there is only one target category. Using race as an example, the target category would be Black if the interest is assessing implicit attitudes towards Blacks. The idea behind the IAT is that concepts that are more closely associated to each other in a person's mind will be more quickly categorized. Since individuals are categorizing stimuli quickly, usually within a few hundred milliseconds, it is difficult to “game” the task to present oneself in a socially desirable way. For this reason, the IAT will be used as a measure of implicit attitude towards the group. The IAT may give different results than the explicit attitude measure in cases where individuals are dishonest or unaware of their feelings towards the group. For this reason, any gaps between the implicit and explicit measure are themselves interesting to examine.

### *Tolerance Judgments*

The standard tolerance scale, consists of six agree/disagree questions on a five-point scale (see appendix A for the full set of questions). For example, one question states, “Members of the [group] should be allowed to teach in public schools.” To create the scale, the responses to each question are summed. For example, if a participant has a total score of six, which is the lowest possible score, it represents being in the least tolerant category. The highest possible score, which is thirty, represents being in the most tolerant category.

### *Social Desirability Scale*

To measure social desirability, I use the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting (BIDR) (Paulhus 1991). The BIDR is a measure of an individual’s tendency to misrepresent themselves in socially desirable ways (Paulhus 1991). The measure includes subscales on self-deceptive enhancement and impression management. The relevant subscale for this study is the impression management scale. Even though this is a self-report measure, it is scaled in a manner that reveals a high level of impression management when an individual is being dishonest in a case that is very unlikely. For example, one of the questions is, “I never cover up my mistakes.” If an individual answered, “very true,” this suggests wanting to appear positively to others. While it is possible that a person has never covered up their mistakes, it is quite unlikely the person has never done it at all. The full set of questions is provided in appendix A.

## Results and Discussion

The study was conducted in October 2016 using an MTurk sample. 250 participants completed the survey. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 73, and the mean age is 36.54 (SD=11.18). 51% of the sample reported male, while 49% reported female for gender. 52% identified as liberal, 25% identified as conservative, and 22% said moderate. For party identification, 60% said Democrat, 23% said Republican

(including Independent leaners), and 12% said Independent. For race/ethnicity, 73% identified as White. 48% reported completing a bachelor's degree or higher.<sup>12</sup>

For each target group, the scores for the tolerance judgments were totaled. There are six tolerance questions, and the total score ranges from 6 to 30 with higher numbers indicating greater tolerance. The means and standard deviations for each group are presented in the tables below.


<b>Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>High tolerance=30</b>  <b>Low tolerance=6</b>
Scientologists	22.58	7.90	
Communists	22.28	7.87	
White power	19.88	6.95	
Fascists	18.36	6.85	

Table 6. Tolerance Scores for Acceptable to Dislike Groups


<b>Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>High tolerance=30</b>  <b>Low tolerance=6</b>
Mormons	27.47	9.04	
Libertarians	27.46	8.80	
Nationalists	24.48	8.20	
Black power	23.70	8.29	

Table 7. Tolerance Scores for Neutral Acceptability Groups

The densities of the tolerance scores for each group are presented in the figures below.

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<sup>12</sup> Detailed demographic tables for race/ethnicity and education are provided in appendix B.




Figure 1. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Scientists)




Figure 2. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Communists)




Figure 3. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (White Power)




Figure 4. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Fascist)




Figure 5. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Mormons)




Figure 6. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Libertarians)




Figure 7. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Nationalists)




Figure 8. Distribution of Tolerance Scores (Black Power)

To create the neutral and acceptable to dislike groupings, the tolerance judgment totals for the respective groups were added together. The tolerance densities for each experimental condition are presented in the figure below. The acceptable to dislike condition density is normal and flatter compared to the neutral acceptability condition. The neutral acceptability density is negatively skewed. A large proportion of individuals have high tolerance scores in the neutral acceptability condition.




Figure 9. Distributions of Tolerance Scores by Acceptability Condition

Recall, I predicted that tolerance would be lower in the acceptable to dislike condition relative to the neutral condition. I calculated a t-test, which was statistically significant,  $p < .001$ . Tolerance was lower in the acceptable to dislike condition relative to neutral condition, though it is important to note that the means for both conditions are at the upper end of the tolerance scale. This is displayed in the figure below. This result provides evidence for the first hypothesis.




Figure 10. Tolerance Means by Acceptability Condition

Next, the explicit attitude results are presented. Explicit attitude towards the group was measured on a scale from 1 to 7, and it was recoded so that higher numbers indicate dislike. The means and standard deviations are presented in the table below.


<b>Group</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Dislike=7</b>
White power	6.03	1.51	
Fascists	5.45	1.48	
Scientologists	4.94	1.69	
Communists	4.59	1.21	
Mormons	4.24	1.64	
Libertarians	4.10	0.94	
Nationalists	3.93	1.27	
Black Power	3.87	0.82	

Table 8. Explicit Attitude

I want to highlight the explicit group attitude differences between the pretest results and the results of the present study. The comparison of results is displayed in the table below. Recall, the pretest asked whether *other* people dislike groups to elicit more honest answers. In the present study, participants were asked how they themselves felt towards these groups. As shown in the table below, the pretest ratings are more negative (more dislike) than the results of the present study with the exception of Libertarians, which is lower, but very close to the current sample. This may be due to variations between the samples, participants being less honest in their dislike of groups, or a combination of both.




<b>Group</b>	<b>Experiment 1</b>	<b>Pretest</b>	<b>Dislike=7</b>	
White power	6.03	6.32		
Communists	4.59	6.13		
Fascists	5.45	6.07		
Scientologists	4.94	5.70		
Black Power	3.87	5.43		
Nationalists	3.93	4.82		
Mormons	4.24	4.40		
Libertarians	4.10	4.07		
				<b>Like=1</b>

Table 9. Explicit Attitude in Pretest and Experiment 1 Samples

Implicit attitude was measured using the ST-IAT. The reaction times from the IAT task were converted into D-scores (see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003). In this study, positive D-scores indicate like towards the group, while negative D-scores indicate dislike towards the group. The results will show whether there is a difference between the individual's implicit and explicit attitude towards the groups. This is important because differences between implicit and explicit attitudes may be due to social desirability. The table below displays the mean D-scores and standard deviations for each group with statistical significance shown in parentheses. The mean D-scores for Communists, Fascists, and White power are negative, but they are not statistically significant. The mean D-scores for Scientologists, Nationalists, Libertarians, Mormons, and Black power are positive, but only the scores for Scientologists and Mormons are statistically significant. It is interesting to note that there is a positive implicit attitude for only the religious groups in the study. Individuals have positive implicit attitudes for Scientologists and Mormons, but their explicit attitudes were in between neutral and negative.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Mean D-score</b>	<b>SD</b>
Communists	-0.01 (p=.86)	0.30
Fascists	-0.04 (p=.32)	0.27
Scientologists	0.10 (p<.01)	0.18
White power	-0.01(p=.81)	0.23
Nationalists	0.04 (p=.34)	0.25
Libertarians	0.09 (p=.13)	0.30
Mormons	0.13 (p<.01)	0.23
Black Power	0.03 (p=.58)	0.28

Table 10. Implicit Attitude

To examine whether implicit attitudes predict tolerance judgments, I ran two models. The first model has implicit attitude<sup>13</sup> and explicit attitude<sup>14</sup> as independent variables, while the second model just has the implicit attitude as the independent variable. The results are presented in the table below. In model 1 where both implicit and explicit attitudes are included, the coefficient for implicit attitude is positive, but it is not statistically significant (p=.96). The coefficient for explicit attitude is positive and statistically significant. Higher explicit liking of the group results in more tolerance. In model 2 with implicit attitude as the only independent variable, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Positive implicit affect results in more tolerance. However, when explicit affect is included as in model 1, the coefficient decreases in size and is no longer statistically significant. These results indicate explicit attitudes are predictive of tolerance judgments.

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<sup>13</sup> Positive scores mean a positive implicit association with the group.

<sup>14</sup> Explicit attitude is coded so that higher numbers mean liking.

	<b>Model 1</b> (Tolerance)	<b>Model 2</b> (Tolerance)
Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Implicit Attitude	1.52 (1.49)	4.16* (1.68)
Explicit Attitude	2.26* (.25)	-- --
Intercept	15.48 (.91)	22.91 (.44)
N	237	237

Table 11. Group Affect Models

To look at the differences between implicit and explicit attitudes, I created a gap measure. I standardized the D-scores and the ratings so the mean is centered at zero and the standard deviation is one. The gap measure is the explicit attitude minus the implicit attitude. Larger values in either direction, positive or negative, indicate a larger gap. The mean gap for each group is presented in the table below.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Mean Gap</b>
Fascists	-0.24
Scientologists	-0.43
White power	-0.68
Mormons	0.19
Communists	0.22
Libertarians	0.29
Black Power	0.33
Nationalists	0.35

Table 12. Explicit- Implicit Gap

I expect there to be a larger gap between explicit and implicit attitudes for the neutral acceptability groups compared to the acceptable to dislike groups. A t-test between the two conditions is statistically significant,  $p < .01$ . The gap in the neutral acceptability condition is larger than the acceptable to dislike condition.

Next, I describe the results of the social desirability scale. The scores on the impression management subscale range from 0 to 20 with higher numbers indicating more concern about managing impressions. Unfortunately, there was not very much

variation in the data. The scores were clustered around the low end of the scale. On the impression management scale ( $\alpha=.86$ ),<sup>15</sup> the mean is 1.85 (SD=1.69) with a maximum score of 6. The mean is much lower than reported in Paulhus (1991). I examined the relationship between the tolerance scores (all groups combined) and impression management. The correlation is  $r=.05$  ( $p=.42$ ). The correlation is very close to zero and not statistically significant. To create high and low groups based on the impression management score, I split the sample based on the mean value of 1.85. Those with scores higher than 1.85 are in the high impression management group, and those with scores lower than 1.85 are in the low impression management group. The split resulted in 52% of the sample being in the high group, while 48% are in the low group. In the second hypothesis, I predicted lower tolerance for those in the high impression management group. For those in the high group, the mean for the acceptable to dislike condition is 21.78, and the mean for the neutral condition is 25.78. For those in the low group, the mean for the acceptable to dislike condition is 19.61, and the mean for the neutral condition is 25.59. These results are displayed in the table below. I failed to find evidence for my second hypothesis.<sup>16</sup>

<b>Condition</b>	<b>High IM (&gt; 1.85)</b>	<b>Low IM (&lt;1.85)</b>
Acceptable to Dislike	21.78	19.61
Neutral	25.78	25.59

Table 13. Tolerance Means by Impression Management (Mean Split)

In the third hypothesis, I predicted a larger divergence between implicit (positive scores mean implicit liking) and explicit attitudes (original coding with higher numbers indicate liking of the group) in the high impression management group relative to the low impression management group. Using the gap measure (difference between explicit and implicit attitude) that I described earlier, I examined the gap by impression management and acceptability condition. The gap means are presented in the table below.

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<sup>15</sup> The reliability of the impression management scale is high. Paulhus (1991) reported alphas ranging from .77-.85.

<sup>16</sup> I also did a top 10% and bottom 90% split. Those in the top 10% had IM scores 5 or higher, and the bottom 90% had IM scores 4 or lower. These results are similar to the mean split, so I did not find evidence of differences in tolerance judgments between those high and low in impression management.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>High IM (&gt;1.85)</b>	<b>Low IM (&lt;1.85)</b>
All Conditions	0.20	-0.22
Acceptable to Dislike	0.04	-0.65
Neutral	0.38	0.20

Table 14. Gap Means by Impression Management (Mean Split)

Notice the gap is actually larger for those low in impression management for all conditions and the acceptable to dislike condition. For the neutral condition, the gap is larger for those high in impression management. I did a t-test, and the difference for the neutral condition is not statistically significant ( $p=.19$ ). I failed to find evidence to support the third hypothesis.

This study presented some challenges in addressing the relationship between social desirability and political tolerance. There were several interesting results about which groups were considered acceptable or unacceptable to dislike. Notably, there was no group in the pretest which was unacceptable to dislike and also believed to be generally disliked. This raises an interesting question, do such groups actually exist? Some of the groups tested may be disliked but the social unacceptability of this opinion could prevent this from being given as an answer. There are two possible reasons this could occur. The participants may be consciously dishonest or unaware of their feelings towards a group. They may also falsely believe the group is generally liked because others do not talk about their dislike for the group; recall the pretest question is whether others dislike the group. In the pretest, the average dislike for groups was higher than the current study, which asked about personal dislike. While this is not definitive, it is interesting that there is a discrepancy between the perception of others dislike and the averaged dislike of a sample of individuals. There may be a perception problem where people do not have an accurate view of other people's feelings towards groups. Another challenge is the lack of variation in the impression management scale; all participants were very low on the impression management scale indicating they rarely misrepresent themselves to other people. The split on the impression management scale may have been between two sets of people who are all fairly low in impression management, not high and low. However, it seems unlikely that almost all people are low in impression management; the scale may not be capturing the true variation. Similarly, the implicit association test does not seem to show anything definitive for this study. Even groups such as White power which are greatly disliked explicitly did not show a significant implicit like or dislike. This also makes the evidence for the third hypothesis difficult to interpret, if the single target IAT is not capturing implicit attitudes towards groups or if individuals just do not have strong implicit attitudes towards abstract political and social groups such as "Libertarians," then it is not possible to assess the difference between their explicit and implicit attitudes. In the model predicting tolerance, implicit attitude was predictive when it was the only variable. When explicit attitude was included in the model, the effect of the implicit attitude went away. The data did not support all the

hypotheses that were put forward for this study, but the data itself was quite interesting. There is significant variation in the acceptability of different groups. Jews and gay rights were the groups that were the least acceptable to dislike. Other religious and social groups were also fairly unacceptable to dislike. Political groups were always considered acceptable to dislike. Perhaps there are other ways of disentangling the impact of social desirability and tolerance.

## **Experiment 2: A Novel Measure of Behavioral Political Tolerance**

In this experiment, I create a new behavioral measure of tolerance. The behavioral measure is a hypothetical online political forum where individuals act as moderators to allow or delete postings from a group. The task of being a moderator and making decisions has external validity as it closely mirrors real situations and interfaces. I examine the relationship between the tolerance scale and the behavioral measure. In addition, I look at whether the major predictors of tolerance also predict the willingness to censor political speech. I further look at the demographic predictors of the behavioral measure and the types of speech that are censored by individuals.

There has been no previous research on behavioral measures of political tolerance. Some scholars have looked at behavioral intention, which has some correspondence to behavior (Marcus et al. 1995). There are a few studies in the political tolerance literature that focus specifically on freedom of speech. Lindner and Nosek (2009) designed a scale that measured willingness to protect free speech and found that scores depended on the target of speech criticism and individual political orientation. Other studies examine specific types of speech, such as racist speech (e.g. Harell 2010) and hate speech (e.g. Lambe 2004). Why should behavioral tolerance be examined? There are many situations in which people's statements differ from their actions. In psychology, there has been a great deal of research examining attitude-behavior consistency. The central question is whether attitudes predict behavior. Using racial/ethnic attitudes and behavior as an example, there are two possibilities, consistency and inconsistency. For example, in the case where the attitude is predictive, an individual expresses positive attitudes towards a racial/ethnic group and then acts positively toward the group (or expresses negative attitudes and then acts negatively towards the group). In an example of inconsistency, an individual expresses positive attitudes and then acts in a discriminatory manner towards another person from that racial/ethnic group (or expresses negative attitudes and then acts in a non-discriminatory manner). Recall that this type of inconsistency is called "evaluative inconsistency" (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). In the case of political tolerance, consistency means that high tolerance corresponds to tolerant behavior (or low tolerance corresponding to intolerant behavior). Inconsistency means that an individual's tolerance judgments do not correspond to their behavior. For example, an individual may express high tolerance, but then be unwilling to extend civil liberties in an actual situation. For instance, an individual may express agreement with the right of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) to have a rally in their city, but when the KKK rally is actually going to happen in their city, the individual may try to prevent the rally from happening.

## Hypotheses

Since attitudes towards free speech are a part of the concept of political tolerance (Lambe 2002), the behavior towards free speech, in this case censorship, are predicted to be related to political tolerance. I expect that as political tolerance increases; censorship should decrease (H1). The major predictors of tolerance should also predict censorship behavior. Threat is predicted to affect the censoring rate. I expect that higher perceived threat leads to increased censoring (H2). If individuals are supportive of democratic principles like freedom of speech, individuals should be less likely to censor. I expect that higher support for democratic norms and institutions leads to decreased censoring (H3). Dogmatism, which is a form of psychological insecurity, is the tendency to view the world in a close-minded manner. I expect that higher dogmatism should lead to increased censoring (H4). As for the censoring task, if the target group matters, then the censoring rate is expected to be significantly different in treatment conditions compared to the control condition (H5). I expect a difference for the most disliked groups<sup>17</sup> (Fascist, Nationalist, Scientologist, White power). However, if the target group does not matter, then the censoring rate should not differ significantly in the treatment conditions versus the control condition.

## Experiment Design and Measures

The experiment is a behavioral task where individuals decide to allow or delete postings made in a political forum. While the forums and postings are not from real websites, it is not mentioned to participants that the postings are hypothetical. This is to allow participants to respond to what they believe are real stimuli. I decided on four major statement categories and generated five stimuli for each category for a total of twenty postings. The statement categories were informed by integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000). The statement categories are power, beliefs/values, comments about the opponent's character, and violence/threats of violence. The postings were modeled from actual postings from political forums. For example, for the beliefs/values category, one of the postings is "our values have produced great things and those people have created nothing." The full list of statements is provided below.

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<sup>17</sup> The most disliked groups were determined from the pretest study.

Category	Statement
Beliefs/Values	Our values have produced great things and those people have created nothing.
	Our way of life is superior.
	Their beliefs are harmful and toxic.
	Their way of life is immoral and corrupt.
	We are right and those people are wrong.
Character	Those people are like cancer.
	Those people have low IQs and are complete idiots.
	Those people are disgusting vermin.
	Those people are the scum of the earth.
	Those people are to blame for what went wrong with our country.
Power	Everyone should bow to us.
	We should control everything.
	We will rise up and take over.
	The more power we have, the better.
	We need to be making the rules.
Violence	We should kill their babies now before they overrun our country.
	We should torch them in their houses.
	We should teach them a lesson and beat them half to death.
	We should exterminate those bastards.
	We should strangle every last one.

Table 15. Forum Statements

Based on the pretest study, there are eight target groups (Black power, Communist, Fascist, Libertarian, Mormon, Nationalist, Scientologist, and White power). For the experimental conditions, the forum consists of the target groups, such as “Communist forum.” For the control condition, the forum is labeled “General Discussion,” so the postings are not tied to any particular group. In the experiment, there are nine total conditions, and the experimental treatment is the forum group. An example of the experiment is shown in the figure below. In this example, the experimental condition is the “Communist forum.” Participants decide whether this specific posting should be allowed or deleted. After responding allow or delete, they are presented with the other postings from the Communist forum and make the decision to allow or delete those postings. All participants are presented with all twenty postings, but the order of the postings is randomized.

Our values have produced great things and those people have created nothing.
Posted by ----- in the Communist forum

Figure 11. Experiment Stimulus Example



The survey also includes the following measures: the tolerance scale, which is a set of six questions involving tolerance judgments with an agree/disagree response scale (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993), perception of group threat, which is measured using nine questions on an agree/disagree scale (Crawford 2014), dogmatism, which is a set of eleven questions on an agree/disagree scale (Shearman and Levine 2006), and support for democratic institutions and norms, which is measured using four questions on an agree/disagree scale that were used in Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993). Examples of questions include support for majority vote and freedom of speech.

## Results and Discussion

I collected data using two samples, the first with a student sample and the second with an internet sample. In both studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions in the forum task. Questions that pertained to the target group were matched in the initial random assignment. For example, if a participant was randomly assigned “Communist” for their treatment condition, questions in the forum task, tolerance scale, and perceptions of group threat would then ask about Communists. The forum task was always presented first, followed by filler questions, and then the tolerance scale.<sup>18</sup> Afterwards, they completed survey items, which include perceptions of group threat, the dogmatism scale, support for democratic norms and institutions, and demographic questions.

### *Study 1: Student Sample*

There were 339 participants in the student sample. The age of participants ranged from 18-26 with a mean age of 19.65 (SD=1.65). 36% of the sample identified as male, while 64% identified as female. For ideology, the breakdown is 48% liberal, 9% conservative, and 29% moderate. For party identification, 78% responded Democrat, 9% responded Republican (including Independent leaners), and 5% said Independent. 59% of the sample identified as Hispanic/Latino.

In the forum task, allowing a posting is coded as a 0 and deleting a posting is coded as a 1. The number of deleted postings is then added together and divided by the total number of postings, which is 20. For example, allowing all postings would result in a 0% censoring rate. On the other extreme, deleting all postings would result in a 100% censoring rate. The censoring rate was calculated for the control condition and experimental conditions. The tolerance scale consists of six questions, and the responses to the questions are summed together. Higher scores on the tolerance scale indicate more political tolerance. The lowest possible score is 6, and the highest possible score is 30. The mean censoring rate for the various conditions and the tolerance scores for each group are presented in the table below.

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<sup>18</sup> The filler questions are to allow some time in between doing the censoring task and the tolerance scale.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Censoring Rate (Mean)</b>	<b>Tolerance Score (Mean)</b>
Control	76%	--
White power	80%	15.64
Fascists	68%	17.31
Nationalists	78%	18.50
Communists	69%	18.83
Scientologists	71%	18.97
Libertarians	72%	21.50
Mormons	74%	21.64
Black power	61%	22.78

Table 16. Censoring Rate and Tolerance Score Means (Student Sample)

As you can see in the table, the average rate of censoring is quite high. In the control condition where no group is indicated, the average rate of censoring is 76%. Even in the other conditions, the censoring rate remains similar to the control. The highest censoring rate is for the White power group forum (80%), while the lowest censoring rate is for the Black power group forum (61%). To see whether the censoring rate differs between the control condition and experimental conditions, I made contingency tables and calculated chi-square with Yates' continuity correction. The chi-square results with statistical significance in parentheses are presented in the table below.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Chi-square</b>
Communists	9.36 (p<.01)
Fascists	11.81 (p<.01)
Scientologists	4.18 (p<.05)
White power	3.10 (p=.08)
Nationalists	1.26 (p=.26)
Libertarians	2.13 (p=.14)
Mormons	.72 (p=.40)
Black Power	37.93 (p<.01)

Table 17. Forum Experiment Results (Student Sample)

To summarize, Black power, Fascists, Communists, and Scientologists are censored *less* than the control condition, and these results were statistically significant. No group was censored at a significantly greater rate than the control. I failed to find evidence for my hypothesis in the expected direction (H5). The mean tolerance scores vary among the different groups. Participants are least tolerant of White power and most tolerant of Black power.

Next, I examine the relationship between the censoring rate and the tolerance scale. I correlated the censoring rate and the tolerance score for each group. Recall, that a higher tolerance score means more willingness to extend civil liberties, while a higher censoring rate means more restriction of speech. The censoring rate was recoded, so the direction is the same as the tolerance scale. In all conditions, the correlation was positive, which means that higher scores on the tolerance scale correspond to less censoring. The correlations are significant for the following conditions: Fascists, Scientologists, White power, Libertarians, and Black power. The correlations are not significant for Communists, Mormons, and Nationalists. The correlations suggest that the relationship between the censoring rate and the tolerance scale is somewhat sensitive to the assigned target group. The overall correlation between the tolerance scale and the censoring rate is  $r=.35$  ( $p<.01$ ), which is positive and statistically significant. This provides support for the first hypothesis, which predicted that as political tolerance increases, censorship decreases.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Correlation</b>
Mormons	.07 (p=.67)
Nationalists	.22 (p=.18)
Communists	.23 (p=.16)
Scientologists	.38 (p<.05)
Black power	.39 (p<.05)
Libertarians	.41 (p<.05)
Fascists	.46 (p<.05)
White power	.48 (p<.05)

Table 18. Relationship between Censoring Rate and Tolerance Scale (Student Sample)

In the figure below, the density of the tolerance scale is shown for all groups combined. The density looks normally distributed with a large proportion in the right tail.




Figure 12. Tolerance Scale Density (Student Sample)

In the following figure, the density of the censoring rate is displayed. The density looks like it is negatively skewed. A large proportion of individuals have a high censoring rate.




Figure 13. Censoring Rate Density (Student Sample)

Next, I examine whether the major predictors of political tolerance also predict the behavioral measure. For perceptions of group threat, there are three types of threat which are safety, symbolic, and realistic threat. The three types of threat perceptions were added together and averaged to create a single index of threat.<sup>19</sup> The index ranges from 1 to 7 with higher numbers indicating a greater perception of threat. Scores on the dogmatism scale range from 5 to 55 with higher numbers indicating more dogmatism. The mean score on the dogmatism scale ( $\alpha = .79$ ) is 15.67 ( $SD=4.78$ ). Support for democratic norms and institutions is measured using four questions. The responses were recoded so that higher numbers indicate more support for democratic norms and

<sup>19</sup> See appendix B for table of threat means for each group.

institutions. The responses to these questions were added together and averaged to create a single measure of support for democratic norms and institutions. The democratic norms and institutions index ( $\alpha = .76$ ) ranges from 1 to 5, and the mean was 4.03 (SD= .86).

I ran two regression models with threat, dogmatism, and support for democratic norms and institutions as independent variables. In model 1, the tolerance scores are the dependent variable; while in model 2, the censoring rate is the dependent variable. For the tolerance scores, higher scores mean higher tolerance. The original coding is kept for the censoring rate (higher numbers means more censoring). For the censoring rate, I converted the decimals into whole numbers. The results of the models are presented in the table below.

	<b>Model 1</b> (Tolerance Scale)	<b>Model 2</b> (Censoring Rate)
Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Threat Perception	-3.56* (.24)	3.66* (1.47)
Support for Democratic Norms & Institutions	.94* (.32)	-.61 (1.95)
Dogmatism	-.10* (.06)	.08 (.36)
Intercept	32.03 (2.14)	57.58 (13.05)
N	297	297

\*p < .05, one-tailed test

Table 19. Model of Tolerance (Student Sample)

In model 1, the coefficient for threat perception is negative and statistically significant. As the perception of threat increases, tolerance decreases. The coefficient for support for democratic norms and institutions is positive and statistically significant. More support for democratic norms and institutions leads to an increase in tolerance. Dogmatism has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. An increase in dogmatism leads to a decrease in tolerance. These results provide support for the standard model of tolerance. In model 2, the coefficient for threat is positive and statistically significant. As threat increases, the censoring rate increases. This provides support for hypothesis 2. The coefficient for support for democratic norms and institutions and dogmatism are in the expected directions, but they are not statistically significant. I failed to find support for hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 in the student sample.

*Study 2: MTurk Sample*

The internet sample consisted of 302 participants. The gender split was 57% male and 43% female. Participants varied in age from 20 to 74, and the mean age was 34.47 (SD=10.37). For ideology, 58% said liberal, 25% responded conservative, and 16% said moderate. For party identification, 60% reported Democrat, and 26% responded Republican (including Independent leaners). 11% said they were Independent. 74% reported White for race/ethnicity. As for education, 45% have a bachelor's degree or higher.<sup>20</sup> The means for the censoring rate and the tolerance scores are shown below.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Censoring Rate (Mean)</b>	<b>Tolerance Score (Mean)</b>
Control	39%	--
White power	43%	18.03
Fascists	41%	20.11
Nationalists	40%	22.23
Scientologists	39%	22.25
Communists	36%	22.29
Black power	39%	25.47
Libertarians	43%	26.38
Mormons	39%	27.50

Table 20. Censoring Rate and Tolerance Score (MTurk Sample)

Compared to the student sample, the average censoring rate is much lower. In the control condition the average censoring rate is 39% versus 76% in the student sample. The censoring rate among the other conditions is similar to the control condition. I created contingency tables and calculated chi-square with Yates' continuity correction. None of the differences between the control and the experimental conditions were statistically significant. This seems to suggest that in this particular sample, individuals find some political speech equally objectionable no matter the target group. The tolerance scores are on the higher end of the scale, so the individuals in the MTurk sample seem to be generally tolerant of the groups.

I calculated the correlation between the censoring rate and tolerance scale. I recoded the censoring rate so that it is in a similar direction as the tolerance scale. The correlations for all of the groups are positive, but only 3 groups have statistically

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<sup>20</sup> Tables for race/ethnicity and education are provided in appendix B.

significant coefficients, which are White power, Nationalists, and Fascists. I calculated the correlation with all the conditions combined. The overall correlation between the tolerance scale and the censoring rate is  $r=.25$ , and it is statistically significant ( $p<.01$ ). This provides support for hypothesis 1.

Condition	Correlation
Communists	.13 ( $p=.47$ )
Mormons	.14 ( $p=.44$ )
Libertarians	.16 ( $p=.39$ )
Scientologists	.17 ( $p=.35$ )
Black power	.30 ( $p=.08$ )
White power	.35 ( $p<.05$ )
Nationalists	.40 ( $p<.05$ )
Fascists	.47 ( $p<.01$ )

Table 21. Relationship between Censoring Rate and Tolerance Scale (MTurk Sample)

Next, I display the results of the tolerance scale and censoring rate for all groups. As you can see in the figure below, a large proportion of the sample are at the higher end of the scale, which indicates high political tolerance.




Figure 14. Tolerance Scale Density (MTurk Sample)

In the next figure, the density of the censoring rate is displayed. As you can see, the density looks somewhat bimodal. There are a proportion of individuals that do not censor at all and some individuals that are censoring close to thirty percent of postings.




Figure 15. Censoring Rate Density (MTurk Sample)

Next, I report descriptive statistics for the major predictors of tolerance. As before, I created an index of threat.<sup>21</sup> On the dogmatism scale ( $\alpha = .83$ ), the mean is 15.02 (SD= 4.93). For the democratic institutions and norms index ( $\alpha = .71$ ), the mean is 4.24 (SD= .84).

I ran 2 regression models with perception of group threat, dogmatism, and support for democratic norms and institutions as independent variables. For model 1, the dependent variable is the tolerance scale, and for model 2, the dependent variable is the censoring rate.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Tables for threat are provided in appendix B.

<sup>22</sup> I recoded the decimals to whole numbers.



	<b>Model 1</b> (Tolerance Scale)	<b>Model 2</b> (Censoring Rate)
Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Threat Perception	-3.14* (.23)	2.89* (1.11)
Support for Democratic Norms & Institutions	1.48* (.36)	-4.16* (1.74)
Dogmatism	-.18* (.06)	-1.02* (.30)
Intercept	32.19 (2.16)	61.15 (10.45)
N	264	264

\*p<.05, one-tailed test

Table 22. Models of Tolerance (MTurk Sample)

In model 1, the coefficient for threat is negative and statistically significant. As threat increases, tolerance decreases. Support for democratic norms and institutions is positive and significant. Higher support for democratic norms leads to an increase in tolerance. Dogmatism is negative and statistically significant. An increase in dogmatism results in a decrease in tolerance. In model 2 where the dependent variable is the censoring rate, threat is positive and statistically significant. An increase in threat leads to a higher censoring rate. I found evidence for hypothesis 1. Support for democratic norms and institutions is negative and statistically significant which means that higher support leads to a lower censoring rate. I found evidence for hypothesis 2. Dogmatism is also negative and statistically significant. Higher dogmatism leads to a *lower* censoring rate. This result was surprising and in the opposite of the expected direction. There may be a different set of principles governing the student sample versus the demographically different Turk sample.

Overall, I found some support for my hypotheses. The two samples yielded quite different results. In the student sample, the average rate of censoring was quite high. In contrast, in the internet sample, the average rate of censoring was relatively low. This difference between the student sample and the internet sample is interesting given the current issues on college campuses regarding freedom of speech. At least with this sample, students are fairly intolerant in their behavior compared to Turk sample. An open question is whether students are intolerant in their behavior in general or whether their greater intolerance is specific to political speech. There was a moderate correlation between the tolerance scale and the censoring rate in both samples. When the traditional model of tolerance was applied to the censoring rate, there were some mixed results. In the student sample, only threat was found to predict the censoring rate. In the internet sample, all three predictors were found to influence the censoring rate, though dogmatism

was in the opposite of the predicted direction. The censoring rate and tolerance scale do not necessarily correspond with each other. For example, in the student sample, the tolerance scores were fairly high, which would indicate high tolerance, but their censoring rate was also quite high, suggesting fairly low behavioral tolerance. Threat was found to be a predictor for the tolerance scale and censoring rate in both samples. But, dogmatism and democratic norms and institutions were only predictive in the Turk sample.

Another method of comparing the tolerance judgments and behavior is to examine them by “category type.” For the tolerance scores, I categorized the means according to the groupings outlined by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993). Scores from 22-30 are “more tolerant.” 15-21 is “in-between.” Scores under 15 are “less tolerant.” The mean scores indicate that respondents are “in-between” for White Power and Fascists. For the rest of the groups (Nationalists, Scientologists, Communists, Black Power, Libertarians, and Mormons), respondents are “more tolerant.” To compare the tolerance judgments to censoring behavior, I arbitrarily split the censoring rates into three categorizations (0-33%= low censoring, 34-67%=medium censoring, 68-100%=high censoring) to create the same number of categories as the tolerance judgment groupings. Based on this categorization scheme, the censoring rate for all groupings falls into the “medium censoring” category. The comparison of the two measures based on the groupings is presented in the table below.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Censoring Rate</b>	<b>Tolerance Score</b>
Control	Medium	--
White power	Medium	In-between
Fascists	Medium	In-between
Nationalists	Medium	More tolerant
Scientologists	Medium	More tolerant
Communists	Medium	More tolerant
Black power	Medium	More tolerant
Libertarians	Medium	More tolerant
Mormons	Medium	More tolerant

Table 23. Comparison of the Censoring Rate and Tolerance Score (MTurk)

Based on these categorizations, there seems to be a correspondence between the tolerance judgments for White Power and Fascists. That is, both the censoring rate and tolerance

score results fall under the middle category. However, for the rest of the groups, there is less correspondence. For these groups, individuals are more tolerant in terms of their explicit tolerance judgments, but censor at a medium rate.

Since the tolerance scores and censoring rate are on two different scales, it is difficult to make direct comparisons. To compare these two measures to each other directly, I standardized both measures with the mean at zero and the standard deviation at one. For the censoring rate, I reverse coded the values so that it is in the same direction as the tolerance scores (for easier comparison). The densities are shown in the figure below.




Figure 16. Densities of Standardized Tolerance Scores and Censoring Rate (MTurk)

The densities do not match each other exactly. The densities have the same general shape with a negative skew, but the censoring rate looks somewhat bimodal. For the censoring rate, a large proportion of individuals are centered close to the mean. For the tolerance scores, a large proportion of individuals are close to the standard deviation of one. Next, I examine what accounts for the gap between tolerance judgements and behavior. I ran two models to examine this. For the first model, the independent variables are the standard predictors of tolerance (perceptions of threat, support for democratic norms and institutions, and dogmatism), and the dependent variable is the gap. The coefficient for threat perception is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that higher perceptions of threat are related to a larger gap between tolerance judgments and tolerance behavior. Support for democratic norms and institutions is negative and not statistically significant. Lastly, dogmatism is positive and statistically significant. Higher dogmatism is related to the gap between tolerance judgments and behavior. In the second model, the independent variables are demographic predictors, which include age, gender, education, ideology, and party identification. The coefficients for age and education are

negative, while gender, ideology, and party identification are positive. None of the coefficients are statistically significant. There is no support for demographic characteristics influencing the gap. To summarize, both threat and dogmatism are related to the gap<sup>23</sup> between tolerance judgments and behavior.

Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Threat Perception	.37* (.05)
Support for Democratic Norms and Institutions	-.07 (.08)
Dogmatism	.07* (.01)
Intercept	2.39 (.46)
N	264

\*p<.05

Table 24. Gap Model with Traditional Predictors

Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Age	-.00* (.01)
Gender	.12 (.15)
Education	-.06 (.06)
Ideology	.07 (.06)
Party ID	.04 (.05)
Intercept	-.30 (.40)
N	254

Table 25. Gap Model with Demographic Predictors

<sup>23</sup> Study 2 did not include social desirability measures, so I cannot examine whether the gap was influenced by social desirability.

## Censoring Behavior: A Closer Look

In this section, I examine censoring behavior in-depth. First, I look at how behavior varies by demographic characteristics. I split the sample into subgroups based on demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, ideology, party identification) to examine differences in censoring behavior. Previous studies on various demographic have shown mixed results. Some scholars have found that demographic factors have an effect (Crawford 2014; Crawford and Pilanski 2014; Golebiowska 1999; Owen and Dennis 1987; while others have found little to no effect on tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1981). Age has been shown to influence tolerance. As individuals gets older, they become more tolerant (Owen and Dennis 1987). Gender also influences tolerance; males are more tolerant than females (Golebiowska 1999). Ideology influences tolerance (Crawford 2014; Crawford and Pilanski 2014), but party identification has not been found to be a significant predictor (Owen and Dennis 1987). Education has been shown to have a positive influence on tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Gibson and Tedin 1988; Golebiowska 1995). The question I examine in this section is how similar the demographic predictors for censorship behavior are to the existing results for tolerance.

I calculated the mean censoring rates for different subgroups. For age, I split the sample into two groups young (34 and younger) and old (35 and older). The mean censoring rate is 37% for the young group and 32% for the older group. For males, the censoring rate is 34%, while for females it is 37%. For education, I split the sample into bachelor's degree and above and those that did not receive a bachelor's degree. Four-year college educated and above individuals have a censoring rate of 34%, and the non-college educated have a 36% censoring rate. I split ideology into three categories, liberal, conservative, and moderate. Liberals have a censoring rate of 36%, and Republicans have a censoring rate of 32%. Moderates have a censoring rate of 40%. Using the seven-point party identification scale, I created three categories, Democrat, Republican, and Independent. Democrats have a 38% censoring rate, while Republicans have a 31% censoring rate (including leaners). Independents have 34% censoring rate. To further examine the influence of these demographic variables, I ran regression models to see the effect of these variables on the censoring rate. The results are displayed in the table below.

	<b>(Model A) Censoring Rate</b>	<b>(Model B) Tolerance Scale</b>
Independent Variable	Estimates (Standard Errors)	Estimates (Standard Errors)
Age	-.38* (.15)	.10* (.05)
Gender	2.80 (3.09)	-2.53* (1.13)
Education	.50 (1.22)	.60 (.45)
Ideology	.75 (1.29)	-.64 (.45)
Party ID	-2.28* (1.13)	.28 (.41)
Intercept	47.61 (8.40)	19.46 (3.07)
N	286	288

\*p<.05, two-tailed test

Table 26. Tolerance Models with Demographic Variables

Age and party identification have statistically significant coefficients. Education, gender, and ideology do not have statistically significant coefficients. Age has a negative coefficient, demonstrating that as age increases, the censoring rate decreases. The coefficient for party identification is negative. The more someone identifies as a Republican, the *lower* the censoring rate. I also ran an additional model with the tolerance scale as the dependent variable for comparison. Model B is useful as a comparison to the results of Model A. In model B, the coefficient for age and gender is statistically significant. As age increases, tolerance scores increase. Gender has a negative coefficient. Being female results in a decrease in tolerance scores. Education, ideology, and party identification are not statistically significant. In sum, age predicts both the censoring rate and tolerance scale. Party identification is predictive for the censoring rate, and gender predicts the tolerance scale.

Next, I examine two different types of people, those that allowed all postings and those that censored all postings. Individuals that allowed all postings may be considered the most tolerant behaviorally, while the opposite is the least tolerant. 15% of the sample did not censor any postings, while 4% censored all postings. Another interesting category is the most common censoring rate. For 35% of the sample, the censoring rate was 25%. While this represents a general picture of censoring behavior, a further question is which posting categories were most commonly censored. Recall, I created four categories of postings, which are beliefs/values, power, negative comments about the opponent, and violence/threats of violence. Postings about beliefs/values had an average censoring rate of 15%, the lowest among the four categories. 70% did not censor any postings for

beliefs/values, while 5% censored all postings for beliefs/values. Postings about power had an average censoring rate of 21%. For power postings, 58% of the sample did not censor any postings, while 7% censored all postings. Comments about the opponent's character had a censoring rate of 33%. For character postings, 45% of the sample did not censor any postings, and 12% censored all postings. The average censoring rate for violent postings is 91%, the highest among the four categories. 4% did not censor any postings, while 82% censored all postings. The tables below display the posting results.

Posting Category	Censoring Rate (Mean)
Beliefs/values	15%
Power	21%
Opponent character	33%
Violence	91%

Table 27. Censoring Rate Means by Posting Category

Posting type	Allowed all postings (% of total)	Deleted all postings (% of total)
Beliefs/values postings	70%	5%
Power postings	58%	7%
Opponent character postings	45%	12%
Violence postings	4%	82%
All postings	15%	4%

Table 28. Response by Posting Category

The following figures show the densities for each category of postings. The first three figures show positively skewed distributions, while the fourth figure is a negatively skewed distribution.




Figure 17. Density of Censoring Rate for Beliefs/Values Postings




Figure 18. Density of Censoring Rate for Power Postings






Figure 19. Density of Censoring Rate for Character Postings




Figure 20. Density of Censoring Rate for Violent Postings

To summarize, age and party identification<sup>24</sup> predict behavioral tolerance. Party identification has a larger effect on behavioral tolerance than age. Older individuals and Republicans are associated with a *decrease* in the censoring rate. Gender, education, and

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<sup>24</sup> I also examined the interaction between party identification and type of group. The interaction was not statistically significant.

ideology did not predict behavioral tolerance. These results are interesting because some previous research has shown that gender, education, and ideology have a positive effect on tolerance, but this was not found for censorship behavior. In terms of the content of the postings, the values/beliefs category was the least censored, while the violence/threats of violence were the most censored. The differences were quite large in some cases. For instance, the mean censoring rate for violent postings was 90%, while the next largest category, comments about the opponent's character, was only 33%. These findings suggest that the content of postings mattered in the decision to allow or delete postings. The results of these studies show the censoring rate also lines up somewhat with the traditional measure of tolerance, but there are some interesting differences.

### **Experiment 3: The Effect of Priming Values on Tolerance**

In the third study, I examine whether priming values can influence tolerance judgments and behavior. It is important to understand whether judgments and behaviors can be influenced by external factors. The effect of priming values on tolerance behavior has not been explored. Previous studies have looked at the effect of priming values on attitudes towards freedom of speech (Cowan et al. 2002; Downs and Cowan 2012). As a society, particularly in the United States, we would like to encourage people to be politically tolerant of others even when the individual or group has beliefs that are extremely antagonistic to one's own beliefs. However, the social values held in American society can be supportive of political tolerance or intolerance. Individual freedom and expression are valued, but conformity is also valued. Freedom of political expression and affiliation is one of the main political values, but political parties like the Communists have been considered so dangerous that it was a moral duty to oppose them. Different values have historically been used to promote tolerant or intolerant behavior. The broader question is, how effective are social values for promoting political tolerance?

There are many ways to define types of values, and a simple classification is values focusing on positive and negative aspects of a given situation. For example, a positive aspect can be described as the possible benefits of diverse ideas, while a negative aspect concerns the detriments of dangerous ideas in society. The former focuses on the diversity of ideas as a benefit, while the latter focuses on potential dangers, which may bring to mind thoughts related to order, safety, and security. Tolerance judgments involve a response to a survey question, so these responses may be more susceptible to change, while tolerance behavior may be more resistant to change. Priming, whether values or some other stimulus, involves activating associations and concepts in the mind. Priming is "temporarily giving an edge to one concept over others by affecting its corresponding mental representation" (Eitam and Higgins 2010, 2). Behavior should not be influenced by priming in this case because activation of concepts itself is not sufficient to change behavior. There are other variables like motivational relevance that influence whether behavior will change (Eitam and Higgins 2010). Therefore, I expect that the priming values should influence tolerance judgements but not tolerance behavior.

## Hypotheses

H1: Tolerance judgments will be highest (more tolerant) in the positive value condition, less tolerant in the neutral condition, and least tolerant in the negative value condition.  
H2: Tolerance behavior will not be significantly different across the three value conditions.

## Experiment Design and Measures

I conduct an experiment in which I prime values and test the effect on tolerance judgments and behavior. The experiment consists of three priming conditions and two group conditions. In the priming conditions, participants were randomly assigned one of three types of statements: neutral, positive, or negative. In the neutral statement, they were asked to list two political ideas. In the positive statement, they were asked to “list two reasons why it is valuable in our society to have diverse political ideas.” In the negative statement, they were similarly asked to “list two reasons why it is dangerous in our society to have radical political ideas.” The key changes are in the wording indicating a positive (valuable/diverse) or negative (dangerous/radical) statement. To reduce the number of group conditions, I selected two groups out of the eight groups that have been used in my previous studies. The two groups are Black power and White power. Participants were first randomly assigned the priming condition followed by the group condition. The experiment has a total of six conditions (3 X 2 design). I ran two different studies with MTurk samples. The difference between the studies is the ordering of the censoring task and tolerance scale. In study 1, participants were given the tolerance scale first followed by the censoring task. In study 2, the ordering was reversed with the censoring task being presented first. In both studies, the tolerance scale and censoring task were separated by unrelated survey questions. In addition to the censoring task and tolerance scale, I included other survey questions such as demographics.

## Results and Discussion

### *Study 1*

There were 205 participants in study 1. The mean age was 34.86 (SD=10.96) with ages ranging from 19 to 67. For gender, 46% said male, and 54% said female. For ideology, 49% identified as liberal, 24% as conservative, and 26% as moderate. For party identification, there were 52% Democrats, 30% Republicans (including Independent leaners), and 14% Independents. 70% identified as White. 44% reported completing a bachelor’s degree or higher.<sup>25</sup>

Next, I describe descriptive statistics across all conditions. Recall, tolerance scores range from 6 to 30 with higher scores meaning more tolerance. The censoring rate is a percentage from 0 to 100 with higher numbers indicating more censoring of postings. The combined mean tolerance score for White power is 17.28 (SD= 6.73), and the average censoring rate is 50%. For Black power, the mean tolerance score is 24.40

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<sup>25</sup> Tables for race/ethnicity and education are displayed in appendix B.

(SD=5.59), and the average censoring rate is 46%. The following tables show the results by condition.

	Positive	Neutral (Control)	Negative
Black power	25.03	24.30	23.61
White power	17.74	19.24	14.21

Table 29. Tolerance Scores by Condition

	Positive	Neutral (Control)	Negative
Black power	43%	50%	46%
White power	56%	41%	54%

Table 30. Censoring Rate by Condition

The following figures show the results of the experiment. I expected tolerance scores to be lowest in the negative condition and highest in the positive condition. I predicted scores in the neutral condition to be in between the negative condition and neutral condition. For Black power, the negative condition has the lowest score and the positive condition has the highest score. T-tests reveal the tolerance scores for Black power are not statistically different from each other. The t-test between the negative condition and control is not significant ( $p=.64$ ). Similarly, a t-test between the positive condition and control is not significant ( $p=.58$ ). Lastly, the test between the positive and negative conditions is not significant ( $p=.31$ ). For White power, the tolerance score is lowest in the negative condition. The tolerance score in the positive condition does not look different from the control. A t-test between the negative condition and control is statistically significant ( $p<.01$ ). The result between the positive condition and control is not significant ( $p=.83$ ). A t-test between the positive and negative condition is significant ( $p<.01$ ). The results are the displayed in the figures below. The first two figures show the tolerance scores, and the latter two figures show the censoring rates.




Figure 21. Black Power Tolerance Scores by Condition




Figure 22. White Power Tolerance Scores by Condition




Figure 23. Black Power Censoring Rate by Condition




Figure 24. White Power Censoring Rate by Condition

Study 2

There were 199 participants in study 2.<sup>26</sup> The age of participants ranged from 20 to 66 with a mean age of 33.83 (SD=9.73). The gender split was 62% male and 38% female. For ideology, 55% reported liberal, 23% said conservative, and 22% said moderate. For party identification, 62% identified with the Democratic Party, 21% with the Republican Party (including Independent leaners), and 15% identified as Independents. For race/ethnicity, 63% reported White. 54% reported completing a bachelor’s degree or higher.<sup>27</sup>

I first present descriptive statistics across all conditions. For Black power, the average rate of censoring is 51% across all conditions. The mean tolerance score for Black power is 22.54 (SD=5.42). The average rate of censoring for White power is 47%, and the mean tolerance score for White power is 18.88 (SD=6.48). The tables below display the results by condition.

	Positive	Neutral (Control)	Negative
Black power	22.13	23.67	21.89
White power	20.17	19.13	17.07

Table 31. Tolerance Scores by Condition

	Positive	Neutral (Control)	Negative
Black power	48%	57%	48%
White power	43%	46%	52%

Table 32. Censoring Rate by Condition

In the following figures, the results of the experiment are displayed. I expected there to be no difference in the censoring rates between the conditions. I calculated difference of means test, and they were not statistically significant. The censoring rate does not differ among the conditions.

Since the tolerance scale came after the censoring task, scores may have been affected, so the results should be considered with the possibility of contamination from the censoring task. Looking at the figure for Black Power, the highest score is the neutral condition, while the scores for the negative and positive condition are nearly the same. In the figure for White Power, the scores conform to the prediction. Scores are lowest in the negative condition and highest in the positive condition. The tolerance score for the

<sup>26</sup> I collected data for 200 participants, but an unknown error reported by a participant resulted in partial data for the participant. I dropped their data from the analysis.

<sup>27</sup> Tables for race/ethnicity and education are provided in appendix B.

neutral condition is in between. However, difference of means tests reveal that the experimental conditions do not differ significantly from the control condition. A t-test between the negative condition and neutral condition was not significant ( $p=.11$ ). Similarly, a t-test between the positive and neutral condition was not significant ( $p=.25$ ). Only the test between the negative and positive condition was significant,  $p<.05$ .




Figure 25. Black Power Tolerance Scores by Condition




Figure 26. White Power Tolerance Scores by Condition






Figure 27. Black Power Tolerance Scores by Condition




Figure 28. White Power Censoring Rate by Condition

The overall results do not provide evidence that priming social values influences tolerance judgments. The evidence also does not indicate that tolerance behavior is influenced by priming social values. I made a prediction that tolerance judgments would be affected by social values and that tolerance behavior would not be affected. There are some possibilities for the null findings. Perhaps the priming task was not strong enough or direct enough to induce an effect. Another possibility is that other social values might

have a stronger effect, and the ones primed in these studies may not be as strong or have no effect. There may also have been some interaction with the target groups chosen. For instance, White power is often viewed as a bigoted group, in which case priming for diversity of ideas could result in less tolerance for White power in particular, but not other groups.

### **Caveats and Supplementary Studies**

While the studies presented in the previous chapters mostly consisted of experiments and were carefully thought out, they still have some drawbacks. One obvious drawback is the lack of representativeness of the samples. While the MTurk samples are much more diverse than the student samples, they do not mirror the population of the United States. The samples tended to skew male,<sup>28</sup> Democratic, liberal, and more educated. Some of the proportions of various race/ethnic categories were over or under represented. Since many of the studies were experimental, the random assignment should have in theory created groupings where the distribution of various characteristics is approximately equal. In appendix B, I display tables with percentages of demographic characteristics by conditions in each of the experiments. Some of the cells are well balanced, while others did not have balanced demographic characteristics.

To see whether tolerance judgments are similar to representative samples, I compare the tolerance scores from 2016 General Social Survey (GSS) to the tolerance scores from experiment 1.<sup>29</sup> In the GSS, tolerance is assessed with the following prompts: whether a particular person should be allowed to make a speech, whether a book should be removed from the library, and whether a particular person should be allowed to teach. The questions ask about six types of individuals: anti-American Muslim clergymen, anti-religionist, racist, communist, homosexual, and militarist. Participants are given binary response options (allow or not allow). For example, one of the questions asks, “Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?” The group that my studies have in common with the GSS are Communists. I converted the tolerance scores in experiment 1 to binary responses to make the percentages comparable.<sup>30</sup> The table is presented below. There is a 14% gap on the speech question, while only a 3% difference for the teach question.

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<sup>28</sup> Experiment 3, study 1 had a higher percentage of females than males.

<sup>29</sup> I only present the results for experiment 1 because the other experiments have other tasks that may have affected the tolerance scores.

<sup>30</sup> The tolerance response scale is from 1 to 5. I converted the agree responses (4,5) to “allow” and the disagree response (1,2) to “not allow.” I dropped the middle response (3) since it was the neutral point between agree and disagree.

	Experiment 1	GSS
Communist Make a Speech	83%	69%
Communist Allowed to Teach	68%	65% <sup>31</sup>

Table 33. Comparison with GSS

Since I could only compare the results of one group from one experiment, it is difficult to say anything conclusive about the difference between the tolerance judgments in my sample and the General Social Survey, except that there are some differences. Another area of concern is that some of my data collection occurred during the 2016 United States presidential election, which may have impacted the results. To examine the effect of the election, I ran a series of studies examining whether both the tolerance scores and censoring behavior differed during the election (November 2016) and post-election (February 2017). First, participants were randomly assigned to the control condition or the experimental condition (Muslims). If they received the control condition, they were given the control condition for the forum task. Recall, in the control condition, there is no group associated with the postings (General Discussion forum). If they received the experimental condition, they were given Muslims for the forum task and the tolerance scale. I ran these studies with student samples and MTurk samples.

#### *Supplementary Study*

There were 63 participants in the November student sample. The mean tolerance score is 26.87 (SD=3.89). Tolerance scores ranged from 15 to 30. For the tolerance behavior task, the censoring rate was 71% in the control condition, while the censoring rate for the Muslim condition was 81%. There were 69 participants in the post-election student sample. The mean tolerance score is 27.94 (SD=2.99). The range of scores was from 18 to 30. For the control condition, the censoring rate was 76%, while the censoring rate for the Muslim condition was 78%. For the November MTurk sample, there were 40 participants total. The mean tolerance score for Muslims is 27.80 (SD=3.68). The lowest score was 19, and the highest was 30. For the control condition, the average rate of censoring was 37%. For the Muslim condition, the average rate of censoring was 49%. 40 participants were in the post-election MTurk sample. The mean tolerance score is 26.3 (SD= 4.72). Again, the scores ranged from 19 to 30. For the control condition, the average rate of censoring was 41% whereas the average rate of censoring was 53% for the Muslim condition.

Looking at the means for both the censoring rate and tolerance scores, there does not seem to be a large change between November and February. I did difference of means tests to determine whether the tolerance scores and censoring rate during the election and

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<sup>31</sup> The GSS question for Communists teaching is phrased differently. The question asks, “Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. B. Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?”

after the election were statistically different from each other. I did not find significant differences, which suggest the election did not impact the results. Based on these studies, there does not seem to be evidence that the 2016 U.S. presidential election influenced my studies.

The last area of concern is the choice of groups included in the studies. The issue is that some of the groups in the study may not have fit with the conceptual definition of political tolerance. The important distinction in the concept of political tolerance is that individuals must *dislike* the group to be able to tolerate the group. “[P]olitical tolerance does not exist when there is no real objection...” (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993, 73). Recall, the groups were chosen empirically based on the results of the pretest study. As discussed in the chapter describing experiment 1, the means for group dislike were different than the pretest study. That is, individuals generally reported greater liking for the groups in the main studies compared to the pretest study. A table comparing the affect (liking) towards groups is displayed in Appendix B. Some of the groups may not have been disliked sufficiently to measure political tolerance. For instance, in study 1, Black power would have been excluded based on the cutoff criteria from the pretest. In this case, maybe it would not have been appropriate to measure tolerance towards Black power. In other examples, some of the groups may have been considered more neutral rather than disliked.

## Conclusion

The studies presented in the empirical chapters have given some insight into political tolerance, while also presenting new questions that may be addressed in future studies. I return to the set of questions that I presented at the beginning of this dissertation. The first question asks, “are people managing impressions of their own tolerance, and are their statements being changed by the social value of the questions about groups?” The pretest study demonstrated that groups vary in their acceptability to dislike. In experiment one, I found evidence that tolerance scores are higher in the acceptable to dislike condition relative to the neutral condition. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from this because the groups were not matched exactly on dislike. The difference may be due to differences in dislike rather than social acceptability. Implicit attitudes by itself predicted tolerance, but when explicit attitudes were included in the model, implicit attitudes no longer predicted tolerance. I found that the gap between explicit and implicit attitudes varied by group. The neutral acceptability groups had a larger gap than the acceptable to dislike groups. I did not find a difference in tolerance scores between those high and low on the social desirability scale. As stated previously, the split may not have yielded individuals that are actually high on the social desirability scale. Based on these results, the answer to the question of whether people are managing impressions of their tolerance is mixed. Alternative methods of measuring social desirability may help answer this question in future studies.

In the second question, I asked, “are people tolerant or intolerant in their behavior? To what extent does people's behavior correspond to their own expressed tolerance?” In experiment two, I created a new measure of behavioral tolerance, which was a censoring task. Based on the college sample, students were relatively intolerant in

their behavior due to a high censoring rate, despite their tolerance scores being relatively high. On the other hand, the MTurk sample had a lower censoring rate compared to the student sample. Whether the MTurk sample is intolerant in their behavior depends on whether one believes that an average of a 40% censoring rate is considered low or not (according to the categorization scheme discussed earlier, the censoring rate is medium). The MTurk sample like the student sample had relatively high tolerance scores. There was a moderate correlation between the tolerance scale and the censoring rate, suggesting that the two are somewhat related. The traditional predictors of tolerance, which are threat perceptions, dogmatism, and democratic norms and institutions, also predict censoring behavior. The interesting finding is that dogmatism influences censoring behavior in the opposite direction. Threat and dogmatism influence the gap between tolerance scores and tolerance behavior. Demographic predictors have no influence on the gap. In terms of demographic factors, age and party identification influence censoring behavior, while age and gender influence tolerance judgments. The predictors of censoring behavior somewhat align with the traditional tolerance model, but there are some differences. The content of postings in the censoring task had a large effect on the censoring rate. Overall, behavior does correspond to expressed tolerance, but with some important differences.

The third question asked, “can values be manipulated to change people's stated tolerance or their actual behavior or both?” In experiment three, I primed social values to examine the effect on censoring behavior and tolerance. The priming of social values did not appear to affect tolerance or censoring behavior. In future studies, there could be other ways to prime social values more strongly or directly to see if there is an effect. An alternative explanation is that tolerance judgments and behavior are resistant to priming.

When it really matters, how much is the mass public committed the ideal of tolerance for groups and ideas regardless of how disagreeable those groups and ideas are? The data shows that people are not equally committed to tolerance for all groups under all circumstances. Previous work has largely assumed that stated tolerance is an accurate measure of people's tolerance. In this dissertation, I have shown that this assumption is false. There are social influences on tolerance, and scholars must carefully consider these influences when examining and measuring political tolerance. Additionally, I have shown that tolerance judgments do not necessarily correspond to tolerance behavior. Scholars should consider tolerance behavior alongside tolerance judgments. Tolerance behavior itself is important given that people may take actions that support or oppose the extension of civil liberties.

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## Appendix A

### *Group Attitude*

Do you think other people generally like or dislike [group]?

Like a lot

Like

Like a little

Neutral

Dislike a little

Dislike

Dislike a lot

Don't know group

### *Acceptability*

How acceptable is it for other people to express dislike of [group]?

Very acceptable (people expressing dislike will be viewed favorably)

Acceptable

Slightly acceptable

Neutral (people expressing dislike will be viewed neither favorably nor unfavorably)

Slightly unacceptable

Unacceptable

Very unacceptable (people expressing dislike will be viewed unfavorably)

### *Balanced Inventory of Desirable Reporting (Paulhus 1991)*

Not True

Very True

### Impression Management

I sometimes tell lies if I have to.

I never cover up my mistakes.

There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.

I never swear.

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.

I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.

When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.

I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.

I always declare everything at customs.

When I was young I sometimes stole things.

I have never dropped litter on the street.

I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.

I never read sexy books or magazines.

I have done things that I don't tell other people about.

I never take things that don't belong to me.

I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.

I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.

I have some pretty awful habits.  
I don't gossip about other people's business.

*Dogmatism Scale, Updated* (Shearman and Levine 2006)

Strongly disagree  
Strongly agree

People who disagree with me are usually wrong.  
Having multiple perspectives on an issue is usually desirable. (reverse coded)  
There is a single correct way to do most things.  
Diversity of opinion and background is valuable in any group or organization. (reverse coded)  
It is important to be open to different points of view. (reverse coded)  
I am a “my way or the highway” type of person.  
There are often many different acceptable ways to solve a problem. (reverse coded)  
I consider myself to be open-minded. (reverse coded)  
Different points of view should be encouraged. (reverse coded)  
People who are very different from us can be dangerous.  
I am “set in my ways.”

*Group Dislike Rating*

Please rate how you feel about this [group]?  
Dislike a lot  
Neutral  
Like a lot

*Threat Perceptions* (Crawford 2014)

To no extent at all  
To a great extent

To what extent does this [group] violate your core values and beliefs?  
To what extent does this [group] take away from societal resources from people like you?  
To what extent does this [group] makes our society more dangerous and less safe?  
To what extent does this [group] strengthen the values, norms, and traditions that are important to you? (reverse scored)  
To what extent does this [group] reject moral values that are important to you?  
To what extent should this [group] have more influence in our society? (reverse scored)  
To what extent does this [group] hold too many positions of power and responsibility in our society?  
To what extent is this [group] not physically dangerous to people like you. (reverse scored)  
To what extent does this group endanger the physical safety of people like you?

*Tolerance Scale*

Agree  
Disagree

Members of the [group] should be banned from running for public office.  
Members of the [group] should be allowed to teach in public schools.  
The [group] should be outlawed.  
Members of the [group] should be allowed to make a speech in this city.  
The [group] should have their electronic communications monitored by our government.  
The [group] should be allowed to hold public rallies in our city.

*Education*

What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
Did not graduate from high school  
High school graduate  
Some college, but no degree (yet)  
2-year college degree  
4-year college degree  
Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

*Gender*

What is your gender?  
Male  
Female

*Ideology*

Below is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?  
Extremely liberal  
Liberal  
Slightly liberal  
Moderate or middle of the road  
Slightly conservative  
Conservative  
Extremely conservative  
Don't know

*Party Identification*

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?  
Democrat  
Republican  
Independent  
Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

*Independent Lean*

Do you think of yourself as close to the Democratic or Republican party?

Democratic Party

Republican Party

Neither

*Republican*

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

Strong Republican

Not very strong Republican

*Democrat*

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

Strong Democrat

Not very strong Democrat

*Race/Ethnicity*

Which racial or ethnic group best describes you?

White

Black or African-American

Hispanic or Latino

Asian or Asian-American

Native American

Middle Eastern

Mixed Race

Other (please specify)

Appendix B

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike (Mean)</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike (Mean)</b>
Anarchists	5.43	3.51
Capitalists	4.27	3.91
Communists	5.77	3.28
Fascists	5.54	3.36
Nationalists	3.88	4.02
Libertarians	4.03	3.99
Socialists	4.37	3.87
Radical Liberals	4.63	3.84
Radical Conservatives	5.25	3.59

Table A. Ratings for Political Groups (Pretest Student Sample)



<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike</b>
Atheists	4.71	3.93
Christians	3.50	4.73
Anti-Christians	5.11	4.12
Jews	3.74	5.24
Anti-Jews	5.38	4.16
Mormons	4.24	4.42
Anti-Mormons	4.59	4.15
Muslims	4.72	4.86
Anti-Muslims	4.89	3.98
Scientologists	4.48	3.74

Table B. Ratings for Religious and Anti-Religious Groups (Pretest Student Sample)

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike</b>
Black rights	3.85	4.88
Black power	4.20	4.72
Feminists	4.02	4.49
Anti-feminists	5.25	4.05
Gay rights	3.85	4.86
Anti- gay rights	5.31	3.95
Immigrant	3.83	4.71
Anti-immigrant	5.14	3.98
White power	5.72	3.33

Table C. Ratings for Social Groups (Pretest Student Sample)

<b>Group</b>	<b>Dislike</b>	<b>Unacceptability of Dislike</b>
Pro-life	4.16	3.95
Pro-choice	3.87	4.20
Radical environmentalists	4.33	3.94
Anti-war	3.55	3.87
Pro-war	5.15	3.63

Table D. Ratings for Issue Groups (Pretest Student Sample)

<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>%</b>
White	76%
Black/African-American	6%
Hispanic/Latino	6%
Asian/Asian-American	9%
Native American	<1%
Middle Eastern	0%
Mixed Race	4%
Other	0%

Table E. Race/Ethnicity of Pretest MTurk Sample

<b>Education</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not graduate from high school	0%
High school graduate	15%
Some college, but no degree yet	26%
2-year college degree	11%
4-year college degree	38%
Postgraduate degree	10%

Table F. Education of Pretest MTurk Sample

<b>Group</b>	<b>Responded</b>	<b>Don't know</b>	<b>% (responded/total)</b>
Anarchists	242	10	96.8
Capitalists	243	9	96.4
Communists	249	3	98.4
Fascists	236	16	93.6
Nationalists	228	24	90.5
Libertarians	241	11	95.6
Socialists	247	5	98.0
Radical Liberals	250	2	99.2
Radical Conservatives	251	1	99.6

Table G. Knowledge of Political Groups (Pretest MTurk Sample)

<b>Group</b>	<b>Responded</b>	<b>Don't know</b>	<b>% (responded/total)</b>
Christians	248	4	98.4
Anti-Christians	251	1	99.6
Jews	251	1	99.6
Anti-Jews	250	2	99.2
Mormons	250	2	99.2
Anti-Mormons	246	6	97.6
Muslims	197	55	78.1
Anti-Muslims	226	26	89.6
Scientists	250	2	99.2

Table H. Knowledge of Religious and Anti-Religious Groups (Pretest MTurk Sample)

<b>Group</b>	<b>Responded</b>	<b>Don't know</b>	<b>% (responded/total)</b>
Black power	251	1	99.6
Feminists	232	20	92.1
Anti-feminists	250	2	99.2
Gay rights	241	11	95.6
Anti- gay rights	251	1	99.6
Immigrant	235	17	93.3
Anti-immigrant	251	1	99.6
White power	251	1	99.6

Table I. Knowledge of Social Groups (Pretest MTurk Sample)

<b>Group</b>	<b>Responded</b>	<b>Don't know</b>	<b>% (responded/total)</b>
Pro-choice	248	4	98.4
Radical environmentalists	251	1	99.6
Anti-war	250	2	99.2
Pro-war	251	1	99.6

Table J. Knowledge of Issue Groups (Pretest MTurk Sample)

<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>%</b>
White	73%
Black/African-American	12%
Hispanic/Latino	6%
Asian/Asian-American	6%
Native American	1%
Middle Eastern	<1%
Mixed Race	1%
Other	1%

Table K. Race/Ethnicity of Experiment 1 MTurk Sample

<b>Education</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not graduate from high school	0%
High school graduate	10%
Some college, but no degree yet	26%
2-year college degree	16%
4-year college degree	41%
Postgraduate degree	7%

Table L. Education of Experiment 1 MTurk Sample

<b>Demographics</b>	<b>Acceptable to Dislike Condition</b>	<b>Neutral Acceptability Condition</b>
Gender (Male, Female)	51%, 49%	51%, 49%
Mean Age	37	37
Ideology (Liberal, Conservative)	52%, 23%	52%, 27%
Party Identity (Democrat, Republican)	69%, 20%	56%, 29%
White	71%	75%
Bachelor's Degree and above	46%	49%

Table M. Demographics by Condition (Experiment 1 MTurk)

<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>%</b>
White	74%
Black/African-American	8%
Hispanic/Latino	7%
Asian/Asian-American	8%
Native American	<1%
Middle Eastern	0%
Mixed Race	3%
Other	<1%

Table N. Race/Ethnicity of Experiment 2 MTurk

<b>Education</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not graduate from high school	<1%
High school graduate	14%
Some college, but no degree yet	28%
2-year college degree	12%
4-year college degree	39%
Postgraduate degree	6%

Table O. Education of Experiment 2 MTurk

<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>%</b>
White	70%
Black/African-American	9%
Hispanic/Latino	8%
Asian/Asian-American	6%
Native American	<1%
Middle Eastern	1%
Mixed Race	3%
Other	<1%

Table P. Race/Ethnicity of Experiment 3, Study 1 MTurk

<b>Education</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not graduate from high school	0%
High school graduate	11%
Some college, but no degree yet	33%
2-year college degree	12%
4-year college degree	36%
Postgraduate degree	8%

Table Q. Education of Experiment 3, Study 1 MTurk



<b>Demographics</b>	<b>Negative Prime Black/ White</b>	<b>Neutral Prime Black/ White</b>	<b>Positive Prime Black/ White</b>
Gender (M, F)	46%, 54% 32%, 68%	54%, 45% 41%, 59%	50%, 50% 50%, 50%
Mean Age	32 35	35 35	34 36
Ideology (Lib, Con)	39%, 29% 64%, 21%	54%, 18% 44%, 26%	38%, 30% 55%, 21%
Party Identity (Dem, Rep)	46%, 31% 72%, 24%	56%, 25% 59%, 35%	44%, 33% 55%, 35%
White	75% 64%	79% 62%	80% 62%
Bachelor's Degree and above	36% 36%	42% 47%	42% 47%

Table R. Demographics by Priming Condition (Experiment 3, Study 1 MTurk)

<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>	<b>%</b>
White	63%
Black/African-American	7%
Hispanic/Latino	6%
Asian/Asian-American	22%
Native American	2%
Middle Eastern	0%
Mixed Race	1%
Other	0%

Table S. Race/Ethnicity of Experiment 3, Study 2 MTurk

<b>Education</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not graduate from high school	0%
High school graduate	11%
Some college, but no degree yet	25%
2-year college degree	10%
4-year college degree	38%
Postgraduate degree	16%

Table T. Education of Experiment 3, Study 2 MTurk

<b>Demographics</b>	<b>Negative Prime Black/ White</b>	<b>Neutral Prime Black/ White</b>	<b>Positive Prime Black/ White</b>
Gender (M, F)	64%, 36% 70%, 30%	52%, 48% 56%, 44%	63%, 38% 67%, 33%
Mean Age	32 34	35 34	35 33
Ideology (Lib, Con)	56%, 19% 53%, 20%	58%, 18% 53%, 19%	50%, 31% 61%, 28%
Party Identity (Dem, Rep)	71%, 17% 61%, 25%	64%, 15% 66%, 19%	66%, 31% 51%, 23%
White	58% 60%	64% 78%	63% 58%
Bachelor's Degree and above	58% 33%	61% 56%	53% 58%

Table U. Demographics by Priming Condition (Experiment 3, Study 2 MTurk)

	Student (Nov. 2016)	Student (Feb. 2017)	MTurk (Nov. 2016)	MTurk (Feb. 2017)
Censoring Rate (Control)	.71	.76	.37	.41
Censoring Rate (Muslim)	.81	.78	.49	.53
Tolerance Score (Muslim)	26.87	27.94	27.80	26.30

Table V. Censoring Rates and Tolerance Scores by Sample


<b>Group</b>	<b>1 (MTurk)</b>	<b>2 (MTurk)</b>	<b>3.1 (MTurk)</b>	<b>3.2 (MTurk)</b>	<b>Pretest</b>	<b>Dislike=7</b>
Communists	4.59	4.94	-	-	6.13	
Fascists	5.45	5.60	-	-	6.07	
Scientologists	4.94	5.66	-	-	5.70	
White power	6.03	6.00	6.55	5.81	6.32	
Nationalists	3.93	5.27	-	-	4.82	
Libertarians	4.10	4.22	-	-	4.07	
Mormons	4.24	4.08	-	-	4.40	
Black Power	3.87	4.67	4.96	4.77	5.43	

Table W. Group Ratings across Studies