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# An equilibrium theory of rationing

Richard J. Gilbert\*

and

Paul Klemperer\*\*

*Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value consumers who are the marginal consumers the monopolist wants to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost “second sources” rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain “efficiency wages,” “second prizes,” and “fair” behavior.*

## 1. Introduction

■ Economists praise the virtues of price as a mechanism to equate supply and demand, but markets often clear by nonprice means. For example, Intel has sometimes rationed the supply of its microprocessors rather than raise its price to clear the market (Burke, 1990). There is also evidence of rationing of several metals, electronic parts, metal fasteners, gypsum board, personal computers, semiconductors, compact disks, titanium dioxide, polypropylene, petrochemicals, and children’s toys.<sup>1</sup> Restaurants and movie theaters usually turn away late arrivals at peak hours rather than invite them to bid for scarce seats. A mild form of rationing that is very commonly observed is that some customers receive a good without delay, while others must wait longer for all or part of their orders to be fulfilled without receiving any compensating price discount (Rotemberg and Summers, 1990). Finally, and conversely to suppliers rationing purchasers rather than raising price, purchasers sometimes “second-source” some of their requirements, rather than cutting costs by procuring only from the lowest-cost supplier.

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<sup>1</sup> Popular toys have been rationed both by manufacturers (e.g., Mattel, Hasbro) among retailers who invest resources in displaying the manufacturers’ lines, and by retailers to consumers. See DeGaba (1995), Carlton (1991), Ghemawat (1986), Haddock and McChesney (1994), McKinnon and Olewiler (1980), and Slade (1991) for these examples.

This article explains why a rational seller may prefer to set prices at which there is excess demand and ration output rather than set market-clearing prices. The key feature is that consumers must incur sunk costs that are specific to the seller before they can use the seller's product. For example, a computer manufacturer must invest in product design and, perhaps, software and other complementary products to be able to use a new microprocessor chip. In such a situation, prices must be set to compensate consumers for the sunk costs they incur, or consumers will not make the investments necessary to use the seller's product. While it is feasible in these markets to set prices that do not result in rationing, we show that this may not be optimal for the seller. Although rationing is *ex post* inefficient, it changes the distribution of surplus among consumers relative to market-clearing prices. As a consequence, rationing in some states of demand may allow higher prices in other states, and thus higher profits.

Section 2 describes our model, and Section 3 develops the basic argument: setting prices that avoid rationing requires high prices that clear the market in high-demand states, together with prices that are low enough in low-demand states to give consumers sufficient *ex post* surplus to cover their investment costs. But this pattern of prices favors consumers who are more likely to be in the market when demand is low, and such consumers will typically be the inframarginal investors. Offering a low price in the low-demand state is a costly way for the seller to attract the marginal investor (i.e., marginal potential consumer) if the marginal investor is relatively unlikely to wish to consume when demand is low. Charging lower than market-clearing prices in high-demand states may attract this potential consumer at a lower cost to the seller, even though the ensuing rationing is *ex post* inefficient.

We show that rationing is most likely to be profitable when the marginal consumer gains more from lower prices in high-demand than in low-demand states (relative to other consumers), when consumers' valuations are not too dissimilar (so rationing is not too *ex post* inefficient), and when consumers' sunk costs are neither insignificant nor so large that it is not worth attracting more consumers to invest than the firm has capacity. Our model also makes two assumptions that are important for rationing to arise. First, capacity must not be too large relative to potential demand. This is most likely in new, or rapidly growing, markets, and it is consistent with, for example, the fact that microprocessors are sometimes rationed when a new product is first introduced and less commonly rationed thereafter. Second, the seller must be able to precommit to a price (or to a demand-dependent price schedule), perhaps by developing a reputation to charge a "fair" price, before consumers invest.<sup>2,3</sup>

Another way of viewing our result is in the context of *auction theory with endogenous entry*: when buyers have costs of entering an auction (i.e., sunk investment costs), the seller may wish to precommit to running an inefficient auction (i.e., rationing) to encourage the entry of buyers who are likely to have lower values and whom it would otherwise be more costly to induce to enter.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Modelling how the seller makes commitments is beyond our scope. However, discussions with industry executives suggest some firms believe a reputation for charging "fair" prices to be a very important and effective commitment (supported by implicit customer threats to punish) even in rapidly changing markets. In the second-sourcing example we discuss later, the government makes explicit promises.

<sup>3</sup> Our discussion is consistent with evidence of stable prices in, e.g., Carlton (1986). Note also that absent our commitment assumption, the need for consumers to invest can prevent any sales in equilibrium. If, after investments are sunk, the firm can set a profit-maximizing price that gives the marginal consumer no surplus, that consumer will do better not to invest, so there will be no marginal consumer who invests, and therefore no investment at all. See Diamond (1971).

<sup>4</sup> Our assumption that the buyers are not *ex ante* symmetric distinguishes our model from most earlier work on auctions with entry costs, e.g., King, Welling, and McAfee (1992). However, Klemperer (1998)

In our main analysis, rationing does not affect the number of consumers who enter (i.e., invest) but does induce them to enter at a lower cost to the seller. However, we also analyze an extension in which rationing is profitable because it results in additional consumers entering (i.e., investing).

Reversing the roles of consumers and the seller in our model shows that rationing can emerge in a procurement market where potential suppliers must incur sunk costs. This corresponds to a “second-sourcing” contract, in which the buyer commits to purchase at least a fraction of its needs from an (*ex post*) inferior source of supply in order to provide that supplier with incentives to participate in the market. For example, the U.S. government has for defense procurement (e.g., missiles) on occasion asked two suppliers to invest in developing prototypes and manufacturing technology and to make bids, with the promise that even the high bidder will receive a fraction of the order (e.g., 30%) if the high bid is within “the competitive range.”<sup>5,6</sup>

More broadly, our model provides a rationale for offering “second prizes.” While the second prize may provide little incentive (or a disincentive) for investment by a strong competitor, offering it may be a very effective way to persuade a weaker competitor (who thinks he has relatively little chance of actually winning first prize) to enter the game. In the context of our model, a “first prize” is a low price to a customer when only his investment is successful (the low-demand state), while a “second prize” is a low price, but a rationed quantity, to a customer when other customers’ investments are successful (the high-demand state).<sup>7,8</sup>

Procurement practices similar to those of the U.S. Department of Defense are also observed in Japan’s telecommunications industry. For example, “competition between the suppliers . . . to NTT . . . is not of the ‘winner takes all’ variety. Rather, it involves *controlled* competition in so far as, contingent on reasonable performance as judged and monitored by NTT, each supplier can expect to receive a sizeable share of NTT’s order” (Fransman (1995), pp. 22–23, italics in original). Another example of a customer rationing suppliers can be found in the period when General Foods was the dominant buyer of coffee. That firm largely engineered the 1962 International Coffee Agreement precommitting it to pricing policies that involved rationing suppliers. There are both substantial sunk costs and uncertainties in coffee production (see McLaren, 1995). Corey (1978) gives other examples of firms precommitting to quantity rationing in their procurement in order to promote supplier investments.<sup>9</sup>

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proposes allocating radio-spectrum licenses using an “Anglo-Dutch” auction, thus accepting some *ex post* inefficiency to encourage weaker bidders to enter. On the standard theory of auctions with endogenous entry, see, e.g., Klemperer (1999, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> “The competitive range” does not seem well defined. Industry executives suggest that a 10% higher per-unit price would be within the competitive range, while a higher bid might lead to a renegotiation process to lower the bid. A too-high bid (e.g., after failure to achieve a low-cost technology) would receive no order at all. (See Pyatt, 1989.)

<sup>6</sup> Consistent with our emphasis on asymmetries between suppliers, Burnett and Kovacic (1989, p. 288) suggest that guaranteeing a minimum share of production (subject to a “reasonable” bid) is particularly important when the Department of Defense wishes to induce a firm to bid against an established producer. In addition, “DOD . . . may need to offer minimum production guarantees even when the entire production run will be dual-sourced. . . . Without [them] suppliers . . . may decline to invest their own funds in the development and prototyping efforts that would precede the award of production contracts.”

<sup>7</sup> Anton and Yao (1989) also suggest that “split-award auctions” (auctions with multiple winners) can provide desirable incentives for investment, but they do not explain trade with an *ex post* inferior supplier or customer. Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) develop a theory of split awards based on risk-averse suppliers. On the standard theory of multiple-winner auctions, see, e.g., Klemperer (1999, forthcoming).

<sup>8</sup> On the standard theory of prize-based incentive schemes, see, e.g., Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).

<sup>9</sup> For example, General Motors limited its purchases of steel from warehouses to encourage steel mills

Similarly, our model offers a possible explanation for efficiency wages in monopsonistic labor markets when workers have to invest in employer-specific human capital.

Section 4 begins by noting that because rationing is *ex post* inefficient, buyers' surpluses in the rationed state can be raised if resale is permitted. The seller can then extract this extra surplus and increase his own profits by raising the general level of prices. Thus rationing with resale permitted is, in principle, even more attractive than rationing and not allowing resale. A problem is that permitting resale may encourage third parties to enter the market purely for purposes of arbitrage, and this may explain why the resale of rationed goods in "gray markets" is often discouraged. (For example, restaurants may not permit the sale of places in their queues because to do so would invite nonserious customers to queue purely to obtain a seat that can be resold.) However, we show how practices such as airlines' buying back of tickets when they are overbooked can be interpreted as mechanisms that implement rationing-plus-resale while making it hard for third parties to enter.

Our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 shows that committing to a single fixed price independent of demand, and rationing when necessary, can dominate the best (typically demand-dependent) market-clearing prices. In Section 5 we analyze our model as a more general mechanism-design problem: we allow the firm in each demand state to force consumers to choose from a menu of contracts, each contract specifying a price that the consumer pays and a quantity of output that the consumer receives. Since our focus is on the effects of sunk costs when consumers cannot be contracted with *ex ante*, we assume consumers select contracts only after demands are reported and so we insist that the firm respect consumers' *ex post* individual rationality and *ex post* incentive compatibility. We show that for a wide range of parameters the solution to this more general problem is equivalent to simply rationing in the high-demand state, as in Sections 3 and 4, but generalized so that the price at which the good is rationed in the high-demand state no longer equals the price in the low-demand state. Although the simple fixed-price rationing described in Sections 3 and 4 is less profitable than if the seller could compensate consumers directly for their sunk investment costs, the more general rationing scheme of Section 5 is as profitable as if the seller could do this.<sup>10</sup>

Our explanation of rationing differs from the existing literature. In Cooper's (1996) model, customers infer a firm's costs, and hence its likely future price, from its current price, so a firm may ration to keep its current prices low and thus encourage its customers to return in the future. This model, and the similar theories of Slade (1991) and Haddock and McChesney (1992), requires some kind of search cost or switching cost to make future demand depend on current price.<sup>11</sup> In contrast to these dynamic stories, our model requires just one purchase period, and it is the promise of rationing in this period that induces consumers to pay sunk costs or search costs. Furthermore, in our model it is asymmetries between consumers that make it more profitable to attract them by rationing than by setting market-clearing prices.

In Carlton's (1991) model, rationing can be efficient if a seller has perfect information about buyers' relative demands. Carlton's model also includes fixed setup costs, but for the seller rather than the buyers, and the setup costs are not necessary for his rationing result provided the seller is capacity constrained. Furthermore, in Carlton's

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to develop capacity, and it committed to allocate leaf spring purchases among several suppliers to encourage investment in supply. Heinz limited its purchase of glass ketchup bottles from any one supplier, and IBM held a split-award auction for TTL chips. Split buys and second-sourcing arrangements are also common in aircraft manufacture.

<sup>10</sup> Direct compensation may be hard because of the difficulties of verifying either whether investment has taken place or whether it has been successful.

<sup>11</sup> Klemperer (1995) surveys the effects of firm-specific investments in an oligopoly context.

model rationing is more profitable than market-clearing prices only if it involves lower administrative costs. In our model, by contrast, rationing *strictly* dominates market-clearing prices when there are no administrative costs involved in using either mechanism.<sup>12</sup>

The most common argument in favor of rationing is that it is “fair.” Many people feel, for example, that all loyal fans deserve a chance of getting tickets when the team they have “invested” in supporting reaches the Cup Final or Super Bowl. The concept of fairness has received little respect in most economic models.<sup>13</sup> However, our article suggests that an appeal to fairness as a justification for rationing can be understood as the need to guarantee sufficient surplus *ex post* to all customers whom the seller wishes to induce to make seller-specific investments *ex ante*. The seller rations inefficiently (acts fairly *ex post*) in order to send the right signals for investment *ex ante*.

## 2. The model

■ A monopolist has one unit of a good for sale, and no costs. Each of two risk-neutral<sup>14</sup> potential customers  $j = H, L$  independently chooses whether or not to make a sunk investment,  $s$ , that succeeds with probability  $r_j$ . Customer  $j$  has valuation  $v_j$  for the seller’s product if his investment succeeds and zero otherwise. The investment has no value in alternative transactions. Conditional on both consumers choosing to invest, we let  $q_{LH}$  be the probability that both investments are successful and  $q_j$  be the probability that only  $j$  is successful. For simplicity we assume consumers’ investment successes are uncorrelated, so  $q_j = r_j(1 - r_k)$ ,  $j \neq k$ , and  $q_{LH} = r_L r_H$ , but none of our propositions require this assumption.

All agents know the values of the parameters  $s$ ,  $v_H$ ,  $v_L$ ,  $r_H$ ,  $r_L$ ,  $q_{LH}$ ,  $q_H$ , and  $q_L$ , but the seller cannot identify which consumer is which.

The order of events is as follows: (1) the seller commits to, and makes public, his pricing policy; (2) each consumer independently chooses whether or not to invest; (3) each consumer finds out whether or not his investment is successful, and any consumer who wishes to do so publicly announces that his investment is successful; and (4) the seller announces the price, and consumers who reported a successful investment choose whether or not to purchase.<sup>15</sup>

Note that a consumer’s stage-3 announcement does not commit him to purchase. This assumption is consistent with a market environment in which consumers cannot easily be contracted with individually. Because consumers do not make an *ex ante* commitment to purchase, this forces the firm to respect consumers’ *ex post* individual

<sup>12</sup> Rationing can also arise when a monopolist’s marginal revenue is not downward sloping (Wilson, 1988; Bulow and Roberts, 1989), in multi-good contexts and for bundling reasons (Bohm et al., 1983; Kenney and Klein, 1983; Wilson and Warren-Boulton, 1995; DeGraba and Mohammed, 1999), to induce consumers to purchase before they learn the good’s value (Allen and Faulhaber, 1991; DeGraba, 1995), in a durable goods monopoly (Denicolò and Garella, 1999), if low prices improve the quality of customers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), if consumers’ valuations increase with (unrationed) demand (Becker, 1991; Basu, 1987; Karni and Levin, 1994), and in common-values auction settings (Bulow and Klemperer, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> Exceptions include Weitzman (1977) and Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), but these articles do not provide an economic explanation for a preference for fairness.

<sup>14</sup> Risk aversion among customers could make rationing more desirable. Klotz and Chatterjee (1995) make this point in the context of second-sourcing.

<sup>15</sup> Our model is equivalent to one in which  $j = H, L$  has demand  $v_j$  with probability  $r_j$  and no demand with probability  $(1 - r_j)$  and the consumer, *after* learning his own demand and the seller’s pricing policy, can choose to incur a sunk investment (e.g., a seller-specific cost of visiting a store)  $s_j = (s/r_j)$ , which always succeeds and allows the option of purchasing. It is not hard to extend our model to allow  $s_H \neq s_L$ .

rationality in each demand state and not merely guarantee nonnegative surplus averaged across all demand states.<sup>16</sup>

We assume the seller must stick to his stage-1 pricing commitment in stage 4 and set his price on the assumption that consumers report honestly in stage 3.<sup>17</sup> We will distinguish cases according to whether the seller can or cannot prevent purchases by unsuccessful investors (or noninvestors) who might hope to make a profit by resale. (Whether or not such “arbitrage” can be prevented will depend on what the seller and consumers can observe about other consumers’ investment successes.)<sup>18,19</sup>

We assume that  $v_H > v_L$  and  $r_H > r_L$ . Since  $r_j = q_j + q_{LH}$ , it follows that  $q_H > q_L$ . This assumption that  $r_j$  is positively correlated with  $v_j$  is not required for our model to yield rationing,<sup>20</sup> but it simplifies the analysis by assuring that the expected surplus of the high-value consumer is at least as large as the expected surplus of the low-value consumer. We also assume that the seller’s maximum profit at prices that clear the market, but induce both consumers to invest, is higher than the seller’s profit at prices for which only the high-value consumer would invest.<sup>21</sup> It follows that the seller will always induce both consumers to invest and also, therefore, that the low-value consumer is always the marginal consumer who must be induced to invest. This assumption also is not necessary to our results,<sup>22</sup> but it too reduces the number of different cases to consider and so simplifies the analysis.

In the following sections we contrast different pricing and rationing policies that the seller might commit to in stage 1.

### 3. “Sticky prices” plus rationing dominates market clearing

■ This section shows that committing to a single price that applies to all demand states, and rationing when there is excess demand, can be more profitable than the best market-clearing price schedule. This is true even though rationing is inefficient *ex post* (and consumers cannot resell between themselves) and there are no administrative costs to charging different prices in different states.

With market-clearing prices, the firm sets a price  $P_1$  at which the unit will be sold if one customer demands the good, and a price  $P_2$  at which the unit will be sold if both customers demand the good.<sup>23</sup> Recall that the firm cannot distinguish the customers

<sup>16</sup> The results would be unaffected if consumers were required to make binding commitments to purchase at stage 3, if we also assume that successful consumers can observe the number of other successful consumers before making their commitments.

<sup>17</sup> We assume (as is conventional) that indifferent consumers report honestly. (As the model is stated, unsuccessful consumers have no reason not to always report success, but adding a small cost of reporting success would remove their indifference in all our equilibria.)

<sup>18</sup> Section 3 forbids all resale so that it does not matter what agents can directly observe about others’ successes. Sections 4 and 5 distinguish different cases.

<sup>19</sup> We assume that the seller cannot directly compensate consumers for their investment costs or directly pay consumers whose investments are successful. However, our most general rationing scheme will yield seller profits that are as high as if he could do either or both of these things. See Section 5.

<sup>20</sup> It is required for rationing that the customer  $j$  with the lower  $r_j$  is the “marginal consumer” who expects the lower surplus from investing at market-clearing prices, *either* because he has the lower  $v_j$  *or* because his  $r_j$  is sufficiently lower to outweigh a higher  $v_j$ .

<sup>21</sup> We show in Section 3, Assumption 1, that this assumption corresponds to  $s \leq q_L[q_L v_L / q_H - (v_H - v_L)]$ , so we are assuming  $v_L$  and  $q_L$  not too small and  $s$  not too large.

<sup>22</sup> We discuss the converse assumption at the end of Section 3.

<sup>23</sup> In this section (with resale impossible), market-clearing prices could be implemented by the firm setting a low “regular” price,  $P_1$ , with the understanding that this price will be raised if necessary to balance supply and demand.



TABLE 1 Prices in Low- and High-Demand States

	Low Demand	High Demand
Market-clearing prices	$P_1$	$P_2$
Fixed price and rationing	$P^r$	$P^r$ and ration

and so cannot make  $P_1$  contingent on which customer demands the good. Consequently, to guarantee market clearing, the prices must satisfy  $P_1 \leq v_L$  and  $v_L \leq P_2 \leq v_H$ .

The alternative we consider is to set a single price  $P^r$  for both states of demand and ration if there is excess demand. The two alternatives are set out in Table 1.

Because there is no resale, no unsuccessful investor can gain by misreporting in order to acquire the good and profit from resale. Consequently, it also does not matter whether or not any agent can directly observe any other agent's success.

□ **Market-clearing prices.** With market-clearing prices, the low-value consumer,  $L$ , is able to buy only in the low-demand state, when his investment, and not  $H$ 's investment, is successful. The probability of this is  $q_L$ , so he obtains expected *ex ante* surplus  $q_L(v_L - P_1) - s$ . Setting this equal to zero yields<sup>24</sup>

$$P_1 = v_L - \frac{s}{q_L}.$$

Because the high-value consumer earns sufficient surplus in the low-demand state, the seller maximizes profits by setting the high-demand price equal to the highest price this consumer will pay, that is,

$$P_2 = v_H.$$

The seller's maximized profit from market-clearing prices is therefore

$$\Pi^{mc} = (q_L + q_H)(v_L - \frac{s}{q_L}) + q_{LH}v_H. \quad (1)$$

Setting market-clearing prices that induce both consumers to invest, rather than only consumer  $H$ , is preferred by the seller as assumed if

$$\Pi^{mc} \geq r_H v_H - s = (q_H + q_{LH})v_H - s,$$

that is, if

*Assumption 1.*  $s \leq q_L[(q_L/q_H)v_L - (v_H - v_L)]$ .

This condition holds if the surplus that can be extracted, using market-clearing prices, from consumer  $L$  exceeds the profits forgone from consumer  $H$  by lowering these prices far enough to induce  $L$  to invest. The condition is easier to satisfy if  $s$  (the cost of  $L$ 's investment) is lower, if  $q_L v_L$  (the gross social value of  $L$ 's investment) is higher, or if  $(v_H - v_L)$  (which reflects the cost of lowering price to  $H$ )<sup>25</sup> is lower.

<sup>24</sup> Our assumption that the seller's profit using market-clearing prices with both consumers investing exceeds the profit with only consumer  $H$  investing guarantees that  $P_1 > 0$ . See Assumption 1.

<sup>25</sup> The surplus forgone from  $H$  equals  $q_H\{(v_H - s/q_H) - (v_L - s/q_L)\} = q_H(v_H - v_L) + [(q_H - q_L)/q_L]s$ .

□ **Fixed price with rationing.** Suppose the seller sets a fixed price  $P^r$  and rations when there is excess demand. With rationing, the low-value consumer receives half a unit on average in the high-demand state and so obtains total expected *ex ante* surplus

$$q_L(v_L - P^r) + q_{LH}\left(\frac{1}{2}[v_L - P^r]\right) - s.$$

Setting this equal to zero yields

$$P^r = v_L - \frac{s}{q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}}.$$

(Assumption 1 ensures that  $P^r > 0$ .) So the seller's maximized profit from setting a fixed price and rationing when there is excess demand is

$$\Pi^r = (q_L + q_H + q_{LH})\left(v_L - \frac{s}{q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}}\right). \quad (2)$$

*Proposition 1.* The seller prefers setting a fixed price and rationing (with resale between consumers prohibited) to market-clearing prices, if and only if

$$q_{LH}(v_H - v_L) \leq \left(\frac{q_H + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}}{q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}}\right)s. \quad (3)$$

*Proof.* Follows directly from comparison of (1) and (2). *Q.E.D.*


Given  $r_H > r_L > 0$  and  $s > 0$ , the right-hand side of (3) is strictly positive, so if the difference between the valuations,  $v_H - v_L$ , is sufficiently small, then rationing is always preferred.

Figure 1 illustrates the costs and benefits to the seller of the rationing strategy. The diagonal lines labelled  $\pi_1$ ,  $\pi_2$ , and  $\pi_3$  are iso-profit lines, assuming that prices are such that both consumers participate in the market and at least one consumer is willing to buy in each state. The thick line labelled "L" is the locus of state-contingent prices for which the *ex ante* expected surplus of the low-value (marginal) consumer is zero. In an optimal strategy, the seller chooses a price pair on this locus. The optimal market-clearing strategy is the price pair labelled "MC" in Figure 1. (Only the vertical segment of "L" is market clearing, and for  $P_2 > v_H$  the seller would make no sales in the high-demand state.) A rationing strategy corresponds to  $P_2 \leq v_L$ , and a single-price rationing strategy is a price on the diagonal "OA." The optimal single-price rationing strategy is the price pair labelled "R."

The cost to the seller of choosing a rationing strategy can be measured by the movement from "MC" to "B", where the marginal consumer is just willing to buy in the high-demand state so rationing occurs. This movement reduces the seller's profit by  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ , the left-hand side of equation (3), with no effect on the marginal consumer. The benefit to the seller of rationing is measured by the movement from

FIGURE 1

LEVEL CURVES FOR SELLER'S PROFIT AND MARGINAL CONSUMER'S SURPLUS (WITHOUT RESALE).



point “B” to “R”, which increases the seller’s profit by the right-hand side of equation (3) while leaving the marginal consumer no worse off. The reason is that the seller’s indifference curves have a slope  $-(q_L + q_H)/q_{LH}$  (the relative likelihood of the two demand states) that is steeper than the slope of the marginal consumer’s indifference curve,  $-q_L/(1/2q_{LH})$ , when  $P_1, P_2 < v_L$  and the seller rations in the high-demand state.

The relative slopes of the indifference curves reflect the lower cost to the seller of subsidizing  $L$  in the high-demand than in the low-demand state. A \$1 reduction in the low-demand state price provides an expected benefit of  $\$q_H$  to  $H$  and only  $\$q_L$  to  $L$ , while a \$1 reduction in the price in both the (rationed) high-demand state and the low-demand state yields expected benefits of  $\$(q_H + 1/2q_{LH})$  to  $H$  and  $\$(q_L + 1/2q_{LH})$  to  $L$  and so gives out less surplus to  $H$  relative to the surplus given to  $L$ . The difference in the amounts of surplus that are given to  $H$  while giving  $s$  to  $L$  is the right-hand side of (3).

In summary, the intuition is that to get the marginal consumer  $L$  to participate, the seller must provide  $L$  an expected *ex post* surplus,  $s$ . Handing out this surplus in the low-demand state is a relatively ineffective way to reward this consumer, who is relatively less likely than  $H$  to be present in this state. Handing out a subsidy in the high-demand state means that half of it reaches  $L$  (each consumer is rationed with probability one-half) and so is preferred by the seller if the resulting inefficiency due to rationing is not too great.

Figure 1 shows that rationing may be desirable for the seller in some situations but not in others. As drawn, rationing with a single price at “R” is better than using market-clearing prices at “MC.” However, if the high-value consumer had a higher

reservation price—say  $v'_H$  in Figure 1—the cost of rationing would exceed its benefits, and the seller would be better off with market-clearing prices (at “MC”).

Note that Figure 1 also shows that rationing at a single price is not the seller’s optimal rationing strategy; profits would be increased further by a move toward point “C.” We will discuss more general rationing strategies in Section 5. However, the figure demonstrates that rationing (at a fixed price) can dominate market clearing if there are costs of implementing more complex rationing schemes (e.g., it is difficult to credibly commit to them).

□ **When does rationing arise?** Examining (3) indicates that we should anticipate rationing under the following conditions:

First, the inefficiency caused by rationing should not be too great. (The welfare cost of rationing relative to market-clearing prices is  $\frac{1}{2}q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ .)<sup>26</sup>

Second, the marginal consumer’s sunk cost should be large, so that the seller’s prices must provide significant *ex post* compensation to this consumer. This means that it is worth the seller’s while to accept the inefficient rent extraction in the high-demand state that rationing causes, in order to be able to pay more compensation in the state in which the marginal consumer is relatively more likely to be present. (The inefficient rent extraction is a fixed cost,  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ , independent of the rationing price and hence independent of the marginal consumer’s sunk cost,  $s$ .)<sup>27</sup>

Third, the marginal consumer should gain more, relative to other consumers, from a lower price in the high-demand state than from a lower price in the low-demand state. In our model this implies that  $q_H$  should be large relative to  $q_L$ . More generally, any other factor that means the marginal consumer accounts for a higher fraction of total demand in states when total demand is high (or supply is low) than in states when demand is low (or supply is high) will suffice to favor rationing when demand is high (or supply is low). (See the discussion of general supply and demands in our working paper, Gilbert and Klemperer (1995).)

Other important conditions for rationing are implicit in the assumptions of the model. Capacity must be constrained—if the seller had two units of capacity in our model, all consumers who successfully invested would always be served. (Thus rationing is most likely in new, growing, or booming markets.) The seller must not be able to discriminate directly between different types of consumers (perhaps because he cannot distinguish between the different types, or perhaps for legal reasons), and the seller must not be able to pay consumers’ sunk costs directly (perhaps because of difficulty in verifying the expenditures). Finally, as we emphasized in the Introduction, the seller must be able to commit to future prices.<sup>28,29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Under our Assumption 1, both customers always invest so that the only welfare effect of rationing is that  $L$  rather than  $H$  receives the unit (which has social cost  $v_H - v_L$ ) half the time when both customers’ investments are successful (probability  $q_{LH}$ ). However, if we drop Assumption 1, rationing can bring about investment that would not otherwise occur (see below), and in this case rationing always improves welfare in our model.

<sup>27</sup> We also need  $s$  small enough and  $q_H/q_L$  not too large, so that it is worth inducing the marginal consumer to invest. See Assumption 1. Note that for any  $s < (q_L^2 v_L / q_H)$ , both Assumption 1 and (3) are satisfied for all sufficiently small  $(v_H - v_L)$ .

<sup>28</sup> As noted in the Introduction (footnote 3), price commitments by the seller may be *required* if consumers are to make any specific investments.

<sup>29</sup> The need to commit may be a reason for rationing at a fixed price, which makes it easier for consumers to monitor the seller’s behavior. (Market-clearing prices that compensate consumers for their sunk costs would have to be higher in high-demand states, so the seller may be tempted to misrepresent demand.) An argument with this flavor can be found in Okun (1982, p. 154). “The antagonism toward price increases based on rising demand as “gouging” or “exploitation” is understandable. . . . Once a firm draws a clientele with attractive implicit contracts, any deviation unfavorable to customers is seen as a violation of these

□ **Second sourcing.** By reversing the roles of the seller and buyers, our model can be applied directly to a procurement setting: Assume each of two suppliers,  $j = H, L$ , can make a sunk investment  $s$  that, with probability  $r_j$ , would allow the supplier to deliver up to one unit of a good at a marginal cost  $c_j$ , with  $c_H > c_L$ . If only one supplier is successful, the buyer (who has demand for up to one unit) would purchase one unit from that firm at a unit price at least as large as the seller's marginal cost. If both sellers are successful, the buyer can choose between a market-clearing price  $P$ , with  $c_L \leq P \leq c_H$ , or a price above  $c_H$  and rationing. Exactly as before, rationing may be optimal; rationing allows the buyer to compensate the marginal seller's sunk cost, permitting a lower price in the state where only one seller is successful. Thus the buyer rations his lowest-cost supplier, and he purchases some of his requirements from a second source. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has on occasion promised to use multiple suppliers even when it would be cost minimizing to use a single supplier, in order to encourage suppliers to invest in improved technology (see Burnett and Kovacic (1989), Pyatt (1989), and our discussion in Section 1); second sourcing with quantity rationing to promote supplier investments is also common in a number of other industries e.g., the aircraft, automotive, computing, and telecommunication industries (see Corey (1978), and the discussion in Section 1).

Another possible application is to a monopsonist employer that wants to provide incentives for workers to make investments that are specific to his labor market: our analysis implies the monopsonist may choose to allocate available jobs randomly in states with excess labor supply, or reduce all workers' hours below their preferred levels, rather than clear the market by cutting wages. This provides an interpretation of "efficiency wages" as wages that are purposely held above market-clearing levels in order to compensate workers for investment in human capital.

□ **Rationing to increase the size of the customer base.** Our Assumption 1 implies that both consumers invest under either rationing or market clearing. If, instead, Assumption 1 were not satisfied, the optimal market clearing prices would induce just one consumer to invest; if also the profit from rationing,  $\Pi^r$  (as defined in (2)), exceeds  $r_H v_H - s$ , then setting a fixed price,  $P^r$ , and rationing would induce both consumers to invest and also increase the seller's profits. In this case, rationing increases the seller's profit by increasing the low-value consumer's surplus from investing, hence stimulating additional investment and so increasing the size of the customer base.

The condition for rationing of this kind to be more profitable than market-clearing prices can be written

$$q_L v_L > (q_H + q_{LH})(v_H - v_L) + \frac{q_H + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}}{q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}} s,$$

assuming that Assumption 1 fails.<sup>30</sup>

This kind of rationing arises when the sunk cost is sufficiently large that Assumption 1 fails (so that it is not worth attracting the marginal consumer with market-clearing

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contracts. . . . If the firm raises its prices . . . it is bound to create suspicions that it is starting to depreciate its investment (or 'goodwill') in customer loyalty."

<sup>30</sup> The conditions for rationing of this kind and Assumption 1 failing can jointly be written  $[(q_H/q_L) - (q_H + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH})/(q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH})]s - q_{LH}(v_H - v_L) \geq [q_H/q_L]s + q_H(v_H - v_L) - q_L v_L \geq 0$ .

prices), but not so large that it is too costly to attract the marginal consumer by using rationing.<sup>31</sup>

As with rationing with a fixed customer base, this rationing is dominated by market clearing if the *ex post* inefficiency of rationing to  $L$  rather than  $H$ ,  $(v_H - v_L)$ , is too great. Note, however, that rationing which induces investment that would not otherwise have been made is unambiguously welfare improving relative to market-clearing prices, since both the firm's profits and consumer  $H$ 's surplus are weakly increased.<sup>32</sup>

#### 4. Rationing with resale, and “buy-backs”

■ Since rationing results in *ex post* inefficiencies, it is natural to ask how permitting resale affects the results. We show in this section that resale can make rationing more attractive to the seller. As in Section 3, the seller commits to a fixed price and rations if there is excess demand.

Of course, allowing resale is attractive only if the seller can prevent arbitrageurs, including firms whose investments were unsuccessful, from misreporting their demands and purchasing the good purely to profit from resale. We therefore assume in this section that arbitrage can be prevented.

The simplest assumptions that rule out arbitrage are that the seller can directly observe whether or not a consumer who reports success has indeed been successful,<sup>33</sup> and that the seller can exclude nongenuine customers.

An alternative set of assumptions that rule out arbitrage in this section are that consumers who have not invested successfully cannot observe who else has announced a successful investment (or who has actually invested successfully) before deciding (in stage 4 of the game outlined in Section 2) whether or not to purchase (note that with a fixed price and rationing, a buyer cannot infer demand from the price) and that “third parties” (those who are neither of the two potential customers in the model) can be excluded from the market. The reason is that unsuccessful investors then will not take the risk of buying and being unable to resell.<sup>34</sup> (With these assumptions, it does not matter what the seller can observe, or what successful investors can observe.)

*Proposition 2.* Assume that rationing is followed by resale between consumers at price  $v_H$  and that there is no arbitrage by unsuccessful investors or third parties. The seller

<sup>31</sup> For example, this kind of rationing arises for any  $s$  such that

$$q_L v_L [q_L / q_H] < s < q_L v_L \left[ \left( q_L + \frac{1}{2} q_{LH} \right) / \left( q_H + \frac{1}{2} q_{LH} \right) \right]$$

for all sufficiently small  $(v_H - v_L)$ . Rationing that does not induce additional investment arises below this range. Larger  $(v_H - v_L)$  reduces both end-points of this range.

<sup>32</sup> Since market-clearing prices that fail to attract  $L$  would be set to give  $H$  no surplus.

<sup>33</sup> This section's simple fixed-price rationing-with-resale and “buy-back” schemes could be improved upon if the seller could make payments to consumers that are contingent on his direct observations of investment successes. However, Section 5's more general rationing scheme could not be improved upon in this way.

<sup>34</sup> A noninvesting or unsuccessful  $L$ 's payoff equals the *ex post* payoff of a successfully invested  $L$  when  $H$  has demand one, and it is  $v_L$  lower when  $H$  has demand zero (with probability  $(1 - r_H)$ )—since the good is now unresaleable. However, the *ex post* payoff of a successfully invested  $L$  is  $(s/r_L)$ , since the *ex ante* payoff of an investing  $L$  is zero in an optimal scheme. So the payoff of the noninvesting  $L$  equals  $(s/r_L) - (1 - r_H)v_L = (s - q_L v_L)/r_L < 0$ , by Assumption 1.  $H$  would also find arbitrage unprofitable, because a noninvesting  $H$  would have a lower chance of being able to resell than a noninvesting  $L$  and would have to resell at a lower price.

prefers a fixed price and rationing to setting market-clearing prices if and only if  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L) \leq [(q_H/q_L) + 1]s$ .

*Proof.* Under market-clearing prices, no resale takes place, so the optimal prices are unchanged and profits,  $\Pi^{mc}$ , are given by (1) as before. Let rationing now be at price  $P^{rr} \leq v_L$ . The low-value consumer will resell the supply he receives in the high-demand state and so obtains total expected *ex ante* surplus  $q_L(v_L - P^{rr}) + q_{LH}(\frac{1}{2}[v_H - P^{rr}]) - s$ . Maximizing the seller's profit from rationing,  $\Pi^{rr} = (q_L + q_H + q_{LH})P^{rr}$ , subject to  $L$ 's surplus being nonnegative and  $P^{rr} \leq v_L$  (so that  $L$  buys in the low-demand state), yields  $P^{rr} = \min[v_L, v_L - (s - \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}(v_H - v_L))/(q_L + \frac{1}{2}q_{LH})]$ . By comparison with (1),  $\Pi^{rr} > \Pi^{mc}$  if  $s$  is such that  $P^{rr} < v_L$ . When  $s$  is smaller so that  $P^{rr} = v_L$ ,  $\Pi^{rr} \geq \Pi^{mc}$  if and only if the equation in the statement of the proposition holds. *Q.E.D.*

Resale removes the *ex post* inefficiency of rationing and at any given prices results in the low-value consumer gaining additional surplus in the high-demand state. So the possibility of resale makes rationing more likely to dominate market clearing—compare the expressions in Propositions 1 and 2.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, if we had not assumed that the seller is constrained to set a rationing price no higher than  $v_L$ , then rationing with resale at  $v_H$  would *always* dominate market-clearing prices. The constraint that  $P^{rr} \leq v_L$  is implied by our assumption (see Section 2) that consumers can observe how many other investors announce success (if  $P^{rr} > v_L$ , then  $L$  would not buy if he was the only successful investor). However, if a successful  $L$  could not observe before buying whether or not he was the only successful investor, the seller might be able to set a rationing price  $P^{rr} > v_L$  such that  $L$ 's losses when he is the only successful investor are compensated by his gains from resale when  $H$  also succeeds. (With rationing at a fixed price,  $L$  cannot infer the state from the price.) In this case, rationing with resale unambiguously dominates market clearing.<sup>36</sup>

In Section 5 we will explore other, more general rationing-with-resale strategies that always dominate market clearing without violating consumer  $L$ 's *ex post* rationality (that is, without charging  $L$  more than  $v_L$  per unit in any demand state).

□ **Gray markets and buy-backs.** In fact, firms often object to a “gray market”<sup>37</sup> in which customers resell their products. One reason is that unsuccessful investors or third-party interlopers might arbitrage the market and so lower the expected surplus earned by the genuine customers that the firm has targeted for subsidy.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, even absent arbitrageurs, the profitability of rationing-plus-resale depends on the terms of trade in the resale market and on its efficiency; relative to resale at  $v_H$ , a lower resale price, or any inefficiency such as trading costs, reduces consumer  $L$ 's *ex post* surplus from any given rationing price and so reduces the seller's profit. Therefore, as an alternative to allowing uncontrolled resale, the firm might prefer itself to conduct a

<sup>35</sup> To understand the expression in Proposition 2, observe that the cost of rationing relative to market clearing is  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ , just as before. The benefit of rationing at price  $v_L$  is that the firm is not reducing the low-demand-state price to compensate  $L$  for his investment cost,  $s$ , because  $L$  is instead compensated by reselling to  $H$ . This saves  $s$  from  $L$ , and therefore also  $[q_H/q_L]s$  from  $H$ , since  $H$  is present in the low-demand state  $[q_H/q_L]$  times as often as  $L$  is.

<sup>36</sup> This can easily be checked by solving for the seller's profit-maximizing  $P^{rr}$  without the constraint that  $P^{rr} \leq v_L$ .

<sup>37</sup> A gray market is one in which trades that are not authorized by the manufacturer are made between retailers or between a wholesaler and distributors or retailers (see, e.g., Inman, 1993).

<sup>38</sup> Another possible concern is that the gray market might prevent the firm from controlling the distribution of its goods in order to price discriminate or to maintain the quality of the product or generate positive externalities from its use.

resale market. One way for the firm to operate such a market is to sell more units than it has available and then buy back the difference. Airlines, for example, do just this. They sell more tickets than seats in some states of demand but then repurchase the excess when their flights are overbooked.<sup>39</sup> Of course a buy-back scheme, like an uncontrolled resale market, is effective only if the seller can prevent arbitrage. (Airlines can discourage arbitrage by limiting the buy-back offer to passengers who have taken a seat on the plane, so an arbitrageur risks being forced to take a flight.)

*Proposition 3.* The seller prefers setting a fixed sale price, together with a (higher) price at which it will buy back any demand in excess of one unit, to setting market-clearing prices if and only if  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L) \leq (q_H/q_L)s$ , assuming there is no arbitrage by unsuccessful investors or third parties.

*Proof.* Let  $P^b$  denote the fixed sale price and  $B$  the buy-back price. The seller's profit under the buy-back scheme is  $\Pi^b = (q_L + q_H)P^b + q_{LH}(2P^b - B)$ . Noting that at the optimum the low-value consumer's *ex ante* surplus,  $q_L(v_L - P^b) + q_{LH}(B - P^b) - s$ , is zero, we obtain  $P^b = v_L - (s - q_{LH}(B - v_L))/(q_L + q_{LH})$  and  $\Pi^b = (v_L q_L - s) + (q_H + q_{LH})P^b$ . Hence  $\Pi^b$  is maximized where  $P^b$  is maximized subject to the constraints implied by  $P^b \leq v_L$  (so that  $L$  buys in the low-demand state) and  $v_L \leq B \leq v_H$  (so that just one consumer wishes to sell back in the high-demand state). Thus, if  $s > q_{LH}[v_H - v_L]$ , then  $B = v_H$ ,  $P^b = v_L - (s - q_{LH}(B - v_L))/(q_L + q_{LH}) < v_L$ , and comparison with  $\Pi^{mc}$  shows that  $\Pi^b > \Pi^{mc}$ . However, if  $s \leq q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ , then  $P^b = v_L$ , and comparison with  $\Pi^{mc}$  shows that  $\Pi^b \geq \Pi^{mc}$  if and only if the equation in the statement of the proposition holds. *Q.E.D.*

As for rationing with resale, if the seller were not constrained to set his sale price below  $v_L$  (as before,  $L$  cannot infer the state from the price, so it may be reasonable to set price above  $v_L$  if  $L$  cannot observe other consumers' demands before buying), a fixed sale price with a buy-back would always dominate market-clearing prices.

Both the buy-back scheme and rationing with resale allow the seller to subsidize consumer  $L$  in the high-demand state while avoiding inefficient rationing. They are not identical when the seller has to charge the same price for the good in both states: when  $s$  is large, the optimal buy-back repurchases one unit from  $L$  at  $v_H$  in the high-demand state and this generates a greater subsidy to  $L$  in that state than rationing with resale, which allows  $L$  to resell only half a unit at  $v_H$ . The seller therefore benefits by being able to charge more in the low-demand state ( $P^{rr} < P^b \leq v_L$ ). But if the seller's price is constrained to be no higher than  $v_L$ , as we assumed, and  $s$  is small so that this constraint is binding, then  $P^{rr} = P^b = v_L$ . In this case, the buy-back scheme earns lower profits than rationing at  $P^{rr}$  and allowing resale, since under the buy-back scheme the seller must buy back a unit in the high-demand state at a cost  $B > v_L$ .<sup>40</sup> We will show in the next section that these distinctions between the schemes disappear when the seller is allowed to charge different prices in different demand states.

<sup>39</sup> In air travel, customers may incur sunk costs of planning a trip or of making complementary travel arrangements before they know definitely whether they will make a trip. Note that our model also applies to customers who wish to travel with some probability, and subsequently incur a cost that is specific to a particular flight (e.g., travel to the airport for that flight); see footnote 15.

<sup>40</sup> To understand the expression in Proposition 3, note rationing costs the firm  $q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)$ , as usual. The benefit of rationing at price  $v_L$  is that  $L$ 's investment cost,  $s$ , is compensated by the buy-back instead of by a low price in the low-demand state. This saves nothing from  $L$ , but saves  $[q_H/q_L]s$  from  $H$ , since  $H$  is present in the low-demand state  $[q_H/q_L]$  times as often as  $L$  is; see footnote 35—the firm does better compensating  $L$  through resale to  $H$  rather than through a costly buy-back.



## 5. Rationing as an optimal mechanism design

■ We have so far shown that even fixing a single price and then rationing when necessary can dominate market-clearing prices. This section shows that rationing continues to arise when we allow the seller to use more general pricing mechanisms. We show that if the seller cannot set a negative price to any consumer in any state (i.e., if he cannot exclude nongenuine customers so that “arbitrage” is a problem), then offering the optimal set of contracts is equivalent to implementing a version of rationing without resale (as in Section 3) generalized to allow different prices in different states.<sup>41</sup> But, if the seller can set negative prices (“award gifts”) in some states without attracting consumers who have not successfully invested, the optimal contracts are equivalent to a similarly generalized version of rationing with resale (as in Section 4).

The order of events is exactly as laid out in Section 2 except that the seller begins (stage 1) by announcing and committing to menus of contracts, one menu for each state of total demand (where total demand is the number of consumers who announce success). Each contract in each menu specifies an amount of the good to be received by the consumer and a total payment to be made by the consumer. In stage 2, as before, each consumer independently chooses whether or not to invest. At stage 3, also as before, each consumer finds out the success of his investment, and any consumer who wishes to do so publicly announces that his investment is successful. At stage 4 the seller offers the menu that is appropriate to the state of total demand that corresponds to consumers’ stage-3 announcements (as before, he is constrained to stick to his stage-1 commitment), and consumers who announced success select contracts from that menu.<sup>42,43</sup> Since there are just two types of consumer, there is no loss of generality in restricting the seller to just two contracts for each state, one of which, in equilibrium, will be selected by each type of consumer. Let the contract that the seller intends that consumer  $j = H, L$  accepts in demand state  $i = 1, 2$  specify an allocation of  $\sigma_{ij}$  of a unit to  $j$  and a total payment of  $t_{ij}$  from  $j$  to the seller. The seller’s objective is to maximize expected transfer payments

$$\Pi = q_L t_{1L} + q_H t_{1H} + q_{LH}(t_{2L} + t_{2H})$$

with respect to  $\{\sigma_{ij}, t_{ij}\}$  and subject to

$$q_j(\sigma_{1j}v_j - t_{1j}) + q_{LH}(\sigma_{2j}v_j - t_{2j}) \geq s \quad j = H, L \quad (\text{IR}_j)$$

$$\sigma_{ij}v_j - t_{ij} \geq 0 \quad i = 1, 2 \quad j = H, L \quad (\text{IR}_{ij})$$

$$\sigma_{ij}v_j - t_{ij} \geq \sigma_{ik}v_j - t_{ik} \quad i = 1, 2 \quad j, k = H, L \quad j \neq k \quad (\text{IC}_{ij})$$

<sup>41</sup> Peak-load prices and interruptible contracts are examples of prices that depend on the state of demand. The price and availability of a vacation may depend on the number of customers who sign up. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) analyze demand-dependent prices and discuss how they may be implemented.

<sup>42</sup> The assumption that consumers select contracts only after all consumers have revealed their demands is consistent with our focus on the effects of sunk costs when consumers cannot be contracted with *ex ante*. However, *ex ante* contracting would affect the solution only for a small range of parameters; see the Appendix. Even under our current assumption, under the conditions of Proposition 5, the firm is as profitable as if it could directly compensate all sunk costs.

<sup>43</sup> In each demand state, a customer’s allocation and payment depend only on his own choice of contract. If the seller could design payoffs to each consumer that depend on the choices of other consumers, the seller might be able to extract consumers’ entire surplus à la Crémer and McLean (1985), but these strategies seem unrealistic in many market situations.

$$0 \leq \sigma_{ij} \leq 1,$$

$$0 \leq \sigma_{2H} + \sigma_{2L} \leq 1 \quad i = 1, 2 \quad j = H, L. \quad (\text{Resources})$$

The *ex ante* individual-rationality constraints above,  $(IR_j)$ , are that each consumer  $j$  must receive a nonnegative expected surplus to be willing to incur the sunk cost  $s$  (since Assumption 1 implies that it is optimal for the seller to induce the participation of both consumers). The *ex post* individual-rationality constraints  $(IR_{ij})$  specify that consumer  $j$  prefers accepting the contract offered him (a fraction  $\sigma_{ij}$  of the good at a cost  $t_{ij}$ ) to not participating in the market in each demand state  $i$ . The incentive-compatibility constraints,  $IC_{ij}$ , specify that consumer  $j$  always prefers the contract intended for him to the contract intended for the other type of consumer. Finally, the resource constraints require that the seller not distribute more of the good than is available.

We consider two cases corresponding to whether or not it is feasible for a contract to specify a negative payment, that is, a payment from the seller to the buyer. We first consider the case in which this is not feasible, perhaps because the seller cannot exclude unsuccessful investors or other “arbitrageurs” from misreporting their demands in the hope of obtaining a free gift. This case corresponds to imposing additional constraints.<sup>44</sup>

$$t_{ij} \geq 0 \quad i = 1, 2 \quad j = H, L. \quad (T_{ij} \text{ [no gifts]})$$

*Proposition 4.* If

$$2\left(\frac{v_H}{v_L} - 1\right) \leq \left(\frac{q_H}{q_L} - 1\right), \quad (4)$$

the optimal mechanism subject to the no-gifts constraints,  $t_{ij} \geq 0$ , is equivalent to implementing the following rationing strategy with no resale.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{In the low-demand state} \quad P_1 &= \min \left[ v_L, v_L - \frac{s - \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L}{q_L} \right] \\ \text{In the high-demand state} \quad P_2 &= v_H \quad \text{with probability } \max \left[ 1 - \frac{2s}{q_{LH}v_L}, 0 \right] \\ P_2 &= 0 \quad \text{with probability } \min \left[ \frac{2s}{q_{LH}v_L}, 1 \right] \end{aligned}$$

and, at the zero price, the seller rations the two consumers equally.

If (4) does not hold, the optimal mechanism subject to  $t_{ij} \geq 0$  corresponds to setting market-clearing prices,  $P_1 = v_L - (s/q_L)$  and  $P_2 = v_H$ .

*Proof.* See the Appendix.

The intuition for Proposition 4 parallels that for Proposition 1, but condition (4) is weaker than the condition (3) under which rationing was preferred in Section 3. For

<sup>44</sup> We assume no resale between consumers after they have received their contract allocations. This assumption increases the firm’s power because the firm can achieve the effect of allowing any resale by announcing the contracts that yield the post-resale allocations of goods and money (see Proposition 5).

simplicity let  $2s/(q_{LH}v_L) \leq 1$ : if we multiply both sides of (4) by  $s$ , the left-hand side of (4) then represents the cost to the seller of the inefficiency caused by rationing.<sup>45</sup> This is  $2s/(q_{LH}v_L) \leq 1$  times as great as the left-hand side of (3), since rationing now occurs only with probability  $2s/(q_{LH}v_L)$ . Furthermore, the right-hand side of (4) (multiplied by  $s$ ) represents the saving relative to market-clearing prices in the amount of surplus given to  $H$  while giving  $s$  to  $L$ : allowing the seller to choose different prices in the two states allows the entire subsidy to  $L$  to be paid in the high-demand state where a \$1 reduction in the price when there is rationing benefits  $H$  and  $L$  equally, so this saving is  $[(q_H/q_L) - 1]s$ . This exceeds the right-hand side of (3), which is the saving under the conditions of Proposition 1. The extension of this intuition to the case where  $2s/(q_{LH}v_L) > 1$  is straightforward.

The cost to the seller of a rationing scheme depends on the probability with which the good is inefficiently allocated. When “gifts” from the seller to buyers are possible without attracting consumers who have not successfully invested (in particular, if the seller can directly observe success or failure and can exclude unsuccessful investors), this probability can be reduced to zero, even while rewarding the low-value consumer,  $L$ , in the high-demand state. Since either resale or a buy-back effects a gift (either of these leads to  $L$  receiving cash in the high-demand state), it follows that an appropriately constructed rationing scheme with one of these features *always* dominates market-clearing prices:

*Proposition 5.* With no restrictions on  $t_{ij}$  (i.e., gifts are possible), the optimal mechanism is equivalent to the following rationing strategy with resale at price  $v_H$ .

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{In the low-demand state} & P_1 = v_L \\ \text{In the high-demand state} & P_2 = v_H - \frac{2s}{q_{LH}}, \end{array}$$

with the seller rationing the two consumers equally.

It is also equivalent to the buy-back strategy in which:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{In the low-demand state} & P_1 = v_L \\ \text{In the high-demand state} & P_2 = v_H - \frac{s}{q_{LH}} \end{array}$$

but the seller buys back a unit at  $v_H$  in the high-demand state.

*Proof.* See the Appendix.

Both the rationing-with-resale and the buy-back schemes of Proposition 5 eliminate the inefficiency of rationing by ensuring that the good is consumed by the high-value consumer when both consumers demand it. Furthermore, both schemes pay the entire subsidy to  $L$  in the high-demand state (where a \$1 total subsidy generates a \$½ subsidy to  $L$  and a \$½ to  $H$ , assuming the resale or buy-back always takes place at  $v_H$ ). It follows therefore that both schemes always dominate market-clearing prices that pay

<sup>45</sup> With probability  $[\frac{1}{2}q_{LH}[2s/(q_{LH}v_L)]]$  the seller sells to  $L$  in the high-demand state, causing inefficiency of  $v_H - v_L$  that the seller bears (since the seller could sell to  $H$  for  $v_H$ ). Furthermore, since this gives  $L$  goods that  $H$  values at  $v_H$ ,  $H$  must be given an extra  $[v_H - v_L]$  to satisfy  $H$ 's incentive-compatibility constraint. Thus the total (private) cost to the seller of the inefficiency caused by rationing is  $2[v_H - v_L][\frac{1}{2}q_{LH}[2s/(q_{LH}v_L)]] = 2s[(v_H)/(v_L) - 1]$ .

the subsidy only in the low-demand state (where a price reduction that costs the seller \$1 generates only a  $\$q_L/(q_L + q_H)$  subsidy to  $L$  while giving  $\$q_H/(q_L + q_H)$  to  $H$ ).

Note that these strategies achieve a profit of  $(q_L + q_H)v_L + q_{LH}v_H - 2s$ , compared to the maximum profit with market-clearing prices,  $(q_L + q_H)v_L + q_{LH}v_H - [(q_H/q_L) + 1]s$ . The former is the same profit that the seller could achieve if it were able to pay all of both consumers' sunk costs directly.

## 6. Conclusions

■ This article offers a new explanation for rationing. When consumers must incur seller-specific sunk costs to use a product, the seller must commit to prices that compensate the marginal customer for these costs. Thus prices must accomplish the dual job of providing incentives for investment and allocating output. It is not surprising that these requirements may be in conflict, and that a seller may compromise allocative efficiency in order to promote desired investment. That is, rationing may be a profit-maximizing equilibrium phenomenon.

Our theory addresses related questions such as why sellers might encourage or object to gray markets in rationed goods and why they might organize markets to buy back goods that are in deficit supply. In addition, while we have emphasized that rationing can help a seller extract more surplus from a given customer base, rationing can also be an effective instrument for altering the size and composition of the seller's customer base. Sellers' needs to focus subsidies on key customers may contribute to a range of other phenomena, such as apparently discriminatory refusals to deal.<sup>46</sup>

Our analysis shows that a seller may choose prices that compromise *ex post* efficiency to promote *ex ante* investments. When consumers have to incur seller-specific sunk costs, prices that appear "fair" in the sense that they distribute surplus *ex post* to all consumers (and involve rationing) can also be profit maximizing for the seller.

## Appendix

■ Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 follow.

*Proof of Proposition 4.* The strategy of proof is to use duality theory plus a few shortcuts to save algebra. In each regime (according to whether or not (4) is satisfied and to whether or not  $s > \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L$ ) the claimed solution implies a total profit  $\hat{\pi}$  and a vector of shadow values  $\hat{y}$  (one for each constraint). If (and only if) the claimed solution is correct, forming the sum of the products of the shadow values and the corresponding constraints will yield an equation that proves the objective function is no greater than  $\hat{\pi}$  and hence that the claimed solution is optimal.

(To be more explicit about our approach, write our problem as choose  $\underline{x} = \{t_{1L}, t_{1H}, t_{2L}, t_{2H}, \sigma_{1L}, \sigma_{1H}, \sigma_{2L}, \sigma_{2H}\}$  to maximize  $\underline{c} \cdot \underline{x}$  subject to  $\underline{A} \cdot \underline{x} \leq \underline{b}$ , in which the matrix  $\underline{A}$  and the vectors  $\underline{b}$  and  $\underline{c}$  are as defined above. The dual problem is choose  $\underline{y}$  to minimize  $\underline{y} \cdot \underline{b}$  subject to  $\underline{y} \cdot \underline{A} \geq \underline{c}$ . The claimed optimal solution  $\hat{\underline{x}}$  implies a total profit  $\hat{\pi}$  and a vector of shadow values  $\hat{\underline{y}}$ . Now, forming the product of the shadow values and the (primal) constraint matrix yields  $\hat{\underline{y}} \cdot \underline{A} \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} \leq \hat{\underline{y}} \cdot \underline{b}$ . Call this equation (\*). But if  $\hat{\underline{x}}$  solves the primal, then  $\hat{\underline{y}}$  solves the dual. In this case,  $\hat{\underline{y}} \cdot \underline{b} = \underline{c} \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} = \hat{\pi}$  (since the primal and dual have the same value) and  $\hat{\underline{y}} \cdot \underline{A} \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} = (\underline{c} + \underline{v}) \cdot \hat{\underline{x}}$ , in which the elements of  $\underline{v}$  are all nonnegative (since feasibility implies  $\hat{\underline{y}} \cdot \underline{A} \geq \underline{c}$ . So if the claimed solution is correct, then equation (\*) will read  $(\underline{c} + \underline{v}) \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} \leq \hat{\pi}$  and so prove that there is no  $\underline{x}$  that does better than  $\hat{\underline{x}}$  (since  $\underline{c} \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} = \hat{\pi}$ ). We therefore proceed by forming equation (\*), using the  $\hat{\underline{y}}$  that would be the shadow values of the claimed optimal solution. Furthermore, it is clear that in any optimal solution all the constraints corresponding to strictly positive  $\hat{y}$  must bind, so it is straightforward to check uniqueness.)

To proceed, consider first the program without the constraint  $IC_{1L}$ . If in a feasible solution to this program  $\sigma_{1L} < 1$ , then increasing  $\sigma_{1L}$  by  $\Delta$  at the same time as increasing  $t_{1L}$  by  $\Delta v_L$  and reducing  $t_{1H}$  by  $(\Delta v_H - \Delta v_L)$  would both be feasible and increase profits for small positive  $\Delta$  if  $q_L v_L - q_H(v_H - v_L) > 0$ . But this latter condition is implied by our Assumption 1. Furthermore, if either  $\sigma_{1H} < 1$  or  $\sigma_{2H} < 1 - \sigma_{2L}$ ,

<sup>46</sup> See our working paper, Gilbert and Klemperer (1995), for some simple examples, in particular one in which the seller commits to a rationing rule that favors past purchasers.

increasing  $\sigma_{iH}$  by  $\Delta$  at the same time as increasing  $t_{iH}$  by  $\Delta v_H$  would be both feasible and profitable for small  $\Delta$ . So  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$  and  $\sigma_{2H} = 1 - \sigma_{2L}$  at the optimum.

Now if (4) holds and  $s < \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L$ , then substituting these values of  $\sigma_{1L}$ ,  $\sigma_{1H}$ , and  $\sigma_{2H}$  into the weighted sum of the constraints (in which the weights have been chosen using our knowledge of duality),

$$q_H IC_{1H} + q_{LH} IC_{2H} + 2\left(\frac{v_H}{v_L}\right)IR_L + 2q_{LH}\left(\frac{v_H - v_L}{v_L}\right)T_{2L} + q_L\left[\left(\frac{q_H - q_L}{q_L}\right) - 2\left(\frac{v_H - v_L}{v_L}\right)\right]IR_{1L},$$

and rearranging, yields  $(q_L + q_H)v_L + q_{LH}(1 - 2s/q_{LH}v_L)v_H \geq \bar{\Pi}$ . But this upper bound on profits can be achieved by  $t_{1L} = t_{1H} = v_L$ ,  $t_{2L} = 0$ ,  $t_{2H} = (1 - 2s/q_{LH}v_L)v_H$ ,  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$ ,  $\sigma_{2L} = (s/q_{LH}v_L)$ , and  $\sigma_{2H} = 1 - \sigma_{2L}$ , which parameters satisfy all the constraints and therefore form a solution to both the program without  $IC_{1L}$  and, since the parameters also satisfy  $IC_{1L}$ , the full program. Furthermore, this upper bound cannot be achieved unless the constraints  $IC_{1H}$ ,  $IC_{2H}$ ,  $IR_L$ ,  $T_{2L}$ , and  $IR_{1L}$  all bind. Since solving the equations that result from these constraints all binding (together with  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$  and  $\sigma_{2L} + \sigma_{2H} = 1$ ) yields a unique solution (the solution above), it follows that this solution is unique (unless (4) holds with equality).

Now observe that  $IC_{2H}$  and  $IC_{2L}$  together imply  $(\sigma_{2H} - \sigma_{2L})v_H \geq t_{2H} - t_{2L} \geq (\sigma_{2H} - \sigma_{2L})v_L$ , which implies  $\sigma_{2H} \geq \sigma_{2L}$ , so  $\sigma_{2L} \leq \frac{1}{2}$ . Substituting  $\sigma_{2L} \leq \frac{1}{2}$  and  $t_{2L} \geq 0$  into  $IR_L$  yields  $\sigma_{1L}v_L - t_{1L} \geq (s - \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L)/q_L$ . Call this constraint  $IR'_{1L}$ . If (4) holds and  $s > \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L$ , then repeating the argument of the previous paragraph, but with  $IR'_{1L}$  substituted for  $IR_{1L}$ , shows that the parameters  $t_{1L} = t_{1H} = v_L - (s - \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L)/q_L$ ,  $t_{2L} = t_{2H} = 0$ ,  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$ , and  $\sigma_{2L} = \sigma_{2H} = \frac{1}{2}$  are the (unique) solution to the full program.

If (4) fails, then writing  $\sum_{2L}$  for the constraint  $\sigma_{2L} \geq 0$  and rearranging the weighted sum

$$q_H IC_{1H} + q_{LH} IC_{2H} + \left(\frac{q_H + q_L}{q_L}\right)IR_L + q_{LH}\left(\frac{q_H - q_L}{q_L}\right)T_{2L} + q_{LH}v_L\left[2\left(\frac{v_H - v_L}{v_L}\right) - \left(\frac{q_H - q_L}{q_L}\right)\right]\sum_{2L}$$

yields  $(q_L + q_H)[v_L - (s/q_L)] + q_{LH}v_H \geq \bar{\Pi}$ . But this upper bound can be achieved by the market-clearing parameters  $t_{1L} = t_{1H} = (v_L - s/q_L)$ ,  $t_{2L} = 0$ ,  $t_{2H} = v_H$ ,  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$ ,  $\sigma_{2L} = 0$ , and  $\sigma_{2H} = 1$ , which satisfy all the constraints and therefore (uniquely) solve the full program.

Finally, it is easy to check that in each case the optimal  $t_{ij}$  and  $\sigma_{ij}$  can be implemented by the strategies specified in the statement of the proposition. *Q.E.D.*

*Proof of Proposition 5.* We use duality theory as in Proposition 4. We use the same argument as in the first paragraph of the proof of Proposition 4, and substitute  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$  and  $\sigma_{2H} = 1 - \sigma_{2L}$  into

$$q_H IC_{1H} + q_{LH} IC_{2H} + 2IR_L + (q_H - q_L)IR_{1L} + 2q_{LH}(v_H - v_L)\sum_{2L}$$

(where  $\sum_{2L}$  is the constraint  $\sigma_{2L} \geq 0$  as before) to obtain  $(q_L + q_H)v_L + q_{LH}v_H - 2s \geq \bar{\Pi}$ , which upper bound on  $\bar{\Pi}$  can be achieved by  $t_{1L} = t_{1H} = v_L$ ,  $t_{2L} = -s/q_{LH}$ ,  $t_{2H} = v_H - (s/q_{LH})$ ,  $\sigma_{1L} = \sigma_{1H} = 1$ ,  $\sigma_{2L} = 0$ , and  $\sigma_{2H} = 1$ . Since these parameters satisfy all the constraints, they (uniquely) solve the program. It is easy to check that this solution can be implemented using either of the strategies in the statement of the proposition. *Q.E.D.*

Note that if consumers had to accept contracts before knowing their demands (i.e., at “stage 2” in the timing), the state-by-state *ex post* incentive-compatibility constraints  $IC_{ij}$ ,  $i = 1, 2, j = H, L$  would be replaced by weaker *ex ante* incentive-compatibility constraints  $IC_j \equiv q_j IC_{1j} + q_{LH} IC_{2j}$ ,  $j = H, L$ . This affects the proof of Proposition 4 only when both (4) and  $s > \frac{1}{2}q_{LH}v_L$  hold (assuming that we still require  $IR_{ij}$ ) and in this case only by permitting the possibility  $\sigma_{2L} > \frac{1}{2}$ , that is, the good is rationed even more (*ex post*) inefficiently. (*Ex post* rationality is a reasonable assumption if the seller cannot observe the success of buyers’ investments or for other reasons cannot compel a buyer to purchase the good in each state of demand.) Similarly, it is easy to check that Proposition 5 is unaffected if consumers are forced to accept contracts before observing demand.

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