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Coethnic Communities and Educational Attainment in the United States, Canada, and the United

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A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

Requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Sociology

by

Rennie Lee

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Coethnic Communities and Educational Attainment in the United States, Canada,

and the United Kingdom

by

Rennie Lee

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology University of California, Los Angeles, 2015 Professor Rebecca Jean Emigh, Chair

This dissertation quantitatively examines the effect of the coethnic community—a national origin group living closely together in a small neighborhood—on educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK, three major immigrant-receiving countries. The average education level of the coethnic community has a positive effect on the educational attainment of immigrant children and the children of immigrants in all three countries. The effect of the coethnic community is particularly strong for immigrant children in Canada and the UK because they face challenges that native-born children of immigrants do not. Specifically, immigrant children encounter two structural problems in these two host countries—limited proficiency in the host country language and being behind in host country schools—that can be attenuated by an educated coethnic community. These challenges stem from the presence of official languages and selective immigration policies in Canada and the UK. Official languages in Canada (English and French) and the UK (English) discourage non-official languages. Furthermore, Canadian

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and UK immigration policies are primarily skill-based, have limited preferences for family reunification, and prioritize the arrival of the primary immigrant applicant, not subsequent family members. A consequence of Canada's selective immigration policies is that immigrant children arrive in Canada after their immigrant parent and consequently, are older and further behind in school. In contrast, immigrant children in the US do not face these problems because of a family oriented immigration policy and the absence of an official language. Thus, immigrant children in Canada and the UK receive an additional benefit from the coethnic community because it helps them alleviate structural challenges posed by the presence of an official language and selective immigration policies. While qualitative studies suggest that the coethnic community positively affects educational attainment, my research quantitatively shows that for several Western countries, the coethnic community does indeed positively affect educational attainment but its strength may differ according to the characteristics of the host society.

The dissertation of Rennie Lee is approved.

Cynthia Feliciano

Vilma Ortiz

Gabriel Rossman

Min Zhou

Rebecca Jean Emigh, Committee Chair

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VITA

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Conferences and Presentations

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Contemporary immigration is transforming the landscape of North America and Western Europe (Alba and Foner 2015:1). After the second world war, these areas underwent a period of recovery and expansion, which initiated a massive and continuous inflow of immigrants to these areas. The influx of immigrants to these countries since the middle of the twentieth century has rapidly reshaped the populations in Western countries. In the US, which has the largest foreign-born population of any country has approximately 40 million immigrants and receives approximately 52 percent of the world's migrants (Lopez Real 2011:3). Similarly, Canada and the UK are the third and fourth largest immigrant-receiving countries among OECD countries. Overall, these countries are facing a "diversity transition" that includes fewer individuals from the native majority population (Alba and Foner 2014).

In turn, the implications of the mass migration in these countries are also equally astonishing. Given that newcomers to each of these countries are arriving with diverse cultures, languages, and ethnic backgrounds that differ greatly from those of the receiving countries, a fundamental concern is how to integrate immigrants and their children (Alba and Foner 2015:1). The children of immigrants, in particular, are especially important as the native-born majority population of these host countries are aging and have lower fertility rates and the second generation in North American and Western European countries are coming of age and entering the labor market (Alba and Foner 2015:14-15). More than immigrants themselves, the children of immigrants will be influential in determining the future labor market and test the long-term effects of immigration policy.

Perspectives in Crossnational Research

In examining the integration of immigrants and their children in different host countries, the research on comparative analysis has relied on a few overarching ideas that provide explanations for crossnational differences or similarities. Three main narratives about host countries have been used to explain crossnational studies: national models, settler societies, and US exceptionalism (Alba and Foner 2015:9-10). One narrative emphasizes the models or public philosophies of immigrant integration, which include citizenship regimes (Brubaker 1992) and integration policies (Favell 1998). The argument is that national models determine how immigrants are integrated into their host societies because it signals the willingness of host countries to acknowledge immigrants' needs and rights, which in turn shape public policies (Alba and Foner 2014:269). For instance, these models tend to emphasize multiculturalism in Canada and the Republican model in France. However, this approach has relied too heavily on these typologies to account for crossnational differences. One instance is when on-the-ground realities frequently contradict the national models (Alba and Foner 2014:270). Although it is clear that national ideologies exist and are important for integration, it is not clear how and to what extent national ideologies influence the opportunities for immigrant and their children.

A second perspective emphasizes the positions of the US and Canada as traditional immigrant countries with settler histories which are distinct from the Old World societies of Western Europe. The argument is that settler societies are more successful for integrating contemporary immigrants and their children because of their history of receiving immigrants, which is embedded in their national identity (Levels et al.

2008:838). As a result, traditional immigrant countries will be more welcoming to newcomers and incorporating them into the national context. In comparison, in Western Europe, immigration is a relatively new phenomenon and is not a part of the historical narrative or national identity (Alba and Foner 2014:271). National identities in European countries reflect the individuals that have occupied the national territory for centuries. In turn, Western European countries have a more difficult time incorporating newcomers in the national identity (Alba and Foner 2014:271).

A third perspective emphasizes US exceptionalism, which highlights the differences between the United States and Western Europe. This perspective has characterized the US as unique in its positive attributes as well as negative attributes. One variant of this perspective has described the US as a uniquely open society that has welcomed immigrants by providing rights and offering access into the middle class (Alba and Foner 2014:272; Torpey 2009:145). Another variant views the US as distinctively harsh and ungenerous in social benefits and economic protections. Included in this perspective sis the history legacy of slavery and legal segregation (Alba and Foner 2015:13; Torpey 2009). Nonetheless, both variants of the US exceptionalism ignores similarities between the US and European countries and Canada and in turn, overstates the differences between the US and these other western host countries (Alba and Foner 2015:13).

Nonetheless, no single perspective adequately captures the integration process. For instance, these perspectives are usually not explicit about the mechanisms that explain these differences (Alba and Foner 2014:283; Alba and Foner 2015:9). The perspectives do not consider the characteristics that immigrants bring with them, such as

their skills, group selectivity, skin color, religion, etc. The features of immigrants shape the challenges and opportunities that newcomers face in the host country (Alba and Foner 2014:283). These characteristics need to be considered in the context of social, political, and economic institutions and structures within each host country. Thus, my dissertation focuses on several factors—individual, group, and community—on the educational of immigrants' children in the US, Canada, and the UK.

Individual and Contextual Factors

Whether the children of immigrants achieve high or low levels of educational attainment depends on a combination of factors. Educational attainment is largely determined by individual characteristics—such as sex, age, and parents' socioeconomic status—and the contextual environment that children grow up in. One important context is the host country. The policies and social context of the host country can shape children's educational attainment. These include national immigration policies used to admit immigrants, integration policies, racial and ethnic context, and the public attitudes of native-born residents toward immigrant (Bloemraad 2005; Reitz 2003).

Another context is the coethnic community; within neighborhoods, children may live closely with people from the same national origin. Coethnic community characteristics refer to the characteristics of all coethnics in the neighborhood. Indicators of the coethnic community include its size or density, mean education, and mean income (Bygren and Szulkin 2010:1313; Gronqvist 2006:371). While there are different interpretations of the coethnic community, particularly at which geographic area it should be defined (Bygren and Szulkin 2010:1313; Fleischmann et al. 2011:398; Gronqvist 2006:371; Levels et al. 2008:843), this paper operationalizes the coethnic community

within neighborhoods, as described by classical assimilation theorists (Burgess 1967 [1925]) and ethnographic studies (Gibson 1988; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston 1998).

Another context is the availability of coethnic resources. Although the concept of coethnic resources has generally been intertwined with patterns and frequencies of interactions between neighbors, it can also be used to describe the use of and participation in local institutions (Smith 1974). For instance, Gibson (1988) and Zhou and Bankston (1998) described social activities sponsored through the local gurdwara or church as well as after school social events, such as retreats, and sports events. Similarly, community values and norms were also reinforced through local institutions, such as ethnic schools and civic organizations. For instance, the Vietnamese Education Association organized two main events in the community: after school classes and an annual awards ceremony honoring academic achievement. Both events were an expression of the community's encouragement and commitment to education.

In addition, coethnic resources can also include ethnic language schools. For instance, Zhou and Kim (2006) find that Chinese and Korean language schools that were initially developed to promote language and cultural education for immigrant children have evolved to also include SAT test prep and after school tutoring as a response to the persistent emphasis on academics and admission into a prestigious university by community members.

Still, another context is the parents' origin country. Group level factors refer to characteristics of the entire national-origin group and are defined at the group level and represent an average of all members in the group (Borjas 1996; Feliciano 2005; Schoeni

1998). Group characteristics may capture several dimensions of a national origin group in the origin country (origin group characteristics) or in the destination country (destination group characteristics). For clarity, I refer to origin group characteristics as characteristics that remain the same for the national origin group regardless of the destination country (origin country GDP) and destination group characteristics as group characteristics that differ depending on the destination country (educational selectivity). My dissertation provides a systematic analysis of three factors—individual, coethnic community, coethnic resources, and national origin group—on educational attainment in three host countries with different institutional characteristics.

EXAMINING DIFFERENT FACTORS

Levels et al. (2008) conclusively showed that individual, group (national origin), and country level variables affect the math scores of second generation immigrants. Their study is currently the most comprehensive in scope: no study examines the effect of these variables at these three levels simultaneously on math scores or on the broader outcome of educational attainment. However, the influence of variables on educational attainment at the individual and country levels separately is well documented (individual: Kao and Thompson 2003; Kao and Tienda 1995; Mare 1980; Portes and MacLeod 1996; country characteristics: Dronkers and Fleischmann 2010).

In contrast, effects at the group level, as well as at the community level, are understudied and underconceptualized. Group and community level effects are not always distinguished from one another, and the terms are often used interchangeably. For clarity, I define group level characteristics as the aggregate characteristics of a group of people from the same country of origin. Some group characteristics are the same

regardless of the destination country (e.g. origin country GDP) whereas others differ in different destinations (e.g. educational selectivity, group size). For instance, all persons born in China and live in the US belong to the same national origin group. Therefore, they share the same aggregate group characteristics, such as the per capita GDP in the origin country, China. In contrast, I define community characteristics as the characteristics of a national origin group living together in close proximity, such as in the same neighborhood or census tract. For instance, Chinese living in the same neighborhood will share the same community characteristics, such as the average level of education of coethnics who live in a neighborhood (community education) or the percentage of coethnics who live in the neighborhood (community income). National origin group characteristics remain the same for anyone of that national origin within a given country. For instance, all persons of Chinese national origin in the US come from a country with the same level of income inequality. In contrast, community effects will vary within these national origin groups because people with the same national origin characteristics live in communities with different characteristics. To illustrate, people of Chinese national origin living in Los Angeles and San Francisco share the same per capita GDP in their origin country (national origin characteristic), but the Chinese in San Francisco will live in communities with different average educational levels than the Chinese in Los Angeles (community characteristics). While national origin group and community characteristics are related, and national origin group characteristics may shape community characteristics (Feliciano 2005), they are distinct. Thus, my dissertation examines group and community level effects separately.

Group and community level effects are often confused because studies have used national origin group characteristics to measure community level characteristics (Hatton and Leigh 2009; De Heus and Dronkers 2009; Levels et al. 2008; Van Tubergen et al. 2004). For instance, Van Tubergen et al. (2004) used census data on the size of the national group in the destination country as a proxy for the density of coethnic communities. This, however, assumes that all individuals of a particular national origin group uniformly live in communities or neighborhoods that are the same size or have the same number of coethnics. Similarly, De Heus and Dronkers (2009) measured community SES by aggregating individual level survey data on education, income, and home possessions. This assumes that individuals of the same national origin group consistently live among coethnic neighbors with the same SES characteristics. These methods, though, do not account for the fact that individuals live in communities with different characteristics and thus, will live among or be in close proximity to different resources and SES characteristics.

Similarly, Levels et al.'s (2008) work, the most comprehensive study of multilevel effects on second generation math scores, did not include community level characteristics. Levels et al. (2008) attempted to control for community level characteristics but measured characteristics of the national origin group instead by aggregating the education of all persons of the same national origin in the sample. Levels et al. (2008) aggregated the individual level education of persons belonging to the same national origin group and called it community level socioeconomic status. Ethnographic case studies suggest that living in a concentrated community, neighborhood, or small geographic area of people of the same national origin in the destination country

positively affects educational attainment (Gibson 1988; Gibson and Bhachu 1988; Logan et al. 2002; Marcuse 1997; Zhou and Bankston 1998). The effect of living in a concentrated coethnic community, however, has not been studied quantitatively across countries or net of individual, group, or country effects. Bygren and Szulkin (2010) quantitatively showed a positive effect of community level education on second generation educational attainment and included individual level characteristics, but only for Sweden. My dissertation examines these effects quantitatively, more comprehensively and broadly than these previous studies. In particular, I distinguish between national origin group and community effects on educational attainment as these are understudied.

The remainder of this chapter will describe my case selection and how the institutional characteristics of the host countries (e.g., immigration policy, language policy, racial/ethnicity policies, racial/ethnic hierarchy) may shape the children of immigrants' educational attainment. Next, I outline my research methodology, which incorporates quantitative analysis of non-public data sources in the three countries, and documentary research. In the final section, I provide a brief outline of the dissertation chapters.

COMPARING THE US, CANADA, AND THE UK

To address how host country characteristics matter for educational attainment, I need to examine countries that have large scale immigration from a variety of groups, differ in immigration history (settler versus non-settler), and differ in their national model of integration. The US, Canada, and the UK meet these criteria and serve as excellent comparison cases. In general, the US, Canada, and the UK are large immigrant-receiving countries that are similar in their education systems and treatment of racial and ethnic

minorities (via race and ethnicity policies). Nonetheless, they differ in some important ways, such as immigrant groups, immigration policy, and language policy.

The three countries receive a large number of immigrants and their children and thus, have a large sample of immigrant children and native-born children of immigrants for analysis. The immigrant population is fairly similar in age structure as all contemporary immigration started in the postwar period. The US has the largest proportion of immigrants and the children of immigrants, comprising nearly 33 percent of the total population. Nearly 30 percent of Canada's population is comprised of immigrants. The UK is the smallest but immigrants and their children still comprise 15 percent of the total population. Unlike Canada and the UK, the children of immigrants' population in the US outnumber the immigrant population. In turn, policies and resources may focus more on the children of immigrants in the US whereas Canada and the UK may focus more on the immigrant population.

TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE

In addition, the US, Canada, and the UK also share similar education systems, which are more flexible and offer more opportunities for second chances and less rigid tracking, especially when compared with other host countries (e.g., France, Germany) (Waters et al. 2013). Compulsory education is complete at age 16 and community colleges are also widely available. Thus, this suggests that the children of immigrants in the three countries may experience relatively similar educational experiences and opportunities compared with other host countries. In addition to the educational system, the US, Canada, and the UK have similar liberal market economies (Alba and Foner 2014:270). Immigrants in these countries have less social protection in the form of government benefits. Given these conditions, immigrants in these countries are more likely to choose bad jobs over unemployment. Overall, this could suggest that immigrant families are at greater risk of slipping into poverty or have a more difficult time moving out of poverty (review in Alba and Foner 2015:11).

Despite these similarities, the three countries also differ on some important characteristics, such as immigrant composition, immigration policy, and language policies, which may affect how immigrants' treatment and opportunities in the host country. First, the US, Canada, and the UK are receiving countries for different immigrant groups with some overlap. The US draws most of its immigrants from Latin America and Asia, so the largest immigrant groups in the US are Mexicans, Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians. Most of Canada's immigrants are from Europe and Asia so the main immigrant groups are Americans, British, Dutch, German, Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians. For the UK, the main sending regions for immigrants are the EU and Asia. In turn, the largest immigrant groups are Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Chinese, and Polish. These differences provide sufficient group and community variation to quantitatively assess how group and community characteristics shape the children of immigrants' educational attainment.

Canada favor highly-skilled immigrants for entry, admitting more selective groups. Particularly noteworthy is the selectivity of Canada's immigrants. Due to their points system, Canada has been able to avoid the mass immigration of poorly educated

immigrants that have elsewhere been described as "low status" (Alba 2014:277). In the UK, migration is mixed. As a member of the EU, there is free movement of immigrants from other EU countries to the UK. For non-EU countries, the UK has a points system, which favors high-skilled migration. In contrast, the US allocates a greater preference for kinship than Canada and the UK, admitting less-skilled immigrants. Thus, immigrants in Canada and the UK may be more selective than immigrants in the US. This may also affect the children of immigrants' outcomes as children with parents that are less selective may fare worse in the host country.

The US, Canada, and the UK also differ in terms of their recognition of an official language and linguistic assistance. Canada has two official languages—English and French—that are officially recognized by the government whereas the US and the UK have defacto official languages—English. The US however provides generous linguistic support for individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP). Thus, the linguistic context in the US may be the most welcoming whereas there may be greater pressure to adopt the official language in Canada and the UK.

Thus, my dissertation includes three major countries of immigration that share relatively similar education systems and offer anti-discrimination legislation for racial and ethnic minorities. The three host countries differ in their immigration policies, selection and composition of immigrants, and their recognition of official languages. A case study of three different host countries shows how immigrants and their children are influenced by the different ways that they are admitted and received in the host country.

METHODS

My dissertation uses quantitative regression methods to examine the individual, coethnic community, national origin group, and host country characteristics affecting the children of immigrants' educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. To address this question, I needed data that incorporates individual, coethnic community, and group characteristics. However, this data set does not exist. So, I constructed community and group variables using different data sources and appended the variables to individuals in nationally representative surveys for the US, Canada, and the UK. For each country, I needed data at three levels—individual, community, and group. My approach for obtaining data was similar in all three countries: a.) individual data was retrieved from nationally representative surveys; b.) community data was created using aggregated survey or national Census data; and c.) group characteristics were coded from various public sources. Community and group variables can be attached to the individual level data because all three individual level surveys have geographic identifiers.

My dissertation broadly examines the children of immigrants born abroad and native-born. I examine the first generation (persons born abroad) and second or higher generations (born in the destination country) in the US, Canada, and the UK. However, in the separate country chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), generation status varies due to the information available in each of the data sets. The data sets provide different information about time of arrival and migration history so the 1.5 and second generations in the US and Canadian are analyzed as a single category with the first generation as the reference group. In the UK analysis, the 1.5 and second generations are analyzed as separate categories and the 1.5 generation is the reference category.

I focus on several measures of educational attainment—a respondent's highest degree (e.g., less than a high school degree, high school degree, and college and more) and college attainment (college degree versus less than a college degree). Key independent variables are two community variables: education and income. Group level variables include educational selectivity, political stability, and economic inequality of the origin country. Individual level controls include the respondent's sex, age, generation status, and parental SES.

Individual level data is retrieved from non-public nationally representative survey data for each country. For the US, I use non-public releases of the 2006 Sensitive General Social Survey (GSS), a biannual survey that collects data on education, work, and communities in the US, and 2000 Census data. The GSS contains individual level variables. The 2006 Sensitive GSS data (with tract level identifiers) is available for use with special permission from NORC and 2000 Census data is publically available. Sensitive GSS files indicate the tract (small areas with a population of 2500 to 8000 persons) where respondents live, which are not included in the public versions. This geographic identifier makes it possible to match the community and group variables to the individual level data. The data were analyzed in a secure computing area in Los Angeles.

The Canadian analyses requires non-public releases of Statistics Canada 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), a one-time survey that collected information on social, economic, and cultural life for persons of different ethnic backgrounds in Canada, and 2006 Canadian Census data. The EDS includes individual level variables. Non-public EDS and 2006 Canadian Census were available for use at research data centers in Canada.

Non-public releases of the EDS contain respondents' Census tracts that are not available in the public versions. This geographic identifier is used to match community and group variables with individual level data. I accessed all of the Canadian analyses at the Quebec Inter-University Centre for Social Statistics (QICSS) in Montreal, Quebec.

For the British analyses, I used the UK Annual Population Survey (APS), a 5% sample of individuals from the UK that collects information on the education, employment, and ethnicity of UK residents, and 2001 UK Census data. The APS includes individual level variables. Non-public APS was accessed at Cardiff University and 2001 UK Census data were analyzed at Office of National Statistics (ONS) data lab in Newport (Wales). Non-public APS data is necessary because it provides the geographic indicators of respondents' residences at the Super Output Area (SOA) level, small areas with an average population of 5,600 to 10,000 persons, that are not available in the public version. These geographic identifiers are used to match community and group characteristics with individual level data. Thus, the three data sets meet the data requirements necessary to answer the research question: a.) nationally representative data; b.) small area data; and c.) data at the individual, community, and group levels.

Group characteristics were coded from public sources. Educational selectivity for the US is coded using Feliciano's (2005, 2006) published measures; I replicate Feliciano's (2005, 2006) method to code educational selectivity for Canada and the UK. Political stability is coded using Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 ranking a country's perceived chance of being overthrown) (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) (Kaufmann et al. 2005). Economic inequality is coded using the World Bank's estimate of Gini coefficients

(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?). All group characteristics are matched to individual level data in the GSS, EDS, and APS. Individual level characteristics (sex, age, generational status, etc.) come from the GSS, EDS, and APS. Data for each country is analyzed separately because they are non-public and cannot be removed or combined.

I also created a measure for coethnic resources by using documentary research on the internet. I coded eighteen different dimensions of ethnic communities in major cities in Canada and the UK. I only coded coethnic resources for Canada and the UK because there was not enough variation in national origin groups in different cities. The dimensions capture the resources available to community members, which can range in type (i.e., political, social, religious, etc.). Some examples of these dimensions include the presence of ethnic schools, ethnic churches, Consulates General, ethnic town, ethnic retirement home, etc. Then, I attached these dimensions to individuals in the EDS and the APS that shared the same national origin and lived in the same CMA. The different dimensions used to create the coethnic resources variable are presented in the Methodological Appendix.

ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION

In Chapter 2, I compare the effect of the coethnic community on educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. Chapter 2 analyzes national survey data from the Sensitive GSS, EDS, and non-public APS as well as interview data. In Chapter 3, I focus on the college attainment of immigrants' children in Canada. Chapter 4 focuses on college attainment among the first, second, and third generations in the US. Chapter 5 examines the educational attainment of foreign-born and native-born children in the

United Kingdom. Chapter 6 summarizes the main arguments of my dissertation, the empirical implications of my dissertation, addresses the limitations, and offers suggestions for future comparative research.

Canada, and the UK				
	US	Canada	UK	
Immigrants	13%	21%	10%	
Children of	12%	9%	5%	
Immigrants				

Table 1.1: Immigrants and their Children in the US, Canada, and the UK

Source: Pew Research Center, Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey

Chapter 2: Coethnic Communities in the US, Canada, and the UK

Of the 214 million international migrants in the world, approximately 72 percent are received in the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom (López Real 2011:3). In turn, immigrants comprise over ten percent of the population in these host countries (Bechusen 2011:ix). Thus, a fundamental concern that the governments of these countries face is how to integrate immigrants and their children. The children of immigrants, in particular, are especially important in determining the future labor market and test the long-term effects of immigration policy.

Educational attainment, particularly for immigrant children, has long been used to understand their eventual socioeconomic integration into the host society especially as it represents the greatest predictor of labor market outcomes (Blau and Duncan 1967; Kao and Thompson 2003; McClendon 1976). Given the relatively young age of the contemporary second generation, educational attainment is a fitting measure for socioeconomic integration. Understanding the educational attainment of immigrants' children is particularly important as roughly one in five school age children in the US belong to an immigrant family, one in three school-age children in Canada, and one in six school-age children in the UK belong to immigrant families (Zhou 1997; Suarez-Orozco & Suarez-Orozco 2001). This chapter examines what factors influence the educational attainment of immigrants' children in the US, Canada, and the UK? I address this question by examining variables at four levels-individual, coethnic community, national origin group, and host country. I will begin with a review of the four levels of factors that shape educational attainment, ranging from the smallest unit to the largest: individual, community, group, and host country.

Individual Characteristics

Educational attainment is influenced by individual level characteristics, such as demographic characteristics of the individual as well as family background characteristics (Kao and Tienda 1995; Mare 1980; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Zsembik and Llanes 1996). Individual demographic characteristics, like gender and nativity, are two of the most important factors affecting educational attainment. Being female (Feliciano and Rumbaut 2003:1098; review in Kao and Thompson 2003; Lopez 2003; Valenzuela 1999; Zhou and Bankston 1998) and being U.S. born (rather than foreign-born) of immigrant parents, also referred to as second generation, are both positively associated with educational attainment (Kao and Tienda 1995:1).

Since the mid-1960s, U.S. high school graduation rates are virtually equal for men and women aged 25 to 29 (King 2000:3). However, Mickelson (1989:47) argues that recently, women surpassed men in high school and baccalaureate degrees in the U.S. Findings on the children of immigrants have also documented the academic success of females over males (Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005:1098). Lopez (2003); Valenzuela (1999); Zhou and Bankston (1998) have attributed the greater academic achievement among females to the gendered treatment of second generation adolescent boys and girls.

A child's generation status also affects academic success. Zsembik and Llanes (1996:376) find that first and third generation Mexican American were significantly less likely to complete college than their second generation counterparts. There have been similar findings of generation on academic achievement. Levels et al. (2008:847) find that the second generation have greater odds of math achievement than first generation immigrant children. Kao and Tienda (1995:1) argue first generation immigrants in the US

are slightly disadvantaged because of their limited English skills but second generation youth (U.S. born children of foreign-born parents) are in an optimal position to succeed academically. I acknowledge that the "second generation" is an ambiguous term that has been defined differently. I adopt Portes and Rumbaut's (2001:23-24) definition of the second generation which refers to native born children with at least one immigrant parent. Throughout this paper, I will also refer to the second generation as the children of immigrants.

The inability of individual demographic characteristics alone to explain educational disparities has led to the examination of family background characteristics, such as parental education and income. Parental education and family income are probably the best predictors of educational attainment (Portes and MacLeod 1996:256) and account for a substantial proportion of educational variation among youth (Duncan 1994; review in Kao and Thompson 2003:431). This relationship is already well documented, in which increasing parental SES and family income, positively affect educational outcomes (Mare 1980; Portes and MacLeod 1996; review in Kao and Thompson 2003). Parent's socioeconomic status can be operationalized in different ways, as occupational status, family income, educational attainment, or a combination of the latter two together in a composite variable/index (Blau and Duncan 1967; Morales and Saenz 2007:356; Sewell et al. 1969:87; Vartanian et al. 2007:171).

Thus, parent's socioeconomic status positively affects children's educational attainment; the higher the SES, the higher the level of educational attainment (Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan 1994; Fligstein and Fernandez 1985; Lutz 2007; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Sewell et al. 1969; review in Haller and Portes 1973; review in Kao and

Thompson 2003). The extent that parental SES and family background affect educational outcomes differs though depending on educational transition (Mare 1981) and national origin group (Portes and Macleod 1996; Vartanian et al. 2007).

Community Characteristics

A second set of factors influencing the children of immigrants' education are community level factors or characteristics of coethnics living in the same community or in close proximity. Some ethnographic studies suggest that living in an coethnic community, or small neighborhoods of people with the same national origin living closely together in the destination country (Logan et al. 2002:301; Marcuse 1997:242), positively affects second generation education (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Two characteristics of the coethnic community affect the children of immigrants' educational attainment: 1.) level of education; and 2.) level of resources.

First, the collective level of educational attainment of the ethnic community positively influences the children of immigrants' educational attainment (Borjas 1995:377, 388; Bygren and Szulkin 2010). Community education is a proxy for the average composition of the coethnic community (Waters et al. 2010:1189). In turn, the children of immigrants living in coethnic communities with high levels of collective education also obtain high education whereas those living in coethnic communities with low levels of collective education also obtain low education (Borjas 1995; Bygren and Szulkin 2010:1318). In fact, Borjas (1995:388) argues that living in the same neighborhoods as coethnic community members is one way the skills of an immigrant community is transmitted to the second generation (Borjas 1995). For instance, the children of immigrants benefit from coethnic communities with a substantial portion of

college educated and professionals because they can exchange information with poorer and less educated coethnics in the community.

Highly educated adult members of the coethnic community affect educational attainment by influencing the children of immigrants' outlook. Though this has not been empirically examined, ethnographic studies (Gibson 1988; Gibson and Bhachu 1988; Zhou and Kim 2006) imply how this works. Gibson (1988:129) finds that Punjabi youth always have access to educated adult immigrants in the community and this constant contact illustrates the benefits and feasibility of high education to immigrant children. This, in turn, instills in the second generation a more positive outlook on their chances for upward mobility. On the other hand, ethnic communities with poorly educated members who work low status jobs signal limited payoffs to education (Portes and Zhou 1993; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998).

Second, a community's financial resources positively influence the children of immigrants' educational attainment (Kroneberg 2008). Ethnic communities with higher earnings (Borjas 1995:377) and a larger proportion of self-employed members (Kroneberg 2008:151) have greater academic success among second generation youth. This may occur in two ways. First, greater financial resources increase the likelihood to develop educational organizations in the community, such as ethnic afterschool programs and test preparation courses (Zhou and Kim 2006:18-9). Second, adults from higher SES coethnic communities in the destination country are less likely to be discriminated against by natives, have a better chance of providing children with resources that stimulate upward mobility, and have fewer problems convincing their children of achieving upward mobility (Levels et al. 2008:840).

Group Characteristics

A third set of factors influencing educational attainment are group characteristics (Borjas 1995; Gibson 1988; Gibson and Bhachu 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998; and Zhou and Kim 2006). Some origin group characteristics that influence educational attainment are political stability and economic inequality of the origin country. Political instability indirectly affects immigrant children (Levels et al. 2008:838). Immigrants from countries with high levels of political instability will be more motivated to move for non-economic reasons (Chiswick 1978, 1999) and tend to have lower levels of class status in the origin country (Van Tubergen et al. 2004:708). In turn, children with parents from politically unstable countries of origin are also adversely affected; they are more likely to grow up in a family with traumatized parents and this in turn, negatively affects their scholastic performance. Levels et al. (2008:849) found that on average, children with parents from less politically stable countries had lower scholastic performance.

Economic conditions of the origin country, such as income inequality and economic development, also influence affect the children of immigrants' education but there are conflicting findings about its effect. Borjas (1987) and Van Tubergen et al. (2004) argue that income inequality affects the children of immigrants through the selectivity of first generation immigrants. For instance, Borjas (1987:534) argues that immigrants from countries with high levels of income inequality or a skewed income distribution will be less skilled and have much more to gain economically by emigrating. Immigrants from more egalitarian countries will be largely concentrated at the upper end of the home country's income distribution (Borjas 1987:534; Borjas 1988:25) and will be more positively selected (Van Tubergen et al. 2004:708).

On the other hand, Levels et al. (2008: 848) find that children with parents from countries with lower economic development show greater academic performance. They offer two possible explanations but they are not well supported by the literature. The first explanation is that adult immigrants from developing countries that leave their countries for economic reasons are more likely to meet economic expectations and push their children to excel academically. Another possibility is that children with parents from less developed countries may have a more transnational orientation towards achievement by comparing themselves with peers in the origin country and thus, are more optimistic about their expectations for the future (Louie 2006).

Group characteristics that differ in the destination country, such as immigrant selectivity, may also affect educational attainment. Immigrant selectivity is the difference between those who migrate (immigrants) and those remain in the origin country (non-immigrants). Migrants can be selective on several dimensions such as education, health, and socioeconomic status. The educational selectivity of a national origin group, the educational difference between immigrants in the destination country and non-immigrants in the origin country, is a positive predictor of second generation educational attainment (Feliciano 2005). Feliciano (2005) finds that highly selective national origin groups in the US show greater college attendance rates among immigrant children than groups that are less selective, net of a group's SES.

Group characteristics have been observed in combination with individual level characteristics. Feliciano (2005) examines the effect of educational group selectivity and individual level characteristics on second generation educational attainment. In another study, Feliciano (2006) interacts group and individual level factors together, premigration

group education and parental SES; both factors are significant but parental SES is less important when educational selectivity is considered. This suggests that both individual and group levels of characteristics influence the children of immigrants' education.

Additionally, European studies examining educational disparities also consider group and individual characteristics together (Heath et al. 2004; Kalter and Granato 2010; Kalter, Granato, and Kristen 2007). The authors propose a causal model, offering an explanation of *how* group level variables affect the children of immigrants' education. Kalter and Granato (2010) and Kalter et al. (2007) suggest a path where an immigrant group's educational selectivity affects parent's class status in the host country which affects second generation education. However, due to data limitations, the authors use bivariate relationships to describe associations between premigration group education, parental SES, and the children of immigrants' educational attainment rather than test causal relationships between variables.

National origin group characteristics are important as they ultimately shape community level characteristics in the destination country (Feliciano 2005:283). Group level characteristics have been interpreted as a reflection of the larger community (Feliciano 2005; Levels et al. 2008). Levels et al. (2008) partially accounted for group characteristics by taking the difference between the average levels of parental education of immigrant children and non-immigrant children in their sample. However, this is limited to the highest educated parent and thus, does not reflect the characteristics of the entire national origin group. Only accounting for the most highly educated parent could present large gender biases though if there are more highly educated males than females. Host Country Characteristics

A fourth set of factors influencing the children of immigrants' education the social, economic, and political characteristics of the host country (Portes and Zhou 1993:83). Country level factors that refer to characteristics of the country of destination. Destination countries have distinct characteristics that influence second generation educational attainment (Dronkers and Fleischmann 2010; Levels et al. 2008). Destination effects refer to the conditions of the destination country that could affect immigrant characteristics in the destination country. Three destination effects may influence the children of immigrants' education: immigration history, government policies (e.g., immigrant integration policies, language policies, multicultural policies, etc.), and the degree of friendliness of the host country (racial and ethnic context and public opinion toward immigration).

First, traditional immigrant countries are host countries with a long history of immigrant reception, such as Australia, Canada, and US. Levels et al. (2008) find that second generation living in traditional immigrant countries such as New Zealand and Australia have greater math performance than second generation living in non-traditional immigrant countries. One explanation is that nonimmigrants in traditional immigrant countries hold a more favorable view of immigrants' contribution to the economy (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmerman 2000). As a result, legislators have passed national and state policy measures targeted towards the educational needs of immigrant children (Iredale and Fox 1997). Thus, immigrant children living in traditional destination countries tend to have higher levels of academic success.

Additionally, immigrants living in destination countries with a point system to rate immigrants on specific skills, such as language fluency, job experience, education,

and other characteristics are assumed to be more skilled and talented than those who do not earn enough points. Immigrants living in countries with point systems are assumed to have higher levels of human capital than migrants in countries without such admission policies (Borjas 2001). Although, this idea has been contested (Reitz 1998). However, Van Tubergen et al. (2004:717) find that these immigrants living in traditional countries with point systems do not show greater employment or labor force activity than those in non-traditional countries.

Although these policies are intended for adult immigrants, they also influence immigrants' children. The children of immigrants living in countries with stricter policies show higher levels of academic success (OECD 2006). One explanation is that immigrant parents that have met the skill requirements for entry into the country transmit their high levels of human capital to their children. For instance, Levels et al. (2008:838) posits that the children of immigrants living in host countries with more selective policies will have greater educational attainment because the immigrants will also be more educated and high skilled. Levels et al. (2008:848) find that the high occupational and educational background of immigrant parents fully explains the greater academic performance of second generation students in countries with strict point systems compared with students in other countries.

Second, there are several government policies that may influence immigrants and minorities although some have been emphasized more than others. These include immigrant integration policies, language policies, and multicultural policies. The legislative measures that national governments adopt are a reflection of a country's dominant ideologies. Although most western countries prohibit discrimination against

racial and ethnic minorities, subtle forms of discrimination may exist, depending on the how well-established the policies are (Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp 2008:838). Immigrant integration policies, multicultural policies, and race relations policies may overlap and are not mutually exclusive. How these policies are created and enacted are done on a country by country basis so what the policies entail and how they are implemented vary widely.

In general, a host society may offer a formal integration policy or program that offers settlement assistance in the form of English language classes, employment training, and social assistance. Countries that offer more formal integration programs can ease the settlement process. A country's immigrant integration policy may matter for the children of immigrants' outcomes because children in countries with less established integration policies may encounter more discrimination into institutions, such as higher education, and thus attain lower levels of education (Levels et al. 2008:838; Portes and Zhou 1993).

A country may also adopt a multicultural policy, which generally refers to equal rights and the promotion of ethnic, racial, religious, or sexual minorities (Joppke 1996:449). Typically, these policies are, in some form, state-sponsored (Bloemraad 2005:869-870;; Saggar and Somerville 2012:10). Countries that adopt multicultural policies are more tolerant of minorities and they may experience lower levels of discrimination and thus, positively affect the children of immigrants' outcomes. For instance, countries with multicultural policies may offer multicultural education, which can positively affect academic performance. Multicultural education emphasizes ethnic materials and experiences, which are more meaningful and engaging for students from

diverse backgrounds. In turn, multicultural education leads to greater focused efforts and academic achievement (review in Gay 1994:8).

Third, a country's degree of friendliness towards immigrants and minorities can be assessed by a country's racial and ethnic context and public attitudes toward immigration (Reitz 2003:3). Preexisting ethnic attitudes and intergroup hierarchies can shape immigrant integration and subsequently, formal and informal institutional arrangements (Retiz 2003:3). Countries that are highly stratified by race and ethnicity may be a harsh context for immigrants and their children, which will make socioeconomic mobility more difficult. In addition, public attitudes can determine the attitudes of the established residents toward immigrants as well as public policy outcomes. Thus, a harsh racial and ethnic context and negative public opinion toward immigration may negatively affect education.

Based on the factors above, this chapter examines how individual, coethnic community, national origin group, and host country characteristics affect educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. Whereas previous studies have focused on these factors separately, my dissertation quantitatively examines group and community effects more comprehensively and broadly than previous works. Using large scale data sets with comparative cases, I will quantitatively assess group and community characteristics on the children of immigrants' educational attainment, net of individual controls.

Coethnic Community, Group, and Individual Effects on College Attainment

In Table 2.1, I examine two characteristics of the coethnic community community education and income—on college attainment. I examine the first generation

(persons born abroad) and second or higher generations (born in the destination country) in the US, Canada, and the UK. The data sets provide different information about time of arrival and migration history so the first generation represents all individuals born abroad and the second or higher generations represents all individuals born in the host country. More information regarding the description of data sources and coding is included in the Methodological Appendix.

The analysis in this study relies on non-public data that were analyzed on secure computers in each country. Because data cannot be removed from the secure labs, data from the three countries could not be merged together and thus, were analyzed separately for each country. Nonetheless, I analyze the data of each country with identical models to ensure that the data as comparable as possible.

Table 2.1, Model 1 presents the odds ratios of the community, group, and individual factors for the US, Canada, and the UK respectively, estimated by logistic regression analysis. The standard errors for each variable are presented in parentheses underneath the odds ratios. Group and individual variables are included as controls so I will only report and interpret on the community education and income variables. In Model 1, column 1, the odds ratio for community education is 2.167 and statistically significant. This suggests that a one year increase in the average education of the community increases the odds of college attainment by 2.2. Model 1, column 2 presents the odds ratios for Canada. The odds ratio for community education in Canada is 1.147 and statistically significant. The odds ratio for community income is 1.499 and statistically significant. Model 1 shows that net of controls, community education and income are positive predictors of college attainment in Canada. Overall, Table 2.1 shows

that community education has a strong effect in all three countries across different institutional policies and groups.

TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

Model 1, column 3 presents the odds ratios predicting college attainment in the UK. Model 1, column 3 shows that the odds ratio for community education is 3.86 and statistically significant. The odds ratio for community income is 1.023, which suggests that community income is a positive predictor of college attainment in the UK. Model 1, column 3 shows that both community education and income are positive predictors of college attainment in the UK, but the effect of community education is about 3 times as strong on college attainment than the effect of community income. Overall, Model 1 shows that net of controls, the role of community education has a strong and positive effect on the odds of college attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. Furthermore, community income has a strong and positive effect on the odds of college attainment in the US. Community education is the strongest predictor of college attainment in the UK, but not in the US, but not Canada.

I also present the predicted probabilities of college attainment by different levels of community education. The probabilities are calculated from the regression results in Table 1. The probabilities are drawn from each of the national surveys and thus, are not comparable across countries. The predicted probabilities for each country show that as community education increases so does the probability of completing college in each college. Figure 2.1 also indicates that in Canada, children living in communities with lower average have a greater probability of college attainment than children living in similar communities in the US and the UK.

My findings are consistent with qualitative studies of coethnic communities that show a positive effect on the children of immigrants' academic success (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998). These studies emphasize several mechanisms that explain the positive effect of coethnic neighbors on educational attainment. Coethnic adults can help monitor children's' behavior, which discourages deviant behavior and encourages academic achievement (Pong and Hao 2007:209; Portes 1996:255; Zhou and Bankston 1998:106). Coethnic adults can also positively affect education by enforcing educational norms, monitoring children, and sharing information about children. Constant supervision makes it difficult for children to engage in deviant behavior and encourages academic achievement (Zhou and Bankston 1994:831; Zhou and Bankston 1998:106). Furthermore, these activities reinforce parents' control and aspirations for their children, which indirectly affect children's education (Pong and Hao 2007:209; Portes 1998:10).

Furthermore, my findings are consistent with quantitative studies of coethnic communities in Sweden and Belgium. Bygren and Szulkin (2010) who focused on Sweden and found that living in a larger coethnic community had a positive effect on the children of immigrants' educational attainment if coethnic neighbors were also highly educated. Thus, Bygren and Szulkin (2010) shows that the educational composition of coethnic neighbors shapes the children of immigrants' educational attainment.

Overall, my findings extend the works of qualitative and quantitative community studies by showing that the coethnic community has a strong positive effect on education beyond small localized contexts (Pong and Hao 2007:207), a single national origin group (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998), or one national context (Bygren and Szulkin 2010; Fleischmann et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; Zhou and Bankston 1998). My study is the

first to conclusively show a strong community effect on the children of immigrants' educational attainment and to show that this effect remains net of individual and group controls. Whereas qualitative studies have showed that the coethnic community positively shapes academic outcomes, it is unclear how strong this effect was (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Bygren and Szulkin (2010:1318) only examined community education in an interaction with community size so it is unclear how strong the effect of community education is by itself.

Furthermore, my study is also able to show that the coethnic community is effective across many heterogeneous immigrant groups with different characteristics in three host countries with different institutional characteristics. Overall, my findings show that the positive community education effect is generalizable in three large immigrantreceiving western countries. Thus, this suggests that the coethnic community is an important factor in integrating immigrants' children and it may offer a protective factor under a diverse set of institutional conditions in the host country.

Nonetheless, it is possible that the positive community effect I found in this study would not hold in other countries. This study focuses on the US, Canada, and the UK, three countries with policies that acknowledge and protect racial and ethnic minorities. To illustrate, Table 2.2 presents scores that summarize the coverage of multicultural policies in each host country in which higher scores indicate greater protection. Countries receive a score based on various policies, such as the availability of laws offering protection against discrimination, laws enforcing punishment for discrimination, and laws promoting equality (Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015). The US, Canada, and the UK all have moderate to high levels of multiculturalism. For instance, the US has

affirmative action policies aimed at racial inequality and discrimination. Immigrants and their children are also beneficiaries of these programs. Canada has a multicultural policy that promotes cultural diversity and encourages individuals to celebrate their ethnic heritage. For instance, under the multicultural policy, the government provides funding for ethnic community organizations. The UK also offers extensive anti-discrimination legislation that protects racial and ethnic minorities. Under anti-discrimination legislation, it is deemed unlawful for any practices or procedures, intentional or not, to place a minority group at a disadvantage (Cheung and Heath 2007). Immigrants and their children are also covered under this legislation. Thus, the three countries I examined offer some support for racial and ethnic minorities that allow the coethnic community to support immigrants and their children.

TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE

My results that focused on the US, Canada, and the UK are also consistent with community studies in Belgium and Sweden. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index, Sweden ranks third and Belgium ranks seventh (out of thirty-one countries) in terms of its provision of anti-discrimination policies (Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015). The positive community effect observed in the US, Canada, the UK, Belgium, and Sweden may suggest that the moderate to high levels of institutional support can allow coethnic communities to act as a protective factor in the integration process.

Nonetheless, it is plausible that the coethnic community does not have a positive effect in countries with a very hostile context for immigrants and minorities. Thomson and Crul (2007:1036) suggest that in European countries with less racial and ethnic recognition, there is less socioeconomic mobility vis-à-vis the coethnic community. To

illustrate, studies examining the coethnic concentration of schools in France (Boado 2007) and ethnic concentration in Germany (review in Kristen 2005:15) and Denmark (Nielsen et al. 2003:765) show a negative effect on educational attainment for immigrants' children. As indicated in Table 2.2, all three countries have low levels of multicultural policies (Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015). For instance, France does not recognize groups in racial terms nor does it collect census or other data on race (or ethnicity) and has no policies directed at racial or ethnic minorities (Brookings Institute 2001). Furthermore, Germany offers limited protection for visible minorities as it has strict guidelines for citizenship that exclude many racial and ethnic minorities (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2013:132). Many immigrants in Germany face unequal access to the rights of German citizens. Although Boado (2007) and Nielsen et al. (2003) did not examine coethnic communities per se, the negative effects of coethnic and ethnic concentration in these three countries may suggest when a country has a particularly harsh environment, it is difficult for coethnics to collectively act as a resource.

FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

The Effects of Community Education by Generation

Thus far, my results indicate that community education has a positive effect on foreign-born and native-born individuals in the US, Canada, and the UK. However, Golash-boza (2005:738-9) has inferred that the coethnic community can have different effects for immigrants' children. In particular, she argues that bilingual immigrant children may have greater access to coethnic community members compared with monolinguals because bilinguals can speak the same language as coethnic community members. Although Golash-boza (2005) focused on how an individual's language ability

shaped community access, her study nonetheless suggests that the children of immigrants with greater access to the community also reap a greater benefit from the community (Golash-Boza 2005:749).

In turn, I assess whether this positive community education also differs by generation status. Generation status may capture some of the language effects observed by Golash-Boza (2005) since immigrants and the 1.5 generation may be more likely to be bilingual than the second or later generations. In Model 2, I examine an interaction between coethnic community education and generational status. In Model 2, column 1, I find that the interaction term between 1st generation and community education is 1.491 and not statistically significant. This suggests that the effect of community education on college attainment does not differ across generational status.

In Model 2, column 2, I examine the interaction between community education and generational status in Canada. When an interaction term is included in the equation, the interpretation of the odds ratio changes. The odds ratio of a variable no longer corresponds to a change in odds ratio; this interpretation only applies to an equation without any interaction terms. In interpreting the interaction between community education and generational status, there are three variables to consider: community education, generational status (first generation), and the interaction term. In Model 2, column 2, the odds ratio for the interaction term is 1.153 and is statistically significant. The odds ratio for community education is 1.102; this represents the odds ratio of college attainment or higher compared with high school or less for a one year increase in community education for second or higher generation respondents. To calculate the corresponding odds for the first generation, it is less straight-forward. I need to multiply

the odds ratio of community education by the odds ratio of the interaction term (1.102*1.153=1.271). Thus, for a one-unit increase in community education, the odds of being the college attainment category are 1.27 greater than the odds of being in the high school or less categories, for the first generation. The odds ratio for the first generation is 0.292. This represents the *difference* in odds ratio of attaining a college degree or more versus high school or less for the first and second or higher generations, given that community education is equal to zero. The predicted odds that the first generation obtains a college degree or more are 0.292 times lower than the corresponding predicted odds for the second or higher generations given that community education is equal to zero. In Model 2, column 3, the odds ratio for the interaction term is 1.794 and statistically significant. This represents the ratio of the two odds ratios (odds ratio of attainment for a one year increase in community education for the first generation and the odds ratio of attainment for a one year increase in community education for the second or higher generations). Thus, the odds ratio of community education on college attainment or more for the first generation is 1.153 times the odds ratio of community education on college attainment for the second or higher generations.

In Model 2, column 3, I examined the interaction between community education and generational status in the UK. Again, I focus on the three variables associated with the interaction. The odds ratio for community education is 3.715 and statistically significant. This suggests that for a one year increase in community education, the odds of completing college or more are 3.7 times greater than the odds of attaining a high school degree or less, for the second or higher generation. To calculate the corresponding odds for the first generation, I multiply the odds ratio for the first generation by the odds

ratio of the interaction term (3.715*1.794=6.66). For a one year increase in community education, the odds of attaining a college degree or more are 6.6 greater than the odds of attaining high school or less for the first generation. The exponentiated coefficient for the first generation is 0.292 and is statistically significant. This suggests that the predicted odds that the first generation attaining a college degree or more is 0.29 times lower than the corresponding predicted odds for the second or higher generations. The exponentiated coefficient for the interaction term is 1.794 and statistically significant. This suggest that the odds ratio of community education on college attainment for the first generation is 1.79 times the odds ratio of community education on college attainment for the second or higher generations. My findings show an interaction between coethnic community education and the first generation in Canada and the UK, but not in the US. This suggests that the positive effect of living with educated coethnics is stronger among the first generation compared with the second or later generations in Canada and the UK.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter examines the effects of individual, coethnic community, group, and country characteristics on educational attainment. In particular, I focus on the role of the coethnic community on college attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. There are two main findings of this paper. First, coethnic community education is a positive and strong predictor of educational attainment, net of individual and group characteristics. These strong community effects are apparent in the US, Canada, and the UK, despite differences in institutional characteristics, policies, and immigrant groups.

Overall, this chapter shows that the coethnic community is an important context in the integration process. In particular, community education has a strong and positive effect on college attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. This positive effect remains despite differences in immigration policy, social context, and different immigrant groups across the three countries. Moreover, these community effects hold net of other individuals and group controls. While other qualitative studies have found a positive relationship between the coethnic community and academic achievement for a few specific groups in localized areas (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998), this study is the first to show a strong positive effect of the coethnic community across several national contexts.

This chapter also shows an interaction effect between community education and generation status. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I will elaborate on why the community education effect is stronger for the first generation compared with the second and higher generations in Canada and the UK, but not in the US. Overall, I argue that while the average education of the community has a strong and positive effect on educational attainment for all individuals in all three countries, the institutional characteristics of Canada and the UK make the community effect stronger for the first generation compared with the second or higher generation. In particular, I will focus on how immigration policy and the social context of each country may influence how strongly community education shapes educational attainment.

	would I	Model 1		Model 2		
US	Canada	UK	US	Canada	UK	
2.167***	1.147***	3.855***	2.112***	1.102***	3.715***	
(0.117)	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.116)	(0.019)	(0.053)	
0.976	1.499***	1.023***	0.968	1.556***	1.023***	
(0.076)	(0.141)	(0.002)	(0.077)	(0.162)	(0.002)	
0.384	1.771***	1.154	0.399	1.710***	1.036	
(0.471)	(0.237)	(0.209)	(0.497)	(0.229)	(0.225)	
0.915	1.000	1.001	0.945	0.998	1.000	
(0.071)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.082)	(0.004)	(0.057)	
0.414	0.740***	0.985	0.537	0.745***	0.993	
(0.242)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.351)	(0.051)	(0.057)	
0.888	1.192**	1.052**	0.885	1.199**	1.050**	
(0.116)	(0.069)	(0.017)	(0.115)	(0.070)	(0.017)	
0.983**	0.965***	0.986***	0.984**	0.966***	0.986***	
(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.001)	
0.782	1.215**	0.912	0.003	0.195***	0.292***	
(0.348)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.013)	(0.074)	(0.051)	
			1.491	1.153***	1.794***	
			(0.449)	(0.033)	(0.119)	
1969	14420	126649	1969	14420	126649	
_	$\begin{array}{c} 2.167^{***}\\ (0.117)\\ 0.976\\ (0.076)\\ 0.384\\ (0.471)\\ 0.915\\ (0.071)\\ 0.414\\ (0.242)\\ 0.888\\ (0.116)\\ 0.983^{**}\\ (0.006)\\ 0.782\\ (0.348)\\ \end{array}$	USCanada 2.167^{***} 1.147^{***} (0.117) (0.016) 0.976 1.499^{***} (0.076) (0.141) 0.384 1.771^{***} (0.471) (0.237) 0.915 1.000 (0.071) (0.004) 0.414 0.740^{***} (0.242) (0.050) 0.888 1.192^{**} (0.116) (0.069) 0.983^{**} 0.965^{***} (0.006) (0.003) 0.782 1.215^{**} (0.348) (0.081)	USCanadaUK 2.167^{***} 1.147^{***} 3.855^{***} (0.117) (0.016) (0.053) 0.976 1.499^{***} 1.023^{***} (0.076) (0.141) (0.002) 0.384 1.771^{***} 1.154 (0.471) (0.237) (0.209) 0.915 1.000 1.001 (0.071) (0.004) (0.005) 0.414 0.740^{***} 0.985 (0.242) (0.050) (0.044) 0.888 1.192^{**} 1.052^{**} (0.116) (0.069) (0.017) 0.983^{**} 0.965^{***} 0.986^{***} (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 0.782 1.215^{**} 0.912 (0.348) (0.081) (0.073)	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	

Table 2.1: Odds ratios of community, group, and individual factors predicting college degree or more in the US, Canada, and the UK

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 Note: Standard errors in parentheses

Source: 2006 Sensitive General Social Survey, 2002 Ethnic Diversity Study, 2008-2009 Annual Population Survey

/80-2010			
	<u>1980</u>	2000	2010
High			
Australia	5	8	8
Canada	3	7.5	7.5
Sweden	3	5	7
Finland	0	1.5	6
Medium			
Belgium	1	3	5.5
New Zealand	2.5	5	5.5
United Kingdom	2.5	5.5	5.5
Norway	0	0	3.5
Portugal	1	2	3.5
Spain	0	1	3.5
Ireland	1	1.5	3
United States	3	3	3
Low			
Germany	0	2	2.5
Greece	0.5	0.5	2.5
France	1	2	2
Netherlands	2.5	5.5	2
Austria	0	1	1.5
Italy	0	1.5	1
Switzerland	0	1	1
Denmark	0	0.5	0
Japan	0	0	0
-			

Table 2.2: Scores Ranking Multicultural Policies in Various Host Countries,1980-2010

Source: Migration Policy Index (2015)




Figure 2.1: Predicted Probabilities of College Attainment by Community Education

Source: 2006 Sensitive GSS, 2002 EDS, and 2008-2009 APS

Chapter 3: Canada

Today, Canada represents the third largest immigrant-receiving OECD country and nearly 20 percent of the country's population is comprised of immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2011). Incoming immigrants in Canada represent educated and skilled individuals from select countries in Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. For instance, nearly one third of Canada's foreign-born arrive from China, the Philippines, and India Consequently, Canada has avoided the mass migration of poorly educated workers, particularly those from Latin America.

Canada's selective immigration is widely celebrated and contributes to Canada's reputation as an "international success story" in its integration of immigrants (Kaushal and Lu 2014:28). Canada's immigration policy utilizes points to screen and admit educated, skilled, and wealthy immigrants. Additionally, the presence of an official multiculturalism policy that celebrates ethnic diversity and cultural heritage and official bilingualism have been argued to be more accepting of immigrants (Bloemraad 2006). While these policies and their international reputation seem to suggest a rather smooth transition for Canada's newcomers, this broad generalization may overlook how these institutional characteristics create distinct settlement issues for immigrants and immigrant children. Thus, this chapter focuses on how immigration policy, language policy, and multicultural policy (Borjas 2002:71; Levels et al. 2008; and Reitz 2003) may create particular challenges among the foreign-born compared with native-borns.

Based on the findings in Chapter 2, I begin with an assessment of the coethnic community on college attainment, net of a comprehensive set of individual and group characteristics that I could not examine in Chapter 2. Next, I detail how the stronger

positive effect of community education is associated with the context of Canada's selective immigration policy, official language policy, and multicultural policy. I begin with an overview of immigration policy from the late nineteenth century up to the contemporary period. I review some of the major demographic changes since immigration reform in the 1960s, such as an increase in the number of racial and ethnic minorities and the rise of urban and coethnic concentration. I describe how immigration policy matters for immigrants' labor force outcomes, which also has important consequences for their children's integration. This will help us understand the challenges that newcomers and their families endure. In the third section, I provide an overview of Canada's official language policy and explain how the official langue policy affects their experience in learning the official language. In the final section, I review the components and overarching goals of Canada's multicultural policy. I review whether the multicultural policy has fulfilled its intended goals.

LANGUAGE, COMMUNITY, AND COETHNIC RESOURCES ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

As illustrated in Chapter 2, the coethnic community in Canada has a stronger positive effect for foreign-born individuals (first generation) compared with native-born individuals (second generation). To further explore this effect, this chapter offers a more detailed analysis of the coethnic community, language attainment, and coethnic resources. To begin, I provide some descriptive statistics about the groups included in my sample. Due to the data restrictions of the Research Data Centre (RDC) in Canada, I only have descriptive statistics on the group variables—educational selectivity, GDP, GINI, and

political stability—for each group in my sample because these variables since they were coded from publicly available sources. Table 3.1 indicates that immigrants in Canada primarily arrive from Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. Immigrants from Pakistan (0.83) and India (0.802) are the most selective whereas immigrants from Greece (0.25) are the least selective.

TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

In Table 3.2, I examine the likelihood of college attainment by different generation groups (first, 1.5 generation, and second generation). The main dependent variable is college attainment, measured as a dichotomous variable of attaining a college degree or more compared with less than a college degree. The first generation represents foreign-born individuals that arrived in Canada after the age of 14 and completed their final degree in Canada. The 1.5 generation represents foreign-born individuals that arrived in Canada after the age of 14 and received their highest degree in Canada. The second generation represents individuals born in Canada to at least one immigrant parent. I analyze data from non-public 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) and 2001 Census. The main dependent variable is college attainment, measured as a dichotomous variable of attaining a college degree or more compared with less than a college degree. Community education measures the average years of schooling of immigrants from the same country of birth, aged 25 and older in each tract. Community income is average income of all individuals 25 and older from the same birth country in each tract. For the first and second generations, community characteristics are averaged for immigrants whereas community characteristics for the third generation are averaged for native-born

individuals. I provide more details on community characteristics in the Methodological Appendix.

TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

Table 3.2 presents the odds ratios of obtaining a college degree or more (compared with less than a college degree) among the first, 1.5, and second generations, estimated by logistic regression analysis. In particular, I examine how individual, community, and group characteristics affect college attainment for each generation. The standard errors for each variable are presented in parentheses underneath the coefficients and the p-values are presented underneath the standard errors.

Table 3.2 shows that community education has a significant and positive effect for the first and 1.5 generations, with and without controls. For the second generation, community education has a positive and significant effect when controls are not considered in the model, but it has no significant effect, net of controls. This suggests that the coethnic community may be particularly beneficial for college completion among the first and 1.5 generations. One explanation could be that the first and 1.5 generations are more influenced by the coethnic community because they are less acculturated. Related, the strong and positive effect on education could also suggest that coethnic community may help alleviate the structural challenges that the first and 1.5 generations face. For instance, the coethnic community may offer assistance that is associated with a later arrival in Canada or less familiarity with Canada's school system. Overall, Table 3.2 shows that immigrant children benefit more from the coethnic community than nativeborn children do. Living with more educated coethnics may help respond to immigration conditions that are specific to immigrant children or educated coethnics may be more

influential on the educational attainment of immigrant children.

The stronger positive effect of community education on college attainment could be associated with Canada's selective immigration policy. In particular, the selective immigration policy could affect the age of arrival of immigrants' children. The age in which children arrive to Canada matters for their educational attainment because children that arrive later are further behind in school(Busby and Corak 2014; Corak 2011). In turn, the age in which children arrive affects their integration processes. While it would be ideal to have information on age at arrival to assess this relationship, I use generation status as a proxy because of data limitations.

In addition to the coethnic community, I examine the role of individual characteristics, such as language skills, on college attainment. Table 3.3 presents the odds ratios of bilingualism predicting college completion for the first, 1.5, and second generations using 2002 EDS data. I operationalize bilingualism as proficiency in an non-official language and at least one official language. For the purposes of this study, I am not interested in individuals that are bilingual in both official languages only. Table 3.3 shows that bilingualism has no effect for the first generation but has a significant and positive effect for the 1.5 and second generations. Being bilingual in an official and non-official language has the strongest effect on college completion for the 1.5 generation. Individuals that have been able to retain fluency in the immigrant language and an official language is a predictor of college completion and immigrant children that are only proficient in the immigrant language are at an academic disadvantage.

TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE

My results indicate that bilingualism has no effect among the first generation. One reason why bilingualism has no effect among the first generation could be due to my sample. First, my sample of the first generation could include immigrant children from English or French-speaking countries that are only proficient in their native language. Immigrant children that are monolingual in English or French will face fewer adjustment difficulties. Another possibility is that these individuals could represent international students that have already been accepted for postsecondary school in Canada. Thus, their educational background and previous achievement may be a greater predictor of college completion than bilingualism. Furthermore, age 16 is the school leaving age so immigrant children that arrive at age 15 or older tend not to be accepted for regular school in Canada (Corak 2011). Therefore, for immigrant children that arrive later, age of arrival is a stronger predictor of college completion than bilingualism.

Thus far, my results illustrate the importance of bilingualism in the immigrant language and an official language for college completion among the 1.5 generation. For immigrant children that arrive in Canada at age 14 or younger, being bilingual in the immigrant language and an official language are more likely to complete college. This provides evidence that bilingual education or bilingual support is crucial for the educational success of immigrant children. Nonetheless, there are few school resources for children to acquire the official language and maintain the immigrant language, which negatively affects their integration. Thus, immigrant children may need to rely on resources outside of the school for linguistic assistance (G. Li 2006:355).

This could be related to Canada's official language policy, which emphasizes English and French. The context of the official language policy can make it difficult for children to adopt the official language because there is little assistance or language services in non-official languages and few language resources for the children of immigrants to adopt the official language in schools (G. Li 2006). In turn, this negatively affects the educational attainment of immigrant children because bilingual children that have proficiency in an immigrant language and official language are more likely to achieve a college degree. The emphasis on English and French in Canada's official language policy can have unintended consequences that hinder the integration of immigrant children. Given these challenges, the coethnic community may serve as a linguistic resource for immigrant children that have not acquired the official language. I elaborate further on the official language policy in the subsequent section below.

In addition to the coethnic community, which is assessed at the neighborhood level, I examine the role of coethnic resources available in the metropolitan area on college attainment. To assess the number of coethnic resources, I examine the number of coethnic organizations and institutions in the six major CMAs (Census Metropolitan Area) in Canada—Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Gatineau, Calgary, and Edmonton. The dimensions capture the political, social, and religious resources available to community members. More details on these different dimensions and coding of the coethnic resources variable are presented in the Methodological Appendix.

In Table 3.4, I present the total number of coethnic resources for different groups in each of the CMAs. Table 3.4 shows that the number of coethnic resources in Canada corresponds with immigrant settlement. Urban areas with the highest concentration of

immigrants—Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal respectively—also have the highest number of coethnic resources, measured as political, social, and religious institutions.

TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE

I compare coethnic resources among the same national origin groups in the UK, a country with no official multicultural policy to get a sense of how the number of coethnic resources in the two countries match up. I present information for national origin groups that have available data in both countries. Table 3.5 below shows the total number of resources in Toronto and Inner London for a select number of groups. I focus on Toronto and Inner London because they are the largest cities in both countries, which have the largest number of immigrant groups. When compared with the UK, there was a only slightly higher number of community resources. On average, among all groups in Canada, there is an average of 8.3 resources per group in Toronto compared with 6.2 resources per group in Inner London. Looking at the specific groups, Table 3.5 shows that there is no consistent pattern that indicates that the number of coethnic resources is uniformly higher among all groups in Canada relative to groups in the UK.

TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE

I also assess whether living in a CMA with a higher number of coethnic resources affects the integration of immigrants' children. Table 3.6 presents the odds ratios of coethnic resources (total number of community resources in the CMA) on obtaining a college degree or more (compared with less than a college degree) among the first, 1.5, and second generations, estimated by logistic regression analysis. The number of resources ranges from 0 to 17. I code coethnic resources as a categorical variable: low (0-9), medium (10-12), and high (13-17).

TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE

Table 3.6 shows that coethnic resources have a positive effect on college completion for the first, 1,5, and second generations. The sample size in Table 3.6 is significantly reduced from the analyses in Table 3.2 because of the small number of observations for the coethnic resources variable. Living in a metropolitan area with a medium number of coethnic resources (10-12) increases the odds of college completion. Additionally, living in a metropolitan area with a large number of coethnic resources (13-17) increases the odds of college attainment. However, the significant effect of coethnic resources is only borders significant, net of controls. This suggests that living in areas with more coethnic resources is beneficial for college completion, but this effect is diminished when individual, national origin group, and coethnic community characteristics are considered. Therefore, coethnic resources can benefit college completion, but living among educated coethnic adults has an even greater effect.

In Table 3.7, I assess whether the effect of coethnic resources on college completion differs by generational status. Table 3.7 presents the odds ratios of coethnic resources on the likelihood of obtaining a college degree or more, by generational status, estimated by logistic regression analysis. For each generation, I present two models. Model 1 presents the effect of coethnic resources on college attainment with no controls. Model 2 presents the effect of coethnic resources on college attainment net of individual, community, and national origin group characteristics.

TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE

I find that living in a metropolitan area with more coethnic resources has a significant effect on college attainment for the second generation, but not for the first or

1.5 generations. However, Table 3.7 also shows that the positive effect of coethnic resources for the second generation disappears, net of controls. In separate analyses, I find that the effect of coethnic resources is primarily explained by father's education and age. My findings suggest that coethnic resources are more likely to support the nativeborn children of immigrants than immigrant children, although this effect is not very strong. One explanation is that coethnic resources may provide the children of immigrants with ties to the immigrant culture, which they may have less access or connection to because they were born in Canada (review in Mouw and Xie 1999). An alternative explanation is that coethnic resources are more likely to be near more educated communities and thus the effect of community education washes out the effect of coethnic resources.

My findings on coethnic resources could be associated with Canada's multicultural policy, which provides widespread and essentially universal government funding for community organizations. Multiculturalism may have a small effect in facilitating the creation of community resources in Canada and the children of immigrants' educational attainment. In addition, my results suggest that multiculturalism may be more influential for native-born children of immigrants, but has no effect on immigrant children's' education. Still, the effect of multiculturalism on the second generation is limited as the coethnic resources effect diminishes with father's education and age.

Overall, my findings suggest that there are several factors in the Canadian context that shape the integration of immigrants and their children. These include a selective immigration policy, official language policy, and multicultural policy. In the subsequent

section, I elaborate on these factors and argue that together, these factors create a context that can be challenging for newcomers, but relatively welcoming for racial and ethnic minorities that are born in Canada. For newcomers, settlement issues may hamper the initial integration process but the process becomes smoother with greater time in Canada.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

Contemporary migration to Canada is overwhelmingly comprised of educated and skilled immigrants. This is a result of a selective immigration policy that was enacted in the 1960s. Prior to the 1960s, immigration policy was based primarily on country of origin with little consideration for immigrants' skills whereas migration since the 1960s has selected immigrants on education and skill regardless of country of origin. In the following section, I will review how the selective immigration policy arose historically and how contemporary immigrants are selected in the points system.

Overview of Immigration Policy

From 1867 to 1895, Canada's immigration policy admitted immigrants based on their country of origin. In particular, immigration policy was essentially open and unrestricted for individuals of European origin, especially those from Britain and the United States (P. S. Li 2003b:18). British, American, and Western European immigrants were viewed most favorably, followed by North Europeans, Central Europeans, and Southern and Eastern Europeans respectively. Asian, Jewish, and other non-white immigrants, however, were excluded from entering the country because of their presumed cultural differences (P. S. Li 2003b:19). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Canada began recruiting limited numbers of Eastern and Southern Europe migrants to fill the labor demands that could not be filled by British and Western

European immigrants alone. Thus, the vast majority of immigrants from the late 19th century to the mid 20th century arrived from Europe and the US—areas that were viewed favorably (S. J. Smith 1994:57).

In the 1960s, the sending countries of immigrants began to change drastically when major reforms were introduced in Canada's immigration policy (Fong 2006:4). Specifically, Canada began to "deracialize" their immigration policy by removing national origins for admission (S. J. Smith 1994:57). In 1962, immigration regulations revoked the special arrangements extended to British, French, and American citizens and replaced it with a policy favoring immigrants with educational, professional, and technical qualifications. Immigration reform was driven by the changing industrial demand for labor and the country's shortage of professional and technical workers that could not be fulfilled by European and American migration alone (Li 2003:37). In 1966, the government proposed a long-term immigration policy that maintained skill-based admissions, but reduced family sponsorship rights. Although family reunification remained an important component of the immigration program, there was increasing pressure to limit the number of immigrants arriving through family reunification (P. S. Li 2003b:22; Wolgin and Bloemraad 2010:57).

In 1967, Canada enacted a universal points system that presented guidelines for entry, which applied to all immigrant applicants regardless of country of origin (S. J. Smith 1994:57). As a result of immigration reform, the composition of incoming migrants since the late 1960s has become both more educated and ethnically diverse. The emphasis on skill and education rather than country of origin has decreased the number of

European immigrants and increased the number of immigrants from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean (Fong 2006:4).

From 1956 to 1967, individuals from Europe and Britain dominated Canada's immigration, comprising 58 percent and 29 percent respectively (P. S. Li 2003a:32). In contrast, immigration from Asia represented approximately 5 percent. From 1968 to 1978, immigrants from Europe remained the largest constituent of Canada's immigration, comprising about 27 percent of total migration. However, Asian immigration increased to 21 percent, surpassing the level of British immigration (17%). From 1979 to 2000, the composition of the sending countries changed dramatically as Asian immigrants represented approximately 54 percent of Canada's immigration whereas European and British migration represented 17 percent and 5 percent respectively. Thus, immigration reform in the 1960s diversified the composition of immigrants from white to non-white groups (Fong, 2006:4).

Since the enactment of immigration policy in 1967, there have been some minor amendments to immigration policy (P. S. Li 2003b:26). In 2001, the Parliament of Canada passed a new immigration bill (Bill C-11), entitled the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. The bill states that the main objectives of the immigration program are to enhance the social, cultural, and economic benefits of Canada and in turn, justifies the selection of skilled immigrants. In 2002, amendments to the points system placed a greater emphasis on educational attainment and language skills to select immigrants with flexible skills that could fill different types of occupations. In turn, there was less emphasis on filling specific labor market demands (P. S. Li 2003b:26).

Immigrants entering Canada are admitted under three main categories as defined by the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*: the family class, the

refugee/humanitarian class, and the independent or economic class (P. S. Li 2003b:39). Selection criteria differ for each category. Currently, the family class is restricted to close family members of Canadian residents or citizens, such as a spouse, common-law partner, children, parents, and grandparents. There are two exceptions: a special category of brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces or grandchildren who are orphans; and any other relative if the sponsor does not have any of the relatives listed above (Canada Visa, 2014). According to the Canadian government, refugees are individuals living in or outside of Canada who fear prosecution from their origin country and need protection (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014a). Independent or economic migrants, also referred to as the skilled worker class, are selected on their education, occupation, and language skills. The economic class also includes business immigrants (e.g., self-employed, investors, and entrepreneurs). The selection of economic immigrants is based on a points system where a visa officer assigns points to an immigrant's application using the selection criteria (see Table 2). Potential immigrants must meet a minimum of 67 points (out of a possible 100 points) to gain entry into the country.

In general, Canada's immigration policy is overwhelmingly skill-based and thus, prioritizes economic immigrants over family class immigrants and refugees. To illustrate, Table 1 indicates that nearly 57 percent of Canada's immigration is comprised of economic immigrants compared with 31 percent for family reunification (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012, 2013).

TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE

Table 3.8 also shows that from 1992 to 2013, immigration policy has increased its proportion of economic migrants and decreased the proportion of family immigrants, refugees, and other immigrants. From 1992 to 2013, the proportion of economic migrants increased from 38 percent of incoming immigrants to 57 percent. Additionally, from 1992 to 2013, the proportion of family immigrants decreased from 34 percent of incoming immigrants to 31 percent. Furthermore, in 1992, approximately 26 percent of incoming immigrants were refugees compared with 9 percent in 2013. While the number of individuals admitted under these categories from year to year varies, the proportion of economic immigrants entering Canada is on the rise whereas the proportion of family and refugees is decreasing over time.

In addition to the increase in the number of economic migrants admitted, there has also been a growing emphasis on skill in the admission process from 1992 to 2006. Table 3.9 below shows that in 1992, individuals could receive a maximum of 12 points for their education whereas in 2006, educated individuals could receive a maximum of 25 points. Additionally, the maximum number of points offered for official language proficiency changed from 15 points in 1992 to 24 points in 2006. Thus, the points system increased the number of points allotted for education and language and thereby, increased the chances for admission among educated and skilled individuals.

TABLE 3.9 ABOUT HERE

From 1991 to 2006, Canada's incoming immigrants have become more educated. For instance, Kaushal and Lu (2014:9) found that in 1991 approximately 22 percent of incoming immigrants had at least a Bachelor's degree compared with 52 percent in 2006. Furthermore, in 1991, 41 percent of incoming immigrants held a high school degree or

less compared with 24 percent of incoming immigrants in 2006. This increase could be related to several factors: changes in the points system, changes in immigrants' sending countries, and a global increase in educational attainment worldwide (Kaushal and Lu 2014:18).

Although the emphasis on education and language has increased, occupational demand is no longer a priority in the points system. Table 3.9 indicates that in 1992, potential immigrants could receive a maximum of 10 points for occupational demand but in 2006, this category was removed from the points system. This reflects a policy change in 1995 in which the government's goals shifted from filling short-term labor shortages to building a diverse and long-term workforce (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1999; Kaushal and Lu 2014:4). Thus, skilled workers admitted after 1995 may experience difficulty finding jobs in their occupational field (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1999:435). When skilled immigrants are admitted without considering the country's occupational demand, they face greater difficulty finding jobs that are commensurate with their own skills.

The increased significance of individual skill in immigration policy has occurred simultaneously with policy changes that restrict family class sponsorship. In 2011, policy changes to the family class restricted individuals from sponsoring their parents or grandparents (Neborak 2013:2). Additionally, in August 2014, the government changed the definition of a dependent child from under the age of 22 to under the age of 19. Both policy changes have made it more difficult to sponsor family members to Canada. Although Canada continues to take in many educated and skilled migrants, there may be fewer family class migrants that are accompanying them.

Within the economic class, there are some differences in the selection criteria between skilled workers and entrepreneurs, although both groups are subject to the points system. First, entrepreneurs are expected to meet minimum levels of net worth, settlement funds, and/or investments. Until June 2014, entrepreneurs were required to have a minimum net worth of CAD\$ 1,600,000 (USD\$1,446,844) and invest CAD\$ 800,000 (USD\$ 723422) in small or medium sized businesses in Canada (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1999:443). Currently, other business-oriented programs, such as the Entrepreneur Start-Up Visa, require entrepreneurs to hold investments from Canadian investors and some individual settlement funds (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014b). Second, the entrepreneur class heavily emphasizes business experience. For instance, Table 3.10 shows that 47 out of the total possible 100 points are designated for business-related activities. Third, the minimum levels of points required for admission is much lower for entrepreneurs (35 points) compared with skilled workers (67 points). In fact. Canada has made it very easy for investors to immigrate and the government has been heavily criticized for selling citizenship to the wealthy and denying it to those who cannot afford it.

TABLE 3.10 ABOUT HERE

Demographic changes since immigration reform in the 1960s

Immigration reform since 1967 has increased the presence of ethnic and racial minorities in Canada. The creation of the term visible minority—which refers to 'persons other than Aboriginal peoples who are non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour'— largely resulted from the removal of national origins in immigration policy that facilitated the subsequent entry of Asian, African, and other non-White immigrants (Li 2003:33).

These groups that were previously restricted from entering Canada were now evaluated for admission under the same criteria as European applicants. Canada refers to the population in terms of visible minorities and non-visible minorities rather than racial categories (Bloemraad 2006:140). Although there is some ambiguity as to who is considered a visible minority, Statistics Canada uses the following categories: South Asian, Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Arab, Southeast Asian, West Asian, Korean, Japanese, and Visible minority not included elsewhere. In 2006, approximately 16 percent of Canada's population belonged to the visible minority category (Statistics Canada, 2014).

These increases in the racial/ethnic population have been particularly noticeable in Canada's major cities because the majority of non-white immigrants since 1967 have settled in urban areas (Fong 2006:5). The top urban areas among immigrants are Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal respectively. Nearly 47 percent of Toronto's population and 45 percent of Vancouver's population are visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2011). Montreal is the third largest metropolitan area and visible minorities comprise nearly 20 percent of the metropolitan area's population, which is similar to the proportion of visible minorities at the national level.

Since 1967, there has been an increased presence of affluent coethnic communities—small neighborhoods of people from the same national origin group living closely together (Fong 1996; Fong 2004:92). While coethnic communities are traditionally low SES and temporary settlements with few resources, many contemporary coethnic communities are established in high SES neighborhoods in urban and suburban areas (Fong and Gulia 1999:578; (Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002:299-300). In Toronto,

Chinese, Korean, West Indian, and South Asian communities contain large shopping malls with restaurants, grocery stores, music stores, medical clinics, pharmacies, and other institutions (Fong 2006:25). Similar coethnic communities have developed in other major Canadian cities, such as Markham, Ontario and Richmond, British Columbia (Fong and Gulia 1999:578).

The increase of high SES coethnic communities has coincided with the arrival of a large number of wealthy immigrants with greater residential options (Driedger and Halli 1999:132). An influx of wealthy immigrants that can "buy up" expensive suburban homes are bypassing traditional, low-quality coethnic communities in the city center, thus facilitating the rise of coethnic communities in affluent suburban neighborhoods (Alba and Nee 2003:254; Zhou 2009). Wealthy new immigrants are concentrated in major metropolitan areas, particularly British Columbia. In 1996, British Columbia received 27 percent of all economic-class immigrants arriving in Canada, which is twice the national proportion (Ley 1999:5). The economic power and geographical concentration of Canada's wealthy immigrants have transformed the housing market in their local areas. Thus, the influx and concentration of wealthy immigrants since the 1960s has established high SES coethnic communities with greater amenities for immigrants.

Effects of Immigration Policy on Immigrant Integration

Canada's selective immigration policy is intended to facilitate immigrant integration in terms of their labor force participation and wages. By selecting potential immigrants with high education and language skills, immigrants should easily find jobs that are commensurate with their skills. Therefore, the assumption is that immigrants in Canada should have wages and jobs that match their credentials and previous experience

in the origin country. Furthermore, relative to the US, which primarily admits immigrants based on family sponsorship, immigrants in Canada should have an easier time finding jobs and wages commensurate with their skills because they are screened on characteristics that match occupational demand.

In the following section, I present some descriptive information on immigrants' occupations and wages relative to their education. Based on Canada's selective immigration policy, wages should be higher and occupations should be closely matched to previous skills and field of study (because of their technical skills) when compared with immigrants in a country with a non-selective immigration policy. Occupational attainment and wages are important predictors of immigrants' long-term income and mobility. Immigrants with low incomes for a sustained period of time face greater social differentiation than their native-born counterparts and experience greater difficulty adapting to the host society (Bonikowska et al. 2001:26; (Ley 1999:10).

Immigrants' Occupational Attainment and Wages

Immigrants represent approximately 21 percent of Canada's labor force, which is on par with their total population in the country (19.8%) (Gilmore 2009:24; Statistics Canada 2015). Overall, immigrants have a lower employment rate (77.4%) than nativeborn Canadians (84.1%) and this is true among university graduates as well (Gilmore:2009tz p24; Zietsma 2010:19). Many immigrants have received training in a regulated field that requires a university degree and has specific credentials required to practice that occupation, such as engineering, medicine, and teaching (Zietsma 2010:13). Nonetheless, very few immigrants are matched or employed in their same fields of study. Overall, immigrants have much lower rates of being 'matched' compared with native-

borns. As illustrated in Table 3.11, the most common field of study for immigrants with university degrees is engineering (52%), but only 19 percent of immigrants actually find a job in engineering. In comparison, 17 percent of native-borns hold a university degree in engineering but 42 percent are matched in an engineering job. In general, immigrants are much less likely to be working in their same field of study.

TABLE 3.11 ABOUT HERE

Given that only a quarter of college educated immigrants are matched in the same occupation field, there are a substantial number of immigrants with university degrees in a regulated field but are employed in a different occupation (Zietsma 2010:18). Among unmatched immigrants, approximately 17 percent entered professional occupations in natural and applied sciences and another 16 percent were employed in technical occupations related to natural and applied sciences. Other common fields for unmatched immigrants include clerical occupations (16%) and sales and service (10%). Additionally, many immigrants with university degrees find jobs that require less training or fewer credentials (Zietsma 2010:19). Immigrants were almost three times more likely than native-borns to work in occupations that required no formal education.

Related to immigrants' mismatch between their skills and occupation is the lower wages of recent immigrants in Canada. For instance, in 2008, the wage gap between working-age immigrants and native-borns was \$2.28 per hour (\$21.44 versus \$23.72) (Gilmore 2009:10). Additionally, the wage gap is even greater among educated immigrants; there was a \$5 difference in hourly pay (\$25.32 versus \$30.33) between immigrants with university degrees compared with their Canadian-born counterparts.

There are three possible explanations for immigrants' underrepresentation in skilled jobs and lower wages. First, many immigrants experience devaluation or denigration of their prior learning and work experience after arriving in Canada (Guo 2009:41). Although devaluation of immigrants' foreign credentials is a widespread and universal problem for immigrants in most host countries, such as the US and Australia, devaluation or denigration may be more frequent in Canada because immigrants are not required to secure a job prior to arrival. In contrast, in the US, labor migrants are required to secure a employment sponsor prior to arrival (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Thus, their job search is already completed prior to arrival. Akresh (2008:442) found that among labor immigrants in the US that are admitted via the skilled categories, their current jobs are commensurate with their previous skills and jobs in the origin country.

In addition, nearly 52 percent of college graduate immigrants find jobs that require a university degree compared with 43 percent in Canada (McHugh, Batalova, and Morawski 2014; Zietsma 2010). Furthermore, nearly 34 percent of college-educated immigrants in Canada take jobs that only require vocational training and compared with 22 percent of college-educated immigrants in the US.

In general, foreign credentials refer to any formal education higher than a high school degree, including professional or technical qualifications and any other degrees, diplomas, or certificates obtained outside of Canada (Guo 2009:40). Prior to landing in Canada, immigrants do not receive any reliable information about the process of foreign credential recognition nor is there a centralized office responsible for the evaluation of foreign credentials in Canada (Guo 2009:47). Overall, there is a disconnect between

immigration policy and admissions and the institution that offers credentialization (Hiebert 2006).

Although most immigrants experience the devaluation of foreign credentials, the process varies considerably by profession and an immigrant's country of origin. Immigrants in regulated fields or occupations, such as engineers, doctors, teachers, nursing, and architectural designers, face greater difficulty returning to their original professions once in Canada because their fields tend to be more institutionalized and require certification. For instance, provincial bodies and/or professional associations have specific requirements regarding the criteria needed to practice these occupations (Zietsma 2010:13). In turn, recertification affects a large proportion of the immigrant population as many incoming immigrants were previously trained in one of these regulated occupations. On the other hand, less institutionalized professions requiring a bachelor's degree but no certification, such as computer programmers, sales persons, and delivery coordinators, experience less difficulty in returning to their previous jobs (Guo 2009).

The process of recertification and credentialing also differs by country of origin as Canadian employers devalue degrees and work experience received outside of the US, Europe, and other English-speaking countries (Hiebert 2006; Zietsma 2010). In general, Zietsma (2010:18) found that immigrants that studied in English-speaking countries were more likely to attain a job in their same field of study. This suggests that immigrants from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin American face greater penalties and lower returns to their education and work experience. This is consistent with the disadvantages that visible minorities experience in Canadian labor markets in terms of lower wages and earnings (review in Hum and Simpson 1999:380).

However, it is unclear whether this preferential treatment for English-speaking applies in Quebec, the predominantly French-speaking province. Quebec has the highest number of regulated occupations compared with the other provinces, but it has the lowest match rate across all provinces (Zietsma 2010:17). Additionally, only 19 percent of immigrants in Quebec are matched compared with 52 percent of native-borns. Despite Quebec's low match rates, there is some preferential treatment for French immigrants as Quebec and France have a mutual agreement to recognize the credentials and professional degrees for the two countries (Girard and M. Smith 2012:221-222).

Second, immigrants' underrepresentation and lower wages may suggest that Canada's point system is not as effective for predicting immigrants' labor market outcomes. This is illustrated in several ways. Although Canada is admitting more immigrants with university degrees, there has been a lower return to education in Canada for the foreign-born relative to native-borns (Kaushal and Lu 2014:28). Bonikowska, Hou, and Picot (2011:43) show that there has been a decline in the wage premium afforded to individuals with university degrees. In addition, Kaushal and Lu (2014) argue that although Canada's points system selects immigrants on observable characteristics (e.g., education and language), it cannot select on unobservable characteristics (e.g., motivation, skill) that affect immigrants' earnings. Therefore, Canada may admit educated immigrants with official language proficiency, but these individuals may not be highly motivated individuals that will seek out skilled jobs or opportunities with higher wages (Kaushal and Lu 2014). Furthermore, although Canada's point system favors immigrants with proficiency in an official language, they do not require demanding language tests.

Therefore, some educated immigrants do not have the language skills required to fill high-skill level professions (Bonikowska, Hou, and Picot 2011:42).

Third, recent immigrants in Canada may encounter a greater mismatch between education levels and labor market demands. For instance, Canada may admit a large number of educated and skilled immigrants but there may be a limited number of highskilled jobs available (Guo 2009). As mentioned above, immigration policy changes since 1995 have continued to admit skilled immigrants without regard for occupational demand (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1999). Thus, one consequence of this policy change is that many skilled immigrants take jobs that they are overqualified for. While native-born Canadians also take jobs that they are overqualified for, immigrants with foreign credentials are much more likely to do so. For instance, Zietsma (2010:19) found that approximately 77 percent of individuals that were educated abroad were employed in jobs that they were overqualified for compared with 57 percent of native-borns.

At first glance, Canada's selective immigration policy seems that it would facilitate immigrants' integration because the policy favors skilled immigrants who should face fewer challenges in adapting to Canadian society. However, the skill-based policy is not necessarily effective in predicting immigrants' integration in terms of labor force participation. For instance, many immigrants experience devaluation of their prior education and work experience and work in jobs that are in different occupational fields or jobs that they are overqualified for. As a result, many skilled immigrants obtain lower wages and fill jobs that are not commensurate with their education levels.

There are several reasons to believe that immigrants in Canada, which were screened with a selective policy, do not have greater socioeconomic outcomes than

immigrants in the US. First, when comparing the wages of immigrants in the US and Canada, Kaushal and Lu (2014:32) found that recent immigrants in the US earn higher wages than their Canadian counterparts. Specifically, immigrants in Canada experienced a wage disadvantage of 25 percent compared with immigrants in the US, despite Canada's ability to attract equally educated immigrants as the US and drawing in immigrants with greater host country language proficiency.

Second, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) found that there was only a small difference in wages between labor immigrants compared with family immigrants in the US. Although Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) focus on labor and family immigrants in the US, these categories may serve as a way to think about the comparison between the main immigration streams in the Canada and the US. One reason that there is little difference in wages between family migrants and skilled migrants is because the former has a extensive family network, which labor migrants are less likely tot have. Thus, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) suggest that the distinction between skilled immigrants and family immigrants may not be as important as is commonly thought. Overall, this suggests that Canada's selective immigration policy may not necessarily result in greater socioeconomic or integration outcomes for immigrants compared with immigrants in other countries with less selective policies.

Immigration Policy and Children of Immigrants' Education

Although Canada's selective immigration policy is intended to shape the integration of immigrants, it also indirectly affects the integration of immigrant children by delaying their arrival to Canada. Skill-based policies offer limited preferences for family reunification and prioritize the arrival of the primary immigrant applicant, not

spouses or immigrant children. In turn, there is often a lag between the arrival of the immigrant applicant and the arrival of spouses and immigrant children, in which immigrant children arrive older. Immigrant children that arrive older have worse educational outcomes (Beck, Corak, and Tienda 2012; Böhlmark 2008; Busby and Corak 2014; Corak 2011). To illustrate, Figure 3.1, which was obtained from Corak (2011:17), shows that the likelihood of dropping out of high school grows as age of arrival increases and nearly 25 percent of immigrant children arriving after the age of 15 did not complete high school.

FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

Age at arrival can negatively affect immigrant children's educational attainment because older immigrant children are less familiar with destination-country specific skills, such as familiarity with the school system or proficiency in the host country language (Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen 2012:14). Older immigrant children are less familiar with the Canadian school system, which can increase the risk of dropping out of school among first generation youth (Anisef et al. 2010:111). In addition, immigrant children that arrive later in the country will experience greater difficulty attaining proficiency in the official language because the capacity to learn a new language declines as one's age at immigration increases (Beiser et al. 1988). Nonetheless, proficiency in the official language is required for all subjects at school and academic success (Böhlmark 2008:1367).

One illustration of how skill-based policies delay the arrival of immigrant children is the Temporary Foreign Worker Program. The program provides temporary work permits for low- and high-skilled foreign workers (Busby and Corak 2014). In 2012,

approximately 210,000 entrants entered Canada through the Temporary Foreign Worker Program whereas 257,887 entered as (permanent) migrants and total migration was 267,200. Thus, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program draws in a significant number of newcomers to Canada, albeit temporary. Although this program is intended to fill shortterm labor shortages, there are pathways to permanent residency. However, one condition is that the temporary worker resides in Canada unaccompanied for at least one year, leaving their spouse and/or children behind. After one year, temporary workers may begin the application process to sponsor their spouse and/or children. However, it is likely that workers will be separated from their spouse and/or children for a significant period of time as the processing times for sponsorship ranges from a minimum of 9 months to 33 months (Statistics Canada, 2011).

Ideally, it would be helpful to know how many temporary foreign workers actually have spouses and dependents to ascertain the number of children and spouses that are affected by the delayed arrival. This data is not available for temporary foreign workers but it is available for economic class immigrants. In 2012, on average, approximately one economic class immigrant sponsored 1.35 dependents. Thus, on average, each economic class immigrant has at least a spouse or child. Assuming that economic and temporary foreign workers are fairly similar in these characteristics, this average suggests that some temporary foreign workers have spouses and children prior to their arrival in Canada, whom they leave behind in their origin country.

Thus far, I have described how a selective immigration policy may adversely affect the integration of immigrant children by increasing their age of arrival. For children born abroad, a late arrival translates to less familiarity with the school system

and lower proficiency in the host country language(s). Thereby, a selective immigration policy with less family reunification may indirectly create educational challenges for immigrant children. To ascertain this, it would be helpful to have information about whether immigrant children's' age at arrival differs by an immigrant's visa. While this information is not available, one way to assess this is to compare the age at arrival among immigrant children in Canada—which is primarily labor migrants—and the US—which is primarily comprised of family migrants. In Canada, approximately 19.2 percent of the population arrived before the age of 15 and another 14.5 percent arrived between the ages of 15 to 24 (Chui 2013:13). In comparison, 21 percent of immigrants arrived in the US before the age of 18 and another 54 arrived between the ages of 18 and 39 (Center for Immigration Studies 2015). In general, immigrants to the US generally arrive as adults and very few arrive as children nor as older children (Center for Immigration Studies 2015). The larger number of immigrant children that arrive later in Canada compared with the US suggests that there may be an association between skilled migration and older age at arrival.

Although a skill-based policy is intended to facilitate the integration of immigrants, it can negatively affect the integration of immigrants and their children. Although the immigration policy heavily favors educated and skilled individuals, immigrants experience difficulty in finding jobs that are commensurate with their educational background. Therefore, there is much emphasis on the screening and selection of skilled immigrants, there is little emphasis on their actual integration. Although Canada's skilled-based immigration policy is concerned with the arrival of the primary immigrant, there is little priority for immigrants' spouses or children. One

consequence is that there can be a lag between the arrival of the primary applicant and their children. Immigrant children may arrive in Canada later and less familiar with the school system, which negatively affects their educational attainment. In sum, an immigration policy that is overwhelmingly concerned with immigrant skill can complicate the integration process for immigrant children.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE POLICY

A second institutional characteristic that may affect the children of immigrants' integration is Canada's official language policy. Since 1988, Canada has adopted two official languages—English and French—although the recognition of both languages in federal institutions has been established since 1969 (Somerstein 2006:252). Language legislation was a result of growing demands for recognition of Quebec's culture and language in the 1960s (Office of the commissioner of Official Languages 2015).

There were three main objectives of the 1988 Official Languages Act: 1.) establish the equality of English and French in Parliament; 2.) preserve and develop official language communities in Canada; and 3.) achieve equality of English and French in Canadian society (Somerstein 2006:256). The official language policy in Canada ensures that communication with and from federal institutions can be in either English or French. For instance, all government documents and websites are bilingual in English and French. The choice between speaking English or French ensures equal opportunity for employment and advancement, regardless of ethnic origin or primary language (Somerstein 2006:257). The attainment of the official language is viewed as a public issue so the Canadian government offers free language classes (Bloemraad 2005:869).

Despite the emphasis on adopting the official languages, there are few resources for immigrant children to do so. For immigrant children to adopt the host country language, they require bilingual instruction in the immigrant and host country languages (review in Bankston and Zhou 1995:443; review in Gay 1994:8; GreeneTomás Rivera Policy Institute 1998). This is especially important for children from Allophone (non-English and non-French speaking) families, which comprise approximately 70 percent of Canada's foreign-born (Anisef et al. 2010:105). However, the government and local schools provide few resources for children to learn the host language. For instance, the government offers free language courses in English and/or French, but instruction is in the official languages and typically geared for adults (Statistics Canada 2014). The expectation is that children will acquire the official language in school.

However, the Canadian school system offers few resources to address the linguistic needs of children, especially for those aged three to four years old and who do not speak English at home. For instance, the British Columbia School Act (1979) prohibits school boards from providing services to children under five years old. This assumes that when children start school at age five, they will understand and speak the language of instruction—standard Canadian English. In turn, this overlooks children from non-English households and as a result, these children are at an academic disadvantage (Beiser et al. 1988).

In addition, most schools only offer English and French instruction. For instance, in British Columbia, most schools are English-only with French being offered as the only second language (G. Li 2006:361). Schools with large populations of ESL students provide ESL programs to support children's English learning but many are taught by

monolingual English-speaking ESL/Resource teachers. Many regular classroom teachers and ESL/Resource teachers adopted a 'English-only' policy and prohibited students from speaking immigrant languages. Thus, this suggests that language resources are limited for immigrant children that need to learn the official language as well as native-born children of immigrants that want to maintain or learn the immigrant language.

Effects of Official Language Policy on the Integration of Immigrant Children

The official language policy emphasizes the official languages but not nonofficial languages. A lack of concern for non-official languages may in turn affect the integration of immigrants' children. The limited number of bilingual resources (in an official language and an immigrant language) for immigrant children can negatively affect their integration outcomes, such as educational attainment. Immigrant children who cannot attain proficiency in an official language in a timely manner face severe educational disadvantages. Language difficulties, specifically those related to learning a new language were the primary reasons for early school leaving or being at risk of early school leaving among first generation youth (Anisef et al. 2010:111).

In addition, the official language policy may also affect the integration of immigrants' children by discouraging bilingualism in an immigrant language and an official language. When there is greater linguistic conformity in the host country, there may be lower rates of bilingualism in the immigrant language and official language. One indication of the linguistic conformity in Canada are the low rates of bilingualism in an immigrant language and an official language among the second generation (P. S. Li 2003b:134). In Canada, approximately 23 percent of second generation females were bilingual in their immigrant language and a official language (Houle 2011). The children

of immigrants in Canada are also less likely than the children of immigrants in other countries to be bilingual in an official language and an immigrant language. For instance, in the US, approximately 75 percent of second generation Latinos in the US and 60 percent of second generation Asians in the US spoke another language in addition to English (Alba 2004:4). Table 3.12 shows bilingualism rates among a few second generation groups in Canada and the US. Among the seven groups, only the Japanese in Canada have higher bilingual rates than their counterparts in the US. The bilingual rates among Chinese in Canada (71 percent) are comparable with those in the US (70 percent). Although the aggregate figures for Canada and the US are drawn from different studies, and thus were not systematically assessed, they nonetheless suggest that Canada's official language policy has a strong effect in encouraging the official languages, which may inadvertently discourage non-official languages. The lower rates of bilingualism could be shaped by the context of the official languages in Canada that heavily promote the use of official languages. In addition, this could be indirectly shaped by the fewer number of family members due to a immigration policy that provides fewer preferences for the sponsorship of extended family members.

TABLE 3.12 ABOUT HERE

Thus far, I have described how the official language policy can discourage bilingualism in the immigrant language and an official language. This may hinder the integration of immigrant children as bilingualism in the immigrant language and in an official language is a positive predictor of educational attainment. To assess whether bilingualism affects the integration of immigrants' children, I examine the effect of bilingualism on college attainment.

MULTICULTURAL POLICY

A third institutional characteristic that may affect immigrant integration is Canada's multicultural policy. In 1971, Canada adopted a multicultural policy, which became codified into law in 1988. Canada's multicultural policy aims to promote cultural diversity and provide individuals with the freedom to celebrate one's own ethnic heritage. In addition, all individuals are guaranteed equality of the law regardless of race, cultural heritage, ethnicity, religion, and gender (Government of Canada 2015).

The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* states several ways to achieve these goals: a.) offer support for immigrant communities; b.) eliminate barriers to participation; and c.) facilitate the acquisition and retention of all languages. These goals have also been implemented into policies. For instance, ethnic organizations are financially supported and promoted through the government's official policy of multiculturalism (Bloemraad 2005:867). In addition, the Multiculturalism Sector of the Department of the Secretary of State also contributes to cultural activities, heritage language programs, and visible minority cultural development projects (Beiser et al. 1988 Chapter 2).

Effects of Multiculturalism on Immigrant Integration

In practice, it is unclear whether the multicultural policy has achieved their intended goals. For instance, while multiculturalism celebrates one's cultural heritage, there is an expectation that this is practiced in the private sphere (P. S. Li 2003b:134). The limited recognition of multiculturalism in the public domain suggests that the multicultural policy is primarily symbolic and may have little effect in achieving their stated goals. To assess whether multiculturalism achieves its three stated goals above and

in turn, shapes the integration of the children of immigrants, I focus on visible minorities and language support.

One objective of the multicultural policy is to eliminate barriers to participation, which can be assessed via visible minorities. Visible minorities are identified as a target group for government regulated businesses to improve the employment opportunities of racial minorities in the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986. However, it is unclear how effective this policy is for combating racial discrimination in the labor market. For instance, black men and immigrants that are visible minorities consistently experience wage inequalities compared with non-visible minorities in Canada (review in Abada, Hou, and Ram 2009; Hum and Simpson 1999).

This is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below, which shows the earning differentials for native-born and immigrant visible minorities relative to native-born whites and foreignborn whites. In general, immigrant visible minorities are at a greater disadvantage than native-born visible minorities. Nonetheless, there are still vast differences in wages between native-born visible minorities and native-born Whites. Overall, black visible minorities, immigrant and native-born, face the highest wage penalties. For instance, native-born blacks earn 30% less than native-born Whites. Thus, Figure 3.2 shows that racial discrimination in the labor market remains a problem despite Canada's multicultural policy.

FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

In addition, the category of visible minorities is rather toothless and unproductive for combating racial discrimination in other arenas of social and institutional life in Canada. For instance, the only other instance where visible minorities receive recognition

is from Statistics Canada, which primarily uses the term visible minorities as a demographic category. Overall, the visible minority category offers few policy implications for addressing racial barriers to integration (Bloemraad 2006:140). Thus, this suggests that the multicultural policy, particularly the use of the visible minorities category as a way to eliminate barriers, may have little effect on the integration of immigrants and their children.

Another objective of the multicultural policy is to facilitate the acquisition and retention of all languages. This suggests that for immigrants and their children, there should be equal emphasis on learning the official language and retaining the immigrant language. However, as I have demonstrated above, there are low levels of retention of the immigrant language and official language among the children of immigrants.

Li (2003) argues that the goal of language retention has not been incorporated into educational institutions. While Canadian schools offer immigrants' children language assistance in terms of learning the official language, they offer limited support for maintaining the immigrant language. School language resources for children with limited proficiency in the official language are often viewed as a cost or burden (P. S. Li 2003b:155). In fact, acquiring or maintaining the immigrant language is typically achieved through the family or through community groups (Christensen and Stanat 2007). Overall, the largely symbolic use of multiculturalism in Canada may explain why Reitz and Breton (1994) found that Canada and the US incorporate their ethnic and racial groups in similar ways despite the presence of an official multicultural policy in Canada. Thus, there are few linguistic resources to help immigrants' children maintain the

immigrant language, which suggests that the multicultural policy is less effective for integrating the children of immigrants.

CONCLUSION

This chapter describes how two structural conditions of Canada—immigration policy and official language policy—may be important contexts in shaping the integration of immigrants and their children but Canada's multicultural policy may be less influential. The selective immigration policy and official language policies may create specific challenges for newcomers that are related to settlement that native-born minorities do not face. In addition, the multicultural policy is not effective in addressing settlement challenges. Overall, this suggests that the context of Canada may be friendlier for native-borns than for the foreign-born.

Nonetheless, this chapter shows that the coethnic community can help alleviate the challenges that immigrant children face. In particular, immigrant children that live among educated coethnics increase their likelihood of higher education. In particular, the coethnic community alleviates specific challenges that stem from a selective immigration policy and official language policy. First, the coethnic community can help immigrant children, especially those that arrive late and are further behind in school to catch up or become familiarized with the Canadian school system. Second, the coethnic community can assist immigrant children in learning the official language, as many incoming immigrants have proficiency in at least one of the official languages. This is crucial as schools and the government have limited language learning resources for immigrant children (G. Li 2006).

Below, I detail how the immigration policy, official language policy, and multicultural policies creates contexts that are more difficult for immigrant children and in turn, how the coethnic community may alleviate these challenges. Immigration has long been a part of a Canada's history, especially as a way to fill labor shortages. Historically, migrants from Great Britain, Europe, and the US met labor demands. At the end of WWII, there was an increased demand for labor that could not be filled by British, European, and American immigrants alone. In the 1960s, there was a massive restructuring of Canada's immigration policy that shifted from selecting heavily on ethnicity and national origin towards an explicit points system that screened and selected individuals with special skills or high education levels. This reform led to an increased emphasis on skill and a demographic shift in the ethnic composition of incoming migrants.

Furthermore, the "deracialization" of Canada's immigration policy meant that individuals from countries that were once barred from entering Canada, were now evaluated under the same criteria as European applicants (P. S. Li 2003b:33-34; S. J. Smith 1994). Since immigration reform in the 1960s, there has been an increase in ethnic and racial minorities or visible minorities and this has been particularly noticeable in urban areas. Additionally, coethnic communities in high SES neighborhoods have proliferated partly as a result of the influx of wealthy immigrants with greater residential options (Driedger and Halli 1999:132).

Over time, there has been a greater emphasis on skill and less preference for family reunification in Canada's immigration policy, which creates several challenges for immigrants and their children (Kaushal and Lu 2014). First, although immigrants are

highly selected, they often do not fill jobs that are commensurate with their education and skill and thus, take jobs with lower wages (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1995). Thus, a selective immigration policy may be inefficient for predicting immigrants' labor market outcomes. Second, immigrants and their children tend to be separated for some time before immigrant children arrive in Canada (Busby and Corak 2014). In turn, immigrant children arrive older and further behind in school. Immigrant children that arrive older are at a greater risk of dropping out of high school.

For immigrant children, the average education of the coethnic community may alleviate some of the structural challenges associated with a selective immigration policy, particularly age at arrival. My results show that there is a positive effect between community education and college attainment and this effect is strongest among the first and 1.5 generations. This suggests that the educational composition of the coethnic community has a strong and positive effect for foreign-born children who immigrate to Canada relatively late. As such, the coethnic community may be an important factor in alleviating the challenges posed by a selective immigration policy.

In addition to immigration policy, Canada's official language policy also affects the children of immigrants' integration. Canada has two official languages—English and French—and the official language policy ensures that communication with the government is conducted in both languages (Somerstein 2006:252). However, Canada's official language policy can create challenges for immigrant children in terms of learning the official language. First, the Canadian government offers official language courses in English and French but they are not bilingual, which makes it more challenging for non-English and non-French speakers (allophones) to learn the official languages. In addition,

these courses are geared more for the first generation and integration into the labor market as children are assumed to learn the official language at school (Statistics Canada 2014). Second, immigrant children's difficulty with learning the official language is in part related to local schools and their inability to provide adequate linguistic services and ESL resources for allophones (Beiser et al. 1988). Therefore, the lack of linguistic resources can be especially difficult for children that arrive older. In turn, immigrant children who do not have proficiency in the official language are at a severe educational handicap.

Thus, the official language policy discourages bilingualism in the official language and immigrant language. This is problematic given the important role of bilingualism for educational attainment. In my analyses, I show that bilingualism in the official language and immigrant language increases the odds of college attainment for the 1.5 and second generations but not the first generation. The effect is very strong among the 1.5 generation, which shows that proficiency in both languages is particularly important for individuals that arrive in Canada before the age of 14. In addition, the lack of language resources in official languages and immigrant languages at school, particularly for ESL students, can exacerbate the effects of age at arrival and make it more difficult for immigrant children to adopt the official language (Beiser et al. 1988; G. Li 2006).

My results show that living in an educated coethnic community helps immigrant children deal with the linguistic challenges associated with the official language. Educated coethnic community members tend to be proficient in both the immigrant and official languages because of the emphasis on official language proficiency in the points

system. In turn, these educated coethnics can help immigrant children learn the official language or assist them with school related business that may be conducted in the official language.

Overall, linguistic conformity remains strong in Canada. Immigrants and their children are expected to conform to Canada's official language policies in public institutions and the rates of bilingualism (in the official language and in the immigrant language) among the second generation remain low. In addition, the official language policy creates challenges for immigrants and their children in Canada, which can be alleviated by an educated coethnic community.

Aside from immigration and language policies, the multicultural policy has been hypothesized to affect the integration of immigrants and their children (Levels et al. 2008:858). The aim of the multicultural policy is to allow individuals to celebrate and maintain their ethnic diversity, which can be achieved by offering support for immigrant communities; eliminating barriers to participation; and facilitating the acquisition and retention of all languages. There are some specific policy outcomes that result from the multicultural policy, such as government support for ethnic organizations and the use of visible minorities in employment.

Despite these policies, my findings show that multicultural policy is largely symbolic. For instance, there is minimal funding for ethnic groups for cultural expression and multiculturalism is not incorporated into the key cultural, political, or educational institutions in Canada (Frenette, Branch, and Division 2005:5; P. S. Li 2003b). Overall, maintenance of one's ethnic heritage is practiced in the private sphere through the family or community groups.

I assess the multicultural policy in three ways: coethnic community resources, visible minorities, and retention and acquisition of all languages. My results show that living in a metropolitan area with more community resources increases the odds of college attainment among the second generation, but has no effect for the first and 1.5 generations. This suggests that community resources are not effective in addressing the needs of immigrant children. Additionally, I argue that the multicultural policy is limited in its ability to counter racial discrimination and to assist immigrant children adopt and retain the immigrant language. Overall, Canada's multicultural policy is largely symbolic and is less influential for the integration of immigrants' children.

In sum, this chapter shows that a selective skill-based immigration policy and an official language policy may create a more difficult context for immigrant children compared with native-born children of immigrants. In addition, although the multicultural policy is intended to maintain and celebrate one's ethnic heritage, my results show that it may be fall short of its goal as it has no effect for the foreign-born and only a small effect for native-born children of immigrants.

Canada has received an international reputation for its ability to successfully integrate its immigrants (Kaushal and Lu 2014:28). Specifically, there has been an emphasis on its immigration policy that selects skilled and educated migrants and a multicultural policy that celebrates ethnic diversity. However, this broad generalization overlooks the specific challenges that immigrants and their children face. In particular, this chapter shows how a selective immigration policy and official language policy create challenges for immigrants and their children. The coethnic community can help alleviate

some of these challenges and thus, may be the most powerful resource in helping immigrant children to combat the structural issues that they face in Canada.

	National Orig	gin Group Lev	vel Independ	lent Variables
				Political
Country of	Educational	GDP per		Stability
Origin	Selectivity	capita	GINI	(1996)
China	0.549	314	32.4	-0.351
India	0.802	275	31.1	-1.046
Philippines	0.565	737	41	-0.6
Greece	0.249	9776	34.3	0.523
Austria	0.507	9315	29.2	1.132
Russia	0.677	2663	48.4	-0.95
Hungary	0.583	3186	25.1	0.821
Mexico	0.468	3116	46.3	-0.922
Jamaica	0.707	1497	43.2	0.248
Trinidad and				
Tobago	0.770	5784	42.6	0.457
France	0.774	21350	32.7	0.884
Pakistan	0.833	337	33.4	-1.485
Vietnam	0.382	97	35.7	0.391
Guyana	0.605	776	51.6	0.017
Denmark	0.363	26520	24.7	1.191
Croatia	0.671	4026	22.8	-0.102
Japan	0.629	25124	24.9	0.811
South Korea	0.471	11468	31.6	-0.053

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Group Variables used in the Anal	ysis

Community	First Ge	eneration	1.5 Gei	neration	Second G	eneration
Education	1.373***	1.349***	1.30***	1.36***	1.09**	1.07 +
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income	0.75	1.31	0.80	0.82	1.07	1.07
	(0.27)	(0.83)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Coethnic Resources						
Medium (10-12)		1.22		0.87		1.30
		(0.57)		(0.35)		(0.33)
High (13-17)		1.11		3.80		1.84
(ref: low: 0-9)		(0.85)		(4.17)		(0.94)
Individual						
Bilingual		2.42		13.42**		4.30***
(ref: monolingual)		(2.18)		(13.47)		(1.62)
Biological Parents		1.98		0.44		1.61
(ref: other family arrangement)		(0.82)		(0.23)		(0.52)
Female		0.68		0.84		0.66
		(0.23)		(0.27)		(0.24)
Quebec		0.91		1.54		0.71
(ref: other province)		(0.60)		(0.63)		(0.20)
Dad: HS degree		1.08		0.86		0.67 +
		(0.43)		(0.42)		(0.16)
Dad: BA+		3.60***		1.32		3.06***
(ref: less than HS)		(1.41)		(0.62)		(0.75)
Age		1.02		.92***		0.93***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)
N	3	40	3	60	11	90

Table 3.2: Odds Ratios predicting College Completion by Generation Status

***P<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	1st generation	1.5 generation	2nd generation
Bilingual	2.42	13.42**	4.30***
(ref: monolingual)	(2.18)	(13.47)	(1.62)
N	340	360	1190
***P≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤.0	5 +p <u>≤</u> .1		
Note: Standard arrors in	naranthagag		

 Table 3.3: Odds Ratios of College Completion by Generational Status

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	Vancouver	Toronto	Montreal	ttawa-Gatinea	Calgary	Edmonton
China	17	16	11	10	14	11
India	11	10	8	2	6	3
Philippines	6	12	5	5	7	9
Germany	10	7	7	7	7	5
Netherlands	4	6	2	5	4	3
Portugal	5	7	6	3	4	8
Japan	10	10	5	2	6	5
Korea	9	14	5	3	5	5
Vietnam	7	9	4	7	7	5
Russia	7	8	6	4	4	4
Mexico	2	6	1	1	4	3
Greece	7	11	6	6	6	3
Ukraine	9	11	8	5	7	10
Austria	5	4	3	3	3	3
Pakistan	5	6	2	1	3	2
Croatia	4	6	4	4	4	3
Poland	7	9	3	7	5	6
Italy	11	11	9	8	7	7
Jamaica	3	8	5	2	3	4
France	4	9	11	7	5	7
Guyana	1	5	2	1	1	1
Trinidad and	1	3	2	1	2	2
Hungary	7	11	6	4	5	3
US	3	5	4	2	3	2
Denmark	4	5	3	2	6	3
UK	6	7	4	2	4	3
Total	6.35	8.31	5.08	4.00	5.08	4.62

 Table 3.4: Number of Coethnic Community Resources in the CMA by National Origin

Source: Author's Documentary Research

	Toronto	Inner London
China	16	12
India	10	10
Germany	7	7
Portugal	7	7
Japan	10	11
Greece	11	9
Pakistan	6	9
Poland	9	11
Italy	11	10
Jamaica	8	3
France	9	8
Trinidad and Tobago	3	2
US	5	8
Denmark	5	7
All groups (average)	8.3	6.2

 Table 3.5. Number of Coethnic Resources for Select

 Groups in Toronto and Inner London

Source: Author's Documentary Research

	Model 1	Model 2
Coethnic Resources		
Medium (10-12)	1.258*	1.27
	(0.14)	(0.24)
High (13-17)	1.970**	2.023 +
(ref: low: 0-9)	(0.47)	(0.83)

 Table 3.6: Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Predicting College

 Completion in Canada

N=4150

***P<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.1

Note: Model 2 controls for community, group, and individual level controls Note: Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Author's Documentary Research

	1st generation		1.5 Gei	1.5 Generation		2nd Generation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	
Coethnic Resource	25						
Medium (10-12)	1.40	1.22	0.82	0.87	1.54*	1.30	
	(0.41)	(0.57)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.33)	
High (13-17)	1.42	1.11	3.50+	3.80	1.73+	1.84	
(ref: low: 0-9)	(0.57)	(0.85)	(2.47)	(4.17)	(0.51)	(0.94)	
Ν	34	40	3	50	11	90	

Table 3.7: Odds Ratio of Coethnic Resources Predicting College Completion in Canada, by generation

*** $P \le .001$ ** $p \le .01$ * $p \le .05 + p \le .1$ Note: Standard errors in parentheses

Catagowy	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Category	(1992	(1992)	(2013)	(2013)
Family	43,391	34%	79,586	31%
Refugee/ Humanitarian	32,089	26%	23,968	9%
Independent/Economic	47,813	38%	148,037	57%
Other	2,719	2%	7,028	3%
Total	126,012	100%	258,619	100%

 Table 3.8: Percentage of Immigration in Canada by Category, 1992 & 2013

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government of Canada, 2012, 2013

	<u>1992</u>	2006
Education	12	25
Special vocational preparation	15	-
Experience	8	21
Occupational Demand	10	-
Arranged employment/designated occupation	10	10
Age	10	10
Knowledge of French or English	15	24
Adaptability	-	10
Personal Suitability	10	-
Levels control	10	-
Total points possible	100	100
Points required for entry	70	67

Table 3.9: Canadian Point System, 1992 & 2006

Source: Kaushal and Lu (2014)

	Skilled Worker	Entrepreneur
Education	25	25
Experience	21	-
Arranged employment/designated occupation	10	-
Age	10	10
Knowledge of French or English	24	24
Adaptability	10	6
Business Experience	-	35
Business exploration trip to Canada within 5	-	6
years of application		
Participation in designated Joint Federal-	-	6
Provincial Business Immigration Initiatives		
Total	100	100
Points required for entry	67	35

Table 3.10: Canadian Point System for Skilled Workers and Entrepreneurs, 2006

Source: Kaushal and Lu 2014; Li 2003; Visit Bureau, 2014

			Forei	gn-educated
	Canadian-born		Immigrants	
-	%	% Match Rate	%	% Match Rate
Field of study				
Chiropractics	1	87	0	84
Occupational Therapy	1	82	0	65
Medicine	3	92	5	56
Nursing	8	73	5	56
Pharmacy	2	84	2	45
Physiotherapy	1	82	1	44
Dentistry	1	90	1	44
Optometry	0	95	0	38
Veterinary Medicine	1	83	1	29
Architecture	1	56	3	26
Accounting	8	50	10	24
Teaching	47	62	15	20
Diet/Nutrtion	0	60	0	20
Engineering	17	42	52	19
Law	8	69	4	12

Table 3.11 University Graduates of Fields Leading to Regulated Occupations &Match Rates for Canadian-born and Immigrants

Source: Zietsma (2010:15-16)

	Canada	US
Chinese	71	70
Filipinos	16	22
Koreans	55	63
Vietnamese	63	75
Japanese	64	32
Cambodians	40	74
Laotians	37	78

 Table 3.12: Rates of Bilingualism Among Second Generation Groups in Canada and the US

Source: Alba (2004); Houle (2011:5)




Figure 3.1: Proportion of Individuals arriving in Canada before the age of 18 without a high school diploma in adulthood, by age of arrival and gender

Note: Derivation by author from Statistics Canada, 2006 Census using analytical files described in the text. Each data point represents the proportion of individuals by age at arrival without a high school diploma who are 35 to 55 years of age in 2006. The continuous line is an estimated local polynomial smooth based upon weighted data, and calculated using a linear smooth and an Epanechnikov kernel.

Source: Corak (2011:17)



Figure 3.2: Earnings Differentials (in percentages) for Native-born and Immigrant Visible Minorities Relative to Native-born Whites and Foreign-born Whites

Source: Swidinsky and Swidinsky (2002:634)

Chapter 4: United States

The US represents the largest immigrant-receiving OECD country, admitting 52 percent of the world's migrants. This is over three times the number of immigrants settling in Australia, the second largest immigrant-receiving OECD country, which takes in approximately 12 percent of the world's migrants. Most immigrants in the US arrive from Asia and Latin America. The largest immigrant groups are from Mexico, China, India, Philippines, El Salvador, and Vietnam. Together immigrants and their children represent approximately one third of the total US population.

The US describes itself as a "country of immigrants" and the reception of immigrants has become a distinctive characteristic of its heritage (Simon and Lynch 1999:455). The identity as an immigrant country has remained robust despite a shift in immigration policy from settlement migration to family migration. The emphasis on family migration is distinctive from other industrialized nations whose immigration policies are primarily comprised of skilled immigrants. Nonetheless, several historical and institutional characteristics— such as the historical legacy of slavery, racial/ethnic hierarchy, and large population of undocumented migrants—create challenges for immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities.

In the US, immigrants are primarily admitted because of their kin relationship with a US citizen or permanent resident (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:39). Upon arrival, immigrants and their children have access to extensive familial and coethnic networks. The admission criteria for immigrants in the US is distinctive from immigrants in other industrialized nations, such as Canada and the UK, who are primarily admitted based on their educational and occupational skills. Once immigrants arrive in the US, there is no

formal integration policy. Instead, they are received in the racial and ethnic hierarchy and face a divided public opinion on immigration. This chapter examines how the context of reception influences the integration of immigrants and their children in the US? In particular, this chapter examines the larger context of reception (shaped by immigration policy, racial and ethnic hierarchy, and public opinion) from the perspective of the coethnic community.

Borjas (2002:71); Levels et al. (2008); Reitz (2003) posit that the ways in which immigrants enter the country and how they are received in the host country shapes integration. In particular, Reitz (2003:2) and Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson (2002) pinpoints a few institutional characteristics as particularly influential— immigration history and policy, racial/ethnic hierarchy, and public attitudes toward immigration. To assess this, I examine the effects of the coethnic community on college attainment net of individual and group factors. I use the coethnic community to assess a family based immigration policy and racial and ethnic hierarchy on integration outcomes from the perspective of the coethnic community. I examine how family networks that are embodied in the coethnic community affect the children of immigrants' academic experiences. I also focus on how the coethnic community, which is comprised of family networks, helps alleviate racial and ethnic stratification.

In the remaining three sections, I provide an overview of three institutional factors—family-based immigration policy, racial and ethnic hierarchy, and public attitudes toward immigration—and assess how these factors shape the integration of immigrants and their children. The first section provides an overview of immigration policy from the 19th century to the contemporary period, documenting the rise of family

reunification in immigration policy. I review some of the major demographic changes since immigration reform in 1965, such as the rise of undocumented migration, increases in the Latino and Asian population, and urban concentration. In the second section, I review the ways in which immigrants are integrated into the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the US and how race, ethnicity, and national origin shape integration outcomes. In the third section, I describe historical and current public attitudes on immigration. I also examine how public attitudes toward immigration have changed over time and how they may shape immigrant integration vis-a-vis immigration legislation.

COETHNIC COMMUNITY AND COLLEGE ATTAINMENT

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the coethnic community is an important factor for educational attainment (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Chapter 2 showed that the coethnic community has a similar positive effect for the first, second, and third generations in the US. To further our understanding of this finding, this chapter offers a more detailed account of the coethnic community in the US.

To begin, Table 4.1 provides some basic information about coethnic communities in the US. In my sample, the coethnic community was based on the average characteristics of approximately 3.5 respondents per tract. However, the number of respondents may not represent the true number of coethnics in a census tract since the data is weighted to the national population so one respondent may be weighted to represent several individuals in the population. The number of respondents in the census tract therefore is not a reliable measure for community size because the weighting occurs at the national level rather than the census tract level. In this regard, national census data would be a more accurate account of the community size. However, there is no national

data on the average education or income of coethnics per tract so this is provides the best solution for assessing average education and income characteristics of coethnics.

TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE

Table 4.2 shows that the average education of the community is the highest among the second (13.7 years) and third generations (13.8 years) compared with the first generation (11.8 years). Similarly, the third generation also lives in communities with the highest incomes as well when compared with the first and second generations.

TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE

Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics by the national origin groups represented in this chapter, which analyzes data from the Sensitive General Social Survey. Table 4.3 is presented in ascending order by community education, which is measured as the average years of education of immigrants from the same country of origin, aged 25 or older. Table 4.3 shows that Mexico has the lowest community education (10.4). Communities with the highest average education are India (17.6) and China (17.8), which surpasses the community education of the third or higher generation (13.6). However, average community education does not correlate with community income. For instance, the Norwegian community has an average education of 15.7 years but only an average income of 9.3. Thus, children may live in communities with lower income but still have educated coethnics.

TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE

The analyses in Chapter 2 indicated that community education has the same positive effect among the foreign-born and native-born individuals. To better understand the relationship between community education and generation, I examine the effect of the

community education on college attainment by generation status. The main dependent variable is college attainment, measured as a dichotomous variable of attaining a college degree or more compared with less than a college degree. The first generation represents all foreign-born individuals. The second generation represents US born individuals that have at least one foreign-born parent. The third generation consists of individuals that are US born with at least one US born parent and grandparent. I constructed two community variables—community education and community income—that are measured at the census tract level for immigrants aged 25 or older from the same country of birth. Community education measures the average years of schooling of immigrants from the same country of birth, aged 25 and older in each tract. Community income is the average income of all individuals 25 and older from the same birth country in each tract. However, income is coded as categories rather than the actual dollar amount. Nonetheless, community income can provide us with a descriptive picture of how community income differs across the different immigrant groups. For the third generation, community education and income are the average education and income of native-born individuals aged 25 and older in each tract.

In Table 4.4, I examine the effects of the average educational attainment of coethnic neighbors on college attainment in the US among the first, second, and third generation. Table 4.4 presents the odds ratios of obtaining a college degree or more (compared with less than a college degree) among the first, second, and third or higher generations, estimated by logistic regression analysis. For each generation, I present two models—one model with no controls and a second model that controls for community, group, and individual level characteristics. The standard errors for each variable are

presented in parentheses underneath the coefficients and the p-values are presented underneath the standard errors.

TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE

Table 4.4 shows that for each of the three generations, community education has a strong and positive effect net of controls. Thus, the community education effect does not differ across the three generations. My results suggest that coethnic community education continues to provide important educational support for foreign-born and native-born children regardless of their length of time in the country.

One possible explanation why the coethnic community effect may matter after several generations could be related to racial and ethnic context of the US. Minorities face persistent and ongoing racial and ethnic discrimination even after several generations. The coethnic community may offer some protection from this discrimination. To assess this, I examine how the coethnic community may affect racial disparities in college attainment in Table 4.5.

TABLE 4.5 ABOUT HERE

Table 4.5, Model 1 presents the baseline effect of race on college attainment. The odds ratio for Blacks is 0.442 and is statistically significant. The odds ratio for Asians is 7.73 and significant. The odds ratio for Native American and Other/Mixed is not significant. When no control variables are considered, Blacks are less likely to complete college whereas Asians are more likely to complete college relative to Whites.

In Model 2, I include community education and income to the equation. Doing so greatly reduces the significance of the odds ratio for blacks. Net of community characteristics, the odds ratio for Asian is no longer significant. Overall, Model 2 shows

that the coethnic community can help reduce some of the racial disparities in college attainment.

In Model 3, I examine the effect of race net of individual, community, and group variables. In Model 3, the odds ratio for Black is no longer significant. The odds ratios for father's high school education is 1.9 and is statistically significant. The odds ratio for father's education (college or more) is 7.1 and statistically significant. Overall, Table 4.5 shows that net of individual, community, and group characteristics, racial disparities in college attainment disappear. Community education and father's education seem to matter most in accounting for the racial and ethnic disparities in college attainment. The results suggest that blacks tend to live in less educated communities and have less educated fathers. However, controlling for community education and father's education diminishes the negative effect for blacks on college attainment. This suggests that parental education and coethnic communities may help buffer against the racial and ethnic discrimination that blacks experience in the educational attainment process.

Model 3 also shows that there is no significant effect of group characteristics. In separate analyses, I find that educational selectivity has a significant and positive effect on college attainment when no controls were present. However, educational selectivity is washed away by community education. These are presented in Table 4.6.

TABLE 4.6 ABOUT HERE

Overall, my assessment of individual, group, and community factors on college attainment shows that community education has a strong positive effect for the first, second, and third generations. The strong positive community effect is consistent with ethnographic work (Gibson 1988; Zhou and Bankston 1998) showing that coethnic

community members can monitor children's behavior, which discourages deviant behavior and encourages academic achievement. The strong positive effect of educated coethnics for each generation could be related to the immigration policy, particularly the orientation towards family reunification. Family reunification policies ensure the likelihood that immigrants' children live in two parent households and have access to an extended family and coethnic network (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Thus, the preference for family reunification in immigration policy may be a social context of the US that allows immigrants to build a wide network of extended family members and coethnic community members. Therefore, the emphasis on family sponsorship in immigration policy may minimize the challenges associated with immigration. In the subsequent section, I will elaborate on family reunification in US immigration policy.

A second finding is that there are racial disparities in college attainment, which disappear when community education and father's education are included. In particular, the two variables diminish the negative effects experienced by Blacks. My finding could be related to several aspects of the US context of reception, such as the racial and ethnic hierarchy and the public attitudes toward immigration. Immigrants and their children are subject to the US system of racial categorization, which includes being defined in racial terms despite their national origin and subject to racial stereotypes and discrimination. The racial and ethnic context is also difficult for native-born minorities because of the longstanding racial and ethnic discrimination. Thus, it is possible that the same positive community effect observed for all three generations is associated with the ongoing discrimination that persists for several generations in the US.

In addition to persistent racial and ethnic discrimination, my findings could also be associated with public attitudes toward immigrants in the US. Public opinion for immigrants is moderate so the context of the US is not particularly hostile for the first generation as it is in other host countries, such as the UK. I will elaborate further on the racial and ethnic context and public attitudes in the subsequent sections below.

Overall, my findings suggest that there are several factors in the US context that shape the integration of immigrants and their children in the US. These include immigration policy with emphasis on family sponsorship, racial and ethnic hierarchy, and public opinion toward immigration. In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on these three institutional characteristics and argue that they create a context that is relatively welcoming for immigrants but harsh for racial and ethnic minorities and remains for several generations.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

Family reunification is a cornerstone of US immigration policy and distinguishes it from other industrialized nations that favor occupational or economic migration (Cott 1998). However, this has not always been the case as US immigration policy has changed from relatively open and unrestricted access for settlement to a policy favoring family migration. For most of the 19th century, immigration policy was open and unrestricted for immigrants that wanted to settle in the US. From the late 19th century to the mid 20th century, immigration policy primarily granted entry based on national origin. By the mid 20th century, immigration legislation adopted a preference system that admitted immigrants based on their kin relationship with a US citizen. In the following section, I

will review how an immigration policy favoring family reunification arose historically and how contemporary immigrants are admitted to the US via the preference system.

Overview of Immigration Policy

The history of US immigration policy has changed in the size; admission criteria; and sending countries of immigrants (Martin and Midgley 2003:14). These changes occur in four major periods: pre-1880, 1880-1919; 1920-1964; 1965 to present. During this time, immigration has shifted in its composition from the mass migration of European immigrants, a hiatus in total migration, and the mass migration of Latin American and Asian immigrants. Overall, these periods reflect four different eras of immigration policy: a.) laissez-faire policies; b.) relatively open migration policy with few restrictions based on individual characteristics and national origin; c.) restrictive policies with priorities for family migration and skilled labor; and d.) immigration policies heavily favoring family migration.

Immigration Pre-1880

Immigration before 1880 was widely encouraged and immigration policy was essentially open and unrestricted because the US was interested in receiving immigrants for settlement (Vialet 2006:10). Most immigrants hailed from Northern and Western Europe with large influxes from Ireland and Germany (Martin and Midgley 2003:15). Relatives in the origin country were encouraged by those in the US to follow. The federal government had several policies that indirectly encouraged immigration, such as subsidizing railroad construction (Martin and Midgley 2003:15). In turn, steamship companies and railroad workers actively recruited immigrants as workers. Immigrants were interested in arriving in the US for economic, religious, and political reasons. In

turn, the US admitted new citizens for national economic and political growth as well as a humanitarian desire to provide refuge for individuals from oppressed countries (Vialet 2006:10). Thus, family, labor, and refugees were primary factors drawing immigrants to the US.

Immigration from 1880-1919

From 1880 to 1919, the US experienced a period of mass migration and enacted an immigration policy that relied on national origin and individual attributes for admission criteria (Massey 1995:633). The overwhelming majority of these immigrants hailed from Europe with small percentages from the Americas and Asia (Massey 1995:634). Specifically, the main sending countries were Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland with significant numbers from Sweden, Norway, and China (Vialet 2006:11). Immigration was also shifting from Northern and Western Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe. Immigration during the first two decades of the 20th century reached its highest levels to date. From 1901 to 1910, immigration reached a peak of 8.8 million, which was unmatched until 1991 to 2000 (Massey 1995:649) (US Census 2012; (US Department of Justice 2002:19-20); (Department of Homeland Security 2011:5-7).

The influx of immigrants contributed to growing ambivalence toward immigration and concern that immigrants adversely affected the wages and working conditions of US workers. In addition, because immigrants primarily settled in urban areas, they were associated with the social problems of the city, such as crime and poverty. The large and unrestricted flow of immigrants entering the country led the Federal government to take an active part in immigration legislation (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:30).

Table 1 summarizes major US legislation for immigration and naturalization (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995; Vialet 2006). Table 1 indicates that in 1882, the Federal government enacted its first immigration statute—Immigration Act of 1882—which barred the arrival of convicts and prostitutes. The year 1882 also saw the first enactment of immigration legislation that used national origin as a basis for eligibility or ineligibility into the US. The Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882 excluded the immigration of skilled and unskilled Chinese laborers employed in mining (Daniels 2004:19). This occurred simultaneously with the enactment of contract labor laws that prohibited the importation of foreign labor. Despite the restrictive nature of the Chinese Exclusion Act, there were a few opportunities for family reunification. Chinese men that had successfully established citizenship could return to China and get married. Any resulting offspring were American citizens who could legally enter the US (Daniels 2004). Each visit to China represented a new opportunity to create one additional child that an adult male citizen could sponsor to the US. Therefore, under the Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese men were still allowed to reunite with some of their family members. Overall, the preservation of family reunification along with the emphasis on individual qualifications, national origin, and protection of US labor established in immigration legislation during this period set the stage for subsequent immigration policy.

TABLE 4.7 ABOUT HERE

Immigration from 1920-1964

From 1920 to 1964, there was a dramatic decrease in immigration primarily as a result of restrictionist policies that emphasized national origin, family, labor, and refugees (Massey 1995:633). Table 4.7 shows that from 1930 to 1940, immigration reached 0.5

million, the lowest level since the 1830s and a significant drop from its previous decade when immigration reached 4.1 million (Vialet 2006:19). Immigration slowly increased starting in 1940 but never reached 3.5 million during the entire period. Immigration policy during this period was restrictive but provided preferences for skilled workers and family members. There was also a shift in the composition of sending countries, which ended the predominance of European immigrants and increased immigration from the Americas and to a lesser extent Asia (Massey 1995:635).

In 1921, the temporary Quota Act introduced numerical restrictions on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere. Immigration from the Western Hemisphere was not subject to numerical restrictions until 1968. Numerical restrictions were permanently enacted in the Immigration Act of 1924. The annual quota of any nationality was 2 percent of the foreign-born in 1890 (164,000) and later amended in 1929 to 2 percent of the white US population (154,000). Although China, Japan, India, and Siam each received 100 quotas, natives from the countries in the "Asiatic barred zone"—which consisted of most Asian countries—were generally barred from entry (Ngai 1999:72-73; Vialet 2006-17).

The 1924 National Origins Act also introduced a "preference" system in which visa applicants were given priorities based on individual attributes (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:36). As illustrated in Table 4.8, which was retrieved from Jasso and Rosenzweig (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:37) potential immigrants with "scarce" skills in agriculture and immediate family members (e.g., husbands and parents of US citizens) were accorded the highest preference among numerically restricted immigrants. The preference for labor in immigration policy reflected the influence of the farm bloc

(Daniels 2004:54). Although it is unclear why family reunification was afforded such a prominent role in the 1924 law, several social groups, including the YMCA, church congregations, and the League of Women's Voters, petitioned to Congress against restrictive measures that separated families (Ngai 1999:68). Additional pieces of immigration legislation enacted during this period extended opportunities for family reunification. In 1945, the government passed the War Brides Act, which expedited the entry for spouses eligible under the existing quota system (Wolgin and Bloemraad 2010:29). This was extended in 1947 to racially ineligible spouses, which were mainly from Asia. Thus, even as immigration policy became more restrictive in the number and national origins of immigrants, family and skilled labor continued to be a priority of immigration policy (Daniels 2004:54).

TABLE 4.8 ABOUT HERE

In addition to legislation favoring family reunification, there was growing accommodation for refugees in US immigration policy. In 1948, the US enacted its first piece of refugee legislation—the Displaced Persons Act, which admitted over 400,000 displaced persons (Vialet 2006:19). This was a result of humanitarian concerns and foreign policy considerations. As a leader of the Western alliance, the US had a responsibility to take in displaced persons and refugees in the wake of WWII.

In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act also referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act was enacted, which codified and carried forward the essential elements of the 1924 Act and represents the nation's basic immigration statute with amendments (Bennett 1966:128). The Act maintained national origins quotas for the Eastern Hemisphere but also established four preference categories for admission based on skill

and family (Vialet 2006:21). Family and skill had equal preference in this Act. Table 4 shows that the first priority, which comprised 50 percent of each national origin quota was allocated for immigrant applicants with high education or exceptional abilities. The remaining three categories were allocated to specific relatives of US citizens and permanent residents. In addition, the McCarran-Walter Act granted quota exemptions to all spouses and children regardless of race (Wolgin and Bloemraad 2010). This exemption opened the door for Asian family members as Asian immigration remained banned from the 1924 Immigration Act.

In the decade following the 1952 Act, it was evident that immigration policy clearly favored family reunification and refugees. From 1951 to 1960, nearly 2.5 million immigrants entered the US and less than half of incoming immigrants were admitted through the quota system. Rather, many immigrants were admitted under special temporary laws for refugees and family members outside of the quotas as well as nonquota immigrants (e.g., immigrants from Western Hemisphere). In fact, refugees represented the largest admission of immigrants outside of the national origins quota system during the 1950s. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 with amendments in 1954 authorized the admission of 214,000 refugees from Europe and escapees from Communist-dominated countries. The inclusion of 'escapees' from Communist countries in the Refugee Relief Act reflected the country's preoccupation with the Cold War. Nonetheless, there was a growing recognition that the national origin quota system was not an effective way of regulating immigration, which led to a major policy revision in 1965 (Vialet 2006:22-23).

Immigration since 1965

The period since 1965 is characterized by large-scale immigration from Latin America and Asia, which continues to the present. Since 1965, immigration policy overwhelmingly favors family reunification and represents the primary route to the US (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:39). The biggest demographic shift occurred from 1960-1980. From 1960 to 1969 approximately 40 percent of immigrants hailed from Europe, 38 percent arrived from Latin America, and another 11 percent arrived from Asia. From 1971 to 1980, approximately 41 percent arrived from Latin America, 35 percent from Asia, and only 20 percent arrive from Europe (Martin and Midgley 2003:4). During this decade, there was an influx of Cuban and Vietnamese refugees due to the refugee policies established as a result of the Cuban Revolution and the Vietnam War. From 1981 to 1990, approximately 42 percent of immigrants arrived from Latin America, 43 percent were from Asia, but only 11 percent arrived from Europe. In particular, the influx of Asian immigrants from Korea, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan was a direct consequence of the removal of the ban on Asian entry. Currently, Latino and Asian immigration continues to increase. In 2012, approximately 37.8 percent arrived from Latin America and 40.4 percent from Asia (Department of Homeland Security 2013:10). In fact, Asian immigration is surpassing Latino immigration as the fastest growing group.

Overall, this period of mass migration and the dominance of Latin American and Asian migration are largely the result of the Immigration Act of 1965. In particular, the 1965 Immigration Act made amendments to the 1952 Act by repealing the national origins quota system and replacing it with a system based primarily on family reunification and to a lesser extent skilled immigration (Vialet 2006:24). The 1965 amendments set an annual ceiling of 170,000 on Eastern Hemisphere immigration and a

20,000 per country limit. Within these restrictions, immigrant visas are distributed among preference categories favoring family and skilled individuals.

Since 1965, there have been some minor amendments to immigration policy. In 1976, immigration reform abolished the distinctions between Eastern and Western Hemisphere immigration systems and immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were subject to the same preference system as immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere (Harris 1977:95). The numerical limit for the Eastern Hemisphere was 170,000 with a 20,000 per-country limit whereas the numerical limit for the Western Hemisphere was 120,000 with a 20,000 per-country limit (Harris 1977:303-4). There was also an amendment stating that professionals were required to have an offer of employment prior to the entry. Legislation enacted in 1978 combined the separate ceilings for the Eastern and Western Hemispheres into a worldwide ceiling of 290,000 with a single preference system.

The 1990 Immigration Act made additional amendments to the 1965 Immigration Act by introducing an overall cap on worldwide immigration that included the relatives of US citizens (Leiden and Neal 1990:329). The cap was 700,000 for the fiscal years 1992 to 1994 and then 675,000 thereafter. Immediate family members, defined as spouses, unmarried minor children, and parents, remained unrestricted and were not subject to numerical quotas and 480,000 visas per year were allotted to extended family members. In addition to maintaining the preference for family reunification, the new law accommodated more skill-based immigrants. The Act introduced five distinct employment visas, which required immigrants to receive sponsorship from an employer and the work would be in an area of labor shortage in the US. In addition, the 1990

Immigration Act introduced Diversity Immigrant Visas, which uses a lottery system to provide visas for countries that were adversely affected by the 1965 law and thus, less represented in the US (Leiden and Neal 1990:327-328).

Current immigration policies are guided by the 1990 Immigration Act (Simon and Lynch 1999:456). As illustrated in Table 4.9, family reunification represents the largest percentage of permanent immigrants (71%), followed by labor migration (21%), and other immigrants (8%). There is a separate number for refugee admissions annually, which is determined by Congress and the President. For 2013, there were 70,000 visas allotted for refugees, which represents approximately 10 percent of the total worldwide limit. Nonetheless, the main route to immigration to the US is via kinship with a US citizen or legal resident (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:39).

Of course, these figures only relate to immigrants entering through legal channels. Due to the limited information on the undocumented population, it is impossible to estimate how the undocumented population is relative to the figures below. Although there are no exact figures on the size of the undocumented population, it is currently estimated at 11.2 million, comprising approximately 3.5 percent of the US population (Krogstad and Passel 2014). Since there is no annual data on the undocumented population, it is no clear how the undocumented immigration affects the figures for the legal categories below.

TABLE 4.9 ABOUT HERE

Major Demographic Changes After 1965

Since 1965, the US has witnessed several demographic changes: increase in undocumented migration, changes in the racial and ethnic composition, and geographic

concentration of immigrants. Mexicans comprise approximately half or 52 percent of undocumented migration (Krogstad and Passel 2014) and Salvadorans, the next largest national-origin, are only about one-tenth the size of the Mexican undocumented population (Bean and Lowell 2007:71).

Several factors have contributed to the rise of undocumented migration particularly from Latin America. First, several policy reforms have contributed to the development of undocumented migration. The 1965 Immigration Act set an annual ceiling of 120,000 for immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, which had not previously been in place. One unintended consequence is that it curtailed the immigration networks and patterns from Mexico to the US that had been established during the bracero program (Bean and Lowell 2007:74; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:32-3). In addition, in 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) aimed to curb undocumented migration by providing legal status to all immigrants that arrived before 1982 as well as implementing symbolic employer sanctions making it illegal to hire undocumented workers and for undocumented immigrants to work (Pan 2012:135). However, the federal government has not implemented employer sanctions that make it illegal to hire such workers (Bean and Lowell 2007:71). In addition, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) has made it more difficult for immigrants to obtain permanent legal residence and eliminated legal mechanisms to help immigrants fight deportation (Abrego 2014:8).

Second, the shared land border between Mexico and the US has contributed to undocumented migration. Geographical proximity allows immigrants from Mexico to move to the US relatively quickly since migrants can cross the border on foot (Portes and

Rumbaut 2006:22). The shared land border, disparities in economic conditions between the two countries, and long-term labor relationship has created a unique situation that is not characteristic of most immigrant-receiving countries, such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. To illustrate, for undocumented immigrants interested in moving to Northern Western European countries, Greece is a primary stop-over location because of its land border with Turkey and Algeria (The Economist 2014). Thus, immigration policies and geographical proximity are key factors that contribute to the large numbers of undocumented migration in the US. In turn, these factors explain why undocumented migration is much more common in the US than in other immigrant receiving countries, such as Canada, Australia, and the UK.

In addition to increasing undocumented migration, immigration since 1965 has also altered the racial and ethnic composition of the US. In 1960, Latinos represented 3.5 percent of the population and Asians represented less than 1 percent (Pew Research Center 2013). In 2011, Latinos represented 17 percent of the US population, and Asians comprised about 5 percent of the US population. In addition to the increase in the Latino and Asian populations is the decrease in the White population from 63 percent in 1960 to 47 percent in 2011 (Pew Research Center 2013).

The changing racial and ethnic composition also corresponds with several residential settlements, such as immigrants' concentration in a few metropolitan areas and neighborhoods. The top five metropolitan areas for immigrants are Los Angeles, New York, Chicago Miami, and Houston (Waters et al. 2013:124). In particular, national origin plays an important role, more so than race and ethnicity, in determining immigrants' settlement patterns. People of the same national origin often live in distinct

regions of the US and within the same metropolitan areas (Ali and Gidley 2014:3). For instance, in 2002, the most common destination for Indians is San Jose, where they represent a quarter of the immigrant population. In comparison, Miami is the most common area for Cuban immigrants, where they represent nearly half (46 %) of the immigrant population (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:50). Thus, immigration since 1965 has increased the concentration of national origin in certain metropolitan areas.

Related, immigrants are also more likely to live in neighborhoods with a high proportion of immigrants and coethnics. Among immigrants, Hispanics live in neighborhoods with the highest share of foreign-born followed by black and Asian immigrants (Logan 2007:92). Hispanics are also the most likely to live among people who speak another language at home followed by Asian immigrants. White and black immigrants are the least likely to live among those who speak another language (Logan 2007:92). In addition, there has been a growth in coethnic communities with individuals from the same national origin living closely together. While these are not a new phenomenon as seen in the early Chinatowns, Little Italy, Greektown, etc., they have changed in their scope and amenities. While these were once thought of as initial and temporary neighborhoods, they have now become permanent housing developed in suburban areas. Also referred to as ethnoburbs, these coethnic communities represent hybrids of innercity enclaves and middle-class suburbs (Logan 2007:92). Ethnoburbs include the ethnic business of innercity enclaves as well as the amenities and resources available in middle-class suburbs. Within these ethnoburbs, immigrants experience both suburbanization and residential concentration. Overall, the changing racial and ethnic

concentration since 1965 has increased the concentration of immigrants in certain metropolitan areas, neighborhoods, and communities.

Effects of Immigration Policy and Immigrant Integration

We have already seen that the primary selection criteria in US immigration policy is a kin relationship with a US citizen or permanent resident (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986:291). This suggests that immigrants have an established family network in place upon arrival (e.g., immigrants sponsored by existing family members in the US) or can quickly reconstitute a family network (e.g., immigrants sponsoring their family members to the US) (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990:128; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995:86). In addition to sponsoring their children and spouses, US citizens and permanent residents can sponsor their parents and siblings, which often increases the number of extended family members in the household (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:203).

Immigrant parents that are sponsored by US citizens (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990) tend to live with their adult children. The percentage of intergenerational households is much greater for immigrants than for native-borns in which increases in coresidence among parents and siblings is associated with immigration legislation (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:204). For instance, between 1970-1980, there was a rapid increase in the proportion of siblings and siblings-in-law coresidence, which was the period in which sibling sponsorship entitlement was extended to the Western Hemisphere (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:205). One reason there was not a similar dramatic increase among parents living in the household is because parent visas were already exempt from numerical limitations in 1970. Thus, the provision in immigration legislation that allows

the sponsorship of relatives of US citizens is associated with increased levels of intergenerational co-residence (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:210).

I consider whether intergenerational co-residence can help support immigrants' labor market outcomes, specifically in the secondary labor market (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990:206). First, immigrants in extended households can rely on family strategies to provide financial and labor resources for operating a business (Portes 1998:11). Family members are an essential resource for immigrants in self-employment because they can provide cheap and productive labor and pool resources to provide start-up capital (Portes 1998:12; Sanders and Nee 1996:233). Family members may be more productive employees because they hold a stake in the success of the business. Furthermore, immigrants often approach members of their extended family before seeking business partners outside of the family (Portes 1998:12; Sanders and Nee 1996:233). Immigrant self-employment is characterized by family migration and thus is lower among Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants that are more likely to be single sojourners who send remittances to the origin country (Sanders and Nee 1996:234).

The reliance on family members may thus be an essential resource since selfemployed immigrants represent nearly 11 percent of the workforce (Fairlie 2012:6). Immigrants are also slightly more likely to engage in self-employment than their nativeborn counterparts (9.3%). Several immigrant groups—such as Greeks, Koreans, Iranians, etc.—show higher than average rates of self-employment than their native-born counterparts (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:6). Thus, self-employment is a common type of employment among many immigrant groups. This is related to immigration policy as

family reunification preferences may help sustain these rates of self-employment, and thus, facilitate immigrant integration.

Second, family members can help newcomers labor market outcomes by providing information about job opportunities or conditions of employment (Sanders, Nee, and Sernau 2002:289). Often, family members may have information about a job opening and pass this information to the job seeker. The family member may even know the employer and vouch for the job seeker. Sanders et al. (2002:289) found that this often involves the current employee bringing in the job seeker and introducing them to the employer and suggesting that they are a good worker. Thus, family sponsorship increases family networks, which act as conduits of information as well as referrals for immigrants during the job search process.

Overall, immigrants in the US are entitled to sponsor immediate and extended family members (e.g., spouses, children, parents, and siblings) and as a result, often live in intergenerational households. Living with more family members can improve labor market outcomes because immigrants can rely on family members to provide cheap labor and pool resources for self-employment (Sanders and Nee 1996:233). In addition, the process of family sponsorship ensures that incoming immigrants have a family network in place which can help immigrants' labor market outcomes by providing information about job opportunities or conditions of employment (Sanders et al. 2002:289). Thus, the preference for family members in immigration policy supports immigrants' integration, specifically their labor market outcomes.

RACIAL/ETHNIC STRATIFICATION IN THE US

While there are formal national policies guiding the admission of immigrants and their children to the US, few government policies are responsible for the integration of immigrants and their children (Bloemraad 2006; Reitz 2003:2). Rather, immigrants and their children are integrated via a patchwork of racial policies (Bloemraad 2006:140; Reitz 2003). In this section, I consider how the racial and ethnic context of the US and their approach to managing diversity structures immigrants' socioeconomic outcomes.

When newcomers arrive in the US, they encounter two contexts regarding ethnoracial diversity—multiculturalism (as discussed in chapter 2) and a racial and ethnic hierarchy. In general, the US government addresses diversity and multiculturalism using broad ethno-racial classifications: White, African American, Asian American, Latino/Hispanic, Native American, and native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (Bloemraad 2006). Many of the constraints and opportunities afforded to individuals are structured by race and to a lesser extent national origin (Schain 2008:240). Immigrants encounter stratification by race, ethnicity, and national origin in three ways. First, upon arrival, immigrants are classified according to the US system of racial categorization and face different levels of discrimination based on their skin color and phenotype. Regardless of their national origin, many immigrants are still defined "racially" and subject to racial stereotypes (Waters 1994). For instance, black Caribbean and West Indian immigrants are often perceived as black Americans and are pressured to adopt such identities by the native born population (Waters 1994:816).

Second, immigrants in the US are integrated as racial minorities. Since the US government does not offer any sort of formal immigrant integration assistance,

immigrants rely on larger programs aimed at racial inequality and discrimination that were derived from the civil rights movement (Bloemraad 2006). When the Immigration Act of 1965 was enacted, it coincided with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2007:190; Joppke 1996:457). As a result, Hispanic and Asian immigrants received protection under the nation's civil rights legislation and Voting Rights Act because they were considered racial and linguistic minorities (Bloemraad:2006ty p133; Jones-Correa 2007:190). Subsequently, several resources and programs that were inspired by the civil rights movement have been extended to immigrants' children and facilitated their integration, such as affirmative action policies at schools and universities, ethnic studies programs, and ethnic based professional clubs and organizations (Kasinitz 2008:265-266). Nonetheless, these programs are not aimed at immigrant integration per se and do not address immigrants' needs directly (Bloemraad 2006:140; Joppke 1996:457). Thus, from the standpoint of the US, immigrants and their children are viewed primarily in these racial terms and the patchwork of civil rights legislation and minority policies incentivize immigrants to define themselves in racial rather than ethnic terms (Jones-Correa 2007:191).

Third, immigrants receive different treatment depending based on their national origin group and some groups are viewed more favorably than others (Bloemraad 2006:867; Jones-Correa 2007:193; Joppke 1996:457). For instance, Latino immigrants are regarded less favorably than Asian immigrants. Furthermore, while these two groups are viewed as foreign or minorities upon arrival, immigrants from Europe are not (Jones-Correa 2007:193). Thus, immigrant groups experience different contexts of reception in

the US. Those with more favorable conditions upon arrival will have an easier time integrating into US society.

The differential treatment and socioeconomic outcomes by national origin group is related to the different admission categories and channels in which immigrants are admitted. The categories that immigrant groups enter the US largely coincide with national origin and also determine the amount of government support they receive (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20). For instance, immigrant groups entering the country legally, which characterizes the experience of most newcomers, are permitted to stay and experience neutral government policies, but receive no governmental assistance (Abrego 2006:216; Bloemraad 2006:871; Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20). Some of these groups include Filipinos, Indians, and the Chinese. Legal immigrants are ineligible for welfare programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Medicaid (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20). Nonetheless, many immigrants from these groups arrive with high levels of education or capital so they experience a smoother integration to the US.

To illustrate, groups that enter as refugees and asylees have legal status and the right to work in the US. This is characterized by the experience of the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. Refugees receive generous resettlement assistance and qualify for welfare provisions from the 1980 Refugee Act (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20-21,31; Zhou 2001:191; Zhou and Bankston 1998:35-36). Therefore, refugees may experience an easier transition because of the government support they receive.

Groups classified as unauthorized—such as Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans—reside in the US without permission from the US government and experience discrimination (Abrego 2006:216; Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20).

Unauthorized youth have access to public education from kindergarten to high school graduation and are denied federal financial aid (Abrego 2006:216). Groups that experience exclusionary state policies denying them legal status face limited structural and economic opportunities and have weak coethnic networks. Thus, unauthorized migrants may have a more difficult time integrating to the US.

Effects of race and ethnicity on the integration of immigrants

Thus far, I have hypothesized that race, ethnicity, and national origin are important contexts that receive immigrants and their children. To illustrate racial and ethnic stratification, I examine the unequal access to socioeconomic mobility. To illustrate, Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 which are retrieved from Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2008:160) show that there are large racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic outcomes, such as occupational status, income, and educational attainment.

Table 4.10 presents the occupational status of different racial and ethnic groups and shows that Latinos and Blacks are consistently less likely to be in managerial/professional occupation and sales compared with Whites (32.07%). For instance, only 9 percent of Salvadorans and 9.5 percent of Guatemalans are in managerial positions. In addition, only 21 percent of blacks fill managerial positions. Many Asian groups, on the other hand, surpass Whites in terms of managerial positions, such as the Chinese (47.79%), Japanese (46.9%), Asian Indians (55.9%), and Taiwanese (61%).

TABLE 4.10 ABOUT HERE

These racial and ethnic differences in occupational status correspond with racial and ethnic disparities in income and educational attainment. Table 4.11 shows that the groups with the lowest income are the Hmong (\$5,175.34), Cambodians (\$8.680.48),

Mexicans (\$9,467.30), Guatemalans (\$11,178.60), and Salvadorans (\$11,371.92). These groups also have the lowest levels of education. Table 4.12 shows that the Hmong have an average of 5.5 years and Guatemalans have an average of 7.5 years. Cambodians, Mexicans, and Salvadorans all have an average of 9 years of education. Thus, Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 indicate that race and national origin is a primary way in which immigrants are stratified in the US.

TABLES 4.11 AND 4.12 ABOUT HERE

Within racial groups, subgroups are differentiated by their phenotype/skin color and mode of entry into the US. Among Latinos, those that are light-skinned and enter the US legally, such as Argentines, Chileans, and Cubans tend to have greater occupations, incomes, and educational attainment. However, dark-skinned Latinos that have a large population of unauthorized members, such as Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans, have the lowest occupational status, income, and education. There are also wide discrepancies among Asians. For some groups within the Asian category—such as Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Filipino-they exhibit high occupational status, income, and education. These groups enter the US as legal migrants have experienced more favorable treatment because of their perception as "Honorary Whites" (2008:158). However, for other Asian groups that have primarily entered as refugees/asylees and have darker skin color, such as the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Hmong, they have low occupational status, income, and education. Although these groups are lumped together under the broad Asian race category, the disparities among Asian groups illustrate the importance of immigrants' mode of entry as well as skin color.

The US addresses diversity using broad ethno-racial categories. In turn, many opportunities and constraints are structured by race, ethnicity, and national origin (Schain 2008:240). When immigrants and their children arrive in the US, they encounter the racial and ethnic hierarchy in several ways. First, immigrants are classified in racial and ethnic terms regardless of their national origin. Second, immigrants are integrated as racial and ethnic minorities. Since the US does not have a formal immigrant integration policy, immigrants and their children are integrated via policies designed to counter racial discrimination (Bloemraad 2006; Joppke 1996:457). Third, immigrants receive different treatment based on their national origin, which is also closely tied to the categories and ways in which they enter the US (Abrego 2006:216; Portes and Rumbaut 2006:20).

ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION

In addition to the racial and ethnic context, the integration of immigrants and their children is also influenced by the attitudes of established residents toward immigrants (Bloemraad 2006:104). Currently, public attitudes toward immigration are fairly liberal. In 2013, approximately 41 percent of the public believed that immigration should be decreased, which is higher than in 1965 when pro-immigrant attitudes were at their peak (Gallup 2015). However, approximately 22 percent believes that immigration should be increased, which is at one of its highest levels in history.

Compared with other immigrant-receiving countries, the US is relatively immigrant friendly. Among other western immigrant-receiving countries, Australia has the most positive sentiment toward immigration in which 58 percent of the population believes that immigration should stay the same or be increased. Compared with Canada, a country that is considered to be more friendly towards immigrants than the US, public

attitudes toward immigration are relatively similar (Bloemraad 2006:104). Table 4.13 indicates that a higher percentage of people in the US believe that immigration should stay the same or be increased (55%) compared with Canada (48%), but a higher percentage of the US population believes immigration should be reduced (41%) than in Canada (36%). Public attitudes toward immigration in the US are overall much more positive than in the UK, in which 77 percent of the population believes that immigration should stay the same or increase.

TABLE 4.13 ABOUT HERE

Public attitudes towards immigration are important because they can shape how immigrants are received by the native-born population and host society as well as how immigrants behave or respond (Esses et al. 2002:71). On the part of the host society, public attitudes may shape individual attitudes toward immigrants as well as government policies. Favorable attitudes towards immigration may promote fair and equitable treatment of immigrants whereas unfavorable attitudes toward immigration or prejudice toward immigrants. In addition, public attitudes toward immigrants, public attitudes may influence immigrants' own expectations and behaviors. Favorable attitudes are likely to promote positive expectations among immigrants whereas negative attitudes may incite fear, tension, and anxiety. In turn, this can affect immigrants' long-term integration in the host society. Thus, favorable attitudes toward immigrants will positively affect integration outcomes whereas unfavorable attitudes will lead to worse integration outcome (Burstein:2003ve p70; Page and Shapiro 1983:858).

To show how public attitudes toward immigration are correlated with immigration policies, Table 4.14 presents a historical overview of attitudes toward immigration and show how they correspond with immigration legislation. Table 4.14 is retrieved from Simon and Alexander (Esses et al. 2002:71). Looking historically, it is clear how public opinion and immigration policy have been correlated. Generally, when public opinion is in favor of immigration, immigration policy is also expansionist and includes more provisions for the admission of immigrates.

TABLE 4.14 ABOUT HERE

To illustrate, Table 4.14 shows that from 1920 to 1930, immigration was viewed unfavorably. Public opinion polls indicated that roughly 4 to 6 percent of the population was in favor of increased immigration. This reflected the sentiment and fear that the US was taking in too many refugees from war-torn Europe, a growing sense of nationalism that the US was emerging as a world power, and biological theories that supported the superiority of certain races (1993:41). Consistent with these attitudes, immigration legislation during this time was restrictive and introduced numerical restrictions on immigration.

In contrast, in 1965 when 8 percent of the population believed that immigration should be increased and only 33 percent believed immigration should be reduced, immigration policy was expansionist. During this time, there were changing opinions about race and national origins partly as a result of the Civil Rights Movement (Vialet 2006:24). The 1965 Immigration Act removed national-origins quotas and increased the overall ceiling for visas from 154,000 to 170,000 (Vialet 2006:24). Thus, these two examples illustrate how public opinion and immigration policy are correlated. When

immigration is viewed more favorably by the public, immigration policy tends to be more expansionist. However, when immigration is viewed unfavorably by the public, immigration tends to be more restrictive.

Of course, public opinion can also be influenced by immigration policy. However, the intention of this chapter is not to establish causality per se, but rather to underscore the correlation between public opinion and immigration reform and further show that public attitudes on immigration can affect immigrant integration vis-à-vis immigration policies. In sum, public attitudes play a role in shaping immigration legislation as well as the immigrants' integration into the host society.

CONCLUSION

There are three possible characteristics that may shape immigrant integration in the US: immigration policy, racial and ethnic stratification, and public opinion (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008; Borjas; Esses Dovidio, and Hodson 2001; Levels et al. 2002:71; and Winkelmann 2008). Overall, this chapter shows that all three structural conditions in the US are important factors in shaping the integration of immigrants and their children.

The history of US immigration policy has led to changes in the size, admission criteria and sending countries of immigrants in four periods: pre-1880, 1880-1919, 1920-1964, and 1965 to present. In these four periods, immigration has shifted from the mass migration of European immigrants to the mass migration of Latin American and Asian immigrants. This shift in ethnic composition reflects changes in immigration legislation from laissez-faire policies to policies heavily favoring family migration. Today, approximately 70 percent of immigrant visas are allotted for family members.

Since 1965, there have been several demographic changes in the US. First, there has been an increase in undocumented migration, primarily from Latin America. Second, there has been an increase in the Latino and Asian population, which are overwhelmingly concentrated in the largest metropolitan areas. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of neighborhoods with large proportions of foreign-born individuals.

The emphasis on family reunification in US immigration policy can facilitate the integration of immigrants, especially their labor market outcomes. Family reunification policies shape the structure of immigrant households by increasing intergenerational co-residence and supporting immigrants' labor market outcomes. For instance, family members are an essential resource for immigrants pursing self-employment since they provide cheap and productive labor and can help pool resources. This is useful as self-employment is a common form of employment among immigrants.

Family reunification may also facilitate the integration of immigrants' children. Family reunification policies ensure that immigrants' children live in two parent households and have access to an extended kin network, both of which positively affect children's' educational attainment. To assess how an extended family network influences the children of immigrants' educational attainment, I examine the coethnic community since coethnic community members may play similar roles as extended family members. My results show that there is a positive effect between community education and college attainment, which suggests that the educational composition of the coethnic community has a strong and positive effect on children's educational attainment. As such, the sponsorship of immediate and extended family kin may contribute to the development of coethnic communities and positively shape children's educational attainment.

In addition to immigration policy, the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the US may affect the integration of immigrants and their children. When immigrants arrive in the US, they are classified in racial terms and subject to racial stereotypes and discrimination regardless of their national origin. Immigrants from different national origin groups are also received differently in which some groups like Europeans and Asians are viewed more favorably than Latinos. The differential treatment and outcomes of national origin groups is also associated with the admission categories in which immigrants are admitted, such as legal immigrant, refugees/asylees, and unauthorized migrants. Legal immigrants will have the smoothest integration, followed by refugees/asylees and unauthorized migrants.

The racial and ethnic hierarchy creates unequal access to socioeconomic mobility, such as occupational status, education, and income. These outcomes are differentiated by race/ethnicity in which blacks and Latinos have the worst outcomes whereas Whites consistently have the greatest outcomes. My findings show that the coethnic community may help alleviate some of these disparities along racial and ethnic lines. In particular, there is a positive effect between community education and college attainment and this effect is consistent across generations. This suggests that the educational composition of the coethnic community has a strong and positive effect for all minority children regardless of how long they have resided in the US. As such, the coethnic community may be an important factor in alleviating structural inequalities that the children of immigrants and minorities experience.

Aside from immigration policy and racial/ethnic hierarchy, public attitudes toward immigration may also affect immigrant integration. Public attitudes are important

because they can shape how immigrants are received by host country members and how immigrants themselves respond and react in the host country (2001). In particular, public attitudes can shape immigration reform in the host country. My results show that in periods where public attitudes are pro-immigration, immigration legislation tends to be more expansionist. However, when public attitudes are more negative towards immigration, immigration legislation tends to be more restrictive. In turn, this may affect immigrant integration because immigrants and their children may face policies that are less attuned to the needs of immigrants and their children.

The US identifies itself as a "country of immigrants" and the long history of immigration in the country has become a distinctive part of the cultural heritage. Consistent with this identity is the strong orientation toward family reunification in US immigration policy that disproportionately favors family visas. This chapter shows that an immigration policy that emphasizes family reunification can positively shape the integration of immigrants and their children. Having a large family network helps alleviate initial settlement and adjustment issues. However, the structural conditions in the US, such as the racial and ethnic hierarchy, create long-term inequalities for minorities. As minorities experience discrimination based on skin color and phenotype, racial and ethnic inequalities persist after several generations in the US. The coethnic community can help alleviate some of these challenges that minorities experience and thus, may be an important resource in combatting harsh structural conditions in the US.

	Observations	Min	Max	Average
Mexico	124	1	11	3.23
Puerto Rico	14	1	4	2.21
Spain	12	1	1	1.17
US (native born)	1739	1	34	10.98
Canada	3	1	1	1
Ireland	5	11	11	11
Italy	15	1	2	1.13
Poland	9	1	1	1
Philippines	10	1	1	1
Greece	2	1	1	1
Norway	3	1	1	1
Portugal	3	1	1	1
Japan	4	1	1	1
India	13	13	13	13
China	11	1	3	1.55

 Table 4.1: Coding of Coethnic Community Characteristics by Group

	<u>First</u> <u>Generation</u>	Second Generation	<u>Third</u> Generation	Full Sample	Min	Max
Educational Attainment						
Mean education (3 categories)	0.858	1.124	1.267	1.209	0	2
	(0.084)	(0.122)	(0.019)	(.019)		
Community						
Community Education	11.81	13.653	13.78	13.57	0	20
	(0.438)	(0.512)	(0.049)	(.064)		
Community Income	10.63	11.135	11.378	11.28	1	12
	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.025)	(.03)		
Group						
Gini	43.9	41.844	41	41.29	25	52
	(0.555)	(1.186)	0	(.073)		
Political Stability	0.331	0.042	0.452	0.366	-1.42	0.954
	(0.056)	(0.105)	0	(.010)		
Educational Selectivity	0.354	0.332	0	0.045	-0.064	0.858
	(0.024)	(0.036)	0	(.004)		
Individual						
Female	0.455	0.581	0.544	0.538	0	1
	(0.051)	(0.078)	(0.016)	(.014)		
Age	39.48	39.61	44.96	44.14	25	65
-	(0.927)	(1.921)	(0.36)	(.33)		
Father's Education	0.541	0.487	0.929	0.861	0	2
	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.022)	(.021)		
N	127	56	1376	1593		

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in the Analysis

Note: Standard errors in parentheses Source: 2006 Sensitive General Social Survey

	Mean Education	Community Education	Community Income	Proportion of Sample
Mexico	0.597	10.429	10.484	7.01
Puerto Rico	0.714	11.093	9.955	0.57
Spain	0.833	11.167	11.028	0.67
US (native born)	1.202	13.644	11.244	86.55
Canada	1.333	13.667	11.000	0.31
Ireland	1.200	14.200	12.000	0.28
Italy	1.267	14.522	10.833	0.99
Poland	1.333	14.556	11.889	0.52
Philippines	1.500	14.900	11.200	0.59
Greece	1.500	15.000	12.000	0.14
Norway	1.667	15.667	9.333	0.16
Portugal	1.333	15.667	12.000	0.18
Japan	1.750	17.500	9.250	0.15
India	1.923	17.631	11.538	0.66
China	1.818	17.843	11.727	0.94

 Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics by National Origin Group

	First ge	neration	Second Generation		Third Ge	eneration
Community						
Education	3.12***	2.66**	2.243**	1.815**	2.098***	1.931***
	(0.897)	(0.971)	(0.536)	(0.401)	(0.122)	(0.136)
Income	1.239	1.27	0.842	0.801	0.95	0.922
	(0.18)	(0.216)	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.089)	(0.104)
Individual						
Female		2.082		3.543		0.79
		(1.74)		(3.94)		(0.123)
Age		0.965		0.985		0.987 +
		(0.037)		(0.027)		(0.007)
Dad ed: high school		11.68**		1.12		1.929***
		(10.71)		(1.083)		(0.361)
Dad ed: college+		4.18		-		7.587***
-		(3.84)		-		(1.801)
Ν		127		49		1376

 Table 4.4: Odds Ratios of Community and Individual Factors Predicting College
 Attainment by Generation

*** $P \le .001$ ** $p \le .01$ * $p \le .05 + p \le .1$ Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Community			
Education		2.083***	1.944***
		(0.117)	(0.122)
Income		0.966	(0.942)
		(0.088)	(0.087)
Group			0.361
Educational Selectivity			(0.850)
			0.993
Gini			(0.095)
			0.675
Political Stability			(0.478)
Individual			0.866
Female			(0.126)
			.986+
Age			(0.007)
			0.637
1st generation			(0.529)
			1.019
2nd generation			(0.784)
(ref: 3+ generation)			1.936***
Dad ed: high school			(0.358)
			7.070***
Dad ed: college+			(1.660)
(ref: less than high school)			
Black	0.442***	0.472*	0.578
	(0.095)	(0.150)	(0.210)
Native American	0.444	0.454	.239+
	(0.525)	(0.424)	(0.189)
Asian	7.73***	2.206	2.871
	(3.526)	(1.292)	(2.001)
Other/Mixed	1.214	1.725	1.942
(ref: White)	(0.379)	(0.859)	(1.048)

Table 4.5: Odds Ratios of Community, Group, and Individual FactorsPredicting College Attainment

N=1593

*** $P \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05 + p \leq .1$

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	Model 1	Model 2
Community	110401 1	1110 401 2
•		
Education		2.14***
		(0.109)
Group		
Educational Selectivity	3.493**	1.188
	(1.351)	(0.497)

Table 4.6: Odds Ratios of Community and GroupFactors Predicting College Attainment

N=2009

***P<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses Source: 2006 Sensitive General Social Survey

Legislation	Date	Major Provision(s)
Immigration Act	1882	Increases list of inadmissibles and imposes head tax
Chinese Exclusion Act	1882	Bars Chinese laborers; prohibits naturalization of Chinese persons
First Quota Law	1921	Limits immigration to 3% of national origin of 1910 foreign-born: 357,000 Limits immigration to 2% of national origin of 1890 foreign-born: 164,000. In 1929,
National Origins Act	1924	shifts quota formula to reflect national origin of white US population in 1920: 154,000.
War Brides Act	1946	Facilitates immigration of spouses and children of military personnel
Displaced Persons	1040	Authorized the admission and permanent residency for displaced persons from
Act	1948	certain European countries
Immigration &		Establishes preference category system; retains national origins quotas; ceiling about
Nationality Act	1952	154,000 plus 2,000 from Asia-Pacific Triangle; eliminates all racial and gender bars
Nationality Act		to naturalization
Refugee Relief Act	1953	Authorized the arrival of refugees from European and Communist-dominated
Kelugee Kellel Act	1955	countries
		Abolishes national-origins quotas; for EH, establishes uniform per-country limit of
Immigration Act	1965	20,000 and preference category system with overall ceiling of 170,000; for WH,
		effective 1968, places overall ceiling of 120,000
Immigration &	1976	Extends per-country limit and preference-category system to WH
Nationality Act	1770	Extends per-country minit and preference-category system to with
Immigration Reform		Grants conditional legalization to certain alien residents in the US; imposes
and Control Act	1986	employer sanctions

 Table 4.7: Major US Legislation Pertaining to Criteria for Immigration and Naturalization: 1882-1986

Source: Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990:28-29); Vialet (2006:22)

<u> </u>	1						
	1924-	1952	1952	-1968	1968	-1977	1978-1989
	EH	WH	EH	WH	EH	WH	<u>EH & WH</u>
Kin of US citizen							
Husband	U/1P	U, NS	U	U,NS	U	U	U
Wife	U	U, NS	U	U,NS	U	U	U
Parent	1P	U, NS	2P	U,NS	U	U	U
Minor Child	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Adult unmarried child	NP	U, NS	4P/2P	U,NS	1P	L,NS	1P
Adult married child	NP	U, NS	4P	U,NS	4P	L,NS	4P
Sibling	NP	U, NS	4P	U,NS	5P	L,NS	5P
Kin of US Permanent Residen	t						
Husband	NP	U, NS	3P	U,NS	2P	L,NS	2P
Wife	2P	U, NS	3P	U,NS	2P	L,NS	2P
Minor Child	2P	U	3P	U	2P	L	2P
Adult unmarried child	NP	U, NS	NP/3P	U,NS	2P	L,NS	2P
Adult married child	NP	U, NS	NP	U,NS	NP	L,NS	NP,NS
Other Kin and Non-Kin							
Skilled	1P	U, NS	1P	U,NS	3P/6P	L,NS	3P/6P
All Others	NP	U, NS	NP	U,NS	NP	L,NS	NP,NS
Ceiling on Numerically							
Limited Visas	165/154	-	156	-	170	120	290 worldwide

Table 4.8: Summary of US Law Governing Immigrant Visa Entitlement 1924-1989,
by Nativity and Kinship Ties to US Citizens and Residents

Notes: U denotes an unlimited supploy of visas. All other visas are numerically limitd, and denoted either by the generic L, by the correpsonding preference cateogry (such as 1P), or by the residual nonpreference NP. NS denotes the case where no visa sponsorship is required; such persons may apply for an immigrant visa without the action of a US citizen or permanent resident. Source: Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990)

Table 4.9: Visa Allowances

Туре	Visas	Percentage
Family Reunification	480,000	71%
Other	55,000	8%
Employment-based	140,000	21%
Immigration	140,000	2170
Total	675,000	100%

Source: American Immigration Council (2014)

	Occupatio	onal statu	s (%)			
Ethnic	Managr. & Prof. Related	Sales &		Construction, Extraction, &	Production, Transport. & Material	Farming, Forestry, &
Groups	Occup.	Office	Services	Maintenance	Moving	Fishing
Chinese	47.79	22.83	15.04	2.77	11.42	0.15
Japanese	46.90	28.05	13.24	4.50	6.70	0.60
Koreans	36.51	31.26	15.65	3.97	12.38	0.23
Asian Indians	55.89	23.39	8.07	2.25	10.03	0.37
Filipinos	34.87	28.70	18.49	4.62	12.35	0.98
Taiwanese	60.95	24.78	8.44	1.34	4.43	0.06
Hmong	14.67	24.14	17.33	4.51	38.57	0.77
Vietnamese	25.21	19.92	19.64	6.02	28.50	0.71
Cambodians	16.66	25.37	17.26	5.45	34.67	0.59
Laotians	12.55	20.60	15.02	6.07	44.96	0.81
Whites	32.07	27.03	15.02	10.12	14.77	1.00
Blacks	21.48	26.48	23.96	7.57	19.84	0.65
Source: 2000 P	UMS 5%	Sample.			L /	
	Occupat	ional stat	us (%)			
	Managr. & Prof. Related	Sales &		Construction, Extraction, &	Production, Transport. & Material	Forestry,
Ethnic Groups	1	Office	Services	Maintenance	Moving	Fishing
Mexicans	13.18	20.62	22.49	14.41	23.76	5.54
Puerto Ricans	21.14	29.46	21.40	8.34	19.01	0.66
Cubans	27.84	28.65	16.09	10.21	16.68	0.53
Guatemalans	9.49	16.13	29.73	14.59	27.55	2.51
Salvadorans	8.96	17.29	32.11	15.44	24.84	1.37
Costa Ricans	23.35	22.76	25.46	11.61	16.27	0.55
Panamanians	31.07	32.82	20.27	5.61	9.94	0.29
Argentines	39.77	24.68	14.84	9.24	10.96	0.51
Chileans	32.12	23.92	20.05	10.32	13.13	0.46
Bolivians	27.20	25.80	23.85	11.19	11.73	0.23
Whites	32.07	27.03	15.02	10.12	14.77	1.00
Blacks	21.48	26.48	23.96	7.57	19.84	0.65

Table 4.10. Occupational Status by Racial/Ethnic Groups

Source: 2000 PUMS 5% Sample.

Source: Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2008:160)

Latinos	Mean income	Asian Americans	Mean income
Mexicans	9,467.30	Chinese	20,728.54
Puerto Ricans	11,314.95	Japanese	23,786.13
Cubans	16,741.89	Koreans	16,976.19
Guatemalans	11,178.60	Asian Indians	25,682.15
Salvadorans	11,371.92	Filipinos	19,051.53
Costa Rican	14,226.92	Taiwanese	22,998.05
Panamanians	16,181.20	Hmong	5,175.34
Argentines	23,589.99	Vietnamese	14,306.74
Chileans	18,272.04	Cambodian	8,680.48
Bolivians	16,322.53	Laotians	10,375.57
Whites	17,968.87	Whites	17,968.87
Blacks	11,366.74	Blacks	11,366.74

Table 4.11: Mean per capita income (\$) of selected Racial/Ethnic Groups, 2000

Source: 2000 PUMS 5% Sample. ¹ We use per capita income as family income distorts the status of some groups (particularly Asians and Whites) as some groups have more people than others contributing toward the family income.

Source: Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2008:160)

	Median		Asian	Median	
Latinos	Years	% College	Americans	Years	% College
Mexicans	9	14.85	Chinese	12	49.65
Puerto Ricans	11	23.54	Japanese	14	59.44
Cubans	12	35.02	Koreans	12	48.97
Guatemaans	7.5	15.36	Asian Indian	14	55.95
Salvadorans	12	14.13	Filipinos	14	54.14
Costa Ricans	12	36.49	Taiwanese	14	65.22
Panamanians	12	46.11	Hmong	5.5	11.51
Argentines	12	48.11	Vietnamese	11	32.19
Chileans	12	44.44	Cambodians	9	17.87
Bolivians	12	44.08	Laotians	10	17.45
Whites	12	39.12			
Blacks	12	27.1			

Table 4.12: Educational Attainment Among Racial/Ethnic Groups, 2000

Source: Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2008:158)

	US	Australia	Canada	UK
Immigration should be reduced	41%	35%	36%	77%
Immigration should stay the same or be	55%	58%	48%	22%
increased				

Table 4.13 Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the US, Australia, Canada, and the UK

Note: Cells do not sum to 100% because of other categories such as, "Don't know" or "No opinion".

Source: Gallup, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Blinder (2011)

	L	8		
Period	% Increase	% Same	% Decrease	Immigration Policy
1920-1930	4-6%	-	-	Restriction
1945-1946	5%	32%	37%	Expansion
1952-1953	13%	37%	39%	Expansion
1965	8%	39%	33%	Expansion
1986	7%	35%	49%	Restriction
1990	9%	29%	48%	Restriction

Table 4.14 Public Opinion and Immigration Reform

Source: Simon and Alexander (1993:41)

Chapter 5: United Kingdom

The United Kingdom represents the fourth largest immigrant-receiving OECD country behind the US, Australia, and Canada, respectively. Immigrants and their children comprise about 10 percent and 5 percent of the population respectively. However, the UK has a short immigration history as the country did not begin receiving immigrants until 1948. These immigrants arrived from the New Commonwealth, such as India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean. Contemporary migration to the UK is more diverse in its national origins than migration to the US or Canada. Contemporary immigrants are primarily from the EU, Eastern Europe, and African countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, Congo, and Malawi), but these are fairly new sending regions as the largest groups in the UK are primarily from New and Old Commonwealth countries, other UK countries, Ireland, and China.

Unlike many immigrant-receiving countries, the UK does not view itself as a country of immigrants. The strong identity as a non-immigrant country corresponds with several institutional characteristics of the UK, such as their strict immigration policy, strong anti-immigrant sentiment in public opinion, and the tendency to view migrants and minorities synonymously (Simon and Lynch 1999:455). Immigration policy in the UK is one of the strictest in the Western world, which allows relatively low numbers of incoming migrants and no rights to family reunification (2001).

Borjas (2002:71); Esses Dovidio, and Hodson (2002:71); Levels et al. (2008); Reitz (1988) and Winkelmann (2001) argue that the ways in which immigrants enter the host country and how they are received in the host country influences immigrant integration. In particular, Reitz (2003) highlights a few institutional characteristics that

are particularly influential—immigration history and policy, racial and ethnic context, and public attitudes toward immigration. To assess these characteristics, this chapter offers a more detailed account of the coethnic community, coethnic resources, and race and ethnicity to understand the context of the UK.

In the remaining three sections, I provide an overview of three institutional factors—immigration policy, racial and ethnic context, and public attitudes toward immigration—and assess how it influences immigrant integration in the UK. The first section reviews immigration policy from the late 20th century to the contemporary period. I review some of the major demographic changes since 1948, such as the increase in the racial and ethnic population and the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in neighborhoods. In the second section, I review how the racial and ethnic hierarchy of the UK shapes the integration outcomes of immigrants' children. In the third section, I describe public attitudes towards immigrant groups, and by host country. I also discuss the implications of public attitudes for immigrant integration vis-à-vis immigration reform.

COETHNIC COMMUNITY AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the coethnic community has a stronger, positive community effect for the foreign-born than native-borns. To better understand this effect, I provide a more detailed account of the coethnic community and other contextual factors, such as coethnic resources and racial and ethnic context that may be driving this effect.

To begin, Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics about coethnic communities in the UK. The most educated coethnic communities are Greeks, Chinese, Irish, Singapore, and Fiji. The least educated communities are immigrants from Afghanistan,

Poland, and Lithuania. However, as illustrated in the US case, average community education does not correlate with community income. The communities with the highest average income are Venezuela, Malawi, and the US whereas the communities with the lowest average income are Togo, Ecuador, and Afghanistan.

TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

To better understand the relationship between the coethnic community and generation, I assess the effects of the coethnic community among three generation groups—the first, 1.5, and second or higher generations. The first generation consists of individuals that were born abroad and immigrated after age 14. The 1.5 generation includes individuals that were born abroad and immigrated to the UK between the ages of 0 to 14. For all groups, I include individuals that completed their highest degree in the UK. The APS does not provide information on the parent's country of birth; therefore, it is not possible to disaggregate the respondents into second generation (individuals born in the UK with at least one immigrant parent) and third or higher generations (individuals born in the UK with native born parents). Thus, this study disaggregates respondents into first, 1.5, and second or higher (native born) generations.

The dependent variable is educational attainment, measured as less than a high school degree, a high school degree, and college degree or more. I created two community characteristics (average education and income of coethnic communities) in the UK using data from the non-public release of the Annual Population Survey (APS). Table 5.2 presents the odds ratios of obtaining less than a high school degree, a high school degree, or a college degree or more among the first, 1.5 generation, and second or

higher generations, estimated by ordinal logistic regression. The standard errors for each variable are presented in parentheses underneath the odds ratios.

TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE

In Table 5.2, the odds ratio for community education is 3.613. Community education has a significant and positive effect for obtaining the next level of education. For every one unit increase in community education, the odds of obtaining a college degree is 3.6 times higher than the odds of combined high school degree and less than a high school degree. The odds ratio for community income is 1.013 and is statistically significant. Thus, a one-unit increase in income is associated with increased odds of attaining the next level of education among 1st, 1.5, and second and higher generations. These effects remain the same even when group characteristics (educational selectivity, income inequality and political stability) and individual characteristic (gender, age, generation) are controlled for. Overall, the coethnic community has a strong effect on educational attainment of the first, 1.5, and second or higher generations.

One limitation of the analyses above is that the second generation cannot be disaggregated from other native-borns given the lack of information in the APS. One way to proxy the second generation is to focus on a few Asian groups (e.g., Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Chinese). In the Asian sample, I am able to disaggregate the sample into first, 1.5, and second generations. The first generation and 1.5 generations are defined similarly as in the full sample and thus, includes individuals born in China, Pakistan, India, or Bangladesh. I create the second generation by selecting individuals that were born in the UK and identified as Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, or Bangladeshi. These four groups arrived roughly in the 1960s, so I can be fairly certain that most

Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, or Bangladeshi individuals born in the UK are second generation. While Chinese immigration began as early as 1880s, the largest wave of Chinese migration occurred during the 1950s and 1960s (Akilli 2003; Chau and Yu 2001:103). Thus, the APS will include very few Chinese individuals that are third generation or higher. While this remains an imperfect way to identify the second generation, given the data restrictions, this provides a more reliable way to understand the educational outcomes of the second generation.

Table 5.3 below examines the effect of coethnic community education for the 1st, 1.5, and 2nd generation Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Chinese. Model 1 shows that the odds ratio for community education is 1.97 and statistically significant. The odds ratio for community income is 1.055 and statistically significant. This shows that without controls, community education and income increase the odds of attaining the next level of educational attainment among the Asian sample.

TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE

In Model 2, I examine the effects of three individual characteristics—gender, age, and generation status—on educational attainment. The odds ratios for females is 0.645 and statistically significant, which indicates that females have lower odds of attaining higher education compared with their male counterparts. This is in contrast to the larger sample that shows that females have an educational advantage over males. This could be attributed to the cultural norms among Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups that encourage females to leave education for an early marriage (Dale et al. 2010:951). The odds ratio for 1.5 generation is 0.133 and statistically significant. The 1.5 generation and the second

generation have lower odds of higher educational attainment compared with the first generation. Thus, there may be some generational differences in the educational attainment process.

To further explore these generational differences, Table 5.4 examines the effects of coethnic community education and income by generation status. For the first generation, community education has an odds ratio of 17.45 and is statistically significant at the .001 level, net of individual and group controls. For the 1.5 generation, the odds ratio for community education is 1.74 and significant at the .05 level. The odds ratio for community income is 1.108 and statistically significant which suggests that a one unit increase in community income is associated with increased educational attainment. Among the second generation, the odds ratio for community education is 1.25 but the effect only borders statistical significance. The odds ratio for community income is 1.096 and significant at the .001 level. Thus, the models indicate that community education has the strongest effect on educational attainment among the first generation and the effect becomes weaker with each subsequent generation. The opposite is true for community income. Community income has no effect among the first generation, but has a significant effect among the 1.5 and second generations. This suggests that community education and income could have different roles in the educational attainment process and their effects differ by generation status.

TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE

Also, the effect of gender also seems to differ by generation. Being female decreases the effect of higher education among the first generation but this effect is only

borderline among the 1.5 generation and not significant among the second generation. Therefore, this suggests that cultural norms about gender may be less strong over time.

Therefore, by disaggregating the sample into second generation, it is clear that the educational attainment process differs by generation status. The second generation may be less influenced by the average education of the community compared with individuals that were not born in the host country, but the first generation is less influenced by the average income of the community. Furthermore, gendered norms may by stronger among those born abroad but seem to disappear by the second generation.

Thus far, I have illustrated that the average education and income of the coethnic community positively influences educational attainment. In addition to these community characteristics, community institutions and resources may also be important for educational attainment (Zhou and Kim 2006). To assess this, I examine the number of community organizations and institutions to understand whether the organizational capacity of coethnic communities matters for the integration of the children of immigrants. Coethnic resources is measured as the number of coethnic organizations and institutions in Inner London and Outer London, the two regions that form the Greater London area. I focus on London because the majority of immigrants reside in London. In separate analyses, I coded for coethnic resources in the six largest cities in the UK but there were very few coethnic organizations and institutions in other UK cities. I coded the measure for coethnic resources using documentary research on the internet. I coded sixteen different dimensions of coethnic communities in Inner and Outer London. The dimensions capture the political, social, and religious resources available to community

members. Some examples of these dimensions include the presence of coethnic language schools, coethnic churches, coethnic retirement homes, etc.¹

For each dimension, I create a dichotomous variable of whether it is available in each of the regions. The idea was to capture the different types of resources available in coethnic communities by examining different institutions in the two locales. One limitation of this approach is that it does not capture more informal institutions that do not have their information on the internet.

In Table 5.5, I present the total number of coethnic resources for different groups. I also assess whether living in an area with a greater number of coethnic resources affects the integration of immigrants' children. Table 5.5 presents the odds ratios of coethnic resources (total number of community resources in Inner or Outer London) on educational attainment estimated by ordinal logistic regression. I created the coethnic resources variable by attaching these dimensions to individuals in the 2008-2009 Annual Population Survey that shared the same national origin and lived in the same region. To create the coethnic resources variable, I summed the total number of coethnic resources for each national origin group in each region. The number of resources ranges from 0 to 12. I code the coethnic resources variable as a categorical variable: low (0-1), medium (2-7), and high (8-12).

TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE

Table 5.6, Model 1 shows that the odds ratio for a medium number of coethnic resources is 1.335 and statistically significant. Thus, living a community with a medium level of coethnic resources compared with a low level of coethnic resources has a positive

¹ These different dimensions are presented in the Methodological Appendix.

effect on attaining the next level of educational attainment. Model 2 presents coethnic resources net of community (education and income), group (gini, political stability, and educational selectivity) and individual characteristics (female, age, generation). Net of controls, coethnic resources has no significant effect on educational attainment. This suggests that living in areas with a moderate number of community resources compared with very few resources is beneficial but living with more educated coethnic adults has an even greater effect on educational attainment. This suggests that the average education of coethnics may be more influential than coethnic organizational and institutional resources.

TABLE 5.6 ABOUT HERE

Overall, the stronger positive community effect for first and 1.5 generation may be attributed to the immigration policy of the UK. The structure of UK immigration policy has changed from relatively open to restrictionist. When immigration policy was more open, there was a short period of family reunification, a decade after primary immigrants arrived. The separation between primary immigrants and their children suggests that immigrant children arrived older and were likely to be at an academic disadvantage. Starting in 1971, the right to family sponsorship was eliminated from immigration policy. Nonetheless, for most immigrants in the UK, they have experienced some separation from their families. Thus, this separation represents a challenge associated with the immigration process for newcomers in the UK. In turn, the coethnic community can serve as a resource for the settlement issues that newcomers and their children face.

In addition to an immigration policy that does not favor family reunification, the stronger positive community effect could be associated with the public attitudes toward

immigration. In the UK, public attitudes toward immigrants are very negative so the context of the UK may be more hostile for the first and 1.5 generations. Therefore, the coethnic community may offer support to newcomers that experience a more hostile environment.

Thus far, my findings show that community education has a stronger positive effect for the first and 1.5 generations compared with second or higher generations. To understand why the positive community effect is less strong for the second or higher generations, I consider the racial and ethnic context. In the UK, racial and ethnic minorities are often identified in broader, panethnic terms, such as South Asian, Black African, Afro Caribbean, and Chinese. These terms incorporate individuals from several national origins that also differ in terms of nativity. In Table 5.7, I assess how panethnic identities and panethnic communities affect educational attainment. Table 5.7 presents the odds ratios of educational attainment for racial and ethnic minorities using 2008-2009 APS data. Model 1 examines the effect of panethnic identity on educational attainment for three groups: Afro Caribbean, Black African, and Chinese with South Asian as the reference group. Relative to South Asians, Afro Caribbeans and Black Africans have greater odds of attaining higher educational attainment than South Asians. Thus, Model 1 shows that among the major visible minority groups, South Asians are the most educationally disadvantaged.

TABLE 5.7 ABOUT HERE

In Model 2, I control for characteristics of the panethnic community—panethnic education and income. I construct two panethnic community variables that are measured at the super output area (lower layer), a geographical area with an average population of

1,000 to 3,000 persons. Panethnic community variables are measured for individuals aged 25 or older that selected the same panethnic identity. Panethnic education measures the average years of schooling of all individuals 25 and older with the same panethnic identity in each super out area. Community income is the natural log of income of all individuals 25 and older with the same panethnic identity in each super out area.

In Model 2, the odds ratio for panethnic community education is 3.55 and statistically significant. This suggests that a one year increase in panethnic community education increases the odds of attaining the next level of education. The odds ratio for panethnic community income is 1.01 and is not statistically significant. When the panethnic community characteristics are included in the model, the panethnic categories are no longer significant. Thus, Model 2 suggests that an educated panethnic community can help alleviate racial and ethnic disparities in education. Thus, some of the educational disparities that were present in Model 1 disappear once the average education and income of the panethnic community are controlled for, which suggests that these disparities are a result of educational differences across the panethnic communities.

In Model 3, I control for two individual characteristics—sex and age. The odds ratio for female is 0.77 and statistically significant. Females are less likely than their male counterparts to attain a higher level of education. This could be shaped by the gendered differences in the South Asian community shown earlier. Overall, the results of Table 5.7 suggest that the living among educated panethnics can help alleviate educational disparities for visible minorities in the UK.

Table 5.7 shows that there are some racial and ethnic disparities in educational attainment in the UK. However, these disparities disappear when panethnic community

education is included. The average education of neighbors from the same panethnicity may help alleviate the structural discrimination that minority children encounter. These panethnic communities, which are based on panethnicity rather than national origin, may act a resource for native-born minorities that may feel less connected to the immigrant community. Overall, my finding could be related to the racial and ethnic context of the UK. Although native-born minorities experience some discrimination, there are several resources other than the coethnic community, which can act as a protective factor. For instance, there is an established anti-discrimination policy that may offer some protection for racial and ethnic minorities. In addition, native-born minorities can rely on panethnic communities for assistance. Thus, a moderate racial and ethnic context and the availability of other panethnic communities may help explain why the coethnic community has a stronger positive effect for foreign-borns compared with native-borns. In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on the racial and ethnic context in the UK.

In sum, my findings suggest that there are several factors in the UK context that shape the integration of immigrants and their children in the US. These include immigration policy with little family reunification, racial and ethnic context, and negative public attitudes toward immigration. In the subsequent section, I elaborate on these three institutional characteristics and argue that they create a context that is hostile for immigrants. However, the context for racial and ethnic minorities seems to improve with greater time in the UK.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

The UK has one of the strictest immigration policies relative to other western countries (Hansen 2000:20). Contemporary immigration policy regulates a smaller annual

flow of immigrants and offers no formal right to family reunification. The UK has a relatively short immigration history beginning in 1948 with the arrival of Caribbean immigrants. Over time, the UK has shifted from a generous and relatively open immigration policy to a restrictive policy. From 1948 to 1962, immigration policy was unrestricted for Old and New Commonwealth. Starting in 1962, immigration legislation became more restrictive and emphasized 'patriality' as a primary criteria for establishing the right to reside in the UK. In the following section, I will review how a restrictive immigration policy arose historically and how contemporary immigrants are admitted to the UK.

Overview of Immigration Policy

For most of the United Kingdom's history, it has been a country of emigrants rather than immigrants. Beginning in the seventeenth century, large numbers of Britons left for Ireland followed by North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and to other parts of the growing British Empire (Cheung and Heath 2007). It was not until the last decades of the 20th century that the United Kingdom became an immigrant-receiving country. In particular, immigration to the UK was dated to the arrival of Caribbeans in 1948.

This was a result of the 1948 British National Act (BNA), which extended citizenship to individuals of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC); citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries; Irish British subjects; British subjects without citizenship, British Protected Persons; and Aliens (Martin and Midgley 2003:14). Any individual that was a citizen of Canada, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and Ceylon would be considered a

citizen of Independent Commonwealth Country. Under the 1948 BNA, the vast majority of British subjects could feely enter the United Kingdom, secure employment immediately, register as citizens, vote, and work for the British government (Hansen 2000:46). From 1948 to 1962, colonial subjects and British citizens were indistinguishable as the former were in law full British citizens (Martin and Midgley 2003:15). Since the 1948 British Nationality Act was intended to be a citizenship policy and not an immigration policy, the arrival of subsequent immigrants was unexpected (Martin and Midgley 2003:15). In turn, the 1948 British Nationality Act offered unrestricted access for 800 million people that were citizens of the colonies or Commonwealth (Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b:126).

Commonwealth immigration occurred in two waves. First, primary immigration occurred from 1948 to 1961 and secondary immigration (migration of spouses and children of immigrants already settled in Britain) took place from 1962 to 1974 (1995:634). The arrival of Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis dominated certain periods. For instance, Caribbean migration started in 1948 and was complete by 1974 (Peach 2005:181). Caribbean migrants were heavily recruited to fill health professions, especially women. Many of these women arrived alone so family members arrived later.

After Caribbeans, many immigrants from northern India arrived approximately from 1965 to 1974 (Peach 1999:328). These immigrants were fairly educated and recruited to work in hospitals. Indian migration was predominantly young men and women and children followed later (Peach 1999:333). The majority of the Indian population migrated from the rural Punjab area. However, about one third of the

population is comprised of East African Indians that were predominantly Gujurati Hindus and Punjabi Sikhs who were urban professionals in East Africa. They were predominantly English-speaking and an educated middle class that brought capital with them. Although Indian migrants were primarily recruited for manual labor, most Indians in the UK occupy white collar professions and nearly 55 percent of Indian women participate in formal employment (Peach 1999:333).

Around the same time as Indian migration, Pakistani Muslims also began immigrating to the UK to fulfill low-wage jobs in the textile industry (Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b:127). Most Pakistani immigrants were poorly educated and had little knowledge of English from rural areas. Shortly after the end of Indian migration, Bangladeshi migration peaked from 1980 to 1985 (Peach 1999:335). Bangladeshi migrants are primarily from the rural areas of Sylhet and have low levels of education and English proficiency (Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b:127). While Caribbean and Indian migration was correlated with labor demand, Bangladeshi migration during this period was primarily for family reunification or formation. Bangladeshi migration

Post-1960 restrictionism

The influx of migration initiated by the 1948 British Nationality Act led to restrictive immigration policies aimed to control immigration in the 1960s (Hansen 2000:109). In 1962, the Commonwealth Immigration Act established a voucher system for potential immigrants. Therefore, only those with government-sponsored vouchers were allowed to enter the UK. Even citizens of the UK or colonies with no substantial connection to the UK (through birth or descent) were required to obtain a voucher before

entering (Cheung and Heath 2007:513). However, the voucher system had little effect in curbing immigration as the vouchers were issued liberally.

The Immigration Act of 1971 introduced the concept of 'patriality', which required potential immigrants to have at least one parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom to establish the right to live in the UK (right to abode) (Hansen 2000:195). The patriality component on the 1971 Act also had a racial element as it secured access for Australians and New Zealanders, but denied access for other Commonwealth citizens (Hansen 2000:195). Since the 1971 Immigration Act, there were some modifications to the British Nationality Act in 1981, which used patriality to replace citizenship. Prior to 1981, all individuals that were born on British soil were entitled to British citizenship. The Act instead mandated that British-born children could only acquire citizenship if they at least one parent that was born in the UK or had permanent residency (Hansen 2000:214-215).

Contemporary migration

Contemporary immigration policy is governed by the Immigration Act of 1971 and its subsequent modifications in 1981 (Hatton 2005:725; Hatton:2005en p725; Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b). The UK immigration system is characterized by three groups of immigrants: British citizens, EU citizens, and non-EU citizens. As summarized in Table 1, non-EU citizens make up approximately half or 47 percent of total migration to the UK while EU citizens comprise another 40 percent. British citizens, Irish citizens, and nationals of European Economic Area countries are free to live and work in the UK (Hatton 2005:726). The European Economic Area (EEA) includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK². In addition,
Commonwealth citizens with the right to abode, those with UK passports, and those who
have acquired finite or indefinite leave to enter or remain have the right of free entry.

TABLE 5.8 ABOUT HERE

Of the total number of migrants to the UK in 2014, migrants who came to work comprised the largest group (42.4%), followed by students (30.2%), and family (14.4%) (Office of National Statistics 2014). Although immigrants coming for work has surpassed student migrants in recent years, student migration exceeded the number of labor migration from 2009-2012 (Office of National Statistics (2014).

Points-based system

In 2008, the UK implemented its first points-based system modeled after the Australian system (Donald 2014). The points-system applies to nationals of countries outside of the EU (European Union) and EEA (European Economic Area) (UK Government 2006:6). Table 5.9 summarizes the five tiers of immigrant categories in the points system, which is comprised of high-value immigrants (exceptional talent, skills, investor, entrepreneur), skilled worker that cannot be filled by a UK or EEA worker, low-skilled workers to fill labor shortages, students, and temporary migrants (UK Government 2006). Family members of primary applicants seeking sponsorship are not subject to the points system but there is no guarantee or right to family sponsorship.

TABLE 5.9 ABOUT HERE

² https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea

Tier 1 or highly-skilled migrants do not need a job offer or sponsor prior to arrival. Tier 1 immigrants are expected to find employment and/or self-employment and increase the productivity and growth of the UK economy (UK Government 2006:21). These immigrants are subject to the points system in which they must score 75 points out of a possible 105 points. Points are allotted based on individual's education (BA or higher), previous earnings, age, and previous education or work experience in the UK, which are summarized in Table 5.10.

TABLE 5.10 ABOUT HERE

Tier 2 immigrants are medium and high skilled workers who have received a job offer from a UK employer (UK Government 2006:23). From the standpoint of the UK, these are desirable workers because a UK employer wants to hire them. A Tier 2 immigrant needs to qualify with an attributes test as well as employment sponsorship. Tier 2 immigrants are subject to a different points-system than Tier 1 immigrants. The points system for Tier 2 immigrants still allots points based on educational qualifications, earnings, and previous work experience in the UK but also allots points for labor shortages and the ability to pass the Resident Labour Market Test. The number of points allotted also differ. Tier 2 immigrants are required to obtain 50 out of the possible 85 points (UK Government 2006:25).

TABLE 5.11 ABOUT HERE

Tier 3 immigrants are low-skilled immigrants. In actuality, there are actually very few low-skilled immigrants that enter outside of the EU or EEA. Tier 4 immigrants are students. Students are admitted if they are accepted for a course at a recognized educational institution and have the right to work during the duration of the course

(Hatton 2005:726). Students outside of the EEA are required to have a valid certificate of sponsorship from an educational institution and a place in the enrollment (UK Government 2006:29). Tier 5 immigrants are youth mobility and temporary workers that are in the UK to serve non-economic purposes. Some of the immigrants coming under this visa include temporary workers that may come for cultural, charitable, religious, or international development reasons.

Spouses and children of primary immigrants are accepted for settlement and acquire the right to work but primary applicants are not guaranteed the right to sponsor family members (Hansen 2000:20). In some circumstances, the right to family reunification may be extended to parents, grandparents, and fiancé(e)s. In 2001, 56,810 family members of British citizens were granted the right to settlement, approximately 11 percent of the immigration visas granted that year (Kofman 2004:246).

Tier 1 and 2 immigrants are the most likely to sponsor dependents (Blinder 2015:9). On average, Tier 1 immigrants sponsor approximately 1.3 dependents whereas students and asylees sponsor less than 0.4 dependents. In general, family sponsorship is quite low and the right to family sponsorship differs by visa category.

Demographic changes

Since 1946 when the UK first started receiving immigrants, there has been a dramatic increase in the racial and ethnic minority population. The increase in the racial and ethnic population has continued despite more restrictive immigration policies starting in the 1960s. In 1951, three years after the 1948 BNA, the total population of racial minorities was less than 100,000 (Peach 2007:10). In 2001, the minority population increased by nearly 45 times, totaling 4,500,000. Among the racial and ethnic population,

Indians represent the largest group (1 million) followed by Pakistani (747,000), Caribbean (565,000), and Bangladeshi (280,000) immigrants. Although these groups represent the large minority groups in the UK, they are no longer the primary sending countries. Instead, in 2012, the largest sending countries are China, India, Poland, the US, and Australia (Office for National Statistics 2013:31).

The increase in the racial and ethnic population has also been particularly noticeable in large urban areas in Greater London, West Midlands, East Midlands, North West, and Yorkshire and Humber (Peach 2007:10). Overall, London takes in about 36 percent of the UK's foreign-born and another 13.7 percent were in the South East (Rienzo 2014:8). Thus, relative to the foreign-born population, the UK-born population is more evenly distributed across the UK.

In addition to the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in urban areas, there is a tendency for immigrant groups to live in coethnic communities or among other coethnics. For instance, Bangladeshis and Indians are the most likely to live in neighborhoods (wards) that comprise over 30 percent of coethnics. Nearly one third of Bangladeshis in London live in a neighborhood where their group comprises 30 percent or more of the neighborhood's population. About one-fifth of Indians in London live in a neighborhood where coethnics comprise 30 percent or more of the neighborhood's population. In addition, approximately 12 percent of Indians in Leicester (East Midlands).

Furthermore, in cities where Pakistanis are more likely to be concentrated, such as Bradford (Yorkshire and the Humber), they are heavily concentrated. In Bradford, nearly 17 percent of Pakistanis live in a neighborhood that is 60 percent coethnic (Peach 2007:21). Thus, within the urban areas that immigrants are concentrated, they also tend to

live closely with their own coethnics. Thus, minority groups show heavy regional/urban concentration as well as neighborhood concentration.

Immigration Policy and the Children of Immigrants' Integration

Since 1948, the UK began receiving immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries. From 1948 to 1961, migration was characterized by the arrival of primary applicants followed by the migration of family members from 1962 to 1974. Thus, for Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis, primary immigrants experienced some separation from their spouses and children before a decade of family reunification followed. Nonetheless, given the policies ensuring family reunification from 1962 to 1974, these groups were able to sponsor family members. Thus, this suggests that for these New Commonwealth groups, the temporary emphasis on family reunification in immigration policy from 1962 to 1974 ensured that the children of immigrants from New Commonwealth countries have a larger family network in the UK. Due to changes in immigration policy, contemporary migrants are not entitled to family sponsorship so family networks may be less extensive for newer migrant groups.

My findings show that the coethnic community positively shapes educational attainment. Among the Asian sample, the coethnic community, particularly community education, is more influential for the first and 1.5 generations, which may suggest that the coethnic community may help to alleviate the challenges of arriving late in the host country. My findings suggest that the coethnic community may act as a resource for Asian groups that experienced delayed family reunification as well as for newer immigrant groups that have limited family sponsorship and limited networks. Overall, the

coethnic community can help alleviate the challenges in the immigration experience that derive from immigration policy.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

Another factor that may affect immigrant integration in the UK is the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the UK. In the UK, ethnic categories are a mix of panethnic, racial, and ethnic categories: Black African, Black Caribbean, Black mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, British and other whites. As illustrated in Table 5.12, which is retrieved from Waters et al. (Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b:129), the largest minority groups in the UK are Indians (2.62%), Pakistanis (1.84%), and African Blacks (1.46%). Immigration has been viewed more in racial terms and thus, immigrant groups are usually referred to as ethnic and racial minorities rather than first, second, or third generation (Ali:2014vk p3; Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013b:124). This suggests that immigrants and their children are integrated as racial and ethnic minorities and subject to racial and ethnic stereotypes despite their national origin (Ali and Gidley 2014:3).

TABLE 5.12 ABOUT HERE

The UK provides anti-discrimination laws that offer protection for racial and ethnic minorities. In 1965, the Race Relations Act made it illegal to discriminate in public places, such as restaurants, pubs, and cinemas (Cheung and Heath 2007:514). However, the Act did not provide protection from discrimination in housing and employment. This was superseded by the 1968 Race Relations Act, which made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origins in employment, training, recruitment, and promotions. In 1976, the Race Relations Act was updated again to include indirect discrimination in the definition of discrimination. Therefore, the definition of indirect discrimination deemed it unlawful for any practices or procedures, intentional or not, that placed a minority group at a disadvantage (Cheung and Heath 2007). Under the Race Relations Act 1976, the UK government established the Commission for Racial Equality. This was a government body aimed to address racial discrimination and promote racial equality and functioned as a monitoring service. Duties included supporting people who claimed racial discrimination with industrial boards or panels (Cheung and Heath 2007:514).

This was superseded by the Equality Act 2010³, which aimed to codify the numerous and complex acts and regulation that formed anti-discrimination law in Great Britain. In particular, this included the Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1974, Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and three statues protecting discrimination in employment on the basis of religion, sexual orientation, and age. In general, the Act allows equal opportunity to employment and public and private services regardless of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation.

Despite the provision of anti-discrimination legislation, there is no legislation to promote the integration of new immigrants (Hansen 2003:32). The extent of the UK's immigrant integration program includes English language and citizenship courses. Much of immigrant integration has been based on anti-discrimination legislation that protects ethnic minorities, rather than immigrants per se, from poor treatment in public services and private markets (Kesler 2010:564; Waters, Heath, Tran, and Boliver 2013a:124). The

³ http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15

distribution of British housing, social services, and jobs of ethnic minorities is "color blind", but in certain circumstances, there are some programs that are directed toward a specific ethnic group. For instance, special employment opportunities for groups that underrepresented in the labor force, such as Hindus in Hindu neighborhoods. In general, there have been few programs addressing immigrant integration directly and where there have been policies, they have limited funding or do not survive. Instead, immigrants' needs have been addressed through broad social policies addressing schooling, housing, employment, health care, etc. Therefore, the UK government has had to pinpoint and adjust mainstream policies to address the needs of immigrants and minorities (Saggar and Somerville 2012:2).

There is, however, an integration policy for officially recognized refugees that has been in place since 2000, albeit limited (Saggar and Somerville 2012). Although there is no official integration policy supporting immigrant communities per se, many immigrants and their children benefit from community cohesion programs that are targeted at the local level and in the neighborhoods where the children of immigrants live (Saggar and Somerville 2012). Programs are directed toward local areas with immigrants so while there is no direct funding to coethnic communities as is the case in Canada, the communities that immigrants live in are supported in indirect ways.

The Effects of Racial/Ethnic Hierarchy on the Children of Immigrants' Integration

To assess how the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the UK has shaped the integration of immigrants' children, I review how education, occupations, communities, and neighborhoods are stratified in the UK. Despite the extensive anti-discrimination policies, educational and occupational outcomes are heavily stratified by an individual's racial and

ethnic group. In particular, these disparities are particularly evident among minority youth (Ali and Gidley 2014:4). Perhaps because of the different ways in which immigrant groups entered the UK, different immigrant groups follow disparate trajectories. Caribbean immigrants are socially integrated in terms of intermarriage and neighborhoods, but are somewhat economically disadvantaged and are typically employed in blue-collar and manual labor (Peach 2005:178). On the other hand, Indians experience socioeconomic success and many are employed in white-collar jobs, selfemployed, and live in suburban neighborhoods. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis show high levels of self-employment but show more economic disadvantage and social exclusion (Peach 2005:179). On the other hand, the Chinese show social and economic mobility (Peach 2005:179). Because Caribbean migration was more dominated by women, Caribbeans are more likely to live in single headed households (28 percent) compared with South Asians (9 percent) (Peach 2005:185).

Table 5.13 below illustrates the educational qualifications by generation and country of origin. In general, the second generation tends to surpass the first generation of the same national origin group in their educational attainment. This suggests that there is some educational mobility from the first generation to the second generation. Table 14 shows that first generation Africans have the highest level of education, followed by second generation Indians. The high levels of education among African immigrants reflects their selective migration. After African immigrants, second generation Indians show the next highest level of education with 29.1 percent completing higher tertiary education followed by first generation Indians in which 18.5 percent have completed higher tertiary education. Overall, the most poorly educated groups are first generation

Caribbeans, Irish, and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis (Cheung and Heath 2007:519). Table 5.13 indicates that educational attainment is stratified by group in which Indians show the highest levels of education, followed by the Irish and Pakistani/Bangladeshi.

TABLE 5.13 ABOUT HERE

Table 5.14 presents the current occupations by national origin and generation. Table 15 indicates that unemployment rates are higher for visible minorities compared with the Irish and Western European men. Unemployment rates are particularly high among for the second generation compared with the first generation. For instance, nearly 25 percent of Caribbean second generation men are unemployed compared with 17 percent of Caribbean first generation men. In addition, nearly 30 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi second generation are unemployment compared with 25.7 percent of first generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Therefore, Tables 5.15 and 5.16 indicate that educational attainment and occupational attainment are stratified by race/ethnicity and generation status.

TABLE 5.14 ABOUT HERE

PUBLIC OPINION

A third institutional factor that may shape immigrant integration are public attitudes or opinions about immigration. In general, public opinion towards immigration is very negative in the UK. To illustrate this, I present secondary analysis from the Migration Observatory in Figure 5.1, which shows that nearly 56 percent of the population felt that immigration should be 'reduced by a lot' and another 21 percent of the population believed that immigration should be 'reduced a little'.

FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

However, public opposition to the arrival of new immigrants in the UK is not a new phenomenon. In 1964, there was increasing concern about the arrival of immigrants from the New Commonwealth, which prompted the British Election Study (BES) to begin questioning the public about immigration. Using secondary analysis from the Migration Observatory, Figure 5.2 presents public attitudes toward immigration from 1964 to 2012. Overall, Figure 5.2 illustrates that immigration has always been viewed negatively. The trend line, however, should not be interpreted as more accepting attitudes toward immigration in 1983 or 2000 because these are likely to be attributable to changes in the wording of the question and response options given to respondents. The first decrease in 1983 coincides with a change in the wording of the initial BES question asking if there are too many immigrants in Britain to a question asking if immigration has 'gone too far' (Blinder 2014:4). A second downward trend from 1994 to 1999 coincides with another change in the wording of the question and response options. During this period, the question returned to the initial BES question but respondents were allowed to answer 'neither agree nor disagree' or 'don't know', which may contribute for the lower percentages of people who respond 'too many'. Thus, strong opposition to immigration has long been a part of immigration history in the UK.

FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE

Compared with other countries, the UK is more strongly opposed to immigration. This is true even when measured by the same questions within the same cross-national surveys (Blinder 2014:4). Figure 5.3, which is obtained from the Migration Observatory, shows that the people in the UK are more likely to view immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity and that there are too many immigrants when compared with other

European countries and the US. Figure 5.3 below shows that the UK is the only country where over 50 percent of the population views immigration as a problem and that the immigrant population is too large (Blinder 2014).

FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE

Despite the strong levels of opposition toward immigration in the UK, more specific polling questions illustrate that anti-immigrant attitudes are stronger for some types of immigrants. For instance, attitudes toward low-skilled migrants, extended family members, and asylees were much more negative than attitudes toward high-skilled migrants, students, and close family members (Blinder 2014:7). Figure 5.4, which is retrieved from the Migration Observatory, shows that students were viewed the least negatively whereas spousal reunion migrants were viewed as a cost versus a benefit and were viewed the most negatively. For instance, only 33 percent of students were viewed as a cost versus a benefit whereas nearly 58 percent of spousal reunion migrants were viewed as a cost versus a benefit. Labor migrants were viewed only slightly less negatively and this was true regardless of whether they were from within or outside of the EU. Strong public opposition to certain types of immigrants (e.g., family and labor migrants) and more positive public support for other types of immigrants (e.g., students) may in turn, shape immigration policy to be more lenient towards certain categories of immigrants than others.

FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE

Implications of Public Attitudes on Immigrant Integration

Public attitudes toward immigration can shape and constrain immigrant integration (Gabel 1998:333). For instance, public attitudes toward immigration are important because they can shape how immigrants are received by the native-born population and the host country (Esses et al. 2002:71). Public opinion has been shown to be important for policy outcomes in several ways. First, public opinion can directly affect referendums (Gabel 1998:333). Public attitudes can affect policies vis-à-vis civil politics, such as lobbying, public protest, and elections (Gabel 1998:333). For instance, the recent successes of extreme right-wing parties make it clear that the mobilization of public opinion can defeat elite politicians that favor greater tolerance for immigrants (Sides and Citrin 2007:477). Second, public opinion can indirectly shape those in office to support policies and views that are consistent with the attitudes of their constituents (Azrout, van Spanje, and de Vreese 2010:4). For instance, Jennings and John (2009:848) found that in the UK, policymakers are particularly sensitive to public attitudes on immigration. One way that the government responds to public attitudes is through the Queen's Speech, which is a formal statement of the legislative measures that Parliament intends to enact during the next parliamentary session (Jennings and John 2009:843). The Queen's Speech sets the legislative agenda and policy outputs, confirms a number of pledges that will be implemented in parliament, and indicates the priorities of policymakers (Jennings and John 2009:843-844). Therefore, when public opinion on immigration is strong, there is a greater response by the government and policymakers in the Queen's speech.

Given the link between public opinion on immigration and response by policymakers, this suggests that when public opinion on immigration is strong and negative, more restrictive immigration policies may be implemented. In turn, the climate for immigrants and their children and racial and ethnic minorities may be more difficult when public opinion toward immigrants is negative. Although I cannot directly assesses

the relationship between public opinion and immigrant integration, this suggests that negative public attitudes toward immigration can affect the children of immigrants' integration vis-à-vis policies.

CONCLUSION

There are three possible characteristics that may shape the children of immigrants' integration in the UK: immigration policy, racial and ethnic stratification, and public opinion. Overall, this chapter suggests that the three structural conditions in the UK are important factors in shaping the children of immigrants' integration.

Immigration has a relatively short history in the United Kingdom, but has moved from an open to restrictive policy relatively quickly. Immigration began in 1948 with the arrival of Caribbean immigrants and was followed by immigration from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The influx of New Commonwealth migration was a result of the 1948 British Nationality Act that essentially provided colonial subjects with the same rights and privileges as British citizens. In response to the inflow of immigrants, the UK passed more restrictive immigration policies starting in 1962. The implementation of the restrictive policies introduced the concept of 'patriality', requiring potential immigrants to have at least on parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom in order to establish the right to live in the UK (Hansen 2000:195). Contemporary immigration policies continue to be governed by restrictive measures. In 2008, the UK implemented its first points-based system that applies to nationals of countries outside of the EU and EEA. The points system heavily favors skilled immigrants and students. Additionally, there are few preferences for family sponsorship and British citizens are not guaranteed the right to sponsor family members.

Since 1948, there has been a dramatic increase in the population of racial and ethnic minorities. The largest minority groups are South Asians and Blacks and they tend to settle in large urban areas. In addition, many immigrant groups tend to live closely with other coethnics in coethnic communities. Bangladeshis and Indians are the most likely to live in neighborhoods where coethnics comprise over one third of the population. The tendency for South Asian groups to live closely with other coethnics suggests that the children of immigrants may also be growing up with many other coethnics.

My results show that there is a positive effect between community education and educational attainment. Among South Asians, this effect is strongest among the first and 1.5 generations. This suggests that the educational composition of the coethnic community has a strong and positive effect for foreign-born children. As such, the coethnic community may be an important factor in adapting to the immigration experience and the conditions that are influenced by a restrictive immigration policy that does not preference family sponsorship, such as children's older age at arrival and family separation.

In addition to the immigration policy, the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the UK may also influence the children of immigrants' integration. In the UK, ethnic categories are a mix of panethnic, racial, and ethnic categories. When immigrants arrive in the UK, they are classified in racial and ethnic terms rather than by generation status. In turn, they are also subject to racial stereotypes and discrimination. Although the UK offers extensive anti-discrimination legislation, racial and ethnic disparities in occupation and education still persist. For minorities, the coethnic community may help alleviate some of these racial and ethnic disparities. My results show that there is a positive effect between

panethnic community education and educational attainment. This suggests that the educational composition of the panethnic community has a strong and positive effect for the educational attainment of minority children. As such, the panethnic community may be an important factor in alleviating the structural inequalities that minorities experience.

Aside from immigration policy and the racial and ethnic hierarchy, public attitudes toward immigration may also shape the children of immigrants' integration. Public attitudes are important because they can shape how immigrants are received by the host country and its members (Esses et al. 2002:71). In particular, public attitudes on immigration can affect policy outcomes vis-à-vis civil politics, such as lobbying, public protest, and elections (Gabel 1998:333). In addition, public opinion can indirectly shape those in office to support policies/views that are consistent with those of their constituents. In particular, Jennings and John (2009:848) found that in the UK when public opinion on immigration is strong, government officials and policymakers will respond by including immigration legislation in the Queen's Speech for the legislative agenda and policy outputs. Although I cannot directly assess the impact of public opinion on the children of immigrants' integration, the strong link between public opinion and policy reform suggests that when public opinions toward immigrants are negative, the children of immigrants' integration may be more difficult because policies may also be more restrictive.

In sum, this chapter points to several structural characteristics of the UK that may affect the children of immigrants' integration. The UK has one of the strictest immigration policies in the western world. The emphasis on skilled immigrants and students and the lack of preference for family sponsorship can create conditions that

make it difficult for immigrants' children to integrate to the UK. In addition, the racial and ethnic hierarchy creates long-term inequalities for immigrants' children as they are perceived and integrated as racial and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, strong and negative public attitudes toward immigrants may also affect the children of immigrants' integration. For instance, public attitudes on immigration shape policy outcomes. This suggests that negative public opinion on immigration may result in policy outcomes that are less sensitive to the needs of immigrants' children. My results point to the coethnic community as a possible resource in alleviating the challenges presented by harsh structural conditions in the UK.

Highest Comm	unity Education	Highest Comm	unity Income
Greece	2.667	Venezuela	22.313
China	2.227	Malawi	19.834
Ireland	2.190	US	19.483
Singapore	2.186	Norway	18.994
Fiji	2.118	New Zealand	18.067
Malaysia	2.010	Chile	17.931
Lowest Commu	nity Education	Lowest Commi	unity Income
Mexico	0.643	Slovakia	7.573
Slovakia	0.540	Nepal	7.481
Afghanistan	0.500	Afghanistan	7.267
Poland	0.453	Ecuador	6.981
Lithuania	0.391	Togo	5.450

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Community Education and Income in the UK

	Model 1	Model 2
Community		
Education	3.613***	3.565***
	(0.038)	(0.037)
Income	1.013***	1.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Group	. ,	
Educational Selectivity		1.179
		(0.171)
Gini		1.014**
		(0.004)
Political Stability		0.982
		(0.036)
Individual		× ,
Female		1.037**
		(0.013)
Age		1.003***
U		(0.001)
2+ generation		2.157***
(ref:1st/1.5 generation)		(0.135)
N-12((40		

Table 5.2: Odds Ratios of Community, Group, andIndividual Variables Predicting EducationalAttainment for 1/1.5, and 2+ Generations

N=126649

*** $P \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05 + p \leq .1$

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	Model 1	Model 2
Community		
Education	1.968***	
	(0.199)	
Income	1.055**	
	(0.021)	
Individual		
Female		0.645*
		(0.132)
Age		1.005
		(0.012)
1st generation		
1.5 generation		0.133***
-		(0.053)
Second generation		0.161***
(ref: 1st generation)		(0.059)
N=529		
***P≤.001 **p≤.01 *j	o≤.05 +p≤.1	

Table 5.3: Odds Ratios Predicting EducationalAttainment for 1st, 1.5, and 2nd GenerationSouth Asians

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	First Generation	1.5 Generation	Second Generation
Community			
Education	17.453***	1.735*	1.253+
	(8.959)	(0.393)	(0.157)
Income	0.967	1.108*	1.096***
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.030)
Individual			
Female	.099**	0.340+	0.814
	(0.086)	(0.191)	(0.228)
Age	0.878*	1.038	0.999
-	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Ν	146	129	254

Table 5.4: Odds Ratios Predicting Educational Attainment for Asians, by generation

***P<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

	Inner London	Outer London		
China	12	5		
Pakistan	9	3		
Bangladesh	7	1		
India	10	4		
Germany	7	1		
US	8	2		
South Africa	6	2		
Zimbabwe	6	2		
Congo	5	3		
Ghana	7	0		
Kenya	3	1		
Uganada	3	1		
Zambia	2	0		
Malawi	3	0		
Sudan	5	0		
Mauritius	5	0		
Jamaica	3	1		
Trinidad & Tobago	2	1		
Guyana	6	2		
Barbados	3	2		
Portugal	7	1		
Australia	7	2		
Sweden	7	0		
Malaysia	2	0		
Brazil	7	3		
Bulgaria	10	2		
Sri Lanka	7	3		
Denmark	7	1		
France	8	1		
Gambia	1	0		
Greece	9	3		
Italy	10	1		
Japan	11	4		
Morocco	4	1		
Norway	6	0		
Poland	11	1		
Singapore	3	1		
Slovakia	5	1		
Turkey	6	1		
Average	6.15	1.46		
Source: 2008-2009 Annual Population Survey				

 Table 5.5. Number of Coethnic Community Resources in Inner and Outer London

 by National Origin

Community 5.639*** Education 5.639^{***} (0.585) 1ncome 1.002 (0.009) Coethnic Resources (0.185) Medium (2-7) 1.335* 1.295 (0.185) (0.207) High (8-12) 1.122 0.726 (ref: low: 0-1)) (0.209) (0.180) Group Gini 1.013+ Gini 1.235** (0.007) Political Stability 1.235** (0.326) Individual (0.103) Female 0.682* (0.103) Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation .084*** (ref:2nd generation or higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)		Model 1	Model 2
Income (0.585) 1.002 (0.009) Coethnic ResourcesMedium (2-7) 1.335^* 1.295 (0.185) Medium (2-7) 1.335^* 1.295 (0.185) High (8-12) 1.122 0.726 $(ref: low: 0-1))$ Gini $1.013+$ (0.007) Gini $1.013+$ (0.007) Political Stability 1.235^{**} (0.099) Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326) Individual $$	Community		
Income 1.002 (0.009)Coethnic ResourcesMedium (2-7) 1.335^* 1.295 (0.185)(0.185)(0.207)High (8-12) 1.122 0.726 (ref: low: 0-1))(0.209)(0.180)GroupGini $1.013+$ (0.007)Political Stability 1.235^{**} (0.099)Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326)Individual 0.682^* (0.103)Female 0.682^* (0.007)Ist generation 0.84^{***} (ref: 2nd generation or higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)	Education		5.639***
$\begin{array}{c} (0.009)\\ \hline Coethnic Resources\\ Medium (2-7) & 1.335* & 1.295\\ & (0.185) & (0.207)\\ High (8-12) & 1.122 & 0.726\\ (ref: low: 0-1)) & (0.209) & (0.180)\\ \hline Group\\ Gini & 1.013+\\ & (0.007)\\ Political Stability & 1.235**\\ & (0.099)\\ Educational Selectivity & 1.242\\ & (0.326)\\ \hline Individual\\ Female & 0.682*\\ & (0.103)\\ Age & 1.003\\ & (0.007)\\ 1st generation & .084***\\ (ref: 2nd generation or\\ & higher)\\ 1.5 generation & 0.691\\ & (0.498)\\ \hline \end{array}$			(0.585)
Coethnic Resources Medium (2-7) 1.335^* 1.295 (0.185) (0.207) High (8-12) 1.122 0.726 (ref: low: 0-1)) (0.209) (0.180) Group Gini $1.013+$ Gini $1.013+$ (0.007) Political Stability 1.235^{**} (0.0099) Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326) Individual Female 0.682^* Female 0.682^* (0.103) Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation $.084^{***}$ (ref:2nd generation or higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498) 0.498 0.691	Income		1.002
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$			(0.009)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Coethnic Resources		
High (8-12) 1.122 0.726 (ref: low: 0-1)) (0.209) (0.180) Group $1.013+$ (0.007) Gini $1.235**$ (0.099) Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326) $Individual$ Female $0.682*$ (0.103) (0.007) Age 1.003 (0.007) $0.684***$ (ref:2nd generation or 0.691 $higher$) 0.691 (0.498)	Medium (2-7)	1.335*	1.295
$\begin{array}{c} (\text{ref: low: 0-1})) & (0.209) & (0.180) \\ \hline Group \\ \text{Gini} & 1.013+ \\ & (0.007) \\ \text{Political Stability} & 1.235^{**} \\ & (0.099) \\ \text{Educational Selectivity} & 1.242 \\ & (0.326) \\ \hline Individual \\ \text{Female} & 0.682^{*} \\ & (0.103) \\ \text{Age} & 1.003 \\ & (0.007) \\ \text{1st generation} & .084^{***} \\ (\text{ref:2nd generation or} \\ & higher) \\ 1.5 \text{ generation} & 0.691 \\ & (0.498) \\ \end{array}$		(0.185)	(0.207)
Group 1.013+ Gini 1.013+ (0.007) 1.235** Political Stability 1.235** (0.099) Educational Selectivity Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326) (0.326) Individual (0.103) Female 0.682* (0.103) (0.007) 1st generation .084**** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498) (0.498) (0.498)	High (8-12)	1.122	0.726
Gini $1.013+$ (0.007)Political Stability 1.235^{**} (0.099)Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326)Individual(0.326)Female 0.682^{*} (0.103)Age 1.003 (0.007)1st generation $.084^{***}$ (ref:2nd generation or higher)1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)	(ref: low: 0-1))	(0.209)	(0.180)
$\begin{array}{c} (0.007) \\ \text{Political Stability} & 1.235^{**} \\ (0.099) \\ \text{Educational Selectivity} & 1.242 \\ (0.326) \\ \hline \textit{Individual} \\ \text{Female} & 0.682^{*} \\ (0.103) \\ \text{Age} & 1.003 \\ (0.007) \\ 1 \text{st generation} & .084^{***} \\ (\text{ref:2nd generation or} \\ \text{higher}) \\ 1.5 \text{ generation} & 0.691 \\ (0.498) \end{array}$	Group		
Political Stability 1.235^{**} (0.099)Educational Selectivity 1.242 (0.326)Individual(0.326)Female 0.682^{*} (0.103)Age 1.003 (0.007)1st generation $.084^{***}$ (ref:2nd generation or higher)1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)	Gini		
$\begin{array}{c} (0.099) \\ \text{Educational Selectivity} & 1.242 \\ (0.326) \\ \hline \textit{Individual} \\ \text{Female} & 0.682* \\ (0.103) \\ \text{Age} & 1.003 \\ (0.007) \\ 1 \text{st generation} & .084*** \\ (\text{ref:2nd generation or} \\ \text{higher}) \\ 1.5 \text{ generation} & 0.691 \\ (0.498) \end{array}$			× /
Educational Selectivity 1.242 Individual (0.326) Female 0.682* (0.103) (0.103) Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation Ist generation or (0.042) higher) 0.691 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498) (0.498)	Political Stability		1.235**
(0.326) Individual Female 0.682* (0.103) Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation (0.042) higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)			
Individual 0.682* Female 0.682* (0.103) 1.003 Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation 1st generation or .084*** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 0.691 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498) 0.498	Educational Selectivity		
Female 0.682* (0.103) (0.003) Age 1.003 (0.007) (0.007) 1st generation .084*** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 0.691 1.5 generation (0.498)			(0.326)
Age (0.103) 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation .084*** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498) (0.498)			
Age 1.003 (0.007) 1st generation 1st generation or .084*** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 1.5 generation 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)	Female		
(0.007) 1st generation .084*** (ref:2nd generation or (0.042) higher) 0.691 (0.498) (0.498)			× /
1st generation.084***(ref:2nd generation or higher)(0.042)1.5 generation0.691 (0.498)	Age		
(ref:2nd generation or higher)(0.042)1.5 generation0.691 (0.498)			
higher) (0.042) 1.5 generation 0.691 (0.498)	•		.084***
higher) 0.691 (0.498) (0.498)	(ref:2nd generation or		(0.042)
(0.498)	e ,		× /
	1.5 generation		0.691
			(0.498)

Table 5.6: Odds Ratio of Coethnic Resources Predicting
Educational Attainment among 1, 1.5, and 2+ generations

N=1111

***P \leq .001 **p \leq .01 *p \leq .05 +p \leq .1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses Source: 2008-2009 Annual Population Survey

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Panethnic Community			
Education		3.549***	3.570***
		(0.242)	(0.244)
Income		1.014	1.014
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Individual			
Afro Caribbean	2.074***	1.335	1.473
	(0.383)	(0.313)	(0.360)
Black African	1.706***	1.161	1.185
	(0.219)	(0.174)	(0.177)
Chinese	1.354+	1.245	1.271
(ref: South Asian)	(0.221)	(0.215)	(0.222)
Female			0.765*
			(0.096)
Age			0.996
			(0.006)

Table 5.7: Odds Ratios Predicting Educational Attainment for Ethnic and Racial Minorities

N=1272

***P<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

Julie 2014	
Region of Immigrant	%
British Citizens	14%
EU citizens (excluding British citizens)	39%
Non-EU citizens	47%

Table 5.8: Immigration to the UK by region, June 2014

Source: Office of National Statistics (2014)

Tier	Description of Immigrant Category	Control Test
	Highly skilled individuals to contribute to growth and	Yes: English languge
Tier 1	productivity	and sufficient funds
		Yes: English languge
Tier 2	Skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in UK labor force	and sufficient funds
	Limited numbers of low skilled workers needed to fill specific	Yes: English languge
Tier 3	temporary labor shortages	and sufficient funds
		Yes: English languge
Tier 4	Students	and sufficient funds
	Youth mobility and temporary workers: people allowed to	
	work in the UK for a limited period of time to satisfy primarily	Yes: English languge
Tier 5	non-economic objectives	and sufficient funds
Source:	UK Government (2006:15-22)	

Qualifications	Previous Earnings	Age	Others
Bachelors: 30 points Masters: 35 points PhD: 50 points	£16-18: 5 points £18-20: 10 points £20-23: 15 points £23-26: 20 points £26-29: 25 points £29-32: 30 points £32-35: 35 points £35-40: 40 points £40+: 45 points	27 or under: 20 points 28 or 29: 10 points 30 or 31: 5 points	Where Previous Earnings of Qualification have been gained in the UKL 5 bonus points (max 5 in this category)

Table 5.10: Points Selection for Tier 1 Immigrants in the UK

Source: UK Government (2006:23)

Qualifications	Previous Earnings	Others	_
NVQ3: 5 points	£15-18: 5 points		_
Bachelors: 10 points	£18-19.5: 10 points £19.5-21: 15 points	Job Offer in shortage occupation	50 points
Masters: 10 points	£121+: 20 points	Job Offer passes Resident Labour	
PhD: 15 points	-	Market Test (if applicable)	30 points
		ICT-defined by 6 moth sprevious employment with the firm; minomum NVQ3 level job; salary	
		appropratio to the UK	50 points

Source: UK Government (2006:23)

Ethnic Crown	2009	% of Total	
Ethnic Group	Population	Population	
White: British	45,682,100	83.35	
White Irish	574,200	1.05	
White: Other White	1,932,600	3.53	
Black: Caribbean	615,200	1.12	
Black: African	798,800	1.46	
Black: Other	126,100	0.23	
Asian: Indian	1,434,200	2.62	
Asian: Pakistani	1,007,400	1.84	
Asian: Bangladeshi	392,200	0.72	
Chinese	451,500	0.82	
Asian: Other	385,700	0.7	
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean	310,600	0.57	
Mixed: White and Black African	131,800	0.24	
Mixed: White and Asian	301,600	0.55	
Mixed: Other Mixed	242,600		
Other	422,500		
Total	54,809,100		

Table 5.12: Size of Racial and Ethnic Groups in the UK, 2009

Source: Waters et al. (2013b:129)

	Primary or	Lower	Higher	Lower
	none	secondary	secondary	tertiary
British Ancestry	30.8	22.6	18.0	13.6
First generation				
African	8.9	20.5	18.8	17.9
Caribbean	55.7	21.1	7.6	8.1
Indian	37.2	28.9	9.5	5.9
Irish	41.5	25.2	8.5	5.6
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	50.9	29.7	8.8	4.8
West European	34.8	31.3	4.5	11.2
Second Generation				
Caribbean	26.2	30.0	24.0	9.0
Indian	14.0	192.0	24.2	13.6
Irish	23.4	24.6	20.8	14.0
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	24.3	28.0	28.0	3.7

Table 5.13: Highest Educational Qualification, by Ancestry and Generation: Men

Source: Cheung and Heath (2007:518)

	Economically	Other	Looking	Full-time	
	active	inactive	after home	student	Ν
British Ancestry	73.1	7.0	18.2	1.7	47313
First generation					
African	72.5	3.3	17.6	6.5	153
Caribbean	80.9	8.6	9.2	1.3	304
Indian	59.3	7.3	32.9	0.6	629
Irish	71.3	9.8	16.4	2.6	428
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	16.1	6.1	75.2	2.6	391
West European	69.1	5.3	19.3	6.3	414
Second Generation					
Caribbean	79.3	2.7	13.8	4.2	334
Indian	69.2	2.4	17.6	10.8	295
Irish	72.8	4.4	20.5	2.3	478
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	47.0	3.0	32.9	17.1	164

Table 5.14: Economic Activity, by Ancestry and Generation: Men

Source: Cheung and Heath (2007:520)





Figure 5.1: Public Attitudes Toward Immigration, 2013






Figure 5.3: Opposition to Immigration, UK and other countries, 2013

Source: Blinder (2014:6)




Figure 5.4: Perceived Costs/Benefits of Different Migrant Types, 2013

Source: Blinder (2014:7)

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The central research question of this dissertation was what are the factors that affect educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK? In particular, my dissertation focuses on the role of individual, community, group, and host country characteristics on educational attainment. In order to answer these questions, I analyzed individual, community, and group characteristics on educational attainment using comparative case studies in the US, Canada, and the UK.

My findings suggest that coethnic communities and several host country characteristics, such as immigration policy, language policies, and the level of friendliness toward immigrants and minorities (e.g., anti-discrimination policies) shape the integration of immigrants' children. My findings illustrated that for all three countries, coethnic communities, specifically the educational composition of coethnic communities, were beneficial for the children of immigrants' education. One possible explanation is that the US, Canada, and the UK all have policies that support racial and ethnic minorities, which may provide more institutional support for coethnic communities.

In addition, my findings illustrated that differences in immigration and language policies influenced the children of immigrants' education. In Canada and the UK, selective immigration policies that offer less family reunification than the US may delay the arrival of immigrant children to the host country. Immigrant children that arrive older have greater adjustment difficulties, such as lower educational outcomes and limited proficiency in the host language(s) (Busby and Corak 2014; Corak 2011; Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen 2012). In addition, the limited family reunification in Canada and the UK also means that the children of immigrants have smaller family networks. The smaller

family networks may lead immigrant children to rely on coethnic community members for assistance.

Furthermore, Canada and the UK place greater emphasis on the official language and provide less linguistic support for immigrant children with limited proficiency. For children that arrive older, there are limited linguistic resources in school to facilitate the adoption of the host country language(s). In turn, immigrant children in these two countries may rely more heavily on the coethnic community for linguistic assistance than immigrant children in the US.

The Children of Immigrants' Integration in Canada

Several institutional characteristics in Canada may shape the integration of immigrants and their children: immigration policy, official language policy, and the multicultural policy. Immigration reform in the 1960s shifted Canada's immigration policy from selecting heavily on ethnicity and national origin towards an explicit points system that screened and selected individuals with special skills or high education levels. In turn, the increasing emphasis on Canada's immigration policy may create several challenges for immigrants and their children (Kaushal and Lu 2014). First, although immigrants are highly selected, they do not fill jobs that are commensurate with their education and skills and may have lower wages (A. G. Green and D. A. Green 1995). Second, a selective immigration policy that offers few preferences for family reunification may also delay the arrival of immigrant children. Immigrant children that arrive older are a greater risk of dropping out of high school because of their limited host country language proficiency and unfamiliarity with the Canadian school system (Busby

and Corak 2014; Heath and Kilpi-Jakonen 2012). The coethnic community positively affects educational attainment and thus, may help alleviate some of these challenges.

In addition to the immigration policy, language policy may also affect the children of immigrants' education. Canada has two official language policy—English and French—which can create some challenges for immigrant children for learning the official language. In particular, there are few linguistic resources for immigrant children, particularly in schools. In turn, their inability to be bilingual (English/French and immigrant language) creates yet another challenge as bilingual children have greater educational outcomes.

Another institutional characteristic of Canada is the multicultural policy. Canada's multicultural policy aims to promote cultural diversity and provide individuals with the freedom to celebrate one's own ethnic heritage. The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* states several ways to achieve these goals: offer support for immigrant communities; eliminate barriers to participation; and facilitate the acquisition and retention of all languages. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether multiculturalism has achieved its intended goals.

First, my findings show that the presence of a multicultural policy in Canada does not show a large difference in community resources when compared with the UK, a country without a multicultural policy. Second, the Canadian government has identified visible minorities as a target group for government regulated business to improve the employment opportunities for racial and ethnic minorities in the *Employment Equity Act* of 1986. However, black men and immigrants that are visible minorities consistently experience wage inequalities compared with non-visible minorities in Canada (review in

Abada, Hou, and Ram 2009; Hum and Simpson 1999). In general, the category of visible minorities is rather toothless and unproductive for combating racial discrimination in other arenas of social and institutional life in Canada.

A third objective of the multicultural policy is to facilitate the acquisition and retention of all languages. However, my findings show that there are lower levels of bilingualism in an immigrant language and an official language compared with the US, a country without a multicultural policy. In general, there are few linguistic resources to facilitate the immigrant language. Schools tend to provide instruction in one official language and provide courses in the other official language as an elective course (Li 2006). Therefore, this suggests that Canada's multicultural policy may be more symbolic and less influential for the children of immigrants' integration.

The Children of Immigrants' Integration in the US

Several institutional characteristics in the US may shape the integration of immigrants' children: immigration policy, racial and ethnic hierarchy, and public opinion. Since 1965, the US has adopted an immigration policy that preferences family reunification. Family reunification policies facilitate the integration of immigrants' children as immigrants and their children have an extended kin network, which positively affects childrens' educational attainment. My findings suggest that the sponsorship of immediate and extended family kin may contribute to the development of coethnic communities and positively shapes childrens' educational attainment. In addition to immigrants and their children. Immigrants and their children arriving in the US are subject to racial stereotypes and discrimination regardless of their national origin. The racial and ethnic hierarchy creates unequal access to socioeconomic mobility, such as occupational status, educational attainment, and income. In particular, these outcomes are differentiated by race/ethnicity in which blacks and Latinos have the worst outcomes whereas whites consistently show the greatest outcomes. My findings show that the coethnic community helps alleviate some of these disparities along racial and ethnic lines. Thus, the coethnic community may be an important factor in alleviating the structural inequalities experienced by the children of immigrants and minorities in the US.

In addition, public attitudes toward immigration may also shape immigrant integration via immigration policies. My findings show an association between public attitudes and immigrant policies; when public attitudes are pro-immigrant, immigration legislation tends to be more expansionist. However, when public attitudes are more negative towards immigration, immigration legislation also tends to be more restrictive. Thus, this suggests that public attitudes may affect immigrant integration because immigrants and their children may face policies that are less attuned to the needs of immigrants and their children.

The Children of Immigrants' Integration in the UK

There are several institutional characteristics in the UK that may shape the integration of immigrants' children: immigration policy, racial and ethnic hierarchy, and negative public opinion toward immigration. The United Kingdom has a relatively short immigration history in which contemporary immigrants arrived in 1948. Immigration policy shifted from a relatively open policy that provided colonial subjects from the Old and New Commonwealth with the same rights and privileges as British citizens. In the 1960s, the UK passed restrictive immigration policies that required potential immigrants

to have at least one parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom to establish the right to live in the UK. Today, the UK has one of the strictest immigration policies and immigrants are not guaranteed the right to family sponsorship. For the New Commonwealth groups, they experienced some separation from family members and thus, immigrant children have some disadvantages. My findings show that the coethnic community has a strong effect on the educational attainment of the first and 1.5 generations. Thus, the coethnic community may be an important factor in adapting to the immigration experience that is influenced by a restrictive immigration policy that does not preference family sponsorship.

Additionally, the racial and ethnic hierarchy in the UK may influence the children of immigrants' integration. Although the UK offers extensive anti-discrimination legislation, racial and ethnic disparities in occupation and education persist. My findings show that for minorities, the coethnic community may help alleviate some of these racial and ethnic disparities. In addition, public attitudes toward immigration in the UK may shape the integration experience of immigrants' children. Public attitudes in the UK are very negative in which 77 percent of the population feels that there are too many immigrants. The strong anti-immigrant context can negatively affect the integration of immigrants and their children. When public attitudes are negative, government officials and policymakers respond by including immigrant legislation in the legislative agenda for policy outputs. Although I cannot directly assess the impact of public opinion on the children of immigrants' integration, the strong link between public and policy reform suggests that when public opinion towards immigration are negative, the children of

immigrants' integration may be more difficult because policies may also be more restrictive.

Contributions to the Literature

This dissertation contributes to sociological research in several ways. First, it furthers our understanding of a longstanding concern in social science and education research— ethnic and immigrant variation in educational attainment— by examining several levels of factors. Individual (review in Kao and Thompson 2003), community (Bygren and Szulkin 2010; Gronqvist 2006), and group factors (Feliciano 2005, 2006; Levels et al. 2008) are significant predictors of educational attainment, but the three levels have not been examined together. The most comprehensive studies have examined two levels of factors. For instance, Bygren and Szulkin (2010) and Gronqvist (2006) examined individual and community factors on educational attainment and Feliciano (2005, 2006) and Levels et al. (2008) examined individual and group characteristics on academic performance. Thereby, a systematic analysis of individual, community, and group factors together can elucidate the role of these factors on educational disparities and the educational attainment process more generally. My dissertation systematically examines individual, group, and community factors on the children of immigrants' educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK.

Second, my dissertation contributes to our knowledge of the coethnic community's role on educational attainment. In general, community effects have been understudied and underconceptualized. For instance, community education and income have only been examined qualitatively and it is unknown whether community effects on educational attainment are generalizable in the US or across countries (Gibson 1988;

Zhou and Bankston 1998). To date, the most comprehensive study quantitatively examined community education and size on second generation educational attainment in Sweden (Bygren and Szulkin 2010). However, the findings are limited to the immigrant groups and institutional context of Sweden, which differs considerably from that of other immigrant receiving countries. Thus, my crossnational study informs our knowledge of community effects by showing that community education is a positive predictor of educational attainment among the children of immigrants in the US, Canada, and the UK.

In particular, my dissertation contributes to our understanding of the underlying processes of the coethnic community that facilitate children's education. Most ethnographic accounts of the coethnic community have attributed the positive effects of the coethnic community to social capital (Portes 1998), such as coethnic neighbors that supervise children (Zhou and Bankston 1998) and coethnics setting high aspirations for their children (Gibson 1988). My dissertation expands on these explanations that emphasize networks and social capital. My dissertation suggests that the coethnic community may be an important part of integration process, especially when there is limited family networks and limited linguistic assistance. In particular, the coethnic community, specifically an educated community may facilitate with learning the host country language and adjusting to the schooling system in the host country.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation is the first to examine individual, coethnic community, and group characteristics on educational attainment in the US, Canada, and the UK. In order to retrieve data with these different levels of factors (e.g., individual, community, and group) for a large number of individuals, I selected non-public data sources from the US,

Canada, and the UK. However, due to the sensitive nature of the data, they could not be merged and thus, the analyses were conducted on three separate surveys in the US, Canada, and the UK. Ideally, the data would be included in one data set to truly understand the differences across the three countries.

There are also several limitations associated with the size and specific information that is available in each data source. For instance, the comparative analyses combine the second generation with other third and later generation native-borns. Of course, there are differences between the second generation and they have shown to be in a particularly advantaged position relative to the first and third generations (Kao and Tienda 1995). In addition, the comparative analyses do not control for parent's education, the most important predictor of educational attainment. This could suggest that the role of the coethnic community may not be as strong as my analyses show. In addition, the sample size for the US data is considerably smaller than Canada and the UK. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain whether some insignificant effects (e.g., community income) are a result of the smaller size.

My research also creates new questions about the coethnic community and the children of immigrants' integration experiences in other countries. Further research may address how the coethnic community matters in other immigrant-receiving countries. An obvious case is Australia, which is the second largest immigrant-receiving country, and also has a selective immigration policy and implements a points system. Other country selections would be France and Germany that have significant immigrant populations but have little recognition for racial and ethnic minorities, highly unequal education systems with tracking, and few preferences for family reunification (Waters et al. 2013).

Future research should examine how immigration policies may affect immigrant children's age at arrival. A more comprehensive study of several host countries with different immigration policies may help to confirm the relationship between a selective immigration policy and age at arrival. In addition, in-depth interviews with immigrant parents and school personnel in different countries could provide greater insight into how immigrant children deal with a later age at arrival and gaining proficiency in the host country language.

Methodological Appendix

My dissertation constructs community and group variables using different data sources and appends the variables to individuals in nationally representative surveys for the US, Canada, and the UK. For each country, I need data at three levels—individual, community, and group. Since each data set contains slightly different information, the analyses are not identical and some of the variables are coded differently. Below, I discuss how each of the main dependent and independent variables were created. This is also summarized in Appendix Table 1. In Appendix Tables 2 to 5, I provide descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the analyses for Chapters 3 to 5.

Educational Attainment

In Chapters 2 to 4, I examine college attainment defined as a college degree or more compared with less than a college degree. In Chapter 5, I examine educational attainment measured as less than a high school degree, high school degree, and college degree or more.

Coethnic Community Education

Community education is the average education of individuals from the same country of birth aged 25 or older, living in the same census tract (for the US and Canada) and lower layer Super Output Area (for the UK). For all individuals where parent's country of birth is available (first, 1.5, and second generations), coethnics will share the same country of birth as a respondent's mother or father if mother's information is not available. For individuals that are third generation, the coethnic community will be the average education of third generation native-borns aged 25 or older living in the same

census tract or SOA. Therefore, a third generation community is supposed to represent the mainstream society (e.g., native-born Whites).

Coethnic Community Income

Community income is the average income of individuals from the same country of birth aged 25 or older, living in the same census tract (for the US and Canada) and lower layer Super Output Area (for the UK). For all individuals where parent's country of birth is available (first, 1.5, and second generations), coethnics will share the same country of birth as a respondent's mother or father if mother's information is not available. For individuals that are third generation, the coethnic community will be the average income of third generation native-borns aged 25 or older living in the same census tract or SOA. *Generation Status*

The data sets provide different information about time of arrival and migration history so generation status is coded differently for the chapters. In chapter 2, the comparative chapter, generation status is coded as the first generation (any individuals born abroad and completed their highest degree in the host country) and the second or higher generation (native-born individuals that completed their highest degree in the host country). Generation status is combined in this way primarily because the UK does not distinguish the second generation from the third generation. In addition, Sensitive GSS data does not provide any information on age at arrival to distinguish the 1.5 generation. I adopted this operationalization of generation status to accommodate the different information in each data set and to make the models as similar as possible. In the Canadian (Chapter 3) and US (Chapter 4) analyses, the 1.5 and second generations in the are analyzed as a single category and the first generation are the reference group. In the UK analysis (Chapter 5), the 1.5 and second generations are analyzed as separate categories and the 1.5 generation is the reference category.

Coethnic Resources

Studies interested in coethnic resources have examined different dimensions of the community, such as the use of and participation in local institutions (review in Keller 1968; Smith 1974:144). Data on coethnic resources is usually collected through selfevaluated scales, although this is not widely available in survey data.

Instead, one way to measure coethnic resources is by examining the ethnic institutions available to community members. Portes and Manning (2005:158) found that immigrants relied on ethnic organizations, such as credit associations and mutual aid societies. In particular, measuring coethnic organizations can provide information on how well organized the community is by showing how many services a community can provide for its members (Breton 1964:194). To examine coethnic resources, it would be ideal to have information at the local level (community) and larger levels (city) to capture smaller and larger institutions. However, this data does not exist.

Instead, I create a measure for coethnic resources by using documentary research on the internet. I coded 17 different dimensions of coethnic communities in the six major CMA (Census Metropolitan Area) in Canada and in Inner and Outer London in the UK. The dimensions capture the resources available to community members, which can range in type (i.e., political, social, religious, etc.). Some examples of these dimensions include the presence of ethnic schools, ethnic churches, Consulates General, ethnic town, ethnic retirement home, etc. The different dimensions used are presented in Appendix Table 1. For each dimension, I create a dichotomous variable of whether it is available in the city or not. The idea was to capture the different types of resources available in coethnic communities by examining different institutions in the city. One limitation of this approach is that it does not capture more informal institutions that do not have their information on the internet.

Then, I attached these dimensions to individuals in the EDS and APS that shared the same national origin and lived in the same geographic area. To create the coethnic resources variable, I summed the total number of coethnic resources for each national origin group in each city. The number of resources ranges from 0 to 18. I code the coethnic resources variable as a categorical variable: low (0-9), medium (10-12), and high (13-17). I also tried coding coethnic resources as a series of scales. I conducted a factor analysis to test which of these variables loaded highly together. I tried 18 different combinations of scales and only one was significant in the analyses (the presence of ethnic arts and the presence of a consulates-general in the city).

In the UK, I coded the coethnic resources variables for several groups in Inner and Outer London. I also tried coding coethnic resources by metropolitan area/city (e.g., London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, etc.), but there were not enough individuals from different national backgrounds in each city. Immigrants and their children were predominantly concentrated in London.

Group Characteristics

Group characteristics are coded in the same way for each country. Educational selectivity for the US is coded using Feliciano's (2005, 2006) published measures. I replicate Feliciano's (2005, 2006) method to code educational selectivity for Canada and the UK. Political stability and economic inequality are coded in the same way for each

country. Political stability is coded using Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 ranking a country's perceived chance of being overthrown) (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) (Kaufmann et al. 2005). Economic inequality is coded using the World Bank's estimate of Gini coefficients (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?). A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality and a Gini coefficient of 100 represents maximal inequality in a country. Thus, the higher the Gini coefficient, the greater the inequality in a country.

Father's Education

For Chapters 3 and 4, I include a measure for father's education. In both chapters, father's education is coded as an ordinal variable with three categories, less than a high school degree (reference category), high school degree, and college or more. Father's education is omitted from Chapters 2 and 5 because the information is not available in the APS. However, I show in Chapters 3 and 4 that father's education has a positive effect on college attainment but community education remains significant even after father's education is included in the equation.

Individual Controls

Individual characteristics such as female and age are coded the same for each country. In Chapter 3, I include two additional individual level controls: region and biological parents. Region is a dichotomous variable for Quebec versus all other English-speaking regions. Biological parents is a dummy variable for whether an individual grew up with both biological parents or some other family arrangement as the reference group. *Logistic Regression Analysis*

My dissertation uses logistic and ordinal logistic regression analyses to examine the effects of individual, community, and group level effects on college attainment. These models are estimated and analyzed with the statistical package, Stata 13. I also analyzed the data using multilevel regression but there is little difference in the results between the two regression methods. Logistic regression is a better fit for this project for three reasons. First, survey weights—which are applied to make the data nationally representative cannot be analyzed with multilevel regression in Stata. Second, the rationale for using multilevel regression is to account for individuals that may be clustered in communities or groups, but survey weights can account for this. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 use logistic regression analysis to examine college attainment whereas Chapter 5 uses ordinal logistic regression analysis to examine educational attainment (less than high school, high school degree, and college or more). In separate analyses, I also analyzed the data with the dichotomous outcome (college degree or more versus less than college). In separate analyses, I have examined college attainment for the UK, which were similar to the analyses analyzing college attainment. However, the results have not been vetted and remain in the secure data lab in the UK.

Omitted Variable Bias

Endogeneity

One limitation of my analysis is the cross-sectional nature of the data, which does not allow me to make strong empirical claims about the causal direction of coethnic communities and educational attainment (Fleischmann 2011:419; Fleischmann 2012). As with all neighborhood studies, I cannot be certain whether living in a census tract or SOA

with a large number of educated coethnics is associated with greater odds of college attainment and/or educational attainment as is suggested by literature on immigration or whether these results are due to a selection process in which highly educated coethnics tend to settle together in the same neighborhoods. Omitted variable bias refers to omitted variables that select individuals with certain characteristics into specific tracts or SOAs and thus cause a spurious association between coethnic education and higher rates of college completion. Omitted variable bias is a risk that is associated with all neighborhood studies (Fleischmann 2011:419). While I cannot rule out that the association between community education and college attainment is partly driven by omitted variables, it is not very likely. It is unlikely that educated coethnics will select themselves into neighborhoods with more educated coethnics than in neighborhoods with less educated coethnics (Alba and Denton 2004).

Appendix Table 1: Dimensions of Coethnic Resources in Canada and the UK

Characteristics of Coethnic Resources Coethnic newspapers Coethnic language schools Coethnic church **Coethnic Businesses** Coethnic Phonebook (hard copy) Coethnic museums Coethnic arts Coethnic chamber of commerce Coethnic medical centers Consulates-general Coethnic hometown associations Coethnic cultural society Coethnic University alumni organizations Coethnic Town Immigration services/organizations Coethnic Charitable foundations

Source: Author's Documentary Research

	Chapter 2:			
	Comparative (US,			
	Canada, UK)	Chapter 3: Canada	Chapter 4: US	Chapter 5: UK
Dependent Variable				
	College degree or more; reference group	College degree or more; reference group	College degree or more; reference group	Ordinal variable: less than high school degre,
Educational	is less than college	is less than college	is less than college	high school degree,
Attainment	degree	degree	degree	college or more
Independent Variable				
Coethnic Community				
	Average education of	Average education of	Average education of	Average education of
	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+
	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census
Community Eduation	tract	tract	tract	tract
	Average income of	Average income of	Average income of	Average income of
	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+	immigrants age 25+
	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census	from same country of origin in the census
Community Income	tract	tract	tract	tract

Appendix Table 2: Coding of Independent and Dependent Variables by Chapter

*Community Education and Income are the averages of individuals that are native-born, third generation or higher living in the same tract or SOA

		Coded 17 dimensions of coethnic resources for each group in 6		Coded 17 dimensions of coethnic resources for each group in Inner
Coethnic Resources	NA	major CMAs	NA	and Outer London
National Origin Group				
Educational Selectivity	Difference between the average group education between immigrants in the destination country and non-migrants in	Difference between the average group education between immigrants in the destination country and non-migrants in the origin country	Difference between the average group education between immigrants in the destination country and non-migrants in the origin country;	Difference between the average group education between immigrants in the destination country and non-migrants in the origin country
Educational Selectivity	the origin country	the origin country	the origin country,	the origin country
Economic Inequality	Gini Scores ranging from 0 to 100	Gini Scores ranging from 0 to 100	Gini Scores ranging from 0 to 100	Gini Scores ranging from 0 to 100
Political Stability	Scale ranging from - 2.5 to 2.5	Scale ranging from - 2.5 to 2.5	Scale ranging from - 2.5 to 2.5	Scale ranging from - 2.5 to 2.5

Individual		Ordinal variable: less than high school (reference), high school, college or	Ordinal variable: less than high school (reference), high school, college or	
Father's Education	NA	more	more	NA
Generation Status	1 and 2+ generations (ref: 1st generation)	1, 1.5, and 2nd generation (ref: 1st generation)	1, 2, and 3rd generations (ref: 3rd generation)	1 and 2+ generations (ref: 1st generation)
Female	Dichotomous variable with males as reference category	Dichotomous variable with males as reference category	Dichotomous variable with males as reference category	Dichotomous variable with males as reference category
Age	Continuous (age restricted to 25-65)	Continuous (age restricted to 25-65)	Continuous (age restricted to 25-65)	Continuous (age restricted to 25-65)
Region (Quebec)	NA	Dichotomous: Quebec versus other regions as reference category	NA	NA
		Dichotomous: Grew up with both biological parents versus other family arrangement as		
Biological Parents	NA	reference	NA	NA

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	
Dependent Variable				
College attainment	Х	0	1	
Independent Variables				
Community Education	Х	Х	Х	
Community Income	Х	Х	Х	
Coethnic Resources	Х	0	17	
Educational Selectivity	Х	0.249	0.833	
GINI	Х	22.8	51.6	
Political Stability	Х	-1.046	-0.884	
Dad's Education	Х	0	2	
Biological Parents	Х	0	1	
Female	Х	0	1	
Age	Х	25	64	
Region (Quebec)	Х	0	1	
Generational status	Х	0	2	
Bilingual	Х	0	1	
Visible Minority	Х	0	1	

Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables that Were Used for Canada

Source: 2002 Ethnic Diversity Study

	Immigrants	Second Generation	<u>Third</u> <u>Generation</u>	Min	Max
Educational Attainment					
Mean education (3 categories)	0.858	1.124	1.267	0	2
	(0.084)	(0.122)	(0.019)		
Community					
Community Education	11.81	13.653	13.78	1	12
	(0.438)	(0.512)	(0.049)		
Community Income	10.63	11.135	11.378	0	12
	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.025)		
Group					
Gini	43.9	41.844	41	25	52
	(0.555)	(1.186)	0		
Political Stability	0.331	0.042	0.452	-1.42	0.954
	(0.056)	(0.105)	(0)		
Educational Selectivity	0.354	0.332	0	-0.064	0.858
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0)		
Individual					
Female	0.455	0.581	0.544	0	1
	(0.051)	(0.078)	(0.016)		
Age	39.48	39.61	44.96	25	65
	(0.927)	(1.921)	(0.36)		
Father's Education	0.541	0.487	0.929	0	2
	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.022)		
N	127	56	1376		

Appendix Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables that Were Used for the US

Source: 2006 General Social Survey

	Full Sample				
	1st generation	<u>1.5</u> generation	<u>2+</u> generation	Min	Max
Educational Attainment					
Mean education (4 categories)	1.012	1.825	1.558	0	3
	(0.022)	(0.075)	(0.004)		
Mean education (3 categories)	0.652	1.222	1.079	0	2
	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.003)		
Community	. ,				
Community Education	1.103	1.542	1.635	0	3
-	(0.021)	(0.065)	(0.003)		
Community Income	12.668	13.531	13.874	0	742
2	(0.151)	(0.390)	(0.036)		
Group					
Gini	37.444	36.143	36.000	19	59
	(0.162)	(0.589)	-		
Political Stability	(0.074)	0.009	0.979	-3	1
	(0.016)	(0.067)	-		
Educational Selectivity	0.342	0.323	0.000	0	1
	(0.004)	(0.011)			
Individual					
Female	50.751	48.107	49.790	0	1
Age	37.960	41.047	44.100	25	65
	(0.160)	(0.660)	(0.040)		
Ν	4742	383	121524		

Appendix Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables that Were Used for the UK

Bangladeshi, Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis 1.5 2nd <u>1st generation</u> <u>generation</u> <u>generation</u> Min Max Educational Attainment Mean education (4 categories) 2.613 1.746 1.828 0 3 (0.101) (0.123)(0.091)Mean education (3 categories) 1.740 1.158 1.203 0 2 (0.067) (0.079) (0.059) Community **Community Education** 2.303 1.433 0.968 0 3 (0.115)(0.134)(0.088)**Community Income** 48 18.762 10.550 9.740 1 (0.947) (0.547)(0.747)Individual Female 26.134 47.351 56.163 0 1 Age 35.672 40.560 32.910 (0.041)(1.012)(0.461)25 65 146 129 254 Ν

Source: 2008-2009 Annual Population Survey

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