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Divided Brazil? An analysis of Brazilian's political attitude

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

in

Latin American Studies

by

Raduan Eugenio Hussak van Velthem Meira

Committee in charge:

Professor Scott Desposato, Chair
Professor Seth Hill
Professor Luis Martin-Cabrera

2019

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Chair

University of California San Diego

2019

DEDICATION

I want to dedicate this thesis to my family. My mom and dad – Lucia and Márcio – and my two siblings – Maiani and Iori. Their support was immeasurable and I hope I can repaid it someday.

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Divided Brazil? An analysis of Brazilian's political attitude

by

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Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

University of California San Diego, 2019

Professor Scott Desposato, Chair

The sense of division within Brazilian society is widespread. 2018 election was widely considered the most virulent election in Brazil since redemocratization. The phenomenon of a polarizing Brazil is at odd with Brazilian political elite that is known to have weak relations with the public. For this reason, the established Brazilian political institutions are not develop to be effective poles representing this polarization. The statistical analysis of several panel data indicate that Brazilians are not polarized and gave little relevance to ideology and parties. These results indicate, on one side, the importance of poles to the manifestation of political ideas by the public. On the other side, demonstrate that the narrative that Brazilian society is polarized is false. An alternative answer for Brazilian current political reality that we explore is a change in

the country Social Movement Sector (SMS). As a historical analysis and interview with members of the political elite indicate, the massive protests in June 2013 do not promote the polarization, but the rise of new interest groups and social movements. June 2013 protests generate the rise of new interest group and social movements disassociate with Brazilian established left. These new group galvanize new individual to act politically in favor of a conservative and libertarian agenda, enlarging the scope of topics disputing Brazilian politics and creating a sensation of a more widespread division within the Brazilian society.

Chapter 1

Introduction

It was a hot day in *Bangu*, a working-class neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro. It was late September 2018, no more than three weeks before the first round of the Brazilian elections. I was interviewing interviewee #28, which was a candidate for a seat at the state legislative¹. Interviewee #28 was not running for one of the prominent and relevant Brazilian parties, just another one among the overwhelmed quantity of parties in the country². In many ways, interviewee #28 is the opposite of what usually thought to be a member of the political or economic elite. She owns a small business and had slim chances of being elected. When asked about the polarization in the country and what would be its poles, interviewee #28 was emphatic that the poles were the “new” and the “old” without further explanation as if it was obvious what she meant.

The “new” and the “old” are, in fact, far from obvious. Brazilian democracy is recent and not based on strong parties. There are neither efficient political mechanisms to inform and provide political knowledge nor long-established political identities that can generate informational cues. Nevertheless, in October, Brazil saw the meteoric rise of the new. Bolsonaro won the presidency and his party – Social Liberal Party (PSL) – suddenly becomes one of the biggest parties in a chronically fragmented Congress. Interviewee #28 does not necessarily mean Bolsonaro as the “new” but he, factually, is.

One recurrent explanation to the rise of Bolsonaro is considering it as the culmination

¹Female pronouns will address all the interviewees as one of the ways to preserve their identity

²There are 35 officially registered parties in Brazil

of a sequence of turbulent events that begin with the impressive and unexpected riots in June 2013. After a bus fare rise in some cities, Brazilians took the streets in shocking numbers. These manifestations have cornered the political elite. President Dilma's, from the Workers' Party (PT), approval ratings plummeted in such a way that she never recovered.

Subsequently, there was a very bitter presidential election in 2014. Dilma manages to narrowly win this election by dismissing all the narratives of the country being suffering from an economic crisis. Just after the election, however, Dilma recognizes the economic fragility, and, going against her campaign promises, she begins to promote conservative economic policies in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. Her policy change fits well the typology defined by Kitschelt et al. (2010) of a government with a low consistency between preelectoral programmatic appeals and postelectoral policies and weak performance of government policy. The consequence was not only affecting Brazilian programmatic party structuration (PPS) but, as well, the entire Brazilian political system.

After 2014's election, in consequence, the country witnessed another round of massive manifestations, in 2015 and 2016, which were either in favor or against president Dilma's impeachment. The protests generate a narrative of a divided country represented by the ones using green and yellow, Brazil's flag colors, which were in favor of the impeachment. On the other side, wearing red, PT's color, was the ones protesting in favor of the government. The antagonism persists even after Dilma's impeachment in 2016. The idea of these two groups – derogatory known as *coxinhas*³, and *mortadelas*⁴, respectively – have entered the collective consciousness.

These events have put Brazil under significant political turbulence. The country saw a wave of new politicians, parties, and organizations winning elections in 2018. These groups, in general, affiliate themselves with conservative and libertarian ideas, elect big caucus in congress,

³Coxinha is a Brazilian pastry, usually filled with chicken, that also used as a derogatory expression to designate upper-class, posh individuals

⁴Mortadela means Bologna sausage. It was coined due to usual practice to provide a bologna sandwich to PT's members during protests

governors in important states, notably Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. However, nothing was more decisive than Bolsonaro presidential victory. The rise of the new.

The new political wave under Bolsonaro has an important characteristic. It is a new political force that is rising against Brazilian political establishment, which, historically, has champion an accommodating politics that avoid strong dissent and cleavage. The new that is burgeoning stresses the dissent and favors political polarization. Hence, it is worth to understand Brazil's political scenario more than ever. This thesis seeks to contribute to understanding this novelty and the foundations that make possible its rise.

This thesis focus, then, in evaluating two phenomena in Brazilian politics. First, the rise of new interest groups and social movements in Brazil. We analyze what is the political opportunity (Meyer, 2004) that those new political actors have to the generation of this Brazil's political reality. We also address the informational mechanism of the protests and its consequence for these new groups.

Second, whether the Brazilian society has become more polarized or not. We do a statistical analysis using several panel datasets to do these evaluation. Hence, in order to evaluate the current political reality in Brazil, this thesis is based on two ideas: political opportunity and polarization.

We argue that the rise of these new groups has an essential impact on the generation of the current zeitgeist that Brazilian society is deeply divided. We explore how the rise of conservative social movements have changed the Social Movement Sector (SMS) (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) in the country. These groups are disruptive by rejecting the PT and the left while being unwilling to cooperate with the other traditional parties, since the latter have no history of significant connections with society's organized groups. We explore how the protests in June 2013 generate the political opportunity for these groups to arise and being crucial actors in subsequent events like Dilma's impeachment.

We show, as well, that that Brazilian society has not polarized in all the topics we address in this thesis, but Lula. We explore polarization in several ways, underscoring its relation to

ideology, partisanship. We also explore it concerning charismatic leaders, especially former president Lula, the most prominent Brazilian politician since democratization. The results indicate that ideology is not a relevant heuristic to the Brazilian public. Also, the attachment of the public and the Brazilian most important party, PT, have weakened (cf. Samuels and Zucco, 2018), Antipartisanship, on the other hand, has an increase. Finally, there is some polarizing evaluation of the PT's presidents, Dilma and Lula, which we considered evidence of the existence of lulismo as a political force in Brazilian society characterized by political identities and preferences go around Lula's figure.

1.1 Puzzles

This thesis effort to understand Brazil's current political reality is centered around two puzzles. The first is how conservative organizations found the political opportunity to arise in Brazil. The mere appearance of conservative social movements is not remarkable. Many have appeared around the world in recent years. Brazil's context, however, is a significant direr environment for these groups to burgeon.

The Tea Party, for example, begun in a context that exists many interest groups that facilitate the rise of the Tea Party like FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity (Williamson et al., 2011). More importantly, the GOP exists. The existence of a conservative party is crucial because it could naturally accommodate Tea Party efforts to mobilize, to pressure through external and internal lobby, and, eventually, to run candidates affiliated with the organization.

In Brazil, however, none of these facilitating mechanisms exist. Society's interest groups, as a whole, suffered from the repression during the military dictatorship, which hindered any social organizations, even conservatives. After democratization, most Brazilian associate the right and conservative ideas with the dictatorship and backward ideas (Power, 2010). A label that many politicians wanted to avoid, defining themselves as in the center. Finally, the Brazilian weak party system is particularly weak in its relation with the public. Hence, new conservative social

movements have difficulty to find an institutional organization that could represent their interests. In consequence, the political opportunity for the emergence of conservative organizations in Brazil is not trivial.

The second puzzle is how Brazil could be polarized. Once again, polarization is far from being an outstanding event. The research on polarization in the United States, for example, is comprehensive. There is a prolific debate to evaluate whether Americans are polarized by having more radical ideas or being more sorted around party lines. One important characteristic of these debates is that they are based on the assumption of strong and ideological parties that are fundamental heuristics in which individuals define their political preferences and identities.

The critical assumption in consolidated democracies of having institutionalized, ideological parties is not the case in Brazil. The country is known for a fragmented Congress with a myriad of catchall parties (Mainwaring, 1999). Also, the Brazilian political elite focus on promoting accommodation and consensus to guarantee access to pork as much as possible. In other words, the political elite does not promote, nor get benefits from promoting a stronger cleavage within the public. Hence, if the country has become consistently polarized, it would indicate a situation of polarization without poles.

1.2 Our argument

The emergence of new interest groups and polarization are two of the most debated issues on current Brazilian politics. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic research trying to analyze the two phenomena and the relation between them. The recurrent narrative is that the polarizing society gave leveraged to the rise of the new groups which, ultimately, led to Bolsonaro's victory.

The results presented in this thesis indicate the lack of a strong and consistent polarization shows that this narrative is false. The data presents that Brazilians have become polarized only on their view toward presidents Lula and Dilma. Parties and ideology are mostly irrelevant. This

result challenges the narrative that Brazil's public polarization is the reason for of a significant polarization of the country resulting in the creation of these new political groups. Even the polarizing opinion on Lula cannot account for the creation of the interest groups. The lulismo base is the Northeast region of the country, while the groups originate in the South and Southeast regions of the country.

The fact that the rise of the groups is unrelated to polarization does not mean it is unrelated to PT and Lula. The rise of the groups is strongly associated with the increase of the antipetismo⁵. The economic crisis, after 2010, and changes in the party have weakened petismo while generating the necessary narrative for these groups to mobilize individuals and create a brand, strengthening the antipetismo.

The sensation of a deeply divided society, therefore, does not derive from Brazilians becoming more polarized. On aggregate, Brazilians are not more divergent today than they were in the past. The weakness of PT's relation with the electorate probably resulted in voters becoming more cynical than before, focusing even more on economic performance and disregarding any partisan or ideological identity or preference.

The rise of conservative groups, on the other hand, is a new fact in Brazilian politics, which created a sensation of division between Brazilians. These groups manage to mobilize around the antipetismo, creating the first mass protest and social movements that not only are not affiliated with the left, but antagonize with it. These groups, as well, enlarge the Social Movement Sector, increasing the set of agenda and possible policies within Brazilian polity. This 'political enlargement' result in the political stratum being more diverse then used to be and with fewer consensus. In other words, Brazilian "heavenly chorus" is bigger, and sung more dissonant notes, despite still keeps their "strong upper-class accent"⁶.

⁵Petismo is how PT's supporters are known

⁶This, of course, is a reference to Schattschneider (1975) famous quote

1.3 What we hope to accomplish

The thesis' main goal is to explore and provide a reasonable explanation of the current political reality in Brazil. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the study of Brazilian politics and the study of polarization by evaluating a dissonant case from consolidated democracies.

First, we present an explanation of how conservative groups had the political opportunity to arise. It is a relevant case because Brazil is a context in which the political opportunity is not equal to all the political actor and have changed during the protest wave. It is a rare example of a dynamic event within a protest wave. Also, we explore the evolution of the protest in June 2013 and its consequence with literature about American interest groups and social movements, which deviate the usual interpretation about these manifestations. In sum, we seek to do a contribution to the study of a consequential event in recent Brazilian history – June 2013 – through political opportunity theory while, at the same time, provide a relevant empirical case for the evaluation of this theory,

Second, we present some models to analyze Brazilian polarization trends. The data exploration contributes to the study about political attitude in Brazil, highlighting its relation with partisanship, ideology, and charismatic leaders. We wanted to present an exploration of polarization in Brazil's public as comprehensive as possible. Besides, Brazil is, once again, a critical case to explore the assumptions made by polarization literature on the matter. We hope that the study about Brazilian case becomes a contribution of the study of polarization and to promote the exchange of methods, concepts, and ideas between the study of American politics and Comparative Politics.

We acknowledge that this thesis has some limitations. The first and most obvious one is the lack of any evaluation of polarization at the political elite level. Despite the conscious focus on the public, we are aware that any genuinely comprehensive evaluation of whether a nation is polarized or not must encompass the political elite as well. Also, the evaluation of polarization, in the public, has some limitations due to the surveys used. These datasets have some questions

lacking temporal consistency. Many relevant topics we cannot explore because the topics have not been addressed whatsoever by the surveys.

The study of interest groups lack more systematic sources. Despite considering qualitative methods a valid approach, we believe that the evaluation of these interest groups would be more fruitful with quantifiable methods along with the historical analysis and interviews we use in this thesis. Both polarization and interest groups would gain from a text as data analysis due to the importance of social media in both phenomena. We expect to explore these limitations on future researches.

1.4 Thesis structure

Besides this introduction, this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 addresses June 2013 and interest groups. We present a literature review about interest groups and protests. After, we underscore two factors related to protests. First, the importance of protests as an informational mechanism to manifest dissatisfaction and policy change. Second, political opportunity role to the emergence of protest.

We, as well, explore the protest in June 2013 using primary sources and interviews made by the author. We also made a formal analysis to explore how the groups had different capacities and opportunities during the protests. Finally, we debate how these new interest groups have affected Brazilian politics.

Chapter 3 is about polarization. First, we explore the debate on American politics literature about the topic, which defines three typologies to classify polarization: divergent, sorting, and affective. We use these typologies to explore, in different ways, if Brazilian society has become more polarized.

We do the exploration of these different types of polarization by analyzing ideology, partisanship, and charismatic leaders. Ideology and parties are the most relevant heuristics and are commonly the poles of polarization. We explore the importance of leader due to Lula's

strength and relevance in Brazilian politics.

Finally, chapter 4 is the conclusion. We related the theme of the two previous chapters. Also, we present, more profoundly, our argument that the interpretation of Brazil's division is due to the emergence of these new groups.

Chapter 2

“Much more than 20 cents”: 2013 as a critical juncture

“I think that 2013 was the trigger. It was where everything truly begins.”
(interviewee #6)

2.1 Introduction

On October 7, 2018, election day, Brazil saw a conservative and non-establishment wave swept the elections at all levels. The conservative Social Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro party, elect three governors, four senators, 52 congresspeople, and 76 state legislative. The libertarian/conservative party New (Novo) elected one governor (in the second more populous state), eight congresspeople, and 12 state legislative. All of this in a notoriously fragmented party system.

Also, many members of conservative and libertarian interest groups managed to be elected, for example, Kim Katagiri, Arthur “Mamãe Falei” Moledo do Val, and Fábio Ostermann. All of the were, at least at one point, related to the main group that leads the protest in favor of Dilma’s impeachment: Free Brazil Movement (MBL). On top of that, there were other groups – more moderate and with a lower profile, but also challenging the older political organizations – have arisen as well. *Livres*, *Movimento Acredito*, *RenovaBR*, and *Agora!* saw some of your members to be elected as well. In sum, the Brazilian system of interest groups and social

movements lobbying, seeking to change public preferences and, ultimately, public policy show, in October 2018, how much it changed.

This change, however, has begun much earlier. Albeit their differences, we argue that all these groups derive from two fundamental mechanisms that have arisen in the country in recent years. First, Workers Party (PT) public approval decreases because of an economic crisis and the party choices. Second, the public becomes more mobilized and more prone to participate in public manifestation, resulting in a society being with a higher sense of internal and external efficacy. These two factors, however, were very effective due to events in June 2013.

In June 2013, a few days before the beginning of the Confederations Cup, a preparatory event for the FIFA World Cup, a massive and unprecedented quantity of Brazilians took over the streets all over the country. Protests initiate against a bus fare increase in some cities, but it escalates that existed a placard for almost any topic. Hence, all the political organizations and preferences within the Brazilian society presented themselves in this wave of protests. The puzzling aspect is how and why these individuals with different preferences decided to share the streets. It is this puzzling situation that manages to make the wave of protests of June 2013 to be so consequential to Brazilian politics.

Here we present the history of the events in June 2013, a theory why so disparate interests were present on the streets, and why these protests are significant and consequential to Brazilian politics. We discuss June 2013 as a critical juncture in Brazilian political reality in which explains PT's downfall and the rise of Bolsonaro. We argue that June 2013 was a critical juncture to Brazilian politics. It has generated the mechanisms that have resulted in the Workers' Party (PT) – which manage to won 4 presidential elections in a row – downfall and the rise of the right-wing anti-establishment personified in Bolsonaro. None of these mechanisms would have happened without the existence of the protests. We present that the June 2103 protests suffered from informational problems in which was not clear who was participating and what were the objectives of the prosters. As Brazilian society 'found a solution' to this informational problem, it generated the political opportunity to the rise of new interest groups that have expanded the

frame of issues in the political arena, changing Brazilian political dynamics. Brazil's current political reality and June have been under scrutiny, but, to the best of knowledge, no one has present these phenomena related to changes in Brazilian interests groups ecosystem.

This chapter is divided as follows. The first section is this introduction. The literature review of protests and social movements is in Section II. Section III addresses the used data and method. June 2013 antecedents are in section IV. June 2013, as a critical juncture, is explored in section V. Section VI is a formal model of how the protest in June 2013 develops in such a particular way. The conclusion which addresses the legacies of June 2013 is section VII.

2.2 Literature review

Manifestations in democratic and authoritarian regimes are two distinct political events. The rationale behind it is quite clear. The focus of the protests and its risks are very different when taking into consideration a democratic or authoritarian context. Also, the requirement organized groups have to ignite mass protests are profoundly different in each context.

These disparities result in some differences in how protests in democracies and authoritarian regimes are views in the literature. In an authoritarian scenario, the usual academic focus is to understand whether the protests will be capable or not to generate a revolution, a "mass-supported seizure of political power that aims to transform the social order" (Kuran, 1991, p. 13). In democratic regimes, on the other hand, the focus is the enlargement of political rights, the creation of new parties, or changes in government policies (Amenta et al., 2010).

Also, the costs and risks of participating in the protest is a crucial division. In authoritarian regimes the chance of the use of violence is palpable and acknowledged by most of the involved actors(e.g., Kricheli et al., 2011). In democratic regimes, however, violence is not entirely out of the table but, usually, is minimal and with minor risks at stake. In democracies, these groups usually are protected by institutions and the rule of law, while the counterparts in the authoritarian regimes are, at least, in the sidelines of any adequate legal protection.

This epistemological differentiation around protests has developed quite different inquiries. In democratic regimes, the question is why protest happens despite “authorities offer a given constituency routine and meaningful avenues for access” (Meyer, 2004, p. 128) which has a better cost-value than going to the streets. On the other side, the issue on authoritarian regimes is the perspective of how to overcome the authoritarian practice of “repress various constituencies such that they are unable to develop the requisite capacity (whether cognitive or organizational) to lodge their claims” (*Ibid.* p. 128).

Difficulties, opportunities, and objectives of social mobilizations observed in authoritarian and consolidated democracies fall short of understanding June 2013 protests idiosyncrasies. These idiosyncrasies happen due to a myriad of reasons. One of the reasons is Brazil’s political characteristics – which we address in more detail in the next chapter – that does not make the association between policies and ideologies with parties as evident as is the case in most of the developed democracies. This lack of association generates a highly diverse agenda in June 2013 (Saad-Filho, 2017; Tatagiba, 2014) and its antipartisan rhetoric (Alonso and Mische, 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). Hence, Brazil had, in 2013, a situation similar to an authoritarian regime where there is no clear political cleavage and no opposition capable of generating the narrative for protest against the incumbent government or to acquire the electoral benefits of the protests. The protest was a cacophonous rejection of the *status quo*. The practical consequence is the lack of a clear understanding of the goals and political standing of the protests’ participants. The academic debate about June 2013, therefore, has, in part, focused on understating how to positioning those protests in familiar ideological concepts like left, center, and right (Singer, 2013).

June 2013, however, has not resulted in any systemic change in the political reality, nor such drastic political changes were protesters’ expectation as is the case in most of authoritarian nations. The objectives were similar to the action of interest groups in democracies. June 2013 protesters seek to frame new issues and sponsor external lobby in favor of some policies. Similar to the Latinos in the US, the protests in Brazil “place demands upon government officials and

raise public awareness of pressing social issues” (Carey Jr et al., 2014, p. 616). Also, the protests generated networks and interactions between individuals, similar to the rise and consolidation of the Tea Party (Madestam et al., 2013).

Understanding June 2013 as this particular event result in stressing two critical elements related to the academic debate around protest: political opportunity and information. First, political opportunity theory, a framework in which actors analyze and respond to the environment (Meyer, 2004) is *sui generis* due to Brazil’s political characteristics. For example, these idiosyncrasies have, on one side, blurred the social movements – “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1217-1218) – and counter-movement – “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement” (*Ibid.*, p, 1218). As we will explore in the following sections, there was a specific context in June 2103 in which the actors have different evaluations and actions as stressed by the political opportunity theory (Meyer, 2004). Hence, we can understand June 2013 historical process as a context of the rise of a political opportunity.

One way to systematically analyze this political opportunity that was the manifestations in June 2013 is by the concept of critical juncture, presented by Collier and Collier (2002). They present that critical juncture is “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (*Ibid*, 29). The critical juncture analysis is a systematic approach to understand a historical process that is based, fundamentally, in three elements: (i) the antecedent conditions, (ii) the cleavage or crisis, and (iii) the legacy. They are the chronological process that qualifies a critical juncture where the antecedent conditions are succeeded by the cleavage, which is succeeded by the legacy.

Second, informational mechanism is an important and lasting legacy of the protests in June 2013. Lohmann (1994a; 1994b) presents a framework to understand protests as a mechanism to signal political preference, to provide information to the public. In a democratic

regime, protests are a mechanism to expose individuals' private opinions about the political *status quo* (Lohmann, 1994b). In authoritarian regimes, protests can be the only practical source of grievance with the regime. In June 2013, the two situations – an individual manifestation of political preference and manifestation against the regime – occurred. Brazilian public, by exposing these informations have shattered Brazil's political establishment.

In summary, the protest in June 2013 in Brazil behaves combining observed characteristics of protests happening in democratic and authoritarian regimes, resulting in a particular context. This particularity is the reason why the events in June have become so important to Brazil's current political reality. In order to understand June 2013, we underscore the importance of protests political opportunity and its role as an information mechanism. It is these two ideas that we stress in our take on the historical process of June 2013 as a critical juncture event.

2.3 Data and methods

The evaluation of the importance and consequence of 2013 is done through several ways. First, we present some descriptive data to provide some context of June 2013 protests. Second, we use a myriad of primary sources in order to do a proper account of the sequence of events and how Brazilians felt during these events. Hence, we do not only rely on traditional media, but we use blogs and other publications on the internet, as well. Finally, we use quotes, information, and impressions from 32 interviews entirely during August and September 2018 during the last national campaign in Brazil we have done a structural and semi-structural interviews. Participants were candidates, campaign coordinators, and high members of political parties bureaucracies. We did a structured and semi-structured interview. Figure 1 presents some characteristics of the interviewees.

We approach the matter through two different methodologies. On one side, we do a historical analysis of the events using the historiographic approach of critical juncture developed by Collier and Collier (2002). On the other hand, we present a formal model to understand June




Figure 2.1. Interviewees’ characteristics

2013 protest particularities. Both approaches are under the theoretical ‘umbrella’ of political opportunity theory (Meyer, 2004). The goal is to, while presenting the two distinct methods, provide evidence of what were the political opportunities around these protests in Brazil, its evolution, and its consequences. The two approaches are telling the same story in two different ways.

2.4 June 2013

2.4.1 Antecedents

On October 2, 2009, the city of Rio de Janeiro was selected to host the 2016 Olympic games. This selection occurred almost two years after Brazil was chosen as the location for an even more significant sports event: the FIFA World Cup. Brazilians felt that sequentially hosting these two significant sports events (in 2014 and 2016) was a crowning event in the country’s history and garnered international applause. Starting with the democratization of the country in 1985, Brazil, since that time, had achieved major economic and social development, which generated high hopes for the country (e.g., The Economist, 2009).

Nevertheless, unexpected massive protests erupted in Brazil during June 2013. The protests occurred just a few weeks before the Confederations Cup, which is a preparatory event for the World Cup. Initially started to oppose a bus fare increase for several cities, the protests rapidly escalated. On June 20, more than 1.5 million people (approximately 1% of the entire Brazilian population) in almost 130 cities protested a myriad of issues, including corruption, the expenses associated with the World Cup and the Olympics, a lack of governmental transparency, and the increased bus fare.

The unprecedented magnitude of the manifestations has astounded international observers and Brazilian politicians alike. In response to such singular public outrage, the cornered political elite have offered both short-term and long-term solutions. They first promoted fast-track approval of many bills that answered and appeased the protesters' demands. They then promised new comprehensive policies and far-reaching political reform (Previdelli, 2013). The political elites' efforts to appease protesters, however, have proven to be futile. President Dilma saw her approval ratings plummet after June 2013 and, despite narrowly winning reelection in 2014, she was impeached in 2016 with sizeable popular support (Cruz, 2016).

In hindsight, the reasons that spurred a reaction from Brazilian society against its political elites were piling up. First, preparations for the major sporting events showcased both debates surrounding their necessity, as well as the contrast between public efficiency in building new stadiums and State incapacity to provide public effective policies. Second, the economic performance had deteriorated since 2010. Third, there was a rise in cynicism towards the political establishment in general and political parties in specific. PT, the ruling party, has changed to be more centrist and a catchall party, following a path initiated since taking power in 2002 (Hunter, 2010) and has started to suffer the consequences. Brazil's high hopes of 2009, based on its selection to be the host country for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics and its expected to become a 'developed nation,' were not realized. Although christened the "country of the future," Brazil had not quite made an idyllic future of 2013's present reality.

The expectation for the events was nationwide, but they were particularly high for the

government. The World Cup and the Olympics would mark the success of the PT's governments internally and internationally. Hence, the government and PT had an incentive to avoid any disruptive occurrence, like a wave of protests that could negatively stain the events. Consequently, the political opportunity to the various social movements which have an association with PT had diminished even further. On the other side, the events' relevance, including the Confederation Cup, increased the political opportunity for the other social movements which do not have any affiliation with PT.

Another change that alters protesters political opportunity to mobilize is the economic fallback related to the end of the effectiveness of the heterodox economic policies in place since, at least, the 2008 crisis (International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept, 2015). Figure 2 shows the evolution of the GDP growth in Brazil since 2002. The data indicate two different realities. First, from 2003 to 2010, Brazil was a vibrant economy with a continuous rising, except for 2009 because of the external shock of the financial crisis. After 2010, however, the GDP growth loses steam and reach rock bottom in 2016, where the GDP decreases more than 3.3% related to the previous year, which was already a year with a notable contraction (-3.55%). Hence, 2010 is a turning point of the economic performance of the *petistas*¹ government, even if that becomes clear only later to the Brazilian society.

This crisis and its social consequences have impacted Brazil's politics in two different ways. First, the impoverishment of the population and the adverse economic outlook generate the rationale of an increasing desire for change in the electoral realm, as commonly acknowledge in political science literature (e.g., Kramer, 1971; Vavreck, 2009). Second, the *petista* suffered from the problem of no longer being able to present results. As Shikida et al. (2009); Hunter and Power (2007) argue, the evolution of Lula and the '*lulismo*' as an electoral phenomenon is due to its capacity to provide goods and benefits to the lowest stratum of the Brazilian society. The economic crisis, which came along with a fiscal crisis, made impossible these policies to continue, as an interviewee, critical to PT, puts it:

¹How PT's member or supporter are known




Figure 2.2. Evolution of the GDP growth in Brazil

From 2006 to 2014, existed a strong predominance of handout appeal in the presidential elections. From Lula’s reelection after *mensalão* to Dilma’s election and reelection which was highly justified for the, so-called, social development that PT brought to Brazil. From the 2014 election this is exhausted because the handout State which was growing, even though growing in stagnant economy, but, after 2014, it simply collapse (interviewee #20)².

In parallel to these increasing economic difficulties, PT’s was going through some significant changings within the party. These changes are dramatic to Brazilian entire political system due to PT’s historical importance it had since democratization in 1985, as interviewee #10 underscore:

I think that PT still is the great protagonist in Brazilian politics. Even though it has left the government, Lula’s leadership in the polls corroborate that, despite the decrease in the PT’s votes in the 2016 [mayoral] campaign. I think that, perhaps, this is a signal of another problem that we have, which is the lack of really consistent parties. I would say that maybe PT is the only genuinely consistent party. I would say that PT is the only genuinely representative in Brazil, in the

²From the original: “no período de 2006 a 2014, existia uma forte predominância do apelo assistencialista nas eleições presidenciais. Tanto pela reeleição do Lula após o mensalão, quanto pela eleição e reeleição da Dilma que foi muito justificada pelos ditos avanços sociais que o PT trouxe para o Brasil. E a partir da eleição de 2014 isso se esgota porque o Estado assistencialista que estava crescendo ainda que crescendo em uma economia estagnada, mas crescendo até 2014 simplesmente desabou”

sense that it has articulation with several segments of the Brazilian social strata. (interviewee #10)³

PT's political and electoral tactics have changed over time. Initially, it seeks to distinguish itself from the Brazilian politics as usual (Hunter, 2010). This approach was efficient and have resulted in the party success, highlighted by interviewee #10.

Later, however, the PT decided to change its course, by becoming more moderate and a catchall party, to have more electoral appeal. We argue that swing made PT increasingly similar to the rest of the parties in the country with far-reaching consequences to the Brazilian political system, as we will discuss it in the next chapter. This argument is strengthened by insights from the interviewees, like interviewee #2, where she highlights the similarities of PT and its historically main opposition, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB):

The PT and PSDB do not oppose in management point of view. They have great ideological matrices differences, at least they put it in that way, But, when they are doing the management itself and the local compositions, they are very similar [to each other]. (interviewee #02)⁴

Forming non-ideological coalitions is one of the most known and criticized element of this transition in PT, as interviewee #01 stress: “[w]hat is the ideological affinity that PT had with, for example, Valdemar Costa Neto from PR [Republic’s Party]? I think it is close to zero.” (interviewee #01)⁵. The Brazilian electoral system makes big coalitions the best strategy for the Brazilian parties to gain a higher quantity of electoral perks, like access to mandatory campaign time in TV and radio, which makes the executive and legislative candidates more competitive (Kinzo, 2006).

³From the original: “Eu acho que o PT é o grande protagonista da política brasileira ainda. Apesar de ter saído do governo, à liderança de Lula na pesquisa, corrobora esse ponto, apesar de ter tido uma diminuição dos votos petista na campanha de 2016. Eu acho que, talvez, isso seja sinal de um outro problema, que a gente tem, que é a falta de partidos realmente consistentes. Eu diria que talvez o PT seja o único partido realmente representativo no Brasil, no sentido de que ele tem articulações com as diversas camadas da sociedade brasileira”.

⁴From the original: “o PT e o PSDB, eles não são opostos do ponto de vista de gestão. Eles tem grandes matrizes ideológicas diferentes, pelo menos se colocam dessa forma. Mas, quando eles vão fazer a gestão em si e as composições locais, eles estão muito próximos”.

⁵From the original: “Qual que é a afinidade ideológica que o PT tinha com, por exemplo, Valdemar Costa Neto do PR? Acho que próxima a zero.”

Hence, the PT evolution to become more competitive electorally meant, as well, to be more 'open' for non-ideological coalitions. One practical result of this change is becoming harder for the electorate to detach the PT from the rest of the Brazilian political establishment and its standard practices. Hence, the PT lost some of the advantages that it had obtained when it differentiates itself from the other Brazilian parties in the eighties and nineties.

PT changes have weakened the party relation with social movements, as well. After taking power, "Lula administration gradually opted for an 'elite-centered' practice (...) to keep social contestation and disruptive practices at low or manageable levels as part of a strategy to secure social governability" (Alvarez, 2017, p. 325). The practical consequence was weakening the traditional Brazilian social movements, and, in consequence, their political opportunity, due to their tacit compromise of supporting PT's government. On the other hand, new social movements have fewer reasons to justify any compromise with PT and their government.

In summary, the fundamental antecedents to June 2013 protests were economic and political. In the economic realm, the boom and bust during PT's 14 years in power have led to a sense of frustration and mistrust among the Brazilian public. The public spending on big sport events increase this bitterness. On the political realm, the antecedent was the poignant context where Brazil was under strong international attention. Also, PT was deepening its path of becoming more moderate and increasingly turning into a catchall party, alienating the traditional movements that have historically supported the party. For this reason, PT becomes more sustained by the personalistic power of its leader Lula, rather than consolidating as a more organic and institutionalize party.

2.4.2 The critical juncture

We can divide June 2013 into two different waves of protests. The first wave was from June 6 to June 13, in which the protests were big, but not in surprising size. After, however, the protest took an unexpected dimension. The second wave, which happened from June 17 to the end of the month, has unforeseen magnitude.

First wave, June 6 to 13

The first wave of the protests begins on June 6 with protests in four cities: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Goiânia, and Natal (O Globo, 2013). In São Paulo, 700⁶ people took the streets (Vieira, 2013). The motivation for the protests was the rise of the bus fare, which, in the case of São Paulo, was R\$ 0.20 (around US\$ 0.05).

The mobilizations were initiated and unofficially led by The Free Fare Movement (MPL). MPL declares to be “an autonomous social movement, non-partisan, horizontal, and independent which fights for real public transportation, free for the population and outside of private organizations” (Movimento Passe Livre, 2019). In other words, MPL is under the umbrella of the Brazilian left. Nevertheless, it is different from the traditional left-wing interest groups in terms of its organization, protests performance, and the group’s lack of relation with traditional left-wing parties, especially PT. MPL’s organization and practices are defined as autonomist as it has a closer resemblance to the organizations originated after Seattle’s protests in 1999 (Alonso and Mische, 2017). These type of protest rejects the tactics from the traditional socialists’ social movements of “public displays of organisational membership (such as red flags and banners, party badges and T-shirts with party or movement symbols), centralised and hierarchical organisation, and high leadership visibility” (*Ibid.*, p. 151).

MPL’s autonomous characteristic, detached from the socialists’ parties and groups, allows MPL to protest mostly disregarding any political or electoral concerns of these parties. The Brazilian left-wing parties, however, felt no robust relation to the group to justify any significant support for its demands. São Paulo city is particularly exemplary of this relation. Fernando Haddad from the PT was the mayor in 2013. He was the one directly responsible for defining the price of the municipal bus fare.

Consequently, the MPL acts directly against its policy and government. The mayor, in

⁶The number of protesters is from the Military Police (PM). There were some accusations that the PM undervalues the number of protesters. However, it is the only available number during the entire month of June to the many protests occurring in the different places of the country. Hence, it is a reasonably consistent dataset during the entire time of this analysis

turn, criticizes the movement considering that a “protocol of civility [from the protesters] was not noted”(Rodrigues, 2013). The pattern of a clash between MPL and affiliated groups against local governments that were either supported by PT’s federal government or ruled by PT happened not only in São Paulo but, in fact, in most of the major cities of the country (e.g., Rio de Janeiro). As the interviewee #12 puts it: “the movement had a strong autonomous influence (...) the PT was in power, so it understood that crisis, that criticism towards the power as a criticism to the party itself”. Hence, one of the critical characteristics of the first wave of protests is the clash of these new left-wing autonomous groups in opposition to PT’s left-wing government, while the traditional leftist interest groups were divided in their support to the protests.

Another significant characteristic of this moment is the use of violence and the narrative around it. The political elites, including from PT, and the media promptly describes protesters as ‘vandals.’ In the case of São Paulo, governor Geraldo Alckmin – which has the authority over the Military Police (PM) – has justified police action because of protesters’ violence of what later would be known as Black Blocks. The protesters, in turn, denounce police brutality. In sum, there was a use of violence and, in parallel, a condemnation of it from both sides. Hence, the evolution of the first wave has an escalation of violence between the police and the protesters.

This escalation led, in the third protest against the rise of the bus fare in São Paulo, on June 11, to accusations of protesters attempting to lynch a police officer and depredation of several public and private properties. It is the moment that the public’s concern with Black bloc begins. The reaction was a joint criticism by the mayor and the governor (Netto, 2013). In addition, the three leading newspapers in the country launched on June 13 – the day scheduled for the fourth protest – editorials condemning the manifestation and MPL. The editorials claimed that “it is enough” and demanding to “retake the *Paulista*⁷” (O Estado de São Paulo, 2013a; Folha de São Paulo, 2013b; O Globo, 2013).

On June 13, São Paulo’s PM acted with particular violence. There were strong accusations of police brutality against protesters and, more consequential, against reporters. One *Folha de*

⁷Paulista is one of São Paulo’s most important streets, comparable to Wall Street in New York

São Paulo reporter from was shot in the eye by a rubber bullet. The image of the reporter's injured face and other images of PM's acts of violence have spread throughout the country, changing the public opinion about the protests and the way the media frame it. The media began to present a favorable coverage of the manifestations, while the political elite started to be cornered by the increasing popular pressure. Suddenly, the dynamics of the protests began to change, creating the scenario for the second wave of protests.

The first wave of the protest was a moment where the majority of the Brazilian population just watched the unfolding of events. The participants were, fundamentally, on the left-wing branches of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, MPL has a non-traditional behavior in terms of the way they act in the manifestations. In consequence, the general perception about MPL was as a group significantly different from the left establishment centered around PT. MPL's characteristics of rejecting being affiliated with political parties and to follow their protest style and the demand centered around the bus fare suit well the opinion of the majority of the Brazilian society.

On the other side, the bus fare agenda have significant popular support (Folha de São Paulo, 2013a). We argue that the practical, material theme of the bus fare is different from protests' history in the country which had more normative agendas like "democracy" (in the '80s), "against neoliberalism" (in the '90s), or "corruption" (in the 2000s). The police violence on June 13 was the last straw to lead individuals closer to the 'median voter' to participate.

Second wave, June 17 to 20

The aftermath of the violence on June 13 rapidly escalate the manifestations. MPL's organizational characteristics – its lack of leadership, hierarchy, and using social media to mobilize – started to be used by other individuals to call for the protests. The result was making the protests an even more deficient information mechanisms to the public using them as an informational tool to present a political preference and agenda. Nevertheless, the protests were quite powerful, as figures 2 and 3 show.




Figure 2.3. Number of protesters (in thousand) (by day)




Figure 2.4. Number of cities with protesters (by day)

June 20 was, until that momen⁸, the biggest protest in Brazil history, after an already impressive protest a few days before on June 17. Its massive size, along with the rise of new political actors, ‘solve,’ partially, the informational problem within the protests, resulting in its

⁸The protest in favor of Dilma’s impeachment in 2015 were bigger

rapidly decrease after June 20 and consolidation of the following protests happening with a clear political and ideological cleavage.

On June 17 and 20, however, the autonomous groups and some members of the socialist organizations which were active and present in the streets since the beginning welcomed new participants. Joining them was a new group of people that was unfamiliar with participating in mass protests. These new actors, the ‘median voter,’ become the majority on the streets and the reason for the impressive increase in participation. In other words, the ‘regular’ Brazilian – in political and ideological terms, but not economically – begun to participate in the protests in the second wave in a larger quantity. Table 2.1 presents the partisan preference in four surveys conducted during protests and a national one conducted by the latinobarómetro. The protests on June 17 and 20 happened during the second wave and the one on August 14, after the events of the second wave, has a closer resemblance to the first wave in terms of the participants’ characteristics.

Table 2.1. Party preference of the protesters and the Brazilian population

	Jun 17	Jun 20	Jun 20	Aug 14	Latinobarometro
PT	5.8% (44)	6.5% (35)	15.9% (94)	21.8% (45)	24.7% (202)
PSDB	2.4% (18)	6.5% (35)	6.3% (37)	1.9% (04)	5.9% (48)
PMDB	0.1% (01)	0.6% (03)	2.2% (13)	0.5% (01)	4.8% (39)
PSOL	4.2% (32)	5.4% (29)	0.8% (05)	16.5% (34)	1.0% (08)
Other Party	1.6% (12)	1.9% (10)	2.4% (14)	2.4% (05)	5.9% (48)
None	84.2% (643)	74.2% (399)	71.6% (423)	49.0% (101)	57.9% (474)
Total	100.0% (764)	100.0% (538)	100.0% (591)	100.0% (206)	100.0% (819)

The table indicates two things. First, protesters on August 14 were reasonable different

from the ones on June 17, 20, and Latinobarometro national survey. The protesters in August were more partisan than on the other surveys. They had a particular higher presence of individuals affiliated with left-wing parties, notably Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) the most electorally successful party in the Brazilian left that is more radical than PT. The data provides evidence of our assumption of the protesters in the first wave were far from the Brazilian society’s political expected value and skewed to the left.

Second, the data from the protests happening on June 17 and 20 does not indicate a high number of member affiliated with the right, as the number favoring PSDB were just a little bit higher than the national average. There is, however, a significantly higher number of individuals declaring not to have an affiliation with any party in comparison with the data from the Latinobarometro, which limits our capacity to understand the individual characteristics of the participants in the second wave by this data alone. One of the surveys on June 20, however, asked about ideological self-identification making it possible to make another comparable statistics⁹




Figure 2.5. Ideological self-identification

⁹The data from June 20 presents a rank from 1 to 7, while the Latinobarometro is from 0 to 10. Both have an integer median (4 and 5). Hence, the both “Center” is the median. The values below the median are the “Left” and above are the “Right”.

Once again, the data from figure 5 does not indicate a quite significant difference between the participants in protest and the Latinobarometro sample of the Brazilian population. The fact that June 20 protest data is skewed slightly to the left is probably the result of the individuals that were the majority in the first wave of protests. In sum, all the available data indicates that the protesters did not significantly deviate from the national average. Nevertheless, they differentiate from the groups that have participated in the protests in the first wave.

There is a startling difference between the first and second waves in terms of how the protesters behave. The entrance of this new group of protesters in the streets meant the appearance of new narratives, symbols, and performances. Along with the autonomist and socialist styles of protests, the new protester brought the patriotic style, which “invokes nationalist sentiment, which always has historical and situational meanings” (Alonso and Mische, 2017, p. 152). The ‘regular’ Brazilian, which have not a strong tradition in participating in mass protests, took reference from successful historical events like the *Diretas Já*¹⁰ and Collor impeachment. In both, the national colors – green and yellow – and the national anthem were a crucial part. Also, there was a reference to the most known mass event in Brazilian society: a soccer match. The use of the national jersey and chants similar to the one from stadiums become more frequent. In sum, the new protesters arise with new symbols and tactics that were quite different from the ones saw in the first wave.

On top of that, some of the issues from the first wave become more prominent at this moment. The matter of partisanship, as already highlighted in table 1, have become increasingly important in the second wave of the protests where the new protesters have escalated the autonomous characteristics from MPL and other groups from the first wave, going against any partisan identification in the protests (Goulart and Amorim, 2013). Also, there is the consolidation of a non-violent rhetoric (O Estado de São Paulo, 2013b). The violence between ‘vandals’ protesters and police during the first wave has resulted in a rejection of it from these

¹⁰A wave of protests at the beginning of the eighties in favor of democratization the country and pushing for direct voting for president

new protesters, making a clear distinction between the peaceful protesters and the violent black block.

The new characteristics brought by these new protesters have become the mainstream in the protests due to the simple fact that they were in higher numbers, marginalizing the autonomists and socialist. The left interpreted that the style and agenda of the new protesters were no longer truly representing their agenda, increasing a sense and narrative that original protest from MPL was coopted and started to be used against the left (Moschkovich, 2013b).

The protests weaken after June 20. The cornered politicians, after the massive increased of protesters, have accepted many of the demands, including reducing the bus fare. Also, the rise and consolidation of 'black bloc' and their violent practices (Martín, 2013) scared many protesters. The next wave of protests in Brazil – in favor and against Dilma's impeachment – will present very different characteristics in comparison to 2013.

2.5 June 2013 as a formal model

As we have previously underscored, the events in June 2013 are idiosyncratic. The way that – at the same time – the socialist, autonomist, and patriotic individuals participate in the same wave of protest is not common elsewhere. Most of the time, there is a strong correlation between individual policy preference and her material, solidary, and purposive benefits (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2012). In other words, one preference for a policy change or political leader is in a cycle with the groups that she participates and her social circles.

This cycle happens because political information is evident in almost every polity. In authoritarian regimes, the protests are all about being in favor of or against the *status quo*. There is little room for dubious interpretations. In democratic regimes, ideology parties and other factors bundle individuals together, making their social relationships to be related to their partisanship and, in consequence, their policy preference.

Departing from Lohmann's model (Lohmann, 1994b), we propose a formal interpretation

of how the events in June 2013 have evolved. The puzzle is how different groups have gone to the streets at the same time. Also, how an event that began under the leadership of an autonomist group has evolved to create the most important conservative social movements since democratization.

In the game, individual i has two options of action: protest or not protest. The loss function for individual i (I_i) options of action can be defined as follow:




Figure 2.6. Model for participation in the protests to individual i

Where P_i is the individual ideal point for policy. P_g and P_{pr} is the proposal of policy by the government and protest, respectively. Ψ is the benefits that an individual received from participating in the protest. These benefits are material, solidary, and purposive and are not directly related to the outcome of P_g . The Ψ gain is associated with participating in a political groups or protest. Finally, c is the cost of participating in the protest.

During June 2013 protests, this game was played five rounds. The state of the world is the political outcome that resulted from the previous round. In the first round, the state of the world was the bus fare increase. In this scenario, individuals that were related to MPL, members or strong supporters, behave as any member of interest groups in a consolidated democracy. The value of $-(P_i - P_g)^2$ and Ψ increase for those individuals in a similar fashion as has happened to members of the Tea Party with Obama policies, for example. In other words, the increase in the bus fare increase the distance between individual ideal point and government’s policy and – at the same – solidary relations (e.g., peer-pressure) and purpose motivations (like accomplishing

MPL goal of no fare in public transportation) increase.

The outcome of the first round is the government dismissing and criticizing the protesters. On one side, this reaction galvanizes even further autonomist individuals affiliated with MPL and similar groups. On the other side, it generates the rationale for individuals in traditional socialist organizations to join the protests. After all, the government distance itself even further from the left, increasing $-(P_i - P_g)^2$ and Ψ for these individuals. In this context, the socialist must avoid the risk of getting the reputation of being, for example, to be a government ‘doormat’ in detriment of leftist ideals. So far, the evolution of the protest happens similar to protests elsewhere. The government, however, decided to answer by forcefully repressing the protesters, changing the utility calculation of many Brazilians, and decouple the policy calculus $-(P_i - P_g)^2$ and $-(P_i - P_{pr})^2$ and Ψ .

As we already highlighted, the general reaction towards police brutality is a critical turning point in protests. It resulted in the entrance of individuals that were neither affiliated with autonomists’, nor socialists’ organized groups nor had the habit of participating in the process. The decision of those individuals to participate is twofold. First, change in the way protesters were framed by the media in which they were no longer ‘vandals,’ but, rather, victims of the police. Hence, diminishing the value of $-(P_i - P_{pr})^2$ for those individuals.

On the other hand, the characteristics of organization and manifestation of MPL and other autonomist groups eschew the protest of being label as an action from traditional social movements and left-wing parties. The consequence is giving the impression that the original protesters were the manifestation of the ‘general will’ of the typical Brazilian. Hence, increasing the purpose element of Ψ .

The political consequence of the third round (June 17) is the widespread acknowledge that police action would be limited, decreasing c . More importantly, however, is the impact of the manifestation size. We argue that the fourth round (May 20) was a moment in which the Ψ part of the equation was significantly more prominent than the other parts of the functions. In other words, the sense of ‘being part of history’ eclipsed any evaluation about policy proposed

by the government (P_g) or the protests (P_{pr}). Hence, virtually all salient policy preferences were manifested on the streets.

The massive participation in the fourth round leads to policy change. The bus fare reduced, and executive and legislative branches were forthcoming to popular demands and made promises with the expectation to appease the streets. Another consequence of the big numbers was making clear that P_{pr} was closer to the median and, in consequence, further away from P_i than P_g to individuals that were an affiliate to the autonomist and socialist groups. On top of that, the anti-party rhetoric increased c and decreased Ψ for those individuals. In sum, there were minimal incentives to the organized left to keep participating, especially to socialists. In consequence, to individuals associated with socialists and autonomists groups, the PT government criticism, some of the protesters' agendas, and the patriotic performance consolidate the rationale that the protests in the fifth round, all the protests after June 10, as the "right on the streets" in which they do not want to be associated.

The other protesters fell embody with more internal and external efficacy. There was a desire to keep the mobilization going to pressure for greater changes in policy outcomes. The weaker protests after June 20, hence, were dominated by the patriotic. P_{pr} and Ψ aggregate in a moderate agenda, close to the median of Brazilian public, but with a strong anti-establishment and anti-party rhetoric, especially against PT. These individuals saw the autonomists and socialists groups' rejection of participating in the fifth round of protests as evidence that they were putting the government and party preference over the country and a legitimate desire for change, generating a dispute of narrative. See, for example, the debate in the media between Veloso (2013) and Moschkovich (2013a). Eventually, the rise of violence by black block and the perspective of the police reacting increased c in a way that ceased the fifth wave and the whole cycle of protest of June 2013.

In addition to the separation of the groups, the fourth and fifth rounds generated the political opportunity to the rise of new political entrepreneurs. The organized left had a small window of political opportunity to participate in the protest because the government was also

to the left of societies' median, and they have a higher affinity with the government. Hence, they only had the opportunity to participate until the fourth round. After that, the agenda's interpretation and who participates in the protests was understood to be too far from their ideal point and preferences.

This limitation opens a flank that new organizations could arise to start embodying and representing the individuals that begun protesting after the third round. Also, these groups that have arisen in the aftermath of 2013 acquire the know-how to organize and mobilize a social movement from June 2013 experiences. They learn to organize themselves with a lack of rigid hierarchy and profound institutionalization that characterized the autonomist groups. After all, despite being ideologically different, all these groups articulate and develop in the same moment resulting that these “movements learn from and emulate one another” (Milkman, 2017). In other words, June 2013 presents itself as a major political opportunity to rise of groups unrelated to the left. This opportunity and the rise of groups that would take advantage of it is a meaningful legacy of June 2013.

2.6 Legacy

The political importance of the events in June 2013 is informational. As we have underscored, there was the rise of new political groups and, more broadly, new activism in Brazilian society. Interviewee #02 stresses how 2013 was essential to “show that the people could agglomerate without being necessarily subordinate to a command. The occupation of public space, the mass manifestations were [before 2013] too deeply associated with big organizations.”¹¹ The success of the manifestations provide the know-how to generate mass manifestations, something increasingly more accessible due to technology and social media. Following the same idea, interviewee #10 stress how this learning has led to the creation of new political groups:

¹¹From the original: “mostrar pras (sic) pessoas que elas poderiam se aglomerar sem necessariamente estar subordinadas a um comando. Porque a ocupação do espaço público, as manifestações de massa estavam muito vinculada a grandes organizações”

I think that 2013 is a moment when society realize that is possible to make articulations in the civil society in way disconnected from what used to exist. I think that this is where created most part of the groups. Moreover, the MBL and Vem Pra Rua [literally; “come to the streets”] are strongly relate to 2013, and the were the protagonist of the manifestations in 2015 [in favor of Dilma’s impeachment]. I see a direct relation between the two protests.¹²

The MBL is the most important group that arise in consequence of June 2013. The MBL define itself as “supporters of democracy, republic, freedom of expression and press, free market, reduction of the State, and reduction of bureaucracy”¹³ (Movimento Brasil Livre, 2019). MBL libertarian narrative for a smaller state and support of the free market is unprecedented in Brazilian recent political history. Hence, MBL is the most effective representation of the rise and consolidation of conservative organizations in Brazil. We can see MBL effectiveness in figure 2.7, which presents the evolution of MBL and MPL Google’s search interest through time. MPL has a spike in June 2013, but have been largely irrelevant after that. MBL, on the other hand, has increased its popularity, with a peak during the last election.

MBL’s popularity was not only due to the tools of how to manifest derived from June 2013 but to discovering against whom these new political entrepreneurs should manifest to attract support. Another key consequence of the riots was the generation of a widespread sense of disapproval towards the political establishment and, more specifically, against PT’s government. The biggest bitterness was, inevitably, directed to president Dilma. The graph in figure 2.8 underscores how significant and drastic was the change in the population’s impression towards Dilma (the solid line is June 20, 2013). It was so unexpected that some of the interviewees (interviewee #07 and #08) argue that foreign interests backed the protest.

The rapid and robust rejection against Dilma indicates that protesting against her and PT could generate significant political profits. The antagonism against Dilma is precisely what MBL

¹²From the original: “Acho que 2013 é um momento em que a sociedade percebe que é possível fazer articulações na sociedade civil de modo desvinculado ao que existia até então. Eu acho que daí surgem grande parte dos movimentos que surgiram até agora. Inclusive, o MBL o Vem Pra Rua estão todos muito ligados a 2013, e foram protagonistas dos protestos de 2015. Eu vejo uma relação direta entre os dois protestos.”

¹³From the original: “Defendemos a Democracia, a República, a Liberdade de Expressão e de Imprensa, o Livre Mercado, a Redução do Estado, Redução da Burocracia.”




Figure 2.7. MPL and MBL Google search popularity




Figure 2.8. Dilma's net approval

has done by claiming to be one of its initial core objectives to taking PT down (Silva, 2016). Along with being a useful justification for the mobilization of individuals around MBL and other like-minded groups, Dilma's popularity rapid decrease was, as well, an important drawback on PT's electoral effectiveness. Table 2 presents that PT has suffered an unequal but rather sharp

decrease in the number of elected offices in every elected position in the electoral cycle after 2013.

Table 2.2. PT electoral results in the last three electoral cycles

	2008-2010	2012-2014	2016-2018
Governors	5	5	4
Senators	14	12	8
Congresspersons	88	69	56
Mayors	558	632	261
City council	4168	5173	2795

Along with the electoral downfall, PT’s relevance in Congress decrease. Figure 2.9 is the evolution of the parties’ number in Inter-Union Department of Parliamentary Advisory (DIAP)¹⁴ “*Cabeças do Congresso*” list which presents their choice of the 100 more influential members of Congress. PT is no longer significantly above the rest of the main parties. Its relative relevance has reduced to the one before the 2000s. These data, albeit not wholly conclusive, indicate the diminish of PT influence after the events in June 2013.

Figure 2.9. *Cabeças do Congresso* (DIAP’s list of the most relevant members in Congress)

In sum, we can understand June 2013 as a moment in time in which become an informational mechanism. On one side, June 2013 was consequential to the political elite by representing the rising of PT’s electoral rejection, making the party increasingly feeble. On the other side, the information provides by June 2013 makes possible the rise of new, disruptive political actors with an anti-establishment approach and agenda. These groups, especially the MBL, were essential to instigate the population in favor of Dilma’s impeachment in 2016 and were a decisive voice and lobby group to make it possible. None of these phenomena would happen without June 2013. June 2013, hence, generate the first active opposition to PT with ties with an influential part of the public:

¹⁴DIAP is an organization that lobby Congress for a myriad of unions.

The manifestations show to who supported the government, that there was – despite being a bit disperse and opaque in your objectives – a coalition against the government. It was the first time that we saw a truly mobilized anti-*petista* force, This, on the other hand, energize the *petistas*¹⁵. (interviewee #27)

This political action created new a scenario that the political elite has to deal with. The party most articulated with organized groups in society was precisely the one protesters reject: PT. Brazilian politics and parties which represented the opposition to PT's governments, however, were not designed to answer for such increase on public political participation, allowing for new actors to represent this new demand:

Maybe today we are seen the rise of a new political elite which is a political elite lead by Bolsonaro that, by no means, was be part of the Congress elite. Therefore, we are seeing, maybe, the rise of this new political elite that is capable of talking with these new engaged population in a way that the former elite was incapable.
16

Assuming as counter-factual of a more smooth decrease on Dilma's approval rating and no popular manifestation, would, very likely, create the necessary circumstances for political change in 2018, ending PT's time on the presidency. Nevertheless, this scenario would not foment the arise of incentives to make the political elite behave the way they did, nor generate a drastic decrease in PT's power. More importantly, without the manifestations would not be generated the necessary leverage to make possible the rise of new political actors, which, in turn, were fundamental to create the political circumstances for the impeachment process and Bolsonaro rise to power. In other words, June 2013 was the trigger for the increase of the Brazilian Social Movement Sector (SMS) and, in parallel, the increase of the part of the population that acts politically.

All the factors have significantly changed the Brazilian political reality and have con-

¹⁵From the original: As manifestações mostraram a quem apoiava o governo, que havia – mesmo que um tanto dispersa e um tanto pouco clara nos seus objetivos – uma coalizão contra o governo. Foi a primeira vez que a gente viu uma força anti petista realmente mobilizada. Isso acirrou também, por outro lado, os ânimos dos petistas

¹⁶From the original: Talvez hoje a gente esteja vendo o surgimento de uma nova elite política que é a elite liderada pelo Bolsonaro que, de forma alguma, era parte da elite congressional. (...). Talvez, então, a gente tenha visto o surgimento dessa nova elite, que, talvez, consiga falar com essa nova massa engajada de uma forma que a elite anterior não consiga

tributed to the significant electoral changes that the country saw in 2018. In the next chapter, we analyze whether this whole process and legacy have resulted, as well, the political polarization of the Brazilian society. To do so, we analyze, as well, the importance of ideology and partisanship to Brazilian political reality.

Chapter 3

Polarization without poles? Evaluating Brazil's political evolution (1995-2018)

3.1 Introduction

As highlighted in the previous chapter, June 2013 protests triggered many changes in Brazilian political reality. One of the many changes have been Brazilians becoming more politically polarized. One could also argue that polarization is the primary factor in understanding Brazil's current political reality beyond other aspects mentioned in the previous chapter.

Nevertheless, the narrative about polarization and its aftermath feels at odds with Brazilian political history after the country's democratization in 1985. One of the most important characteristics of the Brazilian political system that emerges from democratization is the weakness of political parties. The consequence of such fragility is a very fragmented Congress and a lack of party loyalty from politicians. This fragility generates high incentives for politicians to move between parties, which has become a common practice for members of Congress. This political elites' dynamics have caused the parties to have weak ties with the rest of society. Brazilian political elite reality is antithetical to the public masses having a polarizing attitude.

Political polarization is when either the public, the political elite, or both become increasingly vehement and uncompromising in their political attitudes. The commonly described typologies of polarization are divergence polarization, sorting polarization, and affective polarization. Divergence polarization describes when society takes increasingly radical positions on a

topic or a bundle of topics. Sorting polarization, however, refers to when society becomes more clustered around a topic, a variety of topics, or an organization (usually a political party). Finally, affective polarization describes a tribal antagonism between groups.

The Brazilian scenario is puzzling. On the one hand, many accounts claim that Brazil's society has become more agitated and polarizing. On the other hand, there is no meaningful party or other institution or organization to express and represent this new political attitude of society. This situation is at odds with the literature, which usually typifies polarization in the aforementioned types. However, all typologies have the assumption that society gravitates toward some meaningful and salient poles.

In this chapter, we will show that the data available does not corroborate with the narrative that Brazil's public is significantly polarized. Through an analysis of many panel data, we found that there is no indication that Brazilians have become more ideological or partisan. There is, however, indications of polarization related to charismatic leaders, especially Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). Our results reinforce the importance of strong institutions, notably political parties, to articulate political demands. The results also indicate how Brazilian society makes sense of the country's political landscape characterized by a weak party system. We anticipate this chapter to be just the starting point for a more comprehensive analysis of what the salient factors are which Brazilians use to make sense of their political system.

This chapter is divided as follows. Section I is this introduction. In section II, we present a literature review of the three types of polarization: divergence, sorting, and affective. We detail the methods and data that we have used in section III. In sections IV to VI, we address the types of polarization by evaluating them in relation to ideology, parties, and charismatic leaders. Finally, section VII is a conclusion.

3.2 Polarization types

The sense of political polarization is being felt across the world. In less than ten years, the world saw a myriad of evidence that justifies that feeling. First, there was the rise of more radical parties on the left and the right in Europe, including neofascists. Second were the surprising results in historical referendums such as “Brexit” and Colombia’s peace agreement (both in 2016), which rejected the establishment’s consensus. Third, the victory of representatives from the branches of the Democratic and Republican parties to US House of representatives.. Fourth, and most consequential, were the sweeping victories of non-traditional or hyper partisan candidates for presidential and prime minister positions. Hence, the debate about polarization is more relevant than ever, with implications that go far beyond the scope of this thesis. This debate also justifies the necessity of a more comprehensive and qualified understanding of polarization to be used in other contexts and in comparative analysis.

The debate around polarization in American politics literature is comprehensive, however, and useful as a starting point in the process of developing a more extensive idea of polarization. Those studying politics in America point out the critical difference between polarization of the political elites and polarization of the public. The separation is relevant, not only for a better methodological schematization, but also to properly acknowledge that these are two discrete phenomena.

In the American politics scenario, there is not a debate about the existence of polarization among the current political elite (Hetherington, 2009). There is, however, a significant dispute on whether the American public is polarized or not (Fiorina et al., 2005). One reason for this debate is the greater difficulty in asserting that there is polarization of the masses compared to the political elite. The latter not only is considerably smaller but also more politically engaged and frequently manifest their political preference through roll-call voting. Analyzing the public’s polarization is even harder in countries which do not have as much available data as the United States, such as in Brazil. This difficulty is the reason why we use all the available data to test all

the different ways that the Brazilian public could manifest its polarization.

Departing from the American politics literature, we understand that the manifestation of polarization can be rational or irrational. Rational polarization is related to when an individual is seeking to maximize his or her utility from government policies, as theorized by Downs (1957). Downs sees voters seeking to maximize their preferences in the electoral process. There is a dimension where the voters can make their choices by evaluating their utility in relation to a candidate's proposed policy.

There are two types of rational polarization, or two ways that a society becomes polarized by individuals seeking to maximize their utility in a spatial understanding of the electoral process. These two types of polarization are "divergence" and "sorting" (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015).

The rational polarization known as divergence is the most notorious form of polarization. Divergence polarization is the type of polarization in "which the distribution of opinion is spreading apart" (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015, p. 1059). Divergence polarization can happen in two different ways. First, a segment of the mass public starts to define its ideal, closer to the branches of the political dimension than it had in $t - 1$. The other type of divergent polarization is when the aggregate individuals on the left (right) distance themselves from the individuals on the right (left). In other words, the two modes of distribution are further apart. This type of divergent polarization is bimodal (Ibid.), which is different from dispersion because "actors in middle positions can often broker between extremes" (DiMaggio et al., 1996, p. 694). The resulting types of divergence polarization generate different political contexts and different actions in political reality. As a political consequence, the two different sub-types have higher variance in time t than in $t - 1$.

The other type of rational polarization is sorting. In American literature, sorting is strongly related to political parties. Many definitions fundamentally define sorting as party sorting (Thornton, 2013; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008), but it does not have to be. Sorting polarization is when the variance *within* the groups in t is smaller than in $t - 1$. This evolution in the variance can happen between parties and ideologies or within a certain issue. When variance

is around party lines, the matter of partisanship, or party identification, becomes increasingly salient. We argue that party sorting is a stronger sub-type of sorting polarization. The parties are a more effective political mechanism to present preferences than intangible ideologies or policies. A political party can materialize ideologies and take a clear stand on what issue is currently salient on the national agenda. The current US Democratic party, for example, embodies an interpretation of the liberal ideology and has a clear stance on the issue of abortion. The greater the partisanship is, the greater the parties can represent ideas, policies, and ideologies – and parties can also be essential informational tools to help voters decide their preferences.

Conversely, there are two types of “irrational” polarizations. First, there is “valence polarization.” Politics and electoral processes can be focused around “valence-issues” instead of “position-issues” of the rational perspective (Stokes, 1963). Even though no one has a different opinion on a valence topic, – no one claims to be in favor of *more* corruption – it is possible for a society to polarized around a valence issue. For example, a society can have a strong and opposite opinion on whether the political elite is corrupt or whether that valence issue is relevant. A common cynical quote in Brazilian politics states, “he steals but gets things done”¹ which exemplifies the dispute around the relevance of a valence issue. Second, it is also possible to have a dispute of narratives around valence topics. For example, the first side accuses the second side of being corrupt, while the second side reacts by calling the first side “elitist,” generating polarizing narratives².

The second type of irrational polarization is known as affective polarization (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Affective polarization defines political division as social identity in which the individual “behaves more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an investment” (Mason, 2015, p. 129), resulting in an in-group bias where one view the “self” positively and the “other” negatively (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Hence, society is more polarized in P_t when the in-group bias is stronger than it was in $t - 1$. In other words, the voter can “make connections

¹From the original: “Ele rouba, mas faz”

²This is the case in Venezuela today, for example.

between candidates and issue positions along the liberal-conservative continuum that are ‘wrong,’ by objective standards. Nevertheless, they can still crystallize feelings of loyalty, empathy, and hostility toward particular candidates” (Jacoby, 2002, p. 127). The crystallization of these feelings can happen in direct opposition to the rational action of maximizing utility, such as when the affective preference of the voter makes he or she to reject the candidate closer to his or her ideational point.

Similar to sorting polarization, the American politics literature strongly associates affective polarization with parties, but once again, it does not have to be. Mason (2015), for example, highlights the capacity of identity polarization around ideologies. We argue that affective polarization could also occur around populist ideas or a charismatic leader. Nevertheless, the reasons why party sorting is the most effective type of sorting polarization are also valid here. The party is an institution that can contain ideologies, populist ideas, and charismatic leaders, as well as having a more profound and lasting mechanism to generate a more significant and durable in-group bias.

It is worth noting the substantial overlap between the valence-issue polarization and affective polarization. The in-group bias often manifests itself throughout valence positions. Even though they are two different typologies of irrational polarization, they usually happen at the same time.

In an effort to understand whether these three types of political polarization – divergence, sorting, and affective – are meaningful in Brazil, we must address the two main poles. First is the left-right scale, which is an essential informational cue for understanding and manifesting ideology, and thus, the best mechanism to analyze ideological cleavage. Second are political parties and partisanship, which are fundamental elements for understanding how polarization is happening in a given country, because partisan cleavage is preponderant in consolidated democracies. Finally, there are charismatic leaders and populists and their impacts in galvanizing an affective polarization around them. In the next section, we will address these matters focusing on Brazil’s political reality.

3.3 Research design

3.3.1 Data

As highlighted earlier, we encountered difficulty in not having a high quantity of data to evaluate whether the Brazilian public is polarized or not. For this reason, we use several datasets to perform a comprehensive evaluation. Therefore, we use data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE)³, which provides information on voting and affiliation. We also use public opinion panel data to evaluate Brazilians' evolution of opinion on a myriad of topics. We also use data from *Datafolha*⁴, Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB)⁵, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), and Latinobarómetro database.

For this chapter, the most important database is Latinobarómetro, which provides annual political opinion information from 1995 to 2018⁶. The Latinobarómetro asks many vital questions about policy preferences and ideological stance – notably concerning the left-right scale – which allow us to analyze whether Brazil's public has become more polarized.

3.3.2 Methods

The focus here is to evaluate if Brazil is polarized or not. To do so, we evaluated two other crucial political elements: ideology and partisanship. We evaluate whether these elements are salient to the Brazilian public and if it becomes more divergent over time.

The evaluation of polarization happens in several ways. First, we analyze ideology through positioning on the left-right scale and through several themes that we evaluate as relevant and that have been consistently asked in Latinobarómetro. Second, we analyze partisanship through the evaluation of the Workers' Party (PT). Third, we analyze the importance of charismatic leaders by evaluating the political importance of the PT's previously elected presidents, including Lula and Dilma Vana Rousseff.

³Data available through the use of the R package 'electionsBR' (Meireles et al., 2016).

⁴Data available through CESOP/Unicamp

⁵Data available through CESOP/Unicamp

⁶In the years 1999, 2012, and 2014, the Latinobarómetro survey was not done.

The correlation between the variables is made using an OLS regression. These models test several variables with time. In other words, the explanatory variable is time. We are not assuming that time can have a causal relationship with political polarization. Instead, we want to estimate the historical change of these variables to use their evolution as an indication of how Brazilians opinion has evolved. We also perform a factor analysis. This model seeks to estimate whether the variables and the left-right scale are clustered or not. The objective is to analyze what topic, if any, is salient in Brazilian society and how that topic is related to individuals' self-identification on the left-right scale.

3.3.3 Scale construction

The analysis of whether Brazil's public polarization is relevant occurs through two different tests. First, we will assert whether there is a correlation between the time (in years) and the standard deviation of the entire sample. Second, we will analyze the relationship between time and the square of every individual distance from the mean⁷ to evaluate the disaggregate distance of the sample to the mean.

In order to analyze partisanship, we use the data from ESEB and LAPOP. Both surveys evaluate PT from 0 to 10, which allows us to measure the polarization around the party. LAPOP's 2016 survey, however, asks the interviewees to evaluate *petistas* (PT's supporters) , not PT itself⁸. We consider that the difference in this survey leads to a bias in favor of PT⁹ which we take in consideration in our analysis.

It is important to stress that we are assuming that the samples are biased. We have discarded all the “nonmeaningful” answers (e.g. “don't know” and “no-reply”). We assume that the remaining observations are individuals who are better informed, higher educated, and have stronger opinions about politics than the Brazilian population in general. In other words,

⁷ $(x_i - \bar{x})^2$

⁸Additionally, the data in this year ranges from 1 to 10, while in the other years it ranges from 0 to 10, which is why the use of the data from this year is limited.

⁹We are assuming that – on average – interviewee would have a more favorable opinion about *petistas* than the PT itself.

this segment of the Brazilian society would be more prone to be polarized than the rest of the Brazilian society.

Along with the left-right scale, the Latinobarómetro variables we use can be divided into three dimensions: political, economic, and social.

Political dimension

- Support for democracy

The variable has the values -1, 0 and 1; where -1 is “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”. 0 is “For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime”; and 1 is “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”.

- Opinion about the US

The option goes from 1 to 4 which mean going from “Very bad” to “Very good”.

Economic dimension

- How fair is income distribution

The variable goes from 1 to 4 where 1 is “very bad” and 4 is “very fair”,

- The market economy is the only system with which the country can become a developed country

The variable goes from 1 to 4 where 1 is “very bad” and 4 is “very fair”,

Social dimension

- Confidence in the Police
- Confidence in the Armed Forces

Both variables go from 1 to 4 where 1 is “no trust” and 4 is “trust a lot”

- Religious commitment

The variable goes from 1 to 4 where 1 is “Not devout at all” and 4 is “Very devout”

3.4 Ideological variance

Divergence polarization is the type of polarization in which the public has a more radical preference for a topic than it had previously. Generally, individuals define and demonstrate their political preference through heuristic mechanisms. Consequently, it is necessary to identify salient issues and heuristic mechanisms utilized by the Brazilian public. Defining the public’s heuristic is less relevant in consolidated democracies, such as in the US, where the political parties have such prominence that partisanship is often the critical heuristic mechanism. In unconsolidated democracies, on the other hand, parties can be so fragile that partisanship is either irrelevant or inconspicuous. In consequence, it is necessary to go beyond partisanship in order to analyze heuristics and divergent polarization in Brazil.

Another common heuristic mechanism is ideology. Where ideology is the dominant heuristic for the public, ideologies manage to represent and bundle many issues into a cohesive system of information and identification. This system allows individuals to define both their political preferences and personal identity. Left and right have emerged in the Modern era as the most well-known heuristic to represent the main ideologies and political disputes in society (Kitschelt et al., 2010).

In consolidated democracies, ideology preference is strongly correlated with party preference because the parties are traditionally bound to one side or the other. Such ideological restriction does not exist everywhere. The political elite have incentives to avoid being bound by any ideological side because ideological vacillation facilitates their freedom of political action while simultaneously curtailing voters’ accountability. Hence, “the value of left-right semantics for programmatic structuration depends critically on the interconnectedness between politicians’ policy stances on key issues and their abilities (and willingness) to place their party on the

Table 3.1. Number of parties in each party families

	Support for democracy	Opinion about the US	How fair is income distribution	The market economy is the only system with which the country can become a developed country	Confidence in the Police	Confidence in the Armed Forces	Religious commitment	sample
1995	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	832
1996	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	898
1997	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	750
1998	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	720
2000	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	649
2001	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	681
2002	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	686
2003	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	841
2004	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	763
2005	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	858
2006	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	803
2007	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	657
2008	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	805
2009	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	695
2010	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	609
2011	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	626
2013	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	581
2015	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	527
2016	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	756
2017	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	639
2018	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	705

left-right dimension” (Kitschelt et al., 2010, p. 62). The higher the meaningful use of left-right labels by politicians, the greater the relevance of left-right as a heuristic mechanism by the public.

Testing the importance of the left-right ideological label, along with its evolution through time, is one empirical way to analyze the relevance (or lack thereof) of divergence polarization in a given polity. In our research, we evaluate the evolution of divergent polarization around the left-right label in Brazil considering the whole period (from 1995 to 2018), which includes three presidential terms: FHC¹⁰ (1995 to 2002), Lula (2003 to 2010), and Dilma-Temer¹¹ (2011 to 2018). Figure 3.1 shows the average of the left-right scale, by year. Brazilian society is skewed slightly to the right which, by definition, puts the most radical Brazilians on the left. The mean is, by itself, an unexpected result considering the rise and electoral success of the main left-wing party in Brazil: the PT. We will address the party matter in more depth within the next section.




Figure 3.1. Mean of the left-right self-identification variable

Figure 3.2 presents how the standard deviation of the left-right scale has evolved through time. The data shows, on one hand, a significant variation through time with the climax occurring

¹⁰Acronym for Fernando Henrique Cardoso

¹¹In 2016, president Dilma was removed from office and her vice-president, Michel Temer, assumed the presidency.

at the start of the 2000s, followed by a significant decrease afterward. Such data does not indicate an increase in polarization. On the other hand, the large confidence interval indicates noise within the data and does not adequately demonstrate any meaningful social phenomenon.




Figure 3.2. Evolution of divergent polarization using the left-right scale (1995-2018)

The variation presented in Figure 3.2 also matches the changes in administrations through time, indicating a correlation between the variation in the divergent polarization and the electoral cycle. Figure 3.3 shows this correlation, presenting the fluctuation of the left-right divergent polarization and presidential governments. The most substantial graphical evidence is a significant decrease in the ideological polarization during Lula’s government.

Table 3.2 contains the regression of left-right divergent polarization through time. The only significant correlation within the data occurred during President Lula’s government (2003 to 2010). For the other presidential periods, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Throughout the whole period (1995 to 2018), such a weak correlation indicates a decrease in divergent polarization. Hence, we cannot assert that divergent polarization (measured via the left-right scale) exists in Brazil’s public political behavior during that time period.

The data presented so far is minimal due to a sample size of only 21 observations.




Figure 3.3. Evolution of divergent polarization using the left-right scale (by presidency)

Table 3.2. OLS regression on left-right self-identification divergence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	1995-2018	1995-2002	2003-2010	2011-2018
year	-0.022* (0.011)	0.058 (0.041)	-0.123*** (0.029)	0.071 (0.059)
Constant	46.781** (21.484)	-113.743 (81.947)	250.333*** (58.845)	-141.132 (119.586)
Observations	21	7	8	6
R ²	0.182	0.288	0.747	0.265
Adjusted R ²	0.139	0.146	0.705	0.081
Residual Std. Error	0.340 (df = 19)	0.265 (df = 5)	0.190 (df = 6)	0.346 (df = 4)
F Statistic	4.219* (df = 1; 19)	2.026 (df = 1; 5)	17.731*** (df = 1; 6)	1.443 (df = 1; 4)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Therefore, we used individual deviation from the mean to create a significantly larger number of observations. Figure 3.4 presents the results. Similar to what was observed earlier, there is some fluctuation, but the data shows a clearly negative trend line. The most significant difference between this new sample and the original is the smaller confidence interval, indicating a more robust result from this data format.

This new dataset also demonstrates how fluctuations along the curve are related to presidential terms. Figure 5 shows the curve in each presidential period while Table 3.3 presents the regression results. The graph shows that the curves are fitting the data better than on the initial dataset. Nevertheless, the regression table shows a weak correlation, not only because of




Figure 3.4. Evolution of individual divergent polarization on left-right scale (by year)

the small R^2 but also due to the small slopes. This occurs despite the fact that we are assuming that this sample is more radical than the general Brazilian population.




Figure 3.5. Variation of individual divergent polarization on left-right by presidency

Another necessary evaluation of divergence polarization is whether there is another salient and polarizing topic for Brazilians, apart from left-right labels. We evaluated this possibility

Table 3.3. OLS regression on individual left-right self-identification divergence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	1995-2018	1995-2002	2003-2010	2011-2018
year	-0.118*** (0.011)	0.316*** (0.054)	-0.673*** (0.048)	0.317*** (0.058)
Constant	244.586*** (21.112)	-623.762*** (107.046)	1,356.613*** (96.785)	-633.138*** (116.514)
Observations	15,081	5,216	6,031	3,834
R ²	0.008	0.007	0.031	0.008
Adjusted R ²	0.008	0.006	0.031	0.008
Residual Std. Error	8.933 (df = 15079)	9.481 (df = 5214)	8.462 (df = 6029)	8.564 (df = 3832)
F Statistic	126.395*** (df = 1; 15079)	194.536*** (df = 1; 6029)	273.877*** (df = 1; 6655)	30.128*** (df = 1; 3832)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

using an approach similar to what we had done with the left-right scale. We discovered seven topics that were possibly meaningful and had been asked consistently in the Latinobarómetro survey. Figure 6 presents the evolution of the means for each of the variables¹².




Figure 3.6. Evolution of the mean values for the variables

Figure 3.7 presents, graphically, the regression between these topics and the temporal evolution. The pattern of the data is very similar to the data previously observed within the left-right self-perception scale. From 1995 to 2018, divergent polarization decreased for all but two of the topics. The two topics in which the data indicated an increase in divergent polarization

¹²All the variables were set up in such a way that a higher value indicates higher support or commitment. The dotted line is the expected value for each variable.

were not statistically significant. This data, which encompasses economic, social, and political variables, indicates that Brazil today is less polarized than it was in 1995, which allows us to reject the hypothesis of an increase in divergent polarization within the country.




Figure 3.7. Variation of individual divergent polarization on topics

The data also indicates that the divergent polarization related to the variables “US support”, “religious commitment” significantly increased during the governments of FHC and Dilma-Temer. However, “support democracy” is the only variable that increased during Lula’s government. This discontinuity in results tempts the question of existing underlying factors which could account for any ideological differences in Brazil. In order to assess this possibility, we ran a factor analysis of the variables. Table 4 presents the results.

The factor analysis model indicates three compelling results. Firstly, the three factors can only explain around 30% of the variable’s variance. In consequence, the hypothesis for the existence of an underlying ideology cannot be confirmed. Secondly, that left-right variance is not correlated with the other variables, which suggests that left-right labels are not meaningful heuristics within Brazilian politics. Left-right lack of relevance also indicates that these concepts are not meaningful under the definitions we present about polarization. Lastly, the results seem

Table 3.4. Factor Analysis Result

	Support for democracy	Opinion about the US	How fair is income distribution	Confidence in the Police in the Police	Confidence in the Armed Forces	Religious commitment	left-right
Uniquenesses:	0.005	0.969	0.838	0.650	0.470	0.985	0.952
Factor 01	0.997						
Factor 02				0.569	0.721		
Factor 03			0.394				
<i>Note:</i>							
Cumulative variance = 0.304							
$\chi^2 = 9.14$ (df=3) .							
p-value = 0.0274							
Values <0.2 omitted							

to indicate that there is some meaningfulness for factors 1 and 2, defined as the “democratic factor” and “law & order factor.”

These two factors go along with the arguments presented by Samuels & Zucco (2018) about what characterized the particular partisanship in Brazil. Nevertheless, the factors’ mean (Figure 3.6) and standard deviation (Figure 3.7) indicate that they have neither polarized by divergence nor by sorting. The data suggest that these matters have been of historical consensus in Brazilian society. In sum, the several ways we measured ideological evolution throughout time have not shown any indication of becoming more polarized over time.

3.5 Partisanship variance

3.5.1 The Brazilian weak party system

The way that the Brazilian political elite has configured its party system throughout the years is very idiosyncratic. The Brazilian political system has not evolved to have stronger or fewer parties, which is what usually has happened elsewhere¹³. In consolidated democracies, parties have strong internal unity and deep connections with the society, making it harder and more costly to have a large number of political institutions with these characteristics. In nonconsolidated democracies, parties can be weak internally, have no connections with society, or experience both. Even in this case, however, the tendency is to form an oligarchy. The oligarchs would seek a small number of parties and use them as a mechanism to limit access to power and state goods by other actors while increasing the cost of entrance for any political entrepreneur. Finally, even in nondemocratic regimes, there can be no party at all, a single party (like Cuba today), or a single dominant party (like Mexico until 2000). The Brazilian political system, nevertheless, is evolving to have even more parties. Figure 3.8 presents the number of effective parties in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Gallagher, 2019) which have consistently increased since 1998.

¹³The major exception is Israel.




Figure 3.8. Number of effective parties in the Chamber of Deputies after the electoral result

This particular reality in Brazil’s party dynamics is due to several factors. First, the Brazilian electoral rules are set up as a system of perverse incentives that promote the presence of a high quantity of parties in the legislature (do Amaral and Meneguello, 2017). The mix of electoral systems generates a situation where the big parties need the resources of the smaller ones to be competitive in the majority elections, and the small parties manage to win legislative seats, decided by proportional elections, by being part of a coalition with more significant and better-known parties and candidates (Kinzo, 2006). The electoral rules are set up in a way to incentivize political actors to take part in a broad coalition. Similar to the number of parties in the Chamber of Deputies, the average number of parties per coalition has increased throughout the electoral cycles, as Figure 3.9 shows.

A second reason for the larger quantity of parties in Brazil is the incentives for politicians to change between parties or create new ones. There is a low cost for politicians in the Brazilian political system to not follow party decisions or to switch parties. The rational dynamics for an elected politician are to swing between parties to avoid being in the opposition, which would mean losing access to pork and patronage derived from the government (Desposato, 2006).




Figure 3.9. Distribution of parties in coalitions (by type of election and year)

The parties, in return, have a strong incentive to become catch-all parties and give themselves in “insufficiently broad terms that they can capture the sympathies of broad segments of the population, rather than concentrating on winning the support of a particular class” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 19).

A third reason for the high quantity of parties in Brazil is due to how the State has repeatedly defined, in top-down fashion, the configuration of the party system (Mainwaring, 1999). Dictatorial acts have hindered the natural and organic development of parties in Brazil. Also, the last authoritarian regime (1964 to 1985) and its conservative transition created a legacy of “(1) continuity in political personnel, (2) weakness of political institutions, and (3) the intensification of anti-institutional political practices” (Power, 2010, p. 15).

All these reasons explain the uniqueness of the higher quantity of parties in Brazilian political reality, which naturally causes an especially weak party system. We understand a weak-party system to be one in which the parties are lacking in the three fundamental aspects of their reality: party in government, party in Congress, and party in the electorate (Fiorina, 2002). In this research, the most critical aspect is the party in the electorate which is partisanship.

Hence, the matter of whether there is partying sorting polarization depends in Brazil is up to political parties relevance to Brazilians. In other words, the hypothesis of increasing partisanship resulting in a polarized society has as one of its assumptions that the parties importance to the public has increased as well. However, the evolution of party preference in the country goes in the other direction.

Table 3.5 and figure 3.10 presents the results, collected from *Datafolha*¹⁴, that show respondents' answers about party preference since 1989. Respondents' answers include the three biggest parties in the country, none, and others¹⁵. The data indicate the average rise of preference for no party is almost 1% (0.79%) per year.

Preference for the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), on the other hand, decreases significantly. PMDB's fate is likely to be the consequence of losing its image as the democratic opposition during the Military dictatorship (1964 to 1985) while facing several corruption scandals. PT and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) manage to increase over time. However, PSDB increases only marginally. PT, on the other hand, has had a more significant increase, which diminished after the economic and political crisis during Dilma's presidency. The result is the increasing gap between no party preference and all other answers.

Table 3.5. OLS regression on party self-identification divergence

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	None	Other	PMDB	PSDB	PT
Year	0.794*** (0.047)	-0.632*** (0.033)	-0.489*** (0.020)	0.093*** (0.012)	0.235*** (0.036)
Constant	-1,538.837*** (94.263)	1,283.306*** (66.672)	989.096*** (40.056)	-180.937*** (24.020)	-453.340*** (72.783)
Observations	171	171	171	171	171
R ²	0.628	0.681	0.780	0.261	0.198
Adjusted R ²	0.626	0.680	0.779	0.257	0.194
Residual Std. Er.	5.278 (df=169)	3.733 (df=169)	2.243 (df=169)	1.345 (df=169)	4.075 (df=169)
F Stat. (df=1;169)	285.463***	361.508***	599.158***	59.662***	41.819***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The high value for no party preference, however, can be misleading. Samuels and Zucco

¹⁴Datafolha is one of the oldest pooling companies in Brazil.

¹⁵This answer indicates all other answers, including other parties but also answers with politicians' names.




Figure 3.10. Party preference evolution in Brazil

(2018)) argue the existence of a partisanship dispute between petistas and antipetistas (PT’s supporters and antagonists, respectively). The antipetistas, therefore, are not associated with any established party label and would define themselves as having no party preference. Also, there is significant literature that presents the importance of PT to Brazilian politics. Acknowledging PT’s importance to Brazilian politics and the potential polarization between petistas and antipetistas, we will debate PT, petismo, and antipetismo in the next subsection.

3.5.2 PT, *petismo* and *antipetismo*

PT is markedly different from the other Brazilian parties for several reasons. It is a party with significant ties to the organized society (Mainwaring et al., 2018) because of its origin in organized labor and other grassroots organizations. Also, PT is the only Brazilian party with a history of significant internal organization and cohesion of members, including its members in Congress (Hunter, 2010). In sum, PT has behaved similarly to the main parties in consolidated democracies.

Members from three distinct groups founded PT. The first group included members of

labor unions, including Lula, in the ABC's¹⁶ industrial cities. The second group was middle-class left-wing intellectuals. Many of them had fought against the military dictatorship and were persecuted by the regime. Finally, a progressive sect from the Catholic Church derived the Liberation theology, which associates the gospel with Marxist theory.

Most of the participants of these groups were new in Brazilian politics, making them a discrete organization in the Brazilian political establishment. This difference is one of the reasons why PT seeks to distinguish itself from typical Brazilian politics by having tight control of its elected members (Hunter, 2010).




Figure 3.11. Party affiliation (1988-2002)

Figure 3.11 indicates how the party resisted increasing its members as drastically as the other main parties. The dotted line represents the legal deadline for when politicians must be affiliated with a party in order to participate in national elections, while the dashed line shows the same deadline to participate in local elections. All the parties have a sharp increase just before the deadline for the local elections, stressing the catch-all characteristic of Brazilian parties. Nevertheless, PT's curve is significantly distinct from those of PSDB and PMDB. PT's

¹⁶ABC is a region composed with the cities: *Santo André*, *São Bernardo do Campo*, and *São Caetano* in the State of São Paulo.

smaller increases suggests a higher resistance to accepting new members who solely wanted to participate in the electoral process. PT's relative resistance to receiving new members is additional evidence of the party's initial effort to distinguish itself from the rest of the Brazilian political reality, helping make the party label clearer to the electorate.

Another critical action from PT was articulating political attitudes and policies that were effective in generating a rapport with the electorate. In PT's local governments, the party develops the *modo petista de governar* or "PT way of governing". The "PT way of governing" highlighted popular political participation, policies focusing on the poor, and the rejection of patronage and clientelism (Magalhães et al., 1999). At the national level, Brazil's organized labor boosted PT, especially after the party became the most vocal opponent of the FHC administration's (1995-2002) pro-market reforms (Roberts, 2014). The resulting consequence was PT forming strong ties with the organized civil society (Mainwaring et al., 2018; Samuels and Zucco, 2018). In sum, PT actions throughout the 1980s and 1990s were very effective (Hunter, 2010), and the party became capable of gaining the presidency in 2002.

PT's efforts have resulted in the rise of its identification with the party known as *petismo*¹⁷. Samuels and Zucco (2018) define the petistas as the "Brazilians who not only desire social change and believe that democracy can facilitate it [but] also came to believe that the PT was the best vehicle for helping bring such change about." (Samuels and Zucco, 2018, p. 30). In other words, the petistas understood that political democratization also meant economic democratization through state-led economic distribution. Hence, the "PT way of governing" and the PT's opposition to FHC's government fit well with how these segments of Brazilian society, the petistas, connected with the PT party.

The tactics that boosted the PT for the public, however, began to fade by the end of the 20th century. PT decided to change its course. After major defeats in presidential elections in 1994 and 1998, the party leaders changed PT to become a more moderate, catch-all party, seeking to have a better electoral appeal capable of winning the presidential election (Hunter, 2010). One

¹⁷petismo and petistas are the same thing. The change is due to Portuguese grammar.

consequence of PT's change was seeking the formation of a bigger and nonideological coalition. The PT alliance evolution can be seen in Figure 3.12, where the evolution of the distribution clearly shows PT's movement toward participating in broader coalitions.




Figure 3.12. Distribution of parties in coalitions with PT (by type of election and year)

The consequence of PT's evolution is twofold. First, the change generates an unbalanced institutional development between its more ideological segments and those segments focusing on electoral results (Hunter, 2010). Second, PT's actions were very effective, making the party victorious in four presidential elections in a row (2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014). PT's electoral successes and its more meaningful and extensive relationship with society than the other parties led Brazilian politics to become centered around PT and Lula. PT success resulted in the collateral effect of promoting antipetismo (Samuels and Zucco, 2018). Samuels and Zucco define the antipetistas as the ones who “exhibit relatively less enthusiasm for democracy, less engagement in civil-society activism, and greater support for ‘law and order’ approaches to politics.” (*Ibid.* p. 30). The factor analysis that we presented in the last section indicates a similar conclusion by presenting the underlying factors of “democracy” and “law and order,” which match Samuels and Zucco (2018) definition of petista and antipetista. Therefore, polarization in

Brazil may be the result of increasing partisan polarization between petistas and antipetistas that cannot be perceived by a simple analysis of party labels, as we have done in the last subsection.

First, Table 3.6 presents the regression of divergent polarization around PT. Once again, the data indicate a decrease in polarization; the interviewees are closer to the mean. The decrease of our measurement of polarization is due to a consistent movement toward rejecting PT, as shown in Figure 3.13. Since 2006, the median consistently moved against the PT. The higher consensus against the PT is the dominant political force in the country today.

Table 3.6. Petismo polarization evolution

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Polarization	
Year	-0.170*** (0.027)
Constant	353.418*** (53.322)
Observations	9,470
R ²	0.004
Adjusted R ²	0.004
Residual Std. Error	13.571 (df = 9468)
F Statistic	40.887*** (df = 1; 9468)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 3.13. Distribution of PT/petismo approval




Table 3.6 indicates that we cannot assert the existence of a divergent polarization around

the PT. However, it is possible the existence of sorting polarization around these topics. It is also possible that the standard deviation within the groups petismo and antipetismo are reducing, which indicates a more cohesive stance between the two groups. Table 3.7 and 3.8 presents the data to the antipetismo¹⁸.

Table 3.7. Antipetismo sorting polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sorting polarization	Evaluation
year	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.019*** (0.005)
Constant	102.802*** (25.561)	38.627*** (10.255)
Observations	3,088	3,088
R ²	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.004
Residual Std. Error	3.465 (df = 3086)	1.390 (df = 3086)
F Statistic	15.468*** (df = 1; 3086)	13.294*** (df = 1; 3086)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The data indicate the existence and the increase of sorting polarization when we evaluate the antipetismo. The results related to “sorting polarization” show a decrease in the distance within the group, while the “evaluation” results indicate that this consensus is becoming more radical by moving away from the center (5). The petismo, on the other hand, does not present similar results. Table 3.8 shows the results .

Table 3.8. Petismo sorting polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sorting polarization	Evaluation
year	0.014** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.005)
Constant	-26.727* (13.717)	75.346*** (9.116)
Observations	4,001	
R ²	0.001	0.013
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.013
Residual Std. Error	2.149 (df = 3999)	1.428 (df = 3999)
F Statistic	4.431** (df = 1; 3999)	53.839*** (df = 1; 3999)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The petismo presents the opposite evolution. The internal consensus has decreased throughout the years, and the petistas’ view on the party has become less favorable with the

¹⁸The definition of antipetismo were all the values below 5 and petismo all the values above 5. The ones who answered 5 – the median and average answer – were defined as the ‘independent’ in this model.

petistas moving toward the center – the neutral position. The different evolutions can be seen clearly in Figure 3.14.




Figure 3.14. Distribution of PT/petismo approval to antipetismo and petismo

The data on sorting polarization indicate a single-track polarization where the antipetismo got more radical and clustered, while the opposite happens to the petismo. PT’s evolution after 2002, during which the party became more similar to the other catch-all parties in the country, can be held accountable for the weakness on PT’s partisanship. However, the party’s evolution does not answer why antipetismo increases so substantively. In sum, the data about the relevance of parties or about petismo and antipetismo demonstrate that the existence of increasing partisan polarization in Brazil is – at best – dubious.

3.6 Individualistic variance

The main heuristics – ideology and parties – are not profoundly used by the public to express its political preference. In other words, the most crucial mechanism recognized to be relevant to voters to define their ideal point and rationally select their vote is not being used by the Brazilians.

The lack of this rationality, however, does not indicate the inexistence of polarization in Brazil. It is possible to have an affective polarization in which society is more radical about a theme, regardless of its desire to maximize utility. One effective way that this could happen is in a situation where the public debate is centered around a charismatic or populist leader. No public figure has been more relevant in the Brazilian political landscape than former President Lula. The graph in Figure 3.15 presents the net approval rating for FHC, Lula, and Dilma. FHC and Dilma suffered a drastic decrease in approval at the end of their presidencies. Lula, on the other hand, manages to achieve historic approval ratings at the end of his term. The centrality of his persona in Brazilian politics becomes increasingly essential.




Figure 3.15. Presidential net approval (positive - negative ratings)

Another critical element presented in Figure 3.15 is the different pattern observed in Lula's approval before and after 2006. Before 2008, Lula's approval was not much different from FHC's ratings in his first term. Later, however, Lula's approval ratings increased consistently and significantly. The 2006 presidential election, therefore, could indicate a significant turning point or the consequence of one. The literature also understands the importance of the 2006 election (Baker et al., 2016; Singer, 2009; Shikida et al., 2009; Hunter and Power, 2007).

We argue that 2006 consolidates PT's goal of winning the presidential election, which resulted in the party becoming more like a catch-all party and weakening its ideological basis that we presented in the previous section. In Lula's first term, he suffers a critical shift by losing his appeal to Brazilians as a consequence of a major corruption scandal known as *Mensalão*¹⁹. However, the effectiveness of his social programs, along with the better economic outlook boost his government.

These opposing forces reshape the petismo and create (or strengthen) the lulismo, or the personalistic connection of the public with President Lula (Baker et al., 2016). The lulistas connected with Lula because of the socioeconomic improvements he ushered in, as well as "Lula's own humble nordestino [Brazilians from the Northeast part of the country] origins [which] may well enhance his credibility as a caretaker of the poor" (Hunter and Power, 2007, p.20). Hunter and Power (2007) also indicate that a difference between Lula and PT is that the former "moved much more toward a 'catch-all' profile" (Ibid., p. 23). The practical consequence is the increasing gap between Lula's (and Dilma's) voters and PT's voters in the legislature, as Figure 3.16 presents.

Considering only the 2006 election, Hunter and Power stated that: "[a]lthough such a bifurcation is typical of presidential systems everywhere, Lula's first-round vote share in all previous presidential contests far outstripped that of the party in simultaneous races, and Lula grew faster than the PT over time" (Hunter and Power, 2007, p.22). The gap never reduced. Hence, the discrete political appeal and power related to Lula in comparison to PT have never faded away. The matter that concerns us is whether lulismo has gained enough political importance to generate polarization around it.

The measurement of lulismo, however, suffers from data limitations. The Latino-barómetro asks about Brazilians' opinion on the president but only from 2005 to 2011. The ESEB, in turn, asked the same question in 2002, 2010, and 2014. Finally, LAPOP only asks

¹⁹The Mensalão scandal was a denounce of monthly illegal payments for members of Congress to vote along with the government's desires.




Figure 3.16. Evolution of PT's presidential and federal deputy (by state)

for national government evaluation. Hence, we must make two assumptions. First, assume that Dilma manages to embody the lulismo after she took power. Second, government approval is a good proxy to analyze the lulismo. The literature on Latin American presidencies stresses the personalistic characteristics of the national government (O'Donnell, 1994), indicating the reasonableness of the latter assumption.

The overlapping data between the Latinobarómetro and ESEB in 2010 allows us to test the first assumption. Figure 3.17 presents the distribution. The two datasets are only overlapping well when we consider "lulismo." However, there is a more substantial rejection of Dilma in comparison to Lula. In sum, the data indicate that, on average, Dilma had worse approval than Lula, but that it was not drastically different, especially since we are only considering the lulismo group.

The data, therefore, allows us to evaluate whether there is any polarization around lulismo. Table 9 presents the result. The result is not significant, but the evaluations around Lula and Dilma have become more polarized. However, the change from questioning Lula to questioning Dilma probably make this result noisier than they would be if respondents were asked only about




Figure 3.17. Distribution of the perception about Lula and Dilma

Lula in all datasets.

Table 3.9. Lulism divergent polarization

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Divergent polarization	
Year	0.035 (0.024)
Constant	-60.559 (47.465)
Observations	15,753
R ²	0.0001
Adjusted R ²	0.0001
Residual Std. Error	11.489 (df = 15751)
F Statistic	2.178 (df = 1; 15751)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.10 and 3.11, in turn, analyzed sorting polarization within ‘antilulismo’ and ‘lulismo.’ Once again, the evolution variance is smaller within the group and has along with a more radical position in the antilulismo group. The numbers show this evolution despite the fact that the data focused on a moment where the evaluation of Lula was largely positive.

The results of lulismo, on the other hand, show that it becomes weaker over time. The variation within the group increases while evaluation becomes closer to the center. It is crucial to note how the results about lulismo and petismo, whether in favor of or against are similar. The

Table 3.10. Antilulismo sorting polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sorting polarization	Evaluation
year	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.017*** (0.006)
Constant	63.237*** (15.402)	34.857*** (11.941)
Observations	3,562	3,562
R ²	0.004	0.002
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.002
Residual Std. Error	1.957 (df = 3560)	1.517 (df = 3560)
F Statistic	15.719*** (df = 1; 3560)	7.773*** (df = 1; 3560)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

explanation for these results could be that the usual perception of the president is as the party's leader and central figure.

However, the particular party system in Brazil makes this relationship between the president and the party less evident. For this reason, we do another test about the variance in the evaluation of the government during a period similar to the one we used to evaluate petismo in order to evaluate how much historical context determines the outcome, as opposed to the president-party relation.

Table 3.11. Lulismo sorting polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Sorting polarization	Evaluation
year	0.008* (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.004)
Constant	-14.999 (9.718)	93.789*** (7.314)
Observations	10,450	10,450
R ²	0.0003	0.013
Adjusted R ²	0.0002	0.013
Residual Std. Error	1.850 (df = 10448)	1.392 (df = 10448)
F Statistic	3.012* (df = 1; 10448)	135.900*** (df = 1; 10448)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The LAPOP dataset asks the interviewees to evaluate the president's government. It is known that partisans are more resistant to evaluate governments of the same (other) party negatively (positively). Hence, if the results present a similar pattern of higher rejection, then it is an indication of the importance of petismo and antipetismo. However, a different result is an indication in favor of lulismo or gathering around a particular as a discrete political force in Brazil. The results are presented in Table 3.12 and Figure 3.18.

Table 3.12. Divergent polarization on government performance

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Divergent polarization	
year	0.030*** (0.004)
Constant	-59.239*** (8,415)
Observations	9,637
R ²	0.005
Adjusted R ²	0.005
Residual Std. Error	1.314 (df = 9635)
F Statistic	51.077*** (df = 1; 9635)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 3.18. Distribution of the perception about government performance

The results present an increase in the polarization on the opinion about government performance. The results are different from the ones presented in the evaluation of the petismo and antipetismo. In other words, there is a stronger resistance to negatively evaluating the government than the PT, indicating a partisanship that it is solely related to the presidency. This conclusion can be seen in the data presented in Figure 3.10, which stresses the growing gap in voters' preference between the presidential candidate and the party. Finally, this data suffers from the same problem as the one about charismatic leaders, which is that it is not evaluating Lula specifically. As the data in Figure 3.17 shows, Dilma does not have the same appeal as Lula, making it reasonable to assume that the values would be stronger if the data were only

about Lula and his government.

3.7 Conclusion

The evaluation presented here seeks to promote a debate about polarization in Brazil. The relevance of the topics is not only important because of the relevance of the topic, but to understand the case's idiosyncrasies as meaningful for how political science evaluates the concept of polarization in general. For this reason, we aim to explore several interpretations of polarization, as well as polarization's usual relationship with ideology and partisanship, along with its relationship with charismatic leaders.

Contrary to the prevailing narrative that stresses a high current polarization, the data mostly indicate a decrease in polarization in Brazil. The presented data usually made it impossible to reject the null hypothesis in favor of polarization. The results argue that ideology is not relevant in the Brazilian political landscape and the frequent use of the left-right scale as heuristic does not occur in Brazil.

Regarding partisanship, the Brazilian public typically moves to reject the established parties. First, the number of citizens that declare not having any party preference has steadily increased since 1989. Second, antipetismo became more robust without becoming itself a party. Third, PT – historically Brazil's most influential party – has weakened its relationship with the electorate and become a less relevant label.

The resulting consequence is the increasing relevance of individualist politics, where the political debate is around charismatic leaders, not parties. Albeit fragile, the results indicate the existence of a lulismo partisanship in which Brazilians have become more polarized over time. The lulismo polarization, along with the lack of party and ideological polarization, suggests that this polarization is not rational. The individuals are not seeking to define their ideal point in the political dimension to maximize their utility, but instead want to foment an in-group bias centered around a controversial figure.

All this research, however, has significant limitations. The data to better evaluate the importance of lulismo and Brazilian polarization is lacking. Hence, this is ongoing research that we expect to continue to pursue by generating new data specifically about Lula and lulismo.

Chapter 4

Conclusion

The conventional narrative claim that Brazilian society is deeply divided. Some argue that political polarization led the country to dramatic political changes, including Bolsonaro's election. This narrative is incorrect. The data presented here show that the main heuristics – ideologies and parties – are weak in Brazil. Neither of these heuristics has become a critical pole guiding Brazilian politics. Hence, there is more indication that Brazilians are less polarized today than they were in the past when PT had a stronger connection with the public.

Chapter 3 presents many methods evaluating the inexistence of an increase in political polarization in Brazil. The effort of measuring polarization led to analyze ideology, partisanship, and charismatic leaders. Chapter 3 analyzes ideology in Brazil by focusing on the left-right scale and some salient issues. Brazilians have not demonstrated to have any antagonizing opinions in any ideological measurement we used. Moreover, none of these issues bundled together. This lack of coherence indicates that left and right are not effective heuristics for most of Brazilians to use them as political identifiable labels.

Chapter 3 also shows similar weaknesses concerning parties. PT's evolution, after 2006, is of a party becoming institutionally weaker in terms of its relationship with the electorate. One evidence of this change is the party vote for presidential and federal congressperson has become increasingly discrepant. The resulting consequence is, after an economic downfall, as increasing rejection towards PT, resulting in the rise of antipetismo. The antipetismo, however, was not

countered by a strong petismo. Hence, chapter 3 shows that the country has a consensus against PT.

Finally, chapter 3 presents a slightly different result related to charismatic leaders. PT's weakness came along with the rise of Lula and the consolidation of lulismo. 2006 election is a turning in which Lula consolidates his influence in Brazil's Northeast. The result is the existence of individualistic political loyalty, a 'leader partisanship' which has some indication, that is not statically significant, of becoming more polarized through time. In other words, lulismo was strong enough to counter the antilulismo, which is, in fact, the same as antipetismo.

Chapter 2 shows the creation and importance and consequence of the June 2013 wave of protests. June 2013 protests are a consequence of Brazil being the host of the Olympics and the soccer World Cup, the beginning of an economic crisis, and the changes within PT. The rise on the bus fare, therefore, was just a trigger. Chapter 2 shows that, initially, the manifestations were mostly under left-wing social movements influence. The increasing popular participation, however, changed the course and gave the political opportunity to the creation of new political entrepreneurs. The way that the protest unfolds changes the political calculus and opportunity for interest groups and social movements participating in the protest.

These new political actors manage to consolidate themselves. Chapter 2 shows how the rise and consolidation of new interest groups is one of the main legacies from June 2013. These interest groups change the scope of the agenda in Brazilian politics by promoting conservative and libertarian issues. These groups have changed Brazilian politics. They created the first groups with popular participation and support that have not any affiliation with left-wing parties. These groups were crucial to the social mobilization in favor of Dilma's impeachment, in 2016, and Bolsonaro election, in 2018. The changes generated by them have divided parts the Brazilian society and created a sense if increasing radicalism and polarization in the country.

4.1 Implications of our findings: Polarization, interest groups, and the political importance of inequality

The most important takeaway from this thesis is that Brazil is not divided. The several datasets we use do not back the narrative of a divided country. The data present that Brazilians are either indifferent or agreeing in most of the issues we analyze. The only remarkable difference is related to lulismo, in which there is some evidence of generating some antagonism. This antagonism shows that lulismo likely becomes a discrete political identity detached from PT.

Another important implication is that Brazilian politics have become more diverse with, for the first time, the creation of mass organizations with libertarian and conservative ideas. June 2013 is an important event not because it generates a polarization, but by generating the mechanism that made possible the rise of these political groups that change the *status quo*.

Hence, the results presented in chapters 2 and 3 are, to some degree, contradictory. On one side, chapter 2 introduces a scenario of more political action and more political effectiveness by the creation of these groups, resulting in a higher diversification of agendas on the political arena. On the other side, chapter 3 demonstrates that on aggregate, Brazilians not only are disengaged on political matters, but essential political identities – as party and ideology – are becoming less relevant and coherent.

The apparent contradiction of this thesis findings is, in fact, evidence of Schattschneider (1975) point about a class bias in political participation. In fact, Schattschneider (*Ibid.*) criticism of pluralism is even more relevant in notoriously unequal country like Brazil than in the United States. Inequality in Brazil is so stark that Brazilians from different socioeconomic classes live in different realities:

The poorest people in Brazil are at the bottom of the global income distribution, among the poorest people in the world, while its fairly large middle class enjoys income levels that place it between the 70th and 80th percentiles in the world. At the very top, the richest Brazilians are part of the top one or two global percentiles. (Milanovic, 2012, p. 23)

The degree of Brazilian inequality made possible the creation of the nickname Belindia to describe Brazil. Belindia is the combination of Belgium and India. The idea is that Brazil is constituted of a small rich Belgium within a India-size poverty population. We argue that this massive difference resonate beyond economic inequality. Brazilians from the Belgium part are, as well, more politically effective. Also, the Belgium part have post-material concerns that does not resonate as much in the India part of the country.

Hence, the chapters' findings are not contradictory. They are happening in parallel in the two different segments of Brazilian society. The implication is that the events described in chapter 2 happen mostly among Brazilians from the Belgium part. The data used in chapter 3, on the other hand, evaluate mostly people from the India side.

The perception of the country being divide, therefore, has a class bias of the Belgium part perception over the whole country. Nevertheless, there is no indication that even this smaller segment of Brazilian society, is indeed polarized. Figure 2.5 and Table 2.1, actually, present some indication that protesters, which were mostly wealthier than Brazil's average, were reasonably moderate. We argue that the political stratum of the Belgium part of the country strongly influence the general perception of a polarized country. The rise of new groups and their capacity to put different topics on the agenda have generated a profound impact on a segment if the Belgium part of the country. Interviewee # 27 manage to present this argument in a very effective way:

I think that there is a certain perplexity in relation to these organizations that arise recently by the part of Brazilian political elite. Not only politicians, parties, but, as well, reporters, academics, intellectuals, people which actively participate on the Brazilian political debate which might be half percent of the population. Because these organizations are not left-wing. I believe that we used to have the monopoly of the political engagement by the left. (...) There was no mass political engagement by the right that show up now. A total perplexity.¹

¹From the original: Eu acho que há uma certa perplexidade em relação a essas organizações que surgiram agora por parte da elite política brasileira. É a elite política não é só os políticos, partidos, mas, também, jornalistas, acadêmicos, intelectuais, pessoas que participam efetivamente do debate, político brasileiro, que talvez seja meio por cento da população. Porque essas organizações não são de esquerda. Eu acho que a gente tinha o monopólio do engajamento político na esquerda (...) não havia um engajamento político de massas de direita, que agora apareceu.

The sense of a polarized country, therefore, is a reaction to the rise of conservative groups. The country acquired a more diverse group of organizations acting in the polity, generating perplexity on the progressive political elite. In this context, the country saw a heated cultural war on art exhibitions (Londoño, 2018), accusations fo ideological indoctrination on classrooms (The Economist, 2018). These events have largely been used as evidence of polarization in the country. However, these topics hardly are the main concern of the poor majority, underscoring how this polarization has a strong upper-class accent.

4.2 Future research

We never expected this thesis to be exhaustive research on the topic of polarization, much less on Brazil's current political reality. We are aware that this thesis has some limitations that we expect to address in future research.

The first interesting topic for future research is the relevance of socioeconomic differences in Brazilian politics. We assume how political attitude in Brazil is strongly associated with classes. On one side, the new groups and a possible polarization exist in the wealthy segment of society. On the other hand, the underprivileged part of society largely eschews from these debates. We expect to, in future research, elaborate on this relation and how the two groups understand polarization and the different political actors in Brazil. We believe that a text as data analysis could be very useful in the study of this subject due to the importance of social media.

Another important topic for future research is the behavior of the political elite. This thesis focus was on the Brazilian public. However, some of the similar evaluations made here can be done using data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Observatory (PELA-USAL) from Salamanca University. Also, it is accessible some data from roll-call voting in Congress, making it possible to do a similar study like the one developed by Hill and Tausanovitch (2015).

Third, we expect to keep the research about these new interest groups that emerged in the country. Recently, many members of these groups were either elected to office or had a position

Uma perplexidade total.

on the federal government make them increasingly relevant. The phenomenon of the creation and consolidation of a *bolsonarismo* is, probably, the most consequential political event that happened last year. Also, it is a political reality that might have relations and resemblances with the rise of other right-wing populists like Viktor Orbán, in Hungary, Mateo Salvini, in Italy, and Rodrigo Duterte, in the Philippines.

Finally, we want to better address lulismo. The surveys we use do not provide robust evidence to achieve a more conclusive understanding of the importance of lulismo as an important political identity in Brazil. We wish to do an experiment to verify Lula's importance. We believe an experiment similar to Crawford (2018), that presents some partisan cues can be a productive way to assess lulismo and whether it is different from petismo.

We believe that exists a good chance that bolsonarismo and lulismo become the most important forces in Brazilian politics in the following years. If that happens, it would mean that Brazilian politics would be closer and comparable to some nations that have seen the rise of populist leaders. The consolidation of bolsonarismo and lulismo would mean significant changes in Brazilian politics, which is dominated by a political elite averse to conflict and with little connection with society. We might be seeing the beginning of two political movements that oppose each other, that seek to foment division and creation of factions in society and are capable of generating mass mobilization. It would be a brave new world for Brazil.

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