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Reputation: Content, Structure, and Trajectories

Hooria Jazaieri

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

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## Abstract

Reputation: Content, Structure, and Trajectories

by

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University of California, Berkeley

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Utilizing a multi-method approach, in this dissertation I first examined how reputation forms over time and how reputation is transmitted and communicated in newly forming and existing social networks, which are primarily affiliative in nature. Next, I examined how reputation differs from related constructs such as status and trust, how one's workplace reputation changes depending on specific behaviors (workplace transgressions, helpful behaviors, and thoughtful apologies), and how the trajectories of one's reputation may not necessarily be consistent across people in the same context, but may differ depending on individual (and hierarchical) factors such as power and gender. Finally, I examined whether a network's criteria or perception of "good" or "bad" reputation may differ depending on the reference context, how group consensus may differ in "good" versus "bad" reputations, and whether reputation relates to meaningful behaviors (performance) that are objectively observable. While many outstanding questions remain, taken together, the findings from the present research suggest that taking a more nuanced approach to the study of personal reputation is a crucial endeavor in order to better understand and predict important social and organizational outcomes.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL OVERVIEW

Personal reputation, an individual's agreed-upon character that is shaped by and flows through the network (Craik, 2008), serves a number of crucial functions, from the opportunities and influence an individual enjoys to one's ability to impact important organizational outcomes (e.g., Ferris et al. 2003; Craik, 2008). While a socially constructed phenomenon, reputation touches all aspects of modern day living – individuals, groups, teams, organizations, products, industries – there is not a person or context that is free from reputational evaluations. Similar to a background process that is running behind the scenes on a computer, reputation formation is similarly constantly operating, whether we choose to acknowledge it or not. The formation of reputation can be based on direct information (past or present oriented) obtained through one's direct observations, information obtained through the observations of known or unknown others, or reputation can be formed simply based on hearsay; thus, personal reputation can be established without an individual having any direct experience with the target person. Although reputation is based on snippets of information and therefore considered to be somewhat of a cognitive shortcut, reputation provides valuable, albeit imperfect (Kreps & Wilson, 1982), information that helps us form judgments about others.

Reputation is considered to be a powerful signal regarding a person's character (Posner, 1997), and helps us anticipate the future behavior of others (Zinko et al., 2007). From the perspective of the network, the group will fare better when it is comprised of people with “good” character, or character that is consistent with the groups norms (e.g., cooperative, ethical, trustworthy, loyal). Thus, for these reasons, it is important for each network to possess the capacity to readily identify members who have questionable motives or those who are likely to defect (e.g., Yoeli et al., 2013). To this end, reputation provides a valuable tool to reward those who abide by the network's norms, and also punish those who deviate from the norms.

The study of reputation is an old question in the field of psychology that has recently been revived (Bromley, 2001). Despite the centrality of reputation, prior research, across a variety of academic fields (e.g., management, psychology, sociology, marketing, economics), has taken a relatively narrow approach to studying this complex social phenomenon. Setting aside the conceptual murkiness of the construct (Bergh et al., 2010), I begin to address some of the shortcomings of the literature by approaching personal reputation through a context- and network-based perspective, considering how the specific context, time, and motives of the group matter when understanding reputation. Utilizing a multi-method approach, in this dissertation I examine how reputation forms over time and how it is transmitted and communicated in newly forming and existing social networks, which are primarily affiliative in nature (Chapter 2). Next, I examine how reputation differs from related constructs such as status and trust, how one's workplace reputation changes depending on specific behaviors (workplace transgressions, helpful behaviors, and thoughtful apologies), and how the trajectories of one's reputation may not necessarily be consistent across people in the same context, but may differ depending on individual (and hierarchical) factors such as power and gender (Chapter 3). Finally, I examine whether a network's criteria or perception of “good” or “bad” reputation may differ depending on the reference context, how group consensus may differ in “good” versus “bad” reputations, and whether reputation relates to meaningful behaviors (performance) that are objectively observable (Chapter 4). While many outstanding questions remain, taken together, the findings from the present research suggest that taking a more nuanced perspective of the study of personal

reputation is a crucial endeavor for better understanding and predicting important social and organizational outcomes.

## **CHAPTER 2: CONTENT, STRUCTURE, AND DYNAMICS OF REPUTATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS**

Reputation is a central aspect of social identity and thought to convey to others an individual's likelihood of honoring social norms, role expectations, and duties (Craik, 2008; Frank, 1988). Positive reputations arise from actions that subordinate self-interest in the service of upholding the social contract. The pursuit of positive reputations is a powerful motive of social behavior, as suggested by empirical studies of impression management (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Leary & Kowalski, 1990), "face" (Goffman, 1959), social status (Willer, 2009), desirable interpersonal traits (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Jensen-Campbell, Graziano, & West, 1995), and gossip and teasing (e.g., Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001; Kowalski, 2004; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2008; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007).

Recently, studies of social networks have revealed that reputational concerns promote cooperative behavior when defection and antisocial competition are compelling alternatives (e.g., Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013). This important work instantiates reputational concerns in the general sense, manipulating whether or not one's behavior is observed or known by others within a social network. However, no studies to date have systematically examined the specific content of personal reputation, as well as how personal reputation is structured within social groups. The present investigation addresses this by examining the content, structure, and dynamics of reputation in naturalistic groups, guided by the broader theoretical assertion that reputation functions to enable groups to monitor the trustworthiness and status of group members.

### **Conceptualizing Reputation**

Following others, we define personal reputation as *an individual's agreed-upon character that is shaped via discussion in a social network* (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Bromley, 1993; Craik, 2008; Emler, 1990; Frank, 1988; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Van Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 2007). This definition highlights that reputation is primarily about the esteem an individual enjoys in the judgments of others, which emerge in communication and that are shared and distributed across group members (e.g., Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Ayim, 1994; Emler, 1990, 1994a; Kenny, 1991; Malloy & Albright, 1990; Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2010).

Reputational information has been conceptualized as taking two forms, distributive and discursive (see Craik, 2008). *Distributive* reputational information refers to the judgments group members arrive at about an individual that are shared amongst group members that make up a social network. Distributive reputational information is accessible by simply inquiring about a group member, for example, through reference checks, prompted personal recommendations, peer evaluations, and other kinds of peer-reports (Whitmeyer, 2000). Our focus in Study 1 is on distributive reputational information.

*Discursive* reputational information emerges in active communication amongst group members, and is a central determinant of distributive reputational information (Craik, 2008).

Various social practices are forms of discursive reputation, including teasing (e.g., Keltner et al., 2001), the idle “chat” about persons in which people so routinely delight (e.g., Craik, 2008), and gossip (e.g., Ben-Ze'ev, 1994; Dunbar, 2004; Emler, 1994b; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner, 2012; Sommerfeld et al., 2008), the focus of Study 2.

Whereas a person’s sense of personal identity is rooted in that individual’s own beliefs and intrapsychic processes, our analysis suggests that a person’s reputation is constructed in the communication and judgments of group members (Craik, 2008). Groups construct the reputations of the individuals, it is theorized, to promote prosocial, cooperative actions that make for strong and cohesive groups (e.g., Dunbar, Feinberg et al., 2012; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). Thus, reputation can facilitate the selection of cooperative partners and ostracism of non-cooperative partners. Given this analysis, we propose that two dimensions will be particularly salient in distributive and discursive reputation.

### **Trustworthiness and Status as Foci of Reputation-processes**

Recent conceptual analyses point to two more specific attributes that should be the focus of distributive and discursive reputation. A first is trustworthiness, which captures how likely that person will cooperate, or “facilitate smooth interactions”, with other group members (Lount & Pettit, 2012). Groups fare better when comprised of trustworthy individuals, and when they can readily identify those who are likely to cooperate and those who are likely to defect, free-ride, or not cooperate (e.g., Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013). Some scholars have argued that trust is a valuable operational resource within societies (Eisenegger, 2009), and a central aspect of relationships or the “glue that holds most cooperative relationships together” (Limerick & Cunnington, 1993, p. 129).

In more specific terms, an individual’s reputation for cooperation, known by the group through reputational discourse, enables group members to preferentially interact with those individuals who cooperate and avoid those who are defective and adversarial (e.g., Fehr & Schneider, 2010; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Nelissen, 2008; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). The ability to identify non-cooperators serves to keep the rewards of mutual cooperation amongst those with reputations for being good to the group (e.g., Hales, 2002; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Williams & Zadro, 2005), and is associated with cognitive mechanisms, such as the perceptual attunement to cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), communication (Brown & Moore, 2002; Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993), and behavioral signals of trustworthiness (Frank, 1988), and prosociality (Keltner et al., 2014). In terms of personality, trust was the first category assigned to the personality factor of Agreeableness (Norman, 1963). Empirically, prior research with existing groups has linked the broad personality domain of Agreeableness with the specific facet of trust (Mooradian, Renzl, & Matzler, 2006). In light of this literature on trust, we hypothesize that an individual’s reputation will be defined by his or her trustworthiness. In the present investigation we test this hypothesis by examining how trait Agreeableness, the personality factor most strongly related to trust (Hiraishi et al., 2008) and one of the strongest predictors of cooperation (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), figures in distributive reputation (Study 1) and discursive reputational processes (Study 2) within groups.

A second attribute that we hypothesize will shape the content of an individual’s reputation within a group is what we call social potential, or the prospect of a person attaining

status within a group (Anderson et al., 2001; Craik, 2008). Status refers to the respect, admiration, and deference a person enjoys in the eyes of group members (e.g., Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Boehm, 1997, 1999; Huberman, Loch, & Onculer, 2004; Washington & Zajac, 2005). Status overlaps with a person's reputation, in that both derive from the individual's likelihood of engaging in acts that build group cohesion and advance the interests of group members (Willer, 2009). However, a person can have a reputation for many different things unrelated to respect and admiration – the love of crossword puzzles, of doing spot on imitations of celebrities, or cooking horrible food. In the most general sense, a person's social status arises out of actions that make for cohesive and strong social groups – displays of competence, building strong ties and alliances, and enabling goal directed action that benefits many (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Empirically, a person's potential for engaging in such status-enhancing behaviors is captured by the trait Extraversion, which most powerfully predicts the acquisition of social status within groups of different kinds (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Bono & Judge, 2004; Buss, 1987; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Historically, Extraversion is linked to status concerns and status striving (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick, Stewart, & Piotrowski, 2002; Stewart, 1996). Given this literature, we predict that Extraversion, a sign of an individual's status potential, will be a focus in groups' construction of the individual's reputation.

### **Methodological Requirements for the Study of Reputation**

The two central predictions motivating the present investigation, then, are that the content and dynamics of distributive and discursive reputation will focus on an individual's trustworthiness and status potential. Given these predictions, and our overarching definition of reputation as *an individual's agreed-upon character that is shaped via discussion in the social network*, several methodological considerations should guide reputation research. First, empirical research should rely on an open-ended methodology, to ascertain the dispositions most relevant to a reputation. Second, reputational information should be gathered both through formal inquiry (distributive reputational information) and in spontaneous conversation (discursive reputational information). Third, judges for reputation reports can, and should, be randomly selected from the social network, thus providing a more realistic and stringent estimate of the degree of social consensus of individuals' reputations. This kind of data allows for tests of hypothesized properties of distributive reputation, namely that it is shared (as evident in consensus across group members' reputation reports), that it tracks reputation relevant social behavior, and that there is some degree of "self-other" or "self-peer" agreement such that individuals have a sense of what their reputations are like within the social network. In theory, an accurate awareness of one's reputational standing within the social network is necessary in order to guide subsequent behavior to preserve, gain, or repair one's reputation.

### **The Present Research**

In light of our conceptual and methodological analysis, we present two studies, which focus on the content, structure, and dynamics of reputation. In Study 1, a longitudinal study of distributive reputation within a naturalistic group, we expect that the *content* of reputation will focus on trustworthiness and status potential more so than other traits (Hypothesis 1). With respect to the *structure* of the reputation of the individual distributed across a social network,

given our theoretical definition of reputation as an individual's "agreed-upon" character, we hypothesized that there will be social consensus (Hypothesis 2a) and accuracy (Hypothesis 2b) in distributive reputation, which we hypothesized would increase over time. Finally, in Study 2, which focuses on the *dynamics* of reputation, we expect that gossip, an act of discursive reputational information, will (for the sake of group functioning) target individuals who are untrustworthy and have problematic status potential (Hypothesis 3).

## **STUDY 1: REPUTATION DEVELOPMENT IN A NATURALISTIC GROUP**

Study 1 was a nine-month longitudinal study of floormates living in university residence halls in a large public university in the United States. As part of a larger study of relationship development (details available upon request), participants provided open-ended narrative reputation reports as well as sociometric ratings of their floormates and engaged in semi-structured social interactions. In keeping with Hypothesis 1, we predicted that reputational discourse would concentrate on the personality trait of Agreeableness, given that it predicts cooperative behavior (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), and the personality trait of Extraversion, which predicts elevated status (Anderson et al., 2001; Buss, 1987). With respect to Hypothesis 2, we predicted that reputation reports would exhibit both consensus (H2a), as indicated by agreement in reputation reports made by randomly-selected group members, and accuracy (H2b), as indicated by the degree to which these reports reflect the opinions of the group as a whole (e.g., Jones & Skarlicki, 2005; Kenny, 1991; Malloy & Albright, 1990; Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008). Due to the communicative nature of reputation and studies of acquaintanceship effects upon consensus in interpersonal perception (Funder & Colvin, 1988; Kenny, 1991; Paunonen, 1989), we also predicted that social consensus would increase over time. We also examined the validity of peer reputation by comparing reputation reports to coded videotaped target behavior and examined whether individuals' self-awareness will be limited to their reputed levels of Agreeableness and Extraversion, traits that are central to reputation and for which individuals have displayed meta-accuracy in interpersonal perception research (Malloy & Albright, 1990).

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

Ninety-four undergraduates (20 males, 74 females, mean age = 18.5 years) were recruited from two co-ed residence halls at a large public university in the United States. During the study, eight participants dropped out, leaving a sample of eighty-six (16 males, 70 females, mean age = 18.2 years). The diverse sample was 41% Asian American, 36% Caucasian, 10% Latino, and 5% African American (five participants did not identify their ethnic background).

#### **Procedure**

Participants were recruited from two residence halls at the beginning of the school year for a 9-month study on "developing relationships and everyday social behavior". At three time points during the academic year (August (Time 1), December (Time 2), and May (Time 3)), participants completed self-report and sociometric measures. Twice during the year, participants

came to the laboratory to engage in semi-structured interactions with a randomly assigned floormate.

## Measures

Participants completed a combination of sociometric ratings of their floormates, self-report personality measures, and reputation narratives describing their own and their floormates' reputations. Participants also engaged in a videotaped laboratory task during which they told stories about their floormates to one another.

**Sociometric Ratings.** To capture floor-wide perceptions of each participant's reputation quality, status, and cooperativeness, participants completed sociometric ratings of all of their floormates twice, at Time 1 (August), upon just moving in, and at Time 3 (May), after participants had been living together all year. Using 5-point Likert scales (1 = *not at all*; 5 = *very/very much*), participants rated each floormate on the following items: (a) "How well do you know \_\_\_\_\_," (b) "How much do you like \_\_\_\_\_," (c) "How often do you socialize with \_\_\_\_\_," (d) "How much social status (influence, respect) does \_\_\_\_\_ have," (e) "How positive is \_\_\_\_\_'s social reputation," (f) "How cooperative is \_\_\_\_\_," and (g) "How much can \_\_\_\_\_ be trusted to do the right thing."

**Big Five Inventory (BFI).** At Time 1, participants completed the Big Five Inventory personality measure (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). Participants indicate their responses in a Likert format (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *very much so*) to statements beginning with the stem "*I am someone who...*" The inventory assesses the five superordinate traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness) of the Five Factor Model (John et al., 1991). Sample items on the Extraversion scale (8 items, 3 reverse coded) include: "Is outgoing, socialable" and "Tends to be quiet". Sample items on the Agreeableness scale (9 items, 4 reverse coded) include: "Likes to cooperate with others" and "Starts quarrels with others". Alpha reliabilities in this sample were acceptable (ranging from .72 to .86).

## Reputation Narratives

In the Time 1 and Time 3 self-report assessments, participants wrote open-ended narratives about their own reputations and those of two floormates who were randomly selected from the sample of male and female participants on their floor. At each assessment, each participant: (a) provided one self-narrative, (b) provided two narratives about other participants, and (c) was the target of two narratives. The narrative instructions were designed to solicit perceptions of reputation, and not personal opinions about the targets, and read:

"In the space below, please take a few minutes to describe the social reputation of \_\_\_\_\_. By 'reputation' we mean what people on your floor generally say about this individual. This description may or may not agree with what you *personally* think about this person, which is fine. We are just interested in what you perceive this person's overall social reputation to be."

Three trained coders assessed each narrative for the extent to which it reflected coding themes (described below) using a 0-2 scale (0 = *not at all*, 1 = *somewhat*, 2 = *very much*). Interrater reliabilities for the prominence ratings, calculated as coefficient alpha reliabilities (Crocker & Algina, 1986), are listed for each theme in the descriptions below.

**Personality themes.** Coders coded references to the five personality domains (John et al., 1991). *Extraversion* ( $\alpha = .91$ ), which is closely related to the status potential of an individual (Anderson et al., 2001), was defined for coders as the degree to which the subject is described as talkative, assertive, or outgoing, rather than quiet, shy, or anti-social. *Agreeableness* ( $\alpha = .86$ ), which is closely tied to trustworthiness, was defined as the degree to which the subject is described as kind, unselfish, trustful, generous, sweet, nice, or friendly, rather than mean, unfriendly, or selfish. *Conscientiousness* ( $\alpha = .92$ ) was defined to coders as the degree to which the subject is described as organized, responsible, thorough, hardworking, or punctual, rather than irresponsible, immature, or lazy. *Neuroticism* ( $\alpha = .78$ ) was defined to coders as the degree to which the subject is described as tense, nervous, unstable, insecure, obsessive, or anxious, rather than stable or able to cope well with emotions. Lastly, *openness to experience* ( $\alpha = .87$ ) was defined to coders as the degree to which the subject is described as more or less imaginative, creative, curious, reflective, sophisticated, or open-minded.

### **Coders' Inferences about Targets' Personality and Reputation**

While the previous codes allow us to determine the extent to which a target's reputation focuses on a given trait, for example agreeableness, they do not indicate the extent to which that target is described as actually possessing that trait. Such ratings are therefore necessary to test predictions regarding the validity of social reputation by allowing comparisons of targets' personalities as described in their reputations with their actual behavior (described below). For these ratings, coders answered on a 1-5 Likert scale (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *very much so*), the following eight questions which each began with the stem "*Based on the narrative:*" (a) "*How extraverted do you think the target is,*" ( $\alpha = .76$ ), (b) "*How agreeable do you think the target is,*" ( $\alpha = .90$ ), (c) "*How conscientious do you think the target is,*" ( $\alpha = .89$ ), (d) "*How neurotic do you think the target is,*" ( $\alpha = .87$ ), (e) "*How open do you think the target is,*" ( $\alpha = .91$ ), (f) "*How positive do you think the target's reputation is,*" ( $\alpha = .96$ ), (g) "*How cooperative is the target with others,*" ( $\alpha = .96$ ), and (h) "*How much social status (influence, respect) do you think the target has,*" ( $\alpha = .96$ ).

### **Storytelling Interaction in the Laboratory**

At both Time 1 and Time 3, participants came into the laboratory to participate in a series of videotaped discussions with a randomly-selected floormate. One of these discussions at Time 3 was designed to elicit provocative, reputation-relevant discussion, and entailed participants telling stories about things that took place on their floor. Participants took turns telling stories prompted by the following verbal instructions:

"In this discussion, we would like you to take a few minutes to tell us a couple of stories of noteworthy things that have happened on your floor this year. We would like you to

share two such stories. Each of you can pick a story to tell and the story can involve anything - something you observed alone or experienced together. For the story that you pick, you will be the primary talker, but we encourage you to talk about the story much like you would in everyday life, which means the other person can contribute too.”

### Coding of Storytelling Task

Using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *very much so*), a team of three coders assessed each participant’s storytelling task for the degree to which their story was *interesting* ( $\alpha = .71$ ), *funny* ( $\alpha = .77$ ), and *dramatic* ( $\alpha = .82$ ), which were combined into a single “entertaining” composite ( $\alpha = .77$ ). Coders also rated the degree to which each participant’s storytelling was *embarrassing* for the target(s) ( $\alpha = .85$ ), *divulging a secret* about the target ( $\alpha = .77$ ), was likely to *enhance the target’s reputation* (reverse-scored,  $\alpha = .84$ ), and was *warm* (reverse-scored,  $\alpha = .84$ ), which was combined into a single “reputation-threatening” composite ( $\alpha = .80$ ).

**Visibility in reputational discourse.** To assess each floormate’s prominence in the spontaneous reputational discourse, we tallied the number of times each participant appeared as a subject in a floormate’s story, thus deriving a visibility score for each participant.

## Results

### Preliminary Analyses

**Gender and Ethnicity Effects.** We first assessed whether gender or ethnicity differences would be observed for the content of reputation reports or the evaluative ratings made of the targets. No significant patterns emerged and the sample was therefore collapsed across genders and cultures for all further analyses.

**Validity of Distributive Reputation.** To assess the validity of the peer narratives of reputation, we compared: 1) the peer-narrative accounts of reputation, 2) the observable behaviors coded from the participants’ videotaped storytelling interaction, and 3) the target’s own self-reports of their status potential (Extraversion) and trustworthiness (Agreeableness). As expected, a group member’s reputation for status potential (Extraversion) coded from peer-narratives correlated with that individual’s storytelling behavior that was more dramatic ( $r(80) = .38, p < .001$ ) and reputationally-threatening ( $r(80) = .28, p < .02$ ), and with the target’s own self-assessments of extraversion on the BFI ( $r(80) = .32, p < .001$ ). A group member’s trustworthiness (Agreeableness) coded from the peer-narratives was marginally correlated with more reputationally threatening storytelling ( $r(80) = .21, p < .07$ ), but uncorrelated with self-reports of agreeableness. It is also of note that a group member’s reputation for: having a positive reputation ( $r(80) = .31, p < .001$ ), being cooperative ( $r(80) = .29, p < .001$ ), and having an elevated status ( $r(80) = .29, p < .001$ ) were positively correlated with the tendency for telling more reputation-threatening stories. Taken together, one interpretation of these findings point to the validity of a person’s distributive reputation within a group: people who develop reputations for more status potential (extraversion, status) and trust (agreeableness, cooperativeness) in a



group may also spontaneously tell stories regarding other group members that focus more intently upon socially threatening and reputationally damaging behavior. The motives for why these particular individuals tell reputationally damaging stories is unclear – is it to continue to elevate one's own status (by making others look bad), to maintain one's own positive reputation (an act of reputation management), to fit in with the perceived norm of the group (an act of cooperation), to warn others about the target (a prosocial act), or some other reason? The function of telling these reputationally damaging stories is an important area for future research to examine.

### **Hypothesis 1: The Content of Distributive Reputation Focuses on Trustworthiness and Status Potential**

Table 2.1 shows the mean levels of each of the reputation content themes across all narratives for both self- and peer-narratives at the Time 1 and Time 3 assessments. In the self-narratives, there were more references to agreeableness at Time 1 (1.10) compared to Time 3 (.66), which is most likely due to the fact that the Time 1 self-narratives were longer, as indicated by a higher average number of words, ( $M = 43.37$ ,  $SD = 27.95$ ) than the Time 3 self-narratives ( $M = 31.26$ ,  $SD = 18.39$ ;  $t(35) = 2.69$ ,  $p < .04$ ). Therefore, for the remaining content analyses below, self- and peer-narratives will be collapsed across the two timepoints.

When collapsing across the timepoints, results indicated that peer descriptions of reputation were more likely to mention the target's Agreeableness ( $M = .95$ ,  $SD = .38$ ) rather than Extraversion ( $M = .53$ ,  $SD = .38$ ;  $t(82) = 5.41$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Agreeableness was mentioned more frequently than Conscientiousness ( $M = .18$ ,  $SD = .30$ ,  $t(82) = 7.69$ ,  $p < .001$ ), Openness ( $M = .05$ ,  $SD = .14$ ;  $t(82) = 10.70$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and Neuroticism ( $M = .09$ ,  $SD = .17$ ;  $t(82) = 9.83$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Across all themes, indicators of cooperativeness and trustworthiness dominated the content of the reputation narratives – the two most salient themes were Agreeableness ( $M = .94$ ,  $SD = .66$ ) and Extraversion ( $M = .64$ ,  $SD = .65$ ), which in part relates to an individual's status potential.

### **Hypothesis 2a: Distributive Reputations will Demonstrate Consensus Within the Social Network**

Hypothesis 2a pertained to the structure of an individual's reputation, namely the degree to which it was shared in consensual and accurate fashion across a social network. To assess consensus, the two peer reports of each participant's reputation were correlated at both timepoints (Time 1 and Time 3). Due to the indistinguishable nature of the dyad members, the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used, as it allows for a comparison of the inter-dyad variance as compared to the sample variance regardless of the ordering of dyad members (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006).

As evident in Table 2.2, whereas at Time 1 (August) there was no consensus on the participants' reputation narratives about other group members, at Time 3 (May) the peers showed significant intraclass correlations (ICCs) for ratings of the target's extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, positivity of reputation, cooperativeness, and status, suggesting greater consensus at Time 3 regarding the reputations of other group members. To specifically test for the significance of the change in participants' agreement about other group members between

Time 1 and Time 3, regression analyses were used to assess the degree of shared variance between the peer ratings. The difference in the regression weights at Time 1 and Time 3 was calculated using a *t* statistic (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The analyses of the differences in the regression weights using the *t* statistic are shown in the last column in Table 2.2. These analyses indicate that, as predicted, the degree of peer agreement was significantly greater at Time 3 than at Time 1 for extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, positivity of reputation, cooperativeness, and status – consistent with studies of acquaintanceship and consensus (e.g., Funder & Colvin, 1988).

### **Hypothesis 2b: Distributive Reputation will Demonstrate Accuracy**

Hypothesis 2b pertained to the reputational accuracy, or the degree to which reputation reports reflect the opinions of the group they are thought to represent. Three theoretically relevant dimensions coded from the peer narratives corresponded to sociometric ratings made by all group members: positivity of the targets' reputations, cooperativeness, and status. Correlations between each target's average ratings based on the two peer narratives and the average of the sociometric ratings made by the entire floor reveal that peer reputation reports did indeed accurately reflect opinions held by the entire group. Specifically, significant correlations exist for all three ratings: positivity of reputation ( $r(80) = .61, p < .001$ ), cooperativeness ( $r(80) = .62, p < .001$ ), and status ( $r(80) = .61, p < .001$ ).

**Self-Perceptions of Reputation.** To further explore the accuracy of reputation (H2b), we examined participants' self-awareness of their reputations as evident in the correlations between self and peer reputation narratives from both timepoints (Table 2.3). As one might expect from our analysis of reputation, a significant self-peer correlation emerged for Extraversion ( $r(60) = .45, p < .001$ ), and a marginal self-peer correlation was found for Agreeableness ( $r(60) = .23, p = .07$ ).

We further expected participants to be more self-aware of their reputations to the extent that they are salient in group reputational discourse. We tested whether visibility scores (the frequency with which each participant was mentioned in the storytelling task) was a moderator of self-peer correlation on the dependent variables (Aiken & West, 1991). The moderator analyses revealed significant interactions between visibility in the storytelling task and peer reputation narrative descriptions for: positivity of reputation ( $\beta = .38, t(58) = 2.98, p < .01$ ), level of cooperativeness ( $\beta = .43, t(58) = 3.37, p < .001$ ), social status ( $\beta = .46, t(58) = 3.69, p < .001$ ), and extraversion ( $\beta = .31, t(58) = 2.43, p < .02$ ). In each case, the interaction represents higher self-peer correlations for participants with high visibility scores, and lower self-peer correlations for those with low visibility scores. Participants who are talked about more by their peers (or for whom there is a greater quantity of discursive reputation information available) seem to have a better sense of the overall quality of their reputations.

**Modesty and Truth in Reputations.** The non-significant self-peer correlations on positivity of reputation call into question reputational accuracy, specifically, whether individuals tend to systematically over- or underestimate the overall quality of their reputations. That is: do individuals self-enhance (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Paulhus, 1998; Sedikides, 1993; Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988), or do they view the self in relatively harsher terms than through the group's eyes (e.g., Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001)? Comparing the

average positivity of reputation coded from self-narratives with that coded from peer narratives reveals that individuals describe their own reputations ( $M = 3.03$ ,  $SD = .74$ ) *less* positively than their peers ( $M = 3.35$ ,  $SD = .68$ ) describe them ( $t(61) = 2.65$ ,  $p < .02$ ).

## **Discussion**

Study 1 focused on distributive reputation within a social network, testing hypotheses about the content and structure of reputation. In keeping with Hypothesis 1, our open-ended assessment of the content of reputation found that group members' reputational discourse systematically focused on characteristics indicative of trustworthiness (Agreeableness, the ethic of community) and status potential (Extraversion). In keeping with Hypothesis 2 about the structure of reputation, reputation narratives about individual group members generated by two randomly selected group members predicted similar evaluations made by the whole group, self-reports of the target individual, and reputation-relevant behavior in a storytelling task. These results were especially true for individuals who were more likely to be mentioned in group based storytelling, a reputation discursive process. It was interesting to note that consensus in group members' reputations increased overtime and participants viewed their own reputations in more critical terms than other group members.

The somewhat surprising finding of viewing one's own reputation in more critical terms than one's peers may serve an adaptive function. It is possible that perceiving oneself as having a good reputation when one does not is more costly than perceiving oneself to have a bad reputation when the opposite is true. Thus, this "less positive" perception bias may help individuals in regulating their behavior, be more favorable group members, and avoid being socially excluded (thus this modesty serves as a form of reputation management). This is a fascinating and important area for future research to examine.

The marginal ( $p = .07$ ) self-peer reputation narratives on Agreeableness can be interpreted in several ways. It is possible that with a larger sample this marginal finding may be significant. Or, it is possible that there are some differential effects – people may be more aware of their own Extraversion and less aware of their Agreeableness, relative to their peer perceptions. This is an interesting avenue for future research on reputation to continue to examine. Additionally, future research would be well served by exploring causality – does underestimating one's reputation enhance one's reputation in the eyes of others, or, does having a favorable reputation in the eyes of others cause one to underestimate his or her reputation? Nevertheless, when taken together, the findings of this study reveal that the content of distributive reputation does indeed focus on trustworthiness and status potential, and that the structure of reputation is such that groups share beliefs about each individual's reputation.

## **STUDY 2: GOSSIP AND THE DYNAMICS OF REPUTATIONAL DISCOURSE IN A NATURALISTIC GROUP**

In our second study, we examined the dynamics of how reputations are shaped in real life by studying gossip, the most clear example of reputational discourse (Craig, 2008). Gossip is an off-record form of communication between group members that comments upon the reputation of another group member. Gossip has been claimed to be the very foundation of reputation (e.g., Emler, 1994b; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Feinberg et al., 2012; Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008) that also enables the monitoring of group members (Dunbar, 2004).

Within this line of thinking, gossip allows group members to arrive at reliable judgments of each other's social tendencies, in particular those related to trust and social status (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). In Study 2 we tested the following predictions concerning gossip. We expected gossip, an act of discursive reputational information, to focus specifically on individuals who violate rules of trustworthiness – namely those who are highly disagreeable – and those who have a controversial status within the group (Hypothesis 3).

## Method

### Participants

Female undergraduates were recruited from a sorority at large public university in Northern California. Sororities are all-female social organizations that develop a coherent collective identity through activities such as house dinners, meetings, philanthropic fund-raising events, retreats, and social events. Sorority members refer to each other as “sisters” and typically live together throughout college.

To recruit participants, sorority presidents across the university's campus were contacted and asked whether they thought their house would be interested in being paid \$1,000 to participate in a study on gossip. After making arrangements with one house, 55 of the 68 members (81% of the house) completed sociometric ratings of the other sorority sisters and personality questionnaires (described below).

## Procedure

### Questionnaire Measures

**Sociometric ratings of the social network within the sorority.** Participants provided information about their sorority sisters on sociometric items using a 5-point scale (1 = *none or not at all* to 5 = *very much*). First, participants rated all the members of the sorority on two measures: “*How well do you know \_\_\_\_\_?*” and “*How much do you like \_\_\_\_\_?*” Based on pilot testing of how long these ratings would take, for the remaining items, participants were asked to rate only those sisters from their same cohort, defined by the semester in which the sisters joined the sorority. Cohort 1 consisted of 20 sisters (3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> year students), Cohort 2 consisted of 23 sisters (2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> year students), and Cohort 3 consisted of 25 sisters (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> year students).

**Identifying targets of gossip.** The first item assessed the extent to which each sister was the subject of gossip more generally (1 = *none or not at all* to 5 = *very much*). Specifically, each participant rated: “*In general, how much does \_\_\_\_\_ get gossiped about?*”

**Assessment of status potential and reputation.** Next, on the same 5-point Likert scale (1 = *none or not at all* to 5 = *very much*) each participant rated: (a) “*How much status does \_\_\_\_\_ have?*”, (b) “*How much status does \_\_\_\_\_ deserve?*”, and (c) “*How admirable is \_\_\_\_\_'s reputation?*”

**Assessment of social interactions.** The next items (1 = *none or not at all* to 5 = *very much*) measured various forms of social interactions specifically between the rater and each of

her cohort members. Each participant rated: (a) “*How much do you gossip about \_\_\_\_\_ in a critical manner?*”, (b) “*How much do you think \_\_\_\_\_ gossips about you in a critical manner?*”, and (c) “*How much do you tease \_\_\_\_\_?*”. Participants did not rate themselves on any of the above items.

**Personality measures.** As in Study 1, participants completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John et al., 1991). To further test our hypothesis that reputational discourse processes target individuals who violate norms of trustworthiness and have controversial statuses, participants also completed the Machiavellianism Scale (Christie, Geis, & Berger, 1970), a 20-item scale measuring a person’s willingness to manipulate others for personal gain and the expectation that others will do the same.

### Hypothesis 3 Results and Discussion

To test our hypotheses regarding frequent targets of gossip, we used the sociometric ratings the sorority sisters provided of the likelihood of being targets of gossip. Table 2.4 presents the correlations ( $r$ 's) between participants’ identification as a gossip target and both the sociometric ratings sisters made about each other and the self-report personality measures of theoretical interest. Table 2.4 reveals that gossip targets individuals with controversial reputations: Those sisters labeled by their peers as gossip targets compared to those less likely to be labeled as gossip targets were rated as being more well-known (.34) but less well-liked (-.33), seen as deserving less status (-.35), and most notably based on effect size, possessing less admirable reputations (-.51).

Consistent with Hypothesis 3, that gossip is a reputational discourse that identifies untrustworthy group members, sisters who were frequent targets of gossip scored significantly higher on Machiavellianism (.28) and significantly lower on Agreeableness (-.39). While the nature of this study design does not allow for a direct causal test, one interpretation of this finding is that sisters who were the frequent target of gossip were also more likely to engage in manipulative behaviors like lying or back-stabbing, which are assessed by the measure of Machiavellianism, and they were more likely to self-report cold, competitive, and hostile tendencies, as assessed by the measure of Agreeableness.

An examination of other sociometric ratings finds that frequent targets of gossip were more likely targets of critical gossip (.84). They were also marginally ( $p = .08$ ) more likely to be teased by other members of the group (.24) and were also presumed to engage in more critical gossip themselves (.74). Consistent with our hypothesis that gossip focuses on individuals who pose threats to social hierarchy, the gossip targets in the sorority were well-known, but also disliked, seen as deserving less status, presumed to be involved in a variety of unfavorable social interactions, and possess personality traits (lower Agreeableness and higher Machiavellianism) that suggest difficulty cooperating within the social group.

### GENERAL DISCUSSION

Cooperation within social groups depends on interpersonal processes by which group members reinforce the cooperative behavior of other group members (Keltner et al., 2014). We have argued that reputation is one such process, reflecting the group’s assessment of an individual’s character that is stored within the collective judgments of the group (distributive

reputational information) and spreads through spontaneous social discourse (discursive reputational information). The focus of reputational discourse, we proposed, is the trustworthiness and status potential of other group members – discourse that enables cooperative alliance formation and hierarchy navigation.

Guided by this conceptual analysis, we presented two studies that tested a series of predictions that derive from our central hypothesis, that trust and status potential would be central to the content and dynamics of reputational discourse. In Study 1, open-ended reputation reports by group members early and later in the formation of the group focused on personality traits related to trust and status (agreeableness and extraversion) and not other traits or properties of the individual. Consensus was established amongst the group for conceptions of others' reputations, increasing over the course of the year, and while individuals tended to view their own reputations in more critical terms than did the other members of group, those who were most visible in the social discourse were most aware of the quality of their reputations. In Study 2, we examined gossip within a naturalistic group, finding that frequent targets of gossip, assessed sociometrically, possessed negative reputations, and that these individuals were disagreeable and Machiavellian, that is, they were the ones who violated the rules of trust and status. Taken together, these findings lend support that reputational discourse (at least in affiliative groups) may focus on dimensions that are central to the cooperation of groups: trust and status potential.

### **Reputations in Different Groups and Contexts**

These studies examine reputation within naturalistic groups of individuals that encounter one another on a daily basis. One concern about the present data is the generalizability of these findings, given that the participants were floormates within a residence hall (Study 1) or female housemates within a sorority (Study 2) at a large, fairly liberal, public university. We took pains to study naturalistic groups, which are organized according to concerns and dynamics (e.g., status, interests, friendship, etc.), that are likely to be observed in groups outside of a university setting. However, the affiliative nature of our groups may raise concerns about the generalizability of our claims that reputations focus on trustworthiness and status potential. It is likely that the focus of reputational discourse will differ for groups and contexts with different functions. For example, groups of individuals in more competitive settings – traders on the floor of the stock market, members of a military unit, teammates on a competitive athletic team – might prioritize aggression over sociability. Even within affiliative groups, there may be variation; for example, while Study 2 examined gossip in an all female sorority group, it stands to reason that this phenomenon in an all male fraternity group might yield different findings.

In other groups defined by unusual group norms, an individual's reputation may hinge on other types of qualities (e.g., competence, attractiveness, etc.). Such contextual variation in content would echo the manner in which the determinants of status have been observed to vary in accordance with the goals of a given group (e.g., Spataro & Anderson, 2003, Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008). Given that reputation is likely somewhat bound by the specific group in question, it is possible that some groups and contexts may value certain domains of personality more so than other domains of personality. This is an empirical question worthy of examination.

Nevertheless, we would contend that while some portion of reputational content may shift from context to context, the general functions remain the same – to identify and track group

members who can be trusted to further the group's interests and fold effectively into the group hierarchy. Recent research examining the prioritization of characteristics across different interdependent relational contexts supports this perspective. For example, Cottrell and colleagues (2007) found that while some characteristics were perceived as more or less important depending on the type of relationship studied, the traits of trustworthiness and cooperativeness were consistently prioritized across a wide range of relational contexts. In sum, it is possible that there are some important general overlaps and functions in reputations between groups, which can only be addressed by examining and comparing the findings between groups. With continued research on reputation within a variety of groups and contexts we will be able to better understand the generalizability (or lack thereof) of the results from these studies.

### **Limitations and Future Directions**

The current findings represent an initial examination of the study of the structure, content, and dynamics reputation within social networks. We have already noted the need to extend this reasoning and methods to other groups and contexts, in particular those that may privilege other values rather than cooperation and contributing to the group. We note the limitation of relying on the traits of Agreeableness and Extraversion as proxies for trustworthiness and status potential. These superordinate traits do map onto our more specific social attributes, but also denote other attributes, such as warm heartedness (Agreeableness) and social energy and enthusiasm (Extraversion). It will be important to explicitly measure trust and status potential with metrics other than personality traits coded from reputation narratives. When eliciting or coding personality traits, future research may choose to use broader, unvalenced descriptions of personality themes. Additionally, while we were interested in testing a number of different aspects related to the content, structure, and dynamics of personal reputation in social networks, this yielded several hypotheses with individual tests, which may be susceptible to error. Future research with larger samples, using more specific hypotheses, and fewer tests, will be important in order to better understand this exciting area of research.

In future research, scholars may also consider measuring other traits or dimensions of social cognition such as warmth, competence, or honesty-humility (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002, 2007; Hilbig et al., 2013). Further, it will be important to examine the content of reputations in other forms of communication than written narratives, for example in spontaneous conversations, text messaging, or given the importance of one's social network to reputation (Mehra, Dixon, Brass, & Robertson, 2006), examining social media posts (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter). Several of the terms used in the present study have the possibility to be interpreted in numerous ways by participants (e.g., "reputation" or "gossip"), future research would benefit by providing participants with explicit definitions of these terms and considering more inclusive operationalizations of these terms in an effort to more fully capture the scope of the phenomenon. Additionally, with larger sample sizes, researchers will be sufficiently powered to take into account cohort effects that may exist within a social network (e.g., employees who started in an organization at the same time). In the study of reputation, researchers should move away from cross-sectional designs (e.g., Study 2, a cross-sectional examination of discursive reputation) and instead implement study designs of social networks that allow for the examination of the temporal nature of reputations within the social group. Future research must move beyond correlational designs in order to accurately address the causal directions of the findings.

Numerous questions remain within the domain of reputation for future research to consider. One interesting line of inquiry will be to explore how the content of discursive and distributive reputational information differs. While in Study 1 we primarily tapped distributive reputational information by soliciting reputation reports from floormates, in Study 2 we chose to focus on reports of gossip behavior, which reflects discursive reputational information, in order to test our predictions concerning trustworthiness and status. Discursive forms of reputational discourse, such as gossip, are almost certainly motivated by the desire to bond and entertain (Fine & Rosnow, 1978), which is likely to shape the content of reputational discourse. No such motives have been attributed to reputation reports in response to formal reputation inquiry, although it has been argued that conversational norms will motivate answers to inquiries that are truthful, relevant, informative, and concise (e.g., Hilton, 1990, 1995). Future research could benefit from a systematic investigation of how the various modes of reputation transmission themselves influence reputation content.

Our focus in the current research has been on the way that a group's judgment shapes an individual's social reputation. However, a second area of inquiry with great potential is the study of how one's self-awareness of their own reputation shapes the individual's behavior and whether individuals can effectively manage their own reputations. While management of reputation to some degree can take place (e.g., Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016), human social hierarchies are almost certainly unique in the extent to which an individual's reputation and status is in the hands, and minds, of others, rendering reputation beyond the manipulation of the individual to some extent (Emerson, 1962). Our current data suggests that individuals do have some reputation self-awareness, and that this awareness increases the more visible the individual is in social discourse. Recent research investigating the relationship between self-monitoring, helping behavior, and status suggests that high self-monitors are more aware of their own status and the requisites for status in a group and secure elevated status in part by cultivating a reputation for generosity (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Future research can build upon this foundation and explore the reciprocal relationship between reputational discourse, behavior, and subsequent reputational content.

In sum, we argue that reputation is a social construct that serves to identify an individual's tendency for trustworthiness and status. Reputation is a relatively understudied topic that underscores processes such as impression management, social exclusion, hierarchy navigation, and alliance formation. The present research provides a viable methodological approach to reputation and demonstrates that reputation is a coherent construct that plays an important role in social decisions. With increased empirical attention on reputational discourse, a more detailed picture of reputation and how it shapes social perceptions, organizes groups, and facilitates cooperation and effective group functioning may soon emerge.

### **CHAPTER 3: TRAJECTORIES OF REPUTATION AT WORK**

Personal reputation – the esteem an individual enjoys in the eyes of other members of that individual's social network – shapes many dimensions of organizational life, from the influence an individual enjoys to opportunities for innovation and enduring power (e.g., Burt, 1987; Olins, 1995; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Keltner, 2016). While “reputation management” is a pervasive topic on the organizational level, less is known about reputation on the individual employee level (e.g., Burt, 2005; Ferris et al., 2003; Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994). It is widely believed, though, that employees' reputations influence other employees' behavior as well as the



overall functioning and reputation of the organization (e.g., Eisenegger, 2009; Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005; Hollenbeck and Jamieson 2015; Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Simons, 1998; Staw & Epstein, 2000).

Various organizational scholars have speculated about different properties of an individual's reputation, including the difficulty with which good reputations are constructed and the ease with which they are lost (e.g., Cavazza, Guidetti, & Pagliaro, 2015), how reputations may track patterns of behavior over time (Zinko et al., 2012), and the slow to change or "sticky" nature of reputations (e.g., Bromley, 2001; Fombrun, 1996). Clearly, it is widely recognized that reputations shift as a function of the individual's social behavior. In this paper we begin to explore how workplace reputations differentially shift based on an employee's power.

A second aim of the present investigation is to document how reputation relates to status and trust. Social status refers to the respect, admiration, and deference an individual receives from group members, and enjoys as an individual vis-à-vis others within social groups (e.g., Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Boehm, 1997, 1999; Huberman, Loch, & Onculer, 2004; Washington & Zajac, 2005). Status overlaps with a person's reputation (and therefore would be expected to be moderately related) in that both derive from the likelihood of the person engaging in behaviors that build group cohesion and advance the group's interests (Willer, 2009; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). An individual's trustworthiness captures how likely that person will cooperate with other group members (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Gambetta, 1988; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013; Zucker, 1986). To date, few have systematically asked whether reputation, status, and trust, are separate constructs, and how they vary within the organizational context – a central aim of the present investigation.

In general, compared to low-power individuals, high-power individuals are afforded greater latitude and in some cases may not be punished at all when breaking rules or laws (e.g., Goffman, 1956a). When considering status and gender, men, compared to women, are granted more status (Guttentag & Secord, 1983; Rudman & Glick, 1999), particularly when women threaten traditional gender hierarchies (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). At work, women continue to face negative stereotypes and relatively slow ascension in the workplace (Kray & Kennedy, 2017); for instance, when job titles are omitted, women are believed to hold lower status jobs compared to men (Eagly & Wood, 1982).

Research shows that there is in fact a trust bias in favor of those who are considered to be high-power (e.g., Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). There also seems to be some gender differences in trust and trustworthiness (e.g., Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007). In general, prior research has found men to be more trusting than women and men tend to develop trust at twice the rate of women (Bevelander & Page, 2011). However, the data on trust and gender is mixed, suggesting that it may be context dependent; for example, within the context of an investment game, men were found to be more trusting, while women were found to be more trustworthy (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008). Finally, given that high-power is associated with competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999), it stands to reason that following a transgression, a high-power person would be able to more quickly regain reputation, status, and trust compared to a low-power person.

In this paper, we examine how reputation, social status, and trust covary as people rise, fall, and seek to reestablish their reputations. Specifically, we explore employees in high- and low-power positions and the dynamics of change in employees' reputation, social status, and trust following: a minor workplace transgression (Study 1), putting in additional effort in the workplace (Study 2), and following an apology for a transgression (Study 3). Although

reputation is multidimensional (in that a person may have a favorable reputation in one context and simultaneously have an unfavorable reputation in another context), here, we are specifically interested in an employee's workplace reputation. Additionally, we are interested in examining whether factors such as gender or power (high vs. low) influence reputational trajectories. Finally, in terms of transgressions, while there is a spectrum of deviant behaviors that can be committed by employees (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), in an effort to enhance validity, we selected relatively minor deviant workplace behaviors such as an employee coming to work late or leaving early, leaving a job in progress, working slowly, or otherwise withholding effort (e.g., shirking, social loafing, and free riding; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993).

Our research makes several contributions to advance theory and existing research. First, using repeated measures, we provide a trajectory viewpoint of reputation rather than a single snapshot. Second, we demonstrate that the trajectory of one's reputation differs depending on whether the employee is high- or low-power. Third, we expand the literature beyond simply examining reputational gains to examining losses and recoveries. Finally, this study adds to the growing literature distinguishing reputation from related constructs of social status and trust.

## **THEORY, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESES**

### **Reputation**

Reputation, an individual's agreed-upon character, serves a number of important social functions. An individual's reputation provides an important signaling mechanism that reduces uncertainty about the expected behaviors of others (e.g., Posner, 1997; Nisbett & Ross, 1991; Zinko et al., 2007), signals an individual's likelihood of cooperation and thereby influences the flow of resources (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000), and relates to the legitimacy of an individual's power (Eisenegger, 2009). Hall and colleagues (2004) have suggested that leaders who have positive reputations are allocated greater trust, receive less monitoring, and are held to lower accountability standards, making it more of a "sociopolitical process".

Field research with 33 employees by Kilduff and Krackhardt (1994) demonstrated that within the workplace, reputation is a combination of an individual's actual performance as well as their perceived associations (in the eyes of organization members) with prominent others in the work place (signaling one's social connectedness). In a series of experiments, Rosen, Cochran, and Musser (1990) found that an applicant's workplace reputation (superior over inferior) was a greater predictor of the interviewer's evaluation of job suitability than the applicant's self-presentation style (boastful over modest). Still other work has found that personal reputation moderates the relationship between workplace political behavior and three relevant work place outcomes (uncertainty, emotional exhaustion, and job performance) such that those with lower levels of personal reputation reported greater uncertainty and emotional exhaustion and lower levels of job performance as political behavior increased (Hochwarter, Ferris, Zinko, Arnell, & James, 2007).

In general, studies have focused on the early and static properties of the construct (Rhee & Valdez, 2009), that is, how an individual's reputation in one moment in time shapes outcomes of different kinds, including trust and status. Little is known about reputation dynamics, that is the trajectories of reputation over time, and how the dynamic properties of reputation apply to individuals. It is critical to examine how individual reputation shifts in response to actions that

define social life. Thus, we examine three elements of the dynamics of reputation worthy of focus: loss, gain, and regaining following transgressions.

***Losing reputation.*** The rich literature on “bad apples” in organizations has identified the characteristics of individuals who have poor reputations within individuals (Porath, MacInnis, & Folkes, 2010). Employees in a variety of sectors consistently express concern about damaging their reputations in the workplace (e.g., Doby & Caplan, 1995; Muller & Ornstein, 2007). Implicitly, people know that a loss of reputation at work is likely to translate to reduced opportunities and resources (e.g., pay, title, responsibilities, continued employment, etc.) in the workplace (Crowne & Marlwo, 1964). Additionally, threats to one’s workplace reputation can also have negative implications for one’s life outside of work (Doby & Caplan, 1995).

Alongside the recognized importance of reputation are claims about the dynamics of the loss of reputation. It has been suggested that transitions from good reputations to bad ones are quicker than the vice-versa (Nichols & Fournier, 1999), and that transgressions in the social realm are more costly to reputation than problematic behaviors in the objective world (Eisenegger, 2009). For example, committing a social transgression may be more consequential than making a risky financial investment in cryptocurrency and losing a substantial amount of money. We are interested in the dynamics of change in high- and low-power employees’ reputation, social status, and trust following a minor workplace transgression.

***Gaining reputation.*** Gaining a good reputation is critical to an individual faring well in organizations (e.g., Ferris, Davidson, Perrewé, 2005). One likely determinant of gains in reputation is engaging in “additional effort” in the workplace (sometimes referred to as “personal initiative”; e.g., Frese, Fay, Hillburger, Leng, & Tag, 1997; Hakanen, Perhoniemi, & Toppinen-Tanner, 2009). Research suggests that people who behave more cooperatively gain reputations as being more cooperative and people who behave more selfishly gain reputations as being more selfish, in particular for those individuals who are well-known within social networks (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). After all, good reputations “sit on the slippery ground of their constituents’ fickle interpretations” (Fombrun, 1996, p. 388).

***Recovering reputation.*** Critical to an individual and collective’s standing is how to respond to mistakes of different kinds, that is in recovering reputation (e.g., Burke, 2011; Gaines-Ross, 2008; Nicholas & Fournier, 1999; Sims, 2009). Within the corporate world, repairing the reputation of a product and a company is a slow and costly process (e.g., Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Despite this, very little is known about recovering or repairing one’s personal reputation following workplace transgressions.

Recovering one’s reputation generally includes some sort of apology and/or repair. Again, while generally examined at an organizational level, previous research has suggested that in terms of effective strategies following a transgression or crisis, apologies have the strongest positive effect on the organization’s reputation (e.g., Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Dean, 2004). In children, when a child with a good reputation commits some sort of transgression, when remorse is expressed, the child is seen as more likable, having better motives (attributing damage to an unintentional behavior), seen as being more sorry, and ultimately less blameworthy compared to those with bad reputations or those who express no remorse (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). In adults, expressing negative emotions such as embarrassment following a transgression can aid in

reputational recovery (e.g., Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner, 2012; Goffman, 1956b). Research with adults has also suggested that apologies are effective in “mitigating threats to reputation and identity” (Smith, Chen, & Harris, 2010, p. 743). Within the workplace specifically, apologies are necessary given the endless opportunities to intentionally or unintentionally offend or harm others (Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003).

## **Social Status**

Social status, or the respect, admiration, and deference an individual receives from others (e.g., Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Boehm, 1997, 1999; Huberman, Loch, & Onculer, 2004; Washington & Zajac, 2005), is similar to reputation in that it is considered to be contextual, or specific to a particular group or relationship (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). However, unlike reputation, status is considered to be less sensitive to change (Ertug & Castellucci, 2012) and rather than enhancing trust, communication, and collective success, can instead create division amongst group members (Anderson & Willer, 2014). While some have loosely used the terms status and reputation interchangeably, our aim is to provide data supporting that these are in fact distinct constructs.

In general, low-status is associated with numerous disadvantages (ranging from social, professional, and health domains) while high-status individuals have more resources, access to information, and influential social networks, which all favorably influence one’s reputation (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005). Compared to low-status individuals, high-status individuals enjoy greater deference from others (e.g., Kurzman et al., 2007), and are seen as more competent and powerful (Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). Some research suggests that low-status (and less powerful) employees are more likely to be blamed and punished (often through revenge) (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001). Compared to men, women are generally acknowledged to hold lower status (e.g., Lips, 1991; Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neill, 1977).

***Losing social status.*** One’s position of status is said to be “fragile” once one’s reputation has been damaged (Eisenegger, 2009). A number of factors are related to low status; for example, personality factors such as high neuroticism in men predicts lower status (Anderson et al., 2001), or actively seeking help from others (e.g., Ryan, Hicks, & Midgley, 1997; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Additionally, engaging in certain behaviors may also prove consequential for one’s social status.

When considering minor workplace transgressions, when comparing across employees, high-status employees have been shown to engage in more problem behaviors (e.g., cyberslacking; Garrett & Danziger, 2008). In the present research, both high- and low-power employees engage in minor workplace transgressions and the effect on loss in social status is measured. While some niche research has been conducted on how individuals lose social status in the workplace (e.g., the loss of status at work for men in post-communist Russia; Kiblitckaya, 2000), this is a relatively uncharted territory.

***Gaining social status.*** The desire to gain status is largely considered to be a universal human motive that drives much of our behavior (for a review see Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). It has been suggested that individuals can ascend in social hierarches by behaving in favorable ways. For example, individuals can gain social status by enhancing their value in the eyes of other group members - acting in ways that signal generosity and commitment

to the group (for a review see Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). The ability to increase one's social status has important implications for health and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012). In terms of moderating factors, prior research has suggested that personality traits such as high extraversion predict elevated status for both men and women (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001). Physical features such as height (e.g., Egolf & Corder, 1991) and attractiveness for men (Anderson et al., 2001) have also been shown to predict high status.

Status is afforded to those who are perceived as possessing important social value such as competence or some ability to be useful to others (e.g., Leary et al., 2014; Ridgeway, 1984). Thus, it stands to reason that not only will high-power people be perceived as such, but also the ability for high-power people to continue to gain status (due to their instrumental social value) should surpass low-power individuals, who are perceived as having less instrumental social value. Additionally, studies have found that behaving in generous ways is an effective method for gaining status (e.g., Flynn, 2003; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010). While both high-power and low-power individuals may engage in generous behaviors, the value attributed to these behaviors will likely favor high-power individuals in somewhat of a "Matthew effect" manner (Merton, 1968).

***Recovering social status.*** People lose status for a variety of reasons, including losing status following some sort of a transgression. Is it possible to regain some or all of one's social status after it has taken a hit? Are there specific factors (e.g., gender or power) that influence whether a person is able to repair their social status once it takes a hit? We find these to be important empirical questions to consider, particularly within the workplace where one's social status is not inconsequential.

The argument has been made that the degree to which a person is treated fairly is a signal of their status (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Smith, Tyler, & Huo, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Some research has found that higher levels of perceived status is associated with a greater sense of the person deserving procedural fairness (Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007). Thus, on the one hand one could reason that high-power individuals could be treated more fairly (i.e., better able to reinstate their reputation, social status, and trust) following a transgression compared to low-power individuals.

## **Trust**

While reputation is broadly about a person's overall character (Merriam-Webster, 2018), trustworthiness is reflective of one aspect of a person's character, specifically, the degree to which an individual can be relied upon to cooperate with other group members (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Gambetta, 1988; Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013; Zucker, 1986). Trust is an integral component in establishing and maintaining social networks and developing social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). Some have argued that trust is the "most important operational resource in our society" (Eisenegger, 2009, p. 11). Trust is "central to relationships" and is the "glue that holds most cooperative relationships together" (Limerick & Cunnington, 1993, p. 129). Empirically, trust has been shown to contribute to social, economic, and political success (Zak & Knack, 2001).

In terms of the workplace, trust is considered to be a key leadership competency – "the root cause of most failed personal and business relationships is the inability to build, maintain,

and recover trust” (Boutros & Joseph, 2007, p. 38). Trust, a component of political skill, helps people to be viewed more favorably by others (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé, 2005) and helps employees within organizations develop social capital (Spagnolo, 1999). From a business perspective, trust can also help with a variety of objectives within the workplace (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998).

***Losing trust.*** There are numerous behaviors that can occur in the workplace that erode trust. For example, “discourtesies” that occur in the workplace can be considered to be “withdrawals” from one’s trust “bank account” (Covey, 2013). Withholding information or resources in the workplace can also erode trust (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The decline of trust can happen following a single violation or transgression, or the decline in trust can occur gradually, overtime (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). The degree to which a person’s level of trust takes a “hit” likely depends on how the behavior fits in with the larger context of how the person is “seen” – for example, for an individual who is largely seen as less trustworthy, this confirmation of their untrustworthiness may result in a significant “hit” to their trust. On the other hand, for individuals who are seen as more trustworthy, engaging in untrustworthy behavior may be seen as an outlier or not representative of the person’s true nature, thus while trust will take a “hit”, this reduction may be less severe for some compared to others.

***Gaining trust.*** Trust between colleagues has been shown to positively influence group performance (via motivation; Dirks, 1999). It is often said that trust has to be “earned”. Trust can be earned by engaging in specific behaviors, including acting in a kind or courteous way (Covey, 2013). In the workplace, this may mean engaging in specific behaviors that help others (e.g., arriving to work early, giving credit to others, helping others with their work). While relatively minor behaviors, these kind or courteous acts can make the workplace more pleasant. How are these minor kind and courteous acts received by others? If others expect these behaviors, then perhaps engaging in these kind or courteous acts does not actually result in any additional gain in trust. However, if these behaviors are unexpected by others, then perhaps it can provide a boost in trust.

***Recovering trust.*** Can trust be recovered once it has been lost? Trust helps reduce uncertainty (Limerick & Cunnington, 1993); therefore, trusting a person after s/he has committed some sort of transgression can be risky, potentially leaving a person vulnerable to future betrayals of trust.

One of the components involved with recovering trust is a sincere apology (Boutros & Joseph, 2007). Depending on the apology and how the receiver of the apology internalizes it, trust may be restored. There are many options that exist in terms of recovering trust – 1) recovering zero trust (making trust “unrepairable”), 2) recovering some of the trust that was lost (a “partial reparation” of trust), 3) completely restoring all of the trust that was lost back to the original levels (essentially being able to “pick up where they left off”), or 4) allocating even greater trust to the person (depending on what the person values and the nature of the apology, it may result in additional gains in trust). In the workplace setting where relationships cannot be immediately terminated or dissolved, it may be necessary to restore some of a person’s trust in order to continue a workplace relationship. Thus, the motivation to restore trust in the workplace is likely different than motivation to restore trust in other contexts.

## TRAJECTORIES HYPOTHESES AND PRESENT STUDIES

The present investigation tested a set of competing hypotheses concerning how reputation, social status, and trust covary as employees rise, fall, and seek to reestablish their reputations. We used a pilot study (n=200) and three experiments (N=1,014) to test competing hypotheses concerning how power and gender influence the dynamics of reputation, status, and trust in the workplace. More generally, we sought to understand whether reputation, status, and trust are distinct constructs in terms of: a) correlations, and b) how they track specific actions in organizational contexts.

### Power Trajectories Hypotheses

Across the board, high-power individuals are generally seen as “better” (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000); for example, they are seen as more: trustworthy (e.g., Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000), competent (e.g., Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999), and intelligent (White, 1982). First, we hypothesize that initially (at baseline), when compared to low-power employees, high-power employees will be afforded higher reputations, status, and trust. When examining how reputation, social status, and trust covary as employees rise (Study 2), fall (Study 1), and seek to reestablish their reputations (Study 3), on the one hand, it can be hypothesized that high-power employees will be granted greater deference compared to low-power employees, in other words, high-power employees will enjoy greater recovery following transgressional losses, and greater gains after good deeds. Specifically, high-power employees’ behaviors may be justified and therefore may be punished less (e.g., Kim & King, 2014) compared to low-power employees following a transgression (image incongruent negative behavior; Study 1). High-power employees may reap greater rewards (e.g., Merton, 1968) compared to low-power employees when engaging in additional effort (image congruent positive behavior) in the workplace (Study 2). Additionally, given that high-power employees’ are seen as deserving of procedural fairness (e.g., Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007), workplace transgressions may be seen as an oddity (image incongruent negative behavior) and therefore high-power employees may have an easier time recovering following a workplace transgression compared to low-power employees (Study 3).

By contrast, it can also be argued that given the fact that low-power employees will already occupy the space of having lower reputations, social status, and trust relative to high-power employees, when low-power employees engage in a transgression (image congruent negative behavior), this behavior may come as less of a surprise and there may be less of a correction that needs to be made regarding how the low-power employee is seen by others (Study 1). When considering engaging in additional effort in the workplace (image incongruent positive behavior), this behavior may come as a surprise and thus this may require a larger correction in how these employees are seen (Study 2). Finally, following a workplace transgression, the low-power employee’s apology (image incongruent positive behavior) may be interpreted as being earnest and sincere (e.g., Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000) and thus these employees may have an easier time reclaiming reputation, social status, and trust (Study 3).

## Gender Trajectories Hypotheses

Given that historically speaking women are considered to be of lower status than men (e.g., Guttentag & Secord, 1983; Lips, 1991; Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977; Rudman & Glick, 1999), one might expect that for both high- and low-power employees, when compared to men, women may: experience greater punishment (Study 1), have more difficulty gaining (Study 2), and be extended less clemency (Study 3) when it comes to reputation, social status, and trust. On the other hand, it is possible that employees will simply be judged based on their objective behavior (rather than gender), and perhaps in part due to “inequality aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), there may be no gender differences in how people punish (Study 1), reward (Study 2), and forgive (Study 3) male and female employees.

## Overview of studies

In the present investigation, we report results from a pilot study (n=200) and three experiments (N=1,014) to better understand whether reputation, status, and trust are distinct constructs and to test competing hypotheses about how power and gender influence the trajectories of reputation, status, and trust in the workplace. In a pilot study, we first document the central components of workplace reputation. Having characterized reputation in the workplace, we then test competing hypotheses concerning how power and gender influence the loss (Study 1), gain (Study 2), and reclaiming (Study 3) of reputation, social status, and trust following reputationally relevant workplace transgressions (Studies 1, 3) and good deeds (Study 2).

### PILOT STUDY: WORKPLACE REPUTATION

In this study, we examined people's intuitions about the most important aspects for workplace reputation. We recruited 200 adult participants in the United States via Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=100; average age (SD) = 34.34±10.60, age range: 18-71 years; 63% female; 76% Caucasian; paid \$0.25 for their participation) and students from a large West Coast university (n=100; average age (SD) = 21.68±4.12, age range: 18-51 years; 63.8% female; 57.4% Asian, 22.3% Caucasian, 14.9% Hispanic/Latino; given partial course credit for their participation).

We asked participants to rank order 17 reputational components (plus an optional other category where participants were allowed to specify other components not listed as part of the 17 pre-selected components) in terms of the order of importance to a person's reputation at work. The 17 components included: current actions and behaviors, education, ideas, income/wealth, mental/emotional state, morals/values, occupation/job title/industry, past actions/behaviors, personality traits, physical appearance, religion, sexual orientation, social status/rank, their family, their friends, things they own/property, and what others say about them. All reputational components were presented in a random order list.

When looking at the top 5 categories of importance to a person's reputation at work, Amazon Mechanical Turk participants reported: current actions and behaviors (73%), occupation/job title/industry (67%), past actions/behaviors (54%), ideas (49%), and personality traits (46%), while students reported: current actions and behaviors (72%), occupation/job title/industry (71%), personality traits (56%), education (50%), and ideas (45%). Taken together,



the results from this pilot study suggest that people consider one's current actions and behaviors and one's occupation/job title/industry as being the most important components to a person's reputation at work (for related findings, Eagly & Wood, 1982).

## STUDY 1: LOSS TRAJECTORIES

In Study 1, we tested our hypothesis that the rate at which an employee loses trust, social status, and reputation following a minor workplace transgression will differ based on gender and power. Given that prior research suggests that some "masculine jobs" are associated with higher power and status (Glick et al., 1995), in this research we manipulate both gender and power. We measured perceived trust, social status, and reputation following the transgression. Within this 2 (gender of target) x 2 (high- or low-power) design, on the one hand, one might expect that following a minor workplace transgression, women, regardless of power, will take a larger hit to trust, social status, and reputation compared to men, and the same to be true for low-power employees when compared to high-power employees. On the other hand, it is possible that the behavior (workplace transgression) is judged independent of the employee's gender, and that compared to low-power employees, high-power employees will have more at stake (more to lose in terms of trust, social status, and reputation).

### Method

#### Participants

Participants in this study included 264 adults (average age $\pm$ SD = 20.99 $\pm$ 1.82, age range: 18-32 years; 73.11% female; 47.53% Asian, 29.66% Caucasian, 10.27% More than one race, 8.75% Hispanic/Latino) at a large West Coast university. Participants were given partial course credit for their participation.

#### Procedure

Participants completed the study in a single session. In order to make the study more believable, participants were first told the following:

*We interviewed people from a variety of different industries to get their experiences of working with others at their jobs. We are interested in how your ratings and impressions of these individuals compare to those of their co-workers. Because these are real life examples of people, all names have been changed in order to protect confidentiality. First, we would like you to provide ratings for several employees.*

Participants were then shown (in counterbalanced order) the employee's name (which was not a gender neutral name) and their high- or low-power occupation (e.g., "Kathryn Armstrong, a partner at a law firm downtown" or "Daniel Murphy, a delivery driver for a pizza company"). Participants were then asked to make three ratings regarding trust, social status, and reputation for each of the 8 employees (4 high-power and 4 low-power).

After providing the baseline ratings for all 8 employees, participants were then told the following:

*Next, we would like you to read some descriptions of information that has spread about these people at work. We are interested in how your ratings and impressions of these individuals compare to those of their co-workers. Because these are real life examples of people, all names have been changed in order to protect confidentiality.*

Participants were then shown (counterbalanced based on gender) the employee's name, high- or low-power occupation, and a relatively minor transgression (withholding effort) the employee committed in the workplace (e.g., "Kathryn Armstrong, a partner at a law firm downtown, tends to take credit for the work on cases with other partners in the firm without acknowledging their contributions" or "Daniel Murphy, a delivery driver for a pizza company, arrives to work late causing other drivers to stay past their shifts to cover the deliveries"). Participants were then asked again to make three ratings regarding trust, social status, and reputation for each of the 8 employees (4 high-power (2 men and 2 women) and 4 low-power (2 men and 2 women)) following the workplace transgression of withholding effort. All stimuli were presented in counterbalanced order.

### **Measures**

All measures were administered two times in Study 1, at baseline and at post-transgression. All ratings were made using a continuous slider scale ranging from 0 to 100 (with negatively and positively valenced anchors).

**Trust.** We examined trust by asking participants the following question: "*How much do you trust this person?*". Ratings were provided on a scale of 0 (*not at all*) to 100 (*very much*).

**Social Status.** We examined social status by asking participants the following question: "*How would you rate this person's social status?*". Ratings were provided on a scale of 0 (*below average*) to 100 (*above average*).

**Reputation.** We examined reputation by asking participants the following question: "*How would you rate this person's reputation?*". Ratings were provided on a scale of 0 (*one of the worst*) to 100 (*one of the best*).

## **Study 1 Results and Discussion**

### **Gender**

For the 4 high-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the loss trajectories of trust ( $p=.52$ ), social status ( $p=.27$ ), or reputation ( $.65$ ). For the 4 low-power professions, there were also no differences based on the employee's gender for the loss trajectories of trust ( $p=.29$ ), social status ( $p=.64$ ), or reputation ( $p=.26$ ). Thus, within the context of trust, social status, and reputational losses in the workplace following a transgression, there were no gender differences in the trajectories of losses between male and female employees.

### **Power**

Baseline and post-loss correlations between high- and low-power employees for trust, social-status, and reputation are reported in Table 3.1; in general, the three constructs seem to be

moderately correlated with one another but separate constructs. As reported in Table 3.2, high-power rather than low-power employees took a larger hit to trust, social status, and reputation following the minor workplace transgression. Following the minor workplace transgression, relative to low-power employees, high-power employees were still significantly higher on social status ( $M \pm SD$ :  $61.28 \pm 19.02$  vs.  $32.86 \pm 13.58$ ;  $F = 534.35$ ,  $p < .001$ , partial eta-squared ( $\eta^2_p$ ) = .67) and reputation ( $M \pm SD$ :  $39.08 \pm 19.13$  vs.  $29.09 \pm 15.13$ ;  $F = 110.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .30$ ). There were no differences in trustworthiness of high-power vs. low-power employees following the minor workplace transgression ( $p = .651$ ; see Figure 3.1).

When examining effect sizes (Table 3.2), we see that for high- and low-power individuals, the greatest reduction (baseline to post-transgression) in the three domains following the minor workplace transgression is in reputation, with large effect sizes ( $\eta^2_p = .77$  and  $.60$ ), followed by trust ( $\eta^2_p = .76$  and  $.56$ ), and finally, social status ( $\eta^2_p = .53$  and  $.24$ ). The larger effect sizes for the high-power employees reflects greater drops (baseline to post-transgression) in each domain (trust, social status, and reputation) following the transgression. Comparing effect sizes also helps differentiate reputation from social status, where social status seems to be more difficult to shift and tied to a person's power compared to reputation, which demonstrated greater fluctuations for both high- and low-power employees.

Taken together, the results from this study suggest that within the context of workplace transgressions, while there were no gender differences evident between high- and low-power employees, high-power employees have more to lose following a minor workplace transgression compared to low-power employees. Yet, the relative levels of social status and reputation (but not trust) seem to be fairly protected for high-power employees in the sense that even following the transgression, high-power employees are still higher in social status and reputation compared to low-power employees. Interestingly, following the minor workplace transgression, high- and low-power employees are seen equally in terms of trustworthiness.

## STUDY 2: GAIN TRAJECTORIES

In Study 2, we examined the rate at which employees gain reputation, social status, and trust in the workplace, turning to the potential gains associated with minor instances of employees engaging in additional effort in the workplace. In this study we again manipulated gender and power. We again measured trust, social status, and reputation, here within the context of employees engaging in additional effort in the workplace.

Given the literature on biases against women (e.g., Guttentag & Secord, 1983; Lips, 1991; Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977; Rudman & Glick, 1999), on the one hand one might expect that in the context of additional effort in the workplace, women, regardless of power, will gain trust, social status, and reputation at a slower rate compared to men. Additionally, one might expect that following additional effort in the workplace, low-power employees may gain trust, social status, and reputation at a slower rate compared to high-power employees (who may enjoy greater "fairness"; e.g., Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007). On the other hand, a competing prediction is supported by the literature that the behavior (workplace effort) can be judged independent of the employee's gender, and that given the higher expectations for high-power employees (e.g., Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), these individuals will not be afforded meaningful increases in trust, social status, and reputation when engaging in additional effort in the workplace.

## Method

### Participants

Participants in this study included 274 adults (average age $\pm$ SD = 21.22 $\pm$ 3.06, age range: 17-45; 78.83% female; 51.09% Asian, 29.20% Caucasian, 11.31% Hispanic/Latino) at a large West Coast university. Participants were given partial course credit for their participation.

### Procedure

Study 2 procedures were very similar to Study 1 procedures. Participants completed the study in a single session and were first told the following:

*We interviewed people from a variety of different industries to get their experiences of working with others at their jobs. We are interested in how your ratings and impressions of these individuals compare to those of their co-workers. Because these are real life examples of people, all names have been changed in order to protect confidentiality. First, we would like you to provide ratings for several employees.*

Participants were then shown (counterbalanced based on gender) the employee's name and their high- or low-power occupation. Participants were then asked to make three ratings regarding trust, social status, and reputation for each of the 8 employees (4 high-power (2 men and 2 women) and 4 low-power (2 men and 2 women)). All stimuli were presented in counterbalanced order.

After providing the baseline ratings for all 8 employees, participants were similarly told the following:

*Next, we would like you to read some descriptions of information that has spread about these people at work. We are interested in how your ratings and impressions of these individuals compare to those of their co-workers. Because these are real life examples of people, all names have been changed in order to protect confidentiality.*

Participants were then shown (counterbalanced) the employee's name, high- or low-power occupation, and this time, a brief description of the employee's additional effort in the workplace (e.g., "Robert Anderson, a head marketing executive at a high-tech company, tends to give others credit on team projects by acknowledging the efforts of other team members rather than taking credit himself" or "Susan Peters, a receptionist at a massage chain, completes all of her front desk duties and even does some of the tasks for the next person's shift"). Participants were then asked again to make three ratings regarding trust, social status, and reputation for each of the 8 employees (4 high-power and 4 low-power) following the additional effort.

### Measures

All measures (trust, social status, and reputation) were identical in nature to Study 1, and administered at baseline and post-additional effort.

## Study 2: Results and Discussion

### Gender

To examine whether high-power men and women in identical professions and engaging in identical helpful behavior in the workplace experienced different trajectories for trust, social status, and reputation, we conducted paired sampled t-tests based on change scores. For the 4 high-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for trust ( $p=.285$ ); however, there were marginally significant differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for social status ( $p=.054$ ), and significant differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for reputation ( $p=.041$ ). In these analyses, in identical professions, compared to high-power women, men gained marginally more social status and significantly more reputation for the identical helpful behavior in the workplace (see Figure 3.2, Panel A). Thus, for high-power employees, there is indeed a difference in the trajectories between men and women gaining reputation at work, and a potential difference in the trajectories between men and women gaining social status at work.

To examine whether low-power men and women in identical professions and engaging in identical helpful behavior in the workplace experienced different trajectories for trust, social status, and reputation, we conducted paired sampled t-tests based on change scores. For the 4 low-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectories of trust ( $p=.38$ ) or social status ( $p=.16$ ). However, there were significant differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for reputation ( $p=.046$ ). Such that in identical professions, low-power *women* compared to low-power men gained significantly more reputation for the identical helpful behavior in the workplace (see Figure 3.2, Panel B). Thus, for low-power employees, the only difference in the gain trajectories for men and women is for reputation, whereby low-power women seem to have an easier time gaining reputation compared to low-power men.

Taken together, these data provide some insight regarding the differentiation between the gender trajectories for trust, social status, and reputation gains in the workplace. For both high- and low-power professions, reputation seemed to be the variable that was most susceptible to gender differences in gain trajectories. These data also shed light on how reputational gains in the workplace may be easier for high-powered men compared to high-power women, and on the other hand, easier for low-power women compared to low-power men.

### Power

Baseline and post-loss correlations between high- and low-power employees for trust, social-status, and reputation are reported in Table 3.3; in general, the three constructs seem to be moderately interrelated suggesting that they are indeed separate constructs. As reported in Table 3.4, low-power employees had larger gains in trust, social status, and reputation compared to high-power employees. Following the additional effort at work, relative to low-power employees, high-power employees were still significantly higher on trust ( $M\pm SD: 75.69\pm 13.43$  vs.  $69.95\pm 14.46$ ;  $F=70.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .21$ ), social status ( $M\pm SD: 79.88\pm 10.90$  vs.  $48.92\pm 16.55$ ;  $F=683.94$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .72$ ), and reputation ( $M\pm SD: 81.33\pm 10.92$  vs.  $67.30\pm 15.81$ ;  $F=197.70$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .42$ ).

While both high- and low-power employees made gains in trust and reputation following additional effort at work, only low-power employees gained in social status; high-power

employees social status remained unchanged following additional effort at work (pre-social status:  $79.39 \pm 10.27$ , post-social status:  $79.88 \pm 10.90$ ;  $F=1.29$ ,  $p=.257$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .005$ ; see Figure 3.3).

When examining effect sizes (Table 3.4), we see that for low-power employees the greatest gain (baseline to post-additional effort) is in reputation ( $\eta^2_p = .73$ ), followed by trust ( $\eta^2_p = .67$ ), and social status ( $\eta^2_p = .48$ ), replicating a similar pattern to what was seen in Study 1 where reputation was the most malleable variable and social status the least. For high-power employees the greatest gain (baseline to post-additional effort) is in trust ( $\eta^2_p = .51$ ) followed by reputation ( $\eta^2_p = .21$ ) (social status was again non-significant for the high-power employees). The larger effect sizes for the low-power group reflects larger gains (baseline to post-additional effort) in each domain. Comparing effect sizes also suggests that perhaps low-power employees can improve their reputations quite a bit by engaging in additional effort in the workplace.

Taken together, the results from this study suggest that low-power employees have more to gain following additional effort in the workplace, starting first with reputation. While low-power employees have more to gain, similar to the pattern in Study 1, low-power employees' relative levels of trust, social status, and reputation are still lower compared to high-power employees following additional effort in the workplace. While high-power employees can make some gains in trust and reputation following additional effort in the workplace, their social status seems to remain unchanged and insensitive to changes following additional effort at work.

### **Synthesizing Findings Across Studies 1 and 2**

One of the compelling questions that motivated our work was whether losses loom larger than gains, particularly for reputation. When looking at the effect sizes (based on pre-to-post change scores) from the losses in Study 1 (Table 3.2) and the gains in Study 2 (Table 3.4), we see an interesting interaction effect based on power. Specifically, for high-power employees, losses are greater than gains (as depicted in Table 3.2, reductions in: reputation:  $\eta^2_p = .77$  (low-power  $\eta^2_p = .60$ ), trust:  $\eta^2_p = .76$  (low-power  $\eta^2_p = .56$ ), and social status:  $\eta^2_p = .53$  (low-power  $\eta^2_p = .24$ )). However, for low-power employees, gains are greater than losses (as depicted in Table 3.4, improvements in: reputation:  $\eta^2_p = .73$  (high-power  $\eta^2_p = .21$ ), trust:  $\eta^2_p = .67$  (high-power  $\eta^2_p = .51$ ), and social status:  $\eta^2_p = .48$  (high-power  $\eta^2_p = .005$ )). These data suggest that for high-power employees, losses have greater impact, whereas for low-power employees, gains are more potent. Additionally, the pattern of these effect sizes across Studies 1 and 2 also suggest that across these three constructs of reputation, social status, and trust, reputation is the most malleable while social status is the least malleable and likely more tightly tied to power.

## **STUDY 3: RECOVERY TRAJECTORIES**

In Study 3, we completed our trajectories investigation by examining the rate at which employees regain reputation, social status, and trust in the workplace following a transgression. Study 3 was identical in design to the loss study (Study 1); however, following the transgression, the employee is portrayed as making an apology and repair. In this study we tested the idea that on the one hand, high-power employees, enjoying greater procedural fairness (e.g., Diekmann, Sondak, & Barsness, 2007), may be able to regain trust, social status, and reputation at a faster rate compared to low-power employees when making a repair following a transgression in the workplace. On the other hand, a competing prediction supported by the literature that suggests that given the higher expectations for high-power employees (e.g., Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), it may be more difficult (e.g., requiring more time and/or greater effort) for

high-power employees to repair their trust, social status, and reputation following a transgression.

## Method

### Participants

Participants in this study included 467 adults (average age $\pm$ SD = 23.35 $\pm$ 2.47, age range: 20-50; 72.59% female; 50.61% Asian, 25.71% Caucasian, 11.84% More than one race, 8.16% Hispanic/Latino) at a large West Coast university. Participants were given partial course credit for their participation.

### Procedure

Study 3 procedures were initially very similar to Study 1 procedures. However, in Study 3, after making the post-transgression ratings of each employee, participants were then told that:

*These people have since acknowledged and explained the reasons for their behavior. They have expressed genuine remorse for their actions and have attempted to make repairs. We are interested in how your ratings and impressions of these individuals compare to those of their co-workers. Because these are real life examples of people, all names have been changed in order to protect confidentiality.*

Participants were shown (counterbalanced) the employee's name, occupation, description of their transgression, and this time, a brief apology. The apologies were based on Aaron Lazare's work (2005) on the four components apologies must do: 1) acknowledge the harm that has been done, 2) provide an explanation that indicates it wasn't intentional or personal, 3) emotional expression of remorse, shame, or humility, 4) repair the harm that has occurred. For example, participants would see the following:

Kathryn Armstrong, a partner at a law firm downtown, tends to take credit for the work on cases with other partners in the firm without acknowledging their contributions.

She acknowledges that credit has not been given to the other partners and has explained that this was inadvertent. She feels shameful about taking credit for others' work. She has sent an email to the rest of the firm to publicly acknowledge the works of the other partners.

After reading each apology, participants were then asked for the third and final time to make three ratings regarding trust, social status, and reputation for each of the 8 employees (4 high-power (2 men and 2 women) and 4 low-power (2 men and 2 women)). All stimuli were presented in counterbalanced order.

### Measures

All measures (trust, social, status, and reputation) were identical in nature to Studies 1 and 2. Measures were administered three times in Study 3, at baseline, post-transgression, and post-apology.

## Study 3 Results and Discussion

### Gender

Similar to Study 1, when examining the loss trajectories for the 4 high-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for trust ( $p=.82$ ), social status ( $p=.24$ ), or reputation (.18). Also similar to Study 1, when examining the loss trajectories for the 4 low-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the loss trajectories of trust ( $p=.17$ ), social status ( $p=.98$ ), or reputation ( $p=.38$ ).

When examining the trajectories around repairs, for the 4 high-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the recovery trajectory for trust ( $p=.25$ ); however, there were marginally significant differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for social status ( $p=.08$ ), and significant differences based on the employee's gender for the gain trajectory for reputation ( $p=.036$ ). Such that in identical professions, compared to high-power women, men regained marginally more social status and regained significantly more reputation for identical apologies following a minor workplace transgression (see Figure 3.4). Thus, for high-power employees, there is indeed a difference in the recovery trajectories between men and women at work, and a potential difference in the trajectories between men and women regaining social status at work.

When examining repair trajectories for the 4 low-power professions, there were no differences based on the employee's gender for the recovery trajectory for trust ( $p=.622$ ), social status ( $p=.769$ ), or reputation ( $p=.861$ ). Thus, for low-power employees, there is no difference in the recovery trajectories between men and women.

### Power

Baseline and post-loss, and post-apology correlations between high- and low-power employees for trust, social-status, and reputation are reported in Table 3.5; in general, the three constructs seem to be moderately interrelated, further suggesting that they are indeed separate constructs. Again, similar to Study 1, high-power rather than low-power employees took a larger hit to trust, social status, and reputation following the minor workplace transgression. As depicted in Figure 3.5, again similar to Study 1, following the minor workplace transgression, relative to low-power employees, high-power employees were still significantly higher on social status and reputation and again there were no differences in trust between high- vs. low-power employees following the minor workplace transgression ( $p = .821$ ; see Figure 3.5).

In terms of the apology, as reported in Table 3.6, following the repair, low-power employees had larger gains in social status and reputation compared to high-power employees. Following the repair, relative to high-power employees, low-power employees were still significantly lower on trust, social status, and reputation (Figure 3.5). Most interestingly though, while both high- and low-power employees were able to recover some of their trust, social status, and reputation with an apology following the transgression, for low-power employees an unexpected pattern emerged: these employees had significantly *higher* relative levels of trust, social status, and reputation ratings *after* the apology compared to *before* they committed transgressions (baseline scores; Figure 3.5). These counterintuitive findings suggest that a thoughtful apology (à la Lazare, 2005) from low-power employees can greatly improve how they are viewed in terms of trust, social status, and reputation.

When examining effect sizes (Table 3.6), we see that following the apology, there is still a sizeable difference in social status between high- and low-power employees ( $\eta^2_p = .93$ ). When



looking at the effect sizes from post-transgression scores to post-apology scores, we see large gains in trust (high-power:  $\eta^2_p = .69$ , low-power:  $\eta^2_p = .66$ ) and also reputation (high-power:  $\eta^2_p = .61$ , low-power:  $\eta^2_p = .67$ ). Once again, while improvements are made, social status seems less susceptible to movement, particularly for high-power employees (high-power:  $\eta^2_p = .20$ , low-power:  $\eta^2_p = .44$ ).

Taken together, the results from this study suggest that low-power employees have more to gain in terms of an apology following a transgression, in fact, these data suggest that low-power employees may even fare better in the eyes of others following a repair compared to had a transgression and repair never taken place. Yet while low-power employees have seemingly more to gain, as we have seen across studies, regardless of the helpful behavior (Study 2) or repair (Study 3), their relative levels of trust, social status, and reputation still remain below high-power employees.

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

The data from these studies suggest that the trajectories of one's reputation, social status, and trust in the workplace seems to be largely dependent upon whether one is in a high- or low-power position. The present research found that following a minor workplace transgression, high-power employees have more to lose and take larger hits to reputation, social status, and trust compared to low-power employees (Study 1). When examining gains, or engaging in additional effort in the workplace, we found that it is in fact low-power employees who have larger gains in reputation, social status, and trust compared to high-power employees. Unlike low-power employees, high-power employees are unable to improve their social status through additional effort in the workplace. Yet, high-power employees are able to modestly improve reputation and trust through additional effort in the workplace (Study 2). Taken together, the data from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that high-power employees have more to lose (Study 1), and low-power employees have more to gain (Study 2).

In Study 3, similar to Study 1, we found that compared to low-power employees, high-power employees take larger hits to reputation, social status, and trust. When apologizing following a transgression, we found that both high- and low-power employees are able to reclaim reputation, social status, and trust; however, for low-power employees, apologizing allows them to reclaim more reputation, social status, and trust compared to high-power employees, suggesting that apologies are most functional (at least in the immediate term) for low-power employees. Most interestingly though, we found that following the post-transgression apology, the relative levels of reputation, social status, and trust for low-power employees was higher than before the employee committed the transgression (Study 3).

Across all three studies we found that compared to low-power employees, the reputation, social status, and trust of high-power employees never falls below the relative level of low-power employees. In other words, the hierarchy between high- and low-power employees seems difficult to shift. Taken together, our work suggests that the trajectories of one's reputation, social status, and trust in the workplace is largely dependent upon whether one is in a high-versus low-power position.

When considering gender differences, there does not appear to be any differences for the loss trajectories (Study 1); however, for the gain trajectories (Study 2) and recovery trajectories (Study 3), the most pronounced gender differences appear to be for the reputation trajectories. High-power men gain more reputation compared to high-power women, while low power-

women gain more reputation compared to low-power men (Study 2). When examining the repair trajectories (Study 3), compared to high-power women, high-power men regain significantly more reputation for identical apologies following a workplace transgression. Taken together, these data suggest that gender may differentially influence reputation gains (Study 2) and reputation recovery (Study 3) trajectories in specific (and meaningful) ways.

While it has been said that trust and reputation are “fundamental and indispensable” to our societies (Eisenegger, 2009), we see some interesting and differential patterns in our research. For example, when looking at effect sizes with reputation, social status, and trust, in Study 1 we see that regardless of whether it is a high- or low-power employee, reputation is most susceptible to change (or “hits”) following a transgression. For gains (Study 2), we see that for low-power employees reputation is again the most susceptible to change (or improvements), while for high-power employees trust is the most susceptible to change. For repairs (Study 3), once again for low-power employees reputation is most susceptible to change (or reclaim), while for high-power employees trust is the most susceptible to change. When examining effect sizes across all three studies, for both high- and low-power employees, social status seems to be the “stickiest” and most difficult to change.

One potential explanation for the findings with high-power employees receiving harsher “punishments” (Study 1), being rewarded less for additional effort (Study 2), and recovering less of their reputation, social status, and trust (Study 3) compared to low-power employees, may be “inequality aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Perhaps participants were to some degree resisting inequitable outcomes for low-power employees compared to high-power employees. Given that we do not have an objective metric of our participants’ views on inequality, this potential explanation remains speculative. Another potential explanation for these findings is that the expectations for high-power employees are such that there is simply much to lose, and little to gain. It may also be the case that for high-power employees, repeated instances (rather than a single instance, Study 2) of additional effort may be required in order to gain reputation, social status, and trust. Future studies could examine repeated instances of additional effort in the workplace to examine whether there is a “tipping point” at which high-power employees are able to gain equivalent amounts of reputation, social status, and trust as low-power employees. Additionally, when considering the recovery findings (Study 3), it is possible that an extended examination of the temporal trajectories for high-power employees is required; it may be the case that it simply takes longer (or additional apologies/repairs on the part of the high-power employee are required) in order to reinstate reputation, social status, and trust.

### **Theoretical Contributions**

Our work makes several important theoretical contributions. First, some have suggested that reputation is “sticky” and difficult to change (e.g., Bromley, 2001), yet our research suggests that compared to related constructs (e.g., social status, trust) reputation in the workplace may be quite malleable, particularly for low-power employees. While it has been suggested that the link between reputation and behavior may be stronger for more prominent individuals (e.g., high-power) compared to less prominent individuals (e.g., low-power) (e.g., Anderson & Shirako, 2008), the present research suggests that in some contexts and cases (e.g., workplace transgressions, additional effort, and apologies), the link between reputation and behavior may be just as important if not more important for seemingly less prominent individuals. Additionally, while people will “punish” or “reward” reputation based on current actions or

behavior, it does seem that (somewhat immediately) one can reclaim reputation through a thoughtful apology, particularly for low-power employees.

Second, our research adds to the prior literature that social status seems to be “sticky” and difficult to shift through current actions and behaviors. Relative to reputation and trust, social status seems to be the least malleable of the three constructs, at least within the workplace context. Given that people are able to very quickly “detect and encode status differences among others” (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015, p. 11), there seems to be mounting evidence that this initial detection and encoding that occurs is difficult to change. While we would like to assume that one’s own behaviors and achievements might provide a pathway for upward or downward mobility, the present research suggests that while there is some modest movement, large shifts in social status seem to be difficult to attain through single actions or behaviors. The present research also suggests that while relative levels seem to be higher for high-power individuals across all three contexts (loss, gain, and recovery), high-power employees have more to lose (Study 1 and 3) and seemingly less to gain (Study 2), perhaps pointing to the higher expectations of high-power individuals (e.g., Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000) and contributing to the paradoxical literature on deference between high- and low-power actors (Anderson et al., 2012b). Additionally, this research adds to the literature that suggests prosocial behaviors are a way for low-power individuals to strategically gain social capital (e.g., Guinote, Cotzia, Sandhu, & Siwa, 2015).

Third, our research suggests that trust is an important domain, particularly for high-power employees when engaging in beneficial behaviors in the workplace and attempting to make a repair following a transgression in the workplace. In general, people are more trusting of high-power individuals compared to low-power individuals (e.g., Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Additionally, while we crafted thoughtful four component apologies (à la Lazare, 2005) for both high- and low-power employees, our research suggests that the value assigned to a workplace apology may differ depending on whether the person is considered a high- or low-power employee. At least for reputation and social status, there seems to be a greater value placed on an apology from a low-power employee versus a high-power employee. This may again have to do with the differing expectations of how high- and low-power individuals respond to negative events (e.g., Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Moreover, it may be the case that apologies from high-power employees takes additional time to be “accepted” and are not immediate in terms of reinstating reputation, social status, or trust. Future research could examine longer-term trajectories or repeated apologies of high- versus low-power employees in order to unpack this finding further.

While prior research has suggested that trust and social status are important components for personal reputation (e.g., Jazaieri et al., under revision), the present series of studies highlight how these domains are distinct facets that have independent trajectories following transgressions, additional effort, and apologies in the workplace. The current studies suggest that reputation, social status, and trust trajectories appear to behave uniquely for men and women as well as for high- and low-power employees. Finally, these data provide preliminary evidence of potential gender differences in reputation gains amongst high- and low-power employees (Study 2) and the potential difficulty that high-power women have in regaining their workplace reputations following a transgression (Study 3).

## **Practical Implications for Employees and Organizations**

Our findings inform a number of practical implications for the workplace. First, for organizations and employers, it is important to be aware of how the environment and network may view high- and low-power employees differently for similar behaviors. In nearly every single domain in our three studies there were significant differences in how people viewed similar behaviors from high- versus low-power employees. It is important to consider how on an organizational level, the group may “punish” or “reward” certain employees differently, depending on whether they are perceived as being high- versus low-power, or at times, based on their gender.

Second for employees, the data from these studies suggest that it may be easier to lose social capital (reputation, social status, and trust) following a workplace transgression and more difficult to gain social capital following additional effort in the workplace, particularly for those in high-power occupations. Taking into account the discrepancy in the ease of losing and difficulty of gaining may help employees choose different, more skillful behaviors in the workplace. Additionally, our work is encouraging for employees in that it suggests that regardless of high- or low-power, with a thoughtful apology, it is possible to reclaim (part, or in some cases surpass) one’s reputation, social status, and trust in the workplace following a transgression. Interestingly our work also suggests that a thoughtful apology from a low-power employee following a transgression can relatively immediately improve one’s reputation, social status, and trustworthiness in the eyes of others.

Third, given the importance of trust in organizational success (e.g., Ferres, Connell, & Travaglione, 2004; Serrat, 2017), it may be prudent for managers, supervisors, and executives to pay particular attention to monitoring when their employees have workplace transgressions, even relatively minor ones. Our work reveals that with a thoughtful apology, it is possible to reclaim one’s social capital in the workplace and this may be particularly important and beneficial for low-power employees. Workplace transgressions can have severe consequences for the employee, and potentially even for the organization; thus, mentoring employees to recognize their transgressions (even minor ones) and skillfully employing the “art of a thoughtful apology” may be quite beneficial for the individual, team, and organization.

Equally important to making an apology is the willingness of others to accept the employee’s apology. Research from Google’s People Operations team identified “psychological safety” as being the most important factor of effective teams (Rozovsky, 2015). According to Google, embedded within “psychological safety” is the confidence that “no one on the team will embarrass or punish anyone else for admitting a mistake...”. Issuing an apology begins with admitting a mistake, and includes expressing one’s emotions and repairing the harm - making oneself extremely vulnerable to others in a workplace setting. Then, the apology requires the willingness of others to accept the repair and reinstate some amount of the person’s tarnished reputation, social status, and trust. This is a complex transaction whereby managers, supervisors, and executives can play a key mentoring role for employees.

## **Limitations and Future Directions**

Our research is subject to several limitations, which provide opportunities for future research on this topic. We focused this investigation on transgressions that take place within the workplace. Future research may choose to explore the consequences of transgressions that occur

*outside* the workplace, and when known to colleagues, how these non-workplace transgressions influence one's trust, social status, and reputation at work. It is possible that employees are still "punished" for transgressions even when they do not occur in the workplace. Relatedly, we examined additional effort that takes place within the workplace. Future research could also explore the benefits of additional efforts that occur outside the workplace, and when this information is known to colleagues, whether these positive non-workplace behaviors influence one's trust, social status, and reputation at work.

Second, given the within subjects design, participants were rating both high- and low-power employees on different transgressions or additional effort in the workplace. Future research may choose to employ a between subjects design where the specific transgression or additional effort is controlled for between high- and low-power employees (e.g., both the high- and low-power employee is late, or both the high- and low-power employee does additional work for a colleague). Relatedly, we examined fairly low intensity behaviors of transgressions or additional effort in the workplace. Future research may choose to examine a spectrum of low, medium, and high intensity behaviors in both transgressions and additional effort to see whether the trajectories differ between high- and low-power employees depending on the intensity of the behavior.

Third, an interesting question that has emerged from this research is how quickly people assimilate new information and update their reputational beliefs about others and whether this differs depending on power. In our research we asked participants to provide ratings on losses, gains, and reclaiming trust, social status, and reputation immediately following the behaviors (transgression, additional effort, and apology). Future research may consider a more longitudinal approach (which is more akin to the workplace), where repeated ratings are given on the employee's trust, social status, and reputation following the transgression, additional effort, and apology over a period of time (e.g., once a week for several months). It is possible that over the course of time, the perception of the employee's behavior (transgression, additional effort, and apology) shifts. In terms of apologies, some research suggests that late apologies are better than early apologies (e.g., Franz & Benningson, 2005), though this may be dependent upon the perceived power of the transgressor. Relatedly, at least within the context of transgressions and apologies, future research may choose to examine trait-level forgiveness or willingness to take risks of the *evaluator* – these may be an interesting potential moderating variable in terms of how some individuals assign reputation, social status, and trustworthiness to the employee following the transgressions or apologies.

Fourth, based on the pilot study we examined high- and low-power based on the employee's occupation/job title/industry. Beyond power, future studies may choose to additionally examine whether how well-known the person is influences how their trust, social status, and reputation are perceived following a transgression, additional effort, or apology. For example, while Study 3 indicated that low-power individuals were able to recover more of their trust, social status, and reputation following the post-transgression apology, it is possible that when compared to someone who is high-power *and* well-known, the low-power person may fare worse.

Fifth, our research examined losing, gaining, and recovering one's personal reputation. While reputation management has been extensively studied on the organizational level, much less is known about reputation management on the individual level. For example, it is possible that through management of one's reputation (attempting to maintain a good reputation and avoiding a bad reputation), employees may actually paradoxically engage in behaviors that are

not socially acceptable within their organizational unit. This is an important area for research to examine on the individual employee level.

Finally, this study relied on outside raters' perceptions of the employees' behaviors, which were based on fictional scenarios. Future research would benefit by conducting field research where researchers could collect actual workplace behaviors that fall into the positive (gains), negative (transgressions), and repair (recovery) domains and then utilize the employee's colleagues' for ratings of reputation, social status, and trust. Given that these constructs may be largely dependent upon what the specific group values, it is possible that some behaviors that are deemed to be "transgressions" or "gains" in one group may be seen in a different light within the context of another group (e.g., Eisenegger, 2009; Hutton, Goodman, Alexander, & Genest, 2001, p. 249). Relatedly, in our research we focused on how the employee was perceived in terms of the individual's reputation, social status, and trust. Future research may choose to employ questions that are more interpersonal in nature; for example, following a transgression, additional effort, or apology, researchers could ask interpersonal questions such as: "how much do you want to work with this person?" or "how much do you want this person to remain on your team?". Reputation may also be a viable predictor of an individual's success in influencing others (Gamson, 1966), another fruitful area for individual and team reputation research.

## **CONCLUSION**

How employees are perceived in the workplace is important to organizational success. On a daily basis, employees engage in behaviors that are considered to be positive or negative, and these behaviors have important consequences for how the person is perceived in terms of their reputation, social status, and trustworthiness. We find that it is easier to lose these elements of social capital, more difficult to gain these elements, and possible to reclaim them through apology. Our work importantly reveals that the trajectories of gaining, losing, and reclaiming reputation, social status, and trust differs in interesting and important ways depending on whether the employee is high- or low-power, and in some cases, depending on the employee's gender.

## **CHAPTER 4: REPUTATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL**

Reputations are, by definition, based upon the network's specific standards of what constitutes "good" and "bad" behaviors, features, characteristics, and intentions. For these reasons, comparisons of reputations across networks are difficult to make – what may be considered a "good" reputation in one context could be an obstacle in another context. For example, in one context being prosocial may be beneficial for one's reputation, while in another context, being prosocial may be deemed a weakness. Therefore, because "good" and "bad" is truly relative to the standards of the specific network, there is not a universal set of behaviors that can necessarily develop good or bad reputations (Zinko, Furner, Hunt, & Dalton, 2017). Instead, good and bad reputations are largely formed based on the positive and negative deviations one's behavior relative to the specific network's norms (Zinko et al., 2017).

How are the group's norms communicated and made known to the members? At times, the group's norms may be explicit, and other times, the group's norms may be more implicitly held. Often, a member of a group can better understand the group's norms by observing how others in the network are received, as this should in theory hint at how the network constructs

good vs. bad reputations. Other times, we can extract reputational information that is stored within the network through explicitly eliciting such information (Craik, 2008). In some contexts, reputations of individuals are more salient and easier to explicitly extract. For example, sports is an interesting context to consider reputation in that on the one hand, there is already explicit and shared knowledge amongst the network regarding the talent and performance of individual players; yet, it is unknown whether there is explicit and shared knowledge in the network for more “intangible assets” (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013), such as reputation.

Within the context of sports, beyond performance metrics, players are tracked based on a variety of “clout” type metrics including the player’s “search score”, or how often their name is searched online, their endorsement dollars, number of social media followers, etc. (ESPN, 2018). When considering the context of sports, what are the norms for good vs. bad reputations? Do the norms of good vs. bad reputations differ depending on the specific sport (e.g., golf vs. basketball or football vs. baseball) or the specific context (e.g., individual vs. team or contact vs. non-contact)? Is there group consensus regarding what constitutes good vs. bad reputation within a specific sport? While some have suggested that there may be a “surprisingly low level of consensus among members of a group” (Bromley, 2001, p. 322), in the present research within the context of major league baseball (MLB), we consider: a) how group consensus may differ in good vs. bad reputations, b) whether a network’s criteria or perception of good or bad reputation differs depending on the specific reference context, and c) whether reputation relates to meaningful behaviors (performance) that are objectively observable.

## Reputation in Sports

People’s reputations are often in part attributable to the reputations of their organizations, groups, or teams (e.g., Staw & Epstein, 2000; Simons, 1998). Within companies and organizations, reputation is often related to things such as the goods, products, and services the company produces, and/or the reputation of one or two high profile people within the organization, such as the founder or CEO. In sports, reputations of teams are often related to the reputations of specific players on the team, as the players are essentially the team’s “product”. For these reasons, teams have a vested interest in having players with favorable reputations.

Often, it is said that your “reputation precedes you”, meaning that before even having an encounter, others may have formed some sort of an opinion regarding you (positive, negative, neutral or indifferent) – this is likely also true within the context of sports. Reputational information about players can be transmitted through various sources within the network – current or former coaches and teammates, fellow competitors, recruiters, journalists or commentators, fans, referees, etc. This transmission of reputational information about players can be consequential.

An experiment with 38 soccer referees found that when referees in the experimental group were told that one team had a reputation for more aggressive plays or fouls, the referees ended up giving out more severe penalties compared to referees in the control group when viewing the same scenarios (while there were differences in the severity of penalties, there were no differences in the *total* number of decisions made; Jones, Paull, & Erskine, 2002). The data from this study suggests that it is possible for a team or player’s pre-game reputation to influence important decisions of those judging the game or match (e.g., whether arguing or tripping is a simple foul or a “flagrant” foul which may merit an ejection). While we like to assume that

referees are objective judges, only responding to what they are seeing in front of them in the moment (rather than information obtained prior to the game or match), we know that such prior knowledge and expectations (e.g., team or player reputational information) influences judgments (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).

In addition to those judging the game or match, many others involved are influenced by reputational information. For example, the reputation of the team or organization may influence the player's own decision-making process (e.g., causing the player to stay with the team/organization or motivating the player to utilize the team as a stepping stone to another team/organization; Markarius, Stevens, and Tenhiälä, 2017). Reputation also enters into the decision making process for the team, too. For example, a study by Ertug & Castellucci (2013) looked at reputation and status in the NBA and found that when teams are concerned about winning games (which is typically the case with most professional teams when they are not pursuing the “process” for rebuilding purposes), teams often have a preference for recruiting players with highly favorable reputations over high status players. However, when teams are primarily concerned with revenue, they tend to recruit more high status players rather than players with highly favorable reputations. The data from this study (similar to the data presented in the series of studies in Chapter 3) helps disentangle reputation from status (also see Washington & Zajac, 2005), but more importantly, suggests that player possessing highly favorable reputations (over high status) may be associated with winning.

**Reputation in Baseball.** When considering reputation specifically within the context of baseball, surprisingly little has been written in the empirical literature on the topic, yet the construct of reputation does seem to be prevalent and on the minds of many who are associated with the game. For example, on November 30, 2016 coming off a World Series Championship, the Chicago Cubs signed center fielder Jon Jay. When Cubs’ general manager Jed Hoyer was asked about the signing of Jay, he said the following: “From a makeup and leadership standpoint, he’s got an off-the-charts reputation. . .given his reputation and a lot of comments we’ve gotten from his now-teammates indicate his reputation precedes him” (Gonzalez, 2016). Statements such as these suggest that even amongst baseball players, there seems to be something tangible that others observe or experience that contributes to the player's reputation being formed and shaped early on in the social network. While reputation is frequently talked about casually when discussing specific players or teams; to our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies of reputation within baseball.

**MLB.** Founded in 1903, Major League Baseball (MLB) is the oldest of the four major professional sports leagues (the other three being the NBA, NFL, and NHL) in the United States and Canada. The league is currently comprised of 30 teams (29 in the United States and one in Toronto, Canada), divided between two leagues (National and American), each with three conferences (East, Central, and West). Each season, teams play a remarkable 162 regular season games over the course of 6 months, with five teams from each league advancing to post-season tournament play. Teams maintain two rosters – a 25-man “active roster” as well as a 40-man “expanded roster. The additional 15 players on the expanded roster can be called-up to the active roster at any point in time. While rosters vary between teams, typical rosters consist primarily of pitchers (5 starting, 7 relief), 2 catchers, 6 infielders, and 5 outfielders (the American League includes a designated hitter in place of an infielder or outfielder). Aside from being America’s pastime, baseball is an interesting context to study the role of reputation in that it is a sport that is based on a series of fairly solitary events (compared to other sports that require coordination between multiple players; e.g., passes or screens set in basketball, passes or blocks in football,



etc.). One could argue that as far as team sports go, baseball is an ideal context to study the role of personal reputation.

### **The Present Research**

In light of the lack of a substantial literature on the topic of reputation in baseball, we present two initial studies which focus on expert consensus regarding good and bad reputations, as well as the ability to differentiate between multiple (yet related) forms of reputation (player and teammate) (Study 1). Then, utilizing the players and teams nominated in Study 1, in Study 2 we sought to examine the relationship between the experts' nominations of players with good and bad reputations and the players' on-the-field behavior.

### **STUDY 1: EXPERT NOMINATIONS OF PLAYER REPUTATION**

Given that reputation is given to and shaped by the network (Craik, 2008), we sought to examine which players would be allocated good and bad reputations by a group of baseball experts (i.e., those that cover baseball, and multiple MLB teams, for a living). Baseball experts serve a distinct role – in general, experts are not life-long fans that follow a single team and favor a single player. Experts are also not teammates, who inevitably see each other through a different lens. Further, experts are not coaches or front office management, who have different relationships with the players – making decisions about rosters, salaries, and general organization strategy. For these reasons, we consider these experts to be the most knowledgeable, unbiased sample with regards to the reputations of MLB players.

Given the lack of empirical literature in this area, this study was largely exploratory in nature as the intention was to examine expert consensus regarding player reputation, examine multiple (yet related) forms of reputation (player and teammate), and to also ultimately gather responses regarding player reputation in order to be used in subsequent studies. While exploratory in nature, we did make two specific predictions - first, we anticipated that players from the two teams from the 2016 World Series Finals (Chicago Cubs and Cleveland Indians) would be overly represented in the good player category. Second, we anticipated that it would be the case that players on the 2016 World Series Championship team (Chicago Cubs) would be overly represented in the good teammate nominations. Finally, given some of our prior work looking at certainty of reputation (Jazaieri, Karasawa, & Keltner, in prep), we anticipated that the network would have greater certainty of good reputations, which should in turn yield greater group consensus regarding good reputations compared to bad reputations.

### **Method**

#### **Participants**

This study comprised of 47 MLB experts (41 men, 6 women). Average age was  $42.96 \pm 13.37$  with a range of 24 to 68 years old. The average number of years the experts reported following baseball for was  $29.22 \pm 14.75$  years with a range of 4-60 years. In short, these were not casual baseball fans. Experts' occupations included MLB beat writers, journalists, columnists, sportscasters/reporters, editors, anchors, MLB announcers (both radio and TV), as well as individuals who hold office positions in MLB organizations (e.g., lawyer, manager of special events, sales and marketing, etc.). Experts were from various locations across the United States and Canada. The number of teams the experts reported closely following ranged from 1 to

30 teams, with an average of  $6.26 \pm 9.08$  teams. Experts were not compensated for their responses.

### **Procedure, Materials, and Measures**

An online survey was administered to baseball experts prior to spring training in February 2017. Experts were asked four questions in order to examine multiple forms of reputations (good vs. bad and player (likely more competence oriented) vs. teammate reputation (likely more warmth oriented)). The term “reputation” was left undefined for the experts for purposes of this survey, as we wanted the experts to employ their own definition of the term rather than imposing limitations with providing our own scientific definition of the term. Additionally, for all responses we did not specify or limit the entries beyond indicating that we were interested in the experts' thoughts regarding players in the prior (2016) season. For these reasons, experts could in theory nominate the same player for good or bad workplace reputation and also for individual reputation.

**Player reputation.** Here, we were attempting to tap into experts' views regarding workplace reputation (which is likely related to competence). Using a free response entry form (with two separate entry fields), experts were asked to: “*Nominate 2 players from the 2016 season with the best reputations as baseball players*” and separately, to “*Nominate 2 players from the 2016 season with the worst reputations as baseball players*”.

**Teammate reputation.** Here, we were attempting to tap into experts' views regarding individual social reputation (which is likely related to warmth). Using a free response entry form (with two separate entry fields), experts were asked to: “*Nominate 2 players from the 2016 season with the best reputations as a teammate*” and to “*Nominate 2 players from the 2016 season with the worst reputations as a teammate*”.

**Player performance.** We were interested in examining whether there were any differences in the performance of good vs. bad reputation players and teammates. Data on player performance were taken from the MLB website ([www.MLB.com](http://www.MLB.com)). For batting performance statistics we looked at runs, hits, doubles (2B), triples (3B), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), bases on balls (BB), strike outs (SO), stolen bases (SB), caught stealing (CS), batting average (AVG), on-base percentage (OBP), slugging percentage (SLG), and on-base plus slugging (OPS).

**Player status.** We were interested in examining whether there were any differences in the status of good vs. bad reputation players and teammates. Previous research looking at status in athletes has utilized the player's current year's salary as an indicator of the player's status (e.g., Kraus, Huang, & Keltner, 2010). Thus, in the present research we have followed suit. Data for MLB player 2016 salaries were coded from the USA Today Salaries Database (2018).

**Team wins.** Given the work of Ertug & Castellucci (2013) in the NBA, we were interested in examining the relationship between perception of players' reputations and team wins. We included the team's regular season wins (taken from the MLB website ([www.MLB.com](http://www.MLB.com))) as a variable of interest.

## Study 1 Results

### Player Reputation Expert Nominations

As described above, we asked experts to nominate two players with good reputations as *players*, two players with bad reputations as *players*, two players with good reputations as *teammates*, and two players with bad reputations as *teammates*. There were a total of 104 *unique* players nominated across the four categories (with some players appearing more than once across the categories; for a complete list of all 104 player names see Appendix A). Three players nominated once in the bad player and bad teammate categories did not play during the 2016 season (Josh Hamilton, Vincent Padilla, and C.J. Wilson) and were removed from subsequent analyses (leaving 101 unique players nominated from the 2016 season). The total number of unique nominations across the four categories ranged from as few as a total of 25 unique nominations (good reputation as a player) to as many as a total of 50 unique nominations (good reputation as a teammate). Of the 101 players nominated who played in the 2016 season, 49 players were from teams who did not make it to the post-season playoffs while 13 out of the 101 players were from the two teams (Chicago Cubs and Cleveland Indians) appearing in the World Series.

**Good Reputation Players.** For good reputations as a player, there were a total of 25 unique player nominations, with potential consensus (2 or more expert nominations) with 13 players (as 12 players (48%) had only one expert nomination). The player with the top expert nomination for having a top reputation as a player was Mike Trout (28 out of 47 experts (59.6%) nominated him). There was then a sharp drop off in consensus of nominations, which included 12 (25.5%) nominations for Clayton Kershaw, and 6 (12.8%) expert nominations for both Kris Bryant and Buster Posey. The remaining 21 players received 1-4 expert nominations for having a good reputation as player (including 12 players (48%) with only one expert nomination).

**Good Reputation Teammates.** For good reputations as a teammate, there were a total of 50 unique player nominations, with potential consensus (2 or more expert nominations) with 14 players (as 37 players (74%) had only one expert nomination). The player with the most expert nominations for having a good reputation as a teammate was David Ross (10 out of 47 experts (21.3%) nominated him). There was then a sharp drop off in consensus of nominations, which included 5 expert nominations (10%) for both David Ortiz and Kris Bryant, and 4 expert nominations (8%) for both Mike Napoli and Anthony Rizzo. The remaining 46 players received 1-3 expert nominations for having a good reputation as a teammate (including 37 players (74%) with only one nomination).

**Bad Reputation Players.** For bad reputations as a player, there were a total of 39 unique player nominations, with potential consensus (2 or more expert nominations) with 15 players (as 25 players (64%) had only one expert nomination). The player with the top expert nomination for having a bad reputation as a player was Jose Bautista (11 out of 47 experts (23.4%) nominated him), closely followed by Yasiel Puig with 9 expert nominations (19.1%), Bryce Harper with 6 expert nominations (12.8%), and Danny Valencia with 4 expert nominations (8.5%). The remaining 36 players received 1-3 expert nominations for having a bad reputation as a player (including 25 players (64%) with only one nomination).

***Bad Reputation Teammates.*** For bad reputations as teammates, there were a total of 31 unique player nominations, with potential consensus (2 or more expert nominations) with 13 players (as 18 players (58%) had only one expert nomination). The player with the top nomination for having a bad reputation as a teammate was Yasiel Puig with 10 expert nominations (21.3%), and 8 expert nominations (17%) for both Bryce Harper and Jonathan Papelbon. The remaining 30 players received 1-4 expert nominations for having a bad reputation as a teammate (including 18 players (58%) with only one expert nomination).

### **Teams Represented in Expert Nominations**

Across the 4 reputation categories (good/bad x player/teammate) 28 out of the 30 MLB teams had at least one player nominated. The Philadelphia Phillies and St. Louis Cardinals did not have any players nominated across the four categories for the 2016 season. Of the 25 unique players nominated for having reputations as “good players”, 19 unique teams were nominated including: 3 players from the Chicago Cubs, 2 players from the Cleveland Indians, 2 players from the Boston Red Sox, 2 players from the Los Angeles Dodgers, 2 players from the New York Mets, and the remaining 14 teams all had one player nominated. Of the 50 unique players nominated for having reputations as “good teammates”, 22 unique teams were nominated including: 6 players from the Chicago Cubs, 4 players from the Los Angeles Dodgers, 4 players from the New York Mets, 4 players from the San Francisco Giants, 3 players from the Boston Red Sox, 3 players from the Cleveland Indians, 3 players from the Kansas City Royals, 3 players from the New York Yankees, 3 from the Texas Rangers, 3 players from the Toronto Blue Jays, and the remaining 13 teams all had one player nominated. Of the 39 unique players nominated for having reputations as “bad players”, 24 unique teams were nominated including: 4 players from the New York Mets, 4 players from the Washington Nationals, 3 players from the Chicago Cubs, 7 teams had two players nominated, and 14 teams had one player nominated. Finally, of the 31 unique players nominated for having reputations as “bad teammates”, 19 unique teams were nominated including: 4 players from the Chicago White Sox, 4 players from the New York Mets, 3 players from the Toronto Blue Jays, 3 players from the Washington Nationals, 2 teams had two players nominated, and 13 teams with one player nominated. In summary, across the 4 categories, the top 6 teams with unique players nominated included the New York Mets (10 players), Chicago Cubs (8 players), Los Angeles Dodgers (6 players), New York Yankees (6 players), San Francisco Giants (6 players), and Washington Nationals (6 players). The remaining 22 teams had between 1-5 players nominated.

### **Positions Represented in Expert Nominations**

Of the 25 unique players nominated for having reputations as “good players”, there were 5 who play in the outfield, 4 at 1st base, 4 at 2nd base, 4 at 3rd base, 3 catchers, 2 starting pitchers, 1 relief pitcher, 1 short stop, and 1 designated hitter. Of the 50 unique players nominated for having reputations as “good teammates”, there were 9 who play in the outfield, 9 at 2nd base, 9 at 3rd base, 7 starting pitchers, 6 at 1st base, 4 at short stop, 3 catchers, 2 relief pitchers, and 1 designated hitter. Of the 39 unique players nominated for having reputations as “bad players”, there were 10 who play in the outfield, 8 starting pitchers, 6 at 2nd base, 4 relief pitchers, 3 at 1st base, 3 at 3rd base, 2 catchers, 2 designated hitters, and 1 short stop. Finally, of the 31 players nominated for having reputations as “bad teammates”, there were 8 who were outfielders, 8 starting pitchers, 3 relief pitchers, 3 at 1st base, 3 at 3rd base, 2 at 2nd base, 2 designated hitters, 1 catcher, and 1 at short stop.

### Reputation Nominations and Individual Player Performance

We were interested in examining how the expert nominations of good and bad players and teammates compared to that player's batting performance<sup>1</sup> during the 2016 season. For batting statistics we looked at runs, hits, doubles (2B), triples (3B), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), bases on balls (BB), strike outs (SO), stolen bases (SB), caught stealing (CS), batting average (AVG), on-base percentage (OBP), slugging percentage (SLG), and on-base plus slugging (OPS).

**Good vs. Bad Reputation Players.** Of the 25 players nominated by the experts for having good reputations as players, batting statistics were available for 22 players. Of the 39 players nominated by the experts for having bad reputations as players, batting statistics were available for 35 players. For sake of analyses, we excluded the two players (Bryce Harper and Brandon Phillips) who were nominated in both the good and bad player reputation categories. Thus, the following analysis is looking at 57 players who were nominated by experts as having good or bad reputations as players. Across every single batting statistic with the exception of being caught stealing ( $p = .058$ ), good reputation players outperformed bad reputation players (Table 4.1). These data suggest that expert's nominations of good vs. bad player reputations tracks extremely closely with batting statistics, and thus these nominations may be primarily comprised of a player's "on-the-field" performance.

**Good vs. Bad Reputation Teammates.** Of the 50 players nominated by the experts for having good reputations as teammates, batting statistics were available for 42 players. Of the 31 players nominated by the experts for having bad reputations as teammates, batting statistics were available for 22 players. For sake of analyses, we excluded 6 players (Miguel Cabrera, Brandon Phillips, Jose Reyes, Chris Sale, Troy Tulowitzki, and Yordano Ventura) who were nominated in both the good and bad teammate reputation categories. Thus, the following analysis is looking at 64 players who were nominated by experts as having good or bad reputations as teammates. Unlike reputation as a player, reputation as a teammate did not significantly differ among good vs. bad reputation players across most of the 14 batting statistics, with the exception of hits and doubles. There were marginal differences ( $p$ 's between .055 - .092) for runs, 3B, RBIs, OBP, and OPS (Table 4.2). These data suggest that expert's nominations of good vs. bad teammate reputation does not closely track with batting statistics, but is drawing upon some other knowledge that is not captured by a player's "on-the-field" performance.

### Reputation Nominations and Status

When examining the average salary of good vs. bad reputation players, we find no difference in salaries (Good (M±SD)=\$10,191,317.70 ± \$9,530,565.77, Bad (M±SD) = \$10,152,179.40 ± \$7764493.47;  $F=1.75$ ,  $p > .19$ , 95%CI [-4466921.3, 4545197.89]). When examining the average salary of good vs. bad reputation teammates, we again find no difference in salaries (Good (M±SD)=\$10,916,647.10 ± \$8,317,776.79, Bad (M±SD) = \$11,689,289.0 ± \$8,646,778.32;  $F=.16$ ,  $p > .69$ , 95%CI [-4933722.8, 3388438.98]). When looking at the

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<sup>1</sup> Given that out of the 101 unique players nominated only 24 were pitchers, amongst the pitchers we did not have sufficient power to examine pitching performance and good ( $n=3$ ) vs. bad ( $n=12$ ) reputations as players or pitching performance and good ( $n=7$ ) vs. bad ( $n=9$ ) reputations as teammates (plus two players nominated for both good and bad teammate reputation).

relationship between the total number of nominations each player received in each of the four categories and their salary, there again was no relationship between salary and reputation nominations (all  $p$ 's between .11 to .80). Taken together, this data suggest that status does not appear to be a variable that factors into reputation (player or teammate) within this network.

### Reputation Nominations and Team Wins

Given the work of Ertug & Castellucci (2013) in the NBA, we were interested in examining the relationship between perception of players' reputations and team wins. In the 2016 season teams ranged from 59 (36.4% winning percentage, Minnesota Twins) to 103 (63.6% winning percentage, Chicago Cubs) wins. Of the 101 players nominated, the average number of team wins was  $83.74 \pm 10.98$ .

When looking at the relationship between the *number* of nominations the player received and the team's wins, we found no relationship between nominations as a good player and team wins ( $r = -.11$ ,  $p = .612$ ), and also no relationship between nominations as a bad player and team wins ( $r = .27$ ,  $p = .103$ ). When looking at the relationship between nominations as a good teammate and team wins, there was a significant relationship ( $r = .42$ ,  $p = .002$ ); this was also the case for nominations as a bad teammate and team wins ( $r = .38$ ,  $p = .036$ ).

We conducted follow-up t-tests to look at the relationship between team wins and good reputation vs. bad reputation *players* and found no differences ( $t=1.40$ ,  $p = .166$ , 95% CI[-1.77, 10.12]) - players nominated for having good reputations as players had similar numbers of team wins ( $M=86.74 \pm 10.35$ ) compared to those nominated for having bad reputations as players ( $M=82.57 \pm 11.67$ ). We also conducted follow-up t-tests looking at the relationship between team wins and good reputation vs. bad reputation *teammates* and found significant differences  $t=2.12$ ,  $p = .035$ , 95% CI[.42, 11.56] - players nominated for having good reputations as teammates were on teams that had significantly more team wins ( $M=86.59 \pm 11.03$ ) compared to players nominated for having bad reputations as teammates ( $M=80.60 \pm 11.34$ ).

### Study 1 Discussion

While some research examining reputation in sports has used the player's performance as a metric for reputation (e.g., Ertug & Castellucci, 2013 utilized the Player Efficiency Rating (PER) for NBA player reputation), in our research we opted to ask baseball experts to nominate players with good and bad reputations (since players with equivalent talent can in fact have varying reputations). When examining the four different types of player reputations, there was clear consensus amongst the experts for the player with a good reputation as a player (indicating consensus regarding his competence in his job) with 59.6% of experts agreeing on Mike Trout. Interesting, this category (good x player) also received the fewest unique player nominations (25 total, 13 players with more than one nomination) indicating that experts are in relative agreement in this domain. These findings fit nicely with some of our prior work (Jazaieri, Karasawa, & Keltner, in prep), which suggest that people have greater certainty about good reputations. Interestingly though, nominations for good reputations as teammates brought in the most number of unique nominations (50). David Ross had the top nomination with 10 experts (21.3%) reaching consensus. Perhaps this is because experts can speak to a player's abilities in the workplace (competence), and less so to how a player is interpersonally as a teammate (competence). In terms of bad reputations, there were more nominations for reputations as a player (39) than a teammate (31) and similar consensus for athletes with bad reputations as a

player (23.4% for Jose Bautista) and bad reputations as a teammate (21.3% for Yasiel Puig). Nevertheless, as suggested by Bromley (1993), these data provide preliminary evidence for the multiple forms of reputations that exist and how some groups are more privy to certain types of reputations than others. While according to the definition of reputation there needs to be some degree of general agreement, shared perspective, or consensus within the group (Becker, 1982), these data also suggest that consensus within a group ranges, depending on one's definition (e.g., does consensus mean 2 or more people? Does consensus mean the majority of the group? What if the group has fractured opinions and there is no majority?).

When examining the performance of the players nominated by the experts for good and bad reputations, the present data suggest that expert's nominations for good vs. bad reputation players tracked closely with objective performance measures (batting statistics from the 2016) season; however, when considering good vs. bad reputation teammates, these nominations did not track as closely with objective performance measures, which suggests that reputation as a teammate is not so much about performance, but rather about other behaviors or metrics that may not necessarily show up in a stats book. This finding also points to the notion that people can have more than one reputation, depending on the context (e.g., reputation as an MLB player vs. reputation as an MLB teammate), and that the network (in this case the baseball experts) use different criteria for judging various types of reputation. Future research on reputation would benefit from explicitly asking individuals (in this case experts) *why* they are allocating "good" or "bad" reputational labels to specific individuals. Asking this "why" question will allow us to better understand the specific criteria the network uses to designate good and bad reputations.

With regards to status, while there was a range in the status of the 101 players nominated (e.g., in the present sample, a player had a minimum salary of \$522,700 while another player had a maximum salary of \$34,000,000), the data from this study regarding reputation and status suggests that in this network, members differentiate between reputation and status. This finding differentiating reputation from status is consistent with findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, which has suggested that while status is important and factors into reputation to a degree, these two constructs while related, are in fact distinct (also see Washington & Zajac, 2005). Given Ertug & Castellucci's (2013) work that found NBA teams were able to differentiate between reputation and status when recruiting players, it is possible that there are other ways to measure status in MLB aside from salary. For example, future research could consider the number of awards or honors (e.g., MVP awards, All-Star game selection, etc.) as proxies for a player's status. Additionally, given that "high" or "good" reputation actors or players are likely to provide high quality "resources" or "performance" compared to high status actors (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013), teams may choose to have better metrics of gathering and understanding a player's reputation prior to recruiting, drafting, or engaging in salary negotiations.

Finally, given the work of Ertug & Castellucci (2013) in the NBA, we were interested in examining the relationship between perception of players' reputations and team wins. While one may anticipate that good reputation players and teammates would be on teams that are winning more and bad reputation players and teammates would be on teams that are winning less, the present data does not reflect this intuition. First, we found no relationship between the *number* of nominations for reputation as a *player* (good or bad) and team wins. We did find evidence of a positive relationship between the *number* of nominations for reputation as a *teammate* (both good and bad) and team wins. Follow-up t-tests yielded a significant difference in team wins for players nominated with good versus bad reputations as teammates. While this data needs to be

replicated with a larger sample of experts, it suggests that experts may associate players who are seen through a lens of high-warmth (good reputation teammates) with better performing teams.

Taken together, the data from this study suggests that in some domains there is consensus amongst experts regarding player reputations. Furthermore, there is greater clarity and consensus for good versus bad reputation (particularly with player reputation rather than teammate reputation). This may be due to the fact that information is more likely to spread about “good” information and less likely to spread about “bad” information. Additionally, this study also indicates that these experts were able to differentiate between good or bad players versus good or bad teammates (in the sense that these top nominated players are not identical across the player vs. teammate category). While we did not explicitly measure warmth and competence for each player (an opportunity for future research), it is reasonable to anticipate that player reputation may map onto competence while teammate reputation may map onto warmth (Fiske et al., 2002, 2007). Finally, this study allows us to utilize the players nominated by the experts in our subsequent behavioral coding analyses in the next study.

## **STUDY 2: BEHAVIORAL CODING OF 2016 MLB HOME OPENERS**

While reputations are very much “real” in that they have consequences for one’s personal and professional life, reputations are still imperfect (Kreps & Wilson, 1982). Reputations may be established upon incomplete information, hearsay, or word of mouth, and yet, reputations still carry significant weight. While reputations are thought to represent a person’s “overall quality or character” (Merriam-Webster, 2018), the exact link or correlation between the person’s reputation and the person’s actual behavior is unknown. Reputation (good, bad, mixed) and behavior (positive, negative, inconsistent) is at times in the expected direction (e.g., good reputation and positive behaviors – a deserving reputation), at other times it is in the unexpected direction (e.g., good reputation and negative behaviors – an undeserving reputation), and at other times it is in an asymmetric direction (e.g., good reputation and inconsistent behavior) (see Figure 4.1).

In Study 1, we utilized a group of baseball experts to identify players with good and bad reputations. Some data suggests that the link between reputation and actual behavior may be weak at best (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). What is not known is how the reputations of baseball players relates to their actual behavior on the field. In the present study, we are specifically interested in examining the relationship between a player’s reputation and a player’s display of positive and negative emotion and behavior at work (on the baseball field). We will provide a brief review of the literatures that inform our theoretical conceptualization that informed behavioral coding procedures including the role of emotion (positive and negative) and behavior (positive, negative, touch, and synchrony).

### **Factors that Contribute to Reputation in Baseball**

Below, we outline a number of factors that may influence a player’s reputation as a player and/or teammate. These factors include emotion (positive and negative) and behavior (positive, negative, touch, and synchrony). While other factors also likely contribute to the reputations of athletes, we begin this preliminary inquiry by examining these two broad areas.

**Role of Emotion.** Emotions provide us with invaluable information about internal and external experiences (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). It is widely acknowledged that our emotions



influence our behavior and our physiology (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1993; Davidson, 1993; LeDoux, 1996). Often, our emotions are generated by specific thoughts (e.g., Beck, 1974; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, in athletes as young as 14 years old, there is evidence to suggest that following a “failure”, optimism (rather than pessimistic explanatory style) reduces anxiety, helps athletes feel more confident, and positively influences subsequent performance (Martin-Krumm, Sarrazin, Peterson, & Famose, 2003). According to the social-functional approach to emotion (Keltner & Haidt, 1999), one’s experience (and subsequent expression) of emotion has social consequences for individuals and their relationships (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Keltner & Gross, 1999).

Within baseball, we are specifically interested in examining positive emotions such as gratitude, empathy, optimism, general positivity, and joy. We are also equally interested in examining negative emotions such as anger/frustration and their variants (e.g., agitation, annoyance, bitterness, exasperation, fury, rage, wrath, etc.). The study of positive emotions within the context of sports has been studied far less than expected (Skinner & Brewer, 2003; McCarthy, 2011). While it has been well documented that anxiety can interfere with performance in the context of sports (for a meta-analysis see Woodman & Hardy, 2003), anger and frustration on the other hand have gained far less attention in terms of their consequences on an individual and team level, particularly in non-contact team sports (Campo et al., 2012). We are particularly interested in the role of emotion (positive and negative) in “good” and “bad” reputation players in MLB.

**Role of Behavior.** At times we can experience a negative emotion (e.g., anger) and not act on it and instead regulate the emotion (e.g., feeling angry and wanting to throw something and instead taking a deep breath). At other points in time, we can experience a negative emotion and we act on it (e.g., feeling angry and throwing something). Sometimes our behaviors happen in isolation without immediate consequences to others (e.g., feeling angry and throwing a book on the ground), and at other times, our behaviors have relatively immediate consequences both for others and ourselves (e.g., feeling angry and throwing a cellphone that ends up breaking and being phoneless and unreachable until it is replaced). The consequences of our behaviors can be both proximal (i.e., immediate) and distal (i.e., delayed). Behaviors can be crudely divided into two categories – “positive”, or behaviors that help a person further his/her goals (which we view as adding to the construction of a “good” reputation), and “negative”, or behaviors that move a person away from his/her goals (which we view as adding to the construction of a “bad” reputation).

Within the context of baseball, some of the positive behaviors (generally associated with positive emotions) that may add to one’s reputation include things such as: smiling, laughing, joking, dancing, cheering for others, clapping vigorously, providing direct feedback and open communication with others (not suppressing and perhaps engaging in “tough compassion”), and consoling others. Our interest in behaviors includes both verbal and non-verbal behaviors, as there is a growing and intriguing area of research on the non-verbal communication of positive emotions (for a review see Sauter, McDonald, Gangi, & Messinger, 2014). On the other hand, negative behaviors (generally associated with negative emotions) such as yelling at oneself or others, complaining, sulking, throwing or kicking things, swaggering, reveling in personal accomplishments, etc., are all considered to be “negative behaviors” and would be hypothesized to negatively impact an individual’s reputation.

**Touch.** A specific type of behavior that we are interested in examining is the behavior of touch. Here, touch is categorized as a behavior since it is something that is physical, however, we know through research that touch (even in brief forms) can also be a form of communicating specific emotions (e.g., Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 2006) and can even increase feelings of positive emotions such as gratitude (Simão & Seibt, 2015). It is also important to acknowledge that touch has important social functions (Hertenstein, 2002), including enhancing trust, warmth, cooperation, and reducing feelings of threat. From a cultural perspective it is known that some cultures have more touch than others (Remland, Jones, & Brinkman, 1994).

While not within the context of baseball, Kraus and colleagues' (2010) research yielded several fascinating findings on touch in the NBA including that: (1) touch earlier in the season predicted better performance on an individual and team level later in the season, (2) touch predicted improved performance after controlling for player status, preseason expectations, and early season performance, and (3) cooperative behaviors between NBA teammates mediated the relationship between touch and team performance. In the present research, touch is one of the behavioral components in the overall constellation of factors of how players with positive reputations may appear on the baseball field. Given the scant research on the topic, examining touch in sports, particularly baseball, is an exciting avenue for future research.

**Synchrony.** From an evolutionary perspective, it has been argued that interpersonal coordination supports social cohesion (e.g., Freeman, 2000; McNeill, 1995). Sometimes referred to as social entrainment, one form of interpersonal coordination is synchrony, or movement matched in time between two or more people. We see synchrony in many contexts in life ranging from schools of fish in the ocean, to orchestras, and athletic teams. The benefits of synchrony have been touted from promoting similarity and liking to compassion and altruistic behavior (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer, 2013). Steven Strogatz's book *Sync* (2004) eloquently captures the mystery and emerging science behind synchrony and it seems others are catching on. Recently, a company ([SyncStrength](#)) has been formed to examine physiological synchrony (via heart rate) amongst athletes as they claim physiological synchrony promotes stronger "interpersonal chemistry" (e.g., cohesiveness, trust, cooperation). Empirically, one study demonstrated bodily synchronization following telling a joke (which pairs both synchronization with a positive affective state) (Schmidt, Nie, Franco, & Richardson, 2014).

Synchrony can exist both intentionally as well as unintentionally and is often associated with "close, communal relationships" (Smith, 2008), and to some degree because synchrony is evidence of a close relationship, it in turn promotes greater closeness (Hove & Risen, 2009). Simply put, it is possible that synchrony may raise morale, strengthen bonds, and enhance camaraderie. For example, in basketball, LeBron James of the Cleveland Cavaliers is notorious for having a personalized choreographed handshake with *each* of his teammates, some lasting as long as 10 seconds (Haynes, 2015). These handshakes, which require creativity in addition to synchrony, are also opportunities to infuse fun and provide some smiles and laughs in a highly competitive situation.

To date, little is known about synchrony within the context of sports. Many sports (e.g., basketball, football) require coordinated movements amongst players throughout the entire game. Baseball is yet again an interesting context where team synchrony is required when playing defense (e.g., coordination between the catcher and basemen when tagging a runner out), but

synchrony between players is not required on offense (since one is only coordinating the synchrony between the bat and the ball and synchrony amongst teammates is not required). Therefore, synchrony is an interesting variable to isolate to examine whether certain teams and players synchronize more or less with each other and how this behavior relates to individual reputation, and even overall performance.

### **Hypotheses**

Given the lack of empirical literature in this area, this study was largely exploratory in nature; however, we did make a few specific predictions. Given the prior literature, we anticipated that compared to bad reputation players, players with good reputations will: a) display more positive emotion and behaviors during games, b) have greater frequency of touch during home opener games, c) engage in more frequent instances of synchrony during games; d) express less negative emotion and behaviors during home opener games, and e) have more positive interactions with others (fans and opposing team) during home opener games. Finally, we wanted to examine whether home opener behavior would predict better season statistics for good vs. bad reputation players.

## **Method**

### **Participants**

This study focused on the 30 MLB teams in the United States and Canada. Specifically, we were focused on the 101 players who were nominated in Study 1 who played during the 2016 home opener.

### **Procedure**

In order to make the coding process more manageable and reliable, coders coded parts (innings 1, 3, 6, and 9) of the 2016 home opener for each of the 30 MLB teams. Controlling for the home opener allows us to take into account home field advantage and the “early” aspect of the season (for temporal precedence). Specifically, we utilized the players nominated in Study 1 (who actually played in the 2016 home opener), a total of 74 players. Full-game stimuli were obtained through the MLB.tv subscription archive.

### **Coding of Behaviors**

Based on both our theoretical approach to reputation as well as qualitative pilot data gathered in October 2016 from group of baseball columnists and reporters, we had coders code a variety of emotion and behavioral categories. Coding categories (described in greater detail below) included positive emotion and behaviors, touch (intentional forms rather than touch resulting directly from playing baseball (e.g., sliding into a base and coming into contact with the baseman)), synchrony, negative emotion/behaviors), as well as interactions with others (including the fans and the opposing team). Coders coded for these specific codes, making notes of which players are involved, during which innings, and the frequency of the behavior. We had three coders code each of the 30 home opener games and interrater reliability was calculated for each game. For games where IRR was less than .75, a fourth coder coded the game in order to reconcile the discrepancy. Of the 30 games coded, only 2 games had an IRR less than .75. These two games were due to instances where behaviors of players were captured and coded by one or two coders, and not coded (missed) by the other coder(s). All coders were kept blind to the

specific study hypotheses and did not know which players had been nominated by the experts for good and bad reputations in Study 1. In other words, coders were coding behaviors of *all* players during the home opener and did not focus their efforts on any specific players.

The five main coding categories included: positive emotion and behaviors, touch, synchrony, negative emotion and behaviors, and interactions with others. We will briefly describe the subcategory behaviors that were coded below. All categories included an “other” code where coders could make note of any behaviors that fit the category but were not captured by the specific subcategories.

**Positive Emotion and Behaviors.** While a variety of emotions and behaviors can be captured by individuals in a workplace setting, we were particularly interested in instances where the players (on the field) were shown on camera: smiling, laughing, cheering (e.g., yelling, clapping), dancing, consoling others, etc. These behaviors were coded and comprised a single “positive” composite variable.

**Touch.** Given the prior literature (e.g., Kraus et al., 2010), we were particularly interested in displays of touch by baseball players (we only coded intentional touch rather than touch resulting from simply playing the game). The touch behaviors we coded included: celebratory touching behavior (e.g., high fives), encouraging touch (e.g., pats on the back), inclusive touching (e.g., putting one’s arm around another), fist bumps (which can be celebratory or encouraging in nature), etc. These behaviors were coded and comprised a single “touch” composite variable.

**Synchrony.** Unlike other sports that require continual coordination between teammates, baseball has fewer instances of synchronous behavior between players. Nevertheless, we were interested in instances where players were displayed on camera engaging in: a team cheer (as opposed to individual cheering) with at least one other teammate, a coordinated handshake with a teammate or coach, a coordinated chest bump, mirroring each other’s behaviors (typically when in the dugout), etc. Synchrony was often (but not always) coded alongside the touch variable. These behaviors were coded and comprised a single “synchrony” composite variable.

**Negative Emotion and Behaviors.** Here, we were interested in displays of negative emotion and behavior – we were interested in coding instances where players were caught on camera: yelling at themselves out of anger or frustration (e.g., upon striking out), yelling at others out of anger or frustration (e.g., at the umpire when disagreeing with a call), general complaining (e.g., to umpire, coach, etc.), sulking (e.g., upon striking out, or getting pulled out of the game), throwing things out of anger or frustration (e.g., bat, helmet, batting gloves, etc.), kicking things (typically in the dugout), swaggering, reveling in personal accomplishments, etc. These behaviors were coded and comprised a single “negative” composite variable.

**Interacting with Others.** Finally, we were interested in capturing instances where players were caught on camera interacting with others. For example, players at times interact with the: fans (e.g., waving, pointing, touching), opposing team (e.g., joking, helping runner up, touching in encouraging ways, chatting or small talk between runner and baseman), etc. In the home opener games coded there were no instances where there were fights or clearing of the

dugout where there is an inevitable interaction with the opposing team. These behaviors were coded and comprised a single “interaction” composite variable.

### **Batting Statistics**

Similar to Study 1, data on player performance were taken from the MLB website ([www.MLB.com](http://www.MLB.com)).

### **Status**

Similar to Study 1, data for MLB player 2016 salaries were coded from the USA Today Salaries Database (2018).

## **Study 2: Results and Discussion**

### **Preliminary analyses**

Of the 74 players who were nominated by experts in Study 1 who also played during the 2016 home opener, 44 were shown on camera during innings 1, 3, 6, and/or 9 engaging in at least one of the behaviors we were interested in coding. These 44 players represented 23 out of the 28 teams nominated by the experts (Table 4.3). In terms of the positions of the players, 11 out of 44 were outfielders, while only 1 player included was a starting pitcher (Table 4.4). In terms of the 44 players who were coded and nominated by the experts, there were 14 players who were nominated by the experts for having good reputations as players, 23 players who were nominated by the experts for having good reputations as teammates, 14 players who were nominated by the experts for having bad reputations as players, and 9 players who were nominated by the experts for having bad reputations as teammates (the total of 60 is because some players were nominated in more than one category).

### **Reputation and Home Opener Behavior**

We anticipated that players nominated by experts for having good reputations would display more positive emotions and behaviors, have greater frequency of touch, engage in more synchronous behavior, express less negative emotion and behaviors, and engage in more interactions with others during the home opener. As depicted in Table 4.5, we do not see these relationships. In fact, the two significant correlations are for players nominated for bad teammate reputations and the positive ( $r = .74$ ) and touch ( $r = .72$ ) composites. Given the small sample size of players as well as the single game coded (home opener), these results must be interpreted with great caution. However, it is possible that players with reputations as bad teammates may have some awareness of their reputation and may choose to engage in strategies to recover or enhance their reputations (as captured by positive emotions and behaviors, and touch).

### **Home Opener Behavior Predicting Batting Statistics**

Given the relatively small sample per cell (good/bad x teammate/player), we thought to combine the sample of players nominated and observed in the home opener ( $n=44$ ) to examine whether any of the behaviors depicted in the home opener (positive emotion and behaviors, touch, synchrony, negative emotion and behaviors, and interactions with others) predicted season batting performance. Similar to Study 1, we looked at the key metrics - runs, hits, doubles (2B), triples (3B), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), bases on balls (BB), strike outs (SO), stolen bases (SB), caught stealing (CS), batting average (AVG), on-base percentage (OBP), slugging

percentage (SLG), and on-base plus slugging (OPS).

**Positive Emotion and Behaviors.** The positive composite did not predict any batting statistics during the season. All regressions were non-significant - runs ( $p=.778$ ), hits ( $p=.281$ ), 2B ( $p=.650$ ), 3B ( $p=.987$ ), HR ( $p=.602$ ), RBI ( $p=.756$ ), BB ( $p=.808$ ), SO ( $p=.921$ ), SB ( $p=.559$ ), CS ( $p=.088$ ), AVG ( $p=.673$ ), OBP ( $p=.692$ ), SLG ( $p=.324$ ), and OPS ( $p=.416$ ). One may argue that being caught stealing was trending towards significance at  $p=.088$ .

**Touch.** The touch composite predicted three batting statistics, indicating that early season (home opener) touch predicted season: BB ( $\beta=.35$ ,  $t=2.41$ ,  $p=.020$ , 95% CI [.49, 5.52]), SB ( $\beta=.33$ ,  $t=2.29$ ,  $p=.027$ , 95% CI [.11, 1.80]), and CS ( $\beta=.36$ ,  $t=2.52$ ,  $p=.016$ , 95% CI [.06, .58]). The following regression analyses were non-significant: runs ( $p=.093$ ), hits ( $p=.138$ ), 2B ( $p=.112$ ), 3B ( $p=.314$ ), HR ( $p=.235$ ), RBI ( $p=.073$ ), SO ( $p=.424$ ), AVG ( $p=.199$ ), OBP ( $p=.068$ ), SLG ( $p=.167$ ), and OPS ( $p=.105$ ). One may argue that runs, RBIs, and OBP, were trending towards significance with  $ps$  ranging from .068 to .093.

**Synchrony.** Similar to positive emotions and behaviors, the synchrony composite did not predict any batting statistics during the season. All regressions were non-significant - runs ( $p=.847$ ), hits ( $p=.942$ ), 2B ( $p=.668$ ), 3B ( $p=.995$ ), HR ( $p=.754$ ), RBI ( $p=.756$ ), BB ( $p=.428$ ), SO ( $p=.374$ ), SB ( $p=.434$ ), CS ( $p=.899$ ), AVG ( $p=.884$ ), OBP ( $p=.703$ ), SLG ( $p=.794$ ), and OPS ( $p=.969$ ).

**Negative Emotion and Behaviors.** Similar to positive emotions and behaviors and synchrony, the negative emotion and behaviors composite did not predict any batting statistics during the season. All regressions were non-significant - runs ( $p=.759$ ), hits ( $p=.525$ ), 2B ( $p=.298$ ), 3B ( $p=.460$ ), HR ( $p=.886$ ), RBI ( $p=.420$ ), BB ( $p=.604$ ), SO ( $p=.467$ ), SB ( $p=.877$ ), CS ( $p=.731$ ), AVG ( $p=.115$ ), OBP ( $p=.212$ ), SLG ( $p=.184$ ), and OPS ( $p=.164$ ).

**Interactions with Others.** Similar to positive emotions and behaviors, synchrony, and negative emotions and behaviors composites, the interactions with others composite did not predict any batting statistics during the season. All were non-significant - runs ( $p=.581$ ), hits ( $p=.688$ ), 2B ( $p=.735$ ), 3B ( $p=.372$ ), HR ( $p=.481$ ), RBI ( $p=.756$ ), BB ( $p=.967$ ), SO ( $p=.365$ ), SB ( $p=.382$ ), CS ( $p=.404$ ), AVG ( $p=.862$ ), OBP ( $p=.935$ ), SLG ( $p=.359$ ), and OPS ( $p=.512$ ).

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

We sought to examine the role of reputation in a competitive, metrics and revenue driven workplace context, major league baseball. Our preliminary investigation sought to examine how group consensus may differ for good and bad reputations, and whether a network's criteria or perception of good or bad reputation differs depending on the specific reference context (player reputation vs. teammate reputation). We found preliminary evidence for the argument that multiple forms of reputations exist and that some networks (for various reasons) may be more privy to certain types of reputations than others. Reputation as a player (arguably more related to one's competence) was related in some cases to a player's objective performance (batting statistics). On the other hand, reputation as a teammate (arguably more related to one's perceived warmth) seemed to be unrelated to performance, suggesting that the expert network was drawing

upon different criteria and standards when judging what factors make for a good *player* versus what factors make for a good *teammate*. The data from this study also adds to the larger discussion around the relationship between reputation and behavior (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). It is possible that in some cases reputations are only mildly related to behavior and in other contexts reputations are more tightly related to behavior - this an important and exciting area for continued research. Finally, when looking at status (measured by player salary), it did not appear that the expert network was conflating high status players with good reputations and low status players with bad reputations. While we are open to the possibility that in some networks reputation and status are more tightly coupled, this data from the present research continues to add to the growing empirical literature differentiating reputation from status (e.g., Washington, & Zajac, 2005; Jazaieri & Keltner, under review).

Building off Study 1, in Study 2 we sought to examine the relationship between the network's allocation of good and bad reputation and the individual's actual behavior. We began this investigation by examining home opener game behavior of players nominated by the experts in Study 1. We were particularly interested in positive and negative emotions and behaviors. While the experts nominated 101 players of interest, of these players, 44 were captured in our coding. While we anticipated a relationship between player nominations and home opener behaviors, we found sparse evidence of a relationship. The two relationships that existed were not in the predicted direction (bad reputation teammates engaging in more positive behaviors and displaying more positive emotions as well as engaging in more touch). Once again, these data add to our preliminary understanding of the relationship between reputation and behavior (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). Next, given the truncated sample of players in the home opener coding, we chose to collapse across all nominated players to examine whether any of the five home opener composites (positive emotion and behaviors, touch, synchrony, negative emotion and behaviors, and interactions with others) predicted batting statistics during the season. We consistently found no relationship between the home opener composites and batting statistics during the season, with one noteworthy exception. The touch composite was the sole indicator predicting batting statistics (BB, SB, and CS). Given the important social functions of touch (Hertenstein, 2002) and the exciting and emerging literature on the important role of touch in sports (e.g., Kraus et al., 2010), future research may opt to examine touch more broadly in baseball (e.g., with observations from a larger sample of players and/or games).

### **Limitations and Future Directions**

The present preliminary research examining reputation in baseball had numerous strengths, as well as providing several exciting opportunities for future research in the area. Study 1 utilized actual individuals with highly specialized baseball content knowledge to nominate players with good and bad reputations. Given the importance of consensus in reputation, Study 1 would be strengthened by having a larger sample of experts. Based on the experts' nominations in Study 1, we utilized the players nominated to inform our coding of players in the home opener. Future research could expand the pool of players coded beyond the sample used in the present research. Relatedly, Study 2 relied on publicly available video footage of games, meaning that it is likely that some of the behavior we are interested in occurred, but was not captured on camera (and thus could not be coded). While difficult at scale, future research could consider utilizing personalized camera footage in order to capture continuous coverage of player behavior. Additionally, in order to avoid coder fatigue and maintain high reliability of coding of games, we coded 4 out of 9 innings (innings 1, 3, 6, and 9, which took on

average 3-4 hours, depending on the game). Future research could consider coding fewer games and/or coding more innings, or even code the entirety of the game. The present studies focused on coding players “on the field” behaviors, future research could consider coding players’ “off the field” behaviors (e.g., pre- or post-game interviews) for similar emotion and behavioral composites (e.g., expressing gratitude to others or being humble). Finally, in our research we examined reputation within the context of MLB. Future research could expand to examine the relationship between reputation and performance on and off the field in other sports such as soccer and basketball. Given that the length of matches and games for soccer and basketball are shorter compared to baseball, coding of these sports would allow for coding of multiple and entire games (rather than segments of home openers as done in Study 2).

Our research was concerned with individual reputations of players; however, individual reputation is at times partially attributable to the larger organization (e.g., Staw & Epstein, 2000) or the group or team (e.g., Simons, 1998). While prior research has examined team reputation in sports (e.g., the average reputation of each player (as measured by their average performance in the prior three seasons) on the team roster; Ertug & Castellucci, 2013), future research examining reputations of teams should consider whether each player’s reputation is truly weighted equally when considering the team’s overall reputation. For example, it stands to reason that the reputations of players who are of higher status (compared to players who are of lower status) may be weighted more heavily when calculating overall team reputation. The examination of reputation in sports is a relatively untouched area in the empirical literature, with many novel and fascinating opportunities for future researchers.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION**

Utilizing a multi-method approach, this dissertation examined how reputation forms over time and how reputation is transmitted and communicated in existing social networks, which are primarily affiliative in nature (Chapter 2). Next, this dissertation examined how reputation differs from related constructs such as status and trust, how one’s workplace reputation changes depending on specific behaviors (workplace transgressions, helpful behaviors, and thoughtful apologies), and how the trajectories of one’s reputation may not necessarily be consistent across people in the same context, but may differ depending on individual (and hierarchical) factors such as power and gender (Chapter 3). Finally, this dissertation examined whether a network’s criteria or perception of “good” or “bad” reputation differs depending on the reference context, how group consensus may differ in “good” versus “bad” reputations, and whether reputation relates to meaningful behaviors (performance) that are objectively observable (Chapter 4).

In Chapter 2, first we longitudinally examined the content and structure of an individual’s reputation as distributed across a newly forming group. Next, we examined how the dynamics of reputation shape gossip, a form of reputational discourse. In keeping with theoretical claims about the function of reputation, the results suggested that trustworthiness and status potential were central to reputation content that is shared across a social network and emerges over time (Study 1). Gossip, a form of reputational discourse, was found to focus upon individuals who are untrustworthy and of questionable and undeserved status (Study 2).

In Chapter 3, we turned to examining reputational trajectories (losses, gains, and recoveries) in the workplace and whether these trajectories differed depending on power or gender. In Study 1, following a transgression at work, high-power employees suffer greater losses in trust, social status, and reputation compared to low-power employees. Study 1 did



suggest that gain trajectories may in fact differ depending on one's gender. In Study 2, when engaging in additional effort at work, low-power employees enjoy larger gains in trust, social status, and reputation compared to high-power employees. While high-power employees make gains in trust and reputation, social status remains unchanged. In Study 2 we did not find evidence of gender differences in trajectories. Taken together, the data from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that high-power employees have more to lose and less to gain compared to low-power employees. In Study 3, we found that when apologizing following a transgression, both high- and low-power employees reclaim trust, social status, and reputation; however, low-power employees reclaim *more* compared to high-power employees. Interestingly, following the apology, low-power employees have higher levels of trust, social status, and reputation compared to before committing the transgression. Similar to Study 1 (losses), we find evidence that the recovery trajectories differ depending on the employee's gender. Across studies, reputation seems to be more malleable compared to social status and trust. Taken together, the findings from Chapter 3 reveal how power shapes the trajectories of losing, gaining, and repairing workplace reputation, social status, and trust.

In Chapter 4, we sought to examine how a network views employees in a competitive workplace context, major league baseball. In Study 1, we found preliminary evidence for the argument that multiple forms of reputations exist (reputation as a player and reputation as a teammate). We found that in some instances reputation is more tied to behavior (player reputation) than others (teammate reputation). The network also seemed to differentiate reputation from status. Building off Study 1, Study 2 sought to examine the relationship between the network's allocation of good and bad reputation and the individual's actual behavior. While we anticipated a relationship between player nominations in Study 1 and home opener behaviors, we found sparse evidence of a relationship. We then sought to examine whether home opener behaviors predicted batting statistics during the season. Touch was the sole behavior that predicted a subset of batting statistics.

All in all, many outstanding questions remain about personal reputation. Continued investigation is needed to better understand the specific criteria for "good" and "bad" reputations in various networks, how reputation is structured, how reputation is transmitted, how reputation changes and evolves based on behavior, and so forth. The findings from the present dissertation suggest that taking a more nuanced approach to the study of personal reputation is a crucial endeavor in order to better understand and predict important social and organizational outcomes.

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Table 2.1

*Reputation Content Theme Means For Self- and Peer-Narratives at Time 1 and Time 3*

Reputation Theme	Self-narratives		Peer Narratives	
	Time 1 M	Time 3 M	Time 1 M	Time 3 M
Openness	.04	.08	.05	.05
Conscientiousness	.19	.16	.22	.20
Extraversion	.64	.71	.59	.53
Agreeableness	1.10 <sup>a</sup>	.66	.93	.98
Neuroticism	.05	.07	.10	.08

*Note.* <sup>a</sup> Theme is significantly more prominent ( $p < .05$ ) at Time 1.



Table 2.2

Intraclass correlations for peer narrative agreement at Time 1 and Time 3 and test for the significance of the change in agreement between Time 1 and Time 3

Reputation Rating	Time 1 ICC	Time 3 ICC	<i>t</i> , <i>p</i>
Extraversion	.15	.31*	3.07***
Agreeableness	-.01	.41***	9.02***
Conscientiousness	.10	.35**	12.21***
Neuroticism	-.02	.05	3.03**
Openness	.01	.01	.52
Positivity of Reputation	.01	.35**	7.33***
Cooperativeness	.02	.53***	10.40***
Status	.05	.41***	6.82***

*Note.* ICC = Intraclass correlations; \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

Table 2.3

## Correlations Between Self and Peer Reputation Narratives (Study 1)

<b>Rating</b>	<b>Self &amp; Peer r</b>
Extraversion	.45***
Agreeableness	.23 <sup>†</sup>
Conscientiousness	.13
Neuroticism	-.09
Openness	-.23 <sup>†</sup>
Positivity of Reputation	.13
Cooperativeness	.21
Status	.19

*Note.* \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , <sup>†</sup> =  $p < .07$

Table 2.4

Correlations Between Being the Target of Gossip by Other Group Members and Sociometric Ratings and Self-Reported Personality Measures

Ratings	Target of Gossip r, p
<u>Sociometric Ratings of Members</u>	
Well-known	.34**
Liked	-.33**
Status in house	-.08
Status deserved	-.35***
Admirable reputation	-.51***
Teased	.24 <sup>†</sup>
Rater gossips critically about target	.84***
Target gossips critically about rater	.74***
<u>Self-Reported Personality</u>	
Agreeableness	-.39***
Machiavellianism	.28*

Note. <sup>†</sup> =  $p < .08$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

Table 3.1

Baseline and Post-Loss Correlations between Trust, Social Status, and Reputation for High-power (above diagonal) and Low-power (below diagonal) employees (Study 1)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Baseline Trust	----	.34***	.52***	.28***	.08	.10†
2. Baseline Social Status	.51***	----	.61***	-.10†	.33***	-.00
3. Baseline Reputation	.57***	.73***	----	.10†	.13*	.15*
4. Post-Loss Trust	.43***	.43***	.47***	----	.33***	.68***
5. Post-Loss Social Status	.38***	.67***	.57***	.71***	----	.44***
6. Post-Loss Reputation	.29***	.53***	.56***	.83***	.82***	----

*Note.* high-power correlations above the diagonal, low-power correlations below the diagonal  
 † =  $p < .10$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .01$

Table 3.2

Analyses of Losses in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following Transgression at Work (Study 1)

<b>Power</b>	<b>Trust</b> F, <i>p</i> , $\eta^2_p$	<b>Social Status</b> F, <i>p</i> , $\eta^2_p$	<b>Reputation</b> F, <i>p</i> , $\eta^2_p$
<b>HP Change</b>	828.69, .001, .76	298.98, .001, .53	894.44, .001, .77
<b>LP Change</b>	327.74, .001, .56	81.22, .001, .24	386.35, .001, .60
<b>HP v. LP Base.</b>	157.99, .001, .38	1687.50, .001, .87	804.06, .001, .75
<b>HP v. LP Post</b>	.21, .651, .001	534.35, .001, .67	110.63, .001, .30

*Note.* HP = high-power, LP = low-power, Base. = baseline prior to transgression, Post = post-transgression,  $\eta^2_p$  = partial eta squared

Table 3.3

Baseline and Post-Gain Correlations between Trust, Social Status, and Reputation for High-power (above diagonal) and Low-power (below diagonal) employees (Study 2)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Baseline Trust	----	.51***	.55***	.72***	.42***	.46***
2. Baseline Social Status	.46***	----	.69***	.55***	.78***	.67***
3. Baseline Reputation	.50***	.72***	----	.59***	.71***	.78***
4. Post-Gain Trust	.69***	.27***	.34***	----	.64***	.69***
5. Post-Gain Social Status	.36***	.73***	.60***	.40***	----	.88***
6. Post-Gain Reputation	.28***	.35***	.56***	.53***	.53***	----

*Note.* high-power correlations above the diagonal, low-power correlations below the diagonal  
 \*\*\* =  $p < .01$

Table 3.4

Analyses of Gains in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following Additional Effort at Work (Study 2)

<b>Power</b>	<b>Trust</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$	<b>Social Status</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$	<b>Reputation</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$
<b>HP Change</b>	262.73, .001, .51	1.29, .257, .005	70.17, .001, .21
<b>LP Change</b>	540.32, .001, .67	249.97, .001, .48	735.06, .001, .73
<b>HP v. LP Base.</b>	112.07, .001, .30	1738.82, .001, .87	983.73, .001, .78
<b>HP v. LP Post</b>	70.33, .001, .21	683.94, .001, .72	197.70, .001, .42

*Note.* HP = high-power, LP = low-power, Base. = baseline prior to additional effort, Post = post additional effort,  $\eta^2_p$  = partial eta squared

Table 3.5

Baseline, Post-Loss, and Post-Repair Correlations between Trust, Social Status, and Reputation for High-power (above diagonal) and Low-power (below diagonal) employees (Study 3)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Baseline Trust	---	.36***	.46***	.30***	.03	-.02	.46***	.19***	.23***
2. Baseline Social Status	.45***	---	.69***	-.05	.38***	.03	.21***	.49***	.30***
3. Baseline Reputation	.50***	.74***	---	-.00	.21***	.10*	.25***	.40***	.36***
4. Post-Loss Trust	.42***	.41***	.37***	---	.29***	.61***	.45***	.22***	.35***
5. Post-Loss Social Status	.34***	.70***	.58***	.68***	---	.42***	.15***	.64***	.23***
6. Post-Loss Reputation	.28***	.54***	.49***	.77***	.82***	---	.23***	.26***	.45***
7. Post-Repair Trust	.48***	.25***	.25***	.32***	.20***	.17***	---	.55***	.75***
8. Post-Repair Social Status	.29***	.62***	.45***	.26***	.45***	.36***	.54***	---	.66***
9. Post-Repair Reputation	.34***	.39***	.41***	.29***	.31***	.31***	.75***	.75***	---

*Note.* high-power correlations above the diagonal, low-power correlations below the diagonal

\* =  $p < .05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .01$



Table 3.6

Analyses of Recovery of Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following a Post-Transgression Apology at Work (Study 3)

<b>Power</b>	<b>Trust</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$	<b>Social Status</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$	<b>Reputation</b> F, p, $\eta^2_p$
<b>HP Post-Transgression to Repair Change</b>	1030.99, .001, .69	116.52, .001, .20	722.68, .001, .61
<b>LP Post-Transgression to Repair Change</b>	906.09, .001, .66	354.88, .001, .44	916.07, .001, .67
<b>HP Baseline to Repair Change</b>	85.51, .001, .16	310.65, .001, .40	493.04, .001, .52
<b>LP Baseline to Repair Change</b>	7.61, .006, .016	108.23, .001, .19	74.43, .001, .14
<b>HP Baseline to Post-Transgression Change</b>	1481.31, .001, .76	463.81, .001, .50	1665.62, .001, .78
<b>LP Baseline to Post-Transgression Change</b>	983.55, .001, .68	239.11, .001, .34	762.76, .001, .62
<b>HP v. LP Baseline</b>	185.22, .001, .29	2341.73, .001, .84	1332.85, .001, .74
<b>HP v. LP Post-Transgression</b>	.051, .821, .001	766.74, .001, .93	244.65, .001, .35
<b>HP v. LP Post-Repair</b>	6.19, .013, .013	547.97, .001, .54	165.69, .001, .27

Note. HP = high-power, LP = low-power, Baseline = Before transgression,  $\eta^2_p$  = partial eta squared

Table 4.1

## Batting Statistics of Good vs. Bad Reputation Players (Study 1)

<b>Statistic</b>	<b>Reputation Nomination</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
<b>Runs</b>	good	82.95	35.31	0.04	0.000	[29.87, 65.58]
	bad	35.23	31.06			
<b>Hits</b>	good	145.86	61.04	0.02	0.000	[47.77, 110.92]
	bad	66.51	55.88			
<b>2B</b>	good	28.68	13.67	0.52	0.000	[8.34, 21.48]
	bad	13.77	10.92			
<b>3B</b>	good	2.50	2.11	15.11	0.000	[0.77, 2.52]
	bad	0.86	1.19			
<b>HR</b>	good	25.05	12.17	0.11	0.000	[8.01, 21.05]
	bad	10.51	11.83			
<b>RBI</b>	good	82.23	35.57	0.11	0.000	[29.99, 65.72]
	bad	34.37	30.90			
<b>BB</b>	good	58.86	29.04	1.10	0.000	[22.96, 50.19]
	bad	22.29	22.08			
<b>SO</b>	good	100.64	45.67	0.20	0.007	[10.20, 62.61]
	bad	64.23	49.48			
<b>SB</b>	good	9.36	11.09	26.36	0.007	[1.67, 10.03]
	bad	3.51	4.36			
<b>CS</b>	good	2.95	2.87	3.92	0.058	[-0.04, 2.64]
	bad	1.66	2.17			
<b>AVG</b>	good	0.28	0.05	7.06	0.001	[0.03, 0.12]
	bad	0.20	0.09			
<b>OBP</b>	good	0.35	0.06	6.79	0.000	[0.05, 0.15]
	bad	0.26	0.11			
<b>SLG</b>	good	0.48	0.12	2.92	0.001	[0.06, 0.23]
	bad	0.34	0.17			
<b>OPS</b>	good	0.83	0.17	6.63	0.000	[0.13, 0.40]
	bad	0.57	0.28			

Table 4.2

## Batting Statistics of Good vs. Bad Reputation Teammates (Study 1)

<b>Statistic</b>	<b>Reputation Nomination</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
<b>Runs</b>	good	63.29	36.01	0.10	0.055	[-0.43, 37.64]
	bad	44.68	36.53			
<b>Hits</b>	good	117.50	61.06	0.02	0.039	[1.86, 66.23]
	bad	83.45	61.43			
<b>2B</b>	good	23.76	13.91	0.78	0.029	[0.81, 14.53]
	bad	16.09	11.18			
<b>3B</b>	good	2.48	2.66	3.32	0.087	[-0.17, 2.49]
	bad	1.32	2.25			
<b>HR</b>	good	17.60	12.70	0.13	0.29	[-3.06, 10.16]
	bad	14.05	12.32			
<b>RBI</b>	good	63.76	36.18	0.00	0.082	[-2.23, 36.30]
	bad	46.73	37.46			
<b>BB</b>	good	46.45	29.20	0.69	0.14	[-4.12, 28.39]
	bad	34.32	33.98			
<b>SO</b>	good	90.98	47.45	0.04	0.12	[-4.99, 43.22]
	bad	71.86	42.43			
<b>SB</b>	good	5.95	7.89	0.10	0.58	[-2.87, 5.04]
	bad	4.86	6.72			
<b>CS</b>	good	2.24	2.38	0.00	0.47	[-0.82, 1.75]
	bad	1.77	2.54			
<b>AVG</b>	good	0.25	0.07	0.62	0.21	[-0.01, 0.06]
	bad	0.23	0.08			
<b>OBP</b>	good	0.32	0.07	3.56	0.092	[-0.01, 0.08]
	bad	0.29	0.10			
<b>SLG</b>	good	0.42	0.14	0.67	0.30	[-0.04, 0.11]
	bad	0.38	0.15			
<b>OPS</b>	good	0.74	0.21	4.24	0.074	[-0.01, 0.24]
	bad	0.63	0.29			

Table 4.3

## Teams Represented (Study 2)

<b>Team</b>	<b>Number of Players</b>
Chicago Cubs	4
Boston Red Sox	3
New York Mets	3
Oakland Athletics	3
Pittsburgh Pirates	3
Texas Rangers	3
Washington Nationals	3
Chicago White Sox	2
Cincinnati Reds	2
Colorado Rockies	2
LA Dodgers	2
Milwaukee Brewers	2
San Francisco Giants	2
Arizona Diamondbacks	1
Atlanta Braves	1
Baltimore Orioles	1
Houston Astros	1
Kansas City Royals	1
New York Yankees	1
San Diego Padres	1
Seattle Mariners	1
Tampa Bay Rays	1
Toronto Blue Jays	1

Table 4.4

## Positions of Players Represented (Study 2)

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<b>Position</b>	<b>Number of Players</b>
Outfield	11
1st base	8
2nd base	8
3rd base	7
Catcher	3
Designated hitter	3
Short stop	3
Starting pitcher	1

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Table 4.5

Correlations Between Player Reputation Nominations and Home Opener Game Behavior (Study 2)

	Positive	Touch	Synchrony	Negative	Interaction
Good Player	.09	-.09	.00	-.31	.06
Good Teammate	-.17	-.08	-.18	.29	.13
Bad Player	.14	.25	-.07	-.17	.29
Bad Teammate	.74*	.72*	.00	-.28	.23

Note. \* =  $p < .05$

Figure 3.1

Losses in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following Transgression in High-power (HP) and Low-power (LP) Employees (Study 1)





Figure 3.2

Gains in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation based on Gender for High-power (Panel A) and Low-power (Panel B) Employees (Study 2)



Note. n.s. = non-significant, † = .054, \* =  $p < .05$



Figure 3.3

Gains in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following Additional Effort in High-power (HP) and Low-power (LP) Employees (Study 2)




Figure 3.4

Recoveries in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation based on Gender for High-power Employees (Study 3)




Figure 3.5

Recoveries in Trust, Social Status, and Reputation following Repair in High-power (HP) and Low-power (LP) Employees (Study 3)




Figure 4.1

Conceptual Model of the Relationship Between Reputation &amp; Behavior

		REPUTATION		
		GOOD	BAD	MIXED
BEHAVIOR	POSITIVE	✓	✗	≠
	NEGATIVE	✗	✓	≠
	INCONSISTENT	≠	≠	✓

✓ = expected, ✗ = unexpected, ≠ = asymmetric

## APPENDIX A

### BASEBALL PLAYERS NOMINATED BY EXPERTS

A.J. Ellis	David Ross	Juan Uribe
A.J. Pierzynski	David Wright	Jung-ho Kang
Adam Eaton	Derek Norris	Kris Bryant
Adam Jones	Dustin Pedroia	Madison Bumgarner
Addison Russell	Elvis Andrus	Mat Latos
Adrian Beltre	Eric Hosmer	Matt Harvey
Adrian Gonzalez	Evan Longoria	Matt Kemp
Alejandro de Aza	Francisco Lindor	Michael Saunders
Alex Rodriguez	Freddie Freeman	Miguel Cabrera
Alexei Ramirez	Gary Sanchez	Mike Napoli
Andrew McCutchen	Gerardo Parra	Mike Trout
Andrew Miller	Glen Perkins	Mookie Betts
Anthony Rizzo	Gregor Blanco	Neil Walker
Aroldis Chapman	Howie Kendrick	Nolan Arenado
Ben Zobrist	Hunter Pence	Pablo Sandoval
Billy Butler	Jacob DeGrom	Paul Goldschmidt
BJ Upton	James Shields	Robinson Cano
Brandon Crawford	Jason Heyward	Rougned Odor
Brandon Phillips	Jason Kipnis	Ryan Braun
Brett Gardner	Jay Bruce	Ryan Madson
Brett Lawrie	Jeff Francouer	Ryan Vogelsong
Bryce Harper	Jered Weaver	Ryan Zimmerman
Buster Posey	Jeury's Familia	Shelby Miller
C.J. Wilson*	Joey Votto	Stephen Drew
Carlos Beltran	John Lackey	Steven Vogt
Carlos Gomez	Johnny Cueto	Todd Frazier
Chase Utley	Jon Niese	Trevor Bauer
Chris Carter	Jonathan Papelbon	Troy Tulowitzki
Chris Sale	Jose Altuve	Vicente Padilla*
Clayton Kershaw	Jose Bautista	Yasiel Puig
Daniel Murphy	Jose Fernandez	Yasmany Tomas
Danny Valencia	Jose Reyes	Yoenis Cespedes
David Freese	Josh Donaldson	Yordano Ventura
David Ortiz	Josh Hamilton*	Zack Greinke
David Price	Josh Harrison	

\*Did not play in 2016