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Janusz, Andrew

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Race and Political Representation in Brazil

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Andrew Janusz

Committee in charge:

        Professor Scott Desposato, Co-Chair
        Professor Zoltan Hajnal, Co-Chair
        Professor Gary Jacobson
        Professor Simeon Nichter
        Professor Carlos Waisman

2019

The dissertation of Andrew Janusz is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Co-Chair

_____

Co-Chair

University of California San Diego

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DEDICATION

For my mother, Betty.

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2011	B.A. in International Relations *cum laude*, Creighton University
2014	M.A. in Political Science, University of California San Diego
2019	Ph. D. in Political Science, University of California San Diego

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Race and Political Representation in Brazil

by

Andrew Janusz

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California San Diego, 2019

Professor Scott Desposato, Co-Chair
Professor Zoltan Hajnal, Co-Chair

Brazil is Latin America's largest democracy and home to the largest African descendant population of any country outside of Africa. Despite comprising a majority of the Brazilian population, though, Afro-Brazilians hold less than 10 percent of the elected positions in Brazil's Congress. In this dissertation, I seek to answer two central questions about the political marginalization of African descendants. First, why do Afro-Brazilians not attain representation in Brazil's Congress commensurate with their numerical strength? And second, how do racial disparities in electoral outcomes affect the representation of Afro-Brazilian' policy interests?

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to examine how Brazilian elites racially identify themselves. I argue the absence of official rules for racial group membership and the

political salience of racial group membership encourage political candidates to strategically present themselves as members of the racial group that maximizes their chances of winning public office. To test this argument, I use unprecedented panel data from Brazil's 2014 and 2016 elections. I find that over a quarter of Brazilian politicians who ran for office in 2014 and 2016 changed their self-reported race from one election to the next. Moreover, my analysis reveals these changes are by no means random, but instead reflect strategic electoral calculations. This suggest that candidates view their racial groups as electoral vehicles and indicates that measures of self-identified race are likely endogenous to electoral outcomes in Brazil.

Building on evidence that politicians strategically present themselves, I use data from the 2014 congressional elections and an original measure of candidate ascribed race to explore why candidates that are socially perceived as Afro-Brazilian rarely win public office. I show that party opportunity structures and socioeconomic differences between white and Afro-Brazilian candidates hinder the latter from winning public office. Nevertheless, when I control for theoretically important differences between using regression methods, I find that Afro-Brazilian candidates receive significantly fewer votes than their white competitors. This finding suggests that voters discriminate against Afro-Brazilian candidates and points to the possibility that Afro-Brazilians interests are not substantively represented.

My work shows that racial disparities in electoral outcomes have substantial policy implications. In the first quantitative analysis to examine the relationship between legislator race and agenda-setting behavior in Brazil, I show that Afro-Brazilian legislators are more likely to propose legislation that reflects the economic, social, and political preferences of nonwhite Brazilians. Nevertheless, Afro-Brazilian legislators limited numbers constrain their ability to enact the legislation their propose. These results suggest that Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately on the losing side of Brazilian democracy and raises concerns about the nation's future.

By offering a systematic account of how racial group membership shapes political outcomes in Brazil, this dissertation confirms long-held suspicions about the political significance of race in Brazil. It presents a bleak picture of Afro-Brazilian political marginalization and identifies a series

of challenges to achieving racial equality. The future of Brazilian democracy and the country's unity, rests on the ability of its leaders to acknowledge and redress the racial disparities that are reflected and perpetuated by Afro-Brazilian political underrepresentation.

Introduction

In October 2016, an Afro-Brazilian woman named Marielle Franco shocked the Brazilian political establishment by winning election to the Rio de Janeiro city council. In a country in which politics is overwhelmingly dominated by a white male political elite, Franco, a lesbian woman of color from the favela community of Maré had accomplished what seemed impossible. Prior to her only two Afro-Brazilian women had ever held a position on the Rio de Janeiro's city council. Jurema Batista, who had left office more than 10 years before Franco entered, and Benedita da Silva, who had held office ten years prior to Batista.

Franco's 2016 campaign was her first. Motivated by a desire to combat gender and racial inequality, she became a candidate with *Partido Socialismo e Liberdade* (PSOL), a leftist political party (Carneiro 2018). At the start of the campaign, though, her electoral success appeared unlikely. In early electoral polls, few voters expressed support for her (Caballero 2016). Nevertheless, on a shoestring budget, Franco's grassroots campaign attracted the support of voters across the city. When the ballots were counted, she had received 46,502 votes, the fifth most votes of any candidate in the election and became the only Afro-Brazilian politician on Rio de Janeiro's 51 member city council.

The election of Franco was not just symbolically important, her presence had substantively consequences. In office, Franco was an outspoken advocate for those living favela communities, a population composed predominately of Afro-Brazilians that has historically been ignored by politicians except when they are running for reelection. To improve their lives, she championed the expansion of social safety nets, fought for racial equality, and fearlessly denounced police violence

(Abreu 2018; Mesquita 2018*b*). In challenging the status quo, though, she was perceived as a threat.

On the night of March 14, 2018, Franco discussed the status of Afro-Brazilian women at the *Casa das Pretas*, a cultural center in downtown Rio de Janeiro (Mesquita 2018*b*). As she sat in her car preparing to leave, gunshots rang out. Franco was shot in the head four times. While her politically motivated murder was intended to silence discussion of the inequality that pervades Brazilian society, instead it drew attention to the marginalization of Afro-Brazilians. Benedita da Silva, the first Afro-Brazilian woman to be elected to Rio de Janeiro's city council, described the assassination of Franco as "an attack on blackness" and indicated that Franco "had the potential to become a deputy, senator, [or] President of the Republic" (Mesquita 2018*a*).

Scholars have long recognized that Afro-Brazilians like Marielle Franco are rarely elected to public office. As Ollie Johnson observed more than a quarter century ago, "Afro-Brazilians are dramatically underrepresented in Congress in relation to their proportion of the general population" (Johnson 1998). Why Afro-Brazilians are not elected in proportion to their population size, and whether it has real consequences, however, remain open questions.

This dissertation provides a long-overdue look at racial politics in Brazil. It seeks to answer two core questions about Afro-Brazilian political representation. First, why do Afro-Brazilians not attain representation in Brazil's Congress commensurate with their numerical strength? And second, how do racial disparities in descriptive representation affect the representation of Afro-Brazilians' policy interests?

The findings reported in this dissertation contribute to the nascent literature on political representation in Brazil. It provides evidence that a politician's racial group membership affects their chances of winning public office. Drawing on data from Brazil's 2014 elections, I show how a combination of party institutions, resource disparities, and voter prejudice undermine Afro-Brazilian candidates' electoral prospects. Moreover, racial disparities in electoral success affect who wins and loses in the policy-making process.

This dissertation provide the first systematic evidence that the racial composition of Brazil's Congress affects public policy. Using data on agenda setting behavior in the Chamber of Deputies,

Brazil's lower house of Congress, I find that Afro-Brazilian legislators propose different types of policies than their white colleagues. Like members of the general public, lawmakers from different racial groups occupy different positions in Brazil's racial hierarchy and therefore act differently from one another. While I find that Afro-Brazilian legislators are more likely than whites to advocate for the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents, policy tends to reflect the interests of white Brazilians because of Afro-Brazilians numerical underrepresentation.

Evidence that democratic politics perpetuate the marginalization of Afro-Brazilians has serious implications for contemporary Brazil. Scholars, politicians and those interested in racial equality cannot ignore the fact that Afro-Brazilians are severely underrepresented in political office in comparison to their proportion of the general population, and, as a result, the interests and needs of the majority of Brazilians are not represented.

Race in Brazil

Race has no biological foundation, but is rather a social construct. As such, distinctions between so-called races are the products of social forces (Sen and Wasow 2016). Due to historical influences, how Brazilians racially categorize themselves and classify others is distinct from other multiracial societies.

In contrast to the United States and South Africa, the two countries to which Brazil's racial dynamics are most commonly compared, Brazil never codified racial-group membership in law. The historical decision to promote racial miscegenation, as opposed to institute racial segregation, precluded the need to establish formal rules for racial categorization and has given rise to a more complex, relational classification system (Telles 2014*b*).[1]

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the governmental body that

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[1]Brazilian political elites historically promoted racial miscegenation with the goal of decreasing the size of Brazil's non-white population, which was perceived as an impediment to modernization (Marx 1998; Skidmore 1993).

administers the decennial census, allows citizens to classify themselves into one of five mutually exclusive ethno-racial categories. The five categories they employ include: white (*branca*), brown (*parda*), black (*preta*), Asian (*amarela*), and Indigenous (*Indigena*). The Asian and Indigenous categories are considered analytically distinct, whereas the white, brown, and black categories are regarded as existing on a racial continuum (Lesser 1999; Perz, Warren and Kennedy 2008; Telles 2014*b*). On the white-to-black continuum, the brown category occupies an intermediate position and serves as an umbrella category for the multitude of mixed-race terms used in popular discourse (Telles 2014*b*).

The white-nonwhite racial boundary is clearest in the minds of Brazilians. As a result, researchers commonly utilize a binary classification scheme and label members of the brown and black census categories as "Afro-Brazilians," "*negros*," or "nonwhites."[2] Nevertheless, the legitimacy of grouping blacks and browns into a single category is debated in the academic literature (Bailey 2009*a*; Loveman, Muniz and Bailey 2012; Telles 2014*b*). In this dissertation, I use the word Afro-Brazilian to refer collectively to brown and black Brazilians, but distinguish between the two when appropriate.

Racial categorization in Brazil is determined primarily by phentoype as opposed to ancestry. Skin color (*cor*), facial features, and hair type are strong correlates of racial self-classification (Bailey 2009*a*; Harris et al. 1993; Mitchell-Walthour 2017; Sansone 2003; Silva and Paixão 2015; Telles 2014*b*). Nonetheless, extensive phenotypical variation exists within and across racial categories (Silva and Paixão 2015; Telles and Paschel 2014). Research on racial inequality indicates that social status attenuates patterns of racial self-identification and classification by others (Degler 1971; Sansone 2003; Schwartzman 2007; Telles and Paschel 2014; Twine 1998).

In sum, racial group membership in Brazil is complex social construct. The fact that race is a social construction does not mean that it is inconsequential. How individuals racially classify

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[2]"*Negro*" is the preferred term of the Brazilian racial consciousness movement (Telles 2014*b*). Since the word *negro* describes a politicized, nonwhite racial identity, I utilize the word Afro-Brazilian except when quoting others.

themselves and categorize others has real implications for how they are viewed and valued in Brazilian society.

On virtually every indicator of objective well-being, Brazil's majority Afro-Brazilian population lag whites. Statistics reveal they suffer disproportionately from unemployment, poverty, inferior educational opportunities, and poor health care (Arcand and D'hombres 2004; Bailey, Loveman and Muniz 2013; Gradín 2009; Telles 2014*a*; Wood, de Carvalho and Horta 2010). Their interactions with the state are also markedly different. Evidence shows that Afro-Brazilians, and young Afro-Brazilian men in particular, are disproportionately stopped by police (Folha 2004). Moreover, they are also disproportionately killed by them (Cano 2010; French 2013). A report commissioned by the Brazilian Senate went so far as declaring that "the Brazilian state, directly or indirectly, perpetrates the genocide of the young black population" (Francois 2018). Due to the importance of race in Brazilian society, it stands to reason that race is central to politics.

The Racial Makeup of the Brazilian Congress

Electoral politics in Brazil is overwhelmingly dominated by whites. While the size of racial disparities between the citizenry and their elected representatives varies somewhat over time and across institutions, the story is essentially the same. Afro-Brazilians are not elected in proportion their population size.

At the national level, racial disparities in political representation are staggering. As late as the 1980s, the Brazilian Congress had zero Afro-Brazilian legislators (Johnson 1998). While the number of Afro-Brazilian lawmakers has increased since then, at no point in time have Afro-Brazilians come near to achieving parity with whites, much less representation commensurate with their population size. Official reports indicate that only 20 percent of those elected in Brazil's 2014 elections identify themselves as Afro-Brazilian (Macedo 2014).

These racial inequalities raise a number of serious questions about the electoral process and political representation. Why are Afro-Brazilians rarely elected to public office? How does having

Afro-Brazilians in office affect politics? And what are the consequences for Brazilian democracy?

To date, however, research on Afro-Brazilian political representation is remarkably sparse. Not until 1998, did scholars even examine the racial composition of Brazil's Congress. In Johnson's (1998) descriptive analysis, which was the first to show that Afro-Brazilians are dramatically underrepresented in the Brazilian Congress, he called for future research on the causes and consequences of racial disparities in political representation. More than 20 years later, political scientists still do not know much about the political representation of Afro-Brazilians.

Inattention to this enduring feature of Brazilian democracy is a serious oversight. Brazil is Latin America's largest democracy, its most populous, and home to the largest African descendant population of any country outside of Africa. Extensive scholarship shows that Brazil is not the inclusive, racially egalitarian society it was once famed to be (e.g. Reichmann 2010; Telles 2014*b*; Twine 1998). There is dearth of hard research, though, on racial inequalities in governance and their implications.

The principal reason that relatively little academic research exists on the role of race in Brazilian politics is because of the presumption that racism does not exist. This view continues to be widely held and is propagated by elected officials including Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. In a 2019 interview with Rede TV, Bolsonaro stated "In Brazil, racism is a rare thing" (Romano 2019).

Race Matters

My dissertation challenges the perspective that Brazil is a post-racial democracy. The primary argument I put forth is simple and straight forward, *race shapes political outcomes in Brazil*. I contend that institutional and social structures hinder Afro-Brazilians from attaining political power and that their absence in elected political bodies perpetuates their economic, social, and political marginalization. While this may appear obvious, it challenges the basic conclusion of the existing literature.

Extant work largely attribute racial disparities in representation to racialized class stratification. Due to race-based slavery, which was only abolished in Brazil in 1888, white candidates have higher levels of educational attainment, hold more prestigious occupations, and are wealthier than their Afro-Brazilian competitors (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Campos and Machado 2015, 2017; Janusz 2017; Oliveira 1995). Moreover, and arguably most importantly, they possess greater campaign resources than nonwhites (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Janusz 2017; Oliveira 1995). In Brazil's candidate-centered electoral system, socioeconomic differences between whites and Afro-Brazilians likely tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the former.

Nevertheless, there is reason to question whether socioeconomic factors explain racial disparities in political representation. Brazilian voters and politicians commonly attribute the rarity with which Afro-Brazilian candidates win elected office to racial prejudice (Bailey 2009a; da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Mitchell-Walthour 2017; Nascimento and Nascimento 1992). In light of the voluminous body of research which shows that racial discrimination underlies patterns of racial inequality in Brazil, this is logical explanation.

Drawing on data from Brazil's 2014 congressional elections, I show that Afro-Brazilian candidates are penalized by political elites as well as voters. I find that parties recruit Afro-Brazilians to run for political office but do not provide them the financial resources necessary to win. I find parties provide white candidates significantly more financial resources than their Afro-Brazilian counterparts, even after controlling for candidate quality. Economic factors diminish Afro-Brazilian candidates' chances of electoral success, yet do not fully explain why they are rarely elected. My econometric analysis indicates that discrimination by voters hinders Afro-Brazilians from attaining political representation commensurate with their population size.

Yet to what extent does it matter that Brazil's elected political bodies do not share characteristics with the population? According to Pitkin (1967), legislators should be judged based on what they do. Moreover, normative democratic theorists maintain that legislators need not be drawn from a particular racial group to represent its interests (Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Young 1997). Since extant studies provide largely descriptive accounts of the representational styles and policy

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interests of prominent Afro-Brazilian legislators, we do not know whether they behave differently than whites.

I argue that Afro-Brazilian legislators, in contrast to their white counterparts, possess a unique racial consciousness that makes them stronger representatives of Afro-Brazilian constituents. This racial consciousness is grounded in legislators' personal experiences, such as receiving unfair treatment on the basis of race. Moreover, because elected public office does not shield them from suffering discrimination, and may actually increase its likelihood, Afro-Brazilian legislators feel a high level of urgency in addressing the forces that sustain the subordination of Afro-Brazilians in Brazil's racial hierarchy.

Consistent with this argument, this study demonstrates through an analysis of bill sponsorship behavior that Afro-Brazilian legislators provide superior representation for Afro-Brazilian constituents. I find that Afro-Brazilian lawmakers are significantly more likely than their white counterparts to introduce legislation that improves the status of Brazil's majority Afro-Brazilian population. Nevertheless, the ability of Afro-Brazilian legislators to transform the race-conscious legislation they propose into law is hindered by their limited numbers. In this way, the racial composition of Brazil's Congress perpetuates the economic, political, and social marginalization of Afro-Brazilians in Brazilian society.

Outline of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, I present evidence that race affects virtually every aspect of life in Brazil. I argue that since the social and economic realities of white and nonwhite differ because of race, racial group membership can be expected to shape political outcomes. Following this line of reasoning, candidates can be expected to exploit racial cleavages for political purposes, be electorally punished or rewarded based on how they are perceived, and if ultimately elected, act in the interest of members of their racial group. In Chapter 2, I present evidence that politicians instrumentally change their publicly declared race to enhance

their electoral prospects. I demonstrate the racial composition of the electorate and the electoral rules that govern competition affect how candidates racially identify themselves. These results suggest that politicians perceive their racial group membership to be electorally consequential and have empirical implications for assessing how race affects politics. In Chapter 3, I present evidence that candidate race "matters" in Brazilian elections. Drawing on data from Brazil's 2014 congressional elections and interviews with political elites, this chapter shows that Afro-Brazilian candidates are disadvantaged in a variety of ways. I demonstrate how the combination of party institutions, socioeconomic differences, resource disparities, and voter prejudice undermine the electoral prospects of candidates that are perceived by voters to be Afro-Brazilian. In Chapter 4, I examine whether racial disparities in electoral success affect Afro-Brazilian substantive representation. Through a quantitative analysis of all legislation sponsored in Brazil's Congress between 1995 and 2015, I show that less than one percent of the more than 40,000 legislative bills sponsored during this period specifically improve the economic, social, and political status of Afro-Brazilians. Nevertheless, my analysis reveals that Afro-Brazilian legislators are significantly more likely than their white counterparts to introduce legislation that seeks to improve the status of African descendants in Brazil. Lastly, in Chapter 5, I summarize the core findings of the dissertation and discuss their implications.

Chapter 1

The Political Importance of Race

For most of the twentieth century, Brazil was widely held as an example of a successful multiracial society. Its reputation as a society free from racial prejudice led both native-born and foreign observers to hail it as a "racial democracy" (Andrews 1996; Azevedo 1996; Hellwig 1992). In comparison to the United States and South Africa, Brazil appeared to many to be a racial paradise, a society without a color line.

Afro-Brazilians, however, have long recognized that Brazil is not a racial utopia and many have publicly challenged this position. Speaking to the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil's lower house of Congress, Abdias de Nascimento's statements outraged members of the overwhelmingly white assembly on multiple occasions (Nascimento 2014). Upon declaring that Afro-Brazilians suffered enslavement for 400 years and that Brazil's system of white supremacy continues their oppression, Deputy Gerson Peres, a conservative politician, interrupted Nascimento's speech:

> "Your Excellency violates one of the greatest traditions that exist here, for what is here, Deputy, are social prejudices, perhaps derived from the current capitalist system. But there is no racial discrimination. Here, the black, the negro is so noble and so dignified that the Brazilian people bring him to the Congressional rostrum." (Diário do Congresso Nacional - Seção I, March 22, 1985, p.1581)

Peres asserted that racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil and that Nascimento's presence in the Chamber of Deputies was proof of it. According to Peres' logic, if Brazil was a country in which Afro-Brazilians suffered discrimination, Nascimento would have never been

elected. In response, Nascimento pointed out that he was the sole Afro-Brazilian deputy in the 513 seat legislature defending Afro-Brazilians (Nascimento 2014). According to Nascimento, this was proof that racism exists in Brazil and that Afro-Brazilians are more oppressed than blacks in the United States or South Africa.

Since the exchange between Nascimento and Peres, a substantial number of studies have examined the status of Afro-Brazilians and the role of race in Brazilian society. Consistent with Nascimento's claims, evidence shows that due to the legacy of racialized slavery and active discrimination Afro-Brazilians experience worse life outcomes than whites (Reichmann 2010; Telles 2014*b*). While some Brazilians, including elected politicians, continue to express the view that racism does not exist in Brazil, there is a consensus among scholars that race affects all facets of life, from death and dating, to education and employment (Gullickson and Torche 2014; Lovell 1994, 2006; Wood and De Carvalho 1988). Relatively little, however, is known about how race affects politics.

Candidate Race and Electoral Outcomes

Afro-Brazilians comprise a majority of the Brazilian population, but a minority of elected officials. In 2014, only 20% of those elected to the Chamber of Deputies identified themselves as Afro-Brazilian (Macedo 2014). Considering their numerical superiority, it is puzzling why Afro-Brazilians have been unable to attain descriptive representation commensurate with their numerical strength.

A growing number of studies explore why Afro-Brazilians are rarely elected to public office. Using observational as well as experimental approaches, scholars have examined the supply of Afro-Brazilian candidates as well as demand for them. Nevertheless, their divergent conclusions heighten the puzzle of Afro-Brazilian descriptive underrepresentation.

Previous studies emphasize that it is not the limited supply of Afro-Brazilian candidates that hinders them from winning representation. While there are barriers to becoming a political candidate, in Brazil, the use of open-list proportional representation rules incentivize political parties

to nominate as many candidates as legally permissible. As such, party officials encourage individuals to contest office as a member of their candidate slate. Since all votes help, parties are known to support candidates that have a low likelihood of winning office. As such, Brazilian political parties are presumed to not discriminate between prospective white and nonwhite candidates, at least when it comes to elections for seats in at-large assembly districts.

Based on evidence that there is not a shortage of Afro-Brazilian candidates, scholars have naturally turned to examination of candidate quality. Extant research indicates that Afro-Brazilian and white candidates differ from each other on non-racial dimensions. In particular, researchers have found that Brazil's candidate pools mirror the class-based racial stratification found in Brazilian society.

Research indicates that in comparison to whites, Afro-Brazilian candidates commonly have lower levels of formal education and different occupational profiles. While Afro-Brazilian candidates commonly have working-class backgrounds, their whites competitors are more often than not drawn from the upper classes (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Campos and Machado 2017; Oliveira 1995). Scholars presume that differences in the social environments from which Afro-Brazilians and whites emerge, provide the latter greater exposure to politics and access to political capital. Nevertheless, the most important non-racial difference between Afro-Brazilians and whites is not political capital, but rather their financial capital.

Brazilian elections are considered to be among the most expensive in the world (Ames 1995*b*; Mainwaring 1999). Use of Brazil's open-list proportional representation means candidates must distinguish themselves from their copartisans as well as candidates from other political parties. Due to their distinct racialized class inequalities, though, Afro-Brazilian and white candidates have disparate ability to finance their electoral campaigns. In the 2014 congressional elections, Janusz (2017) finds that Afro-Brazilian candidates on average spent R$90,759, about $38,500 U.S.. In contrast, white candidates on average spent R$276,527, nearly three times as much.

There is a consensus that racial differences in campaign resources provide whites an electoral advantage over Afro-Brazilians. Whether racial disparities in representation stem from the economic

resources, though, is contested. While Bueno and Dunning (2017) conclude that elites use their financial resources to sustain a white ruling class, Janusz maintains that racial discrimination is likely at play (2017). Their disparate conclusions are likely in part attributable to their distinct empirical strategies. Using data on a stratified sample of candidates and electoral races, Bueno and Dunning (2017) find that campaign contributions, not candidate ascribed race, is a significant determinant of electoral success. In contrast, Janusz (2017) uses data on the universe of candidates running in the 2014 congressional elections and finds that both campaign spending and self-identified candidate race explain electoral outcomes. Janusz (2017) findings suggest that voters are likely to discriminate against Afro-Brazilian candidates.

It is plausible that prejudice among voters prevents the election of nonwhite candidates. Survey research shows that Brazilians of all races, hold prejudicial views of Afro-Brazilians (Almeida 2008). In one study, Brazilian respondents were found to attribute positive characteristics like intelligence, honesty, and respectfulness to photos of whites more frequently than they did to Afro-Brazilians (Almeida 2008). In another, when shown photographs of three different individuals with different occupations and asked whom they would prefer their daughter to marry, respondents were found to favor the white individual, even when his occupation was less socially prestigious (Almeida 2008). Since an individual's race affects how they are viewed and valued, it is conceivable that a candidate's race affects voter preferences.

There is minimal research on the relationship between candidate race and vote choice. Extant work on race and voting in Brazil has largely focuses on racial differences in turnout (Castro 1993; Lamounier 1968; Prandi 1996; Soares and do Valle Silva 1987; Souza 1971). The work of Gladys Mitchell-Walthour (2009*b*) is a notable exception. Building on the theory of black linked fate developed by Dawson (1994), she contends that Afro-Brazilians that perceive their fate as tied to the status of Afro-Brazilians, are more likely to support nonwhite candidates. Using survey data, she demonstrates that self-identified Afro-Brazilians are more likely to vote for *negro* politicians (Mitchell-Walthour 2009*b*).

Recent experimental studies indicate that under certain conditions, white voters also vote

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for Afro-Brazilian politicians (Aguilar et al. 2015; Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato 2015; Bueno and Dunning 2017). Using voting experiments, Aguilar et al. (2015) and Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato (2015) find that when voters in São Paulo were presented with a small number of candidates, candidate race has limited impact on vote choice. However, when presented with a large number of candidates, Brazilian respondents demonstrate same-race preferences (Aguilar et al. 2015). Importantly, though, they find that self-identified blacks demonstrate a preference for black candidates, irrespective of ballot length (Aguilar et al. 2015; Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato 2015). Their results thus fit well with prior research on racial voting.

In contrast, Bueno and Dunning (2017) find that candidate race has no discernible effect on voter preferences. In an experiment conducted in Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, they show that subjects that viewed a campaign speech given by a white actor rated the speech just as favorably as those that viewed an Afro-Brazilian actor giving the same speech (Bueno and Dunning 2017). Based on the results of their experiment and their observational analysis, they conclude that race-based voter preferences are unlikely to explain the political underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians.

A number of factors could explain the conflicting findings of these experiments. The experiments of Aguilar et al. (2015) and Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato (2015) were conducted in different cities than that of Bueno and Dunning (2017). Moreover, they utilize different experimental designs and measure different outcome values. Therefore, it is possible that the conclusions reached in each of these experiments are correct.

On the other hand, it is also possible that the conclusions of both are wrong. For a variety of reasons, each experimental study lacks external validity. For example, respondents in all three studies were provided considerably more information about candidates priorities and background than they normally would have. At the same time, in none of the studies were respondents told what political party hypothetical candidates were affiliated with, this is information that voters traditionally possess. While rates of political partisanship in Brazil are low, research shows that voters in Brazil rely on party labels to simplify political decisions and that partisanship affects vote choice (Samuels and Zucco 2014, 2018).

Finally, even if extant experimental studies accurately capture the relationship between race and voting behavior in the cities from which they draw respondents, the findings may not hold in other cities. São Paulo, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro, vary from other Brazilian cities in observable as well as unobservable ways. For instance, while a majority of Brazilian cities are small, São Paulo, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro constitute the three most populous cities in Brazil. Moreover, they are also more economically developed and possess relatively educated populations. At a minimum, therefore, further investigation is warranted.

Legislator Race and Political Behavior

As late as the 1980s, the Brazilian Congress had zero Afro-Brazilian legislators (Johnson 1998). Since then, the number of Afro-Brazilian lawmakers has grown substantially. This growth notwithstanding, the scholarly literature on Afro-Brazilian legislators remains limited in quantity, especially when compared to studies of African Americans in the United States Congress. The main sources of information on Afro-Brazilian lawmakers' policy preferences and political behavior have traditionally been news stories and biographies. Based on the words and actions of prominent Afro-Brazilian lawmakers, such as Abdias de Nascimento, Benedita da Silva, and Paulo Paim, it is commonly presumed that Afro-Brazilian legislators are strong advocates of nonwhite Brazilians.

Drawing on memoirs, congressional speeches, and personal conversations with Afro-Brazilian lawmakers, scholars like Ollie Johnson, provide critical detail about Afro-Brazilian legislators' motivations and political activities (Johnson 1998, 2008, 2015). In the first academic study to examine the behavior of Afro-Brazilian legislators, Johnson (1998) shows that Afro-Brazilian legislators advance the interests of nonwhite Brazilians through their participation in parliamentary debates and the introduction of race-conscious legislation. However, he concludes that their descriptive underrepresentation, as well as political and cultural factors, greatly diminish their effectiveness.

In subsequent work, Johnson (2018) argues that while Afro-Brazilian lawmakers are among the most committed defenders of affirmative action and racial equality policies, there

is variation among them. Johnson draws a distinction between what he refers to as "race-neutral" Afro-Brazilians politicians and "race-affirming" politicians. The former, do not call attention to their racial identity or voice race-specific concerns, while the latter emphasize their racial group membership and actively advance a race-centric political agenda (Johnson 2018). Consistent with this view, Sousa (2009) finds evidence that many Afro-Brazilian legislators advance race-neutral claims in parliamentary debates. According to Johnson (2018), it is race-affirming Afro-Brazilian politicians that have advanced the position of Afro-Brazilians over the past 30 years.

Importantly, researchers note that Afro-Brazilian advancement is in part attributable to the actions of white political elites (Htun 2004; Johnson 1998; Mitchell-Walthour 2017; Santos 2006). Htun (2004) indicates that the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who was sympathetic to the anti-racist agenda advocated for by Afro-Brazilian activists, orchestrated a racial transformation. In an interview, Ivanir dos Santos, a *Negro* Movement activist summed it up as follows: "If FHC had not been president, the debate would not have started" (Htun 2004).

In 1995, President Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to publicly acknowledge that the country is not free of racism. In a presidential speech on November 20th, the date on which Zumbi dos Palmares, an Afro-Brazilian slave and resistance leader died 300 years prior, President Cardoso stated:

> "Here in Brazil we constantly live with and are surrounded by prejudice and discrimination...Discrimination in our society has long been consolidated and is constantly reproduced....This situation must be brought out into the open so that we can condemn it, and not merely with words but also through mechanisms and processes that will lead to a transformation of our society into one where truly democratic relations among different races, classes, and social groups can abound." (Santos 2006, p.32)

Thus, President Cardoso acknowledged what *negro* activists had long argued, that Brazil is not a racial democracy. Just as importantly, it laid the foundation for the adoption of race-based public policies (Reichmann 2010).

On the same day that President Cardoso ended decades of official denial of racism, he announced the creation of an Interministerial Working Group to develop public policies that valorize Brazil's Afro-Brazilian population (N.d.). Moreover, later that year, President Cardoso proposed

race-based public policies in the 1996 National Human Rights Plan which prescribed goals to bring about more democratic relation among races (Telles 2014*b*).

Building on the work of President Cardoso, President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva and President Dilma Rousseff have denounced racism in Brazilian society and advanced the interests of Afro-Brazilians. President da Silva is credited with increasing Afro-Brazilian representation at the national level (Mitchell-Walthour 2017). He created the Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR) and chose an Afro-Brazilian to lead it, as well as appointed Afro-Brazilians to serve in his cabinet and on the supreme court (Mitchell-Walthour 2017). Like her predecessor, President Rousseff also appointed Afro-Brazilians to governmental positions, but is credited with also improving the socioeconomic position of Afro-Brazilians. She signed legislation establishing affirmative action programs for all federal universities in the country and implemented quotas for Afro-Brazilians in civil service jobs (Johnson 2015).

Since evidence show that some white politicians have substantially advanced the interests of Afro-Brazilians and that not all Afro-Brazilian lawmakers are outspoken advocates for nonwhite Brazilians, there is reason to question whether there is a link between legislator race and political behavior at all. Alternatively, constituency characteristics, like the racial composition of the electorate, or nonracial legislator attributes, such as a politician's party affiliation, may explain patterns of behavior. In the comparative literature, there is evidence that both of these factors condition legislator behavior and therein representation of racial groups (Grose 2011; Haynie 2001; Swain 1993). However, such explanations have not been systematically tested in the Brazilian context.

A Unified Theory of Afro-Brazilian Political Marginalization

Brazil is a multiracial society in which racial group membership is consequential. Since Portuguese explorers landed on Brazilian shores in 1500, whites have subordinated nonwhites. The abolition of slavery in 1888, changed the legal status of enslaved Africans but did not alter their

symbolic position in Brazil's entrenched racial hierarchy (Telles 2014*b*). White Brazilians occupy positions of prestige, power, and prosperity, while browns and blacks have lower social standing.

Brazilians' life experiences are highly influenced, if not determined according to their position in the country's racial hierarchy. Racial discrimination is technically illegal under the 1988 Brazilian constitution and rarely overt, but nonetheless commonplace due to widely held stereotypes. In the nationally representative 2002 Brazilian Social Survey (*Pesquisa Social Brasileira*), Brazilian respondents were more likely to attribute positive characteristics like intelligence, honesty, and respectfulness to photos of whites as opposed to Afro-Brazilians (Almeida 2008). These opinions, however, are not restricted to whites. Nonwhite, Afro-Brazilians hold similar stereotypes of Afro-Brazilians.

The prevalence of racial prejudice is consequential. From birth until death, Afro-Brazilians suffer unfair treatment as a result of their racial group membership (Telles 2014*b*). Afro-Brazilians face discrimination by teachers, employers, police, and even family members (Arcand and D'hombres 2004; Botelho, Madeira and Rangel 2015; Lovell and Wood 1998; Marteleto and Dondero 2016; Mitchell and Wood 1999; Rangel 2015). Race underlies unfair treatment even when individuals do not regard it as the source (Layton and Smith 2017). Considering the prevalence of racial discrimination in Brazil, it is logical to expect that it diminishes the electoral prospects of Afro-Brazilian politicians.

To attain public office, Afro-Brazilian candidates depend on the support of political elites. Party officials influence who runs for office and the resources they have to support their candidates. Due to inclusive electoral rules, discriminatory nomination procedures are unlikely to lead to a shortage of Afro-Brazilian candidates but can be expected to lead to an excess of underfunded candidates. Due to their prejudicial attitudes and/or the expectation that voters will discriminate against Afro-Brazilian candidates, party elites are likely to direct scare campaign resources to Afro-Brazilians partisan competitors, therein increasing the chances that whites win office.

Nevertheless, even when Afro-Brazilian candidates have the resources necessary to run a competitive electoral campaign, they can be expected to disproportionately lose because of

voter prejudice. Since white and Afro-Brazilian voters both hold negative stereotypes about Afro-Brazilians and express preferences for whiteness, both white and Afro-Brazilian voters are likely to possess latent racial preferences for white candidates. Consistent with this perspective, when asked about racial voting both Afro-Brazilian politicians and voters commonly use the adage "*negros* não votam em *negros*" or "*negros* don't vote for *negros*" (da Silva 2015; Silva 2015; Mitchell-Walthour 2009*a*, 2017, 2018*b*). Moreover, the high rates at which Afro-Brazilians supported Jair Bolsonaro for president suggest that some Afro-Brazilians are willing to vote for a politician that racially insults members of their own group (Fiola and Lopes 2018; Venagalia 2018).

Despite the discrimination that Afro-Brazilian candidates must overcome to get elected to public office, a growing number are successful. Getting elected, however, does not improve the way they are treated. Both within the Brazilian Congress and outside of it, Afro-Brazilian lawmakers continue to suffer unfair treatment because of their race (Bnews 2019; Candido da Universa 2019; da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Frota 2015*b*; Goes and Garcia 2019; Kapa 2019). Such experiences lead Afro-Brazilian legislators to develop a unique racial consciousness and commitment to improving the position of nonwhites in Brazilian society. As a result, Afro-Brazilian legislators are likely to better represent Afro-Brazilian constituents' interests than white legislators.

Chapter 2

Racial Positioning in Brazilian Elections

Racial group differences are commonly portrayed as underlying political competition. Depending on the context, political actors may consider their racial group membership to be an electoral asset or obstacle. When a politician's racial group membership is regarded as an electoral asset, their campaign strategies are routinely built around cultivating coethnic support through the use of race-based appeals (McIlwain and Caliendo 2011). However, when a politician's racial group membership is perceived as diminishing their chances of winning office, they commonly push the introduction of a new social cleavage (Posner 2017). A third strategy, albeit one that has received only passing scholarly attention, is for disadvantaged politicians to assimilate into a racial group that provides greater electoral rewards.

The identity politics literature is replete with evidence that members of the general public discard membership in racial groups that no longer serve them and instrumentally adopt alternative racial identities (Davenport 2018; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013; Hitt 2008; Loveman and Muniz 2007; Nix and Qian 2015; Waters 2009). Studies commonly attribute instrumental racial identity shifts to political motivations (Chandra 2007; Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010; Posner 2017; Thachil 2017). While electoral competition is considered to affect identity change, the majority of published research focuses on voters as opposed to politicians. To my knowledge, no systematic research demonstrates that political elites change how they racially identify themselves over time, much less

that they do so strategically.

Political actors can be expected to change which racial group they claim membership in when it furthers their pursuit of power. In democracies, this may occur over the course of a politician's career because of changes in the electorate, the electoral rules that govern competition, or some combination of the two. Nevertheless, theories of ethnogenesis suggest that social norms and governmental rules are likely to constrain an individual's ability to switch racial groups (Chandra 2007; Chandra and Boulet 2012*b*; Laitin 1986, 1998). As such, politicians that change their professed race can be expected to "racially position" themselves as members of the racial group within their identity repertoire that offers the greatest electoral benefits.

In this chapter, I use unprecedented individual-level data to empirically show that Brazilian politicians instrumentally change their publicly professed race over time. Brazilian electoral authorities require all political candidates to racially classify themselves when they register to contest electoral office. This data offers an unparalleled opportunity to systematically test foundational constructivist assumptions about the fluidity of racial identity. My analysis reveals that 27 percent of political candidates that ran for public office in Brazil's 2014 and 2016 elections changed their self-declared race from one election to the next. This is the first analysis to empirically demonstrate that politicians change their self-classified race over time and thus constitutes a major contribution to the identity politics literature. Moreover, it lays the groundwork for the subsequent chapters. The extent to which race is endogenous has empirical consequences for understanding how racial group membership affects electoral outcomes and shapes the behavior of political elites.

To determine if observed changes in self-reported race reflect strategic considerations, I exploit temporal variation in electoral district boundaries and in electoral rules. Consistent with theoretical expectations, I find the racial composition of the electorate and the electoral rules that govern competition affect which racial identities candidates discard, maintain, and adopt. The results of a conditional logit model indicate that racial switching is strategic and that candidates "racially position" themselves as members of the racial group that maximize their chances of winning office. This finding has important theoretical and empirical implications. It reveals that self-reported

race is neither fixed nor exogenous to many of the political phenomena scholars are interested in.

Racial self-identification is volitional, yet external forces, including governmental rules and social norms, affect how individuals identify themselves (Chandra and Boulet 2012*a*; Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000; Rockquemore and Arend 2002; Saperstein and Penner 2014). To elucidate how external racial ascription shapes patterns of racial self-classification, I develop an original measure of classified race by having candidate photographs racially categorized by Brazilian coders. My analysis reveals that candidates who are racially categorized inconsistently by coders are more likely to change their reported race across elections than candidates who are consistently identified as a particular race. Moreover, I find that candidates largely claim membership in the racial categories that others ascribe them membership in. These findings are consistent with Laitin's (1986) claim that identity is "Janus" faced, that is, both fixed and fluid. Nevertheless, my results reveal that some individuals have greater flexibility to construct their racial identity than others.

Instrumentalist theories of identity indicate that individuals strategically choose how to racially identify themselves and alter how they identify themselves as opportunities change. I find robust empirical evidence that political actors engage in this type of rational, calculated behavior. My analysis suggests that the malleability of racial identity is one of the reasons why it matters in electoral politics.

Instrumental Racial Positioning

Racial identity is a powerful predictor of political behavior. Individuals are known to demonstrate in-group favoritism, including at the ballot box (Adida 2015; Aguilar et al. 2015; Ferree 2006; Heath, Verniers and Kumar 2015; Horowitz 1985; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Posner 2005; Sigelman et al. 1995). As a result, politicians use all available tools to signal that they are members of a voter's racial group, or at least, that they could be (Collet 2008; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011; Sriram and Grindlife 2017). To attain the electoral support of voters from different racial groups, politicians therefore must change how they present themselves.

No empirical studies demonstrate that politicians change how they racially present themselves based on instrumental electoral calculations. Some qualitative evidence, however, suggests that it does occur. For instance, Charles Rangel, a U.S. Congressman who for decades presented himself primarily as African American began to draw attention to his Latino heritage after electoral redistricting increased the proportion of Latino voters in his district (Adida, Davenport and McClendon 2016). Similarly, Dilma Rousseff, the President of Brazil presented herself as white when campaigning in Brazil's predominately white south, but claimed to be "brownish" (*meio pardinha*) when seeking votes in Brazil's north east, a region known for its large Afro-Brazilian population (Pitombo 2014). The behavior of both Rangel and Rousseff can be interpreted as strategic efforts to attain the electoral support of decisive racial constituencies.

Since the electoral strength of racial groups in democratic elections is a consequence of group size, strategic politicians are incentivized to claim membership in numerically large as opposed to small racial groups. Politicians can achieve this outcome in two distinct yet complementary ways. First, politicians can switch out of small racial groups. And second, politicians that switch, profess membership in large as opposed to small racial groups.

- **Constituency Composition**: Political candidates are more likely to claim membership in large as opposed to small racial groups.

  - **H1 Strategic Exit**: Political candidates are more likely to switch out of small racial groups than large racial groups.

  - **H2 Strategic Entrance**: Political candidates are more likely to switch into large racial groups than small racial groups.

All political candidates must assemble winning electoral coalitions. The size of the coalition necessary to attain political office, however, varies according to electoral rules. Under proportional representation electoral rules, candidates must receive votes above a minimum electoral threshold to win office.[1] Assuming candidates competing under proportional representation rules view racial

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[1]This threshold is a function of the variant of proportional representation rules employed and

groups as distinct electoral coalitions, they can be expected to identify themselves as members of racial groups whose size exceeds the minimum threshold and carve out a de facto racial constituency. In contrast, in plurality elections with only one round of voting, political candidates must assemble an electoral coalition larger than all alternatives. Under this type of electoral arrangement, candidates can be expected to claim membership in the largest racial group.

- **H3 Electoral Institutions**: Political candidates competing under plurality rules in single-member districts are more likely to claim membership in the largest racial group than candidates elected according to proportional representation.

While constituency composition and electoral institutions approximate the expected electoral value of different racial identities, a candidate may accrue the electoral benefits that membership entails only if recognized as an "authentic" group member. External forces including official rules for racial classification and social norms of categorization are likely to affect whether individuals are accepted as legitimate group members (Chandra and Boulet 2012*a*; Loveman 2014; Nobles 2000; Rockquemore and Arend 2002; Saperstein and Penner 2014). The literature on political campaigns indicates that candidates convey their racial authenticity through their appearance and behavior (McIlwain and Caliendo 2009, 2011). Political candidates that are characterized as "passing" are likely to be criticized and may suffer an electoral penalty. As a result, political candidates can be expected to identify as members of racial groups that others would plausibly ascribe them membership.

- **H4 Ascriptive Constraints**: Political candidates are more likely to claim membership in racial groups that others ascribe them membership.

Political candidates are incentivized to "racially position" themselves to maximize their chances of winning elected office. While the racial composition of the electorate, the electoral rules that govern political competition, and norms of racial classification are expected to influence district magnitude (Cox 1997).

patterns of racial self-classification, these predictions are by no means exhaustive. For example, other electoral factors and individual attributes may affect how politicians racially identify themselves. The discussion section suggests why Brazil may be a propitious environment for candidates to engage in "racial positioning" at this point in time and the extent to which political actors in other countries may behave similarly.

Racial Classification in Brazilian Elections

Brazilian politicians have remarkable latitude to choose which racial group they claim membership in. The absence of official rules for racial categorization, the ambiguity of racial boundaries, and reliance on phenotypic features to classify individuals means that politicians can alter how they identify themselves situationally. Previous studies suggest that in the aggregate Brazilian citizens strategically change how they racially identify themselves over time (Carvalho, Wood and Andrade 2004; Miranda 2015; Nobles 2000; Wood and De Carvalho 1988). No published research, however, explores if Brazilian politicians behave similarly.

I examine temporal changes in racial self-classification using individual-level data on Brazilian political candidates. Prospective electoral candidates in Brazil must register with the *Tribunal Superior Electoral* (TSE), Brazil's electoral governance body. Each candidate is required to submit a *Requerimento de Registro de Candidatura* (RRC), a registration form on which they provide personal information, including their full name, date of birth, taxpayer number, and gender. Beginning with the 2014 national and state elections, the TSE also started requiring prospective candidates to racially classify themselves on the RRC form.[2] This requirement remained in place for Brazil's 2016 local elections.

A total of 6,584 individuals ran for elected office in both 2014 and 2016. The RRC form prospective candidates completed in each election was identical and required them to racially

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[2]This requirement was instituted in response to formal requests by Brazil's black consciousness movements.

identify themselves using the same racial classification scheme.[3] The candidates that ran for elected office in both elections include men and women from every Brazilian state and each official ethno-racial category. While the majority of candidates that ran in both elections had never held elected political office, 23 percent were elected in 2012 or 2014.[4] For these reasons, TSE data offers an unprecedented opportunity to examine patterns of elite racial self-classification over time.

Different institutional arrangements governed electoral competition in 2014 and 2016. In 2014, political candidates competed in state-wide electoral districts for state and federal assembly positions, as well as, executive offices, like governor and President.[5] In contrast, in the 2016 elections, candidates competed in individual municipalities for mayoral and city council positions.[6] Depending on the office, candidates were elected according to open-list proportional representation or plurality electoral rules. I exploit this variation in electoral institutions to determine if temporal changes in racial self-classification are indicative of racial positioning.

Matched individual-level data from the 2014 and 2016 elections reveals a striking racial pattern.[7] Of the 6,584 political candidates that competed in both elections, 27.4 percent changed their self-reported race from one election to the next.[8]

A check built into the registration process diminishes the likelihood that inconsistency in how candidates racially classify themselves is attributable to error. The information candidates

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[3]Racial self-classification in Brazil is sensitive to the classification scheme employed (Bailey, Loveman and Muniz 2013).

[4]Brazilians politicians routinely run for "higher" elected offices even while they hold another elected position (Samuels 2003). If a currently elected politician wins another political office, they are required to relinquish their previous position.

[5]Brazil has 27 states which range in population size from less than one million to more than 41 million.

[6]Brazil has 5,576 municipalities that are akin to counties in the United States.

[7]Data from the 2014 and 2016 elections were merged using individuals' unique taxpayer registration number, known as the *Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas* (CPF).

[8]In total, 22,033 candidates ran for elected office in 2014 and 466,490 candidates competed in the 2016 elections.

provide on RRC forms is entered into a TSE database by administrative personal affiliated with each candidate's respective political party. Before the information is officially submitted, however, candidates verify a print-out of the entered information and declare they are "responsible for the accuracy of the presented information" by physically signing the document.[9] While it is still possible that candidates incorrectly classify themselves in error, the consistency with which political candidates provide other personal information suggests this is not the case.

Figure 2.1: Inconsistency in Candidate Responses Across Elections

Note: The bar chart depicts the percentage of candidates that responded to RRC questions about gender, date of birth, and race inconsistently across elections.

Brazilian political candidates that competed in both the 2014 and 2016 elections provided

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[9]These signed documents are maintained at the Regional Electoral Tribunal (TRE) and are available upon request. An authorized agent may sign on a candidate's behalf, yet review of a sample of RRC forms indicates candidates typically certify the information themselves.

nonracial personal information with a high degree of consistency. Figure 2.1 shows that less than one percent of candidates inconsistently reported their gender and less than three percent listed a different date of birth. Evidence that candidates consistently provide other personal information, but racially classify themselves inconsistently suggests that changes in self-classified race may reflect strategic electoral calculations.

Table 2.1 provides detail on election-to-election shifts in candidate racial self-classification. Each row displays the race of candidates in 2014 by whether they self-classified as white, brown, black, Asian, or Indigenous. The bolded cells along the center diagonal show the percentage of candidates who classified themselves consistently in 2014 and 2016. Observations in the off-diagonal cells indicate the percentage of candidates who changed their self-reported race from one election to the next and what racial identities they adopted.

Table 2.1: Patterns of Racial Self-Classification in 2014 and 2016

		Self-Identified Race in 2016					
		White	Brown	Black	Asian	Indigenous	N
	White	**81%**	18%	1%	0%	0%	3,722
Self-Identified	Brown	29%	**61%**	9%	0%	1%	2,186
Race in 2014	Black	5%	26%	**69%**	0%	0%	625
	Asian	40%	30%	0%	**30%**	0%	33
	Indigenous	11%	33%	28%	0%	**28%**	18

Note: Table 2.1 shows in each cell the percentage of political candidates who gave a particular combination of responses in the 2014 and 2016 RRC documents. Percentages sum across rows.

Table 2.1 shows the variation in how candidates reported their race across elections. Of the political candidates who declared themselves to be white in the 2014, 81 percent reported themselves to be white in 2016. The percentage of candidates who classified themselves consistently as brown is significantly lower. Only 61 percent of candidates who classified themselves as brown in 2014, classified themselves as such in 2016. In comparison to whites, candidates who declared themselves to be black in 2014 also changed their race at significantly higher rates. Of the candidates who classified themselves as black in 2014, 69 percent declared themselves to be black in 2016. Finally,

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Table 1 shows that membership in the Asian and Indigenous racial categories is extremely fluid. More candidates changed their reported race from Asian and Indigenous, than maintained it.[10]

To determine if observed shifts in racial self-classification are consistent with racial positioning, I examine the relationship between electoral factors and racial switching. A series of univariate tests provide preliminary evidence that changes in self-classified race reflect strategic electoral calculations. Consistent with expectations, I find the racial composition of the electoral district in which a candidate runs for office, the electoral rules that govern political competition, and how candidates are perceived by others affect patterns of racial switching.

Strategic Racial Switching

Racial divisions are increasingly salient in Brazilian electoral politics. Research shows Brazilians have latent racial preferences and that voters prefer candidates from their racial group (Aguilar et al. 2015; Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato 2015; Bailey 2009*a*,*b*; Mitchell-Walthour 2009*b*, 2017; Mitchell-Walthour and Darity Jr 2014).[11] Since voting in Brazil is compulsory, political candidates' electoral prospects are therefore linked to how voters racially perceive them.

Politicians make calculated decisions about how to present themselves to voters. The racial group a candidate claims to be a member of on their RRC form reflects one of those strategic presentational choices. Every candidates' self-reported race is published on the TSE website and publicized by a variety of media outlets. It is spread via broadcast news programs, print media, and on the internet. Moreover, candidates directly disseminate information on how they racially identify themselves via their campaign propaganda and media interactions (Mitchell-Walthour 2009*a*; Oliveira 2016). Experimental research indicates that asserting membership in a racial group is sufficient to affect how an individual is racially categorized by others (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Stockstill 2018). As a result, declaring membership in a racial group on an electoral registration

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[10]Since only a small number of candidates classified themselves as Asian and Indigenous, conclusions about the stability of these two racial identities should be drawn cautiously.

[11]But see also Bueno and Dunning (2017).

form is not an inconsequential bureaucratic requirement, but rather a political action that may affect electoral outcomes.

According to the logic of racial positioning, political candidates are expected to claim membership in the racial group that, by virtue of its size, offers the greatest electoral rewards. Since political candidates competed in state-wide electoral districts in 2014 and in individual municipalities in 2016, the relative size of the same racial group commonly varied across elections.[12] If my first hypothesis is correct, when a candidate runs in an electoral district in which their professed racial group is smaller than other groups, the candidate is likely to change their declared race. On the other hand, when the racial group a candidate claimed membership in is larger than other groups, the candidate is unlikely to change their declared race.

Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between racial group size and racial switching. Consistent with my first hypothesis, it indicates that members of numerically small racial groups are more likely to change their self-classified race than members of large groups. Of the candidates who identified themselves as members of the smallest racial group, 78.6 percent changed their self-reported race from 2014 to 2016. In contrast, only 20.5 percent of candidates who identified themselves as members of the largest racial group changed their self-identified race across elections. These findings suggest the racial composition of the electorate affects which racial groups candidates relinquish membership in.

Temporal variation in the racial composition of the electorate is also likely to affect which racial groups candidates adopt membership in. My second hypothesis indicates that candidates who change their self-reported race across elections are more likely to switch into large as opposed small racial groups. Among candidates who changed their self-reported race across elections, I find that 84.5 percent switched into a racial group that was relatively larger in size than the group they relinquished membership in.

[12]Electoral law mandates that candidates run for public office in their state and municipality of residence. Some candidates try to get around election residency requirement by renting a residence in the municipality where they intend to run.

Figure 2.2: Politicians Relinquish Membership in Small Racial Groups

Note: Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of candidates who changed their self-reported race according to the size of the racial group they claimed membership in. The ordinal categories on the x-axis indicate the numerical size of the racial group a candidate claimed membership in when he or she ran for office in 2014, relative to the size of the racial groups in the municipality in which the candidate ran in 2016. The y-axis indicates the percentage of candidates that changed their self-reported race by group size. N= 6,584

Figure 2.3 shows the size of the racial groups that candidates switched into, relative to the size of the other groups in the municipality in which they ran for office. The figure demonstrates that candidates who changed their self-reported race across elections overwhelmingly professed membership in large as opposed to small racial groups. Of the 1,801 candidates who changed their race, 44 percent claimed membership in the largest racial group in the municipality in which they ran for office. In contrast, less than 1 percent of candidates who changed their race claimed membership in the smallest group. This pattern of racial switching is consistent with my second hypothesis.

Figure 2.3: Politicians Switch Into Large Racial Groups

Note: Figure 2.3 shows the size of the racial group that candidates switched into, relative to the other groups they could have declared membership in. The ordinal categories on the x-axis indicate the relative size of the racial group a candidate claimed membership in when he or she ran for municipal office in 2016. N = 1,801

The decision to claim membership in the largest racial group as opposed to a smaller group is likely to reflect more than constituency characteristics. How large a group must be to make it a viable electoral vehicle is in part a function of electoral rules. Proportional representation electoral rules reward candidates who assemble electoral coalitions that exceed the threshold necessary to win office. In contrast, plurality rules reward only candidates who assemble electoral coalitions larger than all alternative coalitions. In Brazil's 2016 elections, city council candidates were elected according to open-list proportional representation and mayoral candidates were elected by plurality rules.[13] Due to variation in electoral rules, I expect mayoral candidates to retain membership in the largest racial group more commonly than city council candidates.

Figure 2.4 shows the frequency with which mayoral and city council candidates retain membership in the largest racial group. It demonstrates that mayoral candidates are significantly less likely than city council candidates to switch out of the largest racial group (21% versus 18%). This difference is statistically significant at the $p < .1$ level according to a two-tailed T-test.

Due to temporal variation in the racial composition of the electorate, 40 percent of candidates had to change their self-classified race if they wanted to racially position themselves as members of the largest racial group in the municipality where they sought office. Figure 2.5 demonstrates that mayoral and city council candidates were not equally likely to switch into the largest racial group. Among the candidates who did not identify as members of the largest racial group and changed their self-reported race, mayoral candidates were significantly more likely than city council candidates to switch into the largest racial group (88% versus 79%). This difference is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level according to a two-tailed T-test.

Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 provide suggestive evidence that electoral institutions affect patterns of racial positioning. I find that mayoral candidates competing in plurality elections are more likely than city council candidates in open-list proportional representation elections to racially position themselves as members of the largest racial group in the municipality in which they are

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[13]Mayors and vice-mayoral candidates are elected according to plurality rules or majority run-off depending on the population of the municipality.

Figure 2.4: Mayors Retain Membership in the Largest Racial Group

Note: Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of mayoral candidates and city council candidates who retain membership in the largest racial group. This difference is statistically significant at the p<.1 level according to a Two-Tailed T-test. N=3,949

running for office. This finding is consistent with my third hypothesis.

While the racial composition of electoral districts and electoral institutions motivate Brazilian political candidates to identify themselves as members of particular racial groups, a candidate's ability to do so is likely constrained by external factors. How candidates are racially perceived by others is likely to affect their ability to choose their race. Candidates who are inconsistently categorized by others can be expected to have greater latitude to choose how they racially identify themselves and change their declared race over time. To determine if inconsistently classified candidates are more likely to change how they report their race, the photos of all political candidates who participated in both the 2014 and 2016 elections were racially classified by Brazilian coders.

Figure 2.5: Mayors Switch Into the Largest Racial Group

Note: Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of city council and mayoral candidates that switched into the largest racial group. This difference according to a two-tailed T-test is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. N=991

I construct a measure of candidate-ascribed race by having Brazilian coders racially classify photos of each candidate. Candidates are required to submit a black and white headshot photo to the TSE when they register to contest electoral office.[14] Three Brazilian coders independently categorized each political candidate into one of Brazil's five official ethno-racial categories based on the photo the candidate submitted to the TSE in 2014.[15] All coders were self-identified white males with some college education living in southeastern Brazilian states.

One concern with racially classifying candidates using a nonrepresentative sample of

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[14]These photos are published alongside candidate information on the TSE's official website.

[15]Coders were provided only candidate photos, therefore their assessment of candidate race is based solely on phenotype.

Brazilian coders is that categorization reflects interviewer characteristics.[16] Published research, however, indicates that Brazilians generally agree about how individuals should be racially classified (Bailey 2008, 2009*a*; Bueno and Dunning 2017; Telles 2014*b*). Bailey (2008; 2009*a*) finds that 85 percent of a nationally representative sample of Brazilian respondents similarly classified seven of eight photos of men whose skin tones span the color continuum into IBGE categories. Moreover, the photograph with the lowest level of agreement was still racially categorized similarly by 70 percent of respondents (Bailey 2008, 2009*a*). Utilizing a nonrepresentative sample of Brazilians to evaluate the same photos, Bueno and Dunning (2017) find the racial classifications of their study are largely consistent with the findings of Bailey (2008; 2009*a*). Together, these results suggest that interviewer effects are minimal.

A comparison of how the coders racially categorized political candidates reveals a great deal of consensus. Coders unanimously agreed on the race of 62 percent of candidates and two of three coders agreed on the race of 32 percent of the remaining candidates. Only 6 percent of candidates were racially categorized differently by each coder.[17]

Candidates who are inconsistently classified by others likely have greater latitude to change their self-classified race than candidates whose phenotypic features distinguish them as belonging to a particular racial group. All else equal, racially ambiguous candidates can therefore be expected to change their self-reported race more commonly. Using T-Tests, I compare the frequency of racial switching by the consistency of racial ascription. The results of these T-tests are displayed visually in Figure 2.6.

Figure 2.6 shows that candidates who are racially categorized inconsistently by coders are significantly more likely to change their self-classified race than candidates who are unanimously ascribed membership in a particular group. While 24 percent of the 4,060 candidates racially classified consistently by all three coders changed their self-reported race across elections, 32 percent

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[16]One of the principal arguments advanced by opponents of affirmative action policies in Brazil is that racial classification is contingent on interviewer characteristics (Htun 2004; Santos 2006).

[17]These candidates are not confined to any particular geographic area.

Figure 2.6: Racial Ambiguity and Racial Switching

Note: Figure 2.6 indicates that candidates who are racially classified inconsistently by coders are more likely to change their self-classified race than candidates who are racially classified consistently. The reference group is composed of candidates who were unanimously classified by coders as a particular race. Each of these differences are significant at the p<.001 level.

of the 2,146 candidates classified consistently by two of three coders changed their self-classified race across elections. Finally, 38 percent of the 378 candidates who were categorized differently by each coder changed their self-reported race. Each of these differences are significant at the p<.001 level. Evidence that candidates who are racially classified inconsistently change their self-classified race at significantly higher rates than candidates who are classified consistently supports my fourth hypothesis.

The preceding univariate tests suggest that candidates strategically change their self-classified race across elections. Building on these findings, I use a conditional logit model in the next section to examine how characteristics of racial groups and candidate personal attributes affect patterns of racial self-classification. Consistent with theoretical expectations, my results indicate that candidates position themselves as members of the racial group that offers the greatest electoral rewards.

Racial Positioning in Brazilian Elections

The racial positioning framework provides predictions about the conditions under which political candidates will profess membership in one racial group as opposed to another. A candidate's decision about how to racially classify themselves can be operationalized empirically as a discrete-choice problem. Candidates are expected to classify themselves as members of the racial group that maximizes their electoral reward. In the case of Brazil, where political candidates are required to classify themselves as a member of one of five mutually exclusive ethno-racial categories, this can be written as:

$$U_{ij} = MAX(U_{i1}, U_{i2}, U_{i3}, U_{i4}, U_{i5})$$

Where U_{ij} is political candidate i's utility of identifying as a member of racial category j. When racial category j is different than the category a candidate claims membership in, the candidate changes their self-reported race. The utility of identifying as a member of race j can be written as:

$$U_{ij} = B_1 X_{ij} - B_2 I_{j \neq current} + B_{3g_i} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where X_{ij} is a matrix of the covariates, B_1 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and ε_{ij} is the unobserved preference candidate i has for race j. Included in X_{ij} is a dichotomous indicator for whether racial group j constitutes the largest group in a municipality, the electoral rules candidate i is competing under, and whether candidate i is racially categorized by others as a member of race j. Under the assumption that the ε_{ij} follow an extreme-value distribution and are independent across alternatives, this becomes a conditional logit model (McFadden 1974).[18]

The advantage of using a conditional logit model is threefold. First, this type of model assumes that the characteristics of each racial group influence the probability that a candidate classifies themself as any particular race. Second, the conditional logit permits examination of interactions among invariant candidate attributes and the racial categories that candidates can choose from (Powers and Xie 2008). Hence, candidates who classified themselves as white in the previous election can behave differently than candidates who racially identified themselves as members of other racial group. And third, the number of racial categories a candidate can claim membership in is constrained to be one. Therefore, the total number of racial categories a candidate is predicted to claim membership in is equal to the number that the candidate actually chooses.

The dependent variable is candidate i's self-reported race in 2016.[19] Following standard practice for discrete-choice models, Y_{ij} is candidate i's reported race in 2016, coded "1" if the candidate indicates that they are a member of racial category j and "0" otherwise.

The racial positioning framework predicts that the electoral utility of claiming membership in each racial category is a function of group size, electoral rules, and the probability that the candidate will be accepted as an "authentic" group member. For this reason, I include the variable

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[18]The estimation of conditional logit models is somewhat unorthodox in that the unit of analysis is the set of choice alternatives available to each individual and the independent variables are attributes of those alternatives.

[19]This variable is coded according to notarized RRC documents.

Largest Racial Group, which is coded "1" if racial category *j* is the modal racial category in the electoral district in which a candidate ran for public office in 2016 and "0" otherwise. This variable is coded according to data from the 2010 Brazilian population census. I also interact the *Largest Racial Group* variable with the dichotomous *Plurality* variable. The *Plurality* variable is coded "1" if a candidate ran for mayor and therefore competed under plurality electoral rules in 2016 and "0" otherwise. To explore how external racial ascription affects self-classified race, I include a measure of ascribed race. The *Ascribed Racial Membership* variable takes the values "0-3" and reflects how many coders classified candidate *i* as race *j*.[20] Finally, the dichotomous *Self-Reported Race* variable is coded "1" if racial category *j* is the category a candidate claimed membership in on the 2014 RRC registration form and "0" otherwise.

The literature on racial identity in Brazil suggests that ostensibly non-racial attributes may also attenuate patterns of racial self-classification. For this reason, I interact the *Self-Reported Race* variable with a set of time-invariant candidate attributes, including gender, education, electoral experience, and social status. The variable *Female* is coded "1" if the candidate identified herself in 2016 as female and "0" otherwise. The categorical *Education* variable takes the value "1" if a candidate is literate, "2" if they attended primary school, "3" if they completed primary school,"4" if they attended high school, "5" if they completed high school, "6" if they attended college, and "7" if they completed college.[21] The *Elected 2012* variable takes the value "1" if a candidate was elected in 2012 and "0" otherwise. Similarly, the *Elected 2014* variable is coded "1" if a candidate was elected in 2014 and "0" otherwise. Lastly, the dichotomous *Business Professional* variable indicates if a candidate has a white-collar job. This measure is coded according to the Carnes and Lupu (2015) coding schema, using information provided by candidates on the 2016 RRC form.

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[20]Appendix A Table 2.3 provides evidence that patterns of racial self-identification are not attributable to regional norms of racial classification. The results are robust when I restrict my analysis to candidates who ran in Brazil's south-east, the region from which coders were drawn.

[21]Candidates with limited formal schooling may be more likely to commit errors when completing official forms.

Social class analysts regard occupation as an ideal measure of a person's place in a society's status structure (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005).[22]

Table 2.2 reports conditional logit coefficient estimates. In the conditional logit framework, a 1 unit increase in an independent variable is associated with a coefficient change in the unobserved latent utility of claiming membership in racial category j. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 2.2 broadly support the conclusion that Brazilian political candidates racially position themselves to maximize their electoral rewards. In particular, the results indicate that candidates racially classify themselves according to the racial composition of the electorate, the electoral rules that structure competition, and how they are racially perceived by others. To facilitate interpretation of the results, in addition to discussing the coefficient estimates, I also report predicted probabilities based on the results of Model 1.

To examine if political candidates are more likely to claim membership in large as opposed to small racial groups, I focus on the coefficient of the *Largest Racial Group* variable. The size of its positive coefficient indicates that candidates are significantly more likely to claim membership in the largest racial group in an electoral district than claim membership in smaller groups. Moreover, I expect there to be an interaction between the racial composition of the district in which candidates are running and electoral rules. Consistent with this expectation, I find the coefficient on *Largest Racial Group X Plurality* is positive and significant. Together, these results indicate the interaction of constituency characteristics and electoral rules affect how candidates racially classify themselves.

The implications of these findings can be appreciated through examination of predicted probabilities. Consider a hypothetical candidate who self-identified as brown in 2014, and is classified by two coders as white and by one coder as brown. If this candidate ran for political office in a municipality in which browns constitute the largest racial group, the logic of racial positioning suggests the candidate would maximize their chances of winning office by self-identifying as brown. Figure 2.7 shows the predicted probability that the hypothetical candidate will self-identify as brown

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[22]Appendix A Table 2.4 includes alternative measures of social status, including a candidate's reported assets and assets logged. The results are robust to alternative measures of social status.

Table 2.2: Conditional Logit Models of Racial Self-Identification

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
Largest Racial Group	1.018***	1.015***
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Largest Racial Group X Plurality	0.260***	0.263***
	(0.084)	(0.085)
Ascribed Racial Membership	0.587***	0.586***
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Self-Reported Race	1.362***	0.922***
	(0.034)	(0.110)
Female X Self-Reported Race		0.142*
		(0.076)
Education X Self-Reported Race		0.083***
		(0.021)
Elected 2012 X Self-Reported Race		0.113
		(0.086)
Elected 2014 X Self-Reported Race		-0.142
		(0.181)
Business Professional X Self-Reported Race		0.023
		(0.074)
Observations	32,920	32,920
R^2	.5310	.5320

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

if running for city council and mayor.

Figure 2.7: Politicians Remain in Large Groups

Note: Figure 2.7 indicates the probability that a hypothetical candidate self-identifies as brown in 2016 based on the electoral position contested. These probabilities are conditional on the hypothetical candidate self-identifying as brown in 2014, being classified by two coders as white and one coder as brown, and the candidate running in a municipality in which browns constitute the largest racial group.

Figure 2.7 illustrates that candidates are less likely to change their self-reported race if they already identify as members of the racial group that maximizes their chances of winning office. I find the hypothetical candidate has a .76 probability of identifying as brown if the candidate runs for city council and .80 probability of identifying as brown if the candidate runs for mayor. This finding is consistent with my first hypothesis. Nevertheless, the relative size of racial groups varied across elections.

Since membership in the largest group provides a greater electoral advantage than membership

in smaller groups, when candidates are not members of the largest group, they can be expected to change their self-reported race. Returning to the hypothetical candidate introduced above, if that candidate ran for political office in a municipality in which whites as opposed to browns constitute the largest racial group, the electoral benefit of self-identifying as white is likely to exceed the benefit of self-identifying as brown. As a result, the candidate can be expected to relinquish their membership in the brown racial group and profess membership in the white racial group. Figure 2.8 shows predicted probabilities that this hypothetical candidate will identify as white and brown based on the electoral position the candidate is running for.

Figure 2.8: Politicians Switch Into Large Groups

Note: Figure 2.8 indicates the probability that a hypothetical candidate self-identifies as white or brown in 2016 based on the electoral position the candidate is contesting. These probabilities are conditional on the candidate self-identifying as brown in 2014, being classified by two coders as white and by one coder as brown, and running for office in a municipality in which whites constitute the largest racial group.

Figure 2.8 shows the hypothetical candidate has a higher probability of identifying as white than brown, regardless of the office sought. Since the candidate did not previously identify themselves as white, this implies that the candidate would change their self-reported race from brown to white. This finding is consistent with my second hypothesis. The probability that the hypothetical candidate self-identifies as white, though, varies significantly according to the office sought. The candidate has a .47 probability of self-identifying as white if they run for city council, but a .55 probability of self-identifying as white if they run for mayor. Evidence that patterns of racial self-classification reflect electoral arrangements, strongly supports my third hypothesis.

While constituency characteristics and the electoral rules that govern competition motivate political candidates to identify themselves as members of one racial group as opposed to another, the ability of candidates to choose their race is constrained by social forces. The coefficient on the *Ascribed Racial Membership* variable is positive and significant. This indicates that candidates are more likely to claim membership in racial groups when they are ascribed membership in them. Figure 2.9 shows the likelihood that a hypothetical candidate identifies as white, based on whether 1, 2 or 3 coders classify the candidate as white.[23]

Figure 2.9 indicates that external ascription significantly affects patterns of racial self-classification. A hypothetical candidate who is racially perceived by 3 coders as white is six times as likely to classify themselves as white than an otherwise equivalent candidate who is perceived by only 1 coder as white. Figure 2.9 illustrates that candidates are more likely to claim membership in the racial groups that others ascribe them membership in. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Finally, the control variables are mostly as expected. The *Self-Reported Race* variable is significant and positive, indicating that candidates are significantly more likely to identify themselves consistently across elections than change their race. This is especially true of females and candidates with high levels of education. However, it is important to note that even candidates with considerable formal education changed their race at high levels. Of the 3,246 candidates who attained a university

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[23]Predicted probabilities are conditional on the candidate self-identifying as brown in 2014 and running for city council in a municipality in which browns constitute the largest racial group.

Figure 2.9: Impact of Racial Ascription on Self-Classification

Note: Figure 2.9 shows the probability that a hypothetical candidate self-identifies as white, based on the number of coders that classify the candidate as white. These probabilities are conditional on the candidate identifying as brown in 2014 and running for city council in a district in which browns constitute the largest racial group.

degree, 24 percent changed their self-classified race across elections. I do not find that candidates with prior electoral experience are more or less likely to change their race than candidates who never held elected office.[24] Lastly, I do not find that candidates with white collar jobs are more or less likely to change their race.

Overall, the conditional logit provides robust evidence that Brazilian politicians discard racial identities that no longer serve them and acquire membership in racial groups that further their electoral pursuits. Consistent with the predictions of racial positioning, my analysis indicates that

[24]Brazilian candidates may not feel the need to consistently identify themselves because voters may face as many as one thousand candidates in a single district (Aguilar et al. 2015).

patterns of racial self-classification reflect rational career calculations.

Discussion

Scholars recognize that political competition induce members of the electorate to adopt and discard racial identities, yet politicians are typically treated as having stable, temporally fixed racial identities. Using novel individual-level data, I present robust empirical evidence that Brazilian politicians strategically change their self-reported race over time and instrumentally position themselves as members of the racial group that maximizes their expected electoral utility. In particular, my analysis shows that the racial composition of the electorate, the electoral rules that structure competition, and societal norms of racial group membership affect how politicians choose to racially identify themselves. These findings suggest that electoral conditions shape the racial makeup of candidate pools and elected political bodies by influencing how politicians racially identify themselves.

Brazil is a propitious case to test the racial positioning framework I propose. It's history of racial mixture and the absence of official rules for racial classification provide individuals significant latitude to choose how to racially identify themselves (Telles 2014*b*). Since race is a salient electoral cleavage, Brazilian politicians can be expected to racially identify themselves strategically and instrumentally adopt alternative racial identities over the course of their political careers. Brazil, however, is likely not the only country in which politicians embrace and discard racial identities.

Future studies should empirically investigate if politicians in other countries instrumentally change their reported race over time. As the Rangel example illustrates, American politicians may modify how they articulate their race depending on electoral conditions. Since racial group membership in the United States has historically been determined by ancestry, multiracial politicians are likely to have greater opportunity to choose how they racially position themselves than monoracials (Adida, Davenport and McClendon 2016; Lemi 2017). Similarly, in other Latin American countries, individuals of mixed ancestry likely have greater latitude to modify the

ethno-racial group they claim membership in (Loveman 2014). To determine the prevalence of racial switching in other countries cross-national research is required.

In different country contexts, other societal and institutional factors may shape patterns of racial positioning. For example, three Latin American countries reserve seats for indigenous peoples and one reserves seats for Afrodescendants. These formal institutions are intended to promote political inclusion, yet they also create the conditions for opportunistic political behavior. In Colombia, the reserved seats intended for Afrodescendants were won in 2014 by politicians who were not recognized as Afrodescendant and had no connection to the black community (Htun 2016). While Brazil does not currently reserve seats for Afro-Brazilians, a constitutional amendment introduced in 2011 if passed would establish them in the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil's lower house of Congress (Cardoso 2013). The bill as it currently stands reserves seats for self-identified Afro-Brazilians. If it passes, it may lead to the election of opportunistic politicians who are Afro-Brazilian in label alone. Overall, the generalizability of racial positioning and the specific hypotheses posited in this chapter warrant further attention.

This chapter lays the groundwork for future empirical research on racial positioning, but also challenges scholars to reconsider how they even measure race. Race is theoretically recognized as a malleable, multidimensional social construct, however, empirical studies almost always treat individuals as if they have a singular, stable race. The discrepancy between how race is conceptualized and how it is empirically operationalized hinders our understanding of how race matters in politics.

Chapter 2 Appendix A

Table 2.3: Conditional Logit Models of Racial Self-Identification

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
Modal Racial Group	0.563***	0.567***
	(0.063)	(0.064)
Modal Racial Group X Plurality	0.469***	0.453***
	(0.148)	(0.151)
Ascribed Racial Membership	0.624***	0.625***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Self-Reported Race	1.372***	0.708***
	(0.055)	(0.170)
Female X Self-Reported Race		0.301**
		(0.124)
Education X Self-Reported Race		0.118***
		(0.033)
Elected 2012 X Self-Reported Race		-0.179
		(0.138)
Elected 2014 X Self-Reported Race		0.157
		(0.348)
Business Professional X Self-Reported Race		0.306**
		(0.120)
Observations	13,445	13,445
R^2	.5355	.5385

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Robustness checks utilizing a restricted sample. In these models I only include candidates that ran for elected office in South Eastern Brazil, the region from which coders are drawn. The South Eastern region includes Espirito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. The presented models correspond to those displayed in Table 2 of the manuscript and indicate that strategic racial positioning is not attributable to regional norms of racial self-identification and classification.

Table 2.4: Conditional Logit Models of Racial Self-Identification

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Modal Racial Group	1.015***	1.042***	1.042***
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Modal Racial Group X Plurality	0.263***	0.359***	0.362***
	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Ascribed Racial Membership	0.586***	0.595***	0.596***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Self-Reported Race	0.932***	0.874***	1.140***
	(0.105)	(0.134)	(0.278)
Education X Self-Reported Race	0.082***	0.093***	0.098***
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Female X Self-Reported Race	0.140*	0.182*	0.170*
	(0.076)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Elected 2012 X Self-Reported Race	0.109	0.030	0.039
	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Elected 2014 X Self-Reported Race	-0.147	-0.104	-0.063
	(0.181)	(0.188)	(0.191)
Wealth (Missing Coded Zero) X Self-Reported Race	0.000		
	(0.000)		
Wealth X Self-Reported Race		0.000	
		(0.000)	
Wealth (logged) X Self-Reported Race			-0.025
			(0.023)
Observations	32,920	23,725	23,725
R^2	.5320	.5561	.5562

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Note: Robustness checks utilizing alternative measures of candidate socioeconomic status. In Model 1, candidates that did not submit information on their financial assets were coded as having $0 Reals. In Model 2, I only include candidates that declared the value of their assets. In Model 3, I use the log of candidates' declared assets.

Chapter 3

Ascribed Race and Electoral Success

Brazil's democratic transition in the 1980s provided previously excluded segments of society a voice in government through political representation. Democratic institutions alone, however, have proven insufficient to ensure that those elected to public office reflect the demographic and social characteristics of society at large.

In Brazil, politics is overwhelmingly dominated by whites. In 2014, whites, which comprise 48 percent of the Brazilian population, won over 90 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil's lower house of Congress. In contrast, browns, a group which occupies an intermediate position on Brazil's racial continuum and constitutes 43 percent of the Brazilian population, attained just 5 percent of the seats. Blacks, which comprise 8 percent of the population, won just 4 percent of the seats. The stark racial differences between the Brazilian citizenry and elected politicians, which are displayed graphically in Figure 3.1, reveals an important failure in descriptive representation.[1]

The Chamber of Deputies is not Brazil's only elected political assembly in which Afro-Brazilians are descriptively underrepresented. In fact, Afro-Brazilians are severely underrepresented in all elected posts (Bueno and Dunning 2017). The racial disjuncture between the electorate and those elected in Brazil has led Black Movement activists and members of the electorate, as well as,

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[1]Appendix A Figure 3.7 presents the same relationship using data on candidate self-classified race attained from TSE registration forms.

Figure 3.1: Racial Disparities in Descriptive Representation

Note: Figure 3.1 shows the racial composition of the Brazilian citizenry in relation to the racial composition of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2014. Population data comes from the Brazilian decennial census, while data on candidate race was attained by having candidate photos racially classified by Brazilian coders. The classification scheme is discussed in the body of the chapter.

white and Afro-Brazilian politicians to assert that Afro-Brazilian candidates' electoral prospects are diminished by racial discrimination (Bailey 2009*b*; Cotrim 2018; da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Marinho 2015; Santos 2016; Silva 2015, 2016).

Extant research, however, largely attributes the descriptive underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians to ostensibly non-racial differences between whites and nonwhites. Scholars identify candidate characteristics, such as educational attainment, occupational prestige, political experience, and especially campaign resources as the principal impediments to Afro-Brazilian electoral success (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Campos and Machado 2015, 2017; Oliveira 1995). Nevertheless, there

are important reasons to question this conclusion. Published research suffers from potentially consequential empirical limitations and their findings are inconsistent with the substantial literature on racial inequality in Brazil, which overwhelmingly shows that racial group membership impacts life outcomes.[2]

Since race matters in all spheres of life, it can also be expected to shape who wins and who loses in Brazil's political arena. In this chapter, I explore why Afro-Brazilians do not attain representation commensurate with their population size. I examine the obstacles that hinder Afro-Brazilians from winning office, and how the minority of Afro-Brazilian politicians elected defy the odds.

I contend that the pervasive underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians is a consequence of racial discrimination. Using data from Brazil's 2014 federal deputy elections, I illustrate that political parties do not equally assist white and Afro-Brazilian candidates in attaining office as well as show that socioeconomic differences, which fall along racial lines, diminish Afro-Brazilian candidates' electoral prospects. Importantly, when I control for these theoretically important non-racial differences using regression techniques, however, I find that candidate race continues to be a significant determinant of candidate vote-share. Critically, this finding suggests that racial discrimination is a significant impediment to Afro-Brazilian electoral success.

Does Race Matter in Brazilian Elections?

Scholars agree that Brazil's elected political assemblies do not reflect the racial diversity of its population. At the local, state and national levels, political power is concentrated in the hands of whites while Afro-Brazilians rarely are elected to public office. The fact that Afro-Brazilians do not attain political representation commensurate with their population size is well documented, yet there is not a consensus among scholars as to what hinders them from winning public office.

Extant scholarship advances three main explanations for Afro-Brazilians underrepresentation.

[2]See Reichman (2010) and Telles (2014*b*).

These include restrictive party opportunity structures, socioeconomic inequalities between white and Afro-Brazilians, and voter racial preferences. These explanations attribute racial disparities in political representation to the quantity, quality, and demand for Afro-Brazilians candidates, respectfully.

Studies exploring disparities in descriptive representation overwhelmingly first question candidate supply. For Afro-Brazilians to attain representation commensurate with their population size, they must seek office. Janusz (2017) finds that in the 2014 elections, self-identified brown and black candidates comprised nearly 40 percent of the entire candidate pool. While not commensurate with their population size, this finding suggests that disparities in candidate entry do not account for the political underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians.

Evidence that Afro-Brazilian candidates seek office is not entirely surprising. Brazil's use of open-list proportional representation rules, the use of state-wide district with high district magnitudes, and its plethora of political parties discourage gatekeeping behavior. Since parties are incentivized to run as many candidates as possible, aspiring candidates are likely to have limited difficulty finding a party willing to nominate them.

Although political parties are not selective at the nomination stage, evidence shows that party officials are selective when distributing campaign resources. For example, party officials do not distribute financial resources and television air time during the *Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral* (HGPE), a publicly financed electoral program, equally amongst candidates (Araújo 2001; Araújo and Borges 2013; Campos and Janusz N.D.; Quadros and Costa 2017; Romero, Figueiredo and Araújo 2012). With respect to race, Campos and Janusz (N.D.) find that party officials in Rio de Janeiro provide white candidates greater HGPE time than Afro-Brazilians, even after controlling for candidate quality. These findings suggest that party officials limit the competitiveness of Afro-Brazilian candidates through the transfer of campaign resources.

- **H1 Party Opportunity Structure**: Political party officials provide brown and black candidates fewer campaign resources than they provide white candidates.

Due to the legacy of race-based slavery, Afro-Brazilian candidates are likely more reliant

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than whites on the resources that party officials provide. In comparison to whites, Afro-Brazilians are generally less educated, hold less prestigious occupations, and poorer (Arcand and D'hombres 2004; Bailey, Loveman and Muniz 2013; Gradín 2009; Reichmann 2010; Telles 2014*b*). Among political candidates, socioeconomic differences also exist along racial lines. Afro-Brazilian candidates are known to differ from their white counterparts in terms of educational attainment and occupational profile (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Campos and Machado 2015, 2017; Janusz 2017; Oliveira 1995). Whites comparatively high levels of education and employment in respected professions are considered to provide them an electoral advantage over their Afro-Brazilian competitors.

- **H2 Socioeconomic Differences**: More educated candidates and those with prestigious occupations will receive more votes than other candidates.

In addition to its direct implications for vote-share, socioeconomic differences may engender electoral success indirectly, through campaign finance. Brazilian elections are among the most expensive in the world. Traditionally, candidates spend substantial sums of money on particularistic goods in order to drum-up voter support (Ames 1995*b*; Mainwaring 1999). Drawing on a sample of local, state, and national level candidates, Bueno and Dunning (2017) find that candidates classified by coders as white have significantly greater assets to draw upon than those classified as Afro-Brazilians.

Even if candidates do not spend their own money in pursuit of office, it may serve as a pathway to secure campaign contributions from other sources. Bueno and Dunning (2017) show that candidate wealth facilitates campaign contributions. Partially because of racial disparities in wealth, white candidates receive nearly four times as much in donations as nonwhite candidates (Bueno and Dunning 2017).

Scholars have noted a strong relationship between money and votes in Brazilian elections (Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva 2010; Samuels 2001*a*,*b*). Due to racial differences in campaign contributions, whites are able to use those funds to distinguish themselves from their nonwhite competitors. Brazilian politicians also acknowledge that money is critical to electoral success. When asked about the determinants of electoral success, Valmir Assunção, a Federal Deputy from

the state of Bahia stated: "Elections in Brazil are about who has money. Fifty percent of deputies are landowners or business owners. The reason there are few Afro-Brazilian politicians is because of an absence of economic power" (Assunção 2015). This perspective was also conveyed by Irmão Lazaro, another Federal Deputy from Bahia. When asked what separates Afro-Brazilian candidates that win elected office from those that lose, Lazaro simply responded "money" (Lazaro 2015). Janusz (2017) finds that self-identified white candidates outspent self-identified Afro-Brazilian candidates by a margin of 3:1 in the 2014 elections.

- **H3 Resources Differences**: Candidates that spend more money are likely to receive more votes than candidates that spend less money.

Nevertheless, there is still reason to believe that race plays a role in Brazilian elections. Brazilians overwhelmingly agree that racism is pervasive in Brazilian society and that Afro-Brazilians are the principal victims (Telles 2014*b*). It is therefore unsurprising that when asked why there are "few negros in politics," 78 percent of survey respondents in Rio de Janeiro attributed their absence to racial prejudice (Bailey 2009*a*). Statements made by Brazilian politicians, including Assunção and Lazaro support this conclusion (Assunção 2015; da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Frota 2015*a*; Johnson 1998, 2015; Lazaro 2015; Marinho 2015; Silva 2015, 2016). Empirical studies, however, have reached mixed conclusions about whether voters discriminate against Afro-Brazilian candidates at the ballot box.

Extant research suggests that Brazilian voters have latent racial preferences, but that if anything, those preferences provide Afro-Brazilian candidates an electoral advantage over whites. In a voting experiment conducted in Sao Paulo, Aguilar et al. (2015) find the incidence of identity-based voting is conditional on ballot length. When voters were presented with a longer ballot, with a large number of candidates to choose from, they show a significant preference for same-race candidates. Regardless of the ballot length, though, self-identified black voters demonstrate a consistent preference for black candidates (2015). In contrast, Bueno and Dunning (2017) find in Salvador and Rio de Janeiro that voters' evaluations of fictional city-council candidates are biased

by candidate race. As a result, Bueno and Dunning (2017) conclude that if discrimination limits Afro-Brazilian candidates electoral prospects, it does not take place at the ballot box.

A myriad of factors could explain these studies disparate findings. Both Aguilar et al. (2015) and Bueno and Dunning (2017) use different respondent populations and employ unique experimental treatments. For this reason, it is possible that the conclusions reached by both sets of authors are correct. Yet it is also reasonable to view Bueno and Dunning's (2017) results as simply one treatment arm of the experiment conducted by Aguilar et al. (2015). If Bueno and Dunning (2017) had exposed study participants to more than one candidate, it is plausible that the cognitive burden would have led respondents to use candidate race as a voting heuristic.

- **H4A Racial Irrelevance**: Controlling for non-racial candidate differences, white, brown, and black candidates receive similar numbers of votes.

Just as it is possible that the conclusions reached by Aguilar et al. (2015) and Bueno and Dunning (2017) are both correct, it is possible that both sets of authors are wrong. The findings of both experiments are inconsistent with the extensive literature that shows racial discrimination is widespread and that Brazilians of African descent are the principal victims (Bailey 2009*b*; Layton and Smith 2017; Reichmann 2010; Telles 2014*b*). Since racial discrimination remains commonplace in Brazilian society, the conclusion that candidate race does not impact electoral success in Brazil seems implausible. This logic underlies argument put forth by Janusz (2017).

Drawing on observational data from Brazil's 2014 elections, Janusz (2017) shows that self-identified Afro-Brazilian candidates receive significantly fewer votes than their white competitors, even after controlling for non-racial differences among them. Since Janusz (2017) operationalizes candidate race according to self-identification as opposed to classification, and candidates racially identify themselves as members of the racial group that maximizes their chances of winning office, his results may underestimate the importance of candidate race. Specifically, Afro-Brazilian candidates may experience a larger electoral penalty than the one he identifies.

- **H4B Voter Racial Preferences**: Controlling for non-racial candidate differences, white

candidates receive greater votes than brown and black candidates.

Since the importance of race in Brazilian elections remains unclear, in this chapter I empirically test party opportunity structure, socioeconomic inequality, and voter preference based explanations for Afro-Brazilian political underrepresentation. While my analysis improves upon prior studies in a variety of ways, arguably the most important advancement is in the data I bring to bear on the question "why do Afro-Brazilians not achieve representation commensurate with their electoral strength?" I utilize data on the universe of candidates that ran for election to the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil's 2014 elections and an original measure of candidate perceived race.

Candidate Racial Identification

The paucity of research on candidate race and electoral success in Brazil is partially attributable to data limitations. While the Superior Electoral Tribunal (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* - TSE), Brazil's electoral coordinating body, makes detailed electoral data available to the public, it historically has not collected information on candidate race. As a result, scholars seeking to explore the role of race in Brazilian electoral politics have had to attain data on candidate race themselves, an often lengthy and costly enterprise. Beginning with the 2014 elections, the TSE has required political candidates to racially identify themselves when they register to contest elected office. While the racial data collected by the TSE has diminished the barriers to studying the role of race in Brazilian elections, it is not a panacea.

The most concerning issue with using the race data collected by the TSE to study the impact of candidate race on electoral outcomes is that candidates racially identify themselves strategically. The absence of official rules for racial classification and ambiguous racial group boundaries presents individuals substantial latitude to "choose" their race (Daniel 2010; Degler 1971; Harris 1964; Twine 1998). While an individual's physical characteristics constrain which racial categories an individual can plausibly claim membership in, non-phenotypic attributes are considered to influence which of those groups the individual ultimately asserts membership. Published research shows that

educational attainment and socioeconomic status influence how Brazilian citizens racially identify themselves (Bailey and Telles 2006; Guimarães 2012; Telles and Lim 1998; Telles and Paschel 2014). There is even evidence that members of the Brazilian public racially identify themselves strategically to attain excludable, private goods (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013; Garcia-Navarro 2016; Oliveira 2017*a,b*). Similar to members of the general public, political candidates are also likely to racially present themselves strategically.

Chapter 2 shows that electoral calculations underlie patterns of elite racial self-identification. Using TSE data, I find that Brazilian politicians profess membership in the racial group that maximizes their chances of winning elected office and that a substantial portion of politicians change their declared race as electoral conditions evolve. These findings illustrate that patterns of racial self-identification are endogenous to electoral outcomes. As a result, employing TSE data to study the impact of candidate race on electoral outcomes, therefore, would likely bias against finding that a candidate's race affects their likelihood of winning public office.

The voluminous literature on racial inequality in Brazil demonstrates that alternative measures of race lead to disparate conclusions about its importance. Scholars consistently find that racial disparities in education, income, employment, and health in Brazil are larger when race is operationalized according to external ascription as opposed to self-classification (Bailey, Loveman and Muniz 2013; Francis-Tan 2016; Francis and Tannuri-Pianto 2013; Loveman, Muniz and Bailey 2012; Marteleto and Dondero 2016; Monk Jr 2016; Telles and Lim 1998). These results suggest that research using measures of racial self-identification, as opposed to classification by others, underestimates the extent to which racial inequality is attributable to contemporary discrimination.

Due to the endogenous nature of available data on elite racial self-identification data and the potential for racial discrimination to directly as well as indirectly hinder Afro-Brazilian candidates' electoral pursuits, I develop an original measure of candidate ascribed race. This measure, which is akin to that employed in Chapter 2, was constructed by having Brazilian coders racially categorize candidates according to the photo they submitted in 2014 to the TSE.[3] At least

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[3]Candidates are required to submit a black and white headshot photo when they register to

three Brazilian coders independently categorized each political candidate into one of Brazil's five official ethno-racial categories: white (*branca*), brown (*parda*), black (*preta*), Asian (*amarela*), and Indigenous (*Indigena*).

While extant studies have utilized similar measures of ascribed race, the dataset I assemble is distinct. Prior studies have either maximized depth or breadth. Studies in the former category, use data on the race of all candidates in one or two electoral contests to assess the relationship between candidate race and electoral success. In an effort to understand electoral dynamics more broadly, studies in the latter category use data on a sample of candidates from a large number of electoral races to draw conclusions about the importance of race. In contrast to these studies, I had coders racially classify photos of every candidate that ran in 2014 for election to the Federal Chamber of Deputies. As a result, the dataset I assembled includes information on the ascribed race of all federal deputy candidates in each of Brazil's 27 state-wide electoral districts.

Consistent with my findings in Chapter 2, I find that coders generally agree on the race of each candidate. In 62 percent of cases, coders unanimously agreed on the race of the candidate and in more than 80 percent of the remaining cases, at least two of three coders agreed on the race of the candidate. Only in 7 percent of all cases did the three coders ascribe the same candidate into three different racial categories. A fourth coder racially classified photographs of candidates that were ascribed membership into three different racial categories. The fourth coder's assessment of each candidate matched one of the original coders' classifications in 93 percent of cases. In my analysis, I treat candidates as members of the racial category that they were most commonly ascribed membership in. The 28 candidates that were inconsistently racially categorized by all four coders were dropped from the dataset.

Although coders generally classified candidates into the same racial category, their assessments commonly differ from how candidates identify themselves. Table 3.1 shows the relationship between how candidates racially identify themselves and how they are classified by others. Each row displays the percentage of candidates that identified themselves in 2014 as white, brown, black, Asian, or

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contest electoral office.

Indigenous. The bolded cells along the center diagonal show the percentage of candidates who identified themselves as members of the racial category they were ascribed membership in by coders. Observations in the off-diagonal cells indicate the percentage of candidates ascribed membership in a different racial group than the racial category they professed membership in.

Table 3.1: Candidate Racial Self-Classification vs Coder Classification

		Coder Classified Race					
		White	Brown	Black	Asian	Indigenous	N
	White	**92.3%**	5.8%	1.6%	0.3%	0.0%	3,482
Self-Classified	Brown	63.7%	**20.7%**	15.0%	0.4%	0.2%	1,746
Race in 2014	Black	17.9%	21.0%	**61.1%**	0.0%	0.0%	558
	Asian	31.3%	12.5%	3.1%	**50.0%**	3.1%	32
	Indigenous	55.5%	27.8%	0.0%	0.0%	**16.7%**	18

Note: Table 3.1 shows the relationship between how candidates racially identify themselves and how they are racially classified by coders. N= 5,836

Table 3.1 reveals that racial self-identification and classification by others commonly conflict. Of the political candidates that self-identified as white 92.3 percent were also classified as white. In contrast, the percentage of candidates that self-identify as brown and are classified as brown is substantially lower. Only 20.7 percent of candidates that self-identify as brown are classified as brown. In comparison to whites, candidates that self-identify as black are also frequently classified as members of other racial categories. Among the candidates who self-identify as black, 61.1 percent were also classified as black. Finally, Table 3.1 reveals that half of those that self-identify as Asian are perceived as Asian and that only 16.7 percent of candidates that self-identify as Indigenous are classified as Indigenous. In total, just 67.4 percent of candidates racially identify themselves as members of the same racial category that coders ascribed them membership in.

Among the candidates that are racially classified differently than they self-identify, the majority are ascribed membership in a proximate racial category. For example, on the white-black racial continuum, candidates that self-identify as white but are not classified as white, were most frequently perceived as brown. Among those that self-identify as brown but are perceived differently, nearly 64 percent were classified as white and 15 percent were classified as black. And finally,

among candidates that self-identify as black but are not classified as such, 21 percent are classified as brown and 18 percent are regarded as white. While there are inconsistencies in how self-identified Asians and Indigenous persons are racially classified, the small number of candidates that claim these identities constrains the ability to discuss patterns of racial incongruence with confidence.

The frequency with which candidates racially identify themselves differently than they are classified by others suggests that how candidate race is measured and operationalized is likely to shape conclusions about its electoral significance. While one measure of race is no more valid than another, since patterns of racial self-identification are likely to reflect strategic electoral considerations, it is ill-suited for studying why Afro-Brazilians are descriptively underrepresented in Brazil's elected political assemblies. For this reason, I use the original measure of candidate ascribed race introduced in this section to determine why Afro-Brazilians are only rarely elected to the Federal Chamber of Deputies.

Why Race Matters

All political candidates in Brazil must overcome a series of obstacles to win elected public office. First, prospective politicians must become members of a recognized political party as well as nominated by it to run for public office. Next, nominated candidates must communicate their qualifications and goals to the electorate, and in the process, distinguish themselves from hundreds of other candidates. And finally, candidates must receive electoral support that exceeds the threshold necessary to win public office. In this section, I present evidence that in Brazil the first two tasks reduce the likelihood that Afro-Brazilians are elected, but that voter preferences remains a likely explanation for why Afro-Brazilians rarely win public office.

Party Politics

The "political opportunity structure" of Brazilian political parties is a potential explanation for the descriptive underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians. In their capacity as gatekeepers, party

officials in other societies are known to discriminate against prospective candidates from certain racial and ethnic groups (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2010; Bloemraad 2013; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier et al. 2015; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Exclusionary practices, however, appear unlikely to explain why Afro-Brazilians do not achieve representation commensurate with their numerical strength in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies.

Brazilian congressional elections employ open-list proportional representation rules and multimember districts. Under this electoral arrangement, political parties are enabled to nominate between 1.5 and 2 candidates for every position.[4] Voters can cast a preference vote for an individual candidate or a particular political party.[5] The votes received by all candidates are pooled at the party level and seats are distributed to parties in proportion to their vote-share. Parties, in turn, allocate seats to their affiliated candidates in accordance with how many votes each individually received. To maximize the seats that they are awarded, political parties are incentivized to nominate candidates that will receive substantial votes, known as *puxadores de legenda*, meaning vote "pullers."

Since seats are awarded according to how many votes each political party receives and even a small number of additional votes may result in an extra seat in the Congress, political parties seek to nominate as many candidates as legally allowed, even if the candidates are of dubious ability.[6] Consistent with this logic, one federal deputy remarked: "I don't see any discussion of qualifications. They take people who already have a good record as candidates, and the rest are chosen just to make up the numbers" (Marx, Borner and Caminotti 2009). In 2014, political parties could have nominated 28,667 candidates, yet only 5,864 ultimately ran for election to the Federal Chamber of Deputies. This finding suggests that candidate nomination processes are wide-open

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[4]In electoral districts that have twelve or less seats, political parties and coalitions are able to nominate 2 candidates for every electoral position. In contrast, in districts that have more than 12 seats, parties and party coalitions can nominate 1.5 candidates for every position (9.504/1997).

[5]Data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project indicate that the majority of Brazilian voters cast their ballot for a particular candidate.

[6]Political parties may be more discriminating amongst potential candidates when the number of candidates they are allowed to nominate is lower (Wylie 2018).

and that discriminatory nomination procedures are unlikely to lead to a shortage of Afro-Brazilian candidates.

Figure 3.2 shows the rates at which white, brown, and black candidates ran for the Federal Chamber of Deputies in 2014 and the rates at which they won. Among the candidates running for office in Brazil's 2014 elections, 76.7 percent are classified by coders as white, 11.9 percent are classified by coders as brown, and 11.4 percent are classified by coders as black. While browns and blacks run at significantly lower rates than whites, the fact that they are not even elected in proportion to the rates at which they run indicates that nomination processes do not explain their descriptive underrepresentation.

Figure 3.2: Candidacy Rates and Electoral Success by Racial Group

Note: Figure 3.2 indicates the rates at which candidates perceived as white, brown and black run for congressional office as well as the rates at which they win elected office.

Although political party officials nominate white and Afro-Brazilian candidates to run for public office, they may not provide them the resources to run competitive campaigns. According

to campaign finance disclosures, in the 2014 elections, political parties provided candidates on average R$77,297, about $32,766 US dollars. Although the average contribution is relatively high, there is considerable variation in how much individual candidates received. For example, 3,018 candidates received no financial donations from their respective political parties, while three candidates received more than R$5 million each. This finding suggests that party officials distribute campaign funds selectively.

The criteria that underlie the distribution of political parties' campaign resources is largely unclear. Even candidates themselves report not knowing how parties decide whom to financially support (Araújo and Borges 2013). Withholding financial resources from candidates perceived as electorally unviable may maximize the number of seats in Brazil's Congress that a party ultimately attains. On the other hand, party officials may withhold material support from candidates for reasons unrelated to their electoral potential.

A look at how political parties distribute financial resources suggests that whites are advantaged over Afro-Brazilians. Figure 3.3 shows that in 2014, political parties provided white candidates on average R$93,754. In contrast brown and black candidates received on average only R$28,731 and R$17,060, respectfully. The difference in campaign contributions between whites and browns, as well as, the difference between whites and blacks is statistically significant according to Two-Tailed T-test at the p<.0001 level.[7] This finding, which is consistent with my first hypotheses, points to the possibility that party officials discriminate against Afro-Brazilian candidates in their distribution of campaign resources.

Nevertheless, variation in how much money political parties provide candidates may also be attributable to ostensibly non-racial differences between white, brown, and black candidates. Political parties prefer to nominate highly educated, business professionals to run for office (Lamounier and Cardoso 1975; Rodrigues 2009). Such candidates are presumed to possess the skills necessary to run a successful electoral campaign. Due to the legacy of race-based slavery and contemporary discrimination, whites are more likely than Afro-Brazilians to possess this profile

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[7]See Appendix A Table 3.6 for additional detail.

Figure 3.3: Party Campaign Contributions by Race

Note: Figure 3.3 shows the average amount of Reals that political parties donate to white, brown, and black candidates.

and therefore may receive greater financial support.

To determine if candidate quality explains variation in party support, I conduct an OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable I employ in the presented models is the proportion of each party's distributed funds awarded to their affiliated candidates.[8] To gain comparability across parties, I use party-fixed effects and cluster errors at the party level.

In this analysis, the principal independent variables are dichotomous measures of candidate ascribed race. The *Classified as Brown* variable is coded "1" if at least two coders ascribed the candidate membership in the brown racial category and "0" otherwise. Similarly, the *Classified as Black* variable is coded "1" if at least two coders ascribed the candidate membership in the

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[8]In Appendix A Table 3.7 I use the logged proportion of funds awarded to each candidate as the dependent variable.

black racial category and "0" otherwise. I expect both of these variables to produce negative and statistically significant coefficients. In each of the presented models, white candidates are the reference category.

The gender politics literature indicates that Afro-Brazilians may not be the only group of candidates who receive less electoral resources from political parties. Evidence shows that party officials withhold financial support and non-fungible campaign resources, like advertising time during the publicly financed *Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral* (HGPE), from female candidates (Quadros and Costa 2017; Romero, Figueiredo and Araújo 2012). As a result, I expect the included *Female Candidate* variable, which is coded "1" if the candidate identifies herself as female and "0" if the candidate identifies himself as male to have a negative and statistically significant coefficient.

Since political parties prefer to nominate highly educated, business professionals to run for office, they can also be expected to provide them more resources than other candidates. Therefore, I control for candidate educational attainment and occupation. The categorical *Candidate Education* variable takes the value "1" if a candidate is literate, "2" if they attended primary school, "3" if they completed primary school, "4" if they attended high school, "5" if they completed high school, "6" if they attended college, and "7" if they completed college. The dichotomous *Business Professional* variable I include takes the value "1" if a candidate's occupation designates them as a business professional and a value of "0" otherwise. I expect both the Candidate Education and Business Professional variables to return positive and statistically significant coefficients.

Party officials can be expected to support those candidates they perceive as electorally viable. Past electoral performance is therefore something they are likely to take into account. I control for both incumbency and non-incumbent elected experience through inclusion of the *Incumbent* and *Electoral Experience* variables, respectively. The *Incumbent* variable takes the value "1" if a candidate was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2010 and "0" otherwise. The *Electoral Experience* variable takes the value "1" if a candidate was elected to any political office in Brazil between 2004 and 2014. Candidates for which the *Electoral Experience* variable takes the value

Table 3.2: Percent Party Campaign Contributions

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Classified as Brown	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Classified as Black	-0.012***	-0.007***	-0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female Candidate		-0.015***	-0.007***
		(0.004)	(0.002)
Candidate Education		0.003***	0.002***
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Business Professional		0.004*	-0.000
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Incumbent			0.115***
			(0.017)
Electoral Experience			0.019***
			(0.004)
Constant	0.020***	0.004	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	5,793	5,793	5,793
R^2	0.005	0.022	0.197

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

of "1" include senators, federal deputies, state deputies, mayors, and city council members. The *Electoral Experience* variable takes the value of "0" for first-time candidates, those that had run but never held elected office, and any candidate that had not won public office since 2004. I expect both the *Incumbent* and *Electoral Experience* variables to each produce positive, statistically significant coefficients.

Table 3.2 presents my OLS regression results. I progressively add independent variables to each model in order to facilitate comparison of the relative effects of each variable and to confirm the robustness of my findings. The results broadly indicate that political parties provide brown and black candidates less financial support than their white counterparts.

Model 1 in Table 3.2 demonstrates that Afro-Brazilian candidates receive significantly less campaign support than their white counterparts. Brown candidates receive on average 0.010 percent of all campaign donations less than whites, while black candidates receive 0.012 less than whites. Inclusion of additional control variables in Model 2 does not substantially change the conclusions. However, it does reveal that female candidates also receive less campaign support than Afro-Brazilian candidates, as well as suggest non-racial candidate attributes affect the distribution of campaign funds. Specifically, the positive and statistical significance of the *Candidate Education* and *Business Professional* variables demonstrate that candidates with higher educational attainment and those with prestigious occupations are likely to receive greater campaign funds than otherwise equal candidates. Finally, in Model 3, I control for candidate political experience. I find that *Incumbent* and *Electoral Experience* variables are both strong predictors of campaign support. As expected, both variables have positive, statistically significant coefficients.

The inclusion of additional controls decreases the size and significance of both the *Classified as Brown* and *Classified as Black* variables. The former ceases to be statistically significant, while the latter is diminished in significance to the p<.05 level. Importantly, though, both variables retain the expected negative sign. An F-test shows that the coefficients of the *Classified as Brown* and *Classified as Black* variables are statistically different from one another at the p<.1 level. This indicates that political parties provide candidates that are phenotypically black significantly less financial support than those that are brown. This finding supports the disaggregation of the Afro-Brazilian racial category and is partially consistent with my first hypothesis.

The unequal distribution of campaign funds by political parties provide white candidates an advantage over black candidates. It is just one of the advantages, though, that whites may have over their Afro-Brazilian candidates. As alluded, there are critical socioeconomic differences between whites and Afro-Brazilians. These differences warrant consideration.

Socioeconomic Differences

White and Afro-Brazilian candidates differ from each other in observable and theoretically important ways. They possess dissimilar levels of educational attainment, distinct occupational profiles, varying levels of electoral experience, and, above all, vastly different electoral campaign funds. These socioeconomic differences certainly contribute to racial disparities in electoral success, but at best provide an incomplete explanation for why Afro-Brazilians are descriptively underrepresented in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.

Educational attainment is commonly employed as a proxy for skill and ability, that also make candidates more electorally productive. In Brazil, Afro-Brazilians lag whites in years of formal schooling (Bucciferro 2017; Reichmann 2010; Silva and Paixão 2015). Consistent with this pattern, white candidates report having higher educational attainment than their Afro-Brazilian counterparts.

Table 3.3 demonstrates that white candidates possess significantly higher levels of educational attainment than browns and blacks, respectfully.[9] It reveals that white candidates are around 23 percentage points more likely than browns to have a college degree and nearly 30 percentage points more likely to have one than blacks. Moreover, Table 3.3 shows that browns and blacks also differ with respect to educational attainment. Brown candidates are approximately 6 percentage points more likely to possess a college degree than blacks. Considering that 80 percent of the candidates elected in 2014 had a college degree, there is reason to expect that Afro-Brazilian candidates limited educational attainment disadvantage them electorally.

Besides educational disparities, there are notable differences between white and Afro-Brazilian candidates with respect to employment. In Brazil, political candidates are traditionally business professionals and business owners (Lamounier and Cardoso 1975; Rodrigues 2009). Due to racial segmentation in the Brazilian labor market, though, Afro-Brazilians are much less likely to hold such positions (Arcand and D'hombres 2004; Castro and de Sá Barreto 1998; Lamounier and

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[9]The T-test results displayed in Appendix A Table 3.6 indicate that the mean level of education is significantly different for white, brown, and black political candidates.

Table 3.3: Educational Attainment by Candidate Race

	Candidate Race		
Education Level	White	Brown	Black
Read and write	0.7	1.9	0.9
Some elementary school	2.1	3.0	5.5
Completed elementary school	4.4	8.1	11.2
Some high school	2.2	3.2	4.7
Completed high school	23.1	35.9	36.3
Some college	10.3	13.5	12.9
Completed college	57.2	34.4	28.5

Note: Table 3.3 shows candidate reported educational attainment by classified race. Candidates were grouped according to their declared level of educational attainment on their candidate registration form.

Cardoso 1975; Telles 2014*b*). This is also the case among those seeking election to the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 3.4: Occupation by Candidate Race

Occupation		Candidate Race		
Broad Category	Narrow Category	White	Brown	Black
Business Professionals	Business Person	12.4	12.5	8
	Private Sector Professional	15.5	12.5	12.6
	Military or Law Enforcement	2.9	4.2	3.6
	Lawyer	8.3	3.6	3.5
	Politician	11.9	5.1	5.6
	Service Sector Professional	27.7	28.3	25.3
Workers	Worker	4.7	10.4	11.9
	No Information	16.6	23.4	29.5

Note: Table 3.4 shows candidate reported occupation by classified race. Candidates were grouped according to their declared occupation on their candidate registration form.

Table 3.4 shows the relationship between racial group membership and occupation. It reveals that white candidates are especially concentrated in the professional occupations from which politicians in Brazil typically emerge. In total, 78.7 percent of white candidates are business professionals, compared to 66.2 percent of browns and 58.6 percent of blacks. T-tests indicate

significant differences among the percent of 2014 federal deputy candidates that are business professionals by racial category (See Appendix A Table 3.6). These differences are not the only substantively important occupational distinction between whites and Afro-Brazilians.

A total of 600 candidates identified themselves as politicians when they registered to contest elected office.[10] These include Federal and State Deputies (342), City Council Members (256), and Senators (2). Table 3.5 indicates that white candidates are more likely than browns and blacks to identify themselves as politicians, yet it does not demonstrate the magnitude. Among the candidates that listed such occupations, 88 percent are white, 5.8 percent are brown and 6.2 percent are black.

Given racial differences in the percent of candidates that identify themselves as politicians, it is unsurprising that incumbents seeking reelection are overwhelmingly white.[11] Of the 314 incumbents, 91.1 percent are whites, 4.1 percent are browns, and 4.8 percent are blacks. Federal Deputies can use their position to deliver localized benefits through pork-barrel projects, engage in credit claiming, and exert influence over local media markets (Ames 1995*a*,*b*; Boas and Hidalgo 2011; Pereira and Renno 2001, 2003). As a result, they have electoral advantages in retaining public office.

Financial resources, though, may offset the advantages that incumbency affords. Scholars have noted a strong relationship between money and votes in Brazilian elections (Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva 2010; Samuels 2001*a*,*b*). Since political parties typically provide candidates only a small amount of money, candidates fund their campaigns though self-financing, the support of individual donors, and the contributions from corporations.[12] Due to occupational differences that exist along racial lines, whites likely have the greatest opportunities to transform their employment into campaign resources.

Candidates can use their personal resources to bankroll their campaigns. In 2014, Sergio

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[10]In total, 1,078 of the candidates running for Federal Deputy in 2014 previously held elected local, state, or national office.

[11]Among incumbents seeking reelection, 28.3 percent did not identify themselves as politicians when they registered to contest elected office.

[12]Following the 2014 elections, changes to electoral rules barred corporate contributions.

Zveiter, a lawyer from Rio de Janeiro, contributed more than R$3,750,000 to his own political campaign. An examination of campaign contributions reveals that Zveiter's behavior is unique and that how much candidates donate to their own campaigns varies dramatically. Among the candidates that donated to their own campaign, the average contribution was R$45,785. Nearly 66 percent of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies, though, declared that they did not contribute financially to their own campaigns.

Since candidates cannot rely on their party for funds and cannot or choose not to finance their own campaigns, where do the vast sums of money they spend come from? Overwhelmingly, it comes from business owners and corporations. Like political parties, such donors can be expected to contribute to candidates they expect may win office and those with whom they are socially connected (Bueno and Dunning 2017; Samuels 2001*b*).[13] In both cases, business professionals are likely to benefit most from this arrangement.

Figure 3.4 shows the declared amount of money candidates from different occupational classes receive from third-party donors. Consistent with the expectation that candidates from different occupational classes have differential access to critical campaign capital, Figure 3.4 reveals that business professionals receive significantly more contributions from third parties than workers. While candidates in the former declared on average R$223,830 in campaign contributions, those in the latter group declared R$63,391. This difference is both statistically significant and also substantively important.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that controlling for occupational differences, candidate race is likely to still affects campaign contributions. Research on income inequality shows that whites receive greater financial compensation than Afro-Brazilians, even after controlling for human capital (Arcand and D'hombres 2004; Lovell 2000; Telles and Lim 1998). To investigate if there are racial differences in campaign contributions, I compare whites and Afro-Brazilians with similar

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[13]Discrimination, though, may also hinder Afro-Brazilians from raising campaign funds. When asked about racial disparities in campaign resources, Assunção stated that "businesses finance candidates, but what business is going to give money to *negros*?" (Assunção 2015).

Figure 3.4: Campaign Contributions by Candidate Occupation

Note: Figure 3.4 indicates the amount of money candidates from different occupational classes receive from third-party donors as campaign contributions.

occupational profiles.

Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between campaign contributions and candidate race by occupation. It reveals that white business professionals receive significantly more financial contributions than brown and black business professionals. Moreover, it demonstrates that white workers receive significantly more financial contributions than brown and black workers. These results are consistent with the literature on income inequality and suggest that through selective campaign contributions, white candidates attain an electoral advantage over brown and black candidates in their social class.

Importantly, Figure 3.5 also shows that white workers receive financial contributions on par with brown and black business professionals. This finding shows that brown and black candidates are not rewarded in campaign contributions for their socioeconomic position. In fact, Afro-Brazilian

Figure 3.5: Campaign Contributions by Candidate Race and Occupation

Note: Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between campaign contributions and occupation by candidate race.

candidates must hold a socioeconomically advantaged position to even receive the benefits that white workers are awarded.

Unsurprisingly, racial differences in campaign contributions manifest in racial disparities in campaign spending. Figure 3.6 shows that white candidates on average spent R\$244,000, while brown and black candidates on average spent only R\$79,000 and R\$49,000, respectfully.[14] Since candidates must distinguish themselves from their copartisans as well as candidates from other political parties, whites are likely to have a considerable electoral advantage.

The presented findings indicate that socioeconomic differences between whites and Afro-Brazilians tilt the playing field in favor of whites. Consistent with the literature on racial inequality, the evidence

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[14]Appendix A Table 3.6 shows that differences in campaign spending across racial groups are statistically significant according to Two-Tailed T-Tests.

Figure 3.6: Campaign Spending by Candidate Race

Note: Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between campaign spending and candidate race.

though suggest that socioeconomic differences are not only a legacy of race-based slavery, but also a product of contemporary discrimination. Discrimination by political party officials and economic elites hinder the electoral success of Afro-Brazilian candidates. As a result, there is reason to expect that Afro-Brazilian candidates face discrimination at the ballot box.

Race and Voter Preferences

Brazil's long-standing fame as a "racial democracy" has gradually eroded. While it was once hailed for its amicable race relations, academic research and the press commonly focus on its pervasive racial inequality. As one legislative aid remarked "Brazil is a great country, but not if you are *negro*" (Leal 2015). The reason why, she clarified, is because of racial discrimination. In virtually all facets of life, discrimination limits Afro-Brazilians opportunities for advancement. In

many instances, it is not the Brazilian state that discriminates against Afro-Brazilians, but rather the Brazilian citizenry. It is those same citizens that ultimately decide who will represent them through exercising their vote.

Voting in Brazil is mandatory for anyone between the ages of 18 and 70, as well as optional for those between the ages of 16 and 18. As a result, Brazilian elections routinely have high voter turnout. In 2014, over 88 million citizens cast a preference ballot for a federal deputy candidate. Survey data suggests that these voters are not disproportionately from one racial group as opposed to another (LAPOP 2014). Electoral returns, though, demonstrate that white candidates received a disproportionately high number of those votes. In 2014, white candidates received 79,543,863 votes, brown candidates received 4,506,110 votes, and black candidates received 4,284,482.

The electoral returns suggest that white citizens do not vote for brown or black candidates, as well as indicates that brown and black citizens typically do not vote for them either. This conclusion is shared by Benedita da Silva, a prominent black federal deputy from the state of Rio de Janeiro. When asked if "*negros* vote for *negros*," she responded "Of course not. *Negros* do not vote for *negros*, nor women for women, or the rich for the poor. If they did, the Congress would not be full of white men" (da Silva 2015).[15] When asked why Afro-Brazilians are not elected, Da Silva simply responded "*preconcieto*," meaning prejudice.

Survey research suggests that Brazilians of all races, hold prejudicial views of Afro-Brazilians (Almeida 2008). In an experiment on the nationally representative 2002 PESB survey, Brazilian respondents were more likely to attribute positive characteristics like intelligence, honesty, and respectfulness to photos of whites as opposed to Afro-Brazilians (Almeida 2008). In another,

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[15]Survey data is consistent with her statement. In 2006, when voters in Rio de Janeiro were asked if they had ever voted for Benedita da Silva, 61 percent of browns and 60 percent of blacks indicated that they had not (Bailey 2009*a*). Since Benedita da Silva made it to the runoff in the 1992 mayoral election, voters could have either cast their ballot for her or Cesar Maia, a white male candidate. Voters may have also voted for her in city council, congressional and senatorial elections that took place before the survey was conducted.

when shown photographs of three different individuals with different occupations and asked whom they would prefer their daughter to marry, respondents were most likely to choose the white individual, regardless of his occupation (Almeida 2008). Importantly, even Afro-Brazilian respondents demonstrated preferences for whites. As a result, there is reason to expect that brown and black voters prefer white candidates.

Racial discrimination, thus, provides a plausible explanation for gaps in descriptive representation. While survey research indicates, and candidates profess that voters prefer whites, the best way to test this is by examining electoral outcomes. Do white candidates receive more votes than brown and black candidates? Or are racial differences in vote-share explained by ostensibly non-racial candidate attributes, like education, occupation, and campaign resources?

Candidate Race and Electoral Outcomes

To determine if voter preferences is a plausible explanation for why Afro-Brazilian are descriptively underrepresented in the Chamber of Deputies, I conduct an OLS regression analysis. Using OLS regression, I am able to control for theoretically important non-racial candidate attributes and determine the relative importance of candidate race. The results of my analysis indicate that candidate social class and campaign resources impact their electoral success. Nevertheless, when I control for these factors, candidate race remains highly significant.

Brazilian candidates win and lose electoral contests based on how many votes they receive, as well as how many votes their copartisans receive. For this reason, I do not operationalize electoral success dichotomously, based on whether a candidate was elected or not. Instead, as my dependent variable, I use the logged proportion of votes received by a candidate in his or her district. Since electoral districts, which coincide with state boundaries, vary in both observable and unobservable ways, I use state-fixed effects and cluster errors at the state level.

My principal independent variables are dichotomous measures of candidate ascribed race. The *Brown Candidate* variable is coded "1" if at least two coders ascribed the candidate membership

in the brown racial category and "0" otherwise. Similarly, the *Black Candidate* variable is coded "1" if at least two coders ascribed the candidate membership in the black racial category and "0" otherwise. I expect each of these variables to produce negative and statistically significant coefficients. In each of the presented models, white candidates are the reference category.

Since non-racial candidate attributes are considered to impact vote share, I also include a number of control variables. Among these are measures of gender, educational attainment, occupational prestige, and electoral experience. The *Female Candidate*, *Candidate Education*, *Business Professional*, *Incumbent*, and *Electoral Experience* variables that I employ are coded identically to those in my prior analysis of party financial support.

In my analysis, I also control for campaign resources. Money is considered to have a significant impact on vote share. The *Percent Spending* variable I include reflects the percentage of all campaign funds spent in a state by a candidate. To account for the diminishing returns that come from spending, I also include the square of the *Percent Spending* variable. I expect the Percent Spending variable to return a significant, positive coefficient and the *Percent Spending*^{2} variable to produce a significant, negative coefficient.

Table 3.5 presents my OLS regression results. I progressively add independent variables to each model to facilitate hypothesis testing and confirm the robustness of my findings. The number of observations in each regression is 5,793.[16]

Model 1 in Table 3.5 provides a general indication that racial discrimination is a plausible explanation for why Afro-Brazilians constitute a minority of elected officials the Chamber of Deputies. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the Brown Candidate and Black Candidate variable suggest that Afro-Brazilian candidates experience an electoral penalty in federal deputy elections. This model, however, does not account for other theoretically important candidate characteristics which may also influence electoral outcomes.

In Model 2, I include candidate attributes commonly cited to explain Afro-Brazilian

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[16]Only those candidates that were identified by at least two coders as white, brown or black are included in these models.

Table 3.5: Regression of Candidate Vote Share (Logged)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Classified as Brown	-0.912***	-0.245***	-0.154***
	(0.113)	(0.058)	(0.041)
Classified as Black	-1.017***	-0.250***	-0.185***
	(0.117)	(0.060)	(0.051)
Female Candidate		-1.220***	-1.124***
		(0.064)	(0.055)
Candidate Education		0.235***	0.196***
		(0.016)	(0.013)
Business Professional		0.474***	0.447***
		(0.065)	(0.060)
Incumbent		1.528***	0.438**
		(0.069)	(0.168)
Electoral Experience		2.293***	1.895***
		(0.109)	(0.168)
Percent Spending			75.993***
			(5.633)
Precent Spending^2			-304.150***
			(48.818)
Constant	-3.111***	-4.928***	-4.901***
	(0.023)	(0.075)	(0.061)
Observations	5,793	5,793	5,793
R^2	0.036	0.506	0.582

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

underrepresentation. The results of this model demonstrate candidates' non-racial characteristics influence their electoral success. The sign and statistical significance of the *Female Candidate* variable indicate that women receive significantly fewer votes than their male competitors. This finding suggests that gender discrimination also occurs in Brazilian elections.

Model 2 also reveals that social standing affects electoral success. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the *Candidate Education* variable in Model 2 indicates that candidates with higher levels of education obtain larger vote shares than less educated candidates. Moreover, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the *Business Professional* variable indicates that business professionals receive a larger share of the vote than those holding other employment positions. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 2, that more educated candidates and those with prestigious occupations receive more votes than other candidates.

My prior analysis of candidate occupational profiles shows that whites, in comparison to Afro-Brazilians, are more likely to have held public office. Model 2 indicates that candidates derive an electoral advantage from incumbency and prior electoral experience. Both the Incumbent and Electoral Experience variables yield positive, statistically significant coefficients. Nevertheless, even controlling for socioeconomic differences between candidates, the *Brown Candidate* and *Black Candidate* variables remain statistically significant at the p<.01 level and have the expected negative sign.

Finally, in Model 3, I control for racial differences in campaign resources to test hypotheses 3, 4A and 4B. Consistent with my third hypothesis, I find that campaign spending has a positive and statistically significant effect on candidate vote share. As expected, the *Percent Spending* variable has a large, positive, and statistically significant coefficient, while the *Percent Spending*[2] variable yields a large, negative, and statistically significant coefficient. These results indicate that campaign spending increases the number of votes that candidates receive, but that campaign spending is subject to diminishing returns.

Overall, Model 3 shows that non-racial candidate factors affect vote share. I find that candidates' socioeconomic position and especially their financial resources, impact how many votes

they receive. Even when controlling for theoretically important non-racial candidate differences, though, Model 3 shows that brown, and black candidates receive significantly fewer votes than their white competitors. This finding is contrary to hypothesis 4A, but provides empirical support for hypotheses 4B.

According to Models 1, 2, and 3 white candidates receive a larger number of votes than brown and black candidates, respectively. This evidence demonstrates that socioeconomic explanations do not entirely explain why Afro-Brazilians are underrepresented in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Instead, it suggests that racial disparities in electoral success are attributable to discrimination by voters.

Discussion

Researchers broadly agree that contemporary Brazilian society is characterized by entrenched racial stratification. The findings presented provide empirical support that this stratification extends to the Brazilian Congress. Those elected to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2014 are unrepresentative of Brazil's racial diversity. Despite their racial majority status, Afro-Brazilians comprise a minority of those in political office. Using data from the 2014 federal deputy elections, I explore whether Afro-Brazilian political underrepresentation is attributable to restrictive party opportunity structures, an artifact of socioeconomic disparities between whites and Afro-Brazilians and/or the result of discrimination by voters.

My quantitative analysis reveals that political party officials hinder the electoral success of Afro-Brazilian candidates. While electoral incentives lead them to nominate Afro-Brazilian candidates, they do not provide the campaign resources necessary to run a competitive electoral campaign. Even when controlling for candidate quality, I find that white candidates receive significantly more campaign contributions than their brown and black copartisans. Since campaign contributions from political parties constitute a small fraction of what candidates must spend to attain office, it is unlikely to explain why Afro-Brazilians rarely win office. Due to changes in

campaign finance rules, however, in future elections the unequal distribution of campaign funds may be of greater electoral consequence.

Consistent with previous studies, I find that there are important socioeconomic differences between white and Afro-Brazilian candidates. The former, on average, have higher educational attainment and are more likely to be employed as business professionals. Their dissimilar social profiles are likely to provide them both direct as well as indirect electoral advantages. In particular, their educational attainment and occupational prestige may aid them in attracting campaign donations. While I find that business professionals receive greater campaign contributions than those with less prestigious employment, there are still racial disparities in campaign support. On average, white workers receive just as much financial support from individuals and corporations as Afro-Brazilian business professionals. As a result of racial disparities in financial support, whites can and do outspend their Afro-Brazilian competitors.

My regression analysis shows that socioeconomic and resource difference contribute to Afro-Brazilians political marginalization, but do not entirely explain racial disparities in electoral outcomes. In contrast to much of the published work, though, I find that Afro-Brazilian candidates receive significantly fewer votes than their white competitors even when I control for theoretically important non-racial candidate attributes. These results suggest that racial discrimination at the ballot box is a significant impediment to Afro-Brazilian electoral success and underscores the value of further observational and experimental research on the mechanisms through which race affects electoral outcomes in Brazil.

My findings also raise important questions about how racial disparities in political representation affect the democratic process. Racial disparities in representation violate norms of fairness, but also may limit the substantive representation of Afro-Brazilians. While there is a growing number of studies on the role of race in Brazilian elections, relatively little research exists on the relationship between race and political behavior in Brazil's elected assemblies. That is the topic to which I now turn.

Chapter 3 Appendix A

Figure 3.7: Racial Disparities in Descriptive Representation

Note: Figure 3.7 shows the racial composition of the Brazilian citizenry in relation to the racial composition of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies in 2014. Population data comes from the Brazilian decennial census, while data on lawmaker race was attained from TSE candidate registration forms.

Table 3.6: Candidate Attribute T-Test Results

	Candidate Racial Classification			p value for test of:		
	White	Brown	Black	1=2	1=3	2=3
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party Campaign Contribution	93,755	28,731	17,060	0.000***	0.000***	0.116
	(357,539)	(160,644)	(105,115)			
College Educated	57.1	34.4	28.5	0.000***	0.000***	0.020**
	(0.7)	(1.8)	(1.7)			
Business Professional	78.7	66.2	58.7	0.000***	0.000***	0.004***
	(0.6)	(1.8)	(1.9)			
Politician	12.2	5.1	5.8	0.000***	0.000***	0.578
	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.9)			
Campaign Expenditures	244,081	78,672	48,776	0.000***	0.000***	0.080*
	(667,569)	(362,426)	(253,479)			

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

This table shows balance checks for candidate characteristics across racial groups. Columns 1 through 3 show means for white candidates (1), brown candidates (2), and black candidates (3), respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 4 through 6 show p-values for two-tailed equality of means tests between groups.

Table 3.7: Percent Party Campaign Contributions (Log)

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Classified as Brown	-0.672***	-0.420***	-0.232*
	(0.174)	(0.141)	(0.129)
Classified as Black	-0.811***	-0.447**	-0.338**
	(0.204)	(0.168)	(0.154)
Female Candidate		-0.931***	-0.566***
		(0.106)	(0.087)
Candidate Education		0.191***	0.147***
		(0.032)	(0.026)
Business Professional		0.535***	0.246**
		(0.112)	(0.090)
Incumbent			2.033***
			(0.168)
Electoral Experience			1.270***
			(0.160)
Constant	-5.866***	-7.059***	-7.303***
	(0.034)	(0.198)	(0.159)
Observations	2,775	2,775	2,775
R^2	0.018	0.095	0.287

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Chapter 4

Race and Substantive Representation

The combination of restrictive party institutions, resource limitations, and social factors undermine Afro-Brazilian candidates' electoral prospects. As a result, only a minority of the Afro-Brazilian candidates that run for public office, ultimately attain it. Less than 10 percent of the candidates elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2014 are regarded as Afro-Brazilian by Brazilians.[1] The low percentage of Afro-Brazilians elected in 2014 is not an aberration. Between 1994 and 2014, the percentage of Afro-Brazilians elected to the Chamber of Deputies was consistently below 10 percent.

Figure 4.1 indicates that Afro-Brazilians are descriptively underrepresented in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, meaning those in office do not provide an "accurate resemblance" of the citizenry (Pitkin 1967). While a growing body of research explores why Brazil's elected assemblies do not mirror the racial diversity of the electorate, relatively little is known about how the presence of Afro-Brazilian legislators actually affects politics. That is, what do elected Afro-Brazilian officials do? Does their presence affect what interests are represented and the types of policies produced?

Academics, journalists, and legislators presume that the election of Afro-Brazilians does

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[1]In 2014, 20 percent of the candidates elected classified themselves as Afro-Brazilian. Among all elected candidates, 81 classified themselves as brown, 22 classified themselves as black, and 410 classified themselves as white.

Figure 4.1: Afro-Brazilian Descriptive Representation in the Chamber of Deputies

Note: Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of Afro-Brazilians in the Chamber of Deputies over time.

not just affect how Brazil's Congress looks, but also what it does. In other words, there is an expectation that Afro-Brazilians will represent differently than their white counterparts. Substantive representation is defined as "acting in interests of the represented in a manner that is responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967). Afro-Brazilian legislators are expected to represent the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents and sponsor legislation that addresses their needs.

Theory suggests that descriptive representation is not necessary to achieve substantive representation (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967). Consistent with this argument, some white politicians have proven themselves to be outspoken advocates for Afro-Brazilians (Johnson 1998, 2008; Mitchell-Walthour 2018a). Moreover, just because a lawmaker is Afro-Brazilian does not mean that they will represent the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents. Some Afro-Brazilians have been silent on issues of concern to the Afro-Brazilian population, while others have opposed

policies that would have directly enhanced the status of nonwhite Brazilians (Johnson 1998; Senra 2014).

Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that in general Afro-Brazilian legislators are more likely to act for Afro-Brazilian constituents. Scholars reliably find that politicians provide greater substantive representation to constituents who share their personal characteristics, including race. While scholars understanding of the link between descriptive and substantive representation largely emerges from the American case, a number of studies show that this pattern exists in a number of other country contexts (McClendon 2016).

In this chapter, I seek to address two primary questions. Are Afro-Brazilian constituents interests substantively represented in the Chamber of Deputies and to what extent is the substantive representation they achieve attributable to the behavior of Afro-Brazilian legislators? Using an original measure of legislator race and a dataset that includes information on all legislation sponsored in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies between 1995 and 2015, I investigate the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in Brazil.

My analysis reveals that Afro-Brazilians receive limited substantive representation, in terms of policy responsiveness. Less than one percent of the more than 40,000 legislative bills sponsored between 1995 and 2015 were explicitly designed to improve the economic, social, and political status of Afro-Brazilians. Moreover, of the 162 Afro-Brazilian interest bills introduced by federal deputies between 1995 and 2015, only 10 became law. This finding suggest that Brazilian federal deputies perpetuate the marginalization of Afro-Brazilians through a combination of inactivity and opposition.

Not all federal deputies, however, are silent on racial issues. My econometric analysis shows that Afro-Brazilian legislators are significantly more likely than their white counterparts to introduce legislation that improves the status of Brazil's majority Afro-Brazilian population. Afro-Brazilian legislators introduce bills which valorize blackness, such as mandating that African history is taught in public schools, as well as propose legislation to address racial inequality in education, employment, and healthcare. Nevertheless, the ability of Afro-Brazilian legislators to

transform the race-conscious legislation they propose into law is hindered by their limited numbers. In this way, the descriptive underrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians perpetuates racial inequality in Brazilian society.

This chapter advances the nascent literature on race and policymaking behavior in the Chamber of Deputies. Extant research largely focuses on the actions of specific Afro-Brazilian legislators, thus leaving open questions about generalizability. Moreover, since prior studies focus on the behavior of Afro-Brazilian legislators alone, it remains unclear if whites behave differently. In the first systematic examination of legislator race and policymaking behavior, I present evidence that Afro-Brazilian constituents fare better when Afro-Brazilians hold public office. The strong relationship between legislator race and behavior identified is all the more important considering the historic disadvantages as well as contemporary injustices that Afro-Brazilians must overcome.

Race and Policy Interests

To determine if Afro-Brazilian's are substantively represented it is first necessary to identify their interests. Brazil's 117 million Afro-Brazilians are not monolithic in their attitudes, beliefs, and values. Amongst Afro-Brazilians, there are economic, social, and political differences. Nonetheless, due to the legacy of slavery and social exclusion they share many political interests and goals. Indicators of objective interests and subjective orientations reveal striking differences between Afro-Brazilians and whites.

While over the past two decades Afro-Brazilians have made considerable economic advances, they continue to lag whites on virtually every indicator of economic well-being. The results of the Brazilian National Household Survey (*Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios* - PNAD), consistently show that Afro-Brazilians as a group are less well-off than their white counterparts.

Table 4.1 contains unemployment statistics for selected years between 1995 and 2015. It reveals that unemployment decreased during the commodity boom that began in 2003 and rose when the boom ended in 2012. Throughout the entire period, the Afro-Brazilian unemployment rate was nearly 2 percent higher than that of whites.

Table 4.1: Unemployment Rate (Population above 16 years old)

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1995	5.4	6.4
1998	8.1	9.4
2003	8.7	10.7
2006	7.4	9.2
2009	7.1	9.1
2012	5.1	6.9
2015	8.1	10.6

Note: Table 4.1 indicates the percentage of Brazilians older than 16 that are unemployed by racial group.

Source: Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD)

Income levels are directly related to unemployment rates. Table 4.2 contains information on average household incomes for whites and Afro-Brazilians. Between 1995 and 2015, the income of both white and Afro-Brazilian households increased substantially. While the average monthly income of Afro-Brazilian households was R$433 in 1995, by 2015 it had increased to R$762, about $290 US dollars. This constitutes a 76 percent increase. White incomes also increased over the same time period, albeit at a lower rate. The average monthly income of white households increased by 36 percent, from R$1,031 in 1995 to R$1,402.

Although between 1995 and 2015 the income of white households increased at a lower rate relative to that of Afro-Brazilians, they remain in a much more economically privileged position. In 2015, the average monthly income of white households was 1.8 times that of Afro-Brazilians.

Income inequalities contribute to high poverty rates among Afro-Brazilians. Table 4.3 shows that in 1995, nearly 90 percent of Afro-Brazilians were impoverished, meaning they receive less than the monthly minimum wage of R$788, approximately $300 US dollars per month. In 1995, the majority of whites in Brazil were also living in poverty. Nevertheless, the poverty rate among Afro-Brazilians was 22.8 percent higher than that of whites (87.8 versus 65).

In large part because of revolutionary social programs started by Brazilian President Lula da Silva, poverty has significantly diminished over the past twenty years (Campello and Neri 2013;

Table 4.2: Average Monthly Household Income Per Capita

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1995	R$1,031	R$433
1998	R$1,061	R$445
2003	R$965	R$425
2006	R$1,139	R$539
2009	R$1,236	R$636
2012	R$1,424	R$743
2015	R$1,402	R$762

Note: Table 4.2 indicates the average monthly household income per capita by racial group.

Source: Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD)

Hall 2006). While 75.3 percent of Brazilians lived below the poverty line in 1995, by 2015, that percentage had decreased to 59.3 percent.

Despite this advance, Afro-Brazilians continue to be 1.5 times more likely than whites to live below the poverty line. Moreover, they are twice as likely to be extremely poor, meaning their average household income per capita is below R$77 per month, or less than $1 US dollar per day.

Table 4.3: Percentage of Brazilians in Poverty

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1995	65.0	87.8
1998	63.9	86.9
2003	65.5	87.9
2006	59.2	83.3
2009	53.9	78.2
2012	46.6	71.5
2015	46.3	70.1

Note: Table 4.3 indicates the percentage of Brazilians that have a monthly average household income per capita below R$788, the minimum monthly salary in 2015, taking into account consumer price inflation.

Source: Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD)

Due to wealth disparities, white and nonwhite Brazilians can be expected to have different

economic preferences. When asked in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey if the "Brazilian state should implement policies to reduce inequalities in income between rich and poor," Afro-Brazilians were more likely to "strongly agree" or "agree" with the statement than whites (71.3% to 68.1%).[2]

One of the ways that income disparities have been addressed in Brazil is through Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer program. In contrast to other development programs, which provided goods or services, Bolsa Família gave its beneficiaries money. The amount of money beneficiaries receive depends on family size and monthly income, with the average family receiving just $47 US a month (Pereira 2015).[3] While the average recipient receives only a small amount of money, it can change the lives of impoverished Brazilians. The program, which reaches 14 million households and one third of all children in the country, reduced the percentage of Brazilians living below the World Bank's international poverty line of $1.90, from 25 percent of the population in 2004 to 8.5 percent in 2014 (Campello and Neri 2013; Góes and Karpowicz 2017).

Data from the AmericasBarometer, however, show that whites and Afro-Brazilians have disparate views on expanding the program. In the 2010 and 2014 survey waves, Afro-Brazilian respondents were significantly more likely than whites to indicate that the government should increase the number of families that receive Bolsa Família (57.4% vs 46.9%).[4] Opposition to Bolsa Família and other welfare programs may be rooted in a desire to prevent upwardly mobile nonwhites from entering predominately white spaces.[5]

Not only has Bolsa Família reduced poverty, since Bolsa Família recipients are required to make sure their children regularly attend school, it has also had substantial consequences on educational outcomes.[6] There is evidence that the program increased enrollment, lowered

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[2]This difference is statistically significant according to a Two-Tailed Test at the p<.1 level. Data from the 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 survey waves were pooled.

[3]Payments range from $10 US and $77 US a month.

[4]This difference is statistically significant according to a Two-Tailed Test at the p<.001 level. Data from the 2010 and 2014 survey waves were pooled.

[5]Danuzia Leão, a Brazilian newspaper columnist, infamously complained that there was no joy in going to New York to see a musical now that your doorman can as well (Geledés 2012).

[6]All children and adolescents between 6 and 15 years old must be enrolled in school and

dropout rates and raised grade advancement (Glewwe and Kassouf 2012). Moreover, Glewwe and Kaussouf (2012) find that Bolsa Família raises Afro-Brazilian school enrollment, an important finding considering that education is commonly perceived as a means to escape poverty.

Afro-Brazilian educational attainment increased substantially between 1995 and 2015, yet Afro-Brazilians continue to woefully lag whites. The data in Table 4.4 show that in 2015, Afro-Brazilians age 15 and older had on average 8.1 years of formal education. In comparison, whites on average had 10 years of formal schooling.

Table 4.4: Average Years of Formal Education (Population above 15 years old)

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1995	6.9	4.5
1998	7.4	4.9
2003	8.3	5.9
2006	8.7	6.5
2009	9.2	7.2
2012	9.6	7.7
2015	10	8.1

Note: Table 4.4 indicates the average number of years of formal education for Brazilians older than 15 by racial group.

Source: Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD)

While Brazilians stay in school longer than ever before, the quality of education they receive varies substantially. Public education in Brazil is free, but the quality of public schools is notoriously poor. Teacher absenteeism is pervasive, students lack learning materials, and in many cases the infrastructure is nonexistant (Ferraz, Finan and Moreira 2012; Walbe Ornstein et al. 2009). As a result, Brazilians with means send their children to private schools (de Oliveira, Belluzzo and Pazello 2013). Those that are educated in public schools, therefore, are largely poor and overwhelmingly Afro-Brazilian (Constantino 2006).

Public opinion data indicate that Afro-Brazilians want to strengthen Brazil's public education

maintain a minimum monthly attendance of 85%. In 2008, a complementary program called the The Benefício Variável Jovem was introduced for adolescents ages 16 and 17.

system. In the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, when asked if the government should raise taxes to spend more money on public education, Afro-Brazilians were more likely to respond that it should (See Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: Support for Increasing Spending on Public Education

Educational Level	White	Afro-Brazilian
Primary	31.3	36.4
Secondary	30.6	38.1
Universities	33.0	37.9

Note: Table 4.5 indicates the Afro-Brazilian respondents are more likely to support raising taxes to increase government spending on education than whites.

Source: AmericasBarometer (LAPOP 2010)

Educational opportunities are greatest in developed, urban centers. Nevertheless, Brazilian cities are also the location in which racial inequality is most visible. In cities, Afro-Brazilians are relegated to areas with poor public services, exposed to high levels of pollution, constantly face the threat of violence, and suffer displacement due to natural disasters (Freire et al. 2018). In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's second largest city, Afro-Brazilians living in communities known as *favelas*, struggle with all of these issues.

For instance, community public health clinics routinely lack medicine and health professionals to dispense it (Vigna 2016). In Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro's largest favela, the incidence of tuberculosis is 11 times higher than the national average (Collucci 2017). Cramped living conditions and inadequate sanitation are among the reasons for its spread. According to data from the 2015 PNAD, 31.2 percent of Afro-Brazilians living in permanent homes in urban areas lacked adequate sanitation, meaning the home was not connected to the sewer system or had a septic tank. In comparison, only 18.3 percent of the permanent homes whites live in do not have basic sanitation (See Table 4.6).

The ambitious *Morar Carioca* urbanization plan was intended to address living condition issues in favela communities like Rocinha. The program, which was launched in 2011 and received international attention, was intended to improve sanitation, provide road surfacing, and connect Rio de Janeiro's 783 favelas to the electric grid (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). However, by 2013, the

Table 4.6: Adequate Sanitation

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1995	30	52.7
1998	26.4	47.6
2003	24.8	44.1
2006	24.2	42.1
2009	22.7	39.7
2012	20.2	34
2015	18.3	31.2

Note: Table 4.6 indicates the percentage of permanent homes in urban areas without adequate sanitation by racial group.

Source: Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD)

program had been drastically reduced and was no longer a priority of Mayor Eduardo Paes. As a result, favela communities continue to exist in a world apart from the asphalt that denotes connection to the formal city.

Due to abandonment by the state, drug gangs and paramilitary militias control many of the favela communities in which Afro-Brazilians live (Nolen 2016). These groups rule through violence and shootouts are commonplace. Due to the racial composition of favela communities and the frequency of violence, Afro-Brazilians are more likely than whites to be harmed. While the percent of white Brazilians murdered fell by 25 percent between 2003 and 2015, the percent of Afro-Brazilians murdered increased by more than 45 percent during this period (Table 4.7).

Brazil's high death rate is partially attributable to the actions of it's security forces. On the occasions in which police or military forces enter favela communities, it is with guns drawn. In 2018, police killed 1,534 people in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone (ISP 2019). Among those killed, Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately represented (*Homicides by Military Police In the City of Rio de Janeiro* 2015). A report commissioned by the Brazilian Senate went so far as to declare that "the Brazilian state, directly or indirectly, perpetrates the genocide of the young black population" (Francois 2018).

Even when state actors do not take the lives of Afro-Brazilians, their inaction commonly

Table 4.7: Homicides in Brazil

Year	White	Afro-Brazilian
1997	864	1,097
2000	18,226	23,549
2003	19,287	28,621
2006	16,168	30,272
2009	15,249	33,929
2012	14,816	38,755
2015	14,399	41,592

Note: Table 4.7 indicates the number of white and Afro-Brazilians that are murdered in Brazil by racial group.

Source: IPEA Violence Atlas (2018)

results in injury and death. During rain storms in April 2019, the collapse of unlicensed buildings resulted in the death of 24 individuals in the favela community of Muzema, in southern Rio de Janeiro (Globo 2019). This loss of life could have been prevented had building codes, something that Afro-Brazilians want, been enforced. In response to a question on the 2017 AmericasBarometer survey, 45.2 percent of Afro-Brazilian respondents indicated that they "strongly agree" or "agree" with the statement "the government should spend more money on enforcing regulations to make housing safer from natural disasters, even if it means spending less in other areas" compared to only 39.4 percent of whites. The high rates at which Afro-Brazilian respondents support housing regulations is not necessarily surprising considering that 56 percent of them indicated it was "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that someone in their immediate family would be injured or killed by a natural disaster within the next 25 years. In contrast, only 48 percent of white respondents thought the likelihood that a member of their family would be killed was at least somewhat likely.

The reason Afro-Brazilians are economically marginalized is largely attributed to discrimination. In the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, when asked why Afro-Brazilians are generally poorer than other Brazilians, 70.1 percent of whites and 80.3 percent of Afro-Brazilian respondents answered that it was "'Because *negros* are not treated justly" (See Table 4.8). Among the minority of respondents that provided a different answer, 15.5 percent of whites and 10.6 percent of Afro-Brazilians claimed

that Afro-Brazilian poverty is due to their limited education. Only a minority of whites and Afro-Brazilian respondents indicated that it was because Afro-Brazilians do not work hard enough, are less intelligent or claimed cultural differences explain their socioeconomic status.

Table 4.8: Attribution of Afro-Brazilian Poverty

Reason	White	Afro-Brazilian
"Because *negros* don't work hard enough"	2.2%	1.6%
"Because *negros* are less intelligent"	0.6%	0.8%
"Because *negros* are not treated justly"	70.1%	80.3%
"Because *negros* have low levels of education"	15.5%	10.6%
"Because *negros* do not want to change their culture"	11.6%	6.8%

Note: Table 4.8 indicates respondent answers to the question "According to census data, in general, *negros* are poorer than the rest of the population. In your opinion, which is the principal reason for this?" by racial group.

Source: AmericasBarometer (LAPOP 2010)

There is strong evidence that Afro-Brazilians are treated unjustly. In the 2010 AmericasBarometer, 16 percent of Afro-Brazilian respondents said that in the past 5 years they had been discriminated against or treated unjustly because of their skin color (See Table 4.9). Layton and Smith (2017) find that skin color, as coded by the interviewer, is not just a strong determinant of racial discrimination, but also class and gender discrimination. In other words, race underlies discrimination even when individuals do not attribute their unjust treatment to their racial group membership.

Unsurprisingly, Afro-Brazilians voters are likely to support the passage of laws to prevent the unfair treatment of Afro-Brazilians (*The Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)* 2010). When asked if the government should pass laws to prevent the unfair treatment of Afro-Brazilians, 86.2 percent of Afro-Brazilians agreed (*The Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)* 2010).

Importantly, such laws exist already. Article 5 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution establishes that "practice of racism constitutes an unbailable crime, subject to the punishment of imprisonment." This provision, which was made judicially enforceable by the 1989 *Lei Caó* specifies that "crimes

Table 4.9: Personal Experiences with Racism

Frequency of Discrimination	Afro-Brazilians
"Many Times"	3.4%
"Sometimes	5.1%
"Few Times	7.2%
"Never	84.3%

Note: Table 4.9 indicates respondent answers to the question "'Thinking about last five years, did you ever feel discriminated against or poorly or unjustly treated because of the color of your skin? Would you say that this happened many times, several times, a few times, or never?"

Source: AmericasBarometer (LAPOP 2010)

resulting from prejudice or discrimination of race, color, ethnicity, religion or national origin" are punishable by two to five years imprisonment (Hensler 2006). Only rarely though are perpetrators prosecuted.

Afro-Brazilians are discouraged from bringing discrimination claims to courts and when they do, the claims are commonly dismissed. Since racial discrimination under Brazilian law is construed as an act of prejudice, judge's ideology of race and understanding of racial discrimination influence their rulings (Rascussen 2000). In the case of Leda Francisco, an Afro-Brazilian woman that sought legal relief after being insulted on the basis of her race by a shop owner, the judge ultimately ruled that there was no reason for imprisoning the merchant (Telles 2014*b*). In her decision, the judge stated "the racial question and racism should be ignored in favor of peaceful relations among the races. In a tolerant country like ours, it is important to erase such things so that society goes on harmoniously" (Estado do Rio de Janeiro 1997).

The case of Leda Francisco demonstrates that Brazil is not a racially harmonious society and underscores the need to transform it. One of the ways Brazil can become more racially egalitarian is by addressing the socioeconomic marginalization of Afro-Brazilians. Public opinion data shows that they are more likely than whites to support the creation of laws that defend or improve their economic position (See Table 4.10). When asked if the "government has a special obligation to help

negros and Indians improve their standard of living," 69.8 percent of Afro-Brazilians, but only 58.2 percent of whites agreed. Moreover, when asked in about specific policies that would promote this goal, Afro-Brazilian respondents were more supportive than whites. For instance, Afro-Brazilians are more likely than whites to "strongly agree" or "agree" with the statement "the government should protect communities of *negros* that are descendents of runaway slaves" (84.7% vs 81.9%) (*The Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)* 2010). Afro-Brazilians were also more likely to "strongly agree" or "agree" with the statement "Universities should reserve spaces for darker skinned students, even if that means excluding other students" (32.8% vs 19.7%) (LAPOP 2012).

Even as Afro-Brazilians' economic position improves, they are still likely to suffer racial discrimination. In fact, some research indicates that Afro-Brazilians are likely to suffer greater discrimination as they move up the income distribution (Bailey, Loveman and Muniz 2013). Arguably the only way to diminish racism in Brazil is by eliminating the stigma attached to blackness. One potential way to achieve this is by educating the population about the contributions of nonwhites to Brazil's development. According to results from the PERLA (2010) poll, most Brazilians support the inclusion of lessons about Afro-Brazilian history and culture in schools and universities (See Table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Attitudes on Racial Policies

Policy	White	Afro-Brazilian
Special duty to help Afro-Brazilians and Indians	58.2%	69.8%
Protection of Quilombo communities	81.9%	84.7%
Support for affirmative action	19.7%	32.8%
Support for teaching Afro-Brazilian history and traditions	85.5%	84.2%

Note: Table 4.10 indicates the percentage of white and Afro-Brazilian respondents that "strongly agree" or "agree" with certain racial policies.

Source: PERLA (2010) and AmericasBarometer (LAPOP 2012)

Only when Afro-Brazilians' economic position in Brazil's class hierarchy and their symbolic position in Brazil's racial hierarchy are equal to that of whites, can racial equality be said to exist.

One way to achieve this is through policy. In a speech on the day of Black Consciousness, Juvenal Araújo, the Secretary of Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR) declared "We need more public policies and accountability. We will only overcome historic barriers to equality through public policies...Equal opportunities do not exist between *negros* and whites in our country" (Sousa 2017).

Advocacy of Afro-Brazilian Interests

Elected legislators are expected to represent the interests of their constituents and advocate on their behalf. In other words, they provide substantive representation. Pitkin defines substantive representation as "acting in interests of the represented in a manner that is responsive to them" (1967, 209). In contrast to descriptive representation, which focuses on who legislators are, substantive representation concerns what legislators do.

A rich literature indicates that lawmakers need not descriptively represent constituents in order to substantively represent them. Normative democratic theorists contend that membership in a particular group says noting about what they actually do (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Young 1997). Even Pitkin asserts that "the best descriptive representative is not necessarily the best representative for activity or government" (1967, 89).[7] Consistent with these arguments, some empirical studies find that descriptive representation does not lead to superior substantive representation (Diamond 1977; Swain 1993).

To date, researchers have not systematically compared the behavior of white and Afro-Brazilian lawmakers, yet there is reason to suspect that white and Afro-Brazilian legislators may be equally likely, or rather, unlikely to represent the substantive interests of Afro-Brazilians. There are three potential explanations for this. First, the ideology of racial democracy may demobilize Afro-Brazilian legislators from behaving in a racially motivated manner. Second, the social stigma attached to blackness may discourage Afro-Brazilian lawmakers from taking action that would

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[7]Similar claims are made by Griffiths and Wollheim (1960), Grofman (1982), and Pennock (1979).

draw attention to their blackness. And lastly, even if Afro-Brazilian legislators want to represent Afro-Brazilians, the interests of other groups may take precedence.

In his work, Michael Hanchard (1998; 1999) argues that the widespread belief that Brazil is a racial democracy has a demobilizing effect on Afro-Brazilians. Afro-Brazilian legislators may also view racial relations in Brazil as positive, and therefore not recognize a need to represent them. Moreover, even when legislators recognize that racial inequality exists in Brazil, they may attribute it to economic factors as opposed to racism.

For instance, in a speech marking the visit of Nelson Mandela, Eraldo Trindade, an Afro-Brazilian deputy from the state of Amapá stated, "We have been able to build a multiracial society where the coexistence between people does not obey the perverse segregationist logic that still today victimizes the South African people" (Diário do Congresso Nacional - Seção I, August 6 1991, p.2353). Deputy Trindade went on to acknowledge that racial prejudice exists in the minds of some Brazilians, but expressed the belief that its strong social and economic connotations "dilute it substantially."

Similarly, the speeches of Agnaldo Timóteo, an Afro-Brazilian federal deputy from Rio de Janerio indicates he views race relations positively. In a television interview he declared: "We are a very mixed people, it is not possible to discriminate against *negros*" (Timóteo N.d.). Moreover, Timóteo argued against the creation of racial policies. In a debate about creating a national holiday to mark the death of Zumbi, an Afro-Brazilian leader, he stated:

> "Every time they do something to protect us, I feel indignant. I'm no different from anyone, Mr. President! I am semi-illiterate, I attended the elementary school up to third year in the Dom Carloto School Group, in Caratinga, and also in the Princesa Isabel School Group. I went out into the world at 15 years old. I did not prostitute myself, I did not violate myself, I was not not delinquent! I am 59 years old, I spent 44 years out in the world, honoring the name of my parents, honoring the name of my family. Why does someone have to protect me? I sought my own way, my ambition led my way, I prepared to occupy my position and am occupying it." (Diário da Câmara dos Deputados dos Deputados, November 11, 1995, p.5302)

This quote shows that Afro-Brazilian legislators may not feel that Afro-Brazilians need special representation. Moreover, even if they do, they may choose not to pursue it because is likely

to attract attention to their blackness, a socially stigmatized attribute. In interviews and public pronouncements, a number of lawmakers suggest that Afro-Brazilians do not want to be known as Afro-Brazilian.

For example, in an interview with Chico Vigilante, an Afro-Brazilian federal deputy from the Federal District, he indicates that due to the social stigma attached to blackness, some individuals he considers to be *negro* deny their blackness (Vigilante 1994). He said that those that deny they are Afro-Brazilian absolve themselves of their responsibility to improve the situation of nonwhites in Brazilian society (Johnson 1998; Vigilante 1994). Carlos Santana, an Afro-Brazilian federal deputy from the state of Rio de Janeiro, expressed a similar sentiment in a congressional speech advocating for adoption of affirmative action policy. Santana said:

> "Do you know what the big problem is in our country? ... Few [Afro-Brazilians] have publicly assumed their race and fought for it. This is a big problem. We were talking about the United States. There the artists created a fund to assist blacks and, with each show that they do, they deposited in this fund a certain amount to help *negros* enter the university." (Discurso do Projeto de Lei 6.912, March 25, 2003)

Even if legislators see themselves as Afro-Brazilian and want to represent Afro-Brazilians, though, they still may fail to do so. Legislators' time and resources are scarce. Advocating for Afro-Brazilians means having less time to represent other groups or interests. Since Afro-Brazilian legislators do not attribute their electoral success to the support of Afro-Brazilians as a racial group, they may not prioritize them.

Consistent with this argument, when asked in interviews about who they represent, Afro-Brazilian lawmakers commonly did not mention Afro-Brazilians. Instead, they stated that they represent individuals like union members and those affiliated with particular social movements, as well as, followers of specific religions and those in certain socioeconomic classes (Faro 2015; Marinho 2015; Silva 2015). When they did mention that they represent Afro-Brazilians, it was typically only after identifying other groups. For instance, Rosangela Gomes, an Afro-Brazilian federal deputy from the state of Rio de Janeiro, stated that she wanted to represent "the poor, youth, women, and *negros* in Brazil" (Gomes 2015). This quote illustrates that Deputy Gomes has multiple groups

to which she desires to be responsive. Since legislators time and resources are finite, they can be expected to be stronger advocates of those groups and interests that they are most passionate about.

The racial democracy ideology, the social stigma attached to blackness, and the many constituencies to whom elected representatives are accountable, provide potential explanations for why Afro-Brazilian legislators may not be more responsive to the interests of Afro-Brazilians than their white counterparts.

- **H1 Racial Irrelevance**: Afro-Brazilian and white legislators are equally likely to represent the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents.

Nevertheless, comparative research suggests that this is unlikely to be true. Beyond the Brazilian case, research broadly shows that lawmakers who share social characteristics with their constituents better represent their interests and act on their behalf (Butler and Broockman 2011; Canon 1999; Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008; Grose 2011; Haynie 2001; Kerr and Miller 1997; Whitby 2000). One explanation why is that politicians are not blank slates (Butler 2014). White and Afro-Brazilians entering office are likely to have different information and interests that can lead to biases in representation.

Politicians commonly attribute paramount importance to their background. Burden (2007) notes that their personal experiences provide them expertise, shape their interests and values, and ultimately, influence their actions. Like members of the general population, white legislators are likely to have a higher socioeconomic status than Afro-Brazilians. Among the candidates elected in 2014 to the Chamber of Deputies, whites were more likely than their Afro-Brazilian counterparts to have completed college (80.4 to 76.6). Moreover, even though many elected politicians are wealthy, on average, whites reported having assets worth three times as much as Afro-Brazilians (R$2,755,841 to R$887,942).

Socioeconomic class is not the only thing that Afro-Brazilian legislators and Afro-Brazilian constituents traditionally have in common. Like Afro-Brazilian citizens, nonwhite legislators commonly suffer racial discrimination (da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Frota 2015a; Johnson 1998, 2015). Moreover, after assuming office, legislators continue to suffer racism, even within

the Congress itself (Bnews 2019; Candido da Universa 2019; da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Frota 2015*b*; Goes and Garcia 2019; Kapa 2019).

In semi-structured interviews I conducted with federal deputies, racism was one of the topics discussed. While interviewees were never asked if they had personally suffered racial discrimination, 10 of the 12 Afro-Brazilian interviewees recounted how they had been mistreated because of their race. The fact that they shared such experiences suggests that race is socially salient, it affect their preferences, and influences their behavior.

Consistent with this argument, Abdias de Nascimento, arguably Brazil's most famous Afro-Brazilian politician, traced his dedication to equality to the racial discrimination he witnessed and suffered as a youth (Nascimento and Nascimento 1992). The mistreatment Nascimento experienced in school, the military, and at the hands of police, led him to politics and guided his behavior (Nascimento and Nascimento 1992). In an interview, Nascimento (1994) stated, "I was defending that [black] cause as my priority, that's what I was doing there."

Nascimento saw himself as a representative for the Afro-Brazilian people and considered improving life outcomes for Afro-Brazilians to be his most important mission (Nascimento and Nascimento 1992, 2000). The race-conscious legislation that Nascimento proposed and his denunciation of racism, provoked discussion about racial inequality and paved the way for subsequent advancements in racial equality (Johnson 1998, 2006, 2008). Reflecting on Nascimento's accomplishments, Ollie Johnson (N.D.) noted: "It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of Nascimento for setting the agenda of Black politics."

Like Nascimento, Benedita da Silva, the first Afro-Brazilian woman elected to Congress, is also an outspoken advocate for Afro-Brazilians. Da Silva, who describes herself as "three times a minority," attributes her commitment to fighting racial inequality to her experiences as a poor, Afro-Brazilian woman (da Silva, Medonça and Medea 1997; Riding 1987). In an interview with the *New York Times* following her election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1986, da Silva stated:

> "I know the position of blacks in this country. From the time I was tiny, I was made to feel my place. I learned to go in through the back door. I was told I was ugly because I had crinkly hair and black skin...I have a special responsibility to speak out on the

subjects that I know about - against racial discrimination, against the unequal rights of women and against the injustices suffered by the poor." (Riding 1987).

The socioeconomic position, experiences with discrimination, and the racial consciousness that it promotes, can be expected to lead Afro-Brazilian legislators to be more responsive to the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents than their white counterparts.

- **H2 Racial Representation**: Afro-Brazilians legislators are more likely to represent Afro-Brazilian constituents than legislators that are classified as white.

While there is evidence that politicians better represent constituents with whom they share social characteristics, it is also commonly accepted that lawmakers "act for" groups because of electoral incentives. The constituency model of representation presumes that legislators represent constituents' preferences primarily to ensure their electoral survival (Fiorina 1974). As "single-minded seekers of reelection," Brazilian legislators can be expected to advocate for Afro-Brazilians when it improves their chances of winning reelection (Mayhew 1974).

In the comparative racial politics literature, there is evidence that legislative behavior is conditioned by district factors, like the racial composition of the electorate. Swain (1993) argues that constituency factors explain legislator behavior. However, other studies indicate that the combination of race and constituency factors underlie political outcomes (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Grose 2005, 2011; Haynie 2001; Hutchings 1998; Whitby 1985). The balance of empirical evidence suggests that as the percentage of Afro-Brazilians in an electoral district increases, legislators are more likely to substantively represent their interests.

Congressional districts in Brazil, which coincide with state boundaries, vary substantially with respect to racial composition. Afro-Brazilians comprise more than 75 percent of the population in some states and less than 25 percent in others (See Appendix A Figure 4.3). The logic of electoral competition would suggest that in those states in which Afro-Brazilians comprise a large portion of the electorate, legislators, irrespective of their own race, will be more likely to represent the interests of Afro-Brazilian constituents than legislators in those states in which Afro-Brazilians comprise a small portion of the population.

Since Brazilian elections are determined according to open-list proportional representation rules, though, lawmakers do not need to receive a majority or even a plurality of votes to attain office. In the 2014 congressional elections, winning candidates on average received just 3.2 percent of the valid votes cast in their state.[8] Candidates, therefore, focus on cultivating the support of small segments of the electorate.

Political campaigns largely do not target Afro-Brazilian voters (Campos and Janusz N.D.; Mitchell-Walthour 2009*a*). Moreover, candidates that have sought to cultivate electoral support only on the basis of race have not won office (Mitchell-Walthour 2009*a*; Oliveira 2016). As a result, legislators elected in states with predominately Afro-Brazilian populations though may not be responsive to their Afro-Brazilian constituents.

- **H3 Racial Constituency**: Legislators that are elected in states with small Afro-Brazilian populations are likely to be equally responsive to Afro-Brazilian interests as legislators elected in states with large Afro-Brazilian populations.

Nonracial factors may also explain legislator behavior. Lawmakers from different political parties tend to have dissimilar attitudes about the role of government and the types of policies that should exist. According to the party model of substantive representation endorsed by Swain (1993), party affiliation, not racial group membership, explains legislator behavior.

Brazilian political parties are numerous and notoriously weak (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In the 2014 elections, candidates from 20 different political parties ultimately won seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, candidates commonly switch parties once they are elected (Desposato 2006). Desposato (2006) finds that one-third of deputies switch parties during the average legislative session. Nevertheless, this does not indicate that political parties in Brazil are meaningless. In fact, a growing body of research suggests that there are notable ideological divisions between them.

Power and Zucco (2009) argue that Brazil's main legislative parties can be arrayed clearly on a classic left-right scale and that their overall ordering has been relatively stable over time. With

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[8]Some candidates in the 2014 elections won office with as little as 0.1 percent of valid votes.

respect to economic preferences, leftist legislators support a statist or mixed economy, while those on the right prefer a pure market economy (Power and Zucco 2012). Moreover, there are notable differences between legislators on the left and right with respect to social policies. Johnson (2018) notes that most of the racially progressive politicians in Congress come from leftist political parties, especially the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT). As a result, there is reason to expect legislators affiliated with leftist political parties to be more responsive to Afro-Brazilian constituents than legislators affiliated with other political parties.

- **H4 Party Program**: Legislators affiliated with leftist parties are more likely to represent Afro-Brazilian constituents than legislators affiliated with center or right parties.

Substantive Representation of Afro-Brazilians

Substantive representation takes a variety of forms. Legislators can "act for" constituents by sponsoring legislation, participating in committee markups, voting on legislation, and responding to their unique requests for assistance. Arguably the most important way legislators substantively represent constituents, though, is by proposing new laws.

By sponsoring legislation elected officials draw attention to problems and specify policy alternatives (Kingdon 1989). The definition of alternatives, according to Schattschneider (1975) is "the supreme instrument of power." Due to the importance of agenda setting and the power lawmakers have at early stages of decision making, bill sponsorship is regarded as an excellent way to assess linkages between constituency interests and legislator behavior (Arnold 1992).

To determine the extent to which Afro-Brazilian and white legislators advance the interests of Brazil's majority Afro-Brazilian population, I use original data on bill sponsorship behavior in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The dataset I assembled includes information on all legislative proposals introduced in the Chamber of Deputies between 1995 and 2015, a period which spans five congresses. The 1,717 unique federal deputies serving in the Chamber of Deputies during this period introduced a total of 39,337 legislative bills.[9] The data are disaggregated at the bill level

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[9]The 1988 Brazilian Constitution empowers a variety of political actors to introduce legislation.

with information on its content and its sponsor.[10]

Drawing on the prior discussion of Afro-Brazilian interests, I use a semi-supervised categorization scheme to identify "Afro-Brazilian interest bills," which I define as legislative proposals that explicitly seek to improve the socioeconomic position of nonwhites in Brazil's class hierarchy and/or their symbolic position in Brazil's racial hierarchy. In order to minimize bias, the categorization scheme I employ identifies Afro-Brazilian-related keywords on the language in each bill's description.[11] In total, 162 bills were identified as Afro-Brazilian interest bills (See Appendix B Table 4.15).

Afro-Brazilian interest bills can be broadly classified as cultural or material interest legislation. Cultural legislation serve the purpose of valorizing blackness in Brazil and raising awareness of power asymmetries between whites and nonwhites. Examples of this type of legislation include bills that establish a day of black consciousness, codify a national black anthem, and name public institutions after Afro-Brazilian leaders, such as Zumbi dos Palmares.[12] In contrast, material interest legislation is designed to improve the status of Afro-Brazilians by altering institutional structures. Among the material interest legislation introduced between 1995 and 2015 were bills that grant property rights to the descendents of runaway slaves living in quilombo communities, create detection and treatment programs for sickle cell anemia, and establish race-based affirmative action policies.[13] Together, cultural and material interest legislation improve the status of Afro-Brazilians.

However, the Executive and members of Congress are most active in the legislative process.

[10]Legislation can be cosponsored, yet in practice, most bills are sponsored by a single legislator (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Of all bills introduced between 1995 and 2015, less than 2 percent were cosponsored. When a bill is cosponsored, I attribute sponsorship to the first sponsor.

[11]The categorization scheme keywords were chosen based on the Brazilian race politics literature and in consultation with representatives from the Brazilian Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (SEPPIR). The categorization scheme is located in Appendix B Table 4.14.

[12]Zumbi dos Palmares was the leader of a runaway slave community that has become an important symbol of Afro-Brazilian resistance (Mitchell-Walthour 2017).

[13]Sickle cell anemia is a hereditary disease that primarily affects those of African descent.

The rarity with which "Afro-Brazilian interest bills" are sponsored suggests that Afro-Brazilians receive limited substantive representation. A natural question is why? Who is responsible?

Who Substantively Represents Afro-Brazilians?

In order to determine whether white or Afro-Brazilian legislators are stronger advocates of Afro-Brazilian constituents, it is first necessary to identify which legislators are Afro-Brazilian. Consistent with the approach utilized in Chapter 3, I develop an original measure of classified race by having each legislator's official congressional photo classified by three Brazilian coders according to the IBGE categorization scheme.[14] All three coders are self-identified white males with some college education living in South-Eastern Brazilian states.

A comparison of how coders racially classified the federal deputies elected between 1994 and 2014 reveals a great deal of consensus. At least two of three coders agreed on the race of the legislator in 99 percent of cases.[15] Consistent with previous research, I find that coders agree at higher rates about who is white than who is brown or black. If two of three coders classify a legislator as either brown or black, I categorize them as Afro-Brazilian. All other legislators are categorized as white.[16]

In Table 4.11, I compare Afro-Brazilian and white legislators in terms of the percentage of the total number of bill introductions that were devoted to Afro-Brazilian interest legislation. The data show that in each legislature, the proportion of bills that Afro-Brazilian legislators dedicated

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[14]Legislator photos are publicly available on the Chamber of Deputies website. The three legislators that did not have an official photo available were dropped from the analysis. Since coders were provided only legislator photos, their assessments of legislator race are based principally on phenotype. It is unlikely that the clothing of legislators in their photos affects coder assessment of race because legislators utilize business attire in their official photos.

[15]Coders unanimously agreed on the race of the legislator in 85 percent of cases.

[16]The nine legislators classified by coders as Asian are reclassified as white. No legislators were classified by coders as Indigenous.

to Afro-Brazilian issues was greater than that of white legislators. The differences are statistically significant in each of the five legislatures.

Table 4.11: Afro-Brazilian Interest Bills

	Proposed by		
Congress	Afro-Brazilian	White	Difference
50th	3.4%	0.2%	3.2%***
51st	2.4%	0.3%	2.1%***
52nd	1.2%	0.3%	0.9%***
53rd	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%**
54th	1.5%	0.3%	1.2%***

Note: Table 4.11 indicates sponsorship of Afro-Brazilian interest bills as a percentage of all bill sponsored.

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 4.11 provides preliminary evidence that in comparison to whites, Afro-Brazilian legislators are stronger advocates for Afro-Brazilian constituents. Nevertheless, other factors may explain racial disparities in the types of bills legislators sponsor. To more fully test my hypotheses, I disaggregate the data and focus on the behavior of individual legislators.

To assess the relationship between legislator race and Afro-Brazilian interest bill sponsorship, I take each legislator i in year t as the unit of analysis. This legislator-year approach is appropriate because federal deputies commonly leave Congress before the end of their mandate and substitutes serve in their absence (Samuels 2003). With this legislator-level approach, I utilize an event count model in which the number of Afro-Brazilian interest bills initiated each year is the dependent variable. Due to its nonnegative condition and the frequency with which the dependent variable is zero, I estimate Afro-Brazilian interest bill sponsorship using a zero-inflated negative binomial model.[17] The total number of bills submitted annually by each legislator is used as the predictor of zero values. To avoid bias, errors are clustered at the legislator level.

The principal independent variable in my analysis is a dichotomous measure of legislator race. The *Afro-Brazilian Legislator* variable is coded "1" if a legislator is classified by coders as

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[17]The dependent variable is coded "0" for 99 percent of all legislator-year observations.

Afro-Brazilian and "0" otherwise.[18]

I include a number of control variables in the statistical models to isolate the effect of legislator race. These include legislator gender, political experience, and political party affiliation. It is important to control for gender because women are considered to be more supportive of minority policies than men (Barrett 1995; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001). The *Female* variable, which is coded "1" if the legislator is a woman and "0" otherwise. A legislator's political experience may also affect their bill sponsorship behavior. Legislators with seniority are likely to have policy expertise and skill in navigating the legislative process (Hibbing 1991, 1993). The *Seniority* variable is coded according to the number of years a legislator served in the Chamber of Deputies. For similar reasons, I include the *Relinquished Seat* variable, which is coded "1" if a legislator left Congress in a particular legislator-year and "0" otherwise. A legislators' party affiliation may also influence the type of legislative proposals they present. Leftist political parties in Brazil have traditionally presented themselves as defending the interests of Afro-Brazilians (Mitchell-Walthour 2009*a*; Valente 1986). The dichotomous *Centrist Party* and *Right-Wing Party* variables I include indicate if a legislator is a member of a centrist or a right-wing political party, respectfully. These variables are coded according to the classification schemes of Zucco and Power (2009), as well as, Mainwaring, Power, and Bizzarro (2018).[19]

In addition to legislator characteristics, I also control for the racial composition of each legislators' electoral district. In congressional elections, Brazil's 27 states serve as at-large congressional districts. Districts composed of a high percentage of Afro-Brazilian voters may be more likely to elect representatives who advocate for Afro-Brazilian interests regardless of legislator race. The *Percent Afro-Brazilian Population* variable indicates the percentage of residents in a legislator's district self-identify as brown and black as reported in the decennial census.

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[18]I obtain a measure of how substitutes are racially classified by having their official congressional photos classified by the same coders that classified elected federal deputies. If two of three coders classify a legislator as either brown or black, I categorize them as Afro-Brazilian.

[19]See Table 4.16 in Appendix B for information on how political parties are categorized.

Table 4.12 shows coefficient estimates for three zero-inflated negative binomial models of bill sponsorship. The reported results indicate that there is a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in Brazil. However, they also suggest that some types of Afro-Brazilian legislators are more likely to act for their Afro-Brazilian constituents than others.

Each of the models presented in Table 4.12 indicate that there is a connection between legislator race and the introduction of Afro-Brazilian interest legislation. In Model 1, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the *Afro-Brazilian Legislator* variable shows that Afro-Brazilian legislators are significantly more likely to write Afro-Brazilian interest legislation than white federal deputies. The magnitude of the impact of race on behavior is apparent by examining marginal effects.An average Afro-Brazilian male legislator, with 7 years of experience, who is affiliated with a leftist political party and from a state that has a population that is 50 percent Afro-Brazilian, is predicted to introduce nearly 5 times as many Afro-Brazilian interest bills in a year than an otherwise equal white legislator (.083 vs .017). These results are inconsistent with my first hypothesis, but support my second hypotheses.

Importantly, the results of Model 1 reveal that introduction of Afro-Brazilian interest legislation is not attributable to constituency demographics. Consistent with my third hypothesis, the coefficient of the *Afro-Brazilian Population (Percent)* is found to be statistically insignificant. Thus, legislators representing Bahia, which is known as Brazil's blackest state, and Santa Catarina, its whitest, are predicted to sponsor similar numbers of Afro-Brazilian interest bills.[20]

Lastly, Model 1 reveals that party affiliation does affect legislator behavior. The coefficients of the *Centrist Party* and *Right-Wing Party* variables are both negative and statistically significant. This indicates that politicians affiliated with leftist political parties are likely to sponsor more Afro-Brazilian interest bills than legislators affiliated with center or right-wing parties. To determine how many more, I again turn to marginal effects. According to Model 1, an average white male legislator, who has 7 years of political experience that is affiliated with a leftist political party and

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[20]In the state of Bahia, 76.5% of the population is Afro-Brazilian, while only 15.5% of Santa Catarina's population is Afro-Brazilian.

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Table 4.12: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model Results

	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
Afro-Brazilian Legislator	1.588***	1.965**	2.039***
	(0.314)	(0.876)	(0.380)
Female Legislator	0.379	0.378	0.425
	(0.282)	(0.283)	(0.288)
Years In Congress	-0.015	-0.016	-0.017
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Renounced Office	-14.110***	-12.992***	-13.020***
	(0.271)	(0.273)	(0.321)
Afro-Brazilian Population (Percent)	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Centrist Party	-1.130***	-1.120***	-0.850***
	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.306)
Right-Wing Party	-1.145***	-1.129***	-0.865***
	(0.252)	(0.256)	(0.261)
Afro-Brazilian Legislator x Afro-Brazilian Population		-0.008	
		(0.018)	
Afro-Brazilian Legislator x Right-Wing Party			-1.359**
			(0.655)
Afro-Brazilian Legislator x Centerist Party			-2.247**
			(1.130)
Constant	-2.721***	-2.811***	-2.898***
	(0.335)	(0.328)	(0.341)
Number of Bills	-1.156***	-1.172***	-1.140***
	(0.415)	(0.393)	(0.415)
Constant	3.612***	3.621***	3.596***
	(0.461)	(0.449)	(0.461)
Observations	11,893	11,893	11,893

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

from a state that has a population that is 50 percent Afro-Brazilian is likely to introduce three times as many Afro-Brazilian interest bills in a year as otherwise equal legislators affiliated with center or right-wing political parties (0.016 vs 0.005 and 0.005, respectively).

While Model 1 suggests that constituency composition does not generally affect the introduction of Afro-Brazilian interest bills, it is possible that constituency factors differentially impact white and Afro-Brazilian legislators. To determine if Afro-Brazilian legislators in states with large Afro-Brazilian populations are more likely to advocate for their interests than Afro-Brazilians representing largely white populations, in Model 2, I interact the *Afro-Brazilian Legislator* and *Afro-Brazilian Population* variables.

In Model 2, the coefficient of the *Afro-Brazilian Legislator* variable continues to be positive and statistically significant. However, the *Afro-Brazilian Legislator x Afro-Brazilian Population* interaction is not. This indicates that the percentage of Afro-Brazilians in a district does not significant affects the number of Afro-Brazilian interest bills that Afro-Brazilian legislators sponsor in a year. Rather than indicating that Afro-Brazilians are unresponsive, this finding suggests that intrinsic motivations underlie Afro-Brazilian legislator behavior.

Nevertheless, the significance of the *Centrist Party* and *Right-Wing Party* variables in Model 2 indicate that partisanship as opposed to racial group membership explains patterns of legislator behavior. To investigate this possibility, in Model 3, I interact the *Afro-Brazilian Legislator* variable with the two measures of party affiliation. In Model 3, the constituent terms as well as the interaction variables are all significant at the p<.01 level. To communicate the substantive effect of race and party, in Figure 4.2 I present the marginal effect.

Figure 4.2 shows that both legislator race and political party affiliation affect patterns of bill sponsorship. An average Afro-Brazilian male legislator, who has 7 years of political experience and is affiliated with a leftist political party and from a state that has a population that is 50 percent Afro-Brazilian is predicted to sponsor 23 times as many Afro-Brazilian interest bills as otherwise equal legislators affiliated with center parties and 10 times as many bills as those affiliated with right-wing parties. Political partisanship also affects the behavior of white candidates. An average

Figure 4.2: Introduction of Afro-Brazilian Interest Bills

Note: Figure 4.2 shows the predicted number of Afro-Brazilian interest bills that Afro-Brazilian and white legislators sponsor in a year by party ideology.

white male legislator, who has 7 years of political experience and is affiliated with leftist political party and from a state that has a population that is 50 percent Afro-Brazilian is predicted to sponsor 3 times as many Afro-Brazilian interest bills as an otherwise equal legislator affiliated with a center or right-wing political party.

Conclusion

The failure of Afro-Brazilians to attain representation commensurate with their electoral strength is well-documented. Despite comprising a majority of the Brazilian population, Afro-Brazilians are descriptively underrepresented at the national level. This chapter shows that racial disparities in electoral success has critical implications for Afro-Brazilian substantive representation. Only

a fraction of the bills introduced in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies address the pervasive racial inequality that exists in Brazilian society. My analysis suggests, though, that increasing the descriptive representation of Afro-Brazilians can enhance their substantive representation.

Relying on data from five Brazilian Congresses, I find strong evidence that Afro-Brazilian legislators are more likely than whites to "act for" Brazil's nonwhite population. Between 1995 and 2015 Afro-Brazilian legislators sponsored 5.8 times as many bills that addressed the economic, social and political marginalization of Afro-Brazilians as white legislators. Nevertheless, their limited numbers hinder their ability to pass the race conscious legislation they propose. Of the 162 Afro-Brazilian interest bills introduced by federal deputies between 1995 and 2015, only 10 became law. Moreover, securing passage of racial equality legislation has come at the cost of cutting the most controversial and important components of the proposed bills (Silva 2012).

This finding has important implications for electoral reforms. Since Afro-Brazilian representatives are the primary advocates of Afro-Brazilian constituents interests, it is essential that efforts are undertaken to increase their descriptive representation in the policy arena. Their descriptive underrepresentation diminishes government responsiveness and likely perpetuates racial disparities in Brazilian society.

Although most of the Afro-Brazilian interest bills introduced in the Brazilian Congress never become law, they have shaped the legislative agenda. Sponsored bills have draw attention to pervasive racial inequality and the institutions that perpetuate it (Johnson 1998, 2008, 2015). Brazil is not yet a "racial democracy," but the actions of Afro-Brazilian legislators has provoked a national discussion about what must be done to become a racially inclusive, egalitarian society.

Chapter 4 Appendix A

Table 4.13: Federal Deputies Interviewed

Name	Ascribed Race	State	Political Party
Antonio Lazaro Silva	Afro-Brazilian	BA	PSC
Antonio Luiz Paranhos Ribeiro Leite de Brito	Afro-Brazilian	BA	PTB
Benedita Souza da Silva Sampaio	Afro-Brazilian	RJ	PT
Eder Mauro Cardoso Barra	White	PA	PSD
Jean Wyllys	Afro-Brazilian	RJ	PSOL
Joao Gualberto Vasconcelos	White	BA	PSDB
Jorge Silva	Afro-Brazilian	ES	PROS
Jos Roberto Oliveira Faro	Afro-Brazilian	PA	PT
Márcio Carlos Marinho	Afro-Brazilian	BA	PRB
Paulo Fernando dos Santos x2	Afro-Brazilian	AL	PT
Rosangela de Souza Gomes	Afro-Brazilian	RJ	PRB
Valmir Carlos da Assunção	Afro-Brazilian	BA	PT
Vicente Cândido da Silva	Afro-Brazilian	SP	PT
Vicente Paulo da Silva	Afro-Brazilian	SP	PT
Waldenor Alves Pereira Filho	White	BA	PT

*Note*: Table 4.13 lists the Federal Deputies interviewed.

Figure 4.3: Afro-Brazilian Population by State

Note: Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of Afro-Brazilians by state according to the 2010 census.

Chapter 4 Appendix B

Table 4.14: Afro-Brazilian Interest Bill Keywords

Keyword	Translation
Afro-brasileira	Afro-Brazilian (female)
Afro-brasileiro	African (male)
Afrodescendente	African descent
Consciência	Consciousness
Cor	Color
Cota	Quota
Cotista	Quota Recipient
Desigual	Unequal
Desigualdade	Inequality
Discriminação	Discrimination
Equidade	Equity
Escrava	Slave (female)
Escravo	Slave (male)
Escravidão	Slavery
Igualdade	Equality
Negra	Black (female)
Negritude	Blackness
Negro	Black (male)
Parda	Brown (female)
Pardo	Brown (male)
Pele	Skin
Preconceito	Prejudice
Preta	Black (female)
Preto	Black (male)
Quilombo	Quilombo
Quilombola	Person from a Quilombo
Raça	Race
Raciais	Races
Racial	Racial
Racismo	Racism
Zumbi	Zumbi

Note: Table 4.14 lists the words in a bill's keyword description and summary that identified it as a possible Afro-Brazilian interest bill. Legislation the classifier marked as potential Afro-Brazilian interest bills were reviewed to determine that they directly addressed Brazil's Afro-Brazilian population.

Table 4.15: Number of Bills Sponsored Yearly by Issue Area

Year	Afro-Brazilian Interest Bills	Total Number of Bills
1995	13	1,759
1996	1	1,431
1997	7	1,486
1998	6	874
1999	12	2,572
2000	10	1,835
2001	12	2,213
2002	7	1,482
2003	14	3,187
2004	7	2,047
2005	4	1,910
2006	4	1,225
2007	13	3,119
2008	5	1,912
2009	6	2,100
2010	2	1,255
2011	13	3,332
2012	10	1,948
2013	5	2,261
2014	11	1,389
Cumulative	162	39,337

Table 4.16: Political Party Ideology Classification

Ideology	Political Parties
Right	ARENA, DEM, PDC, PFL, PHS, PL, PMR, PP, PPB, PPR, PR, PRB, PRONA, PRTB, PSC, PSDC, PSL, PST, PTB, PTC, PV
Center	PEN, PMDB, PRP, PROS. PSDB, PSD, PTdoB, PTN, SD
Left	PCdoB, PDT, PMN, PPS, PSB, PSOL, PSTU, PT

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Marielle Franco's murder galvanized Afro-Brazilians. Thousands marched in cities across Brazil in honor of Franco and the causes that she championed. Her image can be found spray-painted on walls with the words "*Quem matou Marielle?*" or "Who killed Marielle?" And at meetings, concerts, and social events it is not uncommon to hear individuals engage in a call and response chant of "*Marielle presente*," meaning "Marielle is present." Arguably her biggest legacy, though, is evident in the political arena. In the 2018 elections, a number of candidates ran Marielle inspired campaigns in pursuit of elected office. Three of Franco's legislative aides, Dani Monteiro, Renata Souza, and Monica Francisco were each elected to the Rio de Janeiro state assembly (Atunes 2018).

Nevertheless, not all are Brazilians are happy with the societal changes taking place. Tributes to Franco have been defaced and destroyed by Brazilians, including some politicians. In one prominent image, Rodrigo Amorim, Daniel Silveira, and Wilson Witzel, proudly hold up a broken street nameplate placed by Franco supporters in Floriano Square, the plaza in front of Rio de Janeiro's city hall (Estadão 2018). Like Franco's legislative aides, each of these individuals went on to win public office in 2018. Amorim received the most votes of any candidate for state assembly in Rio de Janeiro, Silveira won a position in the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil's lower house of Congress, and Witzel was elected Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Each of these politicians is affiliated with the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal-PSL), a historically small political

party. Thanks in large part to the popularity of Jair Bolsonaro, the PSL presidential candidate, in 2018, the party won the second most seats in the Chamber of Deputies (52) and Bolsonaro attained the presidency.

Like Franco, President Bolsonaro is from Rio de Janeiro and has also attained international fame. However, he is commonly known domestically and abroad for his racially divisive comments. One month after Franco's assassination, President Bolsonaro was charged with "inciting racial hatred" for statements he made about Afro-Brazilians and indigenous persons on the campaign trail (Ferreira Dodge 2018). While the charges were ultimately dismissed, Bolsonaro has not altered his discourse about race to avoid future legal challenges (Biller 2018).

In sum, Brazil is at a racial crossroads. The assassination of Franco has drawn substantial attention to the marginalization of Afro-Brazilians. Yet many Brazilians, including the current Brazilian president, continue to deny the racial inequality that exists or acknowledge that it is a consequence of contemporary racial discrimination. Brazil is not a racial democracy, but the election of greater numbers of Afro-Brazilians can transform it into one.

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